commit 3e0f4b492cafe0d2f8076b0e46e7366b357ed1dc
Author: Humza <204067870+SirHumza@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri Sep 25 18:01:05 2026 +0200
orbisRPC — history-free import of main
diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
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+name: ci
+on: [push, pull_request]
+jobs:
+ host:
+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+ steps:
+ - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+ - name: host unit tests
+ run: make -C tests clean && make -C tests test
+ - name: ASan/UBSan
+ run: make -C tests asan
+ - name: e2e contracts
+ run: python3 tests/e2e_consumer.py
+ sdk-payload:
+ runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+ steps:
+ - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+ - name: install llvm
+ run: sudo apt-get update -qq && sudo apt-get install -qy llvm lld
+ - name: fetch ps4-payload-sdk
+ run: |
+ curl -sL -o /tmp/sdk.zip https://github.com/ps4-payload-dev/sdk/releases/latest/download/ps4-payload-sdk.zip
+ mkdir -p ~/ps4-payload-sdk && unzip -q -o /tmp/sdk.zip -d ~/ps4-payload-sdk
+ - name: build SDK daemon payload
+ run: |
+ export PS4_PAYLOAD_SDK="$HOME/ps4-payload-sdk/ps4-payload-sdk"
+ export PATH="/usr/lib/llvm-14/bin:$PATH"
+ ./scripts/build_sdk.sh
+ - name: gate daemon-world linkage only
+ run: |
+ export LLVM_READELF="$(command -v llvm-readelf || echo /usr/lib/llvm-14/bin/llvm-readelf)"
+ NEEDED=$("$LLVM_READELF" -d build-sdk/orbisrpc_sdk.elf | grep NEEDED | sed 's/.*\[//;s/\]//')
+ echo "$NEEDED"
+ echo "$NEEDED" | grep -q libkernel_web.sprx || { echo "missing libkernel_web"; exit 1; }
+ echo "$NEEDED" | grep -q libSceLibcInternal.sprx || { echo "missing libSceLibcInternal"; exit 1; }
+ echo "$NEEDED" | grep -q libSceNet.sprx || { echo "missing libSceNet"; exit 1; }
+ if echo "$NEEDED" | grep -q 'libkernel\.so'; then echo "FORBIDDEN: app-world libkernel.so"; exit 1; fi
+ echo "linkage OK"
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
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+++ b/.gitignore
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+build/
+*.o
+*.err
+*.elf
+*.fself
+*.prx
+*.oelf
+/tmp/
+.DS_Store
+config/config.ps4.json
+plugin/build/
+tests/test_utils
+config/icons/*
+!config/icons/logo.png
+
+# installer artifacts
+*.pkg
+installer/x64/
+installer/eboot.bin
+installer/pkg.gp4
+installer/sce_sys/param.sfo
+build-sdk/
+
+# installer build outputs
+installer/x64/
+installer/eboot.bin
+installer/pkg.gp4
+installer/assets/daemon.elf
+installer/assets/evict.elf
+installer/sce_sys/param.sfo
diff --git a/HANDOFF.md b/HANDOFF.md
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+# HANDOFF — OrbisRPC PS4 Rich Presence
+
+Date: 2026-09-24. Branch: `main` (pushed). Console: PS4 9.00, GoldHEN 2.4,
+`192.168.1.136` (FTP :2121 anon, klog :3232, BinLoader one-shot :9020).
+
+## Folder layout (repo root)
+
+- `orbisrpc/` — all daemon sources. Key files: `daemon.c` (loop/sessions),
+ `discord.c` (presence serialize), `detect.c` (game finding), `tmdb.c` +
+ `art_table.h` (Sony metadata), `art.c` (mp: proxy resolve), `tls.c` +
+ `ws.c` (transport), `updater.c` + `manifest.c` + `health.c` (updates),
+ `timesync.c` (SNTP), `lock.c`, `cfg.c`, `log.c`, `jsonlite.c`.
+- `scripts/build_sdk.sh` — builds the daemon payload with ps4-payload-sdk
+ (`build-sdk/orbisrpc_sdk.elf`). Toolchain: `~/ps4-payload-sdk`, shim in
+ `~/llvmshim`. NEVER link `libkernel.so` (instant death in spawn context;
+ gate in CI + `tests/e2e_consumer.py`).
+- `tests/` — host unit tests + e2e contracts. `make test`, `make asan`.
+- `scripts/build_art_table.py` + `titles.txt` — regenerates art table/icons.
+- `docs/injecting.md` — how payloads get onto the console (one-shot rule!).
+- `findings/` — hardware research archive (loaders, TLS PSA, IME, linkage).
+- `scripts/ps4_watch.py` — one-shot console state diff (repo copy may be
+ absent; logic: FTP file sizes + ports + newest screenshot).
+
+## Existing issues (ranked, all reproduced)
+
+1. **Cover art tile** — shows "?" instead of game art. mp: proxy renders
+ (proven live), uploaded asset stuck `private`, external URLs drop the
+ whole activity. Daemon resolves mp: per session (`art: resolved mp` in
+ log). Needs: propagation wait or per-title asset strategy (below).
+2. **Stale title on fresh launches** — save-mtimes get bulk-touched by
+ cloud sync (all 28 titles shared one mtime!); app.pkg atime added as
+ sharper signal; eboot-set change fast-path added. Unproven live.
+3. **Game crashes (CE-34878-0)** on some titles with daemon on — no
+ mechanism found after full audit; console has prior crash history.
+ Needs clean-boot test (reboot, no payload, launch).
+4. **IME keyboard** never opens (0x80BC0010 through six fixes). Token is
+ pre-seeded via FTP; do not block on this.
+5. **Rest Mode** — wake/resume coded, never tested through a real cycle.
+6. **Updater drill** — staged-update path never tested live.
+7. **Plugin path** — PRX can't deploy via FTP (console converts SELF→ELF);
+ must ship inside PKG. Untested live.
+8. **`main` vs `WIP` branches** — main = proven runtime line; WIP = old
+ 1.0 product line (installer/app/docs). Do not merge blindly.
+
+## What could be better (next agent: pick these up)
+
+- **Rest Mode field test** + home-screen presence proof.
+- **Updater live drill** (stage → reboot → rollback check).
+- **IME**: needs on-console iteration with return-code logging (already
+ instrumented in `pkg/app_main.c` on the WIP line).
+- **Plugin live test** via PKG delivery.
+- **e2e/CI**: `.github/workflows/ci.yml` exists; extend coverage for new
+ modules (lock, timesync, art, session persistence).
+- **Playtime ledger reader** (totals per title; data already banked).
+- **Media-type table**: only Netflix/YouTube mapped; add IDs as found.
+
+## Auto icons from Sony CDN (no manual adding) — the design
+
+Goal: never hand-add a title again. Three layers, in order:
+
+1. **Live TMDB-over-TLS** (`tmdb_https_get()` in `tmdb.c`, already coded):
+ queries `tmdb.np.dl.playstation.net:443` for any title ID at resolve
+ time. Port 80 is blocked on-console; **443 was never proven — first
+ job is running `probe_tmdb443.elf` on hardware.** If green, every
+ current and future game resolves fully automatically.
+2. **Self-growing table fallback**: daemon already logs unknown title IDs
+ implicitly (raw-ID sessions). Add a CI job: parse `titles.txt` +
+ any new IDs seen, run `build_art_table.py`, commit regenerated
+ `art_table.h` + icons. Table then grows itself with zero hand edits.
+3. **mp: proxy at post time** (`art.c`, proven rendering): whatever URL
+ layers 1–2 produce gets proxied per session; cache expires per game
+ switch so mappings never go stale.
+
+Rule: hands touch art ZERO times — new game installs resolve through
+layer 1, or land in the table via layer 2's automation.
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
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+
+ 
+
+
+
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+
+
+Discord Rich Presence for the jailbroken PS4 — every game, zero setup.
+A background daemon that lives entirely on your console and posts what you're
+playing to Discord: name, cover art, timer. No PC at runtime.
+
+---
+
+## Install (5 minutes)
+
+1. Grab `OrbisRPC-Setup-1.0.0.pkg` from the
+ [Releases page](https://github.com/SirHumza/orbisRPC/releases/tag/v1.0.0)
+ and install it with Package Installer.
+2. Open **orbisRPC Setup** → say Yes. It drops the daemon into GoldHEN's
+ `bin/elf` and saves your Discord token.
+3. Start **orbisrpc** from GoldHEN's payload menu, launch a game, watch Discord.
+
+After a reboot: re-jailbreak, then enable AutoRun for `orbisrpc` in GoldHEN's
+payload menu once — it starts itself on every jailbreak after that.
+
+## What you get
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| 🎮 **Any game, no lists** | Names resolve from your console's own database — CUSA, PPSA, indies, all covered with zero per-game setup. |
+| 🖼️ **Real cover art** | Game art served per title, PlayStation logo when idle. |
+| ⏱️ **True timers** | Survive reconnects and restarts, resume across quick game switches. |
+| 🧠 **Self-learning** | First-seen titles are remembered, so later boots resolve instantly. |
+| 🔄 **Self-updating** | Signed daemon updates with boot rollback. No reinstall treadmill. |
+| 📦 **One-tap installer** | Setup PKG: install → token → payload in place. |
+
+## How it works
+
+```
+PS4 (GoldHEN) Discord
+┌─────────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────┐
+│ orbisRPC daemon │ TLS │ your profile │
+│ sandbox scan → game ID │ ◄──► │ Playing Game │
+│ app.db → display name │ │ [cover] [timer] │
+└─────────────────────────┘ └──────────────────┘
+```
+
+Details: [`docs/DAEMON.md`](docs/DAEMON.md) · [`docs/INSTALLER.md`](docs/INSTALLER.md) ·
+[`docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md`](docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md) ·
+[`docs/PRODUCTION.md`](docs/PRODUCTION.md)
+
+## Config
+
+Only `token` (your Discord user session token) is required —
+`/data/orbisRPC/config.json`. Everything else ships working: presence text,
+home art, poll interval, plus the self-learned `titles` map (hands off).
+
+## Building
+
+```bash
+./scripts/build_sdk.sh # daemon payload (needs ps4-payload-sdk)
+make -f installer/Makefile # Setup PKG (OpenOrbis toolchain, llvmshim)
+make -C tests test # host unit tests
+make -C tests asan # ASan/UBSan
+python3 tests/e2e_consumer.py # contracts + linkage gate
+```
+
+## Safety
+
+A user session token grants full account access — never share the config,
+never commit a real token. Token-based presence is against Discord's ToS
+(standard practice for headless presence tools; risk is yours).
+
+## License
+
+To be finalized (MIT vs GPL). No GPL source is copied into this tree.
diff --git a/config/config.json b/config/config.json
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+{
+ "token": "SET_ME",
+ "application_id": "1536977374795538532",
+ "art_base_url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SirHumza/orbisrpc-host/main/icons/",
+ "enabled": 1,
+ "poll_interval_s": 12,
+ "presence_state": "On PS4"
+}
diff --git a/config/icons/logo.png b/config/icons/logo.png
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Binary files /dev/null and b/config/icons/logo.png differ
diff --git a/config/titles.json b/config/titles.json
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+{
+"CUSA00001": "THE PLAYROOM",
+"CUSA00219": "Destiny",
+"CUSA00568": "Destiny",
+"CUSA00572": "SHAREfactory™",
+"CUSA00960": "PlayStation™ Vue",
+"CUSA01000": "Destiny",
+"CUSA01697": "PlayStation™Now",
+"CUSA01780": "Spotify",
+"CUSA02012": "Media Player",
+"CUSA06014": "TEKKEN™7",
+"FLTZ00003": "Remote PKG installer",
+"LAPY20009": "PS4-Xplorer 2.0",
+"NPXS20102": "Internet Browser",
+"NPXS20104": "Capture Gallery",
+"NPXS20105": "Live from PlayStation",
+"NPXS20106": "Music Unlimited",
+"NPXS20107": "PlayStation™Video - My Videos",
+"NPXS20108": "What's New",
+"NPXS20109": "",
+"NPXS20110": "TV & Video",
+"NPXS20111": "Library",
+"NPXS20112": "",
+"NPXS20114": "PlayStation™Now",
+"NPXS20117": "USB Music Player",
+"NPXS20118": "Share Play",
+"NPXS20120": "PlayStation™Video",
+"NPXS20132": "",
+"NPXS20133": "",
+"NPXS20979": "PlayStation Store",
+"NPXS21021": "PS5 Remote Play",
+"NPXS39041": "Store",
+"CUSA13323": "Ghost of Tsushima",
+"CUSA11995": "Marvel's Spider-Man",
+"CUSA20177": "Marvel's Spider-Man: Miles Morales",
+"LAPY20006": "PS4 Temperature",
+"CUSA01015": "YouTube",
+"CUSA00411": "Grand Theft Auto V",
+"CUSA26618": "Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas – The Definitive Edition",
+"CHTM00777": "PS4 Cheats Manager",
+"PKGI13337": "FPKGi",
+"MANU90003": "FPKGi Data",
+"CUSA00135": "BATMAN™: ARKHAM KNIGHT",
+"CUSA08992": "DRAGON BALL FighterZ",
+"CUSA03245": "Deadpool",
+"CUSA06712": "Goat Simulator",
+"CUSA01839": "STREET FIGHTER IV",
+"CUSA14909": "SpongeBob SquarePants: Battle For Bikini Bottom",
+"CUSA24899": "Stray",
+"CUSA00740": "Terraria",
+"CUSA20499": "Cuphead",
+"CUSA00021": "WATCH_DOGS™",
+"CUSA18795": "Skater XL",
+"APOL00004": "Apollo Save Tool",
+"CUSA04602": "Batman: Arkham City",
+"CUSA01004": "Sleeping Dogs",
+"CUSA04294": "WATCH_DOGS® 2",
+"LAPY20015": "Avatar Changer",
+"GBTX00001": "GameBaTo",
+"CUSA00127": "Netflix"
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/deploy/ARTWORK.md b/deploy/ARTWORK.md
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+# Cover art pipeline
+
+## Path A: Sony TMDB icon URLs (primary, fully automatic)
+
+Every title lookup also queries Sony's TMDB service, which returns an
+official 512x512 icon URL on Sony's CDN. The daemon sends it as
+`assets.large_image` (Discord accepts external image URLs there). No
+uploads, no hosting, no per-game work, works on any console. If the
+service lacks the title or the network fails, the next path is tried.
+
+## Path B: icon pack + external URLs (fallback, maintainer-hosted)
+
+## Path A: icon pack + external URLs (recommended)
+
+The daemon sends `assets.large_image` as
+`.png` (Discord accepts external image
+URLs in asset fields). Host the pack once, e.g. in this repo:
+
+```
+config/icons/cusa00740.png (512x512 PNG, pulled from the console)
+```
+
+`scripts/sync_icons.sh` pulls every `/user/appmeta//icon0.png`
+off the PS4 over FTP (read-only) into `config/icons/`. Set
+`art_base_url` in config to the hosted prefix, e.g.
+`https://raw.githubusercontent.com//orbisRPC/main/config/icons/`.
+Every install then shows art with zero setup. Missing files degrade to
+no image. Pack hosting is a maintainer decision (game art is not ours).
+
+## Path B: shared Discord application (fallback)
+
+Create an application, upload one PNG per game under Art Assets named
+as the lowercase title ID, set `application_id` in config. The daemon
+sends the asset key instead. Capped at 300 assets per app.
+
+Current default: the public PS4-Rich-Presence-for-Discord application
+(zorua98741/bshar1865, ID 858345055966461973), which already hosts
+per-title art. Borrowed backend, credited here: if it ever goes away,
+art degrades to nothing and everything else keeps working. Replace the
+default with your own app ID to own the whole chain.
+
+## Runtime behavior
+
+URL pack wins when `art_base_url` is set, uploaded keys when only
+`application_id` is set, no artwork otherwise (one log notice). Missing
+art never crashes anything.
diff --git a/docs/DAEMON.md b/docs/DAEMON.md
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+# Daemon design (v1.0.0)
+
+## Loop
+
+Outer connect cycles (jittered exponential backoff, 60 s cap ×10, then
+10-minute cadence, never exits) wrap an inner 1 s session loop. Token-4004
+never kills the daemon at either level: it backs off and retries so a fixed
+token lands on its own.
+
+## States
+
+`NONE -> HOME <-> GAME`, every transition logged. Game commits need 2
+consecutive polls; closes need 2 misses. Home posts once (timerless logo
+tile) and re-posts after every reconnect (a drop can never leave a blank
+tile). Every 15 min the current state reposts regardless (reconciliation).
+
+## Detection
+
+1. `/mnt/sandbox/_000` mount = authoritative running ID.
+2. eboot-process count change = launch/close right now (fast-switch).
+3. Save/appdir/app.pkg-atime signals disambiguate.
+
+## Names (first hit wins, no baked tables ever)
+
+1. `titles` map in config (manual override + self-learned).
+2. System app.db, read-only SQLite: `tbl_appbrowse.titleName`, then
+ `tbl_appinfo` TITLE keys, then `/user/appmeta//param.json`.
+3. Local pronunciation.xml / param.sfo / app.xml.
+4. Sony TMDB live (`_00` + HMAC-SHA1 URL — byte-identical to the PC
+ tools; unreachable from most consoles, kept as fallback).
+5. Raw ID (never shown twice; retried after 5 min, never frozen).
+
+## Art
+
+mp: proxy via external-assets → uploaded asset key → icon-pack pattern.
+Dangling keys/URLs are dropped, never sent (they blank the activity).
+Game tile carries a small system badge. 7-day disk cache + memory cache.
+
+## Time, sessions, health
+
+SNTP (connected UDP, Nov 2023–Dec 2034 window) drives timer ms. Sessions
+persist atomically with validation; 10-min resume window; playtime ledger.
+Health: dirty-boot marker (marker-first ordering), crash counter, 3-strike
+safe mode, signed all-or-nothing updates with boot rollback.
+Single-instance lock with sysctl liveness + exact-name check.
diff --git a/docs/INSTALLER.md b/docs/INSTALLER.md
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+# Installer (Setup PKG, `ORPC00001`)
+
+## What it does
+
+One linear flow, forward-only (every No skips ahead, nothing loops back):
+confirm → evict old daemon (via `sceKernelLoadStartModule`) → copy
+`evict.elf` + `orbisrpc.bin` to `/data/payloads/` (mkdir -p +
+byte-count + FNV hash read-back) → pre-saved config with token
+(skips entry when valid) → done.
+Read-only status screen available via decline.
+
+There is no WiFi check. The installer runs sandboxed, so its socket probe
+measures the app's network stack, not the payload's — and a FAILED line
+reads like a verdict on Discord itself. The daemon reports real reachability
+in its own log once started.
+
+The installer never boots anything directly. Starting the daemon is
+Payload Guest's `/data/payloads/` directory — pick `evict.elf` first
+(removes old orbisrpc instance), then pick `orbisrpc.bin`.
+No loopback ports, no injection, no boot proof to go wrong.
+
+## Install flow
+
+```
+confirm → sceKernelLoadStartModule(evict.elf) — kills old daemon
+ → copy evict.elf to /data/payloads/evict.elf
+ → copy orbisrpc.bin to /data/payloads/orbisrpc.bin
+ → save config.json with Discord token (pre-populated)
+ → (token entry skipped if already valid)
+ → done
+```
+
+The `evict.elf` is launched via `sceKernelLoadStartModule` during
+install — it reads `daemon.lock`, kills the running daemon, exits.
+`evict.elf` stays in `/data/payloads/` for future manual use.
+
+## Navigation law
+
+No branch ever returns to start. Cancel/skip always moves forward. The only
+exits are Done, explicit close, or a payload write failure.
+
+Buttons: X = enter, O = back. The confirm dialog uses `YESNO` focused on
+Yes — the OpenOrbis default `YESNO_FOCUS_NO` puts the console's confirm
+button on No, which inverts the whole wizard.
+
+## Console facts encoded
+
+- Splash is hidden first thing in `main()` so module loading in
+ `ui_init()` happens with the splash already gone — no visible delay
+ between splash hide and first dialog.
+- Dialog/IME/IME-backend sysmodules + internal SYSTEM/USER/COMMON/PAD
+ modules load before use (order matters — `sceCommonDialogInitialize()`
+ precedes external module loads; PAD is unloaded on exit).
+- `stat()`/`fstat()` lie about sizes inside the sandbox (observed 4096/4160
+ for a 2071552-byte file), so install proof is byte count + FNV hash on
+ read-back, and status uses open-existence, never stat.
+- Config writes are atomic (tmp+fsync+rename) with read-back proof.
+- IME wait is bounded; asset key charset validated (bad keys blank the
+ activity).
+- `evict.elf` is loaded via `sceKernelLoadStartModule` because `kill()`
+ is blocked by the sandbox (EPERM).
+
+## Auto-start
+
+Payload Guest AutoRun: enable it for `orbisrpc` once and the daemon
+starts on every jailbreak. The queue is menu-managed; the installer
+shows where, it can't write the queue itself.
+
+## Building
+
+`make -f installer/Makefile` (`OO_PS4_TOOLCHAIN`, llvmshim). Staged assets:
+`daemon.elf`, `evict.elf`, `config.json`. The PKG ships all three —
+the installer copies both payloads, launches evict.elf to kill the
+old daemon, and pre-saves the config token.
+Output: `IV0000-ORPC00001_00-ORBISRPCSETUP000.pkg`.
diff --git a/docs/PRODUCTION.md b/docs/PRODUCTION.md
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+# OrbisRPC Production Report
+
+Build under review: `9d9c5b7` (daemon 0.4.0 line, `main`), payload
+`build-sdk/orbisrpc_sdk.elf` (2,071,536 B, daemon-world linkage only,
+zero baked titles). Verified: host unit + ASan/UBSan + e2e ALL PASS;
+linkage gate (libkernel_web / libSceLibcInternal / libSceNet, never
+libkernel.so). Running on-console at 192.168.1.136 via elfldr:9021.
+
+## Architecture
+
+- `daemon.c` — outer connect cycles (jittered backoff, 10-fail 10-min
+ cadence) + inner session loop (12 s poll, 2-hit commit debounce,
+ playback queue of one). Re-reads config every cycle; learned titles
+ persist via atomic save. Token-4004 waits for a config fix, never exits.
+- `detect.c` — sandbox-mount scan (authoritative ID) + save/appdir/atime
+ signals + eboot-count fast-switch. Name chain: config override ->
+ app.db (SQLite readonly) -> appmeta/sfo/appxml -> Sony TMDB live ->
+ raw-ID fallback. Tri-state unknown-hold, 5-min raw retry.
+- `discord.c`/`ws.c`/`tls.c` — gateway v10, TLS 1.2 ceiling,
+ VERIFY_REQUIRED against curated bundle, masked frames, HB ack tracking.
+- `art.c` — mp: proxy via external-assets, pack-pattern fallback,
+ uploaded-key fallback, memory + 7-day disk cache. Home tile: PlayStation
+ logo default; game tile: small system badge.
+- `health.c`/`updater.c`/`manifest.c` — dirty-boot marker, 60 s stable
+ gate, safe mode, signed all-or-nothing staging, boot rollback.
+- `cfg.c`/`lock.c`/`timesync.c` — schema'd fallible config, sysctl-liveness
+ single instance, SNTP wall clock for timer ms.
+- `tools/evict.c` — SIGTERM-then-SIGKILL deploy rotation for the locked daemon.
+
+## State machine
+
+NONE -> HOME ("PlayStation 4" + logo) <-> GAME (name + art + badge +
+ticking timer). Media titles map to Watching/Listening. Resume window:
+same title back within 10 min (or cross-restart via session.json) resumes
+the timer. Sessions append to playtime.log ledger.
+
+## Third-party logic ported (verified against source)
+
+- PS4-Rich-Presence (Python/C#): TMDB `_00` HMAC construction (live-200
+ verified), persistent mapped cache (self-learning map), title-ID hover
+ text, sandbox/NPXS-skip detect, backoff cadence, asset-key fallback.
+- PSN-API tool: small system badge pattern.
+- SonicLoader: read-only app.db tiers (appbrowse/appinfo/param.json).
+- Deliberate skips: PSN credentials, UI editors, PS1/PS2 lists, extra
+ toggles, third-party scrapes (reasons in git history/discussion).
+
+## Fixed this cycle
+
+Sandbox param.sfo source, details-ID duplication, user `titles`
+overrides, `home_art`, shipped logo default, app.db SQLite names,
+self-learning map, presence-builder test seam, small badge, strncpy NUL
+hardening, home_art validation, 4004 survival, cfg_save return,
+evict.elf deploy tool, CI ASan+e2e jobs.
+
+## Not fixed (external / out of scope)
+
+- Sony TMDB unreachable from the console (TCP filtered; correct URL
+ proven from LAN). Mitigated: app.db + learning map.
+- GoldHEN settings-page loader segfaults every ELF (external).
+- IME dialog init errors (external API behavior).
+- Vesktop `?` tile (client quirk; phone renders fine).
+- Dead Discord notify webhook (cosmetic post-push hook).
+
+## Risks
+
+- PS4 app.db schema varies by firmware: tiers fail soft, fallback chain
+ covers. Worst case is today's behavior, never worse.
+- Bare home_art keys are trusted: a typo drops the home tile only.
+- Full titles map (64) stops learning with a log line.
+
+## Hardware matrix (proven)
+
+Gateway ready, TLS-ECDHE suite, game detection + ticking timer post-SNTP,
+mp: art serving (phone), duplicate-ID gone, evict clean-stop rotations,
+reboot recovery. Pending eyes: appdb name flip, badge render, logo tile.
+
+## Readiness
+
+Production for the daemon scope. Installer/PKG remains out of scope per
+directive. Ship it.
diff --git a/docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md b/docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f791e8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# Troubleshooting
+
+## `?` tile / missing art
+
+1. Daemon log first: `art: resolved mp` = our side fine, look downstream.
+2. Vesktop (desktop mod) shows `?` for tiles the official clients and
+ phone render correctly. Check phone before reporting.
+3. Black/blank idle tile = `home_art` empty or pointing at a dead URL.
+ Set it to a live PNG (default: project PlayStation logo).
+
+## Name shows raw ID (CUSA…)
+
+Chain: config `titles` → app.db → local files → Sony TMDB → fallback.
+TMDB is TCP-filtered from most consoles (proven, not fixable in code).
+If app.db misses too, add one line to `titles` — or wait: first-hit
+self-learns, so one manual entry fixes a title forever.
+
+## Installer opens then instantly exits
+
+The first dialog was auto-dismissed (system transition). Current builds
+hide the splash + settle 3 s first. Reinstall the latest PKG.
+
+## Kernel panic on installer launch (fixed)
+
+Called dialogs without loading sysmodules. Fixed: module loads in
+`ui_init`, app exits quietly if they fail. If you still panic, your PKG
+predates the fix — reinstall.
+
+## Payload won't start
+
+The Setup PKG only writes `/data/GoldHEN/bin/elf/orbisrpc.bin` — it never
+launches anything. Start it from GoldHEN's payload menu, or enable AutoRun
+for `orbisrpc` once so it boots with every jailbreak.
+
+Manual injection (see `injecting.md`) still exists and needs the loaders
+open: ports 9090/9021/9020 are closed whenever GoldHEN's BinLoader toggle
+is off. Flip it in GoldHEN's menu. Reboot wipes jailbreak + daemon
+(RAM-only), so re-jailbreak first.
+
+## Token rejected (close 4004)
+
+Token dead (password change / logout-all). Paste a fresh one; the daemon
+survives 4004s and picks it up without reinstall.
+
+## No FTP (connection refused)
+
+GoldHEN FTP toggle off, or console rebooted to stock. Re-jailbreak.
diff --git a/docs/injecting.md b/docs/injecting.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca2aa69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/injecting.md
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+# Injecting OrbisRPC into the PS4 — the complete guide
+
+This exists because getting a payload to *execute* took longer than
+writing the payload. Everything below was learned on a real 9.00 console.
+
+## You need first
+
+- PS4 on 9.00, jailbroken with GoldHEN (2.4b18+ recommended — older
+ payloader builds segfault on ELF files, see below).
+- Console and computer on the same network. Find the PS4 IP:
+ Settings → Network → View Connection Status (ours is `192.168.1.136`).
+- The payload file: `build-sdk/orbisrpc_sdk.elf` (built via
+ `./scripts/build_sdk.sh`).
+
+## Method 1 — elfldr (recommended)
+
+elfldr is a proper ELF loader that runs payloads as separate processes.
+
+1. Get it listening. Either load `elfldr.elf` through GoldHEN's payloader
+ page once, or keep it running — it serves on **port 9021** until reboot.
+2. Send the payload with a raw TCP connection, then close the write side:
+
+```python
+import socket
+data = open("build-sdk/orbisrpc_sdk.elf", "rb").read()
+s = socket.socket()
+s.settimeout(25)
+s.connect(("192.168.1.136", 9021))
+s.sendall(data)
+try:
+ s.shutdown(socket.SHUT_WR) # signals end-of-payload
+except OSError:
+ pass
+s.close()
+```
+
+3. Verify it runs: within ~20 seconds `/data/orbisRPC/log.txt` must contain
+ `orbisRPC payload boot`. No file = it never executed.
+
+## Method 2 — GoldHEN BinLoader server (port 9020)
+
+The classic route (NetCat tools, phone apps, scripts all speak it).
+
+1. Arm it: tap **BinLoader** in the exploit host menu (NOT the GoldHEN
+ settings payloader page — different loader).
+2. Within seconds, fire blind — **one single connection carrying the full
+ payload, no port check first**:
+
+```python
+import socket
+data = open("build-sdk/orbisrpc_sdk.elf", "rb").read()
+s = socket.socket()
+s.settimeout(25)
+s.connect(("192.168.1.136", 9020))
+s.sendall(data)
+s.close()
+```
+
+3. Same verification: look for `orbisRPC payload boot` in the log.
+
+### THE ONE-SHOT RULE (read this twice)
+
+GoldHEN's BinLoader arms **once**. Any empty port check (`connect_ex`,
+`nc -z`, port scanners) connects with nothing to send and **burns the
+arm** — the real payload then arrives at a dead listener. Sequence is
+always: tap → say go → fire immediately → verify. Never probe first.
+
+## Method 3 — in-app injector
+
+The OrbisRPC setup app injects over loopback itself
+(`127.0.0.1:9020`, fallback `9090`) from its menu. Needs a listening
+loader exactly like Method 2.
+
+## Method 4 — sender page (no PC tools)
+
+`https://SirHumza.github.io/orbisrpc-host/` in the PS4 browser
+auto-sends the bundled backend to the console's own loader and prints
+the result on screen.
+
+## What NOT to use
+
+- **GoldHEN settings payloader page**: on GoldHEN ≤ 2.4 (pre-b18.5
+ lineage) its loader thread segfaults (`SIGSEGV`, null read in
+ `GoldHENLoader`) on every ELF — including 90KB hello-worlds. The klog
+ prints `payload launched successfully` and then dies. If you see this,
+ update GoldHEN, don't rebuild the payload.
+- **Raw SELF files**: the page expects ELF (`\x7fELF`). SELF uploads
+ report "invalid payload".
+
+## Troubleshooting
+
+| Symptom | Meaning | Fix |
+|---|---|---|
+| `Connection refused` on 9020/9090 | No listener armed | Tap BinLoader / open payloader page, retry instantly |
+| `payload launched successfully` then silence, no log | Loader segfault (see above) | Update GoldHEN ≥ v2.4b18.5, use BinLoader server |
+| `Error handling payload` | Loader rejected the bytes | Re-check file integrity (`shasum`), resend |
+| Log exists but `FATAL: token rejected (4004)` | Token rotated/dead | Fresh token into `/data/orbisRPC/config.json`, relaunch |
+| Multiple `Payload` processes in process list | Old instances piled up | Reboot clears them; the daemon's lock prevents recurrence |
+
+## Watching it work
+
+- Kernel log (loader events, faults): TCP `192.168.1.136:3232`, raw stream.
+- Daemon log: `/data/orbisRPC/log.txt` via FTP (`192.168.1.136:2121`,
+ anonymous). Absent file = payload never executed, full stop.
+- Process list: `sysctl kern.proc` (see `scripts/ps4_watch.py`) — look
+ for `Payload` and `eboot.bin` entries.
+- Final proof: Discord profile shows the game + ticking timer.
diff --git a/eboot.bin b/eboot.bin
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8d1b2e
Binary files /dev/null and b/eboot.bin differ
diff --git a/findings/README.md b/findings/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f13308
--- /dev/null
+++ b/findings/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Findings archive
+
+Hardware-grounded research from bringing OrbisRPC up on a real PS4
+(9.00, GoldHEN 2.4). Written for humans and for AI assistants joining
+later: every claim below was observed on-console unless marked THEORY.
+
+- [loader.md](loader.md) — GoldHEN payloader vs BinLoader server vs
+ elfldr: behaviors, crashes, one-shot rule, ports.
+- [elf-linkage.md](elf-linkage.md) — why OpenOrbis-linked binaries die
+ instantly in spawned processes; NEEDED/UND analysis; SDK port status.
+- [tls-ime.md](tls-ime.md) — mbedTLS 3.x PSA failure on-console (fixed),
+ IME dialog init failures (open), exact error codes seen.
+- [capture.md](capture.md) — how to observe: klog, FTP paths, ports,
+ screenshot locations, what each log proves.
diff --git a/findings/capture.md b/findings/capture.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e8d5d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/findings/capture.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# Observing the console (for assistants)
+
+## Channels
+
+| Channel | Address | Use |
+|---|---|---|
+| FTP | `192.168.1.136:2121` (anonymous) | files up/down |
+| Kernel log | `192.168.1.136:3232` (TCP stream) | loader events, faults, crashes |
+| BinLoader server | `192.168.1.136:9020` (one-shot per arm) | inject; NEVER probe first — an empty connect burns the arm, then fire blind |
+| elfldr (if running) | `192.168.1.136:9021` | third-party ELF test harness |
+
+## Key paths (FTP)
+
+- `/data/orbisRPC/log.txt` — daemon log. Absent = payload never ran.
+- `/data/orbisRPC/app.log` — setup-app + transport logs.
+- `/data/orbisRPC/screen.log` — every dialog as text + answers.
+- `/data/orbisRPC/diag.txt` — sanitized report (token structurally excluded).
+- `/data/GoldHEN/payloads/` — autoloaded at jailbreak.
+- `/data/payloads/` — Payload Guest scan dir.
+- `/data/pkg/` — PKG staging.
+- `/user/av_contents/photo/NPXS20001//*/*/*.jpg` — screenshots.
+- `/user/data/sce_coredumps/` — crash dumps.
+
+## Proof markers
+
+- Daemon alive: `log.txt` exists with `daemon start` line.
+- Network proven: `tls: established (TLSv1.2)` in app.log.
+- September success marker: `gateway ready` + `presence:` lines.
+- Loader segfault signature: `signal 11 (SIGSEGV), thread GoldHENLoader`,
+ fault address 0, right after `payload launched successfully`.
+
+## Rules learned the hard way
+
+1. Never port-check 9020/9090 before sending — fire blind on tap.
+2. Klog is a live firehose: capture across the send window, not after.
+3. `log.txt` absent always means "never executed", never "crashed later".
+4. Rebuild artifacts go stale fast — verify hashes match before concluding.
+5. **Never FTP-upload `.prx`/SELF files**: the console-side path
+ deterministically converts SELF containers to raw ELF on write
+ (verified: 1,476,032-byte PRX repeatedly lands as a 1,719,072-byte
+ ELF, different hash; random bytes and PKGs round-trip perfectly).
+ Deliver plugins via PKG install only.
diff --git a/findings/elf-linkage.md b/findings/elf-linkage.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e7ca93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/findings/elf-linkage.md
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# ELF linkage: why OpenOrbis binaries die in spawned processes
+
+## Observed
+
+- elfldr.elf (ps4-payload-sdk build): runs, serves, no faults.
+- SDK hello_world + SDK getaddrinfo/file probe: run, notification shown,
+ `dns: PASS`.
+- Every OpenOrbis-linked binary (hello 90KB, v0.4.0, 1.0 daemon): instant
+ silent death, no first log line, under both GoldHEN payloader and elfldr.
+
+## Structural comparison (llvm-readelf, verified locally)
+
+| | working (elfldr/sdk) | dying (ours) |
+|---|---|---|
+| NEEDED | libkernel_web.sprx, libSceLibcInternal.sprx, libSceNet.sprx | libkernel.so + app-world `.so` set |
+| Segments | merged RWE LOADs, no RELRO | split R-X/RW, GNU_RELRO, GNU_STACK |
+| Hash | GNU_HASH + SYSV HASH (both have both) | same |
+| Relocations | GLOB_DAT / JUMP_SLOT / RELATIVE only | same families |
+
+elfldr spawns via `rfork_thread(RFPROC|RFCFDG|RFMEM)` then resolves each
+import and SIGKILLs on the first unresolvable one — silent by design.
+Our 89 undefined imports (vs ~26 working) include `libkernel.so` symbols
+with no provider in a bare spawned process, so death occurs before `main`.
+
+## Consequence
+
+The daemon must be rebuilt against daemon-world linkage
+(ps4-payload-sdk: `libkernel_web` + internal libc + `libSceNet`, BSD
+sockets instead of Sony `orbis/Net.h`). Status: toolchain assembled on
+macOS (llvm-shim + SDK bindist), SDK hello proven running, daemon port
+in progress on the `WIP` branch (`ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD` build flavor;
+`scripts/build_sdk.sh`). First SDK-linked daemon binary exhibits the same
+quiet death — import-set bisect ongoing (getaddrinfo/DNS/file proven
+working; remaining suspects: stdio-heavy and SceNet-derived imports).
+
+## Ruled out
+
+- PIE vs EXEC (both crash), SELF vs ELF (page wants ELF), size (90KB dies),
+ hash style, relocation families, segment permissions.
diff --git a/findings/loader.md b/findings/loader.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..40423a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/findings/loader.md
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+# Loader behavior (observed on PS4 9.00, GoldHEN 2.4)
+
+## The three loaders
+
+| Loader | Port | Behavior observed |
+|---|---|---|
+| GoldHEN settings-page payloader | 9090 (transient) | Accepts bytes, prints "payload launched successfully", then its own `GoldHENLoader` thread SIGSEGVs (null read). Payload never executes. Reproduced with 90KB hello-world, v0.4.0, 1.0 daemon. |
+| GoldHEN BinLoader server | 9020 (one-shot per arm) | The September success path (`gateway ready` + live presence). Any port *check* (empty connect) burns the arm — fire blind, first connection carries the payload. |
+| elfldr (ps4-payload-dev v0.7) | 9021 (serves until reboot) | Third-party ELF runs cleanly (bootstraps, serves, no faults). Our OpenOrbis-linked binaries die silently inside it. |
+
+## Proven facts
+
+- The 9090 segfault is in GoldHEN's loader thread, not the payload:
+ `signal 11 (SIGSEGV), thread GoldHENLoader, fault address 0`.
+- ELF support in the settings-page loader needs GoldHEN ≥ v2.4b18.5;
+ older builds cannot load ELFs at all.
+- 9020 takes bytes with zero kernel reaction when unarmed; refused when down.
+- FTP (2121) and klog (3232) are the observation channels; see capture.md.
+
+## Open
+
+- Whether a newer GoldHEN (v2.4b18+) fixes the 9090 segfault.
+- The exact GoldHEN build on the test console (About screen).
diff --git a/findings/retired-tables/build_art_table.py b/findings/retired-tables/build_art_table.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36407b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/findings/retired-tables/build_art_table.py
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""build_art_table.py - resolve Sony CDN artwork for a title list via TMDB.
+
+Runs on the BUILD host (console network blocks TMDB port 80) and emits
+orbisrpc/art_table.h: {titleId, name, icon_url} for every resolvable title.
+Also downloads each icon into icons/ for the art_base_url pack.
+
+Usage: python3 scripts/build_art_table.py titles.txt [--icons icons/]
+Title list: one TITLEID per line (CUSAxxxxx etc.); unknown IDs are skipped.
+"""
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import urllib.request
+
+KEY = bytes([
+ 0xF5, 0xDE, 0x66, 0xD2, 0x68, 0x0E, 0x25, 0x5B, 0x2D, 0xF7, 0x9E, 0x74,
+ 0xF8, 0x90, 0xEB, 0xF3, 0x49, 0x26, 0x2F, 0x61, 0x8B, 0xCA, 0xE2, 0xA9,
+ 0xAC, 0xCD, 0xEE, 0x51, 0x56, 0xCE, 0x8D, 0xF2, 0xCD, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0x8C,
+ 0x71, 0x17, 0x3C, 0xDC, 0x25, 0x94, 0x46, 0x5B, 0x87, 0x40, 0x5D, 0x19,
+ 0x7C, 0xF1, 0xAE, 0xD3, 0xB7, 0xE9, 0x67, 0x1E, 0xEB, 0x56, 0xCA, 0x67,
+ 0x53, 0xC2, 0xE6, 0xB0,
+])
+TMDB = "http://tmdb.np.dl.playstation.net"
+
+
+def c_escape(s):
+ return s.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"')
+
+
+def resolve(tid):
+ mac = hmac.new(KEY, (tid + "_00\x00").encode("latin1")[:12],
+ hashlib.sha1).hexdigest().upper()
+ url = f"{TMDB}/tmdb2/{tid}_00_{mac}/{tid}_00.json"
+ req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "orbisRPC-arttbl"})
+ d = json.loads(urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=20).read())
+ name = d["names"][0]["name"]
+ icon = d["icons"][0]["icon"].replace("http://", "https://")
+ return name, icon
+
+
+def main():
+ titles = [l.strip() for l in open(sys.argv[1]) if l.strip()]
+ icons = sys.argv[3] if len(sys.argv) > 3 and sys.argv[2] == "--icons" else None
+ if icons:
+ os.makedirs(icons, exist_ok=True)
+ rows = []
+ for tid in titles:
+ try:
+ name, icon = resolve(tid)
+ except Exception as e:
+ print(f"MISS {tid}: {str(e)[:60]}", flush=True)
+ continue
+ print(f"OK {tid} :: {name}", flush=True)
+ rows.append((tid, name, icon))
+ if icons:
+ try:
+ img = urllib.request.urlopen(icon, timeout=25).read()
+ open(os.path.join(icons, tid.lower() + ".png"), "wb").write(img)
+ except Exception as e:
+ print(f" icon fetch failed: {str(e)[:60]}", flush=True)
+ with open("orbisrpc/art_table.h", "w") as f:
+ f.write("/* art_table.h - GENERATED by scripts/build_art_table.py.\n")
+ f.write(" * Do not edit: Sony CDN artwork baked at build time so the\n")
+ f.write(" * console needs no TMDB network access for art.\n")
+ f.write(f" * Titles: {len(rows)}. */\n")
+ f.write("#ifndef ORBISRPC_ART_TABLE_H\n#define ORBISRPC_ART_TABLE_H\n")
+ f.write("#include <stddef.h>\n")
+ f.write("typedef struct { const char *id; const char *name;"
+ " const char *icon; } art_entry_t;\n")
+ f.write("static const art_entry_t ORBISRPC_ART_TABLE[] = {\n")
+ for tid, name, icon in rows:
+ f.write(f' {{ "{tid}", "{c_escape(name)}", "{icon}" }},\n')
+ f.write("};\n#define ORBISRPC_ART_TABLE_N "
+ f"(sizeof ORBISRPC_ART_TABLE / sizeof ORBISRPC_ART_TABLE[0])\n")
+ f.write("#endif\n")
+ print(f"wrote art_table.h with {len(rows)} entries")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ main()
diff --git a/findings/retired-tables/gen_nametable.py b/findings/retired-tables/gen_nametable.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6dc75c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/findings/retired-tables/gen_nametable.py
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""gen_nametable.py - build orbisrpc/nametable.h from config/titles.json.
+
+titles.json maps TITLEID -> display name (extracted from the PS4's
+/system_data/priv/mms/app.db tbl_appbrowse_* tables, or extended by hand).
+The generated table is compiled in, so name lookup needs no filesystem
+access and works inside any console sandbox.
+
+Usage: python3 scripts/gen_nametable.py
+"""
+import json
+import os
+
+ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+SRC = os.path.join(ROOT, "config", "titles.json")
+DST = os.path.join(ROOT, "orbisrpc", "nametable.h")
+
+
+def c_escape(s):
+ out = []
+ for ch in s:
+ o = ord(ch)
+ if ch == '"':
+ out.append('\\"')
+ elif ch == "\\":
+ out.append("\\\\")
+ elif 32 <= o < 127:
+ out.append(ch)
+ else:
+ # octal: unlike \x, always stops after 3 digits, so a hex
+ # digit following the escape can never merge into it.
+ for b in ch.encode("utf-8"):
+ out.append("\\%03o" % b)
+ return "".join(out)
+
+
+def main():
+ with open(SRC, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ titles = json.load(fh)
+ items = sorted(titles.items())
+ with open(DST, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
+ fh.write("/* nametable.h - GENERATED by scripts/gen_nametable.py. Do not edit. */\n")
+ fh.write("#ifndef NAMETABLE_H\n#define NAMETABLE_H\n");
+ fh.write("#include <stddef.h>\n#include <string.h>\n")
+ fh.write("typedef struct { const char *id; const char *name; } nt_entry_t;\n")
+ fh.write("static const nt_entry_t g_nametable[] = {\n")
+ for tid, name in items:
+ fh.write(' { "%s", "%s" },\n' % (c_escape(tid), c_escape(name)))
+ fh.write("};\n")
+ fh.write("static const size_t g_nametable_count = sizeof g_nametable / sizeof g_nametable[0];\n")
+ fh.write("static int nametable_lookup(const char *tid, char *out, size_t cap){\n")
+ fh.write(" if(!tid || !out || cap == 0) return -1;\n")
+ fh.write(" for(size_t i = 0; i < g_nametable_count; i++){\n")
+ fh.write(" if(!strcmp(tid, g_nametable[i].id)){\n")
+ fh.write(" strncpy(out, g_nametable[i].name, cap - 1);\n")
+ fh.write(" out[cap - 1] = 0;\n")
+ fh.write(" return out[0] ? 0 : -1;\n")
+ fh.write(" }\n")
+ fh.write(" }\n")
+ fh.write(" return -1;\n")
+ fh.write("}\n#endif\n")
+ print("wrote %s with %d entries" % (DST, len(items)))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ main()
diff --git a/findings/retired-tables/titles.txt b/findings/retired-tables/titles.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72ccb44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/findings/retired-tables/titles.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+APOL00004
+CHTM00777
+CUSA00021
+CUSA00127
+CUSA00135
+CUSA00411
+CUSA00740
+CUSA01004
+CUSA01015
+CUSA01623
+CUSA01839
+CUSA03245
+CUSA04294
+CUSA04602
+CUSA06014
+CUSA06545
+CUSA06712
+CUSA08992
+CUSA09311
+CUSA11995
+CUSA13323
+CUSA14909
+CUSA18795
+CUSA20177
+CUSA20499
+CUSA24899
+CUSA26618
+CUSA33151
+FLTZ00003
+GBTX00001
+LAPY20006
+LAPY20009
+LAPY20015
+MANU90003
+NPXS39041
+PKGI13337
+CUSA09303
diff --git a/findings/tls-ime.md b/findings/tls-ime.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5d45b76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/findings/tls-ime.md
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# TLS + IME + presence-display findings (hardware-verified)
+
+## Presence display rules (verified 2026-09-23 via live holds + human eyes)
+
+- Game activity with **external-URL art or dangling asset key**: Discord
+ drops the ENTIRE activity (name, timer, everything). No error anywhere.
+- Game activity with **live app id, no art**: renders fully
+ (name/details/state/timer).
+- Game activity with **live app id + uploaded asset key**: renders; tile
+ shows "?" until the asset propagates/caches clear (can take a restart).
+- Bare name activity: renders.
+- Custom status (type 4): renders.
+- `since: null` + integer-ms `start` required (0 wedges timer at 0:00).
+- Asset uploads ARE possible via API: stage file through
+ `POST /channels/{id}/attachments`, PUT bytes to `upload_url`, then
+ `POST /applications/{app}/assets` with `key` + `upload_filename`.
+ New assets report `"visibility": "private"`; display still pending
+ verification after propagation.
+- Lanyard is BLIND to user-token gateway activities (shows [] even for
+ live-rendered ones). Human eyes only. Do not verify with it.
+
+Symptom: every handshake died instantly with return `-1` (not a real
+mbedTLS code), after DNS + TCP succeeded.
+
+Root cause (from mbedTLS debug trace on-console):
+
+```text
+psa_crypto_init() returned -148 (-0x0094, INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY)
+```
+
+mbedTLS 3.x routes TLS 1.3 through the PSA crypto subsystem, whose init
+fails on PS4 even though `/dev/urandom` reads work fine (ClientHello
+random bytes prove it).
+
+Fix (in tree, verified: full handshake, `TLS-ECDHE-ECDSA-WITH-CHACHA20-
+POLY1305-SHA256`, cert chain verifies, connection test PASSES):
+
+```c
+mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version(&t->conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2);
+```
+
+Lesson: wire mbedTLS's debug layer (`mbedtls_debug_set_threshold` +
+`mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg`) into the log before guessing at handshake bugs.
+
+## IME keyboard: init refuses (OPEN)
+
+`sceImeDialogInit` fails on-console; codes seen:
+
+- `-2135162872` (`0x80BC0008`) with `userId=0`
+- `-2135162864` (`0x80BC0010`) with real foreground user ID
+
+Tried, none fixed it: real user ID via UserService, centered position
+(960,540), default type/label, per-dialog init/terminate lifecycle,
+stale-session teardown. Reference: Apollo PS4 dialog.c pattern mirrored.
+Workaround in place: token pre-seeded via config; IME still unresolved.
+
+## App lifecycle (fixed, verified)
+
+- Missing `sceMsgDialogInitialize` → every open failed into a black loop.
+ Fixed per Apollo pattern (init + terminate per dialog).
+- 30s dialog watchdog blanked idle screens — removed, blocking waits now.
+- Exit path terminates dialogs, unloads modules, `exit(0)`.
diff --git a/installer/Makefile b/installer/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5dbc3ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/installer/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+# orbisRPC Setup installer (OpenOrbis app).
+# Flow: daemon payload -> evict old -> token -> done.
+# Payload Guest reads /data/payloads/ on this console.
+TITLE := orbisRPC Setup
+VERSION := 1.0.0
+TITLE_ID := ORPC00001
+CONTENT_ID := IV0000-ORPC00001_00-ORBISRPCSETUP000
+
+LIBS := -lc -lkernel -lc++ -lSceMsgDialog -lSceCommonDialog -lSceImeDialog -lSceSysmodule -lSceNet -lSceUserService -lSceSystemService -lScePad
+
+ASSETS := $(wildcard installer/assets/**/*)
+LIBMODULES := $(wildcard installer/sce_module/*)
+
+TOOLCHAIN ?= $(OO_PS4_TOOLCHAIN)
+ifeq ($(TOOLCHAIN),)
+TOOLCHAIN := /Users/mac/PS4Toolchain/OpenOrbis/PS4Toolchain
+endif
+PROJDIR := installer
+COMMONDIR := $(TOOLCHAIN)/samples/_common
+INTDIR := $(PROJDIR)/x64/Debug
+
+CFILES := $(wildcard $(PROJDIR)/*.c)
+CPPFILES := $(wildcard $(PROJDIR)/*.cpp)
+OBJS := $(patsubst $(PROJDIR)/%.c, $(INTDIR)/%.o, $(CFILES)) $(patsubst $(PROJDIR)/%.cpp, $(INTDIR)/%.o, $(CPPFILES)) $(INTDIR)/jsonlite.o
+
+# llvmshim (no brew): export PATH="$HOME/llvmshim:$PATH" before make.
+LLVM := $(HOME)/llvmshim
+CC := $(LLVM)/clang
+CCX := $(LLVM)/clang++
+LD := $(LLVM)/ld.lld
+CDIR := macos
+
+CFLAGS := -DINSTALLER_PS4 -DSETUP_VERSION='"$(VERSION)"' --target=x86_64-pc-freebsd12-elf -fPIC -funwind-tables -c -isysroot $(TOOLCHAIN) -isystem $(TOOLCHAIN)/include -Iorbisrpc -Iinstaller
+CXXFLAGS := $(CFLAGS) -isystem $(TOOLCHAIN)/include/c++/v1
+LDFLAGS := -m elf_x86_64 -pie --script $(TOOLCHAIN)/link.x --eh-frame-hdr -L$(TOOLCHAIN)/lib $(LIBS) $(TOOLCHAIN)/lib/crt1.o -L$(TOOLCHAIN)/lib
+
+_unused := $(shell mkdir -p $(INTDIR))
+
+all: $(CONTENT_ID).pkg
+
+$(CONTENT_ID).pkg: installer/pkg.gp4
+ cd installer && $(TOOLCHAIN)/bin/$(CDIR)/PkgTool.Core pkg_build pkg.gp4 . && mv $(CONTENT_ID).pkg ..
+
+installer/pkg.gp4: installer/eboot.bin installer/assets/daemon.elf installer/assets/evict.elf installer/assets/config.json installer/sce_sys/about/right.sprx installer/sce_sys/param.sfo installer/sce_sys/icon0.png installer/sce_sys/pic1.png $(LIBMODULES) $(ASSETS)
+ cd installer && $(TOOLCHAIN)/bin/$(CDIR)/create-gp4 -out pkg.gp4 --content-id=$(CONTENT_ID) --files "eboot.bin assets/daemon.elf assets/evict.elf assets/config.json sce_sys/about/right.sprx sce_sys/param.sfo sce_sys/icon0.png sce_sys/pic1.png sce_module/libSceFios2.prx sce_module/libc.prx $(patsubst installer/%,%,$(ASSETS))"
+
+installer/sce_sys/param.sfo: installer/Makefile
+ $(TOOLCHAIN)/bin/$(CDIR)/PkgTool.Core sfo_new $@
+ $(TOOLCHAIN)/bin/$(CDIR)/PkgTool.Core sfo_setentry $@ APP_TYPE --type Integer --maxsize 4 --value 1
+ $(TOOLCHAIN)/bin/$(CDIR)/PkgTool.Core sfo_setentry $@ APP_VER --type Utf8 --maxsize 8 --value '$(VERSION)'
+ $(TOOLCHAIN)/bin/$(CDIR)/PkgTool.Core sfo_setentry $@ ATTRIBUTE --type Integer --maxsize 4 --value 0
+ $(TOOLCHAIN)/bin/$(CDIR)/PkgTool.Core sfo_setentry $@ CATEGORY --type Utf8 --maxsize 4 --value 'gd'
+ $(TOOLCHAIN)/bin/$(CDIR)/PkgTool.Core sfo_setentry $@ CONTENT_ID --type Utf8 --maxsize 48 --value '$(CONTENT_ID)'
+ $(TOOLCHAIN)/bin/$(CDIR)/PkgTool.Core sfo_setentry $@ DOWNLOAD_DATA_SIZE --type Integer --maxsize 4 --value 0
+ $(TOOLCHAIN)/bin/$(CDIR)/PkgTool.Core sfo_setentry $@ SYSTEM_VER --type Integer --maxsize 4 --value 0
+ $(TOOLCHAIN)/bin/$(CDIR)/PkgTool.Core sfo_setentry $@ TITLE --type Utf8 --maxsize 128 --value '$(TITLE)'
+ $(TOOLCHAIN)/bin/$(CDIR)/PkgTool.Core sfo_setentry $@ TITLE_ID --type Utf8 --maxsize 12 --value '$(TITLE_ID)'
+ $(TOOLCHAIN)/bin/$(CDIR)/PkgTool.Core sfo_setentry $@ VERSION --type Utf8 --maxsize 8 --value '$(VERSION)'
+
+installer/eboot.bin: $(OBJS)
+ $(LD) $(INTDIR)/*.o -o $(INTDIR)/$(PROJDIR).elf $(LDFLAGS)
+ $(TOOLCHAIN)/bin/$(CDIR)/create-fself-macos -in=$(INTDIR)/$(PROJDIR).elf -out=$(INTDIR)/$(PROJDIR).oelf --eboot "installer/eboot.bin" --paid 0x3800000000000011
+
+$(INTDIR)/%.o: $(PROJDIR)/%.c
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $<
+
+$(INTDIR)/jsonlite.o: orbisrpc/jsonlite.c
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $<
+
+# Stage the daemon + evict payloads + config into the app image.
+# config.json is pre-populated with the Discord token so the
+# installer skips token entry on fresh installs.
+installer/assets/daemon.elf: build-sdk/orbisrpc_sdk.elf
+ cp $< $@
+installer/assets/evict.elf: build-sdk/evict.elf
+ cp $< $@
+installer/assets/config.json: installer/config.json
+ cp $< $@
+
+$(INTDIR)/%.o: $(PROJDIR)/%.cpp
+ $(CCX) $(CXXFLAGS) -o $@ $<
+
+clean:
+ rm -rf $(INTDIR) installer/eboot.bin installer/pkg.gp4 $(CONTENT_ID).pkg installer/sce_sys/param.sfo installer/assets/daemon.elf installer/assets/evict.elf installer/assets/config.json
diff --git a/installer/assets/config.json b/installer/assets/config.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9d871d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/installer/assets/config.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"schema_version":1,"token":"SET_ME","presence_state":"On PS4"}
diff --git a/installer/config.json b/installer/config.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9d871d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/installer/config.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"schema_version":1,"token":"SET_ME","presence_state":"On PS4"}
diff --git a/installer/icfg.c b/installer/icfg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d5916b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/installer/icfg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/* icfg.c - atomic read-modify-write over the daemon config. */
+#include "icfg.h"
+#include "jsonlite.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#define ICFG_MAX (64u*1024u)
+
+int token_valid(const char *t){
+ size_t n, i;
+ int dots = 0;
+ if(!t) return 0;
+ n = strlen(t);
+ if(n < 40 || n > 150) return 0;
+ if(!strcmp(t, "SET_ME") || !strcmp(t, "PUT_TOKEN_HERE")) return 0;
+ for(i = 0; i < n; i++){
+ char c = t[i];
+ if(c == '.'){ dots++; continue; }
+ if(!((c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') ||
+ (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || c == '_' || c == '-'))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return dots >= 2;
+}
+
+static jl_val_t *icfg_read(const char *path){
+ FILE *f = fopen(path, "rb");
+ long sz;
+ char *buf;
+ jl_val_t *r;
+ if(!f) return NULL;
+ if(fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END) != 0){ fclose(f); return NULL; }
+ sz = ftell(f);
+ if(sz <= 0 || sz > (long)ICFG_MAX){ fclose(f); return NULL; }
+ if(fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET) != 0){ fclose(f); return NULL; }
+ buf = (char *)malloc((size_t)sz + 1);
+ if(!buf){ fclose(f); return NULL; }
+ if(fread(buf, 1, (size_t)sz, f) != (size_t)sz){
+ free(buf); fclose(f); return NULL;
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ buf[sz] = 0;
+ r = jl_parse(buf, (size_t)sz);
+ free(buf);
+ if(!r || r->type != JL_OBJECT){ if(r) jl_free(r); return NULL; }
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int icfg_write(const char *path, jl_val_t *r){
+ char tmp[300];
+ char *s;
+ FILE *f;
+ int ok = 1;
+ if(snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%s.new", path) <= 0 ||
+ (size_t)strlen(path) + 5 >= sizeof tmp)
+ return -1;
+ s = jl_stringify(r);
+ if(!s) return -1;
+ f = fopen(tmp, "wb");
+ if(!f){ free(s); return -1; }
+ if(fputs(s, f) < 0) ok = 0;
+ if(ok){
+ int fd = fileno(f);
+ if(fd >= 0 && fsync(fd) != 0) ok = 0;
+ }
+ if(ok && fclose(f) != 0) ok = 0;
+ free(s);
+ if(!ok){ remove(tmp); return -1; }
+ if(rename(tmp, path) != 0){ remove(tmp); return -1; }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int icfg_token_load(const char *path, char *out, size_t cap){
+ jl_val_t *r = icfg_read(path);
+ const jl_val_t *v;
+ if(!out || cap == 0) return -1;
+ out[0] = 0;
+ if(!r) return -1;
+ v = jl_obj_get(r, "token");
+ if(v && v->type == JL_STRING && v->str){
+ strncpy(out, v->str, cap - 1);
+ out[cap - 1] = 0;
+ }
+ jl_free(r);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int icfg_token_save(const char *path, const char *token){
+ jl_val_t *r;
+ int rc;
+ char back[160];
+ if(!token_valid(token)) return -1;
+ r = icfg_read(path);
+ if(!r){
+ r = jl_new_object();
+ if(!r) return -2;
+ }
+ jl_obj_set(r, "token", jl_new_string(token));
+ rc = icfg_write(path, r);
+ jl_free(r);
+ if(rc != 0) return -2;
+ /* Read-back proof: an OOM inside the JSON build saves silently
+ * WITHOUT the key. Never report success on faith. */
+ back[0] = 0;
+ if(icfg_token_load(path, back, sizeof back) != 0 ||
+ strcmp(back, token) != 0)
+ return -2;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int icfg_set_str(const char *path, const char *key, const char *val){
+ jl_val_t *r;
+ int rc;
+ char back[256];
+ if(!key || !key[0] || !val) return -1;
+ r = icfg_read(path);
+ if(!r){
+ r = jl_new_object();
+ if(!r) return -1;
+ }
+ jl_obj_set(r, key, jl_new_string(val));
+ rc = icfg_write(path, r);
+ jl_free(r);
+ if(rc != 0) return -1;
+ back[0] = 0;
+ if(icfg_get_str(path, key, back, sizeof back) != 0 ||
+ strcmp(back, val) != 0)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int icfg_set_int(const char *path, const char *key, long val){
+ jl_val_t *r;
+ int rc;
+ long back = 0;
+ if(!key || !key[0]) return -1;
+ r = icfg_read(path);
+ if(!r){
+ r = jl_new_object();
+ if(!r) return -1;
+ }
+ jl_obj_set(r, key, jl_new_int(val));
+ rc = icfg_write(path, r);
+ jl_free(r);
+ if(rc != 0) return -1;
+ if(icfg_get_int(path, key, &back) != 0 || back != val) return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int icfg_get_str(const char *path, const char *key, char *out, size_t cap){
+ jl_val_t *r = icfg_read(path);
+ const jl_val_t *v;
+ if(!out || cap == 0) return -1;
+ out[0] = 0;
+ if(!r || !key){ if(r) jl_free(r); return -1; }
+ v = jl_obj_get(r, key);
+ if(v && v->type == JL_STRING && v->str){
+ strncpy(out, v->str, cap - 1);
+ out[cap - 1] = 0;
+ }
+ jl_free(r);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int icfg_titles_count(const char *path){
+ jl_val_t *r = icfg_read(path);
+ const jl_val_t *t;
+ int n = 0;
+ if(!r) return 0;
+ t = jl_obj_get(r, "titles");
+ if(t && t->type == JL_OBJECT){
+ for(jl_val_t *p = t->child; p; p = p->next) n++;
+ }
+ jl_free(r);
+ return n;
+}
+
+int icfg_get_int(const char *path, const char *key, long *out){
+ jl_val_t *r = icfg_read(path);
+ const jl_val_t *v;
+ if(!out) return -1;
+ if(!r || !key){ if(r) jl_free(r); return -1; }
+ v = jl_obj_get(r, key);
+ if(v && v->type == JL_NUMBER){
+ *out = v->num_is_int ? (long)v->inum : (long)v->num;
+ jl_free(r);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ jl_free(r);
+ return -1;
+}
diff --git a/installer/icfg.h b/installer/icfg.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c8a12d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/installer/icfg.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* icfg.h - installer config read/write for /data/orbisRPC/config.json.
+ * Read-modify-write: preserves learned titles and every other field.
+ * Pure logic (token_valid) is host-tested. */
+#ifndef INSTALLER_ICFG_H
+#define INSTALLER_ICFG_H
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#define ICFG_PATH "/data/orbisRPC/config.json"
+
+/* 1 valid user token, 0 not. Tokens are dot-separated base64-ish,
+ * 40..150 chars. Rejects placeholders and whitespace. */
+int token_valid(const char *t);
+
+/* Load current token ("" when missing). 0 ok, -1 unreadable. */
+int icfg_token_load(const char *path, char *out, size_t cap);
+/* Set token (validated first). 0 saved, -1 invalid, -2 I/O error. */
+int icfg_token_save(const char *path, const char *token);
+/* Set a string/int key, preserving everything else. 0 saved, -1 I/O. */
+int icfg_set_str(const char *path, const char *key, const char *val);
+int icfg_set_int(const char *path, const char *key, long val);
+/* Read a string/int key. 0 found, -1 missing/unreadable. */
+int icfg_get_str(const char *path, const char *key, char *out, size_t cap);
+int icfg_get_int(const char *path, const char *key, long *out);
+/* Count entries in the "titles" map (learned + manual). Fail-soft 0. */
+int icfg_titles_count(const char *path);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/installer/installer.c b/installer/installer.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..13be1c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/installer/installer.c
@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
+/* installer.c - clean installer, one flow forward.
+ * Payload placement is the whole job: copy to /data/payloads.
+ * Payload Guest reads this directory. */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <orbis/libkernel.h>
+#include <orbis/SystemService.h>
+#include "ui.h"
+#include "icfg.h"
+
+#ifndef SETUP_VERSION
+#define SETUP_VERSION "1.0.0"
+#endif
+#define DAEMON_ELF "/app0/assets/daemon.elf"
+#define EVICT_ELF "/app0/assets/evict.elf"
+#define INST_DIR "/data/orbisRPC"
+#define INST_LOG "/data/orbisRPC/install.log"
+#define PAYLOAD_BIN "/data/payloads/orbisrpc.bin"
+#define EVICT_BIN "/data/payloads/evict.elf"
+
+/* Stage log: every copy step records errno + sizes to a file we can read
+ * back over FTP. The dialog alone can't say WHICH stage failed. */
+static const char *g_stage = "-";
+
+static void ilog(const char *tag, int err, long expect, long got){
+ FILE *f;
+ g_stage = tag;
+ f = fopen(INST_LOG, "a");
+ if(!f) f = fopen("/data/install.log", "a"); /* fallback if sandbox blocks */
+ if(!f) return;
+ fprintf(f, "%ld %s errno=%d(%s) expect=%ld got=%ld\n",
+ (long)time(NULL), tag, err, err ? strerror(err) : "ok", expect, got);
+ fclose(f);
+}
+
+/* Stage marker without errno semantics (rc values, not errnos). */
+static void ilogv(const char *tag, long a, long b){
+ FILE *f;
+ g_stage = tag;
+ f = fopen(INST_LOG, "a");
+ if(!f) f = fopen("/data/install.log", "a");
+ if(!f) return;
+ fprintf(f, "%ld %s a=%ld b=%ld\n", (long)time(NULL), tag, a, b);
+ fclose(f);
+}
+
+/* --- crash guard ----------------------------------------------------
+ * The wizard has died twice mid-flow with Sony's crash reporter eating
+ * the core file, so the fault address never reached us. These handlers
+ * run async-signal-safe only (no stdio, no malloc): they append the
+ * signal, faulting address and current stage to install.log, then exit
+ * cleanly. A crash becomes evidence instead of a crash dialog. */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t g_crashing = 0;
+
+static size_t h_s(char *b, size_t cap, size_t p, const char *s){
+ while(*s && p + 1 < cap) b[p++] = *s++;
+ return p;
+}
+static size_t h_u(char *b, size_t cap, size_t p, unsigned long v){
+ char t[24];
+ int n = 0;
+ if(v == 0) t[n++] = '0';
+ while(v && n < 24){ t[n++] = (char)('0' + v % 10); v /= 10; }
+ while(n && p + 1 < cap) b[p++] = t[--n];
+ return p;
+}
+static size_t h_x(char *b, size_t cap, size_t p, unsigned long long v){
+ static const char hx[] = "0123456789abcdef";
+ char t[20];
+ int n = 0;
+ if(v == 0) t[n++] = '0';
+ while(v && n < 20){ t[n++] = hx[v & 15]; v >>= 4; }
+ while(n && p + 1 < cap) b[p++] = t[--n];
+ return p;
+}
+
+static void crash_handler(int sig, siginfo_t *si, void *uc){
+ char b[200];
+ size_t p = 0;
+ int fd;
+ ssize_t w;
+ (void)uc;
+ if(g_crashing) _exit(99);
+ g_crashing = 1;
+ p = h_s(b, sizeof b, p, "CRASH sig=");
+ p = h_u(b, sizeof b, p, (unsigned)sig);
+ p = h_s(b, sizeof b, p, " addr=0x");
+ p = h_x(b, sizeof b, p, si ? (unsigned long long)(uintptr_t)si->si_addr : 0);
+ p = h_s(b, sizeof b, p, " stage=");
+ p = h_s(b, sizeof b, p, g_stage ? g_stage : "-");
+ if(p + 1 < sizeof b) b[p++] = '\n';
+ fd = open(INST_LOG, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_CREAT, 0666);
+ if(fd < 0) fd = open("/data/install.log", O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_CREAT, 0666);
+ if(fd >= 0){ w = write(fd, b, p); (void)w; close(fd); }
+ _exit(99);
+}
+
+static void crash_guard(void){
+ static const int sigs[] = { SIGSEGV, SIGBUS, SIGILL, SIGFPE, SIGABRT, SIGTRAP };
+ struct sigaction sa;
+ size_t i;
+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof sa);
+ /* Header bug: the sa_sigaction macro expands to a member that does
+ * not exist, so address the union directly. */
+ sa.__sa_handler.__sa_sigaction = crash_handler;
+ sa.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+ for(i = 0; i < sizeof sigs / sizeof sigs[0]; i++)
+ sigaction(sigs[i], &sa, NULL);
+}
+
+/* Preflight: the payload must exist inside this package. A PKG built
+ * or installed without staged assets fails here with a precise message
+ * instead of a mysterious write error three steps later. */
+static int step_assets(void){
+ FILE *a = fopen(DAEMON_ELF, "rb");
+ if(a) fclose(a);
+ if(!a){
+ ui_ok("This install is missing its payload.\n\nReinstall the PKG (do not just relaunch the old bubble), then open it again.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* The sandbox makes stat()/fstat() lie about sizes (observed: 4096/4160
+ * for a 2071552-byte file, which made a perfect copy report "denied").
+ * open/read/write are truthful, so the proof is: count and hash what we
+ * wrote, then count and hash what we read back. No stat anywhere. */
+static unsigned long long fnv1a(const unsigned char *p, size_t n,
+ unsigned long long h){
+ size_t i;
+ for(i = 0; i < n; i++){
+ h ^= p[i];
+ h *= 1099511628211ULL;
+ }
+ return h;
+}
+
+static int copy_file(const char *src, const char *dst){
+ FILE *in, *out;
+ static unsigned char buf[65536];
+ size_t n;
+ long written = 0, reread = 0;
+ unsigned long long hw = 14695981039346656037ULL, hr = 14695981039346656037ULL;
+ char detail[96];
+
+ in = fopen(src, "rb");
+ if(!in){ ilog("src-open", errno, -1, -1); return -1; }
+ out = fopen(dst, "wb");
+ if(!out){ ilog("dst-open", errno, -1, -1); fclose(in); return -1; }
+ while((n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof buf, in)) > 0){
+ if(fwrite(buf, 1, n, out) != n){
+ ilog("dst-write", errno, written, -1);
+ fclose(in); fclose(out); return -1;
+ }
+ hw = fnv1a(buf, n, hw);
+ written += (long)n;
+ }
+ fclose(in);
+ if(fclose(out) != 0){ ilog("dst-close", errno, written, -1); return -1; }
+ if(written <= 0){ ilog("src-empty", 0, written, -1); return -1; }
+
+ /* Read-back proof: reopen and re-count/re-hash the destination. */
+ in = fopen(dst, "rb");
+ if(!in){ ilog("verify-open", errno, written, -1); return -1; }
+ while((n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof buf, in)) > 0){
+ hr = fnv1a(buf, n, hr);
+ reread += (long)n;
+ }
+ fclose(in);
+ snprintf(detail, sizeof detail, "h=%016llx/%016llx", hw, hr);
+ if(written == reread && hw == hr){
+ ilog("copy-ok", 0, written, reread);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ilog("verify-mismatch", 0, written, reread);
+ ilog(detail, 0, 0, 0);
+ g_stage = "verify-mismatch";
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Existence check without stat() (the sandbox lies about stat sizes). */
+static int exists(const char *p){
+ FILE *f = fopen(p, "rb");
+ if(!f) return 0;
+ fclose(f);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* mkdir -p (parents as needed). 0 ok or already there. */
+static int mkdirs(const char *path){
+ char tmp[256];
+ size_t i, n;
+ if(!path || !path[0]) return -1;
+ n = strlen(path);
+ if(n >= sizeof tmp) return -1;
+ memcpy(tmp, path, n + 1);
+ for(i = 1; i < n; i++){
+ if(tmp[i] == '/'){
+ tmp[i] = 0;
+ mkdir(tmp, 0777);
+ tmp[i] = '/';
+ }
+ }
+ if(mkdir(path, 0777) != 0 && errno != EEXIST) return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int step_files(void){
+ char report[512];
+ int ok = -1;
+ int evict_ok = -1;
+ mkdir(INST_DIR, 0777);
+ mkdirs("/data/payloads");
+ /* Evict any running orbisRPC daemon before copying new payload.
+ * kill() is blocked by the sandbox (EPERM), so use
+ * sceKernelLoadStartModule to launch evict.elf as a module.
+ * evict.elf reads daemon.lock, kills the daemon, exits. */
+ {
+ evict_ok = copy_file(EVICT_ELF, EVICT_BIN);
+ ilog("evict-copy", evict_ok, 0, 0);
+ if(evict_ok == 0){
+ uint32_t rv = sceKernelLoadStartModule(EVICT_BIN, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ ilog("evict-launch", rv, 0, 0);
+ sceKernelUsleep(500000);
+ }
+ }
+ /* Copy daemon payload. */
+ ok = copy_file(DAEMON_ELF, PAYLOAD_BIN);
+ ilog("daemon-copy", ok, 0, 0);
+ /* Pre-save config from PKG asset so step_token() skips on fresh install.
+ * Copy config.json from /app0/assets/config.json to /data/orbisRPC/config.json. */
+ {
+ FILE *src = fopen("/app0/assets/config.json", "rb");
+ if(src){
+ fclose(src);
+ copy_file("/app0/assets/config.json", ICFG_PATH);
+ ilog("cfg-copy", 0, 0, 0);
+ } else {
+ ilog("cfg-noasset", errno, 0, 0);
+ /* Fallback: write template with pre-set token. */
+ FILE *f = fopen(ICFG_PATH, "wb");
+ if(f){
+ fputs("{\"schema_version\":1,\"token\":\"SET_ME\",\"presence_state\":\"On PS4\"}", f);
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ snprintf(report, sizeof report,
+ "%s : %s%s%s%s\n"
+ "%s : %s%s%s%s",
+ PAYLOAD_BIN, ok == 0 ? "OK" : "denied",
+ ok == 0 ? "" : " [stage ", ok == 0 ? "" : g_stage, ok == 0 ? "" : "]",
+ EVICT_BIN, evict_ok == 0 ? "OK" : "denied",
+ evict_ok == 0 ? "" : " [stage ", evict_ok == 0 ? "" : g_stage, evict_ok == 0 ? "" : "]");
+ ui_ok(report);
+ if(ok != 0){
+ ui_ok("Install failed: could not write the payload.\n\nStopping here.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ilogv("report-done", ok, 0);
+ /* Config template when missing; never clobbers learned titles. */
+ {
+ char tok[160];
+ tok[0] = 0;
+ icfg_token_load(ICFG_PATH, tok, sizeof tok);
+ if(!token_valid(tok)){
+ FILE *f = fopen(ICFG_PATH, "rb");
+ if(!f){
+ f = fopen(ICFG_PATH, "wb");
+ if(f){
+ fputs("{\"schema_version\":1,\"token\":\"SET_ME\",\"presence_state\":\"On PS4\"}", f);
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+ } else {
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ilogv("cfg-done", 0, 0);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* 2: token. Skips silently when one already validates. */
+static void step_token(void){
+ char tok[160];
+ int tries, r;
+ tok[0] = 0;
+ ilogv("token-begun", 0, 0);
+ icfg_token_load(ICFG_PATH, tok, sizeof tok);
+ if(token_valid(tok)){
+ ui_ok("A valid token is already saved.\n\nSkipping.");
+ ilogv("token-skip", 0, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+ for(tries = 0; tries < 3; tries++){
+ r = ui_input("Discord token", "paste token, Done to save", tok, sizeof tok);
+ if(r < 0){ ui_ok("Text input failed. Skipping."); return; }
+ if(r == 0) return;
+ if(token_valid(tok)){
+ r = icfg_token_save(ICFG_PATH, tok);
+ ui_ok("Config saved.");
+ return;
+ }
+ ui_ok("That doesn't look like a token.\nCheck it and try again, or cancel to skip.");
+ }
+}
+
+/* --- clean exit ---------------------------------------------------
+ * Tear dialogs down, unload modules, then _exit. Returning from
+ * main runs the CRT teardown path which has been killing the
+ * wizard on every crash. */
+static void finish(int code){
+ ilogv(code == 0 ? "exit" : "fatal", code, 0);
+ ui_shutdown();
+ _exit(code);
+}
+
+int main(void){
+ /* Hide the PS4 splash first — dialogs opened while the splash
+ * is visible get auto-dismissed (half-second flash) or never
+ * surface. Hiding it early means ui_init() and all dialogs
+ * run with the splash already gone, so no visible lag. */
+ sceSystemServiceHideSplashScreen();
+ crash_guard();
+ if(ui_init() != 0) finish(1);
+ ui_ok("orbisRPC");
+ if(step_assets() != 0) finish(1);
+ ilogv("assets-ok", 0, 0);
+ if(step_files() != 0) finish(1);
+ step_token();
+ ilogv("post-token", 0, 0);
+ ui_ok("Done.\n\n"
+ "Payloads in /data/payloads.\n"
+ "Launch orbisrpc from the payload launcher.");
+ finish(0);
+}
diff --git a/installer/nettest.c b/installer/nettest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1370b88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/installer/nettest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/* nettest.c - connect-only probes. A closed port and a filtered host
+ * both read as unreachable; that honesty is the point (Sony TMDB from
+ * the console genuinely fails while Discord succeeds). */
+#include "nettest.h"
+#include "send.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/select.h>
+
+/* Non-blocking connect with a hard deadline lives in send.c (shared);
+ * blocking connect ignores SNDTIMEO on filtered hosts (75 s hole). */
+
+int net_probe(const char *host, int port, int timeout_s){
+ struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL, *rp;
+ char svc[8];
+ int ok = 0;
+ if(!host || !host[0] || port <= 0 || port > 65535) return 0;
+ if(net_init() != 0) return 0; /* stack dead: everything unreachable */
+ if(timeout_s < 1) timeout_s = 1;
+ if(timeout_s > 10) timeout_s = 10;
+ snprintf(svc, sizeof svc, "%d", port);
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof hints);
+ hints.ai_family = AF_INET; /* v4 only: deterministic on console stacks */
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ if(getaddrinfo(host, svc, &hints, &res) != 0 || !res) return 0;
+ for(rp = res; rp; rp = rp->ai_next){
+ int fd = socket(rp->ai_family, rp->ai_socktype, rp->ai_protocol);
+ if(fd < 0) continue;
+ if(sock_connect_deadline(fd, rp->ai_addr, rp->ai_addrlen, timeout_s) == 0) ok = 1;
+ close(fd);
+ if(ok) break;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+ return ok;
+}
diff --git a/installer/nettest.h b/installer/nettest.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32054a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/installer/nettest.h
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+/* nettest.h - honest TCP reachability probes (no traffic beyond connect). */
+#ifndef INSTALLER_NETTEST_H
+#define INSTALLER_NETTEST_H
+
+/* 1 reachable, 0 not. timeout_s clamped 1..10. Host-testable. */
+int net_probe(const char *host, int port, int timeout_s);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/installer/sce_sys/about/right.sprx b/installer/sce_sys/about/right.sprx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3b01d0
Binary files /dev/null and b/installer/sce_sys/about/right.sprx differ
diff --git a/installer/sce_sys/icon0.png b/installer/sce_sys/icon0.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3db6651
Binary files /dev/null and b/installer/sce_sys/icon0.png differ
diff --git a/installer/sce_sys/pic1.png b/installer/sce_sys/pic1.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9b49f3
Binary files /dev/null and b/installer/sce_sys/pic1.png differ
diff --git a/installer/send.c b/installer/send.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce97c0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/installer/send.c
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+/* send.c - loopback payload injection: file bytes over TCP to the
+ * console's own loaders. Chunked send (no whole-file malloc). */
+#include "send.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/select.h>
+#ifdef INSTALLER_PS4
+#include <orbis/Net.h>
+#include <orbis/Sysmodule.h>
+#endif
+
+#define SEND_CHUNK (64u*1024u)
+static const int SEND_PORTS[] = { 9090, 9021, 9020 };
+
+int net_init(void){
+#ifdef INSTALLER_PS4
+ static int done = 0;
+ int probe;
+ if(done) return 0;
+ /* Internal NET module (Payload Guest boot pattern) + best-effort
+ * stack init. Ground truth is a probe socket, not return codes. */
+ (void)sceSysmoduleLoadModuleInternal(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_INTERNAL_NET);
+ (void)sceNetInit();
+ (void)sceNetPoolCreate("orbisrpc", 64*1024, 0);
+ probe = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if(probe < 0) return -1;
+ close(probe);
+ done = 1;
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int sock_connect_deadline(int fd, const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t len, int timeout_s){
+ int flags, rc, err = 0;
+ socklen_t elen = sizeof err;
+ fd_set wf;
+ struct timeval tv;
+ if(timeout_s < 1) timeout_s = 1;
+ if(timeout_s > 15) timeout_s = 15;
+ flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0);
+ if(flags < 0) return -1;
+ if(fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) < 0) return -1;
+ rc = connect(fd, sa, len);
+ if(rc == 0){
+ fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if(errno != EINPROGRESS){
+ fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ FD_ZERO(&wf);
+ FD_SET(fd, &wf);
+ tv.tv_sec = timeout_s;
+ tv.tv_usec = 0;
+ rc = select(fd + 1, NULL, &wf, NULL, &tv);
+ fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags);
+ if(rc <= 0) return -1;
+ if(getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &elen) != 0) return -1;
+ return err == 0 ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+static int send_one(int fd, const char *path, void (*progress)(unsigned)){
+ FILE *f = fopen(path, "rb");
+ /* Static, not stack: 64 KB is a real fraction of an app thread stack. */
+ static unsigned char buf[SEND_CHUNK];
+ long total = 0, sent = 0;
+ size_t n;
+ if(!f) return -1;
+ if(fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END) != 0){ fclose(f); return -1; }
+ total = ftell(f);
+ if(total <= 0 || total > 16*1024*1024){ fclose(f); return -1; }
+ if(fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET) != 0){ fclose(f); return -1; }
+ if(progress) progress(0);
+ while((n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof buf, f)) > 0){
+ size_t off = 0;
+ int stalls = 0;
+ while(off < n){
+ ssize_t w = send(fd, buf + off, n - off, 0);
+ if(w <= 0){
+ /* Blocking socket + SNDTIMEO: EAGAIN means the loader
+ * stopped reading. Retry briefly, then fail instead of
+ * spinning forever. */
+ if((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && ++stalls < 4)
+ continue;
+ fclose(f);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ stalls = 0;
+ off += (size_t)w;
+ }
+ sent += (long)n;
+ if(progress) progress((unsigned)(sent * 100 / total));
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ if(progress) progress(100);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int send_file_loopback(const char *path, int *port_used, void (*progress)(unsigned)){
+ unsigned i;
+ if(!path || !path[0]) return -1;
+ if(net_init() != 0) return -1; /* no stack, no sockets: fail, don't crash */
+ for(i = 0; i < sizeof SEND_PORTS/sizeof SEND_PORTS[0]; i++){
+ int fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ struct sockaddr_in sa;
+ struct timeval tv = { 20, 0 };
+ if(fd < 0) continue;
+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof sa);
+ sa.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ sa.sin_port = htons((uint16_t)SEND_PORTS[i]);
+ sa.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1");
+ if(sock_connect_deadline(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof sa, 5) < 0){
+ close(fd);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Back to blocking for the bulk send, WITH a send timeout so a
+ * stalled loader surfaces EAGAIN (capped retries below) instead
+ * of wedging forever. */
+ setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
+ if(send_one(fd, path, progress) == 0){
+ close(fd);
+ if(port_used) *port_used = SEND_PORTS[i];
+ return 0;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
diff --git a/installer/send.h b/installer/send.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df95af7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/installer/send.h
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/* send.h - loopback payload injection (clean-room, standard sockets).
+ * Tries native GoldHEN BinLoader 9090, then elfldr 9021, then 9020.
+ * 9020 is one-shot: accepted bytes count as sent. */
+#ifndef INSTALLER_SEND_H
+#define INSTALLER_SEND_H
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+/* progress(pct) may be NULL. Returns 0 + port_used set on success. */
+int send_file_loopback(const char *path, int *port_used, void (*progress)(unsigned pct));
+
+/* Non-blocking connect with a hard deadline (filtered hosts can't stall
+ * past timeout_s). 0 connected, -1 failed. Leaves fd blocking. */
+int sock_connect_deadline(int fd, const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t len, int timeout_s);
+
+/* One-time network stack init (sceNetInit + pool). 0 ready, -1 dead.
+ * No-op returning 0 on host test builds. Safe to call repeatedly. */
+int net_init(void);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/installer/ui.c b/installer/ui.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d612c2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/installer/ui.c
@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+/* ui.c - native PS4 dialogs: MsgDialog (ok / yes-no / progress) + ImeDialog.
+ * Everything here needs the console (dialog system calls); pure logic
+ * (validation, config merge) lives in icfg.c and is host-tested. */
+#include "ui.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <wchar.h>
+#include <orbis/CommonDialog.h>
+#include <orbis/MsgDialog.h>
+#include <orbis/ImeDialog.h>
+#include <orbis/UserService.h>
+#include <orbis/Sysmodule.h>
+#include <orbis/Pad.h>
+#include <orbis/libkernel.h>
+#include <orbis/_types/user.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+static void ime_dbg(const char *msg){
+ int fd = open("/data/ime_debug.log", O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND, 0666);
+ if(fd >= 0){ write(fd, msg, strlen(msg)); close(fd); }
+}
+
+static void base_init(OrbisMsgDialogParam *param){
+ memset(param, 0, sizeof(*param));
+ param->baseParam.size = (uint32_t)sizeof(param->baseParam);
+ param->baseParam.magic =
+ (uint32_t)(ORBIS_COMMON_DIALOG_MAGIC_NUMBER + (uint64_t)¶m->baseParam);
+ param->size = sizeof(OrbisMsgDialogParam);
+ param->mode = ORBIS_MSG_DIALOG_MODE_USER_MSG;
+}
+
+static int ui_ready = 0;
+static int ime_dialog_running = 0;
+
+/* Reap any stale dialog from a previous session that died
+ * mid-flow. Called by ui_init() to ensure a clean start. */
+static void reap_stale(void);
+
+int ui_init(void){
+ if(ui_ready) return 0;
+ /* Reap any stale dialog from a previous session that died
+ * mid-flow. This ensures a clean start. */
+ reap_stale();
+ {
+ /* UserService first: dialogs + pad + IME all key off the user.
+ * Best-effort (already-initialized is fine); uid fallbacks
+ * downstream keep every path forward-safe. */
+ OrbisUserServiceInitializeParams up;
+ memset(&up, 0, sizeof up);
+ up.priority = ORBIS_KERNEL_PRIO_FIFO_LOWEST;
+ (void)sceUserServiceInitialize(&up);
+ }
+ /* Mirrors apollo-ps4 initInternal()/initPad():
+ * 1. internal modules (SYSTEM, USER, COMMON_DIALOG)
+ * 2. sceCommonDialogInitialize() <- BEFORE external modules
+ * 3. PAD module + scePadInit()
+ * 4. external modules (MESSAGE_DIALOG, IME_DIALOG, IME_BACKEND)
+ * Order matters: dialog init must precede external module loads,
+ * and COMMON_DIALOG must precede sceCommonDialogInitialize(). */
+ if(sceSysmoduleLoadModuleInternal(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_INTERNAL_SYSTEM_SERVICE) != 0) return -1;
+ if(sceSysmoduleLoadModuleInternal(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_INTERNAL_USER_SERVICE) != 0) return -1;
+ if(sceSysmoduleLoadModuleInternal(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_INTERNAL_COMMON_DIALOG) != 0) return -1;
+ if(sceCommonDialogInitialize() < 0) return -1;
+ if(sceSysmoduleLoadModuleInternal(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_INTERNAL_PAD) != 0) return -1;
+ (void)scePadInit();
+ if(sceSysmoduleLoadModule(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_MESSAGE_DIALOG) < 0) return -1;
+ if(sceSysmoduleLoadModule(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_IME_DIALOG) < 0){
+ sceSysmoduleUnloadModule(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_MESSAGE_DIALOG);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if(sceSysmoduleLoadModule(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_IME_BACKEND) < 0){
+ sceSysmoduleUnloadModule(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_IME_DIALOG);
+ sceSysmoduleUnloadModule(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_MESSAGE_DIALOG);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ui_ready = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* If a previous session died between open and close, a dialog
+ * can be left in RUNNING state, causing a fresh open() to fail.
+ * This function is called by ui_init() to reclaim any stale
+ * dialog before starting fresh. Currently unused (no stale
+ * dialogs observed after ui_init), kept for safety. */
+static void reap_stale(void){
+ if(sceMsgDialogGetStatus() == ORBIS_COMMON_DIALOG_STATUS_RUNNING)
+ sceMsgDialogTerminate();
+ if(sceImeDialogGetStatus() == ORBIS_DIALOG_STATUS_RUNNING)
+ sceImeDialogTerm();
+}
+
+int ui_ok(const char *msg){
+ OrbisMsgDialogParam param;
+ OrbisMsgDialogUserMessageParam um;
+ OrbisMsgDialogResult res;
+ memset(&res, 0, sizeof res);
+ sceMsgDialogTerminate();
+ if(sceMsgDialogInitialize() < 0) return -1;
+ base_init(¶m);
+ memset(&um, 0, sizeof um);
+ um.msg = msg;
+ um.buttonType = ORBIS_MSG_DIALOG_BUTTON_TYPE_OK;
+ param.userMsgParam = &um;
+ if(sceMsgDialogOpen(¶m) < 0){ sceMsgDialogTerminate(); return -1; }
+ /* Yield while waiting: a hot spin starves the dialog service on the
+ * console (the proven pattern on this box sleeps 20 ms per tick). */
+ while(sceMsgDialogUpdateStatus() != ORBIS_COMMON_DIALOG_STATUS_FINISHED)
+ sceKernelUsleep(20000);
+ sceMsgDialogClose();
+ sceMsgDialogGetResult(&res);
+ sceMsgDialogTerminate();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Yes/No dialog. Returns 1 (Yes) or 0 (No/closed).
+ * The dialog uses YESNO_FOCUS_NO which focuses the "No" button.
+ * On this console, Circle=confirm and X=back. The confirm
+ * button selects the focused button, so X acts as confirm
+ * and selects No, while O acts as back and selects Yes.
+ * Since the dialog inverts the result, this returns 1 when
+ * X is pressed (Yes) and 0 when O is pressed (No) — matching
+ * the system's confirm button behavior. Kept for future use. */
+int ui_confirm(const char *msg){
+ OrbisMsgDialogParam param;
+ OrbisMsgDialogUserMessageParam um;
+ OrbisMsgDialogResult res;
+ memset(&res, 0, sizeof res);
+ sceMsgDialogTerminate();
+ if(sceMsgDialogInitialize() < 0) return -1;
+ base_init(¶m);
+ memset(&um, 0, sizeof um);
+ um.msg = msg;
+ /* YESNO_FOCUS_NO focuses the "No" button. On a Circle-accept
+ * console the confirm button selects the focused button, so
+ * X (confirm) selects No and O (back) selects Yes. The
+ * result is inverted: X→buttonId=NO→returns 1 (Yes). */
+ um.buttonType = ORBIS_MSG_DIALOG_BUTTON_TYPE_YESNO_FOCUS_NO;
+ param.userMsgParam = &um;
+ if(sceMsgDialogOpen(¶m) < 0){ sceMsgDialogTerminate(); return -1; }
+ while(sceMsgDialogUpdateStatus() != ORBIS_COMMON_DIALOG_STATUS_FINISHED)
+ sceKernelUsleep(20000);
+ sceMsgDialogClose();
+ sceMsgDialogGetResult(&res);
+ sceMsgDialogTerminate();
+ return res.buttonId == ORBIS_MSG_DIALOG_BUTTON_ID_YES;
+}
+
+static int progress_open = 0;
+
+int ui_progress_open(const char *msg){
+ OrbisMsgDialogParam param;
+ OrbisMsgDialogProgressBarParam bar;
+ if(progress_open){
+ /* Self-healing: a prior session that died between open and close
+ * leaves the flag set with no dialog behind it. Reclaim it. */
+ ui_progress_close();
+ }
+ sceMsgDialogTerminate();
+ if(sceMsgDialogInitialize() < 0) return -1;
+ base_init(¶m);
+ param.mode = ORBIS_MSG_DIALOG_MODE_PROGRESS_BAR;
+ memset(&bar, 0, sizeof bar);
+ bar.barType = ORBIS_MSG_DIALOG_PROGRESSBAR_TYPE_PERCENTAGE;
+ bar.msg = msg;
+ param.progBarParam = &bar;
+ if(sceMsgDialogOpen(¶m) < 0){ sceMsgDialogTerminate(); return -1; }
+ progress_open = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void ui_progress_msg(const char *msg){
+ if(progress_open && msg) sceMsgDialogProgressBarSetMsg(0, msg);
+}
+
+void ui_progress_set(unsigned pct){
+ if(progress_open) sceMsgDialogProgressBarSetValue(0, pct > 100 ? 100 : pct);
+}
+
+void ui_progress_close(void){
+ if(!progress_open) return;
+ progress_open = 0;
+ sceMsgDialogClose();
+ sceMsgDialogTerminate();
+}
+
+int ui_input(const char *title, const char *placeholder, char *out, size_t cap){
+ static wchar_t wbuf[256];
+ static wchar_t wtitle[64];
+ static wchar_t wplace[64];
+ OrbisImeDialogSetting st;
+ int32_t uid = 0;
+ size_t i;
+ if(!out || cap == 0 || cap > 200) return -1;
+ /* Prefill with current value (ASCII round-trip). */
+ for(i = 0; i < cap - 1 && out[i]; i++) wbuf[i] = (wchar_t)(unsigned char)out[i];
+ wbuf[i] = 0;
+ for(i = 0; i < 63 && title && title[i]; i++) wtitle[i] = (wchar_t)(unsigned char)title[i];
+ wtitle[i] = 0;
+ for(i = 0; i < 63 && placeholder && placeholder[i]; i++) wplace[i] = (wchar_t)(unsigned char)placeholder[i];
+ wplace[i] = 0;
+ if(sceUserServiceGetForegroundUser(&uid) < 0 || uid <= 0) uid = 1;
+ memset(&st, 0, sizeof st);
+ st.userId = (uint32_t)uid;
+ st.type = 0;
+ st.supportedLanguages = 0;
+ st.enterLabel = ORBIS_BUTTON_LABEL_DEFAULT;
+ st.inputMethod = 0;
+ st.filter = 0;
+ st.option = 0;
+ st.maxTextLength = (uint32_t)(cap - 1);
+ st.inputTextBuffer = wbuf;
+ /* Center of 1920x1080. At (0,0) the panel anchors up-left and the
+ * keyboard renders half off-screen; 960,540 is the layout that is
+ * known-good on this console (rutracker-ps4 uses the same values). */
+ st.posx = 960;
+ st.posy = 540;
+ st.horizontalAlignment = ORBIS_H_CENTER;
+ st.verticalAlignment = ORBIS_V_CENTER;
+ st.placeholder = wplace;
+ st.title = wtitle;
+ /* apollo-ps4 pattern: guard against re-entry, terminate stale
+ * state, then init. The dialog owns the running flag. */
+ if(ime_dialog_running){ sceImeDialogTerm(); ime_dialog_running = 0; }
+ ime_dbg("ime_begin\n");
+ if(sceImeDialogInit(&st, NULL) < 0){ ime_dbg("ime_init_fail\n"); return -1; }
+ ime_dialog_running = 1;
+ {
+ int spins = 0;
+ OrbisDialogStatus ds;
+ ds = sceImeDialogGetStatus();
+ if(ds == ORBIS_DIALOG_STATUS_RUNNING) ime_dbg("ime_status_running\n");
+ else if(ds == ORBIS_DIALOG_STATUS_NONE) ime_dbg("ime_status_none\n");
+ else if(ds == ORBIS_DIALOG_STATUS_STOPPED) ime_dbg("ime_status_stopped\n");
+ while(ime_dialog_running){
+ ds = sceImeDialogGetStatus();
+ if(ds == ORBIS_DIALOG_STATUS_STOPPED){
+ OrbisDialogResult res;
+ memset(&res, 0, sizeof res);
+ sceImeDialogGetResult(&res);
+ sceImeDialogTerm();
+ ime_dialog_running = 0;
+ if(res.endstatus != ORBIS_DIALOG_OK) return 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if(ds == ORBIS_DIALOG_STATUS_NONE && ++spins > 250){
+ ime_dbg("ime_timeout\n");
+ sceImeDialogTerm();
+ ime_dialog_running = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if(ds != ORBIS_DIALOG_STATUS_NONE) spins = 0;
+ sceKernelUsleep(20000);
+ }
+ }
+ for(i = 0; i < cap - 1 && wbuf[i]; i++)
+ out[i] = (wbuf[i] < 128 && wbuf[i] >= 32) ? (char)wbuf[i] : '?';
+ out[i] = 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Teardown for exit: terminate any live dialog, then unload the
+ * modules loaded in ui_init. Called before _exit so no dialog
+ * outlives the app. Must unload PAD too since it was loaded
+ * internally (ORBIS_SYSMODULE_INTERNAL_PAD). */
+void ui_shutdown(void){
+ if(!ui_ready) return;
+ ui_ready = 0;
+ progress_open = 0;
+ ime_dialog_running = 0;
+ sceMsgDialogTerminate();
+ sceImeDialogTerm();
+ sceSysmoduleUnloadModule(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_IME_BACKEND);
+ sceSysmoduleUnloadModule(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_IME_DIALOG);
+ sceSysmoduleUnloadModule(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_MESSAGE_DIALOG);
+ sceSysmoduleUnloadModule(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_INTERNAL_PAD);
+}
diff --git a/installer/ui.h b/installer/ui.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..efa051d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/installer/ui.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* ui.h - native dialog helpers for the installer wizard. */
+#ifndef INSTALLER_UI_H
+#define INSTALLER_UI_H
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+/* Must run once before any dialog: loads MsgDialog/ImeDialog sysmodules
+ * and inits CommonDialog. Calling dialogs without this panics the box
+ * (unloaded-sysmodule call at startup). 0 ok, -1 fatal. */
+int ui_init(void);
+
+/* Info dialog with OK. 0 shown, -1 failed to open. */
+int ui_ok(const char *msg);
+/* Yes/No dialog: X = enter (Yes), O = back (No). 1 yes, 0 no/closed,
+ * -1 error. */
+int ui_confirm(const char *msg);
+
+/* Progress dialog. Open once, update, close. 0 ok, -1 error. */
+int ui_progress_open(const char *msg);
+void ui_progress_msg(const char *msg);
+void ui_progress_set(unsigned pct);
+void ui_progress_close(void);
+
+/* OSK text input. Prefills with out's current content. Returns 1 + out
+ * filled on Done, 0 on cancel, -1 on error. */
+int ui_input(const char *title, const char *placeholder, char *out, size_t cap);
+
+/* Terminate dialogs + unload their sysmodules. Call once before exit. */
+void ui_shutdown(void);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/appdb.c b/orbisrpc/appdb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c083e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/appdb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+/* appdb.c - display names from /system_data/priv/mms/app.db (read-only).
+ * Method follows the proven on-console pattern (SonicLoader et al.): SQLite
+ * query, never raw byte-scanning (an earlier revision byte-scanned app.db
+ * and returned wrong names: the file reads fine, the parse was garbage).
+ * Tiers, first hit wins:
+ * 1. tbl_appbrowse.titleName (when the firmware carries it)
+ * 2. tbl_appinfo val for key TITLE / TITLE_xx (localized display titles)
+ * 3. /user/appmeta/<id>/param.json title fields (ShadowMountPlus pattern)
+ * Every tier is schema-guarded and fail-soft: missing tables, missing keys,
+ * unreadable files, and locked DBs all fall through to the next source.
+ * Host-testable via appdb_title_from() with a synthetic DB path. */
+#include "appdb.h"
+#include "jsonlite.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include "sqlite3.h"
+
+#define APPDB_PATH "/system_data/priv/mms/app.db"
+#define APPMETA_BASE "/user/appmeta"
+
+static int valid_tid(const char *t){
+ if(!t) return 0;
+ size_t n = strlen(t);
+ if(n != 9) return 0;
+ for(size_t i = 0; i < n; i++){
+ char c = t[i];
+ if(!((c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= '0' && c <= '9'))) return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int table_exists(sqlite3 *db, const char *name){
+ sqlite3_stmt *st = NULL;
+ int found = 0;
+ if(sqlite3_prepare_v2(db, "SELECT 1 FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='table' AND name=?1 LIMIT 1;",
+ -1, &st, NULL) != SQLITE_OK)
+ return 0;
+ sqlite3_bind_text(st, 1, name, -1, SQLITE_TRANSIENT);
+ if(sqlite3_step(st) == SQLITE_ROW) found = 1;
+ sqlite3_finalize(st);
+ return found;
+}
+
+/* Copy first non-empty TEXT result of a one-row query. 0 on hit. */
+static int query_name(sqlite3 *db, const char *sql, const char *titleId,
+ char *out, size_t cap){
+ sqlite3_stmt *st = NULL;
+ int rc = -1;
+ if(sqlite3_prepare_v2(db, sql, -1, &st, NULL) != SQLITE_OK) return -1;
+ sqlite3_bind_text(st, 1, titleId, -1, SQLITE_TRANSIENT);
+ if(sqlite3_step(st) == SQLITE_ROW){
+ const unsigned char *v = sqlite3_column_text(st, 0);
+ if(v && v[0]){
+ strncpy(out, (const char *)v, cap - 1);
+ out[cap - 1] = 0;
+ if(out[0] && strlen(out) > 1) rc = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ sqlite3_finalize(st);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* param.json title fields: small single read, jsonlite parse. Best-effort. */
+static int paramjson_title(const char *appmeta_base, const char *titleId,
+ char *out, size_t cap){
+ char path[256];
+ int n = snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s/param.json",
+ appmeta_base ? appmeta_base : APPMETA_BASE, titleId);
+ if(n <= 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof path) return -1;
+ int fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+ if(fd < 0) return -1;
+ char buf[4096];
+ ssize_t r = read(fd, buf, sizeof buf - 1);
+ close(fd);
+ if(r <= 0) return -1;
+ buf[r] = 0;
+ jl_val_t *root = jl_parse(buf, (size_t)r);
+ if(!root) return -1;
+ static const char *keys[] = { "titleName", "title", "name", NULL };
+ int rc = -1;
+ for(int i = 0; keys[i]; i++){
+ const jl_val_t *v = jl_obj_get(root, keys[i]);
+ if(v && v->type == JL_STRING && v->str && strlen(v->str) > 1){
+ strncpy(out, v->str, cap - 1);
+ out[cap - 1] = 0;
+ rc = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ jl_free(root);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int appdb_title_from(const char *dbpath, const char *appmeta_base,
+ const char *titleId, char *out, size_t cap){
+ if(!out || cap == 0) return -1;
+ out[0] = 0;
+ if(!valid_tid(titleId)) return -1;
+ if(!dbpath) dbpath = APPDB_PATH;
+
+ sqlite3 *db = NULL;
+ int orc = sqlite3_open_v2(dbpath, &db,
+ SQLITE_OPEN_READONLY | SQLITE_OPEN_NOMUTEX, NULL);
+ if(orc != SQLITE_OK){
+ if(db) sqlite3_close(db);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ sqlite3_busy_timeout(db, 2000);
+
+ /* Tier 1: friendly browse name. */
+ if(table_exists(db, "tbl_appbrowse")){
+ if(query_name(db, "SELECT titleName FROM tbl_appbrowse WHERE titleId=?1 "
+ "AND titleName IS NOT NULL AND titleName<>'' LIMIT 1;",
+ titleId, out, cap) == 0){
+ log_msg("name: %s via appdb-browse", out);
+ sqlite3_close(db);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Tier 2: localized TITLE keys; ORDER BY key prefers bare TITLE
+ * (system language) over TITLE_00..NN variants. */
+ if(table_exists(db, "tbl_appinfo")){
+ if(query_name(db, "SELECT val FROM tbl_appinfo WHERE titleId=?1 "
+ "AND (key='TITLE' OR key LIKE 'TITLE\\_%' ESCAPE '\\') "
+ "AND val IS NOT NULL AND val<>'' ORDER BY key LIMIT 1;",
+ titleId, out, cap) == 0){
+ log_msg("name: %s via appdb-info", out);
+ sqlite3_close(db);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ sqlite3_close(db);
+
+ /* Tier 3: staged appmeta descriptor (no DB needed). */
+ if(paramjson_title(appmeta_base, titleId, out, cap) == 0){
+ log_msg("name: %s via paramjson", out);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int appdb_title(const char *titleId, char *out, size_t cap){
+ return appdb_title_from(NULL, NULL, titleId, out, cap);
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/appdb.h b/orbisrpc/appdb.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..092ee34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/appdb.h
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+/* appdb.h - display names from the system app.db (read-only SQLite). */
+#ifndef APPDB_H
+#define APPDB_H
+#include <stddef.h>
+/* Resolve a display name for a 9-char title ID. 0 on success. */
+int appdb_title(const char *titleId, char *out, size_t cap);
+/* Test seam: explicit DB + appmeta paths (NULL = on-console defaults). */
+int appdb_title_from(const char *dbpath, const char *appmeta_base,
+ const char *titleId, char *out, size_t cap);
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/art.c b/orbisrpc/art.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e57da6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/art.c
@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+/* art.c - external-asset resolution (host-testable parsing + PS4 HTTPS).
+ * Pure parsing lives in art_parse_mp() (unit-tested); the POST itself
+ * mirrors updater.c's bounded HTTPS client. */
+#include "art.h"
+#include "jsonlite.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "updater_http.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+/* Extract external_asset_path for url from an external-assets response.
+ * Returns 1 + out ("mp:"+path), else 0. Pure function, host-tested. */
+int art_parse_mp(const char *body, size_t len, const char *url,
+ char *out, size_t cap){
+ if(!body || !url || !out || cap < 8) return 0;
+ jl_val_t *r = jl_parse(body, len);
+ if(!r || r->type != JL_ARRAY){ if(r) jl_free(r); return 0; }
+ int rc = 0;
+ for(size_t i = 0; ; i++){
+ const jl_val_t *e = jl_arr_at(r, i);
+ if(!e) break;
+ if(e->type != JL_OBJECT) continue;
+ const jl_val_t *u = jl_obj_get(e, "url");
+ const jl_val_t *p = jl_obj_get(e, "external_asset_path");
+ if(!u || u->type != JL_STRING || !u->str) continue;
+ if(!p || p->type != JL_STRING || !p->str) continue;
+ if(strcmp(u->str, url) != 0) continue;
+ if(strlen(p->str) > cap - 5) continue;
+ snprintf(out, cap, "mp:%s", p->str);
+ rc = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ jl_free(r);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+#include "tls.h"
+#include "clock.h"
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#elif defined(__PS4__)
+#include "tls.h"
+#include "clock.h"
+#include <orbis/Net.h>
+#include <orbis/Sysmodule.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+#define ART_HOST "discord.com"
+#define ART_DEADLINE_S 12
+#define ART_RESP_MAX (16u*1024u)
+
+static char s_last_url[512] = "";
+static char s_last_mp[512] = "";
+
+void art_cache_clear(void){
+ s_last_url[0] = 0;
+ s_last_mp[0] = 0;
+}
+
+/* Disk cache: url -> mp path, 7-day TTL. Survives reboots so titles
+ * resolved once never pay the external-assets round trip again.
+ * Best-effort only: any I/O failure degrades to memory-only caching. */
+#define ART_DISK_MAX 32
+#define ART_DISK_TTL (7*24*3600)
+static struct { char url[512]; char mp[512]; int64_t at; } s_disk[ART_DISK_MAX];
+static int s_disk_n = -1; /* -1 = not loaded yet */
+
+static void art_disk_load(void){
+ if(s_disk_n >= 0) return;
+ s_disk_n = 0;
+ FILE *f = fopen("/data/orbisRPC/artwork_cache.json", "rb");
+ if(!f) return;
+ fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END);
+ long sz = ftell(f);
+ fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET);
+ int64_t now = (int64_t)time(NULL);
+ if(sz > 0 && sz < 65536){
+ char *buf = (char*)malloc((size_t)sz + 1);
+ if(buf && fread(buf, 1, (size_t)sz, f) == (size_t)sz){
+ buf[sz] = 0;
+ jl_val_t *r = jl_parse(buf, (size_t)sz);
+ if(r && r->type == JL_ARRAY){
+ for(size_t i = 0; ; i++){
+ const jl_val_t *e = jl_arr_at(r, i);
+ if(!e) break;
+ if(s_disk_n >= ART_DISK_MAX) break;
+ if(e->type != JL_OBJECT) continue;
+ const jl_val_t *u = jl_obj_get(e, "url");
+ const jl_val_t *m = jl_obj_get(e, "mp");
+ const jl_val_t *a = jl_obj_get(e, "at");
+ if(!u || u->type != JL_STRING || !u->str) continue;
+ if(!m || m->type != JL_STRING || !m->str) continue;
+ if(!a || a->type != JL_NUMBER) continue;
+ if(now - (int64_t)a->num > ART_DISK_TTL) continue; /* prune */
+ snprintf(s_disk[s_disk_n].url, sizeof s_disk[s_disk_n].url, "%s", u->str);
+ snprintf(s_disk[s_disk_n].mp, sizeof s_disk[s_disk_n].mp, "%s", m->str);
+ s_disk[s_disk_n].at = (int64_t)a->num;
+ s_disk_n++;
+ }
+ }
+ if(r) jl_free(r);
+ }
+ free(buf);
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+}
+
+static void art_disk_save(void){
+ char tmp[256];
+ snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%s.new", "/data/orbisRPC/artwork_cache.json");
+ FILE *f = fopen(tmp, "wb");
+ if(!f) return;
+ int ok = 1;
+ if(fputs("[", f) < 0) ok = 0;
+ for(int i = 0; ok && i < s_disk_n; i++){
+ if(i > 0 && fputs(",", f) < 0){ ok = 0; break; }
+ /* URLs/mp paths are response-derived; escape defensively. */
+ char eu[1024], em[1024];
+ size_t a = 0, b = 0;
+ for(const char *p = s_disk[i].url; *p && a + 2 < sizeof eu; p++){
+ if(*p == '"' || *p == '\\') eu[a++] = '\\';
+ eu[a++] = *p;
+ }
+ eu[a] = 0;
+ for(const char *p = s_disk[i].mp; *p && b + 2 < sizeof em; p++){
+ if(*p == '"' || *p == '\\') em[b++] = '\\';
+ em[b++] = *p;
+ }
+ em[b] = 0;
+ if(fprintf(f, "{\"url\":\"%s\",\"mp\":\"%s\",\"at\":%lld}",
+ eu, em, (long long)s_disk[i].at) < 0) ok = 0;
+ }
+ if(ok && fputs("]", f) < 0) ok = 0;
+ if(ok && fflush(f) != 0) ok = 0;
+ if(ok){ int fd = fileno(f); if(fd >= 0 && fsync(fd) != 0) ok = 0; }
+ if(fclose(f) != 0) ok = 0;
+ if(ok) rename(tmp, "/data/orbisRPC/artwork_cache.json");
+ else remove(tmp);
+}
+
+static int art_disk_get(const char *url, char *out_mp, size_t cap){
+ art_disk_load();
+ int64_t now = (int64_t)time(NULL);
+ for(int i = 0; i < s_disk_n; i++){
+ if(!strcmp(s_disk[i].url, url)){
+ if(now - s_disk[i].at > ART_DISK_TTL) return 0;
+ strncpy(out_mp, s_disk[i].mp, cap - 1);
+ out_mp[cap - 1] = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void art_disk_put(const char *url, const char *mp){
+ art_disk_load();
+ for(int i = 0; i < s_disk_n; i++){
+ if(!strcmp(s_disk[i].url, url)){
+ snprintf(s_disk[i].mp, sizeof s_disk[i].mp, "%s", mp);
+ s_disk[i].at = (int64_t)time(NULL);
+ art_disk_save();
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ if(s_disk_n < ART_DISK_MAX){
+ snprintf(s_disk[s_disk_n].url, sizeof s_disk[s_disk_n].url, "%s", url);
+ snprintf(s_disk[s_disk_n].mp, sizeof s_disk[s_disk_n].mp, "%s", mp);
+ s_disk[s_disk_n].at = (int64_t)time(NULL);
+ s_disk_n++;
+ art_disk_save();
+ }
+}
+
+static int art_post(const char *app_id, const char *token, const char *url,
+ char *out_body, size_t body_cap, size_t *out_len){
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL;
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof hints);
+ hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ if(getaddrinfo(ART_HOST, "443", &hints, &res) != 0 || !res) return -1;
+ int fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if(fd < 0){ freeaddrinfo(res); return -1; }
+ struct timeval tv = { ART_DEADLINE_S, 0 };
+ setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
+ setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
+ if(connect(fd, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0){
+ close(fd); freeaddrinfo(res); return -1;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+ {
+ int fl = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0);
+ if(fl >= 0) fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fl | O_NONBLOCK);
+ }
+#else
+ /* Host test build: no transport here (parse path still testable). */
+ (void)app_id; (void)token; (void)url;
+ (void)out_body; (void)body_cap; (void)out_len;
+ return -1;
+#endif
+#if defined(ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD) || defined(__PS4__)
+ tls_ctx_t *t = tls_start(fd, ART_HOST);
+ if(!t){
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ close(fd);
+#else
+ sceNetSocketClose(fd);
+#endif
+ return -1;
+ }
+ char payload[768];
+ int pl = snprintf(payload, sizeof payload, "{\"urls\":[\"%s\"]}", url);
+ if(pl <= 0 || pl >= (int)sizeof payload){ tls_free(t); return -1; }
+ char req[1024];
+ int rl = snprintf(req, sizeof req,
+ "POST /api/v10/applications/%s/external-assets HTTP/1.1\r\n"
+ "Host: %s\r\nAuthorization: %s\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\n"
+ "Content-Length: %d\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n",
+ app_id, ART_HOST, token, pl);
+ if(rl <= 0 || rl >= (int)sizeof req){ tls_free(t); return -1; }
+ if(tls_write(t, req, (size_t)rl) < 0){ tls_free(t); return -1; }
+ if(tls_write(t, payload, (size_t)pl) < 0){ tls_free(t); return -1; }
+ size_t bl = 0;
+ int64_t dl = orbis_mono_s() + ART_DEADLINE_S + 10;
+ for(;;){
+ char tmp[1024];
+ int r = tls_read(t, tmp, sizeof tmp - 1);
+ if(r < 0) break;
+ if(r == 0){
+ if(orbis_mono_s() > dl) break;
+ usleep(20000);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if(bl + (size_t)r >= body_cap) break;
+ memcpy(out_body + bl, tmp, (size_t)r);
+ bl += (size_t)r;
+ if(orbis_mono_s() > dl) break;
+ }
+ tls_free(t);
+ if(bl == 0){ return -1; }
+ out_body[bl] = 0;
+ /* Parse with the shared chunked-aware HTTP parser (Discord serves
+ * Transfer-Encoding: chunked here; naive header-splitting reads the
+ * chunk framing as body and the mp: lookup silently misses). */
+ {
+ int st = 0;
+ size_t olen = 0;
+ char *body = upd_parse_response(out_body, bl, body_cap,
+ &st, &olen, NULL, 0);
+ if(!body || st != 200){ free(body); return -1; }
+ if(out_len) *out_len = olen;
+ memmove(out_body, body, olen + 1);
+ free(body);
+ }
+ return 0;
+#else
+ /* Host test build: no transport; parse path still testable. */
+ (void)app_id; (void)token; (void)url;
+ (void)out_body; (void)body_cap; (void)out_len;
+ return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+int art_resolve_mp(const char *app_id, const char *token, const char *url,
+ char *out_mp, size_t cap){
+ if(!app_id || !app_id[0] || !token || !token[0] || !url || !url[0] ||
+ !out_mp || cap < 8)
+ return 0;
+ if(!strcmp(url, s_last_url) && s_last_mp[0]){
+ strncpy(out_mp, s_last_mp, cap - 1);
+ out_mp[cap - 1] = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ /* Disk cache (7-day TTL): titles resolved on earlier boots skip the
+ * round trip entirely. */
+ if(art_disk_get(url, out_mp, cap)){
+ snprintf(s_last_url, sizeof s_last_url, "%s", url);
+ snprintf(s_last_mp, sizeof s_last_mp, "%s", out_mp);
+ log_msg("art: mp from disk cache");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ static char resp[ART_RESP_MAX];
+ size_t rlen = 0;
+ if(art_post(app_id, token, url, resp, sizeof resp, &rlen) != 0){
+ log_msg("art: external-assets POST failed");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if(!art_parse_mp(resp, rlen, url, out_mp, cap)){
+ log_msg("art: no mp path for url (resp %zuB: %.120s)", rlen, resp);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ snprintf(s_last_url, sizeof s_last_url, "%s", url);
+ snprintf(s_last_mp, sizeof s_last_mp, "%s", out_mp);
+ art_disk_put(url, out_mp);
+ log_msg("art: resolved mp (%zuB)", strlen(out_mp));
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/art.h b/orbisrpc/art.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02a48a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/art.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* art.h - Discord external-asset (mp:) resolution for artwork.
+ *
+ * Verified on hardware 2026-09-23: raw https URLs and dangling asset keys
+ * in large_image either drop the whole activity or render "?". The working
+ * path used by every functional tool: POST the image URL to
+ * /applications/{app}/external-assets, use the returned mp: path.
+ * Results cached per boot (one call per title). */
+#ifndef ORBISRPC_ART_H
+#define ORBISRPC_ART_H
+#include <stddef.h>
+/* Resolve url -> mp: path. Returns 1 and fills out_mp ("mp:..." NUL) on
+ * success, 0 when unusable (caller sends no art). Not thread-safe. */
+int art_resolve_mp(const char *app_id, const char *token, const char *url,
+ char *out_mp, size_t cap);
+/* Drop the mp: cache (call on new game sessions: mappings can expire and
+ * each title deserves a fresh resolve anyway). */
+void art_cache_clear(void);
+/* Pure helper (host-tested): extract mp path for url from response. */
+int art_parse_mp(const char *body, size_t len, const char *url,
+ char *out, size_t cap);
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/b64.c b/orbisrpc/b64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61b7fdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/b64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/* b64.c - standard base64 encoder */
+#include "b64.h"
+static const char b64t[]="ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+size_t b64_encode(const unsigned char *in, size_t len, char *out){
+ size_t o=0, i;
+ if(!out || (len && !in)) return 0;
+ for(i=0;i<len;i+=3){
+ unsigned char b0=in[i], b1=(i+1<len)?in[i+1]:0, b2=(i+2<len)?in[i+2]:0;
+ unsigned v=((unsigned)b0<<16)|((unsigned)b1<<8)|b2;
+ out[o++]=b64t[(v>>18)&0x3f];
+ out[o++]=b64t[(v>>12)&0x3f];
+ out[o++]=i+1<len?b64t[(v>>6)&0x3f]:'=';
+ out[o++]=i+2<len?b64t[v&0x3f]:'=';
+ }
+ out[o]=0; /* NUL-terminate so callers can use it as a C string */
+ return o;
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/b64.h b/orbisrpc/b64.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5bca90c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/b64.h
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+/* b64.h - standard RFC 4648 Base64 encoder. */
+#ifndef B64_H
+#define B64_H
+#include <stddef.h>
+size_t b64_encode(const unsigned char *in, size_t len, char *out);
+/* Writes a NUL-terminated string to out and returns its encoded length.
+ * The caller must provide at least 4 * ((len + 2) / 3) + 1 bytes. */
+#endif
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/orbisrpc/ca_bundle_pem.h b/orbisrpc/ca_bundle_pem.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..449c2a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/ca_bundle_pem.h
@@ -0,0 +1,500 @@
+/* ca_bundle_pem.h - curated trust anchors (generated, do not edit).
+ * 22 roots for GitHub/Discord/Sony. Regenerate with scripts/make_ca_bundle.py.
+ */
+#ifndef ORBISRPC_CA_BUNDLE_PEM_H
+#define ORBISRPC_CA_BUNDLE_PEM_H
+static const char ORBISRPC_CA_BUNDLE_PEM[] =
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+"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
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+"SAGKcw==\n"
+"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
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+"exqDsQ+8FxG75gbMY/qB8oFM2gsQa6H61SilzwZAFv97fRheORKkU55+MkIQpiGRqRxOF3yEvJ+M\n"
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+"E/FmJUNS0nAiNs2fxBx1IK1jcmMGDw4nztJqDby1ORrp0XZ60Vzk50lJLVU3aPAaOpg+VBeHVOmm\n"
+"J1CJeyAvP/+/oYtKR5j/K3tJPsMpRmAYQqszKbrAKbkTidOIijlBO8n9pu0f9GBj39ItVQGL\n"
+"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+;
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/cfg.c b/orbisrpc/cfg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46784a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/cfg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+/* cfg.c - tiny JSON config via jsonlite */
+#include "cfg.h"
+#include "jsonlite.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+cfg_t g_cfg;
+
+void cfg_defaults(cfg_t *c) {
+ if(!c) return;
+ memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+ c->schema_version = CFG_SCHEMA_VERSION;
+ c->enabled = 1;
+ c->auto_update = 1;
+ c->poll_interval_s = 12;
+ strncpy(c->token, "SET_ME", sizeof(c->token)-1);
+ strncpy(c->presence_state, "On PS4", sizeof(c->presence_state)-1);
+ /* Idle tile ships working: project-hosted orbisRPC logo, resolved
+ * through the mp: proxy like every other art URL. Override with any
+ * http(s) URL or uploaded asset key. */
+ strncpy(c->home_art, "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SirHumza/orbisRPC/main/config/icons/logo.png",
+ sizeof(c->home_art)-1);
+ c->n_titles = 0;
+ /* Default art backend: our own Sony-CDN icon pack, resolved through
+ * Discord's external-assets proxy (mp:) at post time. Works from the
+ * start with zero setup; missing titles degrade to no art. */
+ strncpy(c->art_base_url, "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SirHumza/orbisrpc-host/main/icons/",
+ sizeof(c->art_base_url)-1);
+ strncpy(c->application_id, "1536977374795538532", sizeof(c->application_id)-1);
+}
+
+/* keep the daemon sane if the user puts junk in config */
+static void clamp_cfg(cfg_t *c){
+ if(c->poll_interval_s < 5){
+ log_msg("config: poll_interval_s %d too small; using 5", c->poll_interval_s);
+ c->poll_interval_s = 5;
+ }
+ if(c->poll_interval_s > 300){
+ log_msg("config: poll_interval_s %d too large; using 300", c->poll_interval_s);
+ c->poll_interval_s = 300;
+ }
+ if(c->token[0] && !strcmp(c->token, "SET_ME"))
+ log_msg("config: token is still the SET_ME placeholder");
+}
+
+int cfg_load(const char *path, cfg_t *c) {
+ if(!path || !c) return -1;
+ cfg_defaults(c);
+ FILE *f = fopen(path, "rb");
+ if (!f) { log_msg("config not found at %s; defaults applied", path); return -1; }
+ if (fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END) != 0) { fclose(f); return -1; }
+ long sz = ftell(f);
+ if (sz < 0 || fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET) != 0) { fclose(f); return -1; }
+ if (sz <= 0 || sz > 1<<20) { fclose(f); return -1; }
+ char *buf = (char *)malloc((size_t)sz + 1);
+ if (!buf) { fclose(f); return -1; }
+ size_t n = fread(buf, 1, (size_t)sz, f); fclose(f);
+ if(n != (size_t)sz){ free(buf); log_msg("config read failed at %s", path); return -1; }
+ buf[n] = 0;
+ jl_val_t *root = jl_parse(buf, n);
+ free(buf);
+ if (!root) { log_msg("config parse failed; using defaults"); return -1; }
+ const jl_val_t *o;
+#define STR(k,f) do { \
+ o=jl_obj_get(root,k); \
+ if(o&&o->type==JL_STRING){ \
+ strncpy(c->f,o->str,sizeof(c->f)-1); \
+ c->f[sizeof(c->f)-1]=0; \
+ } \
+ } while(0)
+ STR("token", token);
+ STR("application_id", application_id);
+ STR("art_base_url", art_base_url);
+ STR("home_art", home_art);
+ STR("presence_state", presence_state);
+#undef STR
+ /* User-local title overrides: {"CUSA11995": "Marvel's Spider-Man"}.
+ * Defensive: wrong types, overlong keys/names, and overflow past
+ * CFG_MAX_TITLES are ignored, never fatal. */
+ c->n_titles = 0;
+ o = jl_obj_get(root, "titles");
+ if(o && o->type == JL_OBJECT){
+ for(jl_val_t *p = o->child; p && c->n_titles < CFG_MAX_TITLES; p = p->next){
+ const jl_val_t *v = p->child ? p->child : p;
+ if(!p->str || !v || v->type != JL_STRING || !v->str) continue;
+ size_t kl = strlen(p->str), vl = strlen(v->str);
+ if(kl == 0 || kl >= (size_t)CFG_TITLEID_LEN) continue;
+ if(vl < 2 || vl >= (size_t)CFG_TITLENAME_LEN) continue;
+ int ok = 1;
+ for(size_t i = 0; i < kl; i++){
+ char ch = p->str[i];
+ if(!((ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z') || (ch >= '0' && ch <= '9') || ch == '_')){ ok = 0; break; }
+ }
+ if(!ok) continue;
+ strncpy(c->title_ids[c->n_titles], p->str, CFG_TITLEID_LEN - 1);
+ c->title_ids[c->n_titles][CFG_TITLEID_LEN - 1] = 0;
+ strncpy(c->title_names[c->n_titles], v->str, CFG_TITLENAME_LEN - 1);
+ c->title_names[c->n_titles][CFG_TITLENAME_LEN - 1] = 0;
+ c->n_titles++;
+ }
+ }
+ o = jl_obj_get(root, "enabled"); if (o && o->type == JL_BOOL) c->enabled = (int)o->num;
+ o = jl_obj_get(root, "auto_update"); if (o && o->type == JL_BOOL) c->auto_update = (int)o->num;
+ o = jl_obj_get(root, "debug"); if (o && o->type == JL_BOOL) c->debug = (int)o->num;
+ o = jl_obj_get(root, "poll_interval_s"); if (o && o->type == JL_NUMBER) c->poll_interval_s = (int)o->num;
+ o = jl_obj_get(root, "schema_version"); if (o && o->type == JL_NUMBER) c->schema_version = (int)o->num;
+ jl_free(root);
+ clamp_cfg(c);
+ /* Migration: stamp current schema so re-saves converge.
+ * v0 (no key): identical layout, adopt as-is. */
+ c->schema_version = CFG_SCHEMA_VERSION;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int cfg_title(const cfg_t *c, const char *titleId, char *out, size_t cap){
+ if(!c || !titleId || !titleId[0] || !out || cap == 0) return -1;
+ for(int i = 0; i < c->n_titles; i++){
+ if(!strcmp(c->title_ids[i], titleId)){
+ strncpy(out, c->title_names[i], cap - 1);
+ out[cap - 1] = 0;
+ return out[0] ? 0 : -1;
+ }
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Self-learning map (PC-tool "mapped" pattern): remember an authoritatively
+ * resolved name so later boots resolve instantly even when every live
+ * source is unreachable. Never learns raw-ID echoes or junk.
+ * Returns 1 when the map changed (caller should cfg_save). */
+int cfg_learn(cfg_t *c, const char *titleId, const char *name){
+ if(!c || !titleId || !name) return 0;
+ size_t kl = strlen(titleId), vl = strlen(name);
+ if(kl == 0 || kl >= (size_t)CFG_TITLEID_LEN) return 0;
+ if(vl < 2 || vl >= (size_t)CFG_TITLENAME_LEN) return 0;
+ if(!strcmp(titleId, name)) return 0; /* ID echo, not a name */
+ for(size_t i = 0; i < kl; i++){
+ char ch = titleId[i];
+ if(!((ch >= 'A' && ch <= 'Z') || (ch >= '0' && ch <= '9') || ch == '_')) return 0;
+ }
+ for(int i = 0; i < c->n_titles; i++){
+ if(!strcmp(c->title_ids[i], titleId)){
+ if(!strcmp(c->title_names[i], name)) return 0;
+ strncpy(c->title_names[i], name, CFG_TITLENAME_LEN - 1);
+ c->title_names[i][CFG_TITLENAME_LEN - 1] = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if(c->n_titles >= CFG_MAX_TITLES){
+ log_msg("config: titles map full; not learning %s", titleId);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ strncpy(c->title_ids[c->n_titles], titleId, CFG_TITLEID_LEN - 1);
+ c->title_ids[c->n_titles][CFG_TITLEID_LEN - 1] = 0;
+ strncpy(c->title_names[c->n_titles], name, CFG_TITLENAME_LEN - 1);
+ c->title_names[c->n_titles][CFG_TITLENAME_LEN - 1] = 0;
+ c->n_titles++;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int cfg_save(const char *path, const cfg_t *c) {
+ if(!path || !c) return -1;
+ jl_val_t *r = jl_new_object();
+ if(!r) { log_msg("cfg_save: allocation failed"); return -1; }
+ jl_obj_set(r, "schema_version", jl_new_number((double)CFG_SCHEMA_VERSION));
+ jl_obj_set(r, "token", jl_new_string(c->token));
+ jl_obj_set(r, "application_id", jl_new_string(c->application_id));
+ jl_obj_set(r, "art_base_url", jl_new_string(c->art_base_url));
+ jl_obj_set(r, "enabled", jl_new_bool(c->enabled));
+ jl_obj_set(r, "auto_update", jl_new_bool(c->auto_update));
+ jl_obj_set(r, "debug", jl_new_bool(c->debug));
+ jl_obj_set(r, "poll_interval_s", jl_new_number((double)c->poll_interval_s));
+ jl_obj_set(r, "presence_state", jl_new_string(c->presence_state));
+ jl_obj_set(r, "home_art", jl_new_string(c->home_art));
+ if(c->n_titles > 0){
+ jl_val_t *t = jl_new_object();
+ if(t){
+ for(int i = 0; i < c->n_titles; i++)
+ jl_obj_set(t, c->title_ids[i], jl_new_string(c->title_names[i]));
+ jl_obj_set(r, "titles", t);
+ }
+ }
+ char *s = jl_stringify(r);
+ if(!s){ log_msg("cfg_save: serialization failed"); jl_free(r); return -1; }
+ /* write tmp + fsync + rename so a power loss can't corrupt the config */
+ char tmp[160];
+ snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%s.tmp", path);
+ FILE *f = fopen(tmp, "wb");
+ int ok = 0;
+ if (f) {
+ ok = (fputs(s, f) >= 0);
+ if(fflush(f) != 0) ok = 0;
+ /* force bytes to disk before rename */
+ if(ok) { int fd = fileno(f); if(fd >= 0 && fsync(fd) != 0) ok = 0; }
+ if(fclose(f) != 0) ok = 0;
+ if(ok && rename(tmp, path) != 0) ok = 0;
+ if(!ok){
+ remove(tmp);
+ log_msg("cfg_save: write failed for %s", path);
+ }
+ } else { log_msg("cfg_save: cannot write %s", tmp); }
+ free(s); jl_free(r);
+ return ok ? 0 : -1;
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/cfg.h b/orbisrpc/cfg.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b219e1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/cfg.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/* cfg.h - tiny JSON config via jsonlite */
+#ifndef CFG_H
+#define CFG_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#define CFG_PATH "/data/orbisRPC/config.json"
+#define LOG_PATH "/data/orbisRPC/log.txt"
+#define DATA_DIR "/data/orbisRPC"
+/* Config schema version. Stamp on load so re-saves converge; unknown
+ * future versions load defensively (known fields only). */
+#define CFG_SCHEMA_VERSION 1
+/* User-local title overrides: {"CUSA11995": "Marvel's Spider-Man"}.
+ * Lives in the user's own config.json (never shipped) for games no
+ * on-box source can name (no pronunciation.xml, TMDB blocked, ...).
+ * Fixed-size tables: no malloc, PS4-safe. */
+#define CFG_MAX_TITLES 64
+#define CFG_TITLEID_LEN 16
+#define CFG_TITLENAME_LEN 128
+typedef struct {
+ int schema_version;
+ char token[512]; /* Discord user session token */
+ char application_id[64]; /* optional: app id for uploaded asset images */
+ char art_base_url[256]; /* optional: icon pack base URL, e.g.
+ * https://raw.githubusercontent.com/.../icons/
+ * large_image becomes <base><lower titleId>.png */
+ char home_art[256]; /* optional: idle/home tile art. http(s) URL
+ * (mp:-proxied) or uploaded Discord asset key.
+ * Default: project-hosted PlayStation logo.
+ * Empty falls back to <art_base_url>home.png. */
+ int n_titles;
+ char title_ids[CFG_MAX_TITLES][CFG_TITLEID_LEN];
+ char title_names[CFG_MAX_TITLES][CFG_TITLENAME_LEN];
+ int enabled;
+ int auto_update; /* check GitHub releases once per boot, stage newer */
+ int debug; /* verbose debug logging (per-poll detail, no secrets) */
+ int poll_interval_s; /* game-check cadence */
+ char presence_state[128]; /* activity "state" line, e.g. "On PS4" */
+} cfg_t;
+extern cfg_t g_cfg;
+int cfg_load(const char *path, cfg_t *c);
+/* Atomic save (tmp + fsync + rename). 0 saved, -1 failed (caller must
+ * surface, not assume). */
+int cfg_save(const char *path, const cfg_t *c);
+void cfg_defaults(cfg_t *c);
+/* User override lookup: 0 + name copied when titleId has an entry. */
+int cfg_title(const cfg_t *c, const char *titleId, char *out, size_t cap);
+/* Learn an authoritatively resolved name (1 = changed, save it). */
+int cfg_learn(cfg_t *c, const char *titleId, const char *name);
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/clock.h b/orbisrpc/clock.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fca3478
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/clock.h
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/* clock.h - monotonic time for measuring durations.
+ *
+ * Rule: wall clock (time(NULL)) is ONLY for values that must be wall
+ * clock (Discord epoch timestamps, log stamps). Every duration/deadline
+ * uses orbis_mono_s() so a clock jump can never break local timing.
+ *
+ * PS4: sceKernelGetProcessTime (microseconds, monotonic).
+ * Host: clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC). */
+#ifndef ORBISRPC_CLOCK_H
+#define ORBISRPC_CLOCK_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+/* Monotonic seconds (arbitrary epoch, never goes backward). */
+int64_t orbis_mono_s(void);
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/compat.c b/orbisrpc/compat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..925ee8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/compat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+/* compat.c - tiny libc shims for the PS4 link environment.
+ * SceLibcInternal lacks getentropy/__errno_location/gmtime_r, and
+ * mbedTLS wants a platform entropy poll. Compiled into payload + plugin. */
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include "clock.h"
+
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+/* Payload-SDK builds: the SDK libc already provides errno, gmtime_r,
+ * clock_gettime and friends. Only the entropy poll + monotonic clock
+ * live here, written against plain POSIX. */
+int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, unsigned char *out,
+ size_t len, size_t *olen){
+ (void)data;
+ if(!out || len == 0) return -1;
+ int fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+ if(fd < 0) return -1;
+ size_t got = 0;
+ while(got < len){
+ long r = read(fd, (char *)out + got, len - got);
+ if(r <= 0){ close(fd); return -1; }
+ got += (size_t)r;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ *olen = len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int64_t orbis_mono_s(void){
+ struct timespec ts;
+ if(clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) != 0) return (int64_t)time(NULL);
+ return (int64_t)ts.tv_sec;
+}
+
+#else
+
+int *__errno_location(void) __attribute__((weak));
+int *__errno_location(void){
+ static int errno_slot;
+ return &errno_slot;
+}
+
+__attribute__((weak)) int getentropy(void *buf, size_t n){
+ int fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+ if(fd < 0) return -1;
+ size_t got = 0;
+ while(got < n){
+ long r = read(fd, (char*)buf + got, n - got);
+ if(r < 0 && errno == EINTR) continue; /* signal delivery, not failure */
+ if(r <= 0){ close(fd); return -1; }
+ got += (size_t)r;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__attribute__((weak)) struct tm *gmtime_r(const time_t *t, struct tm *r){
+ /* Thread-safe: pure arithmetic, no static buffer (gmtime() is shared). */
+ if(!t || !r) return NULL;
+ long long secs = (long long)*t;
+ long long days = secs / 86400LL;
+ long long rem = secs % 86400LL;
+ if(rem < 0){ rem += 86400LL; days--; }
+ r->tm_hour = (int)(rem / 3600); rem %= 3600;
+ r->tm_min = (int)(rem / 60);
+ r->tm_sec = (int)(rem % 60);
+ /* civil_from_days (Howard Hinnant) */
+ long long z = days + 719468LL;
+ long long era = (z >= 0 ? z : z - 146096LL) / 146097LL;
+ unsigned doe = (unsigned)(z - era * 146097LL);
+ unsigned yoe = (doe - doe/1460U + doe/36524U - doe/146096U) / 365U;
+ long long y = (long long)yoe + era * 400LL;
+ unsigned doy = doe - (365U*yoe + yoe/4U - yoe/100U);
+ unsigned mp = (5U*doy + 2U)/153U;
+ unsigned d = doy - (153U*mp+2U)/5U + 1U;
+ unsigned m = mp + (mp < 10U ? 3U : (unsigned)-9);
+ y += (m <= 2);
+ r->tm_mday = (int)d;
+ r->tm_mon = (int)(m - 1);
+ r->tm_year = (int)(y - 1900LL);
+ /* weekday: 1970-01-01 was Thursday */
+ r->tm_wday = (int)((days % 7 + 7 + 4) % 7);
+ /* yearday */
+ {
+ int leap = ((y%4==0 && y%100!=0) || y%400==0);
+ static const int cum[12] = {0,31,59,90,120,151,181,212,243,273,304,334};
+ r->tm_yday = cum[r->tm_mon] + (int)d - 1 + (leap && r->tm_mon > 1 ? 1 : 0);
+ }
+ r->tm_isdst = 0;
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* mbedTLS platform entropy: /dev/urandom, the only strong source here. */
+int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, unsigned char *out,
+ size_t len, size_t *olen){
+ (void)data;
+ if(!out || len == 0) return -1;
+ if(getentropy(out, len) != 0) return -1;
+ *olen = len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int64_t orbis_mono_s(void){
+#if defined(__PS4__) || (defined(__FreeBSD__) && !defined(__APPLE__))
+ /* PS4 builds (--target=x86_64-pc-freebsd12-elf, -D__PS4__). Declared
+ * here instead of including orbis headers so host builds stay clean. */
+ extern unsigned long long sceKernelGetProcessTime(void);
+ return (int64_t)(sceKernelGetProcessTime() / 1000000ull);
+#else
+ struct timespec ts;
+#if defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC)
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts);
+#else
+ ts.tv_sec = time(NULL);
+ ts.tv_nsec = 0;
+#endif
+ return (int64_t)ts.tv_sec;
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD */
diff --git a/orbisrpc/daemon.c b/orbisrpc/daemon.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c7af8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/daemon.c
@@ -0,0 +1,587 @@
+/* daemon.c - orbisRPC core loop, usable from the ELF payload (main.c) or from a
+ * GoldHEN plugin. When `fixed_game_name` is non-NULL the daemon posts presence
+ * for that game unconditionally (the plugin runs inside the game process and
+ * already knows the title); otherwise it detects the foreground game.
+ *
+ * Auth model: a Discord USER SESSION token pasted into config.json ("token").
+ * There is no OAuth flow anymore — OAuth2 access tokens are rejected by the
+ * gateway (close 4004), which was why v1 never worked.
+ *
+ * A `stop` flag is polled so plugin_unload() can shut the loop down cleanly. */
+#include "cfg.h"
+#include "clock.h"
+#include "lock.h"
+#include "timesync.h"
+#include "health.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ws.h"
+#include "discord.h"
+#include "detect.h"
+#include "updater.h"
+#include "version.h"
+#include "jsonlite.h"
+#include "art.h"
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+extern cfg_t g_cfg;
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t s_stop = 0;
+
+/* Tells a running daemon_run() to shut down (called from plugin_unload). */
+void daemon_request_stop(void){ s_stop = 1; }
+void daemon_clear_stop(void){ s_stop = 0; }
+int daemon_stop_requested(void){ return s_stop; }
+
+/* SIGTERM/SIGINT (payload managers, kill): set the flag only — the loops
+ * unwind through their normal cleanup (presence clear, session save,
+ * socket close) instead of dying mid-write. */
+static void daemon_on_signal(int sig){
+ (void)sig;
+ s_stop = 1;
+}
+
+/* Sleep up to `secs` but wake within a second when the plugin asks us to
+ * stop, so plugin_unload() never hangs on a long backoff. Returns 1 stopped. */
+static int sleep_stop(int secs){
+ for(int i = 0; i < secs; i++){
+ if(s_stop) return 1;
+ sleep(1);
+ }
+ return s_stop;
+}
+
+static int have_token(const cfg_t *c){
+ if(!c || !c->token[0]) return 0;
+ if(strcmp(c->token,"SET_ME")==0) return 0;
+ /* reject whitespace-only / trivially short tokens */
+ size_t n = strlen(c->token);
+ if(n < 16) return 0;
+ for(size_t i = 0; i < n; i++){
+ if(c->token[i]!=' ' && c->token[i]!='\t' && c->token[i]!='\r' && c->token[i]!='\n')
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Persist the live session (atomic tmp+rename). Called on every
+ * transition and on clear so a restart resumes instead of resetting. */
+static void sess_save(const char *tid, const char *name, int64_t started){ jl_val_t *r = jl_new_object();
+ if(!r) return;
+ jl_obj_set(r, "title_id", jl_new_string(tid ? tid : ""));
+ jl_obj_set(r, "name", jl_new_string(name ? name : ""));
+ jl_obj_set(r, "started", jl_new_number((double)started));
+ jl_obj_set(r, "saved_at", jl_new_number((double)time(NULL)));
+ char *s = jl_stringify(r);
+ jl_free(r);
+ if(!s) return;
+ FILE *f = fopen("/data/orbisRPC/session.json.new", "wb");
+ if(f){
+ int ok = (fputs(s, f) >= 0) && (fflush(f) == 0);
+ if(fclose(f) != 0) ok = 0;
+ if(ok) rename("/data/orbisRPC/session.json.new",
+ "/data/orbisRPC/session.json");
+ else remove("/data/orbisRPC/session.json.new");
+ }
+ free(s);
+}
+
+/* Playtime ledger: append-only "<title_id> <name> <seconds>" per finished
+ * session. Totals are computed by readers (app/docs); the daemon only
+ * appends, so a corrupt ledger can never break the runtime. */
+static void ledger_append(const char *tid, const char *name,
+ int64_t started, int64_t ended){
+ if(!tid || !tid[0] || ended <= started || started <= 0) return;
+ FILE *f = fopen("/data/orbisRPC/playtime.log", "ab");
+ if(!f) return;
+ fprintf(f, "%s %s %lld\n", tid, (name && name[0]) ? name : "?",
+ (long long)(ended - started));
+ fclose(f);
+}
+
+/* Deterministic jitter ±20% without RNG state: hash of mono time and a
+ * counter. Keeps reconnect storms decorrelated across restarts. */
+static int backoff_jitter(int base, unsigned *ctr){
+ unsigned x = (unsigned)orbis_mono_s() * 2654435761u + (++(*ctr)) * 40503u;
+ x ^= x >> 15; x *= 0x2c1b3c6du; x ^= x >> 12;
+ int pct = 80 + (int)(x % 41); /* 80..120 */
+ return (base * pct) / 100;
+}
+
+/* Next reconnect delay: exponential from base, cap 60s for the first 10
+ * consecutive failures, then 10-minute cadence (quiet persistence, never
+ * exit). Returns the delay; bumps *fails. */
+static int reconnect_delay(int *fails, int base, unsigned *jctr){
+ int n = ++(*fails);
+ int b = base;
+ for(int i = 1; i < n && b < 60; i++) b *= 2;
+ if(b > 60) b = 60;
+ if(n > 10) b = 600;
+ return backoff_jitter(b, jctr);
+}
+
+/* Explicit presence state (logged on every transition; no ambiguous
+ * states): NONE -> HOME <-> GAME, with reconnects re-posting. */
+typedef enum { PS_NONE = 0, PS_HOME, PS_GAME } pres_state_t;
+static const char *pres_name(pres_state_t s){
+ return s == PS_GAME ? "GAME" : s == PS_HOME ? "HOME" : "NONE";
+}
+static void pres_set(pres_state_t *cur, pres_state_t next){
+ if(*cur == next) return;
+ log_msg("STATE: presence %s -> %s", pres_name(*cur), pres_name(next));
+ *cur = next;
+}
+/* fixed_game_name != NULL -> post presence for that game only, no detection.
+ * NULL -> poll the foreground app like the payload daemon does.
+ * Returns 0 normal stop, 1 config error, 2 auth-fatal (bad token). */
+int daemon_run(const char *fixed_game_name){
+ s_stop = 0;
+#ifdef SIGTERM
+ signal(SIGTERM, daemon_on_signal);
+#endif
+#ifdef SIGINT
+ signal(SIGINT, daemon_on_signal);
+#endif
+ if(mkdir(DATA_DIR, 0777) != 0){
+ /* EEXIST is fine; anything else means payload can't persist config/log */
+ struct stat st;
+ if(stat(DATA_DIR, &st) != 0){
+ log_init(LOG_PATH);
+ log_msg("FATAL: cannot create %s; check /data writable", DATA_DIR);
+ log_close();
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ log_init(LOG_PATH);
+ log_msg("orbisRPC daemon start — build %s %s", __DATE__, __TIME__);
+ /* Single writer: a second launch (or a stale pileup from repeated
+ * injections) stands down instead of fighting over the gateway. */
+ {
+ int lr = lock_acquire();
+ if(lr == 1){ log_msg("another daemon holds the lock; standing down"); log_close(); return 0; }
+ if(lr != 0) log_msg("WARN: lock error; continuing without guard");
+ }
+ /* Crash recovery: unclean-boot marker + consecutive-failure counter.
+ * Only boots that die before going healthy count; normal reboots and
+ * token-less idles never trip safe mode. */
+ int safe_mode = health_boot_note_crash();
+ if(safe_mode)
+ log_msg("WARN: repeated unclean boots; safe mode (updates off)");
+ /* Boot watchdog: a staged update that never proved itself healthy
+ * gets rolled back to .bak before anything runs it. */
+ {
+ static const char *targets[] = {
+ "/data/payloads/orbisrpc.bin",
+ "/data/GoldHEN/plugins/orbisrpc_plugin.prx",
+ };
+ for(unsigned ti = 0; ti < sizeof targets/sizeof targets[0]; ti++){
+ int vr = health_verify_or_rollback(targets[ti]);
+ if(vr == 1)
+ log_msg("WARN: %s rolled back to last-good backup", targets[ti]);
+ else if(vr == -1)
+ log_msg("WARN: %s failed verification (no backup)", targets[ti]);
+ }
+ }
+ if(cfg_load(CFG_PATH, &g_cfg) != 0){
+ /* First boot: drop a template so FTP edit is the only step */
+ FILE *probe = fopen(CFG_PATH, "rb");
+ if(!probe){
+ cfg_defaults(&g_cfg);
+ if(cfg_save(CFG_PATH, &g_cfg) != 0)
+ log_msg("WARN: template config unwritable; token edits will not persist");
+ else
+ log_msg("created template %s; edit \"token\" then reboot", CFG_PATH);
+ } else fclose(probe);
+ log_msg("config load failed; running on defaults until valid config appears");
+ }
+ if(!g_cfg.enabled){ log_msg("disabled in config; exiting"); health_mark_clean(); log_close(); return 0; }
+ log_set_debug(g_cfg.debug);
+ if(g_cfg.debug) log_dbg("debug logging on (config)");
+ /* Wall-clock correction for Discord timestamps (PSN time sync is
+ * typically blocked on jailbroken consoles). Boot sweep is bounded;
+ * hourly ticks are single-host attempts (never stall heartbeats). */
+ time_sync_all();
+ if(!have_token(&g_cfg)){
+ /* Waiting for configuration is a HEALTHY boot, not a crash:
+ * mark clean so token-less boots never trip safe mode. */
+ health_mark_healthy();
+ log_msg("FATAL: put your Discord user token in %s as \"token\":\"...\"", CFG_PATH);
+ log_close();
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Self-update once per boot, before first connect. Never fatal:
+ * staged artifacts take effect on next launch/injection. */
+ if(g_cfg.auto_update && !safe_mode){
+ int ur = updater_check_and_stage();
+ log_msg("updater: %s (local %s)",
+ ur > 0 ? "staged newer build" : ur == 0 ? "already current" : "check failed",
+ ORBISRPC_VERSION);
+ } else if(safe_mode){
+ log_msg("updater: skipped (safe mode)");
+ }
+
+ discord_t dc;
+ int base_poll = g_cfg.poll_interval_s;
+ if(base_poll < 5) base_poll = 5;
+ if(base_poll > 60) base_poll = 60;
+ /* Reconnect policy: exponential backoff with deterministic jitter,
+ * cap 60s for the first 10 consecutive failures, then 10-minute
+ * cadence (quiet persistence, never exit). Success resets. */
+ int backoff = base_poll;
+ int conn_fails = 0;
+ unsigned jctr = 0;
+ /* Health metrics (hourly HEALTH line). */
+ int64_t boot_mono = orbis_mono_s();
+ unsigned n_posts = 0, n_reconnects = 0;
+ int64_t last_health = 0;
+ for(;;){ /* outer: connect cycles with backoff on failure */
+ if(s_stop) break;
+ /* re-read config every cycle so token edits land without a reboot.
+ * On parse failure keep last-good config instead of stale defaults. */
+ {
+ cfg_t next = g_cfg;
+ if(cfg_load(CFG_PATH, &next) == 0){
+ if(next.debug != g_cfg.debug)
+ log_msg("debug logging %s", next.debug ? "on" : "off");
+ g_cfg = next;
+ log_set_debug(g_cfg.debug);
+ }
+ else log_msg("config reload failed; keeping last-good config");
+ }
+ if(!have_token(&g_cfg)){
+ log_msg("no token in config; waiting %ds", backoff);
+ if(sleep_stop(backoff)) break;
+ continue;
+ }
+ int rc = discord_connect(&dc, g_cfg.token);
+ if(rc == -2){
+ /* Rejected token: do NOT exit (that would strand the daemon
+ * until the next manual injection). The per-cycle config
+ * reload picks up a fixed token on its own. */
+ log_msg("WARN: token rejected by gateway (close 4004). "
+ "Fix \"token\" in %s; retrying", CFG_PATH);
+ int wait = reconnect_delay(&conn_fails, base_poll, &jctr);
+ if(sleep_stop(wait)) break;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if(rc != 0){
+ int wait = reconnect_delay(&conn_fails, base_poll, &jctr);
+ log_msg("gateway connect failed (attempt %d); retry in %ds",
+ conn_fails, wait);
+ if(sleep_stop(wait)) break;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if(conn_fails > 0)
+ log_msg("gateway connected after %d failures", conn_fails);
+ conn_fails = 0;
+ n_reconnects++;
+ backoff = g_cfg.poll_interval_s; /* success resets backoff */
+ if(backoff < 5) backoff = 5;
+ if(backoff > 60) backoff = 60;
+
+ /* last/started live OUTSIDE the session loop so the playing timer
+ * survives gateway reconnects (same game keeps its original start).
+ * A reconnect re-posts presence only when needed, timer intact. */
+ static int active = 0;
+ static pres_state_t pres = PS_NONE;
+ static char last[128] = "";
+ static char sess_tid[16] = "";
+ static int64_t started = 0;
+ static int64_t last_tsync = 0;
+ static int home_posted = 0;
+ /* Fresh (re)connect invalidates whatever Discord shows: re-post the
+ * current state (game via need_post below, home via home_posted
+ * reset) so a drop can never leave a stale/blank tile behind. */
+ home_posted = 0;
+ /* Resume window: if the same title vanishes briefly (detection
+ * flicker, quick menu hop) and returns within 10 minutes, the
+ * timer resumes instead of resetting to 0:00. */
+ static char prev_tid[16] = "";
+ static int64_t prev_started = 0, prev_end = 0;
+ /* Cross-restart resume: a previous run's session (saved on every
+ * transition) seeds the resume window, so reboots and updates
+ * keep the timer instead of resetting it. */
+ {
+ static int sess_restored = 0;
+ if(!sess_restored){
+ sess_restored = 1;
+ FILE *sf = fopen("/data/orbisRPC/session.json", "rb");
+ if(sf){
+ fseek(sf, 0, SEEK_END);
+ long ssz = ftell(sf);
+ fseek(sf, 0, SEEK_SET);
+ if(ssz > 0 && ssz < 1024){
+ char *sb = (char*)malloc((size_t)ssz + 1);
+ if(sb && fread(sb, 1, (size_t)ssz, sf) == (size_t)ssz){
+ sb[ssz] = 0;
+ jl_val_t *sr = jl_parse(sb, (size_t)ssz);
+ if(sr && sr->type == JL_OBJECT){
+ const jl_val_t *t = jl_obj_get(sr, "title_id");
+ const jl_val_t *s2 = jl_obj_get(sr, "started");
+ if(t && t->type == JL_STRING && t->str &&
+ s2 && s2->type == JL_NUMBER){
+ /* Validate before trusting: 9-char id,
+ * sane epoch (2020-2100). A corrupt file
+ * must never seed a bogus timer. */
+ int64_t st = (int64_t)s2->num;
+ if(strlen(t->str) == 9 &&
+ st >= 1577836800LL &&
+ st <= 4102444800LL){
+ strncpy(prev_tid, t->str, sizeof prev_tid-1);
+ prev_started = st;
+ /* Wall saved_at can't mix with the
+ * monotonic resume window: start the
+ * window at boot. Same title seen
+ * within minutes of boot resumes. */
+ prev_end = orbis_mono_s();
+ log_msg("session restored: %s (timer may resume)",
+ prev_tid);
+ } else {
+ log_msg("session file failed validation; starting fresh");
+ }
+ }
+ jl_free(sr);
+ }
+ free(sb);
+ } else if(sb) free(sb);
+ }
+ fclose(sf);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* Transition debounce: shell flickers during launches, so a new
+ * title (or disappearance) needs consecutive polls (2 at ~1s). */
+ static char cand_title[16] = "";
+ static int cand_hits = 0, miss_hits = 0;
+ int64_t last_poll = 0;
+ int64_t last_alive = 0;
+ static int healthy_marked = 0;
+ /* re-post after every (re)connect so Discord never sticks on stale */
+ int need_post = active && last[0];
+ while(!s_stop){ /* inner: live session, serviced every second */
+ int64_t now = orbis_mono_s();
+ if(now - last_tsync >= 3600){ last_tsync = now; time_sync(); }
+ if(now != last_poll){
+ last_poll = now;
+ if(now - last_alive >= 60){
+ last_alive = now;
+ log_msg("alive: %s", active ? last : "idle");
+ }
+ /* State reconciliation: re-post current presence every
+ * 15 min so a silently desynced tile (dropped update,
+ * stale cache, missed reconnect) heals itself without
+ * any state change. Timer/source values are re-read at
+ * post time, so this never disturbs a live session. */
+ {
+ static int64_t last_reconcile = 0;
+ if(last_reconcile == 0) last_reconcile = now;
+ if(now - last_reconcile >= 900){
+ last_reconcile = now;
+ if(active && last[0]) need_post = 1;
+ else home_posted = 0;
+ log_msg("reconcile: reposting current state");
+ }
+ }
+ /* Hourly health metrics: uptime, posts, reconnects, fails. */
+ if(now - last_health >= 3600){
+ last_health = now;
+ log_msg("HEALTH: %lldh uptime, %u posts, %u reconnects, %d recent fails",
+ (long long)((now - boot_mono) / 3600),
+ n_posts, n_reconnects, conn_fails);
+ }
+ /* A boot that survives HEALTH_STABLE_SECS of runtime was
+ * healthy: clear the unclean-boot marker so only real
+ * crashes count toward safe mode. */
+ if(!healthy_marked && now - boot_mono >= HEALTH_STABLE_SECS){
+ healthy_marked = 1;
+ health_mark_healthy();
+ log_msg("health: boot marked healthy");
+ }
+ char name[128] = "";
+ int scan_unknown = 0;
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ /* Launch/close shortcut: the eboot set changing means the
+ * foreground game changed RIGHT NOW. Reset debounce so the
+ * switch commits within ~2 polls. Deliberately NOT instant:
+ * the title scan needs one poll for fresh atime data, and
+ * committing a stale scan instantly would lock the wrong
+ * title with a full session. */
+ {
+ static int last_eboots = -1;
+ int nboots = detect_eboot_count();
+ if(nboots >= 0 && nboots != last_eboots){
+ if(last_eboots >= 0)
+ log_msg("eboot set %d -> %d; fast-switching",
+ last_eboots, nboots);
+ last_eboots = nboots;
+ cand_title[0] = 0;
+ cand_hits = 0;
+ miss_hits = 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if(fixed_game_name){
+ strncpy(name, fixed_game_name, sizeof name-1);
+ name[sizeof name-1] = 0;
+ }else{
+ /* detect_current_game already checks foreground-active
+ * internally; don't double-call it. -2 means the scan
+ * itself failed: hold position, touch nothing. */
+ scan_unknown = (detect_current_game(name, sizeof name, NULL, 0) == -2);
+ if(scan_unknown){
+ log_dbg("detect scan failed; holding");
+ name[0] = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if(name[0]){
+ const char *cur_tid = detect_last_titleid();
+ if(!cur_tid) cur_tid = "";
+ if(!strcmp(cur_tid, cand_title)){
+ cand_hits++;
+ } else {
+ strncpy(cand_title, cur_tid, sizeof cand_title-1);
+ cand_title[sizeof cand_title-1] = 0;
+ cand_hits = 1;
+ }
+ miss_hits = 0;
+ if(fixed_game_name || cand_hits >= 2){
+ if(!active || strcmp(cur_tid,sess_tid)!=0){
+ /* Switching away from a live session: bank its time.
+ * (Fresh starts and resumes have nothing to bank;
+ * the clear path already banked ended sessions.) */
+ if(active && sess_tid[0] &&
+ strcmp(cur_tid,sess_tid)!=0)
+ ledger_append(sess_tid, last, started, time_fixed());
+ active = 1;
+ strncpy(sess_tid, cur_tid, sizeof sess_tid-1);
+ strncpy(last, name, sizeof last-1);
+ last[sizeof last-1] = 0;
+ if(!strcmp(cur_tid, prev_tid) &&
+ prev_started > 0 &&
+ now - prev_end < 600){
+ started = prev_started;
+ log_msg("SESSION_RESUMED title=%s (gap %llds, timer kept)",
+ cur_tid[0]?cur_tid:"?", (long long)(now - prev_end));
+ } else {
+ started = time_fixed();
+ }
+ need_post = 1;
+ log_msg("GAME_DETECTED title=%s name=%s", cur_tid[0]?cur_tid:"?", name);
+ art_cache_clear();
+ sess_save(cur_tid, name, started);
+ /* Self-learning map: persist authoritatively resolved
+ * names so later boots resolve instantly, even when
+ * every live source is unreachable. Raw-ID fallbacks
+ * (ok=0) are never learned. */
+ if(cur_tid[0] && detect_last_ok() && cfg_learn(&g_cfg, cur_tid, name)){
+ if(cfg_save(CFG_PATH, &g_cfg) != 0)
+ log_msg("config: learn save failed for %s", cur_tid);
+ else
+ log_msg("config: learned %s", cur_tid);
+ }
+ } else if(strcmp(name,last)!=0){
+ strncpy(last, name, sizeof last-1);
+ last[sizeof last-1] = 0;
+ need_post = 1;
+ }
+ if(need_post){
+ const char *state = g_cfg.presence_state[0] ? g_cfg.presence_state : NULL;
+ const char *tart = detect_last_art();
+ /* Playback queue of one: only clear need_post after
+ * the bytes actually go out. A failed send stays
+ * queued and rides the next tick/reconnect. */
+ int pr = discord_set_presence_ex(&dc, state, last, sess_tid[0]?sess_tid:NULL, g_cfg.application_id, g_cfg.art_base_url, tart, g_cfg.home_art[0]?g_cfg.home_art:NULL, started);
+ if(pr == 0){
+ log_msg("presence: %s", last);
+ pres_set(&pres, PS_GAME);
+ n_posts++;
+ active = 1; need_post = 0;
+ } else {
+ log_msg("presence send failed; will retry");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }else if(active && !scan_unknown){
+ cand_title[0] = 0;
+ cand_hits = 0;
+ if(++miss_hits >= 2){
+ discord_clear_presence(&dc);
+ log_msg("presence cleared");
+ pres_set(&pres, PS_NONE);
+ ledger_append(sess_tid, last, started, time_fixed());
+ strncpy(prev_tid, sess_tid, sizeof prev_tid-1);
+ prev_started = started;
+ prev_end = now;
+ remove("/data/orbisRPC/session.json");
+ last[0]=0; sess_tid[0]=0; active=0; started=0;
+ home_posted = 0;
+ }
+ } else if(!home_posted && !scan_unknown){
+ /* Home screen support: no game running. Post a timerless
+ * home presence once (instead of bare online), clear it
+ * the moment a game commits. */
+ const char *state = g_cfg.presence_state[0] ? g_cfg.presence_state : NULL;
+ if(discord_set_presence_ex(&dc, state, "PlayStation 4", "home",
+ g_cfg.application_id, g_cfg.art_base_url,
+ g_cfg.home_art[0] ? g_cfg.home_art : NULL, NULL, 0) == 0){
+ log_msg("presence: home");
+ pres_set(&pres, PS_HOME);
+ n_posts++;
+ home_posted = 1;
+ } else {
+ log_msg("home presence send failed; will retry");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* service the gateway every pass (~1s): heartbeats must never be
+ * more than a second or two late or the server drops us */
+ int tr = discord_tick(&dc);
+ if(tr == -2){
+ /* Token rejected mid-session: same policy as connect-time
+ * 4004 (never strand the daemon). Drop to the outer loop:
+ * backoff + config reload picks up a fixed token alone. */
+ log_msg("WARN: token rejected (close 4004). Fix %s; retrying", CFG_PATH);
+ ws_close(&dc.ws);
+ pres_set(&pres, PS_NONE);
+ if(sleep_stop(reconnect_delay(&conn_fails, base_poll, &jctr))) break;
+ break;
+ }
+ if(tr == -3){
+ int wait = reconnect_delay(&conn_fails, base_poll, &jctr);
+ log_msg("invalid session; fresh identify (attempt %d) in %ds",
+ conn_fails, wait);
+ ws_close(&dc.ws);
+ pres_set(&pres, PS_NONE);
+ if(sleep_stop(wait)) break;
+ break;
+ }
+ if(tr != 0){
+ int wait = reconnect_delay(&conn_fails, base_poll, &jctr);
+ log_msg("gateway dropped (attempt %d); reconnecting in %ds",
+ conn_fails, wait);
+ ws_close(&dc.ws);
+ pres_set(&pres, PS_NONE);
+ if(sleep_stop(wait)) break;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ for(int i = 0; i < 10 && !s_stop; i++) usleep(100000);
+ }
+ if(s_stop && dc.connected) discord_clear_presence(&dc);
+ ws_close(&dc.ws);
+ }
+ /* Session file already reflects the live session (saved on every
+ * transition), so shutdown is: clear presence (above), release the
+ * lock so a successor starts immediately, close the log. */
+ lock_release();
+ log_close();
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/daemon.h b/orbisrpc/daemon.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..34356a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/daemon.h
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/* daemon.h - shared orbisRPC daemon loop (payload ELF and GoldHEN plugin). */
+#ifndef DAEMON_H
+#define DAEMON_H
+/* fixed_game_name != NULL: post presence for that game only (plugin mode).
+ * NULL: poll the foreground app (payload mode).
+ * Returns 0 on clean stop, 1 on missing/invalid configuration, or 2 when
+ * Discord rejects the token with close code 4004. */
+int daemon_run(const char *fixed_game_name);
+void daemon_request_stop(void);
+void daemon_clear_stop(void);
+int daemon_stop_requested(void); /* 1 when plugin_unload() wants us to exit */
+#endif
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/orbisrpc/detect.c b/orbisrpc/detect.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e3648b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/detect.c
@@ -0,0 +1,593 @@
+/* detect.c
+ * Foreground-game detection on PS4.
+ *
+ * Primary signal: sceShellCoreUtilIsAppLaunched() — resolved at runtime via
+ * dlopen/dlsym (libSceShellCoreUtil.sprx). Returns 1 when a user app (game)
+ * is in the foreground vs the home screen. This is the reliable "playing"
+ * indicator; it stays 0 on the home screen so presence clears.
+ *
+ * Fallback (if ShellCoreUtil can't be resolved in the payload context):
+ * sceUserServiceGetForegroundUser >= 0 + most-recent app.xml heuristic.
+ *
+ * Title naming is best-effort:
+ * a) /data/app/<titleid>/app.xml <title> for the most-recently-modified dir
+ * b) app.db tbl_app_static scan (crude byte scan)
+ * c) titleId (CUSAxxxxx) as last resort
+ *
+ * NOTE: mapping the foreground app to its pid/titleId is not exposed by the
+ * public SDK, so the NAME is heuristic. The core signal (a game is in the
+ * foreground) is reliable via ShellCoreUtil.
+ */
+#include "detect.h"
+#include "cfg.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sfo.h"
+#include "tmdb.h"
+#include "clock.h"
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+/* Payload-SDK build: dlopen/dlsym come from the SDK libc (dlfcn);
+ * there is no UserService here — user_init() below degrades. */
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#else
+#include <orbis/UserService.h>
+#include <orbis/libkernel.h>
+#include <orbis/Sysmodule.h>
+#endif
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/sysctl.h>
+
+static int is_title_prefix(const char *n);
+
+/* --- SDK-build foreground/title signals (no ShellCoreUtil/UserService) ---
+ * A launched game shows up as an "eboot.bin" process; its identity comes
+ * from the freshest savedata dir (gameplay writes saves continuously).
+ * Both facts verified live via probes before wiring them in. */
+/* Count eboot.bin processes. A change means launch/close: callers drop
+ * stale state immediately instead of waiting out debounce windows. */
+int detect_eboot_count(void){
+ int mib[4] = { 1, 14, 8, 0 };
+ size_t sz = 0;
+ int n = 0;
+ if(sysctl(mib, 4, NULL, &sz, NULL, 0) != 0) return -1;
+ static unsigned char buf[256*1024];
+ if(sz > sizeof buf) return -1;
+ if(sysctl(mib, 4, buf, &sz, NULL, 0) != 0) return -1;
+ size_t off = 0;
+ while(off + 4 <= sz){
+ int recsz = *(int *)(buf + off);
+ if(recsz <= 0 || off + (size_t)recsz > sz) break;
+ if(recsz >= 479 && !memcmp(buf + off + 447, "eboot.bin", 10))
+ n++;
+ off += (size_t)recsz;
+ }
+ return n;
+}
+static int proc_has_eboot(void){
+ int mib[4] = { 1, 14, 8, 0 };
+ size_t sz = 0;
+ if(sysctl(mib, 4, NULL, &sz, NULL, 0) != 0) return -1;
+ static unsigned char buf[256*1024];
+ if(sz > sizeof buf) return -1;
+ if(sysctl(mib, 4, buf, &sz, NULL, 0) != 0) return -1;
+ size_t off = 0;
+ while(off + 4 <= sz){
+ int recsz = *(int *)(buf + off);
+ if(recsz <= 0 || off + (size_t)recsz > sz) return -1;
+ if(recsz >= 479 && !memcmp(buf + off + 447, "eboot.bin", 10))
+ return 1;
+ off += (size_t)recsz;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Sandbox mounts: /mnt/sandbox/<TITLE>_000 exists exactly while that
+ * title's game process lives. This is authoritative foreground identity
+ * straight from the OS — no heuristics, no races, no sync pollution.
+ * Verified live: only the running game's mount is listed. */
+static int scan_sandbox_mount(char *out, size_t cap){
+ if(!out || cap < 10) return -1;
+ DIR *d = opendir("/mnt/sandbox");
+ if(!d) return -1;
+ struct dirent *e;
+ int found = 0;
+ char best[16] = "";
+ while((e = readdir(d))){
+ const char *n = e->d_name;
+ if(strlen(n) != 13) continue; /* TITLEID_000 */
+ if(n[9] != '_' || n[10] != '0' || n[11] != '0' || n[12] != '0') continue;
+ char tid[16];
+ memcpy(tid, n, 9);
+ tid[9] = 0;
+ if(!is_title_prefix(tid)) continue;
+ if(!found){
+ strncpy(best, tid, sizeof best - 1);
+ found = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ closedir(d);
+ if(!found) return -1;
+ strncpy(out, best, cap - 1);
+ out[cap - 1] = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static long scan_newest_save(char *out, size_t cap){ static const char *users[] = { "1898cd02", "1898cd03", NULL };
+ /* user dirs vary per console; probe the known ones plus a scan of
+ * /user/home for anything looking like a user id dir. */
+ char udirs[8][32];
+ int ndirs = 0;
+ DIR *hd = opendir("/user/home");
+ if(hd){
+ struct dirent *e;
+ while((e = readdir(hd)) && ndirs < 8){
+ if(e->d_name[0] == '.') continue;
+ strncpy(udirs[ndirs], e->d_name, 31);
+ udirs[ndirs][31] = 0;
+ ndirs++;
+ }
+ closedir(hd);
+ }
+ for(int i = 0; users[i] && ndirs < 8; i++){
+ int dup = 0;
+ for(int k = 0; k < ndirs; k++) if(!strcmp(udirs[k], users[i])) dup = 1;
+ if(!dup){ strncpy(udirs[ndirs], users[i], 31); udirs[ndirs][31] = 0; ndirs++; }
+ }
+ long best = -1;
+ out[0] = 0;
+ const char *best_src = "none";
+ /* Per-title activity = max(savedata writes, app.pkg access time).
+ * app.pkg atime is the sharper signal: the running game streams its
+ * own package continuously, while save mtimes get bulk-touched by
+ * cloud sync (proven: all 28 titles sharing one mtime). atime wins
+ * ties because only gameplay advances it. */
+ for(int u = 0; u < ndirs; u++){
+ char spath[96];
+ snprintf(spath, sizeof spath, "/user/home/%s/savedata", udirs[u]);
+ DIR *sd = opendir(spath);
+ if(!sd) continue;
+ struct dirent *e;
+ while((e = readdir(sd))){
+ if(e->d_name[0] == '.') continue;
+ if(strlen(e->d_name) != 9 || !is_title_prefix(e->d_name)) continue;
+ char tp[160];
+ snprintf(tp, sizeof tp, "%s/%s", spath, e->d_name);
+ /* newest write inside the title dir wins */
+ DIR *td = opendir(tp);
+ long tb = -1;
+ if(td){
+ struct dirent *f;
+ while((f = readdir(td))){
+ if(f->d_name[0] == '.') continue;
+ /* d_name can be up to 255 chars; tp already holds up
+ * to ~150 — skip overlong names instead of overflowing. */
+ if(strlen(f->d_name) > 64) continue;
+ char fp[256];
+ int wn = snprintf(fp, sizeof fp, "%s/%s", tp, f->d_name);
+ if(wn <= 0 || (size_t)wn >= sizeof fp) continue;
+ struct stat fs;
+ if(stat(fp, &fs) == 0 && fs.st_mtime > tb) tb = fs.st_mtime;
+ }
+ closedir(td);
+ }
+ if(tb < 0){
+ struct stat ds;
+ if(stat(tp, &ds) == 0) tb = ds.st_mtime;
+ }
+ if(tb > best){ best = tb; strncpy(out, e->d_name, cap-1); out[cap-1] = 0; best_src = "save"; }
+ }
+ closedir(sd);
+ }
+ /* Second signal: /user/app/<TITLE> dir mtime. Launches touch the app
+ * dir even when the game hasn't saved yet (the exact hole that showed
+ * a stale title for a freshly launched game), and it covers titles
+ * with no savedata at all. */
+ {
+ DIR *ad = opendir("/user/app");
+ if(ad){
+ struct dirent *e;
+ while((e = readdir(ad))){
+ if(strlen(e->d_name) != 9 || !is_title_prefix(e->d_name)) continue;
+ char ap[64];
+ snprintf(ap, sizeof ap, "/user/app/%s", e->d_name);
+ struct stat st;
+ if(stat(ap, &st) == 0 && st.st_mtime > best){
+ best = st.st_mtime;
+ strncpy(out, e->d_name, cap-1);
+ out[cap-1] = 0;
+ best_src = "appdir";
+ }
+ }
+ closedir(ad);
+ }
+ }
+ /* Third signal (strongest): app.pkg ACCESS time. The running game
+ * streams its own package, so its atime is the freshest on the box;
+ * cloud sync touches mtimes, never atimes. Verified live: the
+ * foreground title's atime beats every idle title by days. */
+ {
+ DIR *ad = opendir("/user/app");
+ if(ad){
+ struct dirent *e;
+ while((e = readdir(ad))){
+ if(strlen(e->d_name) != 9 || !is_title_prefix(e->d_name)) continue;
+ char pp[96];
+ int wn = snprintf(pp, sizeof pp, "/user/app/%s/app.pkg",
+ e->d_name);
+ if(wn <= 0 || (size_t)wn >= sizeof pp) continue;
+ struct stat st;
+ if(stat(pp, &st) == 0 && (long)st.st_atime > best){
+ best = (long)st.st_atime;
+ strncpy(out, e->d_name, cap-1);
+ out[cap-1] = 0;
+ best_src = "pkg-atime";
+ }
+ }
+ closedir(ad);
+ }
+ }
+ if(out[0]) log_dbg("title scan: %s via %s", out, best_src);
+ return out[0] ? 0 : -1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int s_user_inited = 0;
+static int s_user_ok = 0;
+static int user_init(void){
+ if(s_user_inited) return s_user_ok ? 0 : -1;
+ s_user_inited = 1;
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ /* No UserService in payload-SDK builds: ShellCoreUtil (dlopen) is the
+ * only foreground signal; without it we report inactive (fail closed). */
+ log_msg("UserService unavailable in SDK build; ShellCoreUtil only");
+ return -1;
+#else
+ /* UserService is an external module -> load via internal id */
+ uint32_t r = sceSysmoduleLoadModuleInternal(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_INTERNAL_USER_SERVICE);
+ if(r != 0){ int32_t ir=(int32_t)r; log_msg("load UserService fail %d", ir); return -1; }
+ int32_t rc = sceUserServiceInitialize(NULL);
+ if(rc != 0){ log_msg("UserService init fail %d", rc); return -1; }
+ s_user_ok = 1;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* --- ShellCoreUtil runtime resolution ------------------------------- */
+/* PS4 SDK has no <dlfcn.h>; libkernel exports dlopen/dlsym directly. */
+extern void *dlopen(const char *filename, int flags);
+extern void *dlsym(void *handle, const char *symbol);
+typedef int (*shellcore_isapplaunched_fn)(void);
+static shellcore_isapplaunched_fn s_is_app_launched = NULL;
+static int s_scu_tried = 0;
+
+static int scu_init(void){
+ if(s_scu_tried) return s_is_app_launched != NULL;
+ s_scu_tried = 1;
+ void *h = dlopen("libSceShellCoreUtil.sprx", 0);
+ if(!h){ log_msg("ShellCoreUtil unavailable (dlopen fail); using foreground-user fallback"); return 0; }
+ s_is_app_launched = (shellcore_isapplaunched_fn)(uintptr_t)dlsym(h, "sceShellCoreUtilIsAppLaunched");
+ log_msg("ShellCoreUtil IsAppLaunched %s", s_is_app_launched ? "resolved" : "unavailable (dlsym fail)");
+ return s_is_app_launched != NULL;
+}
+
+/* --- foreground-active: the core "a game is running" signal ---------- */
+int detect_foreground_active(void){
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ /* Spawned processes see no ShellCoreUtil/UserService; the eboot.bin
+ * process itself is the signal (system has no other eboot). */
+ return proc_has_eboot();
+#else
+ if(scu_init() && s_is_app_launched){
+ int on = s_is_app_launched();
+ return (on != 0) ? 1 : 0; /* 0 when sitting on the home screen */
+ }
+#endif
+ /* fallback: foreground user exists. If UserService itself failed,
+ * report inactive instead of guessing "playing". */
+ if(user_init() != 0) return 0;
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ /* No UserService API in SDK builds (user_init always fails there,
+ * so this is unreachable); fail closed regardless. */
+ return 0;
+#else
+ int32_t fg = -1;
+ int32_t rc = sceUserServiceGetForegroundUser(&fg);
+ if(rc != 0){ log_msg("GetForegroundUser err %d", rc); return 0; }
+ return (fg >= 0) ? 1 : 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* --- title naming ---------------------------------------------------- */
+static int is_title_prefix(const char *n){
+ /* CUSA (PS4) + PPSA (PS5-backport) + EU/JP/indie variants */
+ return strncmp(n,"CUSA",4)==0 || strncmp(n,"PPSA",4)==0 ||
+ strncmp(n,"PCSE",4)==0 || strncmp(n,"PCSB",4)==0 ||
+ strncmp(n,"PCSG",4)==0 || strncmp(n,"EPSA",4)==0;
+}
+/* last resolved titleId (for Discord asset key); valid after a successful
+ * detect_current_game / detect_name_for_title. */
+static char s_last_titleid[16] = "";
+static char s_last_art[256] = "";
+/* Last resolved title: same title in a row reuses its name/art with zero
+ * I/O. Any title change resolves fresh — no cross-title cache exists, so
+ * stale identities are impossible by construction. */
+static char s_rs_tid[16] = "";
+static char s_rs_name[128] = "";
+static char s_rs_art[256] = "";
+/* Raw-ID (unresolved) entries are retried, not frozen: a transient miss
+ * (slow I/O at launch) must not lock the raw ID in forever. Successful
+ * resolves reuse indefinitely; raw fallbacks re-resolve after 5 min. */
+static int s_rs_ok = 0;
+static int64_t s_rs_at = 0;
+static int resolve_reuse(const char *ti, char *out_name, size_t cap){
+ if(!ti || !ti[0] || strcmp(ti, s_rs_tid) != 0 || !s_rs_name[0]) return 0;
+ if(!s_rs_ok && orbis_mono_s() - s_rs_at > 300) return 0;
+ strncpy(out_name, s_rs_name, cap - 1);
+ out_name[cap - 1] = 0;
+ strncpy(s_last_art, s_rs_art, sizeof s_last_art - 1);
+ s_last_art[sizeof s_last_art - 1] = 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+static void resolve_remember(const char *ti, const char *name, const char *art, int ok){
+ if(!ti || !name) return;
+ s_rs_ok = ok;
+ s_rs_at = orbis_mono_s();
+ strncpy(s_rs_tid, ti, sizeof s_rs_tid - 1);
+ s_rs_tid[sizeof s_rs_tid - 1] = 0;
+ strncpy(s_rs_name, name, sizeof s_rs_name - 1);
+ s_rs_name[sizeof s_rs_name - 1] = 0;
+ if(art){
+ strncpy(s_rs_art, art, sizeof s_rs_art - 1);
+ s_rs_art[sizeof s_rs_art - 1] = 0;
+ } else s_rs_art[0] = 0;
+}
+/* Media apps post Watching/Listening instead of Playing. IDs verified
+ * against Sony TMDB (names resolve there too). */
+int detect_media_type(const char *title_id){
+ static const struct { const char *id; int type; } media[] = {
+ { "CUSA00127", 3 }, /* Netflix -> Watching */
+ { "CUSA01015", 3 }, /* YouTube -> Watching */
+ };
+ if(!title_id) return 0;
+ for(unsigned i = 0; i < sizeof media/sizeof media[0]; i++){
+ if(!strcmp(title_id, media[i].id)) return media[i].type;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const char *detect_last_titleid(void){ return s_last_titleid[0] ? s_last_titleid : NULL; }
+int detect_last_ok(void){ return s_rs_ok; }
+const char *detect_last_art(void){ return s_last_art[0] ? s_last_art : NULL; }
+static void remember_titleid(const char *ti){
+ if(!ti) return;
+ strncpy(s_last_titleid, ti, sizeof s_last_titleid - 1);
+ s_last_titleid[sizeof s_last_titleid - 1] = 0;
+}
+static long scan_one_appdir(const char *base, char *out, size_t cap, long best){
+ if(!base || !out || cap < 2) return best;
+ DIR *d = opendir(base);
+ if(!d) return best;
+ struct dirent *e;
+ char path[256]; size_t plen;
+ while((e=readdir(d))){
+ if(e->d_name[0]=='.') continue;
+ size_t l=strlen(e->d_name);
+ if(l!=9 || !is_title_prefix(e->d_name)) continue;
+ plen=snprintf(path,sizeof path,"%s/%s/app.xml",base,e->d_name);
+ if(plen>=sizeof path) continue;
+ struct stat st2;
+ if(stat(path,&st2)==0){
+ const char *ti = e->d_name;
+ if(st2.st_mtime > best || best<0){ best=st2.st_mtime; if(cap>1)strncpy(out,ti,cap-1); out[cap-1]=0; }
+ }
+ }
+ closedir(d);
+ return best;
+}
+#ifndef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+static long scan_recent_titleid(char *out, size_t cap){
+ out[0]=0;
+ long best = scan_one_appdir("/user/app", out, cap, -1);
+ best = scan_one_appdir("/data/app", out, cap, best);
+ return (out[0])? 0 : -1;
+}
+#endif /* scan_recent_titleid unused in SDK builds */
+
+/* Best name on the box: /user/appmeta/<id>/pronunciation.xml holds the
+ * display title in its first <text> element (works for every game that
+ * ships speech data, e.g. Terraria). Small file, single read. */
+static int pronunc_title(const char *titleId, char *out, size_t cap){
+ char path[256]; snprintf(path,sizeof path,"/user/appmeta/%s/pronunciation.xml",titleId);
+ int fd=open(path,O_RDONLY);
+ if(fd<0){ log_msg("appmeta open fail %s err=%d", path, errno); return -1; }
+ char buf[2048]; ssize_t n=read(fd,buf,sizeof buf-1); close(fd);
+ if(n<=0) return -1; buf[n]=0;
+ const char *p=strstr(buf,"<text>");
+ if(!p) return -1;
+ p+=6;
+ while(*p==' '||*p=='\t'||*p=='\r'||*p=='\n') p++;
+ size_t i=0;
+ while(*p && *p!='<' && *p!='\n' && *p!='\r' && i<cap-1){ out[i++]=*p++; }
+ out[i]=0;
+ while(i>0 && (out[i-1]==' '||out[i-1]=='\t')) out[--i]=0;
+ return (i>1)?0:-1;
+}
+
+/* Game-process-safe TITLE read: the running game's own param.sfo via the
+ * app0 mount plus on-disc sce_sys copies. Small single read, works on ANY
+ * console with zero setup. Returns 0 on success. */
+static int sfo_file_title(const char *titleId, char *out, size_t cap){
+ char path[256];
+ /* Running game's own sandbox mount first: the payload process can
+ * already list /mnt/sandbox (that is where the title ID comes from),
+ * and the live mount carries the game's own sce_sys/param.sfo with
+ * its TITLE field. Fails soft when untraversable. */
+ if(titleId && titleId[0]){
+ snprintf(path, sizeof path, "/mnt/sandbox/%s_000/sce_sys/param.sfo", titleId);
+ int sfd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+ if(sfd >= 0){
+ unsigned char buf[4096];
+ ssize_t n = read(sfd, buf, sizeof buf);
+ close(sfd);
+ if(n > 0 && sfo_title(buf, (size_t)n, out, cap) == 0) return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ const char *fixed[] = { "app0/sce_sys/param.sfo", "/app0/sce_sys/param.sfo", NULL };
+ for(int i = 0; fixed[i]; i++){
+ int fd = open(fixed[i], O_RDONLY);
+ if(fd < 0) continue;
+ unsigned char buf[4096];
+ ssize_t n = read(fd, buf, sizeof buf);
+ close(fd);
+ if(n > 0 && sfo_title(buf, (size_t)n, out, cap) == 0) return 0;
+ }
+ if(titleId && titleId[0]){
+ const char *bases[] = { "/user/app", "/data/app", NULL };
+ for(int b = 0; bases[b]; b++){
+ snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s/sce_sys/param.sfo", bases[b], titleId);
+ int fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+ if(fd < 0) continue;
+ unsigned char buf[4096];
+ ssize_t n = read(fd, buf, sizeof buf);
+ close(fd);
+ if(n > 0 && sfo_title(buf, (size_t)n, out, cap) == 0) return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int appxml_title(const char *titleId, char *out, size_t cap){
+ const char *bases[] = { "/user/app", "/data/app", NULL };
+ for(int b=0; bases[b]; b++){
+ char path[256]; snprintf(path,sizeof path,"%s/%s/app.xml",bases[b],titleId);
+ int fd=open(path,O_RDONLY); if(fd<0) continue;
+ char buf[640]; ssize_t n=read(fd,buf,sizeof buf-1); close(fd);
+ if(n<=0) continue; buf[n]=0;
+ char *p=strstr(buf,"<title>");
+ if(!p) p=strstr(buf,"titleName");
+ if(!p) continue;
+ p = strchr(p, '>');
+ if(!p) continue;
+ p++;
+ while(*p==' '||*p=='\t'||*p=='\r'||*p=='\n') p++; /* trim leading ws */
+ size_t i=0;
+ while(*p && *p!='<' && *p!='\n' && *p!='\r' && i<cap-1){ out[i++]=*p++; }
+ out[i]=0;
+ while(i>0 && (out[i-1]==' '||out[i-1]=='\t')) out[--i]=0; /* trim trailing */
+ if(i>0) return 0;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* NOTE: an earlier revision byte-scanned app.db for titles. Removed:
+ * the packed record layout makes the title/contentId boundary ambiguous
+ * and the scanner returned wrong names (worse than raw IDs). Exact
+ * sources above plus Sony TMDB cover every case instead. */
+
+int detect_current_game(char *out_name, size_t cap, char *out_path, size_t p_cap){
+ if(!out_name || cap==0) return -1;
+ out_name[0] = 0;
+ if(out_path && p_cap) out_path[0] = 0;
+ {
+ /* Tri-state foreground: 1 game, 0 none, -1 scan failed (unknown).
+ * Unknown must NOT count as disappearance — it means "keep whatever
+ * we had", never a transition. */
+ int fg = detect_foreground_active();
+ if(fg < 0) return -2;
+ if(!fg) return -1;
+ }
+ char titleId[16]=""; int named=0, have_tid=0;
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ /* Sandbox mount first: authoritative OS-level identity. Save-scan
+ * stays as fallback (its mtimes get bulk-touched by cloud sync). */
+ if(scan_sandbox_mount(titleId, sizeof titleId) == 0){
+ have_tid = 1;
+ remember_titleid(titleId);
+ s_last_art[0] = 0;
+ } else if(scan_newest_save(titleId,sizeof titleId)==0){
+ have_tid = 1;
+ remember_titleid(titleId);
+ s_last_art[0] = 0;
+ } else return -1;
+#else
+ have_tid = (scan_recent_titleid(titleId,sizeof titleId)==0);
+ if(have_tid){
+ remember_titleid(titleId);
+ s_last_art[0] = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ if(have_tid){
+ remember_titleid(titleId);
+ s_last_art[0] = 0;
+ if(resolve_reuse(titleId, out_name, cap)){
+ log_dbg("name: %s via cache", out_name);
+ named = 1;
+ }
+ /* cheap, game-process-safe sources first; Sony TMDB (network)
+ * resolves anything local sources miss, on any console. */
+ if(!named && cfg_title(&g_cfg, titleId, out_name, cap)==0){ named=1; log_msg("name: %s via config", out_name); }
+ /* System app.db: the authoritative on-box title registry (SQLite,
+ * read-only). Covers disc + digital where per-file sources miss. */
+ /* appdb_title(titleId, out_name, cap); */
+ if(!named && pronunc_title(titleId, out_name, cap)==0){ named=1; log_msg("name: %s via appmeta", out_name); }
+ if(!named){ if(sfo_file_title(titleId, out_name, cap)==0){ named=1; log_msg("name: %s via sfo", out_name); } }
+ if(!named){ if(appxml_title(titleId, out_name, cap)==0){ named=1; log_msg("name: %s via appxml", out_name); } }
+ if(!named){
+ char art[256] = "";
+ if(tmdb_resolve(titleId, out_name, cap, art, sizeof art)==0){
+ named = 1;
+ strncpy(s_last_art, art, sizeof s_last_art-1);
+ } else s_last_art[0] = 0;
+ }
+ if(!named){ strncpy(out_name, titleId, cap-1); out_name[cap-1]=0; }
+ resolve_remember(titleId, out_name, s_last_art, named);
+ }else{
+ remember_titleid("");
+ s_last_art[0] = 0;
+ strncpy(out_name, "(unknown game)", cap-1); out_name[cap-1]=0;
+ }
+ if(out_path){ snprintf(out_path, p_cap, "/data/orbisRPC/.lastgame/%s", titleId[0]?titleId:"unknown"); }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Resolve a display name for a KNOWN title id (plugin mode: the plugin is
+ * loaded into the game process and knows the titleid from the GoldHEN SDK,
+ * so we skip the foreground-app heuristics entirely). */
+int detect_name_for_title(const char *titleId, char *out_name, size_t cap){
+ if(!titleId || !titleId[0] || !out_name || cap==0) return -1;
+ remember_titleid(titleId);
+ s_last_art[0] = 0;
+ if(resolve_reuse(titleId, out_name, cap)){
+ log_dbg("name: %s via cache", out_name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Game-process-safe only: small reads plus one bounded network
+ * lookup; no multi-megabyte scans anywhere in this codebase. */
+ if(cfg_title(&g_cfg, titleId, out_name, cap)==0){ log_msg("name: %s via config", out_name); resolve_remember(titleId, out_name, "", 1); return 0; }
+ /* appdb_title(titleId, out_name, cap); */ resolve_remember(titleId, out_name, "", 1); return 0;
+ if(pronunc_title(titleId, out_name, cap)==0){ log_msg("name: %s via appmeta", out_name); resolve_remember(titleId, out_name, "", 1); return 0; }
+ else log_msg("name: appmeta miss for %s", titleId);
+ if(sfo_file_title(titleId, out_name, cap)==0){ log_msg("name: %s via sfo", out_name); resolve_remember(titleId, out_name, "", 1); return 0; }
+ if(appxml_title(titleId, out_name, cap)==0){ log_msg("name: %s via appxml", out_name); resolve_remember(titleId, out_name, "", 1); return 0; }
+ {
+ char art[256] = "";
+ if(tmdb_resolve(titleId, out_name, cap, art, sizeof art)==0){
+ strncpy(s_last_art, art, sizeof s_last_art-1);
+ resolve_remember(titleId, out_name, art, 1);
+ return 0; /* tmdb_resolve already logged */
+ }
+ s_last_art[0] = 0;
+ }
+ strncpy(out_name, titleId, cap-1); out_name[cap-1]=0;
+ resolve_remember(titleId, out_name, "", 0);
+ return 0;
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/orbisrpc/detect.h b/orbisrpc/detect.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ffe64af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/detect.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* detect.h - find current foreground game title + app cache dir. */
+#ifndef DETECT_H
+#define DETECT_H
+#include <stddef.h>
+/* Returns 0 and writes a display name when a foreground game is found.
+ * Returns -1 when no game is active or the arguments are invalid.
+ * out_path is optional and receives the per-title cache path when provided. */
+int detect_current_game(char *out_name, size_t cap, char *out_path, size_t p_cap);
+/* Returns 1 if a foreground user app is running, 0 if definitely none,
+ * -1 if the scan itself failed (unknown: keep previous state). */
+int detect_foreground_active(void);
+/* Number of eboot.bin processes (launch/close churn detector). -1 unknown.
+ * Payload-SDK builds only (needs raw sysctl visibility). */
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+int detect_eboot_count(void);
+#endif
+/* Resolve a display name for a KNOWN title id (plugin mode). */
+int detect_name_for_title(const char *titleId, char *out_name, size_t cap);
+/* Last resolved titleId (e.g. "CUSA00740") or NULL if none yet.
+ * Used as the Discord asset key so icons follow automatically. */
+const char *detect_last_titleid(void);
+/* 1 when the last resolve produced a real name (0 = raw-ID fallback). */
+int detect_last_ok(void);/* Last resolved artwork URL (Sony CDN via TMDB, or empty). */
+const char *detect_last_art(void);
+/* Media type for presence: 0 Playing (games), 2 Listening, 3 Watching.
+ * Only known media apps map; everything else is 0. Extend freely. */
+int detect_media_type(const char *title_id);
+#endif
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/orbisrpc/discord.c b/orbisrpc/discord.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ffd49a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/discord.c
@@ -0,0 +1,491 @@
+/* discord.c - Discord gateway client using a USER SESSION token.
+ *
+ * Flow: TLS websocket -> HELLO(op10) -> IDENTIFY(op2) -> READY(dispatch) ->
+ * presence updates (op3) + heartbeats (op1/op11).
+ *
+ * Fresh IDENTIFY per connection (no RESUME): the identify budget is 1000/24h,
+ * far above our reconnect rate, and skipping RESUME removes session-state
+ * bookkeeping entirely. Close frames are parsed so a rejected token
+ * (close 4004) is reported as fatal instead of looping forever.
+ */
+#include "discord.h"
+#include "clock.h"
+#include "b64.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "art.h"
+#include "jsonlite.h"
+#include "detect.h"
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#define GW_HOST "gateway.discord.gg"
+#define GW_PORT 443
+#define GW_PATH "/?v=10&encoding=json"
+
+static void make_key(char *out){
+ unsigned char b[16];
+ memset(b, 0, sizeof b);
+ int fd=open("/dev/urandom",O_RDONLY);
+ if(fd>=0){
+ size_t got = 0;
+ while(got < sizeof b){
+ long r = read(fd, (char *)b + got, sizeof b - got);
+ if(r <= 0) break;
+ got += (size_t)r;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ if(got < sizeof b){
+ /* short read: mix time in rather than leaving stack bytes */
+ uint32_t t = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
+ for(size_t i = got; i < sizeof b; i++, t = t*1664525u + 1013904223u)
+ b[i] ^= (unsigned char)(t >> 24);
+ }
+ }
+ else { for(int i=0;i<16;i++) b[i]=(unsigned char)(time(NULL)+i*7); }
+ b64_encode(b,16,out);
+}
+
+/* Gateway events live INSIDE the JSON text payload ("op":N) — not in the
+ * WebSocket frame header (1=text, 8=close, 9=ping). Scan top-level keys
+ * with string-awareness so a nested `"op":` inside a string value can't
+ * spoof the event type. Works on truncated buffers too (op/s/t sit at the
+ * payload prefix, while the megabyte-long "d" blob may be cut off). */
+static const char *top_val(const char *json, size_t len, const char *key){
+ size_t kl = strlen(key);
+ int depth = 0, instr = 0, esc = 0;
+ for(size_t i = 0; i < len; i++){
+ char c = json[i];
+ if(instr){
+ if(esc) esc = 0;
+ else if(c == '\\') esc = 1;
+ else if(c == '"') instr = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if(c == '"'){
+ /* possible key: must be at depth 1 followed by optional ws + ':' */
+ size_t j = i + 1, k = 0;
+ while(j < len && k < kl && json[j] == key[k]){ j++; k++; }
+ if(k == kl && j < len && json[j] == '"'){
+ j++;
+ while(j < len && (json[j]==' '||json[j]=='\t')) j++;
+ if(j < len && json[j] == ':'){
+ if(depth == 1) return json + j + 1;
+ /* nested same-name key: skip its string opener below */
+ i = j; continue;
+ }
+ }
+ instr = 1; continue;
+ }
+ if(c == '{' || c == '[') depth++;
+ else if(c == '}' || c == ']') depth--;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+static int gw_op(const char *json, size_t len){
+ const char *v = top_val(json, len, "op");
+ if(!v) return -1;
+ while(v < json+len && (*v==' '||*v=='\t')) v++;
+ if(v >= json+len || *v<'0' || *v>'9') return -1;
+ int op = 0;
+ while(v < json+len && *v>='0' && *v<='9'){ op = op*10 + (*v-'0'); v++; }
+ return op;
+}
+static void gw_seq(discord_t *d, const char *json, size_t len){
+ if(!d) return;
+ const char *v = top_val(json, len, "s");
+ if(!v) return;
+ while(v < json+len && (*v==' '||*v=='\t')) v++;
+ if(v >= json+len || *v<'0' || *v>'9') return; /* null or missing: not a seq */
+ int s = 0;
+ while(v < json+len && *v>='0' && *v<='9'){ s = s*10 + (*v-'0'); v++; }
+ d->seq = s;
+}
+static int is_ready(const char *json, size_t len){
+ const char *v = top_val(json, len, "t");
+ if(!v) return 0;
+ while(v < json+len && (*v==' '||*v=='\t')) v++;
+ return (size_t)(json+len-v) >= 7 && !memcmp(v, "\"READY\"", 7);
+}
+
+/* recv one frame with a deadline; -4 = timed out. Skipped oversized frames
+ * (-3) are logged and retried transparently. */
+static int rx_frame(discord_t *d, char *buf, size_t cap, int *op, int *fin, int64_t deadline){
+ for(;;){
+ int nr=ws_recv_frame(&d->ws,buf,cap,op,fin);
+ if(nr==-3){ log_msg("skipped oversized gateway frame"); continue; }
+ if(nr!=0) return nr;
+ if(orbis_mono_s()>deadline) return -4;
+ usleep(50000);
+ }
+}
+
+static int send_identify(discord_t *d, const char *token){
+ jl_val_t *root=jl_new_object();
+ if(!root) return -1;
+ jl_obj_set(root,"op",jl_new_int(2));
+ jl_val_t *dd=jl_new_object();
+ if(!dd){ jl_free(root); return -1; }
+ jl_obj_set(dd,"token",jl_new_string(token));
+ jl_val_t *pp=jl_new_object();
+ if(!pp){ jl_free(root); return -1; }
+ jl_obj_set(pp,"os",jl_new_string("windows"));
+ jl_obj_set(pp,"browser",jl_new_string("Discord Client"));
+ jl_obj_set(pp,"device",jl_new_string(""));
+ jl_obj_set(dd,"properties",pp);
+ jl_val_t *pr=jl_new_object();
+ if(!pr){ jl_free(root); return -1; }
+ jl_obj_set(pr,"status",jl_new_string("online"));
+ jl_obj_set(pr,"activities",jl_new_array());
+ jl_obj_set(pr,"afk",jl_new_bool(0));
+ jl_obj_set(pr,"since",jl_new_null());
+ jl_obj_set(dd,"presence",pr);
+ jl_obj_set(root,"d",dd);
+ char *s=jl_stringify(root); jl_free(root);
+ if(!s) return -1;
+ int rc = ws_send_text(&d->ws,s,strlen(s));
+ free(s);
+ return rc < 0 ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+int discord_connect(discord_t *d, const char *token){
+ if(!d || !token || !token[0]) return -1;
+ memset(d,0,sizeof(*d));
+ strncpy(d->token, token, sizeof d->token-1);
+ d->token[sizeof d->token-1] = 0;
+ char key[64]=""; make_key(key);
+ int rc=ws_connect(&d->ws, GW_HOST, GW_PORT, GW_PATH, key);
+ if(rc){ log_msg("ws connect fail %d",rc); return -1; }
+ d->connected=1;
+ int64_t now=orbis_mono_s();
+ d->last_heartbeat=now; d->last_ack=now;
+ /* HELLO (text frame carrying {"op":10,...}) */
+ char buf[2048]; int op=0,fin=0;
+ int nr=rx_frame(d,buf,sizeof buf,&op,&fin,now+15);
+ if(nr==-4){ log_msg("no HELLO (timeout)"); ws_close(&d->ws); d->connected=0; return -1; }
+ if(nr<=0 || op!=1){
+ log_msg("no HELLO (nr=%d op=%d)",nr,op);
+ ws_close(&d->ws); d->connected=0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ jl_val_t *h=jl_parse(buf,nr);
+ if(h){
+ const jl_val_t *dd=jl_obj_get(h,"d");
+ if(dd){
+ const jl_val_t *hi=jl_obj_get(dd,"heartbeat_interval");
+ if(hi&&hi->type==JL_NUMBER) d->hb_interval_ms=(int64_t)hi->num;
+ }
+ jl_free(h);
+ }
+ if(!d->hb_interval_ms) d->hb_interval_ms=45000;
+ if(d->hb_interval_ms < 5000){
+ log_msg("discord: hb_interval %lldms suspiciously small; clamping to 5000",
+ (long long)d->hb_interval_ms);
+ d->hb_interval_ms = 5000;
+ }
+ if(send_identify(d, token) < 0){
+ log_msg("discord: identify send failed");
+ ws_close(&d->ws); d->connected=0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ log_msg("discord: identify sent, hb=%llds",(long long)(d->hb_interval_ms/1000));
+ /* READY confirms the token was accepted. `op` is the WebSocket frame
+ * type; the gateway event is JSON inside — parse it, don't switch on it. */
+ int64_t dl=orbis_mono_s()+20;
+ for(;;){
+ nr=rx_frame(d,buf,sizeof buf,&op,&fin,dl);
+ if(nr==-4){ log_msg("no READY after identify (timeout)"); break; }
+ if(nr<=0){ log_msg("no READY after identify (nr=%d)",nr); break; }
+ if(op==8){
+ if(!fin){ log_msg("fragmented close; reconnecting"); ws_close(&d->ws); d->connected=0; return -1; }
+ if(nr<2){ log_msg("malformed close (len %d); reconnecting", nr); ws_close(&d->ws); d->connected=0; return -1; }
+ unsigned code = (((unsigned char)buf[0]<<8)|((unsigned char)buf[1]));
+ log_msg("gateway closed during auth: %u",code);
+ ws_close(&d->ws); d->connected=0;
+ return code==4004 ? -2 : -1;
+ }
+ if(op==9){ ws_pong(&d->ws); continue; }
+ if(op!=1) continue;
+ int go = gw_op(buf, (size_t)nr);
+ if(go==11){ d->last_ack=orbis_mono_s(); continue; }
+ if(go==0 && is_ready(buf, (size_t)nr)){
+ gw_seq(d, buf, (size_t)nr);
+ log_msg("discord: gateway ready");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* other pre-READY events: ignore */
+ }
+ ws_close(&d->ws); d->connected=0;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int discord_set_presence(discord_t *d, const char *state, const char *name,
+ const char *application_id, int64_t started_epoch){
+ return discord_set_presence_ex(d, state, name, NULL, application_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, started_epoch);
+}
+
+/* Lowercase titleId into an asset-key buffer. Returns key length. */
+static size_t asset_key(const char *title_id, char *key, size_t cap){
+ size_t ki = 0;
+ if(!title_id || !key || cap == 0) return 0;
+ for(size_t i = 0; title_id[i] && ki < cap-1; i++){
+ char c = title_id[i];
+ if(c>='A'&&c<='Z') c += 'a'-'A';
+ if((c>='a'&&c<='z')||(c>='0'&&c<='9')||c=='_') key[ki++]=c;
+ }
+ key[ki] = 0;
+ return ki;
+}
+
+/* Test seam: pure activity-JSON builder (no sockets). token may be ""
+ * to skip the mp: proxy (deterministic offline tests). NULL on OOM. */
+jl_val_t *discord_build_activity(const char *state, const char *name,
+ const char *title_id, const char *application_id,
+ const char *art_base_url, const char *art_url,
+ const char *small_art_url,
+ int64_t started_epoch, const char *token){
+ if(!name) return NULL;
+ jl_val_t *act=jl_new_object();
+ if(!act) return NULL;
+ jl_obj_set(act,"name",jl_new_string(name?name:""));
+ {
+ /* Media apps (Netflix/YouTube/...) post Watching/Listening. */
+ int atype = 0;
+ if(title_id && title_id[0]){
+ atype = detect_media_type(title_id);
+ if(atype != 0 && atype != 2 && atype != 3) atype = 0;
+ }
+ jl_obj_set(act,"type",jl_new_int(atype)); /* 0 Playing */
+ }
+ if(state&&state[0]) jl_obj_set(act,"state",jl_new_string(state));
+ /* details intentionally mirrors the human-readable name, never the raw
+ * title ID: sending the ID here renders it as a second line under the
+ * game name (and twice when the name itself fell back to the ID).
+ * title_id is still used for media-type lookup and artwork below. */
+ if(started_epoch>0){
+ jl_val_t *ts=jl_new_object();
+ if(!ts){ jl_free(act); return NULL; }
+ if(started_epoch > 0 && started_epoch < 100000000000LL)
+ jl_obj_set(ts,"start",jl_new_int(started_epoch*1000LL)); /* integer ms epoch */
+ jl_obj_set(act,"timestamps",ts);
+ }
+ if(application_id&&application_id[0])
+ jl_obj_set(act,"application_id",jl_new_string(application_id));
+ else if(title_id&&title_id[0]&&!(art_base_url&&art_base_url[0])&&!(art_url&&art_url[0])){
+ /* No artwork will appear without a shared app or art URL pack:
+ * say so once instead of failing silently every update. */
+ static int art_warned = 0;
+ if(!art_warned){ art_warned = 1;
+ log_msg("art: no application_id or art_base_url; presence sends without artwork"); }
+ }
+ /* Artwork (verified on hardware 2026-09-23): raw https URLs and
+ * dangling keys drop the whole activity. Two working forms, tried in
+ * order: (1) mp: proxy resolved via external-assets for the URL we
+ * have (Sony CDN or art_base_url pack); (2) uploaded asset key. */
+ if(title_id&&!strcmp(title_id,"home")&&application_id&&application_id[0]){
+ /* Idle tile: PlayStation logo. home_art (arrives as art_url):
+ * http(s) URL -> mp: proxy; bare value -> uploaded asset key
+ * used as-is; empty -> <art_base_url>home.png when the pack
+ * carries it. A URL that fails mp: sends NO assets (never a
+ * dangling key: those drop the whole activity). */
+ const char *hsrc = (art_url&&art_url[0]) ? art_url : NULL;
+ char home_pack[320] = "";
+ if(hsrc && strchr(hsrc, '"')) hsrc = NULL; /* config garbage fails
+ soft to the pack default, never a broken JSON POST */
+ if(hsrc && strncmp(hsrc, "http", 4) != 0){
+ for(const char *q = hsrc; *q; q++){
+ char ch = *q;
+ if(!((ch >= 'a' && ch <= 'z') || (ch >= '0' && ch <= '9') || ch == '_')){
+ hsrc = NULL; /* not a valid asset key: pack default */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if(!hsrc && art_base_url&&art_base_url[0]){
+ int n=snprintf(home_pack,sizeof home_pack,"%shome.png",art_base_url);
+ if(n>0 && (size_t)n<sizeof home_pack) hsrc = home_pack;
+ }
+ char hmp[512] = "";
+ const char *himg = NULL;
+ if(hsrc && !strncmp(hsrc,"http",4)){
+ if(token && token[0] && art_resolve_mp(application_id, token, hsrc, hmp, sizeof hmp))
+ himg = hmp;
+ } else if(hsrc){
+ himg = hsrc; /* operator-supplied uploaded key: trusted */
+ }
+ if(himg){
+ jl_val_t *as=jl_new_object();
+ if(as){
+ jl_obj_set(as,"large_image",jl_new_string(himg));
+ jl_obj_set(as,"large_text",jl_new_string(name?name:""));
+ jl_obj_set(act,"assets",as);
+ }
+ }
+ } else if(title_id&&title_id[0]&&application_id&&application_id[0]){
+ char mp[512] = "";
+ const char *src_url = (art_url&&art_url[0]) ? art_url : NULL;
+ char pack_url[320] = "";
+ if(!src_url && art_base_url&&art_base_url[0]&&title_id){
+ char key[16];
+ if(asset_key(title_id, key, sizeof key) >= 4){
+ int n=snprintf(pack_url,sizeof pack_url,"%s%s.png",art_base_url,key);
+ if(n>0 && (size_t)n<sizeof pack_url) src_url = pack_url;
+ }
+ }
+ if(src_url && token && token[0] &&
+ art_resolve_mp(application_id, token, src_url, mp, sizeof mp)){
+ jl_val_t *as=jl_new_object();
+ if(as){
+ jl_obj_set(as,"large_image",jl_new_string(mp));
+ /* hover carries the raw title ID (PC-tool pattern):
+ * visible lines stay clean, ID one hover away. */
+ jl_obj_set(as,"large_text",jl_new_string(title_id));
+ jl_obj_set(act,"assets",as);
+ }
+ } else {
+ char key[16];
+ if(asset_key(title_id, key, sizeof key) >= 4){
+ jl_val_t *as=jl_new_object();
+ if(as){
+ jl_obj_set(as,"large_image",jl_new_string(key));
+ jl_obj_set(as,"large_text",jl_new_string(title_id));
+ jl_obj_set(act,"assets",as);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* System badge (PC-tool pattern): small corner tile, e.g. the
+ * PlayStation logo next to game art. mp: URLs resolve through the
+ * disk-cached proxy; anything unresolvable is omitted, never sent
+ * raw (bad small images drop the whole activity). */
+ if(small_art_url && small_art_url[0]){
+ char smp[512] = "";
+ const char *simg = NULL;
+ if(!strncmp(small_art_url, "mp:", 3)){
+ simg = small_art_url;
+ } else if(!strncmp(small_art_url, "http", 4) && token && token[0] &&
+ art_resolve_mp(application_id, token, small_art_url, smp, sizeof smp)){
+ simg = smp;
+ }
+ if(simg){
+ jl_val_t *as = jl_obj_get(act, "assets");
+ if(as && as->type == JL_OBJECT){
+ jl_obj_set(as, "small_image", jl_new_string(simg));
+ jl_obj_set(as, "small_text", jl_new_string("PlayStation 4"));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return act;
+}
+
+int discord_set_presence_ex(discord_t *d, const char *state, const char *name,
+ const char *title_id, const char *application_id,
+ const char *art_base_url, const char *art_url,
+ const char *small_art_url,
+ int64_t started_epoch){
+ if(!d || !d->connected || !name) return -1;
+ jl_val_t *act = discord_build_activity(state, name, title_id,
+ application_id, art_base_url, art_url, small_art_url, started_epoch, d->token);
+ if(!act) return -1;
+ jl_val_t *dd=jl_new_object();
+ jl_obj_set(dd,"activities",jl_new_array());
+ jl_arr_push(jl_obj_get(dd,"activities"), act);
+ jl_obj_set(dd,"status",jl_new_string("online"));
+ /* NOT idle: Gateway expects null, not 0. Sending 0 asserts
+ * "idle since 1970" and can wedge the client timer at 0:00. */
+ jl_obj_set(dd,"since",jl_new_null());
+ jl_obj_set(dd,"afk",jl_new_bool(0));
+ jl_val_t *root=jl_new_object();
+ if(!root){ jl_free(dd); return -1; }
+ jl_obj_set(root,"op",jl_new_int(3));
+ jl_obj_set(root,"d",dd);
+ char *s=jl_stringify(root); jl_free(root);
+ if(!s) return -1;
+ int r=ws_send_text(&d->ws,s,strlen(s)); free(s);
+ return (r>=0)?0:-1;
+}
+
+int discord_clear_presence(discord_t *d){
+ if(!d || !d->connected) return -1;
+ jl_val_t *dd=jl_new_object();
+ jl_obj_set(dd,"activities",jl_new_array());
+ jl_obj_set(dd,"status",jl_new_string("online")); /* stay visible, just idle */
+ jl_obj_set(dd,"since",jl_new_null());
+ jl_obj_set(dd,"afk",jl_new_bool(0));
+ jl_val_t *root=jl_new_object();
+ if(!root){ jl_free(dd); return -1; }
+ jl_obj_set(root,"op",jl_new_int(3));
+ jl_obj_set(root,"d",dd);
+ char *s=jl_stringify(root); jl_free(root);
+ if(!s) return -1;
+ int r=ws_send_text(&d->ws,s,strlen(s)); free(s);
+ return (r>=0)?0:-1;
+}
+
+int discord_tick(discord_t *d){
+ if(!d || !d->connected) return -1;
+ int64_t now=orbis_mono_s();
+ long hb_s=(long)(d->hb_interval_ms/1000); if(hb_s<5)hb_s=5;
+ /* gateway must ack heartbeats; 2 missed intervals means it's gone */
+ if(d->sent_hb && now-d->last_ack > hb_s*2+15){
+ log_msg("heartbeat timeout (no ack)");
+ d->connected=0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* fire slightly EARLY (tick cadence adds up to ~1s of jitter) so we are
+ * always inside the gateway's heartbeat window */
+ long fire = hb_s>3 ? hb_s-2 : hb_s;
+ if(now-d->last_heartbeat >= fire){
+ char hb[64];
+ if(d->seq>0) snprintf(hb,sizeof hb,"{\"op\":1,\"d\":%d}",d->seq);
+ else snprintf(hb,sizeof hb,"{\"op\":1,\"d\":null}");
+ if(ws_send_text(&d->ws,hb,strlen(hb)) < 0){
+ log_msg("heartbeat send failed; reconnecting");
+ d->connected=0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ d->last_heartbeat=now; d->sent_hb=1;
+ }
+ /* drain pending server frames (non-blocking); 2048 covers the dispatch
+ * envelope ({"t":..,"s":N,..) with margin — big payloads are consumed
+ * inside ws_recv_frame regardless of this cap */
+ char buf[2048]; int op=0,fin=0;
+ for(int i=0;i<32;i++){
+ int nr=ws_recv_frame(&d->ws,buf,sizeof buf,&op,&fin);
+ if(nr==-3){ log_msg("skipped oversized frame"); continue; }
+ if(nr==0) break;
+ if(nr<0){ d->connected=0; return -1; }
+ if(op==8){ /* WS CLOSE: payload starts with a 2-byte big-endian code */
+ if(!fin){ log_msg("fragmented close; reconnecting"); d->connected=0; return -1; }
+ if(nr<2){ log_msg("malformed close (len %d); reconnecting", nr); d->connected=0; return -1; }
+ unsigned code = (((unsigned char)buf[0]<<8)|((unsigned char)buf[1]));
+ log_msg("gateway closed: code=%u",code);
+ d->connected=0;
+ return code==4004 ? -2 : -1;
+ }
+ if(op==9){ ws_pong(&d->ws); continue; } /* WS PING -> PONG */
+ if(op!=1 && op!=0) continue;
+ switch(gw_op(buf, (size_t)nr)){
+ case 0: /* DISPATCH: only the sequence matters to us */
+ gw_seq(d, buf, (size_t)nr);
+ break;
+ case 7: /* RECONNECT requested */
+ log_msg("gateway: reconnect requested");
+ d->connected=0;
+ return -1;
+ case 9: /* INVALID_SESSION: session dead, fresh IDENTIFY needed.
+ * Distinct code so the caller retries promptly instead of
+ * doubling into a long backoff. */
+ log_msg("gateway: invalid session");
+ d->connected=0;
+ return -3;
+ case 11:
+ d->last_ack=now;
+ break;
+ default: break;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/discord.h b/orbisrpc/discord.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..205e457
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/discord.h
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/* discord.h - gateway session + presence (user session token). */
+#ifndef DISCORD_H
+#define DISCORD_H
+#include "ws.h"
+#include "jsonlite.h"
+typedef struct {
+ ws_t ws;
+ char token[512];
+ int64_t last_heartbeat; /* when we last sent op 1 */
+ int64_t last_ack; /* when the gateway last acked (op 11) */
+ int64_t hb_interval_ms;
+ int seq; /* last dispatch sequence (heartbeat payload) */
+ int connected;
+ int sent_hb; /* at least one heartbeat sent */
+} discord_t;
+/* Returns 0 on READY, -1 net/proto error, -2 auth-fatal (close 4004: don't
+ * retry — the token is wrong and Discord bans IPs that hammer it). */
+int discord_connect(discord_t *d, const char *token);
+int discord_set_presence(discord_t *d, const char *state, const char *name,
+ const char *application_id, int64_t started_epoch); /* op 3 */
+/* Same + titleId asset key: when application_id is set, sends
+ * assets { large_image: "<lower titleId>", large_text: "<name>" } so the
+ * game icon shows once uploaded under that name in the Discord app.
+ * When art_base_url is set instead, large_image becomes
+ * "<base><lower titleId>.png" (external URL assets, no uploads needed). */
+int discord_set_presence_ex(discord_t *d, const char *state, const char *name,
+ const char *title_id, const char *application_id,
+ const char *art_base_url, const char *art_url,
+ const char *small_art_url,
+ int64_t started_epoch); /* op 3 */
+/* Test seam: pure activity-JSON builder (no sockets). token "" skips mp:. */
+jl_val_t *discord_build_activity(const char *state, const char *name,
+ const char *title_id, const char *application_id,
+ const char *art_base_url, const char *art_url,
+ const char *small_art_url,
+ int64_t started_epoch, const char *token);
+int discord_clear_presence(discord_t *d); /* clear activity, stay online */
+int discord_tick(discord_t *d); /* 0 ok; -1 drop/reconnect; -2 auth-fatal; -3 invalid session (retry promptly) */
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/health.c b/orbisrpc/health.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dda4549
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/health.c
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+/* health.c - unclean-boot marker + consecutive-crash counter + rollback.
+ *
+ * Correct semantics: a normal reboot must NEVER count as a crash.
+ * boot N: write boot.dirty marker
+ * healthy: (stable runtime) remove marker + reset crash.count to 0
+ * boot N+1: marker present? previous boot died before healthy -> count++.
+ * marker absent? previous boot was clean -> keep count (0).
+ * 3 consecutive unclean boots -> safe mode.
+ */
+#include "health.h"
+#include "updater.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#ifdef HEALTH_TESTABLE
+static char g_base[256] = "/data/orbisRPC";
+void health_set_base(const char *dir){
+ if(dir && dir[0]){
+ snprintf(g_base, sizeof g_base, "%s", dir);
+ g_base[sizeof g_base - 1] = 0;
+ }
+}
+static void crash_path(char *out, size_t cap){
+ snprintf(out, cap, "%s/crash.count", g_base);
+}
+static void dirty_path(char *out, size_t cap){
+ snprintf(out, cap, "%s/boot.dirty", g_base);
+}
+#else
+static void crash_path(char *out, size_t cap){
+ snprintf(out, cap, "%s", CRASH_PATH);
+}
+static void dirty_path(char *out, size_t cap){
+ snprintf(out, cap, "%s", DIRTY_PATH);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int path_exists(const char *p){
+ struct stat st;
+ return stat(p, &st) == 0;
+}
+
+static int read_count(void){
+ char cp[320];
+ crash_path(cp, sizeof cp);
+ FILE *f = fopen(cp, "rb");
+ if(!f) return 0;
+ int n = 0;
+ if(fscanf(f, "%d", &n) != 1) n = 0;
+ fclose(f);
+ if(n < 0) n = 0;
+ if(n > 1000) n = 1000;
+ return n;
+}
+
+static void write_count(int n){
+ char cp[320], tmp[352];
+ crash_path(cp, sizeof cp);
+ snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%s.new", cp);
+ FILE *f = fopen(tmp, "wb");
+ if(!f) return;
+ fprintf(f, "%d\n", n);
+ if(fflush(f) != 0){ fclose(f); remove(tmp); return; }
+ int fd = fileno(f);
+ if(fd >= 0) fsync(fd);
+ fclose(f);
+ rename(tmp, cp);
+}
+
+static void write_dirty(void){
+ char dp[320], tmp[352];
+ dirty_path(dp, sizeof dp);
+ snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%s.new", dp);
+ FILE *f = fopen(tmp, "wb");
+ if(!f){
+ /* best-effort: try direct write (dir may not allow tmp+rename) */
+ f = fopen(dp, "wb");
+ if(!f) return;
+ fprintf(f, "dirty\n");
+ fclose(f);
+ return;
+ }
+ fprintf(f, "dirty\n");
+ if(fflush(f) != 0){ fclose(f); remove(tmp); return; }
+ int fd = fileno(f);
+ if(fd >= 0) fsync(fd);
+ fclose(f);
+ rename(tmp, dp);
+}
+
+static void clear_path(const char *p){
+ remove(p);
+}
+
+int health_boot_note_crash(void){
+ char dp[320];
+ dirty_path(dp, sizeof dp);
+ int unclean = path_exists(dp);
+ int n = read_count();
+ /* Marker first, count second: a crash between the two still leaves
+ * the marker behind, so the death is counted next boot instead of
+ * being lost. */
+ write_dirty();
+ if(unclean){
+ n += 1;
+ write_count(n);
+ }
+ return n >= SAFE_THRESHOLD ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+void health_mark_healthy(void){
+ char cp[320], dp[320];
+ crash_path(cp, sizeof cp);
+ dirty_path(dp, sizeof dp);
+ clear_path(dp);
+ clear_path(cp);
+}
+
+void health_mark_clean(void){
+ health_mark_healthy();
+}
+
+int health_check_binary(const char *path){
+ FILE *f = fopen(path, "rb");
+ if(!f) return 0;
+ unsigned char h[64];
+ size_t n = fread(h, 1, sizeof h, f);
+ long sz = -1;
+ if(fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END) == 0) sz = ftell(f);
+ fclose(f);
+ if(n < 64 || sz <= 0) return 0;
+ return updater_image_ok(h, n) && (size_t)sz <= 8u*1024u*1024u;
+}
+
+int health_rollback(const char *path){
+ char bak[320];
+ snprintf(bak, sizeof bak, "%s.bak", path);
+ FILE *f = fopen(bak, "rb");
+ if(!f) return -1;
+ fclose(f);
+ /* Atomic replace: never remove(path) first (a failed second step
+ * would leave no bootable binary at all). */
+ if(rename(bak, path) != 0) return -1;
+ return health_check_binary(path) ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int health_stage_activate(const char *path){
+ char tmp[320], bak[320];
+ snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%s.new", path);
+ snprintf(bak, sizeof bak, "%s.bak", path);
+ if(!health_check_binary(tmp)){ remove(tmp); return -1; }
+ /* backup current (best-effort when a prior file exists) */
+ if(path_exists(path)){
+ /* remove stale .bak first so rename() below cannot fail on
+ * platforms without atomic replace */
+ remove(bak);
+ if(rename(path, bak) != 0){ remove(tmp); return -1; }
+ }
+ if(rename(tmp, path) != 0){
+ /* activation failed: try to restore backup */
+ rename(bak, path);
+ remove(tmp);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if(!health_check_binary(path)){
+ /* activated bytes somehow bad: restore backup immediately */
+ remove(path);
+ rename(bak, path);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int health_verify_or_rollback(const char *path){
+ if(health_check_binary(path)) return 0;
+ if(health_rollback(path) == 0) return 1;
+ return -1;
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/health.h b/orbisrpc/health.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..031bb5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/health.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/* health.h - crash recovery: unclean-boot marker, counter, safe mode.
+ *
+ * Production semantics (v1.0.1+):
+ * boot: health_boot_note_crash() checks for a leftover "dirty" marker.
+ * marker present -> previous boot crashed/was killed -> counter++.
+ * marker absent -> previous boot was clean -> counter unchanged.
+ * then writes the dirty marker for the CURRENT boot.
+ * stable: health_mark_healthy() clears the marker + resets the counter.
+ * call after HEALTH_STABLE_SECS of genuinely healthy runtime.
+ * exit: health_mark_clean() clears both (graceful shutdown paths).
+ *
+ * This way three normal reboots can never trigger safe mode: each clean
+ * shutdown clears the marker, so the next boot sees "clean".
+ * Only consecutive UNCLEAN boots (crash before healthy) count. */
+#ifndef ORBISRPC_HEALTH_H
+#define ORBISRPC_HEALTH_H
+#define CRASH_PATH "/data/orbisRPC/crash.count"
+#define DIRTY_PATH "/data/orbisRPC/boot.dirty"
+#define SAFE_THRESHOLD 3
+/* Seconds of healthy runtime before a boot counts as clean. */
+#define HEALTH_STABLE_SECS 60
+/* Call at clean shutdown to reset the crash counter. */
+void health_mark_clean(void);
+/* Call once the daemon is stably healthy (presence flowing or uptime
+ * past HEALTH_STABLE_SECS). Clears the dirty marker + resets counter. */
+void health_mark_healthy(void);
+/* Call at boot. Returns 1 when safe mode must engage (ORX-BOOT-003),
+ * 0 for normal boot. Increments the persisted crash counter ONLY when
+ * the previous boot left a dirty marker (i.e. crashed before healthy). */
+int health_boot_note_crash(void);
+/* Verify a staged target can run: ELF magic + size sane. 1 ok, 0 bad. */
+int health_check_binary(const char *path);
+/* Restore <path> from <path>.bak. 0 ok, -1 failed/none. */
+int health_rollback(const char *path);
+/* Verify + activate a staged "<path>.new" over <path> with backup.
+ * Returns 0 activated, -1 refused (missing/invalid; .new removed,
+ * live <path> untouched). Host-testable rollback primitive used by
+ * the updater so staging can never leave a corrupt live binary. */
+int health_stage_activate(const char *path);
+/* Post-boot watchdog: if <path> fails health_check_binary, attempt
+ * health_rollback(). Returns 0 healthy, 1 rolled back OK, -1 still bad.
+ * Daemon calls this at startup for each staged target so a bad update
+ * that passed staging is automatically reverted before use. */
+int health_verify_or_rollback(const char *path);
+#ifdef HEALTH_TESTABLE
+/* Override the base dir for crash.count/boot.dirty (host tests). */
+void health_set_base(const char *dir);
+#endif
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/jsonlite.c b/orbisrpc/jsonlite.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b1d361
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/jsonlite.c
@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+/* jsonlite.c */
+#include "jsonlite.h"
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+static jl_val_t *newval(jl_type_t t) {
+ jl_val_t *v = (jl_val_t*)calloc(1, sizeof(jl_val_t));
+ if (v) v->type = t;
+ return v;
+}
+
+/* ---- parser ---- */
+static void skip_ws(jl_parse_t *p) {
+ while (p->cur < p->end) { char c = *p->cur;
+ if (c==' '||c=='\t'||c=='\n'||c=='\r') p->cur++; else break; }
+}
+
+static jl_val_t *parse_value(jl_parse_t *p);
+static jl_val_t *parse_value_depth(jl_parse_t *p, int depth);
+
+/* Stack depth cap: network JSON nests a few levels; a hostile 100k-deep
+ * array would otherwise exhaust the daemon/game thread stack. Counter
+ * advances twice per nesting level, so 128 allows ~64 deep. */
+#define JL_MAX_DEPTH 128
+
+static jl_val_t *parse_string(jl_parse_t *p) {
+ if (p->cur >= p->end || *p->cur != '"') { p->err=1; return NULL; }
+ p->cur++;
+ jl_val_t *v = newval(JL_STRING); if(!v){p->err=1;return NULL;}
+ size_t cap=32, len=0;
+ char *buf = (char*)malloc(cap);
+ if(!buf){ p->err=1; jl_free(v); return NULL; }
+ while (p->cur < p->end && *p->cur != '"') {
+ char c = *p->cur++;
+ if (c=='\\') {
+ if (p->cur >= p->end){p->err=1;break;}
+ char e = *p->cur++;
+ switch(e){ case '"':c='"';break; case '\\':c='\\';break; case '/':c='/';break;
+ case 'b':c='\b';break; case 'f':c='\f';break; case 'n':c='\n';break;
+ case 'r':c='\r';break; case 't':c='\t';break;
+ case 'u':{ /* decode \uXXXX to utf8 */ if (p->cur+4>p->end){p->err=1;break;}
+ unsigned cp=0; for(int i=0;i<4;i++){char h=*p->cur++;
+ cp<<=4; if(h>='0'&&h<='9')cp|=(h-'0'); else if(h>='a'&&h<='f')cp|=(h-'a'+10);
+ else if(h>='A'&&h<='F')cp|=(h-'A'+10); else {p->err=1;break;}}
+ if(p->err)break; char outb[5]; int on=0; if(cp<0x80)outb[on++]=cp;
+ else if(cp<0x800){outb[on++]=(char)(0xC0|(cp>>6));outb[on++]=(char)(0x80|(cp&0x3F));}
+ else {outb[on++]=(char)(0xE0|(cp>>12));outb[on++]=(char)(0x80|((cp>>6)&0x3F));outb[on++]=(char)(0x80|(cp&0x3F));}
+ if(len+(size_t)on+1>cap){
+ size_t ncap=(len+(size_t)on+1)*2;
+ char *nb=(char*)realloc(buf,ncap);
+ if(!nb){ free(buf); jl_free(v); p->err=1; return NULL; }
+ buf=nb; cap=ncap;
+ }
+ memcpy(buf+len,outb,on);len+=on; continue;}
+ default: p->err=1; break;
+ }
+ if(p->err)break;
+ }
+ if(len+2>cap){
+ size_t ncap=cap*2;
+ char *nb=(char*)realloc(buf,ncap);
+ if(!nb){ free(buf); jl_free(v); p->err=1; return NULL; }
+ buf=nb; cap=ncap;
+ }
+ buf[len++]=c;
+ }
+ if(p->err){free(buf);jl_free(v);return NULL;}
+ if(p->cur>=p->end){p->err=1;free(buf);jl_free(v);return NULL;}
+ p->cur++; /* closing quote */
+ buf[len]=0; v->str=buf; v->strlen=len;
+ return v;
+}
+
+static jl_val_t *parse_array(jl_parse_t *p, int depth) {
+ if(depth > JL_MAX_DEPTH){ p->err=1; return NULL; }
+ p->cur++; jl_val_t *v=newval(JL_ARRAY); if(!v){p->err=1;return NULL;}
+ jl_val_t *tail=NULL;
+ skip_ws(p);
+ if(p->cur<p->end && *p->cur==']'){p->cur++;return v;}
+ while(p->cur<p->end){
+ jl_val_t *e=parse_value_depth(p, depth+1); if(p->err){jl_free(v);return NULL;}
+ if(!v->child)v->child=e;else{tail->next=e;}
+ tail=e; v->count++;
+ skip_ws(p);
+ if(p->cur<p->end&&*p->cur==','){p->cur++;skip_ws(p);continue;}
+ if(p->cur<p->end&&*p->cur==']'){p->cur++;return v;}
+ p->err=1;jl_free(v);return NULL;
+ }
+ p->err=1;jl_free(v);return NULL;
+}
+
+static jl_val_t *parse_object(jl_parse_t *p, int depth) {
+ if(depth > JL_MAX_DEPTH){ p->err=1; return NULL; }
+ p->cur++; jl_val_t *v=newval(JL_OBJECT); if(!v){p->err=1;return NULL;}
+ jl_val_t *tail=NULL;
+ skip_ws(p);
+ if(p->cur<p->end && *p->cur=='}'){p->cur++;return v;}
+ while(p->cur<p->end){
+ jl_val_t *key=parse_string(p); if(p->err){jl_free(v);return NULL;}
+ skip_ws(p);
+ if(p->cur<p->end&&*p->cur==':'){p->cur++;skip_ws(p);}else{p->err=1;jl_free(key);jl_free(v);return NULL;}
+ jl_val_t *val=parse_value_depth(p, depth+1); if(p->err){jl_free(key);jl_free(v);return NULL;}
+ jl_val_t *pair=newval(JL_OBJECT);
+ if(!pair){ p->err=1; jl_free(key); jl_free(val); jl_free(v); return NULL; }
+ pair->str=key->str; pair->strlen=key->strlen; pair->child=val;
+ free(key); /* moved key->str into pair */
+ if(!v->child)v->child=pair;else{tail->next=pair;}
+ tail=pair; v->count++;
+ skip_ws(p);
+ if(p->cur<p->end&&*p->cur==','){p->cur++;skip_ws(p);continue;}
+ if(p->cur<p->end&&*p->cur=='}'){p->cur++;return v;}
+ p->err=1;jl_free(v);return NULL;
+ }
+ p->err=1;jl_free(v);return NULL;
+}
+
+static jl_val_t *parse_value_depth(jl_parse_t *p, int depth) {
+ if(depth > JL_MAX_DEPTH){ p->err=1; return NULL; }
+ skip_ws(p);
+ if(p->cur>=p->end){p->err=1;return NULL;}
+ char c=*p->cur;
+ if(c=='{')return parse_object(p, depth+1);
+ if(c=='[')return parse_array(p, depth+1);
+ if(c=='"')return parse_string(p);
+ if(c=='t'){ if(p->end-p->cur>=4&&!memcmp(p->cur,"true",4)){p->cur+=4;jl_val_t*b=newval(JL_BOOL);if(!b){p->err=1;return NULL;}b->num=1;return b;} p->err=1;return NULL;}
+ if(c=='f'){ if(p->end-p->cur>=5&&!memcmp(p->cur,"false",5)){p->cur+=5;jl_val_t*b=newval(JL_BOOL);if(!b){p->err=1;return NULL;}b->num=0;return b;} p->err=1;return NULL;}
+ if(c=='n'){ if(p->end-p->cur>=4&&!memcmp(p->cur,"null",4)){p->cur+=4;jl_val_t*nv=newval(JL_NULL);if(!nv){p->err=1;return NULL;}return nv;} p->err=1;return NULL;}
+ if(c=='-'||(c>='0'&&c<='9')){
+ /* bounded scan: strtod needs NUL-termination but our buffer end is
+ * not terminated, so copy the number token first (64 chars is far
+ * beyond any real JSON number; longer fails cleanly). */
+ char nb[64]; size_t ni=0;
+ const char *q=p->cur;
+ while(q<p->end && ni<sizeof nb-1){
+ char d=*q;
+ if((d>='0'&&d<='9')||d=='-'||d=='+'||d=='.'||d=='e'||d=='E'){ nb[ni++]=d; q++; }
+ else break;
+ }
+ if(ni==0 || ni>=sizeof nb-1){ p->err=1; return NULL; }
+ nb[ni]=0;
+ char *ep; double dd=strtod(nb,&ep);
+ if(ep==nb){ p->err=1; return NULL; }
+ p->cur=q;
+ jl_val_t *n=newval(JL_NUMBER); if(!n){p->err=1;return NULL;} n->num=dd; return n;
+ }
+ p->err=1; return NULL;
+}
+
+static jl_val_t *parse_value(jl_parse_t *p){ return parse_value_depth(p, 0); }
+
+jl_val_t *jl_parse(const char *s, size_t len){
+ if(!s) return NULL;
+ /* Input cap: no legitimate input here exceeds it (gateway frames,
+ * manifests, configs are KBs); unbounded input means unbounded
+ * allocation inside parse_string's doubling buffer. */
+ if(len > 4u*1024u*1024u) return NULL;
+ size_t l = len;
+ jl_parse_t p={s,s+l,0};
+ jl_val_t *v=parse_value(&p);
+ skip_ws(&p);
+ if(p.err || p.cur != p.end){jl_free(v);return NULL;}
+ return v;
+}
+
+/* Nodes: an OBJECT node is either a pair (str=key, child=value) when it is a
+ * child of an object, or an object value (str=NULL, child=pair list) when it is
+ * a child of an array or a pair's value. Distinguish via str to free everything. */
+void jl_free(jl_val_t *v){
+ if(!v)return;
+ if(v->type==JL_STRING){ if(v->str)free(v->str); free(v); return; }
+ jl_val_t *c=v->child;
+ while(c){
+ jl_val_t *n=c->next;
+ if(c->type==JL_OBJECT){
+ if(c->str){ /* pair: child=value owns, str=key */
+ if(c->child)jl_free(c->child);
+ free(c->str);
+ free(c);
+ } else { /* object value: owns its whole pair list */
+ jl_free(c);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if(c->str)free(c->str);
+ if(c->child)jl_free(c->child);
+ free(c);
+ }
+ c=n;
+ }
+ free(v);
+}
+
+jl_val_t *jl_obj_get(const jl_val_t *obj, const char *key){
+ if(!obj||obj->type!=JL_OBJECT||!key)return NULL;
+ jl_val_t *p=obj->child;
+ while(p){
+ if(p->str && !strcmp(p->str,key)){
+ /* pair node -> return its value (child), unless value is missing */
+ return p->child? p->child : p;
+ }
+ p=p->next;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+jl_val_t *jl_arr_at(const jl_val_t *arr, size_t i){
+ if(!arr||arr->type!=JL_ARRAY)return NULL;
+ jl_val_t *e=arr->child;
+ while(e&&i--){ e=e->next; }
+ return e;
+}
+
+/* ---- serializer ---- */
+static int ensure_capacity(char **out, size_t *cap, size_t need);
+
+static int escstr(const char *s, char **out, size_t *cap, size_t *len){
+ if(!s) s = "";
+ size_t l=strlen(s);
+ if(l > ((size_t)-1 - *len - 3) / 6) return -1;
+ size_t need=*len+l*6+2;
+ if(ensure_capacity(out,cap,need+1)<0) return -1;
+ char *p=*out+*len; *p++='"';
+ for(size_t i=0;i<l;i++){
+ char c=s[i];
+ if(c=='"'||c=='\\'||(c>=0&&c<0x20)){
+ *p++='\\';
+ switch(c){case '"':*p++='"';break;case '\\':*p++='\\';break;
+ case '\n':*p++='n';break;case '\r':*p++='r';break;case '\t':*p++='t';break;
+ case '\b':*p++='b';break;case '\f':*p++='f';break;
+ default:{*p++='u';*p++='0';*p++='0';const char hx[]="0123456789abcdef";
+ *p++=hx[(c>>4)&0xf];*p++=hx[c&0xf];break;}}
+ } else { *p++=c; }
+ }
+ *p++='"'; *len=(size_t)(p-*out);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ensure_capacity(char **out, size_t *cap, size_t need){
+ if (need <= *cap) return 0;
+ size_t ncap = *cap;
+ while (ncap < need) {
+ if (ncap > (size_t)-1 / 2) return -1;
+ ncap *= 2;
+ }
+ char *p = (char *)realloc(*out, ncap);
+ if (!p) return -1;
+ *out = p;
+ *cap = ncap;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int emit(jl_val_t *v, char **out, size_t *cap, size_t *len){
+ char buf[64];
+ switch(v->type){
+ case JL_NULL: { size_t l=4; if(ensure_capacity(out,cap,*len+l+1)<0)return -1; memcpy(*out+*len,"null",4);*len+=4; return 0; }
+ case JL_BOOL: { const char*s=v->num?"true":"false"; size_t l=strlen(s);
+ if(ensure_capacity(out,cap,*len+l+1)<0)return -1; memcpy(*out+*len,s,l);*len+=l; return 0; }
+ case JL_NUMBER: if(v->num_is_int) snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%lld",(long long)v->inum); else snprintf(buf,sizeof buf,"%.17g",v->num); break;
+ case JL_STRING: return escstr(v->str,out,cap,len);
+ case JL_ARRAY:{
+ size_t l=*len+1; if(ensure_capacity(out,cap,l+1)<0)return -1; (*out)[(*len)++]='[';
+ jl_val_t*e=v->child;int first=1;
+ while(e){ if(!first){ size_t l2=*len+1; if(ensure_capacity(out,cap,l2+1)<0)return -1; (*out)[(*len)++]=','; }
+ first=0; if(emit(e,out,cap,len)<0)return -1; e=e->next; }
+ l=*len+1; if(ensure_capacity(out,cap,l+1)<0)return -1; (*out)[(*len)++]=']'; return 0; }
+ case JL_OBJECT:{
+ size_t l=*len+1; if(ensure_capacity(out,cap,l+1)<0)return -1; (*out)[(*len)++]='{';
+ jl_val_t*p=v->child;int first=1;
+ while(p){ if(p->str){
+ if(!first){ size_t l2=*len+1; if(ensure_capacity(out,cap,l2+1)<0)return -1; (*out)[(*len)++]=','; }
+ first=0;
+ if(escstr(p->str,out,cap,len)<0)return -1;
+ size_t l3=*len+1; if(ensure_capacity(out,cap,l3+1)<0)return -1; (*out)[(*len)++]= ':';
+ if(p->child){ if(emit(p->child,out,cap,len)<0)return -1; }
+ else { size_t lz=*len+4; if(ensure_capacity(out,cap,lz+1)<0)return -1; memcpy(*out+*len,"null",4);*len+=4; }
+ } p=p->next; }
+ l=*len+1; if(ensure_capacity(out,cap,l+1)<0)return -1; (*out)[(*len)++]='}'; return 0; }
+ }
+ if(buf[0]){ size_t lb=strlen(buf);
+ if(ensure_capacity(out,cap,*len+lb+1)<0)return -1;
+ memcpy(*out+*len,buf,lb);*len+=lb;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+char *jl_stringify(const jl_val_t *v){
+ if(!v) return NULL;
+ char *out=(char*)malloc(256); if(!out) return NULL;
+ size_t cap=256,len=0;
+ if(emit((jl_val_t*)v,&out,&cap,&len)<0){ free(out); return NULL; }
+ char *t=(char*)realloc(out,len+1);
+ if(t){ t[len]=0; return t; }
+ out[len]=0; return out; /* realloc failed: still return what we have */
+}
+
+jl_val_t *jl_new_string(const char *s){
+ jl_val_t *v=newval(JL_STRING);
+ if(!v) return NULL;
+ v->str=strdup(s?s:"");
+ if(!v->str){ free(v); return NULL; }
+ v->strlen=strlen(v->str);
+ return v;
+}
+jl_val_t *jl_new_number(double n){ jl_val_t *v=newval(JL_NUMBER); if(v){v->num=n; v->num_is_int=0;} return v; }
+jl_val_t *jl_new_int(int64_t n){ jl_val_t *v=newval(JL_NUMBER); if(v){v->num=(double)n; v->num_is_int=1; v->inum=n;} return v; }
+jl_val_t *jl_new_bool(int b){ jl_val_t *v=newval(JL_BOOL); if(v)v->num=b?1:0; return v; }
+jl_val_t *jl_new_null(void){ return newval(JL_NULL); }
+jl_val_t *jl_new_object(void){ return newval(JL_OBJECT); }
+jl_val_t *jl_new_array(void){ return newval(JL_ARRAY); }
+void jl_obj_set(jl_val_t *obj,const char *key,jl_val_t *val){
+ if(!obj || obj->type!=JL_OBJECT || !key || !val) return;
+ jl_val_t *pair=newval(JL_OBJECT);
+ if(!pair) return;
+ pair->str=strdup(key);
+ if(!pair->str){ free(pair); return; }
+ pair->strlen=strlen(key); pair->child=val;
+ if(!obj->child){obj->child=pair;}else{ jl_val_t*t=obj->child; while(t->next)t=t->next; t->next=pair; }
+ obj->count++;
+}
+void jl_arr_push(jl_val_t *arr,jl_val_t *val){
+ if(!arr || arr->type!=JL_ARRAY || !val) return;
+ if(!arr->child){arr->child=val;val->next=NULL;}
+ else{ jl_val_t*t=arr->child; while(t->next)t=t->next; t->next=val; }
+ arr->count++;
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/jsonlite.h b/orbisrpc/jsonlite.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1cba42a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/jsonlite.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* jsonlite.h - tiny JSON parser/serializer (self contained). */
+#ifndef JSONLITE_H
+#define JSONLITE_H
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+typedef enum { JL_NULL, JL_BOOL, JL_NUMBER, JL_STRING, JL_OBJECT, JL_ARRAY } jl_type_t;
+typedef struct jl_val {
+ jl_type_t type;
+ char *str; /* string text OR object-entry key */
+ size_t strlen;
+ double num;
+ int num_is_int;
+ int64_t inum;
+ struct jl_val *child; /* object: first pair ; array: first elem */
+ struct jl_val *next; /* object pair chain OR array elem chain */
+ int32_t count;
+} jl_val_t;
+typedef struct { const char *cur; const char *end; int err; } jl_parse_t;
+jl_val_t *jl_parse(const char *s, size_t len);
+void jl_free(jl_val_t *v);
+/* NOTE: the tree is mutable; getters return non-const so results can be
+ * passed to jl_obj_set / jl_arr_push without const-dropping warnings. */
+jl_val_t *jl_obj_get(const jl_val_t *obj, const char *key);
+jl_val_t *jl_arr_at(const jl_val_t *arr, size_t i);
+char *jl_stringify(const jl_val_t *v);
+jl_val_t *jl_new_string(const char *s);
+jl_val_t *jl_new_number(double n);
+jl_val_t *jl_new_int(int64_t n);
+jl_val_t *jl_new_bool(int b);
+jl_val_t *jl_new_null(void);
+jl_val_t *jl_new_object(void);
+jl_val_t *jl_new_array(void);
+void jl_obj_set(jl_val_t *obj, const char *key, jl_val_t *val);
+void jl_arr_push(jl_val_t *arr, jl_val_t *val);
+#endif
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/orbisrpc/lock.c b/orbisrpc/lock.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..580431b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/lock.c
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/* lock.c - pid lockfile with stale detection. No flock on PS4 libc,
+ * so use atomic create (O_CREAT|O_EXCL) + process-table liveness
+ * (sysctl, no signals needed in spawned context). */
+#include "lock.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/sysctl.h>
+static int pid_live(int pid){
+ if(pid <= 0 || pid == (int)getpid()) return 0;
+ int mib[4] = { 1, 14, 8, 0 };
+ size_t sz = 0;
+ if(sysctl(mib, 4, NULL, &sz, NULL, 0) != 0) return 0;
+ static unsigned char buf[256*1024];
+ if(sz > sizeof buf) return 1; /* huge table: assume live, fail closed */
+ if(sysctl(mib, 4, buf, &sz, NULL, 0) != 0) return 0;
+ size_t off = 0;
+ while(off + 4 <= sz){
+ int recsz = *(int *)(buf + off);
+ if(recsz <= 0 || off + (size_t)recsz > sz) break;
+ /* A recycled PID owned by a system daemon must not block us:
+ * only a live payload process counts as a peer. Spawned
+ * payloads (elfldr/GoldHEN) show up as "Payload". */
+ if(recsz >= 479 && *(int *)(buf + off + 72) == pid)
+ return !memcmp(buf + off + 447, "Payload", 8) &&
+ buf[off + 455] == 0;
+ off += (size_t)recsz;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
+#include <signal.h>
+static int pid_live(int pid){
+ if(pid == (int)getpid()) return 0; /* own stale lock: never "live" */
+ if(kill(pid, 0) == 0) return 1;
+ if(errno == EPERM) return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int s_held = 0;
+
+int lock_acquire(void){
+ int fd = open(LOCK_PATH, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, 0644);
+ if(fd >= 0){
+ char b[32];
+ int n = snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%d\n", (int)getpid());
+ if(n > 0) (void)write(fd, b, (size_t)n);
+ close(fd);
+ s_held = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Exists: check liveness of the holder. */
+ FILE *f = fopen(LOCK_PATH, "rb");
+ if(!f) return -1;
+ int pid = 0;
+ if(fscanf(f, "%d", &pid) != 1) pid = 0;
+ fclose(f);
+ if(pid_live(pid)) return 1; /* live peer: stand down */
+ /* Stale (holder dead or unreadable pid): reclaim. */
+ remove(LOCK_PATH);
+ fd = open(LOCK_PATH, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_WRONLY, 0644);
+ if(fd < 0){
+ /* Lost the race: re-check once — a live peer may hold it now. */
+ f = fopen(LOCK_PATH, "rb");
+ if(f){
+ pid = 0;
+ if(fscanf(f, "%d", &pid) != 1) pid = 0;
+ fclose(f);
+ if(pid_live(pid)) return 1;
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+ {
+ char b[32];
+ int n = snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%d\n", (int)getpid());
+ if(n > 0) (void)write(fd, b, (size_t)n);
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ s_held = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void lock_release(void){
+ if(s_held){ remove(LOCK_PATH); s_held = 0; }
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/lock.h b/orbisrpc/lock.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d47f8b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/lock.h
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+/* lock.h - single-instance pid lockfile. */
+#ifndef ORBISRPC_LOCK_H
+#define ORBISRPC_LOCK_H
+#define LOCK_PATH "/data/orbisRPC/daemon.lock"
+/* 0 acquired, 1 live peer holds it (stand down), -1 error/retry. */
+int lock_acquire(void);
+void lock_release(void);
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/log.c b/orbisrpc/log.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b77c45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/log.c
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/* log.c - file logger: rotating (512 KB cap), timestamped, falls back to
+ * stderr. Tries several paths because mount visibility differs between app,
+ * plugin, and payload processes. Every line is mirrored to /dev/klog when
+ * possible so payloads remain debuggable even with no writable mount. */
+#include "log.h"
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#define LOG_CAP (512 * 1024)
+
+static FILE *g_log = NULL;
+static int g_klog = -1;
+static volatile int g_log_lock = 0;
+static volatile int g_debug = 0;
+void log_set_debug(int on){ g_debug = on ? 1 : 0; }
+int log_is_debug(void){ return g_debug; }
+static void log_lock(void){ while(__sync_lock_test_and_set(&g_log_lock, 1)) usleep(1000); }
+static void log_unlock(void){ __sync_lock_release(&g_log_lock); }
+
+/* tried in order at log_init(); first openable file wins */
+static const char *const LOG_FALLBACKS[] = {
+ NULL, /* filled in with the caller's requested path */
+ "/data/orbisRPC/log.txt",
+ "/data/orbisrpc.log",
+ "/user/temp/orbisrpc.log",
+ "/mnt/sandbox/orbisrpc.log",
+ "/orbisrpc.log",
+};
+
+void log_init(const char *path) {
+ if (g_log) return;
+ if(path) {
+ g_log = fopen(path, "ab");
+ if(g_log){
+ /* cap check AFTER open to avoid stat->remove TOCTOU */
+ struct stat st;
+ if(fstat(fileno(g_log), &st)==0 && st.st_size > LOG_CAP){
+ fclose(g_log); g_log = NULL;
+ remove(path);
+ g_log = fopen(path, "ab");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!g_log) {
+ for (unsigned i = 0; i < sizeof(LOG_FALLBACKS)/sizeof(LOG_FALLBACKS[0]); i++) {
+ const char *p = LOG_FALLBACKS[i];
+ if (!p || !path || strcmp(p, path) == 0) continue;
+ g_log = fopen(p, "ab");
+ if (g_log) break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (g_log) setvbuf(g_log, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
+ /* klog mirror: survives even when every mount is invisible */
+ g_klog = open("/dev/klog", O_WRONLY);
+ if(g_klog < 0) g_klog = -1;
+}
+
+void log_msg(const char *fmt, ...) {
+ if (!fmt) return;
+ log_lock();
+ if (!g_log) { g_log = stderr; }
+ va_list ap, ap2;
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ va_copy(ap2, ap); /* copy BEFORE vfprintf consumes ap */
+ time_t t = time(NULL);
+ struct tm tmv; struct tm *tm = NULL;
+ /* gmtime_r is our thread-safe shim; UTC is fine for logs */
+ extern struct tm *gmtime_r(const time_t *, struct tm *);
+ tm = gmtime_r(&t, &tmv);
+ char ts[20];
+ if(tm) strftime(ts, sizeof(ts), "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", tm);
+ else { strncpy(ts, "1970-01-01 00:00:00", sizeof ts); ts[sizeof ts-1]=0; }
+ fprintf(g_log, "[%s] ", ts);
+ vfprintf(g_log, fmt, ap);
+ fprintf(g_log, "\n");
+ fflush(g_log);
+ va_end(ap);
+ if (g_klog >= 0) {
+ char line[512];
+ int n = snprintf(line, sizeof line, "[orbisRPC %s] ", ts);
+ if (n > 0 && n < (int)sizeof line)
+ n += vsnprintf(line + n, sizeof line - n, fmt, ap2);
+ if (n > 0) { if (n >= (int)sizeof line) n = (int)sizeof line - 1; line[n++] = '\n'; (void)write(g_klog, line, (size_t)n); }
+ }
+ va_end(ap2);
+ log_unlock();
+}
+
+void log_close(void) {
+ if (g_log && g_log != stderr) fclose(g_log);
+ g_log = NULL;
+ if (g_klog >= 0) { close(g_klog); g_klog = -1; }
+}
+
+void log_dbg(const char *fmt, ...) {
+ if (!g_debug || !fmt) return;
+ log_lock();
+ if (!g_log) { g_log = stderr; }
+ va_list ap;
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ time_t t = time(NULL);
+ struct tm tmv; struct tm *tm = NULL;
+ extern struct tm *gmtime_r(const time_t *, struct tm *);
+ tm = gmtime_r(&t, &tmv);
+ char ts[20];
+ if(tm) strftime(ts, sizeof(ts), "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S", tm);
+ else { strncpy(ts, "1970-01-01 00:00:00", sizeof ts); ts[sizeof ts-1]=0; }
+ fprintf(g_log, "[%s] DBG ", ts);
+ vfprintf(g_log, fmt, ap);
+ fprintf(g_log, "\n");
+ fflush(g_log);
+ va_end(ap);
+ log_unlock();
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/log.h b/orbisrpc/log.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..593cda8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/log.h
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/* log.h - timestamped file logger with stderr and optional kernel-log fallback. */
+#ifndef LOG_H
+#define LOG_H
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Selects the first writable log path, falling back to stderr if needed. */
+void log_init(const char *path);
+void log_msg(const char *fmt, ...);
+/* Debug logging: compiled in, emitted only when log_set_debug(1) is on.
+ * Zero overhead otherwise. For per-poll detail — never for secrets. */
+void log_set_debug(int on);
+int log_is_debug(void);
+void log_dbg(const char *fmt, ...);
+void log_close(void);
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/main.c b/orbisrpc/main.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4e94f6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/* main.c - orbisRPC payload entry: detect game -> Discord presence.
+ * Runs as a GoldHEN payload (BinLoader push) or standalone ELF. */
+#include "daemon.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv){
+ (void)argc;(void)argv;
+ log_init("/data/orbisRPC/log.txt");
+ log_msg("orbisRPC payload boot");
+ return daemon_run(NULL);
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/orbisrpc/manifest.c b/orbisrpc/manifest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..66e1c9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/manifest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+/* manifest.c - signed release manifest (host-testable + PS4).
+ * Parsing via jsonlite; hashing + ECDSA via mbedTLS (already linked). */
+#include "manifest.h"
+#include "jsonlite.h"
+#include "updater.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <mbedtls/sha256.h>
+#include <mbedtls/ecdsa.h>
+#include <mbedtls/ecp.h>
+#include <mbedtls/bignum.h>
+
+int manifest_sha256_hex(const unsigned char *data, size_t n, char out[65]){
+ unsigned char dig[32];
+ if(!data && n) return -1;
+ mbedtls_sha256_context sc;
+ mbedtls_sha256_init(&sc);
+ int ok = mbedtls_sha256_starts(&sc, 0) == 0 &&
+ mbedtls_sha256_update(&sc, data ? data : (const unsigned char *)"", n) == 0 &&
+ mbedtls_sha256_finish(&sc, dig) == 0;
+ mbedtls_sha256_free(&sc);
+ if(!ok) return -1;
+ for(int i = 0; i < 32; i++) snprintf(out + 2 * i, 3, "%02x", dig[i]);
+ out[64] = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int copy_str(const jl_val_t *v, char *out, size_t cap){
+ if(!v || v->type != JL_STRING || !v->str) return -1;
+ size_t n = strlen(v->str);
+ if(n >= cap) return -1;
+ memcpy(out, v->str, n + 1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int manifest_parse(const char *json, size_t len, manifest_t *out){
+ if(!json || !out) return -1;
+ memset(out, 0, sizeof *out);
+ jl_val_t *r = jl_parse(json, len);
+ if(!r || r->type != JL_OBJECT){ if(r) jl_free(r); return -1; }
+ if(copy_str(jl_obj_get(r, "version"), out->version, sizeof out->version) != 0){
+ jl_free(r); return -1;
+ }
+ /* optional with sane defaults */
+ const jl_val_t *ch = jl_obj_get(r, "channel");
+ if(ch && ch->type == JL_STRING){
+ if(copy_str(ch, out->channel, sizeof out->channel) != 0){ jl_free(r); return -1; }
+ } else {
+ memcpy(out->channel, "stable", 7);
+ }
+ const jl_val_t *mv = jl_obj_get(r, "minimum_version");
+ if(!mv) mv = jl_obj_get(r, "min_version");
+ if(mv && mv->type == JL_STRING){
+ if(copy_str(mv, out->min_version, sizeof out->min_version) != 0){ jl_free(r); return -1; }
+ }
+ const jl_val_t *pl = jl_obj_get(r, "platform");
+ if(!pl) pl = jl_obj_get(r, "supported_platform");
+ if(pl && pl->type == JL_STRING){
+ if(copy_str(pl, out->platform, sizeof out->platform) != 0){ jl_free(r); return -1; }
+ }
+ const jl_val_t *assets = jl_obj_get(r, "assets");
+ if(!assets) assets = jl_obj_get(r, "files");
+ if(assets && assets->type == JL_OBJECT){
+ /* object form: { "orbisrpc.bin": "<hex>", ... } */
+ /* jsonlite has no object iterator in public API; fall back to
+ * array form below. Object form unsupported -> invalid. */
+ jl_free(r);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if(assets && assets->type == JL_ARRAY){
+ int n = 0;
+ for(size_t i = 0; ; i++){
+ const jl_val_t *a = jl_arr_at(assets, i);
+ if(!a) break;
+ if(n >= MANIFEST_MAX_ASSETS) break;
+ const jl_val_t *nm = jl_obj_get(a, "name");
+ const jl_val_t *sh = jl_obj_get(a, "sha256");
+ if(!sh) sh = jl_obj_get(a, "hash");
+ if(!nm || nm->type != JL_STRING || !sh || sh->type != JL_STRING)
+ continue;
+ if(strlen(nm->str) >= sizeof out->assets[n].name) continue;
+ if(strlen(sh->str) != 64) continue;
+ int hexok = 1;
+ for(int k = 0; k < 64; k++){
+ char c = sh->str[k];
+ if(!((c >= '0' && c <= '9') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') ||
+ (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F'))){ hexok = 0; break; }
+ }
+ if(!hexok) continue;
+ memcpy(out->assets[n].name, nm->str, strlen(nm->str) + 1);
+ for(int k = 0; k < 64; k++){
+ char c = sh->str[k];
+ out->assets[n].sha256[k] = (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') ? (char)(c - 'A' + 'a') : c;
+ }
+ out->assets[n].sha256[64] = 0;
+ n++;
+ }
+ out->nassets = n;
+ }
+ jl_free(r);
+ if(!out->version[0] || out->nassets <= 0) return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int manifest_find(const manifest_t *m, const char *name, char out_hex[65]){
+ if(!m || !name) return -1;
+ for(int i = 0; i < m->nassets; i++){
+ if(!strcmp(m->assets[i].name, name)){
+ if(out_hex) memcpy(out_hex, m->assets[i].sha256, 65);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int manifest_check(const manifest_t *m, const char *name,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t n){
+ char want[65], got[65];
+ if(manifest_find(m, name, want) != 0) return -1;
+ if(manifest_sha256_hex(data, n, got) != 0) return -1;
+ if(strcmp(got, want) != 0) return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int manifest_is_newer(const manifest_t *m, const char *local_version){
+ if(!m || !local_version) return 0;
+ return updater_cmp(m->version, local_version) > 0;
+}
+
+int manifest_gate(const manifest_t *m){
+ if(!m) return 0;
+ if(m->channel[0] && strcmp(m->channel, "stable") != 0) return 0;
+ if(m->platform[0] && strcmp(m->platform, "ps4-goldhen") != 0 &&
+ strcmp(m->platform, "ps4") != 0)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int manifest_verify_sig(const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen,
+ const unsigned char sig[64],
+ const unsigned char pubkey[64]){
+ if(!msg || !sig || !pubkey) return -1;
+ unsigned char hash[32];
+ {
+ mbedtls_sha256_context sc;
+ mbedtls_sha256_init(&sc);
+ int ok = mbedtls_sha256_starts(&sc, 0) == 0 &&
+ mbedtls_sha256_update(&sc, msg, msglen) == 0 &&
+ mbedtls_sha256_finish(&sc, hash) == 0;
+ mbedtls_sha256_free(&sc);
+ if(!ok) return -1;
+ }
+ mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point Q;
+ mbedtls_mpi r, s;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Q);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); mbedtls_mpi_init(&s);
+ int rc = -1;
+ unsigned char uncompressed[65];
+ if(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) != 0) goto out;
+ if(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&r, sig, 32) != 0) goto out;
+ if(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&s, sig + 32, 32) != 0) goto out;
+ /* Public API only (no struct internals): uncompressed point 0x04||X||Y. */
+ uncompressed[0] = 0x04;
+ memcpy(uncompressed + 1, pubkey, 64);
+ if(mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&grp, &Q, uncompressed,
+ sizeof uncompressed) != 0) goto out;
+ if(mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(&grp, &Q) != 0) goto out;
+ if(mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(&grp, hash, sizeof hash, &Q, &r, &s) != 0) goto out;
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&Q);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&r); mbedtls_mpi_free(&s);
+ return rc;
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/manifest.h b/orbisrpc/manifest.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..476394e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/manifest.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/* manifest.h - signed release manifest: parse, policy, signature verify.
+ *
+ * Release channel trust (v1.0.1+):
+ * manifest.json (version, channel, min_version, platform, asset sha256s)
+ * manifest.sig (raw 64-byte ECDSA P-256 r||s over manifest.json bytes)
+ * verified with the embedded release public key (release_pubkey.h).
+ * Policy: manifest+valid sig REQUIRED for update; SHA256SUMS is a
+ * compat fallback only when no manifest exists; ELF-only is refused.
+ */
+#ifndef ORBISRPC_MANIFEST_H
+#define ORBISRPC_MANIFEST_H
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#define MANIFEST_MAX_ASSETS 8
+
+typedef struct {
+ char name[64];
+ char sha256[65];
+} manifest_asset_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+ char version[32];
+ char channel[16];
+ char min_version[32];
+ char platform[32];
+ manifest_asset_t assets[MANIFEST_MAX_ASSETS];
+ int nassets;
+} manifest_t;
+
+/* Parse manifest.json bytes. 0 ok, -1 invalid. */
+int manifest_parse(const char *json, size_t len, manifest_t *out);
+/* Find asset hash by filename. 0 ok + out_hex, -1 not listed. */
+int manifest_find(const manifest_t *m, const char *name, char out_hex[65]);
+/* Check data against the listed hash for name. 0 match, -1 mismatch/unlisted. */
+int manifest_check(const manifest_t *m, const char *name,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t n);
+/* 1 when manifest version is newer than local, 0 otherwise. */
+int manifest_is_newer(const manifest_t *m, const char *local_version);
+/* Channel/platform gate: 1 accepted (stable/ps4-goldhen), 0 refused. */
+int manifest_gate(const manifest_t *m);
+/* Verify raw ECDSA P-256 signature (r||s, 64 bytes) over msg with raw
+ * pubkey (X||Y, 64 bytes). 0 valid, -1 invalid/error. */
+int manifest_verify_sig(const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen,
+ const unsigned char sig[64],
+ const unsigned char pubkey[64]);
+/* SHA256 of buffer as lowercase hex (64+NUL). 0 ok. */
+int manifest_sha256_hex(const unsigned char *data, size_t n, char out[65]);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/release_pubkey.h b/orbisrpc/release_pubkey.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a03665e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/release_pubkey.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/* release_pubkey.h - embedded release-channel public key (P-256, raw X||Y).
+ *
+ * DEV KEY: generated for v1.0.1 development. Before publishing a real
+ * release, generate a production keypair OFFLINE, replace these bytes,
+ * and keep the private key out of the repo:
+ * openssl ecparam -name prime256v1 -genkey -noout -out release_priv.pem
+ * openssl ec -in release_priv.pem -pubout -out release_pub.pem
+ * Sign manifest.json with scripts/make_manifest.py (or openssl dgst).
+ */
+#ifndef ORBISRPC_RELEASE_PUBKEY_H
+#define ORBISRPC_RELEASE_PUBKEY_H
+
+/* Uncompressed P-256 X || Y (64 bytes). */
+static const unsigned char ORBISRPC_RELEASE_PUBKEY[64] = {
+ 0x47,0xb8,0x9d,0xb8,0x85,0x3d,0x6c,0xcf,0x7e,0x1a,0xbe,0x6e,0xd1,0x5c,0x2e,0x69,
+ 0x66,0x2f,0xa8,0x09,0xbf,0x6d,0xf8,0x9c,0x50,0xe4,0x10,0x0b,0x79,0x4b,0x66,0x1a,
+ 0xd7,0x79,0xae,0x2e,0x41,0xc9,0x35,0x5c,0x6f,0xe3,0xba,0xed,0xc9,0x93,0x9a,0xca,
+ 0xe8,0x18,0xd5,0x4b,0xeb,0x84,0x20,0x8d,0xb3,0xd2,0x4a,0xfc,0x65,0x81,0x6c,0x6f
+};
+#define ORBISRPC_RELEASE_KEY_ID "dev-2026-09-20"
+
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/sfo.c b/orbisrpc/sfo.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f72bbd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/sfo.c
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/* sfo.c - PARAM.SFO TITLE extractor (bounds-checked, no libc beyond string).
+ * Every PS4 game carries sce_sys/param.sfo with a TITLE field. Inside the
+ * game process it is reachable via the app0 mount; the plugin tries those
+ * paths first because they work on ANY console with zero setup. */
+#include "sfo.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#pragma pack(push, 1)
+typedef struct {
+ uint32_t magic; /* 0x46535000 ("\0PSF" little-endian) */
+ uint32_t version; /* usually 0x0201 */
+ uint32_t key_off;
+ uint32_t data_off;
+ uint32_t count;
+} sfo_hdr_t;
+typedef struct {
+ uint16_t key_off;
+ uint16_t fmt; /* 0x0004 = utf8 string (null-padded), 0x0404 = uint32 */
+ uint32_t len; /* used bytes (incl. null for strings) */
+ uint32_t max_len;
+ uint32_t data_off; /* relative to data_off base */
+} sfo_entry_t;
+#pragma pack(pop)
+
+int sfo_title(const unsigned char *buf, size_t n, char *out, size_t cap){
+ if(!buf || !out || cap == 0) return -1;
+ out[0] = 0;
+ if(n < sizeof(sfo_hdr_t)) return -1;
+ const sfo_hdr_t *h = (const sfo_hdr_t *)buf;
+ if(h->magic != 0x46535000u) return -1;
+ if(h->count == 0 || h->count > 256) return -1;
+ if(h->key_off >= n || h->data_off >= n) return -1;
+ if(sizeof(sfo_hdr_t) + (size_t)h->count * sizeof(sfo_entry_t) > n) return -1;
+ const sfo_entry_t *e = (const sfo_entry_t *)(buf + sizeof(sfo_hdr_t));
+ for(uint32_t i = 0; i < h->count; i++){
+ size_t ko = (size_t)h->key_off + e[i].key_off;
+ if(ko >= n) continue;
+ /* keys must be null-terminated INSIDE the buffer: bound the scan */
+ size_t kmax = n - ko;
+ size_t klen = 0;
+ while(klen < kmax && buf[ko + klen]) klen++;
+ if(klen >= kmax) continue; /* unterminated key: malformed */
+ const char *key = (const char *)(buf + ko);
+ /* keys of interest: TITLE first, then language variants TITLE_XX */
+ int is_title = (!strcmp(key, "TITLE") ||
+ (klen == 8 && !memcmp(key, "TITLE_", 6)));
+ if(!is_title) continue;
+ if(e[i].fmt != 0x0004 && e[i].fmt != 0x0204) continue;
+ size_t dlen = e[i].len;
+ if(dlen == 0 || dlen > 256) continue;
+ size_t doff = (size_t)h->data_off + e[i].data_off;
+ if(doff + dlen > n) continue;
+ /* copy up to null, require printable ASCII/UTF-8 start */
+ size_t ci = 0;
+ for(size_t k = 0; k < dlen && ci < cap - 1; k++){
+ unsigned char c = buf[doff + k];
+ if(c == 0) break;
+ if(c < 0x20 && c != 0x20) break;
+ out[ci++] = (char)c;
+ }
+ out[ci] = 0;
+ if(ci > 1) return 0;
+ out[0] = 0;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/sfo.h b/orbisrpc/sfo.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73c07c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/sfo.h
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+/* sfo.h - PARAM.SFO TITLE extractor. */
+#ifndef SFO_H
+#define SFO_H
+#include <stddef.h>
+/* Returns 0 and writes the TITLE on success, -1 otherwise. Never reads
+ * past buf+n. */
+int sfo_title(const unsigned char *buf, size_t n, char *out, size_t cap);
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/timesync.c b/orbisrpc/timesync.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16a959c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/timesync.c
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+/* timesync.c - minimal SNTP client (RFC 5905, client mode only).
+ * One UDP exchange per call; 3s I/O budget; any failure keeps the old
+ * offset. Host-testable (POSIX only). */
+#include "timesync.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#else
+#include <orbis/Net.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#endif
+
+#define NTP_EPOCH_OFFSET 2208988800u
+#define NTP_PORT 123
+
+static int64_t s_offset = 0;
+static int s_synced = 0;
+
+static int sntp_once(const char *host){
+ unsigned char pkt[48];
+ memset(pkt, 0, sizeof pkt);
+ pkt[0] = 0x1b; /* LI=0, VN=3, Mode=3 (client) */
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL;
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof hints);
+ hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
+ {
+ char portbuf[8];
+ snprintf(portbuf, sizeof portbuf, "%d", NTP_PORT);
+ if(getaddrinfo(host, portbuf, &hints, &res) != 0 || !res) return -1;
+ }
+ int fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+ if(fd < 0){ freeaddrinfo(res); return -1; }
+ struct timeval tv = { 3, 0 };
+ setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
+ setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
+ int ok = -1;
+ /* Connect the UDP socket: recv() then only accepts the peer we
+ * queried, instead of any spoofed datagram on the LAN. */
+ if(connect(fd, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) != 0){
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if(send(fd, pkt, sizeof pkt, 0) == (int)sizeof pkt){
+ unsigned char rep[48];
+ ssize_t n = recv(fd, (char *)rep, sizeof rep, 0);
+ if(n >= 48){
+ uint32_t tx;
+ memcpy(&tx, rep + 40, 4);
+ tx = ((tx & 0xff) << 24) | ((tx & 0xff00) << 8) |
+ ((tx & 0xff0000) >> 8) | ((tx & 0xff000000) >> 24);
+ /* Sanity window Nov 2023..Dec 2034 (uint32 NTP wraps 2036):
+ * a broken/malicious server cannot fling our clock. */
+ if(tx > NTP_EPOCH_OFFSET + 1700000000u &&
+ tx < NTP_EPOCH_OFFSET + 2050000000u){
+ int64_t ntp_unix = (int64_t)(tx - NTP_EPOCH_OFFSET);
+ s_offset = ntp_unix - (int64_t)time(NULL);
+ s_synced = 1;
+ ok = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+ close(fd);
+ return ok;
+#else
+ (void)host;
+ return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+int time_sync(void){
+ static const char *hosts[] = {
+ "time.google.com", "pool.ntp.org", "time.cloudflare.com", NULL
+ };
+ /* One host per call, rotating: a full 3-host sweep can stall ~20s+,
+ * which must never sit inside the 1s gateway loop (heartbeat
+ * starvation). Boot sweeps via time_sync_all(); hourly ticks call
+ * this (single ~6s-bounded attempt). */
+ static int next_host = 0;
+ const char *h = hosts[next_host];
+ next_host = (next_host + 1) % 3;
+ if(sntp_once(h) == 0){
+ log_msg("time sync ok via %s (offset %+llds)",
+ h, (long long)s_offset);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ log_msg("time sync via %s failed; using local clock (offset %+llds)",
+ h, (long long)s_offset);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Boot sweep: try all hosts (bounded, once per boot, before first
+ * connect — never in the live loop). */
+int time_sync_all(void){
+ for(int i = 0; i < 3; i++){
+ if(time_sync() == 0) return 0;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int64_t time_fixed(void){
+ return (int64_t)time(NULL) + s_offset;
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/timesync.h b/orbisrpc/timesync.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3dd1418
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/timesync.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/* timesync.h - SNTP wall-clock correction for Discord timestamps.
+ *
+ * Jailbroken consoles commonly block Sony servers (ban avoidance), which
+ * also kills PSN time sync — the PS4 clock then drifts (observed: +38min
+ * and growing, plus wrong timezones). Discord timestamps must be true
+ * UTC or the timer wedges at 0:00, so the daemon syncs itself against
+ * public NTP (no Sony involved) and stamps sessions with corrected time.
+ * Failure degrades to the local clock (old behavior), never fatal. */
+#ifndef ORBISRPC_TIMESYNC_H
+#define ORBISRPC_TIMESYNC_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+/* Try an SNTP exchange; on success stores offset and returns 0. -1 = keep
+ * old offset (first boot without sync behaves like before). */
+int time_sync(void);
+/* Boot sweep: try all hosts (bounded, once per boot, before first
+ * connect — never in the live loop). */
+int time_sync_all(void);
+/* Corrected wall clock for Discord epoch stamps. */
+int64_t time_fixed(void);
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/tls.c b/orbisrpc/tls.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4bfd024
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/tls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+/* tls.c - mbedTLS-backed TLS client for orbisRPC.
+ *
+ * Why mbedTLS and not BearSSL: Cloudflare (fronting gateway.discord.gg)
+ * silently drops handshakes whose ClientHello looks non-browser. BearSSL
+ * cannot offer session tickets, EMS or encrypt-then-MAC at all, so its
+ * fingerprint always scores as a bot and the server ghosts us after the
+ * handshake (established TLS, zero HTTP bytes back — verified on-host).
+ * mbedTLS sends the standard extension set and gets 101 immediately.
+ *
+ * The socket stays non-blocking; WANT_READ/WRITE maps to our pump model.
+ * Certificate verification is REQUIRED against the curated bundle
+ * (ca_bundle_pem.h); TLS is capped at 1.2 because mbedTLS 3.x routes 1.3
+ * through PSA crypto whose init fails on-console. SNI is sent. */
+#include "tls.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "clock.h"
+#include <mbedtls/ssl.h>
+#include <mbedtls/entropy.h>
+#include <mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h>
+#include <mbedtls/debug.h>
+#include <mbedtls/net_sockets.h> /* error codes only; transport is ours */
+#include <mbedtls/x509_crt.h>
+#include "ca_bundle_pem.h"
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#else
+#include <orbis/Net.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+/* mbedTLS internal trace -> our log: turns "handshake fail" from a bare
+ * code into the exact failing step. */
+static void tls_mbedtls_dbg(void *ctx, int level,
+ const char *file, int line, const char *str){
+ (void)ctx;
+ /* mbedTLS chat (levels 1-3) only in debug mode: at threshold 3 every
+ * TLS record logs a line, which is pure I/O load in production. */
+ if(level > 0 && !log_is_debug()) return;
+ const char *base = strrchr(file, '/');
+ base = base ? base + 1 : file;
+ size_t n = strlen(str);
+ while(n > 0 && (str[n-1] == '\n' || str[n-1] == '\r')) n--;
+ log_msg("mbedTLS %s:%d: %.*s", base, line, (int)n, str);
+}
+
+struct tls_ctx {
+ mbedtls_ssl_context ssl;
+ mbedtls_ssl_config conf;
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context rng;
+ mbedtls_entropy_context ent;
+ mbedtls_x509_crt ca;
+ int fd;
+};
+
+/* Strong entropy from the OS ONLY (/dev/urandom). There is deliberately
+ * no weak fallback: inventing cryptographic randomness from time/address
+ * jitter would silently downgrade every TLS session and the DRBG seed.
+ * If strong entropy is unavailable the handshake fails closed here. */
+static int orbis_poll(void *data, unsigned char *out, size_t len, size_t *olen){
+ (void)data;
+ int fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+ if(fd < 0) return -1;
+ size_t got = 0;
+ while(got < len){
+ long r = read(fd, (char *)out + got, len - got);
+ if(r <= 0){ close(fd); return -1; }
+ got += (size_t)r;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ *olen = len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int net_send(void *ctx, const unsigned char *b, size_t n){
+ tls_ctx_t *t = (tls_ctx_t *)ctx;
+ size_t cap = n > 32768 ? 32768 : n;
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ int r = (int)send(t->fd, b, cap, 0);
+ if(r < 0 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE;
+ if(r < 0) return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED;
+ return r;
+#else
+ int r = (int)sceNetSend(t->fd, b, (int)cap, 0);
+ if(r < 0) return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE; /* NBIO: retry till deadline */
+ return r;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int net_recv(void *ctx, unsigned char *b, size_t n){
+ tls_ctx_t *t = (tls_ctx_t *)ctx;
+ size_t cap = n > 16384 ? 16384 : n;
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ int r = (int)recv(t->fd, b, cap, 0);
+ if(r < 0 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ;
+ if(r < 0) return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED;
+ return r;
+#else
+ int r = (int)sceNetRecv(t->fd, b, (int)cap, 0);
+ if(r < 0) return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ; /* NBIO: retry till deadline */
+ return r;
+#endif
+}
+
+tls_ctx_t *tls_start(int fd, const char *host){
+ tls_ctx_t *t = (tls_ctx_t *)calloc(1, sizeof *t);
+ if(!t) return NULL;
+ t->fd = fd;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_init(&t->ssl);
+ mbedtls_ssl_config_init(&t->conf);
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&t->ca);
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&t->rng);
+ mbedtls_entropy_init(&t->ent);
+ mbedtls_entropy_add_source(&t->ent, orbis_poll, NULL, 64,
+ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG);
+
+ if((rc = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(&t->rng, mbedtls_entropy_func, &t->ent,
+ (const unsigned char *)"orbisRPC", 8)) != 0){
+ log_msg("tls: rng seed fail %d", rc);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if((rc = mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(&t->conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM, MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT)) != 0){
+ log_msg("tls: config fail %d", rc);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* Curated trust anchors: chain verification is REQUIRED. A handshake
+ * that does not verify against the bundle fails closed (no MITM). */
+ if((rc = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(&t->ca,
+ (const unsigned char *)ORBISRPC_CA_BUNDLE_PEM,
+ sizeof ORBISRPC_CA_BUNDLE_PEM)) < 0){
+ log_msg("tls: CA bundle parse fail %d", rc);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(&t->conf, &t->ca, NULL);
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(&t->conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED);
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(&t->conf, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &t->rng);
+ /* TLS 1.2 ceiling (ported from 1.0, proven on hardware): mbedTLS 3.x
+ * routes TLS 1.3 through the PSA crypto subsystem, whose init fails
+ * on-console (PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY) and kills every
+ * handshake instantly. TLS 1.2 needs no PSA state. */
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version(&t->conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2);
+#ifdef MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+ mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3);
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(&t->conf, tls_mbedtls_dbg, NULL);
+#endif
+ {
+ static const char *protos[] = { "http/1.1", NULL };
+ mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols(&t->conf, protos);
+ }
+ if((rc = mbedtls_ssl_setup(&t->ssl, &t->conf)) != 0){
+ log_msg("tls: setup fail %d", rc);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if((rc = mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(&t->ssl, host)) != 0){
+ log_msg("tls: hostname fail %d", rc);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(&t->ssl, t, net_send, net_recv, NULL);
+
+ log_msg("tls: handshake start");
+ {
+ int64_t dl = orbis_mono_s() + 15;
+ extern int daemon_stop_requested(void) __attribute__((weak));
+ for(;;){
+ if(daemon_stop_requested && daemon_stop_requested()){ log_msg("tls: aborted (stop)"); goto fail; }
+ rc = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(&t->ssl);
+ if(rc == 0) break;
+ if(rc != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ &&
+ rc != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE){
+ log_msg("tls: handshake fail %d (mbedTLS 0x%08x)", rc, (unsigned)rc);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if(orbis_mono_s() > dl){ log_msg("tls: handshake timeout"); goto fail; }
+ usleep(20000);
+ }
+ }
+ log_msg("tls: established (%s)", mbedtls_ssl_get_version(&t->ssl));
+ {
+ uint32_t vf = mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(&t->ssl);
+ if(vf != 0){
+ log_msg("tls: cert verify fail flags=0x%08x", vf);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ return t;
+
+fail:
+ mbedtls_ssl_free(&t->ssl);
+ mbedtls_ssl_config_free(&t->conf);
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free(&t->ca);
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(&t->rng);
+ mbedtls_entropy_free(&t->ent);
+ free(t);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int tls_read(tls_ctx_t *t, void *buf, size_t cap){
+ if(!t || !buf || cap == 0) return -1;
+ int r = mbedtls_ssl_read(&t->ssl, (unsigned char *)buf, cap);
+ if(r > 0) return r;
+ if(r == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ || r == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE)
+ return 0; /* nothing yet */
+ if(r == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY || r == 0) return -1;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int tls_write(tls_ctx_t *t, const void *buf, size_t len){
+ if(!t || (!buf && len)) return -1;
+ const unsigned char *p = (const unsigned char *)buf;
+ size_t done = 0;
+ int64_t dl = orbis_mono_s() + 10;
+ while(done < len){
+ int r = mbedtls_ssl_write(&t->ssl, p + done, len - done);
+ if(r > 0){ done += (size_t)r; continue; }
+ if(r != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ && r != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE){
+ log_msg("tls: write fail %d", r);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if(orbis_mono_s() > dl){ log_msg("tls: write timeout"); return -1; }
+ usleep(10000);
+ }
+ return (int)done;
+}
+
+void tls_free(tls_ctx_t *t){
+ if(!t) return;
+ mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(&t->ssl);
+ mbedtls_ssl_free(&t->ssl);
+ mbedtls_ssl_config_free(&t->conf);
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free(&t->ca);
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(&t->rng);
+ mbedtls_entropy_free(&t->ent);
+ free(t);
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/tls.h b/orbisrpc/tls.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..288f9d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/tls.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* tls.h - self-contained TLS client (mbedTLS, statically linked).
+ * No PS4 TLS-module dependency: works in payload and plugin processes.
+ * Certificate verification is REQUIRED against the curated bundle;
+ * see ca_bundle_pem.h. */
+#ifndef TLS_H
+#define TLS_H
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+/* Runs the full TLS handshake over an already-connected socket.
+ * Returns heap context, or NULL on failure (logged). */
+typedef struct tls_ctx tls_ctx_t;
+tls_ctx_t *tls_start(int fd, const char *host);
+
+/* Returns decrypted bytes (>0), 0 if nothing available right now,
+ * <0 on close/error. Non-blocking: never waits for the peer. */
+int tls_read(tls_ctx_t *t, void *buf, size_t cap);
+
+/* Writes exactly len bytes; returns len or <0. */
+int tls_write(tls_ctx_t *t, const void *buf, size_t len);
+
+void tls_free(tls_ctx_t *t);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/tmdb.c b/orbisrpc/tmdb.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..74aa145
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/tmdb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+/* tmdb.c - Sony TMDB runtime resolver: plain-HTTP GET + cache.
+ * Transport mirrors ws.c patterns (resolver pool, SNDTIMEO connect cap,
+ * recv deadline). One attempt, no retries: failure falls through. */
+#include "tmdb.h"
+#include "clock.h"
+#include "tmdb_crypto.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "tls.h"
+#include "updater_http.h"
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#else
+#include <orbis/Net.h>
+#include <orbis/Sysmodule.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+
+#define TMDB_HOST "tmdb.np.dl.playstation.net"
+#define TMDB_PORT 80
+#define TMDB_BODY_MAX 65536
+#define TMDB_DEADLINE_S 10
+#define TMDB_HTTPS_DEADLINE_S 12
+
+static int32_t s_pool = -1;
+static int s_ready = 0;
+/* Mirror ws.c net_ensure exactly: sysmodule first, static-once guard,
+ * 128KB pool (4KB starves the resolver), and deliberately NO NetCtl
+ * init inside game processes. */
+static int net_up(void){
+ if(s_ready) return 0;
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ /* BSD sockets need no init. */
+ s_ready = 1;
+ return 0;
+#else
+ uint32_t ur = sceSysmoduleLoadModuleInternal(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_INTERNAL_NET);
+ if((int)ur < 0){ log_msg("tmdb: load NET fail %d", (int)ur); return -1; }
+ if(sceNetInit() < 0){ log_msg("tmdb: sceNetInit fail"); return -1; }
+ s_pool = (int32_t)sceNetPoolCreate("tmdb", 128*1024, 0);
+ if(s_pool < 0){ log_msg("tmdb: net pool fail %d", (int)s_pool); return -1; }
+ s_ready = 1;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Minimal blocking HTTP GET with deadline. Returns body bytes, or -1. */
+static int http_get(const char *host, const char *path,
+ char *body, size_t cap, int *out_status){
+ if(out_status) *out_status = 0;
+ if(net_up() < 0) return -1;
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL;
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof hints);
+ hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ {
+ char portbuf[16];
+ snprintf(portbuf, sizeof portbuf, "%d", TMDB_PORT);
+ if(getaddrinfo(host, portbuf, &hints, &res) != 0 || !res){
+ log_msg("tmdb: dns fail");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ int fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if(fd < 0){ log_msg("tmdb: socket fail"); freeaddrinfo(res); return -1; }
+ struct timeval tv = { .tv_sec = TMDB_DEADLINE_S, .tv_usec = 0 };
+ setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
+ setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
+ if(connect(fd, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0){
+ log_msg("tmdb: connect fail"); freeaddrinfo(res); close(fd); return -1;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+#else
+ OrbisNetInAddr in;
+ memset(&in, 0, sizeof in);
+ int ok = 0;
+ if(s_pool >= 0){
+ int32_t rid = sceNetResolverCreate("tmdbR", (uint32_t)s_pool, 0);
+ if(rid >= 0){
+ if(sceNetResolverStartNtoa(rid, host, &in, 5000000, 3, 0) >= 0) ok = 1;
+ sceNetResolverDestroy(rid);
+ }
+ }
+ if(!ok){
+ /* IP literal fallback */
+ unsigned a, b, c, d;
+ if(sscanf(host, "%u.%u.%u.%u", &a, &b, &c, &d) != 4) return -1;
+ if(a > 255 || b > 255 || c > 255 || d > 255) return -1;
+ uint32_t ip = (uint32_t)((a<<24)|(b<<16)|(c<<8)|d);
+ in.s_addr = sceNetHtonl(ip);
+ }
+ int fd = sceNetSocket("tmdb", ORBIS_NET_AF_INET, ORBIS_NET_SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if(fd < 0){ log_msg("tmdb: socket fail"); return -1; }
+ struct timeval tv = { .tv_sec = TMDB_DEADLINE_S, .tv_usec = 0 };
+ sceNetSetsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
+ sceNetSetsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
+ OrbisNetSockaddr sa;
+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof sa);
+ sa.sa_family = 2;
+ *(uint16_t*)sa.sa_data = sceNetHtons((uint16_t)TMDB_PORT);
+ memcpy(sa.sa_data+2, &in.s_addr, 4);
+ if(sceNetConnect(fd, &sa, sizeof sa) < 0){
+ log_msg("tmdb: connect fail"); sceNetSocketClose(fd); return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+ char req[512];
+ int rl = snprintf(req, sizeof req,
+ "GET %s HTTP/1.0\r\nHost: %s\r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n",
+ path, host);
+ if(rl <= 0 || rl >= (int)sizeof req){
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ close(fd);
+#else
+ sceNetSocketClose(fd);
+#endif
+ return -1;
+ }
+ int sent = 0;
+ int64_t dl = orbis_mono_s() + TMDB_DEADLINE_S;
+ while(sent < rl){
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ int r = (int)send(fd, req+sent, (size_t)(rl-sent), 0);
+ if(r > 0){ sent += r; continue; }
+ if(orbis_mono_s() > dl || r == 0){ close(fd); return -1; }
+#else
+ int r = sceNetSend(fd, req+sent, rl-sent, 0);
+ if(r > 0){ sent += r; continue; }
+ if(orbis_mono_s() > dl || r == 0){ sceNetSocketClose(fd); return -1; }
+#endif
+ }
+ /* read headers then body; cap total */
+ char hb[2048];
+ size_t hl = 0;
+ int hdr_done = 0, status = 0;
+ size_t bl = 0;
+ for(;;){
+ char tmp[1024];
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ int r = (int)recv(fd, tmp, sizeof tmp, 0);
+#else
+ int r = sceNetRecv(fd, tmp, sizeof tmp, 0);
+#endif
+ if(r <= 0) break;
+ size_t off = 0;
+ if(!hdr_done){
+ size_t room = sizeof hb - 1 - hl;
+ size_t cp = (size_t)r < room ? (size_t)r : room;
+ memcpy(hb+hl, tmp, cp); hl += cp; hb[hl] = 0;
+ char *e = strstr(hb, "\r\n\r\n");
+ if(e){
+ hdr_done = 1;
+ if(!strncmp(hb, "HTTP/1.", 7)) status = atoi(hb+9);
+ off = (size_t)(e + 4 - hb) - (hl - cp);
+ /* off = body bytes already in this chunk */
+ if(off > (size_t)r) off = (size_t)r;
+ } else if(hl >= sizeof hb - 1){
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ close(fd); return -1; /* headers too big */
+#else
+ sceNetSocketClose(fd); return -1; /* headers too big */
+#endif
+ } else continue;
+ }
+ while(off < (size_t)r && bl < cap - 1){
+ body[bl++] = tmp[off++];
+ }
+ if(bl >= cap - 1) break;
+ if(orbis_mono_s() > dl) break;
+ }
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ close(fd);
+#else
+ sceNetSocketClose(fd);
+#endif
+ body[bl] = 0;
+ if(out_status) *out_status = status;
+ if(status != 200 || bl == 0) return -1;
+ return (int)bl;
+}
+/* 8-entry cache: one lookup per title per process lifetime. */
+#define TMDB_CACHE_N 8
+static struct { char id[16]; char name[128]; char icon[256]; } s_cache[TMDB_CACHE_N];
+static int s_cache_n = 0;
+
+
+/* HTTPS GET over TLS (port 443) for the same TMDB paths. Uses the shared
+ * chunked-aware HTTP parser. Returns body bytes or <=0. */
+static int https_get_tmdb(const char *path, char *out, size_t cap, int *out_status){
+ if(out_status) *out_status = 0;
+ if(!path || !out || cap < 2) return -1;
+ if(net_up() < 0) return -1;
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL;
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof hints);
+ hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ if(getaddrinfo(TMDB_HOST, "443", &hints, &res) != 0 || !res){
+ log_msg("tmdb: https dns fail");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ int fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if(fd < 0){ freeaddrinfo(res); return -1; }
+ struct timeval tv = { .tv_sec = TMDB_HTTPS_DEADLINE_S, .tv_usec = 0 };
+ setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
+ if(connect(fd, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0){
+ log_msg("tmdb: https connect fail");
+ freeaddrinfo(res); close(fd); return -1;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+ {
+ int fl = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0);
+ if(fl >= 0) fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fl | O_NONBLOCK);
+ }
+ tls_ctx_t *t = tls_start(fd, TMDB_HOST);
+ if(!t){
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ char req[512];
+ int rl = snprintf(req, sizeof req,
+ "GET %s HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: %s\r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n",
+ path, TMDB_HOST);
+ if(rl <= 0 || rl >= (int)sizeof req){ tls_free(t); close(fd); return -1; }
+ if(tls_write(t, req, (size_t)rl) < 0){ tls_free(t); close(fd); return -1; }
+ static char raw[TMDB_BODY_MAX];
+ size_t bl = 0;
+ int64_t dl = orbis_mono_s() + TMDB_HTTPS_DEADLINE_S + 10;
+ for(;;){
+ char tmp[1024];
+ int r = tls_read(t, tmp, sizeof tmp - 1);
+ if(r < 0) break;
+ if(r == 0){
+ if(orbis_mono_s() > dl) break;
+ usleep(20000);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if(bl + (size_t)r >= sizeof raw) break;
+ memcpy(raw + bl, tmp, (size_t)r);
+ bl += (size_t)r;
+ if(orbis_mono_s() > dl) break;
+ }
+ tls_free(t);
+ close(fd);
+ if(bl == 0) return -1;
+ int st = 0;
+ size_t olen = 0;
+ char *body = upd_parse_response(raw, bl, cap, &st, &olen, NULL, 0);
+ if(out_status) *out_status = st;
+ if(!body || st != 200){ free(body); return -1; }
+ if(olen >= cap){ free(body); return -1; }
+ memcpy(out, body, olen);
+ out[olen] = 0;
+ free(body);
+ return (int)olen;
+#else
+ return -1; /* OpenOrbis app builds keep the plain-HTTP path only. */
+#endif
+}
+
+int tmdb_resolve(const char *titleId, char *name, size_t name_cap,
+ char *icon, size_t icon_cap){
+ if(!titleId || !name || name_cap == 0) return -1;
+ name[0] = 0; if(icon && icon_cap) icon[0] = 0;
+ for(int i = 0; i < s_cache_n; i++){
+ if(!strcmp(s_cache[i].id, titleId)){
+ strncpy(name, s_cache[i].name, name_cap-1); name[name_cap-1] = 0;
+ if(icon && icon_cap){ strncpy(icon, s_cache[i].icon, icon_cap-1); icon[icon_cap-1] = 0; }
+ return name[0] ? 0 : -1;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Live Sony CDN first (TMDB over TLS; plain HTTP is blocked
+ * on-console and handled inside http_get/https fallback below).
+ * No baked tables: CUSA code + Sony CDN is the source of truth. */
+ char path[128];
+ if(tmdb_path(titleId, path, sizeof path) != 0) return -1;
+ static char body[TMDB_BODY_MAX];
+ int status = 0;
+ int n = http_get(TMDB_HOST, path, body, sizeof body, &status);
+ if(n <= 0){
+ /* Port 80 is blocked from jailbroken consoles; Sony also answers
+ * the same paths over TLS (443). Try HTTPS before giving up so
+ * new installs resolve live like everything else. */
+ n = https_get_tmdb(path, body, sizeof body, &status);
+ if(n > 0) log_msg("tmdb: live via https for %s", titleId);
+ }
+ if(n <= 0){ log_msg("tmdb: fetch fail status=%d", status); return -1; }
+ char iname[128] = "", iicon[256] = "";
+ if(tmdb_parse(body, (size_t)n, iname, sizeof iname, iicon, sizeof iicon) != 0){
+ log_msg("tmdb: parse fail for %s", titleId);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ strncpy(name, iname, name_cap-1); name[name_cap-1] = 0;
+ if(icon && icon_cap){ strncpy(icon, iicon, icon_cap-1); icon[icon_cap-1] = 0; }
+ if(s_cache_n < TMDB_CACHE_N){
+ strncpy(s_cache[s_cache_n].id, titleId, 15);
+ strncpy(s_cache[s_cache_n].name, iname, 127);
+ strncpy(s_cache[s_cache_n].icon, iicon, 255);
+ s_cache_n++;
+ }
+ log_msg("name: %s via tmdb", name);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/tmdb.h b/orbisrpc/tmdb.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1e62c61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/tmdb.h
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/* tmdb.h - Sony TMDB runtime title/icon resolver (PS4 transport + cache). */
+#ifndef TMDB_H
+#define TMDB_H
+#include <stddef.h>
+/* Resolve titleId (e.g. "CUSA00740") to official display name and icon
+ * URL via Sony's TMDB service. Results cached in memory. Returns 0 with
+ * name set on success (icon may stay empty), -1 on any failure.
+ * Bounded: single attempt, ~10s worst case, no retries (caller falls
+ * through to the next name source). */
+int tmdb_resolve(const char *titleId, char *name, size_t name_cap,
+ char *icon, size_t icon_cap);
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/tmdb_crypto.c b/orbisrpc/tmdb_crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78834b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/tmdb_crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+/* tmdb_crypto.c - self-contained SHA1 + HMAC-SHA1 + Sony TMDB URL builder
+ * and response parser. No platform headers: host-unit-testable.
+ *
+ * Name/icon resolution idea follows bshar1865/zorua98741
+ * PS4-Rich-Presence-for-Discord (TMDB key/hash scheme, Tustin's hash
+ * construction): title metadata comes from Sony's own
+ * tmdb.np.dl.playstation.net service. Our implementation here (parser,
+ * transport, caching, presence wiring) is original. */
+#include "tmdb_crypto.h"
+#include "jsonlite.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+/* ---- SHA1 (small, public-domain style) ---- */
+typedef struct { uint32_t h[5]; uint64_t len; unsigned char buf[64]; size_t n; } sha1_t;
+static uint32_t rol(uint32_t x, int n){ return (x<<n)|(x>>(32-n)); }
+static void sha1_block(sha1_t *c, const unsigned char *p){
+ uint32_t w[80];
+ for(int i=0;i<16;i++) w[i]=(uint32_t)p[4*i]<<24|(uint32_t)p[4*i+1]<<16|(uint32_t)p[4*i+2]<<8|p[4*i+3];
+ for(int i=16;i<80;i++) w[i]=rol(w[i-3]^w[i-8]^w[i-14]^w[i-16],1);
+ uint32_t a=c->h[0],b=c->h[1],d=c->h[2],e=c->h[3],f=c->h[4];
+ for(int i=0;i<80;i++){
+ uint32_t t;
+ if(i<20) t=((b&d)|((~b)&e))+0x5A827999u;
+ else if(i<40) t=(b^d^e)+0x6ED9EBA1u;
+ else if(i<60) t=((b&d)|(b&e)|(d&e))+0x8F1BBCDCu;
+ else t=(b^d^e)+0xCA62C1D6u;
+ t+=rol(a,5)+f+w[i]; f=e; e=d; d=rol(b,30); b=a; a=t;
+ }
+ c->h[0]+=a; c->h[1]+=b; c->h[2]+=d; c->h[3]+=e; c->h[4]+=f;
+}
+static void sha1_init(sha1_t *c){
+ c->h[0]=0x67452301u; c->h[1]=0xEFCDAB89u; c->h[2]=0x98BADCFEu;
+ c->h[3]=0x10325476u; c->h[4]=0xC3D2E1F0u; c->len=0; c->n=0;
+}
+static void sha1_update(sha1_t *c, const unsigned char *p, size_t n){
+ c->len+=n;
+ while(n){
+ size_t t=64-c->n; if(t>n) t=n;
+ memcpy(c->buf+c->n,p,t); c->n+=t; p+=t; n-=t;
+ if(c->n==64){ sha1_block(c,c->buf); c->n=0; }
+ }
+}
+static void sha1_final(sha1_t *c, unsigned char out[20]){
+ uint64_t bits=c->len*8;
+ unsigned char z=0x80, zz=0x00;
+ sha1_update(c,&z,1);
+ while(c->n!=56) sha1_update(c,&zz,1);
+ unsigned char lb[8];
+ for(int i=0;i<8;i++) lb[i]=(unsigned char)(bits>>((7-i)*8));
+ memcpy(c->buf+c->n,lb,8); sha1_block(c,c->buf);
+ for(int i=0;i<5;i++){
+ out[4*i]=(unsigned char)(c->h[i]>>24); out[4*i+1]=(unsigned char)(c->h[i]>>16);
+ out[4*i+2]=(unsigned char)(c->h[i]>>8); out[4*i+3]=(unsigned char)c->h[i];
+ }
+}
+void tmdb_sha1(const unsigned char *p, size_t n, unsigned char out[20]){
+ sha1_t c; sha1_init(&c); sha1_update(&c,p,n); sha1_final(&c,out);
+}
+void tmdb_hmac_sha1(const unsigned char *key, size_t klen,
+ const unsigned char *msg, size_t mlen,
+ unsigned char out[20]){
+ unsigned char k[64];
+ if(klen>64){ tmdb_sha1(key,klen,k); memset(k+20,0,44); klen=20; }
+ else { memcpy(k,key,klen); memset(k+klen,0,64-klen); }
+ unsigned char ipad[64], opad[64];
+ for(int i=0;i<64;i++){ ipad[i]=k[i]^0x36; opad[i]=k[i]^0x5C; }
+ sha1_t c; unsigned char inner[20];
+ sha1_init(&c); sha1_update(&c,ipad,64); sha1_update(&c,msg,mlen); sha1_final(&c,inner);
+ sha1_init(&c); sha1_update(&c,opad,64); sha1_update(&c,inner,20); sha1_final(&c,out);
+}
+
+/* Sony TMDB service key (same key their own tooling uses). */
+static const unsigned char tmdb_key[64] = {
+ 0xF5,0xDE,0x66,0xD2,0x68,0x0E,0x25,0x5B,0x2D,0xF7,0x9E,0x74,0xF8,0x90,0xEB,0xF3,
+ 0x49,0x26,0x2F,0x61,0x8B,0xCA,0xE2,0xA9,0xAC,0xCD,0xEE,0x51,0x56,0xCE,0x8D,0xF2,
+ 0xCD,0xF2,0xD4,0x8C,0x71,0x17,0x3C,0xDC,0x25,0x94,0x46,0x5B,0x87,0x40,0x5D,0x19,
+ 0x7C,0xF1,0xAE,0xD3,0xB7,0xE9,0x67,0x1E,0xEB,0x56,0xCA,0x67,0x53,0xC2,0xE6,0xB0
+};
+
+/* Path (no scheme/host): /tmdb2/<TID>_00_<UPPERHEX>/<TID>_00.json Const-size. */
+int tmdb_path(const char *titleId, char *out, size_t cap){
+ static const char hex[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+ char tid[16];
+ size_t i = 0;
+ if(!titleId || !out || cap == 0) return -1;
+ while(titleId[i] && i < sizeof tid - 1){
+ char c = titleId[i];
+ if(!((c>='A'&&c<='Z')||(c>='0'&&c<='9'))) return -1;
+ tid[i] = c; i++;
+ }
+ tid[i] = 0;
+ if(i != 9) return -1;
+ char msg[16];
+ memcpy(msg, tid, 9); memcpy(msg+9, "_00", 4); /* includes null */
+ unsigned char mac[20];
+ tmdb_hmac_sha1(tmdb_key, sizeof tmdb_key, (unsigned char*)msg, 12, mac);
+ /* need: /tmdb2/XXXXXXXXX_00_40HEX/XXXXXXXXX_00.json = 7+9+3+40+1+9+5+1 */
+ if(cap < 80) return -1;
+ int n = snprintf(out, cap, "/tmdb2/%s_00_", tid);
+ for(int k = 0; k < 20; k++){ out[n++] = hex[mac[k]>>4]; out[n++] = hex[mac[k]&15]; }
+ n += snprintf(out+n, cap-(size_t)n, "/%s_00.json", tid);
+ (void)n;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Parse a TMDB JSON body: names[0].name + icons[0].icon. */
+int tmdb_parse(const char *body, size_t len,
+ char *name, size_t name_cap, char *icon, size_t icon_cap){
+ if(!body || !name || name_cap == 0) return -1;
+ name[0] = 0; if(icon && icon_cap) icon[0] = 0;
+ jl_val_t *r = jl_parse(body, len);
+ if(!r) return -1;
+ int rc = -1;
+ const jl_val_t *names = jl_obj_get(r, "names");
+ const jl_val_t *n0 = (names && names->type == JL_ARRAY) ? jl_arr_at(names, 0) : NULL;
+ const jl_val_t *nm = n0 ? jl_obj_get(n0, "name") : NULL;
+ if(nm && nm->type == JL_STRING && nm->str[0]){
+ strncpy(name, nm->str, name_cap-1); name[name_cap-1] = 0;
+ rc = 0;
+ if(icon && icon_cap){
+ const jl_val_t *icons = jl_obj_get(r, "icons");
+ const jl_val_t *i0 = (icons && icons->type == JL_ARRAY) ? jl_arr_at(icons, 0) : NULL;
+ const jl_val_t *iu = i0 ? jl_obj_get(i0, "icon") : NULL;
+ if(iu && iu->type == JL_STRING && iu->str[0]){
+ /* only http(s) URLs are usable as external assets */
+ if(!strncmp(iu->str, "http://", 7) || !strncmp(iu->str, "https://", 8)){
+ strncpy(icon, iu->str, icon_cap-1); icon[icon_cap-1] = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ jl_free(r);
+ return rc;
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/tmdb_crypto.h b/orbisrpc/tmdb_crypto.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2bed696
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/tmdb_crypto.h
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/* tmdb_crypto.h - Sony TMDB URL builder + response parser (host-testable). */
+#ifndef TMDB_CRYPTO_H
+#define TMDB_CRYPTO_H
+#include <stddef.h>
+void tmdb_sha1(const unsigned char *p, size_t n, unsigned char out[20]);
+void tmdb_hmac_sha1(const unsigned char *key, size_t klen,
+ const unsigned char *msg, size_t mlen,
+ unsigned char out[20]);
+/* Build "/tmdb2/<TID>_00_<HEX>/<TID>_00.json". 0 ok, -1 invalid input. */
+int tmdb_path(const char *titleId, char *out, size_t cap);
+/* Parse TMDB JSON body into display name + icon URL. 0 ok, -1 no name. */
+int tmdb_parse(const char *body, size_t len,
+ char *name, size_t name_cap, char *icon, size_t icon_cap);
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/updater.c b/orbisrpc/updater.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6684686
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/updater.c
@@ -0,0 +1,528 @@
+/* updater.c - self-updater. Pure logic (host-tested) plus PS4 HTTPS.
+ *
+ * Flow, once per daemon boot when enabled:
+ * GET https://api.github.com/repos/<repo>/releases/latest
+ * -> tag_name + asset browser_download_urls
+ * if tag newer than ORBISRPC_VERSION:
+ * download each known asset (cap 4MB), validate ELF magic,
+ * write <target>.new, rename over target.
+ * Plugin .prx takes effect on next game launch; payload .bin on next
+ * injection. Never deletes, never writes unvalidated bytes.
+ */
+#include "updater.h"
+#include "updater_http.h"
+#include "version.h"
+#include "clock.h"
+#include "jsonlite.h"
+#include "health.h"
+#include "manifest.h"
+#include "release_pubkey.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+/* ---- PS4 HTTPS transport (mirrors ws.c/tmdb.c bring-up) ---- */
+#include "tls.h"
+#include <mbedtls/sha256.h>
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#else
+#include <orbis/Net.h>
+#include <orbis/Sysmodule.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#define UPD_HOST "api.github.com"
+#define UPD_DEADLINE_S 15
+#define UPD_BODY_MAX (4u*1024u*1024u)
+#define UPD_MAX_REDIRECTS 3
+
+/* Release-channel host allowlist: only GitHub API + release infra.
+ * Redirects anywhere else are refused (fail closed). */
+static int upd_host_allowed(const char *host){
+ static const char *ok[] = {
+ "api.github.com",
+ "github.com",
+ "uploads.github.com",
+ "objects.githubusercontent.com",
+ "codeload.github.com",
+ "raw.githubusercontent.com",
+ NULL,
+ };
+ if(!host || !host[0]) return 0;
+ for(int i = 0; ok[i]; i++) if(!strcmp(host, ok[i])) return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifndef SO_NBIO
+#define SO_NBIO 0x2000 /* same local define as ws.c; absent from SDK headers */
+#endif
+
+static int32_t s_upool = -1;
+static int upd_net(void){
+ static int ready = 0;
+ if(ready) return 0;
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ ready = 1;
+ return 0;
+#else
+ uint32_t ur = sceSysmoduleLoadModuleInternal(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_INTERNAL_NET);
+ if((int)ur < 0) return -1;
+ if(sceNetInit() < 0) return -1;
+ s_upool = (int32_t)sceNetPoolCreate("upd", 128*1024, 0);
+ if(s_upool < 0) return -1;
+ ready = 1;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int upd_connect(const char *host, int port){
+ if(upd_net() < 0) return -1;
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL;
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof hints);
+ hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ {
+ char portbuf[16];
+ snprintf(portbuf, sizeof portbuf, "%d", port);
+ if(getaddrinfo(host, portbuf, &hints, &res) != 0 || !res){
+ log_msg("updater: dns fail");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ int fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if(fd < 0){ freeaddrinfo(res); return -1; }
+ struct timeval tv = { .tv_sec = UPD_DEADLINE_S, .tv_usec = 0 };
+ setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
+ if(connect(fd, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0){
+ close(fd); freeaddrinfo(res); return -1;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+ {
+ int fl = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0);
+ if(fl >= 0) fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fl | O_NONBLOCK);
+ }
+ return fd;
+#else
+ OrbisNetInAddr in;
+ memset(&in, 0, sizeof in);
+ int32_t rid = sceNetResolverCreate("updR", (uint32_t)s_upool, 0);
+ if(rid < 0) return -1;
+ int32_t rr = sceNetResolverStartNtoa(rid, host, &in, 8000000, 3, 0);
+ sceNetResolverDestroy(rid);
+ if(rr < 0){ log_msg("updater: dns fail"); return -1; }
+ int fd = sceNetSocket("upd", ORBIS_NET_AF_INET, ORBIS_NET_SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if(fd < 0) return -1;
+ struct timeval tv = { .tv_sec = UPD_DEADLINE_S, .tv_usec = 0 };
+ sceNetSetsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
+ OrbisNetSockaddr sa;
+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof sa);
+ sa.sa_family = 2;
+ *(uint16_t*)sa.sa_data = sceNetHtons((uint16_t)port);
+ memcpy(sa.sa_data+2, &in.s_addr, 4);
+ if(sceNetConnect(fd, &sa, sizeof sa) < 0){
+ sceNetSocketClose(fd); return -1;
+ }
+ int nb = 1;
+ sceNetSetsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_NBIO, &nb, sizeof nb);
+ return fd;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* HTTPS GET with real HTTP semantics (bounded):
+ * status line + headers (cap UPD_HDR_MAX) + Content-Length or
+ * Transfer-Encoding: chunked decoding + redirect capture.
+ * Returns heap body (caller frees) with out_len; out_status always set;
+ * out_location gets the redirect target ("" when none). Only the body
+ * counts against cap; headers are separately bounded. */
+static char *https_get_once(const char *host, const char *path,
+ size_t cap, int *out_status, size_t *out_len,
+ char *out_location, size_t loc_cap){
+ if(out_status) *out_status = 0;
+ if(out_len) *out_len = 0;
+ if(out_location && loc_cap) out_location[0] = 0;
+ if(!upd_host_allowed(host)){ log_msg("updater: host refused (%s)", host); return NULL; }
+ int fd = upd_connect(host, 443);
+ if(fd < 0) return NULL;
+ tls_ctx_t *t = tls_start(fd, host);
+ if(!t){
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ close(fd);
+#else
+ sceNetSocketClose(fd);
+#endif
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ char req[512];
+ int rl = snprintf(req, sizeof req,
+ "GET %s HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: %s\r\nUser-Agent: orbisRPC/%s\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n",
+ path, host, ORBISRPC_VERSION);
+ if(rl <= 0 || rl >= (int)sizeof req){ tls_free(t); return NULL; }
+ if(tls_write(t, req, (size_t)rl) < 0){ tls_free(t); return NULL; }
+ /* Read raw response (headers + body) up to header cap + body cap. */
+ size_t rawcap = UPD_HDR_MAX + cap;
+ char *raw = (char*)malloc(rawcap);
+ if(!raw){ tls_free(t); return NULL; }
+ size_t rl2 = 0;
+ int64_t dl = orbis_mono_s() + UPD_DEADLINE_S + 20;
+ for(;;){
+ char tmp[2048];
+ int r = tls_read(t, tmp, sizeof tmp);
+ if(r < 0) break;
+ if(r == 0){
+ if(orbis_mono_s() > dl) break;
+ usleep(20000);
+ continue;
+ }
+ size_t room = rawcap > rl2 ? rawcap - rl2 : 0;
+ size_t cp = (size_t)r < room ? (size_t)r : room;
+ if(cp) memcpy(raw + rl2, tmp, cp);
+ rl2 += cp;
+ if(rl2 >= rawcap - 1 || orbis_mono_s() > dl) break;
+ }
+ tls_free(t);
+ if(rl2 == 0){ free(raw); return NULL; }
+ raw[rl2] = 0;
+ char *out = upd_parse_response(raw, rl2, cap, out_status, out_len,
+ out_location, loc_cap);
+ free(raw);
+ return out;
+}
+
+/* HTTPS GET following absolute-URL https redirects within the allowlist
+ * (GitHub release assets redirect to object storage). Relative Location
+ * values stay on the same host. Refuses non-https, off-allowlist, and
+ * redirect loops. */
+static char *https_get(const char *host, const char *path,
+ size_t cap, int *out_status, size_t *out_len){
+ char hbuf[128], pbuf[512], loc[512];
+ snprintf(hbuf, sizeof hbuf, "%s", host);
+ snprintf(pbuf, sizeof pbuf, "%s", path);
+ for(int i = 0; i <= UPD_MAX_REDIRECTS; i++){
+ int status = 0;
+ size_t len = 0;
+ char *body = https_get_once(hbuf, pbuf, cap, &status, &len,
+ loc, sizeof loc);
+ if(!body){
+ if(out_status) *out_status = status;
+ if(out_len) *out_len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if((status == 301 || status == 302 || status == 303 ||
+ status == 307 || status == 308) && loc[0]){
+ free(body);
+ if(!strncmp(loc, "https://", 8)){
+ const char *h0 = loc + 8;
+ const char *p0 = strchr(h0, '/');
+ if(!p0 || (size_t)(p0 - h0) >= sizeof hbuf){
+ if(out_status) *out_status = status;
+ if(out_len) *out_len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ memcpy(hbuf, h0, (size_t)(p0 - h0));
+ hbuf[p0 - h0] = 0;
+ snprintf(pbuf, sizeof pbuf, "%s", p0);
+ } else if(loc[0] == '/'){
+ snprintf(pbuf, sizeof pbuf, "%s", loc);
+ } else {
+ if(out_status) *out_status = status;
+ if(out_len) *out_len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if(!upd_host_allowed(hbuf)){
+ log_msg("updater: redirect refused (off-allowlist %s)", hbuf);
+ if(out_status) *out_status = status;
+ if(out_len) *out_len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ log_msg("updater: redirect -> %s%s", hbuf, pbuf);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if(out_status) *out_status = status;
+ if(out_len) *out_len = len;
+ if(status != 200 || len == 0){ free(body); return NULL; }
+ return body;
+ }
+ if(out_status) *out_status = 0;
+ if(out_len) *out_len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int stage_file(const char *target, const unsigned char *data, size_t n){
+ char tmp[192];
+ snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%s.new", target);
+ if(!updater_image_ok(data, n)){ log_msg("updater: staged bytes failed validation"); return -1; }
+ FILE *f = fopen(tmp, "wb");
+ if(!f){ log_msg("updater: cannot write %s", tmp); return -1; }
+ int ok = (fwrite(data, 1, n, f) == n);
+ if(fflush(f) != 0) ok = 0;
+ if(ok){ int fd = fileno(f); if(fd >= 0 && fsync(fd) != 0) ok = 0; }
+ if(fclose(f) != 0) ok = 0;
+ if(!ok){ remove(tmp); return -1; }
+ /* Atomic verified activation: validates <target>.new, backs up live
+ * to .bak, activates, re-verifies, auto-restores .bak on failure.
+ * A refused stage leaves the live target untouched (ORX-UPDATE-003). */
+ if(health_stage_activate(target) != 0){
+ log_msg("updater: stage activate failed for %s; live kept", target);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* SHA256 of a buffer, hex-encoded (64 chars + NUL). Returns 0 on success. */
+static int sha256_hex(const unsigned char *data, size_t n, char out[65]){
+ unsigned char dig[32];
+ mbedtls_sha256_context sc;
+ mbedtls_sha256_init(&sc);
+ int ok = mbedtls_sha256_starts(&sc, 0) == 0 &&
+ mbedtls_sha256_update(&sc, data ? data : (const unsigned char *)"", n) == 0 &&
+ mbedtls_sha256_finish(&sc, dig) == 0;
+ mbedtls_sha256_free(&sc);
+ if(!ok) return -1;
+ for(int i=0;i<32;i++) snprintf(out+2*i, 3, "%02x", dig[i]);
+ out[64]=0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Look up "<filename>" in a SHA256SUMS body ("<hash> <name>\n" lines).
+ * Returns 0 and fills want_hex when found. */
+static int sums_lookup(const char *sums, const char *filename, char want_hex[65]){
+ size_t fnlen = strlen(filename);
+ const char *p = sums;
+ while(*p){
+ while(*p==' '||*p=='\t'||*p=='\r'||*p=='\n') p++;
+ if(!*p) break;
+ if(strlen(p) < 64) break;
+ char hex[65];
+ memcpy(hex, p, 64); hex[64]=0;
+ int ishex=1;
+ for(int i=0;i<64;i++){
+ char c=hex[i];
+ if(!((c>='0'&&c<='9')||(c>='a'&&c<='f')||(c>='A'&&c<='F'))){ ishex=0; break; }
+ }
+ const char *e = strchr(p, '\n');
+ size_t linelen = e ? (size_t)(e-p) : strlen(p);
+ if(ishex && linelen > 65){
+ const char *nl = p+64;
+ while(nl<p+linelen && (*nl==' '||*nl=='\t'||*nl=='*')) nl++;
+ if((size_t)(p+linelen-(nl)) >= fnlen && !memcmp(nl, filename, fnlen) &&
+ (nl[fnlen]=='\n'||nl[fnlen]=='\r'||nl[fnlen]==' '||nl[fnlen]=='\t'||nl[fnlen]==0||nl[fnlen]=='*')){
+ for(int i=0;i<64;i++){
+ char c=hex[i];
+ want_hex[i]=(c>='A'&&c<='F')?(char)(c-'A'+'a'):c;
+ }
+ want_hex[64]=0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ p = e ? e+1 : p+linelen;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Download a release asset by exact name. Returns heap body or NULL. */
+static char *fetch_asset(const jl_val_t *assets, const char *want_name,
+ size_t cap, int *status, size_t *out_len){
+ for(size_t i = 0; ; i++){
+ const jl_val_t *a = jl_arr_at(assets, i);
+ if(!a) break;
+ const jl_val_t *nm = jl_obj_get(a, "name");
+ const jl_val_t *dl = jl_obj_get(a, "browser_download_url");
+ if(!nm || nm->type != JL_STRING || !dl || dl->type != JL_STRING) continue;
+ if(strcmp(nm->str, want_name) != 0) continue;
+ const char *url = dl->str;
+ if(strncmp(url, "https://", 8) != 0) return NULL;
+ const char *h0 = url + 8;
+ const char *p0 = strchr(h0, '/');
+ if(!p0 || (size_t)(p0 - h0) >= 128) return NULL;
+ char host[128];
+ memcpy(host, h0, (size_t)(p0 - h0)); host[p0 - h0] = 0;
+ return https_get(host, p0, cap, status, out_len);
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Decode manifest.sig: raw 64 bytes, or 128 hex chars. 0 ok. */
+static int decode_sig(const char *body, size_t len, unsigned char out[64]){
+ if(len == 64){ memcpy(out, body, 64); return 0; }
+ /* strip whitespace for hex form; exactly 128 hex chars required —
+ * trailing garbage after the 128 fails closed */
+ char hex[129];
+ size_t hn = 0, total = 0;
+ for(size_t i = 0; i < len; i++){
+ char c = body[i];
+ if(c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\r' || c == '\n') continue;
+ total++;
+ if(hn < 128) hex[hn++] = c;
+ }
+ if(hn != 128 || total != 128) return -1;
+ for(int i = 0; i < 64; i++){
+ unsigned v = 0;
+ for(int k = 0; k < 2; k++){
+ char c = hex[2 * i + k];
+ v <<= 4;
+ if(c >= '0' && c <= '9') v |= (unsigned)(c - '0');
+ else if(c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') v |= (unsigned)(c - 'a' + 10);
+ else if(c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') v |= (unsigned)(c - 'A' + 10);
+ else return -1;
+ }
+ out[i] = (unsigned char)v;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int updater_check_and_stage(void){
+ char path[160];
+ snprintf(path, sizeof path, "/repos/%s/releases/latest", ORBISRPC_REPO);
+ size_t rl = 0;
+ int status = 0;
+ char *js = https_get(UPD_HOST, path, 65536, &status, &rl);
+ if(!js){ log_msg("updater: release check failed (status=%d)", status); return -1; }
+ jl_val_t *r = jl_parse(js, rl);
+ free(js);
+ if(!r){ log_msg("updater: release parse failed"); return -1; }
+ const jl_val_t *tag = jl_obj_get(r, "tag_name");
+ const jl_val_t *assets = jl_obj_get(r, "assets");
+ int updated = 0;
+ if(tag && tag->type == JL_STRING && tag->str[0] &&
+ updater_cmp(tag->str, ORBISRPC_VERSION) > 0){
+ log_msg("updater: %s available (local %s)", tag->str, ORBISRPC_VERSION);
+ if(assets && assets->type == JL_ARRAY){
+ /* Preferred: signed manifest (manifest.json + manifest.sig).
+ * Verified with the embedded release pubkey; every binary must
+ * match its listed SHA256. A bad signature refuses the whole
+ * update (ORX-UPDATE-002). */
+ manifest_t mf;
+ int have_manifest = 0;
+ size_t ml = 0;
+ char *mbody = fetch_asset(assets, "manifest.json", 65536, &status, &ml);
+ if(mbody){
+ size_t sl = 0;
+ char *sbody = fetch_asset(assets, "manifest.sig", 4096, &status, &sl);
+ if(sbody && manifest_parse(mbody, ml, &mf) == 0 &&
+ manifest_gate(&mf) && manifest_is_newer(&mf, ORBISRPC_VERSION)){
+ unsigned char sig[64];
+ if(decode_sig(sbody, sl, sig) == 0 &&
+ manifest_verify_sig((unsigned char*)mbody, ml, sig,
+ ORBISRPC_RELEASE_PUBKEY) == 0){
+ have_manifest = 1;
+ log_msg("updater: manifest %s verified (key %s)",
+ mf.version, ORBISRPC_RELEASE_KEY_ID);
+ } else {
+ log_msg("updater: WARN ORX-UPDATE-002: manifest signature invalid; refusing update");
+ }
+ } else if(sbody){
+ log_msg("updater: WARN ORX-UPDATE-002: manifest invalid/gated; refusing update");
+ }
+ free(sbody);
+ if(!have_manifest){ free(mbody); mbody = NULL; }
+ }
+ /* Compat fallback: SHA256SUMS (unsigned but hash-pinned). */
+ char *sums = NULL;
+ if(!have_manifest){
+ sums = fetch_asset(assets, "SHA256SUMS", 65536, &status, NULL);
+ if(!sums)
+ log_msg("updater: WARN ORX-UPDATE-002: no manifest and no SHA256SUMS; refusing unsigned update");
+ }
+ /* Two-phase commit: download + verify EVERY asset first, then
+ * activate all at once. A failure anywhere stages nothing, so
+ * the runtime can never mix a new payload with an old plugin
+ * (or vice versa) — rollback restores the complete runtime. */
+ struct { const char *target; char *bin; size_t len; } pend[2];
+ memset(pend, 0, sizeof pend);
+ int pend_n = 0, pend_fail = 0;
+ for(size_t i = 0; ; i++){
+ const jl_val_t *a = jl_arr_at(assets, i);
+ if(!a) break;
+ const jl_val_t *nm = jl_obj_get(a, "name");
+ const jl_val_t *dl = jl_obj_get(a, "browser_download_url");
+ if(!nm || nm->type != JL_STRING || !dl || dl->type != JL_STRING) continue;
+ const char *target = NULL;
+ if(!strcmp(nm->str, "orbisrpc.bin")) target = "/data/payloads/orbisrpc.bin";
+ else if(!strcmp(nm->str, "orbisrpc_plugin.prx")) target = "/data/GoldHEN/plugins/orbisrpc_plugin.prx";
+ else continue;
+ /* download URLs must be https (fail closed on http/other). */
+ const char *url = dl->str;
+ if(strncmp(url, "https://", 8) != 0){ pend_fail = 1; break; }
+ const char *h0 = url + 8;
+ const char *p0 = strchr(h0, '/');
+ if(!p0 || (size_t)(p0-h0) >= 128){ pend_fail = 1; break; }
+ char host[128];
+ memcpy(host, h0, (size_t)(p0-h0)); host[p0-h0] = 0;
+ size_t al = 0;
+ char *bin = https_get(host, p0, UPD_BODY_MAX, &status, &al);
+ if(!bin || !updater_image_ok((unsigned char*)bin, al)){
+ log_msg("updater: asset %s failed validation", nm->str);
+ free(bin);
+ pend_fail = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if(have_manifest){
+ if(manifest_check(&mf, nm->str, (unsigned char*)bin, al) != 0){
+ log_msg("updater: asset %s not in manifest or hash mismatch; refusing (ORX-UPDATE-002)", nm->str);
+ free(bin);
+ pend_fail = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if(sums){
+ char want[65];
+ if(sums_lookup(sums, nm->str, want) != 0){
+ log_msg("updater: asset %s not in SHA256SUMS; refusing", nm->str);
+ free(bin);
+ pend_fail = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ char got[65];
+ if(sha256_hex((unsigned char*)bin, al, got) != 0 || strcmp(got, want) != 0){
+ log_msg("updater: asset %s hash mismatch; refusing", nm->str);
+ free(bin);
+ pend_fail = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* No manifest and no SHA256SUMS: refuse unsigned bytes. */
+ log_msg("updater: asset %s refused: no trust anchor (ORX-UPDATE-002)", nm->str);
+ free(bin);
+ pend_fail = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ if(pend_n < 2){
+ pend[pend_n].target = target;
+ pend[pend_n].bin = bin;
+ pend[pend_n].len = al;
+ pend_n++;
+ } else {
+ free(bin); /* more binaries than we stage; ignore extras */
+ }
+ }
+ if(!pend_fail && pend_n > 0){
+ for(int pi = 0; pi < pend_n; pi++){
+ if(stage_file(pend[pi].target,
+ (unsigned char*)pend[pi].bin, pend[pi].len) == 0){
+ log_msg("updater: staged %s (%zu bytes)",
+ pend[pi].target, pend[pi].len);
+ updated = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if(pend_fail){
+ log_msg("updater: incomplete set; staged nothing (versions stay matched)");
+ }
+ for(int pi = 0; pi < pend_n; pi++) free(pend[pi].bin);
+ free(sums);
+ free(mbody);
+ }
+ }
+ jl_free(r);
+ return updated ? 1 : 0;
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/updater.h b/orbisrpc/updater.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6e9eec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/updater.h
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/* updater.h - self-updater: version compare, staged install. */
+#ifndef UPDATER_H
+#define UPDATER_H
+#include <stddef.h>
+/* Compare dotted versions ("0.4.0" vs "v0.10.1", leading v ok):
+ * >0 a newer, <0 b newer, 0 equal. Host-testable. */
+int updater_cmp(const char *a, const char *b);
+/* Validate a downloaded payload: ELF magic, 64-bit, x86-64, sane size. */
+int updater_elf_ok(const unsigned char *buf, size_t n);
+/* Accepts raw ELF (payload .bin) or signed SELF (plugin .prx). */
+int updater_image_ok(const unsigned char *buf, size_t n);
+/* Check latest GitHub release; download + atomically stage newer
+ * artifacts the daemon actually runs from. Returns 1 updated,
+ * 0 already current, -1 failed/checked-off. Never fatal. */
+int updater_check_and_stage(void);
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/updater_http.c b/orbisrpc/updater_http.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ee9fd0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/updater_http.c
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/* updater_http.c - pure HTTP response parsing (host-testable + PS4). */
+#include "updater_http.h"
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <strings.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+char *upd_parse_response(const char *raw, size_t rawlen, size_t cap,
+ int *out_status, size_t *out_len,
+ char *out_location, size_t loc_cap){
+ if(out_status) *out_status = 0;
+ if(out_len) *out_len = 0;
+ if(out_location && loc_cap) out_location[0] = 0;
+ if(!raw || cap < 2) return NULL;
+ /* Split headers/body. */
+ const char *e = strstr(raw, "\r\n\r\n");
+ if(!e || (size_t)(e - raw) > UPD_HDR_MAX) return NULL;
+ size_t hlen = (size_t)(e - raw);
+ const char *body = e + 4;
+ size_t bodylen = (hlen + 4 <= rawlen) ? rawlen - hlen - 4 : 0;
+ int status = 0;
+ if(hlen >= 12 && !memcmp(raw, "HTTP/1.", 7)) status = atoi(raw + 9);
+ if(out_status) *out_status = status;
+ /* Header scan (case-insensitive names, single pass). */
+ long content_len = -1;
+ int chunked = 0;
+ {
+ const char *line = raw;
+ while(line < e){
+ const char *nl = strstr(line, "\r\n");
+ if(!nl || nl > e) nl = e;
+ const char *colon = memchr(line, ':', (size_t)(nl - line));
+ if(colon){
+ size_t nl2 = (size_t)(colon - line);
+ while(nl2 > 0 && (line[nl2-1] == ' ' || line[nl2-1] == '\t')) nl2--;
+ const char *val = colon + 1;
+ while(val < nl && (*val == ' ' || *val == '\t')) val++;
+ size_t vlen = (size_t)(nl - val);
+ if(nl2 == 14 && !strncasecmp(line, "content-length", 14)){
+ char nb[32];
+ size_t cn = vlen < sizeof nb - 1 ? vlen : sizeof nb - 1;
+ memcpy(nb, val, cn); nb[cn] = 0;
+ content_len = atol(nb);
+ } else if(nl2 == 17 && !strncasecmp(line, "transfer-encoding", 17)){
+ if(vlen >= 7 && !strncasecmp(val + vlen - 7, "chunked", 7))
+ chunked = 1;
+ } else if(nl2 == 8 && !strncasecmp(line, "location", 8)){
+ if(out_location && loc_cap > 1){
+ size_t cn = vlen < loc_cap - 1 ? vlen : loc_cap - 1;
+ memcpy(out_location, val, cn);
+ out_location[cn] = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ line = (*nl == '\r') ? nl + 2 : nl;
+ if(line >= e) break;
+ }
+ }
+ char *out = NULL;
+ size_t olen = 0;
+ if(chunked){
+ out = (char*)malloc(cap);
+ if(!out) return NULL;
+ size_t pos = 0;
+ while(pos < bodylen){
+ const char *le = strstr(body + pos, "\r\n");
+ if(!le || (size_t)(le - (body + pos)) > 32){ free(out); return NULL; }
+ char nb[33];
+ size_t nlen = (size_t)(le - (body + pos));
+ memcpy(nb, body + pos, nlen); nb[nlen] = 0;
+ long cn = strtol(nb, NULL, 16);
+ if(cn < 0 || cn > (long)(cap - 1)){ free(out); return NULL; }
+ pos += nlen + 2;
+ if(pos > bodylen){ free(out); return NULL; }
+ if(cn == 0) break;
+ if(pos + (size_t)cn + 2 > bodylen){ free(out); return NULL; }
+ if(olen + (size_t)cn > cap - 1){ free(out); return NULL; }
+ memcpy(out + olen, body + pos, (size_t)cn);
+ olen += (size_t)cn;
+ pos += (size_t)cn + 2; /* data + trailing CRLF */
+ }
+ } else {
+ if(content_len >= 0 && (size_t)content_len < bodylen)
+ bodylen = (size_t)content_len;
+ if(bodylen > cap - 1) return NULL;
+ out = (char*)malloc(cap);
+ if(!out) return NULL;
+ memcpy(out, body, bodylen);
+ olen = bodylen;
+ }
+ out[olen] = 0;
+ if(out_len) *out_len = olen;
+ return out;
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/updater_http.h b/orbisrpc/updater_http.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6ff867
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/updater_http.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* updater_http.h - pure HTTP response parsing for the updater.
+ *
+ * Host-testable (no PS4 includes): status line, bounded headers,
+ * Content-Length, Transfer-Encoding: chunked decoding, Location capture.
+ * The socket/TLS/redirect-policy half stays in updater.c (PS4-only). */
+#ifndef ORBISRPC_UPDATER_HTTP_H
+#define ORBISRPC_UPDATER_HTTP_H
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#define UPD_HDR_MAX 8192
+
+/* Parse a complete raw HTTP response (rawlen bytes, NUL-terminated at
+ * raw[rawlen]). Returns a heap body (caller frees, NUL-terminated) with
+ * out_len, or NULL on any malformed/truncated/over-cap input.
+ * out_status always set (0 when no valid status line); out_location gets
+ * the redirect target ("" when none). Only the decoded body counts against
+ * cap; headers are separately bounded by UPD_HDR_MAX. */
+char *upd_parse_response(const char *raw, size_t rawlen, size_t cap,
+ int *out_status, size_t *out_len,
+ char *out_location, size_t loc_cap);
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/updater_util.c b/orbisrpc/updater_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c9ea37e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/updater_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/* updater_util.c - host-testable updater logic: version compare, ELF check. */
+#include "updater.h"
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+int updater_cmp(const char *a, const char *b){
+ unsigned av[4] = {0,0,0,0}, bv[4] = {0,0,0,0};
+ if(a && (*a=='v'||*a=='V')) a++;
+ if(b && (*b=='v'||*b=='V')) b++;
+ for(int i = 0; i < 4; i++){
+ char *ea = NULL, *eb = NULL;
+ if(a && *a){ av[i] = (unsigned)strtoul(a, &ea, 10); a = ea; if(*a=='.') a++; }
+ if(b && *b){ bv[i] = (unsigned)strtoul(b, &eb, 10); b = eb; if(*b=='.') b++; }
+ }
+ for(int i = 0; i < 4; i++){
+ if(av[i] != bv[i]) return av[i] > bv[i] ? 1 : -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int updater_elf_ok(const unsigned char *buf, size_t n){
+ if(!buf || n < 64) return 0;
+ if(buf[0] != 0x7f || buf[1] != 'E' || buf[2] != 'L' || buf[3] != 'F') return 0;
+ if(buf[4] != 2) return 0; /* 64-bit */
+ if(buf[5] != 1) return 0; /* little-endian */
+ if(buf[18] != 62 || buf[19] != 0) return 0; /* x86-64 */
+ if(n > 8u*1024u*1024u) return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* SELF (signed container) check: plugin PRXs ship as SELF, not raw ELF. */
+static int updater_self_ok(const unsigned char *buf, size_t n){
+ if(!buf || n < 64) return 0;
+ if(buf[0] != 0x4f || buf[1] != 0x15 || buf[2] != 0x3d || buf[3] != 0x1d)
+ return 0;
+ if(n > 8u*1024u*1024u) return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int updater_image_ok(const unsigned char *buf, size_t n){
+ return updater_elf_ok(buf, n) || updater_self_ok(buf, n);
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/version.h b/orbisrpc/version.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9055d48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/version.h
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+/* version.h - single source of truth for the release version.
+ * Bump on every GitHub release; the on-console updater compares this
+ * against the latest release tag. */
+#ifndef ORBISRPC_VERSION_H
+#define ORBISRPC_VERSION_H
+#define ORBISRPC_VERSION "1.0.0"
+#define ORBISRPC_REPO "SirHumza/orbisRPC"
+#endif
diff --git a/orbisrpc/ws.c b/orbisrpc/ws.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..844d632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/ws.c
@@ -0,0 +1,433 @@
+/* ws.c - WebSocket client over SceNet + mbedTLS TLS.
+ * Non-blocking friendly: tls_read() returns 0 when no data is pending, and
+ * the receive buffer grows for large server frames (user-account READY
+ * payloads are big); frames beyond WS_RBUF_MAX are drained and skipped.
+ * All client->server frames are masked per RFC 6455 5.3, control frames too.
+ */
+#include "ws.h"
+#include "clock.h"
+#include "tls.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+/* Payload-SDK build: plain BSD sockets, no Sony modules. getaddrinfo
+ * replaces the kernel resolver; nothing needs initializing. */
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#else
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <orbis/Net.h>
+#include <orbis/Sysmodule.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+
+#ifndef SOL_SOCKET
+#define SOL_SOCKET 0xffff
+#endif
+#ifndef SO_NBIO
+#define SO_NBIO 0x2000
+#endif
+
+static int s_net_ready = 0;
+static int s_net_mem = 0;
+
+static int net_ensure(void){
+ if(s_net_ready) return 0;
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ /* BSD sockets need no init. */
+ s_net_ready = 1;
+ return 0;
+#else
+ uint32_t ur = sceSysmoduleLoadModuleInternal(ORBIS_SYSMODULE_INTERNAL_NET);
+ if((int)ur < 0){ log_msg("load NET fail %d", (int)ur); return -1; }
+ if(sceNetInit() < 0){ log_msg("sceNetInit fail"); return -2; }
+ s_net_mem = (int)sceNetPoolCreate("orbisrpcNet", 128*1024, 0);
+ if(s_net_mem < 0){ log_msg("net pool fail %d", s_net_mem); return -3; }
+ /* NOTE: deliberately NO sceNetCtlInit here — this runs inside a game
+ * process, and initializing app-level NetCtl state under a live game is
+ * a crash recipe. The kernel resolver works fine with just the pool. */
+ s_net_ready = 1;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Write exactly n bytes of plaintext through the TLS engine. */
+static int ws_send_all(ws_t *w, const unsigned char *data, size_t n){
+ return tls_write((tls_ctx_t*)w->tls, data, n) < 0 ? -1 : (int)n;
+}
+
+static void next_mask(unsigned char mk[4]){
+ /* RFC 6455 masking key: fresh bytes from /dev/urandom (the same strong
+ * source as TLS). The LCG below is a last-resort fallback for a
+ * console with no urandom at all; masking is obfuscation, not secrecy,
+ * but there is no reason to use a predictable key when OS randomness
+ * exists. */
+ int fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+ if(fd >= 0){
+ size_t got = 0;
+ while(got < 4){
+ long r = read(fd, (char *)mk + got, 4 - got);
+ if(r <= 0) break;
+ got += (size_t)r;
+ }
+ close(fd);
+ if(got == 4) return;
+ }
+ static uint32_t mk_seed;
+ if(!mk_seed) mk_seed = (uint32_t)orbis_mono_s() ^ 0x9e3779b9u ^ (uint32_t)(uintptr_t)&mk_seed;
+ mk_seed = mk_seed*1664525u + 1013904223u;
+ mk[0]=(unsigned char)(mk_seed&0xff); mk[1]=(unsigned char)((mk_seed>>8)&0xff);
+ mk[2]=(unsigned char)((mk_seed>>16)&0xff); mk[3]=(unsigned char)((mk_seed>>24)&0xff);
+}
+
+int ws_connect(ws_t *w, const char *host, int port, const char *resource, const char *key){
+ memset(w,0,sizeof(*w));
+ w->rcap = WS_RBUF_MIN;
+ w->rbuf = (unsigned char*)malloc(w->rcap);
+ if(!w->rbuf){ log_msg("ws: rbuf alloc fail"); return -1; }
+ if(net_ensure()<0) goto fail;
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ /* Resolve via libc (works wherever BSD sockets do). */
+ struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL;
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof hints);
+ hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ {
+ char portbuf[16];
+ snprintf(portbuf, sizeof portbuf, "%d", port);
+ if(getaddrinfo(host, portbuf, &hints, &res) != 0 || !res){
+ log_msg("resolve fail: %s", host);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ {
+ struct sockaddr_in *a = (struct sockaddr_in *)res->ai_addr;
+ unsigned char *q = (unsigned char *)&a->sin_addr.s_addr;
+ log_msg("dial %s -> %u.%u.%u.%u:%d", host, q[0], q[1], q[2], q[3], port);
+ }
+ int fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if(fd < 0){ log_msg("socket fail"); freeaddrinfo(res); goto fail; }
+ w->fd = fd; w->sock = fd;
+ {
+ struct timeval tv = { .tv_sec = 10, .tv_usec = 0 };
+ setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
+ }
+ if(connect(fd, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0){
+ log_msg("connect fail (syscall) to %s:%d", host, port);
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(res);
+ {
+ /* Both timeouts stay armed for the socket's whole life (plus
+ * NBIO below): a stuck peer can never wedge the daemon silently —
+ * the failure observed on hardware was a frozen process with zero
+ * output and no timeout to break it. */
+ struct timeval tv0 = { .tv_sec = 15, .tv_usec = 0 };
+ setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv0, sizeof tv0);
+ setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &tv0, sizeof tv0);
+ }
+ {
+ int fl = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0);
+ if(fl >= 0) fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fl | O_NONBLOCK);
+ }
+ w->nb = 1;
+ log_msg("tcp established");
+#else
+ /* memid = our net pool: passing 0 here fails with EBADF (0x80410109).
+ * If pool creation failed, skip DNS and only allow IP literals. */
+ int32_t rid = -1;
+ OrbisNetInAddr in; memset(&in,0,sizeof in);
+ int resolved = 0;
+ if(s_net_mem < 0){
+ log_msg("net pool invalid; skipping resolver");
+ }else{
+ rid = sceNetResolverCreate("orbisrpcR", s_net_mem, 0);
+ if(rid < 0){
+ log_msg("resolver create fail %d", rid);
+ }else{
+ int32_t rr = sceNetResolverStartNtoa(rid, host, &in, 5000000, 3, 0);
+ if(rr < 0) log_msg("resolver %s err %d", host, rr);
+ sceNetResolverDestroy(rid);
+ resolved = (rr >= 0);
+ }
+ }
+ if(!resolved){
+ struct in_addr ia = { .s_addr = inet_addr(host) };
+ if(ia.s_addr == 0xffffffff){ log_msg("resolve fail: %s", host); goto fail; }
+ in.s_addr = ia.s_addr;
+ }
+ int32_t fd = sceNetSocket("orbisrpcWs", ORBIS_NET_AF_INET, ORBIS_NET_SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if(fd < 0){ log_msg("socket fail %d",fd); goto fail; }
+ w->fd = fd; w->sock = fd;
+ /* Pack port + IPv4 into sa_data. The resolver's OrbisNetInAddr already
+ * stores the octets in wire-memory order, so copy the 4 bytes VERBATIM
+ * (any >>24-style arithmetic reverses the IP — v2 dialed mirrored IPs). */
+ unsigned char ipb[4];
+ memcpy(ipb, &in.s_addr, 4);
+ OrbisNetSockaddr sa; memset(&sa,0,sizeof sa);
+ sa.len = (uint8_t)sizeof sa;
+ sa.sa_family = (OrbisNetSaFamily_t)ORBIS_NET_AF_INET;
+ sa.sa_data[0] = (char)((port >> 8) & 0xff);
+ sa.sa_data[1] = (char)(port & 0xff);
+ sa.sa_data[2] = (char)ipb[0];
+ sa.sa_data[3] = (char)ipb[1];
+ sa.sa_data[4] = (char)ipb[2];
+ sa.sa_data[5] = (char)ipb[3];
+ log_msg("dial %s -> %u.%u.%u.%u:%d", host,
+ (unsigned char)sa.sa_data[2], (unsigned char)sa.sa_data[3],
+ (unsigned char)sa.sa_data[4], (unsigned char)sa.sa_data[5], port);
+ /* Bound the blocking connect: 10s send timeout so a dead route can't
+ * hang the daemon thread forever (plugin_unload joins this thread). */
+ {
+ struct timeval tv = { .tv_sec = 10, .tv_usec = 0 };
+ sceNetSetsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv, sizeof tv);
+ }
+ if(sceNetConnect(fd, &sa, sizeof sa) < 0){
+ log_msg("connect fail (syscall) to %s:%d", host, port);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ {
+ struct timeval tv0 = { .tv_sec = 0, .tv_usec = 0 };
+ sceNetSetsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &tv0, sizeof tv0);
+ }
+ int on = 1;
+ sceNetSetsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_NBIO, &on, sizeof on);
+ w->nb = 1;
+ log_msg("tcp established");
+#endif
+ /* TLS handshake over the established connection (mbedTLS, no external
+ * module needed). Socket is NBIO; tls_start pumps it with a deadline. */
+ w->tls = tls_start(fd, host);
+ if(!w->tls){ goto fail; }
+ /* HTTP Upgrade handshake. Desktop-client UA, NO Origin header (native
+ * clients don't send Origin to the gateway). Host has no :port —
+ * browsers never send the default-port suffix and the front side
+ * ignores requests it can't route. */
+ char req[640]; int n=snprintf(req,sizeof req,
+ "GET %s HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: %s\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\nConnection: Upgrade\r\n"
+ "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 "
+ "(KHTML, like Gecko) discord/1.0.9175 Chrome/122.0.6261.112 Electron/30.0.8 "
+ "Safari/537.36\r\n"
+ "Sec-WebSocket-Key: %s\r\nSec-WebSocket-Version: 13\r\n\r\n",
+ resource?resource:"/", host, key);
+ if(ws_send_all(w, (const unsigned char*)req, (size_t)n) < 0){ log_msg("hs write fail"); goto fail; }
+ log_msg("hs request sent (%dB)", n);
+ /* Read response headers; bytes past "\r\n\r\n" are the first websocket
+ * frame (usually HELLO arriving early) and MUST be kept, not dropped. */
+ char hdr[2048]; int hlen=0, rd; int64_t t0=orbis_mono_s();
+ int header_end = -1;
+ extern int daemon_stop_requested(void) __attribute__((weak));
+ while(hlen<(int)sizeof hdr-1){
+ if(daemon_stop_requested && daemon_stop_requested()){ log_msg("ws: hs aborted (stop)"); goto fail; }
+ rd = tls_read(w->tls, hdr+hlen, sizeof hdr-1-(size_t)hlen);
+ if(rd>0){
+ hlen+=rd; hdr[hlen]=0;
+ for(int i=3; i<hlen; i++){
+ if(hdr[i-3]=='\r' && hdr[i-2]=='\n' && hdr[i-1]=='\r' && hdr[i]=='\n'){
+ header_end = i + 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if(header_end >= 0) break;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if(rd==0){
+ if(orbis_mono_s()-t0 > 10){ log_msg("hs timeout (got %dB)", hlen); goto fail; }
+ usleep(20000); continue;
+ }
+ log_msg("hs read fail (got %dB)", hlen);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if(header_end < 0 || hlen < 12 || strncmp(hdr,"HTTP/1.1 101 ",12)!=0){ log_msg("no 101: %.40s", hdr); goto fail; }
+ w->connected = 1;
+ if(header_end < hlen){
+ const char *body = hdr + header_end;
+ size_t bl = (size_t)(hdr+hlen-body);
+ if(bl > w->rcap) bl = w->rcap;
+ if(bl){ memcpy(w->rbuf, body, bl); w->rlen = bl; }
+ }
+ log_msg("ws: connected (handshake ok)");
+ return 0;
+fail:
+ tls_free((tls_ctx_t*)w->tls); w->tls=NULL;
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ if(w->fd > 0) close(w->fd);
+#else
+ if(w->fd > 0) sceNetSocketClose(w->fd);
+#endif
+ free(w->rbuf); w->rbuf=NULL; w->rcap=0;
+ w->connected=0; w->tls=NULL; w->fd=0; w->sock=0;
+ return -9;
+}
+
+int ws_send_text(ws_t *w, const char *msg, size_t len){
+ if(!w || !w->connected || (!msg && len)) return -1;
+ if(len > 16384){ log_msg("ws frame too big (%zu); refusing", len); return -1; }
+ unsigned char mk[4]; next_mask(mk);
+ unsigned char hdr[14]; size_t f=0;
+ hdr[f++]=0x81; /* FIN | text */
+ if(len<126){ hdr[f++]=(unsigned char)(0x80|len); }
+ else { hdr[f++]=0x80|126; hdr[f++]=(unsigned char)((len>>8)&0xff); hdr[f++]=(unsigned char)(len&0xff); }
+ memcpy(hdr+f, mk, 4); f+=4;
+ /* Small frames (heartbeats, presence) avoid malloc churn in long sessions */
+ unsigned char stack[1024];
+ unsigned char *buf = stack;
+ int use_heap = (f + len > sizeof stack);
+ if(use_heap){
+ buf = (unsigned char*)malloc(f+len);
+ if(!buf) return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(buf,hdr,f);
+ for(size_t i=0;i<len;i++) buf[f+i]=(unsigned char)msg[i]^mk[i%4];
+ int r = ws_send_all(w, buf, f+len);
+ if(use_heap) free(buf);
+ return r<0?-1:r;
+}
+
+/* RFC 6455: client control frames (close/ping/pong) are masked too. */
+static int ws_send_control(ws_t *w, unsigned char op){
+ if(!w->connected) return -1;
+ unsigned char mk[4]; next_mask(mk);
+ unsigned char f[6] = { (unsigned char)(0x80|op), 0x80, mk[0], mk[1], mk[2], mk[3] };
+ return ws_send_all(w, f, 6);
+}
+
+/* Answer a server PING with an (empty) PONG so the gateway keeps us. */
+int ws_pong(ws_t *w){
+ return ws_send_control(w, 0xA);
+}
+
+/* Peek at the pending frame header without consuming. 1 = full header ready. */
+static int peek_frame(ws_t *w, size_t *hdr_out, uint64_t *plen_out){
+ size_t avail = w->rlen - w->rpos;
+ const unsigned char *b = w->rbuf + w->rpos;
+ if(avail < 2) return 0;
+ size_t plen = b[1]&0x7f, hdr = 2;
+ if(plen==126){
+ if(avail < 4) return 0;
+ plen = (size_t)((b[2]<<8)|b[3]); hdr=4;
+ } else if(plen==127){
+ if(avail < 10) return 0;
+ plen=0; for(int i=2;i<10;i++) plen=(plen<<8)|b[i];
+ hdr=10;
+ }
+ *hdr_out=hdr; *plen_out=(uint64_t)plen;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int valid_frame_header(const unsigned char *b, uint64_t plen){
+ int fin = (b[0] & 0x80) != 0;
+ int rsv = b[0] & 0x70;
+ int op = b[0] & 0x0f;
+ int masked = (b[1] & 0x80) != 0;
+ if (rsv || masked) return 0;
+ if (op >= 3 && op <= 7) return 0; /* reserved opcodes */
+ if (op >= 8 && (!fin || plen > 125)) return 0; /* control: final, <=125 */
+ if ((b[1] & 0x7f) == 127 && (b[2] & 0x80)) return 0; /* absurd 64-bit length */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ws_recv_frame(ws_t *w, char *buf, size_t cap, int *opcode_out, int *fin_out){
+ if(!w || !w->connected || !buf || cap==0) return -1;
+ for(;;){
+ /* compact consumed bytes to the front */
+ if(w->rpos>0){
+ memmove(w->rbuf, w->rbuf+w->rpos, w->rlen-w->rpos);
+ w->rlen -= w->rpos; w->rpos = 0;
+ }
+ if(w->skip_left>0){
+ /* draining an oversized frame: drop whatever is buffered */
+ size_t have = w->rlen - w->rpos;
+ size_t take = have < (size_t)w->skip_left ? have : (size_t)w->skip_left;
+ w->skip_left -= take; w->rpos += take;
+ if(w->rpos >= w->rlen){ w->rpos=0; w->rlen=0; }
+ if(w->skip_left==0){
+ if(opcode_out)*opcode_out=w->skip_op;
+ return -3; /* whole oversized frame skipped */
+ }
+ } else {
+ size_t hdr; uint64_t plen;
+ if(peek_frame(w,&hdr,&plen)){
+ const unsigned char *b = w->rbuf + w->rpos;
+ int fin=(b[0]&0x80)!=0, wire_op=b[0]&0x0f;
+ if(!valid_frame_header(b, plen)){
+ log_msg("ws: protocol violation op=%d fin=%d plen=%llu b1=0x%02x b2=0x%02x",
+ b[0]&0x0f, (b[0]&0x80)!=0, (unsigned long long)plen, b[0], b[1]);
+ return -2;
+ }
+ /* absurd length: skip BEFORE arithmetic (hdr+plen could
+ * overflow uint64 and smuggle a tiny "total" past the cap) */
+ if(plen > WS_RBUF_MAX){
+ log_msg("ws: oversized frame op=%d fin=%d plen=%llu (cap %u)",
+ b[0]&0x0f, (b[0]&0x80)!=0, (unsigned long long)plen, WS_RBUF_MAX);
+ size_t avail = w->rlen - w->rpos;
+ size_t h = (hdr < avail) ? hdr : avail;
+ w->rpos += h; /* eat the header */
+ size_t payload_here = avail - h;
+ w->skip_left = plen - (uint64_t)payload_here;
+ w->skip_op = wire_op;
+ if(w->rpos >= w->rlen){ w->rpos=0; w->rlen=0; }
+ continue;
+ }
+ uint64_t total = (uint64_t)hdr + plen;
+ if(total > (uint64_t)w->rcap){
+ size_t ncap=w->rcap;
+ while(ncap < (size_t)total && ncap < WS_RBUF_MAX) ncap*=2;
+ unsigned char *nb=(unsigned char*)realloc(w->rbuf,ncap);
+ if(nb){ w->rbuf=nb; w->rcap=ncap; log_msg("ws: rbuf grown to %zu", ncap); }
+ else { log_msg("ws: rbuf grow fail"); }
+ }
+ if((uint64_t)(w->rlen-w->rpos) >= total){
+ size_t copy = (size_t)plen;
+ if(copy > cap-1) copy = cap-1;
+ memcpy(buf, b+hdr, copy);
+ buf[copy]=0;
+ w->rpos += (size_t)total;
+ if(w->rpos >= w->rlen){ w->rpos=0; w->rlen=0; }
+ if(opcode_out)*opcode_out=wire_op;
+ if(fin_out)*fin_out=fin;
+ return (int)copy;
+ }
+ }
+ if(w->rlen == w->rcap){ /* full with no parseable frame: give up cleanly */
+ log_msg("ws: buffer full with no frame; dropping %zuB and reconnecting", w->rlen);
+ w->rpos=0; w->rlen=0; return -2;
+ }
+ }
+ int rd = tls_read((tls_ctx_t*)w->tls, (char*)w->rbuf+w->rlen, w->rcap-w->rlen);
+ if(rd > 0){ w->rlen += (size_t)rd; continue; }
+ if(rd == 0) return 0; /* no data yet */
+ return -1; /* closed / error */
+ }
+}
+
+int ws_close(ws_t *w){
+ if(!w) return -1;
+ if(!w->connected){
+ free(w->rbuf); w->rbuf=NULL; w->rcap=0; w->rlen=0; w->rpos=0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ws_send_control(w, 0x8); /* best-effort masked CLOSE */
+ tls_free((tls_ctx_t*)w->tls);
+#ifdef ORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD
+ close(w->fd);
+#else
+ sceNetSocketClose(w->fd);
+#endif
+ free(w->rbuf); w->rbuf=NULL; w->rcap=0;
+ w->connected=0; w->sock=0; w->tls=NULL; w->fd=0; w->rlen=0; w->rpos=0;
+ w->skip_left=0;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/orbisrpc/ws.h b/orbisrpc/ws.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6a25556
--- /dev/null
+++ b/orbisrpc/ws.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/* ws.h - minimal Discord gateway WebSocket (text frames + heartbeat).
+ * Non-blocking: recv never blocks the caller; returns 0 when no complete
+ * frame is available yet. */
+#ifndef WS_H
+#define WS_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#define WS_RBUF_MIN 65536 /* initial raw socket buffer (READY is big) */
+#define WS_RBUF_MAX (8*1024*1024) /* grow limit; bigger frames are skipped */
+
+typedef struct {
+ int32_t sock; int32_t connected; int32_t fd;
+ int nb; /* underlying socket non-blocking flag */
+ void *tls; /* tls_ctx_t* (opaque: mbedTLS session) */
+ unsigned char *rbuf; /* raw bytes from TLS layer (heap, grows) */
+ size_t rcap; /* allocated size of rbuf */
+ size_t rlen; /* valid bytes in rbuf */
+ size_t rpos; /* consumed parse position */
+ uint64_t skip_left; /* bytes left of an oversized frame being drained */
+ int skip_op; /* opcode of the frame being drained */
+} ws_t;
+
+int ws_connect(ws_t *w, const char *host, int port, const char *resource, const char *key);
+int ws_send_text(ws_t *w, const char *msg, size_t len);
+/* Returns frame payload length (>0), 0 if no complete frame yet, <0 on error,
+ * or -3 if an oversized frame was drained and skipped (payload lost). */
+int ws_recv_frame(ws_t *w, char *buf, size_t cap, int *opcode_out, int *fin_out);
+int ws_pong(ws_t *w); /* answer a server PING (call when recv gives opcode 9) */
+int ws_close(ws_t *w);
+#endif
diff --git a/plugin/Makefile b/plugin/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dcd6b6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugin/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+# orbisRPC GoldHEN plugin build (plugin/).
+# Builds plugin.prx — a GoldHEN plugin that runs the orbisRPC daemon inside the
+# game process, so presence auto-starts at every boot with no PC involvement.
+
+DEBUG_FLAGS = -D__FINAL__=1
+TYPE = final
+
+OUTPUT_PRX := orbisrpc_plugin
+BUILD_DIR := build
+TARGET := $(BUILD_DIR)/$(OUTPUT_PRX).prx
+TARGET_ELF := $(BUILD_DIR)/$(OUTPUT_PRX).elf
+
+# Root vars
+TOOLCHAIN := $(or $(OO_PS4_TOOLCHAIN),/Users/mac/PS4Toolchain/OpenOrbis/PS4Toolchain)
+GH_SDK := $(or $(GOLDHEN_SDK),/Users/mac/PS4Toolchain/GoldHEN_Plugins_SDK)
+ROOT := ..
+SRCDIR := .
+ORBISRPC := $(ROOT)/orbisrpc
+INTDIR := $(BUILD_DIR)
+
+# Our daemon sources (payload main.c is NOT part of the plugin; plugin.c is the entry)
+DAEMON_SRC := $(ORBISRPC)/log.c $(ORBISRPC)/cfg.c $(ORBISRPC)/jsonlite.c $(ORBISRPC)/b64.c \
+ $(ORBISRPC)/sfo.c $(ORBISRPC)/tmdb_crypto.c $(ORBISRPC)/tmdb.c \
+ $(ORBISRPC)/updater.c $(ORBISRPC)/updater_http.c $(ORBISRPC)/updater_util.c \
+ $(ORBISRPC)/tls.c $(ORBISRPC)/ws.c $(ORBISRPC)/discord.c $(ORBISRPC)/detect.c \
+ $(ORBISRPC)/compat.c $(ORBISRPC)/lock.c $(ORBISRPC)/timesync.c \
+ $(ORBISRPC)/art.c $(ORBISRPC)/health.c $(ORBISRPC)/manifest.c \
+ $(ORBISRPC)/daemon.c
+PLUGIN_SRC := $(SRCDIR)/plugin.c
+CFILES := $(PLUGIN_SRC) $(DAEMON_SRC)
+OBJS := $(patsubst %.c,$(INTDIR)/%.o,$(notdir $(CFILES)))
+MBED_SRC := $(shell find $(ROOT)/third_party/mbedtls/library -name '*.c' ! -name 'net_sockets.c' ! -name 'timing.c' ! -name 'entropy_poll.c' | sort)
+MBED_OBJS := $(patsubst $(ROOT)/third_party/mbedtls/library/%.c,$(INTDIR)/mbed/%.o,$(MBED_SRC))
+
+LIBS := -lSceLibcInternal -lSceNet -lSceNetCtl \
+ -lSceSysmodule -lSceUserService -lSceAppInstUtil -lSceAppContent \
+ -lGoldHEN_Hook -lkernel
+
+EXTRAFLAGS := $(DEBUG_FLAGS) -std=gnu11 -Wall -Wno-unused \
+ -Wno-int-conversion -Wno-incompatible-pointer-types \
+ -Wno-address-of-packed-member \
+ -DMBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY
+
+CFLAGS := --target=x86_64-pc-freebsd12-elf -fPIC -funwind-tables -c $(EXTRAFLAGS) \
+ -isysroot $(TOOLCHAIN) -isystem $(TOOLCHAIN)/include \
+ -I$(GH_SDK)/include -I$(GH_SDK) -I$(ORBISRPC) -I$(SRCDIR) \
+ -I$(ROOT)/third_party/mbedtls/include
+LDFLAGS := -m elf_x86_64 -pie --script $(TOOLCHAIN)/link.x -e _init --eh-frame-hdr \
+ -L$(TOOLCHAIN)/lib -L$(GH_SDK) $(LIBS)
+
+UNAME_S := $(shell uname -s)
+ifeq ($(UNAME_S),Darwin)
+ CC := $(or $(LLVM_CC),/usr/local/opt/llvm/bin/clang)
+ LD := $(or $(LLD),/Users/mac/lldbuild/build/bin/ld.lld)
+ CDIR := macos
+ FSUFFIX := -macos
+else
+ CC := clang
+ LD := ld.lld
+ CDIR := linux
+ FSUFFIX :=
+endif
+
+_unused := $(shell mkdir -p $(INTDIR))
+
+$(INTDIR)/%.o: $(ORBISRPC)/%.c
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $<
+
+$(INTDIR)/plugin.o: $(SRCDIR)/plugin.c
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $<
+
+$(INTDIR)/mbed/%.o: $(ROOT)/third_party/mbedtls/library/%.c
+ @mkdir -p $(dir $@)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $<
+
+$(TARGET): $(OBJS) $(MBED_OBJS)
+ $(LD) $(GH_SDK)/build/crtprx.o $(OBJS) $(MBED_OBJS) -o $(TARGET_ELF) $(LDFLAGS)
+ OO_PS4_TOOLCHAIN=$(TOOLCHAIN) $(TOOLCHAIN)/bin/$(CDIR)/create-fself$(FSUFFIX) -in=$(TARGET_ELF) -out=$(TARGET_ELF).oelf \
+ --lib=$(TARGET) --paid 0x3800000000000011
+
+.PHONY: clean
+.DEFAULT_GOAL := all
+
+all: $(TARGET)
+ @echo "plugin -> $(TARGET)"
+
+clean:
+ rm -rf $(BUILD_DIR)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/plugin/plugin.c b/plugin/plugin.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d100b52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugin/plugin.c
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/* plugin.c - orbisRPC as a GoldHEN plugin (.prx loaded into the game process).
+ *
+ * GoldHEN loads plugins per game title via /data/GoldHEN/plugins.ini. A
+ * plugin runs inside the game's process, so:
+ * - we KNOW which game is running: sys_sdk_proc_info() -> procInfo.titleid
+ * - the game has full network access (this is the whole point)
+ * - it auto-starts at every boot/jailbreak with zero PC involvement
+ *
+ * plugin_load() resolves the titleid to a display name and starts the shared
+ * daemon thread (daemon.c) which handles token refresh, the Discord gateway
+ * and presence. plugin_unload() stops it cleanly.
+ */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <orbis/libkernel.h>
+#include "Common.h"
+#include "daemon.h"
+#include "detect.h"
+
+/* Only post presence for real game titles (CUSA/PPSA/etc). System apps
+ * (NPXS..., shell) launching would otherwise post bogus "playing" state. */
+static int is_game_titleid(const char *t){
+ static const char *pfx[] = { "CUSA", "PPSA", "PCSE", "PCJS", "EPSA", "PCSB", NULL };
+ for(int i=0; pfx[i]; i++) if(strncmp(t, pfx[i], 4)==0) return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define attr_public __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+#define attr_module_hidden __attribute__((weak)) __attribute__((visibility("hidden")))
+
+attr_public const char *g_pluginName = "orbisrpc";
+attr_public const char *g_pluginDesc = "Discord Rich Presence for PS4";
+attr_public const char *g_pluginAuth = "orbisRPC";
+attr_public uint32_t g_pluginVersion = 0x00000100; /* 1.00 */
+
+struct proc_info procInfo;
+
+static OrbisPthread s_daemon_thread;
+static int s_daemon_started = 0;
+
+static void *daemon_thread(void *args){
+ /* args = display name of the game we are loaded into */
+ char name[128];
+ strncpy(name, (const char *)args, sizeof name - 1);
+ name[sizeof name - 1] = 0;
+ FILE *m = fopen("/data/orbisRPC/plugin_boot.log", "a");
+ if(m){ fprintf(m, "daemon thread up game=%s\n", name); fclose(m); }
+ daemon_clear_stop();
+ daemon_run(name);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int32_t attr_public plugin_load(int32_t argc, const char *argv[]){
+ (void)argc; (void)argv;
+ klog("[orbisrpc] <%s\\Ver.0x%08x> %s\n", g_pluginName, g_pluginVersion, __func__);
+ klog("[orbisrpc] Plugin Author(s): %s\n", g_pluginAuth);
+ { FILE *m = fopen("/data/orbisRPC/plugin_boot.log", "a");
+ if(m){ fprintf(m, "plugin_load enter\n"); fclose(m); } }
+
+ if(sys_sdk_proc_info(&procInfo) != 0){
+ klog("[orbisrpc] sys_sdk_proc_info failed; not starting\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Validate SDK struct: must be NUL-terminated ASCII, else version mismatch */
+ procInfo.titleid[sizeof procInfo.titleid - 1] = 0;
+ procInfo.name[sizeof procInfo.name - 1] = 0;
+ size_t tlen = strnlen(procInfo.titleid, sizeof procInfo.titleid);
+ if(tlen != 9 || !is_game_titleid(procInfo.titleid)){
+ klog("[orbisrpc] not a game title (system app?); not starting daemon\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ klog("[orbisrpc] loaded into process: pid=%d name=%s titleid=%s\n",
+ procInfo.pid, procInfo.name, procInfo.titleid);
+
+ /* Resolve a display name for the title we are loaded into. */
+ static char game_name[128];
+ detect_name_for_title(procInfo.titleid, game_name, sizeof game_name);
+ klog("[orbisrpc] game: %s\n", game_name);
+
+ /* explicit fat stack: TLS handshakes + JSON buffers overflow the
+ * small default plugin-thread stacks. 256KB is mandatory — falling
+ * back to 64KB crashes inside games, so refuse to start instead. */
+ OrbisPthreadAttr attr;
+ memset(&attr, 0, sizeof attr);
+ if(scePthreadAttrInit(&attr) != 0 ||
+ scePthreadAttrSetstacksize(&attr, 256*1024) != 0){
+ klog("[orbisrpc] attr/stack setup failed; NOT starting (no fallback)\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if(scePthreadCreate(&s_daemon_thread, &attr, daemon_thread, game_name, "orbisrpc_daemon") == 0)
+ s_daemon_started = 1;
+ else
+ klog("[orbisrpc] daemon thread creation failed\\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int32_t attr_public plugin_unload(int32_t argc, const char *argv[]){
+ (void)argc; (void)argv;
+ klog("[orbisrpc] <%s\\Ver.0x%08x> %s\n", g_pluginName, g_pluginVersion, __func__);
+ daemon_request_stop();
+ if(s_daemon_started){
+ int rc = scePthreadJoin(s_daemon_thread, NULL);
+ klog("[orbisrpc] daemon thread joined rc=%d\\n", rc);
+ s_daemon_started = 0;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int32_t attr_module_hidden module_start(int64_t argc, const void *args){
+ (void)argc; (void)args;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int32_t attr_module_hidden module_stop(int64_t argc, const void *args){
+ (void)argc; (void)args;
+ return 0;
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/plugin/plugins.ini.ps4 b/plugin/plugins.ini.ps4
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a638c59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plugin/plugins.ini.ps4
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+; GoldHEN plugins.ini — GTA V mod menu + orbisRPC Discord presence
+;
+; [default] loads plugins for ANY game title, so orbisRPC auto-starts
+; whenever a game launches (no PC needed).
+;
+[default]
+/data/GoldHEN/plugins/orbisrpc_plugin.prx=true
+
+; Lotus SPRX (primary mod menu — requires GTA V 1.48 update)
+; Press R1 + Square in-game to open
+;
+[CUSA00411]
+/data/GoldHEN/plugins/gtaPayload_148.sprx=true
+
+[CUSA00419]
+/data/GoldHEN/plugins/gtaPayload_148.sprx=true
+
+; Scorpion Menu v1.2B (alternate mod menu — backup option)
+; Uncomment these lines if you prefer Scorpion over Lotus:
+;
+;[CUSA00411]
+;/data/GoldHEN/plugins/ScorpionMenu-v1.2b-148.prx=true
+;
+;[CUSA00419]
+;/data/GoldHEN/plugins/ScorpionMenu-v1.2b-148.prx=true
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/scripts/build.sh b/scripts/build.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..412fd69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/build.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# build.sh - orbisRPC: compile payload ELF + fself for PS4.
+# Usage: ./scripts/build.sh [elf|fself|all] default: all
+# Zero-guess: validates toolchain up front with actionable errors.
+set -euo pipefail
+ROOT="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." && pwd)"
+cd "$ROOT"
+
+SDK="${OO_PS4_TOOLCHAIN:-/Users/mac/PS4Toolchain/OpenOrbis/PS4Toolchain}"
+# Auto-detect Homebrew LLVM on macOS if LLVM_HOME not set
+if [ -z "${LLVM_HOME:-}" ]; then
+ for cand in /opt/homebrew/opt/llvm /usr/local/opt/llvm /usr/local/llvm; do
+ if [ -x "$cand/bin/clang" ]; then LLVM_HOME="$cand"; break; fi
+ done
+fi
+LLVM_BIN="${LLVM_HOME:-/usr/local/opt/llvm}/bin"
+# Auto-detect lld
+if [ -z "${LLD:-}" ]; then
+ if [ -x "/Users/mac/lldbuild/build/bin/ld.lld" ]; then LLD="/Users/mac/lldbuild/build/bin/ld.lld"
+ elif command -v ld.lld >/dev/null 2>&1; then LLD="$(command -v ld.lld)"
+ else LLD="$LLVM_BIN/ld.lld"
+ fi
+fi
+export PATH="$LLVM_BIN:$SDK/bin/macos:$PATH"
+CC="$LLVM_BIN/clang"
+LD="$LLD"
+
+fail() { echo "BUILD FAIL: $1" >&2; exit 1; }
+[ -x "$CC" ] || fail "clang not found at $CC. Install: brew install llvm OR LLVM_HOME=/path ./scripts/build.sh"
+[ -x "$LD" ] || fail "ld.lld not found at $LD. Set LLD=/path/to/ld.lld"
+[ -d "$SDK" ] || fail "OpenOrbis SDK not found at $SDK. Set OO_PS4_TOOLCHAIN=~/PS4Toolchain/OpenOrbis/PS4Toolchain"
+[ -f "$SDK/lib/crt1.o" ] || fail "missing $SDK/lib/crt1.o — corrupt toolchain download, re-extract v0.5.4"
+[ -f "$SDK/link.x" ] || fail "missing $SDK/link.x — corrupt toolchain download"
+[ -f "$SDK/include/orbis/Net.h" ] || fail "SDK headers missing orkNet.h — wrong SDK version?"
+[ -d "third_party/mbedtls/include" ] || fail "third_party/mbedtls missing — git submodule update --init?"
+[ -f "third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h" ] || fail "mbedtls headers missing"
+command -v "$SDK/bin/macos/create-fself-macos" >/dev/null 2>&1 || [ -x "$SDK/bin/macos/create-fself-macos" ] || fail "create-fself-macos missing in SDK/bin/macos"
+
+TARGET="x86_64-pc-freebsd12-elf"
+CFLAGS="--target=$TARGET -fPIC -std=gnu11 -Wall -Wno-unused \
+ -Wno-int-conversion -Wno-incompatible-pointer-types \
+ -DMBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY \
+ -isystem $SDK/include -Ithird_party/mbedtls/include"
+LIBS="-lc -lkernel -lSceNet -lSceNetCtl -lSceSysmodule \
+ -lSceUserService -lSceAppInstUtil -lSceAppContent"
+LDFLAGS="-m elf_x86_64 -pie --eh-frame-hdr -L$SDK/lib $LIBS $SDK/lib/crt1.o --script $SDK/link.x"
+export OO_PS4_TOOLCHAIN="$SDK"
+OUT="$ROOT/build"; mkdir -p "$OUT"
+echo "=== compiling (CC=$CC LD=$LD SDK=$SDK) ==="
+for f in log cfg jsonlite b64 sfo tmdb_crypto tmdb updater updater_http updater_util tls ws detect discord daemon compat lock timesync art health manifest main; do
+ "$CC" $CFLAGS -c -o "$OUT/$f.o" "orbisrpc/$f.c" || fail "compile $f"
+done
+echo "=== mbedtls (skip net_sockets/timing: POSIX-only) ==="
+for f in $(find third_party/mbedtls/library -name '*.c' ! -name 'net_sockets.c' ! -name 'timing.c' ! -name 'entropy_poll.c' | sort); do
+ o="$OUT/mbed_$(echo "$f" | sed 's|third_party/mbedtls/library/||; s|\.c$||').o"
+ "$CC" $CFLAGS -c -o "$o" "$f" || fail "mbedtls $f"
+done
+echo "=== linking ($LD) ==="
+"$LD" $OUT/*.o -o "$OUT/orbisrpc.elf" $LDFLAGS || fail "link — see duplicate-symbol or missing-lib errors above"
+echo "ELF -> $OUT/orbisrpc.elf ($(stat -f%z "$OUT/orbisrpc.elf" 2>/dev/null || stat -c%s "$OUT/orbisrpc.elf") bytes)"
+MODE="${1:-all}"
+if [ "$MODE" = "fself" ] || [ "$MODE" = "all" ]; then
+ "$SDK/bin/macos/create-fself-macos" -in="$OUT/orbisrpc.elf" \
+ -out="$OUT/orbisrpc.fself" --eboot "$OUT/orbisrpc-eboot.bin" --paid 0x3800000000000011 || fail "fself creation"
+ echo "FSELF -> $OUT/orbisrpc.fself"
+ echo " (GoldHEN payload to deploy is $OUT/orbisrpc.elf -> /data/GoldHEN/payloads/orbisrpc.bin)"
+fi
+echo "done."
diff --git a/scripts/build_evict.sh b/scripts/build_evict.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..4896926
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/build_evict.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# build_evict.sh - evict.elf via ps4-payload-sdk (daemon-world linkage only).
+# Usage: PS4_PAYLOAD_SDK=/path ./scripts/build_evict.sh
+set -e
+SDK="${PS4_PAYLOAD_SDK:-$HOME/ps4-payload-sdk/ps4-payload-sdk}"
+CC="$SDK/bin/orbis-clang"
+export PS4_PAYLOAD_SDK="$SDK"
+export PATH="$HOME/llvmshim:$PATH"
+OUT="build-sdk"
+mkdir -p "$OUT"
+echo "=== evict (SDK) ==="
+"$CC" -O2 -Wall -DORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD -o "$OUT/evict.elf" tools/evict.c || { echo "FAIL: evict"; exit 1; }
+ls -la "$OUT/evict.elf"
diff --git a/scripts/build_sdk.sh b/scripts/build_sdk.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..32a5b4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/build_sdk.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# build_sdk.sh - OrbisRPC daemon payload via ps4-payload-sdk (daemon-world
+# linkage: no libkernel.so, BSD sockets, SDK libc). Test vehicle: elfldr.
+# Usage: PS4_PAYLOAD_SDK=/path ./scripts/build_sdk.sh
+set -e
+SDK="${PS4_PAYLOAD_SDK:-$HOME/ps4-payload-sdk/ps4-payload-sdk}"
+[ -x "$SDK/toolchain/../../ps4-payload-sdk/bin/orbis-clang" ] || {
+ # resolve relative to SDK root regardless of layout
+ true
+}
+CC="$SDK/bin/orbis-clang"
+export PS4_PAYLOAD_SDK="$SDK"
+export PATH="$HOME/llvmshim:$PATH"
+OUT="build-sdk"
+mkdir -p "$OUT"
+CFLAGS="-O2 -Wall -DORBISRPC_SDK_PAYLOAD -Iorbisrpc -Ithird_party/mbedtls/include -Ithird_party/sqlite/sqlite-amalgamation-3510100"
+SQLITE_DIR="third_party/sqlite/sqlite-amalgamation-3510100"
+echo "=== daemon sources (SDK) ==="
+for f in log cfg jsonlite b64 sfo tmdb_crypto tmdb updater updater_http updater_util tls ws detect discord daemon compat lock timesync art health manifest appdb main; do
+ # clock has no .c (header-only helper lives in compat.c); skip if missing
+ [ -f "orbisrpc/$f.c" ] || continue
+ "$CC" $CFLAGS -c -o "$OUT/$f.o" "orbisrpc/$f.c" || { echo "FAIL: $f"; exit 1; }
+done
+echo "=== sqlite (SDK, readonly, no threads/extensions) ==="
+"$CC" $CFLAGS -Os -DSQLITE_THREADSAFE=0 -DSQLITE_OMIT_LOAD_EXTENSION -DSQLITE_OMIT_DEPRECATED -c -o "$OUT/sqlite3.o" "$SQLITE_DIR/sqlite3.c" || { echo "FAIL: sqlite"; exit 1; }
+echo "=== mbedtls (SDK, skip net_sockets/timing/entropy_poll) ==="
+for f in $(find third_party/mbedtls/library -name '*.c' ! -name 'net_sockets.c' ! -name 'timing.c' ! -name 'entropy_poll.c' | sort); do
+ o="$OUT/mbed_$(echo "$f" | sed 's|third_party/mbedtls/library/||; s|\.c$||').o"
+ "$CC" $CFLAGS -Wno-unused-parameter -c -o "$o" "$f" || { echo "FAIL: mbedtls $f"; exit 1; }
+done
+echo "=== link ==="
+"$CC" -o "$OUT/orbisrpc_sdk.elf" "$OUT"/*.o || { echo "FAIL: link"; exit 1; }
+ls -la "$OUT/orbisrpc_sdk.elf"
diff --git a/scripts/make_ca_bundle.py b/scripts/make_ca_bundle.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33c3b6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/make_ca_bundle.py
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""make_ca_bundle.py - curate a minimal CA bundle for the PS4 TLS client.
+
+Extracts the roots needed for GitHub (Sectigo/DigiCert), Discord
+(Google Trust Services), and Sony TMDB (DigiCert/Amazon/ISRG) from the
+local OpenSSL bundle, writes orbisrpc/ca_bundle_pem.h as a C string.
+
+Usage: python3 scripts/make_ca_bundle.py [--system PATH] [--out PATH]
+Re-run when a handshake fails with ORX-TLS-003 due to root rotation.
+"""
+import argparse, os, re, subprocess, sys, tempfile
+
+WANT = [
+ "Sectigo Public Server Authentication Root E46",
+ "Sectigo Public Server Authentication Root R46",
+ "USERTrust ECC Certification Authority",
+ "USERTrust RSA Certification Authority",
+ "DigiCert Global Root CA",
+ "DigiCert Global Root G2",
+ "DigiCert Global Root G3",
+ "DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA",
+ "DigiCert Trusted Root G4",
+ "GTS Root R1",
+ "GTS Root R2",
+ "GTS Root R3",
+ "GTS Root R4",
+ "ISRG Root X1",
+ "Amazon Root CA 1",
+ "Baltimore CyberTrust Root",
+ "Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2",
+ "GlobalSign Root CA",
+]
+
+
+def split_pem(path):
+ data = open(path).read()
+ return re.findall(r"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----.*?-----END CERTIFICATE-----", data, re.S)
+
+
+def subject_of(pem):
+ with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile("w", delete=False, suffix=".pem") as f:
+ f.write(pem)
+ fn = f.name
+ try:
+ out = subprocess.run(["openssl", "x509", "-noout", "-subject", "-in", fn],
+ capture_output=True, text=True).stdout.strip()
+ finally:
+ os.unlink(fn)
+ return out
+
+
+def main():
+ ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+ ap.add_argument("--system", default="/usr/local/etc/openssl@3/cert.pem")
+ ap.add_argument("--out", default="orbisrpc/ca_bundle_pem.h")
+ a = ap.parse_args()
+ if not os.path.isfile(a.system):
+ a.system = "/etc/ssl/cert.pem"
+ blocks = split_pem(a.system)
+ picked = []
+ for b in blocks:
+ subj = subject_of(b)
+ for w in WANT:
+ if w.lower() in subj.lower():
+ picked.append(b)
+ break
+ if len(picked) < 8:
+ print("too few roots matched (%d); refusing" % len(picked), file=sys.stderr)
+ return 1
+ c = "/* ca_bundle_pem.h - curated trust anchors (generated, do not edit).\n"
+ c += " * %d roots for GitHub/Discord/Sony. Regenerate with scripts/make_ca_bundle.py.\n" % len(picked)
+ c += " */\n#ifndef ORBISRPC_CA_BUNDLE_PEM_H\n#define ORBISRPC_CA_BUNDLE_PEM_H\n"
+ c += "static const char ORBISRPC_CA_BUNDLE_PEM[] =\n"
+ bundle = "\n".join(picked) + "\n"
+ for line in bundle.splitlines(True):
+ c += '"%s\\n"\n' % line.rstrip("\n").replace('"', "'")
+ c += ";\n#endif\n"
+ open(a.out, "w").write(c)
+ print("wrote %s (%d roots, %d bytes)" % (a.out, len(picked), len(bundle)))
+ return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ sys.exit(main())
diff --git a/scripts/make_manifest.py b/scripts/make_manifest.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..48dacc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/make_manifest.py
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""make_manifest.py - build + sign the release manifest for the updater.
+
+Usage:
+ python3 scripts/make_manifest.py --version 1.0.1 \
+ --priv release_priv.pem \
+ --bin build/orbisrpc.elf \
+ --prx plugin/build/orbisrpc_plugin.prx \
+ --pkg build/pkg/OrbisRPC-1.0.1.pkg \
+ --out build/pkg/manifest.json
+
+Outputs manifest.json + manifest.sig (raw 64-byte r||s, hex file) +
+appends SHA256SUMS for back-compat. The daemon verifies manifest.sig
+with orbisrpc/release_pubkey.h and refuses updates on mismatch
+(ORX-UPDATE-002). Keep release_priv.pem OFFLINE, out of the repo.
+"""
+import argparse, hashlib, json, os, sys
+
+try:
+ from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
+ from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
+ from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.utils import decode_dss_signature, encode_dss_signature
+ HAVE_CRYPTO = True
+except ImportError:
+ HAVE_CRYPTO = False
+
+
+def sha256_file(path):
+ h = hashlib.sha256()
+ with open(path, "rb") as f:
+ for chunk in iter(lambda: f.read(65536), b""):
+ h.update(chunk)
+ return h.hexdigest()
+
+
+def main():
+ ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+ ap.add_argument("--version", required=True)
+ ap.add_argument("--channel", default="stable")
+ ap.add_argument("--min-version", default="")
+ ap.add_argument("--platform", default="ps4-goldhen")
+ ap.add_argument("--priv", required=True, help="EC P-256 private key PEM (offline)")
+ ap.add_argument("--bin", default="")
+ ap.add_argument("--prx", default="")
+ ap.add_argument("--pkg", default="")
+ ap.add_argument("--out", required=True)
+ a = ap.parse_args()
+
+ if not HAVE_CRYPTO:
+ print("need python cryptography package: pip install cryptography", file=sys.stderr)
+ return 1
+ assets = []
+ for name, path in (("orbisrpc.bin", a.bin), ("orbisrpc_plugin.prx", a.prx)):
+ if path and os.path.isfile(path):
+ assets.append({"name": name, "sha256": sha256_file(path)})
+ pkg_name = ""
+ if a.pkg and os.path.isfile(a.pkg):
+ pkg_name = os.path.basename(a.pkg)
+ assets.append({"name": pkg_name, "sha256": sha256_file(a.pkg)})
+ if not assets:
+ print("no assets found (bin/prx/pkg missing)", file=sys.stderr)
+ return 1
+ manifest = {
+ "version": a.version,
+ "channel": a.channel,
+ "platform": a.platform,
+ "assets": assets,
+ }
+ if a.min_version:
+ manifest["minimum_version"] = a.min_version
+ body = json.dumps(manifest, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+ priv = serialization.load_pem_private_key(open(a.priv, "rb").read(), password=None)
+ if not isinstance(priv, ec.EllipticCurvePrivateKey):
+ print("private key is not EC", file=sys.stderr)
+ return 1
+ der = priv.sign(body, ec.ECDSA(hashes.SHA256()))
+ r, s = decode_dss_signature(der)
+ raw = r.to_bytes(32, "big") + s.to_bytes(32, "big")
+ with open(a.out, "wb") as f:
+ f.write(body)
+ with open(a.out + ".sig", "wb") as f:
+ f.write(raw)
+ with open(a.out + ".sig.hex", "w") as f:
+ f.write(raw.hex())
+ # back-compat SHA256SUMS alongside
+ sums = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(a.out), "SHA256SUMS")
+ with open(sums, "w") as f:
+ for ent in assets:
+ f.write("%s %s\n" % (ent["sha256"], ent["name"]))
+ f.write("%s %s\n" % (hashlib.sha256(body).hexdigest(), "manifest.json"))
+ print("wrote %s (%d assets) + %s.sig + SHA256SUMS" % (a.out, len(assets), a.out))
+ return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+ sys.exit(main())
diff --git a/scripts/sync_icons.sh b/scripts/sync_icons.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..c9d42ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/sync_icons.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# sync_icons.sh - pull /user/appmeta/<TITLEID>/icon0.png off the PS4 into
+# config/icons/<lower titleid>.png, ready to host as the art pack.
+# Usage: ./scripts/sync_icons.sh [PS4_IP] default: 192.168.1.136
+# Nothing here touches the console beyond FTP reads.
+set -euo pipefail
+IP="${1:-192.168.1.136}"
+OUT="config/icons"
+mkdir -p "$OUT"
+python3 - "$IP" "$OUT" <<'EOF'
+import sys, os
+from ftplib import FTP
+ip, out = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
+f = FTP()
+f.connect(ip, 2121, timeout=15)
+f.login()
+names = f.nlst('/user/appmeta')
+got, miss = 0, []
+for t in names:
+ if len(t) != 9:
+ continue
+ dst = os.path.join(out, t.lower() + '.png')
+ if os.path.exists(dst):
+ got += 1
+ continue
+ try:
+ with open(dst, 'wb') as fh:
+ f.retrbinary('RETR /user/appmeta/%s/icon0.png' % t, fh.write)
+ # validate PNG magic
+ with open(dst, 'rb') as fh:
+ if fh.read(8) != b'\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n':
+ os.remove(dst)
+ miss.append(t)
+ continue
+ got += 1
+ except Exception:
+ miss.append(t)
+ try: os.remove(dst)
+ except OSError: pass
+print('icons: %d ok, %d missing (%s)' % (got, len(miss), ','.join(miss[:10])))
+EOF
diff --git a/tests/Makefile b/tests/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4bdb7e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+CC ?= cc
+CFLAGS += -std=c11 -Wall -Wextra -Werror -DHEALTH_TESTABLE -I../orbisrpc -I../third_party/mbedtls/include -I$(SQLITE_DIR)
+
+TARGET := test_utils
+OBJDIR := .objs
+ASAN_OBJDIR := .objs-asan
+MBEDTLS_DIR := ../third_party/mbedtls/library
+# Same exclusion set as scripts/build.sh (POSIX-only modules).
+MBEDTLS_SRCS := $(filter-out $(MBEDTLS_DIR)/net_sockets.c $(MBEDTLS_DIR)/timing.c $(MBEDTLS_DIR)/entropy_poll.c,$(wildcard $(MBEDTLS_DIR)/*.c))
+
+ORBIS_SRCS := ../orbisrpc/jsonlite.c ../orbisrpc/b64.c ../orbisrpc/sfo.c ../orbisrpc/tmdb_crypto.c ../orbisrpc/updater_util.c ../orbisrpc/art.c ../orbisrpc/log.c ../orbisrpc/health.c ../orbisrpc/manifest.c ../orbisrpc/compat.c ../orbisrpc/cfg.c ../orbisrpc/appdb.c ../orbisrpc/discord.c
+INST_SRCS := ../installer/icfg.c ../installer/nettest.c ../installer/send.c
+# SQLite amalgamation: -O0 for host iteration speed (payload uses -O2).
+SQLITE_DIR := ../third_party/sqlite/sqlite-amalgamation-3510100
+SQLITE_FLAGS := -O0 -DSQLITE_THREADSAFE=0 -DSQLITE_OMIT_LOAD_EXTENSION -DSQLITE_OMIT_DEPRECATED -I$(SQLITE_DIR)
+
+ORBIS_OBJS := $(patsubst ../orbisrpc/%.c,$(OBJDIR)/orbis_%.o,$(ORBIS_SRCS))
+INST_OBJS := $(patsubst ../installer/%.c,$(OBJDIR)/inst_%.o,$(INST_SRCS))
+MBEDTLS_OBJS := $(patsubst $(MBEDTLS_DIR)/%.c,$(OBJDIR)/mbed_%.o,$(MBEDTLS_SRCS))
+TEST_OBJS := $(OBJDIR)/test_utils.o $(ORBIS_OBJS) $(INST_OBJS) $(MBEDTLS_OBJS) $(OBJDIR)/sqlite3.o
+
+ASAN_FLAGS := -fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-omit-frame-pointer
+ASAN_ORBIS_OBJS := $(patsubst ../orbisrpc/%.c,$(ASAN_OBJDIR)/orbis_%.o,$(ORBIS_SRCS))
+ASAN_INST_OBJS := $(patsubst ../installer/%.c,$(ASAN_OBJDIR)/inst_%.o,$(INST_SRCS))
+ASAN_MBEDTLS_OBJS := $(patsubst $(MBEDTLS_DIR)/%.c,$(ASAN_OBJDIR)/mbed_%.o,$(MBEDTLS_SRCS))
+ASAN_OBJS := $(ASAN_OBJDIR)/test_utils.o $(ASAN_ORBIS_OBJS) $(ASAN_INST_OBJS) $(ASAN_MBEDTLS_OBJS) $(ASAN_OBJDIR)/sqlite3.o
+
+.PHONY: all clean test asan
+
+all: $(TARGET)
+
+test: $(TARGET)
+ ./$(TARGET)
+
+$(TARGET): $(TEST_OBJS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TEST_OBJS) -lm
+
+asan: $(ASAN_OBJS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(ASAN_FLAGS) -o test_utils_asan $(ASAN_OBJS) -lm
+ ./test_utils_asan
+
+$(OBJDIR):
+ mkdir -p $(OBJDIR)
+
+$(ASAN_OBJDIR):
+ mkdir -p $(ASAN_OBJDIR)
+
+$(OBJDIR)/test_utils.o: test_utils.c | $(OBJDIR)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ test_utils.c
+
+$(OBJDIR)/orbis_%.o: ../orbisrpc/%.c | $(OBJDIR)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
+
+$(OBJDIR)/inst_%.o: ../installer/%.c | $(OBJDIR)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -I../installer -c -o $@ $<
+
+$(OBJDIR)/mbed_%.o: $(MBEDTLS_DIR)/%.c | $(OBJDIR)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -Wno-unused-parameter -c -o $@ $<
+
+$(OBJDIR)/sqlite3.o: $(SQLITE_DIR)/sqlite3.c | $(OBJDIR)
+ $(CC) $(SQLITE_FLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
+
+$(ASAN_OBJDIR)/sqlite3.o: $(SQLITE_DIR)/sqlite3.c | $(ASAN_OBJDIR)
+ $(CC) $(SQLITE_FLAGS) $(ASAN_FLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
+
+$(ASAN_OBJDIR)/test_utils.o: test_utils.c | $(ASAN_OBJDIR)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(ASAN_FLAGS) -c -o $@ test_utils.c
+
+$(ASAN_OBJDIR)/orbis_%.o: ../orbisrpc/%.c | $(ASAN_OBJDIR)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(ASAN_FLAGS) -c -o $@ $<
+
+$(ASAN_OBJDIR)/inst_%.o: ../installer/%.c | $(ASAN_OBJDIR)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(ASAN_FLAGS) -I../installer -c -o $@ $<
+
+$(ASAN_OBJDIR)/mbed_%.o: $(MBEDTLS_DIR)/%.c | $(ASAN_OBJDIR)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(ASAN_FLAGS) -Wno-unused-parameter -c -o $@ $<
+
+clean:
+ rm -rf $(TARGET) test_utils_asan $(OBJDIR) $(ASAN_OBJDIR) *.o
diff --git a/tests/e2e_consumer.py b/tests/e2e_consumer.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..1d3db17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/e2e_consumer.py
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""e2e_consumer.py - host verification of the consumer flow for the SDK line.
+Checks source contracts + runs the compiled unit tests + gates the payload
+linkage (daemon-world libs only). Exit nonzero on any failure.
+Honest about what is host-verified (logic/contracts) vs hardware-only
+(presence display, loaders, Rest Mode)."""
+import os
+import re
+import subprocess
+import sys
+
+ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+fails = []
+
+
+def check(name, cond, note=""):
+ print(("PASS " if cond else "FAIL ") + name + (" - " + note if note else ""))
+ if not cond:
+ fails.append(name)
+
+
+def src(p):
+ with open(os.path.join(ROOT, p), encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as f:
+ return f.read()
+
+
+# 1. unit tests build + pass (covers json, sfo, tmdb, updater, art, health…)
+r = subprocess.run(["make", "-C", os.path.join(ROOT, "tests"), "clean"],
+ capture_output=True)
+r = subprocess.run(["make", "-C", os.path.join(ROOT, "tests"), "test"],
+ capture_output=True, text=True)
+check("host/unit-tests", r.returncode == 0 and "utility tests passed" in r.stdout + r.stderr)
+# 2. config template ships no real token, sane defaults, art pack default
+cfg = src("config/config.json")
+check("install/template-has-no-token", "SET_ME" in cfg)
+check("install/art-pack-default", "orbisrpc-host" in cfg)
+# 3. single-instance lock with recycled-PID guard
+lock = src("orbisrpc/lock.c")
+check("runtime/single-lock", "lock_acquire" in src("orbisrpc/daemon.c"))
+check("runtime/lock-name-check", "Payload" in lock)
+# 4. session: persistence file, resume window, integer ms, since null
+d = src("orbisrpc/daemon.c")
+check("session/persisted", "session.json" in d)
+check("session/resume-window", "SESSION_RESUMED" in d)
+check("session/ledger", "playtime.log" in d)
+disc = src("orbisrpc/discord.c")
+check("discord/ms-integer", "jl_new_int" in disc and "1000LL" in disc)
+check("discord/since-null", "jl_new_null" in disc)
+check("discord/media-types", "detect_media_type" in disc)
+# 5. crash recovery wired
+check("health/boot-marker", "health_boot_note_crash" in d)
+check("health/safe-mode-gates-updater", "safe_mode" in d)
+check("health/rollback-at-boot", "health_verify_or_rollback" in d)
+# 6. time correction
+check("clock/sntp", "time_sync" in d and "time_fixed" in d)
+check("clock/monotonic-deadlines", "orbis_mono_s" in src("orbisrpc/ws.c"))
+# 7. art: mp: proxy path, no raw URLs, pack default
+check("art/mp-proxy", "art_resolve_mp" in disc)
+check("art/no-raw-urls", "mp:" in src("orbisrpc/art.c"))
+check("art/live-tmdb", "https_get_tmdb" in src("orbisrpc/tmdb.c"))
+check("art/no-baked-table", "art_table" not in src("orbisrpc/tmdb.c").lower())
+# 8. home + rest handling
+check("home/presence", "presence: home" in d)
+check("shutdown/signals", "daemon_on_signal" in d and "lock_release" in d)
+check("shutdown/session-persisted", "session.json" in d)
+check("reconnect/jitter-attempts", "reconnect_delay" in d and "attempt %d" in d)
+check("reconnect/never-exits", "600" in d and "quiet persistence" in d)
+check("metrics/hourly", "HEALTH:" in d)
+check("queue/failed-post-retries", "will retry" in d)
+check("state/explicit", "pres_set" in d and "STATE: presence" in d)
+check("art/disk-cache", "artwork_cache.json" in src("orbisrpc/art.c"))
+check("cfg/schema-save-checked", "cfg_save" in d and "unwritable" in d)
+# 9. signed updates, no unsigned fallback
+upd = src("orbisrpc/updater.c")
+check("update/manifest-required", "manifest" in upd.lower())
+check("update/unsigned-refused", "refus" in upd.lower())
+# 10. payload linkage gate (daemon-world libs only)
+elf = os.path.join(ROOT, "build-sdk", "orbisrpc_sdk.elf")
+if os.path.exists(elf):
+ readelf = os.environ.get("LLVM_READELF", "/usr/local/opt/llvm/bin/llvm-readelf")
+ try:
+ out = subprocess.run([readelf, "-d", elf], capture_output=True,
+ text=True).stdout
+ except OSError:
+ out = ""
+ needed = re.findall(r"\[(.*?)\]", out)
+ check("linkage/daemon-libs",
+ any("libkernel_web" in n for n in needed) and
+ any("SceLibcInternal" in n for n in needed))
+ check("linkage/no-app-libs",
+ not any(n in ("libkernel.so", "libc.so") for n in needed),
+ ",".join(needed))
+check("detect/unknown-holds", "scan_unknown" in d)
+check("detect/eboot-fast-switch", "fast-switching" in d)
+check("detect/atime-identity", "pkg-atime" in src("orbisrpc/detect.c") or "st_atime" in src("orbisrpc/detect.c"))
+check("detect/no-baked-table", "nametable" not in src("orbisrpc/detect.c").lower())
+check("session/validates-restore", "failed validation" in d)
+elf = os.path.join(ROOT, "build-sdk", "orbisrpc_sdk.elf")
+if not os.path.exists(elf):
+ check("linkage/payload-built", False, "run scripts/build_sdk.sh first")
+print(f"{len(fails)} failures" if fails else "E2E host simulation: ALL PASS")
+sys.exit(1 if fails else 0)
diff --git a/tests/test_utils.c b/tests/test_utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0f5771
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,642 @@
+#include "../orbisrpc/jsonlite.h"
+#include "../orbisrpc/b64.h"
+#include "../orbisrpc/sfo.h"
+#include "../orbisrpc/tmdb_crypto.h"
+#include "../orbisrpc/updater.h"
+#include "../orbisrpc/art.h"
+#include "../orbisrpc/health.h"
+#include "../orbisrpc/manifest.h"
+#include "../orbisrpc/cfg.h"
+#include "../orbisrpc/appdb.h"
+#include "../orbisrpc/discord.h"
+#include "../orbisrpc/detect.h"
+#include "../installer/icfg.h"
+#include "../installer/nettest.h"
+#include "sqlite3.h"
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* discord.c host stubs: builder tests never touch the wire. */
+int detect_media_type(const char *t){
+ if(t && !strcmp(t, "CUSA00127")) return 3;
+ return 0;
+}
+int ws_connect(ws_t *w, const char *h, int p, const char *r, const char *k){
+ (void)w; (void)h; (void)p; (void)r; (void)k; return -1;
+}
+int ws_send_text(ws_t *w, const char *m, size_t n){
+ (void)w; (void)m; (void)n; return -1;
+}
+int ws_recv_frame(ws_t *w, char *b, size_t c, int *o, int *f){
+ (void)w; (void)b; (void)c; (void)o; (void)f; return -1;
+}
+int ws_pong(ws_t *w){ (void)w; return -1; }
+int ws_close(ws_t *w){ (void)w; return -1; }
+#include <mbedtls/ecdsa.h>
+#include <mbedtls/ecp.h>
+#include <mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h>
+#include <mbedtls/entropy.h>
+#include <mbedtls/sha256.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/* Portable temp dir (mkdtemp needs feature macros this toolchain lacks). */
+static int make_tmpdir(char *out, size_t cap){
+ static int seq = 0;
+ snprintf(out, cap, "/tmp/orx_test_%d_%d", (int)getpid(), seq++);
+ if(mkdir(out, 0700) != 0) return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void test_json(void) {
+ const char input[] = "{\"name\":\"A\\u00e9\",\"items\":[true,2,null]}";
+ jl_val_t *root = jl_parse(input, sizeof(input) - 1);
+ assert(root && root->type == JL_OBJECT);
+ assert(strcmp(jl_obj_get(root, "name")->str, "A\xc3\xa9") == 0);
+ assert(jl_arr_at(jl_obj_get(root, "items"), 0)->num == 1);
+ assert(jl_arr_at(jl_obj_get(root, "items"), 1)->num == 2);
+ assert(jl_arr_at(jl_obj_get(root, "items"), 2)->type == JL_NULL);
+ jl_free(root);
+
+ assert(jl_parse("{} trailing", 11) == NULL);
+ assert(jl_parse("[1,]", 4) == NULL);
+ assert(jl_parse("\"unterminated", 13) == NULL);
+}
+
+static void test_gateway_op_spoof(void) {
+ /* string value containing `"op":` must not spoof the real op */
+ const char input[] = "{\"note\":\"x \\\"op\\\":99 y\",\"op\":10,\"s\":42}";
+ jl_val_t *r = jl_parse(input, sizeof(input)-1);
+ assert(r && r->type == JL_OBJECT);
+ const jl_val_t *op = jl_obj_get(r, "op");
+ const jl_val_t *s = jl_obj_get(r, "s");
+ assert(op && op->type == JL_NUMBER && (int)op->num == 10);
+ assert(s && s->type == JL_NUMBER && (int)s->num == 42);
+ jl_free(r);
+ /* missing op -> NULL, not crash */
+ const char no_op[] = "{\"t\":\"READY\"}";
+ jl_val_t *r2 = jl_parse(no_op, sizeof(no_op)-1);
+ assert(r2 && jl_obj_get(r2, "op") == NULL);
+ jl_free(r2);
+}
+
+static void test_json_oom_safe(void) { assert(jl_parse("true", 4) != NULL);
+ assert(jl_parse("false", 5) != NULL);
+ assert(jl_parse("null", 4) != NULL);
+ jl_val_t *n = jl_parse("123.5", 5);
+ assert(n && n->type == JL_NUMBER);
+ jl_free(n);
+ /* incomplete pair must fail cleanly, no leak/crash */
+ assert(jl_parse("{\"a\":", 5) == NULL);
+ assert(jl_parse("{\"a\":1", 6) == NULL);
+ /* oversize input refused before any allocation */
+ assert(jl_parse("[]", 5u*1024u*1024u) == NULL);
+}
+static void test_json_hostile(void) {
+ /* 200-deep nesting must be rejected, not stack-smash */
+ char deep[420];
+ memset(deep, '[', 200);
+ memset(deep+200, ']', 200);
+ deep[400] = 0;
+ assert(jl_parse(deep, 400) == NULL);
+ /* 60-deep is fine */
+ char okd[130];
+ memset(okd, '[', 60);
+ memset(okd+60, ']', 60);
+ okd[120] = 0;
+ jl_val_t *r = jl_parse(okd, 120);
+ assert(r && r->type == JL_ARRAY);
+ jl_free(r);
+ /* number running exactly to buffer end (no NUL past it) */
+ char num[16];
+ memcpy(num, "{\"s\":41250}", 11);
+ jl_val_t *r2 = jl_parse(num, 11);
+ assert(r2);
+ assert(jl_obj_get(r2, "s")->num == 41250);
+ jl_free(r2);
+ /* absurd number token fails cleanly */
+ char big[80];
+ memset(big, '9', 70);
+ big[70] = 0;
+ assert(jl_parse(big, 70) == NULL);
+}
+static void test_sfo(void) {
+ /* minimal synthetic param.sfo: header + 1 entry (TITLE="Terraria") */
+ unsigned char sfo[128];
+ char out[64];
+ memset(sfo, 0, sizeof sfo);
+ sfo[0]=0x00; sfo[1]='P'; sfo[2]='S'; sfo[3]='F';
+ sfo[4]=0x01; sfo[5]=0x02;
+ sfo[8]=36; sfo[12]=48; sfo[16]=1; /* keys@36 data@48 */
+ sfo[20]=0; sfo[21]=0; sfo[22]=0x04; sfo[23]=0; /* key_off=0 fmt=0x0004 */
+ sfo[24]=9; sfo[28]=16; sfo[32]=0; /* len=9 max=16 data_off=0 */
+ memcpy(sfo+36, "TITLE", 6);
+ memcpy(sfo+48, "Terraria", 9);
+ assert(sfo_title(sfo, 64, out, sizeof out) == 0);
+ assert(strcmp(out, "Terraria") == 0);
+ /* malformed: bad magic, truncated, insane count, OOB offsets */
+ unsigned char bad[64];
+ memset(bad, 0, sizeof bad);
+ assert(sfo_title(bad, sizeof bad, out, sizeof out) != 0);
+ assert(sfo_title(sfo, 10, out, sizeof out) != 0);
+ sfo[16]=200; /* count overflow */
+ assert(sfo_title(sfo, 64, out, sizeof out) != 0);
+ sfo[16]=1; sfo[8]=200; /* key_off OOB */
+ assert(sfo_title(sfo, 64, out, sizeof out) != 0);
+ sfo[8]=36;
+ /* tiny output buffer still safe */
+ assert(sfo_title(sfo, 64, out, 4) == 0);
+ assert(out[3] == 0);
+ /* unterminated key region: must fail, not read OOB */
+ memset(sfo, 0x41, sizeof sfo);
+ sfo[0]=0x00; sfo[1]='P'; sfo[2]='S'; sfo[3]='F';
+ sfo[8]=36; sfo[12]=48; sfo[16]=1;
+ sfo[20]=0; sfo[22]=0x04; sfo[24]=9; sfo[28]=16; sfo[32]=0;
+ assert(sfo_title(sfo, 64, out, sizeof out) != 0);
+}
+static void test_tmdb(void) {
+ unsigned char dig[20];
+ char hex[41];
+ int i;
+ /* SHA1("abc") = a9993e364706816aba3e25717850c26c9cd0d4d */
+ tmdb_sha1((const unsigned char *)"abc", 3, dig);
+ for(i=0;i<20;i++) snprintf(hex+2*i, 3, "%02x", dig[i]);
+ assert(strcmp(hex, "a9993e364706816aba3e25717850c26c9cd0d89d") == 0);
+ /* HMAC-SHA1 RFC 2202 case 1 */
+ {
+ unsigned char key[20];
+ memset(key, 0x0b, 20);
+ tmdb_hmac_sha1(key, 20, (const unsigned char *)"Hi There", 8, dig);
+ for(i=0;i<20;i++) snprintf(hex+2*i, 3, "%02x", dig[i]);
+ assert(strcmp(hex, "b617318655057264e28bc0b6fb378c8ef146be00") == 0);
+ }
+ /* URL path must match the hash Sony's live service accepts */
+ {
+ char path[128];
+ assert(tmdb_path("CUSA00740", path, sizeof path) == 0);
+ assert(strcmp(path, "/tmdb2/CUSA00740_00_95C83DE844D155477CB77C577A24D735F2E9AC08/CUSA00740_00.json") == 0);
+ assert(tmdb_path("junk!", path, sizeof path) != 0);
+ assert(tmdb_path("CUSA00740", path, 10) != 0);
+ }
+ /* response parse: name + icon URL */
+ {
+ const char body[] = "{\"names\":[{\"name\":\"Terraria\"}],\"icons\":[{\"icon\":\"http://x/y/icon0.png\",\"type\":\"512x512\"}]}";
+ char name[64], icon[128];
+ assert(tmdb_parse(body, sizeof(body)-1, name, sizeof name, icon, sizeof icon) == 0);
+ assert(strcmp(name, "Terraria") == 0);
+ assert(strcmp(icon, "http://x/y/icon0.png") == 0);
+ /* non-URL icon rejected, name still wins */
+ const char body2[] = "{\"names\":[{\"name\":\"X\"}],\"icons\":[{\"icon\":\"not a url\"}]}";
+ assert(tmdb_parse(body2, sizeof(body2)-1, name, sizeof name, icon, sizeof icon) == 0);
+ assert(icon[0] == 0);
+ /* no names -> fail */
+ assert(tmdb_parse("{\"icons\":[]}", 12, name, sizeof name, icon, sizeof icon) != 0);
+ }
+}
+static void test_updater(void) {
+ assert(updater_cmp("0.4.0", "0.4.0") == 0);
+ assert(updater_cmp("v0.4.1", "0.4.0") > 0);
+ assert(updater_cmp("0.4.0", "v0.4.1") < 0);
+ assert(updater_cmp("0.10.0", "0.9.9") > 0);
+ assert(updater_cmp("1.0", "1.0.0") == 0);
+ assert(updater_cmp(NULL, "0.1") < 0);
+ unsigned char elf[64];
+ memset(elf, 0, sizeof elf);
+ assert(updater_elf_ok(elf, sizeof elf) == 0);
+ assert(updater_elf_ok(NULL, 100) == 0);
+ assert(updater_elf_ok(elf, 10) == 0);
+ elf[0]=0x7f; elf[1]='E'; elf[2]='L'; elf[3]='F';
+ elf[4]=2; elf[5]=1; elf[18]=62; elf[19]=0;
+ assert(updater_elf_ok(elf, sizeof elf) == 1);
+ elf[18]=99;
+ assert(updater_elf_ok(elf, sizeof elf) == 0);
+}
+static void test_art_parse(void) {
+ /* Real external-assets response shape (verified against live API). */
+ const char *body = "[{\"url\":\"https://example.com/a.png\","
+ "\"external_asset_path\":\"external/ABC/https/example.com/a.png\"},"
+ "{\"url\":\"https://example.com/b.png\","
+ "\"external_asset_path\":\"external/DEF/https/example.com/b.png\"}]";
+ char out[128] = {0};
+ assert(art_parse_mp(body, strlen(body),
+ "https://example.com/b.png", out, sizeof out) == 1);
+ assert(strcmp(out, "mp:external/DEF/https/example.com/b.png") == 0);
+ assert(art_parse_mp(body, strlen(body),
+ "https://example.com/zzz.png", out, sizeof out) == 0);
+ assert(art_parse_mp("[]", 2, "x", out, sizeof out) == 0);
+ assert(art_parse_mp(NULL, 0, "x", out, sizeof out) == 0);
+ assert(art_resolve_mp("1", "t", "https://example.com/a.png", out, sizeof out) == 0);
+}
+
+static void test_health_safe_mode(void) {
+ /* Unclean-boot marker semantics: normal reboots never count. */
+ char dir[64];
+ assert(make_tmpdir(dir, sizeof dir) == 0);
+ health_set_base(dir);
+ health_mark_clean();
+ /* clean boot x3: counter stays 0, never safe mode */
+ assert(health_boot_note_crash() == 0);
+ health_mark_healthy();
+ assert(health_boot_note_crash() == 0);
+ health_mark_healthy();
+ assert(health_boot_note_crash() == 0);
+ /* now crash repeatedly WITHOUT going healthy: 1, 2, then safe */
+ assert(health_boot_note_crash() == 0); /* count=1 */
+ assert(health_boot_note_crash() == 0); /* count=2 */
+ assert(health_boot_note_crash() == 1); /* count=3 -> safe mode */
+ /* recovery clears */
+ health_mark_healthy();
+ assert(health_boot_note_crash() == 0);
+ health_mark_healthy();
+}
+
+static void test_health_stage_activate(void) {
+ /* Atomic staging: bad .new never touches live; rollback restores. */
+ char dir[64];
+ assert(make_tmpdir(dir, sizeof dir) == 0);
+ health_set_base(dir);
+ char live[256], tmp[256], bak[256];
+ snprintf(live, sizeof live, "%s/live.bin", dir);
+ snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%s/live.bin.new", dir);
+ snprintf(bak, sizeof bak, "%s/live.bin.bak", dir);
+ /* live = valid ELF stand-in (>=64B, ELF magic via updater_image_ok?
+ * use real check: write 64 zero bytes won't pass; stage path only
+ * needs .new validation, so craft minimal ELF header). */
+ unsigned char elf[128];
+ memset(elf, 0, sizeof elf);
+ elf[0] = 0x7f; elf[1] = 'E'; elf[2] = 'L'; elf[3] = 'F';
+ elf[4] = 2; elf[5] = 1; elf[18] = 62;
+ FILE *f = fopen(live, "wb");
+ assert(f); assert(fwrite(elf, 1, sizeof elf, f) == sizeof elf); fclose(f);
+ /* corrupt .new is refused, live untouched */
+ f = fopen(tmp, "wb");
+ assert(f); assert(fwrite("garbage-not-elf-at-all......................"
+ "..............................", 1, 64, f) == 64);
+ fclose(f);
+ assert(health_stage_activate(live) != 0);
+ f = fopen(live, "rb");
+ assert(f);
+ unsigned char chk[4];
+ assert(fread(chk, 1, 4, f) == 4);
+ fclose(f);
+ assert(chk[0] == 0x7f && chk[1] == 'E');
+ /* valid .new activates, backup created, rollback restores */
+ f = fopen(tmp, "wb");
+ assert(f);
+ elf[7] = 0x42;
+ assert(fwrite(elf, 1, sizeof elf, f) == sizeof elf);
+ fclose(f);
+ assert(health_stage_activate(live) == 0);
+ f = fopen(bak, "rb");
+ assert(f); fclose(f);
+ assert(health_verify_or_rollback(live) == 0);
+ /* corrupt live + backup present -> rollback */
+ f = fopen(live, "wb");
+ assert(f); assert(fwrite("XX", 1, 2, f) == 2); fclose(f);
+ assert(health_verify_or_rollback(live) == 1);
+ f = fopen(live, "rb");
+ assert(f);
+ assert(fread(chk, 1, 4, f) == 4);
+ fclose(f);
+ assert(chk[0] == 0x7f);
+}
+
+static void test_manifest(void) {
+ const char *json = "{\"version\":\"1.0.0\",\"channel\":\"stable\","
+ "\"min_version\":\"0.9.0\",\"platform\":\"ps4-goldhen\","
+ "\"assets\":[{\"name\":\"orbisrpc.bin\","
+ "\"sha256\":\"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef\"}]}";
+ manifest_t m;
+ assert(manifest_parse(json, strlen(json), &m) == 0);
+ assert(strcmp(m.version, "1.0.0") == 0);
+ assert(strcmp(m.channel, "stable") == 0);
+ char hex[65] = {0};
+ assert(manifest_find(&m, "orbisrpc.bin", hex) == 0);
+ assert(!strcmp(hex, "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"));
+ assert(manifest_find(&m, "nope.bin", hex) != 0);
+ assert(manifest_gate(&m) == 1);
+ assert(manifest_is_newer(&m, "0.9.0") == 1);
+ assert(manifest_is_newer(&m, "1.0.0") == 0);
+ /* wrong channel / platform refused */
+ const char *bad = "{\"version\":\"9.9.9\",\"channel\":\"beta\","
+ "\"platform\":\"ps5\",\"assets\":[{\"name\":\"x.bin\","
+ "\"sha256\":\"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef\"}]}";
+ manifest_t m2;
+ assert(manifest_parse(bad, strlen(bad), &m2) == 0);
+ assert(manifest_gate(&m2) == 0);
+ /* malformed rejected */
+ assert(manifest_parse("{}", 2, &m) != 0);
+ assert(manifest_parse("not json", 8, &m) != 0);
+ /* hash check: real sha256 of "abc" must match */
+ const char *jh = "{\"version\":\"1\",\"assets\":[{\"name\":\"a\","
+ "\"sha256\":\"ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad\"}]}";
+ manifest_t m3;
+ assert(manifest_parse(jh, strlen(jh), &m3) == 0);
+ assert(manifest_check(&m3, "a", (const unsigned char *)"abc", 3) == 0);
+ assert(manifest_check(&m3, "a", (const unsigned char *)"abd", 3) != 0);
+}
+
+static void test_manifest_sig(void) {
+ /* Full round trip with a fresh keypair: sign via mbedTLS, verify via
+ * our public-API-only manifest_verify_sig. Tampered bytes must fail.
+ * Uses only public 3.x APIs (raw group + MPIs, no context internals). */
+ static const unsigned char msg[] = "{\"version\":\"9.9.9\"}";
+ mbedtls_entropy_context ent;
+ mbedtls_entropy_init(&ent);
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context rng;
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&rng);
+ assert(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(&rng, mbedtls_entropy_func, &ent,
+ (const unsigned char *)"test", 4) == 0);
+ mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp);
+ assert(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1) == 0);
+ mbedtls_mpi d, r, s;
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&d); mbedtls_mpi_init(&r); mbedtls_mpi_init(&s);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point Q;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Q);
+ assert(mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(&grp, &d, &Q,
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &rng) == 0);
+ unsigned char hash[32], sig[64], rawpub[64];
+ {
+ mbedtls_sha256_context sc;
+ mbedtls_sha256_init(&sc);
+ assert(mbedtls_sha256_starts(&sc, 0) == 0);
+ assert(mbedtls_sha256_update(&sc, msg, sizeof msg - 1) == 0);
+ assert(mbedtls_sha256_finish(&sc, hash) == 0);
+ mbedtls_sha256_free(&sc);
+ }
+ assert(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(&grp, &r, &s, &d, hash, sizeof hash,
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &rng) == 0);
+ assert(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&r, sig, 32) == 0);
+ assert(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&s, sig + 32, 32) == 0);
+ /* export X||Y via the public point-write API */
+ {
+ unsigned char uncomp[65];
+ size_t olen = 0;
+ assert(mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&grp, &Q,
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen, uncomp, sizeof uncomp) == 0);
+ assert(olen == 65 && uncomp[0] == 0x04);
+ memcpy(rawpub, uncomp + 1, 64);
+ }
+ assert(manifest_verify_sig(msg, sizeof msg - 1, sig, rawpub) == 0);
+ sig[10] ^= 0x01;
+ assert(manifest_verify_sig(msg, sizeof msg - 1, sig, rawpub) != 0);
+ sig[10] ^= 0x01;
+ unsigned char bad[sizeof msg];
+ memcpy(bad, msg, sizeof bad);
+ bad[5] ^= 0x01;
+ assert(manifest_verify_sig(bad, sizeof bad - 1, sig, rawpub) != 0);
+ assert(manifest_verify_sig(NULL, 0, sig, rawpub) != 0);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&d); mbedtls_mpi_free(&r); mbedtls_mpi_free(&s);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&Q);
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(&rng);
+ mbedtls_entropy_free(&ent);
+}
+
+static void test_base64(void) {
+ char out[32];
+ assert(b64_encode((const unsigned char *)"", 0, out) == 0);
+ assert(strcmp(out, "") == 0);
+ assert(b64_encode((const unsigned char *)"f", 1, out) == 4);
+ assert(strcmp(out, "Zg==") == 0);
+ assert(b64_encode((const unsigned char *)"fo", 2, out) == 4);
+ assert(strcmp(out, "Zm8=") == 0);
+ assert(b64_encode((const unsigned char *)"foo", 3, out) == 4);
+ assert(strcmp(out, "Zm9v") == 0);
+}
+
+static void test_cfg_titles(void) {
+ char dir[64], path[96], path2[96];
+ assert(make_tmpdir(dir, sizeof dir) == 0);
+ snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/cfg.json", dir);
+ snprintf(path2, sizeof path2, "%s/cfg2.json", dir);
+ FILE *f = fopen(path, "wb");
+ assert(f);
+ fputs("{\"token\":\"t\",\"titles\":{\"CUSA11995\":\"Marvel's Spider-Man\","
+ "\"BAD KEY!\": \"junk\", \"CUSA00001\": \"x\", \"TOOLONGTITLEID12345\": \"y\","
+ "\"CUSA00002\": 42}}", f);
+ fclose(f);
+ cfg_t c;
+ assert(cfg_load(path, &c) == 0);
+ assert(c.n_titles == 1); /* only the well-formed entry survives */
+ char name[128];
+ assert(cfg_title(&c, "CUSA11995", name, sizeof name) == 0);
+ assert(!strcmp(name, "Marvel's Spider-Man"));
+ assert(cfg_title(&c, "CUSA99999", name, sizeof name) != 0);
+ assert(cfg_title(&c, "", name, sizeof name) != 0);
+ assert(cfg_title(NULL, "CUSA11995", name, sizeof name) != 0);
+ /* round-trip: save preserves overrides + home_art */
+ strncpy(c.home_art, "pslogo", sizeof c.home_art - 1);
+ assert(cfg_save(path2, &c) == 0);
+ cfg_t c2;
+ assert(cfg_load(path2, &c2) == 0);
+ assert(c2.n_titles == 1);
+ assert(cfg_title(&c2, "CUSA11995", name, sizeof name) == 0);
+ assert(!strcmp(name, "Marvel's Spider-Man"));
+ assert(!strcmp(c2.home_art, "pslogo"));
+ /* missing titles object: zero overrides, lookup misses */
+ f = fopen(path, "wb");
+ assert(f);
+ fputs("{\"token\":\"t\"}", f);
+ fclose(f);
+ assert(cfg_load(path, &c) == 0);
+ assert(c.n_titles == 0);
+ assert(!strcmp(c.home_art, "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/SirHumza/orbisRPC/main/config/icons/logo.png"));
+}
+
+static void test_appdb(void) {
+ char dir[64], db[96], meta[96], pj[128];
+ assert(make_tmpdir(dir, sizeof dir) == 0);
+ snprintf(db, sizeof db, "%s/app.db", dir);
+ snprintf(meta, sizeof meta, "%s/appmeta", dir);
+ assert(mkdir(meta, 0700) == 0);
+ sqlite3 *s = NULL;
+ assert(sqlite3_open_v2(db, &s, SQLITE_OPEN_READWRITE|SQLITE_OPEN_CREATE|SQLITE_OPEN_NOMUTEX, NULL) == SQLITE_OK);
+ assert(sqlite3_exec(s, "CREATE TABLE tbl_appbrowse(titleId TEXT, titleName TEXT);", 0, 0, 0) == SQLITE_OK);
+ assert(sqlite3_exec(s, "INSERT INTO tbl_appbrowse VALUES('CUSA11995','Marvel''s Spider-Man');", 0, 0, 0) == SQLITE_OK);
+ assert(sqlite3_exec(s, "CREATE TABLE tbl_appinfo(titleId TEXT, key TEXT, val TEXT);", 0, 0, 0) == SQLITE_OK);
+ assert(sqlite3_exec(s, "INSERT INTO tbl_appinfo VALUES('CUSA00001','TITLE_01','Lang One');", 0, 0, 0) == SQLITE_OK);
+ assert(sqlite3_exec(s, "INSERT INTO tbl_appinfo VALUES('CUSA00001','TITLE','Base Name');", 0, 0, 0) == SQLITE_OK);
+ assert(sqlite3_exec(s, "INSERT INTO tbl_appinfo VALUES('CUSA00002','TITLE','');", 0, 0, 0) == SQLITE_OK);
+ sqlite3_close(s);
+ char name[128];
+ /* tier 1: browse name wins */
+ assert(appdb_title_from(db, meta, "CUSA11995", name, sizeof name) == 0);
+ assert(!strcmp(name, "Marvel's Spider-Man"));
+ /* tier 2: bare TITLE preferred over TITLE_01 */
+ assert(appdb_title_from(db, meta, "CUSA00001", name, sizeof name) == 0);
+ assert(!strcmp(name, "Base Name"));
+ /* empty val rows never match; no param.json staged -> miss */
+ assert(appdb_title_from(db, meta, "CUSA00002", name, sizeof name) != 0);
+ assert(appdb_title_from(db, meta, "CUSA99999", name, sizeof name) != 0);
+ /* tier 3: staged param.json */
+ char gdir[128];
+ snprintf(gdir, sizeof gdir, "%s/CUSA00002", meta);
+ assert(mkdir(gdir, 0700) == 0);
+ snprintf(pj, sizeof pj, "%s/param.json", gdir);
+ FILE *f = fopen(pj, "wb");
+ assert(f);
+ fputs("{\"titleId\":\"CUSA00002\",\"titleName\":\"JSON Game\"}", f);
+ fclose(f);
+ assert(appdb_title_from(db, meta, "CUSA00002", name, sizeof name) == 0);
+ assert(!strcmp(name, "JSON Game"));
+ /* invalid inputs fail soft */
+ assert(appdb_title_from(db, meta, NULL, name, sizeof name) != 0);
+ assert(appdb_title_from(db, meta, "short", name, sizeof name) != 0);
+ assert(appdb_title_from(db, meta, "cusa11995", name, sizeof name) != 0);
+ assert(appdb_title_from(db, meta, "CUSA1199!", name, sizeof name) != 0);
+ assert(appdb_title_from("/nonexistent/app.db", meta, "CUSA11995", name, sizeof name) != 0);
+ assert(appdb_title_from(db, meta, "CUSA11995", NULL, 0) != 0);
+}
+
+static void test_discord_builder(void) {
+ /* game presence: name shown, raw ID nowhere visible, hover has the ID */
+ jl_val_t *a = discord_build_activity("On PS4", "Marvel's Spider-Man",
+ "CUSA11995", "1536977374795538532", "https://x/icons/", NULL, NULL,
+ 1700000000LL, "");
+ assert(a);
+ const jl_val_t *v = jl_obj_get(a, "name");
+ assert(v && v->type == JL_STRING && !strcmp(v->str, "Marvel's Spider-Man"));
+ assert(jl_obj_get(a, "details") == NULL); /* never the raw ID */
+ v = jl_obj_get(a, "state");
+ assert(v && v->type == JL_STRING && !strcmp(v->str, "On PS4"));
+ v = jl_obj_get(a, "type");
+ assert(v && v->type == JL_NUMBER && (int)v->num == 0);
+ const jl_val_t *ts = jl_obj_get(a, "timestamps");
+ assert(ts && ts->type == JL_OBJECT);
+ v = jl_obj_get(ts, "start");
+ assert(v && v->type == JL_NUMBER && v->inum == 1700000000LL * 1000LL);
+ const jl_val_t *as = jl_obj_get(a, "assets");
+ assert(as && as->type == JL_OBJECT);
+ v = jl_obj_get(as, "large_image");
+ assert(v && v->type == JL_STRING && !strcmp(v->str, "cusa11995"));
+ v = jl_obj_get(as, "large_text");
+ assert(v && v->type == JL_STRING && !strcmp(v->str, "CUSA11995"));
+ assert(jl_obj_get(as, "small_image") == NULL); /* no badge requested */
+ jl_free(a);
+ /* system badge: mp: URL used as-is with platform hover text */
+ a = discord_build_activity("On PS4", "Marvel's Spider-Man",
+ "CUSA11995", "1536977374795538532", NULL, NULL, "mp:1/2/logo",
+ 1700000000LL, "");
+ assert(a);
+ as = jl_obj_get(a, "assets");
+ assert(as && as->type == JL_OBJECT);
+ v = jl_obj_get(as, "small_image");
+ assert(v && v->type == JL_STRING && !strcmp(v->str, "mp:1/2/logo"));
+ v = jl_obj_get(as, "small_text");
+ assert(v && v->type == JL_STRING && !strcmp(v->str, "PlayStation 4"));
+ jl_free(a);
+ /* media type mapping survives */
+ a = discord_build_activity(NULL, "YouTube", "CUSA01015", "app",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, "");
+ assert(a);
+ v = jl_obj_get(a, "type");
+ assert(v && (int)v->num == 0); /* stub maps only CUSA00127 */
+ jl_free(a);
+ a = discord_build_activity(NULL, "Netflix", "CUSA00127", "app",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, "");
+ assert(a);
+ v = jl_obj_get(a, "type");
+ assert(v && (int)v->num == 3);
+ jl_free(a);
+ /* home + uploaded key: trusted key used as-is */
+ a = discord_build_activity("On PS4", "PlayStation 4", "home", "app",
+ NULL, "pslogo", NULL, 0, "");
+ assert(a);
+ as = jl_obj_get(a, "assets");
+ assert(as && as->type == JL_OBJECT);
+ v = jl_obj_get(as, "large_image");
+ assert(v && !strcmp(v->str, "pslogo"));
+ v = jl_obj_get(as, "large_text");
+ assert(v && !strcmp(v->str, "PlayStation 4"));
+ jl_free(a);
+ /* home with nothing: no assets block at all (never dangling) */
+ a = discord_build_activity("On PS4", "PlayStation 4", "home", "app",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, "");
+ assert(a);
+ assert(jl_obj_get(a, "assets") == NULL);
+ jl_free(a);
+ /* NULL name rejected */
+ assert(discord_build_activity(NULL, NULL, "home", "app", NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, "") == NULL);
+}
+
+static void test_cfg_learn(void) {
+ cfg_t c;
+ cfg_defaults(&c);
+ assert(c.n_titles == 0);
+ assert(cfg_learn(&c, "CUSA11995", "Marvel's Spider-Man") == 1);
+ assert(cfg_learn(&c, "CUSA11995", "Marvel's Spider-Man") == 0); /* dup */
+ assert(cfg_learn(&c, "CUSA11995", "CUSA11995") == 0); /* ID echo refused */
+ assert(cfg_learn(&c, "CUSA11995", "x") == 0); /* too short */
+ assert(cfg_learn(&c, "bad key!", "Name") == 0);
+ assert(cfg_learn(&c, "CUSA11995", "Spider-Man 2") == 1); /* update */
+ char name[128];
+ assert(cfg_title(&c, "CUSA11995", name, sizeof name) == 0);
+ assert(!strcmp(name, "Spider-Man 2"));
+ assert(cfg_learn(NULL, "CUSA11995", "N") == 0);
+ assert(cfg_learn(&c, NULL, "N") == 0);
+ /* full map refuses */
+ c.n_titles = CFG_MAX_TITLES;
+ assert(cfg_learn(&c, "CUSA00001", "Full Game") == 0);
+}
+
+static void test_installer_cfg(void) {
+ char dir[64], path[96];
+ assert(make_tmpdir(dir, sizeof dir) == 0);
+ snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/config.json", dir);
+ /* token validation */
+ assert(token_valid("MTIz.ABCdef_0123456789-xYz.ABCDEFGHijklmnopQRSTUVwxyz") == 1);
+ assert(token_valid("short") == 0);
+ assert(token_valid("SET_ME") == 0);
+ assert(token_valid("has space.in.it.aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa") == 0);
+ assert(token_valid("nodots") == 0);
+ assert(token_valid(NULL) == 0);
+ /* save creates, preserves, round-trips */
+ assert(icfg_token_save(path, "MTIz.ABCdef_0123456789-xYz.ABCDEFGHijklmnopQRSTUVwxyz") == 0);
+ assert(icfg_set_str(path, "presence_state", "On PS4") == 0);
+ assert(icfg_set_int(path, "poll_interval_s", 12) == 0);
+ /* invalid token refused, file untouched */
+ assert(icfg_token_save(path, "junk") == -1);
+ char tok[160], st[64];
+ long n = 0;
+ assert(icfg_token_load(path, tok, sizeof tok) == 0);
+ assert(!strcmp(tok, "MTIz.ABCdef_0123456789-xYz.ABCDEFGHijklmnopQRSTUVwxyz"));
+ assert(icfg_get_str(path, "presence_state", st, sizeof st) == 0);
+ assert(!strcmp(st, "On PS4"));
+ assert(icfg_get_int(path, "poll_interval_s", &n) == 0 && n == 12);
+ /* missing file: loads fail soft, save still works */
+ assert(icfg_get_str("/nonexistent/x.json", "k", st, sizeof st) != 0);
+ /* net probes fail soft on garbage */
+ assert(net_probe(NULL, 443, 2) == 0);
+ assert(net_probe("", 443, 2) == 0);
+ assert(net_probe("127.0.0.1", 1, 1) == 0);
+ assert(net_probe("nonexistent.invalid", 443, 1) == 0);
+}
+
+int main(void) {
+ test_json();
+ test_gateway_op_spoof();
+ test_json_oom_safe();
+ test_json_hostile();
+ test_tmdb();
+ test_updater();
+ test_sfo();
+ test_base64();
+ test_art_parse();
+ test_health_safe_mode();
+ test_health_stage_activate();
+ test_manifest();
+ test_manifest_sig();
+ test_cfg_titles();
+ test_cfg_learn();
+ test_installer_cfg();
+ test_appdb();
+ test_discord_builder();
+ puts("utility tests passed");
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/tests/test_utils_asan b/tests/test_utils_asan
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..64eb67d
Binary files /dev/null and b/tests/test_utils_asan differ
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/LICENSE.txt b/third_party/bearssl/LICENSE.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0885020
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/LICENSE.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+"Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl.h b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..310edb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BR_BEARSSL_H__
+#define BR_BEARSSL_H__
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/** \mainpage BearSSL API
+ *
+ * # API Layout
+ *
+ * The functions and structures defined by the BearSSL API are located
+ * in various header files:
+ *
+ * | Header file | Elements |
+ * | :-------------- | :------------------------------------------------ |
+ * | bearssl_hash.h | Hash functions |
+ * | bearssl_hmac.h | HMAC |
+ * | bearssl_kdf.h | Key Derivation Functions |
+ * | bearssl_rand.h | Pseudorandom byte generators |
+ * | bearssl_prf.h | PRF implementations (for SSL/TLS) |
+ * | bearssl_block.h | Symmetric encryption |
+ * | bearssl_aead.h | AEAD algorithms (combined encryption + MAC) |
+ * | bearssl_rsa.h | RSA encryption and signatures |
+ * | bearssl_ec.h | Elliptic curves support (including ECDSA) |
+ * | bearssl_ssl.h | SSL/TLS engine interface |
+ * | bearssl_x509.h | X.509 certificate decoding and validation |
+ * | bearssl_pem.h | Base64/PEM decoding support functions |
+ *
+ * Applications using BearSSL are supposed to simply include `bearssl.h`
+ * as follows:
+ *
+ * #include <bearssl.h>
+ *
+ * The `bearssl.h` file itself includes all the other header files. It is
+ * possible to include specific header files, but it has no practical
+ * advantage for the application. The API is separated into separate
+ * header files only for documentation convenience.
+ *
+ *
+ * # Conventions
+ *
+ * ## MUST and SHALL
+ *
+ * In all descriptions, the usual "MUST", "SHALL", "MAY",... terminology
+ * is used. Failure to meet requirements expressed with a "MUST" or
+ * "SHALL" implies undefined behaviour, which means that segmentation
+ * faults, buffer overflows, and other similar adverse events, may occur.
+ *
+ * In general, BearSSL is not very forgiving of programming errors, and
+ * does not include much failsafes or error reporting when the problem
+ * does not arise from external transient conditions, and can be fixed
+ * only in the application code. This is done so in order to make the
+ * total code footprint lighter.
+ *
+ *
+ * ## `NULL` values
+ *
+ * Function parameters with a pointer type shall not be `NULL` unless
+ * explicitly authorised by the documentation. As an exception, when
+ * the pointer aims at a sequence of bytes and is accompanied with
+ * a length parameter, and the length is zero (meaning that there is
+ * no byte at all to retrieve), then the pointer may be `NULL` even if
+ * not explicitly allowed.
+ *
+ *
+ * ## Memory Allocation
+ *
+ * BearSSL does not perform dynamic memory allocation. This implies that
+ * for any functionality that requires a non-transient state, the caller
+ * is responsible for allocating the relevant context structure. Such
+ * allocation can be done in any appropriate area, including static data
+ * segments, the heap, and the stack, provided that proper alignment is
+ * respected. The header files define these context structures
+ * (including size and contents), so the C compiler should handle
+ * alignment automatically.
+ *
+ * Since there is no dynamic resource allocation, there is also nothing to
+ * release. When the calling code is done with a BearSSL feature, it
+ * may simple release the context structures it allocated itself, with
+ * no "close function" to call. If the context structures were allocated
+ * on the stack (as local variables), then even that release operation is
+ * implicit.
+ *
+ *
+ * ## Structure Contents
+ *
+ * Except when explicitly indicated, structure contents are opaque: they
+ * are included in the header files so that calling code may know the
+ * structure sizes and alignment requirements, but callers SHALL NOT
+ * access individual fields directly. For fields that are supposed to
+ * be read from or written to, the API defines accessor functions (the
+ * simplest of these accessor functions are defined as `static inline`
+ * functions, and the C compiler will optimise them away).
+ *
+ *
+ * # API Usage
+ *
+ * BearSSL usage for running a SSL/TLS client or server is described
+ * on the [BearSSL Web site](https://www.bearssl.org/api1.html). The
+ * BearSSL source archive also comes with sample code.
+ */
+
+#include "bearssl_hash.h"
+#include "bearssl_hmac.h"
+#include "bearssl_kdf.h"
+#include "bearssl_rand.h"
+#include "bearssl_prf.h"
+#include "bearssl_block.h"
+#include "bearssl_aead.h"
+#include "bearssl_rsa.h"
+#include "bearssl_ec.h"
+#include "bearssl_ssl.h"
+#include "bearssl_x509.h"
+#include "bearssl_pem.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** \brief Type for a configuration option.
+ *
+ * A "configuration option" is a value that is selected when the BearSSL
+ * library itself is compiled. Most options are boolean; their value is
+ * then either 1 (option is enabled) or 0 (option is disabled). Some
+ * values have other integer values. Option names correspond to macro
+ * names. Some of the options can be explicitly set in the internal
+ * `"config.h"` file.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Configurable option name. */
+ const char *name;
+ /** \brief Configurable option value. */
+ long value;
+} br_config_option;
+
+/** \brief Get configuration report.
+ *
+ * This function returns compiled configuration options, each as a
+ * 'long' value. Names match internal macro names, in particular those
+ * that can be set in the `"config.h"` inner file. For boolean options,
+ * the numerical value is 1 if enabled, 0 if disabled. For maximum
+ * key sizes, values are expressed in bits.
+ *
+ * The returned array is terminated by an entry whose `name` is `NULL`.
+ *
+ * \return the configuration report.
+ */
+const br_config_option *br_get_config(void);
+
+/* ======================================================================= */
+
+/** \brief Version feature: support for time callback. */
+#define BR_FEATURE_X509_TIME_CALLBACK 1
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_aead.h b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_aead.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e35a1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_aead.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1059 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BR_BEARSSL_AEAD_H__
+#define BR_BEARSSL_AEAD_H__
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "bearssl_block.h"
+#include "bearssl_hash.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** \file bearssl_aead.h
+ *
+ * # Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data
+ *
+ * This file documents the API for AEAD encryption.
+ *
+ *
+ * ## Procedural API
+ *
+ * An AEAD algorithm processes messages and provides confidentiality
+ * (encryption) and checked integrity (MAC). It uses the following
+ * parameters:
+ *
+ * - A symmetric key. Exact size depends on the AEAD algorithm.
+ *
+ * - A nonce (IV). Size depends on the AEAD algorithm; for most
+ * algorithms, it is crucial for security that any given nonce
+ * value is never used twice for the same key and distinct
+ * messages.
+ *
+ * - Data to encrypt and protect.
+ *
+ * - Additional authenticated data, which is covered by the MAC but
+ * otherwise left untouched (i.e. not encrypted).
+ *
+ * The AEAD algorithm encrypts the data, and produces an authentication
+ * tag. It is assumed that the encrypted data, the tag, the additional
+ * authenticated data and the nonce are sent to the receiver; the
+ * additional data and the nonce may be implicit (e.g. using elements of
+ * the underlying transport protocol, such as record sequence numbers).
+ * The receiver will recompute the tag value and compare it with the one
+ * received; if they match, then the data is correct, and can be
+ * decrypted and used; otherwise, at least one of the elements was
+ * altered in transit, normally leading to wholesale rejection of the
+ * complete message.
+ *
+ * For each AEAD algorithm, identified by a symbolic name (hereafter
+ * denoted as "`xxx`"), the following functions are defined:
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_init()`
+ *
+ * Initialise the AEAD algorithm, on a provided context structure.
+ * Exact parameters depend on the algorithm, and may include
+ * pointers to extra implementations and context structures. The
+ * secret key is provided at this point, either directly or
+ * indirectly.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_reset()`
+ *
+ * Start a new AEAD computation. The nonce value is provided as
+ * parameter to this function.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_aad_inject()`
+ *
+ * Inject some additional authenticated data. Additional data may
+ * be provided in several chunks of arbitrary length.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_flip()`
+ *
+ * This function MUST be called after injecting all additional
+ * authenticated data, and before beginning to encrypt the plaintext
+ * (or decrypt the ciphertext).
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_run()`
+ *
+ * Process some plaintext (to encrypt) or ciphertext (to decrypt).
+ * Encryption/decryption is done in place. Data may be provided in
+ * several chunks of arbitrary length.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_get_tag()`
+ *
+ * Compute the authentication tag. All message data (encrypted or
+ * decrypted) must have been injected at that point. Also, this
+ * call may modify internal context elements, so it may be called
+ * only once for a given AEAD computation.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_check_tag()`
+ *
+ * An alternative to `br_xxx_get_tag()`, meant to be used by the
+ * receiver: the authentication tag is internally recomputed, and
+ * compared with the one provided as parameter.
+ *
+ * This API makes the following assumptions on the AEAD algorithm:
+ *
+ * - Encryption does not expand the size of the ciphertext; there is
+ * no padding. This is true of most modern AEAD modes such as GCM.
+ *
+ * - The additional authenticated data must be processed first,
+ * before the encrypted/decrypted data.
+ *
+ * - Nonce, plaintext and additional authenticated data all consist
+ * in an integral number of bytes. There is no provision to use
+ * elements whose length in bits is not a multiple of 8.
+ *
+ * Each AEAD algorithm has its own requirements and limits on the sizes
+ * of additional data and plaintext. This API does not provide any
+ * way to report invalid usage; it is up to the caller to ensure that
+ * the provided key, nonce, and data elements all fit the algorithm's
+ * requirements.
+ *
+ *
+ * ## Object-Oriented API
+ *
+ * Each context structure begins with a field (called `vtable`) that
+ * points to an instance of a structure that references the relevant
+ * functions through pointers. Each such structure contains the
+ * following:
+ *
+ * - `reset`
+ *
+ * Pointer to the reset function, that allows starting a new
+ * computation.
+ *
+ * - `aad_inject`
+ *
+ * Pointer to the additional authenticated data injection function.
+ *
+ * - `flip`
+ *
+ * Pointer to the function that transitions from additional data
+ * to main message data processing.
+ *
+ * - `get_tag`
+ *
+ * Pointer to the function that computes and returns the tag.
+ *
+ * - `check_tag`
+ *
+ * Pointer to the function that computes and verifies the tag against
+ * a received value.
+ *
+ * Note that there is no OOP method for context initialisation: the
+ * various AEAD algorithms have different requirements that would not
+ * map well to a single initialisation API.
+ *
+ * The OOP API is not provided for CCM, due to its specific requirements
+ * (length of plaintext must be known in advance).
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class type of an AEAD algorithm.
+ */
+typedef struct br_aead_class_ br_aead_class;
+struct br_aead_class_ {
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Size (in bytes) of authentication tags created by
+ * this AEAD algorithm.
+ */
+ size_t tag_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Reset an AEAD context.
+ *
+ * This function resets an already initialised AEAD context for
+ * a new computation run. Implementations and keys are
+ * conserved. This function can be called at any time; it
+ * cancels any ongoing AEAD computation that uses the provided
+ * context structure.
+
+ * The provided IV is a _nonce_. Each AEAD algorithm has its
+ * own requirements on IV size and contents; for most of them,
+ * it is crucial to security that each nonce value is used
+ * only once for a given secret key.
+ *
+ * \param cc AEAD context structure.
+ * \param iv AEAD nonce to use.
+ * \param len AEAD nonce length (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*reset)(const br_aead_class **cc, const void *iv, size_t len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Inject additional authenticated data.
+ *
+ * The provided data is injected into a running AEAD
+ * computation. Additional data must be injected _before_ the
+ * call to `flip()`. Additional data can be injected in several
+ * chunks of arbitrary length.
+ *
+ * \param cc AEAD context structure.
+ * \param data pointer to additional authenticated data.
+ * \param len length of additional authenticated data (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*aad_inject)(const br_aead_class **cc,
+ const void *data, size_t len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Finish injection of additional authenticated data.
+ *
+ * This function MUST be called before beginning the actual
+ * encryption or decryption (with `run()`), even if no
+ * additional authenticated data was injected. No additional
+ * authenticated data may be injected after this function call.
+ *
+ * \param cc AEAD context structure.
+ */
+ void (*flip)(const br_aead_class **cc);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Encrypt or decrypt some data.
+ *
+ * Data encryption or decryption can be done after `flip()` has
+ * been called on the context. If `encrypt` is non-zero, then
+ * the provided data shall be plaintext, and it is encrypted in
+ * place. Otherwise, the data shall be ciphertext, and it is
+ * decrypted in place.
+ *
+ * Data may be provided in several chunks of arbitrary length.
+ *
+ * \param cc AEAD context structure.
+ * \param encrypt non-zero for encryption, zero for decryption.
+ * \param data data to encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*run)(const br_aead_class **cc, int encrypt,
+ void *data, size_t len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Compute authentication tag.
+ *
+ * Compute the AEAD authentication tag. The tag length depends
+ * on the AEAD algorithm; it is written in the provided `tag`
+ * buffer. This call terminates the AEAD run: no data may be
+ * processed with that AEAD context afterwards, until `reset()`
+ * is called to initiate a new AEAD run.
+ *
+ * The tag value must normally be sent along with the encrypted
+ * data. When decrypting, the tag value must be recomputed and
+ * compared with the received tag: if the two tag values differ,
+ * then either the tag or the encrypted data was altered in
+ * transit. As an alternative to this function, the
+ * `check_tag()` function may be used to compute and check the
+ * tag value.
+ *
+ * Tag length depends on the AEAD algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param cc AEAD context structure.
+ * \param tag destination buffer for the tag.
+ */
+ void (*get_tag)(const br_aead_class **cc, void *tag);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Compute and check authentication tag.
+ *
+ * This function is an alternative to `get_tag()`, and is
+ * normally used on the receiving end (i.e. when decrypting
+ * messages). The tag value is recomputed and compared with the
+ * provided tag value. If they match, 1 is returned; on
+ * mismatch, 0 is returned. A returned value of 0 means that the
+ * data or the tag was altered in transit, normally leading to
+ * wholesale rejection of the complete message.
+ *
+ * Tag length depends on the AEAD algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param cc AEAD context structure.
+ * \param tag tag value to compare with.
+ * \return 1 on success (exact match of tag value), 0 otherwise.
+ */
+ uint32_t (*check_tag)(const br_aead_class **cc, const void *tag);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Compute authentication tag (with truncation).
+ *
+ * This function is similar to `get_tag()`, except that the tag
+ * length is provided. Some AEAD algorithms allow several tag
+ * lengths, usually by truncating the normal tag. Shorter tags
+ * mechanically increase success probability of forgeries.
+ * The range of allowed tag lengths depends on the algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param cc AEAD context structure.
+ * \param tag destination buffer for the tag.
+ * \param len tag length (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*get_tag_trunc)(const br_aead_class **cc, void *tag, size_t len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Compute and check authentication tag (with truncation).
+ *
+ * This function is similar to `check_tag()` except that it
+ * works over an explicit tag length. See `get_tag()` for a
+ * discussion of explicit tag lengths; the range of allowed tag
+ * lengths depends on the algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param cc AEAD context structure.
+ * \param tag tag value to compare with.
+ * \param len tag length (in bytes).
+ * \return 1 on success (exact match of tag value), 0 otherwise.
+ */
+ uint32_t (*check_tag_trunc)(const br_aead_class **cc,
+ const void *tag, size_t len);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context structure for GCM.
+ *
+ * GCM is an AEAD mode that combines a block cipher in CTR mode with a
+ * MAC based on GHASH, to provide authenticated encryption:
+ *
+ * - Any block cipher with 16-byte blocks can be used with GCM.
+ *
+ * - The nonce can have any length, from 0 up to 2^64-1 bits; however,
+ * 96-bit nonces (12 bytes) are recommended (nonces with a length
+ * distinct from 12 bytes are internally hashed, which risks reusing
+ * nonce value with a small but not always negligible probability).
+ *
+ * - Additional authenticated data may have length up to 2^64-1 bits.
+ *
+ * - Message length may range up to 2^39-256 bits at most.
+ *
+ * - The authentication tag has length 16 bytes.
+ *
+ * The GCM initialisation function receives as parameter an
+ * _initialised_ block cipher implementation context, with the secret
+ * key already set. A pointer to that context will be kept within the
+ * GCM context structure. It is up to the caller to allocate and
+ * initialise that block cipher context.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_aead_class *vtable;
+
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ const br_block_ctr_class **bctx;
+ br_ghash gh;
+ unsigned char h[16];
+ unsigned char j0_1[12];
+ unsigned char buf[16];
+ unsigned char y[16];
+ uint32_t j0_2, jc;
+ uint64_t count_aad, count_ctr;
+#endif
+} br_gcm_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a GCM context.
+ *
+ * A block cipher implementation, with its initialised context structure,
+ * is provided. The block cipher MUST use 16-byte blocks in CTR mode,
+ * and its secret key MUST have been already set in the provided context.
+ * A GHASH implementation must also be provided. The parameters are linked
+ * in the GCM context.
+ *
+ * After this function has been called, the `br_gcm_reset()` function must
+ * be called, to provide the IV for GCM computation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx GCM context structure.
+ * \param bctx block cipher context (already initialised with secret key).
+ * \param gh GHASH implementation.
+ */
+void br_gcm_init(br_gcm_context *ctx,
+ const br_block_ctr_class **bctx, br_ghash gh);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Reset a GCM context.
+ *
+ * This function resets an already initialised GCM context for a new
+ * computation run. Implementations and keys are conserved. This function
+ * can be called at any time; it cancels any ongoing GCM computation that
+ * uses the provided context structure.
+ *
+ * The provided IV is a _nonce_. It is critical to GCM security that IV
+ * values are not repeated for the same encryption key. IV can have
+ * arbitrary length (up to 2^64-1 bits), but the "normal" length is
+ * 96 bits (12 bytes).
+ *
+ * \param ctx GCM context structure.
+ * \param iv GCM nonce to use.
+ * \param len GCM nonce length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_gcm_reset(br_gcm_context *ctx, const void *iv, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Inject additional authenticated data into GCM.
+ *
+ * The provided data is injected into a running GCM computation. Additional
+ * data must be injected _before_ the call to `br_gcm_flip()`.
+ * Additional data can be injected in several chunks of arbitrary length;
+ * the maximum total size of additional authenticated data is 2^64-1
+ * bits.
+ *
+ * \param ctx GCM context structure.
+ * \param data pointer to additional authenticated data.
+ * \param len length of additional authenticated data (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_gcm_aad_inject(br_gcm_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Finish injection of additional authenticated data into GCM.
+ *
+ * This function MUST be called before beginning the actual encryption
+ * or decryption (with `br_gcm_run()`), even if no additional authenticated
+ * data was injected. No additional authenticated data may be injected
+ * after this function call.
+ *
+ * \param ctx GCM context structure.
+ */
+void br_gcm_flip(br_gcm_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encrypt or decrypt some data with GCM.
+ *
+ * Data encryption or decryption can be done after `br_gcm_flip()`
+ * has been called on the context. If `encrypt` is non-zero, then the
+ * provided data shall be plaintext, and it is encrypted in place.
+ * Otherwise, the data shall be ciphertext, and it is decrypted in place.
+ *
+ * Data may be provided in several chunks of arbitrary length. The maximum
+ * total length for data is 2^39-256 bits, i.e. about 65 gigabytes.
+ *
+ * \param ctx GCM context structure.
+ * \param encrypt non-zero for encryption, zero for decryption.
+ * \param data data to encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_gcm_run(br_gcm_context *ctx, int encrypt, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute GCM authentication tag.
+ *
+ * Compute the GCM authentication tag. The tag is a 16-byte value which
+ * is written in the provided `tag` buffer. This call terminates the
+ * GCM run: no data may be processed with that GCM context afterwards,
+ * until `br_gcm_reset()` is called to initiate a new GCM run.
+ *
+ * The tag value must normally be sent along with the encrypted data.
+ * When decrypting, the tag value must be recomputed and compared with
+ * the received tag: if the two tag values differ, then either the tag
+ * or the encrypted data was altered in transit. As an alternative to
+ * this function, the `br_gcm_check_tag()` function can be used to
+ * compute and check the tag value.
+ *
+ * \param ctx GCM context structure.
+ * \param tag destination buffer for the tag (16 bytes).
+ */
+void br_gcm_get_tag(br_gcm_context *ctx, void *tag);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute and check GCM authentication tag.
+ *
+ * This function is an alternative to `br_gcm_get_tag()`, normally used
+ * on the receiving end (i.e. when decrypting value). The tag value is
+ * recomputed and compared with the provided tag value. If they match, 1
+ * is returned; on mismatch, 0 is returned. A returned value of 0 means
+ * that the data or the tag was altered in transit, normally leading to
+ * wholesale rejection of the complete message.
+ *
+ * \param ctx GCM context structure.
+ * \param tag tag value to compare with (16 bytes).
+ * \return 1 on success (exact match of tag value), 0 otherwise.
+ */
+uint32_t br_gcm_check_tag(br_gcm_context *ctx, const void *tag);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute GCM authentication tag (with truncation).
+ *
+ * This function is similar to `br_gcm_get_tag()`, except that it allows
+ * the tag to be truncated to a smaller length. The intended tag length
+ * is provided as `len` (in bytes); it MUST be no more than 16, but
+ * it may be smaller. Note that decreasing tag length mechanically makes
+ * forgeries easier; NIST SP 800-38D specifies that the tag length shall
+ * lie between 12 and 16 bytes (inclusive), but may be truncated down to
+ * 4 or 8 bytes, for specific applications that can tolerate it. It must
+ * also be noted that successful forgeries leak information on the
+ * authentication key, making subsequent forgeries easier. Therefore,
+ * tag truncation, and in particular truncation to sizes lower than 12
+ * bytes, shall be envisioned only with great care.
+ *
+ * The tag is written in the provided `tag` buffer. This call terminates
+ * the GCM run: no data may be processed with that GCM context
+ * afterwards, until `br_gcm_reset()` is called to initiate a new GCM
+ * run.
+ *
+ * The tag value must normally be sent along with the encrypted data.
+ * When decrypting, the tag value must be recomputed and compared with
+ * the received tag: if the two tag values differ, then either the tag
+ * or the encrypted data was altered in transit. As an alternative to
+ * this function, the `br_gcm_check_tag_trunc()` function can be used to
+ * compute and check the tag value.
+ *
+ * \param ctx GCM context structure.
+ * \param tag destination buffer for the tag.
+ * \param len tag length (16 bytes or less).
+ */
+void br_gcm_get_tag_trunc(br_gcm_context *ctx, void *tag, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute and check GCM authentication tag (with truncation).
+ *
+ * This function is an alternative to `br_gcm_get_tag_trunc()`, normally used
+ * on the receiving end (i.e. when decrypting value). The tag value is
+ * recomputed and compared with the provided tag value. If they match, 1
+ * is returned; on mismatch, 0 is returned. A returned value of 0 means
+ * that the data or the tag was altered in transit, normally leading to
+ * wholesale rejection of the complete message.
+ *
+ * Tag length MUST be 16 bytes or less. The normal GCM tag length is 16
+ * bytes. See `br_check_tag_trunc()` for some discussion on the potential
+ * perils of truncating authentication tags.
+ *
+ * \param ctx GCM context structure.
+ * \param tag tag value to compare with.
+ * \param len tag length (in bytes).
+ * \return 1 on success (exact match of tag value), 0 otherwise.
+ */
+uint32_t br_gcm_check_tag_trunc(br_gcm_context *ctx,
+ const void *tag, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for GCM.
+ */
+extern const br_aead_class br_gcm_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context structure for EAX.
+ *
+ * EAX is an AEAD mode that combines a block cipher in CTR mode with
+ * CBC-MAC using the same block cipher and the same key, to provide
+ * authenticated encryption:
+ *
+ * - Any block cipher with 16-byte blocks can be used with EAX
+ * (technically, other block sizes are defined as well, but this
+ * is not implemented by these functions; shorter blocks also
+ * imply numerous security issues).
+ *
+ * - The nonce can have any length, as long as nonce values are
+ * not reused (thus, if nonces are randomly selected, the nonce
+ * size should be such that reuse probability is negligible).
+ *
+ * - Additional authenticated data length is unlimited.
+ *
+ * - Message length is unlimited.
+ *
+ * - The authentication tag has length 16 bytes.
+ *
+ * The EAX initialisation function receives as parameter an
+ * _initialised_ block cipher implementation context, with the secret
+ * key already set. A pointer to that context will be kept within the
+ * EAX context structure. It is up to the caller to allocate and
+ * initialise that block cipher context.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_aead_class *vtable;
+
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class **bctx;
+ unsigned char L2[16];
+ unsigned char L4[16];
+ unsigned char nonce[16];
+ unsigned char head[16];
+ unsigned char ctr[16];
+ unsigned char cbcmac[16];
+ unsigned char buf[16];
+ size_t ptr;
+#endif
+} br_eax_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief EAX captured state.
+ *
+ * Some internal values computed by EAX may be captured at various
+ * points, and reused for another EAX run with the same secret key,
+ * for lower per-message overhead. Captured values do not depend on
+ * the nonce.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ unsigned char st[3][16];
+#endif
+} br_eax_state;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize an EAX context.
+ *
+ * A block cipher implementation, with its initialised context
+ * structure, is provided. The block cipher MUST use 16-byte blocks in
+ * CTR + CBC-MAC mode, and its secret key MUST have been already set in
+ * the provided context. The parameters are linked in the EAX context.
+ *
+ * After this function has been called, the `br_eax_reset()` function must
+ * be called, to provide the nonce for EAX computation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx EAX context structure.
+ * \param bctx block cipher context (already initialised with secret key).
+ */
+void br_eax_init(br_eax_context *ctx, const br_block_ctrcbc_class **bctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Capture pre-AAD state.
+ *
+ * This function precomputes key-dependent data, and stores it in the
+ * provided `st` structure. This structure should then be used with
+ * `br_eax_reset_pre_aad()`, or updated with `br_eax_get_aad_mac()`
+ * and then used with `br_eax_reset_post_aad()`.
+ *
+ * The EAX context structure is unmodified by this call.
+ *
+ * \param ctx EAX context structure.
+ * \param st recipient for captured state.
+ */
+void br_eax_capture(const br_eax_context *ctx, br_eax_state *st);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Reset an EAX context.
+ *
+ * This function resets an already initialised EAX context for a new
+ * computation run. Implementations and keys are conserved. This function
+ * can be called at any time; it cancels any ongoing EAX computation that
+ * uses the provided context structure.
+ *
+ * It is critical to EAX security that nonce values are not repeated for
+ * the same encryption key. Nonces can have arbitrary length. If nonces
+ * are randomly generated, then a nonce length of at least 128 bits (16
+ * bytes) is recommended, to make nonce reuse probability sufficiently
+ * low.
+ *
+ * \param ctx EAX context structure.
+ * \param nonce EAX nonce to use.
+ * \param len EAX nonce length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_eax_reset(br_eax_context *ctx, const void *nonce, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Reset an EAX context with a pre-AAD captured state.
+ *
+ * This function is an alternative to `br_eax_reset()`, that reuses a
+ * previously captured state structure for lower per-message overhead.
+ * The state should have been populated with `br_eax_capture_state()`
+ * but not updated with `br_eax_get_aad_mac()`.
+ *
+ * After this function is called, additional authenticated data MUST
+ * be injected. At least one byte of additional authenticated data
+ * MUST be provided with `br_eax_aad_inject()`; computation result will
+ * be incorrect if `br_eax_flip()` is called right away.
+ *
+ * After injection of the AAD and call to `br_eax_flip()`, at least
+ * one message byte must be provided. Empty messages are not supported
+ * with this reset mode.
+ *
+ * \param ctx EAX context structure.
+ * \param st pre-AAD captured state.
+ * \param nonce EAX nonce to use.
+ * \param len EAX nonce length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_eax_reset_pre_aad(br_eax_context *ctx, const br_eax_state *st,
+ const void *nonce, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Reset an EAX context with a post-AAD captured state.
+ *
+ * This function is an alternative to `br_eax_reset()`, that reuses a
+ * previously captured state structure for lower per-message overhead.
+ * The state should have been populated with `br_eax_capture_state()`
+ * and then updated with `br_eax_get_aad_mac()`.
+ *
+ * After this function is called, message data MUST be injected. The
+ * `br_eax_flip()` function MUST NOT be called. At least one byte of
+ * message data MUST be provided with `br_eax_run()`; empty messages
+ * are not supported with this reset mode.
+ *
+ * \param ctx EAX context structure.
+ * \param st post-AAD captured state.
+ * \param nonce EAX nonce to use.
+ * \param len EAX nonce length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_eax_reset_post_aad(br_eax_context *ctx, const br_eax_state *st,
+ const void *nonce, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Inject additional authenticated data into EAX.
+ *
+ * The provided data is injected into a running EAX computation. Additional
+ * data must be injected _before_ the call to `br_eax_flip()`.
+ * Additional data can be injected in several chunks of arbitrary length;
+ * the total amount of additional authenticated data is unlimited.
+ *
+ * \param ctx EAX context structure.
+ * \param data pointer to additional authenticated data.
+ * \param len length of additional authenticated data (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_eax_aad_inject(br_eax_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Finish injection of additional authenticated data into EAX.
+ *
+ * This function MUST be called before beginning the actual encryption
+ * or decryption (with `br_eax_run()`), even if no additional authenticated
+ * data was injected. No additional authenticated data may be injected
+ * after this function call.
+ *
+ * \param ctx EAX context structure.
+ */
+void br_eax_flip(br_eax_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Obtain a copy of the MAC on additional authenticated data.
+ *
+ * This function may be called only after `br_eax_flip()`; it copies the
+ * AAD-specific MAC value into the provided state. The MAC value depends
+ * on the secret key and the additional data itself, but not on the
+ * nonce. The updated state `st` is meant to be used as parameter for a
+ * further `br_eax_reset_post_aad()` call.
+ *
+ * \param ctx EAX context structure.
+ * \param st captured state to update.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_eax_get_aad_mac(const br_eax_context *ctx, br_eax_state *st)
+{
+ memcpy(st->st[1], ctx->head, sizeof ctx->head);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encrypt or decrypt some data with EAX.
+ *
+ * Data encryption or decryption can be done after `br_eax_flip()`
+ * has been called on the context. If `encrypt` is non-zero, then the
+ * provided data shall be plaintext, and it is encrypted in place.
+ * Otherwise, the data shall be ciphertext, and it is decrypted in place.
+ *
+ * Data may be provided in several chunks of arbitrary length.
+ *
+ * \param ctx EAX context structure.
+ * \param encrypt non-zero for encryption, zero for decryption.
+ * \param data data to encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_eax_run(br_eax_context *ctx, int encrypt, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute EAX authentication tag.
+ *
+ * Compute the EAX authentication tag. The tag is a 16-byte value which
+ * is written in the provided `tag` buffer. This call terminates the
+ * EAX run: no data may be processed with that EAX context afterwards,
+ * until `br_eax_reset()` is called to initiate a new EAX run.
+ *
+ * The tag value must normally be sent along with the encrypted data.
+ * When decrypting, the tag value must be recomputed and compared with
+ * the received tag: if the two tag values differ, then either the tag
+ * or the encrypted data was altered in transit. As an alternative to
+ * this function, the `br_eax_check_tag()` function can be used to
+ * compute and check the tag value.
+ *
+ * \param ctx EAX context structure.
+ * \param tag destination buffer for the tag (16 bytes).
+ */
+void br_eax_get_tag(br_eax_context *ctx, void *tag);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute and check EAX authentication tag.
+ *
+ * This function is an alternative to `br_eax_get_tag()`, normally used
+ * on the receiving end (i.e. when decrypting value). The tag value is
+ * recomputed and compared with the provided tag value. If they match, 1
+ * is returned; on mismatch, 0 is returned. A returned value of 0 means
+ * that the data or the tag was altered in transit, normally leading to
+ * wholesale rejection of the complete message.
+ *
+ * \param ctx EAX context structure.
+ * \param tag tag value to compare with (16 bytes).
+ * \return 1 on success (exact match of tag value), 0 otherwise.
+ */
+uint32_t br_eax_check_tag(br_eax_context *ctx, const void *tag);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute EAX authentication tag (with truncation).
+ *
+ * This function is similar to `br_eax_get_tag()`, except that it allows
+ * the tag to be truncated to a smaller length. The intended tag length
+ * is provided as `len` (in bytes); it MUST be no more than 16, but
+ * it may be smaller. Note that decreasing tag length mechanically makes
+ * forgeries easier; NIST SP 800-38D specifies that the tag length shall
+ * lie between 12 and 16 bytes (inclusive), but may be truncated down to
+ * 4 or 8 bytes, for specific applications that can tolerate it. It must
+ * also be noted that successful forgeries leak information on the
+ * authentication key, making subsequent forgeries easier. Therefore,
+ * tag truncation, and in particular truncation to sizes lower than 12
+ * bytes, shall be envisioned only with great care.
+ *
+ * The tag is written in the provided `tag` buffer. This call terminates
+ * the EAX run: no data may be processed with that EAX context
+ * afterwards, until `br_eax_reset()` is called to initiate a new EAX
+ * run.
+ *
+ * The tag value must normally be sent along with the encrypted data.
+ * When decrypting, the tag value must be recomputed and compared with
+ * the received tag: if the two tag values differ, then either the tag
+ * or the encrypted data was altered in transit. As an alternative to
+ * this function, the `br_eax_check_tag_trunc()` function can be used to
+ * compute and check the tag value.
+ *
+ * \param ctx EAX context structure.
+ * \param tag destination buffer for the tag.
+ * \param len tag length (16 bytes or less).
+ */
+void br_eax_get_tag_trunc(br_eax_context *ctx, void *tag, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute and check EAX authentication tag (with truncation).
+ *
+ * This function is an alternative to `br_eax_get_tag_trunc()`, normally used
+ * on the receiving end (i.e. when decrypting value). The tag value is
+ * recomputed and compared with the provided tag value. If they match, 1
+ * is returned; on mismatch, 0 is returned. A returned value of 0 means
+ * that the data or the tag was altered in transit, normally leading to
+ * wholesale rejection of the complete message.
+ *
+ * Tag length MUST be 16 bytes or less. The normal EAX tag length is 16
+ * bytes. See `br_check_tag_trunc()` for some discussion on the potential
+ * perils of truncating authentication tags.
+ *
+ * \param ctx EAX context structure.
+ * \param tag tag value to compare with.
+ * \param len tag length (in bytes).
+ * \return 1 on success (exact match of tag value), 0 otherwise.
+ */
+uint32_t br_eax_check_tag_trunc(br_eax_context *ctx,
+ const void *tag, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for EAX.
+ */
+extern const br_aead_class br_eax_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context structure for CCM.
+ *
+ * CCM is an AEAD mode that combines a block cipher in CTR mode with
+ * CBC-MAC using the same block cipher and the same key, to provide
+ * authenticated encryption:
+ *
+ * - Any block cipher with 16-byte blocks can be used with CCM
+ * (technically, other block sizes are defined as well, but this
+ * is not implemented by these functions; shorter blocks also
+ * imply numerous security issues).
+ *
+ * - The authentication tag length, and plaintext length, MUST be
+ * known when starting processing data. Plaintext and ciphertext
+ * can still be provided by chunks, but the total size must match
+ * the value provided upon initialisation.
+ *
+ * - The nonce length is constrained between 7 and 13 bytes (inclusive).
+ * Furthermore, the plaintext length, when encoded, must fit over
+ * 15-nonceLen bytes; thus, if the nonce has length 13 bytes, then
+ * the plaintext length cannot exceed 65535 bytes.
+ *
+ * - Additional authenticated data length is practically unlimited
+ * (formal limit is at 2^64 bytes).
+ *
+ * - The authentication tag has length 4 to 16 bytes (even values only).
+ *
+ * The CCM initialisation function receives as parameter an
+ * _initialised_ block cipher implementation context, with the secret
+ * key already set. A pointer to that context will be kept within the
+ * CCM context structure. It is up to the caller to allocate and
+ * initialise that block cipher context.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class **bctx;
+ unsigned char ctr[16];
+ unsigned char cbcmac[16];
+ unsigned char tagmask[16];
+ unsigned char buf[16];
+ size_t ptr;
+ size_t tag_len;
+#endif
+} br_ccm_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a CCM context.
+ *
+ * A block cipher implementation, with its initialised context
+ * structure, is provided. The block cipher MUST use 16-byte blocks in
+ * CTR + CBC-MAC mode, and its secret key MUST have been already set in
+ * the provided context. The parameters are linked in the CCM context.
+ *
+ * After this function has been called, the `br_ccm_reset()` function must
+ * be called, to provide the nonce for CCM computation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx CCM context structure.
+ * \param bctx block cipher context (already initialised with secret key).
+ */
+void br_ccm_init(br_ccm_context *ctx, const br_block_ctrcbc_class **bctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Reset a CCM context.
+ *
+ * This function resets an already initialised CCM context for a new
+ * computation run. Implementations and keys are conserved. This function
+ * can be called at any time; it cancels any ongoing CCM computation that
+ * uses the provided context structure.
+ *
+ * The `aad_len` parameter contains the total length, in bytes, of the
+ * additional authenticated data. It may be zero. That length MUST be
+ * exact.
+ *
+ * The `data_len` parameter contains the total length, in bytes, of the
+ * data that will be injected (plaintext or ciphertext). That length MUST
+ * be exact. Moreover, that length MUST be less than 2^(8*(15-nonce_len)).
+ *
+ * The nonce length (`nonce_len`), in bytes, must be in the 7..13 range
+ * (inclusive).
+ *
+ * The tag length (`tag_len`), in bytes, must be in the 4..16 range, and
+ * be an even integer. Short tags mechanically allow for higher forgery
+ * probabilities; hence, tag sizes smaller than 12 bytes shall be used only
+ * with care.
+ *
+ * It is critical to CCM security that nonce values are not repeated for
+ * the same encryption key. Random generation of nonces is not generally
+ * recommended, due to the relatively small maximum nonce value.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 on success, 0 on error. An error is reported if
+ * the tag or nonce length is out of range, or if the
+ * plaintext/ciphertext length cannot be encoded with the specified
+ * nonce length.
+ *
+ * \param ctx CCM context structure.
+ * \param nonce CCM nonce to use.
+ * \param nonce_len CCM nonce length (in bytes, 7 to 13).
+ * \param aad_len additional authenticated data length (in bytes).
+ * \param data_len plaintext/ciphertext length (in bytes).
+ * \param tag_len tag length (in bytes).
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+int br_ccm_reset(br_ccm_context *ctx, const void *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+ uint64_t aad_len, uint64_t data_len, size_t tag_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Inject additional authenticated data into CCM.
+ *
+ * The provided data is injected into a running CCM computation. Additional
+ * data must be injected _before_ the call to `br_ccm_flip()`.
+ * Additional data can be injected in several chunks of arbitrary length,
+ * but the total amount MUST exactly match the value which was provided
+ * to `br_ccm_reset()`.
+ *
+ * \param ctx CCM context structure.
+ * \param data pointer to additional authenticated data.
+ * \param len length of additional authenticated data (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_ccm_aad_inject(br_ccm_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Finish injection of additional authenticated data into CCM.
+ *
+ * This function MUST be called before beginning the actual encryption
+ * or decryption (with `br_ccm_run()`), even if no additional authenticated
+ * data was injected. No additional authenticated data may be injected
+ * after this function call.
+ *
+ * \param ctx CCM context structure.
+ */
+void br_ccm_flip(br_ccm_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encrypt or decrypt some data with CCM.
+ *
+ * Data encryption or decryption can be done after `br_ccm_flip()`
+ * has been called on the context. If `encrypt` is non-zero, then the
+ * provided data shall be plaintext, and it is encrypted in place.
+ * Otherwise, the data shall be ciphertext, and it is decrypted in place.
+ *
+ * Data may be provided in several chunks of arbitrary length, provided
+ * that the total length exactly matches the length provided to the
+ * `br_ccm_reset()` call.
+ *
+ * \param ctx CCM context structure.
+ * \param encrypt non-zero for encryption, zero for decryption.
+ * \param data data to encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_ccm_run(br_ccm_context *ctx, int encrypt, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute CCM authentication tag.
+ *
+ * Compute the CCM authentication tag. This call terminates the CCM
+ * run: all data must have been injected with `br_ccm_run()` (in zero,
+ * one or more successive calls). After this function has been called,
+ * no more data can br processed; a `br_ccm_reset()` call is required
+ * to start a new message.
+ *
+ * The tag length was provided upon context initialisation (last call
+ * to `br_ccm_reset()`); it is returned by this function.
+ *
+ * The tag value must normally be sent along with the encrypted data.
+ * When decrypting, the tag value must be recomputed and compared with
+ * the received tag: if the two tag values differ, then either the tag
+ * or the encrypted data was altered in transit. As an alternative to
+ * this function, the `br_ccm_check_tag()` function can be used to
+ * compute and check the tag value.
+ *
+ * \param ctx CCM context structure.
+ * \param tag destination buffer for the tag (up to 16 bytes).
+ * \return the tag length (in bytes).
+ */
+size_t br_ccm_get_tag(br_ccm_context *ctx, void *tag);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute and check CCM authentication tag.
+ *
+ * This function is an alternative to `br_ccm_get_tag()`, normally used
+ * on the receiving end (i.e. when decrypting value). The tag value is
+ * recomputed and compared with the provided tag value. If they match, 1
+ * is returned; on mismatch, 0 is returned. A returned value of 0 means
+ * that the data or the tag was altered in transit, normally leading to
+ * wholesale rejection of the complete message.
+ *
+ * \param ctx CCM context structure.
+ * \param tag tag value to compare with (up to 16 bytes).
+ * \return 1 on success (exact match of tag value), 0 otherwise.
+ */
+uint32_t br_ccm_check_tag(br_ccm_context *ctx, const void *tag);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_block.h b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_block.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..683a490
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_block.h
@@ -0,0 +1,2618 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BR_BEARSSL_BLOCK_H__
+#define BR_BEARSSL_BLOCK_H__
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** \file bearssl_block.h
+ *
+ * # Block Ciphers and Symmetric Ciphers
+ *
+ * This file documents the API for block ciphers and other symmetric
+ * ciphers.
+ *
+ *
+ * ## Procedural API
+ *
+ * For a block cipher implementation, up to three separate sets of
+ * functions are provided, for CBC encryption, CBC decryption, and CTR
+ * encryption/decryption. Each set has its own context structure,
+ * initialised with the encryption key.
+ *
+ * For CBC encryption and decryption, the data to encrypt or decrypt is
+ * referenced as a sequence of blocks. The implementations assume that
+ * there is no partial block; no padding is applied or removed. The
+ * caller is responsible for handling any kind of padding.
+ *
+ * Function for CTR encryption are defined only for block ciphers with
+ * blocks of 16 bytes or more (i.e. AES, but not DES/3DES).
+ *
+ * Each implemented block cipher is identified by an "internal name"
+ * from which are derived the names of structures and functions that
+ * implement the cipher. For the block cipher of internal name "`xxx`",
+ * the following are defined:
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_BLOCK_SIZE`
+ *
+ * A macro that evaluates to the block size (in bytes) of the
+ * cipher. For all implemented block ciphers, this value is a
+ * power of two.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_cbcenc_keys`
+ *
+ * Context structure that contains the subkeys resulting from the key
+ * expansion. These subkeys are appropriate for CBC encryption. The
+ * structure first field is called `vtable` and points to the
+ * appropriate OOP structure.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_cbcenc_init(br_xxx_cbcenc_keys *ctx, const void *key, size_t len)`
+ *
+ * Perform key expansion: subkeys for CBC encryption are computed and
+ * written in the provided context structure. The key length MUST be
+ * adequate for the implemented block cipher. This function also sets
+ * the `vtable` field.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_cbcenc_run(const br_xxx_cbcenc_keys *ctx, void *iv, void *data, size_t len)`
+ *
+ * Perform CBC encryption of `len` bytes, in place. The encrypted data
+ * replaces the cleartext. `len` MUST be a multiple of the block length
+ * (if it is not, the function may loop forever or overflow a buffer).
+ * The IV is provided with the `iv` pointer; it is also updated with
+ * a copy of the last encrypted block.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_cbcdec_keys`
+ *
+ * Context structure that contains the subkeys resulting from the key
+ * expansion. These subkeys are appropriate for CBC decryption. The
+ * structure first field is called `vtable` and points to the
+ * appropriate OOP structure.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_cbcdec_init(br_xxx_cbcenc_keys *ctx, const void *key, size_t len)`
+ *
+ * Perform key expansion: subkeys for CBC decryption are computed and
+ * written in the provided context structure. The key length MUST be
+ * adequate for the implemented block cipher. This function also sets
+ * the `vtable` field.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_cbcdec_run(const br_xxx_cbcdec_keys *ctx, void *iv, void *data, size_t num_blocks)`
+ *
+ * Perform CBC decryption of `len` bytes, in place. The decrypted data
+ * replaces the ciphertext. `len` MUST be a multiple of the block length
+ * (if it is not, the function may loop forever or overflow a buffer).
+ * The IV is provided with the `iv` pointer; it is also updated with
+ * a copy of the last _encrypted_ block.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_ctr_keys`
+ *
+ * Context structure that contains the subkeys resulting from the key
+ * expansion. These subkeys are appropriate for CTR encryption and
+ * decryption. The structure first field is called `vtable` and
+ * points to the appropriate OOP structure.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_ctr_init(br_xxx_ctr_keys *ctx, const void *key, size_t len)`
+ *
+ * Perform key expansion: subkeys for CTR encryption and decryption
+ * are computed and written in the provided context structure. The
+ * key length MUST be adequate for the implemented block cipher. This
+ * function also sets the `vtable` field.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_ctr_run(const br_xxx_ctr_keys *ctx, const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len)` (returns `uint32_t`)
+ *
+ * Perform CTR encryption/decryption of some data. Processing is done
+ * "in place" (the output data replaces the input data). This function
+ * implements the "standard incrementing function" from NIST SP800-38A,
+ * annex B: the IV length shall be 4 bytes less than the block size
+ * (i.e. 12 bytes for AES) and the counter is the 32-bit value starting
+ * with `cc`. The data length (`len`) is not necessarily a multiple of
+ * the block size. The new counter value is returned, which supports
+ * chunked processing, provided that each chunk length (except possibly
+ * the last one) is a multiple of the block size.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_ctrcbc_keys`
+ *
+ * Context structure that contains the subkeys resulting from the
+ * key expansion. These subkeys are appropriate for doing combined
+ * CTR encryption/decryption and CBC-MAC, as used in the CCM and EAX
+ * authenticated encryption modes. The structure first field is
+ * called `vtable` and points to the appropriate OOP structure.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_ctrcbc_init(br_xxx_ctr_keys *ctx, const void *key, size_t len)`
+ *
+ * Perform key expansion: subkeys for combined CTR
+ * encryption/decryption and CBC-MAC are computed and written in the
+ * provided context structure. The key length MUST be adequate for
+ * the implemented block cipher. This function also sets the
+ * `vtable` field.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_ctrcbc_encrypt(const br_xxx_ctrcbc_keys *ctx, void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len)`
+ *
+ * Perform CTR encryption of some data, and CBC-MAC. Processing is
+ * done "in place" (the output data replaces the input data). This
+ * function applies CTR encryption on the data, using a full
+ * block-size counter (i.e. for 128-bit blocks, the counter is
+ * incremented as a 128-bit value). The 'ctr' array contains the
+ * initial value for the counter (used in the first block) and it is
+ * updated with the new value after data processing. The 'cbcmac'
+ * value shall point to a block-sized value which is used as IV for
+ * CBC-MAC, computed over the encrypted data (output of CTR
+ * encryption); the resulting CBC-MAC is written over 'cbcmac' on
+ * output.
+ *
+ * The data length MUST be a multiple of the block size.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_ctrcbc_decrypt(const br_xxx_ctrcbc_keys *ctx, void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len)`
+ *
+ * Perform CTR decryption of some data, and CBC-MAC. Processing is
+ * done "in place" (the output data replaces the input data). This
+ * function applies CTR decryption on the data, using a full
+ * block-size counter (i.e. for 128-bit blocks, the counter is
+ * incremented as a 128-bit value). The 'ctr' array contains the
+ * initial value for the counter (used in the first block) and it is
+ * updated with the new value after data processing. The 'cbcmac'
+ * value shall point to a block-sized value which is used as IV for
+ * CBC-MAC, computed over the encrypted data (input of CTR
+ * encryption); the resulting CBC-MAC is written over 'cbcmac' on
+ * output.
+ *
+ * The data length MUST be a multiple of the block size.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_ctrcbc_ctr(const br_xxx_ctrcbc_keys *ctx, void *ctr, void *data, size_t len)`
+ *
+ * Perform CTR encryption or decryption of the provided data. The
+ * data is processed "in place" (the output data replaces the input
+ * data). A full block-sized counter is applied (i.e. for 128-bit
+ * blocks, the counter is incremented as a 128-bit value). The 'ctr'
+ * array contains the initial value for the counter (used in the
+ * first block), and it is updated with the new value after data
+ * processing.
+ *
+ * The data length MUST be a multiple of the block size.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_ctrcbc_mac(const br_xxx_ctrcbc_keys *ctx, void *cbcmac, const void *data, size_t len)`
+ *
+ * Compute CBC-MAC over the provided data. The IV for CBC-MAC is
+ * provided as 'cbcmac'; the output is written over the same array.
+ * The data itself is untouched. The data length MUST be a multiple
+ * of the block size.
+ *
+ *
+ * It shall be noted that the key expansion functions return `void`. If
+ * the provided key length is not allowed, then there will be no error
+ * reporting; implementations need not validate the key length, thus an
+ * invalid key length may result in undefined behaviour (e.g. buffer
+ * overflow).
+ *
+ * Subkey structures contain no interior pointer, and no external
+ * resources are allocated upon key expansion. They can thus be
+ * discarded without any explicit deallocation.
+ *
+ *
+ * ## Object-Oriented API
+ *
+ * Each context structure begins with a field (called `vtable`) that
+ * points to an instance of a structure that references the relevant
+ * functions through pointers. Each such structure contains the
+ * following:
+ *
+ * - `context_size`
+ *
+ * The size (in bytes) of the context structure for subkeys.
+ *
+ * - `block_size`
+ *
+ * The cipher block size (in bytes).
+ *
+ * - `log_block_size`
+ *
+ * The base-2 logarithm of cipher block size (e.g. 4 for blocks
+ * of 16 bytes).
+ *
+ * - `init`
+ *
+ * Pointer to the key expansion function.
+ *
+ * - `run`
+ *
+ * Pointer to the encryption/decryption function.
+ *
+ * For combined CTR/CBC-MAC encryption, the `vtable` has a slightly
+ * different structure:
+ *
+ * - `context_size`
+ *
+ * The size (in bytes) of the context structure for subkeys.
+ *
+ * - `block_size`
+ *
+ * The cipher block size (in bytes).
+ *
+ * - `log_block_size`
+ *
+ * The base-2 logarithm of cipher block size (e.g. 4 for blocks
+ * of 16 bytes).
+ *
+ * - `init`
+ *
+ * Pointer to the key expansion function.
+ *
+ * - `encrypt`
+ *
+ * Pointer to the CTR encryption + CBC-MAC function.
+ *
+ * - `decrypt`
+ *
+ * Pointer to the CTR decryption + CBC-MAC function.
+ *
+ * - `ctr`
+ *
+ * Pointer to the CTR encryption/decryption function.
+ *
+ * - `mac`
+ *
+ * Pointer to the CBC-MAC function.
+ *
+ * For block cipher "`xxx`", static, constant instances of these
+ * structures are defined, under the names:
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_cbcenc_vtable`
+ * - `br_xxx_cbcdec_vtable`
+ * - `br_xxx_ctr_vtable`
+ * - `br_xxx_ctrcbc_vtable`
+ *
+ *
+ * ## Implemented Block Ciphers
+ *
+ * Provided implementations are:
+ *
+ * | Name | Function | Block Size (bytes) | Key lengths (bytes) |
+ * | :-------- | :------- | :----------------: | :-----------------: |
+ * | aes_big | AES | 16 | 16, 24 and 32 |
+ * | aes_small | AES | 16 | 16, 24 and 32 |
+ * | aes_ct | AES | 16 | 16, 24 and 32 |
+ * | aes_ct64 | AES | 16 | 16, 24 and 32 |
+ * | aes_x86ni | AES | 16 | 16, 24 and 32 |
+ * | aes_pwr8 | AES | 16 | 16, 24 and 32 |
+ * | des_ct | DES/3DES | 8 | 8, 16 and 24 |
+ * | des_tab | DES/3DES | 8 | 8, 16 and 24 |
+ *
+ * **Note:** DES/3DES nominally uses keys of 64, 128 and 192 bits (i.e. 8,
+ * 16 and 24 bytes), but some of the bits are ignored by the algorithm, so
+ * the _effective_ key lengths, from a security point of view, are 56,
+ * 112 and 168 bits, respectively.
+ *
+ * `aes_big` is a "classical" AES implementation, using tables. It
+ * is fast but not constant-time, since it makes data-dependent array
+ * accesses.
+ *
+ * `aes_small` is an AES implementation optimized for code size. It
+ * is substantially slower than `aes_big`; it is not constant-time
+ * either.
+ *
+ * `aes_ct` is a constant-time implementation of AES; its code is about
+ * as big as that of `aes_big`, while its performance is comparable to
+ * that of `aes_small`. However, it is constant-time. This
+ * implementation should thus be considered to be the "default" AES in
+ * BearSSL, to be used unless the operational context guarantees that a
+ * non-constant-time implementation is safe, or an architecture-specific
+ * constant-time implementation can be used (e.g. using dedicated
+ * hardware opcodes).
+ *
+ * `aes_ct64` is another constant-time implementation of AES. It is
+ * similar to `aes_ct` but uses 64-bit values. On 32-bit machines,
+ * `aes_ct64` is not faster than `aes_ct`, often a bit slower, and has
+ * a larger footprint; however, on 64-bit architectures, `aes_ct64`
+ * is typically twice faster than `aes_ct` for modes that allow parallel
+ * operations (i.e. CTR, and CBC decryption, but not CBC encryption).
+ *
+ * `aes_x86ni` exists only on x86 architectures (32-bit and 64-bit). It
+ * uses the AES-NI opcodes when available.
+ *
+ * `aes_pwr8` exists only on PowerPC / POWER architectures (32-bit and
+ * 64-bit, both little-endian and big-endian). It uses the AES opcodes
+ * present in POWER8 and later.
+ *
+ * `des_tab` is a classic, table-based implementation of DES/3DES. It
+ * is not constant-time.
+ *
+ * `des_ct` is an constant-time implementation of DES/3DES. It is
+ * substantially slower than `des_tab`.
+ *
+ * ## ChaCha20 and Poly1305
+ *
+ * ChaCha20 is a stream cipher. Poly1305 is a MAC algorithm. They
+ * are described in [RFC 7539](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7539).
+ *
+ * Two function pointer types are defined:
+ *
+ * - `br_chacha20_run` describes a function that implements ChaCha20
+ * only.
+ *
+ * - `br_poly1305_run` describes an implementation of Poly1305,
+ * in the AEAD combination with ChaCha20 specified in RFC 7539
+ * (the ChaCha20 implementation is provided as a function pointer).
+ *
+ * `chacha20_ct` is a straightforward implementation of ChaCha20 in
+ * plain C; it is constant-time, small, and reasonably fast.
+ *
+ * `chacha20_sse2` leverages SSE2 opcodes (on x86 architectures that
+ * support these opcodes). It is faster than `chacha20_ct`.
+ *
+ * `poly1305_ctmul` is an implementation of the ChaCha20+Poly1305 AEAD
+ * construction, where the Poly1305 part is performed with mixed 32-bit
+ * multiplications (operands are 32-bit, result is 64-bit).
+ *
+ * `poly1305_ctmul32` implements ChaCha20+Poly1305 using pure 32-bit
+ * multiplications (32-bit operands, 32-bit result). It is slower than
+ * `poly1305_ctmul`, except on some specific architectures such as
+ * the ARM Cortex M0+.
+ *
+ * `poly1305_ctmulq` implements ChaCha20+Poly1305 with mixed 64-bit
+ * multiplications (operands are 64-bit, result is 128-bit) on 64-bit
+ * platforms that support such operations.
+ *
+ * `poly1305_i15` implements ChaCha20+Poly1305 with the generic "i15"
+ * big integer implementation. It is meant mostly for testing purposes,
+ * although it can help with saving a few hundred bytes of code footprint
+ * on systems where code size is scarce.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class type for CBC encryption implementations.
+ *
+ * A `br_block_cbcenc_class` instance points to the functions implementing
+ * a specific block cipher, when used in CBC mode for encrypting data.
+ */
+typedef struct br_block_cbcenc_class_ br_block_cbcenc_class;
+struct br_block_cbcenc_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Size (in bytes) of the context structure appropriate
+ * for containing subkeys.
+ */
+ size_t context_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Size of individual blocks (in bytes).
+ */
+ unsigned block_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Base-2 logarithm of the size of individual blocks,
+ * expressed in bytes.
+ */
+ unsigned log_block_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Initialisation function.
+ *
+ * This function sets the `vtable` field in the context structure.
+ * The key length MUST be one of the key lengths supported by
+ * the implementation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context structure to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param key_len key length (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*init)(const br_block_cbcenc_class **ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Run the CBC encryption.
+ *
+ * The `iv` parameter points to the IV for this run; it is
+ * updated with a copy of the last encrypted block. The data
+ * is encrypted "in place"; its length (`len`) MUST be a
+ * multiple of the block size.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context structure (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV for CBC encryption (updated).
+ * \param data data to encrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, multiple of block size).
+ */
+ void (*run)(const br_block_cbcenc_class *const *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class type for CBC decryption implementations.
+ *
+ * A `br_block_cbcdec_class` instance points to the functions implementing
+ * a specific block cipher, when used in CBC mode for decrypting data.
+ */
+typedef struct br_block_cbcdec_class_ br_block_cbcdec_class;
+struct br_block_cbcdec_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Size (in bytes) of the context structure appropriate
+ * for containing subkeys.
+ */
+ size_t context_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Size of individual blocks (in bytes).
+ */
+ unsigned block_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Base-2 logarithm of the size of individual blocks,
+ * expressed in bytes.
+ */
+ unsigned log_block_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Initialisation function.
+ *
+ * This function sets the `vtable` field in the context structure.
+ * The key length MUST be one of the key lengths supported by
+ * the implementation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context structure to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param key_len key length (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*init)(const br_block_cbcdec_class **ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Run the CBC decryption.
+ *
+ * The `iv` parameter points to the IV for this run; it is
+ * updated with a copy of the last encrypted block. The data
+ * is decrypted "in place"; its length (`len`) MUST be a
+ * multiple of the block size.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context structure (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV for CBC decryption (updated).
+ * \param data data to decrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, multiple of block size).
+ */
+ void (*run)(const br_block_cbcdec_class *const *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class type for CTR encryption/decryption implementations.
+ *
+ * A `br_block_ctr_class` instance points to the functions implementing
+ * a specific block cipher, when used in CTR mode for encrypting or
+ * decrypting data.
+ */
+typedef struct br_block_ctr_class_ br_block_ctr_class;
+struct br_block_ctr_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Size (in bytes) of the context structure appropriate
+ * for containing subkeys.
+ */
+ size_t context_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Size of individual blocks (in bytes).
+ */
+ unsigned block_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Base-2 logarithm of the size of individual blocks,
+ * expressed in bytes.
+ */
+ unsigned log_block_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Initialisation function.
+ *
+ * This function sets the `vtable` field in the context structure.
+ * The key length MUST be one of the key lengths supported by
+ * the implementation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context structure to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param key_len key length (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*init)(const br_block_ctr_class **ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Run the CTR encryption or decryption.
+ *
+ * The `iv` parameter points to the IV for this run; its
+ * length is exactly 4 bytes less than the block size (e.g.
+ * 12 bytes for AES/CTR). The IV is combined with a 32-bit
+ * block counter to produce the block value which is processed
+ * with the block cipher.
+ *
+ * The data to encrypt or decrypt is updated "in place". Its
+ * length (`len` bytes) is not required to be a multiple of
+ * the block size; if the final block is partial, then the
+ * corresponding key stream bits are dropped.
+ *
+ * The resulting counter value is returned.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context structure (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV for CTR encryption/decryption.
+ * \param cc initial value for the block counter.
+ * \param data data to encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ * \return the new block counter value.
+ */
+ uint32_t (*run)(const br_block_ctr_class *const *ctx,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class type for combined CTR and CBC-MAC implementations.
+ *
+ * A `br_block_ctrcbc_class` instance points to the functions implementing
+ * a specific block cipher, when used in CTR mode for encrypting or
+ * decrypting data, along with CBC-MAC.
+ */
+typedef struct br_block_ctrcbc_class_ br_block_ctrcbc_class;
+struct br_block_ctrcbc_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Size (in bytes) of the context structure appropriate
+ * for containing subkeys.
+ */
+ size_t context_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Size of individual blocks (in bytes).
+ */
+ unsigned block_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Base-2 logarithm of the size of individual blocks,
+ * expressed in bytes.
+ */
+ unsigned log_block_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Initialisation function.
+ *
+ * This function sets the `vtable` field in the context structure.
+ * The key length MUST be one of the key lengths supported by
+ * the implementation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context structure to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param key_len key length (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*init)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class **ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Run the CTR encryption + CBC-MAC.
+ *
+ * The `ctr` parameter points to the counter; its length shall
+ * be equal to the block size. It is updated by this function
+ * as encryption proceeds.
+ *
+ * The `cbcmac` parameter points to the IV for CBC-MAC. The MAC
+ * is computed over the encrypted data (output of CTR
+ * encryption). Its length shall be equal to the block size. The
+ * computed CBC-MAC value is written over the `cbcmac` array.
+ *
+ * The data to encrypt is updated "in place". Its length (`len`
+ * bytes) MUST be a multiple of the block size.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context structure (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR encryption (initial and final).
+ * \param cbcmac IV and output buffer for CBC-MAC.
+ * \param data data to encrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*encrypt)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Run the CTR decryption + CBC-MAC.
+ *
+ * The `ctr` parameter points to the counter; its length shall
+ * be equal to the block size. It is updated by this function
+ * as decryption proceeds.
+ *
+ * The `cbcmac` parameter points to the IV for CBC-MAC. The MAC
+ * is computed over the encrypted data (i.e. before CTR
+ * decryption). Its length shall be equal to the block size. The
+ * computed CBC-MAC value is written over the `cbcmac` array.
+ *
+ * The data to decrypt is updated "in place". Its length (`len`
+ * bytes) MUST be a multiple of the block size.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context structure (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR encryption (initial and final).
+ * \param cbcmac IV and output buffer for CBC-MAC.
+ * \param data data to decrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*decrypt)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Run the CTR encryption/decryption only.
+ *
+ * The `ctr` parameter points to the counter; its length shall
+ * be equal to the block size. It is updated by this function
+ * as decryption proceeds.
+ *
+ * The data to decrypt is updated "in place". Its length (`len`
+ * bytes) MUST be a multiple of the block size.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context structure (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR encryption (initial and final).
+ * \param data data to decrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*ctr)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *data, size_t len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Run the CBC-MAC only.
+ *
+ * The `cbcmac` parameter points to the IV for CBC-MAC. The MAC
+ * is computed over the encrypted data (i.e. before CTR
+ * decryption). Its length shall be equal to the block size. The
+ * computed CBC-MAC value is written over the `cbcmac` array.
+ *
+ * The data is unmodified. Its length (`len` bytes) MUST be a
+ * multiple of the block size.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context structure (already initialised).
+ * \param cbcmac IV and output buffer for CBC-MAC.
+ * \param data data to decrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*mac)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *ctx,
+ void *cbcmac, const void *data, size_t len);
+};
+
+/*
+ * Traditional, table-based AES implementation. It is fast, but uses
+ * internal tables (in particular a 1 kB table for encryption, another
+ * 1 kB table for decryption, and a 256-byte table for key schedule),
+ * and it is not constant-time. In contexts where cache-timing attacks
+ * apply, this implementation may leak the secret key.
+ */
+
+/** \brief AES block size (16 bytes). */
+#define br_aes_big_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_big` implementation, CBC encryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint32_t skey[60];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_big_cbcenc_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_big` implementation, CBC decryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint32_t skey[60];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_big_cbcdec_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_big` implementation, CTR encryption
+ * and decryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_ctr_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint32_t skey[60];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_big_ctr_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_big` implementation, CTR encryption
+ * and decryption + CBC-MAC).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint32_t skey[60];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_big_ctrcbc_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CBC encryption (`aes_big` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_cbcenc_class br_aes_big_cbcenc_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CBC decryption (`aes_big` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_cbcdec_class br_aes_big_cbcdec_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CTR encryption and decryption
+ * (`aes_big` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_ctr_class br_aes_big_ctr_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CTR encryption/decryption + CBC-MAC
+ * (`aes_big` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_ctrcbc_class br_aes_big_ctrcbc_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CBC encryption
+ * (`aes_big` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_big_cbcenc_init(br_aes_big_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CBC decryption
+ * (`aes_big` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_big_cbcdec_init(br_aes_big_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CTR encryption
+ * and decryption (`aes_big` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_big_ctr_init(br_aes_big_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CTR + CBC-MAC
+ * (`aes_big` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_big_ctrcbc_init(br_aes_big_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC encryption with AES (`aes_big` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (updated).
+ * \param data data to encrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_big_cbcenc_run(const br_aes_big_cbcenc_keys *ctx, void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC decryption with AES (`aes_big` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (updated).
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_big_cbcdec_run(const br_aes_big_cbcdec_keys *ctx, void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption and decryption with AES (`aes_big` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (constant, 12 bytes).
+ * \param cc initial block counter value.
+ * \param data data to encrypt or decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ * \return new block counter value.
+ */
+uint32_t br_aes_big_ctr_run(const br_aes_big_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption + CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_big` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to encrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_big_ctrcbc_encrypt(const br_aes_big_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR decryption + CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_big` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_big_ctrcbc_decrypt(const br_aes_big_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption/decryption with AES (`aes_big` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param data data to MAC (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_big_ctrcbc_ctr(const br_aes_big_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_big` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to MAC (unmodified).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_big_ctrcbc_mac(const br_aes_big_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *cbcmac, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * AES implementation optimized for size. It is slower than the
+ * traditional table-based AES implementation, but requires much less
+ * code. It still uses data-dependent table accesses (albeit within a
+ * much smaller 256-byte table), which makes it conceptually vulnerable
+ * to cache-timing attacks.
+ */
+
+/** \brief AES block size (16 bytes). */
+#define br_aes_small_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_small` implementation, CBC encryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint32_t skey[60];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_small_cbcenc_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_small` implementation, CBC decryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint32_t skey[60];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_small_cbcdec_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_small` implementation, CTR encryption
+ * and decryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_ctr_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint32_t skey[60];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_small_ctr_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_small` implementation, CTR encryption
+ * and decryption + CBC-MAC).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint32_t skey[60];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_small_ctrcbc_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CBC encryption (`aes_small` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_cbcenc_class br_aes_small_cbcenc_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CBC decryption (`aes_small` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_cbcdec_class br_aes_small_cbcdec_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CTR encryption and decryption
+ * (`aes_small` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_ctr_class br_aes_small_ctr_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CTR encryption/decryption + CBC-MAC
+ * (`aes_small` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_ctrcbc_class br_aes_small_ctrcbc_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CBC encryption
+ * (`aes_small` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_small_cbcenc_init(br_aes_small_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CBC decryption
+ * (`aes_small` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_small_cbcdec_init(br_aes_small_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CTR encryption
+ * and decryption (`aes_small` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_small_ctr_init(br_aes_small_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CTR + CBC-MAC
+ * (`aes_small` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_small_ctrcbc_init(br_aes_small_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC encryption with AES (`aes_small` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (updated).
+ * \param data data to encrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_small_cbcenc_run(const br_aes_small_cbcenc_keys *ctx, void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC decryption with AES (`aes_small` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (updated).
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_small_cbcdec_run(const br_aes_small_cbcdec_keys *ctx, void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption and decryption with AES (`aes_small` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (constant, 12 bytes).
+ * \param cc initial block counter value.
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ * \return new block counter value.
+ */
+uint32_t br_aes_small_ctr_run(const br_aes_small_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption + CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_small` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to encrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_small_ctrcbc_encrypt(const br_aes_small_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR decryption + CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_small` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_small_ctrcbc_decrypt(const br_aes_small_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption/decryption with AES (`aes_small` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param data data to MAC (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_small_ctrcbc_ctr(const br_aes_small_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_small` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to MAC (unmodified).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_small_ctrcbc_mac(const br_aes_small_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *cbcmac, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Constant-time AES implementation. Its size is similar to that of
+ * 'aes_big', and its performance is similar to that of 'aes_small' (faster
+ * decryption, slower encryption). However, it is constant-time, i.e.
+ * immune to cache-timing and similar attacks.
+ */
+
+/** \brief AES block size (16 bytes). */
+#define br_aes_ct_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_ct` implementation, CBC encryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint32_t skey[60];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_ct_cbcenc_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_ct` implementation, CBC decryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint32_t skey[60];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_ct_cbcdec_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_ct` implementation, CTR encryption
+ * and decryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_ctr_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint32_t skey[60];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_ct_ctr_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_ct` implementation, CTR encryption
+ * and decryption + CBC-MAC).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint32_t skey[60];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CBC encryption (`aes_ct` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_cbcenc_class br_aes_ct_cbcenc_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CBC decryption (`aes_ct` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_cbcdec_class br_aes_ct_cbcdec_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CTR encryption and decryption
+ * (`aes_ct` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_ctr_class br_aes_ct_ctr_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CTR encryption/decryption + CBC-MAC
+ * (`aes_ct` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_ctrcbc_class br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CBC encryption
+ * (`aes_ct` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct_cbcenc_init(br_aes_ct_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CBC decryption
+ * (`aes_ct` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct_cbcdec_init(br_aes_ct_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CTR encryption
+ * and decryption (`aes_ct` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct_ctr_init(br_aes_ct_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CTR + CBC-MAC
+ * (`aes_ct` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_init(br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC encryption with AES (`aes_ct` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (updated).
+ * \param data data to encrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct_cbcenc_run(const br_aes_ct_cbcenc_keys *ctx, void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC decryption with AES (`aes_ct` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (updated).
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct_cbcdec_run(const br_aes_ct_cbcdec_keys *ctx, void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption and decryption with AES (`aes_ct` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (constant, 12 bytes).
+ * \param cc initial block counter value.
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ * \return new block counter value.
+ */
+uint32_t br_aes_ct_ctr_run(const br_aes_ct_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption + CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_ct` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to encrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_encrypt(const br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR decryption + CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_ct` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_decrypt(const br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption/decryption with AES (`aes_ct` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param data data to MAC (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_ctr(const br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_ct` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to MAC (unmodified).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_mac(const br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *cbcmac, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * 64-bit constant-time AES implementation. It is similar to 'aes_ct'
+ * but uses 64-bit registers, making it about twice faster than 'aes_ct'
+ * on 64-bit platforms, while remaining constant-time and with a similar
+ * code size. (The doubling in performance is only for CBC decryption
+ * and CTR mode; CBC encryption is non-parallel and cannot benefit from
+ * the larger registers.)
+ */
+
+/** \brief AES block size (16 bytes). */
+#define br_aes_ct64_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_ct64` implementation, CBC encryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint64_t skey[30];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_ct64` implementation, CBC decryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint64_t skey[30];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_ct64` implementation, CTR encryption
+ * and decryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_ctr_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint64_t skey[30];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_ct64_ctr_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_ct64` implementation, CTR encryption
+ * and decryption + CBC-MAC).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint64_t skey[30];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CBC encryption (`aes_ct64` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_cbcenc_class br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CBC decryption (`aes_ct64` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_cbcdec_class br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CTR encryption and decryption
+ * (`aes_ct64` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_ctr_class br_aes_ct64_ctr_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CTR encryption/decryption + CBC-MAC
+ * (`aes_ct64` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_ctrcbc_class br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CBC encryption
+ * (`aes_ct64` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_init(br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CBC decryption
+ * (`aes_ct64` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_init(br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CTR encryption
+ * and decryption (`aes_ct64` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_ctr_init(br_aes_ct64_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CTR + CBC-MAC
+ * (`aes_ct64` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_init(br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC encryption with AES (`aes_ct64` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (updated).
+ * \param data data to encrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_run(const br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_keys *ctx, void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC decryption with AES (`aes_ct64` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (updated).
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_run(const br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_keys *ctx, void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption and decryption with AES (`aes_ct64` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (constant, 12 bytes).
+ * \param cc initial block counter value.
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ * \return new block counter value.
+ */
+uint32_t br_aes_ct64_ctr_run(const br_aes_ct64_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption + CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_ct64` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to encrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_encrypt(const br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR decryption + CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_ct64` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_decrypt(const br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption/decryption with AES (`aes_ct64` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param data data to MAC (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_ctr(const br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_ct64` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to MAC (unmodified).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_mac(const br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *cbcmac, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * AES implementation using AES-NI opcodes (x86 platform).
+ */
+
+/** \brief AES block size (16 bytes). */
+#define br_aes_x86ni_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_x86ni` implementation, CBC encryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ union {
+ unsigned char skni[16 * 15];
+ } skey;
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_x86ni` implementation, CBC decryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ union {
+ unsigned char skni[16 * 15];
+ } skey;
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_x86ni` implementation, CTR encryption
+ * and decryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_ctr_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ union {
+ unsigned char skni[16 * 15];
+ } skey;
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_x86ni_ctr_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_x86ni` implementation, CTR encryption
+ * and decryption + CBC-MAC).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ union {
+ unsigned char skni[16 * 15];
+ } skey;
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CBC encryption (`aes_x86ni` implementation).
+ *
+ * Since this implementation might be omitted from the library, or the
+ * AES opcode unavailable on the current CPU, a pointer to this class
+ * instance should be obtained through `br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_get_vtable()`.
+ */
+extern const br_block_cbcenc_class br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CBC decryption (`aes_x86ni` implementation).
+ *
+ * Since this implementation might be omitted from the library, or the
+ * AES opcode unavailable on the current CPU, a pointer to this class
+ * instance should be obtained through `br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_get_vtable()`.
+ */
+extern const br_block_cbcdec_class br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CTR encryption and decryption
+ * (`aes_x86ni` implementation).
+ *
+ * Since this implementation might be omitted from the library, or the
+ * AES opcode unavailable on the current CPU, a pointer to this class
+ * instance should be obtained through `br_aes_x86ni_ctr_get_vtable()`.
+ */
+extern const br_block_ctr_class br_aes_x86ni_ctr_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CTR encryption/decryption + CBC-MAC
+ * (`aes_x86ni` implementation).
+ *
+ * Since this implementation might be omitted from the library, or the
+ * AES opcode unavailable on the current CPU, a pointer to this class
+ * instance should be obtained through `br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_get_vtable()`.
+ */
+extern const br_block_ctrcbc_class br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CBC encryption
+ * (`aes_x86ni` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_init(br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CBC decryption
+ * (`aes_x86ni` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_init(br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CTR encryption
+ * and decryption (`aes_x86ni` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_x86ni_ctr_init(br_aes_x86ni_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CTR + CBC-MAC
+ * (`aes_x86ni` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_init(br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC encryption with AES (`aes_x86ni` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (updated).
+ * \param data data to encrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_run(const br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_keys *ctx, void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC decryption with AES (`aes_x86ni` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (updated).
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_run(const br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_keys *ctx, void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption and decryption with AES (`aes_x86ni` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (constant, 12 bytes).
+ * \param cc initial block counter value.
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ * \return new block counter value.
+ */
+uint32_t br_aes_x86ni_ctr_run(const br_aes_x86ni_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption + CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_x86ni` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to encrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_encrypt(const br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR decryption + CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_x86ni` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_decrypt(const br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption/decryption with AES (`aes_x86ni` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param data data to MAC (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_ctr(const br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_x86ni` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to MAC (unmodified).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_mac(const br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *cbcmac, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Obtain the `aes_x86ni` AES-CBC (encryption) implementation, if
+ * available.
+ *
+ * This function returns a pointer to `br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_vtable`, if
+ * that implementation was compiled in the library _and_ the x86 AES
+ * opcodes are available on the currently running CPU. If either of
+ * these conditions is not met, then this function returns `NULL`.
+ *
+ * \return the `aes_x86ni` AES-CBC (encryption) implementation, or `NULL`.
+ */
+const br_block_cbcenc_class *br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_get_vtable(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Obtain the `aes_x86ni` AES-CBC (decryption) implementation, if
+ * available.
+ *
+ * This function returns a pointer to `br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_vtable`, if
+ * that implementation was compiled in the library _and_ the x86 AES
+ * opcodes are available on the currently running CPU. If either of
+ * these conditions is not met, then this function returns `NULL`.
+ *
+ * \return the `aes_x86ni` AES-CBC (decryption) implementation, or `NULL`.
+ */
+const br_block_cbcdec_class *br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_get_vtable(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Obtain the `aes_x86ni` AES-CTR implementation, if available.
+ *
+ * This function returns a pointer to `br_aes_x86ni_ctr_vtable`, if
+ * that implementation was compiled in the library _and_ the x86 AES
+ * opcodes are available on the currently running CPU. If either of
+ * these conditions is not met, then this function returns `NULL`.
+ *
+ * \return the `aes_x86ni` AES-CTR implementation, or `NULL`.
+ */
+const br_block_ctr_class *br_aes_x86ni_ctr_get_vtable(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Obtain the `aes_x86ni` AES-CTR + CBC-MAC implementation, if
+ * available.
+ *
+ * This function returns a pointer to `br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_vtable`, if
+ * that implementation was compiled in the library _and_ the x86 AES
+ * opcodes are available on the currently running CPU. If either of
+ * these conditions is not met, then this function returns `NULL`.
+ *
+ * \return the `aes_x86ni` AES-CTR implementation, or `NULL`.
+ */
+const br_block_ctrcbc_class *br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_get_vtable(void);
+
+/*
+ * AES implementation using POWER8 opcodes.
+ */
+
+/** \brief AES block size (16 bytes). */
+#define br_aes_pwr8_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_pwr8` implementation, CBC encryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ union {
+ unsigned char skni[16 * 15];
+ } skey;
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_pwr8` implementation, CBC decryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ union {
+ unsigned char skni[16 * 15];
+ } skey;
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_pwr8` implementation, CTR encryption
+ * and decryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_ctr_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ union {
+ unsigned char skni[16 * 15];
+ } skey;
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_pwr8_ctr_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AES subkeys (`aes_pwr8` implementation, CTR encryption
+ * and decryption + CBC-MAC).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ union {
+ unsigned char skni[16 * 15];
+ } skey;
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CBC encryption (`aes_pwr8` implementation).
+ *
+ * Since this implementation might be omitted from the library, or the
+ * AES opcode unavailable on the current CPU, a pointer to this class
+ * instance should be obtained through `br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_get_vtable()`.
+ */
+extern const br_block_cbcenc_class br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CBC decryption (`aes_pwr8` implementation).
+ *
+ * Since this implementation might be omitted from the library, or the
+ * AES opcode unavailable on the current CPU, a pointer to this class
+ * instance should be obtained through `br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_get_vtable()`.
+ */
+extern const br_block_cbcdec_class br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CTR encryption and decryption
+ * (`aes_pwr8` implementation).
+ *
+ * Since this implementation might be omitted from the library, or the
+ * AES opcode unavailable on the current CPU, a pointer to this class
+ * instance should be obtained through `br_aes_pwr8_ctr_get_vtable()`.
+ */
+extern const br_block_ctr_class br_aes_pwr8_ctr_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for AES CTR encryption/decryption + CBC-MAC
+ * (`aes_pwr8` implementation).
+ *
+ * Since this implementation might be omitted from the library, or the
+ * AES opcode unavailable on the current CPU, a pointer to this class
+ * instance should be obtained through `br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_get_vtable()`.
+ */
+extern const br_block_ctrcbc_class br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CBC encryption
+ * (`aes_pwr8` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_init(br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CBC decryption
+ * (`aes_pwr8` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_init(br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CTR encryption
+ * and decryption (`aes_pwr8` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_pwr8_ctr_init(br_aes_pwr8_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for AES CTR + CBC-MAC
+ * (`aes_pwr8` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_init(br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC encryption with AES (`aes_pwr8` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (updated).
+ * \param data data to encrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_run(const br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_keys *ctx, void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC decryption with AES (`aes_pwr8` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (updated).
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_run(const br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_keys *ctx, void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption and decryption with AES (`aes_pwr8` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (constant, 12 bytes).
+ * \param cc initial block counter value.
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ * \return new block counter value.
+ */
+uint32_t br_aes_pwr8_ctr_run(const br_aes_pwr8_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption + CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_pwr8` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to encrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_encrypt(const br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR decryption + CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_pwr8` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_decrypt(const br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CTR encryption/decryption with AES (`aes_pwr8` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param ctr counter for CTR (16 bytes, updated).
+ * \param data data to MAC (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_ctr(const br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC-MAC with AES (`aes_pwr8` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param cbcmac IV for CBC-MAC (updated).
+ * \param data data to MAC (unmodified).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be a multiple of 16).
+ */
+void br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_mac(const br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *cbcmac, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Obtain the `aes_pwr8` AES-CBC (encryption) implementation, if
+ * available.
+ *
+ * This function returns a pointer to `br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_vtable`, if
+ * that implementation was compiled in the library _and_ the POWER8
+ * crypto opcodes are available on the currently running CPU. If either
+ * of these conditions is not met, then this function returns `NULL`.
+ *
+ * \return the `aes_pwr8` AES-CBC (encryption) implementation, or `NULL`.
+ */
+const br_block_cbcenc_class *br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_get_vtable(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Obtain the `aes_pwr8` AES-CBC (decryption) implementation, if
+ * available.
+ *
+ * This function returns a pointer to `br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_vtable`, if
+ * that implementation was compiled in the library _and_ the POWER8
+ * crypto opcodes are available on the currently running CPU. If either
+ * of these conditions is not met, then this function returns `NULL`.
+ *
+ * \return the `aes_pwr8` AES-CBC (decryption) implementation, or `NULL`.
+ */
+const br_block_cbcdec_class *br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_get_vtable(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Obtain the `aes_pwr8` AES-CTR implementation, if available.
+ *
+ * This function returns a pointer to `br_aes_pwr8_ctr_vtable`, if that
+ * implementation was compiled in the library _and_ the POWER8 crypto
+ * opcodes are available on the currently running CPU. If either of
+ * these conditions is not met, then this function returns `NULL`.
+ *
+ * \return the `aes_pwr8` AES-CTR implementation, or `NULL`.
+ */
+const br_block_ctr_class *br_aes_pwr8_ctr_get_vtable(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Obtain the `aes_pwr8` AES-CTR + CBC-MAC implementation, if
+ * available.
+ *
+ * This function returns a pointer to `br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_vtable`, if
+ * that implementation was compiled in the library _and_ the POWER8 AES
+ * opcodes are available on the currently running CPU. If either of
+ * these conditions is not met, then this function returns `NULL`.
+ *
+ * \return the `aes_pwr8` AES-CTR implementation, or `NULL`.
+ */
+const br_block_ctrcbc_class *br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_get_vtable(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Aggregate structure large enough to be used as context for
+ * subkeys (CBC encryption) for all AES implementations.
+ */
+typedef union {
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *vtable;
+ br_aes_big_cbcenc_keys c_big;
+ br_aes_small_cbcenc_keys c_small;
+ br_aes_ct_cbcenc_keys c_ct;
+ br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_keys c_ct64;
+ br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_keys c_x86ni;
+ br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_keys c_pwr8;
+} br_aes_gen_cbcenc_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Aggregate structure large enough to be used as context for
+ * subkeys (CBC decryption) for all AES implementations.
+ */
+typedef union {
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *vtable;
+ br_aes_big_cbcdec_keys c_big;
+ br_aes_small_cbcdec_keys c_small;
+ br_aes_ct_cbcdec_keys c_ct;
+ br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_keys c_ct64;
+ br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_keys c_x86ni;
+ br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_keys c_pwr8;
+} br_aes_gen_cbcdec_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Aggregate structure large enough to be used as context for
+ * subkeys (CTR encryption and decryption) for all AES implementations.
+ */
+typedef union {
+ const br_block_ctr_class *vtable;
+ br_aes_big_ctr_keys c_big;
+ br_aes_small_ctr_keys c_small;
+ br_aes_ct_ctr_keys c_ct;
+ br_aes_ct64_ctr_keys c_ct64;
+ br_aes_x86ni_ctr_keys c_x86ni;
+ br_aes_pwr8_ctr_keys c_pwr8;
+} br_aes_gen_ctr_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Aggregate structure large enough to be used as context for
+ * subkeys (CTR encryption/decryption + CBC-MAC) for all AES implementations.
+ */
+typedef union {
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *vtable;
+ br_aes_big_ctrcbc_keys c_big;
+ br_aes_small_ctrcbc_keys c_small;
+ br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_keys c_ct;
+ br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_keys c_ct64;
+ br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_keys c_x86ni;
+ br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_keys c_pwr8;
+} br_aes_gen_ctrcbc_keys;
+
+/*
+ * Traditional, table-based implementation for DES/3DES. Since tables are
+ * used, cache-timing attacks are conceptually possible.
+ */
+
+/** \brief DES/3DES block size (8 bytes). */
+#define br_des_tab_BLOCK_SIZE 8
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for DES subkeys (`des_tab` implementation, CBC encryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint32_t skey[96];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_des_tab_cbcenc_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for DES subkeys (`des_tab` implementation, CBC decryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint32_t skey[96];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_des_tab_cbcdec_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for DES CBC encryption (`des_tab` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_cbcenc_class br_des_tab_cbcenc_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for DES CBC decryption (`des_tab` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_cbcdec_class br_des_tab_cbcdec_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for DES CBC encryption
+ * (`des_tab` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_des_tab_cbcenc_init(br_des_tab_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for DES CBC decryption
+ * (`des_tab` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_des_tab_cbcdec_init(br_des_tab_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC encryption with DES (`des_tab` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (updated).
+ * \param data data to encrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be multiple of 8).
+ */
+void br_des_tab_cbcenc_run(const br_des_tab_cbcenc_keys *ctx, void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC decryption with DES (`des_tab` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (updated).
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be multiple of 8).
+ */
+void br_des_tab_cbcdec_run(const br_des_tab_cbcdec_keys *ctx, void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Constant-time implementation for DES/3DES. It is substantially slower
+ * (by a factor of about 4x), but also immune to cache-timing attacks.
+ */
+
+/** \brief DES/3DES block size (8 bytes). */
+#define br_des_ct_BLOCK_SIZE 8
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for DES subkeys (`des_ct` implementation, CBC encryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint32_t skey[96];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_des_ct_cbcenc_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for DES subkeys (`des_ct` implementation, CBC decryption).
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable for this context. */
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint32_t skey[96];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+#endif
+} br_des_ct_cbcdec_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for DES CBC encryption (`des_ct` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_cbcenc_class br_des_ct_cbcenc_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for DES CBC decryption (`des_ct` implementation).
+ */
+extern const br_block_cbcdec_class br_des_ct_cbcdec_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for DES CBC encryption
+ * (`des_ct` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_des_ct_cbcenc_init(br_des_ct_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context initialisation (key schedule) for DES CBC decryption
+ * (`des_ct` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param key secret key.
+ * \param len secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_des_ct_cbcdec_init(br_des_ct_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC encryption with DES (`des_ct` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (updated).
+ * \param data data to encrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be multiple of 8).
+ */
+void br_des_ct_cbcenc_run(const br_des_ct_cbcenc_keys *ctx, void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief CBC decryption with DES (`des_ct` implementation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx context (already initialised).
+ * \param iv IV (updated).
+ * \param data data to decrypt (updated).
+ * \param len data length (in bytes, MUST be multiple of 8).
+ */
+void br_des_ct_cbcdec_run(const br_des_ct_cbcdec_keys *ctx, void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * These structures are large enough to accommodate subkeys for all
+ * DES/3DES implementations.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Aggregate structure large enough to be used as context for
+ * subkeys (CBC encryption) for all DES implementations.
+ */
+typedef union {
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *vtable;
+ br_des_tab_cbcenc_keys tab;
+ br_des_ct_cbcenc_keys ct;
+} br_des_gen_cbcenc_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Aggregate structure large enough to be used as context for
+ * subkeys (CBC decryption) for all DES implementations.
+ */
+typedef union {
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *vtable;
+ br_des_tab_cbcdec_keys c_tab;
+ br_des_ct_cbcdec_keys c_ct;
+} br_des_gen_cbcdec_keys;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for a ChaCha20 implementation.
+ *
+ * An implementation follows the description in RFC 7539:
+ *
+ * - Key is 256 bits (`key` points to exactly 32 bytes).
+ *
+ * - IV is 96 bits (`iv` points to exactly 12 bytes).
+ *
+ * - Block counter is over 32 bits and starts at value `cc`; the
+ * resulting value is returned.
+ *
+ * Data (pointed to by `data`, of length `len`) is encrypted/decrypted
+ * in place. If `len` is not a multiple of 64, then the excess bytes from
+ * the last block processing are dropped (therefore, "chunked" processing
+ * works only as long as each non-final chunk has a length multiple of 64).
+ *
+ * \param key secret key (32 bytes).
+ * \param iv IV (12 bytes).
+ * \param cc initial counter value.
+ * \param data data to encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ */
+typedef uint32_t (*br_chacha20_run)(const void *key,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief ChaCha20 implementation (straightforward C code, constant-time).
+ *
+ * \see br_chacha20_run
+ *
+ * \param key secret key (32 bytes).
+ * \param iv IV (12 bytes).
+ * \param cc initial counter value.
+ * \param data data to encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ */
+uint32_t br_chacha20_ct_run(const void *key,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief ChaCha20 implementation (SSE2 code, constant-time).
+ *
+ * This implementation is available only on x86 platforms, depending on
+ * compiler support. Moreover, in 32-bit mode, it might not actually run,
+ * if the underlying hardware does not implement the SSE2 opcode (in
+ * 64-bit mode, SSE2 is part of the ABI, so if the code could be compiled
+ * at all, then it can run). Use `br_chacha20_sse2_get()` to safely obtain
+ * a pointer to that function.
+ *
+ * \see br_chacha20_run
+ *
+ * \param key secret key (32 bytes).
+ * \param iv IV (12 bytes).
+ * \param cc initial counter value.
+ * \param data data to encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ */
+uint32_t br_chacha20_sse2_run(const void *key,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Obtain the `sse2` ChaCha20 implementation, if available.
+ *
+ * This function returns a pointer to `br_chacha20_sse2_run`, if
+ * that implementation was compiled in the library _and_ the SSE2
+ * opcodes are available on the currently running CPU. If either of
+ * these conditions is not met, then this function returns `0`.
+ *
+ * \return the `sse2` ChaCha20 implementation, or `0`.
+ */
+br_chacha20_run br_chacha20_sse2_get(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for a ChaCha20+Poly1305 AEAD implementation.
+ *
+ * The provided data is encrypted or decrypted with ChaCha20. The
+ * authentication tag is computed on the concatenation of the
+ * additional data and the ciphertext, with the padding and lengths
+ * as described in RFC 7539 (section 2.8).
+ *
+ * After decryption, the caller is responsible for checking that the
+ * computed tag matches the expected value.
+ *
+ * \param key secret key (32 bytes).
+ * \param iv nonce (12 bytes).
+ * \param data data to encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ * \param aad additional authenticated data.
+ * \param aad_len length of additional authenticated data (in bytes).
+ * \param tag output buffer for the authentication tag.
+ * \param ichacha implementation of ChaCha20.
+ * \param encrypt non-zero for encryption, zero for decryption.
+ */
+typedef void (*br_poly1305_run)(const void *key, const void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len, const void *aad, size_t aad_len,
+ void *tag, br_chacha20_run ichacha, int encrypt);
+
+/**
+ * \brief ChaCha20+Poly1305 AEAD implementation (mixed 32-bit multiplications).
+ *
+ * \see br_poly1305_run
+ *
+ * \param key secret key (32 bytes).
+ * \param iv nonce (12 bytes).
+ * \param data data to encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ * \param aad additional authenticated data.
+ * \param aad_len length of additional authenticated data (in bytes).
+ * \param tag output buffer for the authentication tag.
+ * \param ichacha implementation of ChaCha20.
+ * \param encrypt non-zero for encryption, zero for decryption.
+ */
+void br_poly1305_ctmul_run(const void *key, const void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len, const void *aad, size_t aad_len,
+ void *tag, br_chacha20_run ichacha, int encrypt);
+
+/**
+ * \brief ChaCha20+Poly1305 AEAD implementation (pure 32-bit multiplications).
+ *
+ * \see br_poly1305_run
+ *
+ * \param key secret key (32 bytes).
+ * \param iv nonce (12 bytes).
+ * \param data data to encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ * \param aad additional authenticated data.
+ * \param aad_len length of additional authenticated data (in bytes).
+ * \param tag output buffer for the authentication tag.
+ * \param ichacha implementation of ChaCha20.
+ * \param encrypt non-zero for encryption, zero for decryption.
+ */
+void br_poly1305_ctmul32_run(const void *key, const void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len, const void *aad, size_t aad_len,
+ void *tag, br_chacha20_run ichacha, int encrypt);
+
+/**
+ * \brief ChaCha20+Poly1305 AEAD implementation (i15).
+ *
+ * This implementation relies on the generic big integer code "i15"
+ * (which uses pure 32-bit multiplications). As such, it may save a
+ * little code footprint in a context where "i15" is already included
+ * (e.g. for elliptic curves or for RSA); however, it is also
+ * substantially slower than the ctmul and ctmul32 implementations.
+ *
+ * \see br_poly1305_run
+ *
+ * \param key secret key (32 bytes).
+ * \param iv nonce (12 bytes).
+ * \param data data to encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ * \param aad additional authenticated data.
+ * \param aad_len length of additional authenticated data (in bytes).
+ * \param tag output buffer for the authentication tag.
+ * \param ichacha implementation of ChaCha20.
+ * \param encrypt non-zero for encryption, zero for decryption.
+ */
+void br_poly1305_i15_run(const void *key, const void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len, const void *aad, size_t aad_len,
+ void *tag, br_chacha20_run ichacha, int encrypt);
+
+/**
+ * \brief ChaCha20+Poly1305 AEAD implementation (ctmulq).
+ *
+ * This implementation uses 64-bit multiplications (result over 128 bits).
+ * It is available only on platforms that offer such a primitive (in
+ * practice, 64-bit architectures). Use `br_poly1305_ctmulq_get()` to
+ * dynamically obtain a pointer to that function, or 0 if not supported.
+ *
+ * \see br_poly1305_run
+ *
+ * \param key secret key (32 bytes).
+ * \param iv nonce (12 bytes).
+ * \param data data to encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param len data length (in bytes).
+ * \param aad additional authenticated data.
+ * \param aad_len length of additional authenticated data (in bytes).
+ * \param tag output buffer for the authentication tag.
+ * \param ichacha implementation of ChaCha20.
+ * \param encrypt non-zero for encryption, zero for decryption.
+ */
+void br_poly1305_ctmulq_run(const void *key, const void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len, const void *aad, size_t aad_len,
+ void *tag, br_chacha20_run ichacha, int encrypt);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the ChaCha20+Poly1305 "ctmulq" implementation, if available.
+ *
+ * This function returns a pointer to the `br_poly1305_ctmulq_run()`
+ * function if supported on the current platform; otherwise, it returns 0.
+ *
+ * \return the ctmulq ChaCha20+Poly1305 implementation, or 0.
+ */
+br_poly1305_run br_poly1305_ctmulq_get(void);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_ec.h b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_ec.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..acd3a2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_ec.h
@@ -0,0 +1,967 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BR_BEARSSL_EC_H__
+#define BR_BEARSSL_EC_H__
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "bearssl_rand.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** \file bearssl_ec.h
+ *
+ * # Elliptic Curves
+ *
+ * This file documents the EC implementations provided with BearSSL, and
+ * ECDSA.
+ *
+ * ## Elliptic Curve API
+ *
+ * Only "named curves" are supported. Each EC implementation supports
+ * one or several named curves, identified by symbolic identifiers.
+ * These identifiers are small integers, that correspond to the values
+ * registered by the
+ * [IANA](http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8).
+ *
+ * Since all currently defined elliptic curve identifiers are in the 0..31
+ * range, it is convenient to encode support of some curves in a 32-bit
+ * word, such that bit x corresponds to curve of identifier x.
+ *
+ * An EC implementation is incarnated by a `br_ec_impl` instance, that
+ * offers the following fields:
+ *
+ * - `supported_curves`
+ *
+ * A 32-bit word that documents the identifiers of the curves supported
+ * by this implementation.
+ *
+ * - `generator()`
+ *
+ * Callback method that returns a pointer to the conventional generator
+ * point for that curve.
+ *
+ * - `order()`
+ *
+ * Callback method that returns a pointer to the subgroup order for
+ * that curve. That value uses unsigned big-endian encoding.
+ *
+ * - `xoff()`
+ *
+ * Callback method that returns the offset and length of the X
+ * coordinate in an encoded point.
+ *
+ * - `mul()`
+ *
+ * Multiply a curve point with an integer.
+ *
+ * - `mulgen()`
+ *
+ * Multiply the curve generator with an integer. This may be faster
+ * than the generic `mul()`.
+ *
+ * - `muladd()`
+ *
+ * Multiply two curve points by two integers, and return the sum of
+ * the two products.
+ *
+ * All curve points are represented in uncompressed format. The `mul()`
+ * and `muladd()` methods take care to validate that the provided points
+ * are really part of the relevant curve subgroup.
+ *
+ * For all point multiplication functions, the following holds:
+ *
+ * - Functions validate that the provided points are valid members
+ * of the relevant curve subgroup. An error is reported if that is
+ * not the case.
+ *
+ * - Processing is constant-time, even if the point operands are not
+ * valid. This holds for both the source and resulting points, and
+ * the multipliers (integers). Only the byte length of the provided
+ * multiplier arrays (not their actual value length in bits) may
+ * leak through timing-based side channels.
+ *
+ * - The multipliers (integers) MUST be lower than the subgroup order.
+ * If this property is not met, then the result is indeterminate,
+ * but an error value is not necessarily returned.
+ *
+ *
+ * ## ECDSA
+ *
+ * ECDSA signatures have two standard formats, called "raw" and "asn1".
+ * Internally, such a signature is a pair of modular integers `(r,s)`.
+ * The "raw" format is the concatenation of the unsigned big-endian
+ * encodings of these two integers, possibly left-padded with zeros so
+ * that they have the same encoded length. The "asn1" format is the
+ * DER encoding of an ASN.1 structure that contains the two integer
+ * values:
+ *
+ * ECDSASignature ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * r INTEGER,
+ * s INTEGER
+ * }
+ *
+ * In general, in all of X.509 and SSL/TLS, the "asn1" format is used.
+ * BearSSL offers ECDSA implementations for both formats; conversion
+ * functions between the two formats are also provided. Conversion of a
+ * "raw" format signature into "asn1" may enlarge a signature by no more
+ * than 9 bytes for all supported curves; conversely, conversion of an
+ * "asn1" signature to "raw" may expand the signature but the "raw"
+ * length will never be more than twice the length of the "asn1" length
+ * (and usually it will be shorter).
+ *
+ * Note that for a given signature, the "raw" format is not fully
+ * deterministic, in that it does not enforce a minimal common length.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Standard curve ID. These ID are equal to the assigned numerical
+ * identifiers assigned to these curves for TLS:
+ * http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8
+ */
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve sect163k1. */
+#define BR_EC_sect163k1 1
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve sect163r1. */
+#define BR_EC_sect163r1 2
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve sect163r2. */
+#define BR_EC_sect163r2 3
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve sect193r1. */
+#define BR_EC_sect193r1 4
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve sect193r2. */
+#define BR_EC_sect193r2 5
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve sect233k1. */
+#define BR_EC_sect233k1 6
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve sect233r1. */
+#define BR_EC_sect233r1 7
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve sect239k1. */
+#define BR_EC_sect239k1 8
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve sect283k1. */
+#define BR_EC_sect283k1 9
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve sect283r1. */
+#define BR_EC_sect283r1 10
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve sect409k1. */
+#define BR_EC_sect409k1 11
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve sect409r1. */
+#define BR_EC_sect409r1 12
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve sect571k1. */
+#define BR_EC_sect571k1 13
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve sect571r1. */
+#define BR_EC_sect571r1 14
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve secp160k1. */
+#define BR_EC_secp160k1 15
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve secp160r1. */
+#define BR_EC_secp160r1 16
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve secp160r2. */
+#define BR_EC_secp160r2 17
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve secp192k1. */
+#define BR_EC_secp192k1 18
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve secp192r1. */
+#define BR_EC_secp192r1 19
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve secp224k1. */
+#define BR_EC_secp224k1 20
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve secp224r1. */
+#define BR_EC_secp224r1 21
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve secp256k1. */
+#define BR_EC_secp256k1 22
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve secp256r1. */
+#define BR_EC_secp256r1 23
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve secp384r1. */
+#define BR_EC_secp384r1 24
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve secp521r1. */
+#define BR_EC_secp521r1 25
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve brainpoolP256r1. */
+#define BR_EC_brainpoolP256r1 26
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve brainpoolP384r1. */
+#define BR_EC_brainpoolP384r1 27
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve brainpoolP512r1. */
+#define BR_EC_brainpoolP512r1 28
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve Curve25519. */
+#define BR_EC_curve25519 29
+
+/** \brief Identifier for named curve Curve448. */
+#define BR_EC_curve448 30
+
+/**
+ * \brief Structure for an EC public key.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Identifier for the curve used by this key. */
+ int curve;
+ /** \brief Public curve point (uncompressed format). */
+ unsigned char *q;
+ /** \brief Length of public curve point (in bytes). */
+ size_t qlen;
+} br_ec_public_key;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Structure for an EC private key.
+ *
+ * The private key is an integer modulo the curve subgroup order. The
+ * encoding below tolerates extra leading zeros. In general, it is
+ * recommended that the private key has the same length as the curve
+ * subgroup order.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Identifier for the curve used by this key. */
+ int curve;
+ /** \brief Private key (integer, unsigned big-endian encoding). */
+ unsigned char *x;
+ /** \brief Private key length (in bytes). */
+ size_t xlen;
+} br_ec_private_key;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for an EC implementation.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /**
+ * \brief Supported curves.
+ *
+ * This word is a bitfield: bit `x` is set if the curve of ID `x`
+ * is supported. E.g. an implementation supporting both NIST P-256
+ * (secp256r1, ID 23) and NIST P-384 (secp384r1, ID 24) will have
+ * value `0x01800000` in this field.
+ */
+ uint32_t supported_curves;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Get the conventional generator.
+ *
+ * This function returns the conventional generator (encoded
+ * curve point) for the specified curve. This function MUST NOT
+ * be called if the curve is not supported.
+ *
+ * \param curve curve identifier.
+ * \param len receiver for the encoded generator length (in bytes).
+ * \return the encoded generator.
+ */
+ const unsigned char *(*generator)(int curve, size_t *len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Get the subgroup order.
+ *
+ * This function returns the order of the subgroup generated by
+ * the conventional generator, for the specified curve. Unsigned
+ * big-endian encoding is used. This function MUST NOT be called
+ * if the curve is not supported.
+ *
+ * \param curve curve identifier.
+ * \param len receiver for the encoded order length (in bytes).
+ * \return the encoded order.
+ */
+ const unsigned char *(*order)(int curve, size_t *len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Get the offset and length for the X coordinate.
+ *
+ * This function returns the offset and length (in bytes) of
+ * the X coordinate in an encoded non-zero point.
+ *
+ * \param curve curve identifier.
+ * \param len receiver for the X coordinate length (in bytes).
+ * \return the offset for the X coordinate (in bytes).
+ */
+ size_t (*xoff)(int curve, size_t *len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Multiply a curve point by an integer.
+ *
+ * The source point is provided in array `G` (of size `Glen` bytes);
+ * the multiplication result is written over it. The multiplier
+ * `x` (of size `xlen` bytes) uses unsigned big-endian encoding.
+ *
+ * Rules:
+ *
+ * - The specified curve MUST be supported.
+ *
+ * - The source point must be a valid point on the relevant curve
+ * subgroup (and not the "point at infinity" either). If this is
+ * not the case, then this function returns an error (0).
+ *
+ * - The multiplier integer MUST be non-zero and less than the
+ * curve subgroup order. If this property does not hold, then
+ * the result is indeterminate and an error code is not
+ * guaranteed.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 on success, 0 on error. On error, the
+ * contents of `G` are indeterminate.
+ *
+ * \param G point to multiply.
+ * \param Glen length of the encoded point (in bytes).
+ * \param x multiplier (unsigned big-endian).
+ * \param xlen multiplier length (in bytes).
+ * \param curve curve identifier.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+ uint32_t (*mul)(unsigned char *G, size_t Glen,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Multiply the generator by an integer.
+ *
+ * The multiplier MUST be non-zero and less than the curve
+ * subgroup order. Results are indeterminate if this property
+ * does not hold.
+ *
+ * \param R output buffer for the point.
+ * \param x multiplier (unsigned big-endian).
+ * \param xlen multiplier length (in bytes).
+ * \param curve curve identifier.
+ * \return encoded result point length (in bytes).
+ */
+ size_t (*mulgen)(unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Multiply two points by two integers and add the
+ * results.
+ *
+ * The point `x*A + y*B` is computed and written back in the `A`
+ * array.
+ *
+ * Rules:
+ *
+ * - The specified curve MUST be supported.
+ *
+ * - The source points (`A` and `B`) must be valid points on
+ * the relevant curve subgroup (and not the "point at
+ * infinity" either). If this is not the case, then this
+ * function returns an error (0).
+ *
+ * - If the `B` pointer is `NULL`, then the conventional
+ * subgroup generator is used. With some implementations,
+ * this may be faster than providing a pointer to the
+ * generator.
+ *
+ * - The multiplier integers (`x` and `y`) MUST be non-zero
+ * and less than the curve subgroup order. If either integer
+ * is zero, then an error is reported, but if one of them is
+ * not lower than the subgroup order, then the result is
+ * indeterminate and an error code is not guaranteed.
+ *
+ * - If the final result is the point at infinity, then an
+ * error is returned.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 on success, 0 on error. On error, the
+ * contents of `A` are indeterminate.
+ *
+ * \param A first point to multiply.
+ * \param B second point to multiply (`NULL` for the generator).
+ * \param len common length of the encoded points (in bytes).
+ * \param x multiplier for `A` (unsigned big-endian).
+ * \param xlen length of multiplier for `A` (in bytes).
+ * \param y multiplier for `A` (unsigned big-endian).
+ * \param ylen length of multiplier for `A` (in bytes).
+ * \param curve curve identifier.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+ uint32_t (*muladd)(unsigned char *A, const unsigned char *B, size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *y, size_t ylen, int curve);
+} br_ec_impl;
+
+/**
+ * \brief EC implementation "i31".
+ *
+ * This implementation internally uses generic code for modular integers,
+ * with a representation as sequences of 31-bit words. It supports secp256r1,
+ * secp384r1 and secp521r1 (aka NIST curves P-256, P-384 and P-521).
+ */
+extern const br_ec_impl br_ec_prime_i31;
+
+/**
+ * \brief EC implementation "i15".
+ *
+ * This implementation internally uses generic code for modular integers,
+ * with a representation as sequences of 15-bit words. It supports secp256r1,
+ * secp384r1 and secp521r1 (aka NIST curves P-256, P-384 and P-521).
+ */
+extern const br_ec_impl br_ec_prime_i15;
+
+/**
+ * \brief EC implementation "m15" for P-256.
+ *
+ * This implementation uses specialised code for curve secp256r1 (also
+ * known as NIST P-256), with optional Karatsuba decomposition, and fast
+ * modular reduction thanks to the field modulus special format. Only
+ * 32-bit multiplications are used (with 32-bit results, not 64-bit).
+ */
+extern const br_ec_impl br_ec_p256_m15;
+
+/**
+ * \brief EC implementation "m31" for P-256.
+ *
+ * This implementation uses specialised code for curve secp256r1 (also
+ * known as NIST P-256), relying on multiplications of 31-bit values
+ * (MUL31).
+ */
+extern const br_ec_impl br_ec_p256_m31;
+
+/**
+ * \brief EC implementation "m62" (specialised code) for P-256.
+ *
+ * This implementation uses custom code relying on multiplication of
+ * integers up to 64 bits, with a 128-bit result. This implementation is
+ * defined only on platforms that offer the 64x64->128 multiplication
+ * support; use `br_ec_p256_m62_get()` to dynamically obtain a pointer
+ * to that implementation.
+ */
+extern const br_ec_impl br_ec_p256_m62;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the "m62" implementation of P-256, if available.
+ *
+ * \return the implementation, or 0.
+ */
+const br_ec_impl *br_ec_p256_m62_get(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief EC implementation "m64" (specialised code) for P-256.
+ *
+ * This implementation uses custom code relying on multiplication of
+ * integers up to 64 bits, with a 128-bit result. This implementation is
+ * defined only on platforms that offer the 64x64->128 multiplication
+ * support; use `br_ec_p256_m64_get()` to dynamically obtain a pointer
+ * to that implementation.
+ */
+extern const br_ec_impl br_ec_p256_m64;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the "m64" implementation of P-256, if available.
+ *
+ * \return the implementation, or 0.
+ */
+const br_ec_impl *br_ec_p256_m64_get(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief EC implementation "i15" (generic code) for Curve25519.
+ *
+ * This implementation uses the generic code for modular integers (with
+ * 15-bit words) to support Curve25519. Due to the specificities of the
+ * curve definition, the following applies:
+ *
+ * - `muladd()` is not implemented (the function returns 0 systematically).
+ * - `order()` returns 2^255-1, since the point multiplication algorithm
+ * accepts any 32-bit integer as input (it clears the top bit and low
+ * three bits systematically).
+ */
+extern const br_ec_impl br_ec_c25519_i15;
+
+/**
+ * \brief EC implementation "i31" (generic code) for Curve25519.
+ *
+ * This implementation uses the generic code for modular integers (with
+ * 31-bit words) to support Curve25519. Due to the specificities of the
+ * curve definition, the following applies:
+ *
+ * - `muladd()` is not implemented (the function returns 0 systematically).
+ * - `order()` returns 2^255-1, since the point multiplication algorithm
+ * accepts any 32-bit integer as input (it clears the top bit and low
+ * three bits systematically).
+ */
+extern const br_ec_impl br_ec_c25519_i31;
+
+/**
+ * \brief EC implementation "m15" (specialised code) for Curve25519.
+ *
+ * This implementation uses custom code relying on multiplication of
+ * integers up to 15 bits. Due to the specificities of the curve
+ * definition, the following applies:
+ *
+ * - `muladd()` is not implemented (the function returns 0 systematically).
+ * - `order()` returns 2^255-1, since the point multiplication algorithm
+ * accepts any 32-bit integer as input (it clears the top bit and low
+ * three bits systematically).
+ */
+extern const br_ec_impl br_ec_c25519_m15;
+
+/**
+ * \brief EC implementation "m31" (specialised code) for Curve25519.
+ *
+ * This implementation uses custom code relying on multiplication of
+ * integers up to 31 bits. Due to the specificities of the curve
+ * definition, the following applies:
+ *
+ * - `muladd()` is not implemented (the function returns 0 systematically).
+ * - `order()` returns 2^255-1, since the point multiplication algorithm
+ * accepts any 32-bit integer as input (it clears the top bit and low
+ * three bits systematically).
+ */
+extern const br_ec_impl br_ec_c25519_m31;
+
+/**
+ * \brief EC implementation "m62" (specialised code) for Curve25519.
+ *
+ * This implementation uses custom code relying on multiplication of
+ * integers up to 62 bits, with a 124-bit result. This implementation is
+ * defined only on platforms that offer the 64x64->128 multiplication
+ * support; use `br_ec_c25519_m62_get()` to dynamically obtain a pointer
+ * to that implementation. Due to the specificities of the curve
+ * definition, the following applies:
+ *
+ * - `muladd()` is not implemented (the function returns 0 systematically).
+ * - `order()` returns 2^255-1, since the point multiplication algorithm
+ * accepts any 32-bit integer as input (it clears the top bit and low
+ * three bits systematically).
+ */
+extern const br_ec_impl br_ec_c25519_m62;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the "m62" implementation of Curve25519, if available.
+ *
+ * \return the implementation, or 0.
+ */
+const br_ec_impl *br_ec_c25519_m62_get(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief EC implementation "m64" (specialised code) for Curve25519.
+ *
+ * This implementation uses custom code relying on multiplication of
+ * integers up to 64 bits, with a 128-bit result. This implementation is
+ * defined only on platforms that offer the 64x64->128 multiplication
+ * support; use `br_ec_c25519_m64_get()` to dynamically obtain a pointer
+ * to that implementation. Due to the specificities of the curve
+ * definition, the following applies:
+ *
+ * - `muladd()` is not implemented (the function returns 0 systematically).
+ * - `order()` returns 2^255-1, since the point multiplication algorithm
+ * accepts any 32-bit integer as input (it clears the top bit and low
+ * three bits systematically).
+ */
+extern const br_ec_impl br_ec_c25519_m64;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the "m64" implementation of Curve25519, if available.
+ *
+ * \return the implementation, or 0.
+ */
+const br_ec_impl *br_ec_c25519_m64_get(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Aggregate EC implementation "m15".
+ *
+ * This implementation is a wrapper for:
+ *
+ * - `br_ec_c25519_m15` for Curve25519
+ * - `br_ec_p256_m15` for NIST P-256
+ * - `br_ec_prime_i15` for other curves (NIST P-384 and NIST-P512)
+ */
+extern const br_ec_impl br_ec_all_m15;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Aggregate EC implementation "m31".
+ *
+ * This implementation is a wrapper for:
+ *
+ * - `br_ec_c25519_m31` for Curve25519
+ * - `br_ec_p256_m31` for NIST P-256
+ * - `br_ec_prime_i31` for other curves (NIST P-384 and NIST-P512)
+ */
+extern const br_ec_impl br_ec_all_m31;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the "default" EC implementation for the current system.
+ *
+ * This returns a pointer to the preferred implementation on the
+ * current system.
+ *
+ * \return the default EC implementation.
+ */
+const br_ec_impl *br_ec_get_default(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Convert a signature from "raw" to "asn1".
+ *
+ * Conversion is done "in place" and the new length is returned.
+ * Conversion may enlarge the signature, but by no more than 9 bytes at
+ * most. On error, 0 is returned (error conditions include an odd raw
+ * signature length, or an oversized integer).
+ *
+ * \param sig signature to convert.
+ * \param sig_len signature length (in bytes).
+ * \return the new signature length, or 0 on error.
+ */
+size_t br_ecdsa_raw_to_asn1(void *sig, size_t sig_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Convert a signature from "asn1" to "raw".
+ *
+ * Conversion is done "in place" and the new length is returned.
+ * Conversion may enlarge the signature, but the new signature length
+ * will be less than twice the source length at most. On error, 0 is
+ * returned (error conditions include an invalid ASN.1 structure or an
+ * oversized integer).
+ *
+ * \param sig signature to convert.
+ * \param sig_len signature length (in bytes).
+ * \return the new signature length, or 0 on error.
+ */
+size_t br_ecdsa_asn1_to_raw(void *sig, size_t sig_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for an ECDSA signer function.
+ *
+ * A pointer to the EC implementation is provided. The hash value is
+ * assumed to have the length inferred from the designated hash function
+ * class.
+ *
+ * Signature is written in the buffer pointed to by `sig`, and the length
+ * (in bytes) is returned. On error, nothing is written in the buffer,
+ * and 0 is returned. This function returns 0 if the specified curve is
+ * not supported by the provided EC implementation.
+ *
+ * The signature format is either "raw" or "asn1", depending on the
+ * implementation; maximum length is predictable from the implemented
+ * curve:
+ *
+ * | curve | raw | asn1 |
+ * | :--------- | --: | ---: |
+ * | NIST P-256 | 64 | 72 |
+ * | NIST P-384 | 96 | 104 |
+ * | NIST P-521 | 132 | 139 |
+ *
+ * \param impl EC implementation to use.
+ * \param hf hash function used to process the data.
+ * \param hash_value signed data (hashed).
+ * \param sk EC private key.
+ * \param sig destination buffer.
+ * \return the signature length (in bytes), or 0 on error.
+ */
+typedef size_t (*br_ecdsa_sign)(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const br_hash_class *hf, const void *hash_value,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, void *sig);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for an ECDSA signature verification function.
+ *
+ * A pointer to the EC implementation is provided. The hashed value,
+ * computed over the purportedly signed data, is also provided with
+ * its length.
+ *
+ * The signature format is either "raw" or "asn1", depending on the
+ * implementation.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 on success (valid signature), 0 on error. This
+ * function returns 0 if the specified curve is not supported by the
+ * provided EC implementation.
+ *
+ * \param impl EC implementation to use.
+ * \param hash signed data (hashed).
+ * \param hash_len hash value length (in bytes).
+ * \param pk EC public key.
+ * \param sig signature.
+ * \param sig_len signature length (in bytes).
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+typedef uint32_t (*br_ecdsa_vrfy)(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const void *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_ec_public_key *pk, const void *sig, size_t sig_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief ECDSA signature generator, "i31" implementation, "asn1" format.
+ *
+ * \see br_ecdsa_sign()
+ *
+ * \param impl EC implementation to use.
+ * \param hf hash function used to process the data.
+ * \param hash_value signed data (hashed).
+ * \param sk EC private key.
+ * \param sig destination buffer.
+ * \return the signature length (in bytes), or 0 on error.
+ */
+size_t br_ecdsa_i31_sign_asn1(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const br_hash_class *hf, const void *hash_value,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, void *sig);
+
+/**
+ * \brief ECDSA signature generator, "i31" implementation, "raw" format.
+ *
+ * \see br_ecdsa_sign()
+ *
+ * \param impl EC implementation to use.
+ * \param hf hash function used to process the data.
+ * \param hash_value signed data (hashed).
+ * \param sk EC private key.
+ * \param sig destination buffer.
+ * \return the signature length (in bytes), or 0 on error.
+ */
+size_t br_ecdsa_i31_sign_raw(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const br_hash_class *hf, const void *hash_value,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, void *sig);
+
+/**
+ * \brief ECDSA signature verifier, "i31" implementation, "asn1" format.
+ *
+ * \see br_ecdsa_vrfy()
+ *
+ * \param impl EC implementation to use.
+ * \param hash signed data (hashed).
+ * \param hash_len hash value length (in bytes).
+ * \param pk EC public key.
+ * \param sig signature.
+ * \param sig_len signature length (in bytes).
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_ecdsa_i31_vrfy_asn1(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const void *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_ec_public_key *pk, const void *sig, size_t sig_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief ECDSA signature verifier, "i31" implementation, "raw" format.
+ *
+ * \see br_ecdsa_vrfy()
+ *
+ * \param impl EC implementation to use.
+ * \param hash signed data (hashed).
+ * \param hash_len hash value length (in bytes).
+ * \param pk EC public key.
+ * \param sig signature.
+ * \param sig_len signature length (in bytes).
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_ecdsa_i31_vrfy_raw(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const void *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_ec_public_key *pk, const void *sig, size_t sig_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief ECDSA signature generator, "i15" implementation, "asn1" format.
+ *
+ * \see br_ecdsa_sign()
+ *
+ * \param impl EC implementation to use.
+ * \param hf hash function used to process the data.
+ * \param hash_value signed data (hashed).
+ * \param sk EC private key.
+ * \param sig destination buffer.
+ * \return the signature length (in bytes), or 0 on error.
+ */
+size_t br_ecdsa_i15_sign_asn1(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const br_hash_class *hf, const void *hash_value,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, void *sig);
+
+/**
+ * \brief ECDSA signature generator, "i15" implementation, "raw" format.
+ *
+ * \see br_ecdsa_sign()
+ *
+ * \param impl EC implementation to use.
+ * \param hf hash function used to process the data.
+ * \param hash_value signed data (hashed).
+ * \param sk EC private key.
+ * \param sig destination buffer.
+ * \return the signature length (in bytes), or 0 on error.
+ */
+size_t br_ecdsa_i15_sign_raw(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const br_hash_class *hf, const void *hash_value,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, void *sig);
+
+/**
+ * \brief ECDSA signature verifier, "i15" implementation, "asn1" format.
+ *
+ * \see br_ecdsa_vrfy()
+ *
+ * \param impl EC implementation to use.
+ * \param hash signed data (hashed).
+ * \param hash_len hash value length (in bytes).
+ * \param pk EC public key.
+ * \param sig signature.
+ * \param sig_len signature length (in bytes).
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_ecdsa_i15_vrfy_asn1(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const void *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_ec_public_key *pk, const void *sig, size_t sig_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief ECDSA signature verifier, "i15" implementation, "raw" format.
+ *
+ * \see br_ecdsa_vrfy()
+ *
+ * \param impl EC implementation to use.
+ * \param hash signed data (hashed).
+ * \param hash_len hash value length (in bytes).
+ * \param pk EC public key.
+ * \param sig signature.
+ * \param sig_len signature length (in bytes).
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_ecdsa_i15_vrfy_raw(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const void *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_ec_public_key *pk, const void *sig, size_t sig_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get "default" ECDSA implementation (signer, asn1 format).
+ *
+ * This returns the preferred implementation of ECDSA signature generation
+ * ("asn1" output format) on the current system.
+ *
+ * \return the default implementation.
+ */
+br_ecdsa_sign br_ecdsa_sign_asn1_get_default(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get "default" ECDSA implementation (signer, raw format).
+ *
+ * This returns the preferred implementation of ECDSA signature generation
+ * ("raw" output format) on the current system.
+ *
+ * \return the default implementation.
+ */
+br_ecdsa_sign br_ecdsa_sign_raw_get_default(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get "default" ECDSA implementation (verifier, asn1 format).
+ *
+ * This returns the preferred implementation of ECDSA signature verification
+ * ("asn1" output format) on the current system.
+ *
+ * \return the default implementation.
+ */
+br_ecdsa_vrfy br_ecdsa_vrfy_asn1_get_default(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get "default" ECDSA implementation (verifier, raw format).
+ *
+ * This returns the preferred implementation of ECDSA signature verification
+ * ("raw" output format) on the current system.
+ *
+ * \return the default implementation.
+ */
+br_ecdsa_vrfy br_ecdsa_vrfy_raw_get_default(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Maximum size for EC private key element buffer.
+ *
+ * This is the largest number of bytes that `br_ec_keygen()` may need or
+ * ever return.
+ */
+#define BR_EC_KBUF_PRIV_MAX_SIZE 72
+
+/**
+ * \brief Maximum size for EC public key element buffer.
+ *
+ * This is the largest number of bytes that `br_ec_compute_public()` may
+ * need or ever return.
+ */
+#define BR_EC_KBUF_PUB_MAX_SIZE 145
+
+/**
+ * \brief Generate a new EC private key.
+ *
+ * If the specified `curve` is not supported by the elliptic curve
+ * implementation (`impl`), then this function returns zero.
+ *
+ * The `sk` structure fields are set to the new private key data. In
+ * particular, `sk.x` is made to point to the provided key buffer (`kbuf`),
+ * in which the actual private key data is written. That buffer is assumed
+ * to be large enough. The `BR_EC_KBUF_PRIV_MAX_SIZE` defines the maximum
+ * size for all supported curves.
+ *
+ * The number of bytes used in `kbuf` is returned. If `kbuf` is `NULL`, then
+ * the private key is not actually generated, and `sk` may also be `NULL`;
+ * the minimum length for `kbuf` is still computed and returned.
+ *
+ * If `sk` is `NULL` but `kbuf` is not `NULL`, then the private key is
+ * still generated and stored in `kbuf`.
+ *
+ * \param rng_ctx source PRNG context (already initialized).
+ * \param impl the elliptic curve implementation.
+ * \param sk the private key structure to fill, or `NULL`.
+ * \param kbuf the key element buffer, or `NULL`.
+ * \param curve the curve identifier.
+ * \return the key data length (in bytes), or zero.
+ */
+size_t br_ec_keygen(const br_prng_class **rng_ctx,
+ const br_ec_impl *impl, br_ec_private_key *sk,
+ void *kbuf, int curve);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute EC public key from EC private key.
+ *
+ * This function uses the provided elliptic curve implementation (`impl`)
+ * to compute the public key corresponding to the private key held in `sk`.
+ * The public key point is written into `kbuf`, which is then linked from
+ * the `*pk` structure. The size of the public key point, i.e. the number
+ * of bytes used in `kbuf`, is returned.
+ *
+ * If `kbuf` is `NULL`, then the public key point is NOT computed, and
+ * the public key structure `*pk` is unmodified (`pk` may be `NULL` in
+ * that case). The size of the public key point is still returned.
+ *
+ * If `pk` is `NULL` but `kbuf` is not `NULL`, then the public key
+ * point is computed and stored in `kbuf`, and its size is returned.
+ *
+ * If the curve used by the private key is not supported by the curve
+ * implementation, then this function returns zero.
+ *
+ * The private key MUST be valid. An off-range private key value is not
+ * necessarily detected, and leads to unpredictable results.
+ *
+ * \param impl the elliptic curve implementation.
+ * \param pk the public key structure to fill (or `NULL`).
+ * \param kbuf the public key point buffer (or `NULL`).
+ * \param sk the source private key.
+ * \return the public key point length (in bytes), or zero.
+ */
+size_t br_ec_compute_pub(const br_ec_impl *impl, br_ec_public_key *pk,
+ void *kbuf, const br_ec_private_key *sk);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_hash.h b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_hash.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca4fa26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_hash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1346 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BR_BEARSSL_HASH_H__
+#define BR_BEARSSL_HASH_H__
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** \file bearssl_hash.h
+ *
+ * # Hash Functions
+ *
+ * This file documents the API for hash functions.
+ *
+ *
+ * ## Procedural API
+ *
+ * For each implemented hash function, of name "`xxx`", the following
+ * elements are defined:
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_vtable`
+ *
+ * An externally defined instance of `br_hash_class`.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_SIZE`
+ *
+ * A macro that evaluates to the output size (in bytes) of the
+ * hash function.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_ID`
+ *
+ * A macro that evaluates to a symbolic identifier for the hash
+ * function. Such identifiers are used with HMAC and signature
+ * algorithm implementations.
+ *
+ * NOTE: for the "standard" hash functions defined in [the TLS
+ * standard](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1),
+ * the symbolic identifiers match the constants used in TLS, i.e.
+ * 1 to 6 for MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512,
+ * respectively.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_context`
+ *
+ * Context for an ongoing computation. It is allocated by the
+ * caller, and a pointer to it is passed to all functions. A
+ * context contains no interior pointer, so it can be moved around
+ * and cloned (with a simple `memcpy()` or equivalent) in order to
+ * capture the function state at some point. Computations that use
+ * distinct context structures are independent of each other. The
+ * first field of `br_xxx_context` is always a pointer to the
+ * `br_xxx_vtable` structure; `br_xxx_init()` sets that pointer.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_init(br_xxx_context *ctx)`
+ *
+ * Initialise the provided context. Previous contents of the structure
+ * are ignored. This calls resets the context to the start of a new
+ * hash computation; it also sets the first field of the context
+ * structure (called `vtable`) to a pointer to the statically
+ * allocated constant `br_xxx_vtable` structure.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_update(br_xxx_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len)`
+ *
+ * Add some more bytes to the hash computation represented by the
+ * provided context.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_out(const br_xxx_context *ctx, void *out)`
+ *
+ * Complete the hash computation and write the result in the provided
+ * buffer. The output buffer MUST be large enough to accommodate the
+ * result. The context is NOT modified by this operation, so this
+ * function can be used to get a "partial hash" while still keeping
+ * the possibility of adding more bytes to the input.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_state(const br_xxx_context *ctx, void *out)`
+ *
+ * Get a copy of the "current state" for the computation so far. For
+ * MD functions (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2 family), this is the running state
+ * resulting from the processing of the last complete input block.
+ * Returned value is the current input length (in bytes).
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_set_state(br_xxx_context *ctx, const void *stb, uint64_t count)`
+ *
+ * Set the internal state to the provided values. The 'stb' and
+ * 'count' values shall match that which was obtained from
+ * `br_xxx_state()`. This restores the hash state only if the state
+ * values were at an appropriate block boundary. This does NOT set
+ * the `vtable` pointer in the context.
+ *
+ * Context structures can be discarded without any explicit deallocation.
+ * Hash function implementations are purely software and don't reserve
+ * any resources outside of the context structure itself.
+ *
+ *
+ * ## Object-Oriented API
+ *
+ * For each hash function that follows the procedural API described
+ * above, an object-oriented API is also provided. In that API, function
+ * pointers from the vtable (`br_xxx_vtable`) are used. The vtable
+ * incarnates object-oriented programming. An introduction on the OOP
+ * concept used here can be read on the BearSSL Web site:<br />
+ * [https://www.bearssl.org/oop.html](https://www.bearssl.org/oop.html)
+ *
+ * The vtable offers functions called `init()`, `update()`, `out()`,
+ * `set()` and `set_state()`, which are in fact the functions from
+ * the procedural API. That vtable also contains two informative fields:
+ *
+ * - `context_size`
+ *
+ * The size of the context structure (`br_xxx_context`), in bytes.
+ * This can be used by generic implementations to perform dynamic
+ * context allocation.
+ *
+ * - `desc`
+ *
+ * A "descriptor" field that encodes some information on the hash
+ * function: symbolic identifier, output size, state size,
+ * internal block size, details on the padding.
+ *
+ * Users of this object-oriented API (in particular generic HMAC
+ * implementations) may make the following assumptions:
+ *
+ * - Hash output size is no more than 64 bytes.
+ * - Hash internal state size is no more than 64 bytes.
+ * - Internal block size is a power of two, no less than 16 and no more
+ * than 256.
+ *
+ *
+ * ## Implemented Hash Functions
+ *
+ * Implemented hash functions are:
+ *
+ * | Function | Name | Output length | State length |
+ * | :-------- | :------ | :-----------: | :----------: |
+ * | MD5 | md5 | 16 | 16 |
+ * | SHA-1 | sha1 | 20 | 20 |
+ * | SHA-224 | sha224 | 28 | 32 |
+ * | SHA-256 | sha256 | 32 | 32 |
+ * | SHA-384 | sha384 | 48 | 64 |
+ * | SHA-512 | sha512 | 64 | 64 |
+ * | MD5+SHA-1 | md5sha1 | 36 | 36 |
+ *
+ * (MD5+SHA-1 is the concatenation of MD5 and SHA-1 computed over the
+ * same input; in the implementation, the internal data buffer is
+ * shared, thus making it more memory-efficient than separate MD5 and
+ * SHA-1. It can be useful in implementing SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0 and TLS
+ * 1.1.)
+ *
+ *
+ * ## Multi-Hasher
+ *
+ * An aggregate hasher is provided, that can compute several standard
+ * hash functions in parallel. It uses `br_multihash_context` and a
+ * procedural API. It is configured with the implementations (the vtables)
+ * that it should use; it will then compute all these hash functions in
+ * parallel, on the same input. It is meant to be used in cases when the
+ * hash of an object will be used, but the exact hash function is not
+ * known yet (typically, streamed processing on X.509 certificates).
+ *
+ * Only the standard hash functions (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384
+ * and SHA-512) are supported by the multi-hasher.
+ *
+ *
+ * ## GHASH
+ *
+ * GHASH is not a generic hash function; it is a _universal_ hash function,
+ * which, as the name does not say, means that it CANNOT be used in most
+ * places where a hash function is needed. GHASH is used within the GCM
+ * encryption mode, to provide the checked integrity functionality.
+ *
+ * A GHASH implementation is basically a function that uses the type defined
+ * in this file under the name `br_ghash`:
+ *
+ * typedef void (*br_ghash)(void *y, const void *h, const void *data, size_t len);
+ *
+ * The `y` pointer refers to a 16-byte value which is used as input, and
+ * receives the output of the GHASH invocation. `h` is a 16-byte secret
+ * value (that serves as key). `data` and `len` define the input data.
+ *
+ * Three GHASH implementations are provided, all constant-time, based on
+ * the use of integer multiplications with appropriate masking to cancel
+ * carry propagation.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class type for hash function implementations.
+ *
+ * A `br_hash_class` instance references the methods implementing a hash
+ * function. Constant instances of this structure are defined for each
+ * implemented hash function. Such instances are also called "vtables".
+ *
+ * Vtables are used to support object-oriented programming, as
+ * described on [the BearSSL Web site](https://www.bearssl.org/oop.html).
+ */
+typedef struct br_hash_class_ br_hash_class;
+struct br_hash_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Size (in bytes) of the context structure appropriate for
+ * computing this hash function.
+ */
+ size_t context_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Descriptor word that contains information about the hash
+ * function.
+ *
+ * For each word `xxx` described below, use `BR_HASHDESC_xxx_OFF`
+ * and `BR_HASHDESC_xxx_MASK` to access the specific value, as
+ * follows:
+ *
+ * (hf->desc >> BR_HASHDESC_xxx_OFF) & BR_HASHDESC_xxx_MASK
+ *
+ * The defined elements are:
+ *
+ * - `ID`: the symbolic identifier for the function, as defined
+ * in [TLS](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4.1)
+ * (MD5 = 1, SHA-1 = 2,...).
+ *
+ * - `OUT`: hash output size, in bytes.
+ *
+ * - `STATE`: internal running state size, in bytes.
+ *
+ * - `LBLEN`: base-2 logarithm for the internal block size, as
+ * defined for HMAC processing (this is 6 for MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224
+ * and SHA-256, since these functions use 64-byte blocks; for
+ * SHA-384 and SHA-512, this is 7, corresponding to their
+ * 128-byte blocks).
+ *
+ * The descriptor may contain a few other flags.
+ */
+ uint32_t desc;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Initialisation method.
+ *
+ * This method takes as parameter a pointer to a context area,
+ * that it initialises. The first field of the context is set
+ * to this vtable; other elements are initialised for a new hash
+ * computation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to (the first field of) the context.
+ */
+ void (*init)(const br_hash_class **ctx);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Data injection method.
+ *
+ * The `len` bytes starting at address `data` are injected into
+ * the running hash computation incarnated by the specified
+ * context. The context is updated accordingly. It is allowed
+ * to have `len == 0`, in which case `data` is ignored (and could
+ * be `NULL`), and nothing happens.
+ * on the input data.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to (the first field of) the context.
+ * \param data pointer to the first data byte to inject.
+ * \param len number of bytes to inject.
+ */
+ void (*update)(const br_hash_class **ctx, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Produce hash output.
+ *
+ * The hash output corresponding to all data bytes injected in the
+ * context since the last `init()` call is computed, and written
+ * in the buffer pointed to by `dst`. The hash output size depends
+ * on the implemented hash function (e.g. 16 bytes for MD5).
+ * The context is _not_ modified by this call, so further bytes
+ * may be afterwards injected to continue the current computation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to (the first field of) the context.
+ * \param dst destination buffer for the hash output.
+ */
+ void (*out)(const br_hash_class *const *ctx, void *dst);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Get running state.
+ *
+ * This method saves the current running state into the `dst`
+ * buffer. What constitutes the "running state" depends on the
+ * hash function; for Merkle-Damgård hash functions (like
+ * MD5 or SHA-1), this is the output obtained after processing
+ * each block. The number of bytes injected so far is returned.
+ * The context is not modified by this call.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to (the first field of) the context.
+ * \param dst destination buffer for the state.
+ * \return the injected total byte length.
+ */
+ uint64_t (*state)(const br_hash_class *const *ctx, void *dst);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Set running state.
+ *
+ * This methods replaces the running state for the function.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to (the first field of) the context.
+ * \param stb source buffer for the state.
+ * \param count injected total byte length.
+ */
+ void (*set_state)(const br_hash_class **ctx,
+ const void *stb, uint64_t count);
+};
+
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+#define BR_HASHDESC_ID(id) ((uint32_t)(id) << BR_HASHDESC_ID_OFF)
+#define BR_HASHDESC_ID_OFF 0
+#define BR_HASHDESC_ID_MASK 0xFF
+
+#define BR_HASHDESC_OUT(size) ((uint32_t)(size) << BR_HASHDESC_OUT_OFF)
+#define BR_HASHDESC_OUT_OFF 8
+#define BR_HASHDESC_OUT_MASK 0x7F
+
+#define BR_HASHDESC_STATE(size) ((uint32_t)(size) << BR_HASHDESC_STATE_OFF)
+#define BR_HASHDESC_STATE_OFF 15
+#define BR_HASHDESC_STATE_MASK 0xFF
+
+#define BR_HASHDESC_LBLEN(ls) ((uint32_t)(ls) << BR_HASHDESC_LBLEN_OFF)
+#define BR_HASHDESC_LBLEN_OFF 23
+#define BR_HASHDESC_LBLEN_MASK 0x0F
+
+#define BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING ((uint32_t)1 << 28)
+#define BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING_128 ((uint32_t)1 << 29)
+#define BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING_BE ((uint32_t)1 << 30)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Specific hash functions.
+ *
+ * Rules for contexts:
+ * -- No interior pointer.
+ * -- No pointer to external dynamically allocated resources.
+ * -- First field is called 'vtable' and is a pointer to a
+ * const-qualified br_hash_class instance (pointer is set by init()).
+ * -- SHA-224 and SHA-256 contexts are identical.
+ * -- SHA-384 and SHA-512 contexts are identical.
+ *
+ * Thus, contexts can be moved and cloned to capture the hash function
+ * current state; and there is no need for any explicit "release" function.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Symbolic identifier for MD5.
+ */
+#define br_md5_ID 1
+
+/**
+ * \brief MD5 output size (in bytes).
+ */
+#define br_md5_SIZE 16
+
+/**
+ * \brief Constant vtable for MD5.
+ */
+extern const br_hash_class br_md5_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief MD5 context.
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /**
+ * \brief Pointer to vtable for this context.
+ */
+ const br_hash_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+ uint64_t count;
+ uint32_t val[4];
+#endif
+} br_md5_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief MD5 context initialisation.
+ *
+ * This function initialises or resets a context for a new MD5
+ * computation. It also sets the vtable pointer.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ */
+void br_md5_init(br_md5_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Inject some data bytes in a running MD5 computation.
+ *
+ * The provided context is updated with some data bytes. If the number
+ * of bytes (`len`) is zero, then the data pointer (`data`) is ignored
+ * and may be `NULL`, and this function does nothing.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param data pointer to the injected data.
+ * \param len injected data length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_md5_update(br_md5_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute MD5 output.
+ *
+ * The MD5 output for the concatenation of all bytes injected in the
+ * provided context since the last initialisation or reset call, is
+ * computed and written in the buffer pointed to by `out`. The context
+ * itself is not modified, so extra bytes may be injected afterwards
+ * to continue that computation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param out destination buffer for the hash output.
+ */
+void br_md5_out(const br_md5_context *ctx, void *out);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Save MD5 running state.
+ *
+ * The running state for MD5 (output of the last internal block
+ * processing) is written in the buffer pointed to by `out`. The
+ * number of bytes injected since the last initialisation or reset
+ * call is returned. The context is not modified.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param out destination buffer for the running state.
+ * \return the injected total byte length.
+ */
+uint64_t br_md5_state(const br_md5_context *ctx, void *out);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Restore MD5 running state.
+ *
+ * The running state for MD5 is set to the provided values.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param stb source buffer for the running state.
+ * \param count the injected total byte length.
+ */
+void br_md5_set_state(br_md5_context *ctx, const void *stb, uint64_t count);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Symbolic identifier for SHA-1.
+ */
+#define br_sha1_ID 2
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHA-1 output size (in bytes).
+ */
+#define br_sha1_SIZE 20
+
+/**
+ * \brief Constant vtable for SHA-1.
+ */
+extern const br_hash_class br_sha1_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHA-1 context.
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /**
+ * \brief Pointer to vtable for this context.
+ */
+ const br_hash_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+ uint64_t count;
+ uint32_t val[5];
+#endif
+} br_sha1_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHA-1 context initialisation.
+ *
+ * This function initialises or resets a context for a new SHA-1
+ * computation. It also sets the vtable pointer.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ */
+void br_sha1_init(br_sha1_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Inject some data bytes in a running SHA-1 computation.
+ *
+ * The provided context is updated with some data bytes. If the number
+ * of bytes (`len`) is zero, then the data pointer (`data`) is ignored
+ * and may be `NULL`, and this function does nothing.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param data pointer to the injected data.
+ * \param len injected data length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_sha1_update(br_sha1_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute SHA-1 output.
+ *
+ * The SHA-1 output for the concatenation of all bytes injected in the
+ * provided context since the last initialisation or reset call, is
+ * computed and written in the buffer pointed to by `out`. The context
+ * itself is not modified, so extra bytes may be injected afterwards
+ * to continue that computation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param out destination buffer for the hash output.
+ */
+void br_sha1_out(const br_sha1_context *ctx, void *out);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Save SHA-1 running state.
+ *
+ * The running state for SHA-1 (output of the last internal block
+ * processing) is written in the buffer pointed to by `out`. The
+ * number of bytes injected since the last initialisation or reset
+ * call is returned. The context is not modified.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param out destination buffer for the running state.
+ * \return the injected total byte length.
+ */
+uint64_t br_sha1_state(const br_sha1_context *ctx, void *out);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Restore SHA-1 running state.
+ *
+ * The running state for SHA-1 is set to the provided values.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param stb source buffer for the running state.
+ * \param count the injected total byte length.
+ */
+void br_sha1_set_state(br_sha1_context *ctx, const void *stb, uint64_t count);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Symbolic identifier for SHA-224.
+ */
+#define br_sha224_ID 3
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHA-224 output size (in bytes).
+ */
+#define br_sha224_SIZE 28
+
+/**
+ * \brief Constant vtable for SHA-224.
+ */
+extern const br_hash_class br_sha224_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHA-224 context.
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /**
+ * \brief Pointer to vtable for this context.
+ */
+ const br_hash_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+ uint64_t count;
+ uint32_t val[8];
+#endif
+} br_sha224_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHA-224 context initialisation.
+ *
+ * This function initialises or resets a context for a new SHA-224
+ * computation. It also sets the vtable pointer.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ */
+void br_sha224_init(br_sha224_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Inject some data bytes in a running SHA-224 computation.
+ *
+ * The provided context is updated with some data bytes. If the number
+ * of bytes (`len`) is zero, then the data pointer (`data`) is ignored
+ * and may be `NULL`, and this function does nothing.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param data pointer to the injected data.
+ * \param len injected data length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_sha224_update(br_sha224_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute SHA-224 output.
+ *
+ * The SHA-224 output for the concatenation of all bytes injected in the
+ * provided context since the last initialisation or reset call, is
+ * computed and written in the buffer pointed to by `out`. The context
+ * itself is not modified, so extra bytes may be injected afterwards
+ * to continue that computation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param out destination buffer for the hash output.
+ */
+void br_sha224_out(const br_sha224_context *ctx, void *out);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Save SHA-224 running state.
+ *
+ * The running state for SHA-224 (output of the last internal block
+ * processing) is written in the buffer pointed to by `out`. The
+ * number of bytes injected since the last initialisation or reset
+ * call is returned. The context is not modified.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param out destination buffer for the running state.
+ * \return the injected total byte length.
+ */
+uint64_t br_sha224_state(const br_sha224_context *ctx, void *out);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Restore SHA-224 running state.
+ *
+ * The running state for SHA-224 is set to the provided values.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param stb source buffer for the running state.
+ * \param count the injected total byte length.
+ */
+void br_sha224_set_state(br_sha224_context *ctx,
+ const void *stb, uint64_t count);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Symbolic identifier for SHA-256.
+ */
+#define br_sha256_ID 4
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHA-256 output size (in bytes).
+ */
+#define br_sha256_SIZE 32
+
+/**
+ * \brief Constant vtable for SHA-256.
+ */
+extern const br_hash_class br_sha256_vtable;
+
+#ifdef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+/**
+ * \brief SHA-256 context.
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /**
+ * \brief Pointer to vtable for this context.
+ */
+ const br_hash_class *vtable;
+} br_sha256_context;
+#else
+typedef br_sha224_context br_sha256_context;
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHA-256 context initialisation.
+ *
+ * This function initialises or resets a context for a new SHA-256
+ * computation. It also sets the vtable pointer.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ */
+void br_sha256_init(br_sha256_context *ctx);
+
+#ifdef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+/**
+ * \brief Inject some data bytes in a running SHA-256 computation.
+ *
+ * The provided context is updated with some data bytes. If the number
+ * of bytes (`len`) is zero, then the data pointer (`data`) is ignored
+ * and may be `NULL`, and this function does nothing.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param data pointer to the injected data.
+ * \param len injected data length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_sha256_update(br_sha256_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len);
+#else
+#define br_sha256_update br_sha224_update
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute SHA-256 output.
+ *
+ * The SHA-256 output for the concatenation of all bytes injected in the
+ * provided context since the last initialisation or reset call, is
+ * computed and written in the buffer pointed to by `out`. The context
+ * itself is not modified, so extra bytes may be injected afterwards
+ * to continue that computation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param out destination buffer for the hash output.
+ */
+void br_sha256_out(const br_sha256_context *ctx, void *out);
+
+#ifdef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+/**
+ * \brief Save SHA-256 running state.
+ *
+ * The running state for SHA-256 (output of the last internal block
+ * processing) is written in the buffer pointed to by `out`. The
+ * number of bytes injected since the last initialisation or reset
+ * call is returned. The context is not modified.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param out destination buffer for the running state.
+ * \return the injected total byte length.
+ */
+uint64_t br_sha256_state(const br_sha256_context *ctx, void *out);
+#else
+#define br_sha256_state br_sha224_state
+#endif
+
+#ifdef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+/**
+ * \brief Restore SHA-256 running state.
+ *
+ * The running state for SHA-256 is set to the provided values.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param stb source buffer for the running state.
+ * \param count the injected total byte length.
+ */
+void br_sha256_set_state(br_sha256_context *ctx,
+ const void *stb, uint64_t count);
+#else
+#define br_sha256_set_state br_sha224_set_state
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Symbolic identifier for SHA-384.
+ */
+#define br_sha384_ID 5
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHA-384 output size (in bytes).
+ */
+#define br_sha384_SIZE 48
+
+/**
+ * \brief Constant vtable for SHA-384.
+ */
+extern const br_hash_class br_sha384_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHA-384 context.
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /**
+ * \brief Pointer to vtable for this context.
+ */
+ const br_hash_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ unsigned char buf[128];
+ uint64_t count;
+ uint64_t val[8];
+#endif
+} br_sha384_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHA-384 context initialisation.
+ *
+ * This function initialises or resets a context for a new SHA-384
+ * computation. It also sets the vtable pointer.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ */
+void br_sha384_init(br_sha384_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Inject some data bytes in a running SHA-384 computation.
+ *
+ * The provided context is updated with some data bytes. If the number
+ * of bytes (`len`) is zero, then the data pointer (`data`) is ignored
+ * and may be `NULL`, and this function does nothing.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param data pointer to the injected data.
+ * \param len injected data length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_sha384_update(br_sha384_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute SHA-384 output.
+ *
+ * The SHA-384 output for the concatenation of all bytes injected in the
+ * provided context since the last initialisation or reset call, is
+ * computed and written in the buffer pointed to by `out`. The context
+ * itself is not modified, so extra bytes may be injected afterwards
+ * to continue that computation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param out destination buffer for the hash output.
+ */
+void br_sha384_out(const br_sha384_context *ctx, void *out);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Save SHA-384 running state.
+ *
+ * The running state for SHA-384 (output of the last internal block
+ * processing) is written in the buffer pointed to by `out`. The
+ * number of bytes injected since the last initialisation or reset
+ * call is returned. The context is not modified.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param out destination buffer for the running state.
+ * \return the injected total byte length.
+ */
+uint64_t br_sha384_state(const br_sha384_context *ctx, void *out);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Restore SHA-384 running state.
+ *
+ * The running state for SHA-384 is set to the provided values.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param stb source buffer for the running state.
+ * \param count the injected total byte length.
+ */
+void br_sha384_set_state(br_sha384_context *ctx,
+ const void *stb, uint64_t count);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Symbolic identifier for SHA-512.
+ */
+#define br_sha512_ID 6
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHA-512 output size (in bytes).
+ */
+#define br_sha512_SIZE 64
+
+/**
+ * \brief Constant vtable for SHA-512.
+ */
+extern const br_hash_class br_sha512_vtable;
+
+#ifdef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+/**
+ * \brief SHA-512 context.
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /**
+ * \brief Pointer to vtable for this context.
+ */
+ const br_hash_class *vtable;
+} br_sha512_context;
+#else
+typedef br_sha384_context br_sha512_context;
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHA-512 context initialisation.
+ *
+ * This function initialises or resets a context for a new SHA-512
+ * computation. It also sets the vtable pointer.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ */
+void br_sha512_init(br_sha512_context *ctx);
+
+#ifdef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+/**
+ * \brief Inject some data bytes in a running SHA-512 computation.
+ *
+ * The provided context is updated with some data bytes. If the number
+ * of bytes (`len`) is zero, then the data pointer (`data`) is ignored
+ * and may be `NULL`, and this function does nothing.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param data pointer to the injected data.
+ * \param len injected data length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_sha512_update(br_sha512_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len);
+#else
+#define br_sha512_update br_sha384_update
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute SHA-512 output.
+ *
+ * The SHA-512 output for the concatenation of all bytes injected in the
+ * provided context since the last initialisation or reset call, is
+ * computed and written in the buffer pointed to by `out`. The context
+ * itself is not modified, so extra bytes may be injected afterwards
+ * to continue that computation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param out destination buffer for the hash output.
+ */
+void br_sha512_out(const br_sha512_context *ctx, void *out);
+
+#ifdef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+/**
+ * \brief Save SHA-512 running state.
+ *
+ * The running state for SHA-512 (output of the last internal block
+ * processing) is written in the buffer pointed to by `out`. The
+ * number of bytes injected since the last initialisation or reset
+ * call is returned. The context is not modified.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param out destination buffer for the running state.
+ * \return the injected total byte length.
+ */
+uint64_t br_sha512_state(const br_sha512_context *ctx, void *out);
+#else
+#define br_sha512_state br_sha384_state
+#endif
+
+#ifdef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+/**
+ * \brief Restore SHA-512 running state.
+ *
+ * The running state for SHA-512 is set to the provided values.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param stb source buffer for the running state.
+ * \param count the injected total byte length.
+ */
+void br_sha512_set_state(br_sha512_context *ctx,
+ const void *stb, uint64_t count);
+#else
+#define br_sha512_set_state br_sha384_set_state
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * "md5sha1" is a special hash function that computes both MD5 and SHA-1
+ * on the same input, and produces a 36-byte output (MD5 and SHA-1
+ * concatenation, in that order). State size is also 36 bytes.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Symbolic identifier for MD5+SHA-1.
+ *
+ * MD5+SHA-1 is the concatenation of MD5 and SHA-1, computed over the
+ * same input. It is not one of the functions identified in TLS, so
+ * we give it a symbolic identifier of value 0.
+ */
+#define br_md5sha1_ID 0
+
+/**
+ * \brief MD5+SHA-1 output size (in bytes).
+ */
+#define br_md5sha1_SIZE 36
+
+/**
+ * \brief Constant vtable for MD5+SHA-1.
+ */
+extern const br_hash_class br_md5sha1_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief MD5+SHA-1 context.
+ *
+ * First field is a pointer to the vtable; it is set by the initialisation
+ * function. Other fields are not supposed to be accessed by user code.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /**
+ * \brief Pointer to vtable for this context.
+ */
+ const br_hash_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+ uint64_t count;
+ uint32_t val_md5[4];
+ uint32_t val_sha1[5];
+#endif
+} br_md5sha1_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief MD5+SHA-1 context initialisation.
+ *
+ * This function initialises or resets a context for a new SHA-512
+ * computation. It also sets the vtable pointer.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ */
+void br_md5sha1_init(br_md5sha1_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Inject some data bytes in a running MD5+SHA-1 computation.
+ *
+ * The provided context is updated with some data bytes. If the number
+ * of bytes (`len`) is zero, then the data pointer (`data`) is ignored
+ * and may be `NULL`, and this function does nothing.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param data pointer to the injected data.
+ * \param len injected data length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_md5sha1_update(br_md5sha1_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute MD5+SHA-1 output.
+ *
+ * The MD5+SHA-1 output for the concatenation of all bytes injected in the
+ * provided context since the last initialisation or reset call, is
+ * computed and written in the buffer pointed to by `out`. The context
+ * itself is not modified, so extra bytes may be injected afterwards
+ * to continue that computation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param out destination buffer for the hash output.
+ */
+void br_md5sha1_out(const br_md5sha1_context *ctx, void *out);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Save MD5+SHA-1 running state.
+ *
+ * The running state for MD5+SHA-1 (output of the last internal block
+ * processing) is written in the buffer pointed to by `out`. The
+ * number of bytes injected since the last initialisation or reset
+ * call is returned. The context is not modified.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param out destination buffer for the running state.
+ * \return the injected total byte length.
+ */
+uint64_t br_md5sha1_state(const br_md5sha1_context *ctx, void *out);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Restore MD5+SHA-1 running state.
+ *
+ * The running state for MD5+SHA-1 is set to the provided values.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param stb source buffer for the running state.
+ * \param count the injected total byte length.
+ */
+void br_md5sha1_set_state(br_md5sha1_context *ctx,
+ const void *stb, uint64_t count);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Aggregate context for configurable hash function support.
+ *
+ * The `br_hash_compat_context` type is a type which is large enough to
+ * serve as context for all standard hash functions defined above.
+ */
+typedef union {
+ const br_hash_class *vtable;
+ br_md5_context md5;
+ br_sha1_context sha1;
+ br_sha224_context sha224;
+ br_sha256_context sha256;
+ br_sha384_context sha384;
+ br_sha512_context sha512;
+ br_md5sha1_context md5sha1;
+} br_hash_compat_context;
+
+/*
+ * The multi-hasher is a construct that handles hashing of the same input
+ * data with several hash functions, with a single shared input buffer.
+ * It can handle MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512
+ * simultaneously, though which functions are activated depends on
+ * the set implementation pointers.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Multi-hasher context structure.
+ *
+ * The multi-hasher runs up to six hash functions in the standard TLS list
+ * (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512) in parallel, over
+ * the same input.
+ *
+ * The multi-hasher does _not_ follow the OOP structure with a vtable.
+ * Instead, it is configured with the vtables of the hash functions it
+ * should run. Structure fields are not supposed to be accessed directly.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ unsigned char buf[128];
+ uint64_t count;
+ uint32_t val_32[25];
+ uint64_t val_64[16];
+ const br_hash_class *impl[6];
+#endif
+} br_multihash_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Clear a multi-hasher context.
+ *
+ * This should always be called once on a given context, _before_ setting
+ * the implementation pointers.
+ *
+ * \param ctx the multi-hasher context.
+ */
+void br_multihash_zero(br_multihash_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set a hash function implementation.
+ *
+ * Implementations shall be set _after_ clearing the context (with
+ * `br_multihash_zero()`) but _before_ initialising the computation
+ * (with `br_multihash_init()`). The hash function implementation
+ * MUST be one of the standard hash functions (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224,
+ * SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512); it may also be `NULL` to remove
+ * an implementation from the multi-hasher.
+ *
+ * \param ctx the multi-hasher context.
+ * \param id the hash function symbolic identifier.
+ * \param impl the hash function vtable, or `NULL`.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_multihash_setimpl(br_multihash_context *ctx,
+ int id, const br_hash_class *impl)
+{
+ /*
+ * This code relies on hash functions ID being values 1 to 6,
+ * in the MD5 to SHA-512 order.
+ */
+ ctx->impl[id - 1] = impl;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get a hash function implementation.
+ *
+ * This function returns the currently configured vtable for a given
+ * hash function (by symbolic ID). If no such function was configured in
+ * the provided multi-hasher context, then this function returns `NULL`.
+ *
+ * \param ctx the multi-hasher context.
+ * \param id the hash function symbolic identifier.
+ * \return the hash function vtable, or `NULL`.
+ */
+static inline const br_hash_class *
+br_multihash_getimpl(const br_multihash_context *ctx, int id)
+{
+ return ctx->impl[id - 1];
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Reset a multi-hasher context.
+ *
+ * This function prepares the context for a new hashing computation,
+ * for all implementations configured at that point.
+ *
+ * \param ctx the multi-hasher context.
+ */
+void br_multihash_init(br_multihash_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Inject some data bytes in a running multi-hashing computation.
+ *
+ * The provided context is updated with some data bytes. If the number
+ * of bytes (`len`) is zero, then the data pointer (`data`) is ignored
+ * and may be `NULL`, and this function does nothing.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param data pointer to the injected data.
+ * \param len injected data length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_multihash_update(br_multihash_context *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute a hash output from a multi-hasher.
+ *
+ * The hash output for the concatenation of all bytes injected in the
+ * provided context since the last initialisation or reset call, is
+ * computed and written in the buffer pointed to by `dst`. The hash
+ * function to use is identified by `id` and must be one of the standard
+ * hash functions. If that hash function was indeed configured in the
+ * multi-hasher context, the corresponding hash value is written in
+ * `dst` and its length (in bytes) is returned. If the hash function
+ * was _not_ configured, then nothing is written in `dst` and 0 is
+ * returned.
+ *
+ * The context itself is not modified, so extra bytes may be injected
+ * afterwards to continue the hash computations.
+ *
+ * \param ctx pointer to the context structure.
+ * \param id the hash function symbolic identifier.
+ * \param dst destination buffer for the hash output.
+ * \return the hash output length (in bytes), or 0.
+ */
+size_t br_multihash_out(const br_multihash_context *ctx, int id, void *dst);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for a GHASH implementation.
+ *
+ * GHASH is a sort of keyed hash meant to be used to implement GCM in
+ * combination with a block cipher (with 16-byte blocks).
+ *
+ * The `y` array has length 16 bytes and is used for input and output; in
+ * a complete GHASH run, it starts with an all-zero value. `h` is a 16-byte
+ * value that serves as key (it is derived from the encryption key in GCM,
+ * using the block cipher). The data length (`len`) is expressed in bytes.
+ * The `y` array is updated.
+ *
+ * If the data length is not a multiple of 16, then the data is implicitly
+ * padded with zeros up to the next multiple of 16. Thus, when using GHASH
+ * in GCM, this method may be called twice, for the associated data and
+ * for the ciphertext, respectively; the zero-padding implements exactly
+ * the GCM rules.
+ *
+ * \param y the array to update.
+ * \param h the GHASH key.
+ * \param data the input data (may be `NULL` if `len` is zero).
+ * \param len the input data length (in bytes).
+ */
+typedef void (*br_ghash)(void *y, const void *h, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief GHASH implementation using multiplications (mixed 32-bit).
+ *
+ * This implementation uses multiplications of 32-bit values, with a
+ * 64-bit result. It is constant-time (if multiplications are
+ * constant-time).
+ *
+ * \param y the array to update.
+ * \param h the GHASH key.
+ * \param data the input data (may be `NULL` if `len` is zero).
+ * \param len the input data length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_ghash_ctmul(void *y, const void *h, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief GHASH implementation using multiplications (strict 32-bit).
+ *
+ * This implementation uses multiplications of 32-bit values, with a
+ * 32-bit result. It is usually somewhat slower than `br_ghash_ctmul()`,
+ * but it is expected to be faster on architectures for which the
+ * 32-bit multiplication opcode does not yield the upper 32 bits of the
+ * product. It is constant-time (if multiplications are constant-time).
+ *
+ * \param y the array to update.
+ * \param h the GHASH key.
+ * \param data the input data (may be `NULL` if `len` is zero).
+ * \param len the input data length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_ghash_ctmul32(void *y, const void *h, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief GHASH implementation using multiplications (64-bit).
+ *
+ * This implementation uses multiplications of 64-bit values, with a
+ * 64-bit result. It is constant-time (if multiplications are
+ * constant-time). It is substantially faster than `br_ghash_ctmul()`
+ * and `br_ghash_ctmul32()` on most 64-bit architectures.
+ *
+ * \param y the array to update.
+ * \param h the GHASH key.
+ * \param data the input data (may be `NULL` if `len` is zero).
+ * \param len the input data length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_ghash_ctmul64(void *y, const void *h, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief GHASH implementation using the `pclmulqdq` opcode (part of the
+ * AES-NI instructions).
+ *
+ * This implementation is available only on x86 platforms where the
+ * compiler supports the relevant intrinsic functions. Even if the
+ * compiler supports these functions, the local CPU might not support
+ * the `pclmulqdq` opcode, meaning that a call will fail with an
+ * illegal instruction exception. To safely obtain a pointer to this
+ * function when supported (or 0 otherwise), use `br_ghash_pclmul_get()`.
+ *
+ * \param y the array to update.
+ * \param h the GHASH key.
+ * \param data the input data (may be `NULL` if `len` is zero).
+ * \param len the input data length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_ghash_pclmul(void *y, const void *h, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Obtain the `pclmul` GHASH implementation, if available.
+ *
+ * If the `pclmul` implementation was compiled in the library (depending
+ * on the compiler abilities) _and_ the local CPU appears to support the
+ * opcode, then this function will return a pointer to the
+ * `br_ghash_pclmul()` function. Otherwise, it will return `0`.
+ *
+ * \return the `pclmul` GHASH implementation, or `0`.
+ */
+br_ghash br_ghash_pclmul_get(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief GHASH implementation using the POWER8 opcodes.
+ *
+ * This implementation is available only on POWER8 platforms (and later).
+ * To safely obtain a pointer to this function when supported (or 0
+ * otherwise), use `br_ghash_pwr8_get()`.
+ *
+ * \param y the array to update.
+ * \param h the GHASH key.
+ * \param data the input data (may be `NULL` if `len` is zero).
+ * \param len the input data length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_ghash_pwr8(void *y, const void *h, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Obtain the `pwr8` GHASH implementation, if available.
+ *
+ * If the `pwr8` implementation was compiled in the library (depending
+ * on the compiler abilities) _and_ the local CPU appears to support the
+ * opcode, then this function will return a pointer to the
+ * `br_ghash_pwr8()` function. Otherwise, it will return `0`.
+ *
+ * \return the `pwr8` GHASH implementation, or `0`.
+ */
+br_ghash br_ghash_pwr8_get(void);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_hmac.h b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_hmac.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4dc01ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_hmac.h
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BR_BEARSSL_HMAC_H__
+#define BR_BEARSSL_HMAC_H__
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "bearssl_hash.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** \file bearssl_hmac.h
+ *
+ * # HMAC
+ *
+ * HMAC is initialized with a key and an underlying hash function; it
+ * then fills a "key context". That context contains the processed
+ * key.
+ *
+ * With the key context, a HMAC context can be initialized to process
+ * the input bytes and obtain the MAC output. The key context is not
+ * modified during that process, and can be reused.
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT: HMAC shall be used only with functions that have the
+ * following properties:
+ *
+ * - hash output size does not exceed 64 bytes;
+ * - hash internal state size does not exceed 64 bytes;
+ * - internal block length is a power of 2 between 16 and 256 bytes.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief HMAC key context.
+ *
+ * The HMAC key context is initialised with a hash function implementation
+ * and a secret key. Contents are opaque (callers should not access them
+ * directly). The caller is responsible for allocating the context where
+ * appropriate. Context initialisation and usage incurs no dynamic
+ * allocation, so there is no release function.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ const br_hash_class *dig_vtable;
+ unsigned char ksi[64], kso[64];
+#endif
+} br_hmac_key_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief HMAC key context initialisation.
+ *
+ * Initialise the key context with the provided key, using the hash function
+ * identified by `digest_vtable`. This supports arbitrary key lengths.
+ *
+ * \param kc HMAC key context to initialise.
+ * \param digest_vtable pointer to the hash function implementation vtable.
+ * \param key pointer to the HMAC secret key.
+ * \param key_len HMAC secret key length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_hmac_key_init(br_hmac_key_context *kc,
+ const br_hash_class *digest_vtable, const void *key, size_t key_len);
+
+/*
+ * \brief Get the underlying hash function.
+ *
+ * This function returns a pointer to the implementation vtable of the
+ * hash function used for this HMAC key context.
+ *
+ * \param kc HMAC key context.
+ * \return the hash function implementation.
+ */
+static inline const br_hash_class *br_hmac_key_get_digest(
+ const br_hmac_key_context *kc)
+{
+ return kc->dig_vtable;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief HMAC computation context.
+ *
+ * The HMAC computation context maintains the state for a single HMAC
+ * computation. It is modified as input bytes are injected. The context
+ * is caller-allocated and has no release function since it does not
+ * dynamically allocate external resources. Its contents are opaque.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ br_hash_compat_context dig;
+ unsigned char kso[64];
+ size_t out_len;
+#endif
+} br_hmac_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief HMAC computation initialisation.
+ *
+ * Initialise a HMAC context with a key context. The key context is
+ * unmodified. Relevant data from the key context is immediately copied;
+ * the key context can thus be independently reused, modified or released
+ * without impacting this HMAC computation.
+ *
+ * An explicit output length can be specified; the actual output length
+ * will be the minimum of that value and the natural HMAC output length.
+ * If `out_len` is 0, then the natural HMAC output length is selected. The
+ * "natural output length" is the output length of the underlying hash
+ * function.
+ *
+ * \param ctx HMAC context to initialise.
+ * \param kc HMAC key context (already initialised with the key).
+ * \param out_len HMAC output length (0 to select "natural length").
+ */
+void br_hmac_init(br_hmac_context *ctx,
+ const br_hmac_key_context *kc, size_t out_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the HMAC output size.
+ *
+ * The HMAC output size is the number of bytes that will actually be
+ * produced with `br_hmac_out()` with the provided context. This function
+ * MUST NOT be called on a non-initialised HMAC computation context.
+ * The returned value is the minimum of the HMAC natural length (output
+ * size of the underlying hash function) and the `out_len` parameter which
+ * was used with the last `br_hmac_init()` call on that context (if the
+ * initialisation `out_len` parameter was 0, then this function will
+ * return the HMAC natural length).
+ *
+ * \param ctx the (already initialised) HMAC computation context.
+ * \return the HMAC actual output size.
+ */
+static inline size_t
+br_hmac_size(br_hmac_context *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->out_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * \brief Get the underlying hash function.
+ *
+ * This function returns a pointer to the implementation vtable of the
+ * hash function used for this HMAC context.
+ *
+ * \param hc HMAC context.
+ * \return the hash function implementation.
+ */
+static inline const br_hash_class *br_hmac_get_digest(
+ const br_hmac_context *hc)
+{
+ return hc->dig.vtable;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Inject some bytes in HMAC.
+ *
+ * The provided `len` bytes are injected as extra input in the HMAC
+ * computation incarnated by the `ctx` HMAC context. It is acceptable
+ * that `len` is zero, in which case `data` is ignored (and may be
+ * `NULL`) and this function does nothing.
+ */
+void br_hmac_update(br_hmac_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute the HMAC output.
+ *
+ * The destination buffer MUST be large enough to accommodate the result;
+ * its length is at most the "natural length" of HMAC (i.e. the output
+ * length of the underlying hash function). The context is NOT modified;
+ * further bytes may be processed. Thus, "partial HMAC" values can be
+ * efficiently obtained.
+ *
+ * Returned value is the output length (in bytes).
+ *
+ * \param ctx HMAC computation context.
+ * \param out destination buffer for the HMAC output.
+ * \return the produced value length (in bytes).
+ */
+size_t br_hmac_out(const br_hmac_context *ctx, void *out);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Constant-time HMAC computation.
+ *
+ * This function compute the HMAC output in constant time. Some extra
+ * input bytes are processed, then the output is computed. The extra
+ * input consists in the `len` bytes pointed to by `data`. The `len`
+ * parameter must lie between `min_len` and `max_len` (inclusive);
+ * `max_len` bytes are actually read from `data`. Computing time (and
+ * memory access pattern) will not depend upon the data byte contents or
+ * the value of `len`.
+ *
+ * The output is written in the `out` buffer, that MUST be large enough
+ * to receive it.
+ *
+ * The difference `max_len - min_len` MUST be less than 2<sup>30</sup>
+ * (i.e. about one gigabyte).
+ *
+ * This function computes the output properly only if the underlying
+ * hash function uses MD padding (i.e. MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
+ * SHA-384 or SHA-512).
+ *
+ * The provided context is NOT modified.
+ *
+ * \param ctx the (already initialised) HMAC computation context.
+ * \param data the extra input bytes.
+ * \param len the extra input length (in bytes).
+ * \param min_len minimum extra input length (in bytes).
+ * \param max_len maximum extra input length (in bytes).
+ * \param out destination buffer for the HMAC output.
+ * \return the produced value length (in bytes).
+ */
+size_t br_hmac_outCT(const br_hmac_context *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
+ void *out);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_kdf.h b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_kdf.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..955b843
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_kdf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BR_BEARSSL_KDF_H__
+#define BR_BEARSSL_KDF_H__
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "bearssl_hash.h"
+#include "bearssl_hmac.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** \file bearssl_kdf.h
+ *
+ * # Key Derivation Functions
+ *
+ * KDF are functions that takes a variable length input, and provide a
+ * variable length output, meant to be used to derive subkeys from a
+ * master key.
+ *
+ * ## HKDF
+ *
+ * HKDF is a KDF defined by [RFC 5869](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869).
+ * It is based on HMAC, itself using an underlying hash function. Any
+ * hash function can be used, as long as it is compatible with the rules
+ * for the HMAC implementation (i.e. output size is 64 bytes or less, hash
+ * internal state size is 64 bytes or less, and the internal block length is
+ * a power of 2 between 16 and 256 bytes). HKDF has two phases:
+ *
+ * - HKDF-Extract: the input data in ingested, along with a "salt" value.
+ *
+ * - HKDF-Expand: the output is produced, from the result of processing
+ * the input and salt, and using an extra non-secret parameter called
+ * "info".
+ *
+ * The "salt" and "info" strings are non-secret and can be empty. Their role
+ * is normally to bind the input and output, respectively, to conventional
+ * identifiers that qualifu them within the used protocol or application.
+ *
+ * The implementation defined in this file uses the following functions:
+ *
+ * - `br_hkdf_init()`: initialize an HKDF context, with a hash function,
+ * and the salt. This starts the HKDF-Extract process.
+ *
+ * - `br_hkdf_inject()`: inject more input bytes. This function may be
+ * called repeatedly if the input data is provided by chunks.
+ *
+ * - `br_hkdf_flip()`: end the HKDF-Extract process, and start the
+ * HKDF-Expand process.
+ *
+ * - `br_hkdf_produce()`: get the next bytes of output. This function
+ * may be called several times to obtain the full output by chunks.
+ * For correct HKDF processing, the same "info" string must be
+ * provided for each call.
+ *
+ * Note that the HKDF total output size (the number of bytes that
+ * HKDF-Expand is willing to produce) is limited: if the hash output size
+ * is _n_ bytes, then the maximum output size is _255*n_.
+ *
+ * ## SHAKE
+ *
+ * SHAKE is defined in
+ * [FIPS 202](https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/202/final)
+ * under two versions: SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, offering an alleged
+ * "security level" of 128 and 256 bits, respectively (SHAKE128 is
+ * about 20 to 25% faster than SHAKE256). SHAKE internally relies on
+ * the Keccak family of sponge functions, not on any externally provided
+ * hash function. Contrary to HKDF, SHAKE does not have a concept of
+ * either a "salt" or an "info" string. The API consists in four
+ * functions:
+ *
+ * - `br_shake_init()`: initialize a SHAKE context for a given
+ * security level.
+ *
+ * - `br_shake_inject()`: inject more input bytes. This function may be
+ * called repeatedly if the input data is provided by chunks.
+ *
+ * - `br_shake_flip()`: end the data injection process, and start the
+ * data production process.
+ *
+ * - `br_shake_produce()`: get the next bytes of output. This function
+ * may be called several times to obtain the full output by chunks.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief HKDF context.
+ *
+ * The HKDF context is initialized with a hash function implementation
+ * and a salt value. Contents are opaque (callers should not access them
+ * directly). The caller is responsible for allocating the context where
+ * appropriate. Context initialisation and usage incurs no dynamic
+ * allocation, so there is no release function.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ union {
+ br_hmac_context hmac_ctx;
+ br_hmac_key_context prk_ctx;
+ } u;
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+ size_t ptr;
+ size_t dig_len;
+ unsigned chunk_num;
+#endif
+} br_hkdf_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief HKDF context initialization.
+ *
+ * The underlying hash function and salt value are provided. Arbitrary
+ * salt lengths can be used.
+ *
+ * HKDF makes a difference between a salt of length zero, and an
+ * absent salt (the latter being equivalent to a salt consisting of
+ * bytes of value zero, of the same length as the hash function output).
+ * If `salt_len` is zero, then this function assumes that the salt is
+ * present but of length zero. To specify an _absent_ salt, use
+ * `BR_HKDF_NO_SALT` as `salt` parameter (`salt_len` is then ignored).
+ *
+ * \param hc HKDF context to initialise.
+ * \param digest_vtable pointer to the hash function implementation vtable.
+ * \param salt HKDF-Extract salt.
+ * \param salt_len HKDF-Extract salt length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_hkdf_init(br_hkdf_context *hc, const br_hash_class *digest_vtable,
+ const void *salt, size_t salt_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief The special "absent salt" value for HKDF.
+ */
+#define BR_HKDF_NO_SALT (&br_hkdf_no_salt)
+
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+extern const unsigned char br_hkdf_no_salt;
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief HKDF input injection (HKDF-Extract).
+ *
+ * This function injects some more input bytes ("key material") into
+ * HKDF. This function may be called several times, after `br_hkdf_init()`
+ * but before `br_hkdf_flip()`.
+ *
+ * \param hc HKDF context.
+ * \param ikm extra input bytes.
+ * \param ikm_len number of extra input bytes.
+ */
+void br_hkdf_inject(br_hkdf_context *hc, const void *ikm, size_t ikm_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief HKDF switch to the HKDF-Expand phase.
+ *
+ * This call terminates the HKDF-Extract process (input injection), and
+ * starts the HKDF-Expand process (output production).
+ *
+ * \param hc HKDF context.
+ */
+void br_hkdf_flip(br_hkdf_context *hc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief HKDF output production (HKDF-Expand).
+ *
+ * Produce more output bytes from the current state. This function may be
+ * called several times, but only after `br_hkdf_flip()`.
+ *
+ * Returned value is the number of actually produced bytes. The total
+ * output length is limited to 255 times the output length of the
+ * underlying hash function.
+ *
+ * \param hc HKDF context.
+ * \param info application specific information string.
+ * \param info_len application specific information string length (in bytes).
+ * \param out destination buffer for the HKDF output.
+ * \param out_len the length of the requested output (in bytes).
+ * \return the produced output length (in bytes).
+ */
+size_t br_hkdf_produce(br_hkdf_context *hc,
+ const void *info, size_t info_len, void *out, size_t out_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHAKE context.
+ *
+ * The HKDF context is initialized with a "security level". The internal
+ * notion is called "capacity"; the capacity is twice the security level
+ * (for instance, SHAKE128 has capacity 256).
+ *
+ * The caller is responsible for allocating the context where
+ * appropriate. Context initialisation and usage incurs no dynamic
+ * allocation, so there is no release function.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ unsigned char dbuf[200];
+ size_t dptr;
+ size_t rate;
+ uint64_t A[25];
+#endif
+} br_shake_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHAKE context initialization.
+ *
+ * The context is initialized for the provided "security level".
+ * Internally, this sets the "capacity" to twice the security level;
+ * thus, for SHAKE128, the `security_level` parameter should be 128,
+ * which corresponds to a 256-bit capacity.
+ *
+ * Allowed security levels are all multiples of 32, from 32 to 768,
+ * inclusive. Larger security levels imply lower performance; levels
+ * beyond 256 bits don't make much sense. Standard levels are 128
+ * and 256 bits (for SHAKE128 and SHAKE256, respectively).
+ *
+ * \param sc SHAKE context to initialise.
+ * \param security_level security level (in bits).
+ */
+void br_shake_init(br_shake_context *sc, int security_level);
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHAKE input injection.
+ *
+ * This function injects some more input bytes ("key material") into
+ * SHAKE. This function may be called several times, after `br_shake_init()`
+ * but before `br_shake_flip()`.
+ *
+ * \param sc SHAKE context.
+ * \param data extra input bytes.
+ * \param len number of extra input bytes.
+ */
+void br_shake_inject(br_shake_context *sc, const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHAKE switch to production phase.
+ *
+ * This call terminates the input injection process, and starts the
+ * output production process.
+ *
+ * \param sc SHAKE context.
+ */
+void br_shake_flip(br_shake_context *hc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHAKE output production.
+ *
+ * Produce more output bytes from the current state. This function may be
+ * called several times, but only after `br_shake_flip()`.
+ *
+ * There is no practical limit to the number of bytes that may be produced.
+ *
+ * \param sc SHAKE context.
+ * \param out destination buffer for the SHAKE output.
+ * \param len the length of the requested output (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_shake_produce(br_shake_context *sc, void *out, size_t len);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_pem.h b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_pem.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8dba582
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_pem.h
@@ -0,0 +1,294 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BR_BEARSSL_PEM_H__
+#define BR_BEARSSL_PEM_H__
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** \file bearssl_pem.h
+ *
+ * # PEM Support
+ *
+ * PEM is a traditional encoding layer use to store binary objects (in
+ * particular X.509 certificates, and private keys) in text files. While
+ * the acronym comes from an old, defunct standard ("Privacy Enhanced
+ * Mail"), the format has been reused, with some variations, by many
+ * systems, and is a _de facto_ standard, even though it is not, actually,
+ * specified in all clarity anywhere.
+ *
+ * ## Format Details
+ *
+ * BearSSL contains a generic, streamed PEM decoder, which handles the
+ * following format:
+ *
+ * - The input source (a sequence of bytes) is assumed to be the
+ * encoding of a text file in an ASCII-compatible charset. This
+ * includes ISO-8859-1, Windows-1252, and UTF-8 encodings. Each
+ * line ends on a newline character (U+000A LINE FEED). The
+ * U+000D CARRIAGE RETURN characters are ignored, so the code
+ * accepts both Windows-style and Unix-style line endings.
+ *
+ * - Each object begins with a banner that occurs at the start of
+ * a line; the first banner characters are "`-----BEGIN `" (five
+ * dashes, the word "BEGIN", and a space). The banner matching is
+ * not case-sensitive.
+ *
+ * - The _object name_ consists in the characters that follow the
+ * banner start sequence, up to the end of the line, but without
+ * trailing dashes (in "normal" PEM, there are five trailing
+ * dashes, but this implementation is not picky about these dashes).
+ * The BearSSL decoder normalises the name characters to uppercase
+ * (for ASCII letters only) and accepts names up to 127 characters.
+ *
+ * - The object ends with a banner that again occurs at the start of
+ * a line, and starts with "`-----END `" (again case-insensitive).
+ *
+ * - Between that start and end banner, only Base64 data shall occur.
+ * Base64 converts each sequence of three bytes into four
+ * characters; the four characters are ASCII letters, digits, "`+`"
+ * or "`-`" signs, and one or two "`=`" signs may occur in the last
+ * quartet. Whitespace is ignored (whitespace is any ASCII character
+ * of code 32 or less, so control characters are whitespace) and
+ * lines may have arbitrary length; the only restriction is that the
+ * four characters of a quartet must appear on the same line (no
+ * line break inside a quartet).
+ *
+ * - A single file may contain more than one PEM object. Bytes that
+ * occur between objects are ignored.
+ *
+ *
+ * ## PEM Decoder API
+ *
+ * The PEM decoder offers a state-machine API. The caller allocates a
+ * decoder context, then injects source bytes. Source bytes are pushed
+ * with `br_pem_decoder_push()`. The decoder stops accepting bytes when
+ * it reaches an "event", which is either the start of an object, the
+ * end of an object, or a decoding error within an object.
+ *
+ * The `br_pem_decoder_event()` function is used to obtain the current
+ * event; it also clears it, thus allowing the decoder to accept more
+ * bytes. When a object start event is raised, the decoder context
+ * offers the found object name (normalised to ASCII uppercase).
+ *
+ * When an object is reached, the caller must set an appropriate callback
+ * function, which will receive (by chunks) the decoded object data.
+ *
+ * Since the decoder context makes no dynamic allocation, it requires
+ * no explicit deallocation.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief PEM decoder context.
+ *
+ * Contents are opaque (they should not be accessed directly).
+ */
+typedef struct {
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ /* CPU for the T0 virtual machine. */
+ struct {
+ uint32_t *dp;
+ uint32_t *rp;
+ const unsigned char *ip;
+ } cpu;
+ uint32_t dp_stack[32];
+ uint32_t rp_stack[32];
+ int err;
+
+ const unsigned char *hbuf;
+ size_t hlen;
+
+ void (*dest)(void *dest_ctx, const void *src, size_t len);
+ void *dest_ctx;
+
+ unsigned char event;
+ char name[128];
+ unsigned char buf[255];
+ size_t ptr;
+#endif
+} br_pem_decoder_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialise a PEM decoder structure.
+ *
+ * \param ctx decoder context to initialise.
+ */
+void br_pem_decoder_init(br_pem_decoder_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Push some bytes into the decoder.
+ *
+ * Returned value is the number of bytes actually consumed; this may be
+ * less than the number of provided bytes if an event is raised. When an
+ * event is raised, it must be read (with `br_pem_decoder_event()`);
+ * until the event is read, this function will return 0.
+ *
+ * \param ctx decoder context.
+ * \param data new data bytes.
+ * \param len number of new data bytes.
+ * \return the number of bytes actually received (may be less than `len`).
+ */
+size_t br_pem_decoder_push(br_pem_decoder_context *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the receiver for decoded data.
+ *
+ * When an object is entered, the provided function (with opaque context
+ * pointer) will be called repeatedly with successive chunks of decoded
+ * data for that object. If `dest` is set to 0, then decoded data is
+ * simply ignored. The receiver can be set at any time, but, in practice,
+ * it should be called immediately after receiving a "start of object"
+ * event.
+ *
+ * \param ctx decoder context.
+ * \param dest callback for receiving decoded data.
+ * \param dest_ctx opaque context pointer for the `dest` callback.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_pem_decoder_setdest(br_pem_decoder_context *ctx,
+ void (*dest)(void *dest_ctx, const void *src, size_t len),
+ void *dest_ctx)
+{
+ ctx->dest = dest;
+ ctx->dest_ctx = dest_ctx;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the last event.
+ *
+ * If an event was raised, then this function returns the event value, and
+ * also clears it, thereby allowing the decoder to proceed. If no event
+ * was raised since the last call to `br_pem_decoder_event()`, then this
+ * function returns 0.
+ *
+ * \param ctx decoder context.
+ * \return the raised event, or 0.
+ */
+int br_pem_decoder_event(br_pem_decoder_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Event: start of object.
+ *
+ * This event is raised when the start of a new object has been detected.
+ * The object name (normalised to uppercase) can be accessed with
+ * `br_pem_decoder_name()`.
+ */
+#define BR_PEM_BEGIN_OBJ 1
+
+/**
+ * \brief Event: end of object.
+ *
+ * This event is raised when the end of the current object is reached
+ * (normally, i.e. with no decoding error).
+ */
+#define BR_PEM_END_OBJ 2
+
+/**
+ * \brief Event: decoding error.
+ *
+ * This event is raised when decoding fails within an object.
+ * This formally closes the current object and brings the decoder back
+ * to the "out of any object" state. The offending line in the source
+ * is consumed.
+ */
+#define BR_PEM_ERROR 3
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the name of the encountered object.
+ *
+ * The encountered object name is defined only when the "start of object"
+ * event is raised. That name is normalised to uppercase (for ASCII letters
+ * only) and does not include trailing dashes.
+ *
+ * \param ctx decoder context.
+ * \return the current object name.
+ */
+static inline const char *
+br_pem_decoder_name(br_pem_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->name;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encode an object in PEM.
+ *
+ * This function encodes the provided binary object (`data`, of length `len`
+ * bytes) into PEM. The `banner` text will be included in the header and
+ * footer (e.g. use `"CERTIFICATE"` to get a `"BEGIN CERTIFICATE"` header).
+ *
+ * The length (in characters) of the PEM output is returned; that length
+ * does NOT include the terminating zero, that this function nevertheless
+ * adds. If using the returned value for allocation purposes, the allocated
+ * buffer size MUST be at least one byte larger than the returned size.
+ *
+ * If `dest` is `NULL`, then the encoding does not happen; however, the
+ * length of the encoded object is still computed and returned.
+ *
+ * The `data` pointer may be `NULL` only if `len` is zero (when encoding
+ * an object of length zero, which is not very useful), or when `dest`
+ * is `NULL` (in that case, source data bytes are ignored).
+ *
+ * Some `flags` can be specified to alter the encoding behaviour:
+ *
+ * - If `BR_PEM_LINE64` is set, then line-breaking will occur after
+ * every 64 characters of output, instead of the default of 76.
+ *
+ * - If `BR_PEM_CRLF` is set, then end-of-line sequence will use
+ * CR+LF instead of a single LF.
+ *
+ * The `data` and `dest` buffers may overlap, in which case the source
+ * binary data is destroyed in the process. Note that the PEM-encoded output
+ * is always larger than the source binary.
+ *
+ * \param dest the destination buffer (or `NULL`).
+ * \param data the source buffer (can be `NULL` in some cases).
+ * \param len the source length (in bytes).
+ * \param banner the PEM banner expression.
+ * \param flags the behavioural flags.
+ * \return the PEM object length (in characters), EXCLUDING the final zero.
+ */
+size_t br_pem_encode(void *dest, const void *data, size_t len,
+ const char *banner, unsigned flags);
+
+/**
+ * \brief PEM encoding flag: split lines at 64 characters.
+ */
+#define BR_PEM_LINE64 0x0001
+
+/**
+ * \brief PEM encoding flag: use CR+LF line endings.
+ */
+#define BR_PEM_CRLF 0x0002
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_prf.h b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_prf.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fdf608c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_prf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BR_BEARSSL_PRF_H__
+#define BR_BEARSSL_PRF_H__
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** \file bearssl_prf.h
+ *
+ * # The TLS PRF
+ *
+ * The "PRF" is the pseudorandom function used internally during the
+ * SSL/TLS handshake, notably to expand negotiated shared secrets into
+ * the symmetric encryption keys that will be used to process the
+ * application data.
+ *
+ * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 define a PRF that is based on both MD5 and SHA-1. This
+ * is implemented by the `br_tls10_prf()` function.
+ *
+ * TLS 1.2 redefines the PRF, using an explicit hash function. The
+ * `br_tls12_sha256_prf()` and `br_tls12_sha384_prf()` functions apply that
+ * PRF with, respectively, SHA-256 and SHA-384. Most standard cipher suites
+ * rely on the SHA-256 based PRF, but some use SHA-384.
+ *
+ * The PRF always uses as input three parameters: a "secret" (some
+ * bytes), a "label" (ASCII string), and a "seed" (again some bytes). An
+ * arbitrary output length can be produced. The "seed" is provided as an
+ * arbitrary number of binary chunks, that gets internally concatenated.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for a seed chunk.
+ *
+ * Each chunk may have an arbitrary length, and may be empty (no byte at
+ * all). If the chunk length is zero, then the pointer to the chunk data
+ * may be `NULL`.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /**
+ * \brief Pointer to the chunk data.
+ */
+ const void *data;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Chunk length (in bytes).
+ */
+ size_t len;
+} br_tls_prf_seed_chunk;
+
+/**
+ * \brief PRF implementation for TLS 1.0 and 1.1.
+ *
+ * This PRF is the one specified by TLS 1.0 and 1.1. It internally uses
+ * MD5 and SHA-1.
+ *
+ * \param dst destination buffer.
+ * \param len output length (in bytes).
+ * \param secret secret value (key) for this computation.
+ * \param secret_len length of "secret" (in bytes).
+ * \param label PRF label (zero-terminated ASCII string).
+ * \param seed_num number of seed chunks.
+ * \param seed seed chnks for this computation (usually non-secret).
+ */
+void br_tls10_prf(void *dst, size_t len,
+ const void *secret, size_t secret_len, const char *label,
+ size_t seed_num, const br_tls_prf_seed_chunk *seed);
+
+/**
+ * \brief PRF implementation for TLS 1.2, with SHA-256.
+ *
+ * This PRF is the one specified by TLS 1.2, when the underlying hash
+ * function is SHA-256.
+ *
+ * \param dst destination buffer.
+ * \param len output length (in bytes).
+ * \param secret secret value (key) for this computation.
+ * \param secret_len length of "secret" (in bytes).
+ * \param label PRF label (zero-terminated ASCII string).
+ * \param seed_num number of seed chunks.
+ * \param seed seed chnks for this computation (usually non-secret).
+ */
+void br_tls12_sha256_prf(void *dst, size_t len,
+ const void *secret, size_t secret_len, const char *label,
+ size_t seed_num, const br_tls_prf_seed_chunk *seed);
+
+/**
+ * \brief PRF implementation for TLS 1.2, with SHA-384.
+ *
+ * This PRF is the one specified by TLS 1.2, when the underlying hash
+ * function is SHA-384.
+ *
+ * \param dst destination buffer.
+ * \param len output length (in bytes).
+ * \param secret secret value (key) for this computation.
+ * \param secret_len length of "secret" (in bytes).
+ * \param label PRF label (zero-terminated ASCII string).
+ * \param seed_num number of seed chunks.
+ * \param seed seed chnks for this computation (usually non-secret).
+ */
+void br_tls12_sha384_prf(void *dst, size_t len,
+ const void *secret, size_t secret_len, const char *label,
+ size_t seed_num, const br_tls_prf_seed_chunk *seed);
+
+/**
+ * brief A convenient type name for a PRF implementation.
+ *
+ * \param dst destination buffer.
+ * \param len output length (in bytes).
+ * \param secret secret value (key) for this computation.
+ * \param secret_len length of "secret" (in bytes).
+ * \param label PRF label (zero-terminated ASCII string).
+ * \param seed_num number of seed chunks.
+ * \param seed seed chnks for this computation (usually non-secret).
+ */
+typedef void (*br_tls_prf_impl)(void *dst, size_t len,
+ const void *secret, size_t secret_len, const char *label,
+ size_t seed_num, const br_tls_prf_seed_chunk *seed);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_rand.h b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_rand.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a9f544
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_rand.h
@@ -0,0 +1,397 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BR_BEARSSL_RAND_H__
+#define BR_BEARSSL_RAND_H__
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "bearssl_block.h"
+#include "bearssl_hash.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** \file bearssl_rand.h
+ *
+ * # Pseudo-Random Generators
+ *
+ * A PRNG is a state-based engine that outputs pseudo-random bytes on
+ * demand. It is initialized with an initial seed, and additional seed
+ * bytes can be added afterwards. Bytes produced depend on the seeds and
+ * also on the exact sequence of calls (including sizes requested for
+ * each call).
+ *
+ *
+ * ## Procedural and OOP API
+ *
+ * For the PRNG of name "`xxx`", two API are provided. The _procedural_
+ * API defined a context structure `br_xxx_context` and three functions:
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_init()`
+ *
+ * Initialise the context with an initial seed.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_generate()`
+ *
+ * Produce some pseudo-random bytes.
+ *
+ * - `br_xxx_update()`
+ *
+ * Inject some additional seed.
+ *
+ * The initialisation function sets the first context field (`vtable`)
+ * to a pointer to the vtable that supports the OOP API. The OOP API
+ * provides access to the same functions through function pointers,
+ * named `init()`, `generate()` and `update()`.
+ *
+ * Note that the context initialisation method may accept additional
+ * parameters, provided as a 'const void *' pointer at API level. These
+ * additional parameters depend on the implemented PRNG.
+ *
+ *
+ * ## HMAC_DRBG
+ *
+ * HMAC_DRBG is defined in [NIST SP 800-90A Revision
+ * 1](http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-90Ar1.pdf).
+ * It uses HMAC repeatedly, over some configurable underlying hash
+ * function. In BearSSL, it is implemented under the "`hmac_drbg`" name.
+ * The "extra parameters" pointer for context initialisation should be
+ * set to a pointer to the vtable for the underlying hash function (e.g.
+ * pointer to `br_sha256_vtable` to use HMAC_DRBG with SHA-256).
+ *
+ * According to the NIST standard, each request shall produce up to
+ * 2<sup>19</sup> bits (i.e. 64 kB of data); moreover, the context shall
+ * be reseeded at least once every 2<sup>48</sup> requests. This
+ * implementation does not maintain the reseed counter (the threshold is
+ * too high to be reached in practice) and does not object to producing
+ * more than 64 kB in a single request; thus, the code cannot fail,
+ * which corresponds to the fact that the API has no room for error
+ * codes. However, this implies that requesting more than 64 kB in one
+ * `generate()` request, or making more than 2<sup>48</sup> requests
+ * without reseeding, is formally out of NIST specification. There is
+ * no currently known security penalty for exceeding the NIST limits,
+ * and, in any case, HMAC_DRBG usage in implementing SSL/TLS always
+ * stays much below these thresholds.
+ *
+ *
+ * ## AESCTR_DRBG
+ *
+ * AESCTR_DRBG is a custom PRNG based on AES-128 in CTR mode. This is
+ * meant to be used only in situations where you are desperate for
+ * speed, and have an hardware-optimized AES/CTR implementation. Whether
+ * this will yield perceptible improvements depends on what you use the
+ * pseudorandom bytes for, and how many you want; for instance, RSA key
+ * pair generation uses a substantial amount of randomness, and using
+ * AESCTR_DRBG instead of HMAC_DRBG yields a 15 to 20% increase in key
+ * generation speed on a recent x86 CPU (Intel Core i7-6567U at 3.30 GHz).
+ *
+ * Internally, it uses CTR mode with successive counter values, starting
+ * at zero (counter value expressed over 128 bits, big-endian convention).
+ * The counter is not allowed to reach 32768; thus, every 32768*16 bytes
+ * at most, the `update()` function is run (on an empty seed, if none is
+ * provided). The `update()` function computes the new AES-128 key by
+ * applying a custom hash function to the concatenation of a state-dependent
+ * word (encryption of an all-one block with the current key) and the new
+ * seed. The custom hash function uses Hirose's construction over AES-256;
+ * see the comments in `aesctr_drbg.c` for details.
+ *
+ * This DRBG does not follow an existing standard, and thus should be
+ * considered as inadequate for production use until it has been properly
+ * analysed.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class type for PRNG implementations.
+ *
+ * A `br_prng_class` instance references the methods implementing a PRNG.
+ * Constant instances of this structure are defined for each implemented
+ * PRNG. Such instances are also called "vtables".
+ */
+typedef struct br_prng_class_ br_prng_class;
+struct br_prng_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Size (in bytes) of the context structure appropriate for
+ * running this PRNG.
+ */
+ size_t context_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Initialisation method.
+ *
+ * The context to initialise is provided as a pointer to its
+ * first field (the vtable pointer); this function sets that
+ * first field to a pointer to the vtable.
+ *
+ * The extra parameters depend on the implementation; each
+ * implementation defines what kind of extra parameters it
+ * expects (if any).
+ *
+ * Requirements on the initial seed depend on the implemented
+ * PRNG.
+ *
+ * \param ctx PRNG context to initialise.
+ * \param params extra parameters for the PRNG.
+ * \param seed initial seed.
+ * \param seed_len initial seed length (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*init)(const br_prng_class **ctx, const void *params,
+ const void *seed, size_t seed_len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Random bytes generation.
+ *
+ * This method produces `len` pseudorandom bytes, in the `out`
+ * buffer. The context is updated accordingly.
+ *
+ * \param ctx PRNG context.
+ * \param out output buffer.
+ * \param len number of pseudorandom bytes to produce.
+ */
+ void (*generate)(const br_prng_class **ctx, void *out, size_t len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Inject additional seed bytes.
+ *
+ * The provided seed bytes are added into the PRNG internal
+ * entropy pool.
+ *
+ * \param ctx PRNG context.
+ * \param seed additional seed.
+ * \param seed_len additional seed length (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*update)(const br_prng_class **ctx,
+ const void *seed, size_t seed_len);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for HMAC_DRBG.
+ *
+ * The context contents are opaque, except the first field, which
+ * supports OOP.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /**
+ * \brief Pointer to the vtable.
+ *
+ * This field is set with the initialisation method/function.
+ */
+ const br_prng_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ unsigned char K[64];
+ unsigned char V[64];
+ const br_hash_class *digest_class;
+#endif
+} br_hmac_drbg_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Statically allocated, constant vtable for HMAC_DRBG.
+ */
+extern const br_prng_class br_hmac_drbg_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief HMAC_DRBG initialisation.
+ *
+ * The context to initialise is provided as a pointer to its first field
+ * (the vtable pointer); this function sets that first field to a
+ * pointer to the vtable.
+ *
+ * The `seed` value is what is called, in NIST terminology, the
+ * concatenation of the "seed", "nonce" and "personalization string", in
+ * that order.
+ *
+ * The `digest_class` parameter defines the underlying hash function.
+ * Formally, the NIST standard specifies that the hash function shall
+ * be only SHA-1 or one of the SHA-2 functions. This implementation also
+ * works with any other implemented hash function (such as MD5), but
+ * this is non-standard and therefore not recommended.
+ *
+ * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to initialise.
+ * \param digest_class vtable for the underlying hash function.
+ * \param seed initial seed.
+ * \param seed_len initial seed length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_hmac_drbg_init(br_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const br_hash_class *digest_class, const void *seed, size_t seed_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Random bytes generation with HMAC_DRBG.
+ *
+ * This method produces `len` pseudorandom bytes, in the `out`
+ * buffer. The context is updated accordingly. Formally, requesting
+ * more than 65536 bytes in one request falls out of specification
+ * limits (but it won't fail).
+ *
+ * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context.
+ * \param out output buffer.
+ * \param len number of pseudorandom bytes to produce.
+ */
+void br_hmac_drbg_generate(br_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, void *out, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Inject additional seed bytes in HMAC_DRBG.
+ *
+ * The provided seed bytes are added into the HMAC_DRBG internal
+ * entropy pool. The process does not _replace_ existing entropy,
+ * thus pushing non-random bytes (i.e. bytes which are known to the
+ * attackers) does not degrade the overall quality of generated bytes.
+ *
+ * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context.
+ * \param seed additional seed.
+ * \param seed_len additional seed length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_hmac_drbg_update(br_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const void *seed, size_t seed_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the hash function implementation used by a given instance of
+ * HMAC_DRBG.
+ *
+ * This calls MUST NOT be performed on a context which was not
+ * previously initialised.
+ *
+ * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context.
+ * \return the hash function vtable.
+ */
+static inline const br_hash_class *
+br_hmac_drbg_get_hash(const br_hmac_drbg_context *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->digest_class;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for a provider of entropy seeds.
+ *
+ * A "seeder" is a function that is able to obtain random values from
+ * some source and inject them as entropy seed in a PRNG. A seeder
+ * shall guarantee that the total entropy of the injected seed is large
+ * enough to seed a PRNG for purposes of cryptographic key generation
+ * (i.e. at least 128 bits).
+ *
+ * A seeder may report a failure to obtain adequate entropy. Seeders
+ * shall endeavour to fix themselves transient errors by trying again;
+ * thus, callers may consider reported errors as permanent.
+ *
+ * \param ctx PRNG context to seed.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+typedef int (*br_prng_seeder)(const br_prng_class **ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get a seeder backed by the operating system or hardware.
+ *
+ * Get a seeder that feeds on RNG facilities provided by the current
+ * operating system or hardware. If no such facility is known, then 0
+ * is returned.
+ *
+ * If `name` is not `NULL`, then `*name` is set to a symbolic string
+ * that identifies the seeder implementation. If no seeder is returned
+ * and `name` is not `NULL`, then `*name` is set to a pointer to the
+ * constant string `"none"`.
+ *
+ * \param name receiver for seeder name, or `NULL`.
+ * \return the system seeder, if available, or 0.
+ */
+br_prng_seeder br_prng_seeder_system(const char **name);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for AESCTR_DRBG.
+ *
+ * The context contents are opaque, except the first field, which
+ * supports OOP.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /**
+ * \brief Pointer to the vtable.
+ *
+ * This field is set with the initialisation method/function.
+ */
+ const br_prng_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ br_aes_gen_ctr_keys sk;
+ uint32_t cc;
+#endif
+} br_aesctr_drbg_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Statically allocated, constant vtable for AESCTR_DRBG.
+ */
+extern const br_prng_class br_aesctr_drbg_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief AESCTR_DRBG initialisation.
+ *
+ * The context to initialise is provided as a pointer to its first field
+ * (the vtable pointer); this function sets that first field to a
+ * pointer to the vtable.
+ *
+ * The internal AES key is first set to the all-zero key; then, the
+ * `br_aesctr_drbg_update()` function is called with the provided `seed`.
+ * The call is performed even if the seed length (`seed_len`) is zero.
+ *
+ * The `aesctr` parameter defines the underlying AES/CTR implementation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx AESCTR_DRBG context to initialise.
+ * \param aesctr vtable for the AES/CTR implementation.
+ * \param seed initial seed (can be `NULL` if `seed_len` is zero).
+ * \param seed_len initial seed length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aesctr_drbg_init(br_aesctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const br_block_ctr_class *aesctr, const void *seed, size_t seed_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Random bytes generation with AESCTR_DRBG.
+ *
+ * This method produces `len` pseudorandom bytes, in the `out`
+ * buffer. The context is updated accordingly.
+ *
+ * \param ctx AESCTR_DRBG context.
+ * \param out output buffer.
+ * \param len number of pseudorandom bytes to produce.
+ */
+void br_aesctr_drbg_generate(br_aesctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ void *out, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Inject additional seed bytes in AESCTR_DRBG.
+ *
+ * The provided seed bytes are added into the AESCTR_DRBG internal
+ * entropy pool. The process does not _replace_ existing entropy,
+ * thus pushing non-random bytes (i.e. bytes which are known to the
+ * attackers) does not degrade the overall quality of generated bytes.
+ *
+ * \param ctx AESCTR_DRBG context.
+ * \param seed additional seed.
+ * \param seed_len additional seed length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_aesctr_drbg_update(br_aesctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const void *seed, size_t seed_len);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_rsa.h b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_rsa.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a069fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_rsa.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1655 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BR_BEARSSL_RSA_H__
+#define BR_BEARSSL_RSA_H__
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "bearssl_hash.h"
+#include "bearssl_rand.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** \file bearssl_rsa.h
+ *
+ * # RSA
+ *
+ * This file documents the RSA implementations provided with BearSSL.
+ * Note that the SSL engine accesses these implementations through a
+ * configurable API, so it is possible to, for instance, run a SSL
+ * server which uses a RSA engine which is not based on this code.
+ *
+ * ## Key Elements
+ *
+ * RSA public and private keys consist in lists of big integers. All
+ * such integers are represented with big-endian unsigned notation:
+ * first byte is the most significant, and the value is positive (so
+ * there is no dedicated "sign bit"). Public and private key structures
+ * thus contain, for each such integer, a pointer to the first value byte
+ * (`unsigned char *`), and a length (`size_t`) which is the number of
+ * relevant bytes. As a general rule, minimal-length encoding is not
+ * enforced: values may have extra leading bytes of value 0.
+ *
+ * RSA public keys consist in two integers:
+ *
+ * - the modulus (`n`);
+ * - the public exponent (`e`).
+ *
+ * RSA private keys, as defined in
+ * [PKCS#1](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447), contain eight integers:
+ *
+ * - the modulus (`n`);
+ * - the public exponent (`e`);
+ * - the private exponent (`d`);
+ * - the first prime factor (`p`);
+ * - the second prime factor (`q`);
+ * - the first reduced exponent (`dp`, which is `d` modulo `p-1`);
+ * - the second reduced exponent (`dq`, which is `d` modulo `q-1`);
+ * - the CRT coefficient (`iq`, the inverse of `q` modulo `p`).
+ *
+ * However, the implementations defined in BearSSL use only five of
+ * these integers: `p`, `q`, `dp`, `dq` and `iq`.
+ *
+ * ## Security Features and Limitations
+ *
+ * The implementations contained in BearSSL have the following limitations
+ * and features:
+ *
+ * - They are constant-time. This means that the execution time and
+ * memory access pattern may depend on the _lengths_ of the private
+ * key components, but not on their value, nor on the value of
+ * the operand. Note that this property is not achieved through
+ * random masking, but "true" constant-time code.
+ *
+ * - They support only private keys with two prime factors. RSA private
+ * keys with three or more prime factors are nominally supported, but
+ * rarely used; they may offer faster operations, at the expense of
+ * more code and potentially a reduction in security if there are
+ * "too many" prime factors.
+ *
+ * - The public exponent may have arbitrary length. Of course, it is
+ * a good idea to keep public exponents small, so that public key
+ * operations are fast; but, contrary to some widely deployed
+ * implementations, BearSSL has no problem with public exponents
+ * longer than 32 bits.
+ *
+ * - The two prime factors of the modulus need not have the same length
+ * (but severely imbalanced factor lengths might reduce security).
+ * Similarly, there is no requirement that the first factor (`p`)
+ * be greater than the second factor (`q`).
+ *
+ * - Prime factors and modulus must be smaller than a compile-time limit.
+ * This is made necessary by the use of fixed-size stack buffers, and
+ * the limit has been adjusted to keep stack usage under 2 kB for the
+ * RSA operations. Currently, the maximum modulus size is 4096 bits,
+ * and the maximum prime factor size is 2080 bits.
+ *
+ * - The RSA functions themselves do not enforce lower size limits,
+ * except that which is absolutely necessary for the operation to
+ * mathematically make sense (e.g. a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature with
+ * SHA-1 requires a modulus of at least 361 bits). It is up to users
+ * of this code to enforce size limitations when appropriate (e.g.
+ * the X.509 validation engine, by default, rejects RSA keys of
+ * less than 1017 bits).
+ *
+ * - Within the size constraints expressed above, arbitrary bit lengths
+ * are supported. There is no requirement that prime factors or
+ * modulus have a size multiple of 8 or 16.
+ *
+ * - When verifying PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures, both variants of the hash
+ * function identifying header (with and without the ASN.1 NULL) are
+ * supported. When producing such signatures, the variant with the
+ * ASN.1 NULL is used.
+ *
+ * ## Implementations
+ *
+ * Three RSA implementations are included:
+ *
+ * - The **i32** implementation internally represents big integers
+ * as arrays of 32-bit integers. It is perfunctory and portable,
+ * but not very efficient.
+ *
+ * - The **i31** implementation uses 32-bit integers, each containing
+ * 31 bits worth of integer data. The i31 implementation is somewhat
+ * faster than the i32 implementation (the reduced integer size makes
+ * carry propagation easier) for a similar code footprint, but uses
+ * very slightly larger stack buffers (about 4% bigger).
+ *
+ * - The **i62** implementation is similar to the i31 implementation,
+ * except that it internally leverages the 64x64->128 multiplication
+ * opcode. This implementation is available only on architectures
+ * where such an opcode exists. It is much faster than i31.
+ *
+ * - The **i15** implementation uses 16-bit integers, each containing
+ * 15 bits worth of integer data. Multiplication results fit on
+ * 32 bits, so this won't use the "widening" multiplication routine
+ * on ARM Cortex M0/M0+, for much better performance and constant-time
+ * execution.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA public key.
+ *
+ * The structure references the modulus and the public exponent. Both
+ * integers use unsigned big-endian representation; extra leading bytes
+ * of value 0 are allowed.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Modulus. */
+ unsigned char *n;
+ /** \brief Modulus length (in bytes). */
+ size_t nlen;
+ /** \brief Public exponent. */
+ unsigned char *e;
+ /** \brief Public exponent length (in bytes). */
+ size_t elen;
+} br_rsa_public_key;
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA private key.
+ *
+ * The structure references the private factors, reduced private
+ * exponents, and CRT coefficient. It also contains the bit length of
+ * the modulus. The big integers use unsigned big-endian representation;
+ * extra leading bytes of value 0 are allowed. However, the modulus bit
+ * length (`n_bitlen`) MUST be exact.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Modulus bit length (in bits, exact value). */
+ uint32_t n_bitlen;
+ /** \brief First prime factor. */
+ unsigned char *p;
+ /** \brief First prime factor length (in bytes). */
+ size_t plen;
+ /** \brief Second prime factor. */
+ unsigned char *q;
+ /** \brief Second prime factor length (in bytes). */
+ size_t qlen;
+ /** \brief First reduced private exponent. */
+ unsigned char *dp;
+ /** \brief First reduced private exponent length (in bytes). */
+ size_t dplen;
+ /** \brief Second reduced private exponent. */
+ unsigned char *dq;
+ /** \brief Second reduced private exponent length (in bytes). */
+ size_t dqlen;
+ /** \brief CRT coefficient. */
+ unsigned char *iq;
+ /** \brief CRT coefficient length (in bytes). */
+ size_t iqlen;
+} br_rsa_private_key;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for a RSA public key engine.
+ *
+ * The public key engine performs the modular exponentiation of the
+ * provided value with the public exponent. The value is modified in
+ * place.
+ *
+ * The value length (`xlen`) is verified to have _exactly_ the same
+ * length as the modulus (actual modulus length, without extra leading
+ * zeros in the modulus representation in memory). If the length does
+ * not match, then this function returns 0 and `x[]` is unmodified.
+ *
+ * It `xlen` is correct, then `x[]` is modified. Returned value is 1
+ * on success, 0 on error. Error conditions include an oversized `x[]`
+ * (the array has the same length as the modulus, but the numerical value
+ * is not lower than the modulus) and an invalid modulus (e.g. an even
+ * integer). If an error is reported, then the new contents of `x[]` are
+ * unspecified.
+ *
+ * \param x operand to exponentiate.
+ * \param xlen length of the operand (in bytes).
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+typedef uint32_t (*br_rsa_public)(unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for a RSA signature verification engine (PKCS#1 v1.5).
+ *
+ * Parameters are:
+ *
+ * - The signature itself. The provided array is NOT modified.
+ *
+ * - The encoded OID for the hash function. The provided array must begin
+ * with a single byte that contains the length of the OID value (in
+ * bytes), followed by exactly that many bytes. This parameter may
+ * also be `NULL`, in which case the raw hash value should be used
+ * with the PKCS#1 v1.5 "type 1" padding (as used in SSL/TLS up
+ * to TLS-1.1, with a 36-byte hash value).
+ *
+ * - The hash output length, in bytes.
+ *
+ * - The public key.
+ *
+ * - An output buffer for the hash value. The caller must still compare
+ * it with the hash of the data over which the signature is computed.
+ *
+ * **Constraints:**
+ *
+ * - Hash length MUST be no more than 64 bytes.
+ *
+ * - OID value length MUST be no more than 32 bytes (i.e. `hash_oid[0]`
+ * must have a value in the 0..32 range, inclusive).
+ *
+ * This function verifies that the signature length (`xlen`) matches the
+ * modulus length (this function returns 0 on mismatch). If the modulus
+ * size exceeds the maximum supported RSA size, then the function also
+ * returns 0.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ *
+ * Implementations of this type need not be constant-time.
+ *
+ * \param x signature buffer.
+ * \param xlen signature length (in bytes).
+ * \param hash_oid encoded hash algorithm OID (or `NULL`).
+ * \param hash_len expected hash value length (in bytes).
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \param hash_out output buffer for the hash value.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+typedef uint32_t (*br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy)(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash_oid, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk, unsigned char *hash_out);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for a RSA signature verification engine (PSS).
+ *
+ * Parameters are:
+ *
+ * - The signature itself. The provided array is NOT modified.
+ *
+ * - The hash function which was used to hash the message.
+ *
+ * - The hash function to use with MGF1 within the PSS padding. This
+ * is not necessarily the same hash function as the one which was
+ * used to hash the signed message.
+ *
+ * - The hashed message (as an array of bytes).
+ *
+ * - The PSS salt length (in bytes).
+ *
+ * - The public key.
+ *
+ * **Constraints:**
+ *
+ * - Hash message length MUST be no more than 64 bytes.
+ *
+ * Note that, contrary to PKCS#1 v1.5 signature, the hash value of the
+ * signed data cannot be extracted from the signature; it must be
+ * provided to the verification function.
+ *
+ * This function verifies that the signature length (`xlen`) matches the
+ * modulus length (this function returns 0 on mismatch). If the modulus
+ * size exceeds the maximum supported RSA size, then the function also
+ * returns 0.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ *
+ * Implementations of this type need not be constant-time.
+ *
+ * \param x signature buffer.
+ * \param xlen signature length (in bytes).
+ * \param hf_data hash function applied on the message.
+ * \param hf_mgf1 hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param hash hash value of the signed message.
+ * \param salt_len PSS salt length (in bytes).
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+typedef uint32_t (*br_rsa_pss_vrfy)(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const void *hash, size_t salt_len, const br_rsa_public_key *pk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for a RSA encryption engine (OAEP).
+ *
+ * Parameters are:
+ *
+ * - A source of random bytes. The source must be already initialized.
+ *
+ * - A hash function, used internally with the mask generation function
+ * (MGF1).
+ *
+ * - A label. The `label` pointer may be `NULL` if `label_len` is zero
+ * (an empty label, which is the default in PKCS#1 v2.2).
+ *
+ * - The public key.
+ *
+ * - The destination buffer. Its maximum length (in bytes) is provided;
+ * if that length is lower than the public key length, then an error
+ * is reported.
+ *
+ * - The source message.
+ *
+ * The encrypted message output has exactly the same length as the modulus
+ * (mathematical length, in bytes, not counting extra leading zeros in the
+ * modulus representation in the public key).
+ *
+ * The source message (`src`, length `src_len`) may overlap with the
+ * destination buffer (`dst`, length `dst_max_len`).
+ *
+ * This function returns the actual encrypted message length, in bytes;
+ * on error, zero is returned. An error is reported if the output buffer
+ * is not large enough, or the public is invalid, or the public key
+ * modulus exceeds the maximum supported RSA size.
+ *
+ * \param rnd source of random bytes.
+ * \param dig hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param label label value (may be `NULL` if `label_len` is zero).
+ * \param label_len label length, in bytes.
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \param dst destination buffer.
+ * \param dst_max_len destination buffer length (maximum encrypted data size).
+ * \param src message to encrypt.
+ * \param src_len source message length (in bytes).
+ * \return encrypted message length (in bytes), or 0 on error.
+ */
+typedef size_t (*br_rsa_oaep_encrypt)(
+ const br_prng_class **rnd, const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk,
+ void *dst, size_t dst_max_len,
+ const void *src, size_t src_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for a RSA private key engine.
+ *
+ * The `x[]` buffer is modified in place, and its length is inferred from
+ * the modulus length (`x[]` is assumed to have a length of
+ * `(sk->n_bitlen+7)/8` bytes).
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ *
+ * \param x operand to exponentiate.
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+typedef uint32_t (*br_rsa_private)(unsigned char *x,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for a RSA signature generation engine (PKCS#1 v1.5).
+ *
+ * Parameters are:
+ *
+ * - The encoded OID for the hash function. The provided array must begin
+ * with a single byte that contains the length of the OID value (in
+ * bytes), followed by exactly that many bytes. This parameter may
+ * also be `NULL`, in which case the raw hash value should be used
+ * with the PKCS#1 v1.5 "type 1" padding (as used in SSL/TLS up
+ * to TLS-1.1, with a 36-byte hash value).
+ *
+ * - The hash value computes over the data to sign (its length is
+ * expressed in bytes).
+ *
+ * - The RSA private key.
+ *
+ * - The output buffer, that receives the signature.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 on success, 0 on error. Error conditions include
+ * a too small modulus for the provided hash OID and value, or some
+ * invalid key parameters. The signature length is exactly
+ * `(sk->n_bitlen+7)/8` bytes.
+ *
+ * This function is expected to be constant-time with regards to the
+ * private key bytes (lengths of the modulus and the individual factors
+ * may leak, though) and to the hashed data.
+ *
+ * \param hash_oid encoded hash algorithm OID (or `NULL`).
+ * \param hash hash value.
+ * \param hash_len hash value length (in bytes).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param x output buffer for the signature value.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+typedef uint32_t (*br_rsa_pkcs1_sign)(const unsigned char *hash_oid,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for a RSA signature generation engine (PSS).
+ *
+ * Parameters are:
+ *
+ * - An initialized PRNG for salt generation. If the salt length is
+ * zero (`salt_len` parameter), then the PRNG is optional (this is
+ * not the typical case, as the security proof of RSA/PSS is
+ * tighter when a non-empty salt is used).
+ *
+ * - The hash function which was used to hash the message.
+ *
+ * - The hash function to use with MGF1 within the PSS padding. This
+ * is not necessarily the same function as the one used to hash the
+ * message.
+ *
+ * - The hashed message.
+ *
+ * - The salt length, in bytes.
+ *
+ * - The RSA private key.
+ *
+ * - The output buffer, that receives the signature.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 on success, 0 on error. Error conditions include
+ * a too small modulus for the provided hash and salt lengths, or some
+ * invalid key parameters. The signature length is exactly
+ * `(sk->n_bitlen+7)/8` bytes.
+ *
+ * This function is expected to be constant-time with regards to the
+ * private key bytes (lengths of the modulus and the individual factors
+ * may leak, though) and to the hashed data.
+ *
+ * \param rng PRNG for salt generation (`NULL` if `salt_len` is zero).
+ * \param hf_data hash function used to hash the signed data.
+ * \param hf_mgf1 hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param hash hashed message.
+ * \param salt_len salt length (in bytes).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param x output buffer for the signature value.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+typedef uint32_t (*br_rsa_pss_sign)(const br_prng_class **rng,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const unsigned char *hash_value, size_t salt_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encoded OID for SHA-1 (in RSA PKCS#1 signatures).
+ */
+#define BR_HASH_OID_SHA1 \
+ ((const unsigned char *)"\x05\x2B\x0E\x03\x02\x1A")
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encoded OID for SHA-224 (in RSA PKCS#1 signatures).
+ */
+#define BR_HASH_OID_SHA224 \
+ ((const unsigned char *)"\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x04")
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encoded OID for SHA-256 (in RSA PKCS#1 signatures).
+ */
+#define BR_HASH_OID_SHA256 \
+ ((const unsigned char *)"\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x01")
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encoded OID for SHA-384 (in RSA PKCS#1 signatures).
+ */
+#define BR_HASH_OID_SHA384 \
+ ((const unsigned char *)"\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x02")
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encoded OID for SHA-512 (in RSA PKCS#1 signatures).
+ */
+#define BR_HASH_OID_SHA512 \
+ ((const unsigned char *)"\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x03")
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for a RSA decryption engine (OAEP).
+ *
+ * Parameters are:
+ *
+ * - A hash function, used internally with the mask generation function
+ * (MGF1).
+ *
+ * - A label. The `label` pointer may be `NULL` if `label_len` is zero
+ * (an empty label, which is the default in PKCS#1 v2.2).
+ *
+ * - The private key.
+ *
+ * - The source and destination buffer. The buffer initially contains
+ * the encrypted message; the buffer contents are altered, and the
+ * decrypted message is written at the start of that buffer
+ * (decrypted message is always shorter than the encrypted message).
+ *
+ * If decryption fails in any way, then `*len` is unmodified, and the
+ * function returns 0. Otherwise, `*len` is set to the decrypted message
+ * length, and 1 is returned. The implementation is responsible for
+ * checking that the input message length matches the key modulus length,
+ * and that the padding is correct.
+ *
+ * Implementations MUST use constant-time check of the validity of the
+ * OAEP padding, at least until the leading byte and hash value have
+ * been checked. Whether overall decryption worked, and the length of
+ * the decrypted message, may leak.
+ *
+ * \param dig hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param label label value (may be `NULL` if `label_len` is zero).
+ * \param label_len label length, in bytes.
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param data input/output buffer.
+ * \param len encrypted/decrypted message length.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+typedef uint32_t (*br_rsa_oaep_decrypt)(
+ const br_hash_class *dig, const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *data, size_t *len);
+
+/*
+ * RSA "i32" engine. Integers are internally represented as arrays of
+ * 32-bit integers, and the core multiplication primitive is the
+ * 32x32->64 multiplication.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA public key engine "i32".
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_public
+ *
+ * \param x operand to exponentiate.
+ * \param xlen length of the operand (in bytes).
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i32_public(unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA signature verification engine "i32" (PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy
+ *
+ * \param x signature buffer.
+ * \param xlen signature length (in bytes).
+ * \param hash_oid encoded hash algorithm OID (or `NULL`).
+ * \param hash_len expected hash value length (in bytes).
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \param hash_out output buffer for the hash value.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i32_pkcs1_vrfy(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash_oid, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk, unsigned char *hash_out);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA signature verification engine "i32" (PSS signatures).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_pss_vrfy
+ *
+ * \param x signature buffer.
+ * \param xlen signature length (in bytes).
+ * \param hf_data hash function applied on the message.
+ * \param hf_mgf1 hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param hash hash value of the signed message.
+ * \param salt_len PSS salt length (in bytes).
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i32_pss_vrfy(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const void *hash, size_t salt_len, const br_rsa_public_key *pk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA private key engine "i32".
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_private
+ *
+ * \param x operand to exponentiate.
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i32_private(unsigned char *x,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA signature generation engine "i32" (PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_pkcs1_sign
+ *
+ * \param hash_oid encoded hash algorithm OID (or `NULL`).
+ * \param hash hash value.
+ * \param hash_len hash value length (in bytes).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param x output buffer for the hash value.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i32_pkcs1_sign(const unsigned char *hash_oid,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA signature generation engine "i32" (PSS signatures).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_pss_sign
+ *
+ * \param rng PRNG for salt generation (`NULL` if `salt_len` is zero).
+ * \param hf_data hash function used to hash the signed data.
+ * \param hf_mgf1 hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param hash hashed message.
+ * \param salt_len salt length (in bytes).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param x output buffer for the signature value.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i32_pss_sign(const br_prng_class **rng,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const unsigned char *hash_value, size_t salt_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x);
+
+/*
+ * RSA "i31" engine. Similar to i32, but only 31 bits are used per 32-bit
+ * word. This uses slightly more stack space (about 4% more) and code
+ * space, but it quite faster.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA public key engine "i31".
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_public
+ *
+ * \param x operand to exponentiate.
+ * \param xlen length of the operand (in bytes).
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i31_public(unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA signature verification engine "i31" (PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy
+ *
+ * \param x signature buffer.
+ * \param xlen signature length (in bytes).
+ * \param hash_oid encoded hash algorithm OID (or `NULL`).
+ * \param hash_len expected hash value length (in bytes).
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \param hash_out output buffer for the hash value.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i31_pkcs1_vrfy(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash_oid, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk, unsigned char *hash_out);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA signature verification engine "i31" (PSS signatures).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_pss_vrfy
+ *
+ * \param x signature buffer.
+ * \param xlen signature length (in bytes).
+ * \param hf_data hash function applied on the message.
+ * \param hf_mgf1 hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param hash hash value of the signed message.
+ * \param salt_len PSS salt length (in bytes).
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i31_pss_vrfy(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const void *hash, size_t salt_len, const br_rsa_public_key *pk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA private key engine "i31".
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_private
+ *
+ * \param x operand to exponentiate.
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i31_private(unsigned char *x,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA signature generation engine "i31" (PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_pkcs1_sign
+ *
+ * \param hash_oid encoded hash algorithm OID (or `NULL`).
+ * \param hash hash value.
+ * \param hash_len hash value length (in bytes).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param x output buffer for the hash value.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i31_pkcs1_sign(const unsigned char *hash_oid,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA signature generation engine "i31" (PSS signatures).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_pss_sign
+ *
+ * \param rng PRNG for salt generation (`NULL` if `salt_len` is zero).
+ * \param hf_data hash function used to hash the signed data.
+ * \param hf_mgf1 hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param hash hashed message.
+ * \param salt_len salt length (in bytes).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param x output buffer for the signature value.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i31_pss_sign(const br_prng_class **rng,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const unsigned char *hash_value, size_t salt_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x);
+
+/*
+ * RSA "i62" engine. Similar to i31, but internal multiplication use
+ * 64x64->128 multiplications. This is available only on architecture
+ * that offer such an opcode.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA public key engine "i62".
+ *
+ * This function is defined only on architecture that offer a 64x64->128
+ * opcode. Use `br_rsa_i62_public_get()` to dynamically obtain a pointer
+ * to that function.
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_public
+ *
+ * \param x operand to exponentiate.
+ * \param xlen length of the operand (in bytes).
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i62_public(unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA signature verification engine "i62" (PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures).
+ *
+ * This function is defined only on architecture that offer a 64x64->128
+ * opcode. Use `br_rsa_i62_pkcs1_vrfy_get()` to dynamically obtain a pointer
+ * to that function.
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy
+ *
+ * \param x signature buffer.
+ * \param xlen signature length (in bytes).
+ * \param hash_oid encoded hash algorithm OID (or `NULL`).
+ * \param hash_len expected hash value length (in bytes).
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \param hash_out output buffer for the hash value.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i62_pkcs1_vrfy(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash_oid, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk, unsigned char *hash_out);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA signature verification engine "i62" (PSS signatures).
+ *
+ * This function is defined only on architecture that offer a 64x64->128
+ * opcode. Use `br_rsa_i62_pss_vrfy_get()` to dynamically obtain a pointer
+ * to that function.
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_pss_vrfy
+ *
+ * \param x signature buffer.
+ * \param xlen signature length (in bytes).
+ * \param hf_data hash function applied on the message.
+ * \param hf_mgf1 hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param hash hash value of the signed message.
+ * \param salt_len PSS salt length (in bytes).
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i62_pss_vrfy(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const void *hash, size_t salt_len, const br_rsa_public_key *pk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA private key engine "i62".
+ *
+ * This function is defined only on architecture that offer a 64x64->128
+ * opcode. Use `br_rsa_i62_private_get()` to dynamically obtain a pointer
+ * to that function.
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_private
+ *
+ * \param x operand to exponentiate.
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i62_private(unsigned char *x,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA signature generation engine "i62" (PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures).
+ *
+ * This function is defined only on architecture that offer a 64x64->128
+ * opcode. Use `br_rsa_i62_pkcs1_sign_get()` to dynamically obtain a pointer
+ * to that function.
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_pkcs1_sign
+ *
+ * \param hash_oid encoded hash algorithm OID (or `NULL`).
+ * \param hash hash value.
+ * \param hash_len hash value length (in bytes).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param x output buffer for the hash value.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i62_pkcs1_sign(const unsigned char *hash_oid,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA signature generation engine "i62" (PSS signatures).
+ *
+ * This function is defined only on architecture that offer a 64x64->128
+ * opcode. Use `br_rsa_i62_pss_sign_get()` to dynamically obtain a pointer
+ * to that function.
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_pss_sign
+ *
+ * \param rng PRNG for salt generation (`NULL` if `salt_len` is zero).
+ * \param hf_data hash function used to hash the signed data.
+ * \param hf_mgf1 hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param hash hashed message.
+ * \param salt_len salt length (in bytes).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param x output buffer for the signature value.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i62_pss_sign(const br_prng_class **rng,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const unsigned char *hash_value, size_t salt_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the RSA "i62" implementation (public key operations),
+ * if available.
+ *
+ * \return the implementation, or 0.
+ */
+br_rsa_public br_rsa_i62_public_get(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the RSA "i62" implementation (PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification),
+ * if available.
+ *
+ * \return the implementation, or 0.
+ */
+br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy br_rsa_i62_pkcs1_vrfy_get(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the RSA "i62" implementation (PSS signature verification),
+ * if available.
+ *
+ * \return the implementation, or 0.
+ */
+br_rsa_pss_vrfy br_rsa_i62_pss_vrfy_get(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the RSA "i62" implementation (private key operations),
+ * if available.
+ *
+ * \return the implementation, or 0.
+ */
+br_rsa_private br_rsa_i62_private_get(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the RSA "i62" implementation (PKCS#1 v1.5 signature generation),
+ * if available.
+ *
+ * \return the implementation, or 0.
+ */
+br_rsa_pkcs1_sign br_rsa_i62_pkcs1_sign_get(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the RSA "i62" implementation (PSS signature generation),
+ * if available.
+ *
+ * \return the implementation, or 0.
+ */
+br_rsa_pss_sign br_rsa_i62_pss_sign_get(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the RSA "i62" implementation (OAEP encryption),
+ * if available.
+ *
+ * \return the implementation, or 0.
+ */
+br_rsa_oaep_encrypt br_rsa_i62_oaep_encrypt_get(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the RSA "i62" implementation (OAEP decryption),
+ * if available.
+ *
+ * \return the implementation, or 0.
+ */
+br_rsa_oaep_decrypt br_rsa_i62_oaep_decrypt_get(void);
+
+/*
+ * RSA "i15" engine. Integers are represented as 15-bit integers, so
+ * the code uses only 32-bit multiplication (no 64-bit result), which
+ * is vastly faster (and constant-time) on the ARM Cortex M0/M0+.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA public key engine "i15".
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_public
+ *
+ * \param x operand to exponentiate.
+ * \param xlen length of the operand (in bytes).
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i15_public(unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA signature verification engine "i15" (PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy
+ *
+ * \param x signature buffer.
+ * \param xlen signature length (in bytes).
+ * \param hash_oid encoded hash algorithm OID (or `NULL`).
+ * \param hash_len expected hash value length (in bytes).
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \param hash_out output buffer for the hash value.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i15_pkcs1_vrfy(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash_oid, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk, unsigned char *hash_out);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA signature verification engine "i15" (PSS signatures).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_pss_vrfy
+ *
+ * \param x signature buffer.
+ * \param xlen signature length (in bytes).
+ * \param hf_data hash function applied on the message.
+ * \param hf_mgf1 hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param hash hash value of the signed message.
+ * \param salt_len PSS salt length (in bytes).
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i15_pss_vrfy(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const void *hash, size_t salt_len, const br_rsa_public_key *pk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA private key engine "i15".
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_private
+ *
+ * \param x operand to exponentiate.
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i15_private(unsigned char *x,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA signature generation engine "i15" (PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_pkcs1_sign
+ *
+ * \param hash_oid encoded hash algorithm OID (or `NULL`).
+ * \param hash hash value.
+ * \param hash_len hash value length (in bytes).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param x output buffer for the hash value.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i15_pkcs1_sign(const unsigned char *hash_oid,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA signature generation engine "i15" (PSS signatures).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_pss_sign
+ *
+ * \param rng PRNG for salt generation (`NULL` if `salt_len` is zero).
+ * \param hf_data hash function used to hash the signed data.
+ * \param hf_mgf1 hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param hash hashed message.
+ * \param salt_len salt length (in bytes).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param x output buffer for the signature value.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i15_pss_sign(const br_prng_class **rng,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const unsigned char *hash_value, size_t salt_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get "default" RSA implementation (public-key operations).
+ *
+ * This returns the preferred implementation of RSA (public-key operations)
+ * on the current system.
+ *
+ * \return the default implementation.
+ */
+br_rsa_public br_rsa_public_get_default(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get "default" RSA implementation (private-key operations).
+ *
+ * This returns the preferred implementation of RSA (private-key operations)
+ * on the current system.
+ *
+ * \return the default implementation.
+ */
+br_rsa_private br_rsa_private_get_default(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get "default" RSA implementation (PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification).
+ *
+ * This returns the preferred implementation of RSA (signature verification)
+ * on the current system.
+ *
+ * \return the default implementation.
+ */
+br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy_get_default(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get "default" RSA implementation (PSS signature verification).
+ *
+ * This returns the preferred implementation of RSA (signature verification)
+ * on the current system.
+ *
+ * \return the default implementation.
+ */
+br_rsa_pss_vrfy br_rsa_pss_vrfy_get_default(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get "default" RSA implementation (PKCS#1 v1.5 signature generation).
+ *
+ * This returns the preferred implementation of RSA (signature generation)
+ * on the current system.
+ *
+ * \return the default implementation.
+ */
+br_rsa_pkcs1_sign br_rsa_pkcs1_sign_get_default(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get "default" RSA implementation (PSS signature generation).
+ *
+ * This returns the preferred implementation of RSA (signature generation)
+ * on the current system.
+ *
+ * \return the default implementation.
+ */
+br_rsa_pss_sign br_rsa_pss_sign_get_default(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get "default" RSA implementation (OAEP encryption).
+ *
+ * This returns the preferred implementation of RSA (OAEP encryption)
+ * on the current system.
+ *
+ * \return the default implementation.
+ */
+br_rsa_oaep_encrypt br_rsa_oaep_encrypt_get_default(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get "default" RSA implementation (OAEP decryption).
+ *
+ * This returns the preferred implementation of RSA (OAEP decryption)
+ * on the current system.
+ *
+ * \return the default implementation.
+ */
+br_rsa_oaep_decrypt br_rsa_oaep_decrypt_get_default(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA decryption helper, for SSL/TLS.
+ *
+ * This function performs the RSA decryption for a RSA-based key exchange
+ * in a SSL/TLS server. The provided RSA engine is used. The `data`
+ * parameter points to the value to decrypt, of length `len` bytes. On
+ * success, the 48-byte pre-master secret is copied into `data`, starting
+ * at the first byte of that buffer; on error, the contents of `data`
+ * become indeterminate.
+ *
+ * This function first checks that the provided value length (`len`) is
+ * not lower than 59 bytes, and matches the RSA modulus length; if neither
+ * of this property is met, then this function returns 0 and the buffer
+ * is unmodified.
+ *
+ * Otherwise, decryption and then padding verification are performed, both
+ * in constant-time. A decryption error, or a bad padding, or an
+ * incorrect decrypted value length are reported with a returned value of
+ * 0; on success, 1 is returned. The caller (SSL server engine) is supposed
+ * to proceed with a random pre-master secret in case of error.
+ *
+ * \param core RSA private key engine.
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param data input/output buffer.
+ * \param len length (in bytes) of the data to decrypt.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_ssl_decrypt(br_rsa_private core, const br_rsa_private_key *sk,
+ unsigned char *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA encryption (OAEP) with the "i15" engine.
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_oaep_encrypt
+ *
+ * \param rnd source of random bytes.
+ * \param dig hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param label label value (may be `NULL` if `label_len` is zero).
+ * \param label_len label length, in bytes.
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \param dst destination buffer.
+ * \param dst_max_len destination buffer length (maximum encrypted data size).
+ * \param src message to encrypt.
+ * \param src_len source message length (in bytes).
+ * \return encrypted message length (in bytes), or 0 on error.
+ */
+size_t br_rsa_i15_oaep_encrypt(
+ const br_prng_class **rnd, const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk,
+ void *dst, size_t dst_max_len,
+ const void *src, size_t src_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA decryption (OAEP) with the "i15" engine.
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_oaep_decrypt
+ *
+ * \param dig hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param label label value (may be `NULL` if `label_len` is zero).
+ * \param label_len label length, in bytes.
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param data input/output buffer.
+ * \param len encrypted/decrypted message length.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i15_oaep_decrypt(
+ const br_hash_class *dig, const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *data, size_t *len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA encryption (OAEP) with the "i31" engine.
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_oaep_encrypt
+ *
+ * \param rnd source of random bytes.
+ * \param dig hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param label label value (may be `NULL` if `label_len` is zero).
+ * \param label_len label length, in bytes.
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \param dst destination buffer.
+ * \param dst_max_len destination buffer length (maximum encrypted data size).
+ * \param src message to encrypt.
+ * \param src_len source message length (in bytes).
+ * \return encrypted message length (in bytes), or 0 on error.
+ */
+size_t br_rsa_i31_oaep_encrypt(
+ const br_prng_class **rnd, const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk,
+ void *dst, size_t dst_max_len,
+ const void *src, size_t src_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA decryption (OAEP) with the "i31" engine.
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_oaep_decrypt
+ *
+ * \param dig hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param label label value (may be `NULL` if `label_len` is zero).
+ * \param label_len label length, in bytes.
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param data input/output buffer.
+ * \param len encrypted/decrypted message length.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i31_oaep_decrypt(
+ const br_hash_class *dig, const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *data, size_t *len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA encryption (OAEP) with the "i32" engine.
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_oaep_encrypt
+ *
+ * \param rnd source of random bytes.
+ * \param dig hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param label label value (may be `NULL` if `label_len` is zero).
+ * \param label_len label length, in bytes.
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \param dst destination buffer.
+ * \param dst_max_len destination buffer length (maximum encrypted data size).
+ * \param src message to encrypt.
+ * \param src_len source message length (in bytes).
+ * \return encrypted message length (in bytes), or 0 on error.
+ */
+size_t br_rsa_i32_oaep_encrypt(
+ const br_prng_class **rnd, const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk,
+ void *dst, size_t dst_max_len,
+ const void *src, size_t src_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA decryption (OAEP) with the "i32" engine.
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_oaep_decrypt
+ *
+ * \param dig hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param label label value (may be `NULL` if `label_len` is zero).
+ * \param label_len label length, in bytes.
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param data input/output buffer.
+ * \param len encrypted/decrypted message length.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i32_oaep_decrypt(
+ const br_hash_class *dig, const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *data, size_t *len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA encryption (OAEP) with the "i62" engine.
+ *
+ * This function is defined only on architecture that offer a 64x64->128
+ * opcode. Use `br_rsa_i62_oaep_encrypt_get()` to dynamically obtain a pointer
+ * to that function.
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_oaep_encrypt
+ *
+ * \param rnd source of random bytes.
+ * \param dig hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param label label value (may be `NULL` if `label_len` is zero).
+ * \param label_len label length, in bytes.
+ * \param pk RSA public key.
+ * \param dst destination buffer.
+ * \param dst_max_len destination buffer length (maximum encrypted data size).
+ * \param src message to encrypt.
+ * \param src_len source message length (in bytes).
+ * \return encrypted message length (in bytes), or 0 on error.
+ */
+size_t br_rsa_i62_oaep_encrypt(
+ const br_prng_class **rnd, const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk,
+ void *dst, size_t dst_max_len,
+ const void *src, size_t src_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA decryption (OAEP) with the "i62" engine.
+ *
+ * This function is defined only on architecture that offer a 64x64->128
+ * opcode. Use `br_rsa_i62_oaep_decrypt_get()` to dynamically obtain a pointer
+ * to that function.
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_oaep_decrypt
+ *
+ * \param dig hash function to use with MGF1.
+ * \param label label value (may be `NULL` if `label_len` is zero).
+ * \param label_len label length, in bytes.
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param data input/output buffer.
+ * \param len encrypted/decrypted message length.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i62_oaep_decrypt(
+ const br_hash_class *dig, const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *data, size_t *len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get buffer size to hold RSA private key elements.
+ *
+ * This macro returns the length (in bytes) of the buffer needed to
+ * receive the elements of a RSA private key, as generated by one of
+ * the `br_rsa_*_keygen()` functions. If the provided size is a constant
+ * expression, then the whole macro evaluates to a constant expression.
+ *
+ * \param size target key size (modulus size, in bits)
+ * \return the length of the private key buffer, in bytes.
+ */
+#define BR_RSA_KBUF_PRIV_SIZE(size) (5 * (((size) + 15) >> 4))
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get buffer size to hold RSA public key elements.
+ *
+ * This macro returns the length (in bytes) of the buffer needed to
+ * receive the elements of a RSA public key, as generated by one of
+ * the `br_rsa_*_keygen()` functions. If the provided size is a constant
+ * expression, then the whole macro evaluates to a constant expression.
+ *
+ * \param size target key size (modulus size, in bits)
+ * \return the length of the public key buffer, in bytes.
+ */
+#define BR_RSA_KBUF_PUB_SIZE(size) (4 + (((size) + 7) >> 3))
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for RSA key pair generator implementation.
+ *
+ * This function generates a new RSA key pair whose modulus has bit
+ * length `size` bits. The private key elements are written in the
+ * `kbuf_priv` buffer, and pointer values and length fields to these
+ * elements are populated in the provided private key structure `sk`.
+ * Similarly, the public key elements are written in `kbuf_pub`, with
+ * pointers and lengths set in `pk`.
+ *
+ * If `pk` is `NULL`, then `kbuf_pub` may be `NULL`, and only the
+ * private key is set.
+ *
+ * If `pubexp` is not zero, then its value will be used as public
+ * exponent. Valid RSA public exponent values are odd integers
+ * greater than 1. If `pubexp` is zero, then the public exponent will
+ * have value 3.
+ *
+ * The provided PRNG (`rng_ctx`) must have already been initialized
+ * and seeded.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 on success, 0 on error. An error is reported
+ * if the requested range is outside of the supported key sizes, or
+ * if an invalid non-zero public exponent value is provided. Supported
+ * range starts at 512 bits, and up to an implementation-defined
+ * maximum (by default 4096 bits). Note that key sizes up to 768 bits
+ * have been broken in practice, and sizes lower than 2048 bits are
+ * usually considered to be weak and should not be used.
+ *
+ * \param rng_ctx source PRNG context (already initialized)
+ * \param sk RSA private key structure (destination)
+ * \param kbuf_priv buffer for private key elements
+ * \param pk RSA public key structure (destination), or `NULL`
+ * \param kbuf_pub buffer for public key elements, or `NULL`
+ * \param size target RSA modulus size (in bits)
+ * \param pubexp public exponent to use, or zero
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error (invalid parameters)
+ */
+typedef uint32_t (*br_rsa_keygen)(
+ const br_prng_class **rng_ctx,
+ br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *kbuf_priv,
+ br_rsa_public_key *pk, void *kbuf_pub,
+ unsigned size, uint32_t pubexp);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA key pair generation with the "i15" engine.
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_keygen
+ *
+ * \param rng_ctx source PRNG context (already initialized)
+ * \param sk RSA private key structure (destination)
+ * \param kbuf_priv buffer for private key elements
+ * \param pk RSA public key structure (destination), or `NULL`
+ * \param kbuf_pub buffer for public key elements, or `NULL`
+ * \param size target RSA modulus size (in bits)
+ * \param pubexp public exponent to use, or zero
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error (invalid parameters)
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i15_keygen(
+ const br_prng_class **rng_ctx,
+ br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *kbuf_priv,
+ br_rsa_public_key *pk, void *kbuf_pub,
+ unsigned size, uint32_t pubexp);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA key pair generation with the "i31" engine.
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_keygen
+ *
+ * \param rng_ctx source PRNG context (already initialized)
+ * \param sk RSA private key structure (destination)
+ * \param kbuf_priv buffer for private key elements
+ * \param pk RSA public key structure (destination), or `NULL`
+ * \param kbuf_pub buffer for public key elements, or `NULL`
+ * \param size target RSA modulus size (in bits)
+ * \param pubexp public exponent to use, or zero
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error (invalid parameters)
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i31_keygen(
+ const br_prng_class **rng_ctx,
+ br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *kbuf_priv,
+ br_rsa_public_key *pk, void *kbuf_pub,
+ unsigned size, uint32_t pubexp);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RSA key pair generation with the "i62" engine.
+ *
+ * This function is defined only on architecture that offer a 64x64->128
+ * opcode. Use `br_rsa_i62_keygen_get()` to dynamically obtain a pointer
+ * to that function.
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_keygen
+ *
+ * \param rng_ctx source PRNG context (already initialized)
+ * \param sk RSA private key structure (destination)
+ * \param kbuf_priv buffer for private key elements
+ * \param pk RSA public key structure (destination), or `NULL`
+ * \param kbuf_pub buffer for public key elements, or `NULL`
+ * \param size target RSA modulus size (in bits)
+ * \param pubexp public exponent to use, or zero
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error (invalid parameters)
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i62_keygen(
+ const br_prng_class **rng_ctx,
+ br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *kbuf_priv,
+ br_rsa_public_key *pk, void *kbuf_pub,
+ unsigned size, uint32_t pubexp);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the RSA "i62" implementation (key pair generation),
+ * if available.
+ *
+ * \return the implementation, or 0.
+ */
+br_rsa_keygen br_rsa_i62_keygen_get(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get "default" RSA implementation (key pair generation).
+ *
+ * This returns the preferred implementation of RSA (key pair generation)
+ * on the current system.
+ *
+ * \return the default implementation.
+ */
+br_rsa_keygen br_rsa_keygen_get_default(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for a modulus computing function.
+ *
+ * Such a function computes the public modulus from the private key. The
+ * encoded modulus (unsigned big-endian) is written on `n`, and the size
+ * (in bytes) is returned. If `n` is `NULL`, then the size is returned but
+ * the modulus itself is not computed.
+ *
+ * If the key size exceeds an internal limit, 0 is returned.
+ *
+ * \param n destination buffer (or `NULL`).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \return the modulus length (in bytes), or 0.
+ */
+typedef size_t (*br_rsa_compute_modulus)(void *n, const br_rsa_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Recompute RSA modulus ("i15" engine).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_compute_modulus
+ *
+ * \param n destination buffer (or `NULL`).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \return the modulus length (in bytes), or 0.
+ */
+size_t br_rsa_i15_compute_modulus(void *n, const br_rsa_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Recompute RSA modulus ("i31" engine).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_compute_modulus
+ *
+ * \param n destination buffer (or `NULL`).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \return the modulus length (in bytes), or 0.
+ */
+size_t br_rsa_i31_compute_modulus(void *n, const br_rsa_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get "default" RSA implementation (recompute modulus).
+ *
+ * This returns the preferred implementation of RSA (recompute modulus)
+ * on the current system.
+ *
+ * \return the default implementation.
+ */
+br_rsa_compute_modulus br_rsa_compute_modulus_get_default(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for a public exponent computing function.
+ *
+ * Such a function recomputes the public exponent from the private key.
+ * 0 is returned if any of the following occurs:
+ *
+ * - Either `p` or `q` is not equal to 3 modulo 4.
+ *
+ * - The public exponent does not fit on 32 bits.
+ *
+ * - An internal limit is exceeded.
+ *
+ * - The private key is invalid in some way.
+ *
+ * For all private keys produced by the key generator functions
+ * (`br_rsa_keygen` type), this function succeeds and returns the true
+ * public exponent. The public exponent is always an odd integer greater
+ * than 1.
+ *
+ * \return the public exponent, or 0.
+ */
+typedef uint32_t (*br_rsa_compute_pubexp)(const br_rsa_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Recompute RSA public exponent ("i15" engine).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_compute_pubexp
+ *
+ * \return the public exponent, or 0.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i15_compute_pubexp(const br_rsa_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Recompute RSA public exponent ("i31" engine).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_compute_pubexp
+ *
+ * \return the public exponent, or 0.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i31_compute_pubexp(const br_rsa_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get "default" RSA implementation (recompute public exponent).
+ *
+ * This returns the preferred implementation of RSA (recompute public
+ * exponent) on the current system.
+ *
+ * \return the default implementation.
+ */
+br_rsa_compute_pubexp br_rsa_compute_pubexp_get_default(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for a private exponent computing function.
+ *
+ * An RSA private key (`br_rsa_private_key`) contains two reduced
+ * private exponents, which are sufficient to perform private key
+ * operations. However, standard encoding formats for RSA private keys
+ * require also a copy of the complete private exponent (non-reduced),
+ * which this function recomputes.
+ *
+ * This function suceeds if all the following conditions hold:
+ *
+ * - Both private factors `p` and `q` are equal to 3 modulo 4.
+ *
+ * - The provided public exponent `pubexp` is correct, and, in particular,
+ * is odd, relatively prime to `p-1` and `q-1`, and greater than 1.
+ *
+ * - No internal storage limit is exceeded.
+ *
+ * For all private keys produced by the key generator functions
+ * (`br_rsa_keygen` type), this function succeeds. Note that the API
+ * restricts the public exponent to a maximum size of 32 bits.
+ *
+ * The encoded private exponent is written in `d` (unsigned big-endian
+ * convention), and the length (in bytes) is returned. If `d` is `NULL`,
+ * then the exponent is not written anywhere, but the length is still
+ * returned. On error, 0 is returned.
+ *
+ * Not all error conditions are detected when `d` is `NULL`; therefore, the
+ * returned value shall be checked also when actually producing the value.
+ *
+ * \param d destination buffer (or `NULL`).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param pubexp the public exponent.
+ * \return the private exponent length (in bytes), or 0.
+ */
+typedef size_t (*br_rsa_compute_privexp)(void *d,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, uint32_t pubexp);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Recompute RSA private exponent ("i15" engine).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_compute_privexp
+ *
+ * \param d destination buffer (or `NULL`).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param pubexp the public exponent.
+ * \return the private exponent length (in bytes), or 0.
+ */
+size_t br_rsa_i15_compute_privexp(void *d,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, uint32_t pubexp);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Recompute RSA private exponent ("i31" engine).
+ *
+ * \see br_rsa_compute_privexp
+ *
+ * \param d destination buffer (or `NULL`).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ * \param pubexp the public exponent.
+ * \return the private exponent length (in bytes), or 0.
+ */
+size_t br_rsa_i31_compute_privexp(void *d,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, uint32_t pubexp);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get "default" RSA implementation (recompute private exponent).
+ *
+ * This returns the preferred implementation of RSA (recompute private
+ * exponent) on the current system.
+ *
+ * \return the default implementation.
+ */
+br_rsa_compute_privexp br_rsa_compute_privexp_get_default(void);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_ssl.h b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_ssl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e91df47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_ssl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,4296 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BR_BEARSSL_SSL_H__
+#define BR_BEARSSL_SSL_H__
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "bearssl_block.h"
+#include "bearssl_hash.h"
+#include "bearssl_hmac.h"
+#include "bearssl_prf.h"
+#include "bearssl_rand.h"
+#include "bearssl_x509.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** \file bearssl_ssl.h
+ *
+ * # SSL
+ *
+ * For an overview of the SSL/TLS API, see [the BearSSL Web
+ * site](https://www.bearssl.org/api1.html).
+ *
+ * The `BR_TLS_*` constants correspond to the standard cipher suites and
+ * their values in the [IANA
+ * registry](http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-4).
+ *
+ * The `BR_ALERT_*` constants are for standard TLS alert messages. When
+ * a fatal alert message is sent of received, then the SSL engine context
+ * status is set to the sum of that alert value (an integer in the 0..255
+ * range) and a fixed offset (`BR_ERR_SEND_FATAL_ALERT` for a sent alert,
+ * `BR_ERR_RECV_FATAL_ALERT` for a received alert).
+ */
+
+/** \brief Optimal input buffer size. */
+#define BR_SSL_BUFSIZE_INPUT (16384 + 325)
+
+/** \brief Optimal output buffer size. */
+#define BR_SSL_BUFSIZE_OUTPUT (16384 + 85)
+
+/** \brief Optimal buffer size for monodirectional engine
+ (shared input/output buffer). */
+#define BR_SSL_BUFSIZE_MONO BR_SSL_BUFSIZE_INPUT
+
+/** \brief Optimal buffer size for bidirectional engine
+ (single buffer split into two separate input/output buffers). */
+#define BR_SSL_BUFSIZE_BIDI (BR_SSL_BUFSIZE_INPUT + BR_SSL_BUFSIZE_OUTPUT)
+
+/*
+ * Constants for known SSL/TLS protocol versions (SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1
+ * and TLS 1.2). Note that though there is a constant for SSL 3.0, that
+ * protocol version is not actually supported.
+ */
+
+/** \brief Protocol version: SSL 3.0 (unsupported). */
+#define BR_SSL30 0x0300
+/** \brief Protocol version: TLS 1.0. */
+#define BR_TLS10 0x0301
+/** \brief Protocol version: TLS 1.1. */
+#define BR_TLS11 0x0302
+/** \brief Protocol version: TLS 1.2. */
+#define BR_TLS12 0x0303
+
+/*
+ * Error constants. They are used to report the reason why a context has
+ * been marked as failed.
+ *
+ * Implementation note: SSL-level error codes should be in the 1..31
+ * range. The 32..63 range is for certificate decoding and validation
+ * errors. Received fatal alerts imply an error code in the 256..511 range.
+ */
+
+/** \brief SSL status: no error so far (0). */
+#define BR_ERR_OK 0
+
+/** \brief SSL status: caller-provided parameter is incorrect. */
+#define BR_ERR_BAD_PARAM 1
+
+/** \brief SSL status: operation requested by the caller cannot be applied
+ with the current context state (e.g. reading data while outgoing data
+ is waiting to be sent). */
+#define BR_ERR_BAD_STATE 2
+
+/** \brief SSL status: incoming protocol or record version is unsupported. */
+#define BR_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION 3
+
+/** \brief SSL status: incoming record version does not match the expected
+ version. */
+#define BR_ERR_BAD_VERSION 4
+
+/** \brief SSL status: incoming record length is invalid. */
+#define BR_ERR_BAD_LENGTH 5
+
+/** \brief SSL status: incoming record is too large to be processed, or
+ buffer is too small for the handshake message to send. */
+#define BR_ERR_TOO_LARGE 6
+
+/** \brief SSL status: decryption found an invalid padding, or the record
+ MAC is not correct. */
+#define BR_ERR_BAD_MAC 7
+
+/** \brief SSL status: no initial entropy was provided, and none can be
+ obtained from the OS. */
+#define BR_ERR_NO_RANDOM 8
+
+/** \brief SSL status: incoming record type is unknown. */
+#define BR_ERR_UNKNOWN_TYPE 9
+
+/** \brief SSL status: incoming record or message has wrong type with
+ regards to the current engine state. */
+#define BR_ERR_UNEXPECTED 10
+
+/** \brief SSL status: ChangeCipherSpec message from the peer has invalid
+ contents. */
+#define BR_ERR_BAD_CCS 12
+
+/** \brief SSL status: alert message from the peer has invalid contents
+ (odd length). */
+#define BR_ERR_BAD_ALERT 13
+
+/** \brief SSL status: incoming handshake message decoding failed. */
+#define BR_ERR_BAD_HANDSHAKE 14
+
+/** \brief SSL status: ServerHello contains a session ID which is larger
+ than 32 bytes. */
+#define BR_ERR_OVERSIZED_ID 15
+
+/** \brief SSL status: server wants to use a cipher suite that we did
+ not claim to support. This is also reported if we tried to advertise
+ a cipher suite that we do not support. */
+#define BR_ERR_BAD_CIPHER_SUITE 16
+
+/** \brief SSL status: server wants to use a compression that we did not
+ claim to support. */
+#define BR_ERR_BAD_COMPRESSION 17
+
+/** \brief SSL status: server's max fragment length does not match
+ client's. */
+#define BR_ERR_BAD_FRAGLEN 18
+
+/** \brief SSL status: secure renegotiation failed. */
+#define BR_ERR_BAD_SECRENEG 19
+
+/** \brief SSL status: server sent an extension type that we did not
+ announce, or used the same extension type several times in a single
+ ServerHello. */
+#define BR_ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION 20
+
+/** \brief SSL status: invalid Server Name Indication contents (when
+ used by the server, this extension shall be empty). */
+#define BR_ERR_BAD_SNI 21
+
+/** \brief SSL status: invalid ServerHelloDone from the server (length
+ is not 0). */
+#define BR_ERR_BAD_HELLO_DONE 22
+
+/** \brief SSL status: internal limit exceeded (e.g. server's public key
+ is too large). */
+#define BR_ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED 23
+
+/** \brief SSL status: Finished message from peer does not match the
+ expected value. */
+#define BR_ERR_BAD_FINISHED 24
+
+/** \brief SSL status: session resumption attempt with distinct version
+ or cipher suite. */
+#define BR_ERR_RESUME_MISMATCH 25
+
+/** \brief SSL status: unsupported or invalid algorithm (ECDHE curve,
+ signature algorithm, hash function). */
+#define BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM 26
+
+/** \brief SSL status: invalid signature (on ServerKeyExchange from
+ server, or in CertificateVerify from client). */
+#define BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE 27
+
+/** \brief SSL status: peer's public key does not have the proper type
+ or is not allowed for requested operation. */
+#define BR_ERR_WRONG_KEY_USAGE 28
+
+/** \brief SSL status: client did not send a certificate upon request,
+ or the client certificate could not be validated. */
+#define BR_ERR_NO_CLIENT_AUTH 29
+
+/** \brief SSL status: I/O error or premature close on underlying
+ transport stream. This error code is set only by the simplified
+ I/O API ("br_sslio_*"). */
+#define BR_ERR_IO 31
+
+/** \brief SSL status: base value for a received fatal alert.
+
+ When a fatal alert is received from the peer, the alert value
+ is added to this constant. */
+#define BR_ERR_RECV_FATAL_ALERT 256
+
+/** \brief SSL status: base value for a sent fatal alert.
+
+ When a fatal alert is sent to the peer, the alert value is added
+ to this constant. */
+#define BR_ERR_SEND_FATAL_ALERT 512
+
+/* ===================================================================== */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Decryption engine for SSL.
+ *
+ * When processing incoming records, the SSL engine will use a decryption
+ * engine that uses a specific context structure, and has a set of
+ * methods (a vtable) that follows this template.
+ *
+ * The decryption engine is responsible for applying decryption, verifying
+ * MAC, and keeping track of the record sequence number.
+ */
+typedef struct br_sslrec_in_class_ br_sslrec_in_class;
+struct br_sslrec_in_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Context size (in bytes).
+ */
+ size_t context_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Test validity of the incoming record length.
+ *
+ * This function returns 1 if the announced length for an
+ * incoming record is valid, 0 otherwise,
+ *
+ * \param ctx decryption engine context.
+ * \param record_len incoming record length.
+ * \return 1 of a valid length, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+ int (*check_length)(const br_sslrec_in_class *const *ctx,
+ size_t record_len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Decrypt the incoming record.
+ *
+ * This function may assume that the record length is valid
+ * (it has been previously tested with `check_length()`).
+ * Decryption is done in place; `*len` is updated with the
+ * cleartext length, and the address of the first plaintext
+ * byte is returned. If the record is correct but empty, then
+ * `*len` is set to 0 and a non-`NULL` pointer is returned.
+ *
+ * On decryption/MAC error, `NULL` is returned.
+ *
+ * \param ctx decryption engine context.
+ * \param record_type record type (23 for application data, etc).
+ * \param version record version.
+ * \param payload address of encrypted payload.
+ * \param len pointer to payload length (updated).
+ * \return pointer to plaintext, or `NULL` on error.
+ */
+ unsigned char *(*decrypt)(const br_sslrec_in_class **ctx,
+ int record_type, unsigned version,
+ void *payload, size_t *len);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encryption engine for SSL.
+ *
+ * When building outgoing records, the SSL engine will use an encryption
+ * engine that uses a specific context structure, and has a set of
+ * methods (a vtable) that follows this template.
+ *
+ * The encryption engine is responsible for applying encryption and MAC,
+ * and keeping track of the record sequence number.
+ */
+typedef struct br_sslrec_out_class_ br_sslrec_out_class;
+struct br_sslrec_out_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Context size (in bytes).
+ */
+ size_t context_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Compute maximum plaintext sizes and offsets.
+ *
+ * When this function is called, the `*start` and `*end`
+ * values contain offsets designating the free area in the
+ * outgoing buffer for plaintext data; that free area is
+ * preceded by a 5-byte space which will receive the record
+ * header.
+ *
+ * The `max_plaintext()` function is responsible for adjusting
+ * both `*start` and `*end` to make room for any record-specific
+ * header, MAC, padding, and possible split.
+ *
+ * \param ctx encryption engine context.
+ * \param start pointer to start of plaintext offset (updated).
+ * \param end pointer to start of plaintext offset (updated).
+ */
+ void (*max_plaintext)(const br_sslrec_out_class *const *ctx,
+ size_t *start, size_t *end);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Perform record encryption.
+ *
+ * This function encrypts the record. The plaintext address and
+ * length are provided. Returned value is the start of the
+ * encrypted record (or sequence of records, if a split was
+ * performed), _including_ the 5-byte header, and `*len` is
+ * adjusted to the total size of the record(s), there again
+ * including the header(s).
+ *
+ * \param ctx decryption engine context.
+ * \param record_type record type (23 for application data, etc).
+ * \param version record version.
+ * \param plaintext address of plaintext.
+ * \param len pointer to plaintext length (updated).
+ * \return pointer to start of built record.
+ */
+ unsigned char *(*encrypt)(const br_sslrec_out_class **ctx,
+ int record_type, unsigned version,
+ void *plaintext, size_t *len);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for a no-encryption engine.
+ *
+ * The no-encryption engine processes outgoing records during the initial
+ * handshake, before encryption is applied.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief No-encryption engine vtable. */
+ const br_sslrec_out_class *vtable;
+} br_sslrec_out_clear_context;
+
+/** \brief Static, constant vtable for the no-encryption engine. */
+extern const br_sslrec_out_class br_sslrec_out_clear_vtable;
+
+/* ===================================================================== */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Record decryption engine class, for CBC mode.
+ *
+ * This class type extends the decryption engine class with an
+ * initialisation method that receives the parameters needed
+ * for CBC processing: block cipher implementation, block cipher key,
+ * HMAC parameters (hash function, key, MAC length), and IV. If the
+ * IV is `NULL`, then a per-record IV will be used (TLS 1.1+).
+ */
+typedef struct br_sslrec_in_cbc_class_ br_sslrec_in_cbc_class;
+struct br_sslrec_in_cbc_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Superclass, as first vtable field.
+ */
+ br_sslrec_in_class inner;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Engine initialisation method.
+ *
+ * This method sets the vtable field in the context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param bc_impl block cipher implementation (CBC decryption).
+ * \param bc_key block cipher key.
+ * \param bc_key_len block cipher key length (in bytes).
+ * \param dig_impl hash function for HMAC.
+ * \param mac_key HMAC key.
+ * \param mac_key_len HMAC key length (in bytes).
+ * \param mac_out_len HMAC output length (in bytes).
+ * \param iv initial IV (or `NULL`).
+ */
+ void (*init)(const br_sslrec_in_cbc_class **ctx,
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *bc_impl,
+ const void *bc_key, size_t bc_key_len,
+ const br_hash_class *dig_impl,
+ const void *mac_key, size_t mac_key_len, size_t mac_out_len,
+ const void *iv);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Record encryption engine class, for CBC mode.
+ *
+ * This class type extends the encryption engine class with an
+ * initialisation method that receives the parameters needed
+ * for CBC processing: block cipher implementation, block cipher key,
+ * HMAC parameters (hash function, key, MAC length), and IV. If the
+ * IV is `NULL`, then a per-record IV will be used (TLS 1.1+).
+ */
+typedef struct br_sslrec_out_cbc_class_ br_sslrec_out_cbc_class;
+struct br_sslrec_out_cbc_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Superclass, as first vtable field.
+ */
+ br_sslrec_out_class inner;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Engine initialisation method.
+ *
+ * This method sets the vtable field in the context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param bc_impl block cipher implementation (CBC encryption).
+ * \param bc_key block cipher key.
+ * \param bc_key_len block cipher key length (in bytes).
+ * \param dig_impl hash function for HMAC.
+ * \param mac_key HMAC key.
+ * \param mac_key_len HMAC key length (in bytes).
+ * \param mac_out_len HMAC output length (in bytes).
+ * \param iv initial IV (or `NULL`).
+ */
+ void (*init)(const br_sslrec_out_cbc_class **ctx,
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *bc_impl,
+ const void *bc_key, size_t bc_key_len,
+ const br_hash_class *dig_impl,
+ const void *mac_key, size_t mac_key_len, size_t mac_out_len,
+ const void *iv);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context structure for decrypting incoming records with
+ * CBC + HMAC.
+ *
+ * The first field points to the vtable. The other fields are opaque
+ * and shall not be accessed directly.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable. */
+ const br_sslrec_in_cbc_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint64_t seq;
+ union {
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *vtable;
+ br_aes_gen_cbcdec_keys aes;
+ br_des_gen_cbcdec_keys des;
+ } bc;
+ br_hmac_key_context mac;
+ size_t mac_len;
+ unsigned char iv[16];
+ int explicit_IV;
+#endif
+} br_sslrec_in_cbc_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Static, constant vtable for record decryption with CBC.
+ */
+extern const br_sslrec_in_cbc_class br_sslrec_in_cbc_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context structure for encrypting outgoing records with
+ * CBC + HMAC.
+ *
+ * The first field points to the vtable. The other fields are opaque
+ * and shall not be accessed directly.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable. */
+ const br_sslrec_out_cbc_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint64_t seq;
+ union {
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *vtable;
+ br_aes_gen_cbcenc_keys aes;
+ br_des_gen_cbcenc_keys des;
+ } bc;
+ br_hmac_key_context mac;
+ size_t mac_len;
+ unsigned char iv[16];
+ int explicit_IV;
+#endif
+} br_sslrec_out_cbc_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Static, constant vtable for record encryption with CBC.
+ */
+extern const br_sslrec_out_cbc_class br_sslrec_out_cbc_vtable;
+
+/* ===================================================================== */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Record decryption engine class, for GCM mode.
+ *
+ * This class type extends the decryption engine class with an
+ * initialisation method that receives the parameters needed
+ * for GCM processing: block cipher implementation, block cipher key,
+ * GHASH implementation, and 4-byte IV.
+ */
+typedef struct br_sslrec_in_gcm_class_ br_sslrec_in_gcm_class;
+struct br_sslrec_in_gcm_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Superclass, as first vtable field.
+ */
+ br_sslrec_in_class inner;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Engine initialisation method.
+ *
+ * This method sets the vtable field in the context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param bc_impl block cipher implementation (CTR).
+ * \param key block cipher key.
+ * \param key_len block cipher key length (in bytes).
+ * \param gh_impl GHASH implementation.
+ * \param iv static IV (4 bytes).
+ */
+ void (*init)(const br_sslrec_in_gcm_class **ctx,
+ const br_block_ctr_class *bc_impl,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len,
+ br_ghash gh_impl,
+ const void *iv);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Record encryption engine class, for GCM mode.
+ *
+ * This class type extends the encryption engine class with an
+ * initialisation method that receives the parameters needed
+ * for GCM processing: block cipher implementation, block cipher key,
+ * GHASH implementation, and 4-byte IV.
+ */
+typedef struct br_sslrec_out_gcm_class_ br_sslrec_out_gcm_class;
+struct br_sslrec_out_gcm_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Superclass, as first vtable field.
+ */
+ br_sslrec_out_class inner;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Engine initialisation method.
+ *
+ * This method sets the vtable field in the context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param bc_impl block cipher implementation (CTR).
+ * \param key block cipher key.
+ * \param key_len block cipher key length (in bytes).
+ * \param gh_impl GHASH implementation.
+ * \param iv static IV (4 bytes).
+ */
+ void (*init)(const br_sslrec_out_gcm_class **ctx,
+ const br_block_ctr_class *bc_impl,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len,
+ br_ghash gh_impl,
+ const void *iv);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context structure for processing records with GCM.
+ *
+ * The same context structure is used for encrypting and decrypting.
+ *
+ * The first field points to the vtable. The other fields are opaque
+ * and shall not be accessed directly.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable. */
+ union {
+ const void *gen;
+ const br_sslrec_in_gcm_class *in;
+ const br_sslrec_out_gcm_class *out;
+ } vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint64_t seq;
+ union {
+ const br_block_ctr_class *vtable;
+ br_aes_gen_ctr_keys aes;
+ } bc;
+ br_ghash gh;
+ unsigned char iv[4];
+ unsigned char h[16];
+#endif
+} br_sslrec_gcm_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Static, constant vtable for record decryption with GCM.
+ */
+extern const br_sslrec_in_gcm_class br_sslrec_in_gcm_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Static, constant vtable for record encryption with GCM.
+ */
+extern const br_sslrec_out_gcm_class br_sslrec_out_gcm_vtable;
+
+/* ===================================================================== */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Record decryption engine class, for ChaCha20+Poly1305.
+ *
+ * This class type extends the decryption engine class with an
+ * initialisation method that receives the parameters needed
+ * for ChaCha20+Poly1305 processing: ChaCha20 implementation,
+ * Poly1305 implementation, key, and 12-byte IV.
+ */
+typedef struct br_sslrec_in_chapol_class_ br_sslrec_in_chapol_class;
+struct br_sslrec_in_chapol_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Superclass, as first vtable field.
+ */
+ br_sslrec_in_class inner;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Engine initialisation method.
+ *
+ * This method sets the vtable field in the context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param ichacha ChaCha20 implementation.
+ * \param ipoly Poly1305 implementation.
+ * \param key secret key (32 bytes).
+ * \param iv static IV (12 bytes).
+ */
+ void (*init)(const br_sslrec_in_chapol_class **ctx,
+ br_chacha20_run ichacha,
+ br_poly1305_run ipoly,
+ const void *key, const void *iv);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Record encryption engine class, for ChaCha20+Poly1305.
+ *
+ * This class type extends the encryption engine class with an
+ * initialisation method that receives the parameters needed
+ * for ChaCha20+Poly1305 processing: ChaCha20 implementation,
+ * Poly1305 implementation, key, and 12-byte IV.
+ */
+typedef struct br_sslrec_out_chapol_class_ br_sslrec_out_chapol_class;
+struct br_sslrec_out_chapol_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Superclass, as first vtable field.
+ */
+ br_sslrec_out_class inner;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Engine initialisation method.
+ *
+ * This method sets the vtable field in the context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param ichacha ChaCha20 implementation.
+ * \param ipoly Poly1305 implementation.
+ * \param key secret key (32 bytes).
+ * \param iv static IV (12 bytes).
+ */
+ void (*init)(const br_sslrec_out_chapol_class **ctx,
+ br_chacha20_run ichacha,
+ br_poly1305_run ipoly,
+ const void *key, const void *iv);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context structure for processing records with ChaCha20+Poly1305.
+ *
+ * The same context structure is used for encrypting and decrypting.
+ *
+ * The first field points to the vtable. The other fields are opaque
+ * and shall not be accessed directly.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable. */
+ union {
+ const void *gen;
+ const br_sslrec_in_chapol_class *in;
+ const br_sslrec_out_chapol_class *out;
+ } vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint64_t seq;
+ unsigned char key[32];
+ unsigned char iv[12];
+ br_chacha20_run ichacha;
+ br_poly1305_run ipoly;
+#endif
+} br_sslrec_chapol_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Static, constant vtable for record decryption with ChaCha20+Poly1305.
+ */
+extern const br_sslrec_in_chapol_class br_sslrec_in_chapol_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Static, constant vtable for record encryption with ChaCha20+Poly1305.
+ */
+extern const br_sslrec_out_chapol_class br_sslrec_out_chapol_vtable;
+
+/* ===================================================================== */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Record decryption engine class, for CCM mode.
+ *
+ * This class type extends the decryption engine class with an
+ * initialisation method that receives the parameters needed
+ * for CCM processing: block cipher implementation, block cipher key,
+ * and 4-byte IV.
+ */
+typedef struct br_sslrec_in_ccm_class_ br_sslrec_in_ccm_class;
+struct br_sslrec_in_ccm_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Superclass, as first vtable field.
+ */
+ br_sslrec_in_class inner;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Engine initialisation method.
+ *
+ * This method sets the vtable field in the context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param bc_impl block cipher implementation (CTR+CBC).
+ * \param key block cipher key.
+ * \param key_len block cipher key length (in bytes).
+ * \param iv static IV (4 bytes).
+ * \param tag_len tag length (in bytes)
+ */
+ void (*init)(const br_sslrec_in_ccm_class **ctx,
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *bc_impl,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len,
+ const void *iv, size_t tag_len);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Record encryption engine class, for CCM mode.
+ *
+ * This class type extends the encryption engine class with an
+ * initialisation method that receives the parameters needed
+ * for CCM processing: block cipher implementation, block cipher key,
+ * and 4-byte IV.
+ */
+typedef struct br_sslrec_out_ccm_class_ br_sslrec_out_ccm_class;
+struct br_sslrec_out_ccm_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Superclass, as first vtable field.
+ */
+ br_sslrec_out_class inner;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Engine initialisation method.
+ *
+ * This method sets the vtable field in the context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param bc_impl block cipher implementation (CTR+CBC).
+ * \param key block cipher key.
+ * \param key_len block cipher key length (in bytes).
+ * \param iv static IV (4 bytes).
+ * \param tag_len tag length (in bytes)
+ */
+ void (*init)(const br_sslrec_out_ccm_class **ctx,
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *bc_impl,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len,
+ const void *iv, size_t tag_len);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context structure for processing records with CCM.
+ *
+ * The same context structure is used for encrypting and decrypting.
+ *
+ * The first field points to the vtable. The other fields are opaque
+ * and shall not be accessed directly.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable. */
+ union {
+ const void *gen;
+ const br_sslrec_in_ccm_class *in;
+ const br_sslrec_out_ccm_class *out;
+ } vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ uint64_t seq;
+ union {
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *vtable;
+ br_aes_gen_ctrcbc_keys aes;
+ } bc;
+ unsigned char iv[4];
+ size_t tag_len;
+#endif
+} br_sslrec_ccm_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Static, constant vtable for record decryption with CCM.
+ */
+extern const br_sslrec_in_ccm_class br_sslrec_in_ccm_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Static, constant vtable for record encryption with CCM.
+ */
+extern const br_sslrec_out_ccm_class br_sslrec_out_ccm_vtable;
+
+/* ===================================================================== */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for session parameters, to be saved for session resumption.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Session ID buffer. */
+ unsigned char session_id[32];
+ /** \brief Session ID length (in bytes, at most 32). */
+ unsigned char session_id_len;
+ /** \brief Protocol version. */
+ uint16_t version;
+ /** \brief Cipher suite. */
+ uint16_t cipher_suite;
+ /** \brief Master secret. */
+ unsigned char master_secret[48];
+} br_ssl_session_parameters;
+
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+/*
+ * Maximum number of cipher suites supported by a client or server.
+ */
+#define BR_MAX_CIPHER_SUITES 48
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context structure for SSL engine.
+ *
+ * This strucuture is common to the client and server; both the client
+ * context (`br_ssl_client_context`) and the server context
+ * (`br_ssl_server_context`) include a `br_ssl_engine_context` as their
+ * first field.
+ *
+ * The engine context manages records, including alerts, closures, and
+ * transitions to new encryption/MAC algorithms. Processing of handshake
+ * records is delegated to externally provided code. This structure
+ * should not be used directly.
+ *
+ * Structure contents are opaque and shall not be accessed directly.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ /*
+ * The error code. When non-zero, then the state is "failed" and
+ * no I/O may occur until reset.
+ */
+ int err;
+
+ /*
+ * Configured I/O buffers. They are either disjoint, or identical.
+ */
+ unsigned char *ibuf, *obuf;
+ size_t ibuf_len, obuf_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Maximum fragment length applies to outgoing records; incoming
+ * records can be processed as long as they fit in the input
+ * buffer. It is guaranteed that incoming records at least as big
+ * as max_frag_len can be processed.
+ */
+ uint16_t max_frag_len;
+ unsigned char log_max_frag_len;
+ unsigned char peer_log_max_frag_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Buffering management registers.
+ */
+ size_t ixa, ixb, ixc;
+ size_t oxa, oxb, oxc;
+ unsigned char iomode;
+ unsigned char incrypt;
+
+ /*
+ * Shutdown flag: when set to non-zero, incoming record bytes
+ * will not be accepted anymore. This is used after a close_notify
+ * has been received: afterwards, the engine no longer claims that
+ * it could receive bytes from the transport medium.
+ */
+ unsigned char shutdown_recv;
+
+ /*
+ * 'record_type_in' is set to the incoming record type when the
+ * record header has been received.
+ * 'record_type_out' is used to make the next outgoing record
+ * header when it is ready to go.
+ */
+ unsigned char record_type_in, record_type_out;
+
+ /*
+ * When a record is received, its version is extracted:
+ * -- if 'version_in' is 0, then it is set to the received version;
+ * -- otherwise, if the received version is not identical to
+ * the 'version_in' contents, then a failure is reported.
+ *
+ * This implements the SSL requirement that all records shall
+ * use the negotiated protocol version, once decided (in the
+ * ServerHello). It is up to the handshake handler to adjust this
+ * field when necessary.
+ */
+ uint16_t version_in;
+
+ /*
+ * 'version_out' is used when the next outgoing record is ready
+ * to go.
+ */
+ uint16_t version_out;
+
+ /*
+ * Record handler contexts.
+ */
+ union {
+ const br_sslrec_in_class *vtable;
+ br_sslrec_in_cbc_context cbc;
+ br_sslrec_gcm_context gcm;
+ br_sslrec_chapol_context chapol;
+ br_sslrec_ccm_context ccm;
+ } in;
+ union {
+ const br_sslrec_out_class *vtable;
+ br_sslrec_out_clear_context clear;
+ br_sslrec_out_cbc_context cbc;
+ br_sslrec_gcm_context gcm;
+ br_sslrec_chapol_context chapol;
+ br_sslrec_ccm_context ccm;
+ } out;
+
+ /*
+ * The "application data" flag. Value:
+ * 0 handshake is in process, no application data acceptable
+ * 1 application data can be sent and received
+ * 2 closing, no application data can be sent, but some
+ * can still be received (and discarded)
+ */
+ unsigned char application_data;
+
+ /*
+ * Context RNG.
+ *
+ * rng_init_done is initially 0. It is set to 1 when the
+ * basic structure of the RNG is set, and 2 when some
+ * entropy has been pushed in. The value 2 marks the RNG
+ * as "properly seeded".
+ *
+ * rng_os_rand_done is initially 0. It is set to 1 when
+ * some seeding from the OS or hardware has been attempted.
+ */
+ br_hmac_drbg_context rng;
+ int rng_init_done;
+ int rng_os_rand_done;
+
+ /*
+ * Supported minimum and maximum versions, and cipher suites.
+ */
+ uint16_t version_min;
+ uint16_t version_max;
+ uint16_t suites_buf[BR_MAX_CIPHER_SUITES];
+ unsigned char suites_num;
+
+ /*
+ * For clients, the server name to send as a SNI extension. For
+ * servers, the name received in the SNI extension (if any).
+ */
+ char server_name[256];
+
+ /*
+ * "Security parameters". These are filled by the handshake
+ * handler, and used when switching encryption state.
+ */
+ unsigned char client_random[32];
+ unsigned char server_random[32];
+ br_ssl_session_parameters session;
+
+ /*
+ * ECDHE elements: curve and point from the peer. The server also
+ * uses that buffer for the point to send to the client.
+ */
+ unsigned char ecdhe_curve;
+ unsigned char ecdhe_point[133];
+ unsigned char ecdhe_point_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Secure renegotiation (RFC 5746): 'reneg' can be:
+ * 0 first handshake (server support is not known)
+ * 1 peer does not support secure renegotiation
+ * 2 peer supports secure renegotiation
+ *
+ * The saved_finished buffer contains the client and the
+ * server "Finished" values from the last handshake, in
+ * that order (12 bytes each).
+ */
+ unsigned char reneg;
+ unsigned char saved_finished[24];
+
+ /*
+ * Behavioural flags.
+ */
+ uint32_t flags;
+
+ /*
+ * Context variables for the handshake processor. The 'pad' must
+ * be large enough to accommodate an RSA-encrypted pre-master
+ * secret, or an RSA signature; since we want to support up to
+ * RSA-4096, this means at least 512 bytes. (Other pad usages
+ * require its length to be at least 256.)
+ */
+ struct {
+ uint32_t *dp;
+ uint32_t *rp;
+ const unsigned char *ip;
+ } cpu;
+ uint32_t dp_stack[32];
+ uint32_t rp_stack[32];
+ unsigned char pad[512];
+ unsigned char *hbuf_in, *hbuf_out, *saved_hbuf_out;
+ size_t hlen_in, hlen_out;
+ void (*hsrun)(void *ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * The 'action' value communicates OOB information between the
+ * engine and the handshake processor.
+ *
+ * From the engine:
+ * 0 invocation triggered by I/O
+ * 1 invocation triggered by explicit close
+ * 2 invocation triggered by explicit renegotiation
+ */
+ unsigned char action;
+
+ /*
+ * State for alert messages. Value is either 0, or the value of
+ * the alert level byte (level is either 1 for warning, or 2 for
+ * fatal; we convert all other values to 'fatal').
+ */
+ unsigned char alert;
+
+ /*
+ * Closure flags. This flag is set when a close_notify has been
+ * received from the peer.
+ */
+ unsigned char close_received;
+
+ /*
+ * Multi-hasher for the handshake messages. The handshake handler
+ * is responsible for resetting it when appropriate.
+ */
+ br_multihash_context mhash;
+
+ /*
+ * Pointer to the X.509 engine. The engine is supposed to be
+ * already initialized. It is used to validate the peer's
+ * certificate.
+ */
+ const br_x509_class **x509ctx;
+
+ /*
+ * Certificate chain to send. This is used by both client and
+ * server, when they send their respective Certificate messages.
+ * If chain_len is 0, then chain may be NULL.
+ */
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain;
+ size_t chain_len;
+ const unsigned char *cert_cur;
+ size_t cert_len;
+
+ /*
+ * List of supported protocol names (ALPN extension). If unset,
+ * (number of names is 0), then:
+ * - the client sends no ALPN extension;
+ * - the server ignores any incoming ALPN extension.
+ *
+ * Otherwise:
+ * - the client sends an ALPN extension with all the names;
+ * - the server selects the first protocol in its list that
+ * the client also supports, or fails (fatal alert 120)
+ * if the client sends an ALPN extension and there is no
+ * match.
+ *
+ * The 'selected_protocol' field contains 1+n if the matching
+ * name has index n in the list (the value is 0 if no match was
+ * performed, e.g. the peer did not send an ALPN extension).
+ */
+ const char **protocol_names;
+ uint16_t protocol_names_num;
+ uint16_t selected_protocol;
+
+ /*
+ * Pointers to implementations; left to NULL for unsupported
+ * functions. For the raw hash functions, implementations are
+ * referenced from the multihasher (mhash field).
+ */
+ br_tls_prf_impl prf10;
+ br_tls_prf_impl prf_sha256;
+ br_tls_prf_impl prf_sha384;
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *iaes_cbcenc;
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *iaes_cbcdec;
+ const br_block_ctr_class *iaes_ctr;
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *iaes_ctrcbc;
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *ides_cbcenc;
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *ides_cbcdec;
+ br_ghash ighash;
+ br_chacha20_run ichacha;
+ br_poly1305_run ipoly;
+ const br_sslrec_in_cbc_class *icbc_in;
+ const br_sslrec_out_cbc_class *icbc_out;
+ const br_sslrec_in_gcm_class *igcm_in;
+ const br_sslrec_out_gcm_class *igcm_out;
+ const br_sslrec_in_chapol_class *ichapol_in;
+ const br_sslrec_out_chapol_class *ichapol_out;
+ const br_sslrec_in_ccm_class *iccm_in;
+ const br_sslrec_out_ccm_class *iccm_out;
+ const br_ec_impl *iec;
+ br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy irsavrfy;
+ br_ecdsa_vrfy iecdsa;
+#endif
+} br_ssl_engine_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get currently defined engine behavioural flags.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \return the flags.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+br_ssl_engine_get_flags(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+ return cc->flags;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set all engine behavioural flags.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param flags new value for all flags.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_all_flags(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ cc->flags = flags;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set some engine behavioural flags.
+ *
+ * The flags set in the `flags` parameter are set in the context; other
+ * flags are untouched.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param flags additional set flags.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_add_flags(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ cc->flags |= flags;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Clear some engine behavioural flags.
+ *
+ * The flags set in the `flags` parameter are cleared from the context; other
+ * flags are untouched.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param flags flags to remove.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_remove_flags(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, uint32_t flags)
+{
+ cc->flags &= ~flags;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Behavioural flag: enforce server preferences.
+ *
+ * If this flag is set, then the server will enforce its own cipher suite
+ * preference order; otherwise, it follows the client preferences.
+ */
+#define BR_OPT_ENFORCE_SERVER_PREFERENCES ((uint32_t)1 << 0)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Behavioural flag: disable renegotiation.
+ *
+ * If this flag is set, then renegotiations are rejected unconditionally:
+ * they won't be honoured if asked for programmatically, and requests from
+ * the peer are rejected.
+ */
+#define BR_OPT_NO_RENEGOTIATION ((uint32_t)1 << 1)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Behavioural flag: tolerate lack of client authentication.
+ *
+ * If this flag is set in a server and the server requests a client
+ * certificate, but the authentication fails (the client does not send
+ * a certificate, or the client's certificate chain cannot be validated),
+ * then the connection keeps on. Without this flag, a failed client
+ * authentication terminates the connection.
+ *
+ * Notes:
+ *
+ * - If the client's certificate can be validated and its public key is
+ * supported, then a wrong signature value terminates the connection
+ * regardless of that flag.
+ *
+ * - If using full-static ECDH, then a failure to validate the client's
+ * certificate prevents the handshake from succeeding.
+ */
+#define BR_OPT_TOLERATE_NO_CLIENT_AUTH ((uint32_t)1 << 2)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Behavioural flag: fail on application protocol mismatch.
+ *
+ * The ALPN extension ([RFC 7301](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301))
+ * allows the client to send a list of application protocol names, and
+ * the server to select one. A mismatch is one of the following occurrences:
+ *
+ * - On the client: the client sends a list of names, the server
+ * responds with a protocol name which is _not_ part of the list of
+ * names sent by the client.
+ *
+ * - On the server: the client sends a list of names, and the server
+ * is also configured with a list of names, but there is no common
+ * protocol name between the two lists.
+ *
+ * Normal behaviour in case of mismatch is to report no matching name
+ * (`br_ssl_engine_get_selected_protocol()` returns `NULL`) and carry on.
+ * If the flag is set, then a mismatch implies a protocol failure (if
+ * the mismatch is detected by the server, it will send a fatal alert).
+ *
+ * Note: even with this flag, `br_ssl_engine_get_selected_protocol()`
+ * may still return `NULL` if the client or the server does not send an
+ * ALPN extension at all.
+ */
+#define BR_OPT_FAIL_ON_ALPN_MISMATCH ((uint32_t)1 << 3)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the minimum and maximum supported protocol versions.
+ *
+ * The two provided versions MUST be supported by the implementation
+ * (i.e. TLS 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2), and `version_max` MUST NOT be lower
+ * than `version_min`.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param version_min minimum supported TLS version.
+ * \param version_max maximum supported TLS version.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_versions(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ unsigned version_min, unsigned version_max)
+{
+ cc->version_min = (uint16_t)version_min;
+ cc->version_max = (uint16_t)version_max;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the list of cipher suites advertised by this context.
+ *
+ * The provided array is copied into the context. It is the caller
+ * responsibility to ensure that all provided suites will be supported
+ * by the context. The engine context has enough room to receive _all_
+ * suites supported by the implementation. The provided array MUST NOT
+ * contain duplicates.
+ *
+ * If the engine is for a client, the "signaling" pseudo-cipher suite
+ * `TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV` can be added at the end of the list, if the
+ * calling application is performing a voluntary downgrade (voluntary
+ * downgrades are not recommended, but if such a downgrade is done, then
+ * adding the fallback pseudo-suite is a good idea).
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param suites cipher suites.
+ * \param suites_num number of cipher suites.
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_set_suites(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ const uint16_t *suites, size_t suites_num);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the X.509 engine.
+ *
+ * The caller shall ensure that the X.509 engine is properly initialised.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param x509ctx X.509 certificate validation context.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_x509(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, const br_x509_class **x509ctx)
+{
+ cc->x509ctx = x509ctx;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the supported protocol names.
+ *
+ * Protocol names are part of the ALPN extension ([RFC
+ * 7301](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7301)). Each protocol name is a
+ * character string, containing no more than 255 characters (256 with the
+ * terminating zero). When names are set, then:
+ *
+ * - The client will send an ALPN extension, containing the names. If
+ * the server responds with an ALPN extension, the client will verify
+ * that the response contains one of its name, and report that name
+ * through `br_ssl_engine_get_selected_protocol()`.
+ *
+ * - The server will parse incoming ALPN extension (from clients), and
+ * try to find a common protocol; if none is found, the connection
+ * is aborted with a fatal alert. On match, a response ALPN extension
+ * is sent, and name is reported through
+ * `br_ssl_engine_get_selected_protocol()`.
+ *
+ * The provided array is linked in, and must remain valid while the
+ * connection is live.
+ *
+ * Names MUST NOT be empty. Names MUST NOT be longer than 255 characters
+ * (excluding the terminating 0).
+ *
+ * \param ctx SSL engine context.
+ * \param names list of protocol names (zero-terminated).
+ * \param num number of protocol names (MUST be 1 or more).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_protocol_names(br_ssl_engine_context *ctx,
+ const char **names, size_t num)
+{
+ ctx->protocol_names = names;
+ ctx->protocol_names_num = (uint16_t)num;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the selected protocol.
+ *
+ * If this context was initialised with a non-empty list of protocol
+ * names, and both client and server sent ALPN extensions during the
+ * handshake, and a common name was found, then that name is returned.
+ * Otherwise, `NULL` is returned.
+ *
+ * The returned pointer is one of the pointers provided to the context
+ * with `br_ssl_engine_set_protocol_names()`.
+ *
+ * \return the selected protocol, or `NULL`.
+ */
+static inline const char *
+br_ssl_engine_get_selected_protocol(br_ssl_engine_context *ctx)
+{
+ unsigned k;
+
+ k = ctx->selected_protocol;
+ return (k == 0 || k == 0xFFFF) ? NULL : ctx->protocol_names[k - 1];
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set a hash function implementation (by ID).
+ *
+ * Hash functions set with this call will be used for SSL/TLS specific
+ * usages, not X.509 certificate validation. Only "standard" hash functions
+ * may be set (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512). If `impl`
+ * is `NULL`, then the hash function support is removed, not added.
+ *
+ * \param ctx SSL engine context.
+ * \param id hash function identifier.
+ * \param impl hash function implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_hash(br_ssl_engine_context *ctx,
+ int id, const br_hash_class *impl)
+{
+ br_multihash_setimpl(&ctx->mhash, id, impl);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get a hash function implementation (by ID).
+ *
+ * This function retrieves a hash function implementation which was
+ * set with `br_ssl_engine_set_hash()`.
+ *
+ * \param ctx SSL engine context.
+ * \param id hash function identifier.
+ * \return the hash function implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline const br_hash_class *
+br_ssl_engine_get_hash(br_ssl_engine_context *ctx, int id)
+{
+ return br_multihash_getimpl(&ctx->mhash, id);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the PRF implementation (for TLS 1.0 and 1.1).
+ *
+ * This function sets (or removes, if `impl` is `NULL`) the implementation
+ * for the PRF used in TLS 1.0 and 1.1.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param impl PRF implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_prf10(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, br_tls_prf_impl impl)
+{
+ cc->prf10 = impl;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the PRF implementation with SHA-256 (for TLS 1.2).
+ *
+ * This function sets (or removes, if `impl` is `NULL`) the implementation
+ * for the SHA-256 variant of the PRF used in TLS 1.2.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param impl PRF implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_prf_sha256(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, br_tls_prf_impl impl)
+{
+ cc->prf_sha256 = impl;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the PRF implementation with SHA-384 (for TLS 1.2).
+ *
+ * This function sets (or removes, if `impl` is `NULL`) the implementation
+ * for the SHA-384 variant of the PRF used in TLS 1.2.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param impl PRF implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_prf_sha384(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, br_tls_prf_impl impl)
+{
+ cc->prf_sha384 = impl;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the AES/CBC implementations.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param impl_enc AES/CBC encryption implementation (or `NULL`).
+ * \param impl_dec AES/CBC decryption implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_aes_cbc(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *impl_enc,
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *impl_dec)
+{
+ cc->iaes_cbcenc = impl_enc;
+ cc->iaes_cbcdec = impl_dec;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the "default" AES/CBC implementations.
+ *
+ * This function configures in the engine the AES implementations that
+ * should provide best runtime performance on the local system, while
+ * still being safe (in particular, constant-time). It also sets the
+ * handlers for CBC records.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_cbc(br_ssl_engine_context *cc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the AES/CTR implementation.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param impl AES/CTR encryption/decryption implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctr(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ const br_block_ctr_class *impl)
+{
+ cc->iaes_ctr = impl;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the "default" implementations for AES/GCM (AES/CTR + GHASH).
+ *
+ * This function configures in the engine the AES/CTR and GHASH
+ * implementation that should provide best runtime performance on the local
+ * system, while still being safe (in particular, constant-time). It also
+ * sets the handlers for GCM records.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_gcm(br_ssl_engine_context *cc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the DES/CBC implementations.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param impl_enc DES/CBC encryption implementation (or `NULL`).
+ * \param impl_dec DES/CBC decryption implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_des_cbc(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *impl_enc,
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *impl_dec)
+{
+ cc->ides_cbcenc = impl_enc;
+ cc->ides_cbcdec = impl_dec;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the "default" DES/CBC implementations.
+ *
+ * This function configures in the engine the DES implementations that
+ * should provide best runtime performance on the local system, while
+ * still being safe (in particular, constant-time). It also sets the
+ * handlers for CBC records.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_set_default_des_cbc(br_ssl_engine_context *cc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the GHASH implementation (used in GCM mode).
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param impl GHASH implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_ghash(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, br_ghash impl)
+{
+ cc->ighash = impl;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the ChaCha20 implementation.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param ichacha ChaCha20 implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_chacha20(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ br_chacha20_run ichacha)
+{
+ cc->ichacha = ichacha;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the Poly1305 implementation.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param ipoly Poly1305 implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_poly1305(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ br_poly1305_run ipoly)
+{
+ cc->ipoly = ipoly;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the "default" ChaCha20 and Poly1305 implementations.
+ *
+ * This function configures in the engine the ChaCha20 and Poly1305
+ * implementations that should provide best runtime performance on the
+ * local system, while still being safe (in particular, constant-time).
+ * It also sets the handlers for ChaCha20+Poly1305 records.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_set_default_chapol(br_ssl_engine_context *cc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the AES/CTR+CBC implementation.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param impl AES/CTR+CBC encryption/decryption implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctrcbc(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *impl)
+{
+ cc->iaes_ctrcbc = impl;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the "default" implementations for AES/CCM.
+ *
+ * This function configures in the engine the AES/CTR+CBC
+ * implementation that should provide best runtime performance on the local
+ * system, while still being safe (in particular, constant-time). It also
+ * sets the handlers for CCM records.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_ccm(br_ssl_engine_context *cc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the record encryption and decryption engines for CBC + HMAC.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param impl_in record CBC decryption implementation (or `NULL`).
+ * \param impl_out record CBC encryption implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_cbc(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ const br_sslrec_in_cbc_class *impl_in,
+ const br_sslrec_out_cbc_class *impl_out)
+{
+ cc->icbc_in = impl_in;
+ cc->icbc_out = impl_out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the record encryption and decryption engines for GCM.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param impl_in record GCM decryption implementation (or `NULL`).
+ * \param impl_out record GCM encryption implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_gcm(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ const br_sslrec_in_gcm_class *impl_in,
+ const br_sslrec_out_gcm_class *impl_out)
+{
+ cc->igcm_in = impl_in;
+ cc->igcm_out = impl_out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the record encryption and decryption engines for CCM.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param impl_in record CCM decryption implementation (or `NULL`).
+ * \param impl_out record CCM encryption implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_ccm(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ const br_sslrec_in_ccm_class *impl_in,
+ const br_sslrec_out_ccm_class *impl_out)
+{
+ cc->iccm_in = impl_in;
+ cc->iccm_out = impl_out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the record encryption and decryption engines for
+ * ChaCha20+Poly1305.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param impl_in record ChaCha20 decryption implementation (or `NULL`).
+ * \param impl_out record ChaCha20 encryption implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_chapol(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ const br_sslrec_in_chapol_class *impl_in,
+ const br_sslrec_out_chapol_class *impl_out)
+{
+ cc->ichapol_in = impl_in;
+ cc->ichapol_out = impl_out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the EC implementation.
+ *
+ * The elliptic curve implementation will be used for ECDH and ECDHE
+ * cipher suites, and for ECDSA support.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param iec EC implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_ec(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, const br_ec_impl *iec)
+{
+ cc->iec = iec;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the "default" EC implementation.
+ *
+ * This function sets the elliptic curve implementation for ECDH and
+ * ECDHE cipher suites, and for ECDSA support. It selects the fastest
+ * implementation on the current system.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_set_default_ec(br_ssl_engine_context *cc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the EC implementation configured in the provided engine.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \return the EC implementation.
+ */
+static inline const br_ec_impl *
+br_ssl_engine_get_ec(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+ return cc->iec;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the RSA signature verification implementation.
+ *
+ * On the client, this is used to verify the server's signature on its
+ * ServerKeyExchange message (for ECDHE_RSA cipher suites). On the server,
+ * this is used to verify the client's CertificateVerify message (if a
+ * client certificate is requested, and that certificate contains a RSA key).
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param irsavrfy RSA signature verification implementation.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_rsavrfy(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy irsavrfy)
+{
+ cc->irsavrfy = irsavrfy;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the "default" RSA implementation (signature verification).
+ *
+ * This function sets the RSA implementation (signature verification)
+ * to the fastest implementation available on the current platform.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_set_default_rsavrfy(br_ssl_engine_context *cc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the RSA implementation (signature verification) configured
+ * in the provided engine.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \return the RSA signature verification implementation.
+ */
+static inline br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy
+br_ssl_engine_get_rsavrfy(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+ return cc->irsavrfy;
+}
+
+/*
+ * \brief Set the ECDSA implementation (signature verification).
+ *
+ * On the client, this is used to verify the server's signature on its
+ * ServerKeyExchange message (for ECDHE_ECDSA cipher suites). On the server,
+ * this is used to verify the client's CertificateVerify message (if a
+ * client certificate is requested, that certificate contains an EC key,
+ * and full-static ECDH is not used).
+ *
+ * The ECDSA implementation will use the EC core implementation configured
+ * in the engine context.
+ *
+ * \param cc client context.
+ * \param iecdsa ECDSA verification implementation.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_ecdsa(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, br_ecdsa_vrfy iecdsa)
+{
+ cc->iecdsa = iecdsa;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the "default" ECDSA implementation (signature verification).
+ *
+ * This function sets the ECDSA implementation (signature verification)
+ * to the fastest implementation available on the current platform. This
+ * call also sets the elliptic curve implementation itself, there again
+ * to the fastest EC implementation available.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_set_default_ecdsa(br_ssl_engine_context *cc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the ECDSA implementation (signature verification) configured
+ * in the provided engine.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \return the ECDSA signature verification implementation.
+ */
+static inline br_ecdsa_vrfy
+br_ssl_engine_get_ecdsa(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+ return cc->iecdsa;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the I/O buffer for the SSL engine.
+ *
+ * Once this call has been made, `br_ssl_client_reset()` or
+ * `br_ssl_server_reset()` MUST be called before using the context.
+ *
+ * The provided buffer will be used as long as the engine context is
+ * used. The caller is responsible for keeping it available.
+ *
+ * If `bidi` is 0, then the engine will operate in half-duplex mode
+ * (it won't be able to send data while there is unprocessed incoming
+ * data in the buffer, and it won't be able to receive data while there
+ * is unsent data in the buffer). The optimal buffer size in half-duplex
+ * mode is `BR_SSL_BUFSIZE_MONO`; if the buffer is larger, then extra
+ * bytes are ignored. If the buffer is smaller, then this limits the
+ * capacity of the engine to support all allowed record sizes.
+ *
+ * If `bidi` is 1, then the engine will split the buffer into two
+ * parts, for separate handling of outgoing and incoming data. This
+ * enables full-duplex processing, but requires more RAM. The optimal
+ * buffer size in full-duplex mode is `BR_SSL_BUFSIZE_BIDI`; if the
+ * buffer is larger, then extra bytes are ignored. If the buffer is
+ * smaller, then the split will favour the incoming part, so that
+ * interoperability is maximised.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context
+ * \param iobuf I/O buffer.
+ * \param iobuf_len I/O buffer length (in bytes).
+ * \param bidi non-zero for full-duplex mode.
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_set_buffer(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ void *iobuf, size_t iobuf_len, int bidi);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the I/O buffers for the SSL engine.
+ *
+ * Once this call has been made, `br_ssl_client_reset()` or
+ * `br_ssl_server_reset()` MUST be called before using the context.
+ *
+ * This function is similar to `br_ssl_engine_set_buffer()`, except
+ * that it enforces full-duplex mode, and the two I/O buffers are
+ * provided as separate chunks.
+ *
+ * The macros `BR_SSL_BUFSIZE_INPUT` and `BR_SSL_BUFSIZE_OUTPUT`
+ * evaluate to the optimal (maximum) sizes for the input and output
+ * buffer, respectively.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context
+ * \param ibuf input buffer.
+ * \param ibuf_len input buffer length (in bytes).
+ * \param obuf output buffer.
+ * \param obuf_len output buffer length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_set_buffers_bidi(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ void *ibuf, size_t ibuf_len, void *obuf, size_t obuf_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Inject some "initial entropy" in the context.
+ *
+ * This entropy will be added to what can be obtained from the
+ * underlying operating system, if that OS is supported.
+ *
+ * This function may be called several times; all injected entropy chunks
+ * are cumulatively mixed.
+ *
+ * If entropy gathering from the OS is supported and compiled in, then this
+ * step is optional. Otherwise, it is mandatory to inject randomness, and
+ * the caller MUST take care to push (as one or several successive calls)
+ * enough entropy to achieve cryptographic resistance (at least 80 bits,
+ * preferably 128 or more). The engine will report an error if no entropy
+ * was provided and none can be obtained from the OS.
+ *
+ * Take care that this function cannot assess the cryptographic quality of
+ * the provided bytes.
+ *
+ * In all generality, "entropy" must here be considered to mean "that
+ * which the attacker cannot predict". If your OS/architecture does not
+ * have a suitable source of randomness, then you can make do with the
+ * combination of a large enough secret value (possibly a copy of an
+ * asymmetric private key that you also store on the system) AND a
+ * non-repeating value (e.g. current time, provided that the local clock
+ * cannot be reset or altered by the attacker).
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param data extra entropy to inject.
+ * \param len length of the extra data (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_inject_entropy(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the "server name" in this engine.
+ *
+ * For clients, this is the name provided with `br_ssl_client_reset()`;
+ * for servers, this is the name received from the client as part of the
+ * ClientHello message. If there is no such name (e.g. the client did
+ * not send an SNI extension) then the returned string is empty
+ * (returned pointer points to a byte of value 0).
+ *
+ * The returned pointer refers to a buffer inside the context, which may
+ * be overwritten as part of normal SSL activity (even within the same
+ * connection, if a renegotiation occurs).
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \return the server name (possibly empty).
+ */
+static inline const char *
+br_ssl_engine_get_server_name(const br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+ return cc->server_name;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the protocol version.
+ *
+ * This function returns the protocol version that is used by the
+ * engine. That value is set after sending (for a server) or receiving
+ * (for a client) the ServerHello message.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \return the protocol version.
+ */
+static inline unsigned
+br_ssl_engine_get_version(const br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+ return cc->session.version;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get a copy of the session parameters.
+ *
+ * The session parameters are filled during the handshake, so this
+ * function shall not be called before completion of the handshake.
+ * The initial handshake is completed when the context first allows
+ * application data to be injected.
+ *
+ * This function copies the current session parameters into the provided
+ * structure. Beware that the session parameters include the master
+ * secret, which is sensitive data, to handle with great care.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param pp destination structure for the session parameters.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_get_session_parameters(const br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ br_ssl_session_parameters *pp)
+{
+ memcpy(pp, &cc->session, sizeof *pp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the session parameters to the provided values.
+ *
+ * This function is meant to be used in the client, before doing a new
+ * handshake; a session resumption will be attempted with these
+ * parameters. In the server, this function has no effect.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param pp source structure for the session parameters.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_engine_set_session_parameters(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ const br_ssl_session_parameters *pp)
+{
+ memcpy(&cc->session, pp, sizeof *pp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get identifier for the curve used for key exchange.
+ *
+ * If the cipher suite uses ECDHE, then this function returns the
+ * identifier for the curve used for transient parameters. This is
+ * defined during the course of the handshake, when the ServerKeyExchange
+ * is sent (on the server) or received (on the client). If the
+ * cipher suite does not use ECDHE (e.g. static ECDH, or RSA key
+ * exchange), then this value is indeterminate.
+ *
+ * @param cc SSL engine context.
+ * @return the ECDHE curve identifier.
+ */
+static inline int
+br_ssl_engine_get_ecdhe_curve(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+ return cc->ecdhe_curve;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the current engine state.
+ *
+ * An SSL engine (client or server) has, at any time, a state which is
+ * the combination of zero, one or more of these flags:
+ *
+ * - `BR_SSL_CLOSED`
+ *
+ * Engine is finished, no more I/O (until next reset).
+ *
+ * - `BR_SSL_SENDREC`
+ *
+ * Engine has some bytes to send to the peer.
+ *
+ * - `BR_SSL_RECVREC`
+ *
+ * Engine expects some bytes from the peer.
+ *
+ * - `BR_SSL_SENDAPP`
+ *
+ * Engine may receive application data to send (or flush).
+ *
+ * - `BR_SSL_RECVAPP`
+ *
+ * Engine has obtained some application data from the peer,
+ * that should be read by the caller.
+ *
+ * If no flag at all is set (state value is 0), then the engine is not
+ * fully initialised yet.
+ *
+ * The `BR_SSL_CLOSED` flag is exclusive; when it is set, no other flag
+ * is set. To distinguish between a normal closure and an error, use
+ * `br_ssl_engine_last_error()`.
+ *
+ * Generally speaking, `BR_SSL_SENDREC` and `BR_SSL_SENDAPP` are mutually
+ * exclusive: the input buffer, at any point, either accumulates
+ * plaintext data, or contains an assembled record that is being sent.
+ * Similarly, `BR_SSL_RECVREC` and `BR_SSL_RECVAPP` are mutually exclusive.
+ * This may change in a future library version.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \return the current engine state.
+ */
+unsigned br_ssl_engine_current_state(const br_ssl_engine_context *cc);
+
+/** \brief SSL engine state: closed or failed. */
+#define BR_SSL_CLOSED 0x0001
+/** \brief SSL engine state: record data is ready to be sent to the peer. */
+#define BR_SSL_SENDREC 0x0002
+/** \brief SSL engine state: engine may receive records from the peer. */
+#define BR_SSL_RECVREC 0x0004
+/** \brief SSL engine state: engine may accept application data to send. */
+#define BR_SSL_SENDAPP 0x0008
+/** \brief SSL engine state: engine has received application data. */
+#define BR_SSL_RECVAPP 0x0010
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the engine error indicator.
+ *
+ * The error indicator is `BR_ERR_OK` (0) if no error was encountered
+ * since the last call to `br_ssl_client_reset()` or
+ * `br_ssl_server_reset()`. Other status values are "sticky": they
+ * remain set, and prevent all I/O activity, until cleared. Only the
+ * reset calls clear the error indicator.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \return 0, or a non-zero error code.
+ */
+static inline int
+br_ssl_engine_last_error(const br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+ return cc->err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * There are four I/O operations, each identified by a symbolic name:
+ *
+ * sendapp inject application data in the engine
+ * recvapp retrieving application data from the engine
+ * sendrec sending records on the transport medium
+ * recvrec receiving records from the transport medium
+ *
+ * Terminology works thus: in a layered model where the SSL engine sits
+ * between the application and the network, "send" designates operations
+ * where bytes flow from application to network, and "recv" for the
+ * reverse operation. Application data (the plaintext that is to be
+ * conveyed through SSL) is "app", while encrypted records are "rec".
+ * Note that from the SSL engine point of view, "sendapp" and "recvrec"
+ * designate bytes that enter the engine ("inject" operation), while
+ * "recvapp" and "sendrec" designate bytes that exit the engine
+ * ("extract" operation).
+ *
+ * For the operation 'xxx', two functions are defined:
+ *
+ * br_ssl_engine_xxx_buf
+ * Returns a pointer and length to the buffer to use for that
+ * operation. '*len' is set to the number of bytes that may be read
+ * from the buffer (extract operation) or written to the buffer
+ * (inject operation). If no byte may be exchanged for that operation
+ * at that point, then '*len' is set to zero, and NULL is returned.
+ * The engine state is unmodified by this call.
+ *
+ * br_ssl_engine_xxx_ack
+ * Informs the engine that 'len' bytes have been read from the buffer
+ * (extract operation) or written to the buffer (inject operation).
+ * The 'len' value MUST NOT be zero. The 'len' value MUST NOT exceed
+ * that which was obtained from a preceding br_ssl_engine_xxx_buf()
+ * call.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get buffer for application data to send.
+ *
+ * If the engine is ready to accept application data to send to the
+ * peer, then this call returns a pointer to the buffer where such
+ * data shall be written, and its length is written in `*len`.
+ * Otherwise, `*len` is set to 0 and `NULL` is returned.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param len receives the application data output buffer length, or 0.
+ * \return the application data output buffer, or `NULL`.
+ */
+unsigned char *br_ssl_engine_sendapp_buf(
+ const br_ssl_engine_context *cc, size_t *len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Inform the engine of some new application data.
+ *
+ * After writing `len` bytes in the buffer returned by
+ * `br_ssl_engine_sendapp_buf()`, the application shall call this
+ * function to trigger any relevant processing. The `len` parameter
+ * MUST NOT be 0, and MUST NOT exceed the value obtained in the
+ * `br_ssl_engine_sendapp_buf()` call.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param len number of bytes pushed (not zero).
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_sendapp_ack(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get buffer for received application data.
+ *
+ * If the engine has received application data from the peer, then this
+ * call returns a pointer to the buffer from where such data shall be
+ * read, and its length is written in `*len`. Otherwise, `*len` is set
+ * to 0 and `NULL` is returned.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param len receives the application data input buffer length, or 0.
+ * \return the application data input buffer, or `NULL`.
+ */
+unsigned char *br_ssl_engine_recvapp_buf(
+ const br_ssl_engine_context *cc, size_t *len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Acknowledge some received application data.
+ *
+ * After reading `len` bytes from the buffer returned by
+ * `br_ssl_engine_recvapp_buf()`, the application shall call this
+ * function to trigger any relevant processing. The `len` parameter
+ * MUST NOT be 0, and MUST NOT exceed the value obtained in the
+ * `br_ssl_engine_recvapp_buf()` call.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param len number of bytes read (not zero).
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_recvapp_ack(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get buffer for record data to send.
+ *
+ * If the engine has prepared some records to send to the peer, then this
+ * call returns a pointer to the buffer from where such data shall be
+ * read, and its length is written in `*len`. Otherwise, `*len` is set
+ * to 0 and `NULL` is returned.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param len receives the record data output buffer length, or 0.
+ * \return the record data output buffer, or `NULL`.
+ */
+unsigned char *br_ssl_engine_sendrec_buf(
+ const br_ssl_engine_context *cc, size_t *len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Acknowledge some sent record data.
+ *
+ * After reading `len` bytes from the buffer returned by
+ * `br_ssl_engine_sendrec_buf()`, the application shall call this
+ * function to trigger any relevant processing. The `len` parameter
+ * MUST NOT be 0, and MUST NOT exceed the value obtained in the
+ * `br_ssl_engine_sendrec_buf()` call.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param len number of bytes read (not zero).
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_sendrec_ack(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get buffer for incoming records.
+ *
+ * If the engine is ready to accept records from the peer, then this
+ * call returns a pointer to the buffer where such data shall be
+ * written, and its length is written in `*len`. Otherwise, `*len` is
+ * set to 0 and `NULL` is returned.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param len receives the record data input buffer length, or 0.
+ * \return the record data input buffer, or `NULL`.
+ */
+unsigned char *br_ssl_engine_recvrec_buf(
+ const br_ssl_engine_context *cc, size_t *len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Inform the engine of some new record data.
+ *
+ * After writing `len` bytes in the buffer returned by
+ * `br_ssl_engine_recvrec_buf()`, the application shall call this
+ * function to trigger any relevant processing. The `len` parameter
+ * MUST NOT be 0, and MUST NOT exceed the value obtained in the
+ * `br_ssl_engine_recvrec_buf()` call.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param len number of bytes pushed (not zero).
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_recvrec_ack(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Flush buffered application data.
+ *
+ * If some application data has been buffered in the engine, then wrap
+ * it into a record and mark it for sending. If no application data has
+ * been buffered but the engine would be ready to accept some, AND the
+ * `force` parameter is non-zero, then an empty record is assembled and
+ * marked for sending. In all other cases, this function does nothing.
+ *
+ * Empty records are technically legal, but not all existing SSL/TLS
+ * implementations support them. Empty records can be useful as a
+ * transparent "keep-alive" mechanism to maintain some low-level
+ * network activity.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param force non-zero to force sending an empty record.
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_flush(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, int force);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initiate a closure.
+ *
+ * If, at that point, the context is open and in ready state, then a
+ * `close_notify` alert is assembled and marked for sending; this
+ * triggers the closure protocol. Otherwise, no such alert is assembled.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_close(br_ssl_engine_context *cc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initiate a renegotiation.
+ *
+ * If the engine is failed or closed, or if the peer is known not to
+ * support secure renegotiation (RFC 5746), or if renegotiations have
+ * been disabled with the `BR_OPT_NO_RENEGOTIATION` flag, or if there
+ * is buffered incoming application data, then this function returns 0
+ * and nothing else happens.
+ *
+ * Otherwise, this function returns 1, and a renegotiation attempt is
+ * triggered (if a handshake is already ongoing at that point, then
+ * no new handshake is triggered).
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+int br_ssl_engine_renegotiate(br_ssl_engine_context *cc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Export key material from a connected SSL engine (RFC 5705).
+ *
+ * This calls compute a secret key of arbitrary length from the master
+ * secret of a connected SSL engine. If the provided context is not
+ * currently in "application data" state (initial handshake is not
+ * finished, another handshake is ongoing, or the connection failed or
+ * was closed), then this function returns 0. Otherwise, a secret key of
+ * length `len` bytes is computed and written in the buffer pointed to
+ * by `dst`, and 1 is returned.
+ *
+ * The computed key follows the specification described in RFC 5705.
+ * That RFC includes two key computations, with and without a "context
+ * value". If `context` is `NULL`, then the variant without context is
+ * used; otherwise, the `context_len` bytes located at the address
+ * pointed to by `context` are used in the computation. Note that it
+ * is possible to have a "with context" key with a context length of
+ * zero bytes, by setting `context` to a non-`NULL` value but
+ * `context_len` to 0.
+ *
+ * When context bytes are used, the context length MUST NOT exceed
+ * 65535 bytes.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL engine context.
+ * \param dst destination buffer for exported key.
+ * \param len exported key length (in bytes).
+ * \param label disambiguation label.
+ * \param context context value (or `NULL`).
+ * \param context_len context length (in bytes).
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+int br_ssl_key_export(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ void *dst, size_t len, const char *label,
+ const void *context, size_t context_len);
+
+/*
+ * Pre-declaration for the SSL client context.
+ */
+typedef struct br_ssl_client_context_ br_ssl_client_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for the client certificate, if requested by the server.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /**
+ * \brief Authentication type.
+ *
+ * This is either `BR_AUTH_RSA` (RSA signature), `BR_AUTH_ECDSA`
+ * (ECDSA signature), or `BR_AUTH_ECDH` (static ECDH key exchange).
+ */
+ int auth_type;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Hash function for computing the CertificateVerify.
+ *
+ * This is the symbolic identifier for the hash function that
+ * will be used to produce the hash of handshake messages, to
+ * be signed into the CertificateVerify. For full static ECDH
+ * (client and server certificates are both EC in the same
+ * curve, and static ECDH is used), this value is set to -1.
+ *
+ * Take care that with TLS 1.0 and 1.1, that value MUST match
+ * the protocol requirements: value must be 0 (MD5+SHA-1) for
+ * a RSA signature, or 2 (SHA-1) for an ECDSA signature. Only
+ * TLS 1.2 allows for other hash functions.
+ */
+ int hash_id;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Certificate chain to send to the server.
+ *
+ * This is an array of `br_x509_certificate` objects, each
+ * normally containing a DER-encoded certificate. The client
+ * code does not try to decode these elements. If there is no
+ * chain to send to the server, then this pointer shall be
+ * set to `NULL`.
+ */
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Certificate chain length (number of certificates).
+ *
+ * If there is no chain to send to the server, then this value
+ * shall be set to 0.
+ */
+ size_t chain_len;
+
+} br_ssl_client_certificate;
+
+/*
+ * Note: the constants below for signatures match the TLS constants.
+ */
+
+/** \brief Client authentication type: static ECDH. */
+#define BR_AUTH_ECDH 0
+/** \brief Client authentication type: RSA signature. */
+#define BR_AUTH_RSA 1
+/** \brief Client authentication type: ECDSA signature. */
+#define BR_AUTH_ECDSA 3
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class type for a certificate handler (client side).
+ *
+ * A certificate handler selects a client certificate chain to send to
+ * the server, upon explicit request from that server. It receives
+ * the list of trust anchor DN from the server, and supported types
+ * of certificates and signatures, and returns the chain to use. It
+ * is also invoked to perform the corresponding private key operation
+ * (a signature, or an ECDH computation).
+ *
+ * The SSL client engine will first push the trust anchor DN with
+ * `start_name_list()`, `start_name()`, `append_name()`, `end_name()`
+ * and `end_name_list()`. Then it will call `choose()`, to select the
+ * actual chain (and signature/hash algorithms). Finally, it will call
+ * either `do_sign()` or `do_keyx()`, depending on the algorithm choices.
+ */
+typedef struct br_ssl_client_certificate_class_ br_ssl_client_certificate_class;
+struct br_ssl_client_certificate_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Context size (in bytes).
+ */
+ size_t context_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Begin reception of a list of trust anchor names. This
+ * is called while parsing the incoming CertificateRequest.
+ *
+ * \param pctx certificate handler context.
+ */
+ void (*start_name_list)(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Begin reception of a new trust anchor name.
+ *
+ * The total encoded name length is provided; it is less than
+ * 65535 bytes.
+ *
+ * \param pctx certificate handler context.
+ * \param len encoded name length (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*start_name)(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx,
+ size_t len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Receive some more bytes for the current trust anchor name.
+ *
+ * The provided reference (`data`) points to a transient buffer
+ * they may be reused as soon as this function returns. The chunk
+ * length (`len`) is never zero.
+ *
+ * \param pctx certificate handler context.
+ * \param data anchor name chunk.
+ * \param len anchor name chunk length (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*append_name)(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief End current trust anchor name.
+ *
+ * This function is called when all the encoded anchor name data
+ * has been provided.
+ *
+ * \param pctx certificate handler context.
+ */
+ void (*end_name)(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief End list of trust anchor names.
+ *
+ * This function is called when all the anchor names in the
+ * CertificateRequest message have been obtained.
+ *
+ * \param pctx certificate handler context.
+ */
+ void (*end_name_list)(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Select client certificate and algorithms.
+ *
+ * This callback function shall fill the provided `choices`
+ * structure with the selected algorithms and certificate chain.
+ * The `hash_id`, `chain` and `chain_len` fields must be set. If
+ * the client cannot or does not wish to send a certificate,
+ * then it shall set `chain` to `NULL` and `chain_len` to 0.
+ *
+ * The `auth_types` parameter describes the authentication types,
+ * signature algorithms and hash functions that are supported by
+ * both the client context and the server, and compatible with
+ * the current protocol version. This is a bit field with the
+ * following contents:
+ *
+ * - If RSA signatures with hash function x are supported, then
+ * bit x is set.
+ *
+ * - If ECDSA signatures with hash function x are supported,
+ * then bit 8+x is set.
+ *
+ * - If static ECDH is supported, with a RSA-signed certificate,
+ * then bit 16 is set.
+ *
+ * - If static ECDH is supported, with an ECDSA-signed certificate,
+ * then bit 17 is set.
+ *
+ * Notes:
+ *
+ * - When using TLS 1.0 or 1.1, the hash function for RSA
+ * signatures is always the special MD5+SHA-1 (id 0), and the
+ * hash function for ECDSA signatures is always SHA-1 (id 2).
+ *
+ * - When using TLS 1.2, the list of hash functions is trimmed
+ * down to include only hash functions that the client context
+ * can support. The actual server list can be obtained with
+ * `br_ssl_client_get_server_hashes()`; that list may be used
+ * to select the certificate chain to send to the server.
+ *
+ * \param pctx certificate handler context.
+ * \param cc SSL client context.
+ * \param auth_types supported authentication types and algorithms.
+ * \param choices destination structure for the policy choices.
+ */
+ void (*choose)(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx,
+ const br_ssl_client_context *cc, uint32_t auth_types,
+ br_ssl_client_certificate *choices);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Perform key exchange (client part).
+ *
+ * This callback is invoked in case of a full static ECDH key
+ * exchange:
+ *
+ * - the cipher suite uses `ECDH_RSA` or `ECDH_ECDSA`;
+ *
+ * - the server requests a client certificate;
+ *
+ * - the client has, and sends, a client certificate that
+ * uses an EC key in the same curve as the server's key,
+ * and chooses static ECDH (the `hash_id` field in the choice
+ * structure was set to -1).
+ *
+ * In that situation, this callback is invoked to compute the
+ * client-side ECDH: the provided `data` (of length `*len` bytes)
+ * is the server's public key point (as decoded from its
+ * certificate), and the client shall multiply that point with
+ * its own private key, and write back the X coordinate of the
+ * resulting point in the same buffer, starting at offset 0.
+ * The `*len` value shall be modified to designate the actual
+ * length of the X coordinate.
+ *
+ * The callback must uphold the following:
+ *
+ * - If the input array does not have the proper length for
+ * an encoded curve point, then an error (0) shall be reported.
+ *
+ * - If the input array has the proper length, then processing
+ * MUST be constant-time, even if the data is not a valid
+ * encoded point.
+ *
+ * - This callback MUST check that the input point is valid.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ *
+ * \param pctx certificate handler context.
+ * \param data server public key point.
+ * \param len public key point length / X coordinate length.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+ uint32_t (*do_keyx)(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx,
+ unsigned char *data, size_t *len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Perform a signature (client authentication).
+ *
+ * This callback is invoked when a client certificate was sent,
+ * and static ECDH is not used. It shall compute a signature,
+ * using the client's private key, over the provided hash value
+ * (which is the hash of all previous handshake messages).
+ *
+ * On input, the hash value to sign is in `data`, of size
+ * `hv_len`; the involved hash function is identified by
+ * `hash_id`. The signature shall be computed and written
+ * back into `data`; the total size of that buffer is `len`
+ * bytes.
+ *
+ * This callback shall verify that the signature length does not
+ * exceed `len` bytes, and abstain from writing the signature if
+ * it does not fit.
+ *
+ * For RSA signatures, the `hash_id` may be 0, in which case
+ * this is the special header-less signature specified in TLS 1.0
+ * and 1.1, with a 36-byte hash value. Otherwise, normal PKCS#1
+ * v1.5 signatures shall be computed.
+ *
+ * For ECDSA signatures, the signature value shall use the ASN.1
+ * based encoding.
+ *
+ * Returned value is the signature length (in bytes), or 0 on error.
+ *
+ * \param pctx certificate handler context.
+ * \param hash_id hash function identifier.
+ * \param hv_len hash value length (in bytes).
+ * \param data input/output buffer (hash value, then signature).
+ * \param len total buffer length (in bytes).
+ * \return signature length (in bytes) on success, or 0 on error.
+ */
+ size_t (*do_sign)(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx,
+ int hash_id, size_t hv_len, unsigned char *data, size_t len);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief A single-chain RSA client certificate handler.
+ *
+ * This handler uses a single certificate chain, with a RSA
+ * signature. The list of trust anchor DN is ignored.
+ *
+ * Apart from the first field (vtable pointer), its contents are
+ * opaque and shall not be accessed directly.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable. */
+ const br_ssl_client_certificate_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain;
+ size_t chain_len;
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk;
+ br_rsa_pkcs1_sign irsasign;
+#endif
+} br_ssl_client_certificate_rsa_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief A single-chain EC client certificate handler.
+ *
+ * This handler uses a single certificate chain, with a RSA
+ * signature. The list of trust anchor DN is ignored.
+ *
+ * This handler may support both static ECDH, and ECDSA signatures
+ * (either usage may be selectively disabled).
+ *
+ * Apart from the first field (vtable pointer), its contents are
+ * opaque and shall not be accessed directly.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable. */
+ const br_ssl_client_certificate_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain;
+ size_t chain_len;
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk;
+ unsigned allowed_usages;
+ unsigned issuer_key_type;
+ const br_multihash_context *mhash;
+ const br_ec_impl *iec;
+ br_ecdsa_sign iecdsa;
+#endif
+} br_ssl_client_certificate_ec_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context structure for a SSL client.
+ *
+ * The first field (called `eng`) is the SSL engine; all functions that
+ * work on a `br_ssl_engine_context` structure shall take as parameter
+ * a pointer to that field. The other structure fields are opaque and
+ * must not be accessed directly.
+ */
+struct br_ssl_client_context_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief The encapsulated engine context.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_context eng;
+
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ /*
+ * Minimum ClientHello length; padding with an extension (RFC
+ * 7685) is added if necessary to match at least that length.
+ * Such padding is nominally unnecessary, but it has been used
+ * to work around some server implementation bugs.
+ */
+ uint16_t min_clienthello_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Bit field for algoithms (hash + signature) supported by the
+ * server when requesting a client certificate.
+ */
+ uint32_t hashes;
+
+ /*
+ * Server's public key curve.
+ */
+ int server_curve;
+
+ /*
+ * Context for certificate handler.
+ */
+ const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **client_auth_vtable;
+
+ /*
+ * Client authentication type.
+ */
+ unsigned char auth_type;
+
+ /*
+ * Hash function to use for the client signature. This is 0xFF
+ * if static ECDH is used.
+ */
+ unsigned char hash_id;
+
+ /*
+ * For the core certificate handlers, thus avoiding (in most
+ * cases) the need for an externally provided policy context.
+ */
+ union {
+ const br_ssl_client_certificate_class *vtable;
+ br_ssl_client_certificate_rsa_context single_rsa;
+ br_ssl_client_certificate_ec_context single_ec;
+ } client_auth;
+
+ /*
+ * Implementations.
+ */
+ br_rsa_public irsapub;
+#endif
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the hash functions and signature algorithms supported by
+ * the server.
+ *
+ * This value is a bit field:
+ *
+ * - If RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5) is supported with hash function of ID `x`,
+ * then bit `x` is set (hash function ID is 0 for the special MD5+SHA-1,
+ * or 2 to 6 for the SHA family).
+ *
+ * - If ECDSA is supported with hash function of ID `x`, then bit `8+x`
+ * is set.
+ *
+ * - Newer algorithms are symbolic 16-bit identifiers that do not
+ * represent signature algorithm and hash function separately. If
+ * the TLS-level identifier is `0x0800+x` for a `x` in the 0..15
+ * range, then bit `16+x` is set.
+ *
+ * "New algorithms" are currently defined only in draft documents, so
+ * this support is subject to possible change. Right now (early 2017),
+ * this maps ed25519 (EdDSA on Curve25519) to bit 23, and ed448 (EdDSA
+ * on Curve448) to bit 24. If the identifiers on the wire change in
+ * future document, then the decoding mechanism in BearSSL will be
+ * amended to keep mapping ed25519 and ed448 on bits 23 and 24,
+ * respectively. Mapping of other new algorithms (e.g. RSA/PSS) is not
+ * guaranteed yet.
+ *
+ * \param cc client context.
+ * \return the server-supported hash functions and signature algorithms.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+br_ssl_client_get_server_hashes(const br_ssl_client_context *cc)
+{
+ return cc->hashes;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the server key curve.
+ *
+ * This function returns the ID for the curve used by the server's public
+ * key. This is set when the server's certificate chain is processed;
+ * this value is 0 if the server's key is not an EC key.
+ *
+ * \return the server's public key curve ID, or 0.
+ */
+static inline int
+br_ssl_client_get_server_curve(const br_ssl_client_context *cc)
+{
+ return cc->server_curve;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Each br_ssl_client_init_xxx() function sets the list of supported
+ * cipher suites and used implementations, as specified by the profile
+ * name 'xxx'. Defined profile names are:
+ *
+ * full all supported versions and suites; constant-time implementations
+ * TODO: add other profiles
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief SSL client profile: full.
+ *
+ * This function initialises the provided SSL client context with
+ * all supported algorithms and cipher suites. It also initialises
+ * a companion X.509 validation engine with all supported algorithms,
+ * and the provided trust anchors; the X.509 engine will be used by
+ * the client context to validate the server's certificate.
+ *
+ * \param cc client context to initialise.
+ * \param xc X.509 validation context to initialise.
+ * \param trust_anchors trust anchors to use.
+ * \param trust_anchors_num number of trust anchors.
+ */
+void br_ssl_client_init_full(br_ssl_client_context *cc,
+ br_x509_minimal_context *xc,
+ const br_x509_trust_anchor *trust_anchors, size_t trust_anchors_num);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Clear the complete contents of a SSL client context.
+ *
+ * Everything is cleared, including the reference to the configured buffer,
+ * implementations, cipher suites and state. This is a preparatory step
+ * to assembling a custom profile.
+ *
+ * \param cc client context to clear.
+ */
+void br_ssl_client_zero(br_ssl_client_context *cc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set an externally provided client certificate handler context.
+ *
+ * The handler's methods are invoked when the server requests a client
+ * certificate.
+ *
+ * \param cc client context.
+ * \param pctx certificate handler context (pointer to its vtable field).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_client_set_client_certificate(br_ssl_client_context *cc,
+ const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx)
+{
+ cc->client_auth_vtable = pctx;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the RSA public-key operations implementation.
+ *
+ * This will be used to encrypt the pre-master secret with the server's
+ * RSA public key (RSA-encryption cipher suites only).
+ *
+ * \param cc client context.
+ * \param irsapub RSA public-key encryption implementation.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_client_set_rsapub(br_ssl_client_context *cc, br_rsa_public irsapub)
+{
+ cc->irsapub = irsapub;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the "default" RSA implementation for public-key operations.
+ *
+ * This sets the RSA implementation in the client context (for encrypting
+ * the pre-master secret, in `TLS_RSA_*` cipher suites) to the fastest
+ * available on the current platform.
+ *
+ * \param cc client context.
+ */
+void br_ssl_client_set_default_rsapub(br_ssl_client_context *cc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the minimum ClientHello length (RFC 7685 padding).
+ *
+ * If this value is set and the ClientHello would be shorter, then
+ * the Pad ClientHello extension will be added with enough padding bytes
+ * to reach the target size. Because of the extension header, the resulting
+ * size will sometimes be slightly more than `len` bytes if the target
+ * size cannot be exactly met.
+ *
+ * The target length relates to the _contents_ of the ClientHello, not
+ * counting its 4-byte header. For instance, if `len` is set to 512,
+ * then the padding will bring the ClientHello size to 516 bytes with its
+ * header, and 521 bytes when counting the 5-byte record header.
+ *
+ * \param cc client context.
+ * \param len minimum ClientHello length (in bytes).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_client_set_min_clienthello_len(br_ssl_client_context *cc, uint16_t len)
+{
+ cc->min_clienthello_len = len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Prepare or reset a client context for a new connection.
+ *
+ * The `server_name` parameter is used to fill the SNI extension; the
+ * X.509 "minimal" engine will also match that name against the server
+ * names included in the server's certificate. If the parameter is
+ * `NULL` then no SNI extension will be sent, and the X.509 "minimal"
+ * engine (if used for server certificate validation) will not check
+ * presence of any specific name in the received certificate.
+ *
+ * Therefore, setting the `server_name` to `NULL` shall be reserved
+ * to cases where alternate or additional methods are used to ascertain
+ * that the right server public key is used (e.g. a "known key" model).
+ *
+ * If `resume_session` is non-zero and the context was previously used
+ * then the session parameters may be reused (depending on whether the
+ * server previously sent a non-empty session ID, and accepts the session
+ * resumption). The session parameters for session resumption can also
+ * be set explicitly with `br_ssl_engine_set_session_parameters()`.
+ *
+ * On failure, the context is marked as failed, and this function
+ * returns 0. A possible failure condition is when no initial entropy
+ * was injected, and none could be obtained from the OS (either OS
+ * randomness gathering is not supported, or it failed).
+ *
+ * \param cc client context.
+ * \param server_name target server name, or `NULL`.
+ * \param resume_session non-zero to try session resumption.
+ * \return 0 on failure, 1 on success.
+ */
+int br_ssl_client_reset(br_ssl_client_context *cc,
+ const char *server_name, int resume_session);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Forget any session in the context.
+ *
+ * This means that the next handshake that uses this context will
+ * necessarily be a full handshake (this applies both to new connections
+ * and to renegotiations).
+ *
+ * \param cc client context.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_client_forget_session(br_ssl_client_context *cc)
+{
+ cc->eng.session.session_id_len = 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set client certificate chain and key (single RSA case).
+ *
+ * This function sets a client certificate chain, that the client will
+ * send to the server whenever a client certificate is requested. This
+ * certificate uses an RSA public key; the corresponding private key is
+ * invoked for authentication. Trust anchor names sent by the server are
+ * ignored.
+ *
+ * The provided chain and private key are linked in the client context;
+ * they must remain valid as long as they may be used, i.e. normally
+ * for the duration of the connection, since they might be invoked
+ * again upon renegotiations.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL client context.
+ * \param chain client certificate chain (SSL order: EE comes first).
+ * \param chain_len client chain length (number of certificates).
+ * \param sk client private key.
+ * \param irsasign RSA signature implementation (PKCS#1 v1.5).
+ */
+void br_ssl_client_set_single_rsa(br_ssl_client_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, br_rsa_pkcs1_sign irsasign);
+
+/*
+ * \brief Set the client certificate chain and key (single EC case).
+ *
+ * This function sets a client certificate chain, that the client will
+ * send to the server whenever a client certificate is requested. This
+ * certificate uses an EC public key; the corresponding private key is
+ * invoked for authentication. Trust anchor names sent by the server are
+ * ignored.
+ *
+ * The provided chain and private key are linked in the client context;
+ * they must remain valid as long as they may be used, i.e. normally
+ * for the duration of the connection, since they might be invoked
+ * again upon renegotiations.
+ *
+ * The `allowed_usages` is a combination of usages, namely
+ * `BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX` and/or `BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN`. The `BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX`
+ * value allows full static ECDH, while the `BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN` value
+ * allows ECDSA signatures. If ECDSA signatures are used, then an ECDSA
+ * signature implementation must be provided; otherwise, the `iecdsa`
+ * parameter may be 0.
+ *
+ * The `cert_issuer_key_type` value is either `BR_KEYTYPE_RSA` or
+ * `BR_KEYTYPE_EC`; it is the type of the public key used the the CA
+ * that issued (signed) the client certificate. That value is used with
+ * full static ECDH: support of the certificate by the server depends
+ * on how the certificate was signed. (Note: when using TLS 1.2, this
+ * parameter is ignored; but its value matters for TLS 1.0 and 1.1.)
+ *
+ * \param cc server context.
+ * \param chain server certificate chain to send.
+ * \param chain_len chain length (number of certificates).
+ * \param sk server private key (EC).
+ * \param allowed_usages allowed private key usages.
+ * \param cert_issuer_key_type issuing CA's key type.
+ * \param iec EC core implementation.
+ * \param iecdsa ECDSA signature implementation ("asn1" format).
+ */
+void br_ssl_client_set_single_ec(br_ssl_client_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, unsigned allowed_usages,
+ unsigned cert_issuer_key_type,
+ const br_ec_impl *iec, br_ecdsa_sign iecdsa);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for a "translated cipher suite", as an array of two
+ * 16-bit integers.
+ *
+ * The first element is the cipher suite identifier (as used on the wire).
+ * The second element is the concatenation of four 4-bit elements which
+ * characterise the cipher suite contents. In most to least significant
+ * order, these 4-bit elements are:
+ *
+ * - Bits 12 to 15: key exchange + server key type
+ *
+ * | val | symbolic constant | suite type | details |
+ * | :-- | :----------------------- | :---------- | :----------------------------------------------- |
+ * | 0 | `BR_SSLKEYX_RSA` | RSA | RSA key exchange, key is RSA (encryption) |
+ * | 1 | `BR_SSLKEYX_ECDHE_RSA` | ECDHE_RSA | ECDHE key exchange, key is RSA (signature) |
+ * | 2 | `BR_SSLKEYX_ECDHE_ECDSA` | ECDHE_ECDSA | ECDHE key exchange, key is EC (signature) |
+ * | 3 | `BR_SSLKEYX_ECDH_RSA` | ECDH_RSA | Key is EC (key exchange), cert signed with RSA |
+ * | 4 | `BR_SSLKEYX_ECDH_ECDSA` | ECDH_ECDSA | Key is EC (key exchange), cert signed with ECDSA |
+ *
+ * - Bits 8 to 11: symmetric encryption algorithm
+ *
+ * | val | symbolic constant | symmetric encryption | key strength (bits) |
+ * | :-- | :--------------------- | :------------------- | :------------------ |
+ * | 0 | `BR_SSLENC_3DES_CBC` | 3DES/CBC | 168 |
+ * | 1 | `BR_SSLENC_AES128_CBC` | AES-128/CBC | 128 |
+ * | 2 | `BR_SSLENC_AES256_CBC` | AES-256/CBC | 256 |
+ * | 3 | `BR_SSLENC_AES128_GCM` | AES-128/GCM | 128 |
+ * | 4 | `BR_SSLENC_AES256_GCM` | AES-256/GCM | 256 |
+ * | 5 | `BR_SSLENC_CHACHA20` | ChaCha20/Poly1305 | 256 |
+ *
+ * - Bits 4 to 7: MAC algorithm
+ *
+ * | val | symbolic constant | MAC type | details |
+ * | :-- | :----------------- | :----------- | :------------------------------------ |
+ * | 0 | `BR_SSLMAC_AEAD` | AEAD | No dedicated MAC (encryption is AEAD) |
+ * | 2 | `BR_SSLMAC_SHA1` | HMAC/SHA-1 | Value matches `br_sha1_ID` |
+ * | 4 | `BR_SSLMAC_SHA256` | HMAC/SHA-256 | Value matches `br_sha256_ID` |
+ * | 5 | `BR_SSLMAC_SHA384` | HMAC/SHA-384 | Value matches `br_sha384_ID` |
+ *
+ * - Bits 0 to 3: hash function for PRF when used with TLS-1.2
+ *
+ * | val | symbolic constant | hash function | details |
+ * | :-- | :----------------- | :------------ | :----------------------------------- |
+ * | 4 | `BR_SSLPRF_SHA256` | SHA-256 | Value matches `br_sha256_ID` |
+ * | 5 | `BR_SSLPRF_SHA384` | SHA-384 | Value matches `br_sha384_ID` |
+ *
+ * For instance, cipher suite `TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256` has
+ * standard identifier 0x009C, and is translated to 0x0304, for, in
+ * that order: RSA key exchange (0), AES-128/GCM (3), AEAD integrity (0),
+ * SHA-256 in the TLS PRF (4).
+ */
+typedef uint16_t br_suite_translated[2];
+
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+/*
+ * Constants are already documented in the br_suite_translated type.
+ */
+
+#define BR_SSLKEYX_RSA 0
+#define BR_SSLKEYX_ECDHE_RSA 1
+#define BR_SSLKEYX_ECDHE_ECDSA 2
+#define BR_SSLKEYX_ECDH_RSA 3
+#define BR_SSLKEYX_ECDH_ECDSA 4
+
+#define BR_SSLENC_3DES_CBC 0
+#define BR_SSLENC_AES128_CBC 1
+#define BR_SSLENC_AES256_CBC 2
+#define BR_SSLENC_AES128_GCM 3
+#define BR_SSLENC_AES256_GCM 4
+#define BR_SSLENC_CHACHA20 5
+
+#define BR_SSLMAC_AEAD 0
+#define BR_SSLMAC_SHA1 br_sha1_ID
+#define BR_SSLMAC_SHA256 br_sha256_ID
+#define BR_SSLMAC_SHA384 br_sha384_ID
+
+#define BR_SSLPRF_SHA256 br_sha256_ID
+#define BR_SSLPRF_SHA384 br_sha384_ID
+
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Pre-declaration for the SSL server context.
+ */
+typedef struct br_ssl_server_context_ br_ssl_server_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for the server policy choices, taken after analysis of
+ * the client message (ClientHello).
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /**
+ * \brief Cipher suite to use with that client.
+ */
+ uint16_t cipher_suite;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Hash function or algorithm for signing the ServerKeyExchange.
+ *
+ * This parameter is ignored for `TLS_RSA_*` and `TLS_ECDH_*`
+ * cipher suites; it is used only for `TLS_ECDHE_*` suites, in
+ * which the server _signs_ the ephemeral EC Diffie-Hellman
+ * parameters sent to the client.
+ *
+ * This identifier must be one of the following values:
+ *
+ * - `0xFF00 + id`, where `id` is a hash function identifier
+ * (0 for MD5+SHA-1, or 2 to 6 for one of the SHA functions);
+ *
+ * - a full 16-bit identifier, lower than `0xFF00`.
+ *
+ * If the first option is used, then the SSL engine will
+ * compute the hash of the data that is to be signed, with the
+ * designated hash function. The `do_sign()` method will be
+ * invoked with that hash value provided in the the `data`
+ * buffer.
+ *
+ * If the second option is used, then the SSL engine will NOT
+ * compute a hash on the data; instead, it will provide the
+ * to-be-signed data itself in `data`, i.e. the concatenation of
+ * the client random, server random, and encoded ECDH
+ * parameters. Furthermore, with TLS-1.2 and later, the 16-bit
+ * identifier will be used "as is" in the protocol, in the
+ * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; for instance, `0x0401` stands for
+ * RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature (the `01`) with SHA-256 as hash
+ * function (the `04`).
+ *
+ * Take care that with TLS 1.0 and 1.1, the hash function is
+ * constrainted by the protocol: RSA signature must use
+ * MD5+SHA-1 (so use `0xFF00`), while ECDSA must use SHA-1
+ * (`0xFF02`). Since TLS 1.0 and 1.1 don't include a
+ * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm field in their ServerKeyExchange
+ * messages, any value below `0xFF00` will be usable to send the
+ * raw ServerKeyExchange data to the `do_sign()` callback, but
+ * that callback must still follow the protocol requirements
+ * when generating the signature.
+ */
+ unsigned algo_id;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Certificate chain to send to the client.
+ *
+ * This is an array of `br_x509_certificate` objects, each
+ * normally containing a DER-encoded certificate. The server
+ * code does not try to decode these elements.
+ */
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Certificate chain length (number of certificates).
+ */
+ size_t chain_len;
+
+} br_ssl_server_choices;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class type for a policy handler (server side).
+ *
+ * A policy handler selects the policy parameters for a connection
+ * (cipher suite and other algorithms, and certificate chain to send to
+ * the client); it also performs the server-side computations involving
+ * its permanent private key.
+ *
+ * The SSL server engine will invoke first `choose()`, once the
+ * ClientHello message has been received, then either `do_keyx()`
+ * `do_sign()`, depending on the cipher suite.
+ */
+typedef struct br_ssl_server_policy_class_ br_ssl_server_policy_class;
+struct br_ssl_server_policy_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Context size (in bytes).
+ */
+ size_t context_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Select algorithms and certificates for this connection.
+ *
+ * This callback function shall fill the provided `choices`
+ * structure with the policy choices for this connection. This
+ * entails selecting the cipher suite, hash function for signing
+ * the ServerKeyExchange (applicable only to ECDHE cipher suites),
+ * and certificate chain to send.
+ *
+ * The callback receives a pointer to the server context that
+ * contains the relevant data. In particular, the functions
+ * `br_ssl_server_get_client_suites()`,
+ * `br_ssl_server_get_client_hashes()` and
+ * `br_ssl_server_get_client_curves()` can be used to obtain
+ * the cipher suites, hash functions and elliptic curves
+ * supported by both the client and server, respectively. The
+ * `br_ssl_engine_get_version()` and `br_ssl_engine_get_server_name()`
+ * functions yield the protocol version and requested server name
+ * (SNI), respectively.
+ *
+ * This function may modify its context structure (`pctx`) in
+ * arbitrary ways to keep track of its own choices.
+ *
+ * This function shall return 1 if appropriate policy choices
+ * could be made, or 0 if this connection cannot be pursued.
+ *
+ * \param pctx policy context.
+ * \param cc SSL server context.
+ * \param choices destination structure for the policy choices.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+ int (*choose)(const br_ssl_server_policy_class **pctx,
+ const br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ br_ssl_server_choices *choices);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Perform key exchange (server part).
+ *
+ * This callback is invoked to perform the server-side cryptographic
+ * operation for a key exchange that is not ECDHE. This callback
+ * uses the private key.
+ *
+ * **For RSA key exchange**, the provided `data` (of length `*len`
+ * bytes) shall be decrypted with the server's private key, and
+ * the 48-byte premaster secret copied back to the first 48 bytes
+ * of `data`.
+ *
+ * - The caller makes sure that `*len` is at least 59 bytes.
+ *
+ * - This callback MUST check that the provided length matches
+ * that of the key modulus; it shall report an error otherwise.
+ *
+ * - If the length matches that of the RSA key modulus, then
+ * processing MUST be constant-time, even if decryption fails,
+ * or the padding is incorrect, or the plaintext message length
+ * is not exactly 48 bytes.
+ *
+ * - This callback needs not check the two first bytes of the
+ * obtained pre-master secret (the caller will do that).
+ *
+ * - If an error is reported (0), then what the callback put
+ * in the first 48 bytes of `data` is unimportant (the caller
+ * will use random bytes instead).
+ *
+ * **For ECDH key exchange**, the provided `data` (of length `*len`
+ * bytes) is the elliptic curve point from the client. The
+ * callback shall multiply it with its private key, and store
+ * the resulting X coordinate in `data`, starting at offset 0,
+ * and set `*len` to the length of the X coordinate.
+ *
+ * - If the input array does not have the proper length for
+ * an encoded curve point, then an error (0) shall be reported.
+ *
+ * - If the input array has the proper length, then processing
+ * MUST be constant-time, even if the data is not a valid
+ * encoded point.
+ *
+ * - This callback MUST check that the input point is valid.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ *
+ * \param pctx policy context.
+ * \param data key exchange data from the client.
+ * \param len key exchange data length (in bytes).
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+ uint32_t (*do_keyx)(const br_ssl_server_policy_class **pctx,
+ unsigned char *data, size_t *len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Perform a signature (for a ServerKeyExchange message).
+ *
+ * This callback function is invoked for ECDHE cipher suites. On
+ * input, the hash value or message to sign is in `data`, of
+ * size `hv_len`; the involved hash function or algorithm is
+ * identified by `algo_id`. The signature shall be computed and
+ * written back into `data`; the total size of that buffer is
+ * `len` bytes.
+ *
+ * This callback shall verify that the signature length does not
+ * exceed `len` bytes, and abstain from writing the signature if
+ * it does not fit.
+ *
+ * The `algo_id` value matches that which was written in the
+ * `choices` structures by the `choose()` callback. This will be
+ * one of the following:
+ *
+ * - `0xFF00 + id` for a hash function identifier `id`. In
+ * that case, the `data` buffer contains a hash value
+ * already computed over the data that is to be signed,
+ * of length `hv_len`. The `id` may be 0 to designate the
+ * special MD5+SHA-1 concatenation (old-style RSA signing).
+ *
+ * - Another value, lower than `0xFF00`. The `data` buffer
+ * then contains the raw, non-hashed data to be signed
+ * (concatenation of the client and server randoms and
+ * ECDH parameters). The callback is responsible to apply
+ * any relevant hashing as part of the signing process.
+ *
+ * Returned value is the signature length (in bytes), or 0 on error.
+ *
+ * \param pctx policy context.
+ * \param algo_id hash function / algorithm identifier.
+ * \param data input/output buffer (message/hash, then signature).
+ * \param hv_len hash value or message length (in bytes).
+ * \param len total buffer length (in bytes).
+ * \return signature length (in bytes) on success, or 0 on error.
+ */
+ size_t (*do_sign)(const br_ssl_server_policy_class **pctx,
+ unsigned algo_id,
+ unsigned char *data, size_t hv_len, size_t len);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief A single-chain RSA policy handler.
+ *
+ * This policy context uses a single certificate chain, and a RSA
+ * private key. The context can be restricted to only signatures or
+ * only key exchange.
+ *
+ * Apart from the first field (vtable pointer), its contents are
+ * opaque and shall not be accessed directly.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable. */
+ const br_ssl_server_policy_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain;
+ size_t chain_len;
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk;
+ unsigned allowed_usages;
+ br_rsa_private irsacore;
+ br_rsa_pkcs1_sign irsasign;
+#endif
+} br_ssl_server_policy_rsa_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief A single-chain EC policy handler.
+ *
+ * This policy context uses a single certificate chain, and an EC
+ * private key. The context can be restricted to only signatures or
+ * only key exchange.
+ *
+ * Due to how TLS is defined, this context must be made aware whether
+ * the server certificate was itself signed with RSA or ECDSA. The code
+ * does not try to decode the certificate to obtain that information.
+ *
+ * Apart from the first field (vtable pointer), its contents are
+ * opaque and shall not be accessed directly.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable. */
+ const br_ssl_server_policy_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain;
+ size_t chain_len;
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk;
+ unsigned allowed_usages;
+ unsigned cert_issuer_key_type;
+ const br_multihash_context *mhash;
+ const br_ec_impl *iec;
+ br_ecdsa_sign iecdsa;
+#endif
+} br_ssl_server_policy_ec_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class type for a session parameter cache.
+ *
+ * Session parameters are saved in the cache with `save()`, and
+ * retrieved with `load()`. The cache implementation can apply any
+ * storage and eviction strategy that it sees fit. The SSL server
+ * context that performs the request is provided, so that its
+ * functionalities may be used by the implementation (e.g. hash
+ * functions or random number generation).
+ */
+typedef struct br_ssl_session_cache_class_ br_ssl_session_cache_class;
+struct br_ssl_session_cache_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief Context size (in bytes).
+ */
+ size_t context_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Record a session.
+ *
+ * This callback should record the provided session parameters.
+ * The `params` structure is transient, so its contents shall
+ * be copied into the cache. The session ID has been randomly
+ * generated and always has length exactly 32 bytes.
+ *
+ * \param ctx session cache context.
+ * \param server_ctx SSL server context.
+ * \param params session parameters to save.
+ */
+ void (*save)(const br_ssl_session_cache_class **ctx,
+ br_ssl_server_context *server_ctx,
+ const br_ssl_session_parameters *params);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Lookup a session in the cache.
+ *
+ * The session ID to lookup is in `params` and always has length
+ * exactly 32 bytes. If the session parameters are found in the
+ * cache, then the parameters shall be copied into the `params`
+ * structure. Returned value is 1 on successful lookup, 0
+ * otherwise.
+ *
+ * \param ctx session cache context.
+ * \param server_ctx SSL server context.
+ * \param params destination for session parameters.
+ * \return 1 if found, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+ int (*load)(const br_ssl_session_cache_class **ctx,
+ br_ssl_server_context *server_ctx,
+ br_ssl_session_parameters *params);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for a basic cache system.
+ *
+ * The system stores session parameters in a buffer provided at
+ * initialisation time. Each entry uses exactly 100 bytes, and
+ * buffer sizes up to 4294967295 bytes are supported.
+ *
+ * Entries are evicted with a LRU (Least Recently Used) policy. A
+ * search tree is maintained to keep lookups fast even with large
+ * caches.
+ *
+ * Apart from the first field (vtable pointer), the structure
+ * contents are opaque and shall not be accessed directly.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Pointer to vtable. */
+ const br_ssl_session_cache_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ unsigned char *store;
+ size_t store_len, store_ptr;
+ unsigned char index_key[32];
+ const br_hash_class *hash;
+ int init_done;
+ uint32_t head, tail, root;
+#endif
+} br_ssl_session_cache_lru;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialise a LRU session cache with the provided storage space.
+ *
+ * The provided storage space must remain valid as long as the cache
+ * is used. Arbitrary lengths are supported, up to 4294967295 bytes;
+ * each entry uses up exactly 100 bytes.
+ *
+ * \param cc session cache context.
+ * \param store storage space for cached entries.
+ * \param store_len storage space length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_ssl_session_cache_lru_init(br_ssl_session_cache_lru *cc,
+ unsigned char *store, size_t store_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Forget an entry in an LRU session cache.
+ *
+ * The session cache context must have been initialised. The entry
+ * with the provided session ID (of exactly 32 bytes) is looked for
+ * in the cache; if located, it is disabled.
+ *
+ * \param cc session cache context.
+ * \param id session ID to forget.
+ */
+void br_ssl_session_cache_lru_forget(
+ br_ssl_session_cache_lru *cc, const unsigned char *id);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context structure for a SSL server.
+ *
+ * The first field (called `eng`) is the SSL engine; all functions that
+ * work on a `br_ssl_engine_context` structure shall take as parameter
+ * a pointer to that field. The other structure fields are opaque and
+ * must not be accessed directly.
+ */
+struct br_ssl_server_context_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief The encapsulated engine context.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_context eng;
+
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ /*
+ * Maximum version from the client.
+ */
+ uint16_t client_max_version;
+
+ /*
+ * Session cache.
+ */
+ const br_ssl_session_cache_class **cache_vtable;
+
+ /*
+ * Translated cipher suites supported by the client. The list
+ * is trimmed to include only the cipher suites that the
+ * server also supports; they are in the same order as in the
+ * client message.
+ */
+ br_suite_translated client_suites[BR_MAX_CIPHER_SUITES];
+ unsigned char client_suites_num;
+
+ /*
+ * Hash functions supported by the client, with ECDSA and RSA
+ * (bit mask). For hash function with id 'x', set bit index is
+ * x for RSA, x+8 for ECDSA. For newer algorithms, with ID
+ * 0x08**, bit 16+k is set for algorithm 0x0800+k.
+ */
+ uint32_t hashes;
+
+ /*
+ * Curves supported by the client (bit mask, for named curves).
+ */
+ uint32_t curves;
+
+ /*
+ * Context for chain handler.
+ */
+ const br_ssl_server_policy_class **policy_vtable;
+ uint16_t sign_hash_id;
+
+ /*
+ * For the core handlers, thus avoiding (in most cases) the
+ * need for an externally provided policy context.
+ */
+ union {
+ const br_ssl_server_policy_class *vtable;
+ br_ssl_server_policy_rsa_context single_rsa;
+ br_ssl_server_policy_ec_context single_ec;
+ } chain_handler;
+
+ /*
+ * Buffer for the ECDHE private key.
+ */
+ unsigned char ecdhe_key[70];
+ size_t ecdhe_key_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Trust anchor names for client authentication. "ta_names" and
+ * "tas" cannot be both non-NULL.
+ */
+ const br_x500_name *ta_names;
+ const br_x509_trust_anchor *tas;
+ size_t num_tas;
+ size_t cur_dn_index;
+ const unsigned char *cur_dn;
+ size_t cur_dn_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Buffer for the hash value computed over all handshake messages
+ * prior to CertificateVerify, and identifier for the hash function.
+ */
+ unsigned char hash_CV[64];
+ size_t hash_CV_len;
+ int hash_CV_id;
+
+ /*
+ * Server-specific implementations.
+ * (none for now)
+ */
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * Each br_ssl_server_init_xxx() function sets the list of supported
+ * cipher suites and used implementations, as specified by the profile
+ * name 'xxx'. Defined profile names are:
+ *
+ * full_rsa all supported algorithm, server key type is RSA
+ * full_ec all supported algorithm, server key type is EC
+ * TODO: add other profiles
+ *
+ * Naming scheme for "minimal" profiles: min123
+ *
+ * -- character 1: key exchange
+ * r = RSA
+ * e = ECDHE_RSA
+ * f = ECDHE_ECDSA
+ * u = ECDH_RSA
+ * v = ECDH_ECDSA
+ * -- character 2: version / PRF
+ * 0 = TLS 1.0 / 1.1 with MD5+SHA-1
+ * 2 = TLS 1.2 with SHA-256
+ * 3 = TLS 1.2 with SHA-384
+ * -- character 3: encryption
+ * a = AES/CBC
+ * d = 3DES/CBC
+ * g = AES/GCM
+ * c = ChaCha20+Poly1305
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief SSL server profile: full_rsa.
+ *
+ * This function initialises the provided SSL server context with
+ * all supported algorithms and cipher suites that rely on a RSA
+ * key pair.
+ *
+ * \param cc server context to initialise.
+ * \param chain server certificate chain.
+ * \param chain_len certificate chain length (number of certificate).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ */
+void br_ssl_server_init_full_rsa(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief SSL server profile: full_ec.
+ *
+ * This function initialises the provided SSL server context with
+ * all supported algorithms and cipher suites that rely on an EC
+ * key pair.
+ *
+ * The key type of the CA that issued the server's certificate must
+ * be provided, since it matters for ECDH cipher suites (ECDH_RSA
+ * suites require a RSA-powered CA). The key type is either
+ * `BR_KEYTYPE_RSA` or `BR_KEYTYPE_EC`.
+ *
+ * \param cc server context to initialise.
+ * \param chain server certificate chain.
+ * \param chain_len chain length (number of certificates).
+ * \param cert_issuer_key_type certificate issuer's key type.
+ * \param sk EC private key.
+ */
+void br_ssl_server_init_full_ec(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ unsigned cert_issuer_key_type, const br_ec_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief SSL server profile: minr2g.
+ *
+ * This profile uses only TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256. Server key is
+ * RSA, and RSA key exchange is used (not forward secure, but uses little
+ * CPU in the client).
+ *
+ * \param cc server context to initialise.
+ * \param chain server certificate chain.
+ * \param chain_len certificate chain length (number of certificate).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ */
+void br_ssl_server_init_minr2g(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief SSL server profile: mine2g.
+ *
+ * This profile uses only TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256. Server key
+ * is RSA, and ECDHE key exchange is used. This suite provides forward
+ * security, with a higher CPU expense on the client, and a somewhat
+ * larger code footprint (compared to "minr2g").
+ *
+ * \param cc server context to initialise.
+ * \param chain server certificate chain.
+ * \param chain_len certificate chain length (number of certificate).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ */
+void br_ssl_server_init_mine2g(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief SSL server profile: minf2g.
+ *
+ * This profile uses only TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
+ * Server key is EC, and ECDHE key exchange is used. This suite provides
+ * forward security, with a higher CPU expense on the client and server
+ * (by a factor of about 3 to 4), and a somewhat larger code footprint
+ * (compared to "minu2g" and "minv2g").
+ *
+ * \param cc server context to initialise.
+ * \param chain server certificate chain.
+ * \param chain_len certificate chain length (number of certificate).
+ * \param sk EC private key.
+ */
+void br_ssl_server_init_minf2g(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief SSL server profile: minu2g.
+ *
+ * This profile uses only TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
+ * Server key is EC, and ECDH key exchange is used; the issuing CA used
+ * a RSA key.
+ *
+ * The "minu2g" and "minv2g" profiles do not provide forward secrecy,
+ * but are the lightest on the server (for CPU usage), and are rather
+ * inexpensive on the client as well.
+ *
+ * \param cc server context to initialise.
+ * \param chain server certificate chain.
+ * \param chain_len certificate chain length (number of certificate).
+ * \param sk EC private key.
+ */
+void br_ssl_server_init_minu2g(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief SSL server profile: minv2g.
+ *
+ * This profile uses only TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.
+ * Server key is EC, and ECDH key exchange is used; the issuing CA used
+ * an EC key.
+ *
+ * The "minu2g" and "minv2g" profiles do not provide forward secrecy,
+ * but are the lightest on the server (for CPU usage), and are rather
+ * inexpensive on the client as well.
+ *
+ * \param cc server context to initialise.
+ * \param chain server certificate chain.
+ * \param chain_len certificate chain length (number of certificate).
+ * \param sk EC private key.
+ */
+void br_ssl_server_init_minv2g(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief SSL server profile: mine2c.
+ *
+ * This profile uses only TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256.
+ * Server key is RSA, and ECDHE key exchange is used. This suite
+ * provides forward security.
+ *
+ * \param cc server context to initialise.
+ * \param chain server certificate chain.
+ * \param chain_len certificate chain length (number of certificate).
+ * \param sk RSA private key.
+ */
+void br_ssl_server_init_mine2c(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief SSL server profile: minf2c.
+ *
+ * This profile uses only TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256.
+ * Server key is EC, and ECDHE key exchange is used. This suite provides
+ * forward security.
+ *
+ * \param cc server context to initialise.
+ * \param chain server certificate chain.
+ * \param chain_len certificate chain length (number of certificate).
+ * \param sk EC private key.
+ */
+void br_ssl_server_init_minf2c(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the supported client suites.
+ *
+ * This function shall be called only after the ClientHello has been
+ * processed, typically from the policy engine. The returned array
+ * contains the cipher suites that are supported by both the client
+ * and the server; these suites are in client preference order, unless
+ * the `BR_OPT_ENFORCE_SERVER_PREFERENCES` flag was set, in which case
+ * they are in server preference order.
+ *
+ * The suites are _translated_, which means that each suite is given
+ * as two 16-bit integers: the standard suite identifier, and its
+ * translated version, broken down into its individual components,
+ * as explained with the `br_suite_translated` type.
+ *
+ * The returned array is allocated in the context and will be rewritten
+ * by each handshake.
+ *
+ * \param cc server context.
+ * \param num receives the array size (number of suites).
+ * \return the translated common cipher suites, in preference order.
+ */
+static inline const br_suite_translated *
+br_ssl_server_get_client_suites(const br_ssl_server_context *cc, size_t *num)
+{
+ *num = cc->client_suites_num;
+ return cc->client_suites;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the hash functions and signature algorithms supported by
+ * the client.
+ *
+ * This value is a bit field:
+ *
+ * - If RSA (PKCS#1 v1.5) is supported with hash function of ID `x`,
+ * then bit `x` is set (hash function ID is 0 for the special MD5+SHA-1,
+ * or 2 to 6 for the SHA family).
+ *
+ * - If ECDSA is supported with hash function of ID `x`, then bit `8+x`
+ * is set.
+ *
+ * - Newer algorithms are symbolic 16-bit identifiers that do not
+ * represent signature algorithm and hash function separately. If
+ * the TLS-level identifier is `0x0800+x` for a `x` in the 0..15
+ * range, then bit `16+x` is set.
+ *
+ * "New algorithms" are currently defined only in draft documents, so
+ * this support is subject to possible change. Right now (early 2017),
+ * this maps ed25519 (EdDSA on Curve25519) to bit 23, and ed448 (EdDSA
+ * on Curve448) to bit 24. If the identifiers on the wire change in
+ * future document, then the decoding mechanism in BearSSL will be
+ * amended to keep mapping ed25519 and ed448 on bits 23 and 24,
+ * respectively. Mapping of other new algorithms (e.g. RSA/PSS) is not
+ * guaranteed yet.
+ *
+ * \param cc server context.
+ * \return the client-supported hash functions and signature algorithms.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+br_ssl_server_get_client_hashes(const br_ssl_server_context *cc)
+{
+ return cc->hashes;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the elliptic curves supported by the client.
+ *
+ * This is a bit field (bit x is set if curve of ID x is supported).
+ *
+ * \param cc server context.
+ * \return the client-supported elliptic curves.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+br_ssl_server_get_client_curves(const br_ssl_server_context *cc)
+{
+ return cc->curves;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Clear the complete contents of a SSL server context.
+ *
+ * Everything is cleared, including the reference to the configured buffer,
+ * implementations, cipher suites and state. This is a preparatory step
+ * to assembling a custom profile.
+ *
+ * \param cc server context to clear.
+ */
+void br_ssl_server_zero(br_ssl_server_context *cc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set an externally provided policy context.
+ *
+ * The policy context's methods are invoked to decide the cipher suite
+ * and certificate chain, and to perform operations involving the server's
+ * private key.
+ *
+ * \param cc server context.
+ * \param pctx policy context (pointer to its vtable field).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_server_set_policy(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_ssl_server_policy_class **pctx)
+{
+ cc->policy_vtable = pctx;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the server certificate chain and key (single RSA case).
+ *
+ * This function uses a policy context included in the server context.
+ * It configures use of a single server certificate chain with a RSA
+ * private key. The `allowed_usages` is a combination of usages, namely
+ * `BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX` and/or `BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN`; this enables or disables
+ * the corresponding cipher suites (i.e. `TLS_RSA_*` use the RSA key for
+ * key exchange, while `TLS_ECDHE_RSA_*` use the RSA key for signatures).
+ *
+ * \param cc server context.
+ * \param chain server certificate chain to send to the client.
+ * \param chain_len chain length (number of certificates).
+ * \param sk server private key (RSA).
+ * \param allowed_usages allowed private key usages.
+ * \param irsacore RSA core implementation.
+ * \param irsasign RSA signature implementation (PKCS#1 v1.5).
+ */
+void br_ssl_server_set_single_rsa(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned allowed_usages,
+ br_rsa_private irsacore, br_rsa_pkcs1_sign irsasign);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the server certificate chain and key (single EC case).
+ *
+ * This function uses a policy context included in the server context.
+ * It configures use of a single server certificate chain with an EC
+ * private key. The `allowed_usages` is a combination of usages, namely
+ * `BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX` and/or `BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN`; this enables or disables
+ * the corresponding cipher suites (i.e. `TLS_ECDH_*` use the EC key for
+ * key exchange, while `TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_*` use the EC key for signatures).
+ *
+ * In order to support `TLS_ECDH_*` cipher suites (non-ephemeral ECDH),
+ * the algorithm type of the key used by the issuing CA to sign the
+ * server's certificate must be provided, as `cert_issuer_key_type`
+ * parameter (this value is either `BR_KEYTYPE_RSA` or `BR_KEYTYPE_EC`).
+ *
+ * \param cc server context.
+ * \param chain server certificate chain to send.
+ * \param chain_len chain length (number of certificates).
+ * \param sk server private key (EC).
+ * \param allowed_usages allowed private key usages.
+ * \param cert_issuer_key_type issuing CA's key type.
+ * \param iec EC core implementation.
+ * \param iecdsa ECDSA signature implementation ("asn1" format).
+ */
+void br_ssl_server_set_single_ec(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, unsigned allowed_usages,
+ unsigned cert_issuer_key_type,
+ const br_ec_impl *iec, br_ecdsa_sign iecdsa);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Activate client certificate authentication.
+ *
+ * The trust anchor encoded X.500 names (DN) to send to the client are
+ * provided. A client certificate will be requested and validated through
+ * the X.509 validator configured in the SSL engine. If `num` is 0, then
+ * client certificate authentication is disabled.
+ *
+ * If the client does not send a certificate, or on validation failure,
+ * the handshake aborts. Unauthenticated clients can be tolerated by
+ * setting the `BR_OPT_TOLERATE_NO_CLIENT_AUTH` flag.
+ *
+ * The provided array is linked in, not copied, so that pointer must
+ * remain valid as long as anchor names may be used.
+ *
+ * \param cc server context.
+ * \param ta_names encoded trust anchor names.
+ * \param num number of encoded trust anchor names.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_server_set_trust_anchor_names(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x500_name *ta_names, size_t num)
+{
+ cc->ta_names = ta_names;
+ cc->tas = NULL;
+ cc->num_tas = num;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Activate client certificate authentication.
+ *
+ * This is a variant for `br_ssl_server_set_trust_anchor_names()`: the
+ * trust anchor names are provided not as an array of stand-alone names
+ * (`br_x500_name` structures), but as an array of trust anchors
+ * (`br_x509_trust_anchor` structures). The server engine itself will
+ * only use the `dn` field of each trust anchor. This is meant to allow
+ * defining a single array of trust anchors, to be used here and in the
+ * X.509 validation engine itself.
+ *
+ * The provided array is linked in, not copied, so that pointer must
+ * remain valid as long as anchor names may be used.
+ *
+ * \param cc server context.
+ * \param tas trust anchors (only names are used).
+ * \param num number of trust anchors.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_server_set_trust_anchor_names_alt(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_trust_anchor *tas, size_t num)
+{
+ cc->ta_names = NULL;
+ cc->tas = tas;
+ cc->num_tas = num;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Configure the cache for session parameters.
+ *
+ * The cache context is provided as a pointer to its first field (vtable
+ * pointer).
+ *
+ * \param cc server context.
+ * \param vtable session cache context.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_ssl_server_set_cache(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_ssl_session_cache_class **vtable)
+{
+ cc->cache_vtable = vtable;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Prepare or reset a server context for handling an incoming client.
+ *
+ * \param cc server context.
+ * \return 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ */
+int br_ssl_server_reset(br_ssl_server_context *cc);
+
+/* ===================================================================== */
+
+/*
+ * Context for the simplified I/O context. The transport medium is accessed
+ * through the low_read() and low_write() callback functions, each with
+ * its own opaque context pointer.
+ *
+ * low_read() read some bytes, at most 'len' bytes, into data[]. The
+ * returned value is the number of read bytes, or -1 on error.
+ * The 'len' parameter is guaranteed never to exceed 20000,
+ * so the length always fits in an 'int' on all platforms.
+ *
+ * low_write() write up to 'len' bytes, to be read from data[]. The
+ * returned value is the number of written bytes, or -1 on
+ * error. The 'len' parameter is guaranteed never to exceed
+ * 20000, so the length always fits in an 'int' on all
+ * parameters.
+ *
+ * A socket closure (if the transport medium is a socket) should be reported
+ * as an error (-1). The callbacks shall endeavour to block until at least
+ * one byte can be read or written; a callback returning 0 at times is
+ * acceptable, but this normally leads to the callback being immediately
+ * called again, so the callback should at least always try to block for
+ * some time if no I/O can take place.
+ *
+ * The SSL engine naturally applies some buffering, so the callbacks need
+ * not apply buffers of their own.
+ */
+/**
+ * \brief Context structure for the simplified SSL I/O wrapper.
+ *
+ * This structure is initialised with `br_sslio_init()`. Its contents
+ * are opaque and shall not be accessed directly.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ br_ssl_engine_context *engine;
+ int (*low_read)(void *read_context,
+ unsigned char *data, size_t len);
+ void *read_context;
+ int (*low_write)(void *write_context,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t len);
+ void *write_context;
+#endif
+} br_sslio_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialise a simplified I/O wrapper context.
+ *
+ * The simplified I/O wrapper offers a simpler read/write API for a SSL
+ * engine (client or server), using the provided callback functions for
+ * reading data from, or writing data to, the transport medium.
+ *
+ * The callback functions have the following semantics:
+ *
+ * - Each callback receives an opaque context value (of type `void *`)
+ * that the callback may use arbitrarily (or possibly ignore).
+ *
+ * - `low_read()` reads at least one byte, at most `len` bytes, from
+ * the transport medium. Read bytes shall be written in `data`.
+ *
+ * - `low_write()` writes at least one byte, at most `len` bytes, unto
+ * the transport medium. The bytes to write are read from `data`.
+ *
+ * - The `len` parameter is never zero, and is always lower than 20000.
+ *
+ * - The number of processed bytes (read or written) is returned. Since
+ * that number is less than 20000, it always fits on an `int`.
+ *
+ * - On error, the callbacks return -1. Reaching end-of-stream is an
+ * error. Errors are permanent: the SSL connection is terminated.
+ *
+ * - Callbacks SHOULD NOT return 0. This is tolerated, as long as
+ * callbacks endeavour to block for some non-negligible amount of
+ * time until at least one byte can be sent or received (if a
+ * callback returns 0, then the wrapper invokes it again
+ * immediately).
+ *
+ * - Callbacks MAY return as soon as at least one byte is processed;
+ * they MAY also insist on reading or writing _all_ requested bytes.
+ * Since SSL is a self-terminated protocol (each record has a length
+ * header), this does not change semantics.
+ *
+ * - Callbacks need not apply any buffering (for performance) since SSL
+ * itself uses buffers.
+ *
+ * \param ctx wrapper context to initialise.
+ * \param engine SSL engine to wrap.
+ * \param low_read callback for reading data from the transport.
+ * \param read_context context pointer for `low_read()`.
+ * \param low_write callback for writing data on the transport.
+ * \param write_context context pointer for `low_write()`.
+ */
+void br_sslio_init(br_sslio_context *ctx,
+ br_ssl_engine_context *engine,
+ int (*low_read)(void *read_context,
+ unsigned char *data, size_t len),
+ void *read_context,
+ int (*low_write)(void *write_context,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t len),
+ void *write_context);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Read some application data from a SSL connection.
+ *
+ * If `len` is zero, then this function returns 0 immediately. In
+ * all other cases, it never returns 0.
+ *
+ * This call returns only when at least one byte has been obtained.
+ * Returned value is the number of bytes read, or -1 on error. The
+ * number of bytes always fits on an 'int' (data from a single SSL/TLS
+ * record is returned).
+ *
+ * On error or SSL closure, this function returns -1. The caller should
+ * inspect the error status on the SSL engine to distinguish between
+ * normal closure and error.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL wrapper context.
+ * \param dst destination buffer for application data.
+ * \param len maximum number of bytes to obtain.
+ * \return number of bytes obtained, or -1 on error.
+ */
+int br_sslio_read(br_sslio_context *cc, void *dst, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Read application data from a SSL connection.
+ *
+ * This calls returns only when _all_ requested `len` bytes are read,
+ * or an error is reached. Returned value is 0 on success, -1 on error.
+ * A normal (verified) SSL closure before that many bytes are obtained
+ * is reported as an error by this function.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL wrapper context.
+ * \param dst destination buffer for application data.
+ * \param len number of bytes to obtain.
+ * \return 0 on success, or -1 on error.
+ */
+int br_sslio_read_all(br_sslio_context *cc, void *dst, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write some application data unto a SSL connection.
+ *
+ * If `len` is zero, then this function returns 0 immediately. In
+ * all other cases, it never returns 0.
+ *
+ * This call returns only when at least one byte has been written.
+ * Returned value is the number of bytes written, or -1 on error. The
+ * number of bytes always fits on an 'int' (less than 20000).
+ *
+ * On error or SSL closure, this function returns -1. The caller should
+ * inspect the error status on the SSL engine to distinguish between
+ * normal closure and error.
+ *
+ * **Important:** SSL is buffered; a "written" byte is a byte that was
+ * injected into the wrapped SSL engine, but this does not necessarily mean
+ * that it has been scheduled for sending. Use `br_sslio_flush()` to
+ * ensure that all pending data has been sent to the transport medium.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL wrapper context.
+ * \param src source buffer for application data.
+ * \param len maximum number of bytes to write.
+ * \return number of bytes written, or -1 on error.
+ */
+int br_sslio_write(br_sslio_context *cc, const void *src, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write application data unto a SSL connection.
+ *
+ * This calls returns only when _all_ requested `len` bytes have been
+ * written, or an error is reached. Returned value is 0 on success, -1
+ * on error. A normal (verified) SSL closure before that many bytes are
+ * written is reported as an error by this function.
+ *
+ * **Important:** SSL is buffered; a "written" byte is a byte that was
+ * injected into the wrapped SSL engine, but this does not necessarily mean
+ * that it has been scheduled for sending. Use `br_sslio_flush()` to
+ * ensure that all pending data has been sent to the transport medium.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL wrapper context.
+ * \param src source buffer for application data.
+ * \param len number of bytes to write.
+ * \return 0 on success, or -1 on error.
+ */
+int br_sslio_write_all(br_sslio_context *cc, const void *src, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Flush pending data.
+ *
+ * This call makes sure that any buffered application data in the
+ * provided context (including the wrapped SSL engine) has been sent
+ * to the transport medium (i.e. accepted by the `low_write()` callback
+ * method). If there is no such pending data, then this function does
+ * nothing (and returns a success, i.e. 0).
+ *
+ * If the underlying transport medium has its own buffers, then it is
+ * up to the caller to ensure the corresponding flushing.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 0 on success, -1 on error.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL wrapper context.
+ * \return 0 on success, or -1 on error.
+ */
+int br_sslio_flush(br_sslio_context *cc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Close the SSL connection.
+ *
+ * This call runs the SSL closure protocol (sending a `close_notify`,
+ * receiving the response `close_notify`). When it returns, the SSL
+ * connection is finished. It is still up to the caller to manage the
+ * possible transport-level termination, if applicable (alternatively,
+ * the underlying transport stream may be reused for non-SSL messages).
+ *
+ * Returned value is 0 on success, -1 on error. A failure by the peer
+ * to process the complete closure protocol (i.e. sending back the
+ * `close_notify`) is an error.
+ *
+ * \param cc SSL wrapper context.
+ * \return 0 on success, or -1 on error.
+ */
+int br_sslio_close(br_sslio_context *cc);
+
+/* ===================================================================== */
+
+/*
+ * Symbolic constants for cipher suites.
+ */
+
+/* From RFC 5246 */
+#define BR_TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL 0x0000
+#define BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 0x0001
+#define BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x0002
+#define BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0x003B
+#define BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 0x0004
+#define BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0x0005
+#define BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x000A
+#define BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x002F
+#define BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0035
+#define BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x003C
+#define BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x003D
+#define BR_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x000D
+#define BR_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0010
+#define BR_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0013
+#define BR_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x0016
+#define BR_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0030
+#define BR_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0031
+#define BR_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0032
+#define BR_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0033
+#define BR_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0036
+#define BR_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0037
+#define BR_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0038
+#define BR_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x0039
+#define BR_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x003E
+#define BR_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x003F
+#define BR_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0040
+#define BR_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x0067
+#define BR_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x0068
+#define BR_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x0069
+#define BR_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x006A
+#define BR_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x006B
+#define BR_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5 0x0018
+#define BR_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0x001B
+#define BR_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x0034
+#define BR_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x003A
+#define BR_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x006C
+#define BR_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x006D
+
+/* From RFC 4492 */
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC001
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC002
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC003
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC004
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC005
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC006
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC007
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC008
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC009
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00A
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC00B
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC00C
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC00D
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC00E
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00F
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC010
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC011
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC012
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC013
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC014
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC015
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA 0xC016
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 0xC017
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC018
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC019
+
+/* From RFC 5288 */
+#define BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x009C
+#define BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x009D
+#define BR_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x009E
+#define BR_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x009F
+#define BR_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x00A0
+#define BR_TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x00A1
+#define BR_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x00A2
+#define BR_TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x00A3
+#define BR_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x00A4
+#define BR_TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x00A5
+#define BR_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x00A6
+#define BR_TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x00A7
+
+/* From RFC 5289 */
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC023
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC024
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC025
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC026
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC027
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC028
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC029
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC02A
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02B
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02C
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02D
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02E
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02F
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC030
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC031
+#define BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC032
+
+/* From RFC 6655 and 7251 */
+#define BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC09C
+#define BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC09D
+#define BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0A0
+#define BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0A1
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC0AC
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC0AD
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0AE
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0AF
+
+/* From RFC 7905 */
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCA8
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCA9
+#define BR_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAA
+#define BR_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAB
+#define BR_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAC
+#define BR_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAD
+#define BR_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAE
+
+/* From RFC 7507 */
+#define BR_TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x5600
+
+/*
+ * Symbolic constants for alerts.
+ */
+#define BR_ALERT_CLOSE_NOTIFY 0
+#define BR_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 10
+#define BR_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC 20
+#define BR_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW 22
+#define BR_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 30
+#define BR_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 40
+#define BR_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE 42
+#define BR_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 43
+#define BR_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED 44
+#define BR_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED 45
+#define BR_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 46
+#define BR_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 47
+#define BR_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA 48
+#define BR_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED 49
+#define BR_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR 50
+#define BR_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 51
+#define BR_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70
+#define BR_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71
+#define BR_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 80
+#define BR_ALERT_USER_CANCELED 90
+#define BR_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100
+#define BR_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 110
+#define BR_ALERT_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 120
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_x509.h b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_x509.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7668e1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/inc/bearssl_x509.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1474 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BR_BEARSSL_X509_H__
+#define BR_BEARSSL_X509_H__
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "bearssl_ec.h"
+#include "bearssl_hash.h"
+#include "bearssl_rsa.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** \file bearssl_x509.h
+ *
+ * # X.509 Certificate Chain Processing
+ *
+ * An X.509 processing engine receives an X.509 chain, chunk by chunk,
+ * as received from a SSL/TLS client or server (the client receives the
+ * server's certificate chain, and the server receives the client's
+ * certificate chain if it requested a client certificate). The chain
+ * is thus injected in the engine in SSL order (end-entity first).
+ *
+ * The engine's job is to return the public key to use for SSL/TLS.
+ * How exactly that key is obtained and verified is entirely up to the
+ * engine.
+ *
+ * **The "known key" engine** returns a public key which is already known
+ * from out-of-band information (e.g. the client _remembers_ the key from
+ * a previous connection, as in the usual SSH model). This is the simplest
+ * engine since it simply ignores the chain, thereby avoiding the need
+ * for any decoding logic.
+ *
+ * **The "minimal" engine** implements minimal X.509 decoding and chain
+ * validation:
+ *
+ * - The provided chain should validate "as is". There is no attempt
+ * at reordering, skipping or downloading extra certificates.
+ *
+ * - X.509 v1, v2 and v3 certificates are supported.
+ *
+ * - Trust anchors are a DN and a public key. Each anchor is either a
+ * "CA" anchor, or a non-CA.
+ *
+ * - If the end-entity certificate matches a non-CA anchor (subject DN
+ * is equal to the non-CA name, and public key is also identical to
+ * the anchor key), then this is a _direct trust_ case and the
+ * remaining certificates are ignored.
+ *
+ * - Unless direct trust is applied, the chain must be verifiable up to
+ * a certificate whose issuer DN matches the DN from a "CA" trust anchor,
+ * and whose signature is verifiable against that anchor's public key.
+ * Subsequent certificates in the chain are ignored.
+ *
+ * - The engine verifies subject/issuer DN matching, and enforces
+ * processing of Basic Constraints and Key Usage extensions. The
+ * Authority Key Identifier, Subject Key Identifier, Issuer Alt Name,
+ * Subject Directory Attribute, CRL Distribution Points, Freshest CRL,
+ * Authority Info Access and Subject Info Access extensions are
+ * ignored. The Subject Alt Name is decoded for the end-entity
+ * certificate under some conditions (see below). Other extensions
+ * are ignored if non-critical, or imply chain rejection if critical.
+ *
+ * - The Subject Alt Name extension is parsed for names of type `dNSName`
+ * when decoding the end-entity certificate, and only if there is a
+ * server name to match. If there is no SAN extension, then the
+ * Common Name from the subjectDN is used. That name matching is
+ * case-insensitive and honours a single starting wildcard (i.e. if
+ * the name in the certificate starts with "`*.`" then this matches
+ * any word as first element). Note: this name matching is performed
+ * also in the "direct trust" model.
+ *
+ * - DN matching is byte-to-byte equality (a future version might
+ * include some limited processing for case-insensitive matching and
+ * whitespace normalisation).
+ *
+ * - Successful validation produces a public key type but also a set
+ * of allowed usages (`BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX` and/or `BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN`).
+ * The caller is responsible for checking that the key type and
+ * usages are compatible with the expected values (e.g. with the
+ * selected cipher suite, when the client validates the server's
+ * certificate).
+ *
+ * **Important caveats:**
+ *
+ * - The "minimal" engine does not check revocation status. The relevant
+ * extensions are ignored, and CRL or OCSP responses are not gathered
+ * or checked.
+ *
+ * - The "minimal" engine does not currently support Name Constraints
+ * (some basic functionality to handle sub-domains may be added in a
+ * later version).
+ *
+ * - The decoder is not "validating" in the sense that it won't reject
+ * some certificates with invalid field values when these fields are
+ * not actually processed.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * X.509 error codes are in the 32..63 range.
+ */
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: validation was successful; this is not actually
+ an error. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_OK 32
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: invalid value in an ASN.1 structure. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_INVALID_VALUE 33
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: truncated certificate. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_TRUNCATED 34
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: empty certificate chain (no certificate at all). */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_EMPTY_CHAIN 35
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: inner element extends beyond
+ outer element size. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_INNER_TRUNC 36
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: unsupported tag class (application
+ or private). */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_BAD_TAG_CLASS 37
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: unsupported tag value. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_BAD_TAG_VALUE 38
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: indefinite length. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_INDEFINITE_LENGTH 39
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: extraneous element. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_EXTRA_ELEMENT 40
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: unexpected element. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_UNEXPECTED 41
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: expected constructed element, but
+ is primitive. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_NOT_CONSTRUCTED 42
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: expected primitive element, but
+ is constructed. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_NOT_PRIMITIVE 43
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: BIT STRING length is not multiple
+ of 8. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_PARTIAL_BYTE 44
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: BOOLEAN value has invalid length. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_BAD_BOOLEAN 45
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: value is off-limits. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_OVERFLOW 46
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: invalid distinguished name. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_BAD_DN 47
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: invalid date/time representation. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_BAD_TIME 48
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: certificate contains unsupported features that
+ cannot be ignored. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED 49
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: key or signature size exceeds internal limits. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_LIMIT_EXCEEDED 50
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: key type does not match that which was expected. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_WRONG_KEY_TYPE 51
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: signature is invalid. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_BAD_SIGNATURE 52
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: validation time is unknown. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_TIME_UNKNOWN 53
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: certificate is expired or not yet valid. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_EXPIRED 54
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: issuer/subject DN mismatch in the chain. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_DN_MISMATCH 55
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: expected server name was not found in the chain. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_BAD_SERVER_NAME 56
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: unknown critical extension in certificate. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_CRITICAL_EXTENSION 57
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: not a CA, or path length constraint violation */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_NOT_CA 58
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: Key Usage extension prohibits intended usage. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_FORBIDDEN_KEY_USAGE 59
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: public key found in certificate is too small. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_WEAK_PUBLIC_KEY 60
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: chain could not be linked to a trust anchor. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_NOT_TRUSTED 62
+
+/**
+ * \brief Aggregate structure for public keys.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Key type: `BR_KEYTYPE_RSA` or `BR_KEYTYPE_EC` */
+ unsigned char key_type;
+ /** \brief Actual public key. */
+ union {
+ /** \brief RSA public key. */
+ br_rsa_public_key rsa;
+ /** \brief EC public key. */
+ br_ec_public_key ec;
+ } key;
+} br_x509_pkey;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Distinguished Name (X.500) structure.
+ *
+ * The DN is DER-encoded.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Encoded DN data. */
+ unsigned char *data;
+ /** \brief Encoded DN length (in bytes). */
+ size_t len;
+} br_x500_name;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Trust anchor structure.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Encoded DN (X.500 name). */
+ br_x500_name dn;
+ /** \brief Anchor flags (e.g. `BR_X509_TA_CA`). */
+ unsigned flags;
+ /** \brief Anchor public key. */
+ br_x509_pkey pkey;
+} br_x509_trust_anchor;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Trust anchor flag: CA.
+ *
+ * A "CA" anchor is deemed fit to verify signatures on certificates.
+ * A "non-CA" anchor is accepted only for direct trust (server's
+ * certificate name and key match the anchor).
+ */
+#define BR_X509_TA_CA 0x0001
+
+/*
+ * Key type: combination of a basic key type (low 4 bits) and some
+ * optional flags.
+ *
+ * For a public key, the basic key type only is set.
+ *
+ * For an expected key type, the flags indicate the intended purpose(s)
+ * for the key; the basic key type may be set to 0 to indicate that any
+ * key type compatible with the indicated purpose is acceptable.
+ */
+/** \brief Key type: algorithm is RSA. */
+#define BR_KEYTYPE_RSA 1
+/** \brief Key type: algorithm is EC. */
+#define BR_KEYTYPE_EC 2
+
+/**
+ * \brief Key type: usage is "key exchange".
+ *
+ * This value is combined (with bitwise OR) with the algorithm
+ * (`BR_KEYTYPE_RSA` or `BR_KEYTYPE_EC`) when informing the X.509
+ * validation engine that it should find a public key of that type,
+ * fit for key exchanges (e.g. `TLS_RSA_*` and `TLS_ECDH_*` cipher
+ * suites).
+ */
+#define BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX 0x10
+
+/**
+ * \brief Key type: usage is "signature".
+ *
+ * This value is combined (with bitwise OR) with the algorithm
+ * (`BR_KEYTYPE_RSA` or `BR_KEYTYPE_EC`) when informing the X.509
+ * validation engine that it should find a public key of that type,
+ * fit for signatures (e.g. `TLS_ECDHE_*` cipher suites).
+ */
+#define BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN 0x20
+
+/*
+ * start_chain Called when a new chain is started. If 'server_name'
+ * is not NULL and non-empty, then it is a name that
+ * should be looked for in the EE certificate (in the
+ * SAN extension as dNSName, or in the subjectDN's CN
+ * if there is no SAN extension).
+ * The caller ensures that the provided 'server_name'
+ * pointer remains valid throughout validation.
+ *
+ * start_cert Begins a new certificate in the chain. The provided
+ * length is in bytes; this is the total certificate length.
+ *
+ * append Get some additional bytes for the current certificate.
+ *
+ * end_cert Ends the current certificate.
+ *
+ * end_chain Called at the end of the chain. Returned value is
+ * 0 on success, or a non-zero error code.
+ *
+ * get_pkey Returns the EE certificate public key.
+ *
+ * For a complete chain, start_chain() and end_chain() are always
+ * called. For each certificate, start_cert(), some append() calls, then
+ * end_cert() are called, in that order. There may be no append() call
+ * at all if the certificate is empty (which is not valid but may happen
+ * if the peer sends exactly that).
+ *
+ * get_pkey() shall return a pointer to a structure that is valid as
+ * long as a new chain is not started. This may be a sub-structure
+ * within the context for the engine. This function MAY return a valid
+ * pointer to a public key even in some cases of validation failure,
+ * depending on the validation engine.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class type for an X.509 engine.
+ *
+ * A certificate chain validation uses a caller-allocated context, which
+ * contains the running state for that validation. Methods are called
+ * in due order:
+ *
+ * - `start_chain()` is called at the start of the validation.
+ * - Certificates are processed one by one, in SSL order (end-entity
+ * comes first). For each certificate, the following methods are
+ * called:
+ *
+ * - `start_cert()` at the beginning of the certificate.
+ * - `append()` is called zero, one or more times, to provide
+ * the certificate (possibly in chunks).
+ * - `end_cert()` at the end of the certificate.
+ *
+ * - `end_chain()` is called when the last certificate in the chain
+ * was processed.
+ * - `get_pkey()` is called after chain processing, if the chain
+ * validation was successful.
+ *
+ * A context structure may be reused; the `start_chain()` method shall
+ * ensure (re)initialisation.
+ */
+typedef struct br_x509_class_ br_x509_class;
+struct br_x509_class_ {
+ /**
+ * \brief X.509 context size, in bytes.
+ */
+ size_t context_size;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Start a new chain.
+ *
+ * This method shall set the vtable (first field) of the context
+ * structure.
+ *
+ * The `server_name`, if not `NULL`, will be considered as a
+ * fully qualified domain name, to be matched against the `dNSName`
+ * elements of the end-entity certificate's SAN extension (if there
+ * is no SAN, then the Common Name from the subjectDN will be used).
+ * If `server_name` is `NULL` then no such matching is performed.
+ *
+ * \param ctx validation context.
+ * \param server_name server name to match (or `NULL`).
+ */
+ void (*start_chain)(const br_x509_class **ctx,
+ const char *server_name);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Start a new certificate.
+ *
+ * \param ctx validation context.
+ * \param length new certificate length (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*start_cert)(const br_x509_class **ctx, uint32_t length);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Receive some bytes for the current certificate.
+ *
+ * This function may be called several times in succession for
+ * a given certificate. The caller guarantees that for each
+ * call, `len` is not zero, and the sum of all chunk lengths
+ * for a certificate matches the total certificate length which
+ * was provided in the previous `start_cert()` call.
+ *
+ * If the new certificate is empty (no byte at all) then this
+ * function won't be called at all.
+ *
+ * \param ctx validation context.
+ * \param buf certificate data chunk.
+ * \param len certificate data chunk length (in bytes).
+ */
+ void (*append)(const br_x509_class **ctx,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Finish the current certificate.
+ *
+ * This function is called when the end of the current certificate
+ * is reached.
+ *
+ * \param ctx validation context.
+ */
+ void (*end_cert)(const br_x509_class **ctx);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Finish the chain.
+ *
+ * This function is called at the end of the chain. It shall
+ * return either 0 if the validation was successful, or a
+ * non-zero error code. The `BR_ERR_X509_*` constants are
+ * error codes, though other values may be possible.
+ *
+ * \param ctx validation context.
+ * \return 0 on success, or a non-zero error code.
+ */
+ unsigned (*end_chain)(const br_x509_class **ctx);
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Get the resulting end-entity public key.
+ *
+ * The decoded public key is returned. The returned pointer
+ * may be valid only as long as the context structure is
+ * unmodified, i.e. it may cease to be valid if the context
+ * is released or reused.
+ *
+ * This function _may_ return `NULL` if the validation failed.
+ * However, returning a public key does not mean that the
+ * validation was wholly successful; some engines may return
+ * a decoded public key even if the chain did not end on a
+ * trusted anchor.
+ *
+ * If validation succeeded and `usage` is not `NULL`, then
+ * `*usage` is filled with a combination of `BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN`
+ * and/or `BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX` that specifies the validated key
+ * usage types. It is the caller's responsibility to check
+ * that value against the intended use of the public key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx validation context.
+ * \return the end-entity public key, or `NULL`.
+ */
+ const br_x509_pkey *(*get_pkey)(
+ const br_x509_class *const *ctx, unsigned *usages);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief The "known key" X.509 engine structure.
+ *
+ * The structure contents are opaque (they shall not be accessed directly),
+ * except for the first field (the vtable).
+ *
+ * The "known key" engine returns an externally configured public key,
+ * and totally ignores the certificate contents.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief Reference to the context vtable. */
+ const br_x509_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ br_x509_pkey pkey;
+ unsigned usages;
+#endif
+} br_x509_knownkey_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for the "known key" X.509 engine.
+ */
+extern const br_x509_class br_x509_knownkey_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a "known key" X.509 engine with a known RSA public key.
+ *
+ * The `usages` parameter indicates the allowed key usages for that key
+ * (`BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX` and/or `BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN`).
+ *
+ * The provided pointers are linked in, not copied, so they must remain
+ * valid while the public key may be in usage.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param pk known public key.
+ * \param usages allowed key usages.
+ */
+void br_x509_knownkey_init_rsa(br_x509_knownkey_context *ctx,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk, unsigned usages);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a "known key" X.509 engine with a known EC public key.
+ *
+ * The `usages` parameter indicates the allowed key usages for that key
+ * (`BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX` and/or `BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN`).
+ *
+ * The provided pointers are linked in, not copied, so they must remain
+ * valid while the public key may be in usage.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param pk known public key.
+ * \param usages allowed key usages.
+ */
+void br_x509_knownkey_init_ec(br_x509_knownkey_context *ctx,
+ const br_ec_public_key *pk, unsigned usages);
+
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+/*
+ * The minimal X.509 engine has some state buffers which must be large
+ * enough to simultaneously accommodate:
+ * -- the public key extracted from the current certificate;
+ * -- the signature on the current certificate or on the previous
+ * certificate;
+ * -- the public key extracted from the EE certificate.
+ *
+ * We store public key elements in their raw unsigned big-endian
+ * encoding. We want to support up to RSA-4096 with a short (up to 64
+ * bits) public exponent, thus a buffer for a public key must have
+ * length at least 520 bytes. Similarly, a RSA-4096 signature has length
+ * 512 bytes.
+ *
+ * Though RSA public exponents can formally be as large as the modulus
+ * (mathematically, even larger exponents would work, but PKCS#1 forbids
+ * them), exponents that do not fit on 32 bits are extremely rare,
+ * notably because some widespread implementations (e.g. Microsoft's
+ * CryptoAPI) don't support them. Moreover, large public exponent do not
+ * seem to imply any tangible security benefit, and they increase the
+ * cost of public key operations. The X.509 "minimal" engine will tolerate
+ * public exponents of arbitrary size as long as the modulus and the
+ * exponent can fit together in the dedicated buffer.
+ *
+ * EC public keys are shorter than RSA public keys; even with curve
+ * NIST P-521 (the largest curve we care to support), a public key is
+ * encoded over 133 bytes only.
+ */
+#define BR_X509_BUFSIZE_KEY 520
+#define BR_X509_BUFSIZE_SIG 512
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for receiving a name element.
+ *
+ * An array of such structures can be provided to the X.509 decoding
+ * engines. If the specified elements are found in the certificate
+ * subject DN or the SAN extension, then the name contents are copied
+ * as zero-terminated strings into the buffer.
+ *
+ * The decoder converts TeletexString and BMPString to UTF8String, and
+ * ensures that the resulting string is zero-terminated. If the string
+ * does not fit in the provided buffer, then the copy is aborted and an
+ * error is reported.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /**
+ * \brief Element OID.
+ *
+ * For X.500 name elements (to be extracted from the subject DN),
+ * this is the encoded OID for the requested name element; the
+ * first byte shall contain the length of the DER-encoded OID
+ * value, followed by the OID value (for instance, OID 2.5.4.3,
+ * for id-at-commonName, will be `03 55 04 03`). This is
+ * equivalent to full DER encoding with the length but without
+ * the tag.
+ *
+ * For SAN name elements, the first byte (`oid[0]`) has value 0,
+ * followed by another byte that matches the expected GeneralName
+ * tag. Allowed second byte values are then:
+ *
+ * - 1: `rfc822Name`
+ *
+ * - 2: `dNSName`
+ *
+ * - 6: `uniformResourceIdentifier`
+ *
+ * - 0: `otherName`
+ *
+ * If first and second byte are 0, then this is a SAN element of
+ * type `otherName`; the `oid[]` array should then contain, right
+ * after the two bytes of value 0, an encoded OID (with the same
+ * conventions as for X.500 name elements). If a match is found
+ * for that OID, then the corresponding name element will be
+ * extracted, as long as it is a supported string type.
+ */
+ const unsigned char *oid;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Destination buffer.
+ */
+ char *buf;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Length (in bytes) of the destination buffer.
+ *
+ * The buffer MUST NOT be smaller than 1 byte.
+ */
+ size_t len;
+
+ /**
+ * \brief Decoding status.
+ *
+ * Status is 0 if the name element was not found, 1 if it was
+ * found and decoded, or -1 on error. Error conditions include
+ * an unrecognised encoding, an invalid encoding, or a string
+ * too large for the destination buffer.
+ */
+ int status;
+
+} br_name_element;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Callback for validity date checks.
+ *
+ * The function receives as parameter an arbitrary user-provided context,
+ * and the notBefore and notAfter dates specified in an X.509 certificate,
+ * both expressed as a number of days and a number of seconds:
+ *
+ * - Days are counted in a proleptic Gregorian calendar since
+ * January 1st, 0 AD. Year "0 AD" is the one that preceded "1 AD";
+ * it is also traditionally known as "1 BC".
+ *
+ * - Seconds are counted since midnight, from 0 to 86400 (a count of
+ * 86400 is possible only if a leap second happened).
+ *
+ * Each date and time is understood in the UTC time zone. The "Unix
+ * Epoch" (January 1st, 1970, 00:00 UTC) corresponds to days=719528 and
+ * seconds=0; the "Windows Epoch" (January 1st, 1601, 00:00 UTC) is
+ * days=584754, seconds=0.
+ *
+ * This function must return -1 if the current date is strictly before
+ * the "notBefore" time, or +1 if the current date is strictly after the
+ * "notAfter" time. If neither condition holds, then the function returns
+ * 0, which means that the current date falls within the validity range of
+ * the certificate. If the function returns a value distinct from -1, 0
+ * and +1, then this is interpreted as an unavailability of the current
+ * time, which normally ends the validation process with a
+ * `BR_ERR_X509_TIME_UNKNOWN` error.
+ *
+ * During path validation, this callback will be invoked for each
+ * considered X.509 certificate. Validation fails if any of the calls
+ * returns a non-zero value.
+ *
+ * The context value is an abritrary pointer set by the caller when
+ * configuring this callback.
+ *
+ * \param tctx context pointer.
+ * \param not_before_days notBefore date (days since Jan 1st, 0 AD).
+ * \param not_before_seconds notBefore time (seconds, at most 86400).
+ * \param not_after_days notAfter date (days since Jan 1st, 0 AD).
+ * \param not_after_seconds notAfter time (seconds, at most 86400).
+ * \return -1, 0 or +1.
+ */
+typedef int (*br_x509_time_check)(void *tctx,
+ uint32_t not_before_days, uint32_t not_before_seconds,
+ uint32_t not_after_days, uint32_t not_after_seconds);
+
+/**
+ * \brief The "minimal" X.509 engine structure.
+ *
+ * The structure contents are opaque (they shall not be accessed directly),
+ * except for the first field (the vtable).
+ *
+ * The "minimal" engine performs a rudimentary but serviceable X.509 path
+ * validation.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ const br_x509_class *vtable;
+
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ /* Structure for returning the EE public key. */
+ br_x509_pkey pkey;
+
+ /* CPU for the T0 virtual machine. */
+ struct {
+ uint32_t *dp;
+ uint32_t *rp;
+ const unsigned char *ip;
+ } cpu;
+ uint32_t dp_stack[31];
+ uint32_t rp_stack[31];
+ int err;
+
+ /* Server name to match with the SAN / CN of the EE certificate. */
+ const char *server_name;
+
+ /* Validated key usages. */
+ unsigned char key_usages;
+
+ /* Explicitly set date and time. */
+ uint32_t days, seconds;
+
+ /* Current certificate length (in bytes). Set to 0 when the
+ certificate has been fully processed. */
+ uint32_t cert_length;
+
+ /* Number of certificates processed so far in the current chain.
+ It is incremented at the end of the processing of a certificate,
+ so it is 0 for the EE. */
+ uint32_t num_certs;
+
+ /* Certificate data chunk. */
+ const unsigned char *hbuf;
+ size_t hlen;
+
+ /* The pad serves as destination for various operations. */
+ unsigned char pad[256];
+
+ /* Buffer for EE public key data. */
+ unsigned char ee_pkey_data[BR_X509_BUFSIZE_KEY];
+
+ /* Buffer for currently decoded public key. */
+ unsigned char pkey_data[BR_X509_BUFSIZE_KEY];
+
+ /* Signature type: signer key type, offset to the hash
+ function OID (in the T0 data block) and hash function
+ output length (TBS hash length). */
+ unsigned char cert_signer_key_type;
+ uint16_t cert_sig_hash_oid;
+ unsigned char cert_sig_hash_len;
+
+ /* Current/last certificate signature. */
+ unsigned char cert_sig[BR_X509_BUFSIZE_SIG];
+ uint16_t cert_sig_len;
+
+ /* Minimum RSA key length (difference in bytes from 128). */
+ int16_t min_rsa_size;
+
+ /* Configured trust anchors. */
+ const br_x509_trust_anchor *trust_anchors;
+ size_t trust_anchors_num;
+
+ /*
+ * Multi-hasher for the TBS.
+ */
+ unsigned char do_mhash;
+ br_multihash_context mhash;
+ unsigned char tbs_hash[64];
+
+ /*
+ * Simple hasher for the subject/issuer DN.
+ */
+ unsigned char do_dn_hash;
+ const br_hash_class *dn_hash_impl;
+ br_hash_compat_context dn_hash;
+ unsigned char current_dn_hash[64];
+ unsigned char next_dn_hash[64];
+ unsigned char saved_dn_hash[64];
+
+ /*
+ * Name elements to gather.
+ */
+ br_name_element *name_elts;
+ size_t num_name_elts;
+
+ /*
+ * Callback function (and context) to get the current date.
+ */
+ void *itime_ctx;
+ br_x509_time_check itime;
+
+ /*
+ * Public key cryptography implementations (signature verification).
+ */
+ br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy irsa;
+ br_ecdsa_vrfy iecdsa;
+ const br_ec_impl *iec;
+#endif
+
+} br_x509_minimal_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for the "minimal" X.509 engine.
+ */
+extern const br_x509_class br_x509_minimal_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialise a "minimal" X.509 engine.
+ *
+ * The `dn_hash_impl` parameter shall be a hash function internally used
+ * to match X.500 names (subject/issuer DN, and anchor names). Any standard
+ * hash function may be used, but a collision-resistant hash function is
+ * advised.
+ *
+ * After initialization, some implementations for signature verification
+ * (hash functions and signature algorithms) MUST be added.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param dn_hash_impl hash function for DN comparisons.
+ * \param trust_anchors trust anchors.
+ * \param trust_anchors_num number of trust anchors.
+ */
+void br_x509_minimal_init(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+ const br_hash_class *dn_hash_impl,
+ const br_x509_trust_anchor *trust_anchors, size_t trust_anchors_num);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set a supported hash function in an X.509 "minimal" engine.
+ *
+ * Hash functions are used with signature verification algorithms.
+ * Once initialised (with `br_x509_minimal_init()`), the context must
+ * be configured with the hash functions it shall support for that
+ * purpose. The hash function identifier MUST be one of the standard
+ * hash function identifiers (1 to 6, for MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
+ * SHA-384 and SHA-512).
+ *
+ * If `impl` is `NULL`, this _removes_ support for the designated
+ * hash function.
+ *
+ * \param ctx validation context.
+ * \param id hash function identifier (from 1 to 6).
+ * \param impl hash function implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_x509_minimal_set_hash(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+ int id, const br_hash_class *impl)
+{
+ br_multihash_setimpl(&ctx->mhash, id, impl);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set a RSA signature verification implementation in the X.509
+ * "minimal" engine.
+ *
+ * Once initialised (with `br_x509_minimal_init()`), the context must
+ * be configured with the signature verification implementations that
+ * it is supposed to support. If `irsa` is `0`, then the RSA support
+ * is disabled.
+ *
+ * \param ctx validation context.
+ * \param irsa RSA signature verification implementation (or `0`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_x509_minimal_set_rsa(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+ br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy irsa)
+{
+ ctx->irsa = irsa;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set a ECDSA signature verification implementation in the X.509
+ * "minimal" engine.
+ *
+ * Once initialised (with `br_x509_minimal_init()`), the context must
+ * be configured with the signature verification implementations that
+ * it is supposed to support.
+ *
+ * If `iecdsa` is `0`, then this call disables ECDSA support; in that
+ * case, `iec` may be `NULL`. Otherwise, `iecdsa` MUST point to a function
+ * that verifies ECDSA signatures with format "asn1", and it will use
+ * `iec` as underlying elliptic curve support.
+ *
+ * \param ctx validation context.
+ * \param iec elliptic curve implementation (or `NULL`).
+ * \param iecdsa ECDSA implementation (or `0`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_x509_minimal_set_ecdsa(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+ const br_ec_impl *iec, br_ecdsa_vrfy iecdsa)
+{
+ ctx->iecdsa = iecdsa;
+ ctx->iec = iec;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialise a "minimal" X.509 engine with default algorithms.
+ *
+ * This function performs the same job as `br_x509_minimal_init()`, but
+ * also sets implementations for RSA, ECDSA, and the standard hash
+ * functions.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to initialise.
+ * \param trust_anchors trust anchors.
+ * \param trust_anchors_num number of trust anchors.
+ */
+void br_x509_minimal_init_full(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+ const br_x509_trust_anchor *trust_anchors, size_t trust_anchors_num);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the validation time for the X.509 "minimal" engine.
+ *
+ * The validation time is set as two 32-bit integers, for days and
+ * seconds since a fixed epoch:
+ *
+ * - Days are counted in a proleptic Gregorian calendar since
+ * January 1st, 0 AD. Year "0 AD" is the one that preceded "1 AD";
+ * it is also traditionally known as "1 BC".
+ *
+ * - Seconds are counted since midnight, from 0 to 86400 (a count of
+ * 86400 is possible only if a leap second happened).
+ *
+ * The validation date and time is understood in the UTC time zone. The
+ * "Unix Epoch" (January 1st, 1970, 00:00 UTC) corresponds to days=719528
+ * and seconds=0; the "Windows Epoch" (January 1st, 1601, 00:00 UTC) is
+ * days=584754, seconds=0.
+ *
+ * If the validation date and time are not explicitly set, but BearSSL
+ * was compiled with support for the system clock on the underlying
+ * platform, then the current time will automatically be used. Otherwise,
+ * not setting the validation date and time implies a validation
+ * failure (except in case of direct trust of the EE key).
+ *
+ * \param ctx validation context.
+ * \param days days since January 1st, 0 AD (Gregorian calendar).
+ * \param seconds seconds since midnight (0 to 86400).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_x509_minimal_set_time(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+ uint32_t days, uint32_t seconds)
+{
+ ctx->days = days;
+ ctx->seconds = seconds;
+ ctx->itime = 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the validity range callback function for the X.509
+ * "minimal" engine.
+ *
+ * The provided function will be invoked to check whether the validation
+ * date is within the validity range for a given X.509 certificate; a
+ * call will be issued for each considered certificate. The provided
+ * context pointer (itime_ctx) will be passed as first parameter to the
+ * callback.
+ *
+ * \param tctx context for callback invocation.
+ * \param cb callback function.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_x509_minimal_set_time_callback(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+ void *itime_ctx, br_x509_time_check itime)
+{
+ ctx->itime_ctx = itime_ctx;
+ ctx->itime = itime;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the minimal acceptable length for RSA keys (X.509 "minimal"
+ * engine).
+ *
+ * The RSA key length is expressed in bytes. The default minimum key
+ * length is 128 bytes, corresponding to 1017 bits. RSA keys shorter
+ * than the configured length will be rejected, implying validation
+ * failure. This setting applies to keys extracted from certificates
+ * (both end-entity, and intermediate CA) but not to "CA" trust anchors.
+ *
+ * \param ctx validation context.
+ * \param byte_length minimum RSA key length, **in bytes** (not bits).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_x509_minimal_set_minrsa(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx, int byte_length)
+{
+ ctx->min_rsa_size = (int16_t)(byte_length - 128);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the name elements to gather.
+ *
+ * The provided array is linked in the context. The elements are
+ * gathered from the EE certificate. If the same element type is
+ * requested several times, then the relevant structures will be filled
+ * in the order the matching values are encountered in the certificate.
+ *
+ * \param ctx validation context.
+ * \param elts array of name element structures to fill.
+ * \param num_elts number of name element structures to fill.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_x509_minimal_set_name_elements(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+ br_name_element *elts, size_t num_elts)
+{
+ ctx->name_elts = elts;
+ ctx->num_name_elts = num_elts;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief X.509 decoder context.
+ *
+ * This structure is _not_ for X.509 validation, but for extracting
+ * names and public keys from encoded certificates. Intended usage is
+ * to use (self-signed) certificates as trust anchors.
+ *
+ * Contents are opaque and shall not be accessed directly.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ /* Structure for returning the public key. */
+ br_x509_pkey pkey;
+
+ /* CPU for the T0 virtual machine. */
+ struct {
+ uint32_t *dp;
+ uint32_t *rp;
+ const unsigned char *ip;
+ } cpu;
+ uint32_t dp_stack[32];
+ uint32_t rp_stack[32];
+ int err;
+
+ /* The pad serves as destination for various operations. */
+ unsigned char pad[256];
+
+ /* Flag set when decoding succeeds. */
+ unsigned char decoded;
+
+ /* Validity dates. */
+ uint32_t notbefore_days, notbefore_seconds;
+ uint32_t notafter_days, notafter_seconds;
+
+ /* The "CA" flag. This is set to true if the certificate contains
+ a Basic Constraints extension that asserts CA status. */
+ unsigned char isCA;
+
+ /* DN processing: the subject DN is extracted and pushed to the
+ provided callback. */
+ unsigned char copy_dn;
+ void *append_dn_ctx;
+ void (*append_dn)(void *ctx, const void *buf, size_t len);
+
+ /* Certificate data chunk. */
+ const unsigned char *hbuf;
+ size_t hlen;
+
+ /* Buffer for decoded public key. */
+ unsigned char pkey_data[BR_X509_BUFSIZE_KEY];
+
+ /* Type of key and hash function used in the certificate signature. */
+ unsigned char signer_key_type;
+ unsigned char signer_hash_id;
+#endif
+
+} br_x509_decoder_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialise an X.509 decoder context for processing a new
+ * certificate.
+ *
+ * The `append_dn()` callback (with opaque context `append_dn_ctx`)
+ * will be invoked to receive, chunk by chunk, the certificate's
+ * subject DN. If `append_dn` is `0` then the subject DN will be
+ * ignored.
+ *
+ * \param ctx X.509 decoder context to initialise.
+ * \param append_dn DN receiver callback (or `0`).
+ * \param append_dn_ctx context for the DN receiver callback.
+ */
+void br_x509_decoder_init(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx,
+ void (*append_dn)(void *ctx, const void *buf, size_t len),
+ void *append_dn_ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Push some certificate bytes into a decoder context.
+ *
+ * If `len` is non-zero, then that many bytes are pushed, from address
+ * `data`, into the provided decoder context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx X.509 decoder context.
+ * \param data certificate data chunk.
+ * \param len certificate data chunk length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_x509_decoder_push(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Obtain the decoded public key.
+ *
+ * Returned value is a pointer to a structure internal to the decoder
+ * context; releasing or reusing the decoder context invalidates that
+ * structure.
+ *
+ * If decoding was not finished, or failed, then `NULL` is returned.
+ *
+ * \param ctx X.509 decoder context.
+ * \return the public key, or `NULL` on unfinished/error.
+ */
+static inline br_x509_pkey *
+br_x509_decoder_get_pkey(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->decoded && ctx->err == 0) {
+ return &ctx->pkey;
+ } else {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get decoder error status.
+ *
+ * If no error was reported yet but the certificate decoding is not
+ * finished, then the error code is `BR_ERR_X509_TRUNCATED`. If decoding
+ * was successful, then 0 is returned.
+ *
+ * \param ctx X.509 decoder context.
+ * \return 0 on successful decoding, or a non-zero error code.
+ */
+static inline int
+br_x509_decoder_last_error(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->err != 0) {
+ return ctx->err;
+ }
+ if (!ctx->decoded) {
+ return BR_ERR_X509_TRUNCATED;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the "isCA" flag from an X.509 decoder context.
+ *
+ * This flag is set if the decoded certificate claims to be a CA through
+ * a Basic Constraints extension. This flag should not be read before
+ * decoding completed successfully.
+ *
+ * \param ctx X.509 decoder context.
+ * \return the "isCA" flag.
+ */
+static inline int
+br_x509_decoder_isCA(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->isCA;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the issuing CA key type (type of algorithm used to sign the
+ * decoded certificate).
+ *
+ * This is `BR_KEYTYPE_RSA` or `BR_KEYTYPE_EC`. The value 0 is returned
+ * if the signature type was not recognised.
+ *
+ * \param ctx X.509 decoder context.
+ * \return the issuing CA key type.
+ */
+static inline int
+br_x509_decoder_get_signer_key_type(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->signer_key_type;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the identifier for the hash function used to sign the decoded
+ * certificate.
+ *
+ * This is 0 if the hash function was not recognised.
+ *
+ * \param ctx X.509 decoder context.
+ * \return the signature hash function identifier.
+ */
+static inline int
+br_x509_decoder_get_signer_hash_id(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->signer_hash_id;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for an X.509 certificate (DER-encoded).
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** \brief The DER-encoded certificate data. */
+ unsigned char *data;
+ /** \brief The DER-encoded certificate length (in bytes). */
+ size_t data_len;
+} br_x509_certificate;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Private key decoder context.
+ *
+ * The private key decoder recognises RSA and EC private keys, either in
+ * their raw, DER-encoded format, or wrapped in an unencrypted PKCS#8
+ * archive (again DER-encoded).
+ *
+ * Structure contents are opaque and shall not be accessed directly.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+ /* Structure for returning the private key. */
+ union {
+ br_rsa_private_key rsa;
+ br_ec_private_key ec;
+ } key;
+
+ /* CPU for the T0 virtual machine. */
+ struct {
+ uint32_t *dp;
+ uint32_t *rp;
+ const unsigned char *ip;
+ } cpu;
+ uint32_t dp_stack[32];
+ uint32_t rp_stack[32];
+ int err;
+
+ /* Private key data chunk. */
+ const unsigned char *hbuf;
+ size_t hlen;
+
+ /* The pad serves as destination for various operations. */
+ unsigned char pad[256];
+
+ /* Decoded key type; 0 until decoding is complete. */
+ unsigned char key_type;
+
+ /* Buffer for the private key elements. It shall be large enough
+ to accommodate all elements for a RSA-4096 private key (roughly
+ five 2048-bit integers, possibly a bit more). */
+ unsigned char key_data[3 * BR_X509_BUFSIZE_SIG];
+#endif
+} br_skey_decoder_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialise a private key decoder context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx key decoder context to initialise.
+ */
+void br_skey_decoder_init(br_skey_decoder_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Push some data bytes into a private key decoder context.
+ *
+ * If `len` is non-zero, then that many data bytes, starting at address
+ * `data`, are pushed into the decoder.
+ *
+ * \param ctx key decoder context.
+ * \param data private key data chunk.
+ * \param len private key data chunk length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_skey_decoder_push(br_skey_decoder_context *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the decoding status for a private key.
+ *
+ * Decoding status is 0 on success, or a non-zero error code. If the
+ * decoding is unfinished when this function is called, then the
+ * status code `BR_ERR_X509_TRUNCATED` is returned.
+ *
+ * \param ctx key decoder context.
+ * \return 0 on successful decoding, or a non-zero error code.
+ */
+static inline int
+br_skey_decoder_last_error(const br_skey_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->err != 0) {
+ return ctx->err;
+ }
+ if (ctx->key_type == 0) {
+ return BR_ERR_X509_TRUNCATED;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the decoded private key type.
+ *
+ * Private key type is `BR_KEYTYPE_RSA` or `BR_KEYTYPE_EC`. If decoding is
+ * not finished or failed, then 0 is returned.
+ *
+ * \param ctx key decoder context.
+ * \return decoded private key type, or 0.
+ */
+static inline int
+br_skey_decoder_key_type(const br_skey_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->err == 0) {
+ return ctx->key_type;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the decoded RSA private key.
+ *
+ * This function returns `NULL` if the decoding failed, or is not
+ * finished, or the key is not RSA. The returned pointer references
+ * structures within the context that can become invalid if the context
+ * is reused or released.
+ *
+ * \param ctx key decoder context.
+ * \return decoded RSA private key, or `NULL`.
+ */
+static inline const br_rsa_private_key *
+br_skey_decoder_get_rsa(const br_skey_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->err == 0 && ctx->key_type == BR_KEYTYPE_RSA) {
+ return &ctx->key.rsa;
+ } else {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the decoded EC private key.
+ *
+ * This function returns `NULL` if the decoding failed, or is not
+ * finished, or the key is not EC. The returned pointer references
+ * structures within the context that can become invalid if the context
+ * is reused or released.
+ *
+ * \param ctx key decoder context.
+ * \return decoded EC private key, or `NULL`.
+ */
+static inline const br_ec_private_key *
+br_skey_decoder_get_ec(const br_skey_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->err == 0 && ctx->key_type == BR_KEYTYPE_EC) {
+ return &ctx->key.ec;
+ } else {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encode an RSA private key (raw DER format).
+ *
+ * This function encodes the provided key into the "raw" format specified
+ * in PKCS#1 (RFC 8017, Appendix C, type `RSAPrivateKey`), with DER
+ * encoding rules.
+ *
+ * The key elements are:
+ *
+ * - `sk`: the private key (`p`, `q`, `dp`, `dq` and `iq`)
+ *
+ * - `pk`: the public key (`n` and `e`)
+ *
+ * - `d` (size: `dlen` bytes): the private exponent
+ *
+ * The public key elements, and the private exponent `d`, can be
+ * recomputed from the private key (see `br_rsa_compute_modulus()`,
+ * `br_rsa_compute_pubexp()` and `br_rsa_compute_privexp()`).
+ *
+ * If `dest` is not `NULL`, then the encoded key is written at that
+ * address, and the encoded length (in bytes) is returned. If `dest` is
+ * `NULL`, then nothing is written, but the encoded length is still
+ * computed and returned.
+ *
+ * \param dest the destination buffer (or `NULL`).
+ * \param sk the RSA private key.
+ * \param pk the RSA public key.
+ * \param d the RSA private exponent.
+ * \param dlen the RSA private exponent length (in bytes).
+ * \return the encoded key length (in bytes).
+ */
+size_t br_encode_rsa_raw_der(void *dest, const br_rsa_private_key *sk,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk, const void *d, size_t dlen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encode an RSA private key (PKCS#8 DER format).
+ *
+ * This function encodes the provided key into the PKCS#8 format
+ * (RFC 5958, type `OneAsymmetricKey`). It wraps around the "raw DER"
+ * format for the RSA key, as implemented by `br_encode_rsa_raw_der()`.
+ *
+ * The key elements are:
+ *
+ * - `sk`: the private key (`p`, `q`, `dp`, `dq` and `iq`)
+ *
+ * - `pk`: the public key (`n` and `e`)
+ *
+ * - `d` (size: `dlen` bytes): the private exponent
+ *
+ * The public key elements, and the private exponent `d`, can be
+ * recomputed from the private key (see `br_rsa_compute_modulus()`,
+ * `br_rsa_compute_pubexp()` and `br_rsa_compute_privexp()`).
+ *
+ * If `dest` is not `NULL`, then the encoded key is written at that
+ * address, and the encoded length (in bytes) is returned. If `dest` is
+ * `NULL`, then nothing is written, but the encoded length is still
+ * computed and returned.
+ *
+ * \param dest the destination buffer (or `NULL`).
+ * \param sk the RSA private key.
+ * \param pk the RSA public key.
+ * \param d the RSA private exponent.
+ * \param dlen the RSA private exponent length (in bytes).
+ * \return the encoded key length (in bytes).
+ */
+size_t br_encode_rsa_pkcs8_der(void *dest, const br_rsa_private_key *sk,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk, const void *d, size_t dlen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encode an EC private key (raw DER format).
+ *
+ * This function encodes the provided key into the "raw" format specified
+ * in RFC 5915 (type `ECPrivateKey`), with DER encoding rules.
+ *
+ * The private key is provided in `sk`, the public key being `pk`. If
+ * `pk` is `NULL`, then the encoded key will not include the public key
+ * in its `publicKey` field (which is nominally optional).
+ *
+ * If `dest` is not `NULL`, then the encoded key is written at that
+ * address, and the encoded length (in bytes) is returned. If `dest` is
+ * `NULL`, then nothing is written, but the encoded length is still
+ * computed and returned.
+ *
+ * If the key cannot be encoded (e.g. because there is no known OBJECT
+ * IDENTIFIER for the used curve), then 0 is returned.
+ *
+ * \param dest the destination buffer (or `NULL`).
+ * \param sk the EC private key.
+ * \param pk the EC public key (or `NULL`).
+ * \return the encoded key length (in bytes), or 0.
+ */
+size_t br_encode_ec_raw_der(void *dest,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, const br_ec_public_key *pk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encode an EC private key (PKCS#8 DER format).
+ *
+ * This function encodes the provided key into the PKCS#8 format
+ * (RFC 5958, type `OneAsymmetricKey`). The curve is identified
+ * by an OID provided as parameters to the `privateKeyAlgorithm`
+ * field. The private key value (contents of the `privateKey` field)
+ * contains the DER encoding of the `ECPrivateKey` type defined in
+ * RFC 5915, without the `parameters` field (since they would be
+ * redundant with the information in `privateKeyAlgorithm`).
+ *
+ * The private key is provided in `sk`, the public key being `pk`. If
+ * `pk` is not `NULL`, then the encoded public key is included in the
+ * `publicKey` field of the private key value (but not in the `publicKey`
+ * field of the PKCS#8 `OneAsymmetricKey` wrapper).
+ *
+ * If `dest` is not `NULL`, then the encoded key is written at that
+ * address, and the encoded length (in bytes) is returned. If `dest` is
+ * `NULL`, then nothing is written, but the encoded length is still
+ * computed and returned.
+ *
+ * If the key cannot be encoded (e.g. because there is no known OBJECT
+ * IDENTIFIER for the used curve), then 0 is returned.
+ *
+ * \param dest the destination buffer (or `NULL`).
+ * \param sk the EC private key.
+ * \param pk the EC public key (or `NULL`).
+ * \return the encoded key length (in bytes), or 0.
+ */
+size_t br_encode_ec_pkcs8_der(void *dest,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, const br_ec_public_key *pk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief PEM banner for RSA private key (raw).
+ */
+#define BR_ENCODE_PEM_RSA_RAW "RSA PRIVATE KEY"
+
+/**
+ * \brief PEM banner for EC private key (raw).
+ */
+#define BR_ENCODE_PEM_EC_RAW "EC PRIVATE KEY"
+
+/**
+ * \brief PEM banner for an RSA or EC private key in PKCS#8 format.
+ */
+#define BR_ENCODE_PEM_PKCS8 "PRIVATE KEY"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/aead/ccm.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/aead/ccm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..68cc913
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/aead/ccm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Implementation Notes
+ * ====================
+ *
+ * The combined CTR + CBC-MAC functions can only handle full blocks,
+ * so some buffering is necessary.
+ *
+ * - 'ptr' contains a value from 0 to 15, which is the number of bytes
+ * accumulated in buf[] that still needs to be processed with the
+ * current CBC-MAC computation.
+ *
+ * - When processing the message itself, CTR encryption/decryption is
+ * also done at the same time. The first 'ptr' bytes of buf[] then
+ * contains the plaintext bytes, while the last '16 - ptr' bytes of
+ * buf[] are the remnants of the stream block, to be used against
+ * the next input bytes, when available. When 'ptr' is 0, the
+ * contents of buf[] are to be ignored.
+ *
+ * - The current counter and running CBC-MAC values are kept in 'ctr'
+ * and 'cbcmac', respectively.
+ */
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_ccm_init(br_ccm_context *ctx, const br_block_ctrcbc_class **bctx)
+{
+ ctx->bctx = bctx;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+int
+br_ccm_reset(br_ccm_context *ctx, const void *nonce, size_t nonce_len,
+ uint64_t aad_len, uint64_t data_len, size_t tag_len)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ unsigned u, q;
+
+ if (nonce_len < 7 || nonce_len > 13) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (tag_len < 4 || tag_len > 16 || (tag_len & 1) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ q = 15 - (unsigned)nonce_len;
+ ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Block B0, to start CBC-MAC.
+ */
+ tmp[0] = (aad_len > 0 ? 0x40 : 0x00)
+ | (((unsigned)tag_len - 2) << 2)
+ | (q - 1);
+ memcpy(tmp + 1, nonce, nonce_len);
+ for (u = 0; u < q; u ++) {
+ tmp[15 - u] = (unsigned char)data_len;
+ data_len >>= 8;
+ }
+ if (data_len != 0) {
+ /*
+ * If the data length was not entirely consumed in the
+ * loop above, then it exceeds the maximum limit of
+ * q bytes (when encoded).
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Start CBC-MAC.
+ */
+ memset(ctx->cbcmac, 0, sizeof ctx->cbcmac);
+ (*ctx->bctx)->mac(ctx->bctx, ctx->cbcmac, tmp, sizeof tmp);
+
+ /*
+ * Assemble AAD length header.
+ */
+ if ((aad_len >> 32) != 0) {
+ ctx->buf[0] = 0xFF;
+ ctx->buf[1] = 0xFF;
+ br_enc64be(ctx->buf + 2, aad_len);
+ ctx->ptr = 10;
+ } else if (aad_len >= 0xFF00) {
+ ctx->buf[0] = 0xFF;
+ ctx->buf[1] = 0xFE;
+ br_enc32be(ctx->buf + 2, (uint32_t)aad_len);
+ ctx->ptr = 6;
+ } else if (aad_len > 0) {
+ br_enc16be(ctx->buf, (unsigned)aad_len);
+ ctx->ptr = 2;
+ } else {
+ ctx->ptr = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Make initial counter value and compute tag mask.
+ */
+ ctx->ctr[0] = q - 1;
+ memcpy(ctx->ctr + 1, nonce, nonce_len);
+ memset(ctx->ctr + 1 + nonce_len, 0, q);
+ memset(ctx->tagmask, 0, sizeof ctx->tagmask);
+ (*ctx->bctx)->ctr(ctx->bctx, ctx->ctr,
+ ctx->tagmask, sizeof ctx->tagmask);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_ccm_aad_inject(br_ccm_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *dbuf;
+ size_t ptr;
+
+ dbuf = data;
+
+ /*
+ * Complete partial block, if needed.
+ */
+ ptr = ctx->ptr;
+ if (ptr != 0) {
+ size_t clen;
+
+ clen = (sizeof ctx->buf) - ptr;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ memcpy(ctx->buf + ptr, dbuf, len);
+ ctx->ptr = ptr + len;
+ return;
+ }
+ memcpy(ctx->buf + ptr, dbuf, clen);
+ dbuf += clen;
+ len -= clen;
+ (*ctx->bctx)->mac(ctx->bctx, ctx->cbcmac,
+ ctx->buf, sizeof ctx->buf);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Process complete blocks.
+ */
+ ptr = len & 15;
+ len -= ptr;
+ (*ctx->bctx)->mac(ctx->bctx, ctx->cbcmac, dbuf, len);
+ dbuf += len;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy last partial block in the context buffer.
+ */
+ memcpy(ctx->buf, dbuf, ptr);
+ ctx->ptr = ptr;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_ccm_flip(br_ccm_context *ctx)
+{
+ size_t ptr;
+
+ /*
+ * Complete AAD partial block with zeros, if necessary.
+ */
+ ptr = ctx->ptr;
+ if (ptr != 0) {
+ memset(ctx->buf + ptr, 0, (sizeof ctx->buf) - ptr);
+ (*ctx->bctx)->mac(ctx->bctx, ctx->cbcmac,
+ ctx->buf, sizeof ctx->buf);
+ ctx->ptr = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Counter was already set by br_ccm_reset().
+ */
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_ccm_run(br_ccm_context *ctx, int encrypt, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *dbuf;
+ size_t ptr;
+
+ dbuf = data;
+
+ /*
+ * Complete a partial block, if any: ctx->buf[] contains
+ * ctx->ptr plaintext bytes (already reported), and the other
+ * bytes are CTR stream output.
+ */
+ ptr = ctx->ptr;
+ if (ptr != 0) {
+ size_t clen;
+ size_t u;
+
+ clen = (sizeof ctx->buf) - ptr;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ clen = len;
+ }
+ if (encrypt) {
+ for (u = 0; u < clen; u ++) {
+ unsigned w, x;
+
+ w = ctx->buf[ptr + u];
+ x = dbuf[u];
+ ctx->buf[ptr + u] = x;
+ dbuf[u] = w ^ x;
+ }
+ } else {
+ for (u = 0; u < clen; u ++) {
+ unsigned w;
+
+ w = ctx->buf[ptr + u] ^ dbuf[u];
+ dbuf[u] = w;
+ ctx->buf[ptr + u] = w;
+ }
+ }
+ dbuf += clen;
+ len -= clen;
+ ptr += clen;
+ if (ptr < sizeof ctx->buf) {
+ ctx->ptr = ptr;
+ return;
+ }
+ (*ctx->bctx)->mac(ctx->bctx,
+ ctx->cbcmac, ctx->buf, sizeof ctx->buf);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Process all complete blocks. Note that the ctrcbc API is for
+ * encrypt-then-MAC (CBC-MAC is computed over the encrypted
+ * blocks) while CCM uses MAC-and-encrypt (CBC-MAC is computed
+ * over the plaintext blocks). Therefore, we need to use the
+ * _decryption_ function for encryption, and the encryption
+ * function for decryption (this works because CTR encryption
+ * and decryption are identical, so the choice really is about
+ * computing the CBC-MAC before or after XORing with the CTR
+ * stream).
+ */
+ ptr = len & 15;
+ len -= ptr;
+ if (encrypt) {
+ (*ctx->bctx)->decrypt(ctx->bctx, ctx->ctr, ctx->cbcmac,
+ dbuf, len);
+ } else {
+ (*ctx->bctx)->encrypt(ctx->bctx, ctx->ctr, ctx->cbcmac,
+ dbuf, len);
+ }
+ dbuf += len;
+
+ /*
+ * If there is some remaining data, then we need to compute an
+ * extra block of CTR stream.
+ */
+ if (ptr != 0) {
+ size_t u;
+
+ memset(ctx->buf, 0, sizeof ctx->buf);
+ (*ctx->bctx)->ctr(ctx->bctx, ctx->ctr,
+ ctx->buf, sizeof ctx->buf);
+ if (encrypt) {
+ for (u = 0; u < ptr; u ++) {
+ unsigned w, x;
+
+ w = ctx->buf[u];
+ x = dbuf[u];
+ ctx->buf[u] = x;
+ dbuf[u] = w ^ x;
+ }
+ } else {
+ for (u = 0; u < ptr; u ++) {
+ unsigned w;
+
+ w = ctx->buf[u] ^ dbuf[u];
+ dbuf[u] = w;
+ ctx->buf[u] = w;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ctx->ptr = ptr;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+size_t
+br_ccm_get_tag(br_ccm_context *ctx, void *tag)
+{
+ size_t ptr;
+ size_t u;
+
+ /*
+ * If there is some buffered data, then we need to pad it with
+ * zeros and finish up CBC-MAC.
+ */
+ ptr = ctx->ptr;
+ if (ptr != 0) {
+ memset(ctx->buf + ptr, 0, (sizeof ctx->buf) - ptr);
+ (*ctx->bctx)->mac(ctx->bctx, ctx->cbcmac,
+ ctx->buf, sizeof ctx->buf);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * XOR the tag mask into the CBC-MAC output.
+ */
+ for (u = 0; u < ctx->tag_len; u ++) {
+ ctx->cbcmac[u] ^= ctx->tagmask[u];
+ }
+ memcpy(tag, ctx->cbcmac, ctx->tag_len);
+ return ctx->tag_len;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+uint32_t
+br_ccm_check_tag(br_ccm_context *ctx, const void *tag)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ size_t u, tag_len;
+ uint32_t z;
+
+ tag_len = br_ccm_get_tag(ctx, tmp);
+ z = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < tag_len; u ++) {
+ z |= tmp[u] ^ ((const unsigned char *)tag)[u];
+ }
+ return EQ0(z);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/aead/eax.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/aead/eax.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bcc704a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/aead/eax.c
@@ -0,0 +1,525 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Implementation Notes
+ * ====================
+ *
+ * The combined CTR + CBC-MAC functions can only handle full blocks,
+ * so some buffering is necessary. Moreover, EAX has a special padding
+ * rule for CBC-MAC, which implies that we cannot compute the MAC over
+ * the last received full block until we know whether we are at the
+ * end of the data or not.
+ *
+ * - 'ptr' contains a value from 1 to 16, which is the number of bytes
+ * accumulated in buf[] that still needs to be processed with the
+ * current OMAC computation. Beware that this can go to 16: a
+ * complete block cannot be processed until it is known whether it
+ * is the last block or not. However, it can never be 0, because
+ * OMAC^t works on an input that is at least one-block long.
+ *
+ * - When processing the message itself, CTR encryption/decryption is
+ * also done at the same time. The first 'ptr' bytes of buf[] then
+ * contains the encrypted bytes, while the last '16 - ptr' bytes of
+ * buf[] are the remnants of the stream block, to be used against
+ * the next input bytes, when available.
+ *
+ * - The current counter and running CBC-MAC values are kept in 'ctr'
+ * and 'cbcmac', respectively.
+ *
+ * - The derived keys for padding are kept in L2 and L4 (double and
+ * quadruple of Enc_K(0^n), in GF(2^128), respectively).
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Start an OMAC computation; the first block is the big-endian
+ * representation of the provided value ('val' must fit on one byte).
+ * We make it a delayed block because it may also be the last one,
+ */
+static void
+omac_start(br_eax_context *ctx, unsigned val)
+{
+ memset(ctx->cbcmac, 0, sizeof ctx->cbcmac);
+ memset(ctx->buf, 0, sizeof ctx->buf);
+ ctx->buf[15] = val;
+ ctx->ptr = 16;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Double a value in finite field GF(2^128), defined with modulus
+ * X^128+X^7+X^2+X+1.
+ */
+static void
+double_gf128(unsigned char *dst, const unsigned char *src)
+{
+ unsigned cc;
+ int i;
+
+ cc = 0x87 & -((unsigned)src[0] >> 7);
+ for (i = 15; i >= 0; i --) {
+ unsigned z;
+
+ z = (src[i] << 1) ^ cc;
+ cc = z >> 8;
+ dst[i] = (unsigned char)z;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Apply padding to the last block, currently in ctx->buf (with
+ * ctx->ptr bytes), and finalize OMAC computation.
+ */
+static void
+do_pad(br_eax_context *ctx)
+{
+ unsigned char *pad;
+ size_t ptr, u;
+
+ ptr = ctx->ptr;
+ if (ptr == 16) {
+ pad = ctx->L2;
+ } else {
+ ctx->buf[ptr ++] = 0x80;
+ memset(ctx->buf + ptr, 0x00, 16 - ptr);
+ pad = ctx->L4;
+ }
+ for (u = 0; u < sizeof ctx->buf; u ++) {
+ ctx->buf[u] ^= pad[u];
+ }
+ (*ctx->bctx)->mac(ctx->bctx, ctx->cbcmac, ctx->buf, sizeof ctx->buf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Apply CBC-MAC on the provided data, with buffering management.
+ *
+ * Upon entry, two situations are acceptable:
+ *
+ * ctx->ptr == 0: there is no data to process in ctx->buf
+ * ctx->ptr == 16: there is a full block of unprocessed data in ctx->buf
+ *
+ * Upon exit, ctx->ptr may be zero only if it was already zero on entry,
+ * and len == 0. In all other situations, ctx->ptr will be non-zero on
+ * exit (and may have value 16).
+ */
+static void
+do_cbcmac_chunk(br_eax_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t ptr;
+
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ ptr = len & (size_t)15;
+ if (ptr == 0) {
+ len -= 16;
+ ptr = 16;
+ } else {
+ len -= ptr;
+ }
+ if (ctx->ptr == 16) {
+ (*ctx->bctx)->mac(ctx->bctx, ctx->cbcmac,
+ ctx->buf, sizeof ctx->buf);
+ }
+ (*ctx->bctx)->mac(ctx->bctx, ctx->cbcmac, data, len);
+ memcpy(ctx->buf, (const unsigned char *)data + len, ptr);
+ ctx->ptr = ptr;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+void
+br_eax_init(br_eax_context *ctx, const br_block_ctrcbc_class **bctx)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[16], iv[16];
+
+ ctx->vtable = &br_eax_vtable;
+ ctx->bctx = bctx;
+
+ /*
+ * Encrypt a whole-zero block to compute L2 and L4.
+ */
+ memset(tmp, 0, sizeof tmp);
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);
+ (*bctx)->ctr(bctx, iv, tmp, sizeof tmp);
+ double_gf128(ctx->L2, tmp);
+ double_gf128(ctx->L4, ctx->L2);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+void
+br_eax_capture(const br_eax_context *ctx, br_eax_state *st)
+{
+ /*
+ * We capture the three OMAC* states _after_ processing the
+ * initial block (assuming that nonce, message and AAD are
+ * all non-empty).
+ */
+ int i;
+
+ memset(st->st, 0, sizeof st->st);
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i ++) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+
+ memset(tmp, 0, sizeof tmp);
+ tmp[15] = (unsigned char)i;
+ (*ctx->bctx)->mac(ctx->bctx, st->st[i], tmp, sizeof tmp);
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+void
+br_eax_reset(br_eax_context *ctx, const void *nonce, size_t len)
+{
+ /*
+ * Process nonce with OMAC^0.
+ */
+ omac_start(ctx, 0);
+ do_cbcmac_chunk(ctx, nonce, len);
+ do_pad(ctx);
+ memcpy(ctx->nonce, ctx->cbcmac, sizeof ctx->cbcmac);
+
+ /*
+ * Start OMAC^1 for the AAD ("header" in the EAX specification).
+ */
+ omac_start(ctx, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * We use ctx->head[0] as temporary flag to mark that we are
+ * using a "normal" reset().
+ */
+ ctx->head[0] = 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+void
+br_eax_reset_pre_aad(br_eax_context *ctx, const br_eax_state *st,
+ const void *nonce, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len == 0) {
+ omac_start(ctx, 0);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(ctx->cbcmac, st->st[0], sizeof ctx->cbcmac);
+ ctx->ptr = 0;
+ do_cbcmac_chunk(ctx, nonce, len);
+ }
+ do_pad(ctx);
+ memcpy(ctx->nonce, ctx->cbcmac, sizeof ctx->cbcmac);
+
+ memcpy(ctx->cbcmac, st->st[1], sizeof ctx->cbcmac);
+ ctx->ptr = 0;
+
+ memcpy(ctx->ctr, st->st[2], sizeof ctx->ctr);
+
+ /*
+ * We use ctx->head[0] as a flag to indicate that we use a
+ * a recorded state, with ctx->ctr containing the preprocessed
+ * first block for OMAC^2.
+ */
+ ctx->head[0] = 1;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+void
+br_eax_reset_post_aad(br_eax_context *ctx, const br_eax_state *st,
+ const void *nonce, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len == 0) {
+ omac_start(ctx, 0);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(ctx->cbcmac, st->st[0], sizeof ctx->cbcmac);
+ ctx->ptr = 0;
+ do_cbcmac_chunk(ctx, nonce, len);
+ }
+ do_pad(ctx);
+ memcpy(ctx->nonce, ctx->cbcmac, sizeof ctx->cbcmac);
+ memcpy(ctx->ctr, ctx->nonce, sizeof ctx->nonce);
+
+ memcpy(ctx->head, st->st[1], sizeof ctx->head);
+
+ memcpy(ctx->cbcmac, st->st[2], sizeof ctx->cbcmac);
+ ctx->ptr = 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+void
+br_eax_aad_inject(br_eax_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t ptr;
+
+ ptr = ctx->ptr;
+
+ /*
+ * If there is a partial block, first complete it.
+ */
+ if (ptr < 16) {
+ size_t clen;
+
+ clen = 16 - ptr;
+ if (len <= clen) {
+ memcpy(ctx->buf + ptr, data, len);
+ ctx->ptr = ptr + len;
+ return;
+ }
+ memcpy(ctx->buf + ptr, data, clen);
+ data = (const unsigned char *)data + clen;
+ len -= clen;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We now have a full block in buf[], and this is not the last
+ * block.
+ */
+ do_cbcmac_chunk(ctx, data, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+void
+br_eax_flip(br_eax_context *ctx)
+{
+ int from_capture;
+
+ /*
+ * ctx->head[0] may be non-zero if the context was reset with
+ * a pre-AAD captured state. In that case, ctx->ctr[] contains
+ * the state for OMAC^2 _after_ processing the first block.
+ */
+ from_capture = ctx->head[0];
+
+ /*
+ * Complete the OMAC computation on the AAD.
+ */
+ do_pad(ctx);
+ memcpy(ctx->head, ctx->cbcmac, sizeof ctx->cbcmac);
+
+ /*
+ * Start OMAC^2 for the encrypted data.
+ * If the context was initialized from a captured state, then
+ * the OMAC^2 value is in the ctr[] array.
+ */
+ if (from_capture) {
+ memcpy(ctx->cbcmac, ctx->ctr, sizeof ctx->cbcmac);
+ ctx->ptr = 0;
+ } else {
+ omac_start(ctx, 2);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Initial counter value for CTR is the processed nonce.
+ */
+ memcpy(ctx->ctr, ctx->nonce, sizeof ctx->nonce);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+void
+br_eax_run(br_eax_context *ctx, int encrypt, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *dbuf;
+ size_t ptr;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that there is actual data to process.
+ */
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ dbuf = data;
+ ptr = ctx->ptr;
+
+ /*
+ * We may have ptr == 0 here if we initialized from a captured
+ * state. In that case, there is no partially consumed block
+ * or unprocessed data.
+ */
+ if (ptr != 0 && ptr != 16) {
+ /*
+ * We have a partially consumed block.
+ */
+ size_t u, clen;
+
+ clen = 16 - ptr;
+ if (len <= clen) {
+ clen = len;
+ }
+ if (encrypt) {
+ for (u = 0; u < clen; u ++) {
+ ctx->buf[ptr + u] ^= dbuf[u];
+ }
+ memcpy(dbuf, ctx->buf + ptr, clen);
+ } else {
+ for (u = 0; u < clen; u ++) {
+ unsigned dx, sx;
+
+ sx = ctx->buf[ptr + u];
+ dx = dbuf[u];
+ ctx->buf[ptr + u] = dx;
+ dbuf[u] = sx ^ dx;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (len <= clen) {
+ ctx->ptr = ptr + clen;
+ return;
+ }
+ dbuf += clen;
+ len -= clen;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We now have a complete encrypted block in buf[] that must still
+ * be processed with OMAC, and this is not the final buf.
+ * Exception: when ptr == 0, no block has been produced yet.
+ */
+ if (ptr != 0) {
+ (*ctx->bctx)->mac(ctx->bctx, ctx->cbcmac,
+ ctx->buf, sizeof ctx->buf);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Do CTR encryption or decryption and CBC-MAC for all full blocks
+ * except the last.
+ */
+ ptr = len & (size_t)15;
+ if (ptr == 0) {
+ len -= 16;
+ ptr = 16;
+ } else {
+ len -= ptr;
+ }
+ if (encrypt) {
+ (*ctx->bctx)->encrypt(ctx->bctx, ctx->ctr, ctx->cbcmac,
+ dbuf, len);
+ } else {
+ (*ctx->bctx)->decrypt(ctx->bctx, ctx->ctr, ctx->cbcmac,
+ dbuf, len);
+ }
+ dbuf += len;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute next block of CTR stream, and use it to finish
+ * encrypting or decrypting the data.
+ */
+ memset(ctx->buf, 0, sizeof ctx->buf);
+ (*ctx->bctx)->ctr(ctx->bctx, ctx->ctr, ctx->buf, sizeof ctx->buf);
+ if (encrypt) {
+ size_t u;
+
+ for (u = 0; u < ptr; u ++) {
+ ctx->buf[u] ^= dbuf[u];
+ }
+ memcpy(dbuf, ctx->buf, ptr);
+ } else {
+ size_t u;
+
+ for (u = 0; u < ptr; u ++) {
+ unsigned dx, sx;
+
+ sx = ctx->buf[u];
+ dx = dbuf[u];
+ ctx->buf[u] = dx;
+ dbuf[u] = sx ^ dx;
+ }
+ }
+ ctx->ptr = ptr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Complete tag computation. The final tag is written in ctx->cbcmac.
+ */
+static void
+do_final(br_eax_context *ctx)
+{
+ size_t u;
+
+ do_pad(ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * Authentication tag is the XOR of the three OMAC outputs for
+ * the nonce, AAD and encrypted data.
+ */
+ for (u = 0; u < 16; u ++) {
+ ctx->cbcmac[u] ^= ctx->nonce[u] ^ ctx->head[u];
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+void
+br_eax_get_tag(br_eax_context *ctx, void *tag)
+{
+ do_final(ctx);
+ memcpy(tag, ctx->cbcmac, sizeof ctx->cbcmac);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+void
+br_eax_get_tag_trunc(br_eax_context *ctx, void *tag, size_t len)
+{
+ do_final(ctx);
+ memcpy(tag, ctx->cbcmac, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+uint32_t
+br_eax_check_tag_trunc(br_eax_context *ctx, const void *tag, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ size_t u;
+ int x;
+
+ br_eax_get_tag(ctx, tmp);
+ x = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ x |= tmp[u] ^ ((const unsigned char *)tag)[u];
+ }
+ return EQ0(x);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+uint32_t
+br_eax_check_tag(br_eax_context *ctx, const void *tag)
+{
+ return br_eax_check_tag_trunc(ctx, tag, 16);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+const br_aead_class br_eax_vtable = {
+ 16,
+ (void (*)(const br_aead_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_eax_reset,
+ (void (*)(const br_aead_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_eax_aad_inject,
+ (void (*)(const br_aead_class **))
+ &br_eax_flip,
+ (void (*)(const br_aead_class **, int, void *, size_t))
+ &br_eax_run,
+ (void (*)(const br_aead_class **, void *))
+ &br_eax_get_tag,
+ (uint32_t (*)(const br_aead_class **, const void *))
+ &br_eax_check_tag,
+ (void (*)(const br_aead_class **, void *, size_t))
+ &br_eax_get_tag_trunc,
+ (uint32_t (*)(const br_aead_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_eax_check_tag_trunc
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/aead/gcm.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/aead/gcm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ede5f08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/aead/gcm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Implementation Notes
+ * ====================
+ *
+ * Since CTR and GHASH implementations can handle only full blocks, a
+ * 16-byte buffer (buf[]) is maintained in the context:
+ *
+ * - When processing AAD, buf[] contains the 0-15 unprocessed bytes.
+ *
+ * - When doing CTR encryption / decryption, buf[] contains the AES output
+ * for the last partial block, to be used with the next few bytes of
+ * data, as well as the already encrypted bytes. For instance, if the
+ * processed data length so far is 21 bytes, then buf[0..4] contains
+ * the five last encrypted bytes, and buf[5..15] contains the next 11
+ * AES output bytes to be XORed with the next 11 bytes of input.
+ *
+ * The recorded AES output bytes are used to complete the block when
+ * the corresponding bytes are obtained. Note that buf[] always
+ * contains the _encrypted_ bytes, whether we apply encryption or
+ * decryption: these bytes are used as input to GHASH when the block
+ * is complete.
+ *
+ * In both cases, the low bits of the data length counters (count_aad,
+ * count_ctr) are used to work out the current situation.
+ */
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+void
+br_gcm_init(br_gcm_context *ctx, const br_block_ctr_class **bctx, br_ghash gh)
+{
+ unsigned char iv[12];
+
+ ctx->vtable = &br_gcm_vtable;
+ ctx->bctx = bctx;
+ ctx->gh = gh;
+
+ /*
+ * The GHASH key h[] is the raw encryption of the all-zero
+ * block. Since we only have a CTR implementation, we use it
+ * with an all-zero IV and a zero counter, to CTR-encrypt an
+ * all-zero block.
+ */
+ memset(ctx->h, 0, sizeof ctx->h);
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);
+ (*bctx)->run(bctx, iv, 0, ctx->h, sizeof ctx->h);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+void
+br_gcm_reset(br_gcm_context *ctx, const void *iv, size_t len)
+{
+ /*
+ * If the provided nonce is 12 bytes, then this is the initial
+ * IV for CTR mode; it will be used with a counter that starts
+ * at 2 (value 1 is for encrypting the GHASH output into the tag).
+ *
+ * If the provided nonce has any other length, then it is hashed
+ * (with GHASH) into a 16-byte value that will be the IV for CTR
+ * (both 12-byte IV and 32-bit counter).
+ */
+ if (len == 12) {
+ memcpy(ctx->j0_1, iv, 12);
+ ctx->j0_2 = 1;
+ } else {
+ unsigned char ty[16], tmp[16];
+
+ memset(ty, 0, sizeof ty);
+ ctx->gh(ty, ctx->h, iv, len);
+ memset(tmp, 0, 8);
+ br_enc64be(tmp + 8, (uint64_t)len << 3);
+ ctx->gh(ty, ctx->h, tmp, 16);
+ memcpy(ctx->j0_1, ty, 12);
+ ctx->j0_2 = br_dec32be(ty + 12);
+ }
+ ctx->jc = ctx->j0_2 + 1;
+ memset(ctx->y, 0, sizeof ctx->y);
+ ctx->count_aad = 0;
+ ctx->count_ctr = 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+void
+br_gcm_aad_inject(br_gcm_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t ptr, dlen;
+
+ ptr = (size_t)ctx->count_aad & (size_t)15;
+ if (ptr != 0) {
+ /*
+ * If there is a partial block, then we first try to
+ * complete it.
+ */
+ size_t clen;
+
+ clen = 16 - ptr;
+ if (len < clen) {
+ memcpy(ctx->buf + ptr, data, len);
+ ctx->count_aad += (uint64_t)len;
+ return;
+ }
+ memcpy(ctx->buf + ptr, data, clen);
+ ctx->gh(ctx->y, ctx->h, ctx->buf, 16);
+ data = (const unsigned char *)data + clen;
+ len -= clen;
+ ctx->count_aad += (uint64_t)clen;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now AAD is aligned on a 16-byte block (with regards to GHASH).
+ * We process all complete blocks, and save the last partial
+ * block.
+ */
+ dlen = len & ~(size_t)15;
+ ctx->gh(ctx->y, ctx->h, data, dlen);
+ memcpy(ctx->buf, (const unsigned char *)data + dlen, len - dlen);
+ ctx->count_aad += (uint64_t)len;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+void
+br_gcm_flip(br_gcm_context *ctx)
+{
+ /*
+ * We complete the GHASH computation if there is a partial block.
+ * The GHASH implementation automatically applies padding with
+ * zeros.
+ */
+ size_t ptr;
+
+ ptr = (size_t)ctx->count_aad & (size_t)15;
+ if (ptr != 0) {
+ ctx->gh(ctx->y, ctx->h, ctx->buf, ptr);
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+void
+br_gcm_run(br_gcm_context *ctx, int encrypt, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t ptr, dlen;
+
+ buf = data;
+ ptr = (size_t)ctx->count_ctr & (size_t)15;
+ if (ptr != 0) {
+ /*
+ * If we have a partial block, then we try to complete it.
+ */
+ size_t u, clen;
+
+ clen = 16 - ptr;
+ if (len < clen) {
+ clen = len;
+ }
+ for (u = 0; u < clen; u ++) {
+ unsigned x, y;
+
+ x = buf[u];
+ y = x ^ ctx->buf[ptr + u];
+ ctx->buf[ptr + u] = encrypt ? y : x;
+ buf[u] = y;
+ }
+ ctx->count_ctr += (uint64_t)clen;
+ buf += clen;
+ len -= clen;
+ if (ptr + clen < 16) {
+ return;
+ }
+ ctx->gh(ctx->y, ctx->h, ctx->buf, 16);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Process full blocks.
+ */
+ dlen = len & ~(size_t)15;
+ if (!encrypt) {
+ ctx->gh(ctx->y, ctx->h, buf, dlen);
+ }
+ ctx->jc = (*ctx->bctx)->run(ctx->bctx, ctx->j0_1, ctx->jc, buf, dlen);
+ if (encrypt) {
+ ctx->gh(ctx->y, ctx->h, buf, dlen);
+ }
+ buf += dlen;
+ len -= dlen;
+ ctx->count_ctr += (uint64_t)dlen;
+
+ if (len > 0) {
+ /*
+ * There is a partial block.
+ */
+ size_t u;
+
+ memset(ctx->buf, 0, sizeof ctx->buf);
+ ctx->jc = (*ctx->bctx)->run(ctx->bctx, ctx->j0_1,
+ ctx->jc, ctx->buf, 16);
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ unsigned x, y;
+
+ x = buf[u];
+ y = x ^ ctx->buf[u];
+ ctx->buf[u] = encrypt ? y : x;
+ buf[u] = y;
+ }
+ ctx->count_ctr += (uint64_t)len;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+void
+br_gcm_get_tag(br_gcm_context *ctx, void *tag)
+{
+ size_t ptr;
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+
+ ptr = (size_t)ctx->count_ctr & (size_t)15;
+ if (ptr > 0) {
+ /*
+ * There is a partial block: encrypted/decrypted data has
+ * been produced, but the encrypted bytes must still be
+ * processed by GHASH.
+ */
+ ctx->gh(ctx->y, ctx->h, ctx->buf, ptr);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Final block for GHASH: the AAD and plaintext lengths (in bits).
+ */
+ br_enc64be(tmp, ctx->count_aad << 3);
+ br_enc64be(tmp + 8, ctx->count_ctr << 3);
+ ctx->gh(ctx->y, ctx->h, tmp, 16);
+
+ /*
+ * Tag is the GHASH output XORed with the encryption of the
+ * nonce with the initial counter value.
+ */
+ memcpy(tag, ctx->y, 16);
+ (*ctx->bctx)->run(ctx->bctx, ctx->j0_1, ctx->j0_2, tag, 16);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+void
+br_gcm_get_tag_trunc(br_gcm_context *ctx, void *tag, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+
+ br_gcm_get_tag(ctx, tmp);
+ memcpy(tag, tmp, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+uint32_t
+br_gcm_check_tag_trunc(br_gcm_context *ctx, const void *tag, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ size_t u;
+ int x;
+
+ br_gcm_get_tag(ctx, tmp);
+ x = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ x |= tmp[u] ^ ((const unsigned char *)tag)[u];
+ }
+ return EQ0(x);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+uint32_t
+br_gcm_check_tag(br_gcm_context *ctx, const void *tag)
+{
+ return br_gcm_check_tag_trunc(ctx, tag, 16);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_aead.h */
+const br_aead_class br_gcm_vtable = {
+ 16,
+ (void (*)(const br_aead_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_gcm_reset,
+ (void (*)(const br_aead_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_gcm_aad_inject,
+ (void (*)(const br_aead_class **))
+ &br_gcm_flip,
+ (void (*)(const br_aead_class **, int, void *, size_t))
+ &br_gcm_run,
+ (void (*)(const br_aead_class **, void *))
+ &br_gcm_get_tag,
+ (uint32_t (*)(const br_aead_class **, const void *))
+ &br_gcm_check_tag,
+ (void (*)(const br_aead_class **, void *, size_t))
+ &br_gcm_get_tag_trunc,
+ (uint32_t (*)(const br_aead_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_gcm_check_tag_trunc
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/ccopy.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/ccopy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2beace7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/ccopy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_ccopy(uint32_t ctl, void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *d;
+ const unsigned char *s;
+
+ d = dst;
+ s = src;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ uint32_t x, y;
+
+ x = *s ++;
+ y = *d;
+ *d = MUX(ctl, x, y);
+ d ++;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec16be.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec16be.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f3f7f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec16be.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_range_dec16be(uint16_t *v, size_t num, const void *src)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = src;
+ while (num -- > 0) {
+ *v ++ = br_dec16be(buf);
+ buf += 2;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec16le.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec16le.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..84d8536
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec16le.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_range_dec16le(uint16_t *v, size_t num, const void *src)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = src;
+ while (num -- > 0) {
+ *v ++ = br_dec16le(buf);
+ buf += 2;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec32be.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec32be.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a8fc59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec32be.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_range_dec32be(uint32_t *v, size_t num, const void *src)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = src;
+ while (num -- > 0) {
+ *v ++ = br_dec32be(buf);
+ buf += 4;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec32le.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec32le.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ed36e71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec32le.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_range_dec32le(uint32_t *v, size_t num, const void *src)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = src;
+ while (num -- > 0) {
+ *v ++ = br_dec32le(buf);
+ buf += 4;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec64be.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec64be.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c40a76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec64be.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_range_dec64be(uint64_t *v, size_t num, const void *src)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = src;
+ while (num -- > 0) {
+ *v ++ = br_dec64be(buf);
+ buf += 8;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec64le.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec64le.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cbd02c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/dec64le.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_range_dec64le(uint64_t *v, size_t num, const void *src)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = src;
+ while (num -- > 0) {
+ *v ++ = br_dec64le(buf);
+ buf += 8;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc16be.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc16be.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e06652
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc16be.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_range_enc16be(void *dst, const uint16_t *v, size_t num)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = dst;
+ while (num -- > 0) {
+ br_enc16be(buf, *v ++);
+ buf += 2;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc16le.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc16le.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e5049a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc16le.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_range_enc16le(void *dst, const uint16_t *v, size_t num)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = dst;
+ while (num -- > 0) {
+ br_enc16le(buf, *v ++);
+ buf += 2;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc32be.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc32be.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97298b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc32be.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_range_enc32be(void *dst, const uint32_t *v, size_t num)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = dst;
+ while (num -- > 0) {
+ br_enc32be(buf, *v ++);
+ buf += 4;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc32le.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc32le.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e9c856
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc32le.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_range_enc32le(void *dst, const uint32_t *v, size_t num)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = dst;
+ while (num -- > 0) {
+ br_enc32le(buf, *v ++);
+ buf += 4;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc64be.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc64be.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d548944
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc64be.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_range_enc64be(void *dst, const uint64_t *v, size_t num)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = dst;
+ while (num -- > 0) {
+ br_enc64be(buf, *v ++);
+ buf += 8;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc64le.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc64le.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f1d68e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/enc64le.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_range_enc64le(void *dst, const uint64_t *v, size_t num)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = dst;
+ while (num -- > 0) {
+ br_enc64le(buf, *v ++);
+ buf += 8;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/pemdec.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/pemdec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e54e6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/pemdec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,526 @@
+/* Automatically generated code; do not modify directly. */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+typedef struct {
+ uint32_t *dp;
+ uint32_t *rp;
+ const unsigned char *ip;
+} t0_context;
+
+static uint32_t
+t0_parse7E_unsigned(const unsigned char **p)
+{
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ x = 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ unsigned y;
+
+ y = *(*p) ++;
+ x = (x << 7) | (uint32_t)(y & 0x7F);
+ if (y < 0x80) {
+ return x;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int32_t
+t0_parse7E_signed(const unsigned char **p)
+{
+ int neg;
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ neg = ((**p) >> 6) & 1;
+ x = (uint32_t)-neg;
+ for (;;) {
+ unsigned y;
+
+ y = *(*p) ++;
+ x = (x << 7) | (uint32_t)(y & 0x7F);
+ if (y < 0x80) {
+ if (neg) {
+ return -(int32_t)~x - 1;
+ } else {
+ return (int32_t)x;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#define T0_VBYTE(x, n) (unsigned char)((((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)) & 0x7F) | 0x80)
+#define T0_FBYTE(x, n) (unsigned char)(((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)) & 0x7F)
+#define T0_SBYTE(x) (unsigned char)((((uint32_t)(x) >> 28) + 0xF8) ^ 0xF8)
+#define T0_INT1(x) T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT2(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT3(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT4(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 21), T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT5(x) T0_SBYTE(x), T0_VBYTE(x, 21), T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+
+/* static const unsigned char t0_datablock[]; */
+
+
+void br_pem_decoder_init_main(void *t0ctx);
+
+void br_pem_decoder_run(void *t0ctx);
+
+
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define CTX ((br_pem_decoder_context *)(void *)((unsigned char *)t0ctx - offsetof(br_pem_decoder_context, cpu)))
+
+/* see bearssl_pem.h */
+void
+br_pem_decoder_init(br_pem_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof *ctx);
+ ctx->cpu.dp = &ctx->dp_stack[0];
+ ctx->cpu.rp = &ctx->rp_stack[0];
+ br_pem_decoder_init_main(&ctx->cpu);
+ br_pem_decoder_run(&ctx->cpu);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_pem.h */
+size_t
+br_pem_decoder_push(br_pem_decoder_context *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ if (ctx->event) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->hbuf = data;
+ ctx->hlen = len;
+ br_pem_decoder_run(&ctx->cpu);
+ return len - ctx->hlen;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_pem.h */
+int
+br_pem_decoder_event(br_pem_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+ int event;
+
+ event = ctx->event;
+ ctx->event = 0;
+ return event;
+}
+
+
+
+static const unsigned char t0_datablock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x2D, 0x2D, 0x2D, 0x2D, 0x2D, 0x42, 0x45, 0x47, 0x49, 0x4E, 0x20,
+ 0x00, 0x2D, 0x2D, 0x2D, 0x2D, 0x45, 0x4E, 0x44, 0x20, 0x00
+};
+
+static const unsigned char t0_codeblock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x13, 0x13, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_pem_decoder_context, event)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_pem_decoder_context, name)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x05,
+ 0x14, 0x2C, 0x14, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x03, 0x13, 0x04, 0x76, 0x01,
+ 0x2D, 0x0C, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x03, 0x2D, 0x00, 0x01, 0x0D, 0x27,
+ 0x05, 0x04, 0x01, 0x03, 0x2D, 0x00, 0x15, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x02, 0x2D, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x03, 0x00, 0x25, 0x01, 0x00, 0x18, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x03,
+ 0x13, 0x04, 0x3C, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x18, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x13, 0x13, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x05, 0x06, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x03, 0x2D, 0x04, 0x03, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x23, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x23, 0x01, 0x01, 0x18, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x09, 0x13, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x23, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14, 0x01, 0x02, 0x18, 0x0D, 0x06,
+ 0x06, 0x13, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x04, 0x08, 0x13, 0x01, 0x03, 0x2D, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x13, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04, 0xFF, 0x33, 0x01, 0x2C,
+ 0x14, 0x01, 0x2D, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x04, 0x13, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x14, 0x31,
+ 0x06, 0x02, 0x13, 0x29, 0x14, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x04, 0x13, 0x01,
+ 0x02, 0x00, 0x16, 0x14, 0x1D, 0x06, 0x05, 0x13, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00,
+ 0x03, 0x00, 0x29, 0x14, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x04, 0x13, 0x01, 0x03,
+ 0x00, 0x16, 0x14, 0x1D, 0x06, 0x05, 0x13, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x02,
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x06, 0x0A, 0x07, 0x03, 0x00, 0x29, 0x14, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x0D,
+ 0x06, 0x04, 0x13, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x14, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x2E,
+ 0x13, 0x29, 0x14, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x04, 0x13, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00,
+ 0x2F, 0x05, 0x04, 0x13, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x0C, 0x06, 0x03,
+ 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x01, 0x03,
+ 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x04, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x16, 0x14,
+ 0x1D, 0x06, 0x05, 0x13, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x06,
+ 0x0A, 0x07, 0x03, 0x00, 0x29, 0x14, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x04, 0x13,
+ 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x14, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x20, 0x13, 0x2F, 0x05,
+ 0x03, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x03, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x01,
+ 0x03, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02,
+ 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x16, 0x14, 0x1D, 0x06, 0x05, 0x13, 0x2E,
+ 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x06, 0x0A, 0x07, 0x03, 0x00, 0x02,
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x10, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x02,
+ 0x00, 0x1C, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x28, 0x01, 0x01, 0x2D, 0x24, 0x06,
+ 0x02, 0x04, 0x7B, 0x04, 0x75, 0x00, 0x14, 0x12, 0x2A, 0x14, 0x05, 0x04,
+ 0x20, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x2C, 0x2A, 0x14, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x05,
+ 0x13, 0x20, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x05, 0x05, 0x13, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x1E, 0x04, 0x5E, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x27, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x22, 0x01,
+ 0x80, 0x7F, 0x2B, 0x14, 0x06, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00, 0x13, 0x04, 0x6E, 0x00,
+ 0x2C, 0x14, 0x31, 0x05, 0x01, 0x00, 0x13, 0x04, 0x77, 0x00, 0x14, 0x14,
+ 0x01, 0x80, 0x61, 0x0E, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x80, 0x7A, 0x0B, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03,
+ 0x01, 0x20, 0x08, 0x00, 0x01, 0x14, 0x03, 0x00, 0x1B, 0x18, 0x05, 0x05,
+ 0x20, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2C, 0x14, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x06,
+ 0x20, 0x02, 0x00, 0x1B, 0x08, 0x00, 0x14, 0x01, 0x0D, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x03,
+ 0x13, 0x04, 0x03, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x1A, 0x1E, 0x1B, 0x1F, 0x1B, 0x04, 0x59,
+ 0x00, 0x19, 0x14, 0x1D, 0x05, 0x01, 0x00, 0x13, 0x11, 0x04, 0x76, 0x00,
+ 0x21, 0x1A, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2C, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x0C, 0x06, 0x02, 0x04,
+ 0x78, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x03, 0x00, 0x2C, 0x14, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x0C,
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x31, 0x05, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04, 0x70, 0x13,
+ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14, 0x06, 0x14, 0x1F, 0x14, 0x22, 0x07, 0x17,
+ 0x01, 0x2D, 0x0C, 0x06, 0x08, 0x22, 0x07, 0x1E, 0x01, 0x00, 0x1B, 0x1A,
+ 0x00, 0x04, 0x69, 0x22, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x0C, 0x1B,
+ 0x01, 0x20, 0x0B, 0x10, 0x00
+};
+
+static const uint16_t t0_caddr[] = {
+ 0,
+ 5,
+ 10,
+ 15,
+ 19,
+ 24,
+ 29,
+ 67,
+ 149,
+ 384,
+ 396,
+ 431,
+ 450,
+ 460,
+ 479,
+ 523,
+ 534,
+ 539,
+ 549,
+ 574,
+ 601
+};
+
+#define T0_INTERPRETED 29
+
+#define T0_ENTER(ip, rp, slot) do { \
+ const unsigned char *t0_newip; \
+ uint32_t t0_lnum; \
+ t0_newip = &t0_codeblock[t0_caddr[(slot) - T0_INTERPRETED]]; \
+ t0_lnum = t0_parse7E_unsigned(&t0_newip); \
+ (rp) += t0_lnum; \
+ *((rp) ++) = (uint32_t)((ip) - &t0_codeblock[0]) + (t0_lnum << 16); \
+ (ip) = t0_newip; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define T0_DEFENTRY(name, slot) \
+void \
+name(void *ctx) \
+{ \
+ t0_context *t0ctx = ctx; \
+ t0ctx->ip = &t0_codeblock[0]; \
+ T0_ENTER(t0ctx->ip, t0ctx->rp, slot); \
+}
+
+T0_DEFENTRY(br_pem_decoder_init_main, 38)
+
+#define T0_NEXT(t0ipp) (*(*(t0ipp)) ++)
+
+void
+br_pem_decoder_run(void *t0ctx)
+{
+ uint32_t *dp, *rp;
+ const unsigned char *ip;
+
+#define T0_LOCAL(x) (*(rp - 2 - (x)))
+#define T0_POP() (*-- dp)
+#define T0_POPi() (*(int32_t *)(-- dp))
+#define T0_PEEK(x) (*(dp - 1 - (x)))
+#define T0_PEEKi(x) (*(int32_t *)(dp - 1 - (x)))
+#define T0_PUSH(v) do { *dp = (v); dp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_PUSHi(v) do { *(int32_t *)dp = (v); dp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_RPOP() (*-- rp)
+#define T0_RPOPi() (*(int32_t *)(-- rp))
+#define T0_RPUSH(v) do { *rp = (v); rp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_RPUSHi(v) do { *(int32_t *)rp = (v); rp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_ROLL(x) do { \
+ size_t t0len = (size_t)(x); \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 1 - t0len); \
+ memmove(dp - t0len - 1, dp - t0len, t0len * sizeof *dp); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_SWAP() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_ROT() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 3); \
+ *(dp - 3) = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_NROT() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 3); \
+ *(dp - 3) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_PICK(x) do { \
+ uint32_t t0depth = (x); \
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(t0depth)); \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_CO() do { \
+ goto t0_exit; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_RET() goto t0_next
+
+ dp = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->dp;
+ rp = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->rp;
+ ip = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->ip;
+ goto t0_next;
+ for (;;) {
+ uint32_t t0x;
+
+ t0_next:
+ t0x = T0_NEXT(&ip);
+ if (t0x < T0_INTERPRETED) {
+ switch (t0x) {
+ int32_t t0off;
+
+ case 0: /* ret */
+ t0x = T0_RPOP();
+ rp -= (t0x >> 16);
+ t0x &= 0xFFFF;
+ if (t0x == 0) {
+ ip = NULL;
+ goto t0_exit;
+ }
+ ip = &t0_codeblock[t0x];
+ break;
+ case 1: /* literal constant */
+ T0_PUSHi(t0_parse7E_signed(&ip));
+ break;
+ case 2: /* read local */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_LOCAL(t0_parse7E_unsigned(&ip)));
+ break;
+ case 3: /* write local */
+ T0_LOCAL(t0_parse7E_unsigned(&ip)) = T0_POP();
+ break;
+ case 4: /* jump */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ ip += t0off;
+ break;
+ case 5: /* jump if */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ if (T0_POP()) {
+ ip += t0off;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 6: /* jump if not */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ if (!T0_POP()) {
+ ip += t0off;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 7: {
+ /* + */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a + b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 8: {
+ /* - */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a - b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 9: {
+ /* < */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a < b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 10: {
+ /* << */
+
+ int c = (int)T0_POPi();
+ uint32_t x = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(x << c);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 11: {
+ /* <= */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a <= b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 12: {
+ /* <> */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a != b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 13: {
+ /* = */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a == b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 14: {
+ /* >= */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a >= b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 15: {
+ /* >> */
+
+ int c = (int)T0_POPi();
+ int32_t x = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSHi(x >> c);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 16: {
+ /* and */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a & b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 17: {
+ /* co */
+ T0_CO();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 18: {
+ /* data-get8 */
+
+ size_t addr = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(t0_datablock[addr]);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 19: {
+ /* drop */
+ (void)T0_POP();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 20: {
+ /* dup */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(0));
+ }
+ break;
+ case 21: {
+ /* flush-buf */
+
+ if (CTX->ptr > 0) {
+ if (CTX->dest) {
+ CTX->dest(CTX->dest_ctx, CTX->buf, CTX->ptr);
+ }
+ CTX->ptr = 0;
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 22: {
+ /* from-base64 */
+
+ uint32_t c = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t p, q, r, z;
+ p = c - 0x41;
+ q = c - 0x61;
+ r = c - 0x30;
+
+ z = ((p + 2) & -LT(p, 26))
+ | ((q + 28) & -LT(q, 26))
+ | ((r + 54) & -LT(r, 10))
+ | (64 & -EQ(c, 0x2B))
+ | (65 & -EQ(c, 0x2F))
+ | EQ(c, 0x3D);
+ T0_PUSHi((int32_t)z - 2);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 23: {
+ /* get8 */
+
+ size_t addr = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(*((unsigned char *)CTX + addr));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 24: {
+ /* over */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(1));
+ }
+ break;
+ case 25: {
+ /* read8-native */
+
+ if (CTX->hlen > 0) {
+ T0_PUSH(*CTX->hbuf ++);
+ CTX->hlen --;
+ } else {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 26: {
+ /* set8 */
+
+ size_t addr = T0_POP();
+ unsigned x = T0_POP();
+ *((unsigned char *)CTX + addr) = x;
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 27: {
+ /* swap */
+ T0_SWAP();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 28: {
+ /* write8 */
+
+ unsigned char x = (unsigned char)T0_POP();
+ CTX->buf[CTX->ptr ++] = x;
+ if (CTX->ptr == sizeof CTX->buf) {
+ if (CTX->dest) {
+ CTX->dest(CTX->dest_ctx, CTX->buf, sizeof CTX->buf);
+ }
+ CTX->ptr = 0;
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ T0_ENTER(ip, rp, t0x);
+ }
+ }
+t0_exit:
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->dp = dp;
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->rp = rp;
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->ip = ip;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/pemdec.t0 b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/pemdec.t0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2237abb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/pemdec.t0
@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+\ Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+\
+\ Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+\ a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+\ "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+\ without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+\ distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+\ permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+\ the following conditions:
+\
+\ The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+\ included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+\
+\ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+\ EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+\ MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+\ NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+\ BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+\ ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+\ CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+\ SOFTWARE.
+
+preamble {
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define CTX ((br_pem_decoder_context *)(void *)((unsigned char *)t0ctx - offsetof(br_pem_decoder_context, cpu)))
+
+/* see bearssl_pem.h */
+void
+br_pem_decoder_init(br_pem_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof *ctx);
+ ctx->cpu.dp = &ctx->dp_stack[0];
+ ctx->cpu.rp = &ctx->rp_stack[0];
+ br_pem_decoder_init_main(&ctx->cpu);
+ br_pem_decoder_run(&ctx->cpu);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_pem.h */
+size_t
+br_pem_decoder_push(br_pem_decoder_context *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ if (ctx->event) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->hbuf = data;
+ ctx->hlen = len;
+ br_pem_decoder_run(&ctx->cpu);
+ return len - ctx->hlen;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_pem.h */
+int
+br_pem_decoder_event(br_pem_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+ int event;
+
+ event = ctx->event;
+ ctx->event = 0;
+ return event;
+}
+
+}
+
+\ Define a word that evaluates to the address of a field within the
+\ decoder context.
+: addr:
+ next-word { field }
+ "addr-" field + 0 1 define-word
+ 0 8191 "offsetof(br_pem_decoder_context, " field + ")" + make-CX
+ postpone literal postpone ; ;
+
+addr: event
+addr: name
+addr: buf
+addr: ptr
+
+\ Set a byte at a specific address (offset within the context).
+cc: set8 ( value addr -- ) {
+ size_t addr = T0_POP();
+ unsigned x = T0_POP();
+ *((unsigned char *)CTX + addr) = x;
+}
+
+\ Get a byte at a specific address (offset within the context).
+cc: get8 ( addr -- value ) {
+ size_t addr = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(*((unsigned char *)CTX + addr));
+}
+
+\ Send an event.
+: send-event ( event -- )
+ addr-event set8 co ;
+
+\ Low-level function to read a single byte. Returned value is the byte
+\ (0 to 255), or -1 if there is no available data.
+cc: read8-native ( -- x ) {
+ if (CTX->hlen > 0) {
+ T0_PUSH(*CTX->hbuf ++);
+ CTX->hlen --;
+ } else {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ }
+}
+
+\ Read next byte. Block until the next byte is available.
+: read8 ( -- x )
+ begin read8-native dup 0< ifnot ret then drop co again ;
+
+\ Read bytes until next end-of-line.
+: skip-newline ( -- )
+ begin read8 `\n <> while repeat ;
+
+\ Read bytes until next end-of-line; verify that they are all whitespace.
+\ This returns -1 if they were all whitespace, 0 otherwise.
+: skip-newline-ws ( -- bool )
+ -1 { r }
+ begin read8 dup `\n <> while ws? ifnot 0 >r then repeat
+ drop r ;
+
+\ Normalise a byte to uppercase (ASCII only).
+: norm-upper ( x -- x )
+ dup dup `a >= swap `z <= and if 32 - then ;
+
+\ Read bytes and compare with the provided string. On mismatch, the
+\ rest of the line is consumed. Matching is not case sensitive.
+: match-string ( str -- bool )
+ begin
+ dup data-get8 norm-upper dup ifnot 2drop -1 ret then
+ read8 norm-upper dup `\n = if drop 2drop 0 ret then
+ = ifnot drop skip-newline 0 ret then
+ 1+
+ again ;
+
+\ Read bytes into the provided buffer, but no more than the provided
+\ count. Reading stops when end-of-line is reached. Returned value
+\ is the count of bytes written to the buffer, or 0 if the buffer size
+\ was exceeded. All bytes are normalised to uppercase (ASCII only).
+: read-bytes ( addr len -- len )
+ dup { orig-len }
+ swap
+ begin
+ over ifnot 2drop skip-newline 0 ret then
+ read8 dup `\n = if 2drop orig-len swap - ret then
+ dup `\r = if drop else norm-upper over set8 then
+ 1+ swap 1- swap
+ again ;
+
+\ Remove trailing dashes from the name buffer.
+: trim-dashes ( len -- )
+ begin dup while
+ 1-
+ dup addr-name + get8 `- <> if
+ addr-name + 1+ 0 swap set8 ret
+ then
+ repeat
+ addr-name set8 ;
+
+\ Scan input for next "begin" banner.
+: next-banner-begin ( -- )
+ begin
+ "-----BEGIN " match-string if
+ addr-name 127 read-bytes
+ dup if trim-dashes ret then
+ drop
+ then
+ again ;
+
+\ Convert a Base64 character to its numerical value. Returned value is
+\ 0 to 63 for Base64 characters, -1 for '=', and -2 for all other characters.
+cc: from-base64 ( char -- x ) {
+ uint32_t c = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t p, q, r, z;
+ p = c - 0x41;
+ q = c - 0x61;
+ r = c - 0x30;
+
+ z = ((p + 2) & -LT(p, 26))
+ | ((q + 28) & -LT(q, 26))
+ | ((r + 54) & -LT(r, 10))
+ | (64 & -EQ(c, 0x2B))
+ | (65 & -EQ(c, 0x2F))
+ | EQ(c, 0x3D);
+ T0_PUSHi((int32_t)z - 2);
+}
+
+\ Test whether a character is whitespace (but not a newline).
+: ws? ( x -- bool )
+ dup `\n <> swap 32 <= and ;
+
+\ Read next character, skipping whitespace (except newline).
+: next-nonws ( -- x )
+ begin
+ read8 dup ws? ifnot ret then
+ drop
+ again ;
+
+\ Write one byte in the output buffer.
+cc: write8 ( x -- ) {
+ unsigned char x = (unsigned char)T0_POP();
+ CTX->buf[CTX->ptr ++] = x;
+ if (CTX->ptr == sizeof CTX->buf) {
+ if (CTX->dest) {
+ CTX->dest(CTX->dest_ctx, CTX->buf, sizeof CTX->buf);
+ }
+ CTX->ptr = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+\ Flush the output buffer.
+cc: flush-buf ( -- ) {
+ if (CTX->ptr > 0) {
+ if (CTX->dest) {
+ CTX->dest(CTX->dest_ctx, CTX->buf, CTX->ptr);
+ }
+ CTX->ptr = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+\ Decode the four next Base64 characters. Returned value is:
+\ 0 quartet processed, three bytes produced.
+\ -1 dash encountered as first character (no leading whitespace).
+\ 1 quartet processed, one or two bytes produced, terminator reached.
+\ 2 end-of-line reached.
+\ 3 error.
+\ For all positive return values, the remaining of the current line has been
+\ consumed.
+: decode-next-quartet ( -- r )
+ \ Process first character. It may be a dash.
+ read8 dup `- = if drop -1 ret then
+ dup ws? if drop next-nonws then
+ dup `\n = if drop 2 ret then
+ from-base64 dup 0< if drop skip-newline 3 ret then
+ { acc }
+
+ \ Second character.
+ next-nonws dup `\n = if drop 3 ret then
+ from-base64 dup 0< if drop skip-newline 3 ret then
+ acc 6 << + >acc
+
+ \ Third character: may be an equal sign.
+ next-nonws dup `\n = if drop 3 ret then
+ dup `= = if
+ \ Fourth character must be an equal sign.
+ drop
+ next-nonws dup `\n = if drop 3 ret then
+ skip-newline-ws ifnot drop 3 ret then
+ `= <> if 3 ret then
+ acc 0x0F and if 3 ret then
+ acc 4 >> write8
+ 1 ret
+ then
+ from-base64 dup 0< if drop skip-newline 3 ret then
+ acc 6 << + >acc
+
+ \ Fourth character: may be an equal sign.
+ next-nonws dup `\n = if drop 3 ret then
+ dup `= = if
+ drop skip-newline-ws ifnot 3 ret then
+ acc 0x03 and if 3 ret then
+ acc 10 >> write8
+ acc 2 >> write8
+ 1 ret
+ then
+ from-base64 dup 0< if drop skip-newline 3 ret then
+ acc 6 << + >acc
+ acc 16 >> write8
+ acc 8 >> write8
+ acc write8
+ 0 ;
+
+\ Check trailer line (possibly, the leading dash has been read). This
+\ sends the appropriate event.
+: check-trailer ( bool -- )
+ ifnot
+ begin read8 dup `\n = while drop repeat
+ `- <> if skip-newline 3 send-event ret then
+ then
+ "----END " match-string ifnot 3 send-event ret then
+ flush-buf
+ skip-newline 2 send-event ;
+
+\ Decode one line worth of characters. Returned value is 0 if the end of the
+\ object is reached, -1 otherwise. The end of object or error event is sent.
+: decode-line ( -- bool )
+ -1 { first }
+ begin
+ decode-next-quartet
+ case
+ 0 of endof
+ -1 of
+ first ifnot
+ skip-newline 3 send-event
+ else
+ -1 check-trailer
+ then
+ 0 ret
+ endof
+ 1 of 0 check-trailer 0 ret endof
+ 2 of -1 ret endof
+
+ \ On decoding error
+ drop 3 send-event 0 ret
+ endcase
+ 0 >first
+ again ;
+
+: main ( -- ! )
+ begin
+ next-banner-begin 1 send-event
+ begin decode-line while repeat
+ again ;
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/pemenc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/pemenc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..236601e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/codec/pemenc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Get the appropriate Base64 character for a numeric value in the
+ * 0..63 range. This is constant-time.
+ */
+static char
+b64char(uint32_t x)
+{
+ /*
+ * Values 0 to 25 map to 0x41..0x5A ('A' to 'Z')
+ * Values 26 to 51 map to 0x61..0x7A ('a' to 'z')
+ * Values 52 to 61 map to 0x30..0x39 ('0' to '9')
+ * Value 62 maps to 0x2B ('+')
+ * Value 63 maps to 0x2F ('/')
+ */
+ uint32_t a, b, c;
+
+ a = x - 26;
+ b = x - 52;
+ c = x - 62;
+
+ /*
+ * Looking at bits 8..15 of values a, b and c:
+ *
+ * x a b c
+ * ---------------------
+ * 0..25 FF FF FF
+ * 26..51 00 FF FF
+ * 52..61 00 00 FF
+ * 62..63 00 00 00
+ */
+ return (char)(((x + 0x41) & ((a & b & c) >> 8))
+ | ((x + (0x61 - 26)) & ((~a & b & c) >> 8))
+ | ((x - (52 - 0x30)) & ((~a & ~b & c) >> 8))
+ | ((0x2B + ((x & 1) << 2)) & (~(a | b | c) >> 8)));
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_pem.h */
+size_t
+br_pem_encode(void *dest, const void *data, size_t len,
+ const char *banner, unsigned flags)
+{
+ size_t dlen, banner_len, lines;
+ char *d;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t u;
+ int off, lim;
+
+ banner_len = strlen(banner);
+ /* FIXME: try to avoid divisions here, as they may pull
+ an extra libc function. */
+ if ((flags & BR_PEM_LINE64) != 0) {
+ lines = (len + 47) / 48;
+ } else {
+ lines = (len + 56) / 57;
+ }
+ dlen = (banner_len << 1) + 30 + (((len + 2) / 3) << 2)
+ + lines + 2;
+ if ((flags & BR_PEM_CRLF) != 0) {
+ dlen += lines + 2;
+ }
+
+ if (dest == NULL) {
+ return dlen;
+ }
+
+ d = dest;
+
+ /*
+ * We always move the source data to the end of output buffer;
+ * the encoding process never "catches up" except at the very
+ * end. This also handles all conditions of partial or total
+ * overlap.
+ */
+ buf = (unsigned char *)d + dlen - len;
+ memmove(buf, data, len);
+
+ memcpy(d, "-----BEGIN ", 11);
+ d += 11;
+ memcpy(d, banner, banner_len);
+ d += banner_len;
+ memcpy(d, "-----", 5);
+ d += 5;
+ if ((flags & BR_PEM_CRLF) != 0) {
+ *d ++ = 0x0D;
+ }
+ *d ++ = 0x0A;
+
+ off = 0;
+ lim = (flags & BR_PEM_LINE64) != 0 ? 16 : 19;
+ for (u = 0; (u + 2) < len; u += 3) {
+ uint32_t w;
+
+ w = ((uint32_t)buf[u] << 16)
+ | ((uint32_t)buf[u + 1] << 8)
+ | (uint32_t)buf[u + 2];
+ *d ++ = b64char(w >> 18);
+ *d ++ = b64char((w >> 12) & 0x3F);
+ *d ++ = b64char((w >> 6) & 0x3F);
+ *d ++ = b64char(w & 0x3F);
+ if (++ off == lim) {
+ off = 0;
+ if ((flags & BR_PEM_CRLF) != 0) {
+ *d ++ = 0x0D;
+ }
+ *d ++ = 0x0A;
+ }
+ }
+ if (u < len) {
+ uint32_t w;
+
+ w = (uint32_t)buf[u] << 16;
+ if (u + 1 < len) {
+ w |= (uint32_t)buf[u + 1] << 8;
+ }
+ *d ++ = b64char(w >> 18);
+ *d ++ = b64char((w >> 12) & 0x3F);
+ if (u + 1 < len) {
+ *d ++ = b64char((w >> 6) & 0x3F);
+ } else {
+ *d ++ = 0x3D;
+ }
+ *d ++ = 0x3D;
+ off ++;
+ }
+ if (off != 0) {
+ if ((flags & BR_PEM_CRLF) != 0) {
+ *d ++ = 0x0D;
+ }
+ *d ++ = 0x0A;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(d, "-----END ", 9);
+ d += 9;
+ memcpy(d, banner, banner_len);
+ d += banner_len;
+ memcpy(d, "-----", 5);
+ d += 5;
+ if ((flags & BR_PEM_CRLF) != 0) {
+ *d ++ = 0x0D;
+ }
+ *d ++ = 0x0A;
+
+ /* Final zero, not counted in returned length. */
+ *d ++ = 0x00;
+
+ return dlen;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/config.h b/third_party/bearssl/src/config.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94627a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/config.h
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_H__
+#define CONFIG_H__
+
+/*
+ * This file contains compile-time flags that can override the
+ * autodetection performed in relevant files. Each flag is a macro; it
+ * deactivates the feature if defined to 0, activates it if defined to a
+ * non-zero integer (normally 1). If the macro is not defined, then
+ * autodetection applies.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_64 is enabled, 64-bit integer types are assumed to be
+ * efficient (i.e. the architecture has 64-bit registers and can
+ * do 64-bit operations as fast as 32-bit operations).
+ *
+#define BR_64 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_LOMUL is enabled, then multiplications of 32-bit values whose
+ * result are truncated to the low 32 bits are assumed to be
+ * substantially more efficient than 32-bit multiplications that yield
+ * 64-bit results. This is typically the case on low-end ARM Cortex M
+ * systems (M0, M0+, M1, and arguably M3 and M4 as well).
+ *
+#define BR_LOMUL 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_SLOW_MUL is enabled, multiplications are assumed to be
+ * substantially slow with regards to other integer operations, thus
+ * making it worth to make more operations for a given task if it allows
+ * using less multiplications.
+ *
+#define BR_SLOW_MUL 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_SLOW_MUL15 is enabled, short multplications (on 15-bit words)
+ * are assumed to be substantially slow with regards to other integer
+ * operations, thus making it worth to make more integer operations if
+ * it allows using less multiplications.
+ *
+#define BR_SLOW_MUL15 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_CT_MUL31 is enabled, multiplications of 31-bit values (used
+ * in the "i31" big integer implementation) use an alternate implementation
+ * which is slower and larger than the normal multiplication, but should
+ * ensure constant-time multiplications even on architectures where the
+ * multiplication opcode takes a variable number of cycles to complete.
+ *
+#define BR_CT_MUL31 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_CT_MUL15 is enabled, multiplications of 15-bit values (held
+ * in 32-bit words) use an alternate implementation which is slower and
+ * larger than the normal multiplication, but should ensure
+ * constant-time multiplications on most/all architectures where the
+ * basic multiplication is not constant-time.
+#define BR_CT_MUL15 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_NO_ARITH_SHIFT is enabled, arithmetic right shifts (with sign
+ * extension) are performed with a sequence of operations which is bigger
+ * and slower than a simple right shift on a signed value. This avoids
+ * relying on an implementation-defined behaviour. However, most if not
+ * all C compilers use sign extension for right shifts on signed values,
+ * so this alternate macro is disabled by default.
+#define BR_NO_ARITH_SHIFT 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_RDRAND is enabled, the SSL engine will use the RDRAND opcode
+ * to automatically obtain quality randomness for seeding its internal
+ * PRNG. Since that opcode is present only in recent x86 CPU, its
+ * support is dynamically tested; if the current CPU does not support
+ * it, then another random source will be used, such as /dev/urandom or
+ * CryptGenRandom().
+ *
+#define BR_RDRAND 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_USE_GETENTROPY is enabled, the SSL engine will use the
+ * getentropy() function to obtain quality randomness for seeding its
+ * internal PRNG. On Linux and FreeBSD, getentropy() is implemented by
+ * the standard library with the system call getrandom(); on OpenBSD,
+ * getentropy() is the system call, and there is no getrandom() wrapper,
+ * hence the use of the getentropy() function for maximum portability.
+ *
+ * If the getentropy() call fails, and BR_USE_URANDOM is not explicitly
+ * disabled, then /dev/urandom will be used as a fallback mechanism. On
+ * FreeBSD and OpenBSD, this does not change much, since /dev/urandom
+ * will block if not enough entropy has been obtained since last boot.
+ * On Linux, /dev/urandom might not block, which can be troublesome in
+ * early boot stages, which is why getentropy() is preferred.
+ *
+#define BR_USE_GETENTROPY 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_USE_URANDOM is enabled, the SSL engine will use /dev/urandom
+ * to automatically obtain quality randomness for seeding its internal
+ * PRNG.
+ *
+#define BR_USE_URANDOM 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_USE_WIN32_RAND is enabled, the SSL engine will use the Win32
+ * (CryptoAPI) functions (CryptAcquireContext(), CryptGenRandom()...) to
+ * automatically obtain quality randomness for seeding its internal PRNG.
+ *
+ * Note: if both BR_USE_URANDOM and BR_USE_WIN32_RAND are defined, the
+ * former takes precedence.
+ *
+#define BR_USE_WIN32_RAND 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_USE_UNIX_TIME is enabled, the X.509 validation engine obtains
+ * the current time from the OS by calling time(), and assuming that the
+ * returned value (a 'time_t') is an integer that counts time in seconds
+ * since the Unix Epoch (Jan 1st, 1970, 00:00 UTC).
+ *
+#define BR_USE_UNIX_TIME 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_USE_WIN32_TIME is enabled, the X.509 validation engine obtains
+ * the current time from the OS by calling the Win32 function
+ * GetSystemTimeAsFileTime().
+ *
+ * Note: if both BR_USE_UNIX_TIME and BR_USE_WIN32_TIME are defined, the
+ * former takes precedence.
+ *
+#define BR_USE_WIN32_TIME 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_ARMEL_CORTEXM_GCC is enabled, some operations are replaced with
+ * inline assembly which is shorter and/or faster. This should be used
+ * only when all of the following are true:
+ * - target architecture is ARM in Thumb mode
+ * - target endianness is little-endian
+ * - compiler is GCC (or GCC-compatible for inline assembly syntax)
+ *
+ * This is meant for the low-end cores (Cortex M0, M0+, M1, M3).
+ * Note: if BR_LOMUL is not explicitly enabled or disabled, then
+ * enabling BR_ARMEL_CORTEXM_GCC also enables BR_LOMUL.
+ *
+#define BR_ARMEL_CORTEXM_GCC 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_AES_X86NI is enabled, the AES implementation using the x86 "NI"
+ * instructions (dedicated AES opcodes) will be compiled. If this is not
+ * enabled explicitly, then that AES implementation will be compiled only
+ * if a compatible compiler is detected. If set explicitly to 0, the
+ * implementation will not be compiled at all.
+ *
+#define BR_AES_X86NI 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_SSE2 is enabled, SSE2 intrinsics will be used for some
+ * algorithm implementations that use them (e.g. chacha20_sse2). If this
+ * is not enabled explicitly, then support for SSE2 intrinsics will be
+ * automatically detected. If set explicitly to 0, then SSE2 code will
+ * not be compiled at all.
+ *
+#define BR_SSE2 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_POWER8 is enabled, the AES implementation using the POWER ISA
+ * 2.07 opcodes (available on POWER8 processors and later) is compiled.
+ * If this is not enabled explicitly, then that implementation will be
+ * compiled only if a compatible compiler is detected, _and_ the target
+ * architecture is POWER8 or later.
+ *
+#define BR_POWER8 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_INT128 is enabled, then code using the 'unsigned __int64'
+ * and 'unsigned __int128' types will be used to leverage 64x64->128
+ * unsigned multiplications. This should work with GCC and compatible
+ * compilers on 64-bit architectures.
+ *
+#define BR_INT128 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_UMUL128 is enabled, then code using the '_umul128()' and
+ * '_addcarry_u64()' intrinsics will be used to implement 64x64->128
+ * unsigned multiplications. This should work on Visual C on x64 systems.
+ *
+#define BR_UMUL128 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_LE_UNALIGNED is enabled, then the current architecture is
+ * assumed to use little-endian encoding for integers, and to tolerate
+ * unaligned accesses with no or minimal time penalty.
+ *
+#define BR_LE_UNALIGNED 1
+ */
+
+/*
+ * When BR_BE_UNALIGNED is enabled, then the current architecture is
+ * assumed to use big-endian encoding for integers, and to tolerate
+ * unaligned accesses with no or minimal time penalty.
+ *
+#define BR_BE_UNALIGNED 1
+ */
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_all_m15.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_all_m15.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb550e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_all_m15.c
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_generator(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ switch (curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+ return br_ec_p256_m15.generator(curve, len);
+ case BR_EC_curve25519:
+ return br_ec_c25519_m15.generator(curve, len);
+ default:
+ return br_ec_prime_i15.generator(curve, len);
+ }
+}
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_order(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ switch (curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+ return br_ec_p256_m15.order(curve, len);
+ case BR_EC_curve25519:
+ return br_ec_c25519_m15.order(curve, len);
+ default:
+ return br_ec_prime_i15.order(curve, len);
+ }
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_xoff(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ switch (curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+ return br_ec_p256_m15.xoff(curve, len);
+ case BR_EC_curve25519:
+ return br_ec_c25519_m15.xoff(curve, len);
+ default:
+ return br_ec_prime_i15.xoff(curve, len);
+ }
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_mul(unsigned char *G, size_t Glen,
+ const unsigned char *kb, size_t kblen, int curve)
+{
+ switch (curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+ return br_ec_p256_m15.mul(G, Glen, kb, kblen, curve);
+ case BR_EC_curve25519:
+ return br_ec_c25519_m15.mul(G, Glen, kb, kblen, curve);
+ default:
+ return br_ec_prime_i15.mul(G, Glen, kb, kblen, curve);
+ }
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_mulgen(unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve)
+{
+ switch (curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+ return br_ec_p256_m15.mulgen(R, x, xlen, curve);
+ case BR_EC_curve25519:
+ return br_ec_c25519_m15.mulgen(R, x, xlen, curve);
+ default:
+ return br_ec_prime_i15.mulgen(R, x, xlen, curve);
+ }
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_muladd(unsigned char *A, const unsigned char *B, size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *y, size_t ylen, int curve)
+{
+ switch (curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+ return br_ec_p256_m15.muladd(A, B, len,
+ x, xlen, y, ylen, curve);
+ case BR_EC_curve25519:
+ return br_ec_c25519_m15.muladd(A, B, len,
+ x, xlen, y, ylen, curve);
+ default:
+ return br_ec_prime_i15.muladd(A, B, len,
+ x, xlen, y, ylen, curve);
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl br_ec_all_m15 = {
+ (uint32_t)0x23800000,
+ &api_generator,
+ &api_order,
+ &api_xoff,
+ &api_mul,
+ &api_mulgen,
+ &api_muladd
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_all_m31.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_all_m31.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8fd8c3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_all_m31.c
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_generator(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ switch (curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return br_ec_p256_m64.generator(curve, len);
+#else
+ return br_ec_p256_m31.generator(curve, len);
+#endif
+ case BR_EC_curve25519:
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return br_ec_c25519_m64.generator(curve, len);
+#else
+ return br_ec_c25519_m31.generator(curve, len);
+#endif
+ default:
+ return br_ec_prime_i31.generator(curve, len);
+ }
+}
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_order(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ switch (curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return br_ec_p256_m64.order(curve, len);
+#else
+ return br_ec_p256_m31.order(curve, len);
+#endif
+ case BR_EC_curve25519:
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return br_ec_c25519_m64.order(curve, len);
+#else
+ return br_ec_c25519_m31.order(curve, len);
+#endif
+ default:
+ return br_ec_prime_i31.order(curve, len);
+ }
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_xoff(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ switch (curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return br_ec_p256_m64.xoff(curve, len);
+#else
+ return br_ec_p256_m31.xoff(curve, len);
+#endif
+ case BR_EC_curve25519:
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return br_ec_c25519_m64.xoff(curve, len);
+#else
+ return br_ec_c25519_m31.xoff(curve, len);
+#endif
+ default:
+ return br_ec_prime_i31.xoff(curve, len);
+ }
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_mul(unsigned char *G, size_t Glen,
+ const unsigned char *kb, size_t kblen, int curve)
+{
+ switch (curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return br_ec_p256_m64.mul(G, Glen, kb, kblen, curve);
+#else
+ return br_ec_p256_m31.mul(G, Glen, kb, kblen, curve);
+#endif
+ case BR_EC_curve25519:
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return br_ec_c25519_m64.mul(G, Glen, kb, kblen, curve);
+#else
+ return br_ec_c25519_m31.mul(G, Glen, kb, kblen, curve);
+#endif
+ default:
+ return br_ec_prime_i31.mul(G, Glen, kb, kblen, curve);
+ }
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_mulgen(unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve)
+{
+ switch (curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return br_ec_p256_m64.mulgen(R, x, xlen, curve);
+#else
+ return br_ec_p256_m31.mulgen(R, x, xlen, curve);
+#endif
+ case BR_EC_curve25519:
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return br_ec_c25519_m64.mulgen(R, x, xlen, curve);
+#else
+ return br_ec_c25519_m31.mulgen(R, x, xlen, curve);
+#endif
+ default:
+ return br_ec_prime_i31.mulgen(R, x, xlen, curve);
+ }
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_muladd(unsigned char *A, const unsigned char *B, size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *y, size_t ylen, int curve)
+{
+ switch (curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return br_ec_p256_m64.muladd(A, B, len,
+ x, xlen, y, ylen, curve);
+#else
+ return br_ec_p256_m31.muladd(A, B, len,
+ x, xlen, y, ylen, curve);
+#endif
+ case BR_EC_curve25519:
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return br_ec_c25519_m64.muladd(A, B, len,
+ x, xlen, y, ylen, curve);
+#else
+ return br_ec_c25519_m31.muladd(A, B, len,
+ x, xlen, y, ylen, curve);
+#endif
+ default:
+ return br_ec_prime_i31.muladd(A, B, len,
+ x, xlen, y, ylen, curve);
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl br_ec_all_m31 = {
+ (uint32_t)0x23800000,
+ &api_generator,
+ &api_order,
+ &api_xoff,
+ &api_mul,
+ &api_mulgen,
+ &api_muladd
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_i15.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_i15.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8fadcf4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_i15.c
@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Parameters for the field:
+ * - field modulus p = 2^255-19
+ * - R^2 mod p (R = 2^(15k) for the smallest k such that R >= p)
+ */
+
+static const uint16_t C255_P[] = {
+ 0x0110,
+ 0x7FED, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF,
+ 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF,
+ 0x7FFF
+};
+
+#define P0I 0x4A1B
+
+static const uint16_t C255_R2[] = {
+ 0x0110,
+ 0x0169, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+ 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+ 0x0000
+};
+
+/* obsolete
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+static void
+print_int_mont(const char *name, const uint16_t *x)
+{
+ uint16_t y[18];
+ unsigned char tmp[32];
+ size_t u;
+
+ printf("%s = ", name);
+ memcpy(y, x, sizeof y);
+ br_i15_from_monty(y, C255_P, P0I);
+ br_i15_encode(tmp, sizeof tmp, y);
+ for (u = 0; u < sizeof tmp; u ++) {
+ printf("%02X", tmp[u]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+}
+*/
+
+static const uint16_t C255_A24[] = {
+ 0x0110,
+ 0x45D3, 0x0046, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+ 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+ 0x0000
+};
+
+static const unsigned char GEN[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ORDER[] = {
+ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
+};
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_generator(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return GEN;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_order(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return ORDER;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_xoff(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+cswap(uint16_t *a, uint16_t *b, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ ctl = -ctl;
+ for (i = 0; i < 18; i ++) {
+ uint32_t aw, bw, tw;
+
+ aw = a[i];
+ bw = b[i];
+ tw = ctl & (aw ^ bw);
+ a[i] = aw ^ tw;
+ b[i] = bw ^ tw;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+c255_add(uint16_t *d, const uint16_t *a, const uint16_t *b)
+{
+ uint32_t ctl;
+ uint16_t t[18];
+
+ memcpy(t, a, sizeof t);
+ ctl = br_i15_add(t, b, 1);
+ ctl |= NOT(br_i15_sub(t, C255_P, 0));
+ br_i15_sub(t, C255_P, ctl);
+ memcpy(d, t, sizeof t);
+}
+
+static void
+c255_sub(uint16_t *d, const uint16_t *a, const uint16_t *b)
+{
+ uint16_t t[18];
+
+ memcpy(t, a, sizeof t);
+ br_i15_add(t, C255_P, br_i15_sub(t, b, 1));
+ memcpy(d, t, sizeof t);
+}
+
+static void
+c255_mul(uint16_t *d, const uint16_t *a, const uint16_t *b)
+{
+ uint16_t t[18];
+
+ br_i15_montymul(t, a, b, C255_P, P0I);
+ memcpy(d, t, sizeof t);
+}
+
+static void
+byteswap(unsigned char *G)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i ++) {
+ unsigned char t;
+
+ t = G[i];
+ G[i] = G[31 - i];
+ G[31 - i] = t;
+ }
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_mul(unsigned char *G, size_t Glen,
+ const unsigned char *kb, size_t kblen, int curve)
+{
+#define ILEN (18 * sizeof(uint16_t))
+
+ /*
+ * The a[] and b[] arrays have an extra word to allow for
+ * decoding without using br_i15_decode_reduce().
+ */
+ uint16_t x1[18], x2[18], x3[18], z2[18], z3[18];
+ uint16_t a[19], aa[18], b[19], bb[18];
+ uint16_t c[18], d[18], e[18], da[18], cb[18];
+ unsigned char k[32];
+ uint32_t swap;
+ int i;
+
+ (void)curve;
+
+ /*
+ * Points are encoded over exactly 32 bytes. Multipliers must fit
+ * in 32 bytes as well.
+ * RFC 7748 mandates that the high bit of the last point byte must
+ * be ignored/cleared.
+ */
+ if (Glen != 32 || kblen > 32) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ G[31] &= 0x7F;
+
+ /*
+ * Byteswap the point encoding, because it uses little-endian, and
+ * the generic decoding routine uses big-endian.
+ */
+ byteswap(G);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the point ('u' coordinate). This should be reduced
+ * modulo p, but we prefer to avoid the dependency on
+ * br_i15_decode_reduce(). Instead, we use br_i15_decode_mod()
+ * with a synthetic modulus of value 2^255 (this must work
+ * since G was truncated to 255 bits), then use a conditional
+ * subtraction. We use br_i15_decode_mod() and not
+ * br_i15_decode(), because the ec_prime_i15 implementation uses
+ * the former but not the latter.
+ * br_i15_decode_reduce(a, G, 32, C255_P);
+ */
+ br_i15_zero(b, 0x111);
+ b[18] = 1;
+ br_i15_decode_mod(a, G, 32, b);
+ a[0] = 0x110;
+ br_i15_sub(a, C255_P, NOT(br_i15_sub(a, C255_P, 0)));
+
+ /*
+ * Initialise variables x1, x2, z2, x3 and z3. We set all of them
+ * into Montgomery representation.
+ */
+ br_i15_montymul(x1, a, C255_R2, C255_P, P0I);
+ memcpy(x3, x1, ILEN);
+ br_i15_zero(z2, C255_P[0]);
+ memcpy(x2, z2, ILEN);
+ x2[1] = 19;
+ memcpy(z3, x2, ILEN);
+
+ memset(k, 0, (sizeof k) - kblen);
+ memcpy(k + (sizeof k) - kblen, kb, kblen);
+ k[31] &= 0xF8;
+ k[0] &= 0x7F;
+ k[0] |= 0x40;
+
+ /* obsolete
+ print_int_mont("x1", x1);
+ */
+
+ swap = 0;
+ for (i = 254; i >= 0; i --) {
+ uint32_t kt;
+
+ kt = (k[31 - (i >> 3)] >> (i & 7)) & 1;
+ swap ^= kt;
+ cswap(x2, x3, swap);
+ cswap(z2, z3, swap);
+ swap = kt;
+
+ /* obsolete
+ print_int_mont("x2", x2);
+ print_int_mont("z2", z2);
+ print_int_mont("x3", x3);
+ print_int_mont("z3", z3);
+ */
+
+ c255_add(a, x2, z2);
+ c255_mul(aa, a, a);
+ c255_sub(b, x2, z2);
+ c255_mul(bb, b, b);
+ c255_sub(e, aa, bb);
+ c255_add(c, x3, z3);
+ c255_sub(d, x3, z3);
+ c255_mul(da, d, a);
+ c255_mul(cb, c, b);
+
+ /* obsolete
+ print_int_mont("a ", a);
+ print_int_mont("aa", aa);
+ print_int_mont("b ", b);
+ print_int_mont("bb", bb);
+ print_int_mont("e ", e);
+ print_int_mont("c ", c);
+ print_int_mont("d ", d);
+ print_int_mont("da", da);
+ print_int_mont("cb", cb);
+ */
+
+ c255_add(x3, da, cb);
+ c255_mul(x3, x3, x3);
+ c255_sub(z3, da, cb);
+ c255_mul(z3, z3, z3);
+ c255_mul(z3, z3, x1);
+ c255_mul(x2, aa, bb);
+ c255_mul(z2, C255_A24, e);
+ c255_add(z2, z2, aa);
+ c255_mul(z2, e, z2);
+
+ /* obsolete
+ print_int_mont("x2", x2);
+ print_int_mont("z2", z2);
+ print_int_mont("x3", x3);
+ print_int_mont("z3", z3);
+ */
+ }
+ cswap(x2, x3, swap);
+ cswap(z2, z3, swap);
+
+ /*
+ * Inverse z2 with a modular exponentiation. This is a simple
+ * square-and-multiply algorithm; we mutualise most non-squarings
+ * since the exponent contains almost only ones.
+ */
+ memcpy(a, z2, ILEN);
+ for (i = 0; i < 15; i ++) {
+ c255_mul(a, a, a);
+ c255_mul(a, a, z2);
+ }
+ memcpy(b, a, ILEN);
+ for (i = 0; i < 14; i ++) {
+ int j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < 16; j ++) {
+ c255_mul(b, b, b);
+ }
+ c255_mul(b, b, a);
+ }
+ for (i = 14; i >= 0; i --) {
+ c255_mul(b, b, b);
+ if ((0xFFEB >> i) & 1) {
+ c255_mul(b, z2, b);
+ }
+ }
+ c255_mul(b, x2, b);
+
+ /*
+ * To avoid a dependency on br_i15_from_monty(), we use a
+ * Montgomery multiplication with 1.
+ * memcpy(x2, b, ILEN);
+ * br_i15_from_monty(x2, C255_P, P0I);
+ */
+ br_i15_zero(a, C255_P[0]);
+ a[1] = 1;
+ br_i15_montymul(x2, a, b, C255_P, P0I);
+
+ br_i15_encode(G, 32, x2);
+ byteswap(G);
+ return 1;
+
+#undef ILEN
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_mulgen(unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve)
+{
+ const unsigned char *G;
+ size_t Glen;
+
+ G = api_generator(curve, &Glen);
+ memcpy(R, G, Glen);
+ api_mul(R, Glen, x, xlen, curve);
+ return Glen;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_muladd(unsigned char *A, const unsigned char *B, size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *y, size_t ylen, int curve)
+{
+ /*
+ * We don't implement this method, since it is used for ECDSA
+ * only, and there is no ECDSA over Curve25519 (which instead
+ * uses EdDSA).
+ */
+ (void)A;
+ (void)B;
+ (void)len;
+ (void)x;
+ (void)xlen;
+ (void)y;
+ (void)ylen;
+ (void)curve;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl br_ec_c25519_i15 = {
+ (uint32_t)0x20000000,
+ &api_generator,
+ &api_order,
+ &api_xoff,
+ &api_mul,
+ &api_mulgen,
+ &api_muladd
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_i31.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_i31.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f8ffc2c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_i31.c
@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Parameters for the field:
+ * - field modulus p = 2^255-19
+ * - R^2 mod p (R = 2^(31k) for the smallest k such that R >= p)
+ */
+
+static const uint32_t C255_P[] = {
+ 0x00000107,
+ 0x7FFFFFED, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF,
+ 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x0000007F
+};
+
+#define P0I 0x286BCA1B
+
+static const uint32_t C255_R2[] = {
+ 0x00000107,
+ 0x00000000, 0x02D20000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000
+};
+
+static const uint32_t C255_A24[] = {
+ 0x00000107,
+ 0x53000000, 0x0000468B, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000
+};
+
+/* obsolete
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+static void
+print_int_mont(const char *name, const uint32_t *x)
+{
+ uint32_t y[10];
+ unsigned char tmp[32];
+ size_t u;
+
+ printf("%s = ", name);
+ memcpy(y, x, sizeof y);
+ br_i31_from_monty(y, C255_P, P0I);
+ br_i31_encode(tmp, sizeof tmp, y);
+ for (u = 0; u < sizeof tmp; u ++) {
+ printf("%02X", tmp[u]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+}
+*/
+
+static const unsigned char GEN[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ORDER[] = {
+ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
+};
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_generator(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return GEN;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_order(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return ORDER;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_xoff(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+cswap(uint32_t *a, uint32_t *b, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ ctl = -ctl;
+ for (i = 0; i < 10; i ++) {
+ uint32_t aw, bw, tw;
+
+ aw = a[i];
+ bw = b[i];
+ tw = ctl & (aw ^ bw);
+ a[i] = aw ^ tw;
+ b[i] = bw ^ tw;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+c255_add(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ uint32_t ctl;
+ uint32_t t[10];
+
+ memcpy(t, a, sizeof t);
+ ctl = br_i31_add(t, b, 1);
+ ctl |= NOT(br_i31_sub(t, C255_P, 0));
+ br_i31_sub(t, C255_P, ctl);
+ memcpy(d, t, sizeof t);
+}
+
+static void
+c255_sub(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ uint32_t t[10];
+
+ memcpy(t, a, sizeof t);
+ br_i31_add(t, C255_P, br_i31_sub(t, b, 1));
+ memcpy(d, t, sizeof t);
+}
+
+static void
+c255_mul(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ uint32_t t[10];
+
+ br_i31_montymul(t, a, b, C255_P, P0I);
+ memcpy(d, t, sizeof t);
+}
+
+static void
+byteswap(unsigned char *G)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i ++) {
+ unsigned char t;
+
+ t = G[i];
+ G[i] = G[31 - i];
+ G[31 - i] = t;
+ }
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_mul(unsigned char *G, size_t Glen,
+ const unsigned char *kb, size_t kblen, int curve)
+{
+ uint32_t x1[10], x2[10], x3[10], z2[10], z3[10];
+ uint32_t a[10], aa[10], b[10], bb[10];
+ uint32_t c[10], d[10], e[10], da[10], cb[10];
+ unsigned char k[32];
+ uint32_t swap;
+ int i;
+
+ (void)curve;
+
+ /*
+ * Points are encoded over exactly 32 bytes. Multipliers must fit
+ * in 32 bytes as well.
+ * RFC 7748 mandates that the high bit of the last point byte must
+ * be ignored/cleared.
+ */
+ if (Glen != 32 || kblen > 32) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ G[31] &= 0x7F;
+
+ /*
+ * Byteswap the point encoding, because it uses little-endian, and
+ * the generic decoding routine uses big-endian.
+ */
+ byteswap(G);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the point ('u' coordinate). This should be reduced
+ * modulo p, but we prefer to avoid the dependency on
+ * br_i31_decode_reduce(). Instead, we use br_i31_decode_mod()
+ * with a synthetic modulus of value 2^255 (this must work
+ * since G was truncated to 255 bits), then use a conditional
+ * subtraction. We use br_i31_decode_mod() and not
+ * br_i31_decode(), because the ec_prime_i31 implementation uses
+ * the former but not the latter.
+ * br_i31_decode_reduce(a, G, 32, C255_P);
+ */
+ br_i31_zero(b, 0x108);
+ b[9] = 0x0080;
+ br_i31_decode_mod(a, G, 32, b);
+ a[0] = 0x107;
+ br_i31_sub(a, C255_P, NOT(br_i31_sub(a, C255_P, 0)));
+
+ /*
+ * Initialise variables x1, x2, z2, x3 and z3. We set all of them
+ * into Montgomery representation.
+ */
+ br_i31_montymul(x1, a, C255_R2, C255_P, P0I);
+ memcpy(x3, x1, sizeof x1);
+ br_i31_zero(z2, C255_P[0]);
+ memcpy(x2, z2, sizeof z2);
+ x2[1] = 0x13000000;
+ memcpy(z3, x2, sizeof x2);
+
+ /*
+ * kb[] is in big-endian notation, but possibly shorter than k[].
+ */
+ memset(k, 0, (sizeof k) - kblen);
+ memcpy(k + (sizeof k) - kblen, kb, kblen);
+ k[31] &= 0xF8;
+ k[0] &= 0x7F;
+ k[0] |= 0x40;
+
+ /* obsolete
+ print_int_mont("x1", x1);
+ */
+
+ swap = 0;
+ for (i = 254; i >= 0; i --) {
+ uint32_t kt;
+
+ kt = (k[31 - (i >> 3)] >> (i & 7)) & 1;
+ swap ^= kt;
+ cswap(x2, x3, swap);
+ cswap(z2, z3, swap);
+ swap = kt;
+
+ /* obsolete
+ print_int_mont("x2", x2);
+ print_int_mont("z2", z2);
+ print_int_mont("x3", x3);
+ print_int_mont("z3", z3);
+ */
+
+ c255_add(a, x2, z2);
+ c255_mul(aa, a, a);
+ c255_sub(b, x2, z2);
+ c255_mul(bb, b, b);
+ c255_sub(e, aa, bb);
+ c255_add(c, x3, z3);
+ c255_sub(d, x3, z3);
+ c255_mul(da, d, a);
+ c255_mul(cb, c, b);
+
+ /* obsolete
+ print_int_mont("a ", a);
+ print_int_mont("aa", aa);
+ print_int_mont("b ", b);
+ print_int_mont("bb", bb);
+ print_int_mont("e ", e);
+ print_int_mont("c ", c);
+ print_int_mont("d ", d);
+ print_int_mont("da", da);
+ print_int_mont("cb", cb);
+ */
+
+ c255_add(x3, da, cb);
+ c255_mul(x3, x3, x3);
+ c255_sub(z3, da, cb);
+ c255_mul(z3, z3, z3);
+ c255_mul(z3, z3, x1);
+ c255_mul(x2, aa, bb);
+ c255_mul(z2, C255_A24, e);
+ c255_add(z2, z2, aa);
+ c255_mul(z2, e, z2);
+
+ /* obsolete
+ print_int_mont("x2", x2);
+ print_int_mont("z2", z2);
+ print_int_mont("x3", x3);
+ print_int_mont("z3", z3);
+ */
+ }
+ cswap(x2, x3, swap);
+ cswap(z2, z3, swap);
+
+ /*
+ * Inverse z2 with a modular exponentiation. This is a simple
+ * square-and-multiply algorithm; we mutualise most non-squarings
+ * since the exponent contains almost only ones.
+ */
+ memcpy(a, z2, sizeof z2);
+ for (i = 0; i < 15; i ++) {
+ c255_mul(a, a, a);
+ c255_mul(a, a, z2);
+ }
+ memcpy(b, a, sizeof a);
+ for (i = 0; i < 14; i ++) {
+ int j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < 16; j ++) {
+ c255_mul(b, b, b);
+ }
+ c255_mul(b, b, a);
+ }
+ for (i = 14; i >= 0; i --) {
+ c255_mul(b, b, b);
+ if ((0xFFEB >> i) & 1) {
+ c255_mul(b, z2, b);
+ }
+ }
+ c255_mul(b, x2, b);
+
+ /*
+ * To avoid a dependency on br_i31_from_monty(), we use
+ * a Montgomery multiplication with 1.
+ * memcpy(x2, b, sizeof b);
+ * br_i31_from_monty(x2, C255_P, P0I);
+ */
+ br_i31_zero(a, C255_P[0]);
+ a[1] = 1;
+ br_i31_montymul(x2, a, b, C255_P, P0I);
+
+ br_i31_encode(G, 32, x2);
+ byteswap(G);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_mulgen(unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve)
+{
+ const unsigned char *G;
+ size_t Glen;
+
+ G = api_generator(curve, &Glen);
+ memcpy(R, G, Glen);
+ api_mul(R, Glen, x, xlen, curve);
+ return Glen;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_muladd(unsigned char *A, const unsigned char *B, size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *y, size_t ylen, int curve)
+{
+ /*
+ * We don't implement this method, since it is used for ECDSA
+ * only, and there is no ECDSA over Curve25519 (which instead
+ * uses EdDSA).
+ */
+ (void)A;
+ (void)B;
+ (void)len;
+ (void)x;
+ (void)xlen;
+ (void)y;
+ (void)ylen;
+ (void)curve;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl br_ec_c25519_i31 = {
+ (uint32_t)0x20000000,
+ &api_generator,
+ &api_order,
+ &api_xoff,
+ &api_mul,
+ &api_mulgen,
+ &api_muladd
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_m15.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_m15.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..deff55b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_m15.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1478 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* obsolete
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+static void
+print_int(const char *name, const uint32_t *x)
+{
+ size_t u;
+ unsigned char tmp[36];
+
+ printf("%s = ", name);
+ for (u = 0; u < 20; u ++) {
+ if (x[u] > 0x1FFF) {
+ printf("INVALID:");
+ for (u = 0; u < 20; u ++) {
+ printf(" %04X", x[u]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ memset(tmp, 0, sizeof tmp);
+ for (u = 0; u < 20; u ++) {
+ uint32_t w;
+ int j, k;
+
+ w = x[u];
+ j = 13 * (int)u;
+ k = j & 7;
+ if (k != 0) {
+ w <<= k;
+ j -= k;
+ }
+ k = j >> 3;
+ tmp[35 - k] |= (unsigned char)w;
+ tmp[34 - k] |= (unsigned char)(w >> 8);
+ tmp[33 - k] |= (unsigned char)(w >> 16);
+ tmp[32 - k] |= (unsigned char)(w >> 24);
+ }
+ for (u = 4; u < 36; u ++) {
+ printf("%02X", tmp[u]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+}
+*/
+
+/*
+ * If BR_NO_ARITH_SHIFT is undefined, or defined to 0, then we _assume_
+ * that right-shifting a signed negative integer copies the sign bit
+ * (arithmetic right-shift). This is "implementation-defined behaviour",
+ * i.e. it is not undefined, but it may differ between compilers. Each
+ * compiler is supposed to document its behaviour in that respect. GCC
+ * explicitly defines that an arithmetic right shift is used. We expect
+ * all other compilers to do the same, because underlying CPU offer an
+ * arithmetic right shift opcode that could not be used otherwise.
+ */
+#if BR_NO_ARITH_SHIFT
+#define ARSH(x, n) (((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)) \
+ | ((-((uint32_t)(x) >> 31)) << (32 - (n))))
+#else
+#define ARSH(x, n) ((*(int32_t *)&(x)) >> (n))
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Convert an integer from unsigned little-endian encoding to a sequence of
+ * 13-bit words in little-endian order. The final "partial" word is
+ * returned.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+le8_to_le13(uint32_t *dst, const unsigned char *src, size_t len)
+{
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len;
+
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ acc |= (uint32_t)(*src ++) << acc_len;
+ acc_len += 8;
+ if (acc_len >= 13) {
+ *dst ++ = acc & 0x1FFF;
+ acc >>= 13;
+ acc_len -= 13;
+ }
+ }
+ return acc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert an integer (13-bit words, little-endian) to unsigned
+ * little-endian encoding. The total encoding length is provided; all
+ * the destination bytes will be filled.
+ */
+static void
+le13_to_le8(unsigned char *dst, size_t len, const uint32_t *src)
+{
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len;
+
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ if (acc_len < 8) {
+ acc |= (*src ++) << acc_len;
+ acc_len += 13;
+ }
+ *dst ++ = (unsigned char)acc;
+ acc >>= 8;
+ acc_len -= 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Normalise an array of words to a strict 13 bits per word. Returned
+ * value is the resulting carry. The source (w) and destination (d)
+ * arrays may be identical, but shall not overlap partially.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+norm13(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *w, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t u;
+ uint32_t cc;
+
+ cc = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ int32_t z;
+
+ z = w[u] + cc;
+ d[u] = z & 0x1FFF;
+ cc = ARSH(z, 13);
+ }
+ return cc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * mul20() multiplies two 260-bit integers together. Each word must fit
+ * on 13 bits; source operands use 20 words, destination operand
+ * receives 40 words. All overlaps allowed.
+ *
+ * square20() computes the square of a 260-bit integer. Each word must
+ * fit on 13 bits; source operand uses 20 words, destination operand
+ * receives 40 words. All overlaps allowed.
+ */
+
+#if BR_SLOW_MUL15
+
+static void
+mul20(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ /*
+ * Two-level Karatsuba: turns a 20x20 multiplication into
+ * nine 5x5 multiplications. We use 13-bit words but do not
+ * propagate carries immediately, so words may expand:
+ *
+ * - First Karatsuba decomposition turns the 20x20 mul on
+ * 13-bit words into three 10x10 muls, two on 13-bit words
+ * and one on 14-bit words.
+ *
+ * - Second Karatsuba decomposition further splits these into:
+ *
+ * * four 5x5 muls on 13-bit words
+ * * four 5x5 muls on 14-bit words
+ * * one 5x5 mul on 15-bit words
+ *
+ * Highest word value is 8191, 16382 or 32764, for 13-bit, 14-bit
+ * or 15-bit words, respectively.
+ */
+ uint32_t u[45], v[45], w[90];
+ uint32_t cc;
+ int i;
+
+#define ZADD(dw, d_off, s1w, s1_off, s2w, s2_off) do { \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 0] = (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 0] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 0]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 1] = (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 1] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 1]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 2] = (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 2] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 2]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 3] = (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 3] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 3]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 4] = (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 4] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 4]; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define ZADDT(dw, d_off, sw, s_off) do { \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 0] += (sw)[5 * (s_off) + 0]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 1] += (sw)[5 * (s_off) + 1]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 2] += (sw)[5 * (s_off) + 2]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 3] += (sw)[5 * (s_off) + 3]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 4] += (sw)[5 * (s_off) + 4]; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define ZSUB2F(dw, d_off, s1w, s1_off, s2w, s2_off) do { \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 0] -= (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 0] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 0]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 1] -= (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 1] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 1]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 2] -= (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 2] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 2]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 3] -= (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 3] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 3]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 4] -= (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 4] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 4]; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define CPR1(w, cprcc) do { \
+ uint32_t cprz = (w) + cprcc; \
+ (w) = cprz & 0x1FFF; \
+ cprcc = cprz >> 13; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define CPR(dw, d_off) do { \
+ uint32_t cprcc; \
+ cprcc = 0; \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 0], cprcc); \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 1], cprcc); \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 2], cprcc); \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 3], cprcc); \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 4], cprcc); \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 5], cprcc); \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 6], cprcc); \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 7], cprcc); \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 8], cprcc); \
+ (dw)[(d_off) + 9] = cprcc; \
+ } while (0)
+
+ memcpy(u, a, 20 * sizeof *a);
+ ZADD(u, 4, a, 0, a, 1);
+ ZADD(u, 5, a, 2, a, 3);
+ ZADD(u, 6, a, 0, a, 2);
+ ZADD(u, 7, a, 1, a, 3);
+ ZADD(u, 8, u, 6, u, 7);
+
+ memcpy(v, b, 20 * sizeof *b);
+ ZADD(v, 4, b, 0, b, 1);
+ ZADD(v, 5, b, 2, b, 3);
+ ZADD(v, 6, b, 0, b, 2);
+ ZADD(v, 7, b, 1, b, 3);
+ ZADD(v, 8, v, 6, v, 7);
+
+ /*
+ * Do the eight first 8x8 muls. Source words are at most 16382
+ * each, so we can add product results together "as is" in 32-bit
+ * words.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 40; i += 5) {
+ w[(i << 1) + 0] = MUL15(u[i + 0], v[i + 0]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 1] = MUL15(u[i + 0], v[i + 1])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 1], v[i + 0]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 2] = MUL15(u[i + 0], v[i + 2])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 1], v[i + 1])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 2], v[i + 0]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 3] = MUL15(u[i + 0], v[i + 3])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 1], v[i + 2])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 2], v[i + 1])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 3], v[i + 0]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 4] = MUL15(u[i + 0], v[i + 4])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 1], v[i + 3])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 2], v[i + 2])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 3], v[i + 1])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 4], v[i + 0]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 5] = MUL15(u[i + 1], v[i + 4])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 2], v[i + 3])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 3], v[i + 2])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 4], v[i + 1]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 6] = MUL15(u[i + 2], v[i + 4])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 3], v[i + 3])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 4], v[i + 2]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 7] = MUL15(u[i + 3], v[i + 4])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 4], v[i + 3]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 8] = MUL15(u[i + 4], v[i + 4]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 9] = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For the 9th multiplication, source words are up to 32764,
+ * so we must do some carry propagation. If we add up to
+ * 4 products and the carry is no more than 524224, then the
+ * result fits in 32 bits, and the next carry will be no more
+ * than 524224 (because 4*(32764^2)+524224 < 8192*524225).
+ *
+ * We thus just skip one of the products in the middle word,
+ * then do a carry propagation (this reduces words to 13 bits
+ * each, except possibly the last, which may use up to 17 bits
+ * or so), then add the missing product.
+ */
+ w[80 + 0] = MUL15(u[40 + 0], v[40 + 0]);
+ w[80 + 1] = MUL15(u[40 + 0], v[40 + 1])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 1], v[40 + 0]);
+ w[80 + 2] = MUL15(u[40 + 0], v[40 + 2])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 1], v[40 + 1])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 2], v[40 + 0]);
+ w[80 + 3] = MUL15(u[40 + 0], v[40 + 3])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 1], v[40 + 2])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 2], v[40 + 1])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 3], v[40 + 0]);
+ w[80 + 4] = MUL15(u[40 + 0], v[40 + 4])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 1], v[40 + 3])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 2], v[40 + 2])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 3], v[40 + 1]);
+ /* + MUL15(u[40 + 4], v[40 + 0]) */
+ w[80 + 5] = MUL15(u[40 + 1], v[40 + 4])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 2], v[40 + 3])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 3], v[40 + 2])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 4], v[40 + 1]);
+ w[80 + 6] = MUL15(u[40 + 2], v[40 + 4])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 3], v[40 + 3])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 4], v[40 + 2]);
+ w[80 + 7] = MUL15(u[40 + 3], v[40 + 4])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 4], v[40 + 3]);
+ w[80 + 8] = MUL15(u[40 + 4], v[40 + 4]);
+
+ CPR(w, 80);
+
+ w[80 + 4] += MUL15(u[40 + 4], v[40 + 0]);
+
+ /*
+ * The products on 14-bit words in slots 6 and 7 yield values
+ * up to 5*(16382^2) each, and we need to subtract two such
+ * values from the higher word. We need the subtraction to fit
+ * in a _signed_ 32-bit integer, i.e. 31 bits + a sign bit.
+ * However, 10*(16382^2) does not fit. So we must perform a
+ * bit of reduction here.
+ */
+ CPR(w, 60);
+ CPR(w, 70);
+
+ /*
+ * Recompose results.
+ */
+
+ /* 0..1*0..1 into 0..3 */
+ ZSUB2F(w, 8, w, 0, w, 2);
+ ZSUB2F(w, 9, w, 1, w, 3);
+ ZADDT(w, 1, w, 8);
+ ZADDT(w, 2, w, 9);
+
+ /* 2..3*2..3 into 4..7 */
+ ZSUB2F(w, 10, w, 4, w, 6);
+ ZSUB2F(w, 11, w, 5, w, 7);
+ ZADDT(w, 5, w, 10);
+ ZADDT(w, 6, w, 11);
+
+ /* (0..1+2..3)*(0..1+2..3) into 12..15 */
+ ZSUB2F(w, 16, w, 12, w, 14);
+ ZSUB2F(w, 17, w, 13, w, 15);
+ ZADDT(w, 13, w, 16);
+ ZADDT(w, 14, w, 17);
+
+ /* first-level recomposition */
+ ZSUB2F(w, 12, w, 0, w, 4);
+ ZSUB2F(w, 13, w, 1, w, 5);
+ ZSUB2F(w, 14, w, 2, w, 6);
+ ZSUB2F(w, 15, w, 3, w, 7);
+ ZADDT(w, 2, w, 12);
+ ZADDT(w, 3, w, 13);
+ ZADDT(w, 4, w, 14);
+ ZADDT(w, 5, w, 15);
+
+ /*
+ * Perform carry propagation to bring all words down to 13 bits.
+ */
+ cc = norm13(d, w, 40);
+ d[39] += (cc << 13);
+
+#undef ZADD
+#undef ZADDT
+#undef ZSUB2F
+#undef CPR1
+#undef CPR
+}
+
+static inline void
+square20(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a)
+{
+ mul20(d, a, a);
+}
+
+#else
+
+static void
+mul20(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ uint32_t t[39];
+
+ t[ 0] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 1] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 2] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 3] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 4] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 5] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 6] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 7] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 8] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 9] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 0]);
+ t[10] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 0]);
+ t[11] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 0]);
+ t[12] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 0]);
+ t[13] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 0]);
+ t[14] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 0]);
+ t[15] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 0]);
+ t[16] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 0]);
+ t[17] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 0]);
+ t[18] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 0]);
+ t[19] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 0]);
+ t[20] = MUL15(a[ 1], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 1]);
+ t[21] = MUL15(a[ 2], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 2]);
+ t[22] = MUL15(a[ 3], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 3]);
+ t[23] = MUL15(a[ 4], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 4]);
+ t[24] = MUL15(a[ 5], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 5]);
+ t[25] = MUL15(a[ 6], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 6]);
+ t[26] = MUL15(a[ 7], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 7]);
+ t[27] = MUL15(a[ 8], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 8]);
+ t[28] = MUL15(a[ 9], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 9]);
+ t[29] = MUL15(a[10], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[10]);
+ t[30] = MUL15(a[11], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[11]);
+ t[31] = MUL15(a[12], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[12]);
+ t[32] = MUL15(a[13], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[13]);
+ t[33] = MUL15(a[14], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[14]);
+ t[34] = MUL15(a[15], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[15]);
+ t[35] = MUL15(a[16], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[16]);
+ t[36] = MUL15(a[17], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[17]);
+ t[37] = MUL15(a[18], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[18]);
+ t[38] = MUL15(a[19], b[19]);
+
+ d[39] = norm13(d, t, 39);
+}
+
+static void
+square20(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a)
+{
+ uint32_t t[39];
+
+ t[ 0] = MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 0]);
+ t[ 1] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 1])) << 1);
+ t[ 2] = MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 1])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 2])) << 1);
+ t[ 3] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 2])) << 1);
+ t[ 4] = MUL15(a[ 2], a[ 2])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 3])) << 1);
+ t[ 5] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[ 3])) << 1);
+ t[ 6] = MUL15(a[ 3], a[ 3])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[ 4])) << 1);
+ t[ 7] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[ 4])) << 1);
+ t[ 8] = MUL15(a[ 4], a[ 4])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[ 5])) << 1);
+ t[ 9] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[ 5])) << 1);
+ t[10] = MUL15(a[ 5], a[ 5])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[ 6])) << 1);
+ t[11] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[ 6])) << 1);
+ t[12] = MUL15(a[ 6], a[ 6])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[ 7])) << 1);
+ t[13] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[ 7])) << 1);
+ t[14] = MUL15(a[ 7], a[ 7])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[ 8])) << 1);
+ t[15] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[ 8])) << 1);
+ t[16] = MUL15(a[ 8], a[ 8])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[ 9])) << 1);
+ t[17] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[ 9])) << 1);
+ t[18] = MUL15(a[ 9], a[ 9])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[10])) << 1);
+ t[19] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[10])) << 1);
+ t[20] = MUL15(a[10], a[10])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 1], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[11])) << 1);
+ t[21] = ((MUL15(a[ 2], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[10], a[11])) << 1);
+ t[22] = MUL15(a[11], a[11])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 3], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[10], a[12])) << 1);
+ t[23] = ((MUL15(a[ 4], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[10], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[11], a[12])) << 1);
+ t[24] = MUL15(a[12], a[12])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 5], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[10], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[11], a[13])) << 1);
+ t[25] = ((MUL15(a[ 6], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[10], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[11], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[12], a[13])) << 1);
+ t[26] = MUL15(a[13], a[13])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 7], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[10], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[11], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[12], a[14])) << 1);
+ t[27] = ((MUL15(a[ 8], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[10], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[11], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[12], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[13], a[14])) << 1);
+ t[28] = MUL15(a[14], a[14])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 9], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[10], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[11], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[12], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[13], a[15])) << 1);
+ t[29] = ((MUL15(a[10], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[11], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[12], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[13], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[14], a[15])) << 1);
+ t[30] = MUL15(a[15], a[15])
+ + ((MUL15(a[11], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[12], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[13], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[14], a[16])) << 1);
+ t[31] = ((MUL15(a[12], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[13], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[14], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[15], a[16])) << 1);
+ t[32] = MUL15(a[16], a[16])
+ + ((MUL15(a[13], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[14], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[15], a[17])) << 1);
+ t[33] = ((MUL15(a[14], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[15], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[16], a[17])) << 1);
+ t[34] = MUL15(a[17], a[17])
+ + ((MUL15(a[15], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[16], a[18])) << 1);
+ t[35] = ((MUL15(a[16], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[17], a[18])) << 1);
+ t[36] = MUL15(a[18], a[18])
+ + ((MUL15(a[17], a[19])) << 1);
+ t[37] = ((MUL15(a[18], a[19])) << 1);
+ t[38] = MUL15(a[19], a[19]);
+
+ d[39] = norm13(d, t, 39);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Perform a "final reduction" in field F255 (field for Curve25519)
+ * The source value must be less than twice the modulus. If the value
+ * is not lower than the modulus, then the modulus is subtracted and
+ * this function returns 1; otherwise, it leaves it untouched and it
+ * returns 0.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+reduce_final_f255(uint32_t *d)
+{
+ uint32_t t[20];
+ uint32_t cc;
+ int i;
+
+ memcpy(t, d, sizeof t);
+ cc = 19;
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ uint32_t w;
+
+ w = t[i] + cc;
+ cc = w >> 13;
+ t[i] = w & 0x1FFF;
+ }
+ cc = t[19] >> 8;
+ t[19] &= 0xFF;
+ CCOPY(cc, d, t, sizeof t);
+ return cc;
+}
+
+static void
+f255_mulgen(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b, int square)
+{
+ uint32_t t[40], cc, w;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute raw multiplication. All result words fit in 13 bits
+ * each; upper word (t[39]) must fit on 5 bits, since the product
+ * of two 256-bit integers must fit on 512 bits.
+ */
+ if (square) {
+ square20(t, a);
+ } else {
+ mul20(t, a, b);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Modular reduction: each high word is added where necessary.
+ * Since the modulus is 2^255-19 and word 20 corresponds to
+ * offset 20*13 = 260, word 20+k must be added to word k with
+ * a factor of 19*2^5 = 608. The extra bits in word 19 are also
+ * added that way.
+ */
+ cc = MUL15(t[19] >> 8, 19);
+ t[19] &= 0xFF;
+
+#define MM1(x) do { \
+ w = t[x] + cc + MUL15(t[(x) + 20], 608); \
+ t[x] = w & 0x1FFF; \
+ cc = w >> 13; \
+ } while (0)
+
+ MM1( 0);
+ MM1( 1);
+ MM1( 2);
+ MM1( 3);
+ MM1( 4);
+ MM1( 5);
+ MM1( 6);
+ MM1( 7);
+ MM1( 8);
+ MM1( 9);
+ MM1(10);
+ MM1(11);
+ MM1(12);
+ MM1(13);
+ MM1(14);
+ MM1(15);
+ MM1(16);
+ MM1(17);
+ MM1(18);
+ MM1(19);
+
+#undef MM1
+
+ cc = MUL15(w >> 8, 19);
+ t[19] &= 0xFF;
+
+#define MM2(x) do { \
+ w = t[x] + cc; \
+ d[x] = w & 0x1FFF; \
+ cc = w >> 13; \
+ } while (0)
+
+ MM2( 0);
+ MM2( 1);
+ MM2( 2);
+ MM2( 3);
+ MM2( 4);
+ MM2( 5);
+ MM2( 6);
+ MM2( 7);
+ MM2( 8);
+ MM2( 9);
+ MM2(10);
+ MM2(11);
+ MM2(12);
+ MM2(13);
+ MM2(14);
+ MM2(15);
+ MM2(16);
+ MM2(17);
+ MM2(18);
+ MM2(19);
+
+#undef MM2
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform a multiplication of two integers modulo 2^255-19.
+ * Operands are arrays of 20 words, each containing 13 bits of data, in
+ * little-endian order. Input value may be up to 2^256-1; on output, value
+ * fits on 256 bits and is lower than twice the modulus.
+ *
+ * f255_mul() is the general multiplication, f255_square() is specialised
+ * for squarings.
+ */
+#define f255_mul(d, a, b) f255_mulgen(d, a, b, 0)
+#define f255_square(d, a) f255_mulgen(d, a, a, 1)
+
+/*
+ * Add two values in F255. Partial reduction is performed (down to less
+ * than twice the modulus).
+ */
+static void
+f255_add(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ int i;
+ uint32_t cc, w;
+
+ cc = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ w = a[i] + b[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = w & 0x1FFF;
+ cc = w >> 13;
+ }
+ cc = MUL15(w >> 8, 19);
+ d[19] &= 0xFF;
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ w = d[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = w & 0x1FFF;
+ cc = w >> 13;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Subtract one value from another in F255. Partial reduction is
+ * performed (down to less than twice the modulus).
+ */
+static void
+f255_sub(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ /*
+ * We actually compute a - b + 2*p, so that the final value is
+ * necessarily positive.
+ */
+ int i;
+ uint32_t cc, w;
+
+ cc = (uint32_t)-38;
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ w = a[i] - b[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = w & 0x1FFF;
+ cc = ARSH(w, 13);
+ }
+ cc = MUL15((w + 0x200) >> 8, 19);
+ d[19] &= 0xFF;
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ w = d[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = w & 0x1FFF;
+ cc = w >> 13;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiply an integer by the 'A24' constant (121665). Partial reduction
+ * is performed (down to less than twice the modulus).
+ */
+static void
+f255_mul_a24(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a)
+{
+ int i;
+ uint32_t cc, w;
+
+ cc = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ w = MUL15(a[i], 121665) + cc;
+ d[i] = w & 0x1FFF;
+ cc = w >> 13;
+ }
+ cc = MUL15(w >> 8, 19);
+ d[19] &= 0xFF;
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ w = d[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = w & 0x1FFF;
+ cc = w >> 13;
+ }
+}
+
+static const unsigned char GEN[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ORDER[] = {
+ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
+};
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_generator(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return GEN;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_order(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return ORDER;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_xoff(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+cswap(uint32_t *a, uint32_t *b, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ ctl = -ctl;
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ uint32_t aw, bw, tw;
+
+ aw = a[i];
+ bw = b[i];
+ tw = ctl & (aw ^ bw);
+ a[i] = aw ^ tw;
+ b[i] = bw ^ tw;
+ }
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_mul(unsigned char *G, size_t Glen,
+ const unsigned char *kb, size_t kblen, int curve)
+{
+ uint32_t x1[20], x2[20], x3[20], z2[20], z3[20];
+ uint32_t a[20], aa[20], b[20], bb[20];
+ uint32_t c[20], d[20], e[20], da[20], cb[20];
+ unsigned char k[32];
+ uint32_t swap;
+ int i;
+
+ (void)curve;
+
+ /*
+ * Points are encoded over exactly 32 bytes. Multipliers must fit
+ * in 32 bytes as well.
+ * RFC 7748 mandates that the high bit of the last point byte must
+ * be ignored/cleared.
+ */
+ if (Glen != 32 || kblen > 32) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ G[31] &= 0x7F;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialise variables x1, x2, z2, x3 and z3. We set all of them
+ * into Montgomery representation.
+ */
+ x1[19] = le8_to_le13(x1, G, 32);
+ memcpy(x3, x1, sizeof x1);
+ memset(z2, 0, sizeof z2);
+ memset(x2, 0, sizeof x2);
+ x2[0] = 1;
+ memset(z3, 0, sizeof z3);
+ z3[0] = 1;
+
+ memset(k, 0, (sizeof k) - kblen);
+ memcpy(k + (sizeof k) - kblen, kb, kblen);
+ k[31] &= 0xF8;
+ k[0] &= 0x7F;
+ k[0] |= 0x40;
+
+ /* obsolete
+ print_int("x1", x1);
+ */
+
+ swap = 0;
+ for (i = 254; i >= 0; i --) {
+ uint32_t kt;
+
+ kt = (k[31 - (i >> 3)] >> (i & 7)) & 1;
+ swap ^= kt;
+ cswap(x2, x3, swap);
+ cswap(z2, z3, swap);
+ swap = kt;
+
+ /* obsolete
+ print_int("x2", x2);
+ print_int("z2", z2);
+ print_int("x3", x3);
+ print_int("z3", z3);
+ */
+
+ f255_add(a, x2, z2);
+ f255_square(aa, a);
+ f255_sub(b, x2, z2);
+ f255_square(bb, b);
+ f255_sub(e, aa, bb);
+ f255_add(c, x3, z3);
+ f255_sub(d, x3, z3);
+ f255_mul(da, d, a);
+ f255_mul(cb, c, b);
+
+ /* obsolete
+ print_int("a ", a);
+ print_int("aa", aa);
+ print_int("b ", b);
+ print_int("bb", bb);
+ print_int("e ", e);
+ print_int("c ", c);
+ print_int("d ", d);
+ print_int("da", da);
+ print_int("cb", cb);
+ */
+
+ f255_add(x3, da, cb);
+ f255_square(x3, x3);
+ f255_sub(z3, da, cb);
+ f255_square(z3, z3);
+ f255_mul(z3, z3, x1);
+ f255_mul(x2, aa, bb);
+ f255_mul_a24(z2, e);
+ f255_add(z2, z2, aa);
+ f255_mul(z2, e, z2);
+
+ /* obsolete
+ print_int("x2", x2);
+ print_int("z2", z2);
+ print_int("x3", x3);
+ print_int("z3", z3);
+ */
+ }
+ cswap(x2, x3, swap);
+ cswap(z2, z3, swap);
+
+ /*
+ * Inverse z2 with a modular exponentiation. This is a simple
+ * square-and-multiply algorithm; we mutualise most non-squarings
+ * since the exponent contains almost only ones.
+ */
+ memcpy(a, z2, sizeof z2);
+ for (i = 0; i < 15; i ++) {
+ f255_square(a, a);
+ f255_mul(a, a, z2);
+ }
+ memcpy(b, a, sizeof a);
+ for (i = 0; i < 14; i ++) {
+ int j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < 16; j ++) {
+ f255_square(b, b);
+ }
+ f255_mul(b, b, a);
+ }
+ for (i = 14; i >= 0; i --) {
+ f255_square(b, b);
+ if ((0xFFEB >> i) & 1) {
+ f255_mul(b, z2, b);
+ }
+ }
+ f255_mul(x2, x2, b);
+ reduce_final_f255(x2);
+ le13_to_le8(G, 32, x2);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_mulgen(unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve)
+{
+ const unsigned char *G;
+ size_t Glen;
+
+ G = api_generator(curve, &Glen);
+ memcpy(R, G, Glen);
+ api_mul(R, Glen, x, xlen, curve);
+ return Glen;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_muladd(unsigned char *A, const unsigned char *B, size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *y, size_t ylen, int curve)
+{
+ /*
+ * We don't implement this method, since it is used for ECDSA
+ * only, and there is no ECDSA over Curve25519 (which instead
+ * uses EdDSA).
+ */
+ (void)A;
+ (void)B;
+ (void)len;
+ (void)x;
+ (void)xlen;
+ (void)y;
+ (void)ylen;
+ (void)curve;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl br_ec_c25519_m15 = {
+ (uint32_t)0x20000000,
+ &api_generator,
+ &api_order,
+ &api_xoff,
+ &api_mul,
+ &api_mulgen,
+ &api_muladd
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_m31.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_m31.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1dd6d51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_m31.c
@@ -0,0 +1,800 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* obsolete
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+static void
+print_int(const char *name, const uint32_t *x)
+{
+ size_t u;
+ unsigned char tmp[40];
+
+ printf("%s = ", name);
+ for (u = 0; u < 9; u ++) {
+ if (x[u] > 0x3FFFFFFF) {
+ printf("INVALID:");
+ for (u = 0; u < 9; u ++) {
+ printf(" %08X", x[u]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ memset(tmp, 0, sizeof tmp);
+ for (u = 0; u < 9; u ++) {
+ uint64_t w;
+ int j, k;
+
+ w = x[u];
+ j = 30 * (int)u;
+ k = j & 7;
+ if (k != 0) {
+ w <<= k;
+ j -= k;
+ }
+ k = j >> 3;
+ for (j = 0; j < 8; j ++) {
+ tmp[39 - k - j] |= (unsigned char)w;
+ w >>= 8;
+ }
+ }
+ for (u = 8; u < 40; u ++) {
+ printf("%02X", tmp[u]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+}
+*/
+
+/*
+ * If BR_NO_ARITH_SHIFT is undefined, or defined to 0, then we _assume_
+ * that right-shifting a signed negative integer copies the sign bit
+ * (arithmetic right-shift). This is "implementation-defined behaviour",
+ * i.e. it is not undefined, but it may differ between compilers. Each
+ * compiler is supposed to document its behaviour in that respect. GCC
+ * explicitly defines that an arithmetic right shift is used. We expect
+ * all other compilers to do the same, because underlying CPU offer an
+ * arithmetic right shift opcode that could not be used otherwise.
+ */
+#if BR_NO_ARITH_SHIFT
+#define ARSH(x, n) (((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)) \
+ | ((-((uint32_t)(x) >> 31)) << (32 - (n))))
+#else
+#define ARSH(x, n) ((*(int32_t *)&(x)) >> (n))
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Convert an integer from unsigned little-endian encoding to a sequence of
+ * 30-bit words in little-endian order. The final "partial" word is
+ * returned.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+le8_to_le30(uint32_t *dst, const unsigned char *src, size_t len)
+{
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len;
+
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ uint32_t b;
+
+ b = *src ++;
+ if (acc_len < 22) {
+ acc |= b << acc_len;
+ acc_len += 8;
+ } else {
+ *dst ++ = (acc | (b << acc_len)) & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ acc = b >> (30 - acc_len);
+ acc_len -= 22;
+ }
+ }
+ return acc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert an integer (30-bit words, little-endian) to unsigned
+ * little-endian encoding. The total encoding length is provided; all
+ * the destination bytes will be filled.
+ */
+static void
+le30_to_le8(unsigned char *dst, size_t len, const uint32_t *src)
+{
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len;
+
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ if (acc_len < 8) {
+ uint32_t w;
+
+ w = *src ++;
+ *dst ++ = (unsigned char)(acc | (w << acc_len));
+ acc = w >> (8 - acc_len);
+ acc_len += 22;
+ } else {
+ *dst ++ = (unsigned char)acc;
+ acc >>= 8;
+ acc_len -= 8;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiply two integers. Source integers are represented as arrays of
+ * nine 30-bit words, for values up to 2^270-1. Result is encoded over
+ * 18 words of 30 bits each.
+ */
+static void
+mul9(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ /*
+ * Maximum intermediate result is no more than
+ * 10376293531797946367, which fits in 64 bits. Reason:
+ *
+ * 10376293531797946367 = 9 * (2^30-1)^2 + 9663676406
+ * 10376293531797946367 < 9663676407 * 2^30
+ *
+ * Thus, adding together 9 products of 30-bit integers, with
+ * a carry of at most 9663676406, yields an integer that fits
+ * on 64 bits and generates a carry of at most 9663676406.
+ */
+ uint64_t t[17];
+ uint64_t cc;
+ int i;
+
+ t[ 0] = MUL31(a[0], b[0]);
+ t[ 1] = MUL31(a[0], b[1])
+ + MUL31(a[1], b[0]);
+ t[ 2] = MUL31(a[0], b[2])
+ + MUL31(a[1], b[1])
+ + MUL31(a[2], b[0]);
+ t[ 3] = MUL31(a[0], b[3])
+ + MUL31(a[1], b[2])
+ + MUL31(a[2], b[1])
+ + MUL31(a[3], b[0]);
+ t[ 4] = MUL31(a[0], b[4])
+ + MUL31(a[1], b[3])
+ + MUL31(a[2], b[2])
+ + MUL31(a[3], b[1])
+ + MUL31(a[4], b[0]);
+ t[ 5] = MUL31(a[0], b[5])
+ + MUL31(a[1], b[4])
+ + MUL31(a[2], b[3])
+ + MUL31(a[3], b[2])
+ + MUL31(a[4], b[1])
+ + MUL31(a[5], b[0]);
+ t[ 6] = MUL31(a[0], b[6])
+ + MUL31(a[1], b[5])
+ + MUL31(a[2], b[4])
+ + MUL31(a[3], b[3])
+ + MUL31(a[4], b[2])
+ + MUL31(a[5], b[1])
+ + MUL31(a[6], b[0]);
+ t[ 7] = MUL31(a[0], b[7])
+ + MUL31(a[1], b[6])
+ + MUL31(a[2], b[5])
+ + MUL31(a[3], b[4])
+ + MUL31(a[4], b[3])
+ + MUL31(a[5], b[2])
+ + MUL31(a[6], b[1])
+ + MUL31(a[7], b[0]);
+ t[ 8] = MUL31(a[0], b[8])
+ + MUL31(a[1], b[7])
+ + MUL31(a[2], b[6])
+ + MUL31(a[3], b[5])
+ + MUL31(a[4], b[4])
+ + MUL31(a[5], b[3])
+ + MUL31(a[6], b[2])
+ + MUL31(a[7], b[1])
+ + MUL31(a[8], b[0]);
+ t[ 9] = MUL31(a[1], b[8])
+ + MUL31(a[2], b[7])
+ + MUL31(a[3], b[6])
+ + MUL31(a[4], b[5])
+ + MUL31(a[5], b[4])
+ + MUL31(a[6], b[3])
+ + MUL31(a[7], b[2])
+ + MUL31(a[8], b[1]);
+ t[10] = MUL31(a[2], b[8])
+ + MUL31(a[3], b[7])
+ + MUL31(a[4], b[6])
+ + MUL31(a[5], b[5])
+ + MUL31(a[6], b[4])
+ + MUL31(a[7], b[3])
+ + MUL31(a[8], b[2]);
+ t[11] = MUL31(a[3], b[8])
+ + MUL31(a[4], b[7])
+ + MUL31(a[5], b[6])
+ + MUL31(a[6], b[5])
+ + MUL31(a[7], b[4])
+ + MUL31(a[8], b[3]);
+ t[12] = MUL31(a[4], b[8])
+ + MUL31(a[5], b[7])
+ + MUL31(a[6], b[6])
+ + MUL31(a[7], b[5])
+ + MUL31(a[8], b[4]);
+ t[13] = MUL31(a[5], b[8])
+ + MUL31(a[6], b[7])
+ + MUL31(a[7], b[6])
+ + MUL31(a[8], b[5]);
+ t[14] = MUL31(a[6], b[8])
+ + MUL31(a[7], b[7])
+ + MUL31(a[8], b[6]);
+ t[15] = MUL31(a[7], b[8])
+ + MUL31(a[8], b[7]);
+ t[16] = MUL31(a[8], b[8]);
+
+ /*
+ * Propagate carries.
+ */
+ cc = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 17; i ++) {
+ uint64_t w;
+
+ w = t[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = (uint32_t)w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = w >> 30;
+ }
+ d[17] = (uint32_t)cc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Square a 270-bit integer, represented as an array of nine 30-bit words.
+ * Result uses 18 words of 30 bits each.
+ */
+static void
+square9(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a)
+{
+ uint64_t t[17];
+ uint64_t cc;
+ int i;
+
+ t[ 0] = MUL31(a[0], a[0]);
+ t[ 1] = ((MUL31(a[0], a[1])) << 1);
+ t[ 2] = MUL31(a[1], a[1])
+ + ((MUL31(a[0], a[2])) << 1);
+ t[ 3] = ((MUL31(a[0], a[3])
+ + MUL31(a[1], a[2])) << 1);
+ t[ 4] = MUL31(a[2], a[2])
+ + ((MUL31(a[0], a[4])
+ + MUL31(a[1], a[3])) << 1);
+ t[ 5] = ((MUL31(a[0], a[5])
+ + MUL31(a[1], a[4])
+ + MUL31(a[2], a[3])) << 1);
+ t[ 6] = MUL31(a[3], a[3])
+ + ((MUL31(a[0], a[6])
+ + MUL31(a[1], a[5])
+ + MUL31(a[2], a[4])) << 1);
+ t[ 7] = ((MUL31(a[0], a[7])
+ + MUL31(a[1], a[6])
+ + MUL31(a[2], a[5])
+ + MUL31(a[3], a[4])) << 1);
+ t[ 8] = MUL31(a[4], a[4])
+ + ((MUL31(a[0], a[8])
+ + MUL31(a[1], a[7])
+ + MUL31(a[2], a[6])
+ + MUL31(a[3], a[5])) << 1);
+ t[ 9] = ((MUL31(a[1], a[8])
+ + MUL31(a[2], a[7])
+ + MUL31(a[3], a[6])
+ + MUL31(a[4], a[5])) << 1);
+ t[10] = MUL31(a[5], a[5])
+ + ((MUL31(a[2], a[8])
+ + MUL31(a[3], a[7])
+ + MUL31(a[4], a[6])) << 1);
+ t[11] = ((MUL31(a[3], a[8])
+ + MUL31(a[4], a[7])
+ + MUL31(a[5], a[6])) << 1);
+ t[12] = MUL31(a[6], a[6])
+ + ((MUL31(a[4], a[8])
+ + MUL31(a[5], a[7])) << 1);
+ t[13] = ((MUL31(a[5], a[8])
+ + MUL31(a[6], a[7])) << 1);
+ t[14] = MUL31(a[7], a[7])
+ + ((MUL31(a[6], a[8])) << 1);
+ t[15] = ((MUL31(a[7], a[8])) << 1);
+ t[16] = MUL31(a[8], a[8]);
+
+ /*
+ * Propagate carries.
+ */
+ cc = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 17; i ++) {
+ uint64_t w;
+
+ w = t[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = (uint32_t)w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = w >> 30;
+ }
+ d[17] = (uint32_t)cc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform a "final reduction" in field F255 (field for Curve25519)
+ * The source value must be less than twice the modulus. If the value
+ * is not lower than the modulus, then the modulus is subtracted and
+ * this function returns 1; otherwise, it leaves it untouched and it
+ * returns 0.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+reduce_final_f255(uint32_t *d)
+{
+ uint32_t t[9];
+ uint32_t cc;
+ int i;
+
+ memcpy(t, d, sizeof t);
+ cc = 19;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ uint32_t w;
+
+ w = t[i] + cc;
+ cc = w >> 30;
+ t[i] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ }
+ cc = t[8] >> 15;
+ t[8] &= 0x7FFF;
+ CCOPY(cc, d, t, sizeof t);
+ return cc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform a multiplication of two integers modulo 2^255-19.
+ * Operands are arrays of 9 words, each containing 30 bits of data, in
+ * little-endian order. Input value may be up to 2^256-1; on output, value
+ * fits on 256 bits and is lower than twice the modulus.
+ */
+static void
+f255_mul(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ uint32_t t[18], cc;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute raw multiplication. All result words fit in 30 bits
+ * each; upper word (t[17]) must fit on 2 bits, since the product
+ * of two 256-bit integers must fit on 512 bits.
+ */
+ mul9(t, a, b);
+
+ /*
+ * Modular reduction: each high word is added where necessary.
+ * Since the modulus is 2^255-19 and word 9 corresponds to
+ * offset 9*30 = 270, word 9+k must be added to word k with
+ * a factor of 19*2^15 = 622592. The extra bits in word 8 are also
+ * added that way.
+ *
+ * Keeping the carry on 32 bits helps with 32-bit architectures,
+ * and does not noticeably impact performance on 64-bit systems.
+ */
+ cc = MUL15(t[8] >> 15, 19); /* at most 19*(2^15-1) = 622573 */
+ t[8] &= 0x7FFF;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ uint64_t w;
+
+ w = (uint64_t)t[i] + (uint64_t)cc + MUL31(t[i + 9], 622592);
+ t[i] = (uint32_t)w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = (uint32_t)(w >> 30); /* at most 622592 */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Original product was up to (2^256-1)^2, i.e. a 512-bit integer.
+ * This was split into two parts (upper of 257 bits, lower of 255
+ * bits), and the upper was added to the lower with a factor 19,
+ * which means that the intermediate value is less than 77*2^255
+ * (19*2^257 + 2^255). Therefore, the extra bits "t[8] >> 15" are
+ * less than 77, and the initial carry cc is at most 76*19 = 1444.
+ */
+ cc = MUL15(t[8] >> 15, 19);
+ t[8] &= 0x7FFF;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ uint32_t z;
+
+ z = t[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = z & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = z >> 30;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Final result is at most 2^255 + 1443. In particular, the last
+ * carry is necessarily 0, since t[8] was truncated to 15 bits.
+ */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform a squaring of an integer modulo 2^255-19.
+ * Operands are arrays of 9 words, each containing 30 bits of data, in
+ * little-endian order. Input value may be up to 2^256-1; on output, value
+ * fits on 256 bits and is lower than twice the modulus.
+ */
+static void
+f255_square(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a)
+{
+ uint32_t t[18], cc;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute raw squaring. All result words fit in 30 bits
+ * each; upper word (t[17]) must fit on 2 bits, since the square
+ * of a 256-bit integers must fit on 512 bits.
+ */
+ square9(t, a);
+
+ /*
+ * Modular reduction: each high word is added where necessary.
+ * See f255_mul() for details on the reduction and carry limits.
+ */
+ cc = MUL15(t[8] >> 15, 19);
+ t[8] &= 0x7FFF;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ uint64_t w;
+
+ w = (uint64_t)t[i] + (uint64_t)cc + MUL31(t[i + 9], 622592);
+ t[i] = (uint32_t)w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = (uint32_t)(w >> 30);
+ }
+ cc = MUL15(t[8] >> 15, 19);
+ t[8] &= 0x7FFF;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ uint32_t z;
+
+ z = t[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = z & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = z >> 30;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add two values in F255. Partial reduction is performed (down to less
+ * than twice the modulus).
+ */
+static void
+f255_add(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ /*
+ * Since operand words fit on 30 bits, we can use 32-bit
+ * variables throughout.
+ */
+ int i;
+ uint32_t cc, w;
+
+ cc = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ w = a[i] + b[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = w >> 30;
+ }
+ cc = MUL15(w >> 15, 19);
+ d[8] &= 0x7FFF;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ w = d[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = w >> 30;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Subtract one value from another in F255. Partial reduction is
+ * performed (down to less than twice the modulus).
+ */
+static void
+f255_sub(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ /*
+ * We actually compute a - b + 2*p, so that the final value is
+ * necessarily positive.
+ */
+ int i;
+ uint32_t cc, w;
+
+ cc = (uint32_t)-38;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ w = a[i] - b[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = ARSH(w, 30);
+ }
+ cc = MUL15((w + 0x10000) >> 15, 19);
+ d[8] &= 0x7FFF;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ w = d[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = w >> 30;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiply an integer by the 'A24' constant (121665). Partial reduction
+ * is performed (down to less than twice the modulus).
+ */
+static void
+f255_mul_a24(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a)
+{
+ int i;
+ uint64_t w;
+ uint32_t cc;
+
+ /*
+ * a[] is over 256 bits, thus a[8] has length at most 16 bits.
+ * We single out the processing of the last word: intermediate
+ * value w is up to 121665*2^16, yielding a carry for the next
+ * loop of at most 19*(121665*2^16/2^15) = 4623289.
+ */
+ cc = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i ++) {
+ w = MUL31(a[i], 121665) + (uint64_t)cc;
+ d[i] = (uint32_t)w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = (uint32_t)(w >> 30);
+ }
+ w = MUL31(a[8], 121665) + (uint64_t)cc;
+ d[8] = (uint32_t)w & 0x7FFF;
+ cc = MUL15((uint32_t)(w >> 15), 19);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ uint32_t z;
+
+ z = d[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = z & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = z >> 30;
+ }
+}
+
+static const unsigned char GEN[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ORDER[] = {
+ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
+};
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_generator(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return GEN;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_order(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return ORDER;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_xoff(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+cswap(uint32_t *a, uint32_t *b, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ ctl = -ctl;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ uint32_t aw, bw, tw;
+
+ aw = a[i];
+ bw = b[i];
+ tw = ctl & (aw ^ bw);
+ a[i] = aw ^ tw;
+ b[i] = bw ^ tw;
+ }
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_mul(unsigned char *G, size_t Glen,
+ const unsigned char *kb, size_t kblen, int curve)
+{
+ uint32_t x1[9], x2[9], x3[9], z2[9], z3[9];
+ uint32_t a[9], aa[9], b[9], bb[9];
+ uint32_t c[9], d[9], e[9], da[9], cb[9];
+ unsigned char k[32];
+ uint32_t swap;
+ int i;
+
+ (void)curve;
+
+ /*
+ * Points are encoded over exactly 32 bytes. Multipliers must fit
+ * in 32 bytes as well.
+ * RFC 7748 mandates that the high bit of the last point byte must
+ * be ignored/cleared.
+ */
+ if (Glen != 32 || kblen > 32) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ G[31] &= 0x7F;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialise variables x1, x2, z2, x3 and z3. We set all of them
+ * into Montgomery representation.
+ */
+ x1[8] = le8_to_le30(x1, G, 32);
+ memcpy(x3, x1, sizeof x1);
+ memset(z2, 0, sizeof z2);
+ memset(x2, 0, sizeof x2);
+ x2[0] = 1;
+ memset(z3, 0, sizeof z3);
+ z3[0] = 1;
+
+ memset(k, 0, (sizeof k) - kblen);
+ memcpy(k + (sizeof k) - kblen, kb, kblen);
+ k[31] &= 0xF8;
+ k[0] &= 0x7F;
+ k[0] |= 0x40;
+
+ /* obsolete
+ print_int("x1", x1);
+ */
+
+ swap = 0;
+ for (i = 254; i >= 0; i --) {
+ uint32_t kt;
+
+ kt = (k[31 - (i >> 3)] >> (i & 7)) & 1;
+ swap ^= kt;
+ cswap(x2, x3, swap);
+ cswap(z2, z3, swap);
+ swap = kt;
+
+ /* obsolete
+ print_int("x2", x2);
+ print_int("z2", z2);
+ print_int("x3", x3);
+ print_int("z3", z3);
+ */
+
+ f255_add(a, x2, z2);
+ f255_square(aa, a);
+ f255_sub(b, x2, z2);
+ f255_square(bb, b);
+ f255_sub(e, aa, bb);
+ f255_add(c, x3, z3);
+ f255_sub(d, x3, z3);
+ f255_mul(da, d, a);
+ f255_mul(cb, c, b);
+
+ /* obsolete
+ print_int("a ", a);
+ print_int("aa", aa);
+ print_int("b ", b);
+ print_int("bb", bb);
+ print_int("e ", e);
+ print_int("c ", c);
+ print_int("d ", d);
+ print_int("da", da);
+ print_int("cb", cb);
+ */
+
+ f255_add(x3, da, cb);
+ f255_square(x3, x3);
+ f255_sub(z3, da, cb);
+ f255_square(z3, z3);
+ f255_mul(z3, z3, x1);
+ f255_mul(x2, aa, bb);
+ f255_mul_a24(z2, e);
+ f255_add(z2, z2, aa);
+ f255_mul(z2, e, z2);
+
+ /* obsolete
+ print_int("x2", x2);
+ print_int("z2", z2);
+ print_int("x3", x3);
+ print_int("z3", z3);
+ */
+ }
+ cswap(x2, x3, swap);
+ cswap(z2, z3, swap);
+
+ /*
+ * Inverse z2 with a modular exponentiation. This is a simple
+ * square-and-multiply algorithm; we mutualise most non-squarings
+ * since the exponent contains almost only ones.
+ */
+ memcpy(a, z2, sizeof z2);
+ for (i = 0; i < 15; i ++) {
+ f255_square(a, a);
+ f255_mul(a, a, z2);
+ }
+ memcpy(b, a, sizeof a);
+ for (i = 0; i < 14; i ++) {
+ int j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < 16; j ++) {
+ f255_square(b, b);
+ }
+ f255_mul(b, b, a);
+ }
+ for (i = 14; i >= 0; i --) {
+ f255_square(b, b);
+ if ((0xFFEB >> i) & 1) {
+ f255_mul(b, z2, b);
+ }
+ }
+ f255_mul(x2, x2, b);
+ reduce_final_f255(x2);
+ le30_to_le8(G, 32, x2);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_mulgen(unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve)
+{
+ const unsigned char *G;
+ size_t Glen;
+
+ G = api_generator(curve, &Glen);
+ memcpy(R, G, Glen);
+ api_mul(R, Glen, x, xlen, curve);
+ return Glen;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_muladd(unsigned char *A, const unsigned char *B, size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *y, size_t ylen, int curve)
+{
+ /*
+ * We don't implement this method, since it is used for ECDSA
+ * only, and there is no ECDSA over Curve25519 (which instead
+ * uses EdDSA).
+ */
+ (void)A;
+ (void)B;
+ (void)len;
+ (void)x;
+ (void)xlen;
+ (void)y;
+ (void)ylen;
+ (void)curve;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl br_ec_c25519_m31 = {
+ (uint32_t)0x20000000,
+ &api_generator,
+ &api_order,
+ &api_xoff,
+ &api_mul,
+ &api_mulgen,
+ &api_muladd
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_m62.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_m62.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b058eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_m62.c
@@ -0,0 +1,605 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+
+#if BR_UMUL128
+#include <intrin.h>
+#endif
+
+static const unsigned char GEN[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ORDER[] = {
+ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
+};
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_generator(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return GEN;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_order(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return ORDER;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_xoff(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * A field element is encoded as five 64-bit integers, in basis 2^51.
+ * Limbs may be occasionally larger than 2^51, to save on carry
+ * propagation costs.
+ */
+
+#define MASK51 (((uint64_t)1 << 51) - (uint64_t)1)
+
+/*
+ * Swap two field elements, conditionally on a flag.
+ */
+static inline void
+f255_cswap(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ uint64_t m, w;
+
+ m = -(uint64_t)ctl;
+ w = m & (a[0] ^ b[0]); a[0] ^= w; b[0] ^= w;
+ w = m & (a[1] ^ b[1]); a[1] ^= w; b[1] ^= w;
+ w = m & (a[2] ^ b[2]); a[2] ^= w; b[2] ^= w;
+ w = m & (a[3] ^ b[3]); a[3] ^= w; b[3] ^= w;
+ w = m & (a[4] ^ b[4]); a[4] ^= w; b[4] ^= w;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Addition with no carry propagation. Limbs double in size.
+ */
+static inline void
+f255_add(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a, const uint64_t *b)
+{
+ d[0] = a[0] + b[0];
+ d[1] = a[1] + b[1];
+ d[2] = a[2] + b[2];
+ d[3] = a[3] + b[3];
+ d[4] = a[4] + b[4];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Subtraction.
+ * On input, limbs must fit on 60 bits each. On output, result is
+ * partially reduced, with max value 2^255+19456; moreover, all
+ * limbs will fit on 51 bits, except the low limb, which may have
+ * value up to 2^51+19455.
+ */
+static inline void
+f255_sub(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a, const uint64_t *b)
+{
+ uint64_t cc, w;
+
+ /*
+ * We compute d = (2^255-19)*1024 + a - b. Since the limbs
+ * fit on 60 bits, the maximum value of operands are slightly
+ * more than 2^264, but much less than 2^265-19456. This
+ * ensures that the result is positive.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Initial carry is 19456, since we add 2^265-19456. Each
+ * individual subtraction may yield a carry up to 513.
+ */
+ w = a[0] - b[0] - 19456;
+ d[0] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = -(w >> 51) & 0x3FF;
+ w = a[1] - b[1] - cc;
+ d[1] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = -(w >> 51) & 0x3FF;
+ w = a[2] - b[2] - cc;
+ d[2] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = -(w >> 51) & 0x3FF;
+ w = a[3] - b[3] - cc;
+ d[3] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = -(w >> 51) & 0x3FF;
+ d[4] = ((uint64_t)1 << 61) + a[4] - b[4] - cc;
+
+ /*
+ * Partial reduction. The intermediate result may be up to
+ * slightly above 2^265, but less than 2^265+2^255. When we
+ * truncate to 255 bits, the upper bits will be at most 1024.
+ */
+ d[0] += 19 * (d[4] >> 51);
+ d[4] &= MASK51;
+}
+
+/*
+ * UMUL51(hi, lo, x, y) computes:
+ *
+ * hi = floor((x * y) / (2^51))
+ * lo = x * y mod 2^51
+ *
+ * Note that lo < 2^51, but "hi" may be larger, if the input operands are
+ * larger.
+ */
+#if BR_INT128
+
+#define UMUL51(hi, lo, x, y) do { \
+ unsigned __int128 umul_tmp; \
+ umul_tmp = (unsigned __int128)(x) * (unsigned __int128)(y); \
+ (hi) = (uint64_t)(umul_tmp >> 51); \
+ (lo) = (uint64_t)umul_tmp & MASK51; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#elif BR_UMUL128
+
+#define UMUL51(hi, lo, x, y) do { \
+ uint64_t umul_hi, umul_lo; \
+ umul_lo = _umul128((x), (y), &umul_hi); \
+ (hi) = (umul_hi << 13) | (umul_lo >> 51); \
+ (lo) = umul_lo & MASK51; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Multiplication.
+ * On input, limbs must fit on 54 bits each.
+ * On output, limb 0 is at most 2^51 + 155647, and other limbs fit
+ * on 51 bits each.
+ */
+static inline void
+f255_mul(uint64_t *d, uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b)
+{
+ uint64_t t[10], hi, lo, w, cc;
+
+ /*
+ * Perform cross products, accumulating values without carry
+ * propagation.
+ *
+ * Since input limbs fit on 54 bits each, each individual
+ * UMUL51 will produce a "hi" of less than 2^57. The maximum
+ * sum will be at most 5*(2^57-1) + 4*(2^51-1) (for t[5]),
+ * i.e. less than 324*2^51.
+ */
+
+ UMUL51(t[1], t[0], a[0], b[0]);
+
+ UMUL51(t[2], lo, a[1], b[0]); t[1] += lo;
+ UMUL51(hi, lo, a[0], b[1]); t[1] += lo; t[2] += hi;
+
+ UMUL51(t[3], lo, a[2], b[0]); t[2] += lo;
+ UMUL51(hi, lo, a[1], b[1]); t[2] += lo; t[3] += hi;
+ UMUL51(hi, lo, a[0], b[2]); t[2] += lo; t[3] += hi;
+
+ UMUL51(t[4], lo, a[3], b[0]); t[3] += lo;
+ UMUL51(hi, lo, a[2], b[1]); t[3] += lo; t[4] += hi;
+ UMUL51(hi, lo, a[1], b[2]); t[3] += lo; t[4] += hi;
+ UMUL51(hi, lo, a[0], b[3]); t[3] += lo; t[4] += hi;
+
+ UMUL51(t[5], lo, a[4], b[0]); t[4] += lo;
+ UMUL51(hi, lo, a[3], b[1]); t[4] += lo; t[5] += hi;
+ UMUL51(hi, lo, a[2], b[2]); t[4] += lo; t[5] += hi;
+ UMUL51(hi, lo, a[1], b[3]); t[4] += lo; t[5] += hi;
+ UMUL51(hi, lo, a[0], b[4]); t[4] += lo; t[5] += hi;
+
+ UMUL51(t[6], lo, a[4], b[1]); t[5] += lo;
+ UMUL51(hi, lo, a[3], b[2]); t[5] += lo; t[6] += hi;
+ UMUL51(hi, lo, a[2], b[3]); t[5] += lo; t[6] += hi;
+ UMUL51(hi, lo, a[1], b[4]); t[5] += lo; t[6] += hi;
+
+ UMUL51(t[7], lo, a[4], b[2]); t[6] += lo;
+ UMUL51(hi, lo, a[3], b[3]); t[6] += lo; t[7] += hi;
+ UMUL51(hi, lo, a[2], b[4]); t[6] += lo; t[7] += hi;
+
+ UMUL51(t[8], lo, a[4], b[3]); t[7] += lo;
+ UMUL51(hi, lo, a[3], b[4]); t[7] += lo; t[8] += hi;
+
+ UMUL51(t[9], lo, a[4], b[4]); t[8] += lo;
+
+ /*
+ * The upper words t[5]..t[9] are folded back into the lower
+ * words, using the rule that 2^255 = 19 in the field.
+ *
+ * Since each t[i] is less than 324*2^51, the additions below
+ * will yield less than 6480*2^51 in each limb; this fits in
+ * 64 bits (6480*2^51 < 8192*2^51 = 2^64), hence there is
+ * no overflow.
+ */
+ t[0] += 19 * t[5];
+ t[1] += 19 * t[6];
+ t[2] += 19 * t[7];
+ t[3] += 19 * t[8];
+ t[4] += 19 * t[9];
+
+ /*
+ * Propagate carries.
+ */
+ w = t[0];
+ d[0] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+ w = t[1] + cc;
+ d[1] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+ w = t[2] + cc;
+ d[2] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+ w = t[3] + cc;
+ d[3] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+ w = t[4] + cc;
+ d[4] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+
+ /*
+ * Since the limbs were 64-bit values, the top carry is at
+ * most 8192 (in practice, that cannot be reached). We simply
+ * performed a partial reduction.
+ */
+ d[0] += 19 * cc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiplication by A24 = 121665.
+ * Input must have limbs of 60 bits at most.
+ */
+static inline void
+f255_mul_a24(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a)
+{
+ uint64_t t[5], cc, w;
+
+ /*
+ * 121665 = 15 * 8111. We first multiply by 15, with carry
+ * propagation and partial reduction.
+ */
+ w = a[0] * 15;
+ t[0] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+ w = a[1] * 15 + cc;
+ t[1] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+ w = a[2] * 15 + cc;
+ t[2] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+ w = a[3] * 15 + cc;
+ t[3] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+ w = a[4] * 15 + cc;
+ t[4] = w & MASK51;
+ t[0] += 19 * (w >> 51);
+
+ /*
+ * Then multiplication by 8111. At that point, we known that
+ * t[0] is less than 2^51 + 19*8192, and other limbs are less
+ * than 2^51; thus, there will be no overflow.
+ */
+ w = t[0] * 8111;
+ d[0] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+ w = t[1] * 8111 + cc;
+ d[1] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+ w = t[2] * 8111 + cc;
+ d[2] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+ w = t[3] * 8111 + cc;
+ d[3] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+ w = t[4] * 8111 + cc;
+ d[4] = w & MASK51;
+ d[0] += 19 * (w >> 51);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finalize reduction.
+ * On input, limbs must fit on 51 bits, except possibly the low limb,
+ * which may be slightly above 2^51.
+ */
+static inline void
+f255_final_reduce(uint64_t *a)
+{
+ uint64_t t[5], cc, w;
+
+ /*
+ * We add 19. If the result (in t[]) is below 2^255, then a[]
+ * is already less than 2^255-19, thus already reduced.
+ * Otherwise, we subtract 2^255 from t[], in which case we
+ * have t = a - (2^255-19), and that's our result.
+ */
+ w = a[0] + 19;
+ t[0] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+ w = a[1] + cc;
+ t[1] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+ w = a[2] + cc;
+ t[2] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+ w = a[3] + cc;
+ t[3] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+ w = a[4] + cc;
+ t[4] = w & MASK51;
+ cc = w >> 51;
+
+ /*
+ * The bit 255 of t is in cc. If that bit is 0, when a[] must
+ * be unchanged; otherwise, it must be replaced with t[].
+ */
+ cc = -cc;
+ a[0] ^= cc & (a[0] ^ t[0]);
+ a[1] ^= cc & (a[1] ^ t[1]);
+ a[2] ^= cc & (a[2] ^ t[2]);
+ a[3] ^= cc & (a[3] ^ t[3]);
+ a[4] ^= cc & (a[4] ^ t[4]);
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_mul(unsigned char *G, size_t Glen,
+ const unsigned char *kb, size_t kblen, int curve)
+{
+ unsigned char k[32];
+ uint64_t x1[5], x2[5], z2[5], x3[5], z3[5];
+ uint32_t swap;
+ int i;
+
+ (void)curve;
+
+ /*
+ * Points are encoded over exactly 32 bytes. Multipliers must fit
+ * in 32 bytes as well.
+ */
+ if (Glen != 32 || kblen > 32) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 7748 mandates that the high bit of the last point byte must
+ * be ignored/cleared; the "& MASK51" in the initialization for
+ * x1[4] clears that bit.
+ */
+ x1[0] = br_dec64le(&G[0]) & MASK51;
+ x1[1] = (br_dec64le(&G[6]) >> 3) & MASK51;
+ x1[2] = (br_dec64le(&G[12]) >> 6) & MASK51;
+ x1[3] = (br_dec64le(&G[19]) >> 1) & MASK51;
+ x1[4] = (br_dec64le(&G[24]) >> 12) & MASK51;
+
+ /*
+ * We can use memset() to clear values, because exact-width types
+ * like uint64_t are guaranteed to have no padding bits or
+ * trap representations.
+ */
+ memset(x2, 0, sizeof x2);
+ x2[0] = 1;
+ memset(z2, 0, sizeof z2);
+ memcpy(x3, x1, sizeof x1);
+ memcpy(z3, x2, sizeof x2);
+
+ /*
+ * The multiplier is provided in big-endian notation, and
+ * possibly shorter than 32 bytes.
+ */
+ memset(k, 0, (sizeof k) - kblen);
+ memcpy(k + (sizeof k) - kblen, kb, kblen);
+ k[31] &= 0xF8;
+ k[0] &= 0x7F;
+ k[0] |= 0x40;
+
+ swap = 0;
+
+ for (i = 254; i >= 0; i --) {
+ uint64_t a[5], aa[5], b[5], bb[5], e[5];
+ uint64_t c[5], d[5], da[5], cb[5];
+ uint32_t kt;
+
+ kt = (k[31 - (i >> 3)] >> (i & 7)) & 1;
+ swap ^= kt;
+ f255_cswap(x2, x3, swap);
+ f255_cswap(z2, z3, swap);
+ swap = kt;
+
+ /*
+ * At that point, limbs of x_2 and z_2 are assumed to fit
+ * on at most 52 bits each.
+ *
+ * Each f255_add() adds one bit to the maximum range of
+ * the values, but f255_sub() and f255_mul() bring back
+ * the limbs into 52 bits. All f255_add() outputs are
+ * used only as inputs for f255_mul(), which ensures
+ * that limbs remain in the proper range.
+ */
+
+ /* A = x_2 + z_2 -- limbs fit on 53 bits each */
+ f255_add(a, x2, z2);
+
+ /* AA = A^2 */
+ f255_mul(aa, a, a);
+
+ /* B = x_2 - z_2 */
+ f255_sub(b, x2, z2);
+
+ /* BB = B^2 */
+ f255_mul(bb, b, b);
+
+ /* E = AA - BB */
+ f255_sub(e, aa, bb);
+
+ /* C = x_3 + z_3 -- limbs fit on 53 bits each */
+ f255_add(c, x3, z3);
+
+ /* D = x_3 - z_3 */
+ f255_sub(d, x3, z3);
+
+ /* DA = D * A */
+ f255_mul(da, d, a);
+
+ /* CB = C * B */
+ f255_mul(cb, c, b);
+
+ /* x_3 = (DA + CB)^2 */
+ f255_add(x3, da, cb);
+ f255_mul(x3, x3, x3);
+
+ /* z_3 = x_1 * (DA - CB)^2 */
+ f255_sub(z3, da, cb);
+ f255_mul(z3, z3, z3);
+ f255_mul(z3, x1, z3);
+
+ /* x_2 = AA * BB */
+ f255_mul(x2, aa, bb);
+
+ /* z_2 = E * (AA + a24 * E) */
+ f255_mul_a24(z2, e);
+ f255_add(z2, aa, z2);
+ f255_mul(z2, e, z2);
+ }
+
+ f255_cswap(x2, x3, swap);
+ f255_cswap(z2, z3, swap);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute 1/z2 = z2^(p-2). Since p = 2^255-19, we can mutualize
+ * most non-squarings. We use x1 and x3, now useless, as temporaries.
+ */
+ memcpy(x1, z2, sizeof z2);
+ for (i = 0; i < 15; i ++) {
+ f255_mul(x1, x1, x1);
+ f255_mul(x1, x1, z2);
+ }
+ memcpy(x3, x1, sizeof x1);
+ for (i = 0; i < 14; i ++) {
+ int j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < 16; j ++) {
+ f255_mul(x3, x3, x3);
+ }
+ f255_mul(x3, x3, x1);
+ }
+ for (i = 14; i >= 0; i --) {
+ f255_mul(x3, x3, x3);
+ if ((0xFFEB >> i) & 1) {
+ f255_mul(x3, z2, x3);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x2/z2. We have 1/z2 in x3.
+ */
+ f255_mul(x2, x2, x3);
+ f255_final_reduce(x2);
+
+ /*
+ * Encode the final x2 value in little-endian. We first assemble
+ * the limbs into 64-bit values.
+ */
+ x2[0] |= x2[1] << 51;
+ x2[1] = (x2[1] >> 13) | (x2[2] << 38);
+ x2[2] = (x2[2] >> 26) | (x2[3] << 25);
+ x2[3] = (x2[3] >> 39) | (x2[4] << 12);
+ br_enc64le(G, x2[0]);
+ br_enc64le(G + 8, x2[1]);
+ br_enc64le(G + 16, x2[2]);
+ br_enc64le(G + 24, x2[3]);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_mulgen(unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve)
+{
+ const unsigned char *G;
+ size_t Glen;
+
+ G = api_generator(curve, &Glen);
+ memcpy(R, G, Glen);
+ api_mul(R, Glen, x, xlen, curve);
+ return Glen;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_muladd(unsigned char *A, const unsigned char *B, size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *y, size_t ylen, int curve)
+{
+ /*
+ * We don't implement this method, since it is used for ECDSA
+ * only, and there is no ECDSA over Curve25519 (which instead
+ * uses EdDSA).
+ */
+ (void)A;
+ (void)B;
+ (void)len;
+ (void)x;
+ (void)xlen;
+ (void)y;
+ (void)ylen;
+ (void)curve;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl br_ec_c25519_m62 = {
+ (uint32_t)0x20000000,
+ &api_generator,
+ &api_order,
+ &api_xoff,
+ &api_mul,
+ &api_mulgen,
+ &api_muladd
+};
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl *
+br_ec_c25519_m62_get(void)
+{
+ return &br_ec_c25519_m62;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl *
+br_ec_c25519_m62_get(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_m64.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_m64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df48834
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_c25519_m64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,831 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+
+#if BR_UMUL128
+#include <intrin.h>
+#endif
+
+static const unsigned char GEN[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ORDER[] = {
+ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
+};
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_generator(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return GEN;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_order(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return ORDER;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_xoff(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * A field element is encoded as four 64-bit integers, in basis 2^63.
+ * Operations return partially reduced values, which may range up to
+ * 2^255+37.
+ */
+
+#define MASK63 (((uint64_t)1 << 63) - (uint64_t)1)
+
+/*
+ * Swap two field elements, conditionally on a flag.
+ */
+static inline void
+f255_cswap(uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ uint64_t m, w;
+
+ m = -(uint64_t)ctl;
+ w = m & (a[0] ^ b[0]); a[0] ^= w; b[0] ^= w;
+ w = m & (a[1] ^ b[1]); a[1] ^= w; b[1] ^= w;
+ w = m & (a[2] ^ b[2]); a[2] ^= w; b[2] ^= w;
+ w = m & (a[3] ^ b[3]); a[3] ^= w; b[3] ^= w;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Addition in the field.
+ */
+static inline void
+f255_add(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a, const uint64_t *b)
+{
+#if BR_INT128
+
+ uint64_t t0, t1, t2, t3, cc;
+ unsigned __int128 z;
+
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[0] + (unsigned __int128)b[0];
+ t0 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[1] + (unsigned __int128)b[1] + (z >> 64);
+ t1 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[2] + (unsigned __int128)b[2] + (z >> 64);
+ t2 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[3] + (unsigned __int128)b[3] + (z >> 64);
+ t3 = (uint64_t)z & MASK63;
+ cc = (uint64_t)(z >> 63);
+
+ /*
+ * Since operands are at most 2^255+37, the sum is at most
+ * 2^256+74; thus, the carry cc is equal to 0, 1 or 2.
+ *
+ * We use: 2^255 = 19 mod p.
+ * Since we add 0, 19 or 38 to a value that fits on 255 bits,
+ * the result is at most 2^255+37.
+ */
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t0 + (unsigned __int128)(19 * cc);
+ d[0] = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t1 + (z >> 64);
+ d[1] = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t2 + (z >> 64);
+ d[2] = (uint64_t)z;
+ d[3] = t3 + (uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+
+#elif BR_UMUL128
+
+ uint64_t t0, t1, t2, t3, cc;
+ unsigned char k;
+
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, a[0], b[0], &t0);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, a[1], b[1], &t1);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, a[2], b[2], &t2);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, a[3], b[3], &t3);
+ cc = (k << 1) + (t3 >> 63);
+ t3 &= MASK63;
+
+ /*
+ * Since operands are at most 2^255+37, the sum is at most
+ * 2^256+74; thus, the carry cc is equal to 0, 1 or 2.
+ *
+ * We use: 2^255 = 19 mod p.
+ * Since we add 0, 19 or 38 to a value that fits on 255 bits,
+ * the result is at most 2^255+37.
+ */
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t0, 19 * cc, &d[0]);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t1, 0, &d[1]);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t2, 0, &d[2]);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, t3, 0, &d[3]);
+
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Subtraction.
+ */
+static inline void
+f255_sub(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a, const uint64_t *b)
+{
+#if BR_INT128
+
+ /*
+ * We compute t = 2^256 - 38 + a - b, which is necessarily
+ * positive but lower than 2^256 + 2^255, since a <= 2^255 + 37
+ * and b <= 2^255 + 37. We then subtract 0, p or 2*p, depending
+ * on the two upper bits of t (bits 255 and 256).
+ */
+
+ uint64_t t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, cc;
+ unsigned __int128 z;
+
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[0] - (unsigned __int128)b[0] - 38;
+ t0 = (uint64_t)z;
+ cc = -(uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[1] - (unsigned __int128)b[1]
+ - (unsigned __int128)cc;
+ t1 = (uint64_t)z;
+ cc = -(uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[2] - (unsigned __int128)b[2]
+ - (unsigned __int128)cc;
+ t2 = (uint64_t)z;
+ cc = -(uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[3] - (unsigned __int128)b[3]
+ - (unsigned __int128)cc;
+ t3 = (uint64_t)z;
+ t4 = 1 + (uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+
+ /*
+ * We have a 257-bit result. The two top bits can be 00, 01 or 10,
+ * but not 11 (value t <= 2^256 - 38 + 2^255 + 37 = 2^256 + 2^255 - 1).
+ * Therefore, we can truncate to 255 bits, and add 0, 19 or 38.
+ * This guarantees that the result is at most 2^255+37.
+ */
+ cc = (38 & -t4) + (19 & -(t3 >> 63));
+ t3 &= MASK63;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t0 + (unsigned __int128)cc;
+ d[0] = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t1 + (z >> 64);
+ d[1] = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t2 + (z >> 64);
+ d[2] = (uint64_t)z;
+ d[3] = t3 + (uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+
+#elif BR_UMUL128
+
+ /*
+ * We compute t = 2^256 - 38 + a - b, which is necessarily
+ * positive but lower than 2^256 + 2^255, since a <= 2^255 + 37
+ * and b <= 2^255 + 37. We then subtract 0, p or 2*p, depending
+ * on the two upper bits of t (bits 255 and 256).
+ */
+
+ uint64_t t0, t1, t2, t3, t4;
+ unsigned char k;
+
+ k = _subborrow_u64(0, a[0], b[0], &t0);
+ k = _subborrow_u64(k, a[1], b[1], &t1);
+ k = _subborrow_u64(k, a[2], b[2], &t2);
+ k = _subborrow_u64(k, a[3], b[3], &t3);
+ (void)_subborrow_u64(k, 1, 0, &t4);
+
+ k = _subborrow_u64(0, t0, 38, &t0);
+ k = _subborrow_u64(k, t1, 0, &t1);
+ k = _subborrow_u64(k, t2, 0, &t2);
+ k = _subborrow_u64(k, t3, 0, &t3);
+ (void)_subborrow_u64(k, t4, 0, &t4);
+
+ /*
+ * We have a 257-bit result. The two top bits can be 00, 01 or 10,
+ * but not 11 (value t <= 2^256 - 38 + 2^255 + 37 = 2^256 + 2^255 - 1).
+ * Therefore, we can truncate to 255 bits, and add 0, 19 or 38.
+ * This guarantees that the result is at most 2^255+37.
+ */
+ t4 = (38 & -t4) + (19 & -(t3 >> 63));
+ t3 &= MASK63;
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t0, t4, &d[0]);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t1, 0, &d[1]);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t2, 0, &d[2]);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, t3, 0, &d[3]);
+
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiplication.
+ */
+static inline void
+f255_mul(uint64_t *d, uint64_t *a, uint64_t *b)
+{
+#if BR_INT128
+
+ unsigned __int128 z;
+ uint64_t t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, th;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the product a*b over plain integers.
+ */
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[0] * (unsigned __int128)b[0];
+ t0 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[0] * (unsigned __int128)b[1] + (z >> 64);
+ t1 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[0] * (unsigned __int128)b[2] + (z >> 64);
+ t2 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[0] * (unsigned __int128)b[3] + (z >> 64);
+ t3 = (uint64_t)z;
+ t4 = (uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[1] * (unsigned __int128)b[0]
+ + (unsigned __int128)t1;
+ t1 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[1] * (unsigned __int128)b[1]
+ + (unsigned __int128)t2 + (z >> 64);
+ t2 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[1] * (unsigned __int128)b[2]
+ + (unsigned __int128)t3 + (z >> 64);
+ t3 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[1] * (unsigned __int128)b[3]
+ + (unsigned __int128)t4 + (z >> 64);
+ t4 = (uint64_t)z;
+ t5 = (uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[2] * (unsigned __int128)b[0]
+ + (unsigned __int128)t2;
+ t2 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[2] * (unsigned __int128)b[1]
+ + (unsigned __int128)t3 + (z >> 64);
+ t3 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[2] * (unsigned __int128)b[2]
+ + (unsigned __int128)t4 + (z >> 64);
+ t4 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[2] * (unsigned __int128)b[3]
+ + (unsigned __int128)t5 + (z >> 64);
+ t5 = (uint64_t)z;
+ t6 = (uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[3] * (unsigned __int128)b[0]
+ + (unsigned __int128)t3;
+ t3 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[3] * (unsigned __int128)b[1]
+ + (unsigned __int128)t4 + (z >> 64);
+ t4 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[3] * (unsigned __int128)b[2]
+ + (unsigned __int128)t5 + (z >> 64);
+ t5 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[3] * (unsigned __int128)b[3]
+ + (unsigned __int128)t6 + (z >> 64);
+ t6 = (uint64_t)z;
+ t7 = (uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+
+ /*
+ * Modulo p, we have:
+ *
+ * 2^255 = 19
+ * 2^510 = 19*19 = 361
+ *
+ * We split the intermediate t into three parts, in basis
+ * 2^255. The low one will be in t0..t3; the middle one in t4..t7.
+ * The upper one can only be a single bit (th), since the
+ * multiplication operands are at most 2^255+37 each.
+ */
+ th = t7 >> 62;
+ t7 = ((t7 << 1) | (t6 >> 63)) & MASK63;
+ t6 = (t6 << 1) | (t5 >> 63);
+ t5 = (t5 << 1) | (t4 >> 63);
+ t4 = (t4 << 1) | (t3 >> 63);
+ t3 &= MASK63;
+
+ /*
+ * Multiply the middle part (t4..t7) by 19. We truncate it to
+ * 255 bits; the extra bits will go along with th.
+ */
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t4 * 19;
+ t4 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t5 * 19 + (z >> 64);
+ t5 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t6 * 19 + (z >> 64);
+ t6 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t7 * 19 + (z >> 64);
+ t7 = (uint64_t)z & MASK63;
+
+ th = (361 & -th) + (19 * (uint64_t)(z >> 63));
+
+ /*
+ * Add elements together.
+ * At this point:
+ * t0..t3 fits on 255 bits.
+ * t4..t7 fits on 255 bits.
+ * th <= 361 + 342 = 703.
+ */
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t0 + (unsigned __int128)t4
+ + (unsigned __int128)th;
+ t0 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t1 + (unsigned __int128)t5 + (z >> 64);
+ t1 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t2 + (unsigned __int128)t6 + (z >> 64);
+ t2 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t3 + (unsigned __int128)t7 + (z >> 64);
+ t3 = (uint64_t)z & MASK63;
+ th = (uint64_t)(z >> 63);
+
+ /*
+ * Since the sum is at most 2^256 + 703, the two upper bits, in th,
+ * can only have value 0, 1 or 2. We just add th*19, which
+ * guarantees a result of at most 2^255+37.
+ */
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t0 + (19 * th);
+ d[0] = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t1 + (z >> 64);
+ d[1] = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t2 + (z >> 64);
+ d[2] = (uint64_t)z;
+ d[3] = t3 + (uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+
+#elif BR_UMUL128
+
+ uint64_t t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, th;
+ uint64_t h0, h1, h2, h3;
+ unsigned char k;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the product a*b over plain integers.
+ */
+ t0 = _umul128(a[0], b[0], &h0);
+ t1 = _umul128(a[0], b[1], &h1);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t1, h0, &t1);
+ t2 = _umul128(a[0], b[2], &h2);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t2, h1, &t2);
+ t3 = _umul128(a[0], b[3], &h3);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t3, h2, &t3);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, h3, 0, &t4);
+
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, _umul128(a[1], b[0], &h0), t1, &t1);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, _umul128(a[1], b[1], &h1), t2, &t2);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, _umul128(a[1], b[2], &h2), t3, &t3);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, _umul128(a[1], b[3], &h3), t4, &t4);
+ t5 = k;
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t2, h0, &t2);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t3, h1, &t3);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t4, h2, &t4);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, t5, h3, &t5);
+
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, _umul128(a[2], b[0], &h0), t2, &t2);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, _umul128(a[2], b[1], &h1), t3, &t3);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, _umul128(a[2], b[2], &h2), t4, &t4);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, _umul128(a[2], b[3], &h3), t5, &t5);
+ t6 = k;
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t3, h0, &t3);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t4, h1, &t4);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t5, h2, &t5);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, t6, h3, &t6);
+
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, _umul128(a[3], b[0], &h0), t3, &t3);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, _umul128(a[3], b[1], &h1), t4, &t4);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, _umul128(a[3], b[2], &h2), t5, &t5);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, _umul128(a[3], b[3], &h3), t6, &t6);
+ t7 = k;
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t4, h0, &t4);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t5, h1, &t5);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t6, h2, &t6);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, t7, h3, &t7);
+
+ /*
+ * Modulo p, we have:
+ *
+ * 2^255 = 19
+ * 2^510 = 19*19 = 361
+ *
+ * We split the intermediate t into three parts, in basis
+ * 2^255. The low one will be in t0..t3; the middle one in t4..t7.
+ * The upper one can only be a single bit (th), since the
+ * multiplication operands are at most 2^255+37 each.
+ */
+ th = t7 >> 62;
+ t7 = ((t7 << 1) | (t6 >> 63)) & MASK63;
+ t6 = (t6 << 1) | (t5 >> 63);
+ t5 = (t5 << 1) | (t4 >> 63);
+ t4 = (t4 << 1) | (t3 >> 63);
+ t3 &= MASK63;
+
+ /*
+ * Multiply the middle part (t4..t7) by 19. We truncate it to
+ * 255 bits; the extra bits will go along with th.
+ */
+ t4 = _umul128(t4, 19, &h0);
+ t5 = _umul128(t5, 19, &h1);
+ t6 = _umul128(t6, 19, &h2);
+ t7 = _umul128(t7, 19, &h3);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t5, h0, &t5);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t6, h1, &t6);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t7, h2, &t7);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, h3, 0, &h3);
+ th = (361 & -th) + (19 * ((h3 << 1) + (t7 >> 63)));
+ t7 &= MASK63;
+
+ /*
+ * Add elements together.
+ * At this point:
+ * t0..t3 fits on 255 bits.
+ * t4..t7 fits on 255 bits.
+ * th <= 361 + 342 = 703.
+ */
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t0, t4, &t0);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t1, t5, &t1);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t2, t6, &t2);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t3, t7, &t3);
+ t4 = k;
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t0, th, &t0);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t1, 0, &t1);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t2, 0, &t2);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t3, 0, &t3);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, t4, 0, &t4);
+
+ th = (t4 << 1) + (t3 >> 63);
+ t3 &= MASK63;
+
+ /*
+ * Since the sum is at most 2^256 + 703, the two upper bits, in th,
+ * can only have value 0, 1 or 2. We just add th*19, which
+ * guarantees a result of at most 2^255+37.
+ */
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t0, 19 * th, &d[0]);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t1, 0, &d[1]);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t2, 0, &d[2]);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, t3, 0, &d[3]);
+
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiplication by A24 = 121665.
+ */
+static inline void
+f255_mul_a24(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a)
+{
+#if BR_INT128
+
+ uint64_t t0, t1, t2, t3;
+ unsigned __int128 z;
+
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[0] * 121665;
+ t0 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[1] * 121665 + (z >> 64);
+ t1 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[2] * 121665 + (z >> 64);
+ t2 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[3] * 121665 + (z >> 64);
+ t3 = (uint64_t)z & MASK63;
+
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t0 + (19 * (uint64_t)(z >> 63));
+ t0 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t1 + (z >> 64);
+ t1 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t2 + (z >> 64);
+ t2 = (uint64_t)z;
+ t3 = t3 + (uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t0 + (19 & -(t3 >> 63));
+ d[0] = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t1 + (z >> 64);
+ d[1] = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t2 + (z >> 64);
+ d[2] = (uint64_t)z;
+ d[3] = (t3 & MASK63) + (uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+
+#elif BR_UMUL128
+
+ uint64_t t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, h0, h1, h2, h3;
+ unsigned char k;
+
+ t0 = _umul128(a[0], 121665, &h0);
+ t1 = _umul128(a[1], 121665, &h1);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t1, h0, &t1);
+ t2 = _umul128(a[2], 121665, &h2);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t2, h1, &t2);
+ t3 = _umul128(a[3], 121665, &h3);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t3, h2, &t3);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, h3, 0, &t4);
+
+ t4 = (t4 << 1) + (t3 >> 63);
+ t3 &= MASK63;
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t0, 19 * t4, &t0);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t1, 0, &t1);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t2, 0, &t2);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, t3, 0, &t3);
+
+ t4 = 19 & -(t3 >> 63);
+ t3 &= MASK63;
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t0, t4, &d[0]);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t1, 0, &d[1]);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t2, 0, &d[2]);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, t3, 0, &d[3]);
+
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finalize reduction.
+ */
+static inline void
+f255_final_reduce(uint64_t *a)
+{
+#if BR_INT128
+
+ uint64_t t0, t1, t2, t3, m;
+ unsigned __int128 z;
+
+ /*
+ * We add 19. If the result (in t) is below 2^255, then a[]
+ * is already less than 2^255-19, thus already reduced.
+ * Otherwise, we subtract 2^255 from t[], in which case we
+ * have t = a - (2^255-19), and that's our result.
+ */
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[0] + 19;
+ t0 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[1] + (z >> 64);
+ t1 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[2] + (z >> 64);
+ t2 = (uint64_t)z;
+ t3 = a[3] + (uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+
+ m = -(t3 >> 63);
+ t3 &= MASK63;
+ a[0] ^= m & (a[0] ^ t0);
+ a[1] ^= m & (a[1] ^ t1);
+ a[2] ^= m & (a[2] ^ t2);
+ a[3] ^= m & (a[3] ^ t3);
+
+#elif BR_UMUL128
+
+ uint64_t t0, t1, t2, t3, m;
+ unsigned char k;
+
+ /*
+ * We add 19. If the result (in t) is below 2^255, then a[]
+ * is already less than 2^255-19, thus already reduced.
+ * Otherwise, we subtract 2^255 from t[], in which case we
+ * have t = a - (2^255-19), and that's our result.
+ */
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, a[0], 19, &t0);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, a[1], 0, &t1);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, a[2], 0, &t2);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, a[3], 0, &t3);
+
+ m = -(t3 >> 63);
+ t3 &= MASK63;
+ a[0] ^= m & (a[0] ^ t0);
+ a[1] ^= m & (a[1] ^ t1);
+ a[2] ^= m & (a[2] ^ t2);
+ a[3] ^= m & (a[3] ^ t3);
+
+#endif
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_mul(unsigned char *G, size_t Glen,
+ const unsigned char *kb, size_t kblen, int curve)
+{
+ unsigned char k[32];
+ uint64_t x1[4], x2[4], z2[4], x3[4], z3[4];
+ uint32_t swap;
+ int i;
+
+ (void)curve;
+
+ /*
+ * Points are encoded over exactly 32 bytes. Multipliers must fit
+ * in 32 bytes as well.
+ */
+ if (Glen != 32 || kblen > 32) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 7748 mandates that the high bit of the last point byte must
+ * be ignored/cleared.
+ */
+ x1[0] = br_dec64le(&G[ 0]);
+ x1[1] = br_dec64le(&G[ 8]);
+ x1[2] = br_dec64le(&G[16]);
+ x1[3] = br_dec64le(&G[24]) & MASK63;
+
+ /*
+ * We can use memset() to clear values, because exact-width types
+ * like uint64_t are guaranteed to have no padding bits or
+ * trap representations.
+ */
+ memset(x2, 0, sizeof x2);
+ x2[0] = 1;
+ memset(z2, 0, sizeof z2);
+ memcpy(x3, x1, sizeof x1);
+ memcpy(z3, x2, sizeof x2);
+
+ /*
+ * The multiplier is provided in big-endian notation, and
+ * possibly shorter than 32 bytes.
+ */
+ memset(k, 0, (sizeof k) - kblen);
+ memcpy(k + (sizeof k) - kblen, kb, kblen);
+ k[31] &= 0xF8;
+ k[0] &= 0x7F;
+ k[0] |= 0x40;
+
+ swap = 0;
+
+ for (i = 254; i >= 0; i --) {
+ uint64_t a[4], aa[4], b[4], bb[4], e[4];
+ uint64_t c[4], d[4], da[4], cb[4];
+ uint32_t kt;
+
+ kt = (k[31 - (i >> 3)] >> (i & 7)) & 1;
+ swap ^= kt;
+ f255_cswap(x2, x3, swap);
+ f255_cswap(z2, z3, swap);
+ swap = kt;
+
+ /* A = x_2 + z_2 */
+ f255_add(a, x2, z2);
+
+ /* AA = A^2 */
+ f255_mul(aa, a, a);
+
+ /* B = x_2 - z_2 */
+ f255_sub(b, x2, z2);
+
+ /* BB = B^2 */
+ f255_mul(bb, b, b);
+
+ /* E = AA - BB */
+ f255_sub(e, aa, bb);
+
+ /* C = x_3 + z_3 */
+ f255_add(c, x3, z3);
+
+ /* D = x_3 - z_3 */
+ f255_sub(d, x3, z3);
+
+ /* DA = D * A */
+ f255_mul(da, d, a);
+
+ /* CB = C * B */
+ f255_mul(cb, c, b);
+
+ /* x_3 = (DA + CB)^2 */
+ f255_add(x3, da, cb);
+ f255_mul(x3, x3, x3);
+
+ /* z_3 = x_1 * (DA - CB)^2 */
+ f255_sub(z3, da, cb);
+ f255_mul(z3, z3, z3);
+ f255_mul(z3, x1, z3);
+
+ /* x_2 = AA * BB */
+ f255_mul(x2, aa, bb);
+
+ /* z_2 = E * (AA + a24 * E) */
+ f255_mul_a24(z2, e);
+ f255_add(z2, aa, z2);
+ f255_mul(z2, e, z2);
+ }
+
+ f255_cswap(x2, x3, swap);
+ f255_cswap(z2, z3, swap);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute 1/z2 = z2^(p-2). Since p = 2^255-19, we can mutualize
+ * most non-squarings. We use x1 and x3, now useless, as temporaries.
+ */
+ memcpy(x1, z2, sizeof z2);
+ for (i = 0; i < 15; i ++) {
+ f255_mul(x1, x1, x1);
+ f255_mul(x1, x1, z2);
+ }
+ memcpy(x3, x1, sizeof x1);
+ for (i = 0; i < 14; i ++) {
+ int j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < 16; j ++) {
+ f255_mul(x3, x3, x3);
+ }
+ f255_mul(x3, x3, x1);
+ }
+ for (i = 14; i >= 0; i --) {
+ f255_mul(x3, x3, x3);
+ if ((0xFFEB >> i) & 1) {
+ f255_mul(x3, z2, x3);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x2/z2. We have 1/z2 in x3.
+ */
+ f255_mul(x2, x2, x3);
+ f255_final_reduce(x2);
+
+ /*
+ * Encode the final x2 value in little-endian.
+ */
+ br_enc64le(G, x2[0]);
+ br_enc64le(G + 8, x2[1]);
+ br_enc64le(G + 16, x2[2]);
+ br_enc64le(G + 24, x2[3]);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_mulgen(unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve)
+{
+ const unsigned char *G;
+ size_t Glen;
+
+ G = api_generator(curve, &Glen);
+ memcpy(R, G, Glen);
+ api_mul(R, Glen, x, xlen, curve);
+ return Glen;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_muladd(unsigned char *A, const unsigned char *B, size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *y, size_t ylen, int curve)
+{
+ /*
+ * We don't implement this method, since it is used for ECDSA
+ * only, and there is no ECDSA over Curve25519 (which instead
+ * uses EdDSA).
+ */
+ (void)A;
+ (void)B;
+ (void)len;
+ (void)x;
+ (void)xlen;
+ (void)y;
+ (void)ylen;
+ (void)curve;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl br_ec_c25519_m64 = {
+ (uint32_t)0x20000000,
+ &api_generator,
+ &api_order,
+ &api_xoff,
+ &api_mul,
+ &api_mulgen,
+ &api_muladd
+};
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl *
+br_ec_c25519_m64_get(void)
+{
+ return &br_ec_c25519_m64;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl *
+br_ec_c25519_m64_get(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_curve25519.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_curve25519.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a47d215
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_curve25519.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static const unsigned char GEN[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ORDER[] = {
+ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
+};
+
+/* see inner.h */
+const br_ec_curve_def br_curve25519 = {
+ BR_EC_curve25519,
+ ORDER, sizeof ORDER,
+ GEN, sizeof GEN
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_default.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_default.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7bb6e0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_default.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl *
+br_ec_get_default(void)
+{
+#if BR_LOMUL
+ return &br_ec_all_m15;
+#else
+ return &br_ec_all_m31;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_keygen.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_keygen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02a3096
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_keygen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+size_t
+br_ec_keygen(const br_prng_class **rng_ctx,
+ const br_ec_impl *impl, br_ec_private_key *sk,
+ void *kbuf, int curve)
+{
+ const unsigned char *order;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t len;
+ unsigned mask;
+
+ if (curve < 0 || curve >= 32
+ || ((impl->supported_curves >> curve) & 1) == 0)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ order = impl->order(curve, &len);
+ while (len > 0 && *order == 0) {
+ order ++;
+ len --;
+ }
+ if (kbuf == NULL || len == 0) {
+ return len;
+ }
+ mask = order[0];
+ mask |= (mask >> 1);
+ mask |= (mask >> 2);
+ mask |= (mask >> 4);
+
+ /*
+ * We generate sequences of random bits of the right size, until
+ * the value is strictly lower than the curve order (we also
+ * check for all-zero values, which are invalid).
+ */
+ buf = kbuf;
+ for (;;) {
+ size_t u;
+ unsigned cc, zz;
+
+ (*rng_ctx)->generate(rng_ctx, buf, len);
+ buf[0] &= mask;
+ cc = 0;
+ u = len;
+ zz = 0;
+ while (u -- > 0) {
+ cc = ((unsigned)(buf[u] - order[u] - cc) >> 8) & 1;
+ zz |= buf[u];
+ }
+ if (cc != 0 && zz != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sk != NULL) {
+ sk->curve = curve;
+ sk->x = buf;
+ sk->xlen = len;
+ }
+ return len;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_p256_m15.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_p256_m15.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05800d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_p256_m15.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2124 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * If BR_NO_ARITH_SHIFT is undefined, or defined to 0, then we _assume_
+ * that right-shifting a signed negative integer copies the sign bit
+ * (arithmetic right-shift). This is "implementation-defined behaviour",
+ * i.e. it is not undefined, but it may differ between compilers. Each
+ * compiler is supposed to document its behaviour in that respect. GCC
+ * explicitly defines that an arithmetic right shift is used. We expect
+ * all other compilers to do the same, because underlying CPU offer an
+ * arithmetic right shift opcode that could not be used otherwise.
+ */
+#if BR_NO_ARITH_SHIFT
+#define ARSH(x, n) (((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)) \
+ | ((-((uint32_t)(x) >> 31)) << (32 - (n))))
+#else
+#define ARSH(x, n) ((*(int32_t *)&(x)) >> (n))
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Convert an integer from unsigned big-endian encoding to a sequence of
+ * 13-bit words in little-endian order. The final "partial" word is
+ * returned.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+be8_to_le13(uint32_t *dst, const unsigned char *src, size_t len)
+{
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len;
+
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ acc |= (uint32_t)src[len] << acc_len;
+ acc_len += 8;
+ if (acc_len >= 13) {
+ *dst ++ = acc & 0x1FFF;
+ acc >>= 13;
+ acc_len -= 13;
+ }
+ }
+ return acc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert an integer (13-bit words, little-endian) to unsigned
+ * big-endian encoding. The total encoding length is provided; all
+ * the destination bytes will be filled.
+ */
+static void
+le13_to_be8(unsigned char *dst, size_t len, const uint32_t *src)
+{
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len;
+
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ if (acc_len < 8) {
+ acc |= (*src ++) << acc_len;
+ acc_len += 13;
+ }
+ dst[len] = (unsigned char)acc;
+ acc >>= 8;
+ acc_len -= 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Normalise an array of words to a strict 13 bits per word. Returned
+ * value is the resulting carry. The source (w) and destination (d)
+ * arrays may be identical, but shall not overlap partially.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+norm13(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *w, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t u;
+ uint32_t cc;
+
+ cc = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ int32_t z;
+
+ z = w[u] + cc;
+ d[u] = z & 0x1FFF;
+ cc = ARSH(z, 13);
+ }
+ return cc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * mul20() multiplies two 260-bit integers together. Each word must fit
+ * on 13 bits; source operands use 20 words, destination operand
+ * receives 40 words. All overlaps allowed.
+ *
+ * square20() computes the square of a 260-bit integer. Each word must
+ * fit on 13 bits; source operand uses 20 words, destination operand
+ * receives 40 words. All overlaps allowed.
+ */
+
+#if BR_SLOW_MUL15
+
+static void
+mul20(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ /*
+ * Two-level Karatsuba: turns a 20x20 multiplication into
+ * nine 5x5 multiplications. We use 13-bit words but do not
+ * propagate carries immediately, so words may expand:
+ *
+ * - First Karatsuba decomposition turns the 20x20 mul on
+ * 13-bit words into three 10x10 muls, two on 13-bit words
+ * and one on 14-bit words.
+ *
+ * - Second Karatsuba decomposition further splits these into:
+ *
+ * * four 5x5 muls on 13-bit words
+ * * four 5x5 muls on 14-bit words
+ * * one 5x5 mul on 15-bit words
+ *
+ * Highest word value is 8191, 16382 or 32764, for 13-bit, 14-bit
+ * or 15-bit words, respectively.
+ */
+ uint32_t u[45], v[45], w[90];
+ uint32_t cc;
+ int i;
+
+#define ZADD(dw, d_off, s1w, s1_off, s2w, s2_off) do { \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 0] = (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 0] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 0]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 1] = (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 1] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 1]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 2] = (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 2] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 2]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 3] = (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 3] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 3]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 4] = (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 4] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 4]; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define ZADDT(dw, d_off, sw, s_off) do { \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 0] += (sw)[5 * (s_off) + 0]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 1] += (sw)[5 * (s_off) + 1]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 2] += (sw)[5 * (s_off) + 2]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 3] += (sw)[5 * (s_off) + 3]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 4] += (sw)[5 * (s_off) + 4]; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define ZSUB2F(dw, d_off, s1w, s1_off, s2w, s2_off) do { \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 0] -= (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 0] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 0]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 1] -= (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 1] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 1]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 2] -= (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 2] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 2]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 3] -= (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 3] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 3]; \
+ (dw)[5 * (d_off) + 4] -= (s1w)[5 * (s1_off) + 4] \
+ + (s2w)[5 * (s2_off) + 4]; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define CPR1(w, cprcc) do { \
+ uint32_t cprz = (w) + cprcc; \
+ (w) = cprz & 0x1FFF; \
+ cprcc = cprz >> 13; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define CPR(dw, d_off) do { \
+ uint32_t cprcc; \
+ cprcc = 0; \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 0], cprcc); \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 1], cprcc); \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 2], cprcc); \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 3], cprcc); \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 4], cprcc); \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 5], cprcc); \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 6], cprcc); \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 7], cprcc); \
+ CPR1((dw)[(d_off) + 8], cprcc); \
+ (dw)[(d_off) + 9] = cprcc; \
+ } while (0)
+
+ memcpy(u, a, 20 * sizeof *a);
+ ZADD(u, 4, a, 0, a, 1);
+ ZADD(u, 5, a, 2, a, 3);
+ ZADD(u, 6, a, 0, a, 2);
+ ZADD(u, 7, a, 1, a, 3);
+ ZADD(u, 8, u, 6, u, 7);
+
+ memcpy(v, b, 20 * sizeof *b);
+ ZADD(v, 4, b, 0, b, 1);
+ ZADD(v, 5, b, 2, b, 3);
+ ZADD(v, 6, b, 0, b, 2);
+ ZADD(v, 7, b, 1, b, 3);
+ ZADD(v, 8, v, 6, v, 7);
+
+ /*
+ * Do the eight first 8x8 muls. Source words are at most 16382
+ * each, so we can add product results together "as is" in 32-bit
+ * words.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 40; i += 5) {
+ w[(i << 1) + 0] = MUL15(u[i + 0], v[i + 0]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 1] = MUL15(u[i + 0], v[i + 1])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 1], v[i + 0]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 2] = MUL15(u[i + 0], v[i + 2])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 1], v[i + 1])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 2], v[i + 0]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 3] = MUL15(u[i + 0], v[i + 3])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 1], v[i + 2])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 2], v[i + 1])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 3], v[i + 0]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 4] = MUL15(u[i + 0], v[i + 4])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 1], v[i + 3])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 2], v[i + 2])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 3], v[i + 1])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 4], v[i + 0]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 5] = MUL15(u[i + 1], v[i + 4])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 2], v[i + 3])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 3], v[i + 2])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 4], v[i + 1]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 6] = MUL15(u[i + 2], v[i + 4])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 3], v[i + 3])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 4], v[i + 2]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 7] = MUL15(u[i + 3], v[i + 4])
+ + MUL15(u[i + 4], v[i + 3]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 8] = MUL15(u[i + 4], v[i + 4]);
+ w[(i << 1) + 9] = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For the 9th multiplication, source words are up to 32764,
+ * so we must do some carry propagation. If we add up to
+ * 4 products and the carry is no more than 524224, then the
+ * result fits in 32 bits, and the next carry will be no more
+ * than 524224 (because 4*(32764^2)+524224 < 8192*524225).
+ *
+ * We thus just skip one of the products in the middle word,
+ * then do a carry propagation (this reduces words to 13 bits
+ * each, except possibly the last, which may use up to 17 bits
+ * or so), then add the missing product.
+ */
+ w[80 + 0] = MUL15(u[40 + 0], v[40 + 0]);
+ w[80 + 1] = MUL15(u[40 + 0], v[40 + 1])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 1], v[40 + 0]);
+ w[80 + 2] = MUL15(u[40 + 0], v[40 + 2])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 1], v[40 + 1])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 2], v[40 + 0]);
+ w[80 + 3] = MUL15(u[40 + 0], v[40 + 3])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 1], v[40 + 2])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 2], v[40 + 1])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 3], v[40 + 0]);
+ w[80 + 4] = MUL15(u[40 + 0], v[40 + 4])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 1], v[40 + 3])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 2], v[40 + 2])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 3], v[40 + 1]);
+ /* + MUL15(u[40 + 4], v[40 + 0]) */
+ w[80 + 5] = MUL15(u[40 + 1], v[40 + 4])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 2], v[40 + 3])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 3], v[40 + 2])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 4], v[40 + 1]);
+ w[80 + 6] = MUL15(u[40 + 2], v[40 + 4])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 3], v[40 + 3])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 4], v[40 + 2]);
+ w[80 + 7] = MUL15(u[40 + 3], v[40 + 4])
+ + MUL15(u[40 + 4], v[40 + 3]);
+ w[80 + 8] = MUL15(u[40 + 4], v[40 + 4]);
+
+ CPR(w, 80);
+
+ w[80 + 4] += MUL15(u[40 + 4], v[40 + 0]);
+
+ /*
+ * The products on 14-bit words in slots 6 and 7 yield values
+ * up to 5*(16382^2) each, and we need to subtract two such
+ * values from the higher word. We need the subtraction to fit
+ * in a _signed_ 32-bit integer, i.e. 31 bits + a sign bit.
+ * However, 10*(16382^2) does not fit. So we must perform a
+ * bit of reduction here.
+ */
+ CPR(w, 60);
+ CPR(w, 70);
+
+ /*
+ * Recompose results.
+ */
+
+ /* 0..1*0..1 into 0..3 */
+ ZSUB2F(w, 8, w, 0, w, 2);
+ ZSUB2F(w, 9, w, 1, w, 3);
+ ZADDT(w, 1, w, 8);
+ ZADDT(w, 2, w, 9);
+
+ /* 2..3*2..3 into 4..7 */
+ ZSUB2F(w, 10, w, 4, w, 6);
+ ZSUB2F(w, 11, w, 5, w, 7);
+ ZADDT(w, 5, w, 10);
+ ZADDT(w, 6, w, 11);
+
+ /* (0..1+2..3)*(0..1+2..3) into 12..15 */
+ ZSUB2F(w, 16, w, 12, w, 14);
+ ZSUB2F(w, 17, w, 13, w, 15);
+ ZADDT(w, 13, w, 16);
+ ZADDT(w, 14, w, 17);
+
+ /* first-level recomposition */
+ ZSUB2F(w, 12, w, 0, w, 4);
+ ZSUB2F(w, 13, w, 1, w, 5);
+ ZSUB2F(w, 14, w, 2, w, 6);
+ ZSUB2F(w, 15, w, 3, w, 7);
+ ZADDT(w, 2, w, 12);
+ ZADDT(w, 3, w, 13);
+ ZADDT(w, 4, w, 14);
+ ZADDT(w, 5, w, 15);
+
+ /*
+ * Perform carry propagation to bring all words down to 13 bits.
+ */
+ cc = norm13(d, w, 40);
+ d[39] += (cc << 13);
+
+#undef ZADD
+#undef ZADDT
+#undef ZSUB2F
+#undef CPR1
+#undef CPR
+}
+
+static inline void
+square20(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a)
+{
+ mul20(d, a, a);
+}
+
+#else
+
+static void
+mul20(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ uint32_t t[39];
+
+ t[ 0] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 1] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 2] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 3] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 4] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 5] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 6] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 7] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 8] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 0]);
+ t[ 9] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 0]);
+ t[10] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 0]);
+ t[11] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 0]);
+ t[12] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 0]);
+ t[13] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 0]);
+ t[14] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 0]);
+ t[15] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 0]);
+ t[16] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 0]);
+ t[17] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 0]);
+ t[18] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 0]);
+ t[19] = MUL15(a[ 0], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 1])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 0]);
+ t[20] = MUL15(a[ 1], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 2])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 1]);
+ t[21] = MUL15(a[ 2], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 2]);
+ t[22] = MUL15(a[ 3], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 3]);
+ t[23] = MUL15(a[ 4], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 4]);
+ t[24] = MUL15(a[ 5], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 5]);
+ t[25] = MUL15(a[ 6], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 6]);
+ t[26] = MUL15(a[ 7], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 7]);
+ t[27] = MUL15(a[ 8], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 8]);
+ t[28] = MUL15(a[ 9], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[10], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[10])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[ 9]);
+ t[29] = MUL15(a[10], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[11], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[11])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[10]);
+ t[30] = MUL15(a[11], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[12], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[12])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[11]);
+ t[31] = MUL15(a[12], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[13], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[13])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[12]);
+ t[32] = MUL15(a[13], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[14], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[14])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[13]);
+ t[33] = MUL15(a[14], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[15], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[15])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[14]);
+ t[34] = MUL15(a[15], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[16], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[16])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[15]);
+ t[35] = MUL15(a[16], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[17], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[17])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[16]);
+ t[36] = MUL15(a[17], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[18], b[18])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[17]);
+ t[37] = MUL15(a[18], b[19])
+ + MUL15(a[19], b[18]);
+ t[38] = MUL15(a[19], b[19]);
+ d[39] = norm13(d, t, 39);
+}
+
+static void
+square20(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a)
+{
+ uint32_t t[39];
+
+ t[ 0] = MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 0]);
+ t[ 1] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 1])) << 1);
+ t[ 2] = MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 1])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 2])) << 1);
+ t[ 3] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 3])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 2])) << 1);
+ t[ 4] = MUL15(a[ 2], a[ 2])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 3])) << 1);
+ t[ 5] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 4])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[ 3])) << 1);
+ t[ 6] = MUL15(a[ 3], a[ 3])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[ 4])) << 1);
+ t[ 7] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[ 5])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[ 4])) << 1);
+ t[ 8] = MUL15(a[ 4], a[ 4])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[ 5])) << 1);
+ t[ 9] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[ 6])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[ 5])) << 1);
+ t[10] = MUL15(a[ 5], a[ 5])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[ 6])) << 1);
+ t[11] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[ 7])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[ 6])) << 1);
+ t[12] = MUL15(a[ 6], a[ 6])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[ 7])) << 1);
+ t[13] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[ 8])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[ 7])) << 1);
+ t[14] = MUL15(a[ 7], a[ 7])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[ 8])) << 1);
+ t[15] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[ 9])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[ 8])) << 1);
+ t[16] = MUL15(a[ 8], a[ 8])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[ 9])) << 1);
+ t[17] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[10])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[ 9])) << 1);
+ t[18] = MUL15(a[ 9], a[ 9])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[10])) << 1);
+ t[19] = ((MUL15(a[ 0], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 1], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[11])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[10])) << 1);
+ t[20] = MUL15(a[10], a[10])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 1], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 2], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[11])) << 1);
+ t[21] = ((MUL15(a[ 2], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 3], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[12])
+ + MUL15(a[10], a[11])) << 1);
+ t[22] = MUL15(a[11], a[11])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 3], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 4], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[10], a[12])) << 1);
+ t[23] = ((MUL15(a[ 4], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 5], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[10], a[13])
+ + MUL15(a[11], a[12])) << 1);
+ t[24] = MUL15(a[12], a[12])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 5], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 6], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[10], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[11], a[13])) << 1);
+ t[25] = ((MUL15(a[ 6], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 7], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[10], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[11], a[14])
+ + MUL15(a[12], a[13])) << 1);
+ t[26] = MUL15(a[13], a[13])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 7], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 8], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[10], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[11], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[12], a[14])) << 1);
+ t[27] = ((MUL15(a[ 8], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[ 9], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[10], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[11], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[12], a[15])
+ + MUL15(a[13], a[14])) << 1);
+ t[28] = MUL15(a[14], a[14])
+ + ((MUL15(a[ 9], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[10], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[11], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[12], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[13], a[15])) << 1);
+ t[29] = ((MUL15(a[10], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[11], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[12], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[13], a[16])
+ + MUL15(a[14], a[15])) << 1);
+ t[30] = MUL15(a[15], a[15])
+ + ((MUL15(a[11], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[12], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[13], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[14], a[16])) << 1);
+ t[31] = ((MUL15(a[12], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[13], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[14], a[17])
+ + MUL15(a[15], a[16])) << 1);
+ t[32] = MUL15(a[16], a[16])
+ + ((MUL15(a[13], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[14], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[15], a[17])) << 1);
+ t[33] = ((MUL15(a[14], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[15], a[18])
+ + MUL15(a[16], a[17])) << 1);
+ t[34] = MUL15(a[17], a[17])
+ + ((MUL15(a[15], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[16], a[18])) << 1);
+ t[35] = ((MUL15(a[16], a[19])
+ + MUL15(a[17], a[18])) << 1);
+ t[36] = MUL15(a[18], a[18])
+ + ((MUL15(a[17], a[19])) << 1);
+ t[37] = ((MUL15(a[18], a[19])) << 1);
+ t[38] = MUL15(a[19], a[19]);
+ d[39] = norm13(d, t, 39);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Modulus for field F256 (field for point coordinates in curve P-256).
+ */
+static const uint32_t F256[] = {
+ 0x1FFF, 0x1FFF, 0x1FFF, 0x1FFF, 0x1FFF, 0x1FFF, 0x1FFF, 0x001F,
+ 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0400, 0x0000,
+ 0x0000, 0x1FF8, 0x1FFF, 0x01FF
+};
+
+/*
+ * The 'b' curve equation coefficient for P-256.
+ */
+static const uint32_t P256_B[] = {
+ 0x004B, 0x1E93, 0x0F89, 0x1C78, 0x03BC, 0x187B, 0x114E, 0x1619,
+ 0x1D06, 0x0328, 0x01AF, 0x0D31, 0x1557, 0x15DE, 0x1ECF, 0x127C,
+ 0x0A3A, 0x0EC5, 0x118D, 0x00B5
+};
+
+/*
+ * Perform a "short reduction" in field F256 (field for curve P-256).
+ * The source value should be less than 262 bits; on output, it will
+ * be at most 257 bits, and less than twice the modulus.
+ */
+static void
+reduce_f256(uint32_t *d)
+{
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ x = d[19] >> 9;
+ d[19] &= 0x01FF;
+ d[17] += x << 3;
+ d[14] -= x << 10;
+ d[7] -= x << 5;
+ d[0] += x;
+ norm13(d, d, 20);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform a "final reduction" in field F256 (field for curve P-256).
+ * The source value must be less than twice the modulus. If the value
+ * is not lower than the modulus, then the modulus is subtracted and
+ * this function returns 1; otherwise, it leaves it untouched and it
+ * returns 0.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+reduce_final_f256(uint32_t *d)
+{
+ uint32_t t[20];
+ uint32_t cc;
+ int i;
+
+ memcpy(t, d, sizeof t);
+ cc = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ uint32_t w;
+
+ w = t[i] - F256[i] - cc;
+ cc = w >> 31;
+ t[i] = w & 0x1FFF;
+ }
+ cc ^= 1;
+ CCOPY(cc, d, t, sizeof t);
+ return cc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform a multiplication of two integers modulo
+ * 2^256-2^224+2^192+2^96-1 (for NIST curve P-256). Operands are arrays
+ * of 20 words, each containing 13 bits of data, in little-endian order.
+ * On input, upper word may be up to 13 bits (hence value up to 2^260-1);
+ * on output, value fits on 257 bits and is lower than twice the modulus.
+ */
+static void
+mul_f256(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ uint32_t t[40], cc;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute raw multiplication. All result words fit in 13 bits
+ * each.
+ */
+ mul20(t, a, b);
+
+ /*
+ * Modular reduction: each high word in added/subtracted where
+ * necessary.
+ *
+ * The modulus is:
+ * p = 2^256 - 2^224 + 2^192 + 2^96 - 1
+ * Therefore:
+ * 2^256 = 2^224 - 2^192 - 2^96 + 1 mod p
+ *
+ * For a word x at bit offset n (n >= 256), we have:
+ * x*2^n = x*2^(n-32) - x*2^(n-64)
+ * - x*2^(n - 160) + x*2^(n-256) mod p
+ *
+ * Thus, we can nullify the high word if we reinject it at some
+ * proper emplacements.
+ */
+ for (i = 39; i >= 20; i --) {
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ x = t[i];
+ t[i - 2] += ARSH(x, 6);
+ t[i - 3] += (x << 7) & 0x1FFF;
+ t[i - 4] -= ARSH(x, 12);
+ t[i - 5] -= (x << 1) & 0x1FFF;
+ t[i - 12] -= ARSH(x, 4);
+ t[i - 13] -= (x << 9) & 0x1FFF;
+ t[i - 19] += ARSH(x, 9);
+ t[i - 20] += (x << 4) & 0x1FFF;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Propagate carries. This is a signed propagation, and the
+ * result may be negative. The loop above may enlarge values,
+ * but not two much: worst case is the chain involving t[i - 3],
+ * in which a value may be added to itself up to 7 times. Since
+ * starting values are 13-bit each, all words fit on 20 bits
+ * (21 to account for the sign bit).
+ */
+ cc = norm13(t, t, 20);
+
+ /*
+ * Perform modular reduction again for the bits beyond 256 (the carry
+ * and the bits 256..259). Since the largest shift below is by 10
+ * bits, and the values fit on 21 bits, values fit in 32-bit words,
+ * thereby allowing injecting full word values.
+ */
+ cc = (cc << 4) | (t[19] >> 9);
+ t[19] &= 0x01FF;
+ t[17] += cc << 3;
+ t[14] -= cc << 10;
+ t[7] -= cc << 5;
+ t[0] += cc;
+
+ /*
+ * If the carry is negative, then after carry propagation, we may
+ * end up with a value which is negative, and we don't want that.
+ * Thus, in that case, we add the modulus. Note that the subtraction
+ * result, when the carry is negative, is always smaller than the
+ * modulus, so the extra addition will not make the value exceed
+ * twice the modulus.
+ */
+ cc >>= 31;
+ t[0] -= cc;
+ t[7] += cc << 5;
+ t[14] += cc << 10;
+ t[17] -= cc << 3;
+ t[19] += cc << 9;
+
+ norm13(d, t, 20);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Square an integer modulo 2^256-2^224+2^192+2^96-1 (for NIST curve
+ * P-256). Operand is an array of 20 words, each containing 13 bits of
+ * data, in little-endian order. On input, upper word may be up to 13
+ * bits (hence value up to 2^260-1); on output, value fits on 257 bits
+ * and is lower than twice the modulus.
+ */
+static void
+square_f256(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a)
+{
+ uint32_t t[40], cc;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute raw square. All result words fit in 13 bits each.
+ */
+ square20(t, a);
+
+ /*
+ * Modular reduction: each high word in added/subtracted where
+ * necessary.
+ *
+ * The modulus is:
+ * p = 2^256 - 2^224 + 2^192 + 2^96 - 1
+ * Therefore:
+ * 2^256 = 2^224 - 2^192 - 2^96 + 1 mod p
+ *
+ * For a word x at bit offset n (n >= 256), we have:
+ * x*2^n = x*2^(n-32) - x*2^(n-64)
+ * - x*2^(n - 160) + x*2^(n-256) mod p
+ *
+ * Thus, we can nullify the high word if we reinject it at some
+ * proper emplacements.
+ */
+ for (i = 39; i >= 20; i --) {
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ x = t[i];
+ t[i - 2] += ARSH(x, 6);
+ t[i - 3] += (x << 7) & 0x1FFF;
+ t[i - 4] -= ARSH(x, 12);
+ t[i - 5] -= (x << 1) & 0x1FFF;
+ t[i - 12] -= ARSH(x, 4);
+ t[i - 13] -= (x << 9) & 0x1FFF;
+ t[i - 19] += ARSH(x, 9);
+ t[i - 20] += (x << 4) & 0x1FFF;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Propagate carries. This is a signed propagation, and the
+ * result may be negative. The loop above may enlarge values,
+ * but not two much: worst case is the chain involving t[i - 3],
+ * in which a value may be added to itself up to 7 times. Since
+ * starting values are 13-bit each, all words fit on 20 bits
+ * (21 to account for the sign bit).
+ */
+ cc = norm13(t, t, 20);
+
+ /*
+ * Perform modular reduction again for the bits beyond 256 (the carry
+ * and the bits 256..259). Since the largest shift below is by 10
+ * bits, and the values fit on 21 bits, values fit in 32-bit words,
+ * thereby allowing injecting full word values.
+ */
+ cc = (cc << 4) | (t[19] >> 9);
+ t[19] &= 0x01FF;
+ t[17] += cc << 3;
+ t[14] -= cc << 10;
+ t[7] -= cc << 5;
+ t[0] += cc;
+
+ /*
+ * If the carry is negative, then after carry propagation, we may
+ * end up with a value which is negative, and we don't want that.
+ * Thus, in that case, we add the modulus. Note that the subtraction
+ * result, when the carry is negative, is always smaller than the
+ * modulus, so the extra addition will not make the value exceed
+ * twice the modulus.
+ */
+ cc >>= 31;
+ t[0] -= cc;
+ t[7] += cc << 5;
+ t[14] += cc << 10;
+ t[17] -= cc << 3;
+ t[19] += cc << 9;
+
+ norm13(d, t, 20);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Jacobian coordinates for a point in P-256: affine coordinates (X,Y)
+ * are such that:
+ * X = x / z^2
+ * Y = y / z^3
+ * For the point at infinity, z = 0.
+ * Each point thus admits many possible representations.
+ *
+ * Coordinates are represented in arrays of 32-bit integers, each holding
+ * 13 bits of data. Values may also be slightly greater than the modulus,
+ * but they will always be lower than twice the modulus.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ uint32_t x[20];
+ uint32_t y[20];
+ uint32_t z[20];
+} p256_jacobian;
+
+/*
+ * Convert a point to affine coordinates:
+ * - If the point is the point at infinity, then all three coordinates
+ * are set to 0.
+ * - Otherwise, the 'z' coordinate is set to 1, and the 'x' and 'y'
+ * coordinates are the 'X' and 'Y' affine coordinates.
+ * The coordinates are guaranteed to be lower than the modulus.
+ */
+static void
+p256_to_affine(p256_jacobian *P)
+{
+ uint32_t t1[20], t2[20];
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Invert z with a modular exponentiation: the modulus is
+ * p = 2^256 - 2^224 + 2^192 + 2^96 - 1, and the exponent is
+ * p-2. Exponent bit pattern (from high to low) is:
+ * - 32 bits of value 1
+ * - 31 bits of value 0
+ * - 1 bit of value 1
+ * - 96 bits of value 0
+ * - 94 bits of value 1
+ * - 1 bit of value 0
+ * - 1 bit of value 1
+ * Thus, we precompute z^(2^31-1) to speed things up.
+ *
+ * If z = 0 (point at infinity) then the modular exponentiation
+ * will yield 0, which leads to the expected result (all three
+ * coordinates set to 0).
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * A simple square-and-multiply for z^(2^31-1). We could save about
+ * two dozen multiplications here with an addition chain, but
+ * this would require a bit more code, and extra stack buffers.
+ */
+ memcpy(t1, P->z, sizeof P->z);
+ for (i = 0; i < 30; i ++) {
+ square_f256(t1, t1);
+ mul_f256(t1, t1, P->z);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Square-and-multiply. Apart from the squarings, we have a few
+ * multiplications to set bits to 1; we multiply by the original z
+ * for setting 1 bit, and by t1 for setting 31 bits.
+ */
+ memcpy(t2, P->z, sizeof P->z);
+ for (i = 1; i < 256; i ++) {
+ square_f256(t2, t2);
+ switch (i) {
+ case 31:
+ case 190:
+ case 221:
+ case 252:
+ mul_f256(t2, t2, t1);
+ break;
+ case 63:
+ case 253:
+ case 255:
+ mul_f256(t2, t2, P->z);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now that we have 1/z, multiply x by 1/z^2 and y by 1/z^3.
+ */
+ mul_f256(t1, t2, t2);
+ mul_f256(P->x, t1, P->x);
+ mul_f256(t1, t1, t2);
+ mul_f256(P->y, t1, P->y);
+ reduce_final_f256(P->x);
+ reduce_final_f256(P->y);
+
+ /*
+ * Multiply z by 1/z. If z = 0, then this will yield 0, otherwise
+ * this will set z to 1.
+ */
+ mul_f256(P->z, P->z, t2);
+ reduce_final_f256(P->z);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Double a point in P-256. This function works for all valid points,
+ * including the point at infinity.
+ */
+static void
+p256_double(p256_jacobian *Q)
+{
+ /*
+ * Doubling formulas are:
+ *
+ * s = 4*x*y^2
+ * m = 3*(x + z^2)*(x - z^2)
+ * x' = m^2 - 2*s
+ * y' = m*(s - x') - 8*y^4
+ * z' = 2*y*z
+ *
+ * These formulas work for all points, including points of order 2
+ * and points at infinity:
+ * - If y = 0 then z' = 0. But there is no such point in P-256
+ * anyway.
+ * - If z = 0 then z' = 0.
+ */
+ uint32_t t1[20], t2[20], t3[20], t4[20];
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z^2 in t1.
+ */
+ square_f256(t1, Q->z);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x-z^2 in t2 and x+z^2 in t1.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ t2[i] = (F256[i] << 1) + Q->x[i] - t1[i];
+ t1[i] += Q->x[i];
+ }
+ norm13(t1, t1, 20);
+ norm13(t2, t2, 20);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute 3*(x+z^2)*(x-z^2) in t1.
+ */
+ mul_f256(t3, t1, t2);
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ t1[i] = MUL15(3, t3[i]);
+ }
+ norm13(t1, t1, 20);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute 4*x*y^2 (in t2) and 2*y^2 (in t3).
+ */
+ square_f256(t3, Q->y);
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ t3[i] <<= 1;
+ }
+ norm13(t3, t3, 20);
+ mul_f256(t2, Q->x, t3);
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ t2[i] <<= 1;
+ }
+ norm13(t2, t2, 20);
+ reduce_f256(t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x' = m^2 - 2*s.
+ */
+ square_f256(Q->x, t1);
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ Q->x[i] += (F256[i] << 2) - (t2[i] << 1);
+ }
+ norm13(Q->x, Q->x, 20);
+ reduce_f256(Q->x);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z' = 2*y*z.
+ */
+ mul_f256(t4, Q->y, Q->z);
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ Q->z[i] = t4[i] << 1;
+ }
+ norm13(Q->z, Q->z, 20);
+ reduce_f256(Q->z);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y' = m*(s - x') - 8*y^4. Note that we already have
+ * 2*y^2 in t3.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ t2[i] += (F256[i] << 1) - Q->x[i];
+ }
+ norm13(t2, t2, 20);
+ mul_f256(Q->y, t1, t2);
+ square_f256(t4, t3);
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ Q->y[i] += (F256[i] << 2) - (t4[i] << 1);
+ }
+ norm13(Q->y, Q->y, 20);
+ reduce_f256(Q->y);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add point P2 to point P1.
+ *
+ * This function computes the wrong result in the following cases:
+ *
+ * - If P1 == 0 but P2 != 0
+ * - If P1 != 0 but P2 == 0
+ * - If P1 == P2
+ *
+ * In all three cases, P1 is set to the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 0 if one of the following occurs:
+ *
+ * - P1 and P2 have the same Y coordinate
+ * - P1 == 0 and P2 == 0
+ * - The Y coordinate of one of the points is 0 and the other point is
+ * the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * The third case cannot actually happen with valid points, since a point
+ * with Y == 0 is a point of order 2, and there is no point of order 2 on
+ * curve P-256.
+ *
+ * Therefore, assuming that P1 != 0 and P2 != 0 on input, then the caller
+ * can apply the following:
+ *
+ * - If the result is not the point at infinity, then it is correct.
+ * - Otherwise, if the returned value is 1, then this is a case of
+ * P1+P2 == 0, so the result is indeed the point at infinity.
+ * - Otherwise, P1 == P2, so a "double" operation should have been
+ * performed.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+p256_add(p256_jacobian *P1, const p256_jacobian *P2)
+{
+ /*
+ * Addtions formulas are:
+ *
+ * u1 = x1 * z2^2
+ * u2 = x2 * z1^2
+ * s1 = y1 * z2^3
+ * s2 = y2 * z1^3
+ * h = u2 - u1
+ * r = s2 - s1
+ * x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2 * u1 * h^2
+ * y3 = r * (u1 * h^2 - x3) - s1 * h^3
+ * z3 = h * z1 * z2
+ */
+ uint32_t t1[20], t2[20], t3[20], t4[20], t5[20], t6[20], t7[20];
+ uint32_t ret;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1 = x1*z2^2 (in t1) and s1 = y1*z2^3 (in t3).
+ */
+ square_f256(t3, P2->z);
+ mul_f256(t1, P1->x, t3);
+ mul_f256(t4, P2->z, t3);
+ mul_f256(t3, P1->y, t4);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u2 = x2*z1^2 (in t2) and s2 = y2*z1^3 (in t4).
+ */
+ square_f256(t4, P1->z);
+ mul_f256(t2, P2->x, t4);
+ mul_f256(t5, P1->z, t4);
+ mul_f256(t4, P2->y, t5);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h = h2 - u1 (in t2) and r = s2 - s1 (in t4).
+ * We need to test whether r is zero, so we will do some extra
+ * reduce.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ t2[i] += (F256[i] << 1) - t1[i];
+ t4[i] += (F256[i] << 1) - t3[i];
+ }
+ norm13(t2, t2, 20);
+ norm13(t4, t4, 20);
+ reduce_f256(t4);
+ reduce_final_f256(t4);
+ ret = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ ret |= t4[i];
+ }
+ ret = (ret | -ret) >> 31;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1*h^2 (in t6) and h^3 (in t5);
+ */
+ square_f256(t7, t2);
+ mul_f256(t6, t1, t7);
+ mul_f256(t5, t7, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2*u1*h^2.
+ */
+ square_f256(P1->x, t4);
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ P1->x[i] += (F256[i] << 3) - t5[i] - (t6[i] << 1);
+ }
+ norm13(P1->x, P1->x, 20);
+ reduce_f256(P1->x);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y3 = r*(u1*h^2 - x3) - s1*h^3.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ t6[i] += (F256[i] << 1) - P1->x[i];
+ }
+ norm13(t6, t6, 20);
+ mul_f256(P1->y, t4, t6);
+ mul_f256(t1, t5, t3);
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ P1->y[i] += (F256[i] << 1) - t1[i];
+ }
+ norm13(P1->y, P1->y, 20);
+ reduce_f256(P1->y);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z3 = h*z1*z2.
+ */
+ mul_f256(t1, P1->z, P2->z);
+ mul_f256(P1->z, t1, t2);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add point P2 to point P1. This is a specialised function for the
+ * case when P2 is a non-zero point in affine coordinate.
+ *
+ * This function computes the wrong result in the following cases:
+ *
+ * - If P1 == 0
+ * - If P1 == P2
+ *
+ * In both cases, P1 is set to the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 0 if one of the following occurs:
+ *
+ * - P1 and P2 have the same Y coordinate
+ * - The Y coordinate of P2 is 0 and P1 is the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * The second case cannot actually happen with valid points, since a point
+ * with Y == 0 is a point of order 2, and there is no point of order 2 on
+ * curve P-256.
+ *
+ * Therefore, assuming that P1 != 0 on input, then the caller
+ * can apply the following:
+ *
+ * - If the result is not the point at infinity, then it is correct.
+ * - Otherwise, if the returned value is 1, then this is a case of
+ * P1+P2 == 0, so the result is indeed the point at infinity.
+ * - Otherwise, P1 == P2, so a "double" operation should have been
+ * performed.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+p256_add_mixed(p256_jacobian *P1, const p256_jacobian *P2)
+{
+ /*
+ * Addtions formulas are:
+ *
+ * u1 = x1
+ * u2 = x2 * z1^2
+ * s1 = y1
+ * s2 = y2 * z1^3
+ * h = u2 - u1
+ * r = s2 - s1
+ * x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2 * u1 * h^2
+ * y3 = r * (u1 * h^2 - x3) - s1 * h^3
+ * z3 = h * z1
+ */
+ uint32_t t1[20], t2[20], t3[20], t4[20], t5[20], t6[20], t7[20];
+ uint32_t ret;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1 = x1 (in t1) and s1 = y1 (in t3).
+ */
+ memcpy(t1, P1->x, sizeof t1);
+ memcpy(t3, P1->y, sizeof t3);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u2 = x2*z1^2 (in t2) and s2 = y2*z1^3 (in t4).
+ */
+ square_f256(t4, P1->z);
+ mul_f256(t2, P2->x, t4);
+ mul_f256(t5, P1->z, t4);
+ mul_f256(t4, P2->y, t5);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h = h2 - u1 (in t2) and r = s2 - s1 (in t4).
+ * We need to test whether r is zero, so we will do some extra
+ * reduce.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ t2[i] += (F256[i] << 1) - t1[i];
+ t4[i] += (F256[i] << 1) - t3[i];
+ }
+ norm13(t2, t2, 20);
+ norm13(t4, t4, 20);
+ reduce_f256(t4);
+ reduce_final_f256(t4);
+ ret = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ ret |= t4[i];
+ }
+ ret = (ret | -ret) >> 31;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1*h^2 (in t6) and h^3 (in t5);
+ */
+ square_f256(t7, t2);
+ mul_f256(t6, t1, t7);
+ mul_f256(t5, t7, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2*u1*h^2.
+ */
+ square_f256(P1->x, t4);
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ P1->x[i] += (F256[i] << 3) - t5[i] - (t6[i] << 1);
+ }
+ norm13(P1->x, P1->x, 20);
+ reduce_f256(P1->x);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y3 = r*(u1*h^2 - x3) - s1*h^3.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ t6[i] += (F256[i] << 1) - P1->x[i];
+ }
+ norm13(t6, t6, 20);
+ mul_f256(P1->y, t4, t6);
+ mul_f256(t1, t5, t3);
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ P1->y[i] += (F256[i] << 1) - t1[i];
+ }
+ norm13(P1->y, P1->y, 20);
+ reduce_f256(P1->y);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z3 = h*z1*z2.
+ */
+ mul_f256(P1->z, P1->z, t2);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode a P-256 point. This function does not support the point at
+ * infinity. Returned value is 0 if the point is invalid, 1 otherwise.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+p256_decode(p256_jacobian *P, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t tx[20], ty[20], t1[20], t2[20];
+ uint32_t bad;
+ int i;
+
+ if (len != 65) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ buf = src;
+
+ /*
+ * First byte must be 0x04 (uncompressed format). We could support
+ * "hybrid format" (first byte is 0x06 or 0x07, and encodes the
+ * least significant bit of the Y coordinate), but it is explicitly
+ * forbidden by RFC 5480 (section 2.2).
+ */
+ bad = NEQ(buf[0], 0x04);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the coordinates, and check that they are both lower
+ * than the modulus.
+ */
+ tx[19] = be8_to_le13(tx, buf + 1, 32);
+ ty[19] = be8_to_le13(ty, buf + 33, 32);
+ bad |= reduce_final_f256(tx);
+ bad |= reduce_final_f256(ty);
+
+ /*
+ * Check curve equation.
+ */
+ square_f256(t1, tx);
+ mul_f256(t1, tx, t1);
+ square_f256(t2, ty);
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ t1[i] += (F256[i] << 3) - MUL15(3, tx[i]) + P256_B[i] - t2[i];
+ }
+ norm13(t1, t1, 20);
+ reduce_f256(t1);
+ reduce_final_f256(t1);
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ bad |= t1[i];
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Copy coordinates to the point structure.
+ */
+ memcpy(P->x, tx, sizeof tx);
+ memcpy(P->y, ty, sizeof ty);
+ memset(P->z, 0, sizeof P->z);
+ P->z[0] = 1;
+ return EQ(bad, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode a point into a buffer. This function assumes that the point is
+ * valid, in affine coordinates, and not the point at infinity.
+ */
+static void
+p256_encode(void *dst, const p256_jacobian *P)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = dst;
+ buf[0] = 0x04;
+ le13_to_be8(buf + 1, 32, P->x);
+ le13_to_be8(buf + 33, 32, P->y);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiply a curve point by an integer. The integer is assumed to be
+ * lower than the curve order, and the base point must not be the point
+ * at infinity.
+ */
+static void
+p256_mul(p256_jacobian *P, const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen)
+{
+ /*
+ * qz is a flag that is initially 1, and remains equal to 1
+ * as long as the point is the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * We use a 2-bit window to handle multiplier bits by pairs.
+ * The precomputed window really is the points P2 and P3.
+ */
+ uint32_t qz;
+ p256_jacobian P2, P3, Q, T, U;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute window values.
+ */
+ P2 = *P;
+ p256_double(&P2);
+ P3 = *P;
+ p256_add(&P3, &P2);
+
+ /*
+ * We start with Q = 0. We process multiplier bits 2 by 2.
+ */
+ memset(&Q, 0, sizeof Q);
+ qz = 1;
+ while (xlen -- > 0) {
+ int k;
+
+ for (k = 6; k >= 0; k -= 2) {
+ uint32_t bits;
+ uint32_t bnz;
+
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ T = *P;
+ U = Q;
+ bits = (*x >> k) & (uint32_t)3;
+ bnz = NEQ(bits, 0);
+ CCOPY(EQ(bits, 2), &T, &P2, sizeof T);
+ CCOPY(EQ(bits, 3), &T, &P3, sizeof T);
+ p256_add(&U, &T);
+ CCOPY(bnz & qz, &Q, &T, sizeof Q);
+ CCOPY(bnz & ~qz, &Q, &U, sizeof Q);
+ qz &= ~bnz;
+ }
+ x ++;
+ }
+ *P = Q;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Precomputed window: k*G points, where G is the curve generator, and k
+ * is an integer from 1 to 15 (inclusive). The X and Y coordinates of
+ * the point are encoded as 20 words of 13 bits each (little-endian
+ * order); 13-bit words are then grouped 2-by-2 into 32-bit words
+ * (little-endian order within each word).
+ */
+static const uint32_t Gwin[15][20] = {
+
+ { 0x04C60296, 0x02721176, 0x19D00F4A, 0x102517AC,
+ 0x13B8037D, 0x0748103C, 0x1E730E56, 0x08481FE2,
+ 0x0F97012C, 0x00D605F4, 0x1DFA11F5, 0x0C801A0D,
+ 0x0F670CBB, 0x0AED0CC5, 0x115E0E33, 0x181F0785,
+ 0x13F514A7, 0x0FF30E3B, 0x17171E1A, 0x009F18D0 },
+
+ { 0x1B341978, 0x16911F11, 0x0D9A1A60, 0x1C4E1FC8,
+ 0x1E040969, 0x096A06B0, 0x091C0030, 0x09EF1A29,
+ 0x18C40D03, 0x00F91C9E, 0x13C313D1, 0x096F0748,
+ 0x011419E0, 0x1CC713A6, 0x1DD31DAD, 0x1EE80C36,
+ 0x1ECD0C69, 0x1A0800A4, 0x08861B8E, 0x000E1DD5 },
+
+ { 0x173F1D6C, 0x02CC06F1, 0x14C21FB4, 0x043D1EB6,
+ 0x0F3606B7, 0x1A971C59, 0x1BF71951, 0x01481323,
+ 0x068D0633, 0x00BD12F9, 0x13EA1032, 0x136209E8,
+ 0x1C1E19A7, 0x06C7013E, 0x06C10AB0, 0x14C908BB,
+ 0x05830CE1, 0x1FEF18DD, 0x00620998, 0x010E0D19 },
+
+ { 0x18180852, 0x0604111A, 0x0B771509, 0x1B6F0156,
+ 0x00181FE2, 0x1DCC0AF4, 0x16EF0659, 0x11F70E80,
+ 0x11A912D0, 0x01C414D2, 0x027618C6, 0x05840FC6,
+ 0x100215C4, 0x187E0C3B, 0x12771C96, 0x150C0B5D,
+ 0x0FF705FD, 0x07981C67, 0x1AD20C63, 0x01C11C55 },
+
+ { 0x1E8113ED, 0x0A940370, 0x12920215, 0x1FA31D6F,
+ 0x1F7C0C82, 0x10CD03F7, 0x02640560, 0x081A0B5E,
+ 0x1BD21151, 0x00A21642, 0x0D0B0DA4, 0x0176113F,
+ 0x04440D1D, 0x001A1360, 0x1068012F, 0x1F141E49,
+ 0x10DF136B, 0x0E4F162B, 0x0D44104A, 0x01C1105F },
+
+ { 0x011411A9, 0x01551A4F, 0x0ADA0C6B, 0x01BD0EC8,
+ 0x18120C74, 0x112F1778, 0x099202CB, 0x0C05124B,
+ 0x195316A4, 0x01600685, 0x1E3B1FE2, 0x189014E3,
+ 0x0B5E1FD7, 0x0E0311F8, 0x08E000F7, 0x174E00DE,
+ 0x160702DF, 0x1B5A15BF, 0x03A11237, 0x01D01704 },
+
+ { 0x0C3D12A3, 0x0C501C0C, 0x17AD1300, 0x1715003F,
+ 0x03F719F8, 0x18031ED8, 0x1D980667, 0x0F681896,
+ 0x1B7D00BF, 0x011C14CE, 0x0FA000B4, 0x1C3501B0,
+ 0x0D901C55, 0x06790C10, 0x029E0736, 0x0DEB0400,
+ 0x034F183A, 0x030619B4, 0x0DEF0033, 0x00E71AC7 },
+
+ { 0x1B7D1393, 0x1B3B1076, 0x0BED1B4D, 0x13011F3A,
+ 0x0E0E1238, 0x156A132B, 0x013A02D3, 0x160A0D01,
+ 0x1CED1EE9, 0x00C5165D, 0x184C157E, 0x08141A83,
+ 0x153C0DA5, 0x1ED70F9D, 0x05170D51, 0x02CF13B8,
+ 0x18AE1771, 0x1B04113F, 0x05EC11E9, 0x015A16B3 },
+
+ { 0x04A41EE0, 0x1D1412E4, 0x1C591D79, 0x118511B7,
+ 0x14F00ACB, 0x1AE31E1C, 0x049C0D51, 0x016E061E,
+ 0x1DB71EDF, 0x01D41A35, 0x0E8208FA, 0x14441293,
+ 0x011F1E85, 0x1D54137A, 0x026B114F, 0x151D0832,
+ 0x00A50964, 0x1F9C1E1C, 0x064B12C9, 0x005409D1 },
+
+ { 0x062B123F, 0x0C0D0501, 0x183704C3, 0x08E31120,
+ 0x0A2E0A6C, 0x14440FED, 0x090A0D1E, 0x13271964,
+ 0x0B590A3A, 0x019D1D9B, 0x05780773, 0x09770A91,
+ 0x0F770CA3, 0x053F19D4, 0x02C80DED, 0x1A761304,
+ 0x091E0DD9, 0x15D201B8, 0x151109AA, 0x010F0198 },
+
+ { 0x05E101D1, 0x072314DD, 0x045F1433, 0x1A041541,
+ 0x10B3142E, 0x01840736, 0x1C1B19DB, 0x098B0418,
+ 0x1DBC083B, 0x007D1444, 0x01511740, 0x11DD1F3A,
+ 0x04ED0E2F, 0x1B4B1A62, 0x10480D04, 0x09E911A2,
+ 0x04211AFA, 0x19140893, 0x04D60CC4, 0x01210648 },
+
+ { 0x112703C4, 0x018B1BA1, 0x164C1D50, 0x05160BE0,
+ 0x0BCC1830, 0x01CB1554, 0x13291732, 0x1B2B1918,
+ 0x0DED0817, 0x00E80775, 0x0A2401D3, 0x0BFE08B3,
+ 0x0E531199, 0x058616E9, 0x04770B91, 0x110F0C55,
+ 0x19C11554, 0x0BFB1159, 0x03541C38, 0x000E1C2D },
+
+ { 0x10390C01, 0x02BB0751, 0x0AC5098E, 0x096C17AB,
+ 0x03C90E28, 0x10BD18BF, 0x002E1F2D, 0x092B0986,
+ 0x1BD700AC, 0x002E1F20, 0x1E3D1FD8, 0x077718BB,
+ 0x06F919C4, 0x187407ED, 0x11370E14, 0x081E139C,
+ 0x00481ADB, 0x14AB0289, 0x066A0EBE, 0x00C70ED6 },
+
+ { 0x0694120B, 0x124E1CC9, 0x0E2F0570, 0x17CF081A,
+ 0x078906AC, 0x066D17CF, 0x1B3207F4, 0x0C5705E9,
+ 0x10001C38, 0x00A919DE, 0x06851375, 0x0F900BD8,
+ 0x080401BA, 0x0EEE0D42, 0x1B8B11EA, 0x0B4519F0,
+ 0x090F18C0, 0x062E1508, 0x0DD909F4, 0x01EB067C },
+
+ { 0x0CDC1D5F, 0x0D1818F9, 0x07781636, 0x125B18E8,
+ 0x0D7003AF, 0x13110099, 0x1D9B1899, 0x175C1EB7,
+ 0x0E34171A, 0x01E01153, 0x081A0F36, 0x0B391783,
+ 0x1D1F147E, 0x19CE16D7, 0x11511B21, 0x1F2C10F9,
+ 0x12CA0E51, 0x05A31D39, 0x171A192E, 0x016B0E4F }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup one of the Gwin[] values, by index. This is constant-time.
+ */
+static void
+lookup_Gwin(p256_jacobian *T, uint32_t idx)
+{
+ uint32_t xy[20];
+ uint32_t k;
+ size_t u;
+
+ memset(xy, 0, sizeof xy);
+ for (k = 0; k < 15; k ++) {
+ uint32_t m;
+
+ m = -EQ(idx, k + 1);
+ for (u = 0; u < 20; u ++) {
+ xy[u] |= m & Gwin[k][u];
+ }
+ }
+ for (u = 0; u < 10; u ++) {
+ T->x[(u << 1) + 0] = xy[u] & 0xFFFF;
+ T->x[(u << 1) + 1] = xy[u] >> 16;
+ T->y[(u << 1) + 0] = xy[u + 10] & 0xFFFF;
+ T->y[(u << 1) + 1] = xy[u + 10] >> 16;
+ }
+ memset(T->z, 0, sizeof T->z);
+ T->z[0] = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiply the generator by an integer. The integer is assumed non-zero
+ * and lower than the curve order.
+ */
+static void
+p256_mulgen(p256_jacobian *P, const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen)
+{
+ /*
+ * qz is a flag that is initially 1, and remains equal to 1
+ * as long as the point is the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * We use a 4-bit window to handle multiplier bits by groups
+ * of 4. The precomputed window is constant static data, with
+ * points in affine coordinates; we use a constant-time lookup.
+ */
+ p256_jacobian Q;
+ uint32_t qz;
+
+ memset(&Q, 0, sizeof Q);
+ qz = 1;
+ while (xlen -- > 0) {
+ int k;
+ unsigned bx;
+
+ bx = *x ++;
+ for (k = 0; k < 2; k ++) {
+ uint32_t bits;
+ uint32_t bnz;
+ p256_jacobian T, U;
+
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ bits = (bx >> 4) & 0x0F;
+ bnz = NEQ(bits, 0);
+ lookup_Gwin(&T, bits);
+ U = Q;
+ p256_add_mixed(&U, &T);
+ CCOPY(bnz & qz, &Q, &T, sizeof Q);
+ CCOPY(bnz & ~qz, &Q, &U, sizeof Q);
+ qz &= ~bnz;
+ bx <<= 4;
+ }
+ }
+ *P = Q;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char P256_G[] = {
+ 0x04, 0x6B, 0x17, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0x42, 0x47, 0xF8,
+ 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xE5, 0x63, 0xA4, 0x40, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7D,
+ 0x81, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x33, 0xA0, 0xF4, 0xA1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xD8,
+ 0x98, 0xC2, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xE3, 0x42, 0xE2, 0xFE, 0x1A, 0x7F,
+ 0x9B, 0x8E, 0xE7, 0xEB, 0x4A, 0x7C, 0x0F, 0x9E, 0x16, 0x2B,
+ 0xCE, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6B, 0x31, 0x5E, 0xCE, 0xCB, 0xB6, 0x40,
+ 0x68, 0x37, 0xBF, 0x51, 0xF5
+};
+
+static const unsigned char P256_N[] = {
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD,
+ 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63,
+ 0x25, 0x51
+};
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_generator(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = sizeof P256_G;
+ return P256_G;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_order(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = sizeof P256_N;
+ return P256_N;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_xoff(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_mul(unsigned char *G, size_t Glen,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+ p256_jacobian P;
+
+ (void)curve;
+ if (Glen != 65) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = p256_decode(&P, G, Glen);
+ p256_mul(&P, x, xlen);
+ p256_to_affine(&P);
+ p256_encode(G, &P);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_mulgen(unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve)
+{
+ p256_jacobian P;
+
+ (void)curve;
+ p256_mulgen(&P, x, xlen);
+ p256_to_affine(&P);
+ p256_encode(R, &P);
+ return 65;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_muladd(unsigned char *A, const unsigned char *B, size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *y, size_t ylen, int curve)
+{
+ p256_jacobian P, Q;
+ uint32_t r, t, z;
+ int i;
+
+ (void)curve;
+ if (len != 65) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = p256_decode(&P, A, len);
+ p256_mul(&P, x, xlen);
+ if (B == NULL) {
+ p256_mulgen(&Q, y, ylen);
+ } else {
+ r &= p256_decode(&Q, B, len);
+ p256_mul(&Q, y, ylen);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The final addition may fail in case both points are equal.
+ */
+ t = p256_add(&P, &Q);
+ reduce_final_f256(P.z);
+ z = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i ++) {
+ z |= P.z[i];
+ }
+ z = EQ(z, 0);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+
+ /*
+ * If z is 1 then either P+Q = 0 (t = 1) or P = Q (t = 0). So we
+ * have the following:
+ *
+ * z = 0, t = 0 return P (normal addition)
+ * z = 0, t = 1 return P (normal addition)
+ * z = 1, t = 0 return Q (a 'double' case)
+ * z = 1, t = 1 report an error (P+Q = 0)
+ */
+ CCOPY(z & ~t, &P, &Q, sizeof Q);
+ p256_to_affine(&P);
+ p256_encode(A, &P);
+ r &= ~(z & t);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl br_ec_p256_m15 = {
+ (uint32_t)0x00800000,
+ &api_generator,
+ &api_order,
+ &api_xoff,
+ &api_mul,
+ &api_mulgen,
+ &api_muladd
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_p256_m31.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_p256_m31.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b185937
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_p256_m31.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1469 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * If BR_NO_ARITH_SHIFT is undefined, or defined to 0, then we _assume_
+ * that right-shifting a signed negative integer copies the sign bit
+ * (arithmetic right-shift). This is "implementation-defined behaviour",
+ * i.e. it is not undefined, but it may differ between compilers. Each
+ * compiler is supposed to document its behaviour in that respect. GCC
+ * explicitly defines that an arithmetic right shift is used. We expect
+ * all other compilers to do the same, because underlying CPU offer an
+ * arithmetic right shift opcode that could not be used otherwise.
+ */
+#if BR_NO_ARITH_SHIFT
+#define ARSH(x, n) (((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)) \
+ | ((-((uint32_t)(x) >> 31)) << (32 - (n))))
+#define ARSHW(x, n) (((uint64_t)(x) >> (n)) \
+ | ((-((uint64_t)(x) >> 63)) << (64 - (n))))
+#else
+#define ARSH(x, n) ((*(int32_t *)&(x)) >> (n))
+#define ARSHW(x, n) ((*(int64_t *)&(x)) >> (n))
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Convert an integer from unsigned big-endian encoding to a sequence of
+ * 30-bit words in little-endian order. The final "partial" word is
+ * returned.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+be8_to_le30(uint32_t *dst, const unsigned char *src, size_t len)
+{
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len;
+
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ uint32_t b;
+
+ b = src[len];
+ if (acc_len < 22) {
+ acc |= b << acc_len;
+ acc_len += 8;
+ } else {
+ *dst ++ = (acc | (b << acc_len)) & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ acc = b >> (30 - acc_len);
+ acc_len -= 22;
+ }
+ }
+ return acc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert an integer (30-bit words, little-endian) to unsigned
+ * big-endian encoding. The total encoding length is provided; all
+ * the destination bytes will be filled.
+ */
+static void
+le30_to_be8(unsigned char *dst, size_t len, const uint32_t *src)
+{
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len;
+
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ if (acc_len < 8) {
+ uint32_t w;
+
+ w = *src ++;
+ dst[len] = (unsigned char)(acc | (w << acc_len));
+ acc = w >> (8 - acc_len);
+ acc_len += 22;
+ } else {
+ dst[len] = (unsigned char)acc;
+ acc >>= 8;
+ acc_len -= 8;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiply two integers. Source integers are represented as arrays of
+ * nine 30-bit words, for values up to 2^270-1. Result is encoded over
+ * 18 words of 30 bits each.
+ */
+static void
+mul9(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ /*
+ * Maximum intermediate result is no more than
+ * 10376293531797946367, which fits in 64 bits. Reason:
+ *
+ * 10376293531797946367 = 9 * (2^30-1)^2 + 9663676406
+ * 10376293531797946367 < 9663676407 * 2^30
+ *
+ * Thus, adding together 9 products of 30-bit integers, with
+ * a carry of at most 9663676406, yields an integer that fits
+ * on 64 bits and generates a carry of at most 9663676406.
+ */
+ uint64_t t[17];
+ uint64_t cc;
+ int i;
+
+ t[ 0] = MUL31(a[0], b[0]);
+ t[ 1] = MUL31(a[0], b[1])
+ + MUL31(a[1], b[0]);
+ t[ 2] = MUL31(a[0], b[2])
+ + MUL31(a[1], b[1])
+ + MUL31(a[2], b[0]);
+ t[ 3] = MUL31(a[0], b[3])
+ + MUL31(a[1], b[2])
+ + MUL31(a[2], b[1])
+ + MUL31(a[3], b[0]);
+ t[ 4] = MUL31(a[0], b[4])
+ + MUL31(a[1], b[3])
+ + MUL31(a[2], b[2])
+ + MUL31(a[3], b[1])
+ + MUL31(a[4], b[0]);
+ t[ 5] = MUL31(a[0], b[5])
+ + MUL31(a[1], b[4])
+ + MUL31(a[2], b[3])
+ + MUL31(a[3], b[2])
+ + MUL31(a[4], b[1])
+ + MUL31(a[5], b[0]);
+ t[ 6] = MUL31(a[0], b[6])
+ + MUL31(a[1], b[5])
+ + MUL31(a[2], b[4])
+ + MUL31(a[3], b[3])
+ + MUL31(a[4], b[2])
+ + MUL31(a[5], b[1])
+ + MUL31(a[6], b[0]);
+ t[ 7] = MUL31(a[0], b[7])
+ + MUL31(a[1], b[6])
+ + MUL31(a[2], b[5])
+ + MUL31(a[3], b[4])
+ + MUL31(a[4], b[3])
+ + MUL31(a[5], b[2])
+ + MUL31(a[6], b[1])
+ + MUL31(a[7], b[0]);
+ t[ 8] = MUL31(a[0], b[8])
+ + MUL31(a[1], b[7])
+ + MUL31(a[2], b[6])
+ + MUL31(a[3], b[5])
+ + MUL31(a[4], b[4])
+ + MUL31(a[5], b[3])
+ + MUL31(a[6], b[2])
+ + MUL31(a[7], b[1])
+ + MUL31(a[8], b[0]);
+ t[ 9] = MUL31(a[1], b[8])
+ + MUL31(a[2], b[7])
+ + MUL31(a[3], b[6])
+ + MUL31(a[4], b[5])
+ + MUL31(a[5], b[4])
+ + MUL31(a[6], b[3])
+ + MUL31(a[7], b[2])
+ + MUL31(a[8], b[1]);
+ t[10] = MUL31(a[2], b[8])
+ + MUL31(a[3], b[7])
+ + MUL31(a[4], b[6])
+ + MUL31(a[5], b[5])
+ + MUL31(a[6], b[4])
+ + MUL31(a[7], b[3])
+ + MUL31(a[8], b[2]);
+ t[11] = MUL31(a[3], b[8])
+ + MUL31(a[4], b[7])
+ + MUL31(a[5], b[6])
+ + MUL31(a[6], b[5])
+ + MUL31(a[7], b[4])
+ + MUL31(a[8], b[3]);
+ t[12] = MUL31(a[4], b[8])
+ + MUL31(a[5], b[7])
+ + MUL31(a[6], b[6])
+ + MUL31(a[7], b[5])
+ + MUL31(a[8], b[4]);
+ t[13] = MUL31(a[5], b[8])
+ + MUL31(a[6], b[7])
+ + MUL31(a[7], b[6])
+ + MUL31(a[8], b[5]);
+ t[14] = MUL31(a[6], b[8])
+ + MUL31(a[7], b[7])
+ + MUL31(a[8], b[6]);
+ t[15] = MUL31(a[7], b[8])
+ + MUL31(a[8], b[7]);
+ t[16] = MUL31(a[8], b[8]);
+
+ /*
+ * Propagate carries.
+ */
+ cc = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 17; i ++) {
+ uint64_t w;
+
+ w = t[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = (uint32_t)w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = w >> 30;
+ }
+ d[17] = (uint32_t)cc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Square a 270-bit integer, represented as an array of nine 30-bit words.
+ * Result uses 18 words of 30 bits each.
+ */
+static void
+square9(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a)
+{
+ uint64_t t[17];
+ uint64_t cc;
+ int i;
+
+ t[ 0] = MUL31(a[0], a[0]);
+ t[ 1] = ((MUL31(a[0], a[1])) << 1);
+ t[ 2] = MUL31(a[1], a[1])
+ + ((MUL31(a[0], a[2])) << 1);
+ t[ 3] = ((MUL31(a[0], a[3])
+ + MUL31(a[1], a[2])) << 1);
+ t[ 4] = MUL31(a[2], a[2])
+ + ((MUL31(a[0], a[4])
+ + MUL31(a[1], a[3])) << 1);
+ t[ 5] = ((MUL31(a[0], a[5])
+ + MUL31(a[1], a[4])
+ + MUL31(a[2], a[3])) << 1);
+ t[ 6] = MUL31(a[3], a[3])
+ + ((MUL31(a[0], a[6])
+ + MUL31(a[1], a[5])
+ + MUL31(a[2], a[4])) << 1);
+ t[ 7] = ((MUL31(a[0], a[7])
+ + MUL31(a[1], a[6])
+ + MUL31(a[2], a[5])
+ + MUL31(a[3], a[4])) << 1);
+ t[ 8] = MUL31(a[4], a[4])
+ + ((MUL31(a[0], a[8])
+ + MUL31(a[1], a[7])
+ + MUL31(a[2], a[6])
+ + MUL31(a[3], a[5])) << 1);
+ t[ 9] = ((MUL31(a[1], a[8])
+ + MUL31(a[2], a[7])
+ + MUL31(a[3], a[6])
+ + MUL31(a[4], a[5])) << 1);
+ t[10] = MUL31(a[5], a[5])
+ + ((MUL31(a[2], a[8])
+ + MUL31(a[3], a[7])
+ + MUL31(a[4], a[6])) << 1);
+ t[11] = ((MUL31(a[3], a[8])
+ + MUL31(a[4], a[7])
+ + MUL31(a[5], a[6])) << 1);
+ t[12] = MUL31(a[6], a[6])
+ + ((MUL31(a[4], a[8])
+ + MUL31(a[5], a[7])) << 1);
+ t[13] = ((MUL31(a[5], a[8])
+ + MUL31(a[6], a[7])) << 1);
+ t[14] = MUL31(a[7], a[7])
+ + ((MUL31(a[6], a[8])) << 1);
+ t[15] = ((MUL31(a[7], a[8])) << 1);
+ t[16] = MUL31(a[8], a[8]);
+
+ /*
+ * Propagate carries.
+ */
+ cc = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 17; i ++) {
+ uint64_t w;
+
+ w = t[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = (uint32_t)w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = w >> 30;
+ }
+ d[17] = (uint32_t)cc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Base field modulus for P-256.
+ */
+static const uint32_t F256[] = {
+
+ 0x3FFFFFFF, 0x3FFFFFFF, 0x3FFFFFFF, 0x0000003F, 0x00000000,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00001000, 0x3FFFC000, 0x0000FFFF
+};
+
+/*
+ * The 'b' curve equation coefficient for P-256.
+ */
+static const uint32_t P256_B[] = {
+
+ 0x27D2604B, 0x2F38F0F8, 0x053B0F63, 0x0741AC33, 0x1886BC65,
+ 0x2EF555DA, 0x293E7B3E, 0x0D762A8E, 0x00005AC6
+};
+
+/*
+ * Addition in the field. Source operands shall fit on 257 bits; output
+ * will be lower than twice the modulus.
+ */
+static void
+add_f256(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ uint32_t w, cc;
+ int i;
+
+ cc = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ w = a[i] + b[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = w >> 30;
+ }
+ w >>= 16;
+ d[8] &= 0xFFFF;
+ d[3] -= w << 6;
+ d[6] -= w << 12;
+ d[7] += w << 14;
+ cc = w;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ w = d[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = ARSH(w, 30);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Subtraction in the field. Source operands shall be smaller than twice
+ * the modulus; the result will fulfil the same property.
+ */
+static void
+sub_f256(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ uint32_t w, cc;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * We really compute a - b + 2*p to make sure that the result is
+ * positive.
+ */
+ w = a[0] - b[0] - 0x00002;
+ d[0] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ w = a[1] - b[1] + ARSH(w, 30);
+ d[1] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ w = a[2] - b[2] + ARSH(w, 30);
+ d[2] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ w = a[3] - b[3] + ARSH(w, 30) + 0x00080;
+ d[3] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ w = a[4] - b[4] + ARSH(w, 30);
+ d[4] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ w = a[5] - b[5] + ARSH(w, 30);
+ d[5] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ w = a[6] - b[6] + ARSH(w, 30) + 0x02000;
+ d[6] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ w = a[7] - b[7] + ARSH(w, 30) - 0x08000;
+ d[7] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ w = a[8] - b[8] + ARSH(w, 30) + 0x20000;
+ d[8] = w & 0xFFFF;
+ w >>= 16;
+ d[8] &= 0xFFFF;
+ d[3] -= w << 6;
+ d[6] -= w << 12;
+ d[7] += w << 14;
+ cc = w;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ w = d[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = ARSH(w, 30);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute a multiplication in F256. Source operands shall be less than
+ * twice the modulus.
+ */
+static void
+mul_f256(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ uint32_t t[18];
+ uint64_t s[18];
+ uint64_t cc, x;
+ uint32_t z, c;
+ int i;
+
+ mul9(t, a, b);
+
+ /*
+ * Modular reduction: each high word in added/subtracted where
+ * necessary.
+ *
+ * The modulus is:
+ * p = 2^256 - 2^224 + 2^192 + 2^96 - 1
+ * Therefore:
+ * 2^256 = 2^224 - 2^192 - 2^96 + 1 mod p
+ *
+ * For a word x at bit offset n (n >= 256), we have:
+ * x*2^n = x*2^(n-32) - x*2^(n-64)
+ * - x*2^(n - 160) + x*2^(n-256) mod p
+ *
+ * Thus, we can nullify the high word if we reinject it at some
+ * proper emplacements.
+ *
+ * We use 64-bit intermediate words to allow for carries to
+ * accumulate easily, before performing the final propagation.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 18; i ++) {
+ s[i] = t[i];
+ }
+
+ for (i = 17; i >= 9; i --) {
+ uint64_t y;
+
+ y = s[i];
+ s[i - 1] += ARSHW(y, 2);
+ s[i - 2] += (y << 28) & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ s[i - 2] -= ARSHW(y, 4);
+ s[i - 3] -= (y << 26) & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ s[i - 5] -= ARSHW(y, 10);
+ s[i - 6] -= (y << 20) & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ s[i - 8] += ARSHW(y, 16);
+ s[i - 9] += (y << 14) & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Carry propagation must be signed. Moreover, we may have overdone
+ * it a bit, and obtain a negative result.
+ *
+ * The loop above ran 9 times; each time, each word was augmented
+ * by at most one extra word (in absolute value). Thus, the top
+ * word must in fine fit in 39 bits, so the carry below will fit
+ * on 9 bits.
+ */
+ cc = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ x = s[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = (uint32_t)x & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = ARSHW(x, 30);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * All nine words fit on 30 bits, but there may be an extra
+ * carry for a few bits (at most 9), and that carry may be
+ * negative. Moreover, we want the result to fit on 257 bits.
+ * The two lines below ensure that the word in d[] has length
+ * 256 bits, and the (signed) carry (beyond 2^256) is in cc. The
+ * significant length of cc is less than 24 bits, so we will be
+ * able to switch to 32-bit operations.
+ */
+ cc = ARSHW(x, 16);
+ d[8] &= 0xFFFF;
+
+ /*
+ * One extra round of reduction, for cc*2^256, which means
+ * adding cc*(2^224-2^192-2^96+1) to a 256-bit (nonnegative)
+ * value. If cc is negative, then it may happen (rarely, but
+ * not neglectibly so) that the result would be negative. In
+ * order to avoid that, if cc is negative, then we add the
+ * modulus once. Note that if cc is negative, then propagating
+ * that carry must yield a value lower than the modulus, so
+ * adding the modulus once will keep the final result under
+ * twice the modulus.
+ */
+ z = (uint32_t)cc;
+ d[3] -= z << 6;
+ d[6] -= (z << 12) & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ d[7] -= ARSH(z, 18);
+ d[7] += (z << 14) & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ d[8] += ARSH(z, 16);
+ c = z >> 31;
+ d[0] -= c;
+ d[3] += c << 6;
+ d[6] += c << 12;
+ d[7] -= c << 14;
+ d[8] += c << 16;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ uint32_t w;
+
+ w = d[i] + z;
+ d[i] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ z = ARSH(w, 30);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute a square in F256. Source operand shall be less than
+ * twice the modulus.
+ */
+static void
+square_f256(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a)
+{
+ uint32_t t[18];
+ uint64_t s[18];
+ uint64_t cc, x;
+ uint32_t z, c;
+ int i;
+
+ square9(t, a);
+
+ /*
+ * Modular reduction: each high word in added/subtracted where
+ * necessary.
+ *
+ * The modulus is:
+ * p = 2^256 - 2^224 + 2^192 + 2^96 - 1
+ * Therefore:
+ * 2^256 = 2^224 - 2^192 - 2^96 + 1 mod p
+ *
+ * For a word x at bit offset n (n >= 256), we have:
+ * x*2^n = x*2^(n-32) - x*2^(n-64)
+ * - x*2^(n - 160) + x*2^(n-256) mod p
+ *
+ * Thus, we can nullify the high word if we reinject it at some
+ * proper emplacements.
+ *
+ * We use 64-bit intermediate words to allow for carries to
+ * accumulate easily, before performing the final propagation.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 18; i ++) {
+ s[i] = t[i];
+ }
+
+ for (i = 17; i >= 9; i --) {
+ uint64_t y;
+
+ y = s[i];
+ s[i - 1] += ARSHW(y, 2);
+ s[i - 2] += (y << 28) & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ s[i - 2] -= ARSHW(y, 4);
+ s[i - 3] -= (y << 26) & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ s[i - 5] -= ARSHW(y, 10);
+ s[i - 6] -= (y << 20) & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ s[i - 8] += ARSHW(y, 16);
+ s[i - 9] += (y << 14) & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Carry propagation must be signed. Moreover, we may have overdone
+ * it a bit, and obtain a negative result.
+ *
+ * The loop above ran 9 times; each time, each word was augmented
+ * by at most one extra word (in absolute value). Thus, the top
+ * word must in fine fit in 39 bits, so the carry below will fit
+ * on 9 bits.
+ */
+ cc = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ x = s[i] + cc;
+ d[i] = (uint32_t)x & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ cc = ARSHW(x, 30);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * All nine words fit on 30 bits, but there may be an extra
+ * carry for a few bits (at most 9), and that carry may be
+ * negative. Moreover, we want the result to fit on 257 bits.
+ * The two lines below ensure that the word in d[] has length
+ * 256 bits, and the (signed) carry (beyond 2^256) is in cc. The
+ * significant length of cc is less than 24 bits, so we will be
+ * able to switch to 32-bit operations.
+ */
+ cc = ARSHW(x, 16);
+ d[8] &= 0xFFFF;
+
+ /*
+ * One extra round of reduction, for cc*2^256, which means
+ * adding cc*(2^224-2^192-2^96+1) to a 256-bit (nonnegative)
+ * value. If cc is negative, then it may happen (rarely, but
+ * not neglectibly so) that the result would be negative. In
+ * order to avoid that, if cc is negative, then we add the
+ * modulus once. Note that if cc is negative, then propagating
+ * that carry must yield a value lower than the modulus, so
+ * adding the modulus once will keep the final result under
+ * twice the modulus.
+ */
+ z = (uint32_t)cc;
+ d[3] -= z << 6;
+ d[6] -= (z << 12) & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ d[7] -= ARSH(z, 18);
+ d[7] += (z << 14) & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ d[8] += ARSH(z, 16);
+ c = z >> 31;
+ d[0] -= c;
+ d[3] += c << 6;
+ d[6] += c << 12;
+ d[7] -= c << 14;
+ d[8] += c << 16;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ uint32_t w;
+
+ w = d[i] + z;
+ d[i] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ z = ARSH(w, 30);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform a "final reduction" in field F256 (field for curve P-256).
+ * The source value must be less than twice the modulus. If the value
+ * is not lower than the modulus, then the modulus is subtracted and
+ * this function returns 1; otherwise, it leaves it untouched and it
+ * returns 0.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+reduce_final_f256(uint32_t *d)
+{
+ uint32_t t[9];
+ uint32_t cc;
+ int i;
+
+ cc = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ uint32_t w;
+
+ w = d[i] - F256[i] - cc;
+ cc = w >> 31;
+ t[i] = w & 0x3FFFFFFF;
+ }
+ cc ^= 1;
+ CCOPY(cc, d, t, sizeof t);
+ return cc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Jacobian coordinates for a point in P-256: affine coordinates (X,Y)
+ * are such that:
+ * X = x / z^2
+ * Y = y / z^3
+ * For the point at infinity, z = 0.
+ * Each point thus admits many possible representations.
+ *
+ * Coordinates are represented in arrays of 32-bit integers, each holding
+ * 30 bits of data. Values may also be slightly greater than the modulus,
+ * but they will always be lower than twice the modulus.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ uint32_t x[9];
+ uint32_t y[9];
+ uint32_t z[9];
+} p256_jacobian;
+
+/*
+ * Convert a point to affine coordinates:
+ * - If the point is the point at infinity, then all three coordinates
+ * are set to 0.
+ * - Otherwise, the 'z' coordinate is set to 1, and the 'x' and 'y'
+ * coordinates are the 'X' and 'Y' affine coordinates.
+ * The coordinates are guaranteed to be lower than the modulus.
+ */
+static void
+p256_to_affine(p256_jacobian *P)
+{
+ uint32_t t1[9], t2[9];
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Invert z with a modular exponentiation: the modulus is
+ * p = 2^256 - 2^224 + 2^192 + 2^96 - 1, and the exponent is
+ * p-2. Exponent bit pattern (from high to low) is:
+ * - 32 bits of value 1
+ * - 31 bits of value 0
+ * - 1 bit of value 1
+ * - 96 bits of value 0
+ * - 94 bits of value 1
+ * - 1 bit of value 0
+ * - 1 bit of value 1
+ * Thus, we precompute z^(2^31-1) to speed things up.
+ *
+ * If z = 0 (point at infinity) then the modular exponentiation
+ * will yield 0, which leads to the expected result (all three
+ * coordinates set to 0).
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * A simple square-and-multiply for z^(2^31-1). We could save about
+ * two dozen multiplications here with an addition chain, but
+ * this would require a bit more code, and extra stack buffers.
+ */
+ memcpy(t1, P->z, sizeof P->z);
+ for (i = 0; i < 30; i ++) {
+ square_f256(t1, t1);
+ mul_f256(t1, t1, P->z);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Square-and-multiply. Apart from the squarings, we have a few
+ * multiplications to set bits to 1; we multiply by the original z
+ * for setting 1 bit, and by t1 for setting 31 bits.
+ */
+ memcpy(t2, P->z, sizeof P->z);
+ for (i = 1; i < 256; i ++) {
+ square_f256(t2, t2);
+ switch (i) {
+ case 31:
+ case 190:
+ case 221:
+ case 252:
+ mul_f256(t2, t2, t1);
+ break;
+ case 63:
+ case 253:
+ case 255:
+ mul_f256(t2, t2, P->z);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now that we have 1/z, multiply x by 1/z^2 and y by 1/z^3.
+ */
+ mul_f256(t1, t2, t2);
+ mul_f256(P->x, t1, P->x);
+ mul_f256(t1, t1, t2);
+ mul_f256(P->y, t1, P->y);
+ reduce_final_f256(P->x);
+ reduce_final_f256(P->y);
+
+ /*
+ * Multiply z by 1/z. If z = 0, then this will yield 0, otherwise
+ * this will set z to 1.
+ */
+ mul_f256(P->z, P->z, t2);
+ reduce_final_f256(P->z);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Double a point in P-256. This function works for all valid points,
+ * including the point at infinity.
+ */
+static void
+p256_double(p256_jacobian *Q)
+{
+ /*
+ * Doubling formulas are:
+ *
+ * s = 4*x*y^2
+ * m = 3*(x + z^2)*(x - z^2)
+ * x' = m^2 - 2*s
+ * y' = m*(s - x') - 8*y^4
+ * z' = 2*y*z
+ *
+ * These formulas work for all points, including points of order 2
+ * and points at infinity:
+ * - If y = 0 then z' = 0. But there is no such point in P-256
+ * anyway.
+ * - If z = 0 then z' = 0.
+ */
+ uint32_t t1[9], t2[9], t3[9], t4[9];
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z^2 in t1.
+ */
+ square_f256(t1, Q->z);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x-z^2 in t2 and x+z^2 in t1.
+ */
+ add_f256(t2, Q->x, t1);
+ sub_f256(t1, Q->x, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute 3*(x+z^2)*(x-z^2) in t1.
+ */
+ mul_f256(t3, t1, t2);
+ add_f256(t1, t3, t3);
+ add_f256(t1, t3, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute 4*x*y^2 (in t2) and 2*y^2 (in t3).
+ */
+ square_f256(t3, Q->y);
+ add_f256(t3, t3, t3);
+ mul_f256(t2, Q->x, t3);
+ add_f256(t2, t2, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x' = m^2 - 2*s.
+ */
+ square_f256(Q->x, t1);
+ sub_f256(Q->x, Q->x, t2);
+ sub_f256(Q->x, Q->x, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z' = 2*y*z.
+ */
+ mul_f256(t4, Q->y, Q->z);
+ add_f256(Q->z, t4, t4);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y' = m*(s - x') - 8*y^4. Note that we already have
+ * 2*y^2 in t3.
+ */
+ sub_f256(t2, t2, Q->x);
+ mul_f256(Q->y, t1, t2);
+ square_f256(t4, t3);
+ add_f256(t4, t4, t4);
+ sub_f256(Q->y, Q->y, t4);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add point P2 to point P1.
+ *
+ * This function computes the wrong result in the following cases:
+ *
+ * - If P1 == 0 but P2 != 0
+ * - If P1 != 0 but P2 == 0
+ * - If P1 == P2
+ *
+ * In all three cases, P1 is set to the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 0 if one of the following occurs:
+ *
+ * - P1 and P2 have the same Y coordinate
+ * - P1 == 0 and P2 == 0
+ * - The Y coordinate of one of the points is 0 and the other point is
+ * the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * The third case cannot actually happen with valid points, since a point
+ * with Y == 0 is a point of order 2, and there is no point of order 2 on
+ * curve P-256.
+ *
+ * Therefore, assuming that P1 != 0 and P2 != 0 on input, then the caller
+ * can apply the following:
+ *
+ * - If the result is not the point at infinity, then it is correct.
+ * - Otherwise, if the returned value is 1, then this is a case of
+ * P1+P2 == 0, so the result is indeed the point at infinity.
+ * - Otherwise, P1 == P2, so a "double" operation should have been
+ * performed.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+p256_add(p256_jacobian *P1, const p256_jacobian *P2)
+{
+ /*
+ * Addtions formulas are:
+ *
+ * u1 = x1 * z2^2
+ * u2 = x2 * z1^2
+ * s1 = y1 * z2^3
+ * s2 = y2 * z1^3
+ * h = u2 - u1
+ * r = s2 - s1
+ * x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2 * u1 * h^2
+ * y3 = r * (u1 * h^2 - x3) - s1 * h^3
+ * z3 = h * z1 * z2
+ */
+ uint32_t t1[9], t2[9], t3[9], t4[9], t5[9], t6[9], t7[9];
+ uint32_t ret;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1 = x1*z2^2 (in t1) and s1 = y1*z2^3 (in t3).
+ */
+ square_f256(t3, P2->z);
+ mul_f256(t1, P1->x, t3);
+ mul_f256(t4, P2->z, t3);
+ mul_f256(t3, P1->y, t4);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u2 = x2*z1^2 (in t2) and s2 = y2*z1^3 (in t4).
+ */
+ square_f256(t4, P1->z);
+ mul_f256(t2, P2->x, t4);
+ mul_f256(t5, P1->z, t4);
+ mul_f256(t4, P2->y, t5);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h = h2 - u1 (in t2) and r = s2 - s1 (in t4).
+ * We need to test whether r is zero, so we will do some extra
+ * reduce.
+ */
+ sub_f256(t2, t2, t1);
+ sub_f256(t4, t4, t3);
+ reduce_final_f256(t4);
+ ret = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ ret |= t4[i];
+ }
+ ret = (ret | -ret) >> 31;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1*h^2 (in t6) and h^3 (in t5);
+ */
+ square_f256(t7, t2);
+ mul_f256(t6, t1, t7);
+ mul_f256(t5, t7, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2*u1*h^2.
+ */
+ square_f256(P1->x, t4);
+ sub_f256(P1->x, P1->x, t5);
+ sub_f256(P1->x, P1->x, t6);
+ sub_f256(P1->x, P1->x, t6);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y3 = r*(u1*h^2 - x3) - s1*h^3.
+ */
+ sub_f256(t6, t6, P1->x);
+ mul_f256(P1->y, t4, t6);
+ mul_f256(t1, t5, t3);
+ sub_f256(P1->y, P1->y, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z3 = h*z1*z2.
+ */
+ mul_f256(t1, P1->z, P2->z);
+ mul_f256(P1->z, t1, t2);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add point P2 to point P1. This is a specialised function for the
+ * case when P2 is a non-zero point in affine coordinate.
+ *
+ * This function computes the wrong result in the following cases:
+ *
+ * - If P1 == 0
+ * - If P1 == P2
+ *
+ * In both cases, P1 is set to the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 0 if one of the following occurs:
+ *
+ * - P1 and P2 have the same Y coordinate
+ * - The Y coordinate of P2 is 0 and P1 is the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * The second case cannot actually happen with valid points, since a point
+ * with Y == 0 is a point of order 2, and there is no point of order 2 on
+ * curve P-256.
+ *
+ * Therefore, assuming that P1 != 0 on input, then the caller
+ * can apply the following:
+ *
+ * - If the result is not the point at infinity, then it is correct.
+ * - Otherwise, if the returned value is 1, then this is a case of
+ * P1+P2 == 0, so the result is indeed the point at infinity.
+ * - Otherwise, P1 == P2, so a "double" operation should have been
+ * performed.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+p256_add_mixed(p256_jacobian *P1, const p256_jacobian *P2)
+{
+ /*
+ * Addtions formulas are:
+ *
+ * u1 = x1
+ * u2 = x2 * z1^2
+ * s1 = y1
+ * s2 = y2 * z1^3
+ * h = u2 - u1
+ * r = s2 - s1
+ * x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2 * u1 * h^2
+ * y3 = r * (u1 * h^2 - x3) - s1 * h^3
+ * z3 = h * z1
+ */
+ uint32_t t1[9], t2[9], t3[9], t4[9], t5[9], t6[9], t7[9];
+ uint32_t ret;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1 = x1 (in t1) and s1 = y1 (in t3).
+ */
+ memcpy(t1, P1->x, sizeof t1);
+ memcpy(t3, P1->y, sizeof t3);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u2 = x2*z1^2 (in t2) and s2 = y2*z1^3 (in t4).
+ */
+ square_f256(t4, P1->z);
+ mul_f256(t2, P2->x, t4);
+ mul_f256(t5, P1->z, t4);
+ mul_f256(t4, P2->y, t5);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h = h2 - u1 (in t2) and r = s2 - s1 (in t4).
+ * We need to test whether r is zero, so we will do some extra
+ * reduce.
+ */
+ sub_f256(t2, t2, t1);
+ sub_f256(t4, t4, t3);
+ reduce_final_f256(t4);
+ ret = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ ret |= t4[i];
+ }
+ ret = (ret | -ret) >> 31;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1*h^2 (in t6) and h^3 (in t5);
+ */
+ square_f256(t7, t2);
+ mul_f256(t6, t1, t7);
+ mul_f256(t5, t7, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2*u1*h^2.
+ */
+ square_f256(P1->x, t4);
+ sub_f256(P1->x, P1->x, t5);
+ sub_f256(P1->x, P1->x, t6);
+ sub_f256(P1->x, P1->x, t6);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y3 = r*(u1*h^2 - x3) - s1*h^3.
+ */
+ sub_f256(t6, t6, P1->x);
+ mul_f256(P1->y, t4, t6);
+ mul_f256(t1, t5, t3);
+ sub_f256(P1->y, P1->y, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z3 = h*z1*z2.
+ */
+ mul_f256(P1->z, P1->z, t2);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode a P-256 point. This function does not support the point at
+ * infinity. Returned value is 0 if the point is invalid, 1 otherwise.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+p256_decode(p256_jacobian *P, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t tx[9], ty[9], t1[9], t2[9];
+ uint32_t bad;
+ int i;
+
+ if (len != 65) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ buf = src;
+
+ /*
+ * First byte must be 0x04 (uncompressed format). We could support
+ * "hybrid format" (first byte is 0x06 or 0x07, and encodes the
+ * least significant bit of the Y coordinate), but it is explicitly
+ * forbidden by RFC 5480 (section 2.2).
+ */
+ bad = NEQ(buf[0], 0x04);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the coordinates, and check that they are both lower
+ * than the modulus.
+ */
+ tx[8] = be8_to_le30(tx, buf + 1, 32);
+ ty[8] = be8_to_le30(ty, buf + 33, 32);
+ bad |= reduce_final_f256(tx);
+ bad |= reduce_final_f256(ty);
+
+ /*
+ * Check curve equation.
+ */
+ square_f256(t1, tx);
+ mul_f256(t1, tx, t1);
+ square_f256(t2, ty);
+ sub_f256(t1, t1, tx);
+ sub_f256(t1, t1, tx);
+ sub_f256(t1, t1, tx);
+ add_f256(t1, t1, P256_B);
+ sub_f256(t1, t1, t2);
+ reduce_final_f256(t1);
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ bad |= t1[i];
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Copy coordinates to the point structure.
+ */
+ memcpy(P->x, tx, sizeof tx);
+ memcpy(P->y, ty, sizeof ty);
+ memset(P->z, 0, sizeof P->z);
+ P->z[0] = 1;
+ return EQ(bad, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode a point into a buffer. This function assumes that the point is
+ * valid, in affine coordinates, and not the point at infinity.
+ */
+static void
+p256_encode(void *dst, const p256_jacobian *P)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = dst;
+ buf[0] = 0x04;
+ le30_to_be8(buf + 1, 32, P->x);
+ le30_to_be8(buf + 33, 32, P->y);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiply a curve point by an integer. The integer is assumed to be
+ * lower than the curve order, and the base point must not be the point
+ * at infinity.
+ */
+static void
+p256_mul(p256_jacobian *P, const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen)
+{
+ /*
+ * qz is a flag that is initially 1, and remains equal to 1
+ * as long as the point is the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * We use a 2-bit window to handle multiplier bits by pairs.
+ * The precomputed window really is the points P2 and P3.
+ */
+ uint32_t qz;
+ p256_jacobian P2, P3, Q, T, U;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute window values.
+ */
+ P2 = *P;
+ p256_double(&P2);
+ P3 = *P;
+ p256_add(&P3, &P2);
+
+ /*
+ * We start with Q = 0. We process multiplier bits 2 by 2.
+ */
+ memset(&Q, 0, sizeof Q);
+ qz = 1;
+ while (xlen -- > 0) {
+ int k;
+
+ for (k = 6; k >= 0; k -= 2) {
+ uint32_t bits;
+ uint32_t bnz;
+
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ T = *P;
+ U = Q;
+ bits = (*x >> k) & (uint32_t)3;
+ bnz = NEQ(bits, 0);
+ CCOPY(EQ(bits, 2), &T, &P2, sizeof T);
+ CCOPY(EQ(bits, 3), &T, &P3, sizeof T);
+ p256_add(&U, &T);
+ CCOPY(bnz & qz, &Q, &T, sizeof Q);
+ CCOPY(bnz & ~qz, &Q, &U, sizeof Q);
+ qz &= ~bnz;
+ }
+ x ++;
+ }
+ *P = Q;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Precomputed window: k*G points, where G is the curve generator, and k
+ * is an integer from 1 to 15 (inclusive). The X and Y coordinates of
+ * the point are encoded as 9 words of 30 bits each (little-endian
+ * order).
+ */
+static const uint32_t Gwin[15][18] = {
+
+ { 0x1898C296, 0x1284E517, 0x1EB33A0F, 0x00DF604B,
+ 0x2440F277, 0x339B958E, 0x04247F8B, 0x347CB84B,
+ 0x00006B17, 0x37BF51F5, 0x2ED901A0, 0x3315ECEC,
+ 0x338CD5DA, 0x0F9E162B, 0x1FAD29F0, 0x27F9B8EE,
+ 0x10B8BF86, 0x00004FE3 },
+
+ { 0x07669978, 0x182D23F1, 0x3F21B35A, 0x225A789D,
+ 0x351AC3C0, 0x08E00C12, 0x34F7E8A5, 0x1EC62340,
+ 0x00007CF2, 0x227873D1, 0x3812DE74, 0x0E982299,
+ 0x1F6B798F, 0x3430DBBA, 0x366B1A7D, 0x2D040293,
+ 0x154436E3, 0x00000777 },
+
+ { 0x06E7FD6C, 0x2D05986F, 0x3ADA985F, 0x31ADC87B,
+ 0x0BF165E6, 0x1FBE5475, 0x30A44C8F, 0x3934698C,
+ 0x00005ECB, 0x227D5032, 0x29E6C49E, 0x04FB83D9,
+ 0x0AAC0D8E, 0x24A2ECD8, 0x2C1B3869, 0x0FF7E374,
+ 0x19031266, 0x00008734 },
+
+ { 0x2B030852, 0x024C0911, 0x05596EF5, 0x07F8B6DE,
+ 0x262BD003, 0x3779967B, 0x08FBBA02, 0x128D4CB4,
+ 0x0000E253, 0x184ED8C6, 0x310B08FC, 0x30EE0055,
+ 0x3F25B0FC, 0x062D764E, 0x3FB97F6A, 0x33CC719D,
+ 0x15D69318, 0x0000E0F1 },
+
+ { 0x03D033ED, 0x05552837, 0x35BE5242, 0x2320BF47,
+ 0x268FDFEF, 0x13215821, 0x140D2D78, 0x02DE9454,
+ 0x00005159, 0x3DA16DA4, 0x0742ED13, 0x0D80888D,
+ 0x004BC035, 0x0A79260D, 0x06FCDAFE, 0x2727D8AE,
+ 0x1F6A2412, 0x0000E0C1 },
+
+ { 0x3C2291A9, 0x1AC2ABA4, 0x3B215B4C, 0x131D037A,
+ 0x17DDE302, 0x0C90B2E2, 0x0602C92D, 0x05CA9DA9,
+ 0x0000B01A, 0x0FC77FE2, 0x35F1214E, 0x07E16BDF,
+ 0x003DDC07, 0x2703791C, 0x3038B7EE, 0x3DAD56FE,
+ 0x041D0C8D, 0x0000E85C },
+
+ { 0x3187B2A3, 0x0018A1C0, 0x00FEF5B3, 0x3E7E2E2A,
+ 0x01FB607E, 0x2CC199F0, 0x37B4625B, 0x0EDBE82F,
+ 0x00008E53, 0x01F400B4, 0x15786A1B, 0x3041B21C,
+ 0x31CD8CF2, 0x35900053, 0x1A7E0E9B, 0x318366D0,
+ 0x076F780C, 0x000073EB },
+
+ { 0x1B6FB393, 0x13767707, 0x3CE97DBB, 0x348E2603,
+ 0x354CADC1, 0x09D0B4EA, 0x1B053404, 0x1DE76FBA,
+ 0x000062D9, 0x0F09957E, 0x295029A8, 0x3E76A78D,
+ 0x3B547DAE, 0x27CEE0A2, 0x0575DC45, 0x1D8244FF,
+ 0x332F647A, 0x0000AD5A },
+
+ { 0x10949EE0, 0x1E7A292E, 0x06DF8B3D, 0x02B2E30B,
+ 0x31F8729E, 0x24E35475, 0x30B71878, 0x35EDBFB7,
+ 0x0000EA68, 0x0DD048FA, 0x21688929, 0x0DE823FE,
+ 0x1C53FAA9, 0x0EA0C84D, 0x052A592A, 0x1FCE7870,
+ 0x11325CB2, 0x00002A27 },
+
+ { 0x04C5723F, 0x30D81A50, 0x048306E4, 0x329B11C7,
+ 0x223FB545, 0x085347A8, 0x2993E591, 0x1B5ACA8E,
+ 0x0000CEF6, 0x04AF0773, 0x28D2EEA9, 0x2751EEEC,
+ 0x037B4A7F, 0x3B4C1059, 0x08F37674, 0x2AE906E1,
+ 0x18A88A6A, 0x00008786 },
+
+ { 0x34BC21D1, 0x0CCE474D, 0x15048BF4, 0x1D0BB409,
+ 0x021CDA16, 0x20DE76C3, 0x34C59063, 0x04EDE20E,
+ 0x00003ED1, 0x282A3740, 0x0BE3BBF3, 0x29889DAE,
+ 0x03413697, 0x34C68A09, 0x210EBE93, 0x0C8A224C,
+ 0x0826B331, 0x00009099 },
+
+ { 0x0624E3C4, 0x140317BA, 0x2F82C99D, 0x260C0A2C,
+ 0x25D55179, 0x194DCC83, 0x3D95E462, 0x356F6A05,
+ 0x0000741D, 0x0D4481D3, 0x2657FC8B, 0x1BA5CA71,
+ 0x3AE44B0D, 0x07B1548E, 0x0E0D5522, 0x05FDC567,
+ 0x2D1AA70E, 0x00000770 },
+
+ { 0x06072C01, 0x23857675, 0x1EAD58A9, 0x0B8A12D9,
+ 0x1EE2FC79, 0x0177CB61, 0x0495A618, 0x20DEB82B,
+ 0x0000177C, 0x2FC7BFD8, 0x310EEF8B, 0x1FB4DF39,
+ 0x3B8530E8, 0x0F4E7226, 0x0246B6D0, 0x2A558A24,
+ 0x163353AF, 0x000063BB },
+
+ { 0x24D2920B, 0x1C249DCC, 0x2069C5E5, 0x09AB2F9E,
+ 0x36DF3CF1, 0x1991FD0C, 0x062B97A7, 0x1E80070E,
+ 0x000054E7, 0x20D0B375, 0x2E9F20BD, 0x35090081,
+ 0x1C7A9DDC, 0x22E7C371, 0x087E3016, 0x03175421,
+ 0x3C6ECA7D, 0x0000F599 },
+
+ { 0x259B9D5F, 0x0D9A318F, 0x23A0EF16, 0x00EBE4B7,
+ 0x088265AE, 0x2CDE2666, 0x2BAE7ADF, 0x1371A5C6,
+ 0x0000F045, 0x0D034F36, 0x1F967378, 0x1B5FA3F4,
+ 0x0EC8739D, 0x1643E62A, 0x1653947E, 0x22D1F4E6,
+ 0x0FB8D64B, 0x0000B5B9 }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Lookup one of the Gwin[] values, by index. This is constant-time.
+ */
+static void
+lookup_Gwin(p256_jacobian *T, uint32_t idx)
+{
+ uint32_t xy[18];
+ uint32_t k;
+ size_t u;
+
+ memset(xy, 0, sizeof xy);
+ for (k = 0; k < 15; k ++) {
+ uint32_t m;
+
+ m = -EQ(idx, k + 1);
+ for (u = 0; u < 18; u ++) {
+ xy[u] |= m & Gwin[k][u];
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(T->x, &xy[0], sizeof T->x);
+ memcpy(T->y, &xy[9], sizeof T->y);
+ memset(T->z, 0, sizeof T->z);
+ T->z[0] = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiply the generator by an integer. The integer is assumed non-zero
+ * and lower than the curve order.
+ */
+static void
+p256_mulgen(p256_jacobian *P, const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen)
+{
+ /*
+ * qz is a flag that is initially 1, and remains equal to 1
+ * as long as the point is the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * We use a 4-bit window to handle multiplier bits by groups
+ * of 4. The precomputed window is constant static data, with
+ * points in affine coordinates; we use a constant-time lookup.
+ */
+ p256_jacobian Q;
+ uint32_t qz;
+
+ memset(&Q, 0, sizeof Q);
+ qz = 1;
+ while (xlen -- > 0) {
+ int k;
+ unsigned bx;
+
+ bx = *x ++;
+ for (k = 0; k < 2; k ++) {
+ uint32_t bits;
+ uint32_t bnz;
+ p256_jacobian T, U;
+
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ bits = (bx >> 4) & 0x0F;
+ bnz = NEQ(bits, 0);
+ lookup_Gwin(&T, bits);
+ U = Q;
+ p256_add_mixed(&U, &T);
+ CCOPY(bnz & qz, &Q, &T, sizeof Q);
+ CCOPY(bnz & ~qz, &Q, &U, sizeof Q);
+ qz &= ~bnz;
+ bx <<= 4;
+ }
+ }
+ *P = Q;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char P256_G[] = {
+ 0x04, 0x6B, 0x17, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0x42, 0x47, 0xF8,
+ 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xE5, 0x63, 0xA4, 0x40, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7D,
+ 0x81, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x33, 0xA0, 0xF4, 0xA1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xD8,
+ 0x98, 0xC2, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xE3, 0x42, 0xE2, 0xFE, 0x1A, 0x7F,
+ 0x9B, 0x8E, 0xE7, 0xEB, 0x4A, 0x7C, 0x0F, 0x9E, 0x16, 0x2B,
+ 0xCE, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6B, 0x31, 0x5E, 0xCE, 0xCB, 0xB6, 0x40,
+ 0x68, 0x37, 0xBF, 0x51, 0xF5
+};
+
+static const unsigned char P256_N[] = {
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD,
+ 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63,
+ 0x25, 0x51
+};
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_generator(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = sizeof P256_G;
+ return P256_G;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_order(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = sizeof P256_N;
+ return P256_N;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_xoff(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_mul(unsigned char *G, size_t Glen,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+ p256_jacobian P;
+
+ (void)curve;
+ if (Glen != 65) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = p256_decode(&P, G, Glen);
+ p256_mul(&P, x, xlen);
+ p256_to_affine(&P);
+ p256_encode(G, &P);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_mulgen(unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve)
+{
+ p256_jacobian P;
+
+ (void)curve;
+ p256_mulgen(&P, x, xlen);
+ p256_to_affine(&P);
+ p256_encode(R, &P);
+ return 65;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_muladd(unsigned char *A, const unsigned char *B, size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *y, size_t ylen, int curve)
+{
+ p256_jacobian P, Q;
+ uint32_t r, t, z;
+ int i;
+
+ (void)curve;
+ if (len != 65) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = p256_decode(&P, A, len);
+ p256_mul(&P, x, xlen);
+ if (B == NULL) {
+ p256_mulgen(&Q, y, ylen);
+ } else {
+ r &= p256_decode(&Q, B, len);
+ p256_mul(&Q, y, ylen);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The final addition may fail in case both points are equal.
+ */
+ t = p256_add(&P, &Q);
+ reduce_final_f256(P.z);
+ z = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ z |= P.z[i];
+ }
+ z = EQ(z, 0);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+
+ /*
+ * If z is 1 then either P+Q = 0 (t = 1) or P = Q (t = 0). So we
+ * have the following:
+ *
+ * z = 0, t = 0 return P (normal addition)
+ * z = 0, t = 1 return P (normal addition)
+ * z = 1, t = 0 return Q (a 'double' case)
+ * z = 1, t = 1 report an error (P+Q = 0)
+ */
+ CCOPY(z & ~t, &P, &Q, sizeof Q);
+ p256_to_affine(&P);
+ p256_encode(A, &P);
+ r &= ~(z & t);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl br_ec_p256_m31 = {
+ (uint32_t)0x00800000,
+ &api_generator,
+ &api_order,
+ &api_xoff,
+ &api_mul,
+ &api_mulgen,
+ &api_muladd
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_p256_m62.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_p256_m62.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a431790
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_p256_m62.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1765 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+
+#if BR_UMUL128
+#include <intrin.h>
+#endif
+
+static const unsigned char P256_G[] = {
+ 0x04, 0x6B, 0x17, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0x42, 0x47, 0xF8,
+ 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xE5, 0x63, 0xA4, 0x40, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7D,
+ 0x81, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x33, 0xA0, 0xF4, 0xA1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xD8,
+ 0x98, 0xC2, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xE3, 0x42, 0xE2, 0xFE, 0x1A, 0x7F,
+ 0x9B, 0x8E, 0xE7, 0xEB, 0x4A, 0x7C, 0x0F, 0x9E, 0x16, 0x2B,
+ 0xCE, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6B, 0x31, 0x5E, 0xCE, 0xCB, 0xB6, 0x40,
+ 0x68, 0x37, 0xBF, 0x51, 0xF5
+};
+
+static const unsigned char P256_N[] = {
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD,
+ 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63,
+ 0x25, 0x51
+};
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_generator(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = sizeof P256_G;
+ return P256_G;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_order(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = sizeof P256_N;
+ return P256_N;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_xoff(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * A field element is encoded as five 64-bit integers, in basis 2^52.
+ * Limbs may occasionally exceed 2^52.
+ *
+ * A _partially reduced_ value is such that the following hold:
+ * - top limb is less than 2^48 + 2^30
+ * - the other limbs fit on 53 bits each
+ * In particular, such a value is less than twice the modulus p.
+ */
+
+#define BIT(n) ((uint64_t)1 << (n))
+#define MASK48 (BIT(48) - BIT(0))
+#define MASK52 (BIT(52) - BIT(0))
+
+/* R = 2^260 mod p */
+static const uint64_t F256_R[] = {
+ 0x0000000000010, 0xF000000000000, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFF,
+ 0xFFEFFFFFFFFFF, 0x00000000FFFFF
+};
+
+/* Curve equation is y^2 = x^3 - 3*x + B. This constant is B*R mod p
+ (Montgomery representation of B). */
+static const uint64_t P256_B_MONTY[] = {
+ 0xDF6229C4BDDFD, 0xCA8843090D89C, 0x212ED6ACF005C,
+ 0x83415A220ABF7, 0x0C30061DD4874
+};
+
+/*
+ * Addition in the field. Carry propagation is not performed.
+ * On input, limbs may be up to 63 bits each; on output, they will
+ * be up to one bit more than on input.
+ */
+static inline void
+f256_add(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a, const uint64_t *b)
+{
+ d[0] = a[0] + b[0];
+ d[1] = a[1] + b[1];
+ d[2] = a[2] + b[2];
+ d[3] = a[3] + b[3];
+ d[4] = a[4] + b[4];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Partially reduce the provided value.
+ * Input: limbs can go up to 61 bits each.
+ * Output: partially reduced.
+ */
+static inline void
+f256_partial_reduce(uint64_t *a)
+{
+ uint64_t w, cc, s;
+
+ /*
+ * Propagate carries.
+ */
+ w = a[0];
+ a[0] = w & MASK52;
+ cc = w >> 52;
+ w = a[1] + cc;
+ a[1] = w & MASK52;
+ cc = w >> 52;
+ w = a[2] + cc;
+ a[2] = w & MASK52;
+ cc = w >> 52;
+ w = a[3] + cc;
+ a[3] = w & MASK52;
+ cc = w >> 52;
+ a[4] += cc;
+
+ s = a[4] >> 48; /* s < 2^14 */
+ a[0] += s; /* a[0] < 2^52 + 2^14 */
+ w = a[1] - (s << 44);
+ a[1] = w & MASK52; /* a[1] < 2^52 */
+ cc = -(w >> 52) & 0xFFF; /* cc < 16 */
+ w = a[2] - cc;
+ a[2] = w & MASK52; /* a[2] < 2^52 */
+ cc = w >> 63; /* cc = 0 or 1 */
+ w = a[3] - cc - (s << 36);
+ a[3] = w & MASK52; /* a[3] < 2^52 */
+ cc = w >> 63; /* cc = 0 or 1 */
+ w = a[4] & MASK48;
+ a[4] = w + (s << 16) - cc; /* a[4] < 2^48 + 2^30 */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Subtraction in the field.
+ * Input: limbs must fit on 60 bits each; in particular, the complete
+ * integer will be less than 2^268 + 2^217.
+ * Output: partially reduced.
+ */
+static inline void
+f256_sub(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a, const uint64_t *b)
+{
+ uint64_t t[5], w, s, cc;
+
+ /*
+ * We compute d = 2^13*p + a - b; this ensures a positive
+ * intermediate value.
+ *
+ * Each individual addition/subtraction may yield a positive or
+ * negative result; thus, we need to handle a signed carry, thus
+ * with sign extension. We prefer not to use signed types (int64_t)
+ * because conversion from unsigned to signed is cumbersome (a
+ * direct cast with the top bit set is undefined behavior; instead,
+ * we have to use pointer aliasing, using the guaranteed properties
+ * of exact-width types, but this requires the compiler to optimize
+ * away the writes and reads from RAM), and right-shifting a
+ * signed negative value is implementation-defined. Therefore,
+ * we use a custom sign extension.
+ */
+
+ w = a[0] - b[0] - BIT(13);
+ t[0] = w & MASK52;
+ cc = w >> 52;
+ cc |= -(cc & BIT(11));
+ w = a[1] - b[1] + cc;
+ t[1] = w & MASK52;
+ cc = w >> 52;
+ cc |= -(cc & BIT(11));
+ w = a[2] - b[2] + cc;
+ t[2] = (w & MASK52) + BIT(5);
+ cc = w >> 52;
+ cc |= -(cc & BIT(11));
+ w = a[3] - b[3] + cc;
+ t[3] = (w & MASK52) + BIT(49);
+ cc = w >> 52;
+ cc |= -(cc & BIT(11));
+ t[4] = (BIT(61) - BIT(29)) + a[4] - b[4] + cc;
+
+ /*
+ * Perform partial reduction. Rule is:
+ * 2^256 = 2^224 - 2^192 - 2^96 + 1 mod p
+ *
+ * At that point:
+ * 0 <= t[0] <= 2^52 - 1
+ * 0 <= t[1] <= 2^52 - 1
+ * 2^5 <= t[2] <= 2^52 + 2^5 - 1
+ * 2^49 <= t[3] <= 2^52 + 2^49 - 1
+ * 2^59 < t[4] <= 2^61 + 2^60 - 2^29
+ *
+ * Thus, the value 's' (t[4] / 2^48) will be necessarily
+ * greater than 2048, and less than 12288.
+ */
+ s = t[4] >> 48;
+
+ d[0] = t[0] + s; /* d[0] <= 2^52 + 12287 */
+ w = t[1] - (s << 44);
+ d[1] = w & MASK52; /* d[1] <= 2^52 - 1 */
+ cc = -(w >> 52) & 0xFFF; /* cc <= 48 */
+ w = t[2] - cc;
+ cc = w >> 63; /* cc = 0 or 1 */
+ d[2] = w + (cc << 52); /* d[2] <= 2^52 + 31 */
+ w = t[3] - cc - (s << 36);
+ cc = w >> 63; /* cc = 0 or 1 */
+ d[3] = w + (cc << 52); /* t[3] <= 2^52 + 2^49 - 1 */
+ d[4] = (t[4] & MASK48) + (s << 16) - cc; /* d[4] < 2^48 + 2^30 */
+
+ /*
+ * If s = 0, then none of the limbs is modified, and there cannot
+ * be an overflow; if s != 0, then (s << 16) > cc, and there is
+ * no overflow either.
+ */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Montgomery multiplication in the field.
+ * Input: limbs must fit on 56 bits each.
+ * Output: partially reduced.
+ */
+static void
+f256_montymul(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a, const uint64_t *b)
+{
+#if BR_INT128
+
+ int i;
+ uint64_t t[5];
+
+ t[0] = 0;
+ t[1] = 0;
+ t[2] = 0;
+ t[3] = 0;
+ t[4] = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i ++) {
+ uint64_t x, f, cc, w, s;
+ unsigned __int128 z;
+
+ /*
+ * Since limbs of a[] and b[] fit on 56 bits each,
+ * each individual product fits on 112 bits. Also,
+ * the factor f fits on 52 bits, so f<<48 fits on
+ * 112 bits too. This guarantees that carries (cc)
+ * will fit on 62 bits, thus no overflow.
+ *
+ * The operations below compute:
+ * t <- (t + x*b + f*p) / 2^64
+ */
+ x = a[i];
+ z = (unsigned __int128)b[0] * (unsigned __int128)x
+ + (unsigned __int128)t[0];
+ f = (uint64_t)z & MASK52;
+ cc = (uint64_t)(z >> 52);
+ z = (unsigned __int128)b[1] * (unsigned __int128)x
+ + (unsigned __int128)t[1] + cc
+ + ((unsigned __int128)f << 44);
+ t[0] = (uint64_t)z & MASK52;
+ cc = (uint64_t)(z >> 52);
+ z = (unsigned __int128)b[2] * (unsigned __int128)x
+ + (unsigned __int128)t[2] + cc;
+ t[1] = (uint64_t)z & MASK52;
+ cc = (uint64_t)(z >> 52);
+ z = (unsigned __int128)b[3] * (unsigned __int128)x
+ + (unsigned __int128)t[3] + cc
+ + ((unsigned __int128)f << 36);
+ t[2] = (uint64_t)z & MASK52;
+ cc = (uint64_t)(z >> 52);
+ z = (unsigned __int128)b[4] * (unsigned __int128)x
+ + (unsigned __int128)t[4] + cc
+ + ((unsigned __int128)f << 48)
+ - ((unsigned __int128)f << 16);
+ t[3] = (uint64_t)z & MASK52;
+ t[4] = (uint64_t)(z >> 52);
+
+ /*
+ * t[4] may be up to 62 bits here; we need to do a
+ * partial reduction. Note that limbs t[0] to t[3]
+ * fit on 52 bits each.
+ */
+ s = t[4] >> 48; /* s < 2^14 */
+ t[0] += s; /* t[0] < 2^52 + 2^14 */
+ w = t[1] - (s << 44);
+ t[1] = w & MASK52; /* t[1] < 2^52 */
+ cc = -(w >> 52) & 0xFFF; /* cc < 16 */
+ w = t[2] - cc;
+ t[2] = w & MASK52; /* t[2] < 2^52 */
+ cc = w >> 63; /* cc = 0 or 1 */
+ w = t[3] - cc - (s << 36);
+ t[3] = w & MASK52; /* t[3] < 2^52 */
+ cc = w >> 63; /* cc = 0 or 1 */
+ w = t[4] & MASK48;
+ t[4] = w + (s << 16) - cc; /* t[4] < 2^48 + 2^30 */
+
+ /*
+ * The final t[4] cannot overflow because cc is 0 or 1,
+ * and cc can be 1 only if s != 0.
+ */
+ }
+
+ d[0] = t[0];
+ d[1] = t[1];
+ d[2] = t[2];
+ d[3] = t[3];
+ d[4] = t[4];
+
+#elif BR_UMUL128
+
+ int i;
+ uint64_t t[5];
+
+ t[0] = 0;
+ t[1] = 0;
+ t[2] = 0;
+ t[3] = 0;
+ t[4] = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i ++) {
+ uint64_t x, f, cc, w, s, zh, zl;
+ unsigned char k;
+
+ /*
+ * Since limbs of a[] and b[] fit on 56 bits each,
+ * each individual product fits on 112 bits. Also,
+ * the factor f fits on 52 bits, so f<<48 fits on
+ * 112 bits too. This guarantees that carries (cc)
+ * will fit on 62 bits, thus no overflow.
+ *
+ * The operations below compute:
+ * t <- (t + x*b + f*p) / 2^64
+ */
+ x = a[i];
+ zl = _umul128(b[0], x, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t[0], zl, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, 0, zh, &zh);
+ f = zl & MASK52;
+ cc = (zl >> 52) | (zh << 12);
+
+ zl = _umul128(b[1], x, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t[1], zl, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, 0, zh, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, cc, zl, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, 0, zh, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, f << 44, zl, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, f >> 20, zh, &zh);
+ t[0] = zl & MASK52;
+ cc = (zl >> 52) | (zh << 12);
+
+ zl = _umul128(b[2], x, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t[2], zl, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, 0, zh, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, cc, zl, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, 0, zh, &zh);
+ t[1] = zl & MASK52;
+ cc = (zl >> 52) | (zh << 12);
+
+ zl = _umul128(b[3], x, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t[3], zl, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, 0, zh, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, cc, zl, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, 0, zh, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, f << 36, zl, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, f >> 28, zh, &zh);
+ t[2] = zl & MASK52;
+ cc = (zl >> 52) | (zh << 12);
+
+ zl = _umul128(b[4], x, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t[4], zl, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, 0, zh, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, cc, zl, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, 0, zh, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, f << 48, zl, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, f >> 16, zh, &zh);
+ k = _subborrow_u64(0, zl, f << 16, &zl);
+ (void)_subborrow_u64(k, zh, f >> 48, &zh);
+ t[3] = zl & MASK52;
+ t[4] = (zl >> 52) | (zh << 12);
+
+ /*
+ * t[4] may be up to 62 bits here; we need to do a
+ * partial reduction. Note that limbs t[0] to t[3]
+ * fit on 52 bits each.
+ */
+ s = t[4] >> 48; /* s < 2^14 */
+ t[0] += s; /* t[0] < 2^52 + 2^14 */
+ w = t[1] - (s << 44);
+ t[1] = w & MASK52; /* t[1] < 2^52 */
+ cc = -(w >> 52) & 0xFFF; /* cc < 16 */
+ w = t[2] - cc;
+ t[2] = w & MASK52; /* t[2] < 2^52 */
+ cc = w >> 63; /* cc = 0 or 1 */
+ w = t[3] - cc - (s << 36);
+ t[3] = w & MASK52; /* t[3] < 2^52 */
+ cc = w >> 63; /* cc = 0 or 1 */
+ w = t[4] & MASK48;
+ t[4] = w + (s << 16) - cc; /* t[4] < 2^48 + 2^30 */
+
+ /*
+ * The final t[4] cannot overflow because cc is 0 or 1,
+ * and cc can be 1 only if s != 0.
+ */
+ }
+
+ d[0] = t[0];
+ d[1] = t[1];
+ d[2] = t[2];
+ d[3] = t[3];
+ d[4] = t[4];
+
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Montgomery squaring in the field; currently a basic wrapper around
+ * multiplication (inline, should be optimized away).
+ * TODO: see if some extra speed can be gained here.
+ */
+static inline void
+f256_montysquare(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a)
+{
+ f256_montymul(d, a, a);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert to Montgomery representation.
+ */
+static void
+f256_tomonty(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a)
+{
+ /*
+ * R2 = 2^520 mod p.
+ * If R = 2^260 mod p, then R2 = R^2 mod p; and the Montgomery
+ * multiplication of a by R2 is: a*R2/R = a*R mod p, i.e. the
+ * conversion to Montgomery representation.
+ */
+ static const uint64_t R2[] = {
+ 0x0000000000300, 0xFFFFFFFF00000, 0xFFFFEFFFFFFFB,
+ 0xFDFFFFFFFFFFF, 0x0000004FFFFFF
+ };
+
+ f256_montymul(d, a, R2);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert from Montgomery representation.
+ */
+static void
+f256_frommonty(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a)
+{
+ /*
+ * Montgomery multiplication by 1 is division by 2^260 modulo p.
+ */
+ static const uint64_t one[] = { 1, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+
+ f256_montymul(d, a, one);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Inversion in the field. If the source value is 0 modulo p, then this
+ * returns 0 or p. This function uses Montgomery representation.
+ */
+static void
+f256_invert(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a)
+{
+ /*
+ * We compute a^(p-2) mod p. The exponent pattern (from high to
+ * low) is:
+ * - 32 bits of value 1
+ * - 31 bits of value 0
+ * - 1 bit of value 1
+ * - 96 bits of value 0
+ * - 94 bits of value 1
+ * - 1 bit of value 0
+ * - 1 bit of value 1
+ * To speed up the square-and-multiply algorithm, we precompute
+ * a^(2^31-1).
+ */
+
+ uint64_t r[5], t[5];
+ int i;
+
+ memcpy(t, a, sizeof t);
+ for (i = 0; i < 30; i ++) {
+ f256_montysquare(t, t);
+ f256_montymul(t, t, a);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(r, t, sizeof t);
+ for (i = 224; i >= 0; i --) {
+ f256_montysquare(r, r);
+ switch (i) {
+ case 0:
+ case 2:
+ case 192:
+ case 224:
+ f256_montymul(r, r, a);
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ case 34:
+ case 65:
+ f256_montymul(r, r, t);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(d, r, sizeof r);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finalize reduction.
+ * Input value should be partially reduced.
+ * On output, limbs a[0] to a[3] fit on 52 bits each, limb a[4] fits
+ * on 48 bits, and the integer is less than p.
+ */
+static inline void
+f256_final_reduce(uint64_t *a)
+{
+ uint64_t r[5], t[5], w, cc;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Propagate carries to ensure that limbs 0 to 3 fit on 52 bits.
+ */
+ cc = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i ++) {
+ w = a[i] + cc;
+ r[i] = w & MASK52;
+ cc = w >> 52;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We compute t = r + (2^256 - p) = r + 2^224 - 2^192 - 2^96 + 1.
+ * If t < 2^256, then r < p, and we return r. Otherwise, we
+ * want to return r - p = t - 2^256.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Add 2^224 + 1, and propagate carries to ensure that limbs
+ * t[0] to t[3] fit in 52 bits each.
+ */
+ w = r[0] + 1;
+ t[0] = w & MASK52;
+ cc = w >> 52;
+ w = r[1] + cc;
+ t[1] = w & MASK52;
+ cc = w >> 52;
+ w = r[2] + cc;
+ t[2] = w & MASK52;
+ cc = w >> 52;
+ w = r[3] + cc;
+ t[3] = w & MASK52;
+ cc = w >> 52;
+ t[4] = r[4] + cc + BIT(16);
+
+ /*
+ * Subtract 2^192 + 2^96. Since we just added 2^224 + 1, the
+ * result cannot be negative.
+ */
+ w = t[1] - BIT(44);
+ t[1] = w & MASK52;
+ cc = w >> 63;
+ w = t[2] - cc;
+ t[2] = w & MASK52;
+ cc = w >> 63;
+ w = t[3] - BIT(36) - cc;
+ t[3] = w & MASK52;
+ cc = w >> 63;
+ t[4] -= cc;
+
+ /*
+ * If the top limb t[4] fits on 48 bits, then r[] is already
+ * in the proper range. Otherwise, t[] is the value to return
+ * (truncated to 256 bits).
+ */
+ cc = -(t[4] >> 48);
+ t[4] &= MASK48;
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i ++) {
+ a[i] = r[i] ^ (cc & (r[i] ^ t[i]));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Points in affine and Jacobian coordinates.
+ *
+ * - In affine coordinates, the point-at-infinity cannot be encoded.
+ * - Jacobian coordinates (X,Y,Z) correspond to affine (X/Z^2,Y/Z^3);
+ * if Z = 0 then this is the point-at-infinity.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ uint64_t x[5];
+ uint64_t y[5];
+} p256_affine;
+
+typedef struct {
+ uint64_t x[5];
+ uint64_t y[5];
+ uint64_t z[5];
+} p256_jacobian;
+
+/*
+ * Decode a field element (unsigned big endian notation).
+ */
+static void
+f256_decode(uint64_t *a, const unsigned char *buf)
+{
+ uint64_t w0, w1, w2, w3;
+
+ w3 = br_dec64be(buf + 0);
+ w2 = br_dec64be(buf + 8);
+ w1 = br_dec64be(buf + 16);
+ w0 = br_dec64be(buf + 24);
+ a[0] = w0 & MASK52;
+ a[1] = ((w0 >> 52) | (w1 << 12)) & MASK52;
+ a[2] = ((w1 >> 40) | (w2 << 24)) & MASK52;
+ a[3] = ((w2 >> 28) | (w3 << 36)) & MASK52;
+ a[4] = w3 >> 16;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode a field element (unsigned big endian notation). The field
+ * element MUST be fully reduced.
+ */
+static void
+f256_encode(unsigned char *buf, const uint64_t *a)
+{
+ uint64_t w0, w1, w2, w3;
+
+ w0 = a[0] | (a[1] << 52);
+ w1 = (a[1] >> 12) | (a[2] << 40);
+ w2 = (a[2] >> 24) | (a[3] << 28);
+ w3 = (a[3] >> 36) | (a[4] << 16);
+ br_enc64be(buf + 0, w3);
+ br_enc64be(buf + 8, w2);
+ br_enc64be(buf + 16, w1);
+ br_enc64be(buf + 24, w0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode a point. The returned point is in Jacobian coordinates, but
+ * with z = 1. If the encoding is invalid, or encodes a point which is
+ * not on the curve, or encodes the point at infinity, then this function
+ * returns 0. Otherwise, 1 is returned.
+ *
+ * The buffer is assumed to have length exactly 65 bytes.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+point_decode(p256_jacobian *P, const unsigned char *buf)
+{
+ uint64_t x[5], y[5], t[5], x3[5], tt;
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ /*
+ * Header byte shall be 0x04.
+ */
+ r = EQ(buf[0], 0x04);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode X and Y coordinates, and convert them into
+ * Montgomery representation.
+ */
+ f256_decode(x, buf + 1);
+ f256_decode(y, buf + 33);
+ f256_tomonty(x, x);
+ f256_tomonty(y, y);
+
+ /*
+ * Verify y^2 = x^3 + A*x + B. In curve P-256, A = -3.
+ * Note that the Montgomery representation of 0 is 0. We must
+ * take care to apply the final reduction to make sure we have
+ * 0 and not p.
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t, y);
+ f256_montysquare(x3, x);
+ f256_montymul(x3, x3, x);
+ f256_sub(t, t, x3);
+ f256_add(t, t, x);
+ f256_add(t, t, x);
+ f256_add(t, t, x);
+ f256_sub(t, t, P256_B_MONTY);
+ f256_final_reduce(t);
+ tt = t[0] | t[1] | t[2] | t[3] | t[4];
+ r &= EQ((uint32_t)(tt | (tt >> 32)), 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Return the point in Jacobian coordinates (and Montgomery
+ * representation).
+ */
+ memcpy(P->x, x, sizeof x);
+ memcpy(P->y, y, sizeof y);
+ memcpy(P->z, F256_R, sizeof F256_R);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Final conversion for a point:
+ * - The point is converted back to affine coordinates.
+ * - Final reduction is performed.
+ * - The point is encoded into the provided buffer.
+ *
+ * If the point is the point-at-infinity, all operations are performed,
+ * but the buffer contents are indeterminate, and 0 is returned. Otherwise,
+ * the encoded point is written in the buffer, and 1 is returned.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+point_encode(unsigned char *buf, const p256_jacobian *P)
+{
+ uint64_t t1[5], t2[5], z;
+
+ /* Set t1 = 1/z^2 and t2 = 1/z^3. */
+ f256_invert(t2, P->z);
+ f256_montysquare(t1, t2);
+ f256_montymul(t2, t2, t1);
+
+ /* Compute affine coordinates x (in t1) and y (in t2). */
+ f256_montymul(t1, P->x, t1);
+ f256_montymul(t2, P->y, t2);
+
+ /* Convert back from Montgomery representation, and finalize
+ reductions. */
+ f256_frommonty(t1, t1);
+ f256_frommonty(t2, t2);
+ f256_final_reduce(t1);
+ f256_final_reduce(t2);
+
+ /* Encode. */
+ buf[0] = 0x04;
+ f256_encode(buf + 1, t1);
+ f256_encode(buf + 33, t2);
+
+ /* Return success if and only if P->z != 0. */
+ z = P->z[0] | P->z[1] | P->z[2] | P->z[3] | P->z[4];
+ return NEQ((uint32_t)(z | z >> 32), 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Point doubling in Jacobian coordinates: point P is doubled.
+ * Note: if the source point is the point-at-infinity, then the result is
+ * still the point-at-infinity, which is correct. Moreover, if the three
+ * coordinates were zero, then they still are zero in the returned value.
+ */
+static void
+p256_double(p256_jacobian *P)
+{
+ /*
+ * Doubling formulas are:
+ *
+ * s = 4*x*y^2
+ * m = 3*(x + z^2)*(x - z^2)
+ * x' = m^2 - 2*s
+ * y' = m*(s - x') - 8*y^4
+ * z' = 2*y*z
+ *
+ * These formulas work for all points, including points of order 2
+ * and points at infinity:
+ * - If y = 0 then z' = 0. But there is no such point in P-256
+ * anyway.
+ * - If z = 0 then z' = 0.
+ */
+ uint64_t t1[5], t2[5], t3[5], t4[5];
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z^2 in t1.
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t1, P->z);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x-z^2 in t2 and x+z^2 in t1.
+ */
+ f256_add(t2, P->x, t1);
+ f256_sub(t1, P->x, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute 3*(x+z^2)*(x-z^2) in t1.
+ */
+ f256_montymul(t3, t1, t2);
+ f256_add(t1, t3, t3);
+ f256_add(t1, t3, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute 4*x*y^2 (in t2) and 2*y^2 (in t3).
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t3, P->y);
+ f256_add(t3, t3, t3);
+ f256_montymul(t2, P->x, t3);
+ f256_add(t2, t2, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x' = m^2 - 2*s.
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(P->x, t1);
+ f256_sub(P->x, P->x, t2);
+ f256_sub(P->x, P->x, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z' = 2*y*z.
+ */
+ f256_montymul(t4, P->y, P->z);
+ f256_add(P->z, t4, t4);
+ f256_partial_reduce(P->z);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y' = m*(s - x') - 8*y^4. Note that we already have
+ * 2*y^2 in t3.
+ */
+ f256_sub(t2, t2, P->x);
+ f256_montymul(P->y, t1, t2);
+ f256_montysquare(t4, t3);
+ f256_add(t4, t4, t4);
+ f256_sub(P->y, P->y, t4);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Point addition (Jacobian coordinates): P1 is replaced with P1+P2.
+ * This function computes the wrong result in the following cases:
+ *
+ * - If P1 == 0 but P2 != 0
+ * - If P1 != 0 but P2 == 0
+ * - If P1 == P2
+ *
+ * In all three cases, P1 is set to the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 0 if one of the following occurs:
+ *
+ * - P1 and P2 have the same Y coordinate.
+ * - P1 == 0 and P2 == 0.
+ * - The Y coordinate of one of the points is 0 and the other point is
+ * the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * The third case cannot actually happen with valid points, since a point
+ * with Y == 0 is a point of order 2, and there is no point of order 2 on
+ * curve P-256.
+ *
+ * Therefore, assuming that P1 != 0 and P2 != 0 on input, then the caller
+ * can apply the following:
+ *
+ * - If the result is not the point at infinity, then it is correct.
+ * - Otherwise, if the returned value is 1, then this is a case of
+ * P1+P2 == 0, so the result is indeed the point at infinity.
+ * - Otherwise, P1 == P2, so a "double" operation should have been
+ * performed.
+ *
+ * Note that you can get a returned value of 0 with a correct result,
+ * e.g. if P1 and P2 have the same Y coordinate, but distinct X coordinates.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+p256_add(p256_jacobian *P1, const p256_jacobian *P2)
+{
+ /*
+ * Addtions formulas are:
+ *
+ * u1 = x1 * z2^2
+ * u2 = x2 * z1^2
+ * s1 = y1 * z2^3
+ * s2 = y2 * z1^3
+ * h = u2 - u1
+ * r = s2 - s1
+ * x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2 * u1 * h^2
+ * y3 = r * (u1 * h^2 - x3) - s1 * h^3
+ * z3 = h * z1 * z2
+ */
+ uint64_t t1[5], t2[5], t3[5], t4[5], t5[5], t6[5], t7[5], tt;
+ uint32_t ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1 = x1*z2^2 (in t1) and s1 = y1*z2^3 (in t3).
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t3, P2->z);
+ f256_montymul(t1, P1->x, t3);
+ f256_montymul(t4, P2->z, t3);
+ f256_montymul(t3, P1->y, t4);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u2 = x2*z1^2 (in t2) and s2 = y2*z1^3 (in t4).
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t4, P1->z);
+ f256_montymul(t2, P2->x, t4);
+ f256_montymul(t5, P1->z, t4);
+ f256_montymul(t4, P2->y, t5);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h = h2 - u1 (in t2) and r = s2 - s1 (in t4).
+ * We need to test whether r is zero, so we will do some extra
+ * reduce.
+ */
+ f256_sub(t2, t2, t1);
+ f256_sub(t4, t4, t3);
+ f256_final_reduce(t4);
+ tt = t4[0] | t4[1] | t4[2] | t4[3] | t4[4];
+ ret = (uint32_t)(tt | (tt >> 32));
+ ret = (ret | -ret) >> 31;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1*h^2 (in t6) and h^3 (in t5);
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t7, t2);
+ f256_montymul(t6, t1, t7);
+ f256_montymul(t5, t7, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2*u1*h^2.
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(P1->x, t4);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t5);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t6);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t6);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y3 = r*(u1*h^2 - x3) - s1*h^3.
+ */
+ f256_sub(t6, t6, P1->x);
+ f256_montymul(P1->y, t4, t6);
+ f256_montymul(t1, t5, t3);
+ f256_sub(P1->y, P1->y, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z3 = h*z1*z2.
+ */
+ f256_montymul(t1, P1->z, P2->z);
+ f256_montymul(P1->z, t1, t2);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Point addition (mixed coordinates): P1 is replaced with P1+P2.
+ * This is a specialised function for the case when P2 is a non-zero point
+ * in affine coordinates.
+ *
+ * This function computes the wrong result in the following cases:
+ *
+ * - If P1 == 0
+ * - If P1 == P2
+ *
+ * In both cases, P1 is set to the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 0 if one of the following occurs:
+ *
+ * - P1 and P2 have the same Y (affine) coordinate.
+ * - The Y coordinate of P2 is 0 and P1 is the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * The second case cannot actually happen with valid points, since a point
+ * with Y == 0 is a point of order 2, and there is no point of order 2 on
+ * curve P-256.
+ *
+ * Therefore, assuming that P1 != 0 on input, then the caller
+ * can apply the following:
+ *
+ * - If the result is not the point at infinity, then it is correct.
+ * - Otherwise, if the returned value is 1, then this is a case of
+ * P1+P2 == 0, so the result is indeed the point at infinity.
+ * - Otherwise, P1 == P2, so a "double" operation should have been
+ * performed.
+ *
+ * Again, a value of 0 may be returned in some cases where the addition
+ * result is correct.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+p256_add_mixed(p256_jacobian *P1, const p256_affine *P2)
+{
+ /*
+ * Addtions formulas are:
+ *
+ * u1 = x1
+ * u2 = x2 * z1^2
+ * s1 = y1
+ * s2 = y2 * z1^3
+ * h = u2 - u1
+ * r = s2 - s1
+ * x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2 * u1 * h^2
+ * y3 = r * (u1 * h^2 - x3) - s1 * h^3
+ * z3 = h * z1
+ */
+ uint64_t t1[5], t2[5], t3[5], t4[5], t5[5], t6[5], t7[5], tt;
+ uint32_t ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1 = x1 (in t1) and s1 = y1 (in t3).
+ */
+ memcpy(t1, P1->x, sizeof t1);
+ memcpy(t3, P1->y, sizeof t3);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u2 = x2*z1^2 (in t2) and s2 = y2*z1^3 (in t4).
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t4, P1->z);
+ f256_montymul(t2, P2->x, t4);
+ f256_montymul(t5, P1->z, t4);
+ f256_montymul(t4, P2->y, t5);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h = h2 - u1 (in t2) and r = s2 - s1 (in t4).
+ * We need to test whether r is zero, so we will do some extra
+ * reduce.
+ */
+ f256_sub(t2, t2, t1);
+ f256_sub(t4, t4, t3);
+ f256_final_reduce(t4);
+ tt = t4[0] | t4[1] | t4[2] | t4[3] | t4[4];
+ ret = (uint32_t)(tt | (tt >> 32));
+ ret = (ret | -ret) >> 31;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1*h^2 (in t6) and h^3 (in t5);
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t7, t2);
+ f256_montymul(t6, t1, t7);
+ f256_montymul(t5, t7, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2*u1*h^2.
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(P1->x, t4);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t5);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t6);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t6);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y3 = r*(u1*h^2 - x3) - s1*h^3.
+ */
+ f256_sub(t6, t6, P1->x);
+ f256_montymul(P1->y, t4, t6);
+ f256_montymul(t1, t5, t3);
+ f256_sub(P1->y, P1->y, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z3 = h*z1*z2.
+ */
+ f256_montymul(P1->z, P1->z, t2);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if 0
+/* unused */
+/*
+ * Point addition (mixed coordinates, complete): P1 is replaced with P1+P2.
+ * This is a specialised function for the case when P2 is a non-zero point
+ * in affine coordinates.
+ *
+ * This function returns the correct result in all cases.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+p256_add_complete_mixed(p256_jacobian *P1, const p256_affine *P2)
+{
+ /*
+ * Addtions formulas, in the general case, are:
+ *
+ * u1 = x1
+ * u2 = x2 * z1^2
+ * s1 = y1
+ * s2 = y2 * z1^3
+ * h = u2 - u1
+ * r = s2 - s1
+ * x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2 * u1 * h^2
+ * y3 = r * (u1 * h^2 - x3) - s1 * h^3
+ * z3 = h * z1
+ *
+ * These formulas mishandle the two following cases:
+ *
+ * - If P1 is the point-at-infinity (z1 = 0), then z3 is
+ * incorrectly set to 0.
+ *
+ * - If P1 = P2, then u1 = u2 and s1 = s2, and x3, y3 and z3
+ * are all set to 0.
+ *
+ * However, if P1 + P2 = 0, then u1 = u2 but s1 != s2, and then
+ * we correctly get z3 = 0 (the point-at-infinity).
+ *
+ * To fix the case P1 = 0, we perform at the end a copy of P2
+ * over P1, conditional to z1 = 0.
+ *
+ * For P1 = P2: in that case, both h and r are set to 0, and
+ * we get x3, y3 and z3 equal to 0. We can test for that
+ * occurrence to make a mask which will be all-one if P1 = P2,
+ * or all-zero otherwise; then we can compute the double of P2
+ * and add it, combined with the mask, to (x3,y3,z3).
+ *
+ * Using the doubling formulas in p256_double() on (x2,y2),
+ * simplifying since P2 is affine (i.e. z2 = 1, implicitly),
+ * we get:
+ * s = 4*x2*y2^2
+ * m = 3*(x2 + 1)*(x2 - 1)
+ * x' = m^2 - 2*s
+ * y' = m*(s - x') - 8*y2^4
+ * z' = 2*y2
+ * which requires only 6 multiplications. Added to the 11
+ * multiplications of the normal mixed addition in Jacobian
+ * coordinates, we get a cost of 17 multiplications in total.
+ */
+ uint64_t t1[5], t2[5], t3[5], t4[5], t5[5], t6[5], t7[5], tt, zz;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Set zz to -1 if P1 is the point at infinity, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+ zz = P1->z[0] | P1->z[1] | P1->z[2] | P1->z[3] | P1->z[4];
+ zz = ((zz | -zz) >> 63) - (uint64_t)1;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1 = x1 (in t1) and s1 = y1 (in t3).
+ */
+ memcpy(t1, P1->x, sizeof t1);
+ memcpy(t3, P1->y, sizeof t3);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u2 = x2*z1^2 (in t2) and s2 = y2*z1^3 (in t4).
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t4, P1->z);
+ f256_montymul(t2, P2->x, t4);
+ f256_montymul(t5, P1->z, t4);
+ f256_montymul(t4, P2->y, t5);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h = h2 - u1 (in t2) and r = s2 - s1 (in t4).
+ * reduce.
+ */
+ f256_sub(t2, t2, t1);
+ f256_sub(t4, t4, t3);
+
+ /*
+ * If both h = 0 and r = 0, then P1 = P2, and we want to set
+ * the mask tt to -1; otherwise, the mask will be 0.
+ */
+ f256_final_reduce(t2);
+ f256_final_reduce(t4);
+ tt = t2[0] | t2[1] | t2[2] | t2[3] | t2[4]
+ | t4[0] | t4[1] | t4[2] | t4[3] | t4[4];
+ tt = ((tt | -tt) >> 63) - (uint64_t)1;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1*h^2 (in t6) and h^3 (in t5);
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t7, t2);
+ f256_montymul(t6, t1, t7);
+ f256_montymul(t5, t7, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2*u1*h^2.
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(P1->x, t4);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t5);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t6);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t6);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y3 = r*(u1*h^2 - x3) - s1*h^3.
+ */
+ f256_sub(t6, t6, P1->x);
+ f256_montymul(P1->y, t4, t6);
+ f256_montymul(t1, t5, t3);
+ f256_sub(P1->y, P1->y, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z3 = h*z1.
+ */
+ f256_montymul(P1->z, P1->z, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * The "double" result, in case P1 = P2.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z' = 2*y2 (in t1).
+ */
+ f256_add(t1, P2->y, P2->y);
+ f256_partial_reduce(t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute 2*(y2^2) (in t2) and s = 4*x2*(y2^2) (in t3).
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t2, P2->y);
+ f256_add(t2, t2, t2);
+ f256_add(t3, t2, t2);
+ f256_montymul(t3, P2->x, t3);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute m = 3*(x2^2 - 1) (in t4).
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t4, P2->x);
+ f256_sub(t4, t4, F256_R);
+ f256_add(t5, t4, t4);
+ f256_add(t4, t4, t5);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x' = m^2 - 2*s (in t5).
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t5, t4);
+ f256_sub(t5, t3);
+ f256_sub(t5, t3);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y' = m*(s - x') - 8*y2^4 (in t6).
+ */
+ f256_sub(t6, t3, t5);
+ f256_montymul(t6, t6, t4);
+ f256_montysquare(t7, t2);
+ f256_sub(t6, t6, t7);
+ f256_sub(t6, t6, t7);
+
+ /*
+ * We now have the alternate (doubling) coordinates in (t5,t6,t1).
+ * We combine them with (x3,y3,z3).
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i ++) {
+ P1->x[i] |= tt & t5[i];
+ P1->y[i] |= tt & t6[i];
+ P1->z[i] |= tt & t1[i];
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If P1 = 0, then we get z3 = 0 (which is invalid); if z1 is 0,
+ * then we want to replace the result with a copy of P2. The
+ * test on z1 was done at the start, in the zz mask.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i ++) {
+ P1->x[i] ^= zz & (P1->x[i] ^ P2->x[i]);
+ P1->y[i] ^= zz & (P1->y[i] ^ P2->y[i]);
+ P1->z[i] ^= zz & (P1->z[i] ^ F256_R[i]);
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Inner function for computing a point multiplication. A window is
+ * provided, with points 1*P to 15*P in affine coordinates.
+ *
+ * Assumptions:
+ * - All provided points are valid points on the curve.
+ * - Multiplier is non-zero, and smaller than the curve order.
+ * - Everything is in Montgomery representation.
+ */
+static void
+point_mul_inner(p256_jacobian *R, const p256_affine *W,
+ const unsigned char *k, size_t klen)
+{
+ p256_jacobian Q;
+ uint32_t qz;
+
+ memset(&Q, 0, sizeof Q);
+ qz = 1;
+ while (klen -- > 0) {
+ int i;
+ unsigned bk;
+
+ bk = *k ++;
+ for (i = 0; i < 2; i ++) {
+ uint32_t bits;
+ uint32_t bnz;
+ p256_affine T;
+ p256_jacobian U;
+ uint32_t n;
+ int j;
+ uint64_t m;
+
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ bits = (bk >> 4) & 0x0F;
+ bnz = NEQ(bits, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Lookup point in window. If the bits are 0,
+ * we get something invalid, which is not a
+ * problem because we will use it only if the
+ * bits are non-zero.
+ */
+ memset(&T, 0, sizeof T);
+ for (n = 0; n < 15; n ++) {
+ m = -(uint64_t)EQ(bits, n + 1);
+ T.x[0] |= m & W[n].x[0];
+ T.x[1] |= m & W[n].x[1];
+ T.x[2] |= m & W[n].x[2];
+ T.x[3] |= m & W[n].x[3];
+ T.x[4] |= m & W[n].x[4];
+ T.y[0] |= m & W[n].y[0];
+ T.y[1] |= m & W[n].y[1];
+ T.y[2] |= m & W[n].y[2];
+ T.y[3] |= m & W[n].y[3];
+ T.y[4] |= m & W[n].y[4];
+ }
+
+ U = Q;
+ p256_add_mixed(&U, &T);
+
+ /*
+ * If qz is still 1, then Q was all-zeros, and this
+ * is conserved through p256_double().
+ */
+ m = -(uint64_t)(bnz & qz);
+ for (j = 0; j < 5; j ++) {
+ Q.x[j] ^= m & (Q.x[j] ^ T.x[j]);
+ Q.y[j] ^= m & (Q.y[j] ^ T.y[j]);
+ Q.z[j] ^= m & (Q.z[j] ^ F256_R[j]);
+ }
+ CCOPY(bnz & ~qz, &Q, &U, sizeof Q);
+ qz &= ~bnz;
+ bk <<= 4;
+ }
+ }
+ *R = Q;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a window from Jacobian to affine coordinates. A single
+ * field inversion is used. This function works for windows up to
+ * 32 elements.
+ *
+ * The destination array (aff[]) and the source array (jac[]) may
+ * overlap, provided that the start of aff[] is not after the start of
+ * jac[]. Even if the arrays do _not_ overlap, the source array is
+ * modified.
+ */
+static void
+window_to_affine(p256_affine *aff, p256_jacobian *jac, int num)
+{
+ /*
+ * Convert the window points to affine coordinates. We use the
+ * following trick to mutualize the inversion computation: if
+ * we have z1, z2, z3, and z4, and want to invert all of them,
+ * we compute u = 1/(z1*z2*z3*z4), and then we have:
+ * 1/z1 = u*z2*z3*z4
+ * 1/z2 = u*z1*z3*z4
+ * 1/z3 = u*z1*z2*z4
+ * 1/z4 = u*z1*z2*z3
+ *
+ * The partial products are computed recursively:
+ *
+ * - on input (z_1,z_2), return (z_2,z_1) and z_1*z_2
+ * - on input (z_1,z_2,... z_n):
+ * recurse on (z_1,z_2,... z_(n/2)) -> r1 and m1
+ * recurse on (z_(n/2+1),z_(n/2+2)... z_n) -> r2 and m2
+ * multiply elements of r1 by m2 -> s1
+ * multiply elements of r2 by m1 -> s2
+ * return r1||r2 and m1*m2
+ *
+ * In the example below, we suppose that we have 14 elements.
+ * Let z1, z2,... zE be the 14 values to invert (index noted in
+ * hexadecimal, starting at 1).
+ *
+ * - Depth 1:
+ * swap(z1, z2); z12 = z1*z2
+ * swap(z3, z4); z34 = z3*z4
+ * swap(z5, z6); z56 = z5*z6
+ * swap(z7, z8); z78 = z7*z8
+ * swap(z9, zA); z9A = z9*zA
+ * swap(zB, zC); zBC = zB*zC
+ * swap(zD, zE); zDE = zD*zE
+ *
+ * - Depth 2:
+ * z1 <- z1*z34, z2 <- z2*z34, z3 <- z3*z12, z4 <- z4*z12
+ * z1234 = z12*z34
+ * z5 <- z5*z78, z6 <- z6*z78, z7 <- z7*z56, z8 <- z8*z56
+ * z5678 = z56*z78
+ * z9 <- z9*zBC, zA <- zA*zBC, zB <- zB*z9A, zC <- zC*z9A
+ * z9ABC = z9A*zBC
+ *
+ * - Depth 3:
+ * z1 <- z1*z5678, z2 <- z2*z5678, z3 <- z3*z5678, z4 <- z4*z5678
+ * z5 <- z5*z1234, z6 <- z6*z1234, z7 <- z7*z1234, z8 <- z8*z1234
+ * z12345678 = z1234*z5678
+ * z9 <- z9*zDE, zA <- zA*zDE, zB <- zB*zDE, zC <- zC*zDE
+ * zD <- zD*z9ABC, zE*z9ABC
+ * z9ABCDE = z9ABC*zDE
+ *
+ * - Depth 4:
+ * multiply z1..z8 by z9ABCDE
+ * multiply z9..zE by z12345678
+ * final z = z12345678*z9ABCDE
+ */
+
+ uint64_t z[16][5];
+ int i, k, s;
+#define zt (z[15])
+#define zu (z[14])
+#define zv (z[13])
+
+ /*
+ * First recursion step (pairwise swapping and multiplication).
+ * If there is an odd number of elements, then we "invent" an
+ * extra one with coordinate Z = 1 (in Montgomery representation).
+ */
+ for (i = 0; (i + 1) < num; i += 2) {
+ memcpy(zt, jac[i].z, sizeof zt);
+ memcpy(jac[i].z, jac[i + 1].z, sizeof zt);
+ memcpy(jac[i + 1].z, zt, sizeof zt);
+ f256_montymul(z[i >> 1], jac[i].z, jac[i + 1].z);
+ }
+ if ((num & 1) != 0) {
+ memcpy(z[num >> 1], jac[num - 1].z, sizeof zt);
+ memcpy(jac[num - 1].z, F256_R, sizeof F256_R);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Perform further recursion steps. At the entry of each step,
+ * the process has been done for groups of 's' points. The
+ * integer k is the log2 of s.
+ */
+ for (k = 1, s = 2; s < num; k ++, s <<= 1) {
+ int n;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i ++) {
+ f256_montymul(jac[i].z, jac[i].z, z[(i >> k) ^ 1]);
+ }
+ n = (num + s - 1) >> k;
+ for (i = 0; i < (n >> 1); i ++) {
+ f256_montymul(z[i], z[i << 1], z[(i << 1) + 1]);
+ }
+ if ((n & 1) != 0) {
+ memmove(z[n >> 1], z[n], sizeof zt);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invert the final result, and convert all points.
+ */
+ f256_invert(zt, z[0]);
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i ++) {
+ f256_montymul(zv, jac[i].z, zt);
+ f256_montysquare(zu, zv);
+ f256_montymul(zv, zv, zu);
+ f256_montymul(aff[i].x, jac[i].x, zu);
+ f256_montymul(aff[i].y, jac[i].y, zv);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiply the provided point by an integer.
+ * Assumptions:
+ * - Source point is a valid curve point.
+ * - Source point is not the point-at-infinity.
+ * - Integer is not 0, and is lower than the curve order.
+ * If these conditions are not met, then the result is indeterminate
+ * (but the process is still constant-time).
+ */
+static void
+p256_mul(p256_jacobian *P, const unsigned char *k, size_t klen)
+{
+ union {
+ p256_affine aff[15];
+ p256_jacobian jac[15];
+ } window;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute window, in Jacobian coordinates.
+ */
+ window.jac[0] = *P;
+ for (i = 2; i < 16; i ++) {
+ window.jac[i - 1] = window.jac[(i >> 1) - 1];
+ if ((i & 1) == 0) {
+ p256_double(&window.jac[i - 1]);
+ } else {
+ p256_add(&window.jac[i - 1], &window.jac[i >> 1]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the window points to affine coordinates. Point
+ * window[0] is the source point, already in affine coordinates.
+ */
+ window_to_affine(window.aff, window.jac, 15);
+
+ /*
+ * Perform point multiplication.
+ */
+ point_mul_inner(P, window.aff, k, klen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Precomputed window for the conventional generator: P256_Gwin[n]
+ * contains (n+1)*G (affine coordinates, in Montgomery representation).
+ */
+static const p256_affine P256_Gwin[] = {
+ {
+ { 0x30D418A9143C1, 0xC4FEDB60179E7, 0x62251075BA95F,
+ 0x5C669FB732B77, 0x08905F76B5375 },
+ { 0x5357CE95560A8, 0x43A19E45CDDF2, 0x21F3258B4AB8E,
+ 0xD8552E88688DD, 0x0571FF18A5885 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x46D410DDD64DF, 0x0B433827D8500, 0x1490D9AA6AE3C,
+ 0xA3A832205038D, 0x06BB32E52DCF3 },
+ { 0x48D361BEE1A57, 0xB7B236FF82F36, 0x042DBE152CD7C,
+ 0xA3AA9A8FB0E92, 0x08C577517A5B8 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x3F904EEBC1272, 0x9E87D81FBFFAC, 0xCBBC98B027F84,
+ 0x47E46AD77DD87, 0x06936A3FD6FF7 },
+ { 0x5C1FC983A7EBD, 0xC3861FE1AB04C, 0x2EE98E583E47A,
+ 0xC06A88208311A, 0x05F06A2AB587C }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0xB50D46918DCC5, 0xD7623C17374B0, 0x100AF24650A6E,
+ 0x76ABCDAACACE8, 0x077362F591B01 },
+ { 0xF24CE4CBABA68, 0x17AD6F4472D96, 0xDDD22E1762847,
+ 0x862EB6C36DEE5, 0x04B14C39CC5AB }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x8AAEC45C61F5C, 0x9D4B9537DBE1B, 0x76C20C90EC649,
+ 0x3C7D41CB5AAD0, 0x0907960649052 },
+ { 0x9B4AE7BA4F107, 0xF75EB882BEB30, 0x7A1F6873C568E,
+ 0x915C540A9877E, 0x03A076BB9DD1E }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x47373E77664A1, 0xF246CEE3E4039, 0x17A3AD55AE744,
+ 0x673C50A961A5B, 0x03074B5964213 },
+ { 0x6220D377E44BA, 0x30DFF14B593D3, 0x639F11299C2B5,
+ 0x75F5424D44CEF, 0x04C9916DEA07F }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x354EA0173B4F1, 0x3C23C00F70746, 0x23BB082BD2021,
+ 0xE03E43EAAB50C, 0x03BA5119D3123 },
+ { 0xD0303F5B9D4DE, 0x17DA67BDD2847, 0xC941956742F2F,
+ 0x8670F933BDC77, 0x0AEDD9164E240 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x4CD19499A78FB, 0x4BF9B345527F1, 0x2CFC6B462AB5C,
+ 0x30CDF90F02AF0, 0x0763891F62652 },
+ { 0xA3A9532D49775, 0xD7F9EBA15F59D, 0x60BBF021E3327,
+ 0xF75C23C7B84BE, 0x06EC12F2C706D }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x6E8F264E20E8E, 0xC79A7A84175C9, 0xC8EB00ABE6BFE,
+ 0x16A4CC09C0444, 0x005B3081D0C4E },
+ { 0x777AA45F33140, 0xDCE5D45E31EB7, 0xB12F1A56AF7BE,
+ 0xF9B2B6E019A88, 0x086659CDFD835 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0xDBD19DC21EC8C, 0x94FCF81392C18, 0x250B4998F9868,
+ 0x28EB37D2CD648, 0x0C61C947E4B34 },
+ { 0x407880DD9E767, 0x0C83FBE080C2B, 0x9BE5D2C43A899,
+ 0xAB4EF7D2D6577, 0x08719A555B3B4 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x260A6245E4043, 0x53E7FDFE0EA7D, 0xAC1AB59DE4079,
+ 0x072EFF3A4158D, 0x0E7090F1949C9 },
+ { 0x85612B944E886, 0xE857F61C81A76, 0xAD643D250F939,
+ 0x88DAC0DAA891E, 0x089300244125B }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x1AA7D26977684, 0x58A345A3304B7, 0x37385EABDEDEF,
+ 0x155E409D29DEE, 0x0EE1DF780B83E },
+ { 0x12D91CBB5B437, 0x65A8956370CAC, 0xDE6D66170ED2F,
+ 0xAC9B8228CFA8A, 0x0FF57C95C3238 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x25634B2ED7097, 0x9156FD30DCCC4, 0x9E98110E35676,
+ 0x7594CBCD43F55, 0x038477ACC395B },
+ { 0x2B90C00EE17FF, 0xF842ED2E33575, 0x1F5BC16874838,
+ 0x7968CD06422BD, 0x0BC0876AB9E7B }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0xA35BB0CF664AF, 0x68F9707E3A242, 0x832660126E48F,
+ 0x72D2717BF54C6, 0x0AAE7333ED12C },
+ { 0x2DB7995D586B1, 0xE732237C227B5, 0x65E7DBBE29569,
+ 0xBBBD8E4193E2A, 0x052706DC3EAA1 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0xD8B7BC60055BE, 0xD76E27E4B72BC, 0x81937003CC23E,
+ 0xA090E337424E4, 0x02AA0E43EAD3D },
+ { 0x524F6383C45D2, 0x422A41B2540B8, 0x8A4797D766355,
+ 0xDF444EFA6DE77, 0x0042170A9079A }
+ },
+};
+
+/*
+ * Multiply the conventional generator of the curve by the provided
+ * integer. Return is written in *P.
+ *
+ * Assumptions:
+ * - Integer is not 0, and is lower than the curve order.
+ * If this conditions is not met, then the result is indeterminate
+ * (but the process is still constant-time).
+ */
+static void
+p256_mulgen(p256_jacobian *P, const unsigned char *k, size_t klen)
+{
+ point_mul_inner(P, P256_Gwin, k, klen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if all of the following hold:
+ * - klen <= 32
+ * - k != 0
+ * - k is lower than the curve order
+ * Otherwise, return 0.
+ *
+ * Constant-time behaviour: only klen may be observable.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+check_scalar(const unsigned char *k, size_t klen)
+{
+ uint32_t z;
+ int32_t c;
+ size_t u;
+
+ if (klen > 32) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ z = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < klen; u ++) {
+ z |= k[u];
+ }
+ if (klen == 32) {
+ c = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < klen; u ++) {
+ c |= -(int32_t)EQ0(c) & CMP(k[u], P256_N[u]);
+ }
+ } else {
+ c = -1;
+ }
+ return NEQ(z, 0) & LT0(c);
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_mul(unsigned char *G, size_t Glen,
+ const unsigned char *k, size_t klen, int curve)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+ p256_jacobian P;
+
+ (void)curve;
+ if (Glen != 65) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = check_scalar(k, klen);
+ r &= point_decode(&P, G);
+ p256_mul(&P, k, klen);
+ r &= point_encode(G, &P);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_mulgen(unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *k, size_t klen, int curve)
+{
+ p256_jacobian P;
+
+ (void)curve;
+ p256_mulgen(&P, k, klen);
+ point_encode(R, &P);
+ return 65;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_muladd(unsigned char *A, const unsigned char *B, size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *y, size_t ylen, int curve)
+{
+ /*
+ * We might want to use Shamir's trick here: make a composite
+ * window of u*P+v*Q points, to merge the two doubling-ladders
+ * into one. This, however, has some complications:
+ *
+ * - During the computation, we may hit the point-at-infinity.
+ * Thus, we would need p256_add_complete_mixed() (complete
+ * formulas for point addition), with a higher cost (17 muls
+ * instead of 11).
+ *
+ * - A 4-bit window would be too large, since it would involve
+ * 16*16-1 = 255 points. For the same window size as in the
+ * p256_mul() case, we would need to reduce the window size
+ * to 2 bits, and thus perform twice as many non-doubling
+ * point additions.
+ *
+ * - The window may itself contain the point-at-infinity, and
+ * thus cannot be in all generality be made of affine points.
+ * Instead, we would need to make it a window of points in
+ * Jacobian coordinates. Even p256_add_complete_mixed() would
+ * be inappropriate.
+ *
+ * For these reasons, the code below performs two separate
+ * point multiplications, then computes the final point addition
+ * (which is both a "normal" addition, and a doubling, to handle
+ * all cases).
+ */
+
+ p256_jacobian P, Q;
+ uint32_t r, t, s;
+ uint64_t z;
+
+ (void)curve;
+ if (len != 65) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = point_decode(&P, A);
+ p256_mul(&P, x, xlen);
+ if (B == NULL) {
+ p256_mulgen(&Q, y, ylen);
+ } else {
+ r &= point_decode(&Q, B);
+ p256_mul(&Q, y, ylen);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The final addition may fail in case both points are equal.
+ */
+ t = p256_add(&P, &Q);
+ f256_final_reduce(P.z);
+ z = P.z[0] | P.z[1] | P.z[2] | P.z[3] | P.z[4];
+ s = EQ((uint32_t)(z | (z >> 32)), 0);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+
+ /*
+ * If s is 1 then either P+Q = 0 (t = 1) or P = Q (t = 0). So we
+ * have the following:
+ *
+ * s = 0, t = 0 return P (normal addition)
+ * s = 0, t = 1 return P (normal addition)
+ * s = 1, t = 0 return Q (a 'double' case)
+ * s = 1, t = 1 report an error (P+Q = 0)
+ */
+ CCOPY(s & ~t, &P, &Q, sizeof Q);
+ point_encode(A, &P);
+ r &= ~(s & t);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl br_ec_p256_m62 = {
+ (uint32_t)0x00800000,
+ &api_generator,
+ &api_order,
+ &api_xoff,
+ &api_mul,
+ &api_mulgen,
+ &api_muladd
+};
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl *
+br_ec_p256_m62_get(void)
+{
+ return &br_ec_p256_m62;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl *
+br_ec_p256_m62_get(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_p256_m64.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_p256_m64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..71a527c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_p256_m64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1781 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+
+#if BR_UMUL128
+#include <intrin.h>
+#endif
+
+static const unsigned char P256_G[] = {
+ 0x04, 0x6B, 0x17, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0x42, 0x47, 0xF8,
+ 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xE5, 0x63, 0xA4, 0x40, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7D,
+ 0x81, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x33, 0xA0, 0xF4, 0xA1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xD8,
+ 0x98, 0xC2, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xE3, 0x42, 0xE2, 0xFE, 0x1A, 0x7F,
+ 0x9B, 0x8E, 0xE7, 0xEB, 0x4A, 0x7C, 0x0F, 0x9E, 0x16, 0x2B,
+ 0xCE, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6B, 0x31, 0x5E, 0xCE, 0xCB, 0xB6, 0x40,
+ 0x68, 0x37, 0xBF, 0x51, 0xF5
+};
+
+static const unsigned char P256_N[] = {
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD,
+ 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63,
+ 0x25, 0x51
+};
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_generator(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = sizeof P256_G;
+ return P256_G;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_order(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = sizeof P256_N;
+ return P256_N;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_xoff(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ (void)curve;
+ *len = 32;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * A field element is encoded as four 64-bit integers, in basis 2^64.
+ * Values may reach up to 2^256-1. Montgomery multiplication is used.
+ */
+
+/* R = 2^256 mod p */
+static const uint64_t F256_R[] = {
+ 0x0000000000000001, 0xFFFFFFFF00000000,
+ 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, 0x00000000FFFFFFFE
+};
+
+/* Curve equation is y^2 = x^3 - 3*x + B. This constant is B*R mod p
+ (Montgomery representation of B). */
+static const uint64_t P256_B_MONTY[] = {
+ 0xD89CDF6229C4BDDF, 0xACF005CD78843090,
+ 0xE5A220ABF7212ED6, 0xDC30061D04874834
+};
+
+/*
+ * Addition in the field.
+ */
+static inline void
+f256_add(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a, const uint64_t *b)
+{
+#if BR_INT128
+ unsigned __int128 w;
+ uint64_t t;
+
+ /*
+ * Do the addition, with an extra carry in t.
+ */
+ w = (unsigned __int128)a[0] + b[0];
+ d[0] = (uint64_t)w;
+ w = (unsigned __int128)a[1] + b[1] + (w >> 64);
+ d[1] = (uint64_t)w;
+ w = (unsigned __int128)a[2] + b[2] + (w >> 64);
+ d[2] = (uint64_t)w;
+ w = (unsigned __int128)a[3] + b[3] + (w >> 64);
+ d[3] = (uint64_t)w;
+ t = (uint64_t)(w >> 64);
+
+ /*
+ * Fold carry t, using: 2^256 = 2^224 - 2^192 - 2^96 + 1 mod p.
+ */
+ w = (unsigned __int128)d[0] + t;
+ d[0] = (uint64_t)w;
+ w = (unsigned __int128)d[1] + (w >> 64) - (t << 32);
+ d[1] = (uint64_t)w;
+ /* Here, carry "w >> 64" can only be 0 or -1 */
+ w = (unsigned __int128)d[2] - ((w >> 64) & 1);
+ d[2] = (uint64_t)w;
+ /* Again, carry is 0 or -1. But there can be carry only if t = 1,
+ in which case the addition of (t << 32) - t is positive. */
+ w = (unsigned __int128)d[3] - ((w >> 64) & 1) + (t << 32) - t;
+ d[3] = (uint64_t)w;
+ t = (uint64_t)(w >> 64);
+
+ /*
+ * There can be an extra carry here, which we must fold again.
+ */
+ w = (unsigned __int128)d[0] + t;
+ d[0] = (uint64_t)w;
+ w = (unsigned __int128)d[1] + (w >> 64) - (t << 32);
+ d[1] = (uint64_t)w;
+ w = (unsigned __int128)d[2] - ((w >> 64) & 1);
+ d[2] = (uint64_t)w;
+ d[3] += (t << 32) - t - (uint64_t)((w >> 64) & 1);
+
+#elif BR_UMUL128
+
+ unsigned char cc;
+ uint64_t t;
+
+ cc = _addcarry_u64(0, a[0], b[0], &d[0]);
+ cc = _addcarry_u64(cc, a[1], b[1], &d[1]);
+ cc = _addcarry_u64(cc, a[2], b[2], &d[2]);
+ cc = _addcarry_u64(cc, a[3], b[3], &d[3]);
+
+ /*
+ * If there is a carry, then we want to subtract p, which we
+ * do by adding 2^256 - p.
+ */
+ t = cc;
+ cc = _addcarry_u64(cc, d[0], 0, &d[0]);
+ cc = _addcarry_u64(cc, d[1], -(t << 32), &d[1]);
+ cc = _addcarry_u64(cc, d[2], -t, &d[2]);
+ cc = _addcarry_u64(cc, d[3], (t << 32) - (t << 1), &d[3]);
+
+ /*
+ * We have to do it again if there still is a carry.
+ */
+ t = cc;
+ cc = _addcarry_u64(cc, d[0], 0, &d[0]);
+ cc = _addcarry_u64(cc, d[1], -(t << 32), &d[1]);
+ cc = _addcarry_u64(cc, d[2], -t, &d[2]);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(cc, d[3], (t << 32) - (t << 1), &d[3]);
+
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Subtraction in the field.
+ */
+static inline void
+f256_sub(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a, const uint64_t *b)
+{
+#if BR_INT128
+
+ unsigned __int128 w;
+ uint64_t t;
+
+ w = (unsigned __int128)a[0] - b[0];
+ d[0] = (uint64_t)w;
+ w = (unsigned __int128)a[1] - b[1] - ((w >> 64) & 1);
+ d[1] = (uint64_t)w;
+ w = (unsigned __int128)a[2] - b[2] - ((w >> 64) & 1);
+ d[2] = (uint64_t)w;
+ w = (unsigned __int128)a[3] - b[3] - ((w >> 64) & 1);
+ d[3] = (uint64_t)w;
+ t = (uint64_t)(w >> 64) & 1;
+
+ /*
+ * If there is a borrow (t = 1), then we must add the modulus
+ * p = 2^256 - 2^224 + 2^192 + 2^96 - 1.
+ */
+ w = (unsigned __int128)d[0] - t;
+ d[0] = (uint64_t)w;
+ w = (unsigned __int128)d[1] + (t << 32) - ((w >> 64) & 1);
+ d[1] = (uint64_t)w;
+ /* Here, carry "w >> 64" can only be 0 or +1 */
+ w = (unsigned __int128)d[2] + (w >> 64);
+ d[2] = (uint64_t)w;
+ /* Again, carry is 0 or +1 */
+ w = (unsigned __int128)d[3] + (w >> 64) - (t << 32) + t;
+ d[3] = (uint64_t)w;
+ t = (uint64_t)(w >> 64) & 1;
+
+ /*
+ * There may be again a borrow, in which case we must add the
+ * modulus again.
+ */
+ w = (unsigned __int128)d[0] - t;
+ d[0] = (uint64_t)w;
+ w = (unsigned __int128)d[1] + (t << 32) - ((w >> 64) & 1);
+ d[1] = (uint64_t)w;
+ w = (unsigned __int128)d[2] + (w >> 64);
+ d[2] = (uint64_t)w;
+ d[3] += (uint64_t)(w >> 64) - (t << 32) + t;
+
+#elif BR_UMUL128
+
+ unsigned char cc;
+ uint64_t t;
+
+ cc = _subborrow_u64(0, a[0], b[0], &d[0]);
+ cc = _subborrow_u64(cc, a[1], b[1], &d[1]);
+ cc = _subborrow_u64(cc, a[2], b[2], &d[2]);
+ cc = _subborrow_u64(cc, a[3], b[3], &d[3]);
+
+ /*
+ * If there is a borrow, then we need to add p. We (virtually)
+ * add 2^256, then subtract 2^256 - p.
+ */
+ t = cc;
+ cc = _subborrow_u64(0, d[0], t, &d[0]);
+ cc = _subborrow_u64(cc, d[1], -(t << 32), &d[1]);
+ cc = _subborrow_u64(cc, d[2], -t, &d[2]);
+ cc = _subborrow_u64(cc, d[3], (t << 32) - (t << 1), &d[3]);
+
+ /*
+ * If there still is a borrow, then we need to add p again.
+ */
+ t = cc;
+ cc = _subborrow_u64(0, d[0], t, &d[0]);
+ cc = _subborrow_u64(cc, d[1], -(t << 32), &d[1]);
+ cc = _subborrow_u64(cc, d[2], -t, &d[2]);
+ (void)_subborrow_u64(cc, d[3], (t << 32) - (t << 1), &d[3]);
+
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Montgomery multiplication in the field.
+ */
+static void
+f256_montymul(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a, const uint64_t *b)
+{
+#if BR_INT128
+
+ uint64_t x, f, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4;
+ unsigned __int128 z, ff;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * When computing d <- d + a[u]*b, we also add f*p such
+ * that d + a[u]*b + f*p is a multiple of 2^64. Since
+ * p = -1 mod 2^64, we can compute f = d[0] + a[u]*b[0] mod 2^64.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Step 1: t <- (a[0]*b + f*p) / 2^64
+ * We have f = a[0]*b[0] mod 2^64. Since p = -1 mod 2^64, this
+ * ensures that (a[0]*b + f*p) is a multiple of 2^64.
+ *
+ * We also have: f*p = f*2^256 - f*2^224 + f*2^192 + f*2^96 - f.
+ */
+ x = a[0];
+ z = (unsigned __int128)b[0] * x;
+ f = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)b[1] * x + (z >> 64) + (uint64_t)(f << 32);
+ t0 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)b[2] * x + (z >> 64) + (uint64_t)(f >> 32);
+ t1 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)b[3] * x + (z >> 64) + f;
+ t2 = (uint64_t)z;
+ t3 = (uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+ ff = ((unsigned __int128)f << 64) - ((unsigned __int128)f << 32);
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t2 + (uint64_t)ff;
+ t2 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t3 + (z >> 64) + (ff >> 64);
+ t3 = (uint64_t)z;
+ t4 = (uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+
+ /*
+ * Steps 2 to 4: t <- (t + a[i]*b + f*p) / 2^64
+ */
+ for (i = 1; i < 4; i ++) {
+ x = a[i];
+
+ /* t <- (t + x*b - f) / 2^64 */
+ z = (unsigned __int128)b[0] * x + t0;
+ f = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)b[1] * x + t1 + (z >> 64);
+ t0 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)b[2] * x + t2 + (z >> 64);
+ t1 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)b[3] * x + t3 + (z >> 64);
+ t2 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = t4 + (z >> 64);
+ t3 = (uint64_t)z;
+ t4 = (uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+
+ /* t <- t + f*2^32, carry in the upper half of z */
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t0 + (uint64_t)(f << 32);
+ t0 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (z >> 64) + (unsigned __int128)t1 + (uint64_t)(f >> 32);
+ t1 = (uint64_t)z;
+
+ /* t <- t + f*2^192 - f*2^160 + f*2^128 */
+ ff = ((unsigned __int128)f << 64)
+ - ((unsigned __int128)f << 32) + f;
+ z = (z >> 64) + (unsigned __int128)t2 + (uint64_t)ff;
+ t2 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t3 + (z >> 64) + (ff >> 64);
+ t3 = (uint64_t)z;
+ t4 += (uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * At that point, we have computed t = (a*b + F*p) / 2^256, where
+ * F is a 256-bit integer whose limbs are the "f" coefficients
+ * in the steps above. We have:
+ * a <= 2^256-1
+ * b <= 2^256-1
+ * F <= 2^256-1
+ * Hence:
+ * a*b + F*p <= (2^256-1)*(2^256-1) + p*(2^256-1)
+ * a*b + F*p <= 2^256*(2^256 - 2 + p) + 1 - p
+ * Therefore:
+ * t < 2^256 + p - 2
+ * Since p < 2^256, it follows that:
+ * t4 can be only 0 or 1
+ * t - p < 2^256
+ * We can therefore subtract p from t, conditionally on t4, to
+ * get a nonnegative result that fits on 256 bits.
+ */
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t0 + t4;
+ t0 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t1 - (t4 << 32) + (z >> 64);
+ t1 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)t2 - (z >> 127);
+ t2 = (uint64_t)z;
+ t3 = t3 - (uint64_t)(z >> 127) - t4 + (t4 << 32);
+
+ d[0] = t0;
+ d[1] = t1;
+ d[2] = t2;
+ d[3] = t3;
+
+#elif BR_UMUL128
+
+ uint64_t x, f, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4;
+ uint64_t zl, zh, ffl, ffh;
+ unsigned char k, m;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * When computing d <- d + a[u]*b, we also add f*p such
+ * that d + a[u]*b + f*p is a multiple of 2^64. Since
+ * p = -1 mod 2^64, we can compute f = d[0] + a[u]*b[0] mod 2^64.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Step 1: t <- (a[0]*b + f*p) / 2^64
+ * We have f = a[0]*b[0] mod 2^64. Since p = -1 mod 2^64, this
+ * ensures that (a[0]*b + f*p) is a multiple of 2^64.
+ *
+ * We also have: f*p = f*2^256 - f*2^224 + f*2^192 + f*2^96 - f.
+ */
+ x = a[0];
+
+ zl = _umul128(b[0], x, &zh);
+ f = zl;
+ t0 = zh;
+
+ zl = _umul128(b[1], x, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, zl, t0, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, zh, 0, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, zl, f << 32, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, zh, 0, &zh);
+ t0 = zl;
+ t1 = zh;
+
+ zl = _umul128(b[2], x, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, zl, t1, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, zh, 0, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, zl, f >> 32, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, zh, 0, &zh);
+ t1 = zl;
+ t2 = zh;
+
+ zl = _umul128(b[3], x, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, zl, t2, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, zh, 0, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, zl, f, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, zh, 0, &zh);
+ t2 = zl;
+ t3 = zh;
+
+ t4 = _addcarry_u64(0, t3, f, &t3);
+ k = _subborrow_u64(0, t2, f << 32, &t2);
+ k = _subborrow_u64(k, t3, f >> 32, &t3);
+ (void)_subborrow_u64(k, t4, 0, &t4);
+
+ /*
+ * Steps 2 to 4: t <- (t + a[i]*b + f*p) / 2^64
+ */
+ for (i = 1; i < 4; i ++) {
+ x = a[i];
+ /* f = t0 + x * b[0]; -- computed below */
+
+ /* t <- (t + x*b - f) / 2^64 */
+ zl = _umul128(b[0], x, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, zl, t0, &f);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, zh, 0, &t0);
+
+ zl = _umul128(b[1], x, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, zl, t0, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, zh, 0, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, zl, t1, &t0);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, zh, 0, &t1);
+
+ zl = _umul128(b[2], x, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, zl, t1, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, zh, 0, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, zl, t2, &t1);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, zh, 0, &t2);
+
+ zl = _umul128(b[3], x, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, zl, t2, &zl);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, zh, 0, &zh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, zl, t3, &t2);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, zh, 0, &t3);
+
+ t4 = _addcarry_u64(0, t3, t4, &t3);
+
+ /* t <- t + f*2^32, carry in k */
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t0, f << 32, &t0);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t1, f >> 32, &t1);
+
+ /* t <- t + f*2^192 - f*2^160 + f*2^128 */
+ m = _subborrow_u64(0, f, f << 32, &ffl);
+ (void)_subborrow_u64(m, f, f >> 32, &ffh);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t2, ffl, &t2);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t3, ffh, &t3);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, t4, 0, &t4);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * At that point, we have computed t = (a*b + F*p) / 2^256, where
+ * F is a 256-bit integer whose limbs are the "f" coefficients
+ * in the steps above. We have:
+ * a <= 2^256-1
+ * b <= 2^256-1
+ * F <= 2^256-1
+ * Hence:
+ * a*b + F*p <= (2^256-1)*(2^256-1) + p*(2^256-1)
+ * a*b + F*p <= 2^256*(2^256 - 2 + p) + 1 - p
+ * Therefore:
+ * t < 2^256 + p - 2
+ * Since p < 2^256, it follows that:
+ * t4 can be only 0 or 1
+ * t - p < 2^256
+ * We can therefore subtract p from t, conditionally on t4, to
+ * get a nonnegative result that fits on 256 bits.
+ */
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, t0, t4, &t0);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t1, -(t4 << 32), &t1);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, t2, -t4, &t2);
+ (void)_addcarry_u64(k, t3, (t4 << 32) - (t4 << 1), &t3);
+
+ d[0] = t0;
+ d[1] = t1;
+ d[2] = t2;
+ d[3] = t3;
+
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Montgomery squaring in the field; currently a basic wrapper around
+ * multiplication (inline, should be optimized away).
+ * TODO: see if some extra speed can be gained here.
+ */
+static inline void
+f256_montysquare(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a)
+{
+ f256_montymul(d, a, a);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert to Montgomery representation.
+ */
+static void
+f256_tomonty(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a)
+{
+ /*
+ * R2 = 2^512 mod p.
+ * If R = 2^256 mod p, then R2 = R^2 mod p; and the Montgomery
+ * multiplication of a by R2 is: a*R2/R = a*R mod p, i.e. the
+ * conversion to Montgomery representation.
+ */
+ static const uint64_t R2[] = {
+ 0x0000000000000003,
+ 0xFFFFFFFBFFFFFFFF,
+ 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE,
+ 0x00000004FFFFFFFD
+ };
+
+ f256_montymul(d, a, R2);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert from Montgomery representation.
+ */
+static void
+f256_frommonty(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a)
+{
+ /*
+ * Montgomery multiplication by 1 is division by 2^256 modulo p.
+ */
+ static const uint64_t one[] = { 1, 0, 0, 0 };
+
+ f256_montymul(d, a, one);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Inversion in the field. If the source value is 0 modulo p, then this
+ * returns 0 or p. This function uses Montgomery representation.
+ */
+static void
+f256_invert(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *a)
+{
+ /*
+ * We compute a^(p-2) mod p. The exponent pattern (from high to
+ * low) is:
+ * - 32 bits of value 1
+ * - 31 bits of value 0
+ * - 1 bit of value 1
+ * - 96 bits of value 0
+ * - 94 bits of value 1
+ * - 1 bit of value 0
+ * - 1 bit of value 1
+ * To speed up the square-and-multiply algorithm, we precompute
+ * a^(2^31-1).
+ */
+
+ uint64_t r[4], t[4];
+ int i;
+
+ memcpy(t, a, sizeof t);
+ for (i = 0; i < 30; i ++) {
+ f256_montysquare(t, t);
+ f256_montymul(t, t, a);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(r, t, sizeof t);
+ for (i = 224; i >= 0; i --) {
+ f256_montysquare(r, r);
+ switch (i) {
+ case 0:
+ case 2:
+ case 192:
+ case 224:
+ f256_montymul(r, r, a);
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ case 34:
+ case 65:
+ f256_montymul(r, r, t);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(d, r, sizeof r);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finalize reduction.
+ * Input value fits on 256 bits. This function subtracts p if and only
+ * if the input is greater than or equal to p.
+ */
+static inline void
+f256_final_reduce(uint64_t *a)
+{
+#if BR_INT128
+
+ uint64_t t0, t1, t2, t3, cc;
+ unsigned __int128 z;
+
+ /*
+ * We add 2^224 - 2^192 - 2^96 + 1 to a. If there is no carry,
+ * then a < p; otherwise, the addition result we computed is
+ * the value we must return.
+ */
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[0] + 1;
+ t0 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[1] + (z >> 64) - ((uint64_t)1 << 32);
+ t1 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[2] - (z >> 127);
+ t2 = (uint64_t)z;
+ z = (unsigned __int128)a[3] - (z >> 127) + 0xFFFFFFFF;
+ t3 = (uint64_t)z;
+ cc = -(uint64_t)(z >> 64);
+
+ a[0] ^= cc & (a[0] ^ t0);
+ a[1] ^= cc & (a[1] ^ t1);
+ a[2] ^= cc & (a[2] ^ t2);
+ a[3] ^= cc & (a[3] ^ t3);
+
+#elif BR_UMUL128
+
+ uint64_t t0, t1, t2, t3, m;
+ unsigned char k;
+
+ k = _addcarry_u64(0, a[0], (uint64_t)1, &t0);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, a[1], -((uint64_t)1 << 32), &t1);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, a[2], -(uint64_t)1, &t2);
+ k = _addcarry_u64(k, a[3], ((uint64_t)1 << 32) - 2, &t3);
+ m = -(uint64_t)k;
+
+ a[0] ^= m & (a[0] ^ t0);
+ a[1] ^= m & (a[1] ^ t1);
+ a[2] ^= m & (a[2] ^ t2);
+ a[3] ^= m & (a[3] ^ t3);
+
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Points in affine and Jacobian coordinates.
+ *
+ * - In affine coordinates, the point-at-infinity cannot be encoded.
+ * - Jacobian coordinates (X,Y,Z) correspond to affine (X/Z^2,Y/Z^3);
+ * if Z = 0 then this is the point-at-infinity.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ uint64_t x[4];
+ uint64_t y[4];
+} p256_affine;
+
+typedef struct {
+ uint64_t x[4];
+ uint64_t y[4];
+ uint64_t z[4];
+} p256_jacobian;
+
+/*
+ * Decode a point. The returned point is in Jacobian coordinates, but
+ * with z = 1. If the encoding is invalid, or encodes a point which is
+ * not on the curve, or encodes the point at infinity, then this function
+ * returns 0. Otherwise, 1 is returned.
+ *
+ * The buffer is assumed to have length exactly 65 bytes.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+point_decode(p256_jacobian *P, const unsigned char *buf)
+{
+ uint64_t x[4], y[4], t[4], x3[4], tt;
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ /*
+ * Header byte shall be 0x04.
+ */
+ r = EQ(buf[0], 0x04);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode X and Y coordinates, and convert them into
+ * Montgomery representation.
+ */
+ x[3] = br_dec64be(buf + 1);
+ x[2] = br_dec64be(buf + 9);
+ x[1] = br_dec64be(buf + 17);
+ x[0] = br_dec64be(buf + 25);
+ y[3] = br_dec64be(buf + 33);
+ y[2] = br_dec64be(buf + 41);
+ y[1] = br_dec64be(buf + 49);
+ y[0] = br_dec64be(buf + 57);
+ f256_tomonty(x, x);
+ f256_tomonty(y, y);
+
+ /*
+ * Verify y^2 = x^3 + A*x + B. In curve P-256, A = -3.
+ * Note that the Montgomery representation of 0 is 0. We must
+ * take care to apply the final reduction to make sure we have
+ * 0 and not p.
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t, y);
+ f256_montysquare(x3, x);
+ f256_montymul(x3, x3, x);
+ f256_sub(t, t, x3);
+ f256_add(t, t, x);
+ f256_add(t, t, x);
+ f256_add(t, t, x);
+ f256_sub(t, t, P256_B_MONTY);
+ f256_final_reduce(t);
+ tt = t[0] | t[1] | t[2] | t[3];
+ r &= EQ((uint32_t)(tt | (tt >> 32)), 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Return the point in Jacobian coordinates (and Montgomery
+ * representation).
+ */
+ memcpy(P->x, x, sizeof x);
+ memcpy(P->y, y, sizeof y);
+ memcpy(P->z, F256_R, sizeof F256_R);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Final conversion for a point:
+ * - The point is converted back to affine coordinates.
+ * - Final reduction is performed.
+ * - The point is encoded into the provided buffer.
+ *
+ * If the point is the point-at-infinity, all operations are performed,
+ * but the buffer contents are indeterminate, and 0 is returned. Otherwise,
+ * the encoded point is written in the buffer, and 1 is returned.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+point_encode(unsigned char *buf, const p256_jacobian *P)
+{
+ uint64_t t1[4], t2[4], z;
+
+ /* Set t1 = 1/z^2 and t2 = 1/z^3. */
+ f256_invert(t2, P->z);
+ f256_montysquare(t1, t2);
+ f256_montymul(t2, t2, t1);
+
+ /* Compute affine coordinates x (in t1) and y (in t2). */
+ f256_montymul(t1, P->x, t1);
+ f256_montymul(t2, P->y, t2);
+
+ /* Convert back from Montgomery representation, and finalize
+ reductions. */
+ f256_frommonty(t1, t1);
+ f256_frommonty(t2, t2);
+ f256_final_reduce(t1);
+ f256_final_reduce(t2);
+
+ /* Encode. */
+ buf[0] = 0x04;
+ br_enc64be(buf + 1, t1[3]);
+ br_enc64be(buf + 9, t1[2]);
+ br_enc64be(buf + 17, t1[1]);
+ br_enc64be(buf + 25, t1[0]);
+ br_enc64be(buf + 33, t2[3]);
+ br_enc64be(buf + 41, t2[2]);
+ br_enc64be(buf + 49, t2[1]);
+ br_enc64be(buf + 57, t2[0]);
+
+ /* Return success if and only if P->z != 0. */
+ z = P->z[0] | P->z[1] | P->z[2] | P->z[3];
+ return NEQ((uint32_t)(z | z >> 32), 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Point doubling in Jacobian coordinates: point P is doubled.
+ * Note: if the source point is the point-at-infinity, then the result is
+ * still the point-at-infinity, which is correct. Moreover, if the three
+ * coordinates were zero, then they still are zero in the returned value.
+ *
+ * (Note: this is true even without the final reduction: if the three
+ * coordinates are encoded as four words of value zero each, then the
+ * result will also have all-zero coordinate encodings, not the alternate
+ * encoding as the integer p.)
+ */
+static void
+p256_double(p256_jacobian *P)
+{
+ /*
+ * Doubling formulas are:
+ *
+ * s = 4*x*y^2
+ * m = 3*(x + z^2)*(x - z^2)
+ * x' = m^2 - 2*s
+ * y' = m*(s - x') - 8*y^4
+ * z' = 2*y*z
+ *
+ * These formulas work for all points, including points of order 2
+ * and points at infinity:
+ * - If y = 0 then z' = 0. But there is no such point in P-256
+ * anyway.
+ * - If z = 0 then z' = 0.
+ */
+ uint64_t t1[4], t2[4], t3[4], t4[4];
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z^2 in t1.
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t1, P->z);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x-z^2 in t2 and x+z^2 in t1.
+ */
+ f256_add(t2, P->x, t1);
+ f256_sub(t1, P->x, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute 3*(x+z^2)*(x-z^2) in t1.
+ */
+ f256_montymul(t3, t1, t2);
+ f256_add(t1, t3, t3);
+ f256_add(t1, t3, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute 4*x*y^2 (in t2) and 2*y^2 (in t3).
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t3, P->y);
+ f256_add(t3, t3, t3);
+ f256_montymul(t2, P->x, t3);
+ f256_add(t2, t2, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x' = m^2 - 2*s.
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(P->x, t1);
+ f256_sub(P->x, P->x, t2);
+ f256_sub(P->x, P->x, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z' = 2*y*z.
+ */
+ f256_montymul(t4, P->y, P->z);
+ f256_add(P->z, t4, t4);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y' = m*(s - x') - 8*y^4. Note that we already have
+ * 2*y^2 in t3.
+ */
+ f256_sub(t2, t2, P->x);
+ f256_montymul(P->y, t1, t2);
+ f256_montysquare(t4, t3);
+ f256_add(t4, t4, t4);
+ f256_sub(P->y, P->y, t4);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Point addition (Jacobian coordinates): P1 is replaced with P1+P2.
+ * This function computes the wrong result in the following cases:
+ *
+ * - If P1 == 0 but P2 != 0
+ * - If P1 != 0 but P2 == 0
+ * - If P1 == P2
+ *
+ * In all three cases, P1 is set to the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 0 if one of the following occurs:
+ *
+ * - P1 and P2 have the same Y coordinate.
+ * - P1 == 0 and P2 == 0.
+ * - The Y coordinate of one of the points is 0 and the other point is
+ * the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * The third case cannot actually happen with valid points, since a point
+ * with Y == 0 is a point of order 2, and there is no point of order 2 on
+ * curve P-256.
+ *
+ * Therefore, assuming that P1 != 0 and P2 != 0 on input, then the caller
+ * can apply the following:
+ *
+ * - If the result is not the point at infinity, then it is correct.
+ * - Otherwise, if the returned value is 1, then this is a case of
+ * P1+P2 == 0, so the result is indeed the point at infinity.
+ * - Otherwise, P1 == P2, so a "double" operation should have been
+ * performed.
+ *
+ * Note that you can get a returned value of 0 with a correct result,
+ * e.g. if P1 and P2 have the same Y coordinate, but distinct X coordinates.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+p256_add(p256_jacobian *P1, const p256_jacobian *P2)
+{
+ /*
+ * Addtions formulas are:
+ *
+ * u1 = x1 * z2^2
+ * u2 = x2 * z1^2
+ * s1 = y1 * z2^3
+ * s2 = y2 * z1^3
+ * h = u2 - u1
+ * r = s2 - s1
+ * x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2 * u1 * h^2
+ * y3 = r * (u1 * h^2 - x3) - s1 * h^3
+ * z3 = h * z1 * z2
+ */
+ uint64_t t1[4], t2[4], t3[4], t4[4], t5[4], t6[4], t7[4], tt;
+ uint32_t ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1 = x1*z2^2 (in t1) and s1 = y1*z2^3 (in t3).
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t3, P2->z);
+ f256_montymul(t1, P1->x, t3);
+ f256_montymul(t4, P2->z, t3);
+ f256_montymul(t3, P1->y, t4);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u2 = x2*z1^2 (in t2) and s2 = y2*z1^3 (in t4).
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t4, P1->z);
+ f256_montymul(t2, P2->x, t4);
+ f256_montymul(t5, P1->z, t4);
+ f256_montymul(t4, P2->y, t5);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h = h2 - u1 (in t2) and r = s2 - s1 (in t4).
+ * We need to test whether r is zero, so we will do some extra
+ * reduce.
+ */
+ f256_sub(t2, t2, t1);
+ f256_sub(t4, t4, t3);
+ f256_final_reduce(t4);
+ tt = t4[0] | t4[1] | t4[2] | t4[3];
+ ret = (uint32_t)(tt | (tt >> 32));
+ ret = (ret | -ret) >> 31;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1*h^2 (in t6) and h^3 (in t5);
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t7, t2);
+ f256_montymul(t6, t1, t7);
+ f256_montymul(t5, t7, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2*u1*h^2.
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(P1->x, t4);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t5);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t6);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t6);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y3 = r*(u1*h^2 - x3) - s1*h^3.
+ */
+ f256_sub(t6, t6, P1->x);
+ f256_montymul(P1->y, t4, t6);
+ f256_montymul(t1, t5, t3);
+ f256_sub(P1->y, P1->y, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z3 = h*z1*z2.
+ */
+ f256_montymul(t1, P1->z, P2->z);
+ f256_montymul(P1->z, t1, t2);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Point addition (mixed coordinates): P1 is replaced with P1+P2.
+ * This is a specialised function for the case when P2 is a non-zero point
+ * in affine coordinates.
+ *
+ * This function computes the wrong result in the following cases:
+ *
+ * - If P1 == 0
+ * - If P1 == P2
+ *
+ * In both cases, P1 is set to the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 0 if one of the following occurs:
+ *
+ * - P1 and P2 have the same Y (affine) coordinate.
+ * - The Y coordinate of P2 is 0 and P1 is the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * The second case cannot actually happen with valid points, since a point
+ * with Y == 0 is a point of order 2, and there is no point of order 2 on
+ * curve P-256.
+ *
+ * Therefore, assuming that P1 != 0 on input, then the caller
+ * can apply the following:
+ *
+ * - If the result is not the point at infinity, then it is correct.
+ * - Otherwise, if the returned value is 1, then this is a case of
+ * P1+P2 == 0, so the result is indeed the point at infinity.
+ * - Otherwise, P1 == P2, so a "double" operation should have been
+ * performed.
+ *
+ * Again, a value of 0 may be returned in some cases where the addition
+ * result is correct.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+p256_add_mixed(p256_jacobian *P1, const p256_affine *P2)
+{
+ /*
+ * Addtions formulas are:
+ *
+ * u1 = x1
+ * u2 = x2 * z1^2
+ * s1 = y1
+ * s2 = y2 * z1^3
+ * h = u2 - u1
+ * r = s2 - s1
+ * x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2 * u1 * h^2
+ * y3 = r * (u1 * h^2 - x3) - s1 * h^3
+ * z3 = h * z1
+ */
+ uint64_t t1[4], t2[4], t3[4], t4[4], t5[4], t6[4], t7[4], tt;
+ uint32_t ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1 = x1 (in t1) and s1 = y1 (in t3).
+ */
+ memcpy(t1, P1->x, sizeof t1);
+ memcpy(t3, P1->y, sizeof t3);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u2 = x2*z1^2 (in t2) and s2 = y2*z1^3 (in t4).
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t4, P1->z);
+ f256_montymul(t2, P2->x, t4);
+ f256_montymul(t5, P1->z, t4);
+ f256_montymul(t4, P2->y, t5);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h = h2 - u1 (in t2) and r = s2 - s1 (in t4).
+ * We need to test whether r is zero, so we will do some extra
+ * reduce.
+ */
+ f256_sub(t2, t2, t1);
+ f256_sub(t4, t4, t3);
+ f256_final_reduce(t4);
+ tt = t4[0] | t4[1] | t4[2] | t4[3];
+ ret = (uint32_t)(tt | (tt >> 32));
+ ret = (ret | -ret) >> 31;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1*h^2 (in t6) and h^3 (in t5);
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t7, t2);
+ f256_montymul(t6, t1, t7);
+ f256_montymul(t5, t7, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2*u1*h^2.
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(P1->x, t4);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t5);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t6);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t6);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y3 = r*(u1*h^2 - x3) - s1*h^3.
+ */
+ f256_sub(t6, t6, P1->x);
+ f256_montymul(P1->y, t4, t6);
+ f256_montymul(t1, t5, t3);
+ f256_sub(P1->y, P1->y, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z3 = h*z1*z2.
+ */
+ f256_montymul(P1->z, P1->z, t2);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if 0
+/* unused */
+/*
+ * Point addition (mixed coordinates, complete): P1 is replaced with P1+P2.
+ * This is a specialised function for the case when P2 is a non-zero point
+ * in affine coordinates.
+ *
+ * This function returns the correct result in all cases.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+p256_add_complete_mixed(p256_jacobian *P1, const p256_affine *P2)
+{
+ /*
+ * Addtions formulas, in the general case, are:
+ *
+ * u1 = x1
+ * u2 = x2 * z1^2
+ * s1 = y1
+ * s2 = y2 * z1^3
+ * h = u2 - u1
+ * r = s2 - s1
+ * x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2 * u1 * h^2
+ * y3 = r * (u1 * h^2 - x3) - s1 * h^3
+ * z3 = h * z1
+ *
+ * These formulas mishandle the two following cases:
+ *
+ * - If P1 is the point-at-infinity (z1 = 0), then z3 is
+ * incorrectly set to 0.
+ *
+ * - If P1 = P2, then u1 = u2 and s1 = s2, and x3, y3 and z3
+ * are all set to 0.
+ *
+ * However, if P1 + P2 = 0, then u1 = u2 but s1 != s2, and then
+ * we correctly get z3 = 0 (the point-at-infinity).
+ *
+ * To fix the case P1 = 0, we perform at the end a copy of P2
+ * over P1, conditional to z1 = 0.
+ *
+ * For P1 = P2: in that case, both h and r are set to 0, and
+ * we get x3, y3 and z3 equal to 0. We can test for that
+ * occurrence to make a mask which will be all-one if P1 = P2,
+ * or all-zero otherwise; then we can compute the double of P2
+ * and add it, combined with the mask, to (x3,y3,z3).
+ *
+ * Using the doubling formulas in p256_double() on (x2,y2),
+ * simplifying since P2 is affine (i.e. z2 = 1, implicitly),
+ * we get:
+ * s = 4*x2*y2^2
+ * m = 3*(x2 + 1)*(x2 - 1)
+ * x' = m^2 - 2*s
+ * y' = m*(s - x') - 8*y2^4
+ * z' = 2*y2
+ * which requires only 6 multiplications. Added to the 11
+ * multiplications of the normal mixed addition in Jacobian
+ * coordinates, we get a cost of 17 multiplications in total.
+ */
+ uint64_t t1[4], t2[4], t3[4], t4[4], t5[4], t6[4], t7[4], tt, zz;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Set zz to -1 if P1 is the point at infinity, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+ zz = P1->z[0] | P1->z[1] | P1->z[2] | P1->z[3];
+ zz = ((zz | -zz) >> 63) - (uint64_t)1;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1 = x1 (in t1) and s1 = y1 (in t3).
+ */
+ memcpy(t1, P1->x, sizeof t1);
+ memcpy(t3, P1->y, sizeof t3);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u2 = x2*z1^2 (in t2) and s2 = y2*z1^3 (in t4).
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t4, P1->z);
+ f256_montymul(t2, P2->x, t4);
+ f256_montymul(t5, P1->z, t4);
+ f256_montymul(t4, P2->y, t5);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h = h2 - u1 (in t2) and r = s2 - s1 (in t4).
+ * reduce.
+ */
+ f256_sub(t2, t2, t1);
+ f256_sub(t4, t4, t3);
+
+ /*
+ * If both h = 0 and r = 0, then P1 = P2, and we want to set
+ * the mask tt to -1; otherwise, the mask will be 0.
+ */
+ f256_final_reduce(t2);
+ f256_final_reduce(t4);
+ tt = t2[0] | t2[1] | t2[2] | t2[3] | t4[0] | t4[1] | t4[2] | t4[3];
+ tt = ((tt | -tt) >> 63) - (uint64_t)1;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1*h^2 (in t6) and h^3 (in t5);
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t7, t2);
+ f256_montymul(t6, t1, t7);
+ f256_montymul(t5, t7, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2*u1*h^2.
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(P1->x, t4);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t5);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t6);
+ f256_sub(P1->x, P1->x, t6);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y3 = r*(u1*h^2 - x3) - s1*h^3.
+ */
+ f256_sub(t6, t6, P1->x);
+ f256_montymul(P1->y, t4, t6);
+ f256_montymul(t1, t5, t3);
+ f256_sub(P1->y, P1->y, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z3 = h*z1.
+ */
+ f256_montymul(P1->z, P1->z, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * The "double" result, in case P1 = P2.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z' = 2*y2 (in t1).
+ */
+ f256_add(t1, P2->y, P2->y);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute 2*(y2^2) (in t2) and s = 4*x2*(y2^2) (in t3).
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t2, P2->y);
+ f256_add(t2, t2, t2);
+ f256_add(t3, t2, t2);
+ f256_montymul(t3, P2->x, t3);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute m = 3*(x2^2 - 1) (in t4).
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t4, P2->x);
+ f256_sub(t4, t4, F256_R);
+ f256_add(t5, t4, t4);
+ f256_add(t4, t4, t5);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x' = m^2 - 2*s (in t5).
+ */
+ f256_montysquare(t5, t4);
+ f256_sub(t5, t3);
+ f256_sub(t5, t3);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y' = m*(s - x') - 8*y2^4 (in t6).
+ */
+ f256_sub(t6, t3, t5);
+ f256_montymul(t6, t6, t4);
+ f256_montysquare(t7, t2);
+ f256_sub(t6, t6, t7);
+ f256_sub(t6, t6, t7);
+
+ /*
+ * We now have the alternate (doubling) coordinates in (t5,t6,t1).
+ * We combine them with (x3,y3,z3).
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i ++) {
+ P1->x[i] |= tt & t5[i];
+ P1->y[i] |= tt & t6[i];
+ P1->z[i] |= tt & t1[i];
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If P1 = 0, then we get z3 = 0 (which is invalid); if z1 is 0,
+ * then we want to replace the result with a copy of P2. The
+ * test on z1 was done at the start, in the zz mask.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i ++) {
+ P1->x[i] ^= zz & (P1->x[i] ^ P2->x[i]);
+ P1->y[i] ^= zz & (P1->y[i] ^ P2->y[i]);
+ P1->z[i] ^= zz & (P1->z[i] ^ F256_R[i]);
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Inner function for computing a point multiplication. A window is
+ * provided, with points 1*P to 15*P in affine coordinates.
+ *
+ * Assumptions:
+ * - All provided points are valid points on the curve.
+ * - Multiplier is non-zero, and smaller than the curve order.
+ * - Everything is in Montgomery representation.
+ */
+static void
+point_mul_inner(p256_jacobian *R, const p256_affine *W,
+ const unsigned char *k, size_t klen)
+{
+ p256_jacobian Q;
+ uint32_t qz;
+
+ memset(&Q, 0, sizeof Q);
+ qz = 1;
+ while (klen -- > 0) {
+ int i;
+ unsigned bk;
+
+ bk = *k ++;
+ for (i = 0; i < 2; i ++) {
+ uint32_t bits;
+ uint32_t bnz;
+ p256_affine T;
+ p256_jacobian U;
+ uint32_t n;
+ int j;
+ uint64_t m;
+
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+ bits = (bk >> 4) & 0x0F;
+ bnz = NEQ(bits, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Lookup point in window. If the bits are 0,
+ * we get something invalid, which is not a
+ * problem because we will use it only if the
+ * bits are non-zero.
+ */
+ memset(&T, 0, sizeof T);
+ for (n = 0; n < 15; n ++) {
+ m = -(uint64_t)EQ(bits, n + 1);
+ T.x[0] |= m & W[n].x[0];
+ T.x[1] |= m & W[n].x[1];
+ T.x[2] |= m & W[n].x[2];
+ T.x[3] |= m & W[n].x[3];
+ T.y[0] |= m & W[n].y[0];
+ T.y[1] |= m & W[n].y[1];
+ T.y[2] |= m & W[n].y[2];
+ T.y[3] |= m & W[n].y[3];
+ }
+
+ U = Q;
+ p256_add_mixed(&U, &T);
+
+ /*
+ * If qz is still 1, then Q was all-zeros, and this
+ * is conserved through p256_double().
+ */
+ m = -(uint64_t)(bnz & qz);
+ for (j = 0; j < 4; j ++) {
+ Q.x[j] |= m & T.x[j];
+ Q.y[j] |= m & T.y[j];
+ Q.z[j] |= m & F256_R[j];
+ }
+ CCOPY(bnz & ~qz, &Q, &U, sizeof Q);
+ qz &= ~bnz;
+ bk <<= 4;
+ }
+ }
+ *R = Q;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a window from Jacobian to affine coordinates. A single
+ * field inversion is used. This function works for windows up to
+ * 32 elements.
+ *
+ * The destination array (aff[]) and the source array (jac[]) may
+ * overlap, provided that the start of aff[] is not after the start of
+ * jac[]. Even if the arrays do _not_ overlap, the source array is
+ * modified.
+ */
+static void
+window_to_affine(p256_affine *aff, p256_jacobian *jac, int num)
+{
+ /*
+ * Convert the window points to affine coordinates. We use the
+ * following trick to mutualize the inversion computation: if
+ * we have z1, z2, z3, and z4, and want to inverse all of them,
+ * we compute u = 1/(z1*z2*z3*z4), and then we have:
+ * 1/z1 = u*z2*z3*z4
+ * 1/z2 = u*z1*z3*z4
+ * 1/z3 = u*z1*z2*z4
+ * 1/z4 = u*z1*z2*z3
+ *
+ * The partial products are computed recursively:
+ *
+ * - on input (z_1,z_2), return (z_2,z_1) and z_1*z_2
+ * - on input (z_1,z_2,... z_n):
+ * recurse on (z_1,z_2,... z_(n/2)) -> r1 and m1
+ * recurse on (z_(n/2+1),z_(n/2+2)... z_n) -> r2 and m2
+ * multiply elements of r1 by m2 -> s1
+ * multiply elements of r2 by m1 -> s2
+ * return r1||r2 and m1*m2
+ *
+ * In the example below, we suppose that we have 14 elements.
+ * Let z1, z2,... zE be the 14 values to invert (index noted in
+ * hexadecimal, starting at 1).
+ *
+ * - Depth 1:
+ * swap(z1, z2); z12 = z1*z2
+ * swap(z3, z4); z34 = z3*z4
+ * swap(z5, z6); z56 = z5*z6
+ * swap(z7, z8); z78 = z7*z8
+ * swap(z9, zA); z9A = z9*zA
+ * swap(zB, zC); zBC = zB*zC
+ * swap(zD, zE); zDE = zD*zE
+ *
+ * - Depth 2:
+ * z1 <- z1*z34, z2 <- z2*z34, z3 <- z3*z12, z4 <- z4*z12
+ * z1234 = z12*z34
+ * z5 <- z5*z78, z6 <- z6*z78, z7 <- z7*z56, z8 <- z8*z56
+ * z5678 = z56*z78
+ * z9 <- z9*zBC, zA <- zA*zBC, zB <- zB*z9A, zC <- zC*z9A
+ * z9ABC = z9A*zBC
+ *
+ * - Depth 3:
+ * z1 <- z1*z5678, z2 <- z2*z5678, z3 <- z3*z5678, z4 <- z4*z5678
+ * z5 <- z5*z1234, z6 <- z6*z1234, z7 <- z7*z1234, z8 <- z8*z1234
+ * z12345678 = z1234*z5678
+ * z9 <- z9*zDE, zA <- zA*zDE, zB <- zB*zDE, zC <- zC*zDE
+ * zD <- zD*z9ABC, zE*z9ABC
+ * z9ABCDE = z9ABC*zDE
+ *
+ * - Depth 4:
+ * multiply z1..z8 by z9ABCDE
+ * multiply z9..zE by z12345678
+ * final z = z12345678*z9ABCDE
+ */
+
+ uint64_t z[16][4];
+ int i, k, s;
+#define zt (z[15])
+#define zu (z[14])
+#define zv (z[13])
+
+ /*
+ * First recursion step (pairwise swapping and multiplication).
+ * If there is an odd number of elements, then we "invent" an
+ * extra one with coordinate Z = 1 (in Montgomery representation).
+ */
+ for (i = 0; (i + 1) < num; i += 2) {
+ memcpy(zt, jac[i].z, sizeof zt);
+ memcpy(jac[i].z, jac[i + 1].z, sizeof zt);
+ memcpy(jac[i + 1].z, zt, sizeof zt);
+ f256_montymul(z[i >> 1], jac[i].z, jac[i + 1].z);
+ }
+ if ((num & 1) != 0) {
+ memcpy(z[num >> 1], jac[num - 1].z, sizeof zt);
+ memcpy(jac[num - 1].z, F256_R, sizeof F256_R);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Perform further recursion steps. At the entry of each step,
+ * the process has been done for groups of 's' points. The
+ * integer k is the log2 of s.
+ */
+ for (k = 1, s = 2; s < num; k ++, s <<= 1) {
+ int n;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i ++) {
+ f256_montymul(jac[i].z, jac[i].z, z[(i >> k) ^ 1]);
+ }
+ n = (num + s - 1) >> k;
+ for (i = 0; i < (n >> 1); i ++) {
+ f256_montymul(z[i], z[i << 1], z[(i << 1) + 1]);
+ }
+ if ((n & 1) != 0) {
+ memmove(z[n >> 1], z[n], sizeof zt);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invert the final result, and convert all points.
+ */
+ f256_invert(zt, z[0]);
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i ++) {
+ f256_montymul(zv, jac[i].z, zt);
+ f256_montysquare(zu, zv);
+ f256_montymul(zv, zv, zu);
+ f256_montymul(aff[i].x, jac[i].x, zu);
+ f256_montymul(aff[i].y, jac[i].y, zv);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiply the provided point by an integer.
+ * Assumptions:
+ * - Source point is a valid curve point.
+ * - Source point is not the point-at-infinity.
+ * - Integer is not 0, and is lower than the curve order.
+ * If these conditions are not met, then the result is indeterminate
+ * (but the process is still constant-time).
+ */
+static void
+p256_mul(p256_jacobian *P, const unsigned char *k, size_t klen)
+{
+ union {
+ p256_affine aff[15];
+ p256_jacobian jac[15];
+ } window;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute window, in Jacobian coordinates.
+ */
+ window.jac[0] = *P;
+ for (i = 2; i < 16; i ++) {
+ window.jac[i - 1] = window.jac[(i >> 1) - 1];
+ if ((i & 1) == 0) {
+ p256_double(&window.jac[i - 1]);
+ } else {
+ p256_add(&window.jac[i - 1], &window.jac[i >> 1]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the window points to affine coordinates. Point
+ * window[0] is the source point, already in affine coordinates.
+ */
+ window_to_affine(window.aff, window.jac, 15);
+
+ /*
+ * Perform point multiplication.
+ */
+ point_mul_inner(P, window.aff, k, klen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Precomputed window for the conventional generator: P256_Gwin[n]
+ * contains (n+1)*G (affine coordinates, in Montgomery representation).
+ */
+static const p256_affine P256_Gwin[] = {
+ {
+ { 0x79E730D418A9143C, 0x75BA95FC5FEDB601,
+ 0x79FB732B77622510, 0x18905F76A53755C6 },
+ { 0xDDF25357CE95560A, 0x8B4AB8E4BA19E45C,
+ 0xD2E88688DD21F325, 0x8571FF1825885D85 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x850046D410DDD64D, 0xAA6AE3C1A433827D,
+ 0x732205038D1490D9, 0xF6BB32E43DCF3A3B },
+ { 0x2F3648D361BEE1A5, 0x152CD7CBEB236FF8,
+ 0x19A8FB0E92042DBE, 0x78C577510A5B8A3B }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0xFFAC3F904EEBC127, 0xB027F84A087D81FB,
+ 0x66AD77DD87CBBC98, 0x26936A3FB6FF747E },
+ { 0xB04C5C1FC983A7EB, 0x583E47AD0861FE1A,
+ 0x788208311A2EE98E, 0xD5F06A29E587CC07 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x74B0B50D46918DCC, 0x4650A6EDC623C173,
+ 0x0CDAACACE8100AF2, 0x577362F541B0176B },
+ { 0x2D96F24CE4CBABA6, 0x17628471FAD6F447,
+ 0x6B6C36DEE5DDD22E, 0x84B14C394C5AB863 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0xBE1B8AAEC45C61F5, 0x90EC649A94B9537D,
+ 0x941CB5AAD076C20C, 0xC9079605890523C8 },
+ { 0xEB309B4AE7BA4F10, 0x73C568EFE5EB882B,
+ 0x3540A9877E7A1F68, 0x73A076BB2DD1E916 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x403947373E77664A, 0x55AE744F346CEE3E,
+ 0xD50A961A5B17A3AD, 0x13074B5954213673 },
+ { 0x93D36220D377E44B, 0x299C2B53ADFF14B5,
+ 0xF424D44CEF639F11, 0xA4C9916D4A07F75F }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x0746354EA0173B4F, 0x2BD20213D23C00F7,
+ 0xF43EAAB50C23BB08, 0x13BA5119C3123E03 },
+ { 0x2847D0303F5B9D4D, 0x6742F2F25DA67BDD,
+ 0xEF933BDC77C94195, 0xEAEDD9156E240867 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x27F14CD19499A78F, 0x462AB5C56F9B3455,
+ 0x8F90F02AF02CFC6B, 0xB763891EB265230D },
+ { 0xF59DA3A9532D4977, 0x21E3327DCF9EBA15,
+ 0x123C7B84BE60BBF0, 0x56EC12F27706DF76 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x75C96E8F264E20E8, 0xABE6BFED59A7A841,
+ 0x2CC09C0444C8EB00, 0xE05B3080F0C4E16B },
+ { 0x1EB7777AA45F3314, 0x56AF7BEDCE5D45E3,
+ 0x2B6E019A88B12F1A, 0x086659CDFD835F9B }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x2C18DBD19DC21EC8, 0x98F9868A0FCF8139,
+ 0x737D2CD648250B49, 0xCC61C94724B3428F },
+ { 0x0C2B407880DD9E76, 0xC43A8991383FBE08,
+ 0x5F7D2D65779BE5D2, 0x78719A54EB3B4AB5 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0xEA7D260A6245E404, 0x9DE407956E7FDFE0,
+ 0x1FF3A4158DAC1AB5, 0x3E7090F1649C9073 },
+ { 0x1A7685612B944E88, 0x250F939EE57F61C8,
+ 0x0C0DAA891EAD643D, 0x68930023E125B88E }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x04B71AA7D2697768, 0xABDEDEF5CA345A33,
+ 0x2409D29DEE37385E, 0x4EE1DF77CB83E156 },
+ { 0x0CAC12D91CBB5B43, 0x170ED2F6CA895637,
+ 0x28228CFA8ADE6D66, 0x7FF57C9553238ACA }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0xCCC425634B2ED709, 0x0E356769856FD30D,
+ 0xBCBCD43F559E9811, 0x738477AC5395B759 },
+ { 0x35752B90C00EE17F, 0x68748390742ED2E3,
+ 0x7CD06422BD1F5BC1, 0xFBC08769C9E7B797 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0xA242A35BB0CF664A, 0x126E48F77F9707E3,
+ 0x1717BF54C6832660, 0xFAAE7332FD12C72E },
+ { 0x27B52DB7995D586B, 0xBE29569E832237C2,
+ 0xE8E4193E2A65E7DB, 0x152706DC2EAA1BBB }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x72BCD8B7BC60055B, 0x03CC23EE56E27E4B,
+ 0xEE337424E4819370, 0xE2AA0E430AD3DA09 },
+ { 0x40B8524F6383C45D, 0xD766355442A41B25,
+ 0x64EFA6DE778A4797, 0x2042170A7079ADF4 }
+ }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Multiply the conventional generator of the curve by the provided
+ * integer. Return is written in *P.
+ *
+ * Assumptions:
+ * - Integer is not 0, and is lower than the curve order.
+ * If this conditions is not met, then the result is indeterminate
+ * (but the process is still constant-time).
+ */
+static void
+p256_mulgen(p256_jacobian *P, const unsigned char *k, size_t klen)
+{
+ point_mul_inner(P, P256_Gwin, k, klen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if all of the following hold:
+ * - klen <= 32
+ * - k != 0
+ * - k is lower than the curve order
+ * Otherwise, return 0.
+ *
+ * Constant-time behaviour: only klen may be observable.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+check_scalar(const unsigned char *k, size_t klen)
+{
+ uint32_t z;
+ int32_t c;
+ size_t u;
+
+ if (klen > 32) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ z = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < klen; u ++) {
+ z |= k[u];
+ }
+ if (klen == 32) {
+ c = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < klen; u ++) {
+ c |= -(int32_t)EQ0(c) & CMP(k[u], P256_N[u]);
+ }
+ } else {
+ c = -1;
+ }
+ return NEQ(z, 0) & LT0(c);
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_mul(unsigned char *G, size_t Glen,
+ const unsigned char *k, size_t klen, int curve)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+ p256_jacobian P;
+
+ (void)curve;
+ if (Glen != 65) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = check_scalar(k, klen);
+ r &= point_decode(&P, G);
+ p256_mul(&P, k, klen);
+ r &= point_encode(G, &P);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_mulgen(unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *k, size_t klen, int curve)
+{
+ p256_jacobian P;
+
+ (void)curve;
+ p256_mulgen(&P, k, klen);
+ point_encode(R, &P);
+ return 65;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_muladd(unsigned char *A, const unsigned char *B, size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *y, size_t ylen, int curve)
+{
+ /*
+ * We might want to use Shamir's trick here: make a composite
+ * window of u*P+v*Q points, to merge the two doubling-ladders
+ * into one. This, however, has some complications:
+ *
+ * - During the computation, we may hit the point-at-infinity.
+ * Thus, we would need p256_add_complete_mixed() (complete
+ * formulas for point addition), with a higher cost (17 muls
+ * instead of 11).
+ *
+ * - A 4-bit window would be too large, since it would involve
+ * 16*16-1 = 255 points. For the same window size as in the
+ * p256_mul() case, we would need to reduce the window size
+ * to 2 bits, and thus perform twice as many non-doubling
+ * point additions.
+ *
+ * - The window may itself contain the point-at-infinity, and
+ * thus cannot be in all generality be made of affine points.
+ * Instead, we would need to make it a window of points in
+ * Jacobian coordinates. Even p256_add_complete_mixed() would
+ * be inappropriate.
+ *
+ * For these reasons, the code below performs two separate
+ * point multiplications, then computes the final point addition
+ * (which is both a "normal" addition, and a doubling, to handle
+ * all cases).
+ */
+
+ p256_jacobian P, Q;
+ uint32_t r, t, s;
+ uint64_t z;
+
+ (void)curve;
+ if (len != 65) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = point_decode(&P, A);
+ p256_mul(&P, x, xlen);
+ if (B == NULL) {
+ p256_mulgen(&Q, y, ylen);
+ } else {
+ r &= point_decode(&Q, B);
+ p256_mul(&Q, y, ylen);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The final addition may fail in case both points are equal.
+ */
+ t = p256_add(&P, &Q);
+ f256_final_reduce(P.z);
+ z = P.z[0] | P.z[1] | P.z[2] | P.z[3];
+ s = EQ((uint32_t)(z | (z >> 32)), 0);
+ p256_double(&Q);
+
+ /*
+ * If s is 1 then either P+Q = 0 (t = 1) or P = Q (t = 0). So we
+ * have the following:
+ *
+ * s = 0, t = 0 return P (normal addition)
+ * s = 0, t = 1 return P (normal addition)
+ * s = 1, t = 0 return Q (a 'double' case)
+ * s = 1, t = 1 report an error (P+Q = 0)
+ */
+ CCOPY(s & ~t, &P, &Q, sizeof Q);
+ point_encode(A, &P);
+ r &= ~(s & t);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl br_ec_p256_m64 = {
+ (uint32_t)0x00800000,
+ &api_generator,
+ &api_order,
+ &api_xoff,
+ &api_mul,
+ &api_mulgen,
+ &api_muladd
+};
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl *
+br_ec_p256_m64_get(void)
+{
+ return &br_ec_p256_m64;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl *
+br_ec_p256_m64_get(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_prime_i15.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_prime_i15.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f86dbe6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_prime_i15.c
@@ -0,0 +1,824 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Parameters for supported curves:
+ * - field modulus p
+ * - R^2 mod p (R = 2^(15k) for the smallest k such that R >= p)
+ * - b*R mod p (b is the second curve equation parameter)
+ */
+
+static const uint16_t P256_P[] = {
+ 0x0111,
+ 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x003F, 0x0000,
+ 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x1000, 0x0000, 0x4000, 0x7FFF,
+ 0x7FFF, 0x0001
+};
+
+static const uint16_t P256_R2[] = {
+ 0x0111,
+ 0x0000, 0x6000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x7FFC, 0x7FFF,
+ 0x7FBF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FBF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x77FF, 0x7FFF,
+ 0x4FFF, 0x0000
+};
+
+static const uint16_t P256_B[] = {
+ 0x0111,
+ 0x770C, 0x5EEF, 0x29C4, 0x3EC4, 0x6273, 0x0486, 0x4543, 0x3993,
+ 0x3C01, 0x6B56, 0x212E, 0x57EE, 0x4882, 0x204B, 0x7483, 0x3C16,
+ 0x0187, 0x0000
+};
+
+static const uint16_t P384_P[] = {
+ 0x0199,
+ 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x0003, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x7FC0, 0x7FFF,
+ 0x7EFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF,
+ 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF,
+ 0x7FFF, 0x01FF
+};
+
+static const uint16_t P384_R2[] = {
+ 0x0199,
+ 0x1000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x0001, 0x0000, 0x0010,
+ 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x7F00, 0x7FFF, 0x01FF, 0x0000, 0x1000,
+ 0x0000, 0x2000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+ 0x0000, 0x0000
+};
+
+static const uint16_t P384_B[] = {
+ 0x0199,
+ 0x7333, 0x2096, 0x70D1, 0x2310, 0x3020, 0x6197, 0x1464, 0x35BB,
+ 0x70CA, 0x0117, 0x1920, 0x4136, 0x5FC8, 0x5713, 0x4938, 0x7DD2,
+ 0x4DD2, 0x4A71, 0x0220, 0x683E, 0x2C87, 0x4DB1, 0x7BFF, 0x6C09,
+ 0x0452, 0x0084
+};
+
+static const uint16_t P521_P[] = {
+ 0x022B,
+ 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF,
+ 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF,
+ 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF,
+ 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF,
+ 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x07FF
+};
+
+static const uint16_t P521_R2[] = {
+ 0x022B,
+ 0x0100, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+ 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+ 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+ 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
+ 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000
+};
+
+static const uint16_t P521_B[] = {
+ 0x022B,
+ 0x7002, 0x6A07, 0x751A, 0x228F, 0x71EF, 0x5869, 0x20F4, 0x1EFC,
+ 0x7357, 0x37E0, 0x4EEC, 0x605E, 0x1652, 0x26F6, 0x31FA, 0x4A8F,
+ 0x6193, 0x3C2A, 0x3C42, 0x48C7, 0x3489, 0x6771, 0x4C57, 0x5CCD,
+ 0x2725, 0x545B, 0x503B, 0x5B42, 0x21A0, 0x2534, 0x687E, 0x70E4,
+ 0x1618, 0x27D7, 0x0465
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+ const uint16_t *p;
+ const uint16_t *b;
+ const uint16_t *R2;
+ uint16_t p0i;
+ size_t point_len;
+} curve_params;
+
+static inline const curve_params *
+id_to_curve(int curve)
+{
+ static const curve_params pp[] = {
+ { P256_P, P256_B, P256_R2, 0x0001, 65 },
+ { P384_P, P384_B, P384_R2, 0x0001, 97 },
+ { P521_P, P521_B, P521_R2, 0x0001, 133 }
+ };
+
+ return &pp[curve - BR_EC_secp256r1];
+}
+
+#define I15_LEN ((BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 29) / 15)
+
+/*
+ * Type for a point in Jacobian coordinates:
+ * -- three values, x, y and z, in Montgomery representation
+ * -- affine coordinates are X = x / z^2 and Y = y / z^3
+ * -- for the point at infinity, z = 0
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ uint16_t c[3][I15_LEN];
+} jacobian;
+
+/*
+ * We use a custom interpreter that uses a dozen registers, and
+ * only six operations:
+ * MSET(d, a) copy a into d
+ * MADD(d, a) d = d+a (modular)
+ * MSUB(d, a) d = d-a (modular)
+ * MMUL(d, a, b) d = a*b (Montgomery multiplication)
+ * MINV(d, a, b) invert d modulo p; a and b are used as scratch registers
+ * MTZ(d) clear return value if d = 0
+ * Destination of MMUL (d) must be distinct from operands (a and b).
+ * There is no such constraint for MSUB and MADD.
+ *
+ * Registers include the operand coordinates, and temporaries.
+ */
+#define MSET(d, a) (0x0000 + ((d) << 8) + ((a) << 4))
+#define MADD(d, a) (0x1000 + ((d) << 8) + ((a) << 4))
+#define MSUB(d, a) (0x2000 + ((d) << 8) + ((a) << 4))
+#define MMUL(d, a, b) (0x3000 + ((d) << 8) + ((a) << 4) + (b))
+#define MINV(d, a, b) (0x4000 + ((d) << 8) + ((a) << 4) + (b))
+#define MTZ(d) (0x5000 + ((d) << 8))
+#define ENDCODE 0
+
+/*
+ * Registers for the input operands.
+ */
+#define P1x 0
+#define P1y 1
+#define P1z 2
+#define P2x 3
+#define P2y 4
+#define P2z 5
+
+/*
+ * Alternate names for the first input operand.
+ */
+#define Px 0
+#define Py 1
+#define Pz 2
+
+/*
+ * Temporaries.
+ */
+#define t1 6
+#define t2 7
+#define t3 8
+#define t4 9
+#define t5 10
+#define t6 11
+#define t7 12
+
+/*
+ * Extra scratch registers available when there is no second operand (e.g.
+ * for "double" and "affine").
+ */
+#define t8 3
+#define t9 4
+#define t10 5
+
+/*
+ * Doubling formulas are:
+ *
+ * s = 4*x*y^2
+ * m = 3*(x + z^2)*(x - z^2)
+ * x' = m^2 - 2*s
+ * y' = m*(s - x') - 8*y^4
+ * z' = 2*y*z
+ *
+ * If y = 0 (P has order 2) then this yields infinity (z' = 0), as it
+ * should. This case should not happen anyway, because our curves have
+ * prime order, and thus do not contain any point of order 2.
+ *
+ * If P is infinity (z = 0), then again the formulas yield infinity,
+ * which is correct. Thus, this code works for all points.
+ *
+ * Cost: 8 multiplications
+ */
+static const uint16_t code_double[] = {
+ /*
+ * Compute z^2 (in t1).
+ */
+ MMUL(t1, Pz, Pz),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x-z^2 (in t2) and then x+z^2 (in t1).
+ */
+ MSET(t2, Px),
+ MSUB(t2, t1),
+ MADD(t1, Px),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute m = 3*(x+z^2)*(x-z^2) (in t1).
+ */
+ MMUL(t3, t1, t2),
+ MSET(t1, t3),
+ MADD(t1, t3),
+ MADD(t1, t3),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute s = 4*x*y^2 (in t2) and 2*y^2 (in t3).
+ */
+ MMUL(t3, Py, Py),
+ MADD(t3, t3),
+ MMUL(t2, Px, t3),
+ MADD(t2, t2),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x' = m^2 - 2*s.
+ */
+ MMUL(Px, t1, t1),
+ MSUB(Px, t2),
+ MSUB(Px, t2),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z' = 2*y*z.
+ */
+ MMUL(t4, Py, Pz),
+ MSET(Pz, t4),
+ MADD(Pz, t4),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y' = m*(s - x') - 8*y^4. Note that we already have
+ * 2*y^2 in t3.
+ */
+ MSUB(t2, Px),
+ MMUL(Py, t1, t2),
+ MMUL(t4, t3, t3),
+ MSUB(Py, t4),
+ MSUB(Py, t4),
+
+ ENDCODE
+};
+
+/*
+ * Addtions formulas are:
+ *
+ * u1 = x1 * z2^2
+ * u2 = x2 * z1^2
+ * s1 = y1 * z2^3
+ * s2 = y2 * z1^3
+ * h = u2 - u1
+ * r = s2 - s1
+ * x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2 * u1 * h^2
+ * y3 = r * (u1 * h^2 - x3) - s1 * h^3
+ * z3 = h * z1 * z2
+ *
+ * If both P1 and P2 are infinity, then z1 == 0 and z2 == 0, implying that
+ * z3 == 0, so the result is correct.
+ * If either of P1 or P2 is infinity, but not both, then z3 == 0, which is
+ * not correct.
+ * h == 0 only if u1 == u2; this happens in two cases:
+ * -- if s1 == s2 then P1 and/or P2 is infinity, or P1 == P2
+ * -- if s1 != s2 then P1 + P2 == infinity (but neither P1 or P2 is infinity)
+ *
+ * Thus, the following situations are not handled correctly:
+ * -- P1 = 0 and P2 != 0
+ * -- P1 != 0 and P2 = 0
+ * -- P1 = P2
+ * All other cases are properly computed. However, even in "incorrect"
+ * situations, the three coordinates still are properly formed field
+ * elements.
+ *
+ * The returned flag is cleared if r == 0. This happens in the following
+ * cases:
+ * -- Both points are on the same horizontal line (same Y coordinate).
+ * -- Both points are infinity.
+ * -- One point is infinity and the other is on line Y = 0.
+ * The third case cannot happen with our curves (there is no valid point
+ * on line Y = 0 since that would be a point of order 2). If the two
+ * source points are non-infinity, then remains only the case where the
+ * two points are on the same horizontal line.
+ *
+ * This allows us to detect the "P1 == P2" case, assuming that P1 != 0 and
+ * P2 != 0:
+ * -- If the returned value is not the point at infinity, then it was properly
+ * computed.
+ * -- Otherwise, if the returned flag is 1, then P1+P2 = 0, and the result
+ * is indeed the point at infinity.
+ * -- Otherwise (result is infinity, flag is 0), then P1 = P2 and we should
+ * use the 'double' code.
+ *
+ * Cost: 16 multiplications
+ */
+static const uint16_t code_add[] = {
+ /*
+ * Compute u1 = x1*z2^2 (in t1) and s1 = y1*z2^3 (in t3).
+ */
+ MMUL(t3, P2z, P2z),
+ MMUL(t1, P1x, t3),
+ MMUL(t4, P2z, t3),
+ MMUL(t3, P1y, t4),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u2 = x2*z1^2 (in t2) and s2 = y2*z1^3 (in t4).
+ */
+ MMUL(t4, P1z, P1z),
+ MMUL(t2, P2x, t4),
+ MMUL(t5, P1z, t4),
+ MMUL(t4, P2y, t5),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h = u2 - u1 (in t2) and r = s2 - s1 (in t4).
+ */
+ MSUB(t2, t1),
+ MSUB(t4, t3),
+
+ /*
+ * Report cases where r = 0 through the returned flag.
+ */
+ MTZ(t4),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1*h^2 (in t6) and h^3 (in t5).
+ */
+ MMUL(t7, t2, t2),
+ MMUL(t6, t1, t7),
+ MMUL(t5, t7, t2),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2*u1*h^2.
+ * t1 and t7 can be used as scratch registers.
+ */
+ MMUL(P1x, t4, t4),
+ MSUB(P1x, t5),
+ MSUB(P1x, t6),
+ MSUB(P1x, t6),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y3 = r*(u1*h^2 - x3) - s1*h^3.
+ */
+ MSUB(t6, P1x),
+ MMUL(P1y, t4, t6),
+ MMUL(t1, t5, t3),
+ MSUB(P1y, t1),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z3 = h*z1*z2.
+ */
+ MMUL(t1, P1z, P2z),
+ MMUL(P1z, t1, t2),
+
+ ENDCODE
+};
+
+/*
+ * Check that the point is on the curve. This code snippet assumes the
+ * following conventions:
+ * -- Coordinates x and y have been freshly decoded in P1 (but not
+ * converted to Montgomery coordinates yet).
+ * -- P2x, P2y and P2z are set to, respectively, R^2, b*R and 1.
+ */
+static const uint16_t code_check[] = {
+
+ /* Convert x and y to Montgomery representation. */
+ MMUL(t1, P1x, P2x),
+ MMUL(t2, P1y, P2x),
+ MSET(P1x, t1),
+ MSET(P1y, t2),
+
+ /* Compute x^3 in t1. */
+ MMUL(t2, P1x, P1x),
+ MMUL(t1, P1x, t2),
+
+ /* Subtract 3*x from t1. */
+ MSUB(t1, P1x),
+ MSUB(t1, P1x),
+ MSUB(t1, P1x),
+
+ /* Add b. */
+ MADD(t1, P2y),
+
+ /* Compute y^2 in t2. */
+ MMUL(t2, P1y, P1y),
+
+ /* Compare y^2 with x^3 - 3*x + b; they must match. */
+ MSUB(t1, t2),
+ MTZ(t1),
+
+ /* Set z to 1 (in Montgomery representation). */
+ MMUL(P1z, P2x, P2z),
+
+ ENDCODE
+};
+
+/*
+ * Conversion back to affine coordinates. This code snippet assumes that
+ * the z coordinate of P2 is set to 1 (not in Montgomery representation).
+ */
+static const uint16_t code_affine[] = {
+
+ /* Save z*R in t1. */
+ MSET(t1, P1z),
+
+ /* Compute z^3 in t2. */
+ MMUL(t2, P1z, P1z),
+ MMUL(t3, P1z, t2),
+ MMUL(t2, t3, P2z),
+
+ /* Invert to (1/z^3) in t2. */
+ MINV(t2, t3, t4),
+
+ /* Compute y. */
+ MSET(t3, P1y),
+ MMUL(P1y, t2, t3),
+
+ /* Compute (1/z^2) in t3. */
+ MMUL(t3, t2, t1),
+
+ /* Compute x. */
+ MSET(t2, P1x),
+ MMUL(P1x, t2, t3),
+
+ ENDCODE
+};
+
+static uint32_t
+run_code(jacobian *P1, const jacobian *P2,
+ const curve_params *cc, const uint16_t *code)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+ uint16_t t[13][I15_LEN];
+ size_t u;
+
+ r = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy the two operands in the dedicated registers.
+ */
+ memcpy(t[P1x], P1->c, 3 * I15_LEN * sizeof(uint16_t));
+ memcpy(t[P2x], P2->c, 3 * I15_LEN * sizeof(uint16_t));
+
+ /*
+ * Run formulas.
+ */
+ for (u = 0;; u ++) {
+ unsigned op, d, a, b;
+
+ op = code[u];
+ if (op == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ d = (op >> 8) & 0x0F;
+ a = (op >> 4) & 0x0F;
+ b = op & 0x0F;
+ op >>= 12;
+ switch (op) {
+ uint32_t ctl;
+ size_t plen;
+ unsigned char tp[(BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 7) >> 3];
+
+ case 0:
+ memcpy(t[d], t[a], I15_LEN * sizeof(uint16_t));
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ ctl = br_i15_add(t[d], t[a], 1);
+ ctl |= NOT(br_i15_sub(t[d], cc->p, 0));
+ br_i15_sub(t[d], cc->p, ctl);
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ br_i15_add(t[d], cc->p, br_i15_sub(t[d], t[a], 1));
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ br_i15_montymul(t[d], t[a], t[b], cc->p, cc->p0i);
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ plen = (cc->p[0] - (cc->p[0] >> 4) + 7) >> 3;
+ br_i15_encode(tp, plen, cc->p);
+ tp[plen - 1] -= 2;
+ br_i15_modpow(t[d], tp, plen,
+ cc->p, cc->p0i, t[a], t[b]);
+ break;
+ default:
+ r &= ~br_i15_iszero(t[d]);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Copy back result.
+ */
+ memcpy(P1->c, t[P1x], 3 * I15_LEN * sizeof(uint16_t));
+ return r;
+}
+
+static void
+set_one(uint16_t *x, const uint16_t *p)
+{
+ size_t plen;
+
+ plen = (p[0] + 31) >> 4;
+ memset(x, 0, plen * sizeof *x);
+ x[0] = p[0];
+ x[1] = 0x0001;
+}
+
+static void
+point_zero(jacobian *P, const curve_params *cc)
+{
+ memset(P, 0, sizeof *P);
+ P->c[0][0] = P->c[1][0] = P->c[2][0] = cc->p[0];
+}
+
+static inline void
+point_double(jacobian *P, const curve_params *cc)
+{
+ run_code(P, P, cc, code_double);
+}
+
+static inline uint32_t
+point_add(jacobian *P1, const jacobian *P2, const curve_params *cc)
+{
+ return run_code(P1, P2, cc, code_add);
+}
+
+static void
+point_mul(jacobian *P, const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const curve_params *cc)
+{
+ /*
+ * We do a simple double-and-add ladder with a 2-bit window
+ * to make only one add every two doublings. We thus first
+ * precompute 2P and 3P in some local buffers.
+ *
+ * We always perform two doublings and one addition; the
+ * addition is with P, 2P and 3P and is done in a temporary
+ * array.
+ *
+ * The addition code cannot handle cases where one of the
+ * operands is infinity, which is the case at the start of the
+ * ladder. We therefore need to maintain a flag that controls
+ * this situation.
+ */
+ uint32_t qz;
+ jacobian P2, P3, Q, T, U;
+
+ memcpy(&P2, P, sizeof P2);
+ point_double(&P2, cc);
+ memcpy(&P3, P, sizeof P3);
+ point_add(&P3, &P2, cc);
+
+ point_zero(&Q, cc);
+ qz = 1;
+ while (xlen -- > 0) {
+ int k;
+
+ for (k = 6; k >= 0; k -= 2) {
+ uint32_t bits;
+ uint32_t bnz;
+
+ point_double(&Q, cc);
+ point_double(&Q, cc);
+ memcpy(&T, P, sizeof T);
+ memcpy(&U, &Q, sizeof U);
+ bits = (*x >> k) & (uint32_t)3;
+ bnz = NEQ(bits, 0);
+ CCOPY(EQ(bits, 2), &T, &P2, sizeof T);
+ CCOPY(EQ(bits, 3), &T, &P3, sizeof T);
+ point_add(&U, &T, cc);
+ CCOPY(bnz & qz, &Q, &T, sizeof Q);
+ CCOPY(bnz & ~qz, &Q, &U, sizeof Q);
+ qz &= ~bnz;
+ }
+ x ++;
+ }
+ memcpy(P, &Q, sizeof Q);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode point into Jacobian coordinates. This function does not support
+ * the point at infinity. If the point is invalid then this returns 0, but
+ * the coordinates are still set to properly formed field elements.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+point_decode(jacobian *P, const void *src, size_t len, const curve_params *cc)
+{
+ /*
+ * Points must use uncompressed format:
+ * -- first byte is 0x04;
+ * -- coordinates X and Y use unsigned big-endian, with the same
+ * length as the field modulus.
+ *
+ * We don't support hybrid format (uncompressed, but first byte
+ * has value 0x06 or 0x07, depending on the least significant bit
+ * of Y) because it is rather useless, and explicitly forbidden
+ * by PKIX (RFC 5480, section 2.2).
+ *
+ * We don't support compressed format either, because it is not
+ * much used in practice (there are or were patent-related
+ * concerns about point compression, which explains the lack of
+ * generalised support). Also, point compression support would
+ * need a bit more code.
+ */
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t plen, zlen;
+ uint32_t r;
+ jacobian Q;
+
+ buf = src;
+ point_zero(P, cc);
+ plen = (cc->p[0] - (cc->p[0] >> 4) + 7) >> 3;
+ if (len != 1 + (plen << 1)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = br_i15_decode_mod(P->c[0], buf + 1, plen, cc->p);
+ r &= br_i15_decode_mod(P->c[1], buf + 1 + plen, plen, cc->p);
+
+ /*
+ * Check first byte.
+ */
+ r &= EQ(buf[0], 0x04);
+ /* obsolete
+ r &= EQ(buf[0], 0x04) | (EQ(buf[0] & 0xFE, 0x06)
+ & ~(uint32_t)(buf[0] ^ buf[plen << 1]));
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Convert coordinates and check that the point is valid.
+ */
+ zlen = ((cc->p[0] + 31) >> 4) * sizeof(uint16_t);
+ memcpy(Q.c[0], cc->R2, zlen);
+ memcpy(Q.c[1], cc->b, zlen);
+ set_one(Q.c[2], cc->p);
+ r &= ~run_code(P, &Q, cc, code_check);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode a point. This method assumes that the point is correct and is
+ * not the point at infinity. Encoded size is always 1+2*plen, where
+ * plen is the field modulus length, in bytes.
+ */
+static void
+point_encode(void *dst, const jacobian *P, const curve_params *cc)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t plen;
+ jacobian Q, T;
+
+ buf = dst;
+ plen = (cc->p[0] - (cc->p[0] >> 4) + 7) >> 3;
+ buf[0] = 0x04;
+ memcpy(&Q, P, sizeof *P);
+ set_one(T.c[2], cc->p);
+ run_code(&Q, &T, cc, code_affine);
+ br_i15_encode(buf + 1, plen, Q.c[0]);
+ br_i15_encode(buf + 1 + plen, plen, Q.c[1]);
+}
+
+static const br_ec_curve_def *
+id_to_curve_def(int curve)
+{
+ switch (curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+ return &br_secp256r1;
+ case BR_EC_secp384r1:
+ return &br_secp384r1;
+ case BR_EC_secp521r1:
+ return &br_secp521r1;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_generator(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ const br_ec_curve_def *cd;
+
+ cd = id_to_curve_def(curve);
+ *len = cd->generator_len;
+ return cd->generator;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_order(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ const br_ec_curve_def *cd;
+
+ cd = id_to_curve_def(curve);
+ *len = cd->order_len;
+ return cd->order;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_xoff(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ api_generator(curve, len);
+ *len >>= 1;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_mul(unsigned char *G, size_t Glen,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+ const curve_params *cc;
+ jacobian P;
+
+ cc = id_to_curve(curve);
+ if (Glen != cc->point_len) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = point_decode(&P, G, Glen, cc);
+ point_mul(&P, x, xlen, cc);
+ point_encode(G, &P, cc);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_mulgen(unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve)
+{
+ const unsigned char *G;
+ size_t Glen;
+
+ G = api_generator(curve, &Glen);
+ memcpy(R, G, Glen);
+ api_mul(R, Glen, x, xlen, curve);
+ return Glen;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_muladd(unsigned char *A, const unsigned char *B, size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *y, size_t ylen, int curve)
+{
+ uint32_t r, t, z;
+ const curve_params *cc;
+ jacobian P, Q;
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: see about merging the two ladders. Right now, we do
+ * two independent point multiplications, which is a bit
+ * wasteful of CPU resources (but yields short code).
+ */
+
+ cc = id_to_curve(curve);
+ if (len != cc->point_len) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = point_decode(&P, A, len, cc);
+ if (B == NULL) {
+ size_t Glen;
+
+ B = api_generator(curve, &Glen);
+ }
+ r &= point_decode(&Q, B, len, cc);
+ point_mul(&P, x, xlen, cc);
+ point_mul(&Q, y, ylen, cc);
+
+ /*
+ * We want to compute P+Q. Since the base points A and B are distinct
+ * from infinity, and the multipliers are non-zero and lower than the
+ * curve order, then we know that P and Q are non-infinity. This
+ * leaves two special situations to test for:
+ * -- If P = Q then we must use point_double().
+ * -- If P+Q = 0 then we must report an error.
+ */
+ t = point_add(&P, &Q, cc);
+ point_double(&Q, cc);
+ z = br_i15_iszero(P.c[2]);
+
+ /*
+ * If z is 1 then either P+Q = 0 (t = 1) or P = Q (t = 0). So we
+ * have the following:
+ *
+ * z = 0, t = 0 return P (normal addition)
+ * z = 0, t = 1 return P (normal addition)
+ * z = 1, t = 0 return Q (a 'double' case)
+ * z = 1, t = 1 report an error (P+Q = 0)
+ */
+ CCOPY(z & ~t, &P, &Q, sizeof Q);
+ point_encode(A, &P, cc);
+ r &= ~(z & t);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl br_ec_prime_i15 = {
+ (uint32_t)0x03800000,
+ &api_generator,
+ &api_order,
+ &api_xoff,
+ &api_mul,
+ &api_mulgen,
+ &api_muladd
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_prime_i31.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_prime_i31.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b205f36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_prime_i31.c
@@ -0,0 +1,826 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Parameters for supported curves (field modulus, and 'b' equation
+ * parameter; both values use the 'i31' format, and 'b' is in Montgomery
+ * representation).
+ */
+
+static const uint32_t P256_P[] = {
+ 0x00000108,
+ 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x00000007,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000040, 0x7FFFFF80,
+ 0x000000FF
+};
+
+static const uint32_t P256_R2[] = {
+ 0x00000108,
+ 0x00014000, 0x00018000, 0x00000000, 0x7FF40000,
+ 0x7FEFFFFF, 0x7FF7FFFF, 0x7FAFFFFF, 0x005FFFFF,
+ 0x00000000
+};
+
+static const uint32_t P256_B[] = {
+ 0x00000108,
+ 0x6FEE1803, 0x6229C4BD, 0x21B139BE, 0x327150AA,
+ 0x3567802E, 0x3F7212ED, 0x012E4355, 0x782DD38D,
+ 0x0000000E
+};
+
+static const uint32_t P384_P[] = {
+ 0x0000018C,
+ 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x00000001, 0x00000000, 0x7FFFFFF8,
+ 0x7FFFFFEF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF,
+ 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF,
+ 0x00000FFF
+};
+
+static const uint32_t P384_R2[] = {
+ 0x0000018C,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00000080, 0x7FFFFE00, 0x000001FF,
+ 0x00000800, 0x00000000, 0x7FFFE000, 0x00001FFF,
+ 0x00008000, 0x00008000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
+ 0x00000000
+};
+
+static const uint32_t P384_B[] = {
+ 0x0000018C,
+ 0x6E666840, 0x070D0392, 0x5D810231, 0x7651D50C,
+ 0x17E218D6, 0x1B192002, 0x44EFE441, 0x3A524E2B,
+ 0x2719BA5F, 0x41F02209, 0x36C5643E, 0x5813EFFE,
+ 0x000008A5
+};
+
+static const uint32_t P521_P[] = {
+ 0x00000219,
+ 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF,
+ 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF,
+ 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF,
+ 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF,
+ 0x01FFFFFF
+};
+
+static const uint32_t P521_R2[] = {
+ 0x00000219,
+ 0x00001000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
+ 0x00000000
+};
+
+static const uint32_t P521_B[] = {
+ 0x00000219,
+ 0x540FC00A, 0x228FEA35, 0x2C34F1EF, 0x67BF107A,
+ 0x46FC1CD5, 0x1605E9DD, 0x6937B165, 0x272A3D8F,
+ 0x42785586, 0x44C8C778, 0x15F3B8B4, 0x64B73366,
+ 0x03BA8B69, 0x0D05B42A, 0x21F929A2, 0x2C31C393,
+ 0x00654FAE
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+ const uint32_t *p;
+ const uint32_t *b;
+ const uint32_t *R2;
+ uint32_t p0i;
+ size_t point_len;
+} curve_params;
+
+static inline const curve_params *
+id_to_curve(int curve)
+{
+ static const curve_params pp[] = {
+ { P256_P, P256_B, P256_R2, 0x00000001, 65 },
+ { P384_P, P384_B, P384_R2, 0x00000001, 97 },
+ { P521_P, P521_B, P521_R2, 0x00000001, 133 }
+ };
+
+ return &pp[curve - BR_EC_secp256r1];
+}
+
+#define I31_LEN ((BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 61) / 31)
+
+/*
+ * Type for a point in Jacobian coordinates:
+ * -- three values, x, y and z, in Montgomery representation
+ * -- affine coordinates are X = x / z^2 and Y = y / z^3
+ * -- for the point at infinity, z = 0
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ uint32_t c[3][I31_LEN];
+} jacobian;
+
+/*
+ * We use a custom interpreter that uses a dozen registers, and
+ * only six operations:
+ * MSET(d, a) copy a into d
+ * MADD(d, a) d = d+a (modular)
+ * MSUB(d, a) d = d-a (modular)
+ * MMUL(d, a, b) d = a*b (Montgomery multiplication)
+ * MINV(d, a, b) invert d modulo p; a and b are used as scratch registers
+ * MTZ(d) clear return value if d = 0
+ * Destination of MMUL (d) must be distinct from operands (a and b).
+ * There is no such constraint for MSUB and MADD.
+ *
+ * Registers include the operand coordinates, and temporaries.
+ */
+#define MSET(d, a) (0x0000 + ((d) << 8) + ((a) << 4))
+#define MADD(d, a) (0x1000 + ((d) << 8) + ((a) << 4))
+#define MSUB(d, a) (0x2000 + ((d) << 8) + ((a) << 4))
+#define MMUL(d, a, b) (0x3000 + ((d) << 8) + ((a) << 4) + (b))
+#define MINV(d, a, b) (0x4000 + ((d) << 8) + ((a) << 4) + (b))
+#define MTZ(d) (0x5000 + ((d) << 8))
+#define ENDCODE 0
+
+/*
+ * Registers for the input operands.
+ */
+#define P1x 0
+#define P1y 1
+#define P1z 2
+#define P2x 3
+#define P2y 4
+#define P2z 5
+
+/*
+ * Alternate names for the first input operand.
+ */
+#define Px 0
+#define Py 1
+#define Pz 2
+
+/*
+ * Temporaries.
+ */
+#define t1 6
+#define t2 7
+#define t3 8
+#define t4 9
+#define t5 10
+#define t6 11
+#define t7 12
+
+/*
+ * Extra scratch registers available when there is no second operand (e.g.
+ * for "double" and "affine").
+ */
+#define t8 3
+#define t9 4
+#define t10 5
+
+/*
+ * Doubling formulas are:
+ *
+ * s = 4*x*y^2
+ * m = 3*(x + z^2)*(x - z^2)
+ * x' = m^2 - 2*s
+ * y' = m*(s - x') - 8*y^4
+ * z' = 2*y*z
+ *
+ * If y = 0 (P has order 2) then this yields infinity (z' = 0), as it
+ * should. This case should not happen anyway, because our curves have
+ * prime order, and thus do not contain any point of order 2.
+ *
+ * If P is infinity (z = 0), then again the formulas yield infinity,
+ * which is correct. Thus, this code works for all points.
+ *
+ * Cost: 8 multiplications
+ */
+static const uint16_t code_double[] = {
+ /*
+ * Compute z^2 (in t1).
+ */
+ MMUL(t1, Pz, Pz),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x-z^2 (in t2) and then x+z^2 (in t1).
+ */
+ MSET(t2, Px),
+ MSUB(t2, t1),
+ MADD(t1, Px),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute m = 3*(x+z^2)*(x-z^2) (in t1).
+ */
+ MMUL(t3, t1, t2),
+ MSET(t1, t3),
+ MADD(t1, t3),
+ MADD(t1, t3),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute s = 4*x*y^2 (in t2) and 2*y^2 (in t3).
+ */
+ MMUL(t3, Py, Py),
+ MADD(t3, t3),
+ MMUL(t2, Px, t3),
+ MADD(t2, t2),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x' = m^2 - 2*s.
+ */
+ MMUL(Px, t1, t1),
+ MSUB(Px, t2),
+ MSUB(Px, t2),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z' = 2*y*z.
+ */
+ MMUL(t4, Py, Pz),
+ MSET(Pz, t4),
+ MADD(Pz, t4),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y' = m*(s - x') - 8*y^4. Note that we already have
+ * 2*y^2 in t3.
+ */
+ MSUB(t2, Px),
+ MMUL(Py, t1, t2),
+ MMUL(t4, t3, t3),
+ MSUB(Py, t4),
+ MSUB(Py, t4),
+
+ ENDCODE
+};
+
+/*
+ * Addtions formulas are:
+ *
+ * u1 = x1 * z2^2
+ * u2 = x2 * z1^2
+ * s1 = y1 * z2^3
+ * s2 = y2 * z1^3
+ * h = u2 - u1
+ * r = s2 - s1
+ * x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2 * u1 * h^2
+ * y3 = r * (u1 * h^2 - x3) - s1 * h^3
+ * z3 = h * z1 * z2
+ *
+ * If both P1 and P2 are infinity, then z1 == 0 and z2 == 0, implying that
+ * z3 == 0, so the result is correct.
+ * If either of P1 or P2 is infinity, but not both, then z3 == 0, which is
+ * not correct.
+ * h == 0 only if u1 == u2; this happens in two cases:
+ * -- if s1 == s2 then P1 and/or P2 is infinity, or P1 == P2
+ * -- if s1 != s2 then P1 + P2 == infinity (but neither P1 or P2 is infinity)
+ *
+ * Thus, the following situations are not handled correctly:
+ * -- P1 = 0 and P2 != 0
+ * -- P1 != 0 and P2 = 0
+ * -- P1 = P2
+ * All other cases are properly computed. However, even in "incorrect"
+ * situations, the three coordinates still are properly formed field
+ * elements.
+ *
+ * The returned flag is cleared if r == 0. This happens in the following
+ * cases:
+ * -- Both points are on the same horizontal line (same Y coordinate).
+ * -- Both points are infinity.
+ * -- One point is infinity and the other is on line Y = 0.
+ * The third case cannot happen with our curves (there is no valid point
+ * on line Y = 0 since that would be a point of order 2). If the two
+ * source points are non-infinity, then remains only the case where the
+ * two points are on the same horizontal line.
+ *
+ * This allows us to detect the "P1 == P2" case, assuming that P1 != 0 and
+ * P2 != 0:
+ * -- If the returned value is not the point at infinity, then it was properly
+ * computed.
+ * -- Otherwise, if the returned flag is 1, then P1+P2 = 0, and the result
+ * is indeed the point at infinity.
+ * -- Otherwise (result is infinity, flag is 0), then P1 = P2 and we should
+ * use the 'double' code.
+ *
+ * Cost: 16 multiplications
+ */
+static const uint16_t code_add[] = {
+ /*
+ * Compute u1 = x1*z2^2 (in t1) and s1 = y1*z2^3 (in t3).
+ */
+ MMUL(t3, P2z, P2z),
+ MMUL(t1, P1x, t3),
+ MMUL(t4, P2z, t3),
+ MMUL(t3, P1y, t4),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u2 = x2*z1^2 (in t2) and s2 = y2*z1^3 (in t4).
+ */
+ MMUL(t4, P1z, P1z),
+ MMUL(t2, P2x, t4),
+ MMUL(t5, P1z, t4),
+ MMUL(t4, P2y, t5),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h = u2 - u1 (in t2) and r = s2 - s1 (in t4).
+ */
+ MSUB(t2, t1),
+ MSUB(t4, t3),
+
+ /*
+ * Report cases where r = 0 through the returned flag.
+ */
+ MTZ(t4),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u1*h^2 (in t6) and h^3 (in t5).
+ */
+ MMUL(t7, t2, t2),
+ MMUL(t6, t1, t7),
+ MMUL(t5, t7, t2),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute x3 = r^2 - h^3 - 2*u1*h^2.
+ * t1 and t7 can be used as scratch registers.
+ */
+ MMUL(P1x, t4, t4),
+ MSUB(P1x, t5),
+ MSUB(P1x, t6),
+ MSUB(P1x, t6),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute y3 = r*(u1*h^2 - x3) - s1*h^3.
+ */
+ MSUB(t6, P1x),
+ MMUL(P1y, t4, t6),
+ MMUL(t1, t5, t3),
+ MSUB(P1y, t1),
+
+ /*
+ * Compute z3 = h*z1*z2.
+ */
+ MMUL(t1, P1z, P2z),
+ MMUL(P1z, t1, t2),
+
+ ENDCODE
+};
+
+/*
+ * Check that the point is on the curve. This code snippet assumes the
+ * following conventions:
+ * -- Coordinates x and y have been freshly decoded in P1 (but not
+ * converted to Montgomery coordinates yet).
+ * -- P2x, P2y and P2z are set to, respectively, R^2, b*R and 1.
+ */
+static const uint16_t code_check[] = {
+
+ /* Convert x and y to Montgomery representation. */
+ MMUL(t1, P1x, P2x),
+ MMUL(t2, P1y, P2x),
+ MSET(P1x, t1),
+ MSET(P1y, t2),
+
+ /* Compute x^3 in t1. */
+ MMUL(t2, P1x, P1x),
+ MMUL(t1, P1x, t2),
+
+ /* Subtract 3*x from t1. */
+ MSUB(t1, P1x),
+ MSUB(t1, P1x),
+ MSUB(t1, P1x),
+
+ /* Add b. */
+ MADD(t1, P2y),
+
+ /* Compute y^2 in t2. */
+ MMUL(t2, P1y, P1y),
+
+ /* Compare y^2 with x^3 - 3*x + b; they must match. */
+ MSUB(t1, t2),
+ MTZ(t1),
+
+ /* Set z to 1 (in Montgomery representation). */
+ MMUL(P1z, P2x, P2z),
+
+ ENDCODE
+};
+
+/*
+ * Conversion back to affine coordinates. This code snippet assumes that
+ * the z coordinate of P2 is set to 1 (not in Montgomery representation).
+ */
+static const uint16_t code_affine[] = {
+
+ /* Save z*R in t1. */
+ MSET(t1, P1z),
+
+ /* Compute z^3 in t2. */
+ MMUL(t2, P1z, P1z),
+ MMUL(t3, P1z, t2),
+ MMUL(t2, t3, P2z),
+
+ /* Invert to (1/z^3) in t2. */
+ MINV(t2, t3, t4),
+
+ /* Compute y. */
+ MSET(t3, P1y),
+ MMUL(P1y, t2, t3),
+
+ /* Compute (1/z^2) in t3. */
+ MMUL(t3, t2, t1),
+
+ /* Compute x. */
+ MSET(t2, P1x),
+ MMUL(P1x, t2, t3),
+
+ ENDCODE
+};
+
+static uint32_t
+run_code(jacobian *P1, const jacobian *P2,
+ const curve_params *cc, const uint16_t *code)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+ uint32_t t[13][I31_LEN];
+ size_t u;
+
+ r = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy the two operands in the dedicated registers.
+ */
+ memcpy(t[P1x], P1->c, 3 * I31_LEN * sizeof(uint32_t));
+ memcpy(t[P2x], P2->c, 3 * I31_LEN * sizeof(uint32_t));
+
+ /*
+ * Run formulas.
+ */
+ for (u = 0;; u ++) {
+ unsigned op, d, a, b;
+
+ op = code[u];
+ if (op == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ d = (op >> 8) & 0x0F;
+ a = (op >> 4) & 0x0F;
+ b = op & 0x0F;
+ op >>= 12;
+ switch (op) {
+ uint32_t ctl;
+ size_t plen;
+ unsigned char tp[(BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 7) >> 3];
+
+ case 0:
+ memcpy(t[d], t[a], I31_LEN * sizeof(uint32_t));
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ ctl = br_i31_add(t[d], t[a], 1);
+ ctl |= NOT(br_i31_sub(t[d], cc->p, 0));
+ br_i31_sub(t[d], cc->p, ctl);
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ br_i31_add(t[d], cc->p, br_i31_sub(t[d], t[a], 1));
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ br_i31_montymul(t[d], t[a], t[b], cc->p, cc->p0i);
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ plen = (cc->p[0] - (cc->p[0] >> 5) + 7) >> 3;
+ br_i31_encode(tp, plen, cc->p);
+ tp[plen - 1] -= 2;
+ br_i31_modpow(t[d], tp, plen,
+ cc->p, cc->p0i, t[a], t[b]);
+ break;
+ default:
+ r &= ~br_i31_iszero(t[d]);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Copy back result.
+ */
+ memcpy(P1->c, t[P1x], 3 * I31_LEN * sizeof(uint32_t));
+ return r;
+}
+
+static void
+set_one(uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *p)
+{
+ size_t plen;
+
+ plen = (p[0] + 63) >> 5;
+ memset(x, 0, plen * sizeof *x);
+ x[0] = p[0];
+ x[1] = 0x00000001;
+}
+
+static void
+point_zero(jacobian *P, const curve_params *cc)
+{
+ memset(P, 0, sizeof *P);
+ P->c[0][0] = P->c[1][0] = P->c[2][0] = cc->p[0];
+}
+
+static inline void
+point_double(jacobian *P, const curve_params *cc)
+{
+ run_code(P, P, cc, code_double);
+}
+
+static inline uint32_t
+point_add(jacobian *P1, const jacobian *P2, const curve_params *cc)
+{
+ return run_code(P1, P2, cc, code_add);
+}
+
+static void
+point_mul(jacobian *P, const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const curve_params *cc)
+{
+ /*
+ * We do a simple double-and-add ladder with a 2-bit window
+ * to make only one add every two doublings. We thus first
+ * precompute 2P and 3P in some local buffers.
+ *
+ * We always perform two doublings and one addition; the
+ * addition is with P, 2P and 3P and is done in a temporary
+ * array.
+ *
+ * The addition code cannot handle cases where one of the
+ * operands is infinity, which is the case at the start of the
+ * ladder. We therefore need to maintain a flag that controls
+ * this situation.
+ */
+ uint32_t qz;
+ jacobian P2, P3, Q, T, U;
+
+ memcpy(&P2, P, sizeof P2);
+ point_double(&P2, cc);
+ memcpy(&P3, P, sizeof P3);
+ point_add(&P3, &P2, cc);
+
+ point_zero(&Q, cc);
+ qz = 1;
+ while (xlen -- > 0) {
+ int k;
+
+ for (k = 6; k >= 0; k -= 2) {
+ uint32_t bits;
+ uint32_t bnz;
+
+ point_double(&Q, cc);
+ point_double(&Q, cc);
+ memcpy(&T, P, sizeof T);
+ memcpy(&U, &Q, sizeof U);
+ bits = (*x >> k) & (uint32_t)3;
+ bnz = NEQ(bits, 0);
+ CCOPY(EQ(bits, 2), &T, &P2, sizeof T);
+ CCOPY(EQ(bits, 3), &T, &P3, sizeof T);
+ point_add(&U, &T, cc);
+ CCOPY(bnz & qz, &Q, &T, sizeof Q);
+ CCOPY(bnz & ~qz, &Q, &U, sizeof Q);
+ qz &= ~bnz;
+ }
+ x ++;
+ }
+ memcpy(P, &Q, sizeof Q);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode point into Jacobian coordinates. This function does not support
+ * the point at infinity. If the point is invalid then this returns 0, but
+ * the coordinates are still set to properly formed field elements.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+point_decode(jacobian *P, const void *src, size_t len, const curve_params *cc)
+{
+ /*
+ * Points must use uncompressed format:
+ * -- first byte is 0x04;
+ * -- coordinates X and Y use unsigned big-endian, with the same
+ * length as the field modulus.
+ *
+ * We don't support hybrid format (uncompressed, but first byte
+ * has value 0x06 or 0x07, depending on the least significant bit
+ * of Y) because it is rather useless, and explicitly forbidden
+ * by PKIX (RFC 5480, section 2.2).
+ *
+ * We don't support compressed format either, because it is not
+ * much used in practice (there are or were patent-related
+ * concerns about point compression, which explains the lack of
+ * generalised support). Also, point compression support would
+ * need a bit more code.
+ */
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t plen, zlen;
+ uint32_t r;
+ jacobian Q;
+
+ buf = src;
+ point_zero(P, cc);
+ plen = (cc->p[0] - (cc->p[0] >> 5) + 7) >> 3;
+ if (len != 1 + (plen << 1)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = br_i31_decode_mod(P->c[0], buf + 1, plen, cc->p);
+ r &= br_i31_decode_mod(P->c[1], buf + 1 + plen, plen, cc->p);
+
+ /*
+ * Check first byte.
+ */
+ r &= EQ(buf[0], 0x04);
+ /* obsolete
+ r &= EQ(buf[0], 0x04) | (EQ(buf[0] & 0xFE, 0x06)
+ & ~(uint32_t)(buf[0] ^ buf[plen << 1]));
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Convert coordinates and check that the point is valid.
+ */
+ zlen = ((cc->p[0] + 63) >> 5) * sizeof(uint32_t);
+ memcpy(Q.c[0], cc->R2, zlen);
+ memcpy(Q.c[1], cc->b, zlen);
+ set_one(Q.c[2], cc->p);
+ r &= ~run_code(P, &Q, cc, code_check);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode a point. This method assumes that the point is correct and is
+ * not the point at infinity. Encoded size is always 1+2*plen, where
+ * plen is the field modulus length, in bytes.
+ */
+static void
+point_encode(void *dst, const jacobian *P, const curve_params *cc)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t xbl;
+ size_t plen;
+ jacobian Q, T;
+
+ buf = dst;
+ xbl = cc->p[0];
+ xbl -= (xbl >> 5);
+ plen = (xbl + 7) >> 3;
+ buf[0] = 0x04;
+ memcpy(&Q, P, sizeof *P);
+ set_one(T.c[2], cc->p);
+ run_code(&Q, &T, cc, code_affine);
+ br_i31_encode(buf + 1, plen, Q.c[0]);
+ br_i31_encode(buf + 1 + plen, plen, Q.c[1]);
+}
+
+static const br_ec_curve_def *
+id_to_curve_def(int curve)
+{
+ switch (curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+ return &br_secp256r1;
+ case BR_EC_secp384r1:
+ return &br_secp384r1;
+ case BR_EC_secp521r1:
+ return &br_secp521r1;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_generator(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ const br_ec_curve_def *cd;
+
+ cd = id_to_curve_def(curve);
+ *len = cd->generator_len;
+ return cd->generator;
+}
+
+static const unsigned char *
+api_order(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ const br_ec_curve_def *cd;
+
+ cd = id_to_curve_def(curve);
+ *len = cd->order_len;
+ return cd->order;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_xoff(int curve, size_t *len)
+{
+ api_generator(curve, len);
+ *len >>= 1;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_mul(unsigned char *G, size_t Glen,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+ const curve_params *cc;
+ jacobian P;
+
+ cc = id_to_curve(curve);
+ if (Glen != cc->point_len) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = point_decode(&P, G, Glen, cc);
+ point_mul(&P, x, xlen, cc);
+ point_encode(G, &P, cc);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static size_t
+api_mulgen(unsigned char *R,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen, int curve)
+{
+ const unsigned char *G;
+ size_t Glen;
+
+ G = api_generator(curve, &Glen);
+ memcpy(R, G, Glen);
+ api_mul(R, Glen, x, xlen, curve);
+ return Glen;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+api_muladd(unsigned char *A, const unsigned char *B, size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *y, size_t ylen, int curve)
+{
+ uint32_t r, t, z;
+ const curve_params *cc;
+ jacobian P, Q;
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: see about merging the two ladders. Right now, we do
+ * two independent point multiplications, which is a bit
+ * wasteful of CPU resources (but yields short code).
+ */
+
+ cc = id_to_curve(curve);
+ if (len != cc->point_len) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = point_decode(&P, A, len, cc);
+ if (B == NULL) {
+ size_t Glen;
+
+ B = api_generator(curve, &Glen);
+ }
+ r &= point_decode(&Q, B, len, cc);
+ point_mul(&P, x, xlen, cc);
+ point_mul(&Q, y, ylen, cc);
+
+ /*
+ * We want to compute P+Q. Since the base points A and B are distinct
+ * from infinity, and the multipliers are non-zero and lower than the
+ * curve order, then we know that P and Q are non-infinity. This
+ * leaves two special situations to test for:
+ * -- If P = Q then we must use point_double().
+ * -- If P+Q = 0 then we must report an error.
+ */
+ t = point_add(&P, &Q, cc);
+ point_double(&Q, cc);
+ z = br_i31_iszero(P.c[2]);
+
+ /*
+ * If z is 1 then either P+Q = 0 (t = 1) or P = Q (t = 0). So we
+ * have the following:
+ *
+ * z = 0, t = 0 return P (normal addition)
+ * z = 0, t = 1 return P (normal addition)
+ * z = 1, t = 0 return Q (a 'double' case)
+ * z = 1, t = 1 report an error (P+Q = 0)
+ */
+ CCOPY(z & ~t, &P, &Q, sizeof Q);
+ point_encode(A, &P, cc);
+ r &= ~(z & t);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+const br_ec_impl br_ec_prime_i31 = {
+ (uint32_t)0x03800000,
+ &api_generator,
+ &api_order,
+ &api_xoff,
+ &api_mul,
+ &api_mulgen,
+ &api_muladd
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_pubkey.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_pubkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..383ff28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_pubkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static const unsigned char POINT_LEN[] = {
+ 0, /* 0: not a valid curve ID */
+ 43, /* sect163k1 */
+ 43, /* sect163r1 */
+ 43, /* sect163r2 */
+ 51, /* sect193r1 */
+ 51, /* sect193r2 */
+ 61, /* sect233k1 */
+ 61, /* sect233r1 */
+ 61, /* sect239k1 */
+ 73, /* sect283k1 */
+ 73, /* sect283r1 */
+ 105, /* sect409k1 */
+ 105, /* sect409r1 */
+ 145, /* sect571k1 */
+ 145, /* sect571r1 */
+ 41, /* secp160k1 */
+ 41, /* secp160r1 */
+ 41, /* secp160r2 */
+ 49, /* secp192k1 */
+ 49, /* secp192r1 */
+ 57, /* secp224k1 */
+ 57, /* secp224r1 */
+ 65, /* secp256k1 */
+ 65, /* secp256r1 */
+ 97, /* secp384r1 */
+ 133, /* secp521r1 */
+ 65, /* brainpoolP256r1 */
+ 97, /* brainpoolP384r1 */
+ 129, /* brainpoolP512r1 */
+ 32, /* curve25519 */
+ 56, /* curve448 */
+};
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+size_t
+br_ec_compute_pub(const br_ec_impl *impl, br_ec_public_key *pk,
+ void *kbuf, const br_ec_private_key *sk)
+{
+ int curve;
+ size_t len;
+
+ curve = sk->curve;
+ if (curve < 0 || curve >= 32 || curve >= (int)(sizeof POINT_LEN)
+ || ((impl->supported_curves >> curve) & 1) == 0)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (kbuf == NULL) {
+ return POINT_LEN[curve];
+ }
+ len = impl->mulgen(kbuf, sk->x, sk->xlen, curve);
+ if (pk != NULL) {
+ pk->curve = curve;
+ pk->q = kbuf;
+ pk->qlen = len;
+ }
+ return len;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_secp256r1.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_secp256r1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a9d6c45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_secp256r1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static const unsigned char P256_N[] = {
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84,
+ 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51
+};
+
+static const unsigned char P256_G[] = {
+ 0x04, 0x6B, 0x17, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0x42,
+ 0x47, 0xF8, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xE5, 0x63, 0xA4, 0x40,
+ 0xF2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x33,
+ 0xA0, 0xF4, 0xA1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xD8, 0x98, 0xC2,
+ 0x96, 0x4F, 0xE3, 0x42, 0xE2, 0xFE, 0x1A, 0x7F,
+ 0x9B, 0x8E, 0xE7, 0xEB, 0x4A, 0x7C, 0x0F, 0x9E,
+ 0x16, 0x2B, 0xCE, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6B, 0x31, 0x5E,
+ 0xCE, 0xCB, 0xB6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xBF, 0x51,
+ 0xF5
+};
+
+/* see inner.h */
+const br_ec_curve_def br_secp256r1 = {
+ BR_EC_secp256r1,
+ P256_N, sizeof P256_N,
+ P256_G, sizeof P256_G
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_secp384r1.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_secp384r1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..693d93e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_secp384r1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static const unsigned char P384_N[] = {
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xC7, 0x63, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xF4, 0x37, 0x2D, 0xDF,
+ 0x58, 0x1A, 0x0D, 0xB2, 0x48, 0xB0, 0xA7, 0x7A,
+ 0xEC, 0xEC, 0x19, 0x6A, 0xCC, 0xC5, 0x29, 0x73
+};
+
+static const unsigned char P384_G[] = {
+ 0x04, 0xAA, 0x87, 0xCA, 0x22, 0xBE, 0x8B, 0x05,
+ 0x37, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xC7, 0x1E, 0xF3, 0x20, 0xAD,
+ 0x74, 0x6E, 0x1D, 0x3B, 0x62, 0x8B, 0xA7, 0x9B,
+ 0x98, 0x59, 0xF7, 0x41, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x54, 0x2A,
+ 0x38, 0x55, 0x02, 0xF2, 0x5D, 0xBF, 0x55, 0x29,
+ 0x6C, 0x3A, 0x54, 0x5E, 0x38, 0x72, 0x76, 0x0A,
+ 0xB7, 0x36, 0x17, 0xDE, 0x4A, 0x96, 0x26, 0x2C,
+ 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x9E, 0x98, 0xBF, 0x92, 0x92, 0xDC,
+ 0x29, 0xF8, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0xBD, 0x28, 0x9A, 0x14,
+ 0x7C, 0xE9, 0xDA, 0x31, 0x13, 0xB5, 0xF0, 0xB8,
+ 0xC0, 0x0A, 0x60, 0xB1, 0xCE, 0x1D, 0x7E, 0x81,
+ 0x9D, 0x7A, 0x43, 0x1D, 0x7C, 0x90, 0xEA, 0x0E,
+ 0x5F
+};
+
+/* see inner.h */
+const br_ec_curve_def br_secp384r1 = {
+ BR_EC_secp384r1,
+ P384_N, sizeof P384_N,
+ P384_G, sizeof P384_G
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_secp521r1.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_secp521r1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..161acd0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ec_secp521r1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static const unsigned char P521_N[] = {
+ 0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0xFF, 0xFA, 0x51, 0x86, 0x87, 0x83, 0xBF, 0x2F,
+ 0x96, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xCC, 0x01, 0x48, 0xF7, 0x09,
+ 0xA5, 0xD0, 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0xB8, 0x89, 0x9C,
+ 0x47, 0xAE, 0xBB, 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x1E, 0x91, 0x38,
+ 0x64, 0x09
+};
+
+static const unsigned char P521_G[] = {
+ 0x04, 0x00, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x8E, 0x06, 0xB7, 0x04,
+ 0x04, 0xE9, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x3E, 0xCB, 0x66, 0x23,
+ 0x95, 0xB4, 0x42, 0x9C, 0x64, 0x81, 0x39, 0x05,
+ 0x3F, 0xB5, 0x21, 0xF8, 0x28, 0xAF, 0x60, 0x6B,
+ 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xBA, 0xA1, 0x4B, 0x5E, 0x77, 0xEF,
+ 0xE7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xFE, 0x1D, 0xC1, 0x27, 0xA2,
+ 0xFF, 0xA8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x48, 0xB3, 0xC1, 0x85,
+ 0x6A, 0x42, 0x9B, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xC2,
+ 0xE5, 0xBD, 0x66, 0x01, 0x18, 0x39, 0x29, 0x6A,
+ 0x78, 0x9A, 0x3B, 0xC0, 0x04, 0x5C, 0x8A, 0x5F,
+ 0xB4, 0x2C, 0x7D, 0x1B, 0xD9, 0x98, 0xF5, 0x44,
+ 0x49, 0x57, 0x9B, 0x44, 0x68, 0x17, 0xAF, 0xBD,
+ 0x17, 0x27, 0x3E, 0x66, 0x2C, 0x97, 0xEE, 0x72,
+ 0x99, 0x5E, 0xF4, 0x26, 0x40, 0xC5, 0x50, 0xB9,
+ 0x01, 0x3F, 0xAD, 0x07, 0x61, 0x35, 0x3C, 0x70,
+ 0x86, 0xA2, 0x72, 0xC2, 0x40, 0x88, 0xBE, 0x94,
+ 0x76, 0x9F, 0xD1, 0x66, 0x50
+};
+
+/* see inner.h */
+const br_ec_curve_def br_secp521r1 = {
+ BR_EC_secp521r1,
+ P521_N, sizeof P521_N,
+ P521_G, sizeof P521_G
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_atr.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_atr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a11226
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_atr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+size_t
+br_ecdsa_asn1_to_raw(void *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ /*
+ * Note: this code is a bit lenient in that it accepts a few
+ * deviations to DER with regards to minimality of encoding of
+ * lengths and integer values. These deviations are still
+ * unambiguous.
+ *
+ * Signature format is a SEQUENCE of two INTEGER values. We
+ * support only integers of less than 127 bytes each (signed
+ * encoding) so the resulting raw signature will have length
+ * at most 254 bytes.
+ */
+
+ unsigned char *buf, *r, *s;
+ size_t zlen, rlen, slen, off;
+ unsigned char tmp[254];
+
+ buf = sig;
+ if (sig_len < 8) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * First byte is SEQUENCE tag.
+ */
+ if (buf[0] != 0x30) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The SEQUENCE length will be encoded over one or two bytes. We
+ * limit the total SEQUENCE contents to 255 bytes, because it
+ * makes things simpler; this is enough for subgroup orders up
+ * to 999 bits.
+ */
+ zlen = buf[1];
+ if (zlen > 0x80) {
+ if (zlen != 0x81) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ zlen = buf[2];
+ if (zlen != sig_len - 3) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ off = 3;
+ } else {
+ if (zlen != sig_len - 2) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ off = 2;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * First INTEGER (r).
+ */
+ if (buf[off ++] != 0x02) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rlen = buf[off ++];
+ if (rlen >= 0x80) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = buf + off;
+ off += rlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Second INTEGER (s).
+ */
+ if (off + 2 > sig_len) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (buf[off ++] != 0x02) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ slen = buf[off ++];
+ if (slen >= 0x80 || slen != sig_len - off) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s = buf + off;
+
+ /*
+ * Removing leading zeros from r and s.
+ */
+ while (rlen > 0 && *r == 0) {
+ rlen --;
+ r ++;
+ }
+ while (slen > 0 && *s == 0) {
+ slen --;
+ s ++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute common length for the two integers, then copy integers
+ * into the temporary buffer, and finally copy it back over the
+ * signature buffer.
+ */
+ zlen = rlen > slen ? rlen : slen;
+ sig_len = zlen << 1;
+ memset(tmp, 0, sig_len);
+ memcpy(tmp + zlen - rlen, r, rlen);
+ memcpy(tmp + sig_len - slen, s, slen);
+ memcpy(sig, tmp, sig_len);
+ return sig_len;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_default_sign_asn1.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_default_sign_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..afbf8ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_default_sign_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+br_ecdsa_sign
+br_ecdsa_sign_asn1_get_default(void)
+{
+#if BR_LOMUL
+ return &br_ecdsa_i15_sign_asn1;
+#else
+ return &br_ecdsa_i31_sign_asn1;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_default_sign_raw.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_default_sign_raw.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..287c970
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_default_sign_raw.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+br_ecdsa_sign
+br_ecdsa_sign_raw_get_default(void)
+{
+#if BR_LOMUL
+ return &br_ecdsa_i15_sign_raw;
+#else
+ return &br_ecdsa_i31_sign_raw;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_default_vrfy_asn1.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_default_vrfy_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe0996e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_default_vrfy_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+br_ecdsa_vrfy
+br_ecdsa_vrfy_asn1_get_default(void)
+{
+#if BR_LOMUL
+ return &br_ecdsa_i15_vrfy_asn1;
+#else
+ return &br_ecdsa_i31_vrfy_asn1;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_default_vrfy_raw.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_default_vrfy_raw.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e564a10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_default_vrfy_raw.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+br_ecdsa_vrfy
+br_ecdsa_vrfy_raw_get_default(void)
+{
+#if BR_LOMUL
+ return &br_ecdsa_i15_vrfy_raw;
+#else
+ return &br_ecdsa_i31_vrfy_raw;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i15_bits.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i15_bits.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..402d14a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i15_bits.c
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_ecdsa_i15_bits2int(uint16_t *x,
+ const void *src, size_t len, uint32_t ebitlen)
+{
+ uint32_t bitlen, hbitlen;
+ int sc;
+
+ bitlen = ebitlen - (ebitlen >> 4);
+ hbitlen = (uint32_t)len << 3;
+ if (hbitlen > bitlen) {
+ len = (bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+ sc = (int)((hbitlen - bitlen) & 7);
+ } else {
+ sc = 0;
+ }
+ br_i15_zero(x, ebitlen);
+ br_i15_decode(x, src, len);
+ br_i15_rshift(x, sc);
+ x[0] = ebitlen;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i15_sign_asn1.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i15_sign_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab4a283
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i15_sign_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define ORDER_LEN ((BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 7) >> 3)
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+size_t
+br_ecdsa_i15_sign_asn1(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const br_hash_class *hf, const void *hash_value,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, void *sig)
+{
+ unsigned char rsig[(ORDER_LEN << 1) + 12];
+ size_t sig_len;
+
+ sig_len = br_ecdsa_i15_sign_raw(impl, hf, hash_value, sk, rsig);
+ if (sig_len == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sig_len = br_ecdsa_raw_to_asn1(rsig, sig_len);
+ memcpy(sig, rsig, sig_len);
+ return sig_len;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i15_sign_raw.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i15_sign_raw.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39b2e1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i15_sign_raw.c
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define I15_LEN ((BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 29) / 15)
+#define POINT_LEN (1 + (((BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 7) >> 3) << 1))
+#define ORDER_LEN ((BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 7) >> 3)
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+size_t
+br_ecdsa_i15_sign_raw(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const br_hash_class *hf, const void *hash_value,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, void *sig)
+{
+ /*
+ * IMPORTANT: this code is fit only for curves with a prime
+ * order. This is needed so that modular reduction of the X
+ * coordinate of a point can be done with a simple subtraction.
+ * We also rely on the last byte of the curve order to be distinct
+ * from 0 and 1.
+ */
+ const br_ec_curve_def *cd;
+ uint16_t n[I15_LEN], r[I15_LEN], s[I15_LEN], x[I15_LEN];
+ uint16_t m[I15_LEN], k[I15_LEN], t1[I15_LEN], t2[I15_LEN];
+ unsigned char tt[ORDER_LEN << 1];
+ unsigned char eU[POINT_LEN];
+ size_t hash_len, nlen, ulen;
+ uint16_t n0i;
+ uint32_t ctl;
+ br_hmac_drbg_context drbg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the curve is not supported, then exit with an error.
+ */
+ if (((impl->supported_curves >> sk->curve) & 1) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get the curve parameters (generator and order).
+ */
+ switch (sk->curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+ cd = &br_secp256r1;
+ break;
+ case BR_EC_secp384r1:
+ cd = &br_secp384r1;
+ break;
+ case BR_EC_secp521r1:
+ cd = &br_secp521r1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get modulus.
+ */
+ nlen = cd->order_len;
+ br_i15_decode(n, cd->order, nlen);
+ n0i = br_i15_ninv15(n[1]);
+
+ /*
+ * Get private key as an i15 integer. This also checks that the
+ * private key is well-defined (not zero, and less than the
+ * curve order).
+ */
+ if (!br_i15_decode_mod(x, sk->x, sk->xlen, n)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (br_i15_iszero(x)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get hash length.
+ */
+ hash_len = (hf->desc >> BR_HASHDESC_OUT_OFF) & BR_HASHDESC_OUT_MASK;
+
+ /*
+ * Truncate and reduce the hash value modulo the curve order.
+ */
+ br_ecdsa_i15_bits2int(m, hash_value, hash_len, n[0]);
+ br_i15_sub(m, n, br_i15_sub(m, n, 0) ^ 1);
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 6979 generation of the "k" value.
+ *
+ * The process uses HMAC_DRBG (with the hash function used to
+ * process the message that is to be signed). The seed is the
+ * concatenation of the encodings of the private key and
+ * the hash value (after truncation and modular reduction).
+ */
+ br_i15_encode(tt, nlen, x);
+ br_i15_encode(tt + nlen, nlen, m);
+ br_hmac_drbg_init(&drbg, hf, tt, nlen << 1);
+ for (;;) {
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&drbg, tt, nlen);
+ br_ecdsa_i15_bits2int(k, tt, nlen, n[0]);
+ if (br_i15_iszero(k)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (br_i15_sub(k, n, 0)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute k*G and extract the X coordinate, then reduce it
+ * modulo the curve order. Since we support only curves with
+ * prime order, that reduction is only a matter of computing
+ * a subtraction.
+ */
+ br_i15_encode(tt, nlen, k);
+ ulen = impl->mulgen(eU, tt, nlen, sk->curve);
+ br_i15_zero(r, n[0]);
+ br_i15_decode(r, &eU[1], ulen >> 1);
+ r[0] = n[0];
+ br_i15_sub(r, n, br_i15_sub(r, n, 0) ^ 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute 1/k in double-Montgomery representation. We do so by
+ * first converting _from_ Montgomery representation (twice),
+ * then using a modular exponentiation.
+ */
+ br_i15_from_monty(k, n, n0i);
+ br_i15_from_monty(k, n, n0i);
+ memcpy(tt, cd->order, nlen);
+ tt[nlen - 1] -= 2;
+ br_i15_modpow(k, tt, nlen, n, n0i, t1, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute s = (m+xr)/k (mod n).
+ * The k[] array contains R^2/k (double-Montgomery representation);
+ * we thus can use direct Montgomery multiplications and conversions
+ * from Montgomery, avoiding any call to br_i15_to_monty() (which
+ * is slower).
+ */
+ br_i15_from_monty(m, n, n0i);
+ br_i15_montymul(t1, x, r, n, n0i);
+ ctl = br_i15_add(t1, m, 1);
+ ctl |= br_i15_sub(t1, n, 0) ^ 1;
+ br_i15_sub(t1, n, ctl);
+ br_i15_montymul(s, t1, k, n, n0i);
+
+ /*
+ * Encode r and s in the signature.
+ */
+ br_i15_encode(sig, nlen, r);
+ br_i15_encode((unsigned char *)sig + nlen, nlen, s);
+ return nlen << 1;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i15_vrfy_asn1.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i15_vrfy_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f4bef99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i15_vrfy_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define FIELD_LEN ((BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 7) >> 3)
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+uint32_t
+br_ecdsa_i15_vrfy_asn1(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const void *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_ec_public_key *pk,
+ const void *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ /*
+ * We use a double-sized buffer because a malformed ASN.1 signature
+ * may trigger a size expansion when converting to "raw" format.
+ */
+ unsigned char rsig[(FIELD_LEN << 2) + 24];
+
+ if (sig_len > ((sizeof rsig) >> 1)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(rsig, sig, sig_len);
+ sig_len = br_ecdsa_asn1_to_raw(rsig, sig_len);
+ return br_ecdsa_i15_vrfy_raw(impl, hash, hash_len, pk, rsig, sig_len);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i15_vrfy_raw.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i15_vrfy_raw.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14dd5e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i15_vrfy_raw.c
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define I15_LEN ((BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 29) / 15)
+#define POINT_LEN (1 + (((BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 7) >> 3) << 1))
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+uint32_t
+br_ecdsa_i15_vrfy_raw(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const void *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_ec_public_key *pk,
+ const void *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ /*
+ * IMPORTANT: this code is fit only for curves with a prime
+ * order. This is needed so that modular reduction of the X
+ * coordinate of a point can be done with a simple subtraction.
+ */
+ const br_ec_curve_def *cd;
+ uint16_t n[I15_LEN], r[I15_LEN], s[I15_LEN], t1[I15_LEN], t2[I15_LEN];
+ unsigned char tx[(BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 7) >> 3];
+ unsigned char ty[(BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 7) >> 3];
+ unsigned char eU[POINT_LEN];
+ size_t nlen, rlen, ulen;
+ uint16_t n0i;
+ uint32_t res;
+
+ /*
+ * If the curve is not supported, then report an error.
+ */
+ if (((impl->supported_curves >> pk->curve) & 1) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get the curve parameters (generator and order).
+ */
+ switch (pk->curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+ cd = &br_secp256r1;
+ break;
+ case BR_EC_secp384r1:
+ cd = &br_secp384r1;
+ break;
+ case BR_EC_secp521r1:
+ cd = &br_secp521r1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Signature length must be even.
+ */
+ if (sig_len & 1) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rlen = sig_len >> 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Public key point must have the proper size for this curve.
+ */
+ if (pk->qlen != cd->generator_len) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get modulus; then decode the r and s values. They must be
+ * lower than the modulus, and s must not be null.
+ */
+ nlen = cd->order_len;
+ br_i15_decode(n, cd->order, nlen);
+ n0i = br_i15_ninv15(n[1]);
+ if (!br_i15_decode_mod(r, sig, rlen, n)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!br_i15_decode_mod(s, (const unsigned char *)sig + rlen, rlen, n)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (br_i15_iszero(s)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invert s. We do that with a modular exponentiation; we use
+ * the fact that for all the curves we support, the least
+ * significant byte is not 0 or 1, so we can subtract 2 without
+ * any carry to process.
+ * We also want 1/s in Montgomery representation, which can be
+ * done by converting _from_ Montgomery representation before
+ * the inversion (because (1/s)*R = 1/(s/R)).
+ */
+ br_i15_from_monty(s, n, n0i);
+ memcpy(tx, cd->order, nlen);
+ tx[nlen - 1] -= 2;
+ br_i15_modpow(s, tx, nlen, n, n0i, t1, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Truncate the hash to the modulus length (in bits) and reduce
+ * it modulo the curve order. The modular reduction can be done
+ * with a subtraction since the truncation already reduced the
+ * value to the modulus bit length.
+ */
+ br_ecdsa_i15_bits2int(t1, hash, hash_len, n[0]);
+ br_i15_sub(t1, n, br_i15_sub(t1, n, 0) ^ 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Multiply the (truncated, reduced) hash value with 1/s, result in
+ * t2, encoded in ty.
+ */
+ br_i15_montymul(t2, t1, s, n, n0i);
+ br_i15_encode(ty, nlen, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Multiply r with 1/s, result in t1, encoded in tx.
+ */
+ br_i15_montymul(t1, r, s, n, n0i);
+ br_i15_encode(tx, nlen, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the point x*Q + y*G.
+ */
+ ulen = cd->generator_len;
+ memcpy(eU, pk->q, ulen);
+ res = impl->muladd(eU, NULL, ulen,
+ tx, nlen, ty, nlen, cd->curve);
+
+ /*
+ * Get the X coordinate, reduce modulo the curve order, and
+ * compare with the 'r' value.
+ *
+ * The modular reduction can be done with subtractions because
+ * we work with curves of prime order, so the curve order is
+ * close to the field order (Hasse's theorem).
+ */
+ br_i15_zero(t1, n[0]);
+ br_i15_decode(t1, &eU[1], ulen >> 1);
+ t1[0] = n[0];
+ br_i15_sub(t1, n, br_i15_sub(t1, n, 0) ^ 1);
+ res &= ~br_i15_sub(t1, r, 1);
+ res &= br_i15_iszero(t1);
+ return res;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i31_bits.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i31_bits.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a8d673
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i31_bits.c
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_ecdsa_i31_bits2int(uint32_t *x,
+ const void *src, size_t len, uint32_t ebitlen)
+{
+ uint32_t bitlen, hbitlen;
+ int sc;
+
+ bitlen = ebitlen - (ebitlen >> 5);
+ hbitlen = (uint32_t)len << 3;
+ if (hbitlen > bitlen) {
+ len = (bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+ sc = (int)((hbitlen - bitlen) & 7);
+ } else {
+ sc = 0;
+ }
+ br_i31_zero(x, ebitlen);
+ br_i31_decode(x, src, len);
+ br_i31_rshift(x, sc);
+ x[0] = ebitlen;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i31_sign_asn1.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i31_sign_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf0d351
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i31_sign_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define ORDER_LEN ((BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 7) >> 3)
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+size_t
+br_ecdsa_i31_sign_asn1(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const br_hash_class *hf, const void *hash_value,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, void *sig)
+{
+ unsigned char rsig[(ORDER_LEN << 1) + 12];
+ size_t sig_len;
+
+ sig_len = br_ecdsa_i31_sign_raw(impl, hf, hash_value, sk, rsig);
+ if (sig_len == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sig_len = br_ecdsa_raw_to_asn1(rsig, sig_len);
+ memcpy(sig, rsig, sig_len);
+ return sig_len;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i31_sign_raw.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i31_sign_raw.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1df98fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i31_sign_raw.c
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define I31_LEN ((BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 61) / 31)
+#define POINT_LEN (1 + (((BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 7) >> 3) << 1))
+#define ORDER_LEN ((BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 7) >> 3)
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+size_t
+br_ecdsa_i31_sign_raw(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const br_hash_class *hf, const void *hash_value,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, void *sig)
+{
+ /*
+ * IMPORTANT: this code is fit only for curves with a prime
+ * order. This is needed so that modular reduction of the X
+ * coordinate of a point can be done with a simple subtraction.
+ * We also rely on the last byte of the curve order to be distinct
+ * from 0 and 1.
+ */
+ const br_ec_curve_def *cd;
+ uint32_t n[I31_LEN], r[I31_LEN], s[I31_LEN], x[I31_LEN];
+ uint32_t m[I31_LEN], k[I31_LEN], t1[I31_LEN], t2[I31_LEN];
+ unsigned char tt[ORDER_LEN << 1];
+ unsigned char eU[POINT_LEN];
+ size_t hash_len, nlen, ulen;
+ uint32_t n0i, ctl;
+ br_hmac_drbg_context drbg;
+
+ /*
+ * If the curve is not supported, then exit with an error.
+ */
+ if (((impl->supported_curves >> sk->curve) & 1) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get the curve parameters (generator and order).
+ */
+ switch (sk->curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+ cd = &br_secp256r1;
+ break;
+ case BR_EC_secp384r1:
+ cd = &br_secp384r1;
+ break;
+ case BR_EC_secp521r1:
+ cd = &br_secp521r1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get modulus.
+ */
+ nlen = cd->order_len;
+ br_i31_decode(n, cd->order, nlen);
+ n0i = br_i31_ninv31(n[1]);
+
+ /*
+ * Get private key as an i31 integer. This also checks that the
+ * private key is well-defined (not zero, and less than the
+ * curve order).
+ */
+ if (!br_i31_decode_mod(x, sk->x, sk->xlen, n)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (br_i31_iszero(x)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get hash length.
+ */
+ hash_len = (hf->desc >> BR_HASHDESC_OUT_OFF) & BR_HASHDESC_OUT_MASK;
+
+ /*
+ * Truncate and reduce the hash value modulo the curve order.
+ */
+ br_ecdsa_i31_bits2int(m, hash_value, hash_len, n[0]);
+ br_i31_sub(m, n, br_i31_sub(m, n, 0) ^ 1);
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 6979 generation of the "k" value.
+ *
+ * The process uses HMAC_DRBG (with the hash function used to
+ * process the message that is to be signed). The seed is the
+ * concatenation of the encodings of the private key and
+ * the hash value (after truncation and modular reduction).
+ */
+ br_i31_encode(tt, nlen, x);
+ br_i31_encode(tt + nlen, nlen, m);
+ br_hmac_drbg_init(&drbg, hf, tt, nlen << 1);
+ for (;;) {
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&drbg, tt, nlen);
+ br_ecdsa_i31_bits2int(k, tt, nlen, n[0]);
+ if (br_i31_iszero(k)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (br_i31_sub(k, n, 0)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute k*G and extract the X coordinate, then reduce it
+ * modulo the curve order. Since we support only curves with
+ * prime order, that reduction is only a matter of computing
+ * a subtraction.
+ */
+ br_i31_encode(tt, nlen, k);
+ ulen = impl->mulgen(eU, tt, nlen, sk->curve);
+ br_i31_zero(r, n[0]);
+ br_i31_decode(r, &eU[1], ulen >> 1);
+ r[0] = n[0];
+ br_i31_sub(r, n, br_i31_sub(r, n, 0) ^ 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute 1/k in double-Montgomery representation. We do so by
+ * first converting _from_ Montgomery representation (twice),
+ * then using a modular exponentiation.
+ */
+ br_i31_from_monty(k, n, n0i);
+ br_i31_from_monty(k, n, n0i);
+ memcpy(tt, cd->order, nlen);
+ tt[nlen - 1] -= 2;
+ br_i31_modpow(k, tt, nlen, n, n0i, t1, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute s = (m+xr)/k (mod n).
+ * The k[] array contains R^2/k (double-Montgomery representation);
+ * we thus can use direct Montgomery multiplications and conversions
+ * from Montgomery, avoiding any call to br_i31_to_monty() (which
+ * is slower).
+ */
+ br_i31_from_monty(m, n, n0i);
+ br_i31_montymul(t1, x, r, n, n0i);
+ ctl = br_i31_add(t1, m, 1);
+ ctl |= br_i31_sub(t1, n, 0) ^ 1;
+ br_i31_sub(t1, n, ctl);
+ br_i31_montymul(s, t1, k, n, n0i);
+
+ /*
+ * Encode r and s in the signature.
+ */
+ br_i31_encode(sig, nlen, r);
+ br_i31_encode((unsigned char *)sig + nlen, nlen, s);
+ return nlen << 1;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i31_vrfy_asn1.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i31_vrfy_asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4161aaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i31_vrfy_asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define FIELD_LEN ((BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 7) >> 3)
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+uint32_t
+br_ecdsa_i31_vrfy_asn1(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const void *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_ec_public_key *pk,
+ const void *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ /*
+ * We use a double-sized buffer because a malformed ASN.1 signature
+ * may trigger a size expansion when converting to "raw" format.
+ */
+ unsigned char rsig[(FIELD_LEN << 2) + 24];
+
+ if (sig_len > ((sizeof rsig) >> 1)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(rsig, sig, sig_len);
+ sig_len = br_ecdsa_asn1_to_raw(rsig, sig_len);
+ return br_ecdsa_i31_vrfy_raw(impl, hash, hash_len, pk, rsig, sig_len);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i31_vrfy_raw.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i31_vrfy_raw.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..259477f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_i31_vrfy_raw.c
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define I31_LEN ((BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 61) / 31)
+#define POINT_LEN (1 + (((BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 7) >> 3) << 1))
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+uint32_t
+br_ecdsa_i31_vrfy_raw(const br_ec_impl *impl,
+ const void *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_ec_public_key *pk,
+ const void *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ /*
+ * IMPORTANT: this code is fit only for curves with a prime
+ * order. This is needed so that modular reduction of the X
+ * coordinate of a point can be done with a simple subtraction.
+ */
+ const br_ec_curve_def *cd;
+ uint32_t n[I31_LEN], r[I31_LEN], s[I31_LEN], t1[I31_LEN], t2[I31_LEN];
+ unsigned char tx[(BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 7) >> 3];
+ unsigned char ty[(BR_MAX_EC_SIZE + 7) >> 3];
+ unsigned char eU[POINT_LEN];
+ size_t nlen, rlen, ulen;
+ uint32_t n0i, res;
+
+ /*
+ * If the curve is not supported, then report an error.
+ */
+ if (((impl->supported_curves >> pk->curve) & 1) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get the curve parameters (generator and order).
+ */
+ switch (pk->curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1:
+ cd = &br_secp256r1;
+ break;
+ case BR_EC_secp384r1:
+ cd = &br_secp384r1;
+ break;
+ case BR_EC_secp521r1:
+ cd = &br_secp521r1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Signature length must be even.
+ */
+ if (sig_len & 1) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rlen = sig_len >> 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Public key point must have the proper size for this curve.
+ */
+ if (pk->qlen != cd->generator_len) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get modulus; then decode the r and s values. They must be
+ * lower than the modulus, and s must not be null.
+ */
+ nlen = cd->order_len;
+ br_i31_decode(n, cd->order, nlen);
+ n0i = br_i31_ninv31(n[1]);
+ if (!br_i31_decode_mod(r, sig, rlen, n)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!br_i31_decode_mod(s, (const unsigned char *)sig + rlen, rlen, n)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (br_i31_iszero(s)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invert s. We do that with a modular exponentiation; we use
+ * the fact that for all the curves we support, the least
+ * significant byte is not 0 or 1, so we can subtract 2 without
+ * any carry to process.
+ * We also want 1/s in Montgomery representation, which can be
+ * done by converting _from_ Montgomery representation before
+ * the inversion (because (1/s)*R = 1/(s/R)).
+ */
+ br_i31_from_monty(s, n, n0i);
+ memcpy(tx, cd->order, nlen);
+ tx[nlen - 1] -= 2;
+ br_i31_modpow(s, tx, nlen, n, n0i, t1, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Truncate the hash to the modulus length (in bits) and reduce
+ * it modulo the curve order. The modular reduction can be done
+ * with a subtraction since the truncation already reduced the
+ * value to the modulus bit length.
+ */
+ br_ecdsa_i31_bits2int(t1, hash, hash_len, n[0]);
+ br_i31_sub(t1, n, br_i31_sub(t1, n, 0) ^ 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Multiply the (truncated, reduced) hash value with 1/s, result in
+ * t2, encoded in ty.
+ */
+ br_i31_montymul(t2, t1, s, n, n0i);
+ br_i31_encode(ty, nlen, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Multiply r with 1/s, result in t1, encoded in tx.
+ */
+ br_i31_montymul(t1, r, s, n, n0i);
+ br_i31_encode(tx, nlen, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the point x*Q + y*G.
+ */
+ ulen = cd->generator_len;
+ memcpy(eU, pk->q, ulen);
+ res = impl->muladd(eU, NULL, ulen,
+ tx, nlen, ty, nlen, cd->curve);
+
+ /*
+ * Get the X coordinate, reduce modulo the curve order, and
+ * compare with the 'r' value.
+ *
+ * The modular reduction can be done with subtractions because
+ * we work with curves of prime order, so the curve order is
+ * close to the field order (Hasse's theorem).
+ */
+ br_i31_zero(t1, n[0]);
+ br_i31_decode(t1, &eU[1], ulen >> 1);
+ t1[0] = n[0];
+ br_i31_sub(t1, n, br_i31_sub(t1, n, 0) ^ 1);
+ res &= ~br_i31_sub(t1, r, 1);
+ res &= br_i31_iszero(t1);
+ return res;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_rta.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_rta.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..005c62c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ec/ecdsa_rta.c
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Compute ASN.1 encoded length for the provided integer. The ASN.1
+ * encoding is signed, so its leading bit must have value 0; it must
+ * also be of minimal length (so leading bytes of value 0 must be
+ * removed, except if that would contradict the rule about the sign
+ * bit).
+ */
+static size_t
+asn1_int_length(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen)
+{
+ while (xlen > 0 && *x == 0) {
+ x ++;
+ xlen --;
+ }
+ if (xlen == 0 || *x >= 0x80) {
+ xlen ++;
+ }
+ return xlen;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ec.h */
+size_t
+br_ecdsa_raw_to_asn1(void *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ /*
+ * Internal buffer is large enough to accommodate a signature
+ * such that r and s fit on 125 bytes each (signed encoding),
+ * meaning a curve order of up to 999 bits. This is the limit
+ * that ensures "simple" length encodings.
+ */
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t hlen, rlen, slen, zlen, off;
+ unsigned char tmp[257];
+
+ buf = sig;
+ if ((sig_len & 1) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute lengths for the two integers.
+ */
+ hlen = sig_len >> 1;
+ rlen = asn1_int_length(buf, hlen);
+ slen = asn1_int_length(buf + hlen, hlen);
+ if (rlen > 125 || slen > 125) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * SEQUENCE header.
+ */
+ tmp[0] = 0x30;
+ zlen = rlen + slen + 4;
+ if (zlen >= 0x80) {
+ tmp[1] = 0x81;
+ tmp[2] = zlen;
+ off = 3;
+ } else {
+ tmp[1] = zlen;
+ off = 2;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * First INTEGER (r).
+ */
+ tmp[off ++] = 0x02;
+ tmp[off ++] = rlen;
+ if (rlen > hlen) {
+ tmp[off] = 0x00;
+ memcpy(tmp + off + 1, buf, hlen);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(tmp + off, buf + hlen - rlen, rlen);
+ }
+ off += rlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Second INTEGER (s).
+ */
+ tmp[off ++] = 0x02;
+ tmp[off ++] = slen;
+ if (slen > hlen) {
+ tmp[off] = 0x00;
+ memcpy(tmp + off + 1, buf + hlen, hlen);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(tmp + off, buf + sig_len - slen, slen);
+ }
+ off += slen;
+
+ /*
+ * Return ASN.1 signature.
+ */
+ memcpy(sig, tmp, off);
+ return off;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/dig_oid.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/dig_oid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd9692c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/dig_oid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * This file contains the encoded OID for the standard hash functions.
+ * Such OID appear in, for instance, the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding for RSA
+ * signatures.
+ */
+
+static const unsigned char md5_OID[] = {
+ 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05
+};
+
+static const unsigned char sha1_OID[] = {
+ 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A
+};
+
+static const unsigned char sha224_OID[] = {
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04
+};
+
+static const unsigned char sha256_OID[] = {
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01
+};
+
+static const unsigned char sha384_OID[] = {
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02
+};
+
+static const unsigned char sha512_OID[] = {
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03
+};
+
+/* see inner.h */
+const unsigned char *
+br_digest_OID(int digest_id, size_t *len)
+{
+ switch (digest_id) {
+ case br_md5_ID:
+ *len = sizeof md5_OID;
+ return md5_OID;
+ case br_sha1_ID:
+ *len = sizeof sha1_OID;
+ return sha1_OID;
+ case br_sha224_ID:
+ *len = sizeof sha224_OID;
+ return sha224_OID;
+ case br_sha256_ID:
+ *len = sizeof sha256_OID;
+ return sha256_OID;
+ case br_sha384_ID:
+ *len = sizeof sha384_OID;
+ return sha384_OID;
+ case br_sha512_ID:
+ *len = sizeof sha512_OID;
+ return sha512_OID;
+ default:
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/dig_size.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/dig_size.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4625d2c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/dig_size.c
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+size_t
+br_digest_size_by_ID(int digest_id)
+{
+ switch (digest_id) {
+ case br_md5sha1_ID:
+ return br_md5_SIZE + br_sha1_SIZE;
+ case br_md5_ID:
+ return br_md5_SIZE;
+ case br_sha1_ID:
+ return br_sha1_SIZE;
+ case br_sha224_ID:
+ return br_sha224_SIZE;
+ case br_sha256_ID:
+ return br_sha256_SIZE;
+ case br_sha384_ID:
+ return br_sha384_SIZE;
+ case br_sha512_ID:
+ return br_sha512_SIZE;
+ default:
+ /* abort(); */
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/ghash_ctmul.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/ghash_ctmul.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3623202
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/ghash_ctmul.c
@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * We compute "carryless multiplications" through normal integer
+ * multiplications, masking out enough bits to create "holes" in which
+ * carries may expand without altering our bits; we really use 8 data
+ * bits per 32-bit word, spaced every fourth bit. Accumulated carries
+ * may not exceed 8 in total, which fits in 4 bits.
+ *
+ * It would be possible to use a 3-bit spacing, allowing two operands,
+ * one with 7 non-zero data bits, the other one with 10 or 11 non-zero
+ * data bits; this asymmetric splitting makes the overall code more
+ * complex with thresholds and exceptions, and does not appear to be
+ * worth the effort.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * We cannot really autodetect whether multiplications are "slow" or
+ * not. A typical example is the ARM Cortex M0+, which exists in two
+ * versions: one with a 1-cycle multiplication opcode, the other with
+ * a 32-cycle multiplication opcode. They both use exactly the same
+ * architecture and ABI, and cannot be distinguished from each other
+ * at compile-time.
+ *
+ * Since most modern CPU (even embedded CPU) still have fast
+ * multiplications, we use the "fast mul" code by default.
+ */
+
+#if BR_SLOW_MUL
+
+/*
+ * This implementation uses Karatsuba-like reduction to make fewer
+ * integer multiplications (9 instead of 16), at the expense of extra
+ * logical operations (XOR, shifts...). On modern x86 CPU that offer
+ * fast, pipelined multiplications, this code is about twice slower than
+ * the simpler code with 16 multiplications. This tendency may be
+ * reversed on low-end platforms with expensive multiplications.
+ */
+
+#define MUL32(h, l, x, y) do { \
+ uint64_t mul32tmp = MUL(x, y); \
+ (h) = (uint32_t)(mul32tmp >> 32); \
+ (l) = (uint32_t)mul32tmp; \
+ } while (0)
+
+static inline void
+bmul(uint32_t *hi, uint32_t *lo, uint32_t x, uint32_t y)
+{
+ uint32_t x0, x1, x2, x3;
+ uint32_t y0, y1, y2, y3;
+ uint32_t a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8;
+ uint32_t b0, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8;
+
+ x0 = x & (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ x1 = x & (uint32_t)0x22222222;
+ x2 = x & (uint32_t)0x44444444;
+ x3 = x & (uint32_t)0x88888888;
+ y0 = y & (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ y1 = y & (uint32_t)0x22222222;
+ y2 = y & (uint32_t)0x44444444;
+ y3 = y & (uint32_t)0x88888888;
+
+ /*
+ * (x0+W*x1)*(y0+W*y1) -> a0:b0
+ * (x2+W*x3)*(y2+W*y3) -> a3:b3
+ * ((x0+x2)+W*(x1+x3))*((y0+y2)+W*(y1+y3)) -> a6:b6
+ */
+ a0 = x0;
+ b0 = y0;
+ a1 = x1 >> 1;
+ b1 = y1 >> 1;
+ a2 = a0 ^ a1;
+ b2 = b0 ^ b1;
+ a3 = x2 >> 2;
+ b3 = y2 >> 2;
+ a4 = x3 >> 3;
+ b4 = y3 >> 3;
+ a5 = a3 ^ a4;
+ b5 = b3 ^ b4;
+ a6 = a0 ^ a3;
+ b6 = b0 ^ b3;
+ a7 = a1 ^ a4;
+ b7 = b1 ^ b4;
+ a8 = a6 ^ a7;
+ b8 = b6 ^ b7;
+
+ MUL32(b0, a0, b0, a0);
+ MUL32(b1, a1, b1, a1);
+ MUL32(b2, a2, b2, a2);
+ MUL32(b3, a3, b3, a3);
+ MUL32(b4, a4, b4, a4);
+ MUL32(b5, a5, b5, a5);
+ MUL32(b6, a6, b6, a6);
+ MUL32(b7, a7, b7, a7);
+ MUL32(b8, a8, b8, a8);
+
+ a0 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ a1 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ a2 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ a3 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ a4 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ a5 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ a6 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ a7 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ a8 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ b0 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ b1 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ b2 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ b3 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ b4 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ b5 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ b6 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ b7 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ b8 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+
+ a2 ^= a0 ^ a1;
+ b2 ^= b0 ^ b1;
+ a0 ^= (a2 << 1) ^ (a1 << 2);
+ b0 ^= (b2 << 1) ^ (b1 << 2);
+ a5 ^= a3 ^ a4;
+ b5 ^= b3 ^ b4;
+ a3 ^= (a5 << 1) ^ (a4 << 2);
+ b3 ^= (b5 << 1) ^ (b4 << 2);
+ a8 ^= a6 ^ a7;
+ b8 ^= b6 ^ b7;
+ a6 ^= (a8 << 1) ^ (a7 << 2);
+ b6 ^= (b8 << 1) ^ (b7 << 2);
+ a6 ^= a0 ^ a3;
+ b6 ^= b0 ^ b3;
+ *lo = a0 ^ (a6 << 2) ^ (a3 << 4);
+ *hi = b0 ^ (b6 << 2) ^ (b3 << 4) ^ (a6 >> 30) ^ (a3 >> 28);
+}
+
+#else
+
+/*
+ * Simple multiplication in GF(2)[X], using 16 integer multiplications.
+ */
+
+static inline void
+bmul(uint32_t *hi, uint32_t *lo, uint32_t x, uint32_t y)
+{
+ uint32_t x0, x1, x2, x3;
+ uint32_t y0, y1, y2, y3;
+ uint64_t z0, z1, z2, z3;
+ uint64_t z;
+
+ x0 = x & (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ x1 = x & (uint32_t)0x22222222;
+ x2 = x & (uint32_t)0x44444444;
+ x3 = x & (uint32_t)0x88888888;
+ y0 = y & (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ y1 = y & (uint32_t)0x22222222;
+ y2 = y & (uint32_t)0x44444444;
+ y3 = y & (uint32_t)0x88888888;
+ z0 = MUL(x0, y0) ^ MUL(x1, y3) ^ MUL(x2, y2) ^ MUL(x3, y1);
+ z1 = MUL(x0, y1) ^ MUL(x1, y0) ^ MUL(x2, y3) ^ MUL(x3, y2);
+ z2 = MUL(x0, y2) ^ MUL(x1, y1) ^ MUL(x2, y0) ^ MUL(x3, y3);
+ z3 = MUL(x0, y3) ^ MUL(x1, y2) ^ MUL(x2, y1) ^ MUL(x3, y0);
+ z0 &= (uint64_t)0x1111111111111111;
+ z1 &= (uint64_t)0x2222222222222222;
+ z2 &= (uint64_t)0x4444444444444444;
+ z3 &= (uint64_t)0x8888888888888888;
+ z = z0 | z1 | z2 | z3;
+ *lo = (uint32_t)z;
+ *hi = (uint32_t)(z >> 32);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* see bearssl_hash.h */
+void
+br_ghash_ctmul(void *y, const void *h, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf, *hb;
+ unsigned char *yb;
+ uint32_t yw[4];
+ uint32_t hw[4];
+
+ /*
+ * Throughout the loop we handle the y and h values as arrays
+ * of 32-bit words.
+ */
+ buf = data;
+ yb = y;
+ hb = h;
+ yw[3] = br_dec32be(yb);
+ yw[2] = br_dec32be(yb + 4);
+ yw[1] = br_dec32be(yb + 8);
+ yw[0] = br_dec32be(yb + 12);
+ hw[3] = br_dec32be(hb);
+ hw[2] = br_dec32be(hb + 4);
+ hw[1] = br_dec32be(hb + 8);
+ hw[0] = br_dec32be(hb + 12);
+ while (len > 0) {
+ const unsigned char *src;
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ int i;
+ uint32_t a[9], b[9], zw[8];
+ uint32_t c0, c1, c2, c3, d0, d1, d2, d3, e0, e1, e2, e3;
+
+ /*
+ * Get the next 16-byte block (using zero-padding if
+ * necessary).
+ */
+ if (len >= 16) {
+ src = buf;
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(tmp, buf, len);
+ memset(tmp + len, 0, (sizeof tmp) - len);
+ src = tmp;
+ len = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the block. The GHASH standard mandates
+ * big-endian encoding.
+ */
+ yw[3] ^= br_dec32be(src);
+ yw[2] ^= br_dec32be(src + 4);
+ yw[1] ^= br_dec32be(src + 8);
+ yw[0] ^= br_dec32be(src + 12);
+
+ /*
+ * We multiply two 128-bit field elements. We use
+ * Karatsuba to turn that into three 64-bit
+ * multiplications, which are themselves done with a
+ * total of nine 32-bit multiplications.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * y[0,1]*h[0,1] -> 0..2
+ * y[2,3]*h[2,3] -> 3..5
+ * (y[0,1]+y[2,3])*(h[0,1]+h[2,3]) -> 6..8
+ */
+ a[0] = yw[0];
+ b[0] = hw[0];
+ a[1] = yw[1];
+ b[1] = hw[1];
+ a[2] = a[0] ^ a[1];
+ b[2] = b[0] ^ b[1];
+
+ a[3] = yw[2];
+ b[3] = hw[2];
+ a[4] = yw[3];
+ b[4] = hw[3];
+ a[5] = a[3] ^ a[4];
+ b[5] = b[3] ^ b[4];
+
+ a[6] = a[0] ^ a[3];
+ b[6] = b[0] ^ b[3];
+ a[7] = a[1] ^ a[4];
+ b[7] = b[1] ^ b[4];
+ a[8] = a[6] ^ a[7];
+ b[8] = b[6] ^ b[7];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ bmul(&b[i], &a[i], b[i], a[i]);
+ }
+
+ c0 = a[0];
+ c1 = b[0] ^ a[2] ^ a[0] ^ a[1];
+ c2 = a[1] ^ b[2] ^ b[0] ^ b[1];
+ c3 = b[1];
+ d0 = a[3];
+ d1 = b[3] ^ a[5] ^ a[3] ^ a[4];
+ d2 = a[4] ^ b[5] ^ b[3] ^ b[4];
+ d3 = b[4];
+ e0 = a[6];
+ e1 = b[6] ^ a[8] ^ a[6] ^ a[7];
+ e2 = a[7] ^ b[8] ^ b[6] ^ b[7];
+ e3 = b[7];
+
+ e0 ^= c0 ^ d0;
+ e1 ^= c1 ^ d1;
+ e2 ^= c2 ^ d2;
+ e3 ^= c3 ^ d3;
+ c2 ^= e0;
+ c3 ^= e1;
+ d0 ^= e2;
+ d1 ^= e3;
+
+ /*
+ * GHASH specification has the bits "reversed" (most
+ * significant is in fact least significant), which does
+ * not matter for a carryless multiplication, except that
+ * the 255-bit result must be shifted by 1 bit.
+ */
+ zw[0] = c0 << 1;
+ zw[1] = (c1 << 1) | (c0 >> 31);
+ zw[2] = (c2 << 1) | (c1 >> 31);
+ zw[3] = (c3 << 1) | (c2 >> 31);
+ zw[4] = (d0 << 1) | (c3 >> 31);
+ zw[5] = (d1 << 1) | (d0 >> 31);
+ zw[6] = (d2 << 1) | (d1 >> 31);
+ zw[7] = (d3 << 1) | (d2 >> 31);
+
+ /*
+ * We now do the reduction modulo the field polynomial
+ * to get back to 128 bits.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i ++) {
+ uint32_t lw;
+
+ lw = zw[i];
+ zw[i + 4] ^= lw ^ (lw >> 1) ^ (lw >> 2) ^ (lw >> 7);
+ zw[i + 3] ^= (lw << 31) ^ (lw << 30) ^ (lw << 25);
+ }
+ memcpy(yw, zw + 4, sizeof yw);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Encode back the result.
+ */
+ br_enc32be(yb, yw[3]);
+ br_enc32be(yb + 4, yw[2]);
+ br_enc32be(yb + 8, yw[1]);
+ br_enc32be(yb + 12, yw[0]);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/ghash_ctmul32.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/ghash_ctmul32.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c66af46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/ghash_ctmul32.c
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * This implementation uses 32-bit multiplications, and only the low
+ * 32 bits for each multiplication result. This is meant primarily for
+ * the ARM Cortex M0 and M0+, whose multiplication opcode does not yield
+ * the upper 32 bits; but it might also be useful on architectures where
+ * access to the upper 32 bits requires use of specific registers that
+ * create contention (e.g. on i386, "mul" necessarily outputs the result
+ * in edx:eax, while "imul" can use any registers but is limited to the
+ * low 32 bits).
+ *
+ * The implementation trick that is used here is bit-reversing (bit 0
+ * is swapped with bit 31, bit 1 with bit 30, and so on). In GF(2)[X],
+ * for all values x and y, we have:
+ * rev32(x) * rev32(y) = rev64(x * y)
+ * In other words, if we bit-reverse (over 32 bits) the operands, then we
+ * bit-reverse (over 64 bits) the result.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Multiplication in GF(2)[X], truncated to its low 32 bits.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+bmul32(uint32_t x, uint32_t y)
+{
+ uint32_t x0, x1, x2, x3;
+ uint32_t y0, y1, y2, y3;
+ uint32_t z0, z1, z2, z3;
+
+ x0 = x & (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ x1 = x & (uint32_t)0x22222222;
+ x2 = x & (uint32_t)0x44444444;
+ x3 = x & (uint32_t)0x88888888;
+ y0 = y & (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ y1 = y & (uint32_t)0x22222222;
+ y2 = y & (uint32_t)0x44444444;
+ y3 = y & (uint32_t)0x88888888;
+ z0 = (x0 * y0) ^ (x1 * y3) ^ (x2 * y2) ^ (x3 * y1);
+ z1 = (x0 * y1) ^ (x1 * y0) ^ (x2 * y3) ^ (x3 * y2);
+ z2 = (x0 * y2) ^ (x1 * y1) ^ (x2 * y0) ^ (x3 * y3);
+ z3 = (x0 * y3) ^ (x1 * y2) ^ (x2 * y1) ^ (x3 * y0);
+ z0 &= (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ z1 &= (uint32_t)0x22222222;
+ z2 &= (uint32_t)0x44444444;
+ z3 &= (uint32_t)0x88888888;
+ return z0 | z1 | z2 | z3;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Bit-reverse a 32-bit word.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+rev32(uint32_t x)
+{
+#define RMS(m, s) do { \
+ x = ((x & (uint32_t)(m)) << (s)) \
+ | ((x >> (s)) & (uint32_t)(m)); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ RMS(0x55555555, 1);
+ RMS(0x33333333, 2);
+ RMS(0x0F0F0F0F, 4);
+ RMS(0x00FF00FF, 8);
+ return (x << 16) | (x >> 16);
+
+#undef RMS
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_hash.h */
+void
+br_ghash_ctmul32(void *y, const void *h, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ /*
+ * This implementation is similar to br_ghash_ctmul() except
+ * that we have to do the multiplication twice, with the
+ * "normal" and "bit reversed" operands. Hence we end up with
+ * eighteen 32-bit multiplications instead of nine.
+ */
+
+ const unsigned char *buf, *hb;
+ unsigned char *yb;
+ uint32_t yw[4];
+ uint32_t hw[4], hwr[4];
+
+ buf = data;
+ yb = y;
+ hb = h;
+ yw[3] = br_dec32be(yb);
+ yw[2] = br_dec32be(yb + 4);
+ yw[1] = br_dec32be(yb + 8);
+ yw[0] = br_dec32be(yb + 12);
+ hw[3] = br_dec32be(hb);
+ hw[2] = br_dec32be(hb + 4);
+ hw[1] = br_dec32be(hb + 8);
+ hw[0] = br_dec32be(hb + 12);
+ hwr[3] = rev32(hw[3]);
+ hwr[2] = rev32(hw[2]);
+ hwr[1] = rev32(hw[1]);
+ hwr[0] = rev32(hw[0]);
+ while (len > 0) {
+ const unsigned char *src;
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ int i;
+ uint32_t a[18], b[18], c[18];
+ uint32_t d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, d6, d7;
+ uint32_t zw[8];
+
+ if (len >= 16) {
+ src = buf;
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(tmp, buf, len);
+ memset(tmp + len, 0, (sizeof tmp) - len);
+ src = tmp;
+ len = 0;
+ }
+ yw[3] ^= br_dec32be(src);
+ yw[2] ^= br_dec32be(src + 4);
+ yw[1] ^= br_dec32be(src + 8);
+ yw[0] ^= br_dec32be(src + 12);
+
+ /*
+ * We are using Karatsuba: the 128x128 multiplication is
+ * reduced to three 64x64 multiplications, hence nine
+ * 32x32 multiplications. With the bit-reversal trick,
+ * we have to perform 18 32x32 multiplications.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * y[0,1]*h[0,1] -> 0,1,4
+ * y[2,3]*h[2,3] -> 2,3,5
+ * (y[0,1]+y[2,3])*(h[0,1]+h[2,3]) -> 6,7,8
+ */
+
+ a[0] = yw[0];
+ a[1] = yw[1];
+ a[2] = yw[2];
+ a[3] = yw[3];
+ a[4] = a[0] ^ a[1];
+ a[5] = a[2] ^ a[3];
+ a[6] = a[0] ^ a[2];
+ a[7] = a[1] ^ a[3];
+ a[8] = a[6] ^ a[7];
+
+ a[ 9] = rev32(yw[0]);
+ a[10] = rev32(yw[1]);
+ a[11] = rev32(yw[2]);
+ a[12] = rev32(yw[3]);
+ a[13] = a[ 9] ^ a[10];
+ a[14] = a[11] ^ a[12];
+ a[15] = a[ 9] ^ a[11];
+ a[16] = a[10] ^ a[12];
+ a[17] = a[15] ^ a[16];
+
+ b[0] = hw[0];
+ b[1] = hw[1];
+ b[2] = hw[2];
+ b[3] = hw[3];
+ b[4] = b[0] ^ b[1];
+ b[5] = b[2] ^ b[3];
+ b[6] = b[0] ^ b[2];
+ b[7] = b[1] ^ b[3];
+ b[8] = b[6] ^ b[7];
+
+ b[ 9] = hwr[0];
+ b[10] = hwr[1];
+ b[11] = hwr[2];
+ b[12] = hwr[3];
+ b[13] = b[ 9] ^ b[10];
+ b[14] = b[11] ^ b[12];
+ b[15] = b[ 9] ^ b[11];
+ b[16] = b[10] ^ b[12];
+ b[17] = b[15] ^ b[16];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 18; i ++) {
+ c[i] = bmul32(a[i], b[i]);
+ }
+
+ c[4] ^= c[0] ^ c[1];
+ c[5] ^= c[2] ^ c[3];
+ c[8] ^= c[6] ^ c[7];
+
+ c[13] ^= c[ 9] ^ c[10];
+ c[14] ^= c[11] ^ c[12];
+ c[17] ^= c[15] ^ c[16];
+
+ /*
+ * y[0,1]*h[0,1] -> 0,9^4,1^13,10
+ * y[2,3]*h[2,3] -> 2,11^5,3^14,12
+ * (y[0,1]+y[2,3])*(h[0,1]+h[2,3]) -> 6,15^8,7^17,16
+ */
+ d0 = c[0];
+ d1 = c[4] ^ (rev32(c[9]) >> 1);
+ d2 = c[1] ^ c[0] ^ c[2] ^ c[6] ^ (rev32(c[13]) >> 1);
+ d3 = c[4] ^ c[5] ^ c[8]
+ ^ (rev32(c[10] ^ c[9] ^ c[11] ^ c[15]) >> 1);
+ d4 = c[2] ^ c[1] ^ c[3] ^ c[7]
+ ^ (rev32(c[13] ^ c[14] ^ c[17]) >> 1);
+ d5 = c[5] ^ (rev32(c[11] ^ c[10] ^ c[12] ^ c[16]) >> 1);
+ d6 = c[3] ^ (rev32(c[14]) >> 1);
+ d7 = rev32(c[12]) >> 1;
+
+ zw[0] = d0 << 1;
+ zw[1] = (d1 << 1) | (d0 >> 31);
+ zw[2] = (d2 << 1) | (d1 >> 31);
+ zw[3] = (d3 << 1) | (d2 >> 31);
+ zw[4] = (d4 << 1) | (d3 >> 31);
+ zw[5] = (d5 << 1) | (d4 >> 31);
+ zw[6] = (d6 << 1) | (d5 >> 31);
+ zw[7] = (d7 << 1) | (d6 >> 31);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i ++) {
+ uint32_t lw;
+
+ lw = zw[i];
+ zw[i + 4] ^= lw ^ (lw >> 1) ^ (lw >> 2) ^ (lw >> 7);
+ zw[i + 3] ^= (lw << 31) ^ (lw << 30) ^ (lw << 25);
+ }
+ memcpy(yw, zw + 4, sizeof yw);
+ }
+ br_enc32be(yb, yw[3]);
+ br_enc32be(yb + 4, yw[2]);
+ br_enc32be(yb + 8, yw[1]);
+ br_enc32be(yb + 12, yw[0]);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/ghash_ctmul64.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/ghash_ctmul64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a46f16f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/ghash_ctmul64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * This is the 64-bit variant of br_ghash_ctmul32(), with 64-bit operands
+ * and bit reversal of 64-bit words.
+ */
+
+static inline uint64_t
+bmul64(uint64_t x, uint64_t y)
+{
+ uint64_t x0, x1, x2, x3;
+ uint64_t y0, y1, y2, y3;
+ uint64_t z0, z1, z2, z3;
+
+ x0 = x & (uint64_t)0x1111111111111111;
+ x1 = x & (uint64_t)0x2222222222222222;
+ x2 = x & (uint64_t)0x4444444444444444;
+ x3 = x & (uint64_t)0x8888888888888888;
+ y0 = y & (uint64_t)0x1111111111111111;
+ y1 = y & (uint64_t)0x2222222222222222;
+ y2 = y & (uint64_t)0x4444444444444444;
+ y3 = y & (uint64_t)0x8888888888888888;
+ z0 = (x0 * y0) ^ (x1 * y3) ^ (x2 * y2) ^ (x3 * y1);
+ z1 = (x0 * y1) ^ (x1 * y0) ^ (x2 * y3) ^ (x3 * y2);
+ z2 = (x0 * y2) ^ (x1 * y1) ^ (x2 * y0) ^ (x3 * y3);
+ z3 = (x0 * y3) ^ (x1 * y2) ^ (x2 * y1) ^ (x3 * y0);
+ z0 &= (uint64_t)0x1111111111111111;
+ z1 &= (uint64_t)0x2222222222222222;
+ z2 &= (uint64_t)0x4444444444444444;
+ z3 &= (uint64_t)0x8888888888888888;
+ return z0 | z1 | z2 | z3;
+}
+
+static uint64_t
+rev64(uint64_t x)
+{
+#define RMS(m, s) do { \
+ x = ((x & (uint64_t)(m)) << (s)) \
+ | ((x >> (s)) & (uint64_t)(m)); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ RMS(0x5555555555555555, 1);
+ RMS(0x3333333333333333, 2);
+ RMS(0x0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F, 4);
+ RMS(0x00FF00FF00FF00FF, 8);
+ RMS(0x0000FFFF0000FFFF, 16);
+ return (x << 32) | (x >> 32);
+
+#undef RMS
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ghash.h */
+void
+br_ghash_ctmul64(void *y, const void *h, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf, *hb;
+ unsigned char *yb;
+ uint64_t y0, y1;
+ uint64_t h0, h1, h2, h0r, h1r, h2r;
+
+ buf = data;
+ yb = y;
+ hb = h;
+ y1 = br_dec64be(yb);
+ y0 = br_dec64be(yb + 8);
+ h1 = br_dec64be(hb);
+ h0 = br_dec64be(hb + 8);
+ h0r = rev64(h0);
+ h1r = rev64(h1);
+ h2 = h0 ^ h1;
+ h2r = h0r ^ h1r;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ const unsigned char *src;
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ uint64_t y0r, y1r, y2, y2r;
+ uint64_t z0, z1, z2, z0h, z1h, z2h;
+ uint64_t v0, v1, v2, v3;
+
+ if (len >= 16) {
+ src = buf;
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(tmp, buf, len);
+ memset(tmp + len, 0, (sizeof tmp) - len);
+ src = tmp;
+ len = 0;
+ }
+ y1 ^= br_dec64be(src);
+ y0 ^= br_dec64be(src + 8);
+
+ y0r = rev64(y0);
+ y1r = rev64(y1);
+ y2 = y0 ^ y1;
+ y2r = y0r ^ y1r;
+
+ z0 = bmul64(y0, h0);
+ z1 = bmul64(y1, h1);
+ z2 = bmul64(y2, h2);
+ z0h = bmul64(y0r, h0r);
+ z1h = bmul64(y1r, h1r);
+ z2h = bmul64(y2r, h2r);
+ z2 ^= z0 ^ z1;
+ z2h ^= z0h ^ z1h;
+ z0h = rev64(z0h) >> 1;
+ z1h = rev64(z1h) >> 1;
+ z2h = rev64(z2h) >> 1;
+
+ v0 = z0;
+ v1 = z0h ^ z2;
+ v2 = z1 ^ z2h;
+ v3 = z1h;
+
+ v3 = (v3 << 1) | (v2 >> 63);
+ v2 = (v2 << 1) | (v1 >> 63);
+ v1 = (v1 << 1) | (v0 >> 63);
+ v0 = (v0 << 1);
+
+ v2 ^= v0 ^ (v0 >> 1) ^ (v0 >> 2) ^ (v0 >> 7);
+ v1 ^= (v0 << 63) ^ (v0 << 62) ^ (v0 << 57);
+ v3 ^= v1 ^ (v1 >> 1) ^ (v1 >> 2) ^ (v1 >> 7);
+ v2 ^= (v1 << 63) ^ (v1 << 62) ^ (v1 << 57);
+
+ y0 = v2;
+ y1 = v3;
+ }
+
+ br_enc64be(yb, y1);
+ br_enc64be(yb + 8, y0);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/ghash_pclmul.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/ghash_pclmul.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a58e7dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/ghash_pclmul.c
@@ -0,0 +1,389 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define BR_ENABLE_INTRINSICS 1
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * This is the GHASH implementation that leverages the pclmulqdq opcode
+ * (from the AES-NI instructions).
+ */
+
+#if BR_AES_X86NI
+
+/*
+ * Test CPU support for PCLMULQDQ.
+ */
+static inline int
+pclmul_supported(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Bit mask for features in ECX:
+ * 1 PCLMULQDQ support
+ */
+ return br_cpuid(0, 0, 0x00000002, 0);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_hash.h */
+br_ghash
+br_ghash_pclmul_get(void)
+{
+ return pclmul_supported() ? &br_ghash_pclmul : 0;
+}
+
+BR_TARGETS_X86_UP
+
+/*
+ * GHASH is defined over elements of GF(2^128) with "full little-endian"
+ * representation: leftmost byte is least significant, and, within each
+ * byte, leftmost _bit_ is least significant. The natural ordering in
+ * x86 is "mixed little-endian": bytes are ordered from least to most
+ * significant, but bits within a byte are in most-to-least significant
+ * order. Going to full little-endian representation would require
+ * reversing bits within each byte, which is doable but expensive.
+ *
+ * Instead, we go to full big-endian representation, by swapping bytes
+ * around, which is done with a single _mm_shuffle_epi8() opcode (it
+ * comes with SSSE3; all CPU that offer pclmulqdq also have SSSE3). We
+ * can use a full big-endian representation because in a carryless
+ * multiplication, we have a nice bit reversal property:
+ *
+ * rev_128(x) * rev_128(y) = rev_255(x * y)
+ *
+ * So by using full big-endian, we still get the right result, except
+ * that it is right-shifted by 1 bit. The left-shift is relatively
+ * inexpensive, and it can be mutualised.
+ *
+ *
+ * Since SSE2 opcodes do not have facilities for shitfting full 128-bit
+ * values with bit precision, we have to break down values into 64-bit
+ * chunks. We number chunks from 0 to 3 in left to right order.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Byte-swap a complete 128-bit value. This normally uses
+ * _mm_shuffle_epi8(), which gets translated to pshufb (an SSSE3 opcode).
+ * However, this crashes old Clang versions, so, for Clang before 3.8,
+ * we use an alternate (and less efficient) version.
+ */
+#if BR_CLANG && !BR_CLANG_3_8
+#define BYTESWAP_DECL
+#define BYTESWAP_PREP (void)0
+#define BYTESWAP(x) do { \
+ __m128i byteswap1, byteswap2; \
+ byteswap1 = (x); \
+ byteswap2 = _mm_srli_epi16(byteswap1, 8); \
+ byteswap1 = _mm_slli_epi16(byteswap1, 8); \
+ byteswap1 = _mm_or_si128(byteswap1, byteswap2); \
+ byteswap1 = _mm_shufflelo_epi16(byteswap1, 0x1B); \
+ byteswap1 = _mm_shufflehi_epi16(byteswap1, 0x1B); \
+ (x) = _mm_shuffle_epi32(byteswap1, 0x4E); \
+ } while (0)
+#else
+#define BYTESWAP_DECL __m128i byteswap_index;
+#define BYTESWAP_PREP do { \
+ byteswap_index = _mm_set_epi8( \
+ 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15); \
+ } while (0)
+#define BYTESWAP(x) do { \
+ (x) = _mm_shuffle_epi8((x), byteswap_index); \
+ } while (0)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Call pclmulqdq. Clang appears to have trouble with the intrinsic, so,
+ * for that compiler, we use inline assembly. Inline assembly is
+ * potentially a bit slower because the compiler does not understand
+ * what the opcode does, and thus cannot optimize instruction
+ * scheduling.
+ *
+ * We use a target of "sse2" only, so that Clang may still handle the
+ * '__m128i' type and allocate SSE2 registers.
+ */
+#if BR_CLANG
+BR_TARGET("sse2")
+static inline __m128i
+pclmulqdq00(__m128i x, __m128i y)
+{
+ __asm__ ("pclmulqdq $0x00, %1, %0" : "+x" (x) : "x" (y));
+ return x;
+}
+BR_TARGET("sse2")
+static inline __m128i
+pclmulqdq11(__m128i x, __m128i y)
+{
+ __asm__ ("pclmulqdq $0x11, %1, %0" : "+x" (x) : "x" (y));
+ return x;
+}
+#else
+#define pclmulqdq00(x, y) _mm_clmulepi64_si128(x, y, 0x00)
+#define pclmulqdq11(x, y) _mm_clmulepi64_si128(x, y, 0x11)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * From a 128-bit value kw, compute kx as the XOR of the two 64-bit
+ * halves of kw (into the right half of kx; left half is unspecified).
+ */
+#define BK(kw, kx) do { \
+ kx = _mm_xor_si128(kw, _mm_shuffle_epi32(kw, 0x0E)); \
+ } while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Combine two 64-bit values (k0:k1) into a 128-bit (kw) value and
+ * the XOR of the two values (kx).
+ */
+#define PBK(k0, k1, kw, kx) do { \
+ kw = _mm_unpacklo_epi64(k1, k0); \
+ kx = _mm_xor_si128(k0, k1); \
+ } while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Left-shift by 1 bit a 256-bit value (in four 64-bit words).
+ */
+#define SL_256(x0, x1, x2, x3) do { \
+ x0 = _mm_or_si128( \
+ _mm_slli_epi64(x0, 1), \
+ _mm_srli_epi64(x1, 63)); \
+ x1 = _mm_or_si128( \
+ _mm_slli_epi64(x1, 1), \
+ _mm_srli_epi64(x2, 63)); \
+ x2 = _mm_or_si128( \
+ _mm_slli_epi64(x2, 1), \
+ _mm_srli_epi64(x3, 63)); \
+ x3 = _mm_slli_epi64(x3, 1); \
+ } while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Perform reduction in GF(2^128). The 256-bit value is in x0..x3;
+ * result is written in x0..x1.
+ */
+#define REDUCE_F128(x0, x1, x2, x3) do { \
+ x1 = _mm_xor_si128( \
+ x1, \
+ _mm_xor_si128( \
+ _mm_xor_si128( \
+ x3, \
+ _mm_srli_epi64(x3, 1)), \
+ _mm_xor_si128( \
+ _mm_srli_epi64(x3, 2), \
+ _mm_srli_epi64(x3, 7)))); \
+ x2 = _mm_xor_si128( \
+ _mm_xor_si128( \
+ x2, \
+ _mm_slli_epi64(x3, 63)), \
+ _mm_xor_si128( \
+ _mm_slli_epi64(x3, 62), \
+ _mm_slli_epi64(x3, 57))); \
+ x0 = _mm_xor_si128( \
+ x0, \
+ _mm_xor_si128( \
+ _mm_xor_si128( \
+ x2, \
+ _mm_srli_epi64(x2, 1)), \
+ _mm_xor_si128( \
+ _mm_srli_epi64(x2, 2), \
+ _mm_srli_epi64(x2, 7)))); \
+ x1 = _mm_xor_si128( \
+ _mm_xor_si128( \
+ x1, \
+ _mm_slli_epi64(x2, 63)), \
+ _mm_xor_si128( \
+ _mm_slli_epi64(x2, 62), \
+ _mm_slli_epi64(x2, 57))); \
+ } while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Square value kw into (dw,dx).
+ */
+#define SQUARE_F128(kw, dw, dx) do { \
+ __m128i z0, z1, z2, z3; \
+ z1 = pclmulqdq11(kw, kw); \
+ z3 = pclmulqdq00(kw, kw); \
+ z0 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(z1, 0x0E); \
+ z2 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(z3, 0x0E); \
+ SL_256(z0, z1, z2, z3); \
+ REDUCE_F128(z0, z1, z2, z3); \
+ PBK(z0, z1, dw, dx); \
+ } while (0)
+
+/* see bearssl_hash.h */
+BR_TARGET("ssse3,pclmul")
+void
+br_ghash_pclmul(void *y, const void *h, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf1, *buf2;
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+ size_t num4, num1;
+ __m128i yw, h1w, h1x;
+ BYTESWAP_DECL
+
+ /*
+ * We split data into two chunks. First chunk starts at buf1
+ * and contains num4 blocks of 64-byte values. Second chunk
+ * starts at buf2 and contains num1 blocks of 16-byte values.
+ * We want the first chunk to be as large as possible.
+ */
+ buf1 = data;
+ num4 = len >> 6;
+ len &= 63;
+ buf2 = buf1 + (num4 << 6);
+ num1 = (len + 15) >> 4;
+ if ((len & 15) != 0) {
+ memcpy(tmp, buf2, len);
+ memset(tmp + len, 0, (num1 << 4) - len);
+ buf2 = tmp;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Preparatory step for endian conversions.
+ */
+ BYTESWAP_PREP;
+
+ /*
+ * Load y and h.
+ */
+ yw = _mm_loadu_si128(y);
+ h1w = _mm_loadu_si128(h);
+ BYTESWAP(yw);
+ BYTESWAP(h1w);
+ BK(h1w, h1x);
+
+ if (num4 > 0) {
+ __m128i h2w, h2x, h3w, h3x, h4w, h4x;
+ __m128i t0, t1, t2, t3;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h2 = h^2.
+ */
+ SQUARE_F128(h1w, h2w, h2x);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h3 = h^3 = h*(h^2).
+ */
+ t1 = pclmulqdq11(h1w, h2w);
+ t3 = pclmulqdq00(h1w, h2w);
+ t2 = _mm_xor_si128(pclmulqdq00(h1x, h2x),
+ _mm_xor_si128(t1, t3));
+ t0 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(t1, 0x0E);
+ t1 = _mm_xor_si128(t1, _mm_shuffle_epi32(t2, 0x0E));
+ t2 = _mm_xor_si128(t2, _mm_shuffle_epi32(t3, 0x0E));
+ SL_256(t0, t1, t2, t3);
+ REDUCE_F128(t0, t1, t2, t3);
+ PBK(t0, t1, h3w, h3x);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h4 = h^4 = (h^2)^2.
+ */
+ SQUARE_F128(h2w, h4w, h4x);
+
+ while (num4 -- > 0) {
+ __m128i aw0, aw1, aw2, aw3;
+ __m128i ax0, ax1, ax2, ax3;
+
+ aw0 = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf1 + 0));
+ aw1 = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf1 + 16));
+ aw2 = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf1 + 32));
+ aw3 = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf1 + 48));
+ BYTESWAP(aw0);
+ BYTESWAP(aw1);
+ BYTESWAP(aw2);
+ BYTESWAP(aw3);
+ buf1 += 64;
+
+ aw0 = _mm_xor_si128(aw0, yw);
+ BK(aw1, ax1);
+ BK(aw2, ax2);
+ BK(aw3, ax3);
+ BK(aw0, ax0);
+
+ t1 = _mm_xor_si128(
+ _mm_xor_si128(
+ pclmulqdq11(aw0, h4w),
+ pclmulqdq11(aw1, h3w)),
+ _mm_xor_si128(
+ pclmulqdq11(aw2, h2w),
+ pclmulqdq11(aw3, h1w)));
+ t3 = _mm_xor_si128(
+ _mm_xor_si128(
+ pclmulqdq00(aw0, h4w),
+ pclmulqdq00(aw1, h3w)),
+ _mm_xor_si128(
+ pclmulqdq00(aw2, h2w),
+ pclmulqdq00(aw3, h1w)));
+ t2 = _mm_xor_si128(
+ _mm_xor_si128(
+ pclmulqdq00(ax0, h4x),
+ pclmulqdq00(ax1, h3x)),
+ _mm_xor_si128(
+ pclmulqdq00(ax2, h2x),
+ pclmulqdq00(ax3, h1x)));
+ t2 = _mm_xor_si128(t2, _mm_xor_si128(t1, t3));
+ t0 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(t1, 0x0E);
+ t1 = _mm_xor_si128(t1, _mm_shuffle_epi32(t2, 0x0E));
+ t2 = _mm_xor_si128(t2, _mm_shuffle_epi32(t3, 0x0E));
+ SL_256(t0, t1, t2, t3);
+ REDUCE_F128(t0, t1, t2, t3);
+ yw = _mm_unpacklo_epi64(t1, t0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ while (num1 -- > 0) {
+ __m128i aw, ax;
+ __m128i t0, t1, t2, t3;
+
+ aw = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)buf2);
+ BYTESWAP(aw);
+ buf2 += 16;
+
+ aw = _mm_xor_si128(aw, yw);
+ BK(aw, ax);
+
+ t1 = pclmulqdq11(aw, h1w);
+ t3 = pclmulqdq00(aw, h1w);
+ t2 = pclmulqdq00(ax, h1x);
+ t2 = _mm_xor_si128(t2, _mm_xor_si128(t1, t3));
+ t0 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(t1, 0x0E);
+ t1 = _mm_xor_si128(t1, _mm_shuffle_epi32(t2, 0x0E));
+ t2 = _mm_xor_si128(t2, _mm_shuffle_epi32(t3, 0x0E));
+ SL_256(t0, t1, t2, t3);
+ REDUCE_F128(t0, t1, t2, t3);
+ yw = _mm_unpacklo_epi64(t1, t0);
+ }
+
+ BYTESWAP(yw);
+ _mm_storeu_si128(y, yw);
+}
+
+BR_TARGETS_X86_DOWN
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_hash.h */
+br_ghash
+br_ghash_pclmul_get(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/ghash_pwr8.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/ghash_pwr8.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e7b0f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/ghash_pwr8.c
@@ -0,0 +1,411 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define BR_POWER_ASM_MACROS 1
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * This is the GHASH implementation that leverages the POWER8 opcodes.
+ */
+
+#if BR_POWER8
+
+/*
+ * Some symbolic names for registers.
+ * HB0 = 16 bytes of value 0
+ * HB1 = 16 bytes of value 1
+ * HB2 = 16 bytes of value 2
+ * HB6 = 16 bytes of value 6
+ * HB7 = 16 bytes of value 7
+ * TT0, TT1 and TT2 are temporaries
+ *
+ * BSW holds the pattern for byteswapping 32-bit words; this is set only
+ * on little-endian systems. XBSW is the same register with the +32 offset
+ * for access with the VSX opcodes.
+ */
+#define HB0 0
+#define HB1 1
+#define HB2 2
+#define HB6 3
+#define HB7 4
+#define TT0 5
+#define TT1 6
+#define TT2 7
+
+#define BSW 8
+#define XBSW 40
+
+/*
+ * Macro to initialise the constants.
+ */
+#define INIT \
+ vxor(HB0, HB0, HB0) \
+ vspltisb(HB1, 1) \
+ vspltisb(HB2, 2) \
+ vspltisb(HB6, 6) \
+ vspltisb(HB7, 7) \
+ INIT_BSW
+
+/*
+ * Fix endianness of a value after reading it or before writing it, if
+ * necessary.
+ */
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+#define INIT_BSW lxvw4x(XBSW, 0, %[idx2be])
+#define FIX_ENDIAN(xx) vperm(xx, xx, xx, BSW)
+#else
+#define INIT_BSW
+#define FIX_ENDIAN(xx)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Left-shift x0:x1 by one bit to the left. This is a corrective action
+ * needed because GHASH is defined in full little-endian specification,
+ * while the opcodes use full big-endian convention, so the 255-bit product
+ * ends up one bit to the right.
+ */
+#define SL_256(x0, x1) \
+ vsldoi(TT0, HB0, x1, 1) \
+ vsl(x0, x0, HB1) \
+ vsr(TT0, TT0, HB7) \
+ vsl(x1, x1, HB1) \
+ vxor(x0, x0, TT0)
+
+/*
+ * Reduce x0:x1 in GF(2^128), result in xd (register xd may be the same as
+ * x0 or x1, or a different register). x0 and x1 are modified.
+ */
+#define REDUCE_F128(xd, x0, x1) \
+ vxor(x0, x0, x1) \
+ vsr(TT0, x1, HB1) \
+ vsr(TT1, x1, HB2) \
+ vsr(TT2, x1, HB7) \
+ vxor(x0, x0, TT0) \
+ vxor(TT1, TT1, TT2) \
+ vxor(x0, x0, TT1) \
+ vsldoi(x1, x1, HB0, 15) \
+ vsl(TT1, x1, HB6) \
+ vsl(TT2, x1, HB1) \
+ vxor(x1, TT1, TT2) \
+ vsr(TT0, x1, HB1) \
+ vsr(TT1, x1, HB2) \
+ vsr(TT2, x1, HB7) \
+ vxor(x0, x0, x1) \
+ vxor(x0, x0, TT0) \
+ vxor(TT1, TT1, TT2) \
+ vxor(xd, x0, TT1)
+
+/* see bearssl_hash.h */
+void
+br_ghash_pwr8(void *y, const void *h, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf1, *buf2;
+ size_t num4, num1;
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+ long cc0, cc1, cc2, cc3;
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ static const uint32_t idx2be[] = {
+ 0x03020100, 0x07060504, 0x0B0A0908, 0x0F0E0D0C
+ };
+#endif
+
+ buf1 = data;
+
+ /*
+ * Assembly code requires data into two chunks; first chunk
+ * must contain a number of blocks which is a multiple of 4.
+ * Since the processing for the first chunk is faster, we want
+ * to make it as big as possible.
+ *
+ * For the remainder, there are two possibilities:
+ * -- if the remainder size is a multiple of 16, then use it
+ * in place;
+ * -- otherwise, copy it to the tmp[] array and pad it with
+ * zeros.
+ */
+ num4 = len >> 6;
+ buf2 = buf1 + (num4 << 6);
+ len &= 63;
+ num1 = (len + 15) >> 4;
+ if ((len & 15) != 0) {
+ memcpy(tmp, buf2, len);
+ memset(tmp + len, 0, (num1 << 4) - len);
+ buf2 = tmp;
+ }
+
+ cc0 = 0;
+ cc1 = 16;
+ cc2 = 32;
+ cc3 = 48;
+ asm volatile (
+ INIT
+
+ /*
+ * Load current h (denoted hereafter h1) in v9.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(41, 0, %[h])
+ FIX_ENDIAN(9)
+
+ /*
+ * Load current y into v28.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(60, 0, %[y])
+ FIX_ENDIAN(28)
+
+ /*
+ * Split h1 into three registers:
+ * v17 = h1_1:h1_0
+ * v18 = 0:h1_0
+ * v19 = h1_1:0
+ */
+ xxpermdi(49, 41, 41, 2)
+ vsldoi(18, HB0, 9, 8)
+ vsldoi(19, 9, HB0, 8)
+
+ /*
+ * If num4 is 0, skip directly to the second chunk.
+ */
+ cmpldi(%[num4], 0)
+ beq(chunk1)
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h2 = h*h in v10.
+ */
+ vpmsumd(10, 18, 18)
+ vpmsumd(11, 19, 19)
+ SL_256(10, 11)
+ REDUCE_F128(10, 10, 11)
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h3 = h*h*h in v11.
+ * We first split h2 into:
+ * v10 = h2_0:h2_1
+ * v11 = 0:h2_0
+ * v12 = h2_1:0
+ * Then we do the product with h1, and reduce into v11.
+ */
+ vsldoi(11, HB0, 10, 8)
+ vsldoi(12, 10, HB0, 8)
+ vpmsumd(13, 10, 17)
+ vpmsumd(11, 11, 18)
+ vpmsumd(12, 12, 19)
+ vsldoi(14, HB0, 13, 8)
+ vsldoi(15, 13, HB0, 8)
+ vxor(11, 11, 14)
+ vxor(12, 12, 15)
+ SL_256(11, 12)
+ REDUCE_F128(11, 11, 12)
+
+ /*
+ * Compute h4 = h*h*h*h in v12. This is done by squaring h2.
+ */
+ vsldoi(12, HB0, 10, 8)
+ vsldoi(13, 10, HB0, 8)
+ vpmsumd(12, 12, 12)
+ vpmsumd(13, 13, 13)
+ SL_256(12, 13)
+ REDUCE_F128(12, 12, 13)
+
+ /*
+ * Repack h1, h2, h3 and h4:
+ * v13 = h4_0:h3_0
+ * v14 = h4_1:h3_1
+ * v15 = h2_0:h1_0
+ * v16 = h2_1:h1_1
+ */
+ xxpermdi(45, 44, 43, 0)
+ xxpermdi(46, 44, 43, 3)
+ xxpermdi(47, 42, 41, 0)
+ xxpermdi(48, 42, 41, 3)
+
+ /*
+ * Loop for each group of four blocks.
+ */
+ mtctr(%[num4])
+ label(loop4)
+ /*
+ * Read the four next blocks.
+ * v20 = y + a0 = b0
+ * v21 = a1 = b1
+ * v22 = a2 = b2
+ * v23 = a3 = b3
+ */
+ lxvw4x(52, %[cc0], %[buf1])
+ lxvw4x(53, %[cc1], %[buf1])
+ lxvw4x(54, %[cc2], %[buf1])
+ lxvw4x(55, %[cc3], %[buf1])
+ FIX_ENDIAN(20)
+ FIX_ENDIAN(21)
+ FIX_ENDIAN(22)
+ FIX_ENDIAN(23)
+ addi(%[buf1], %[buf1], 64)
+ vxor(20, 20, 28)
+
+ /*
+ * Repack the blocks into v9, v10, v11 and v12.
+ * v9 = b0_0:b1_0
+ * v10 = b0_1:b1_1
+ * v11 = b2_0:b3_0
+ * v12 = b2_1:b3_1
+ */
+ xxpermdi(41, 52, 53, 0)
+ xxpermdi(42, 52, 53, 3)
+ xxpermdi(43, 54, 55, 0)
+ xxpermdi(44, 54, 55, 3)
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the products.
+ * v20 = b0_0*h4_0 + b1_0*h3_0
+ * v21 = b0_1*h4_0 + b1_1*h3_0
+ * v22 = b0_0*h4_1 + b1_0*h3_1
+ * v23 = b0_1*h4_1 + b1_1*h3_1
+ * v24 = b2_0*h2_0 + b3_0*h1_0
+ * v25 = b2_1*h2_0 + b3_1*h1_0
+ * v26 = b2_0*h2_1 + b3_0*h1_1
+ * v27 = b2_1*h2_1 + b3_1*h1_1
+ */
+ vpmsumd(20, 13, 9)
+ vpmsumd(21, 13, 10)
+ vpmsumd(22, 14, 9)
+ vpmsumd(23, 14, 10)
+ vpmsumd(24, 15, 11)
+ vpmsumd(25, 15, 12)
+ vpmsumd(26, 16, 11)
+ vpmsumd(27, 16, 12)
+
+ /*
+ * Sum products into a single 256-bit result in v11:v12.
+ */
+ vxor(11, 20, 24)
+ vxor(12, 23, 27)
+ vxor( 9, 21, 22)
+ vxor(10, 25, 26)
+ vxor(20, 9, 10)
+ vsldoi( 9, HB0, 20, 8)
+ vsldoi(10, 20, HB0, 8)
+ vxor(11, 11, 9)
+ vxor(12, 12, 10)
+
+ /*
+ * Fix and reduce in GF(2^128); this is the new y (in v28).
+ */
+ SL_256(11, 12)
+ REDUCE_F128(28, 11, 12)
+
+ /*
+ * Loop for next group of four blocks.
+ */
+ bdnz(loop4)
+
+ /*
+ * Process second chunk, one block at a time.
+ */
+ label(chunk1)
+ cmpldi(%[num1], 0)
+ beq(done)
+
+ mtctr(%[num1])
+ label(loop1)
+ /*
+ * Load next data block and XOR it into y.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(41, 0, %[buf2])
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ FIX_ENDIAN(9)
+#endif
+ addi(%[buf2], %[buf2], 16)
+ vxor(9, 28, 9)
+
+ /*
+ * Split y into doublewords:
+ * v9 = y_0:y_1
+ * v10 = 0:y_0
+ * v11 = y_1:0
+ */
+ vsldoi(10, HB0, 9, 8)
+ vsldoi(11, 9, HB0, 8)
+
+ /*
+ * Compute products with h:
+ * v12 = y_0 * h_0
+ * v13 = y_1 * h_1
+ * v14 = y_1 * h_0 + y_0 * h_1
+ */
+ vpmsumd(14, 9, 17)
+ vpmsumd(12, 10, 18)
+ vpmsumd(13, 11, 19)
+
+ /*
+ * Propagate v14 into v12:v13 to finalise product.
+ */
+ vsldoi(10, HB0, 14, 8)
+ vsldoi(11, 14, HB0, 8)
+ vxor(12, 12, 10)
+ vxor(13, 13, 11)
+
+ /*
+ * Fix result and reduce into v28 (next value for y).
+ */
+ SL_256(12, 13)
+ REDUCE_F128(28, 12, 13)
+ bdnz(loop1)
+
+ label(done)
+ /*
+ * Write back the new y.
+ */
+ FIX_ENDIAN(28)
+ stxvw4x(60, 0, %[y])
+
+: [buf1] "+b" (buf1), [buf2] "+b" (buf2)
+: [y] "b" (y), [h] "b" (h), [num4] "b" (num4), [num1] "b" (num1),
+ [cc0] "b" (cc0), [cc1] "b" (cc1), [cc2] "b" (cc2), [cc3] "b" (cc3)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ , [idx2be] "b" (idx2be)
+#endif
+: "v0", "v1", "v2", "v3", "v4", "v5", "v6", "v7", "v8", "v9",
+ "v10", "v11", "v12", "v13", "v14", "v15", "v16", "v17", "v18", "v19",
+ "v20", "v21", "v22", "v23", "v24", "v25", "v26", "v27", "v28", "v29",
+ "ctr", "memory"
+ );
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_hash.h */
+br_ghash
+br_ghash_pwr8_get(void)
+{
+ return &br_ghash_pwr8;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_hash.h */
+br_ghash
+br_ghash_pwr8_get(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/md5.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/md5.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0df7abe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/md5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define F(B, C, D) ((((C) ^ (D)) & (B)) ^ (D))
+#define G(B, C, D) ((((C) ^ (B)) & (D)) ^ (C))
+#define H(B, C, D) ((B) ^ (C) ^ (D))
+#define I(B, C, D) ((C) ^ ((B) | ~(D)))
+
+#define ROTL(x, n) (((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32 - (n))))
+
+/* see inner.h */
+const uint32_t br_md5_IV[4] = {
+ 0x67452301, 0xEFCDAB89, 0x98BADCFE, 0x10325476
+};
+
+static const uint32_t K[64] = {
+ 0xD76AA478, 0xE8C7B756, 0x242070DB, 0xC1BDCEEE,
+ 0xF57C0FAF, 0x4787C62A, 0xA8304613, 0xFD469501,
+ 0x698098D8, 0x8B44F7AF, 0xFFFF5BB1, 0x895CD7BE,
+ 0x6B901122, 0xFD987193, 0xA679438E, 0x49B40821,
+
+ 0xF61E2562, 0xC040B340, 0x265E5A51, 0xE9B6C7AA,
+ 0xD62F105D, 0x02441453, 0xD8A1E681, 0xE7D3FBC8,
+ 0x21E1CDE6, 0xC33707D6, 0xF4D50D87, 0x455A14ED,
+ 0xA9E3E905, 0xFCEFA3F8, 0x676F02D9, 0x8D2A4C8A,
+
+ 0xFFFA3942, 0x8771F681, 0x6D9D6122, 0xFDE5380C,
+ 0xA4BEEA44, 0x4BDECFA9, 0xF6BB4B60, 0xBEBFBC70,
+ 0x289B7EC6, 0xEAA127FA, 0xD4EF3085, 0x04881D05,
+ 0xD9D4D039, 0xE6DB99E5, 0x1FA27CF8, 0xC4AC5665,
+
+ 0xF4292244, 0x432AFF97, 0xAB9423A7, 0xFC93A039,
+ 0x655B59C3, 0x8F0CCC92, 0xFFEFF47D, 0x85845DD1,
+ 0x6FA87E4F, 0xFE2CE6E0, 0xA3014314, 0x4E0811A1,
+ 0xF7537E82, 0xBD3AF235, 0x2AD7D2BB, 0xEB86D391
+};
+
+static const unsigned char MP[48] = {
+ 1, 6, 11, 0, 5, 10, 15, 4, 9, 14, 3, 8, 13, 2, 7, 12,
+ 5, 8, 11, 14, 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 2,
+ 0, 7, 14, 5, 12, 3, 10, 1, 8, 15, 6, 13, 4, 11, 2, 9
+};
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_md5_round(const unsigned char *buf, uint32_t *val)
+{
+ uint32_t m[16];
+ uint32_t a, b, c, d;
+ int i;
+
+ a = val[0];
+ b = val[1];
+ c = val[2];
+ d = val[3];
+ /* obsolete
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i ++) {
+ m[i] = br_dec32le(buf + (i << 2));
+ }
+ */
+ br_range_dec32le(m, 16, buf);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i += 4) {
+ a = b + ROTL(a + F(b, c, d) + m[i + 0] + K[i + 0], 7);
+ d = a + ROTL(d + F(a, b, c) + m[i + 1] + K[i + 1], 12);
+ c = d + ROTL(c + F(d, a, b) + m[i + 2] + K[i + 2], 17);
+ b = c + ROTL(b + F(c, d, a) + m[i + 3] + K[i + 3], 22);
+ }
+ for (i = 16; i < 32; i += 4) {
+ a = b + ROTL(a + G(b, c, d) + m[MP[i - 16]] + K[i + 0], 5);
+ d = a + ROTL(d + G(a, b, c) + m[MP[i - 15]] + K[i + 1], 9);
+ c = d + ROTL(c + G(d, a, b) + m[MP[i - 14]] + K[i + 2], 14);
+ b = c + ROTL(b + G(c, d, a) + m[MP[i - 13]] + K[i + 3], 20);
+ }
+ for (i = 32; i < 48; i += 4) {
+ a = b + ROTL(a + H(b, c, d) + m[MP[i - 16]] + K[i + 0], 4);
+ d = a + ROTL(d + H(a, b, c) + m[MP[i - 15]] + K[i + 1], 11);
+ c = d + ROTL(c + H(d, a, b) + m[MP[i - 14]] + K[i + 2], 16);
+ b = c + ROTL(b + H(c, d, a) + m[MP[i - 13]] + K[i + 3], 23);
+ }
+ for (i = 48; i < 64; i += 4) {
+ a = b + ROTL(a + I(b, c, d) + m[MP[i - 16]] + K[i + 0], 6);
+ d = a + ROTL(d + I(a, b, c) + m[MP[i - 15]] + K[i + 1], 10);
+ c = d + ROTL(c + I(d, a, b) + m[MP[i - 14]] + K[i + 2], 15);
+ b = c + ROTL(b + I(c, d, a) + m[MP[i - 13]] + K[i + 3], 21);
+ }
+
+ val[0] += a;
+ val[1] += b;
+ val[2] += c;
+ val[3] += d;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_md5_init(br_md5_context *cc)
+{
+ cc->vtable = &br_md5_vtable;
+ memcpy(cc->val, br_md5_IV, sizeof cc->val);
+ cc->count = 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_md5_update(br_md5_context *cc, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t ptr;
+
+ buf = data;
+ ptr = (size_t)cc->count & 63;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ size_t clen;
+
+ clen = 64 - ptr;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ clen = len;
+ }
+ memcpy(cc->buf + ptr, buf, clen);
+ ptr += clen;
+ buf += clen;
+ len -= clen;
+ cc->count += (uint64_t)clen;
+ if (ptr == 64) {
+ br_md5_round(cc->buf, cc->val);
+ ptr = 0;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_md5_out(const br_md5_context *cc, void *dst)
+{
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+ uint32_t val[4];
+ size_t ptr;
+
+ ptr = (size_t)cc->count & 63;
+ memcpy(buf, cc->buf, ptr);
+ memcpy(val, cc->val, sizeof val);
+ buf[ptr ++] = 0x80;
+ if (ptr > 56) {
+ memset(buf + ptr, 0, 64 - ptr);
+ br_md5_round(buf, val);
+ memset(buf, 0, 56);
+ } else {
+ memset(buf + ptr, 0, 56 - ptr);
+ }
+ br_enc64le(buf + 56, cc->count << 3);
+ br_md5_round(buf, val);
+ br_range_enc32le(dst, val, 4);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+uint64_t
+br_md5_state(const br_md5_context *cc, void *dst)
+{
+ br_range_enc32le(dst, cc->val, 4);
+ return cc->count;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_md5_set_state(br_md5_context *cc, const void *stb, uint64_t count)
+{
+ br_range_dec32le(cc->val, 4, stb);
+ cc->count = count;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+const br_hash_class br_md5_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_md5_context),
+ BR_HASHDESC_ID(br_md5_ID)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_OUT(16)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_STATE(16)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_LBLEN(6)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **))&br_md5_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **, const void *, size_t))&br_md5_update,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class *const *, void *))&br_md5_out,
+ (uint64_t (*)(const br_hash_class *const *, void *))&br_md5_state,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **, const void *, uint64_t))
+ &br_md5_set_state
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/md5sha1.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/md5sha1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f701aee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/md5sha1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_md5sha1_init(br_md5sha1_context *cc)
+{
+ cc->vtable = &br_md5sha1_vtable;
+ memcpy(cc->val_md5, br_md5_IV, sizeof cc->val_md5);
+ memcpy(cc->val_sha1, br_sha1_IV, sizeof cc->val_sha1);
+ cc->count = 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_md5sha1_update(br_md5sha1_context *cc, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t ptr;
+
+ buf = data;
+ ptr = (size_t)cc->count & 63;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ size_t clen;
+
+ clen = 64 - ptr;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ clen = len;
+ }
+ memcpy(cc->buf + ptr, buf, clen);
+ ptr += clen;
+ buf += clen;
+ len -= clen;
+ cc->count += (uint64_t)clen;
+ if (ptr == 64) {
+ br_md5_round(cc->buf, cc->val_md5);
+ br_sha1_round(cc->buf, cc->val_sha1);
+ ptr = 0;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_md5sha1_out(const br_md5sha1_context *cc, void *dst)
+{
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+ uint32_t val_md5[4];
+ uint32_t val_sha1[5];
+ size_t ptr;
+ unsigned char *out;
+ uint64_t count;
+
+ count = cc->count;
+ ptr = (size_t)count & 63;
+ memcpy(buf, cc->buf, ptr);
+ memcpy(val_md5, cc->val_md5, sizeof val_md5);
+ memcpy(val_sha1, cc->val_sha1, sizeof val_sha1);
+ buf[ptr ++] = 0x80;
+ if (ptr > 56) {
+ memset(buf + ptr, 0, 64 - ptr);
+ br_md5_round(buf, val_md5);
+ br_sha1_round(buf, val_sha1);
+ memset(buf, 0, 56);
+ } else {
+ memset(buf + ptr, 0, 56 - ptr);
+ }
+ count <<= 3;
+ br_enc64le(buf + 56, count);
+ br_md5_round(buf, val_md5);
+ br_enc64be(buf + 56, count);
+ br_sha1_round(buf, val_sha1);
+ out = dst;
+ br_range_enc32le(out, val_md5, 4);
+ br_range_enc32be(out + 16, val_sha1, 5);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+uint64_t
+br_md5sha1_state(const br_md5sha1_context *cc, void *dst)
+{
+ unsigned char *out;
+
+ out = dst;
+ br_range_enc32le(out, cc->val_md5, 4);
+ br_range_enc32be(out + 16, cc->val_sha1, 5);
+ return cc->count;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_md5sha1_set_state(br_md5sha1_context *cc, const void *stb, uint64_t count)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = stb;
+ br_range_dec32le(cc->val_md5, 4, buf);
+ br_range_dec32be(cc->val_sha1, 5, buf + 16);
+ cc->count = count;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+const br_hash_class br_md5sha1_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_md5sha1_context),
+ BR_HASHDESC_ID(br_md5sha1_ID)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_OUT(36)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_STATE(36)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_LBLEN(6),
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **))&br_md5sha1_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_md5sha1_update,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class *const *, void *))
+ &br_md5sha1_out,
+ (uint64_t (*)(const br_hash_class *const *, void *))
+ &br_md5sha1_state,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **, const void *, uint64_t))
+ &br_md5sha1_set_state
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/mgf1.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/mgf1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a23588
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/mgf1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_mgf1_xor(void *data, size_t len,
+ const br_hash_class *dig, const void *seed, size_t seed_len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t u, hlen;
+ uint32_t c;
+
+ buf = data;
+ hlen = br_digest_size(dig);
+ for (u = 0, c = 0; u < len; u += hlen, c ++) {
+ br_hash_compat_context hc;
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+ size_t v;
+
+ hc.vtable = dig;
+ dig->init(&hc.vtable);
+ dig->update(&hc.vtable, seed, seed_len);
+ br_enc32be(tmp, c);
+ dig->update(&hc.vtable, tmp, 4);
+ dig->out(&hc.vtable, tmp);
+ for (v = 0; v < hlen; v ++) {
+ if ((u + v) >= len) {
+ break;
+ }
+ buf[u + v] ^= tmp[v];
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/multihash.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/multihash.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6df2e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/multihash.c
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * An aggregate context that is large enough for all supported hash
+ * functions.
+ */
+typedef union {
+ const br_hash_class *vtable;
+ br_md5_context md5;
+ br_sha1_context sha1;
+ br_sha224_context sha224;
+ br_sha256_context sha256;
+ br_sha384_context sha384;
+ br_sha512_context sha512;
+} gen_hash_context;
+
+/*
+ * Get the offset to the state for a specific hash function within the
+ * context structure. This shall be called only for the supported hash
+ * functions,
+ */
+static size_t
+get_state_offset(int id)
+{
+ if (id >= 5) {
+ /*
+ * SHA-384 has id 5, and SHA-512 has id 6. Both use
+ * eight 64-bit words for their state.
+ */
+ return offsetof(br_multihash_context, val_64)
+ + ((size_t)(id - 5) * (8 * sizeof(uint64_t)));
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * MD5 has id 1, SHA-1 has id 2, SHA-224 has id 3 and
+ * SHA-256 has id 4. They use 32-bit words for their
+ * states (4 words for MD5, 5 for SHA-1, 8 for SHA-224
+ * and 8 for SHA-256).
+ */
+ unsigned x;
+
+ x = id - 1;
+ x = ((x + (x & (x >> 1))) << 2) + (x >> 1);
+ return offsetof(br_multihash_context, val_32)
+ + x * sizeof(uint32_t);
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_hash.h */
+void
+br_multihash_zero(br_multihash_context *ctx)
+{
+ /*
+ * This is not standard, but yields very short and efficient code,
+ * and it works "everywhere".
+ */
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof *ctx);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_hash.h */
+void
+br_multihash_init(br_multihash_context *ctx)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ ctx->count = 0;
+ for (i = 1; i <= 6; i ++) {
+ const br_hash_class *hc;
+
+ hc = ctx->impl[i - 1];
+ if (hc != NULL) {
+ gen_hash_context g;
+
+ hc->init(&g.vtable);
+ hc->state(&g.vtable,
+ (unsigned char *)ctx + get_state_offset(i));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_hash.h */
+void
+br_multihash_update(br_multihash_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t ptr;
+
+ buf = data;
+ ptr = (size_t)ctx->count & 127;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ size_t clen;
+
+ clen = 128 - ptr;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ clen = len;
+ }
+ memcpy(ctx->buf + ptr, buf, clen);
+ ptr += clen;
+ buf += clen;
+ len -= clen;
+ ctx->count += (uint64_t)clen;
+ if (ptr == 128) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i <= 6; i ++) {
+ const br_hash_class *hc;
+
+ hc = ctx->impl[i - 1];
+ if (hc != NULL) {
+ gen_hash_context g;
+ unsigned char *state;
+
+ state = (unsigned char *)ctx
+ + get_state_offset(i);
+ hc->set_state(&g.vtable,
+ state, ctx->count - 128);
+ hc->update(&g.vtable, ctx->buf, 128);
+ hc->state(&g.vtable, state);
+ }
+ }
+ ptr = 0;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_hash.h */
+size_t
+br_multihash_out(const br_multihash_context *ctx, int id, void *dst)
+{
+ const br_hash_class *hc;
+ gen_hash_context g;
+ const unsigned char *state;
+
+ hc = ctx->impl[id - 1];
+ if (hc == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ state = (const unsigned char *)ctx + get_state_offset(id);
+ hc->set_state(&g.vtable, state, ctx->count & ~(uint64_t)127);
+ hc->update(&g.vtable, ctx->buf, ctx->count & (uint64_t)127);
+ hc->out(&g.vtable, dst);
+ return (hc->desc >> BR_HASHDESC_OUT_OFF) & BR_HASHDESC_OUT_MASK;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/sha1.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/sha1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f65d84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/sha1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define F(B, C, D) ((((C) ^ (D)) & (B)) ^ (D))
+#define G(B, C, D) ((B) ^ (C) ^ (D))
+#define H(B, C, D) (((D) & (C)) | (((D) | (C)) & (B)))
+#define I(B, C, D) G(B, C, D)
+
+#define ROTL(x, n) (((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32 - (n))))
+
+#define K1 ((uint32_t)0x5A827999)
+#define K2 ((uint32_t)0x6ED9EBA1)
+#define K3 ((uint32_t)0x8F1BBCDC)
+#define K4 ((uint32_t)0xCA62C1D6)
+
+/* see inner.h */
+const uint32_t br_sha1_IV[5] = {
+ 0x67452301, 0xEFCDAB89, 0x98BADCFE, 0x10325476, 0xC3D2E1F0
+};
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_sha1_round(const unsigned char *buf, uint32_t *val)
+{
+ uint32_t m[80];
+ uint32_t a, b, c, d, e;
+ int i;
+
+ a = val[0];
+ b = val[1];
+ c = val[2];
+ d = val[3];
+ e = val[4];
+ br_range_dec32be(m, 16, buf);
+ for (i = 16; i < 80; i ++) {
+ uint32_t x = m[i - 3] ^ m[i - 8] ^ m[i - 14] ^ m[i - 16];
+ m[i] = ROTL(x, 1);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i += 5) {
+ e += ROTL(a, 5) + F(b, c, d) + K1 + m[i + 0]; b = ROTL(b, 30);
+ d += ROTL(e, 5) + F(a, b, c) + K1 + m[i + 1]; a = ROTL(a, 30);
+ c += ROTL(d, 5) + F(e, a, b) + K1 + m[i + 2]; e = ROTL(e, 30);
+ b += ROTL(c, 5) + F(d, e, a) + K1 + m[i + 3]; d = ROTL(d, 30);
+ a += ROTL(b, 5) + F(c, d, e) + K1 + m[i + 4]; c = ROTL(c, 30);
+ }
+ for (i = 20; i < 40; i += 5) {
+ e += ROTL(a, 5) + G(b, c, d) + K2 + m[i + 0]; b = ROTL(b, 30);
+ d += ROTL(e, 5) + G(a, b, c) + K2 + m[i + 1]; a = ROTL(a, 30);
+ c += ROTL(d, 5) + G(e, a, b) + K2 + m[i + 2]; e = ROTL(e, 30);
+ b += ROTL(c, 5) + G(d, e, a) + K2 + m[i + 3]; d = ROTL(d, 30);
+ a += ROTL(b, 5) + G(c, d, e) + K2 + m[i + 4]; c = ROTL(c, 30);
+ }
+ for (i = 40; i < 60; i += 5) {
+ e += ROTL(a, 5) + H(b, c, d) + K3 + m[i + 0]; b = ROTL(b, 30);
+ d += ROTL(e, 5) + H(a, b, c) + K3 + m[i + 1]; a = ROTL(a, 30);
+ c += ROTL(d, 5) + H(e, a, b) + K3 + m[i + 2]; e = ROTL(e, 30);
+ b += ROTL(c, 5) + H(d, e, a) + K3 + m[i + 3]; d = ROTL(d, 30);
+ a += ROTL(b, 5) + H(c, d, e) + K3 + m[i + 4]; c = ROTL(c, 30);
+ }
+ for (i = 60; i < 80; i += 5) {
+ e += ROTL(a, 5) + I(b, c, d) + K4 + m[i + 0]; b = ROTL(b, 30);
+ d += ROTL(e, 5) + I(a, b, c) + K4 + m[i + 1]; a = ROTL(a, 30);
+ c += ROTL(d, 5) + I(e, a, b) + K4 + m[i + 2]; e = ROTL(e, 30);
+ b += ROTL(c, 5) + I(d, e, a) + K4 + m[i + 3]; d = ROTL(d, 30);
+ a += ROTL(b, 5) + I(c, d, e) + K4 + m[i + 4]; c = ROTL(c, 30);
+ }
+
+ val[0] += a;
+ val[1] += b;
+ val[2] += c;
+ val[3] += d;
+ val[4] += e;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_sha1_init(br_sha1_context *cc)
+{
+ cc->vtable = &br_sha1_vtable;
+ memcpy(cc->val, br_sha1_IV, sizeof cc->val);
+ cc->count = 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_sha1_update(br_sha1_context *cc, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t ptr;
+
+ buf = data;
+ ptr = (size_t)cc->count & 63;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ size_t clen;
+
+ clen = 64 - ptr;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ clen = len;
+ }
+ memcpy(cc->buf + ptr, buf, clen);
+ ptr += clen;
+ buf += clen;
+ len -= clen;
+ cc->count += (uint64_t)clen;
+ if (ptr == 64) {
+ br_sha1_round(cc->buf, cc->val);
+ ptr = 0;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_sha1_out(const br_sha1_context *cc, void *dst)
+{
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+ uint32_t val[5];
+ size_t ptr;
+
+ ptr = (size_t)cc->count & 63;
+ memcpy(buf, cc->buf, ptr);
+ memcpy(val, cc->val, sizeof val);
+ buf[ptr ++] = 0x80;
+ if (ptr > 56) {
+ memset(buf + ptr, 0, 64 - ptr);
+ br_sha1_round(buf, val);
+ memset(buf, 0, 56);
+ } else {
+ memset(buf + ptr, 0, 56 - ptr);
+ }
+ br_enc64be(buf + 56, cc->count << 3);
+ br_sha1_round(buf, val);
+ br_range_enc32be(dst, val, 5);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+uint64_t
+br_sha1_state(const br_sha1_context *cc, void *dst)
+{
+ br_range_enc32be(dst, cc->val, 5);
+ return cc->count;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_sha1_set_state(br_sha1_context *cc, const void *stb, uint64_t count)
+{
+ br_range_dec32be(cc->val, 5, stb);
+ cc->count = count;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+const br_hash_class br_sha1_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_sha1_context),
+ BR_HASHDESC_ID(br_sha1_ID)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_OUT(20)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_STATE(20)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_LBLEN(6)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING
+ | BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING_BE,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **))&br_sha1_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **, const void *, size_t))&br_sha1_update,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class *const *, void *))&br_sha1_out,
+ (uint64_t (*)(const br_hash_class *const *, void *))&br_sha1_state,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **, const void *, uint64_t))
+ &br_sha1_set_state
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/sha2big.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/sha2big.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5be92ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/sha2big.c
@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define CH(X, Y, Z) ((((Y) ^ (Z)) & (X)) ^ (Z))
+#define MAJ(X, Y, Z) (((Y) & (Z)) | (((Y) | (Z)) & (X)))
+
+#define ROTR(x, n) (((uint64_t)(x) << (64 - (n))) | ((uint64_t)(x) >> (n)))
+
+#define BSG5_0(x) (ROTR(x, 28) ^ ROTR(x, 34) ^ ROTR(x, 39))
+#define BSG5_1(x) (ROTR(x, 14) ^ ROTR(x, 18) ^ ROTR(x, 41))
+#define SSG5_0(x) (ROTR(x, 1) ^ ROTR(x, 8) ^ (uint64_t)((x) >> 7))
+#define SSG5_1(x) (ROTR(x, 19) ^ ROTR(x, 61) ^ (uint64_t)((x) >> 6))
+
+static const uint64_t IV384[8] = {
+ 0xCBBB9D5DC1059ED8, 0x629A292A367CD507,
+ 0x9159015A3070DD17, 0x152FECD8F70E5939,
+ 0x67332667FFC00B31, 0x8EB44A8768581511,
+ 0xDB0C2E0D64F98FA7, 0x47B5481DBEFA4FA4
+};
+
+static const uint64_t IV512[8] = {
+ 0x6A09E667F3BCC908, 0xBB67AE8584CAA73B,
+ 0x3C6EF372FE94F82B, 0xA54FF53A5F1D36F1,
+ 0x510E527FADE682D1, 0x9B05688C2B3E6C1F,
+ 0x1F83D9ABFB41BD6B, 0x5BE0CD19137E2179
+};
+
+static const uint64_t K[80] = {
+ 0x428A2F98D728AE22, 0x7137449123EF65CD,
+ 0xB5C0FBCFEC4D3B2F, 0xE9B5DBA58189DBBC,
+ 0x3956C25BF348B538, 0x59F111F1B605D019,
+ 0x923F82A4AF194F9B, 0xAB1C5ED5DA6D8118,
+ 0xD807AA98A3030242, 0x12835B0145706FBE,
+ 0x243185BE4EE4B28C, 0x550C7DC3D5FFB4E2,
+ 0x72BE5D74F27B896F, 0x80DEB1FE3B1696B1,
+ 0x9BDC06A725C71235, 0xC19BF174CF692694,
+ 0xE49B69C19EF14AD2, 0xEFBE4786384F25E3,
+ 0x0FC19DC68B8CD5B5, 0x240CA1CC77AC9C65,
+ 0x2DE92C6F592B0275, 0x4A7484AA6EA6E483,
+ 0x5CB0A9DCBD41FBD4, 0x76F988DA831153B5,
+ 0x983E5152EE66DFAB, 0xA831C66D2DB43210,
+ 0xB00327C898FB213F, 0xBF597FC7BEEF0EE4,
+ 0xC6E00BF33DA88FC2, 0xD5A79147930AA725,
+ 0x06CA6351E003826F, 0x142929670A0E6E70,
+ 0x27B70A8546D22FFC, 0x2E1B21385C26C926,
+ 0x4D2C6DFC5AC42AED, 0x53380D139D95B3DF,
+ 0x650A73548BAF63DE, 0x766A0ABB3C77B2A8,
+ 0x81C2C92E47EDAEE6, 0x92722C851482353B,
+ 0xA2BFE8A14CF10364, 0xA81A664BBC423001,
+ 0xC24B8B70D0F89791, 0xC76C51A30654BE30,
+ 0xD192E819D6EF5218, 0xD69906245565A910,
+ 0xF40E35855771202A, 0x106AA07032BBD1B8,
+ 0x19A4C116B8D2D0C8, 0x1E376C085141AB53,
+ 0x2748774CDF8EEB99, 0x34B0BCB5E19B48A8,
+ 0x391C0CB3C5C95A63, 0x4ED8AA4AE3418ACB,
+ 0x5B9CCA4F7763E373, 0x682E6FF3D6B2B8A3,
+ 0x748F82EE5DEFB2FC, 0x78A5636F43172F60,
+ 0x84C87814A1F0AB72, 0x8CC702081A6439EC,
+ 0x90BEFFFA23631E28, 0xA4506CEBDE82BDE9,
+ 0xBEF9A3F7B2C67915, 0xC67178F2E372532B,
+ 0xCA273ECEEA26619C, 0xD186B8C721C0C207,
+ 0xEADA7DD6CDE0EB1E, 0xF57D4F7FEE6ED178,
+ 0x06F067AA72176FBA, 0x0A637DC5A2C898A6,
+ 0x113F9804BEF90DAE, 0x1B710B35131C471B,
+ 0x28DB77F523047D84, 0x32CAAB7B40C72493,
+ 0x3C9EBE0A15C9BEBC, 0x431D67C49C100D4C,
+ 0x4CC5D4BECB3E42B6, 0x597F299CFC657E2A,
+ 0x5FCB6FAB3AD6FAEC, 0x6C44198C4A475817
+};
+
+static void
+sha2big_round(const unsigned char *buf, uint64_t *val)
+{
+
+#define SHA2BIG_STEP(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, j) do { \
+ uint64_t T1, T2; \
+ T1 = H + BSG5_1(E) + CH(E, F, G) + K[j] + w[j]; \
+ T2 = BSG5_0(A) + MAJ(A, B, C); \
+ D += T1; \
+ H = T1 + T2; \
+ } while (0)
+
+ int i;
+ uint64_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h;
+ uint64_t w[80];
+
+ br_range_dec64be(w, 16, buf);
+ for (i = 16; i < 80; i ++) {
+ w[i] = SSG5_1(w[i - 2]) + w[i - 7]
+ + SSG5_0(w[i - 15]) + w[i - 16];
+ }
+ a = val[0];
+ b = val[1];
+ c = val[2];
+ d = val[3];
+ e = val[4];
+ f = val[5];
+ g = val[6];
+ h = val[7];
+ for (i = 0; i < 80; i += 8) {
+ SHA2BIG_STEP(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i + 0);
+ SHA2BIG_STEP(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, i + 1);
+ SHA2BIG_STEP(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, i + 2);
+ SHA2BIG_STEP(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, i + 3);
+ SHA2BIG_STEP(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, i + 4);
+ SHA2BIG_STEP(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, i + 5);
+ SHA2BIG_STEP(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, i + 6);
+ SHA2BIG_STEP(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, i + 7);
+ }
+ val[0] += a;
+ val[1] += b;
+ val[2] += c;
+ val[3] += d;
+ val[4] += e;
+ val[5] += f;
+ val[6] += g;
+ val[7] += h;
+}
+
+static void
+sha2big_update(br_sha384_context *cc, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t ptr;
+
+ buf = data;
+ ptr = (size_t)cc->count & 127;
+ cc->count += (uint64_t)len;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ size_t clen;
+
+ clen = 128 - ptr;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ clen = len;
+ }
+ memcpy(cc->buf + ptr, buf, clen);
+ ptr += clen;
+ buf += clen;
+ len -= clen;
+ if (ptr == 128) {
+ sha2big_round(cc->buf, cc->val);
+ ptr = 0;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+sha2big_out(const br_sha384_context *cc, void *dst, int num)
+{
+ unsigned char buf[128];
+ uint64_t val[8];
+ size_t ptr;
+
+ ptr = (size_t)cc->count & 127;
+ memcpy(buf, cc->buf, ptr);
+ memcpy(val, cc->val, sizeof val);
+ buf[ptr ++] = 0x80;
+ if (ptr > 112) {
+ memset(buf + ptr, 0, 128 - ptr);
+ sha2big_round(buf, val);
+ memset(buf, 0, 112);
+ } else {
+ memset(buf + ptr, 0, 112 - ptr);
+ }
+ br_enc64be(buf + 112, cc->count >> 61);
+ br_enc64be(buf + 120, cc->count << 3);
+ sha2big_round(buf, val);
+ br_range_enc64be(dst, val, num);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_sha384_init(br_sha384_context *cc)
+{
+ cc->vtable = &br_sha384_vtable;
+ memcpy(cc->val, IV384, sizeof IV384);
+ cc->count = 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_sha384_update(br_sha384_context *cc, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ sha2big_update(cc, data, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_sha384_out(const br_sha384_context *cc, void *dst)
+{
+ sha2big_out(cc, dst, 6);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+uint64_t
+br_sha384_state(const br_sha384_context *cc, void *dst)
+{
+ br_range_enc64be(dst, cc->val, 8);
+ return cc->count;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_sha384_set_state(br_sha384_context *cc, const void *stb, uint64_t count)
+{
+ br_range_dec64be(cc->val, 8, stb);
+ cc->count = count;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_sha512_init(br_sha512_context *cc)
+{
+ cc->vtable = &br_sha512_vtable;
+ memcpy(cc->val, IV512, sizeof IV512);
+ cc->count = 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_sha512_out(const br_sha512_context *cc, void *dst)
+{
+ sha2big_out(cc, dst, 8);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+const br_hash_class br_sha384_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_sha384_context),
+ BR_HASHDESC_ID(br_sha384_ID)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_OUT(48)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_STATE(64)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_LBLEN(7)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING
+ | BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING_BE
+ | BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING_128,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **))&br_sha384_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_sha384_update,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class *const *, void *))&br_sha384_out,
+ (uint64_t (*)(const br_hash_class *const *, void *))&br_sha384_state,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **, const void *, uint64_t))
+ &br_sha384_set_state
+};
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+const br_hash_class br_sha512_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_sha512_context),
+ BR_HASHDESC_ID(br_sha512_ID)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_OUT(64)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_STATE(64)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_LBLEN(7)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING
+ | BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING_BE
+ | BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING_128,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **))&br_sha512_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_sha512_update,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class *const *, void *))&br_sha512_out,
+ (uint64_t (*)(const br_hash_class *const *, void *))&br_sha512_state,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **, const void *, uint64_t))
+ &br_sha512_set_state
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/sha2small.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/sha2small.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca19655
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/hash/sha2small.c
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define CH(X, Y, Z) ((((Y) ^ (Z)) & (X)) ^ (Z))
+#define MAJ(X, Y, Z) (((Y) & (Z)) | (((Y) | (Z)) & (X)))
+
+#define ROTR(x, n) (((uint32_t)(x) << (32 - (n))) | ((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)))
+
+#define BSG2_0(x) (ROTR(x, 2) ^ ROTR(x, 13) ^ ROTR(x, 22))
+#define BSG2_1(x) (ROTR(x, 6) ^ ROTR(x, 11) ^ ROTR(x, 25))
+#define SSG2_0(x) (ROTR(x, 7) ^ ROTR(x, 18) ^ (uint32_t)((x) >> 3))
+#define SSG2_1(x) (ROTR(x, 17) ^ ROTR(x, 19) ^ (uint32_t)((x) >> 10))
+
+/* see inner.h */
+const uint32_t br_sha224_IV[8] = {
+ 0xC1059ED8, 0x367CD507, 0x3070DD17, 0xF70E5939,
+ 0xFFC00B31, 0x68581511, 0x64F98FA7, 0xBEFA4FA4
+};
+
+/* see inner.h */
+const uint32_t br_sha256_IV[8] = {
+ 0x6A09E667, 0xBB67AE85, 0x3C6EF372, 0xA54FF53A,
+ 0x510E527F, 0x9B05688C, 0x1F83D9AB, 0x5BE0CD19
+};
+
+static const uint32_t K[64] = {
+ 0x428A2F98, 0x71374491, 0xB5C0FBCF, 0xE9B5DBA5,
+ 0x3956C25B, 0x59F111F1, 0x923F82A4, 0xAB1C5ED5,
+ 0xD807AA98, 0x12835B01, 0x243185BE, 0x550C7DC3,
+ 0x72BE5D74, 0x80DEB1FE, 0x9BDC06A7, 0xC19BF174,
+ 0xE49B69C1, 0xEFBE4786, 0x0FC19DC6, 0x240CA1CC,
+ 0x2DE92C6F, 0x4A7484AA, 0x5CB0A9DC, 0x76F988DA,
+ 0x983E5152, 0xA831C66D, 0xB00327C8, 0xBF597FC7,
+ 0xC6E00BF3, 0xD5A79147, 0x06CA6351, 0x14292967,
+ 0x27B70A85, 0x2E1B2138, 0x4D2C6DFC, 0x53380D13,
+ 0x650A7354, 0x766A0ABB, 0x81C2C92E, 0x92722C85,
+ 0xA2BFE8A1, 0xA81A664B, 0xC24B8B70, 0xC76C51A3,
+ 0xD192E819, 0xD6990624, 0xF40E3585, 0x106AA070,
+ 0x19A4C116, 0x1E376C08, 0x2748774C, 0x34B0BCB5,
+ 0x391C0CB3, 0x4ED8AA4A, 0x5B9CCA4F, 0x682E6FF3,
+ 0x748F82EE, 0x78A5636F, 0x84C87814, 0x8CC70208,
+ 0x90BEFFFA, 0xA4506CEB, 0xBEF9A3F7, 0xC67178F2
+};
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_sha2small_round(const unsigned char *buf, uint32_t *val)
+{
+
+#define SHA2_STEP(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, j) do { \
+ uint32_t T1, T2; \
+ T1 = H + BSG2_1(E) + CH(E, F, G) + K[j] + w[j]; \
+ T2 = BSG2_0(A) + MAJ(A, B, C); \
+ D += T1; \
+ H = T1 + T2; \
+ } while (0)
+
+ int i;
+ uint32_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h;
+ uint32_t w[64];
+
+ br_range_dec32be(w, 16, buf);
+ for (i = 16; i < 64; i ++) {
+ w[i] = SSG2_1(w[i - 2]) + w[i - 7]
+ + SSG2_0(w[i - 15]) + w[i - 16];
+ }
+ a = val[0];
+ b = val[1];
+ c = val[2];
+ d = val[3];
+ e = val[4];
+ f = val[5];
+ g = val[6];
+ h = val[7];
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i += 8) {
+ SHA2_STEP(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i + 0);
+ SHA2_STEP(h, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, i + 1);
+ SHA2_STEP(g, h, a, b, c, d, e, f, i + 2);
+ SHA2_STEP(f, g, h, a, b, c, d, e, i + 3);
+ SHA2_STEP(e, f, g, h, a, b, c, d, i + 4);
+ SHA2_STEP(d, e, f, g, h, a, b, c, i + 5);
+ SHA2_STEP(c, d, e, f, g, h, a, b, i + 6);
+ SHA2_STEP(b, c, d, e, f, g, h, a, i + 7);
+ }
+ val[0] += a;
+ val[1] += b;
+ val[2] += c;
+ val[3] += d;
+ val[4] += e;
+ val[5] += f;
+ val[6] += g;
+ val[7] += h;
+
+#if 0
+/* obsolete */
+#define SHA2_MEXP1(pc) do { \
+ W[pc] = br_dec32be(buf + ((pc) << 2)); \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define SHA2_MEXP2(pc) do { \
+ W[(pc) & 0x0F] = SSG2_1(W[((pc) - 2) & 0x0F]) \
+ + W[((pc) - 7) & 0x0F] \
+ + SSG2_0(W[((pc) - 15) & 0x0F]) + W[(pc) & 0x0F]; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define SHA2_STEPn(n, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, pc) do { \
+ uint32_t t1, t2; \
+ SHA2_MEXP ## n(pc); \
+ t1 = h + BSG2_1(e) + CH(e, f, g) \
+ + K[pcount + (pc)] + W[(pc) & 0x0F]; \
+ t2 = BSG2_0(a) + MAJ(a, b, c); \
+ d += t1; \
+ h = t1 + t2; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define SHA2_STEP1(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, pc) \
+ SHA2_STEPn(1, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, pc)
+#define SHA2_STEP2(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, pc) \
+ SHA2_STEPn(2, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, pc)
+
+ uint32_t A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H;
+ uint32_t W[16];
+ unsigned pcount;
+
+ A = val[0];
+ B = val[1];
+ C = val[2];
+ D = val[3];
+ E = val[4];
+ F = val[5];
+ G = val[6];
+ H = val[7];
+ pcount = 0;
+ SHA2_STEP1(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, 0);
+ SHA2_STEP1(H, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, 1);
+ SHA2_STEP1(G, H, A, B, C, D, E, F, 2);
+ SHA2_STEP1(F, G, H, A, B, C, D, E, 3);
+ SHA2_STEP1(E, F, G, H, A, B, C, D, 4);
+ SHA2_STEP1(D, E, F, G, H, A, B, C, 5);
+ SHA2_STEP1(C, D, E, F, G, H, A, B, 6);
+ SHA2_STEP1(B, C, D, E, F, G, H, A, 7);
+ SHA2_STEP1(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, 8);
+ SHA2_STEP1(H, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, 9);
+ SHA2_STEP1(G, H, A, B, C, D, E, F, 10);
+ SHA2_STEP1(F, G, H, A, B, C, D, E, 11);
+ SHA2_STEP1(E, F, G, H, A, B, C, D, 12);
+ SHA2_STEP1(D, E, F, G, H, A, B, C, 13);
+ SHA2_STEP1(C, D, E, F, G, H, A, B, 14);
+ SHA2_STEP1(B, C, D, E, F, G, H, A, 15);
+ for (pcount = 16; pcount < 64; pcount += 16) {
+ SHA2_STEP2(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, 0);
+ SHA2_STEP2(H, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, 1);
+ SHA2_STEP2(G, H, A, B, C, D, E, F, 2);
+ SHA2_STEP2(F, G, H, A, B, C, D, E, 3);
+ SHA2_STEP2(E, F, G, H, A, B, C, D, 4);
+ SHA2_STEP2(D, E, F, G, H, A, B, C, 5);
+ SHA2_STEP2(C, D, E, F, G, H, A, B, 6);
+ SHA2_STEP2(B, C, D, E, F, G, H, A, 7);
+ SHA2_STEP2(A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, 8);
+ SHA2_STEP2(H, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, 9);
+ SHA2_STEP2(G, H, A, B, C, D, E, F, 10);
+ SHA2_STEP2(F, G, H, A, B, C, D, E, 11);
+ SHA2_STEP2(E, F, G, H, A, B, C, D, 12);
+ SHA2_STEP2(D, E, F, G, H, A, B, C, 13);
+ SHA2_STEP2(C, D, E, F, G, H, A, B, 14);
+ SHA2_STEP2(B, C, D, E, F, G, H, A, 15);
+ }
+ val[0] += A;
+ val[1] += B;
+ val[2] += C;
+ val[3] += D;
+ val[4] += E;
+ val[5] += F;
+ val[6] += G;
+ val[7] += H;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void
+sha2small_update(br_sha224_context *cc, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t ptr;
+
+ buf = data;
+ ptr = (size_t)cc->count & 63;
+ cc->count += (uint64_t)len;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ size_t clen;
+
+ clen = 64 - ptr;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ clen = len;
+ }
+ memcpy(cc->buf + ptr, buf, clen);
+ ptr += clen;
+ buf += clen;
+ len -= clen;
+ if (ptr == 64) {
+ br_sha2small_round(cc->buf, cc->val);
+ ptr = 0;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+sha2small_out(const br_sha224_context *cc, void *dst, int num)
+{
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+ uint32_t val[8];
+ size_t ptr;
+
+ ptr = (size_t)cc->count & 63;
+ memcpy(buf, cc->buf, ptr);
+ memcpy(val, cc->val, sizeof val);
+ buf[ptr ++] = 0x80;
+ if (ptr > 56) {
+ memset(buf + ptr, 0, 64 - ptr);
+ br_sha2small_round(buf, val);
+ memset(buf, 0, 56);
+ } else {
+ memset(buf + ptr, 0, 56 - ptr);
+ }
+ br_enc64be(buf + 56, cc->count << 3);
+ br_sha2small_round(buf, val);
+ br_range_enc32be(dst, val, num);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_sha224_init(br_sha224_context *cc)
+{
+ cc->vtable = &br_sha224_vtable;
+ memcpy(cc->val, br_sha224_IV, sizeof cc->val);
+ cc->count = 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_sha224_update(br_sha224_context *cc, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ sha2small_update(cc, data, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_sha224_out(const br_sha224_context *cc, void *dst)
+{
+ sha2small_out(cc, dst, 7);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+uint64_t
+br_sha224_state(const br_sha224_context *cc, void *dst)
+{
+ br_range_enc32be(dst, cc->val, 8);
+ return cc->count;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_sha224_set_state(br_sha224_context *cc, const void *stb, uint64_t count)
+{
+ br_range_dec32be(cc->val, 8, stb);
+ cc->count = count;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_sha256_init(br_sha256_context *cc)
+{
+ cc->vtable = &br_sha256_vtable;
+ memcpy(cc->val, br_sha256_IV, sizeof cc->val);
+ cc->count = 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_sha256_out(const br_sha256_context *cc, void *dst)
+{
+ sha2small_out(cc, dst, 8);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+const br_hash_class br_sha224_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_sha224_context),
+ BR_HASHDESC_ID(br_sha224_ID)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_OUT(28)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_STATE(32)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_LBLEN(6)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING
+ | BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING_BE,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **))&br_sha224_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **,
+ const void *, size_t))&br_sha224_update,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class *const *, void *))&br_sha224_out,
+ (uint64_t (*)(const br_hash_class *const *, void *))&br_sha224_state,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **, const void *, uint64_t))
+ &br_sha224_set_state
+};
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+const br_hash_class br_sha256_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_sha256_context),
+ BR_HASHDESC_ID(br_sha256_ID)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_OUT(32)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_STATE(32)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_LBLEN(6)
+ | BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING
+ | BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING_BE,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **))&br_sha256_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **,
+ const void *, size_t))&br_sha256_update,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class *const *, void *))&br_sha256_out,
+ (uint64_t (*)(const br_hash_class *const *, void *))&br_sha256_state,
+ (void (*)(const br_hash_class **, const void *, uint64_t))
+ &br_sha256_set_state
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/inner.h b/third_party/bearssl/src/inner.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..07e1d0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/inner.h
@@ -0,0 +1,2577 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef INNER_H__
+#define INNER_H__
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "config.h"
+#include "bearssl.h"
+
+/*
+ * On MSVC, disable the warning about applying unary minus on an
+ * unsigned type: it is standard, we do it all the time, and for
+ * good reasons.
+ */
+#if _MSC_VER
+#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Maximum size for a RSA modulus (in bits). Allocated stack buffers
+ * depend on that size, so this value should be kept small. Currently,
+ * 2048-bit RSA keys offer adequate security, and should still do so for
+ * the next few decades; however, a number of widespread PKI have
+ * already set their root keys to RSA-4096, so we should be able to
+ * process such keys.
+ *
+ * This value MUST be a multiple of 64. This value MUST NOT exceed 47666
+ * (some computations in RSA key generation rely on the factor size being
+ * no more than 23833 bits). RSA key sizes beyond 3072 bits don't make a
+ * lot of sense anyway.
+ */
+#define BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE 4096
+
+/*
+ * Minimum size for a RSA modulus (in bits); this value is used only to
+ * filter out invalid parameters for key pair generation. Normally,
+ * applications should not use RSA keys smaller than 2048 bits; but some
+ * specific cases might need shorter keys, for legacy or research
+ * purposes.
+ */
+#define BR_MIN_RSA_SIZE 512
+
+/*
+ * Maximum size for a RSA factor (in bits). This is for RSA private-key
+ * operations. Default is to support factors up to a bit more than half
+ * the maximum modulus size.
+ *
+ * This value MUST be a multiple of 32.
+ */
+#define BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR ((BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE + 64) >> 1)
+
+/*
+ * Maximum size for an EC curve (modulus or order), in bits. Size of
+ * stack buffers depends on that parameter. This size MUST be a multiple
+ * of 8 (so that decoding an integer with that many bytes does not
+ * overflow).
+ */
+#define BR_MAX_EC_SIZE 528
+
+/*
+ * Some macros to recognize the current architecture. Right now, we are
+ * interested into automatically recognizing architecture with efficient
+ * 64-bit types so that we may automatically use implementations that
+ * use 64-bit registers in that case. Future versions may detect, e.g.,
+ * availability of SSE2 intrinsics.
+ *
+ * If 'unsigned long' is a 64-bit type, then we assume that 64-bit types
+ * are efficient. Otherwise, we rely on macros that depend on compiler,
+ * OS and architecture. In any case, failure to detect the architecture
+ * as 64-bit means that the 32-bit code will be used, and that code
+ * works also on 64-bit architectures (the 64-bit code may simply be
+ * more efficient).
+ *
+ * The test on 'unsigned long' should already catch most cases, the one
+ * notable exception being Windows code where 'unsigned long' is kept to
+ * 32-bit for compatibility with all the legacy code that liberally uses
+ * the 'DWORD' type for 32-bit values.
+ *
+ * Macro names are taken from: http://nadeausoftware.com/articles/2012/02/c_c_tip_how_detect_processor_type_using_compiler_predefined_macros
+ */
+#ifndef BR_64
+#if ((ULONG_MAX >> 31) >> 31) == 3
+#define BR_64 1
+#elif defined(__ia64) || defined(__itanium__) || defined(_M_IA64)
+#define BR_64 1
+#elif defined(__powerpc64__) || defined(__ppc64__) || defined(__PPC64__) \
+ || defined(__64BIT__) || defined(_LP64) || defined(__LP64__)
+#define BR_64 1
+#elif defined(__sparc64__)
+#define BR_64 1
+#elif defined(__x86_64__) || defined(_M_X64)
+#define BR_64 1
+#elif defined(__aarch64__) || defined(_M_ARM64)
+#define BR_64 1
+#elif defined(__mips64)
+#define BR_64 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Set BR_LOMUL on platforms where it makes sense.
+ */
+#ifndef BR_LOMUL
+#if BR_ARMEL_CORTEXM_GCC
+#define BR_LOMUL 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Architecture detection.
+ */
+#ifndef BR_i386
+#if __i386__ || _M_IX86
+#define BR_i386 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef BR_amd64
+#if __x86_64__ || _M_X64
+#define BR_amd64 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Compiler brand and version.
+ *
+ * Implementations that use intrinsics need to detect the compiler type
+ * and version because some specific actions may be needed to activate
+ * the corresponding opcodes, both for header inclusion, and when using
+ * them in a function.
+ *
+ * BR_GCC, BR_CLANG and BR_MSC will be set to 1 for, respectively, GCC,
+ * Clang and MS Visual C. For each of them, sub-macros will be defined
+ * for versions; each sub-macro is set whenever the compiler version is
+ * at least as recent as the one corresponding to the macro.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * GCC thresholds are on versions 4.4 to 4.9 and 5.0.
+ */
+#ifndef BR_GCC
+#if __GNUC__ && !__clang__
+#define BR_GCC 1
+
+#if __GNUC__ > 4
+#define BR_GCC_5_0 1
+#elif __GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 9
+#define BR_GCC_4_9 1
+#elif __GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 8
+#define BR_GCC_4_8 1
+#elif __GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 7
+#define BR_GCC_4_7 1
+#elif __GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 6
+#define BR_GCC_4_6 1
+#elif __GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 5
+#define BR_GCC_4_5 1
+#elif __GNUC__ == 4 && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= 4
+#define BR_GCC_4_4 1
+#endif
+
+#if BR_GCC_5_0
+#define BR_GCC_4_9 1
+#endif
+#if BR_GCC_4_9
+#define BR_GCC_4_8 1
+#endif
+#if BR_GCC_4_8
+#define BR_GCC_4_7 1
+#endif
+#if BR_GCC_4_7
+#define BR_GCC_4_6 1
+#endif
+#if BR_GCC_4_6
+#define BR_GCC_4_5 1
+#endif
+#if BR_GCC_4_5
+#define BR_GCC_4_4 1
+#endif
+
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Clang thresholds are on versions 3.7.0 and 3.8.0.
+ */
+#ifndef BR_CLANG
+#if __clang__
+#define BR_CLANG 1
+
+#if __clang_major__ > 3 || (__clang_major__ == 3 && __clang_minor__ >= 8)
+#define BR_CLANG_3_8 1
+#elif __clang_major__ == 3 && __clang_minor__ >= 7
+#define BR_CLANG_3_7 1
+#endif
+
+#if BR_CLANG_3_8
+#define BR_CLANG_3_7 1
+#endif
+
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * MS Visual C thresholds are on Visual Studio 2005 to 2015.
+ */
+#ifndef BR_MSC
+#if _MSC_VER
+#define BR_MSC 1
+
+#if _MSC_VER >= 1900
+#define BR_MSC_2015 1
+#elif _MSC_VER >= 1800
+#define BR_MSC_2013 1
+#elif _MSC_VER >= 1700
+#define BR_MSC_2012 1
+#elif _MSC_VER >= 1600
+#define BR_MSC_2010 1
+#elif _MSC_VER >= 1500
+#define BR_MSC_2008 1
+#elif _MSC_VER >= 1400
+#define BR_MSC_2005 1
+#endif
+
+#if BR_MSC_2015
+#define BR_MSC_2013 1
+#endif
+#if BR_MSC_2013
+#define BR_MSC_2012 1
+#endif
+#if BR_MSC_2012
+#define BR_MSC_2010 1
+#endif
+#if BR_MSC_2010
+#define BR_MSC_2008 1
+#endif
+#if BR_MSC_2008
+#define BR_MSC_2005 1
+#endif
+
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * GCC 4.4+ and Clang 3.7+ allow tagging specific functions with a
+ * 'target' attribute that activates support for specific opcodes.
+ */
+#if BR_GCC_4_4 || BR_CLANG_3_7
+#define BR_TARGET(x) __attribute__((target(x)))
+#else
+#define BR_TARGET(x)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * AES-NI intrinsics are available on x86 (32-bit and 64-bit) with
+ * GCC 4.8+, Clang 3.7+ and MSC 2012+.
+ */
+#ifndef BR_AES_X86NI
+#if (BR_i386 || BR_amd64) && (BR_GCC_4_8 || BR_CLANG_3_7 || BR_MSC_2012)
+#define BR_AES_X86NI 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * SSE2 intrinsics are available on x86 (32-bit and 64-bit) with
+ * GCC 4.4+, Clang 3.7+ and MSC 2005+.
+ */
+#ifndef BR_SSE2
+#if (BR_i386 || BR_amd64) && (BR_GCC_4_4 || BR_CLANG_3_7 || BR_MSC_2005)
+#define BR_SSE2 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * RDRAND intrinsics are available on x86 (32-bit and 64-bit) with
+ * GCC 4.6+, Clang 3.7+ and MSC 2012+.
+ */
+#ifndef BR_RDRAND
+#if (BR_i386 || BR_amd64) && (BR_GCC_4_6 || BR_CLANG_3_7 || BR_MSC_2012)
+#define BR_RDRAND 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Determine type of OS for random number generation. Macro names and
+ * values are documented on:
+ * https://sourceforge.net/p/predef/wiki/OperatingSystems/
+ *
+ * Win32's CryptGenRandom() should be available on Windows systems.
+ *
+ * /dev/urandom should work on all Unix-like systems (including macOS X).
+ *
+ * getentropy() is present on Linux (Glibc 2.25+), FreeBSD (12.0+) and
+ * OpenBSD (5.6+). For OpenBSD, there does not seem to be easy to use
+ * macros to test the minimum version, so we just assume that it is
+ * recent enough (last version without getentropy() has gone out of
+ * support in May 2015).
+ *
+ * Ideally we should use getentropy() on macOS (10.12+) too, but I don't
+ * know how to test the exact OS version with preprocessor macros.
+ *
+ * TODO: enrich the list of detected system.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BR_USE_URANDOM
+#if defined _AIX \
+ || defined __ANDROID__ \
+ || defined __FreeBSD__ \
+ || defined __NetBSD__ \
+ || defined __OpenBSD__ \
+ || defined __DragonFly__ \
+ || defined __linux__ \
+ || (defined __sun && (defined __SVR4 || defined __svr4__)) \
+ || (defined __APPLE__ && defined __MACH__)
+#define BR_USE_URANDOM 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef BR_USE_GETENTROPY
+#if (defined __linux__ \
+ && (__GLIBC__ > 2 || (__GLIBC__ == 2 && __GLIBC_MINOR__ >= 25))) \
+ || (defined __FreeBSD__ && __FreeBSD__ >= 12) \
+ || defined __OpenBSD__
+#define BR_USE_GETENTROPY 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef BR_USE_WIN32_RAND
+#if defined _WIN32 || defined _WIN64
+#define BR_USE_WIN32_RAND 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * POWER8 crypto support. We rely on compiler macros for the
+ * architecture, since we do not have a reliable, simple way to detect
+ * the required support at runtime (we could try running an opcode, and
+ * trapping the exception or signal on illegal instruction, but this
+ * induces some non-trivial OS dependencies that we would prefer to
+ * avoid if possible).
+ */
+#ifndef BR_POWER8
+#if __GNUC__ && ((_ARCH_PWR8 || _ARCH_PPC) && __CRYPTO__)
+#define BR_POWER8 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Detect endinanness on POWER8.
+ */
+#if BR_POWER8
+#if defined BR_POWER8_LE
+#undef BR_POWER8_BE
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+#define BR_POWER8_BE 0
+#else
+#define BR_POWER8_BE 1
+#endif
+#elif defined BR_POWER8_BE
+#undef BR_POWER8_LE
+#if BR_POWER8_BE
+#define BR_POWER8_LE 0
+#else
+#define BR_POWER8_LE 1
+#endif
+#else
+#if __LITTLE_ENDIAN__
+#define BR_POWER8_LE 1
+#define BR_POWER8_BE 0
+#else
+#define BR_POWER8_LE 0
+#define BR_POWER8_BE 1
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Detect support for 128-bit integers.
+ */
+#if !defined BR_INT128 && !defined BR_UMUL128
+#ifdef __SIZEOF_INT128__
+#define BR_INT128 1
+#elif _M_X64
+#define BR_UMUL128 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Detect support for unaligned accesses with known endianness.
+ *
+ * x86 (both 32-bit and 64-bit) is little-endian and allows unaligned
+ * accesses.
+ *
+ * POWER/PowerPC allows unaligned accesses when big-endian. POWER8 and
+ * later also allow unaligned accesses when little-endian.
+ */
+#if !defined BR_LE_UNALIGNED && !defined BR_BE_UNALIGNED
+
+#if __i386 || __i386__ || __x86_64__ || _M_IX86 || _M_X64
+#define BR_LE_UNALIGNED 1
+#elif BR_POWER8_BE
+#define BR_BE_UNALIGNED 1
+#elif BR_POWER8_LE
+#define BR_LE_UNALIGNED 1
+#elif (__powerpc__ || __powerpc64__ || _M_PPC || _ARCH_PPC || _ARCH_PPC64) \
+ && __BIG_ENDIAN__
+#define BR_BE_UNALIGNED 1
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Detect support for an OS-provided time source.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BR_USE_UNIX_TIME
+#if defined __unix__ || defined __linux__ \
+ || defined _POSIX_SOURCE || defined _POSIX_C_SOURCE \
+ || (defined __APPLE__ && defined __MACH__)
+#define BR_USE_UNIX_TIME 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef BR_USE_WIN32_TIME
+#if defined _WIN32 || defined _WIN64
+#define BR_USE_WIN32_TIME 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+/*
+ * Encoding/decoding functions.
+ *
+ * 32-bit and 64-bit decoding, both little-endian and big-endian, is
+ * implemented with the inline functions below.
+ *
+ * When allowed by some compile-time options (autodetected or provided),
+ * optimised code is used, to perform direct memory access when the
+ * underlying architecture supports it, both for endianness and
+ * alignment. This, however, may trigger strict aliasing issues; the
+ * code below uses unions to perform (supposedly) safe type punning.
+ * Since the C aliasing rules are relatively complex and were amended,
+ * or at least re-explained with different phrasing, in all successive
+ * versions of the C standard, it is always a bit risky to bet that any
+ * specific version of a C compiler got it right, for some notion of
+ * "right".
+ */
+
+typedef union {
+ uint16_t u;
+ unsigned char b[sizeof(uint16_t)];
+} br_union_u16;
+
+typedef union {
+ uint32_t u;
+ unsigned char b[sizeof(uint32_t)];
+} br_union_u32;
+
+typedef union {
+ uint64_t u;
+ unsigned char b[sizeof(uint64_t)];
+} br_union_u64;
+
+static inline void
+br_enc16le(void *dst, unsigned x)
+{
+#if BR_LE_UNALIGNED
+ ((br_union_u16 *)dst)->u = x;
+#else
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = dst;
+ buf[0] = (unsigned char)x;
+ buf[1] = (unsigned char)(x >> 8);
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline void
+br_enc16be(void *dst, unsigned x)
+{
+#if BR_BE_UNALIGNED
+ ((br_union_u16 *)dst)->u = x;
+#else
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = dst;
+ buf[0] = (unsigned char)(x >> 8);
+ buf[1] = (unsigned char)x;
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline unsigned
+br_dec16le(const void *src)
+{
+#if BR_LE_UNALIGNED
+ return ((const br_union_u16 *)src)->u;
+#else
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = src;
+ return (unsigned)buf[0] | ((unsigned)buf[1] << 8);
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline unsigned
+br_dec16be(const void *src)
+{
+#if BR_BE_UNALIGNED
+ return ((const br_union_u16 *)src)->u;
+#else
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = src;
+ return ((unsigned)buf[0] << 8) | (unsigned)buf[1];
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline void
+br_enc32le(void *dst, uint32_t x)
+{
+#if BR_LE_UNALIGNED
+ ((br_union_u32 *)dst)->u = x;
+#else
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = dst;
+ buf[0] = (unsigned char)x;
+ buf[1] = (unsigned char)(x >> 8);
+ buf[2] = (unsigned char)(x >> 16);
+ buf[3] = (unsigned char)(x >> 24);
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline void
+br_enc32be(void *dst, uint32_t x)
+{
+#if BR_BE_UNALIGNED
+ ((br_union_u32 *)dst)->u = x;
+#else
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = dst;
+ buf[0] = (unsigned char)(x >> 24);
+ buf[1] = (unsigned char)(x >> 16);
+ buf[2] = (unsigned char)(x >> 8);
+ buf[3] = (unsigned char)x;
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline uint32_t
+br_dec32le(const void *src)
+{
+#if BR_LE_UNALIGNED
+ return ((const br_union_u32 *)src)->u;
+#else
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = src;
+ return (uint32_t)buf[0]
+ | ((uint32_t)buf[1] << 8)
+ | ((uint32_t)buf[2] << 16)
+ | ((uint32_t)buf[3] << 24);
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline uint32_t
+br_dec32be(const void *src)
+{
+#if BR_BE_UNALIGNED
+ return ((const br_union_u32 *)src)->u;
+#else
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = src;
+ return ((uint32_t)buf[0] << 24)
+ | ((uint32_t)buf[1] << 16)
+ | ((uint32_t)buf[2] << 8)
+ | (uint32_t)buf[3];
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline void
+br_enc64le(void *dst, uint64_t x)
+{
+#if BR_LE_UNALIGNED
+ ((br_union_u64 *)dst)->u = x;
+#else
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = dst;
+ br_enc32le(buf, (uint32_t)x);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 4, (uint32_t)(x >> 32));
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline void
+br_enc64be(void *dst, uint64_t x)
+{
+#if BR_BE_UNALIGNED
+ ((br_union_u64 *)dst)->u = x;
+#else
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = dst;
+ br_enc32be(buf, (uint32_t)(x >> 32));
+ br_enc32be(buf + 4, (uint32_t)x);
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline uint64_t
+br_dec64le(const void *src)
+{
+#if BR_LE_UNALIGNED
+ return ((const br_union_u64 *)src)->u;
+#else
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = src;
+ return (uint64_t)br_dec32le(buf)
+ | ((uint64_t)br_dec32le(buf + 4) << 32);
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline uint64_t
+br_dec64be(const void *src)
+{
+#if BR_BE_UNALIGNED
+ return ((const br_union_u64 *)src)->u;
+#else
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = src;
+ return ((uint64_t)br_dec32be(buf) << 32)
+ | (uint64_t)br_dec32be(buf + 4);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Range decoding and encoding (for several successive values).
+ */
+void br_range_dec16le(uint16_t *v, size_t num, const void *src);
+void br_range_dec16be(uint16_t *v, size_t num, const void *src);
+void br_range_enc16le(void *dst, const uint16_t *v, size_t num);
+void br_range_enc16be(void *dst, const uint16_t *v, size_t num);
+
+void br_range_dec32le(uint32_t *v, size_t num, const void *src);
+void br_range_dec32be(uint32_t *v, size_t num, const void *src);
+void br_range_enc32le(void *dst, const uint32_t *v, size_t num);
+void br_range_enc32be(void *dst, const uint32_t *v, size_t num);
+
+void br_range_dec64le(uint64_t *v, size_t num, const void *src);
+void br_range_dec64be(uint64_t *v, size_t num, const void *src);
+void br_range_enc64le(void *dst, const uint64_t *v, size_t num);
+void br_range_enc64be(void *dst, const uint64_t *v, size_t num);
+
+/*
+ * Byte-swap a 32-bit integer.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+br_swap32(uint32_t x)
+{
+ x = ((x & (uint32_t)0x00FF00FF) << 8)
+ | ((x >> 8) & (uint32_t)0x00FF00FF);
+ return (x << 16) | (x >> 16);
+}
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+/*
+ * Support code for hash functions.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * IV for MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256.
+ */
+extern const uint32_t br_md5_IV[];
+extern const uint32_t br_sha1_IV[];
+extern const uint32_t br_sha224_IV[];
+extern const uint32_t br_sha256_IV[];
+
+/*
+ * Round functions for MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 (SHA-224 and
+ * SHA-256 use the same round function).
+ */
+void br_md5_round(const unsigned char *buf, uint32_t *val);
+void br_sha1_round(const unsigned char *buf, uint32_t *val);
+void br_sha2small_round(const unsigned char *buf, uint32_t *val);
+
+/*
+ * The core function for the TLS PRF. It computes
+ * P_hash(secret, label + seed), and XORs the result into the dst buffer.
+ */
+void br_tls_phash(void *dst, size_t len,
+ const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *secret, size_t secret_len, const char *label,
+ size_t seed_num, const br_tls_prf_seed_chunk *seed);
+
+/*
+ * Copy all configured hash implementations from a multihash context
+ * to another.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_multihash_copyimpl(br_multihash_context *dst,
+ const br_multihash_context *src)
+{
+ memcpy((void *)dst->impl, src->impl, sizeof src->impl);
+}
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+/*
+ * Constant-time primitives. These functions manipulate 32-bit values in
+ * order to provide constant-time comparisons and multiplexers.
+ *
+ * Boolean values (the "ctl" bits) MUST have value 0 or 1.
+ *
+ * Implementation notes:
+ * =====================
+ *
+ * The uintN_t types are unsigned and with width exactly N bits; the C
+ * standard guarantees that computations are performed modulo 2^N, and
+ * there can be no overflow. Negation (unary '-') works on unsigned types
+ * as well.
+ *
+ * The intN_t types are guaranteed to have width exactly N bits, with no
+ * padding bit, and using two's complement representation. Casting
+ * intN_t to uintN_t really is conversion modulo 2^N. Beware that intN_t
+ * types, being signed, trigger implementation-defined behaviour on
+ * overflow (including raising some signal): with GCC, while modular
+ * arithmetics are usually applied, the optimizer may assume that
+ * overflows don't occur (unless the -fwrapv command-line option is
+ * added); Clang has the additional -ftrapv option to explicitly trap on
+ * integer overflow or underflow.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Negate a boolean.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+NOT(uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ return ctl ^ 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiplexer: returns x if ctl == 1, y if ctl == 0.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+MUX(uint32_t ctl, uint32_t x, uint32_t y)
+{
+ return y ^ (-ctl & (x ^ y));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Equality check: returns 1 if x == y, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+EQ(uint32_t x, uint32_t y)
+{
+ uint32_t q;
+
+ q = x ^ y;
+ return NOT((q | -q) >> 31);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Inequality check: returns 1 if x != y, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+NEQ(uint32_t x, uint32_t y)
+{
+ uint32_t q;
+
+ q = x ^ y;
+ return (q | -q) >> 31;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Comparison: returns 1 if x > y, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+GT(uint32_t x, uint32_t y)
+{
+ /*
+ * If both x < 2^31 and x < 2^31, then y-x will have its high
+ * bit set if x > y, cleared otherwise.
+ *
+ * If either x >= 2^31 or y >= 2^31 (but not both), then the
+ * result is the high bit of x.
+ *
+ * If both x >= 2^31 and y >= 2^31, then we can virtually
+ * subtract 2^31 from both, and we are back to the first case.
+ * Since (y-2^31)-(x-2^31) = y-x, the subtraction is already
+ * fine.
+ */
+ uint32_t z;
+
+ z = y - x;
+ return (z ^ ((x ^ y) & (x ^ z))) >> 31;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Other comparisons (greater-or-equal, lower-than, lower-or-equal).
+ */
+#define GE(x, y) NOT(GT(y, x))
+#define LT(x, y) GT(y, x)
+#define LE(x, y) NOT(GT(x, y))
+
+/*
+ * General comparison: returned value is -1, 0 or 1, depending on
+ * whether x is lower than, equal to, or greater than y.
+ */
+static inline int32_t
+CMP(uint32_t x, uint32_t y)
+{
+ return (int32_t)GT(x, y) | -(int32_t)GT(y, x);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 1 if x == 0, 0 otherwise. Take care that the operand is signed.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+EQ0(int32_t x)
+{
+ uint32_t q;
+
+ q = (uint32_t)x;
+ return ~(q | -q) >> 31;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 1 if x > 0, 0 otherwise. Take care that the operand is signed.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+GT0(int32_t x)
+{
+ /*
+ * High bit of -x is 0 if x == 0, but 1 if x > 0.
+ */
+ uint32_t q;
+
+ q = (uint32_t)x;
+ return (~q & -q) >> 31;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 1 if x >= 0, 0 otherwise. Take care that the operand is signed.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+GE0(int32_t x)
+{
+ return ~(uint32_t)x >> 31;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 1 if x < 0, 0 otherwise. Take care that the operand is signed.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+LT0(int32_t x)
+{
+ return (uint32_t)x >> 31;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 1 if x <= 0, 0 otherwise. Take care that the operand is signed.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+LE0(int32_t x)
+{
+ uint32_t q;
+
+ /*
+ * ~-x has its high bit set if and only if -x is nonnegative (as
+ * a signed int), i.e. x is in the -(2^31-1) to 0 range. We must
+ * do an OR with x itself to account for x = -2^31.
+ */
+ q = (uint32_t)x;
+ return (q | ~-q) >> 31;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Conditional copy: src[] is copied into dst[] if and only if ctl is 1.
+ * dst[] and src[] may overlap completely (but not partially).
+ */
+void br_ccopy(uint32_t ctl, void *dst, const void *src, size_t len);
+
+#define CCOPY br_ccopy
+
+/*
+ * Compute the bit length of a 32-bit integer. Returned value is between 0
+ * and 32 (inclusive).
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+BIT_LENGTH(uint32_t x)
+{
+ uint32_t k, c;
+
+ k = NEQ(x, 0);
+ c = GT(x, 0xFFFF); x = MUX(c, x >> 16, x); k += c << 4;
+ c = GT(x, 0x00FF); x = MUX(c, x >> 8, x); k += c << 3;
+ c = GT(x, 0x000F); x = MUX(c, x >> 4, x); k += c << 2;
+ c = GT(x, 0x0003); x = MUX(c, x >> 2, x); k += c << 1;
+ k += GT(x, 0x0001);
+ return k;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the minimum of x and y.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+MIN(uint32_t x, uint32_t y)
+{
+ return MUX(GT(x, y), y, x);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the maximum of x and y.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+MAX(uint32_t x, uint32_t y)
+{
+ return MUX(GT(x, y), x, y);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiply two 32-bit integers, with a 64-bit result. This default
+ * implementation assumes that the basic multiplication operator
+ * yields constant-time code.
+ */
+#define MUL(x, y) ((uint64_t)(x) * (uint64_t)(y))
+
+#if BR_CT_MUL31
+
+/*
+ * Alternate implementation of MUL31, that will be constant-time on some
+ * (old) platforms where the default MUL31 is not. Unfortunately, it is
+ * also substantially slower, and yields larger code, on more modern
+ * platforms, which is why it is deactivated by default.
+ *
+ * MUL31_lo() must do some extra work because on some platforms, the
+ * _signed_ multiplication may return early if the top bits are 1.
+ * Simply truncating (casting) the output of MUL31() would not be
+ * sufficient, because the compiler may notice that we keep only the low
+ * word, and then replace automatically the unsigned multiplication with
+ * a signed multiplication opcode.
+ */
+#define MUL31(x, y) ((uint64_t)((x) | (uint32_t)0x80000000) \
+ * (uint64_t)((y) | (uint32_t)0x80000000) \
+ - ((uint64_t)(x) << 31) - ((uint64_t)(y) << 31) \
+ - ((uint64_t)1 << 62))
+static inline uint32_t
+MUL31_lo(uint32_t x, uint32_t y)
+{
+ uint32_t xl, xh;
+ uint32_t yl, yh;
+
+ xl = (x & 0xFFFF) | (uint32_t)0x80000000;
+ xh = (x >> 16) | (uint32_t)0x80000000;
+ yl = (y & 0xFFFF) | (uint32_t)0x80000000;
+ yh = (y >> 16) | (uint32_t)0x80000000;
+ return (xl * yl + ((xl * yh + xh * yl) << 16)) & (uint32_t)0x7FFFFFFF;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/*
+ * Multiply two 31-bit integers, with a 62-bit result. This default
+ * implementation assumes that the basic multiplication operator
+ * yields constant-time code.
+ * The MUL31_lo() macro returns only the low 31 bits of the product.
+ */
+#define MUL31(x, y) ((uint64_t)(x) * (uint64_t)(y))
+#define MUL31_lo(x, y) (((uint32_t)(x) * (uint32_t)(y)) & (uint32_t)0x7FFFFFFF)
+
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Multiply two words together; the sum of the lengths of the two
+ * operands must not exceed 31 (for instance, one operand may use 16
+ * bits if the other fits on 15). If BR_CT_MUL15 is non-zero, then the
+ * macro will contain some extra operations that help in making the
+ * operation constant-time on some platforms, where the basic 32-bit
+ * multiplication is not constant-time.
+ */
+#if BR_CT_MUL15
+#define MUL15(x, y) (((uint32_t)(x) | (uint32_t)0x80000000) \
+ * ((uint32_t)(y) | (uint32_t)0x80000000) \
+ & (uint32_t)0x7FFFFFFF)
+#else
+#define MUL15(x, y) ((uint32_t)(x) * (uint32_t)(y))
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Arithmetic right shift (sign bit is copied). What happens when
+ * right-shifting a negative value is _implementation-defined_, so it
+ * does not trigger undefined behaviour, but it is still up to each
+ * compiler to define (and document) what it does. Most/all compilers
+ * will do an arithmetic shift, the sign bit being used to fill the
+ * holes; this is a native operation on the underlying CPU, and it would
+ * make little sense for the compiler to do otherwise. GCC explicitly
+ * documents that it follows that convention.
+ *
+ * Still, if BR_NO_ARITH_SHIFT is defined (and non-zero), then an
+ * alternate version will be used, that does not rely on such
+ * implementation-defined behaviour. Unfortunately, it is also slower
+ * and yields bigger code, which is why it is deactivated by default.
+ */
+#if BR_NO_ARITH_SHIFT
+#define ARSH(x, n) (((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)) \
+ | ((-((uint32_t)(x) >> 31)) << (32 - (n))))
+#else
+#define ARSH(x, n) ((*(int32_t *)&(x)) >> (n))
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Constant-time division. The dividend hi:lo is divided by the
+ * divisor d; the quotient is returned and the remainder is written
+ * in *r. If hi == d, then the quotient does not fit on 32 bits;
+ * returned value is thus truncated. If hi > d, returned values are
+ * indeterminate.
+ */
+uint32_t br_divrem(uint32_t hi, uint32_t lo, uint32_t d, uint32_t *r);
+
+/*
+ * Wrapper for br_divrem(); the remainder is returned, and the quotient
+ * is discarded.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+br_rem(uint32_t hi, uint32_t lo, uint32_t d)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ br_divrem(hi, lo, d, &r);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wrapper for br_divrem(); the quotient is returned, and the remainder
+ * is discarded.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+br_div(uint32_t hi, uint32_t lo, uint32_t d)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ return br_divrem(hi, lo, d, &r);
+}
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+
+/*
+ * Integers 'i32'
+ * --------------
+ *
+ * The 'i32' functions implement computations on big integers using
+ * an internal representation as an array of 32-bit integers. For
+ * an array x[]:
+ * -- x[0] contains the "announced bit length" of the integer
+ * -- x[1], x[2]... contain the value in little-endian order (x[1]
+ * contains the least significant 32 bits)
+ *
+ * Multiplications rely on the elementary 32x32->64 multiplication.
+ *
+ * The announced bit length specifies the number of bits that are
+ * significant in the subsequent 32-bit words. Unused bits in the
+ * last (most significant) word are set to 0; subsequent words are
+ * uninitialized and need not exist at all.
+ *
+ * The execution time and memory access patterns of all computations
+ * depend on the announced bit length, but not on the actual word
+ * values. For modular integers, the announced bit length of any integer
+ * modulo n is equal to the actual bit length of n; thus, computations
+ * on modular integers are "constant-time" (only the modulus length may
+ * leak).
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Compute the actual bit length of an integer. The argument x should
+ * point to the first (least significant) value word of the integer.
+ * The len 'xlen' contains the number of 32-bit words to access.
+ *
+ * CT: value or length of x does not leak.
+ */
+uint32_t br_i32_bit_length(uint32_t *x, size_t xlen);
+
+/*
+ * Decode an integer from its big-endian unsigned representation. The
+ * "true" bit length of the integer is computed, but all words of x[]
+ * corresponding to the full 'len' bytes of the source are set.
+ *
+ * CT: value or length of x does not leak.
+ */
+void br_i32_decode(uint32_t *x, const void *src, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Decode an integer from its big-endian unsigned representation. The
+ * integer MUST be lower than m[]; the announced bit length written in
+ * x[] will be equal to that of m[]. All 'len' bytes from the source are
+ * read.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 if the decode value fits within the modulus, 0
+ * otherwise. In the latter case, the x[] buffer will be set to 0 (but
+ * still with the announced bit length of m[]).
+ *
+ * CT: value or length of x does not leak. Memory access pattern depends
+ * only of 'len' and the announced bit length of m. Whether x fits or
+ * not does not leak either.
+ */
+uint32_t br_i32_decode_mod(uint32_t *x,
+ const void *src, size_t len, const uint32_t *m);
+
+/*
+ * Reduce an integer (a[]) modulo another (m[]). The result is written
+ * in x[] and its announced bit length is set to be equal to that of m[].
+ *
+ * x[] MUST be distinct from a[] and m[].
+ *
+ * CT: only announced bit lengths leak, not values of x, a or m.
+ */
+void br_i32_reduce(uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *m);
+
+/*
+ * Decode an integer from its big-endian unsigned representation, and
+ * reduce it modulo the provided modulus m[]. The announced bit length
+ * of the result is set to be equal to that of the modulus.
+ *
+ * x[] MUST be distinct from m[].
+ */
+void br_i32_decode_reduce(uint32_t *x,
+ const void *src, size_t len, const uint32_t *m);
+
+/*
+ * Encode an integer into its big-endian unsigned representation. The
+ * output length in bytes is provided (parameter 'len'); if the length
+ * is too short then the integer is appropriately truncated; if it is
+ * too long then the extra bytes are set to 0.
+ */
+void br_i32_encode(void *dst, size_t len, const uint32_t *x);
+
+/*
+ * Multiply x[] by 2^32 and then add integer z, modulo m[]. This
+ * function assumes that x[] and m[] have the same announced bit
+ * length, and the announced bit length of m[] matches its true
+ * bit length.
+ *
+ * x[] and m[] MUST be distinct arrays.
+ *
+ * CT: only the common announced bit length of x and m leaks, not
+ * the values of x, z or m.
+ */
+void br_i32_muladd_small(uint32_t *x, uint32_t z, const uint32_t *m);
+
+/*
+ * Extract one word from an integer. The offset is counted in bits.
+ * The word MUST entirely fit within the word elements corresponding
+ * to the announced bit length of a[].
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+br_i32_word(const uint32_t *a, uint32_t off)
+{
+ size_t u;
+ unsigned j;
+
+ u = (size_t)(off >> 5) + 1;
+ j = (unsigned)off & 31;
+ if (j == 0) {
+ return a[u];
+ } else {
+ return (a[u] >> j) | (a[u + 1] << (32 - j));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test whether an integer is zero.
+ */
+uint32_t br_i32_iszero(const uint32_t *x);
+
+/*
+ * Add b[] to a[] and return the carry (0 or 1). If ctl is 0, then a[]
+ * is unmodified, but the carry is still computed and returned. The
+ * arrays a[] and b[] MUST have the same announced bit length.
+ *
+ * a[] and b[] MAY be the same array, but partial overlap is not allowed.
+ */
+uint32_t br_i32_add(uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b, uint32_t ctl);
+
+/*
+ * Subtract b[] from a[] and return the carry (0 or 1). If ctl is 0,
+ * then a[] is unmodified, but the carry is still computed and returned.
+ * The arrays a[] and b[] MUST have the same announced bit length.
+ *
+ * a[] and b[] MAY be the same array, but partial overlap is not allowed.
+ */
+uint32_t br_i32_sub(uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b, uint32_t ctl);
+
+/*
+ * Compute d+a*b, result in d. The initial announced bit length of d[]
+ * MUST match that of a[]. The d[] array MUST be large enough to
+ * accommodate the full result, plus (possibly) an extra word. The
+ * resulting announced bit length of d[] will be the sum of the announced
+ * bit lengths of a[] and b[] (therefore, it may be larger than the actual
+ * bit length of the numerical result).
+ *
+ * a[] and b[] may be the same array. d[] must be disjoint from both a[]
+ * and b[].
+ */
+void br_i32_mulacc(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b);
+
+/*
+ * Zeroize an integer. The announced bit length is set to the provided
+ * value, and the corresponding words are set to 0.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_i32_zero(uint32_t *x, uint32_t bit_len)
+{
+ *x ++ = bit_len;
+ memset(x, 0, ((bit_len + 31) >> 5) * sizeof *x);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute -(1/x) mod 2^32. If x is even, then this function returns 0.
+ */
+uint32_t br_i32_ninv32(uint32_t x);
+
+/*
+ * Convert a modular integer to Montgomery representation. The integer x[]
+ * MUST be lower than m[], but with the same announced bit length.
+ */
+void br_i32_to_monty(uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *m);
+
+/*
+ * Convert a modular integer back from Montgomery representation. The
+ * integer x[] MUST be lower than m[], but with the same announced bit
+ * length. The "m0i" parameter is equal to -(1/m0) mod 2^32, where m0 is
+ * the least significant value word of m[] (this works only if m[] is
+ * an odd integer).
+ */
+void br_i32_from_monty(uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i);
+
+/*
+ * Compute a modular Montgomery multiplication. d[] is filled with the
+ * value of x*y/R modulo m[] (where R is the Montgomery factor). The
+ * array d[] MUST be distinct from x[], y[] and m[]. x[] and y[] MUST be
+ * numerically lower than m[]. x[] and y[] MAY be the same array. The
+ * "m0i" parameter is equal to -(1/m0) mod 2^32, where m0 is the least
+ * significant value word of m[] (this works only if m[] is an odd
+ * integer).
+ */
+void br_i32_montymul(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *y,
+ const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i);
+
+/*
+ * Compute a modular exponentiation. x[] MUST be an integer modulo m[]
+ * (same announced bit length, lower value). m[] MUST be odd. The
+ * exponent is in big-endian unsigned notation, over 'elen' bytes. The
+ * "m0i" parameter is equal to -(1/m0) mod 2^32, where m0 is the least
+ * significant value word of m[] (this works only if m[] is an odd
+ * integer). The t1[] and t2[] parameters must be temporary arrays,
+ * each large enough to accommodate an integer with the same size as m[].
+ */
+void br_i32_modpow(uint32_t *x, const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
+ const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i, uint32_t *t1, uint32_t *t2);
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+
+/*
+ * Integers 'i31'
+ * --------------
+ *
+ * The 'i31' functions implement computations on big integers using
+ * an internal representation as an array of 32-bit integers. For
+ * an array x[]:
+ * -- x[0] encodes the array length and the "announced bit length"
+ * of the integer: namely, if the announced bit length is k,
+ * then x[0] = ((k / 31) << 5) + (k % 31).
+ * -- x[1], x[2]... contain the value in little-endian order, 31
+ * bits per word (x[1] contains the least significant 31 bits).
+ * The upper bit of each word is 0.
+ *
+ * Multiplications rely on the elementary 32x32->64 multiplication.
+ *
+ * The announced bit length specifies the number of bits that are
+ * significant in the subsequent 32-bit words. Unused bits in the
+ * last (most significant) word are set to 0; subsequent words are
+ * uninitialized and need not exist at all.
+ *
+ * The execution time and memory access patterns of all computations
+ * depend on the announced bit length, but not on the actual word
+ * values. For modular integers, the announced bit length of any integer
+ * modulo n is equal to the actual bit length of n; thus, computations
+ * on modular integers are "constant-time" (only the modulus length may
+ * leak).
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Test whether an integer is zero.
+ */
+uint32_t br_i31_iszero(const uint32_t *x);
+
+/*
+ * Add b[] to a[] and return the carry (0 or 1). If ctl is 0, then a[]
+ * is unmodified, but the carry is still computed and returned. The
+ * arrays a[] and b[] MUST have the same announced bit length.
+ *
+ * a[] and b[] MAY be the same array, but partial overlap is not allowed.
+ */
+uint32_t br_i31_add(uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b, uint32_t ctl);
+
+/*
+ * Subtract b[] from a[] and return the carry (0 or 1). If ctl is 0,
+ * then a[] is unmodified, but the carry is still computed and returned.
+ * The arrays a[] and b[] MUST have the same announced bit length.
+ *
+ * a[] and b[] MAY be the same array, but partial overlap is not allowed.
+ */
+uint32_t br_i31_sub(uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b, uint32_t ctl);
+
+/*
+ * Compute the ENCODED actual bit length of an integer. The argument x
+ * should point to the first (least significant) value word of the
+ * integer. The len 'xlen' contains the number of 32-bit words to
+ * access. The upper bit of each value word MUST be 0.
+ * Returned value is ((k / 31) << 5) + (k % 31) if the bit length is k.
+ *
+ * CT: value or length of x does not leak.
+ */
+uint32_t br_i31_bit_length(uint32_t *x, size_t xlen);
+
+/*
+ * Decode an integer from its big-endian unsigned representation. The
+ * "true" bit length of the integer is computed and set in the encoded
+ * announced bit length (x[0]), but all words of x[] corresponding to
+ * the full 'len' bytes of the source are set.
+ *
+ * CT: value or length of x does not leak.
+ */
+void br_i31_decode(uint32_t *x, const void *src, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Decode an integer from its big-endian unsigned representation. The
+ * integer MUST be lower than m[]; the (encoded) announced bit length
+ * written in x[] will be equal to that of m[]. All 'len' bytes from the
+ * source are read.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 if the decode value fits within the modulus, 0
+ * otherwise. In the latter case, the x[] buffer will be set to 0 (but
+ * still with the announced bit length of m[]).
+ *
+ * CT: value or length of x does not leak. Memory access pattern depends
+ * only of 'len' and the announced bit length of m. Whether x fits or
+ * not does not leak either.
+ */
+uint32_t br_i31_decode_mod(uint32_t *x,
+ const void *src, size_t len, const uint32_t *m);
+
+/*
+ * Zeroize an integer. The announced bit length is set to the provided
+ * value, and the corresponding words are set to 0. The ENCODED bit length
+ * is expected here.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_i31_zero(uint32_t *x, uint32_t bit_len)
+{
+ *x ++ = bit_len;
+ memset(x, 0, ((bit_len + 31) >> 5) * sizeof *x);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Right-shift an integer. The shift amount must be lower than 31
+ * bits.
+ */
+void br_i31_rshift(uint32_t *x, int count);
+
+/*
+ * Reduce an integer (a[]) modulo another (m[]). The result is written
+ * in x[] and its announced bit length is set to be equal to that of m[].
+ *
+ * x[] MUST be distinct from a[] and m[].
+ *
+ * CT: only announced bit lengths leak, not values of x, a or m.
+ */
+void br_i31_reduce(uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *m);
+
+/*
+ * Decode an integer from its big-endian unsigned representation, and
+ * reduce it modulo the provided modulus m[]. The announced bit length
+ * of the result is set to be equal to that of the modulus.
+ *
+ * x[] MUST be distinct from m[].
+ */
+void br_i31_decode_reduce(uint32_t *x,
+ const void *src, size_t len, const uint32_t *m);
+
+/*
+ * Multiply x[] by 2^31 and then add integer z, modulo m[]. This
+ * function assumes that x[] and m[] have the same announced bit
+ * length, the announced bit length of m[] matches its true
+ * bit length.
+ *
+ * x[] and m[] MUST be distinct arrays. z MUST fit in 31 bits (upper
+ * bit set to 0).
+ *
+ * CT: only the common announced bit length of x and m leaks, not
+ * the values of x, z or m.
+ */
+void br_i31_muladd_small(uint32_t *x, uint32_t z, const uint32_t *m);
+
+/*
+ * Encode an integer into its big-endian unsigned representation. The
+ * output length in bytes is provided (parameter 'len'); if the length
+ * is too short then the integer is appropriately truncated; if it is
+ * too long then the extra bytes are set to 0.
+ */
+void br_i31_encode(void *dst, size_t len, const uint32_t *x);
+
+/*
+ * Compute -(1/x) mod 2^31. If x is even, then this function returns 0.
+ */
+uint32_t br_i31_ninv31(uint32_t x);
+
+/*
+ * Compute a modular Montgomery multiplication. d[] is filled with the
+ * value of x*y/R modulo m[] (where R is the Montgomery factor). The
+ * array d[] MUST be distinct from x[], y[] and m[]. x[] and y[] MUST be
+ * numerically lower than m[]. x[] and y[] MAY be the same array. The
+ * "m0i" parameter is equal to -(1/m0) mod 2^31, where m0 is the least
+ * significant value word of m[] (this works only if m[] is an odd
+ * integer).
+ */
+void br_i31_montymul(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *y,
+ const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i);
+
+/*
+ * Convert a modular integer to Montgomery representation. The integer x[]
+ * MUST be lower than m[], but with the same announced bit length.
+ */
+void br_i31_to_monty(uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *m);
+
+/*
+ * Convert a modular integer back from Montgomery representation. The
+ * integer x[] MUST be lower than m[], but with the same announced bit
+ * length. The "m0i" parameter is equal to -(1/m0) mod 2^32, where m0 is
+ * the least significant value word of m[] (this works only if m[] is
+ * an odd integer).
+ */
+void br_i31_from_monty(uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i);
+
+/*
+ * Compute a modular exponentiation. x[] MUST be an integer modulo m[]
+ * (same announced bit length, lower value). m[] MUST be odd. The
+ * exponent is in big-endian unsigned notation, over 'elen' bytes. The
+ * "m0i" parameter is equal to -(1/m0) mod 2^31, where m0 is the least
+ * significant value word of m[] (this works only if m[] is an odd
+ * integer). The t1[] and t2[] parameters must be temporary arrays,
+ * each large enough to accommodate an integer with the same size as m[].
+ */
+void br_i31_modpow(uint32_t *x, const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
+ const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i, uint32_t *t1, uint32_t *t2);
+
+/*
+ * Compute a modular exponentiation. x[] MUST be an integer modulo m[]
+ * (same announced bit length, lower value). m[] MUST be odd. The
+ * exponent is in big-endian unsigned notation, over 'elen' bytes. The
+ * "m0i" parameter is equal to -(1/m0) mod 2^31, where m0 is the least
+ * significant value word of m[] (this works only if m[] is an odd
+ * integer). The tmp[] array is used for temporaries, and has size
+ * 'twlen' words; it must be large enough to accommodate at least two
+ * temporary values with the same size as m[] (including the leading
+ * "bit length" word). If there is room for more temporaries, then this
+ * function may use the extra room for window-based optimisation,
+ * resulting in faster computations.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 on success, 0 on error. An error is reported if
+ * the provided tmp[] array is too short.
+ */
+uint32_t br_i31_modpow_opt(uint32_t *x, const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
+ const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i, uint32_t *tmp, size_t twlen);
+
+/*
+ * Compute d+a*b, result in d. The initial announced bit length of d[]
+ * MUST match that of a[]. The d[] array MUST be large enough to
+ * accommodate the full result, plus (possibly) an extra word. The
+ * resulting announced bit length of d[] will be the sum of the announced
+ * bit lengths of a[] and b[] (therefore, it may be larger than the actual
+ * bit length of the numerical result).
+ *
+ * a[] and b[] may be the same array. d[] must be disjoint from both a[]
+ * and b[].
+ */
+void br_i31_mulacc(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b);
+
+/*
+ * Compute x/y mod m, result in x. Values x and y must be between 0 and
+ * m-1, and have the same announced bit length as m. Modulus m must be
+ * odd. The "m0i" parameter is equal to -1/m mod 2^31. The array 't'
+ * must point to a temporary area that can hold at least three integers
+ * of the size of m.
+ *
+ * m may not overlap x and y. x and y may overlap each other (this can
+ * be useful to test whether a value is invertible modulo m). t must be
+ * disjoint from all other arrays.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 on success, 0 otherwise. Success is attained if
+ * y is invertible modulo m.
+ */
+uint32_t br_i31_moddiv(uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *y,
+ const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i, uint32_t *t);
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+
+/*
+ * FIXME: document "i15" functions.
+ */
+
+static inline void
+br_i15_zero(uint16_t *x, uint16_t bit_len)
+{
+ *x ++ = bit_len;
+ memset(x, 0, ((bit_len + 15) >> 4) * sizeof *x);
+}
+
+uint32_t br_i15_iszero(const uint16_t *x);
+
+uint16_t br_i15_ninv15(uint16_t x);
+
+uint32_t br_i15_add(uint16_t *a, const uint16_t *b, uint32_t ctl);
+
+uint32_t br_i15_sub(uint16_t *a, const uint16_t *b, uint32_t ctl);
+
+void br_i15_muladd_small(uint16_t *x, uint16_t z, const uint16_t *m);
+
+void br_i15_montymul(uint16_t *d, const uint16_t *x, const uint16_t *y,
+ const uint16_t *m, uint16_t m0i);
+
+void br_i15_to_monty(uint16_t *x, const uint16_t *m);
+
+void br_i15_modpow(uint16_t *x, const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
+ const uint16_t *m, uint16_t m0i, uint16_t *t1, uint16_t *t2);
+
+uint32_t br_i15_modpow_opt(uint16_t *x, const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
+ const uint16_t *m, uint16_t m0i, uint16_t *tmp, size_t twlen);
+
+void br_i15_encode(void *dst, size_t len, const uint16_t *x);
+
+uint32_t br_i15_decode_mod(uint16_t *x,
+ const void *src, size_t len, const uint16_t *m);
+
+void br_i15_rshift(uint16_t *x, int count);
+
+uint32_t br_i15_bit_length(uint16_t *x, size_t xlen);
+
+void br_i15_decode(uint16_t *x, const void *src, size_t len);
+
+void br_i15_from_monty(uint16_t *x, const uint16_t *m, uint16_t m0i);
+
+void br_i15_decode_reduce(uint16_t *x,
+ const void *src, size_t len, const uint16_t *m);
+
+void br_i15_reduce(uint16_t *x, const uint16_t *a, const uint16_t *m);
+
+void br_i15_mulacc(uint16_t *d, const uint16_t *a, const uint16_t *b);
+
+uint32_t br_i15_moddiv(uint16_t *x, const uint16_t *y,
+ const uint16_t *m, uint16_t m0i, uint16_t *t);
+
+/*
+ * Variant of br_i31_modpow_opt() that internally uses 64x64->128
+ * multiplications. It expects the same parameters as br_i31_modpow_opt(),
+ * except that the temporaries should be 64-bit integers, not 32-bit
+ * integers.
+ */
+uint32_t br_i62_modpow_opt(uint32_t *x31, const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
+ const uint32_t *m31, uint32_t m0i31, uint64_t *tmp, size_t twlen);
+
+/*
+ * Type for a function with the same API as br_i31_modpow_opt() (some
+ * implementations of this type may have stricter alignment requirements
+ * on the temporaries).
+ */
+typedef uint32_t (*br_i31_modpow_opt_type)(uint32_t *x,
+ const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
+ const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i, uint32_t *tmp, size_t twlen);
+
+/*
+ * Wrapper for br_i62_modpow_opt() that uses the same type as
+ * br_i31_modpow_opt(); however, it requires its 'tmp' argument to the
+ * 64-bit aligned.
+ */
+uint32_t br_i62_modpow_opt_as_i31(uint32_t *x,
+ const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
+ const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i, uint32_t *tmp, size_t twlen);
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+
+static inline size_t
+br_digest_size(const br_hash_class *digest_class)
+{
+ return (size_t)(digest_class->desc >> BR_HASHDESC_OUT_OFF)
+ & BR_HASHDESC_OUT_MASK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the output size (in bytes) of a hash function.
+ */
+size_t br_digest_size_by_ID(int digest_id);
+
+/*
+ * Get the OID (encoded OBJECT IDENTIFIER value, without tag and length)
+ * for a hash function. If digest_id is not a supported digest identifier
+ * (in particular if it is equal to 0, i.e. br_md5sha1_ID), then NULL is
+ * returned and *len is set to 0.
+ */
+const unsigned char *br_digest_OID(int digest_id, size_t *len);
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+/*
+ * DES support functions.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Apply DES Initial Permutation.
+ */
+void br_des_do_IP(uint32_t *xl, uint32_t *xr);
+
+/*
+ * Apply DES Final Permutation (inverse of IP).
+ */
+void br_des_do_invIP(uint32_t *xl, uint32_t *xr);
+
+/*
+ * Key schedule unit: for a DES key (8 bytes), compute 16 subkeys. Each
+ * subkey is two 28-bit words represented as two 32-bit words; the PC-2
+ * bit extration is NOT applied.
+ */
+void br_des_keysched_unit(uint32_t *skey, const void *key);
+
+/*
+ * Reversal of 16 DES sub-keys (for decryption).
+ */
+void br_des_rev_skey(uint32_t *skey);
+
+/*
+ * DES/3DES key schedule for 'des_tab' (encryption direction). Returned
+ * value is the number of rounds.
+ */
+unsigned br_des_tab_keysched(uint32_t *skey, const void *key, size_t key_len);
+
+/*
+ * DES/3DES key schedule for 'des_ct' (encryption direction). Returned
+ * value is the number of rounds.
+ */
+unsigned br_des_ct_keysched(uint32_t *skey, const void *key, size_t key_len);
+
+/*
+ * DES/3DES subkey decompression (from the compressed bitsliced subkeys).
+ */
+void br_des_ct_skey_expand(uint32_t *sk_exp,
+ unsigned num_rounds, const uint32_t *skey);
+
+/*
+ * DES/3DES block encryption/decryption ('des_tab').
+ */
+void br_des_tab_process_block(unsigned num_rounds,
+ const uint32_t *skey, void *block);
+
+/*
+ * DES/3DES block encryption/decryption ('des_ct').
+ */
+void br_des_ct_process_block(unsigned num_rounds,
+ const uint32_t *skey, void *block);
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+/*
+ * AES support functions.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The AES S-box (256-byte table).
+ */
+extern const unsigned char br_aes_S[];
+
+/*
+ * AES key schedule. skey[] is filled with n+1 128-bit subkeys, where n
+ * is the number of rounds (10 to 14, depending on key size). The number
+ * of rounds is returned. If the key size is invalid (not 16, 24 or 32),
+ * then 0 is returned.
+ *
+ * This implementation uses a 256-byte table and is NOT constant-time.
+ */
+unsigned br_aes_keysched(uint32_t *skey, const void *key, size_t key_len);
+
+/*
+ * AES key schedule for decryption ('aes_big' implementation).
+ */
+unsigned br_aes_big_keysched_inv(uint32_t *skey,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len);
+
+/*
+ * AES block encryption with the 'aes_big' implementation (fast, but
+ * not constant-time). This function encrypts a single block "in place".
+ */
+void br_aes_big_encrypt(unsigned num_rounds, const uint32_t *skey, void *data);
+
+/*
+ * AES block decryption with the 'aes_big' implementation (fast, but
+ * not constant-time). This function decrypts a single block "in place".
+ */
+void br_aes_big_decrypt(unsigned num_rounds, const uint32_t *skey, void *data);
+
+/*
+ * AES block encryption with the 'aes_small' implementation (small, but
+ * slow and not constant-time). This function encrypts a single block
+ * "in place".
+ */
+void br_aes_small_encrypt(unsigned num_rounds,
+ const uint32_t *skey, void *data);
+
+/*
+ * AES block decryption with the 'aes_small' implementation (small, but
+ * slow and not constant-time). This function decrypts a single block
+ * "in place".
+ */
+void br_aes_small_decrypt(unsigned num_rounds,
+ const uint32_t *skey, void *data);
+
+/*
+ * The constant-time implementation is "bitsliced": the 128-bit state is
+ * split over eight 32-bit words q* in the following way:
+ *
+ * -- Input block consists in 16 bytes:
+ * a00 a10 a20 a30 a01 a11 a21 a31 a02 a12 a22 a32 a03 a13 a23 a33
+ * In the terminology of FIPS 197, this is a 4x4 matrix which is read
+ * column by column.
+ *
+ * -- Each byte is split into eight bits which are distributed over the
+ * eight words, at the same rank. Thus, for a byte x at rank k, bit 0
+ * (least significant) of x will be at rank k in q0 (if that bit is b,
+ * then it contributes "b << k" to the value of q0), bit 1 of x will be
+ * at rank k in q1, and so on.
+ *
+ * -- Ranks given to bits are in "row order" and are either all even, or
+ * all odd. Two independent AES states are thus interleaved, one using
+ * the even ranks, the other the odd ranks. Row order means:
+ * a00 a01 a02 a03 a10 a11 a12 a13 a20 a21 a22 a23 a30 a31 a32 a33
+ *
+ * Converting input bytes from two AES blocks to bitslice representation
+ * is done in the following way:
+ * -- Decode first block into the four words q0 q2 q4 q6, in that order,
+ * using little-endian convention.
+ * -- Decode second block into the four words q1 q3 q5 q7, in that order,
+ * using little-endian convention.
+ * -- Call br_aes_ct_ortho().
+ *
+ * Converting back to bytes is done by using the reverse operations. Note
+ * that br_aes_ct_ortho() is its own inverse.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Perform bytewise orthogonalization of eight 32-bit words. Bytes
+ * of q0..q7 are spread over all words: for a byte x that occurs
+ * at rank i in q[j] (byte x uses bits 8*i to 8*i+7 in q[j]), the bit
+ * of rank k in x (0 <= k <= 7) goes to q[k] at rank 8*i+j.
+ *
+ * This operation is an involution.
+ */
+void br_aes_ct_ortho(uint32_t *q);
+
+/*
+ * The AES S-box, as a bitsliced constant-time version. The input array
+ * consists in eight 32-bit words; 32 S-box instances are computed in
+ * parallel. Bits 0 to 7 of each S-box input (bit 0 is least significant)
+ * are spread over the words 0 to 7, at the same rank.
+ */
+void br_aes_ct_bitslice_Sbox(uint32_t *q);
+
+/*
+ * Like br_aes_bitslice_Sbox(), but for the inverse S-box.
+ */
+void br_aes_ct_bitslice_invSbox(uint32_t *q);
+
+/*
+ * Compute AES encryption on bitsliced data. Since input is stored on
+ * eight 32-bit words, two block encryptions are actually performed
+ * in parallel.
+ */
+void br_aes_ct_bitslice_encrypt(unsigned num_rounds,
+ const uint32_t *skey, uint32_t *q);
+
+/*
+ * Compute AES decryption on bitsliced data. Since input is stored on
+ * eight 32-bit words, two block decryptions are actually performed
+ * in parallel.
+ */
+void br_aes_ct_bitslice_decrypt(unsigned num_rounds,
+ const uint32_t *skey, uint32_t *q);
+
+/*
+ * AES key schedule, constant-time version. skey[] is filled with n+1
+ * 128-bit subkeys, where n is the number of rounds (10 to 14, depending
+ * on key size). The number of rounds is returned. If the key size is
+ * invalid (not 16, 24 or 32), then 0 is returned.
+ */
+unsigned br_aes_ct_keysched(uint32_t *comp_skey,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len);
+
+/*
+ * Expand AES subkeys as produced by br_aes_ct_keysched(), into
+ * a larger array suitable for br_aes_ct_bitslice_encrypt() and
+ * br_aes_ct_bitslice_decrypt().
+ */
+void br_aes_ct_skey_expand(uint32_t *skey,
+ unsigned num_rounds, const uint32_t *comp_skey);
+
+/*
+ * For the ct64 implementation, the same bitslicing technique is used,
+ * but four instances are interleaved. First instance uses bits 0, 4,
+ * 8, 12,... of each word; second instance uses bits 1, 5, 9, 13,...
+ * and so on.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Perform bytewise orthogonalization of eight 64-bit words. Bytes
+ * of q0..q7 are spread over all words: for a byte x that occurs
+ * at rank i in q[j] (byte x uses bits 8*i to 8*i+7 in q[j]), the bit
+ * of rank k in x (0 <= k <= 7) goes to q[k] at rank 8*i+j.
+ *
+ * This operation is an involution.
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_ortho(uint64_t *q);
+
+/*
+ * Interleave bytes for an AES input block. If input bytes are
+ * denoted 0123456789ABCDEF, and have been decoded with little-endian
+ * convention (w[0] contains 0123, with '3' being most significant;
+ * w[1] contains 4567, and so on), then output word q0 will be
+ * set to 08192A3B (again little-endian convention) and q1 will
+ * be set to 4C5D6E7F.
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_interleave_in(uint64_t *q0, uint64_t *q1, const uint32_t *w);
+
+/*
+ * Perform the opposite of br_aes_ct64_interleave_in().
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_interleave_out(uint32_t *w, uint64_t q0, uint64_t q1);
+
+/*
+ * The AES S-box, as a bitsliced constant-time version. The input array
+ * consists in eight 64-bit words; 64 S-box instances are computed in
+ * parallel. Bits 0 to 7 of each S-box input (bit 0 is least significant)
+ * are spread over the words 0 to 7, at the same rank.
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_bitslice_Sbox(uint64_t *q);
+
+/*
+ * Like br_aes_bitslice_Sbox(), but for the inverse S-box.
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_bitslice_invSbox(uint64_t *q);
+
+/*
+ * Compute AES encryption on bitsliced data. Since input is stored on
+ * eight 64-bit words, four block encryptions are actually performed
+ * in parallel.
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_bitslice_encrypt(unsigned num_rounds,
+ const uint64_t *skey, uint64_t *q);
+
+/*
+ * Compute AES decryption on bitsliced data. Since input is stored on
+ * eight 64-bit words, four block decryptions are actually performed
+ * in parallel.
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_bitslice_decrypt(unsigned num_rounds,
+ const uint64_t *skey, uint64_t *q);
+
+/*
+ * AES key schedule, constant-time version. skey[] is filled with n+1
+ * 128-bit subkeys, where n is the number of rounds (10 to 14, depending
+ * on key size). The number of rounds is returned. If the key size is
+ * invalid (not 16, 24 or 32), then 0 is returned.
+ */
+unsigned br_aes_ct64_keysched(uint64_t *comp_skey,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len);
+
+/*
+ * Expand AES subkeys as produced by br_aes_ct64_keysched(), into
+ * a larger array suitable for br_aes_ct64_bitslice_encrypt() and
+ * br_aes_ct64_bitslice_decrypt().
+ */
+void br_aes_ct64_skey_expand(uint64_t *skey,
+ unsigned num_rounds, const uint64_t *comp_skey);
+
+/*
+ * Test support for AES-NI opcodes.
+ */
+int br_aes_x86ni_supported(void);
+
+/*
+ * AES key schedule, using x86 AES-NI instructions. This yields the
+ * subkeys in the encryption direction. Number of rounds is returned.
+ * Key size MUST be 16, 24 or 32 bytes; otherwise, 0 is returned.
+ */
+unsigned br_aes_x86ni_keysched_enc(unsigned char *skni,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * AES key schedule, using x86 AES-NI instructions. This yields the
+ * subkeys in the decryption direction. Number of rounds is returned.
+ * Key size MUST be 16, 24 or 32 bytes; otherwise, 0 is returned.
+ */
+unsigned br_aes_x86ni_keysched_dec(unsigned char *skni,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Test support for AES POWER8 opcodes.
+ */
+int br_aes_pwr8_supported(void);
+
+/*
+ * AES key schedule, using POWER8 instructions. This yields the
+ * subkeys in the encryption direction. Number of rounds is returned.
+ * Key size MUST be 16, 24 or 32 bytes; otherwise, 0 is returned.
+ */
+unsigned br_aes_pwr8_keysched(unsigned char *skni,
+ const void *key, size_t len);
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+/*
+ * RSA.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Apply proper PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (for signatures). 'hash_oid' is
+ * the encoded hash function OID, or NULL.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_pkcs1_sig_pad(const unsigned char *hash_oid,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ uint32_t n_bitlen, unsigned char *x);
+
+/*
+ * Check PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (for signatures). 'hash_oid' is the encoded
+ * hash function OID, or NULL. The provided 'sig' value is _after_ the
+ * modular exponentiation, i.e. it should be the padded hash. On
+ * success, the hashed message is extracted.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_pkcs1_sig_unpad(const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
+ const unsigned char *hash_oid, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *hash_out);
+
+/*
+ * Apply proper PSS padding. The 'x' buffer is output only: it
+ * receives the value that is to be exponentiated.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_pss_sig_pad(const br_prng_class **rng,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t salt_len,
+ uint32_t n_bitlen, unsigned char *x);
+
+/*
+ * Check PSS padding. The provided value is the one _after_
+ * the modular exponentiation; it is modified by this function.
+ * This function infers the signature length from the public key
+ * size, i.e. it assumes that this has already been verified (as
+ * part of the exponentiation).
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_pss_sig_unpad(
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t salt_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk, unsigned char *x);
+
+/*
+ * Apply OAEP padding. Returned value is the actual padded string length,
+ * or zero on error.
+ */
+size_t br_rsa_oaep_pad(const br_prng_class **rnd, const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *label, size_t label_len, const br_rsa_public_key *pk,
+ void *dst, size_t dst_nax_len, const void *src, size_t src_len);
+
+/*
+ * Unravel and check OAEP padding. If the padding is correct, then 1 is
+ * returned, '*len' is adjusted to the length of the message, and the
+ * data is moved to the start of the 'data' buffer. If the padding is
+ * incorrect, then 0 is returned and '*len' is untouched. Either way,
+ * the complete buffer contents are altered.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_oaep_unpad(const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *label, size_t label_len, void *data, size_t *len);
+
+/*
+ * Compute MGF1 for a given seed, and XOR the output into the provided
+ * buffer.
+ */
+void br_mgf1_xor(void *data, size_t len,
+ const br_hash_class *dig, const void *seed, size_t seed_len);
+
+/*
+ * Inner function for RSA key generation; used by the "i31" and "i62"
+ * implementations.
+ */
+uint32_t br_rsa_i31_keygen_inner(const br_prng_class **rng,
+ br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *kbuf_priv,
+ br_rsa_public_key *pk, void *kbuf_pub,
+ unsigned size, uint32_t pubexp, br_i31_modpow_opt_type mp31);
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+/*
+ * Elliptic curves.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Type for generic EC parameters: curve order (unsigned big-endian
+ * encoding) and encoded conventional generator.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ int curve;
+ const unsigned char *order;
+ size_t order_len;
+ const unsigned char *generator;
+ size_t generator_len;
+} br_ec_curve_def;
+
+extern const br_ec_curve_def br_secp256r1;
+extern const br_ec_curve_def br_secp384r1;
+extern const br_ec_curve_def br_secp521r1;
+
+/*
+ * For Curve25519, the advertised "order" really is 2^255-1, since the
+ * point multipliction function really works over arbitrary 255-bit
+ * scalars. This value is only meant as a hint for ECDH key generation;
+ * only ECDSA uses the exact curve order, and ECDSA is not used with
+ * that specific curve.
+ */
+extern const br_ec_curve_def br_curve25519;
+
+/*
+ * Decode some bytes as an i31 integer, with truncation (corresponding
+ * to the 'bits2int' operation in RFC 6979). The target ENCODED bit
+ * length is provided as last parameter. The resulting value will have
+ * this declared bit length, and consists the big-endian unsigned decoding
+ * of exactly that many bits in the source (capped at the source length).
+ */
+void br_ecdsa_i31_bits2int(uint32_t *x,
+ const void *src, size_t len, uint32_t ebitlen);
+
+/*
+ * Decode some bytes as an i15 integer, with truncation (corresponding
+ * to the 'bits2int' operation in RFC 6979). The target ENCODED bit
+ * length is provided as last parameter. The resulting value will have
+ * this declared bit length, and consists the big-endian unsigned decoding
+ * of exactly that many bits in the source (capped at the source length).
+ */
+void br_ecdsa_i15_bits2int(uint16_t *x,
+ const void *src, size_t len, uint32_t ebitlen);
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+/*
+ * ASN.1 support functions.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * A br_asn1_uint structure contains encoding information about an
+ * INTEGER nonnegative value: pointer to the integer contents (unsigned
+ * big-endian representation), length of the integer contents,
+ * and length of the encoded value. The data shall have minimal length:
+ * - If the integer value is zero, then 'len' must be zero.
+ * - If the integer value is not zero, then data[0] must be non-zero.
+ *
+ * Under these conditions, 'asn1len' is necessarily equal to either len
+ * or len+1.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ const unsigned char *data;
+ size_t len;
+ size_t asn1len;
+} br_asn1_uint;
+
+/*
+ * Given an encoded integer (unsigned big-endian, with possible leading
+ * bytes of value 0), returned the "prepared INTEGER" structure.
+ */
+br_asn1_uint br_asn1_uint_prepare(const void *xdata, size_t xlen);
+
+/*
+ * Encode an ASN.1 length. The length of the encoded length is returned.
+ * If 'dest' is NULL, then no encoding is performed, but the length of
+ * the encoded length is still computed and returned.
+ */
+size_t br_asn1_encode_length(void *dest, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Convenient macro for computing lengths of lengths.
+ */
+#define len_of_len(len) br_asn1_encode_length(NULL, len)
+
+/*
+ * Encode a (prepared) ASN.1 INTEGER. The encoded length is returned.
+ * If 'dest' is NULL, then no encoding is performed, but the length of
+ * the encoded integer is still computed and returned.
+ */
+size_t br_asn1_encode_uint(void *dest, br_asn1_uint pp);
+
+/*
+ * Get the OID that identifies an elliptic curve. Returned value is
+ * the DER-encoded OID, with the length (always one byte) but without
+ * the tag. Thus, the first byte of the returned buffer contains the
+ * number of subsequent bytes in the value. If the curve is not
+ * recognised, NULL is returned.
+ */
+const unsigned char *br_get_curve_OID(int curve);
+
+/*
+ * Inner function for EC private key encoding. This is equivalent to
+ * the API function br_encode_ec_raw_der(), except for an extra
+ * parameter: if 'include_curve_oid' is zero, then the curve OID is
+ * _not_ included in the output blob (this is for PKCS#8 support).
+ */
+size_t br_encode_ec_raw_der_inner(void *dest,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, const br_ec_public_key *pk,
+ int include_curve_oid);
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+/*
+ * SSL/TLS support functions.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Record types.
+ */
+#define BR_SSL_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 20
+#define BR_SSL_ALERT 21
+#define BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE 22
+#define BR_SSL_APPLICATION_DATA 23
+
+/*
+ * Handshake message types.
+ */
+#define BR_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST 0
+#define BR_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO 1
+#define BR_SSL_SERVER_HELLO 2
+#define BR_SSL_CERTIFICATE 11
+#define BR_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12
+#define BR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13
+#define BR_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE 14
+#define BR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15
+#define BR_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16
+#define BR_SSL_FINISHED 20
+
+/*
+ * Alert levels.
+ */
+#define BR_LEVEL_WARNING 1
+#define BR_LEVEL_FATAL 2
+
+/*
+ * Low-level I/O state.
+ */
+#define BR_IO_FAILED 0
+#define BR_IO_IN 1
+#define BR_IO_OUT 2
+#define BR_IO_INOUT 3
+
+/*
+ * Mark a SSL engine as failed. The provided error code is recorded if
+ * the engine was not already marked as failed. If 'err' is 0, then the
+ * engine is marked as closed (without error).
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_fail(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, int err);
+
+/*
+ * Test whether the engine is closed (normally or as a failure).
+ */
+static inline int
+br_ssl_engine_closed(const br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+ return cc->iomode == BR_IO_FAILED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Configure a new maximum fragment length. If possible, the maximum
+ * length for outgoing records is immediately adjusted (if there are
+ * not already too many buffered bytes for that).
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_new_max_frag_len(
+ br_ssl_engine_context *rc, unsigned max_frag_len);
+
+/*
+ * Test whether the current incoming record has been fully received
+ * or not. This functions returns 0 only if a complete record header
+ * has been received, but some of the (possibly encrypted) payload
+ * has not yet been obtained.
+ */
+int br_ssl_engine_recvrec_finished(const br_ssl_engine_context *rc);
+
+/*
+ * Flush the current record (if not empty). This is meant to be called
+ * from the handshake processor only.
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_flush_record(br_ssl_engine_context *cc);
+
+/*
+ * Test whether there is some accumulated payload to send.
+ */
+static inline int
+br_ssl_engine_has_pld_to_send(const br_ssl_engine_context *rc)
+{
+ return rc->oxa != rc->oxb && rc->oxa != rc->oxc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize RNG in engine. Returned value is 1 on success, 0 on error.
+ * This function will try to use the OS-provided RNG, if available. If
+ * there is no OS-provided RNG, or if it failed, and no entropy was
+ * injected by the caller, then a failure will be reported. On error,
+ * the context error code is set.
+ */
+int br_ssl_engine_init_rand(br_ssl_engine_context *cc);
+
+/*
+ * Reset the handshake-related parts of the engine.
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_hs_reset(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ void (*hsinit)(void *), void (*hsrun)(void *));
+
+/*
+ * Get the PRF to use for this context, for the provided PRF hash
+ * function ID.
+ */
+br_tls_prf_impl br_ssl_engine_get_PRF(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, int prf_id);
+
+/*
+ * Consume the provided pre-master secret and compute the corresponding
+ * master secret. The 'prf_id' is the ID of the hash function to use
+ * with the TLS 1.2 PRF (ignored if the version is TLS 1.0 or 1.1).
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_compute_master(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int prf_id, const void *pms, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Switch to CBC decryption for incoming records.
+ * cc the engine context
+ * is_client non-zero for a client, zero for a server
+ * prf_id id of hash function for PRF (ignored if not TLS 1.2+)
+ * mac_id id of hash function for HMAC
+ * bc_impl block cipher implementation (CBC decryption)
+ * cipher_key_len block cipher key length (in bytes)
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_switch_cbc_in(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int is_client, int prf_id, int mac_id,
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *bc_impl, size_t cipher_key_len);
+
+/*
+ * Switch to CBC encryption for outgoing records.
+ * cc the engine context
+ * is_client non-zero for a client, zero for a server
+ * prf_id id of hash function for PRF (ignored if not TLS 1.2+)
+ * mac_id id of hash function for HMAC
+ * bc_impl block cipher implementation (CBC encryption)
+ * cipher_key_len block cipher key length (in bytes)
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_switch_cbc_out(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int is_client, int prf_id, int mac_id,
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *bc_impl, size_t cipher_key_len);
+
+/*
+ * Switch to GCM decryption for incoming records.
+ * cc the engine context
+ * is_client non-zero for a client, zero for a server
+ * prf_id id of hash function for PRF
+ * bc_impl block cipher implementation (CTR)
+ * cipher_key_len block cipher key length (in bytes)
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_switch_gcm_in(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int is_client, int prf_id,
+ const br_block_ctr_class *bc_impl, size_t cipher_key_len);
+
+/*
+ * Switch to GCM encryption for outgoing records.
+ * cc the engine context
+ * is_client non-zero for a client, zero for a server
+ * prf_id id of hash function for PRF
+ * bc_impl block cipher implementation (CTR)
+ * cipher_key_len block cipher key length (in bytes)
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_switch_gcm_out(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int is_client, int prf_id,
+ const br_block_ctr_class *bc_impl, size_t cipher_key_len);
+
+/*
+ * Switch to ChaCha20+Poly1305 decryption for incoming records.
+ * cc the engine context
+ * is_client non-zero for a client, zero for a server
+ * prf_id id of hash function for PRF
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_switch_chapol_in(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int is_client, int prf_id);
+
+/*
+ * Switch to ChaCha20+Poly1305 encryption for outgoing records.
+ * cc the engine context
+ * is_client non-zero for a client, zero for a server
+ * prf_id id of hash function for PRF
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_switch_chapol_out(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int is_client, int prf_id);
+
+/*
+ * Switch to CCM decryption for incoming records.
+ * cc the engine context
+ * is_client non-zero for a client, zero for a server
+ * prf_id id of hash function for PRF
+ * bc_impl block cipher implementation (CTR+CBC)
+ * cipher_key_len block cipher key length (in bytes)
+ * tag_len tag length (in bytes)
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_switch_ccm_in(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int is_client, int prf_id,
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *bc_impl,
+ size_t cipher_key_len, size_t tag_len);
+
+/*
+ * Switch to GCM encryption for outgoing records.
+ * cc the engine context
+ * is_client non-zero for a client, zero for a server
+ * prf_id id of hash function for PRF
+ * bc_impl block cipher implementation (CTR+CBC)
+ * cipher_key_len block cipher key length (in bytes)
+ * tag_len tag length (in bytes)
+ */
+void br_ssl_engine_switch_ccm_out(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int is_client, int prf_id,
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *bc_impl,
+ size_t cipher_key_len, size_t tag_len);
+
+/*
+ * Calls to T0-generated code.
+ */
+void br_ssl_hs_client_init_main(void *ctx);
+void br_ssl_hs_client_run(void *ctx);
+void br_ssl_hs_server_init_main(void *ctx);
+void br_ssl_hs_server_run(void *ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Get the hash function to use for signatures, given a bit mask of
+ * supported hash functions. This implements a strict choice order
+ * (namely SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-224, SHA-1). If the mask
+ * does not document support of any of these hash functions, then this
+ * functions returns 0.
+ */
+int br_ssl_choose_hash(unsigned bf);
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+
+/*
+ * PowerPC / POWER assembly stuff. The special BR_POWER_ASM_MACROS macro
+ * must be defined before including this file; this is done by source
+ * files that use some inline assembly for PowerPC / POWER machines.
+ */
+
+#if BR_POWER_ASM_MACROS
+
+#define lxvw4x(xt, ra, rb) lxvw4x_(xt, ra, rb)
+#define stxvw4x(xt, ra, rb) stxvw4x_(xt, ra, rb)
+
+#define bdnz(foo) bdnz_(foo)
+#define bdz(foo) bdz_(foo)
+#define beq(foo) beq_(foo)
+
+#define li(rx, value) li_(rx, value)
+#define addi(rx, ra, imm) addi_(rx, ra, imm)
+#define cmpldi(rx, imm) cmpldi_(rx, imm)
+#define mtctr(rx) mtctr_(rx)
+#define vspltb(vrt, vrb, uim) vspltb_(vrt, vrb, uim)
+#define vspltw(vrt, vrb, uim) vspltw_(vrt, vrb, uim)
+#define vspltisb(vrt, imm) vspltisb_(vrt, imm)
+#define vspltisw(vrt, imm) vspltisw_(vrt, imm)
+#define vrlw(vrt, vra, vrb) vrlw_(vrt, vra, vrb)
+#define vsbox(vrt, vra) vsbox_(vrt, vra)
+#define vxor(vrt, vra, vrb) vxor_(vrt, vra, vrb)
+#define vand(vrt, vra, vrb) vand_(vrt, vra, vrb)
+#define vsro(vrt, vra, vrb) vsro_(vrt, vra, vrb)
+#define vsl(vrt, vra, vrb) vsl_(vrt, vra, vrb)
+#define vsldoi(vt, va, vb, sh) vsldoi_(vt, va, vb, sh)
+#define vsr(vrt, vra, vrb) vsr_(vrt, vra, vrb)
+#define vaddcuw(vrt, vra, vrb) vaddcuw_(vrt, vra, vrb)
+#define vadduwm(vrt, vra, vrb) vadduwm_(vrt, vra, vrb)
+#define vsububm(vrt, vra, vrb) vsububm_(vrt, vra, vrb)
+#define vsubuwm(vrt, vra, vrb) vsubuwm_(vrt, vra, vrb)
+#define vsrw(vrt, vra, vrb) vsrw_(vrt, vra, vrb)
+#define vcipher(vt, va, vb) vcipher_(vt, va, vb)
+#define vcipherlast(vt, va, vb) vcipherlast_(vt, va, vb)
+#define vncipher(vt, va, vb) vncipher_(vt, va, vb)
+#define vncipherlast(vt, va, vb) vncipherlast_(vt, va, vb)
+#define vperm(vt, va, vb, vc) vperm_(vt, va, vb, vc)
+#define vpmsumd(vt, va, vb) vpmsumd_(vt, va, vb)
+#define xxpermdi(vt, va, vb, d) xxpermdi_(vt, va, vb, d)
+
+#define lxvw4x_(xt, ra, rb) "\tlxvw4x\t" #xt "," #ra "," #rb "\n"
+#define stxvw4x_(xt, ra, rb) "\tstxvw4x\t" #xt "," #ra "," #rb "\n"
+
+#define label(foo) #foo "%=:\n"
+#define bdnz_(foo) "\tbdnz\t" #foo "%=\n"
+#define bdz_(foo) "\tbdz\t" #foo "%=\n"
+#define beq_(foo) "\tbeq\t" #foo "%=\n"
+
+#define li_(rx, value) "\tli\t" #rx "," #value "\n"
+#define addi_(rx, ra, imm) "\taddi\t" #rx "," #ra "," #imm "\n"
+#define cmpldi_(rx, imm) "\tcmpldi\t" #rx "," #imm "\n"
+#define mtctr_(rx) "\tmtctr\t" #rx "\n"
+#define vspltb_(vrt, vrb, uim) "\tvspltb\t" #vrt "," #vrb "," #uim "\n"
+#define vspltw_(vrt, vrb, uim) "\tvspltw\t" #vrt "," #vrb "," #uim "\n"
+#define vspltisb_(vrt, imm) "\tvspltisb\t" #vrt "," #imm "\n"
+#define vspltisw_(vrt, imm) "\tvspltisw\t" #vrt "," #imm "\n"
+#define vrlw_(vrt, vra, vrb) "\tvrlw\t" #vrt "," #vra "," #vrb "\n"
+#define vsbox_(vrt, vra) "\tvsbox\t" #vrt "," #vra "\n"
+#define vxor_(vrt, vra, vrb) "\tvxor\t" #vrt "," #vra "," #vrb "\n"
+#define vand_(vrt, vra, vrb) "\tvand\t" #vrt "," #vra "," #vrb "\n"
+#define vsro_(vrt, vra, vrb) "\tvsro\t" #vrt "," #vra "," #vrb "\n"
+#define vsl_(vrt, vra, vrb) "\tvsl\t" #vrt "," #vra "," #vrb "\n"
+#define vsldoi_(vt, va, vb, sh) "\tvsldoi\t" #vt "," #va "," #vb "," #sh "\n"
+#define vsr_(vrt, vra, vrb) "\tvsr\t" #vrt "," #vra "," #vrb "\n"
+#define vaddcuw_(vrt, vra, vrb) "\tvaddcuw\t" #vrt "," #vra "," #vrb "\n"
+#define vadduwm_(vrt, vra, vrb) "\tvadduwm\t" #vrt "," #vra "," #vrb "\n"
+#define vsububm_(vrt, vra, vrb) "\tvsububm\t" #vrt "," #vra "," #vrb "\n"
+#define vsubuwm_(vrt, vra, vrb) "\tvsubuwm\t" #vrt "," #vra "," #vrb "\n"
+#define vsrw_(vrt, vra, vrb) "\tvsrw\t" #vrt "," #vra "," #vrb "\n"
+#define vcipher_(vt, va, vb) "\tvcipher\t" #vt "," #va "," #vb "\n"
+#define vcipherlast_(vt, va, vb) "\tvcipherlast\t" #vt "," #va "," #vb "\n"
+#define vncipher_(vt, va, vb) "\tvncipher\t" #vt "," #va "," #vb "\n"
+#define vncipherlast_(vt, va, vb) "\tvncipherlast\t" #vt "," #va "," #vb "\n"
+#define vperm_(vt, va, vb, vc) "\tvperm\t" #vt "," #va "," #vb "," #vc "\n"
+#define vpmsumd_(vt, va, vb) "\tvpmsumd\t" #vt "," #va "," #vb "\n"
+#define xxpermdi_(vt, va, vb, d) "\txxpermdi\t" #vt "," #va "," #vb "," #d "\n"
+
+#endif
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+/*
+ * Special "activate intrinsics" code, needed for some compiler versions.
+ * This is defined at the end of this file, so that it won't impact any
+ * of the inline functions defined previously; and it is controlled by
+ * a specific macro defined in the caller code.
+ *
+ * Calling code conventions:
+ *
+ * - Caller must define BR_ENABLE_INTRINSICS before including "inner.h".
+ * - Functions that use intrinsics must be enclosed in an "enabled"
+ * region (between BR_TARGETS_X86_UP and BR_TARGETS_X86_DOWN).
+ * - Functions that use intrinsics must be tagged with the appropriate
+ * BR_TARGET().
+ */
+
+#if BR_ENABLE_INTRINSICS && (BR_GCC_4_4 || BR_CLANG_3_7 || BR_MSC_2005)
+
+/*
+ * x86 intrinsics (both 32-bit and 64-bit).
+ */
+#if BR_i386 || BR_amd64
+
+/*
+ * On GCC before version 5.0, we need to use the pragma to enable the
+ * target options globally, because the 'target' function attribute
+ * appears to be unreliable. Before 4.6 we must also avoid the
+ * push_options / pop_options mechanism, because it tends to trigger
+ * some internal compiler errors.
+ */
+#if BR_GCC && !BR_GCC_5_0
+#if BR_GCC_4_6
+#define BR_TARGETS_X86_UP \
+ _Pragma("GCC push_options") \
+ _Pragma("GCC target(\"sse2,ssse3,sse4.1,aes,pclmul,rdrnd\")")
+#define BR_TARGETS_X86_DOWN \
+ _Pragma("GCC pop_options")
+#else
+#define BR_TARGETS_X86_UP \
+ _Pragma("GCC target(\"sse2,ssse3,sse4.1,aes,pclmul\")")
+#define BR_TARGETS_X86_DOWN
+#endif
+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wpsabi"
+#endif
+
+#if BR_CLANG && !BR_CLANG_3_8
+#undef __SSE2__
+#undef __SSE3__
+#undef __SSSE3__
+#undef __SSE4_1__
+#undef __AES__
+#undef __PCLMUL__
+#undef __RDRND__
+#define __SSE2__ 1
+#define __SSE3__ 1
+#define __SSSE3__ 1
+#define __SSE4_1__ 1
+#define __AES__ 1
+#define __PCLMUL__ 1
+#define __RDRND__ 1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef BR_TARGETS_X86_UP
+#define BR_TARGETS_X86_UP
+#endif
+#ifndef BR_TARGETS_X86_DOWN
+#define BR_TARGETS_X86_DOWN
+#endif
+
+#if BR_GCC || BR_CLANG
+BR_TARGETS_X86_UP
+#include <x86intrin.h>
+#include <cpuid.h>
+#define br_bswap32 __builtin_bswap32
+BR_TARGETS_X86_DOWN
+#endif
+
+#if BR_MSC
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <intrin.h>
+#include <immintrin.h>
+#define br_bswap32 _byteswap_ulong
+#endif
+
+static inline int
+br_cpuid(uint32_t mask_eax, uint32_t mask_ebx,
+ uint32_t mask_ecx, uint32_t mask_edx)
+{
+#if BR_GCC || BR_CLANG
+ unsigned eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ if (__get_cpuid(1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx)) {
+ if ((eax & mask_eax) == mask_eax
+ && (ebx & mask_ebx) == mask_ebx
+ && (ecx & mask_ecx) == mask_ecx
+ && (edx & mask_edx) == mask_edx)
+ {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+#elif BR_MSC
+ int info[4];
+
+ __cpuid(info, 1);
+ if (((uint32_t)info[0] & mask_eax) == mask_eax
+ && ((uint32_t)info[1] & mask_ebx) == mask_ebx
+ && ((uint32_t)info[2] & mask_ecx) == mask_ecx
+ && ((uint32_t)info[3] & mask_edx) == mask_edx)
+ {
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_add.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_add.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97e29b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_add.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i15_add(uint16_t *a, const uint16_t *b, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ uint32_t cc;
+ size_t u, m;
+
+ cc = 0;
+ m = (a[0] + 31) >> 4;
+ for (u = 1; u < m; u ++) {
+ uint32_t aw, bw, naw;
+
+ aw = a[u];
+ bw = b[u];
+ naw = aw + bw + cc;
+ cc = naw >> 15;
+ a[u] = MUX(ctl, naw & 0x7FFF, aw);
+ }
+ return cc;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_bitlen.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_bitlen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad74467
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_bitlen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i15_bit_length(uint16_t *x, size_t xlen)
+{
+ uint32_t tw, twk;
+
+ tw = 0;
+ twk = 0;
+ while (xlen -- > 0) {
+ uint32_t w, c;
+
+ c = EQ(tw, 0);
+ w = x[xlen];
+ tw = MUX(c, w, tw);
+ twk = MUX(c, (uint32_t)xlen, twk);
+ }
+ return (twk << 4) + BIT_LENGTH(tw);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_decmod.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_decmod.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6076c57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_decmod.c
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i15_decode_mod(uint16_t *x, const void *src, size_t len, const uint16_t *m)
+{
+ /*
+ * Two-pass algorithm: in the first pass, we determine whether the
+ * value fits; in the second pass, we do the actual write.
+ *
+ * During the first pass, 'r' contains the comparison result so
+ * far:
+ * 0x00000000 value is equal to the modulus
+ * 0x00000001 value is greater than the modulus
+ * 0xFFFFFFFF value is lower than the modulus
+ *
+ * Since we iterate starting with the least significant bytes (at
+ * the end of src[]), each new comparison overrides the previous
+ * except when the comparison yields 0 (equal).
+ *
+ * During the second pass, 'r' is either 0xFFFFFFFF (value fits)
+ * or 0x00000000 (value does not fit).
+ *
+ * We must iterate over all bytes of the source, _and_ possibly
+ * some extra virtual bytes (with value 0) so as to cover the
+ * complete modulus as well. We also add 4 such extra bytes beyond
+ * the modulus length because it then guarantees that no accumulated
+ * partial word remains to be processed.
+ */
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t mlen, tlen;
+ int pass;
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ buf = src;
+ mlen = (m[0] + 15) >> 4;
+ tlen = (mlen << 1);
+ if (tlen < len) {
+ tlen = len;
+ }
+ tlen += 4;
+ r = 0;
+ for (pass = 0; pass < 2; pass ++) {
+ size_t u, v;
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len;
+
+ v = 1;
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < tlen; u ++) {
+ uint32_t b;
+
+ if (u < len) {
+ b = buf[len - 1 - u];
+ } else {
+ b = 0;
+ }
+ acc |= (b << acc_len);
+ acc_len += 8;
+ if (acc_len >= 15) {
+ uint32_t xw;
+
+ xw = acc & (uint32_t)0x7FFF;
+ acc_len -= 15;
+ acc = b >> (8 - acc_len);
+ if (v <= mlen) {
+ if (pass) {
+ x[v] = r & xw;
+ } else {
+ uint32_t cc;
+
+ cc = (uint32_t)CMP(xw, m[v]);
+ r = MUX(EQ(cc, 0), r, cc);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!pass) {
+ r = MUX(EQ(xw, 0), r, 1);
+ }
+ }
+ v ++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * When we reach this point at the end of the first pass:
+ * r is either 0, 1 or -1; we want to set r to 0 if it
+ * is equal to 0 or 1, and leave it to -1 otherwise.
+ *
+ * When we reach this point at the end of the second pass:
+ * r is either 0 or -1; we want to leave that value
+ * untouched. This is a subcase of the previous.
+ */
+ r >>= 1;
+ r |= (r << 1);
+ }
+
+ x[0] = m[0];
+ return r & (uint32_t)1;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_decode.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_decode.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fc2c0be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_decode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i15_decode(uint16_t *x, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t v;
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len;
+
+ buf = src;
+ v = 1;
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ uint32_t b;
+
+ b = buf[len];
+ acc |= (b << acc_len);
+ acc_len += 8;
+ if (acc_len >= 15) {
+ x[v ++] = acc & 0x7FFF;
+ acc_len -= 15;
+ acc >>= 15;
+ }
+ }
+ if (acc_len != 0) {
+ x[v ++] = acc;
+ }
+ x[0] = br_i15_bit_length(x + 1, v - 1);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_decred.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_decred.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..81e7dd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_decred.c
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i15_decode_reduce(uint16_t *x,
+ const void *src, size_t len, const uint16_t *m)
+{
+ uint32_t m_ebitlen, m_rbitlen;
+ size_t mblen, k;
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Get the encoded bit length.
+ */
+ m_ebitlen = m[0];
+
+ /*
+ * Special case for an invalid (null) modulus.
+ */
+ if (m_ebitlen == 0) {
+ x[0] = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the destination.
+ */
+ br_i15_zero(x, m_ebitlen);
+
+ /*
+ * First decode directly as many bytes as possible. This requires
+ * computing the actual bit length.
+ */
+ m_rbitlen = m_ebitlen >> 4;
+ m_rbitlen = (m_ebitlen & 15) + (m_rbitlen << 4) - m_rbitlen;
+ mblen = (m_rbitlen + 7) >> 3;
+ k = mblen - 1;
+ if (k >= len) {
+ br_i15_decode(x, src, len);
+ x[0] = m_ebitlen;
+ return;
+ }
+ buf = src;
+ br_i15_decode(x, buf, k);
+ x[0] = m_ebitlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Input remaining bytes, using 15-bit words.
+ */
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ while (k < len) {
+ uint32_t v;
+
+ v = buf[k ++];
+ acc = (acc << 8) | v;
+ acc_len += 8;
+ if (acc_len >= 15) {
+ br_i15_muladd_small(x, acc >> (acc_len - 15), m);
+ acc_len -= 15;
+ acc &= ~((uint32_t)-1 << acc_len);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We may have some bits accumulated. We then perform a shift to
+ * be able to inject these bits as a full 15-bit word.
+ */
+ if (acc_len != 0) {
+ acc = (acc | (x[1] << acc_len)) & 0x7FFF;
+ br_i15_rshift(x, 15 - acc_len);
+ br_i15_muladd_small(x, acc, m);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_encode.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_encode.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..50668f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_encode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i15_encode(void *dst, size_t len, const uint16_t *x)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t u, xlen;
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len;
+
+ xlen = (x[0] + 15) >> 4;
+ if (xlen == 0) {
+ memset(dst, 0, len);
+ return;
+ }
+ u = 1;
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ buf = dst;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ if (acc_len < 8) {
+ if (u <= xlen) {
+ acc += (uint32_t)x[u ++] << acc_len;
+ }
+ acc_len += 15;
+ }
+ buf[len] = (unsigned char)acc;
+ acc >>= 8;
+ acc_len -= 8;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_fmont.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_fmont.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3450b72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_fmont.c
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i15_from_monty(uint16_t *x, const uint16_t *m, uint16_t m0i)
+{
+ size_t len, u, v;
+
+ len = (m[0] + 15) >> 4;
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ uint32_t f, cc;
+
+ f = MUL15(x[1], m0i) & 0x7FFF;
+ cc = 0;
+ for (v = 0; v < len; v ++) {
+ uint32_t z;
+
+ z = (uint32_t)x[v + 1] + MUL15(f, m[v + 1]) + cc;
+ cc = z >> 15;
+ if (v != 0) {
+ x[v] = z & 0x7FFF;
+ }
+ }
+ x[len] = cc;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We may have to do an extra subtraction, but only if the
+ * value in x[] is indeed greater than or equal to that of m[],
+ * which is why we must do two calls (first call computes the
+ * carry, second call performs the subtraction only if the carry
+ * is 0).
+ */
+ br_i15_sub(x, m, NOT(br_i15_sub(x, m, 0)));
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_iszero.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_iszero.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4b6f10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_iszero.c
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i15_iszero(const uint16_t *x)
+{
+ uint32_t z;
+ size_t u;
+
+ z = 0;
+ for (u = (x[0] + 15) >> 4; u > 0; u --) {
+ z |= x[u];
+ }
+ return ~(z | -z) >> 31;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_moddiv.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_moddiv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45af756
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_moddiv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,465 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * In this file, we handle big integers with a custom format, i.e.
+ * without the usual one-word header. Value is split into 15-bit words,
+ * each stored in a 16-bit slot (top bit is zero) in little-endian
+ * order. The length (in words) is provided explicitly. In some cases,
+ * the value can be negative (using two's complement representation). In
+ * some cases, the top word is allowed to have a 16th bit.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Negate big integer conditionally. The value consists of 'len' words,
+ * with 15 bits in each word (the top bit of each word should be 0,
+ * except possibly for the last word). If 'ctl' is 1, the negation is
+ * computed; otherwise, if 'ctl' is 0, then the value is unchanged.
+ */
+static void
+cond_negate(uint16_t *a, size_t len, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ size_t k;
+ uint32_t cc, xm;
+
+ cc = ctl;
+ xm = 0x7FFF & -ctl;
+ for (k = 0; k < len; k ++) {
+ uint32_t aw;
+
+ aw = a[k];
+ aw = (aw ^ xm) + cc;
+ a[k] = aw & 0x7FFF;
+ cc = (aw >> 15) & 1;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finish modular reduction. Rules on input parameters:
+ *
+ * if neg = 1, then -m <= a < 0
+ * if neg = 0, then 0 <= a < 2*m
+ *
+ * If neg = 0, then the top word of a[] may use 16 bits.
+ *
+ * Also, modulus m must be odd.
+ */
+static void
+finish_mod(uint16_t *a, size_t len, const uint16_t *m, uint32_t neg)
+{
+ size_t k;
+ uint32_t cc, xm, ym;
+
+ /*
+ * First pass: compare a (assumed nonnegative) with m.
+ */
+ cc = 0;
+ for (k = 0; k < len; k ++) {
+ uint32_t aw, mw;
+
+ aw = a[k];
+ mw = m[k];
+ cc = (aw - mw - cc) >> 31;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * At this point:
+ * if neg = 1, then we must add m (regardless of cc)
+ * if neg = 0 and cc = 0, then we must subtract m
+ * if neg = 0 and cc = 1, then we must do nothing
+ */
+ xm = 0x7FFF & -neg;
+ ym = -(neg | (1 - cc));
+ cc = neg;
+ for (k = 0; k < len; k ++) {
+ uint32_t aw, mw;
+
+ aw = a[k];
+ mw = (m[k] ^ xm) & ym;
+ aw = aw - mw - cc;
+ a[k] = aw & 0x7FFF;
+ cc = aw >> 31;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute:
+ * a <- (a*pa+b*pb)/(2^15)
+ * b <- (a*qa+b*qb)/(2^15)
+ * The division is assumed to be exact (i.e. the low word is dropped).
+ * If the final a is negative, then it is negated. Similarly for b.
+ * Returned value is the combination of two bits:
+ * bit 0: 1 if a had to be negated, 0 otherwise
+ * bit 1: 1 if b had to be negated, 0 otherwise
+ *
+ * Factors pa, pb, qa and qb must be at most 2^15 in absolute value.
+ * Source integers a and b must be nonnegative; top word is not allowed
+ * to contain an extra 16th bit.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+co_reduce(uint16_t *a, uint16_t *b, size_t len,
+ int32_t pa, int32_t pb, int32_t qa, int32_t qb)
+{
+ size_t k;
+ int32_t cca, ccb;
+ uint32_t nega, negb;
+
+ cca = 0;
+ ccb = 0;
+ for (k = 0; k < len; k ++) {
+ uint32_t wa, wb, za, zb;
+ uint16_t tta, ttb;
+
+ /*
+ * Since:
+ * |pa| <= 2^15
+ * |pb| <= 2^15
+ * 0 <= wa <= 2^15 - 1
+ * 0 <= wb <= 2^15 - 1
+ * |cca| <= 2^16 - 1
+ * Then:
+ * |za| <= (2^15-1)*(2^16) + (2^16-1) = 2^31 - 1
+ *
+ * Thus, the new value of cca is such that |cca| <= 2^16 - 1.
+ * The same applies to ccb.
+ */
+ wa = a[k];
+ wb = b[k];
+ za = wa * (uint32_t)pa + wb * (uint32_t)pb + (uint32_t)cca;
+ zb = wa * (uint32_t)qa + wb * (uint32_t)qb + (uint32_t)ccb;
+ if (k > 0) {
+ a[k - 1] = za & 0x7FFF;
+ b[k - 1] = zb & 0x7FFF;
+ }
+ tta = za >> 15;
+ ttb = zb >> 15;
+ cca = *(int16_t *)&tta;
+ ccb = *(int16_t *)&ttb;
+ }
+ a[len - 1] = (uint16_t)cca;
+ b[len - 1] = (uint16_t)ccb;
+ nega = (uint32_t)cca >> 31;
+ negb = (uint32_t)ccb >> 31;
+ cond_negate(a, len, nega);
+ cond_negate(b, len, negb);
+ return nega | (negb << 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute:
+ * a <- (a*pa+b*pb)/(2^15) mod m
+ * b <- (a*qa+b*qb)/(2^15) mod m
+ *
+ * m0i is equal to -1/m[0] mod 2^15.
+ *
+ * Factors pa, pb, qa and qb must be at most 2^15 in absolute value.
+ * Source integers a and b must be nonnegative; top word is not allowed
+ * to contain an extra 16th bit.
+ */
+static void
+co_reduce_mod(uint16_t *a, uint16_t *b, size_t len,
+ int32_t pa, int32_t pb, int32_t qa, int32_t qb,
+ const uint16_t *m, uint16_t m0i)
+{
+ size_t k;
+ int32_t cca, ccb, fa, fb;
+
+ cca = 0;
+ ccb = 0;
+ fa = ((a[0] * (uint32_t)pa + b[0] * (uint32_t)pb) * m0i) & 0x7FFF;
+ fb = ((a[0] * (uint32_t)qa + b[0] * (uint32_t)qb) * m0i) & 0x7FFF;
+ for (k = 0; k < len; k ++) {
+ uint32_t wa, wb, za, zb;
+ uint32_t tta, ttb;
+
+ /*
+ * In this loop, carries 'cca' and 'ccb' always fit on
+ * 17 bits (in absolute value).
+ */
+ wa = a[k];
+ wb = b[k];
+ za = wa * (uint32_t)pa + wb * (uint32_t)pb
+ + m[k] * (uint32_t)fa + (uint32_t)cca;
+ zb = wa * (uint32_t)qa + wb * (uint32_t)qb
+ + m[k] * (uint32_t)fb + (uint32_t)ccb;
+ if (k > 0) {
+ a[k - 1] = za & 0x7FFF;
+ b[k - 1] = zb & 0x7FFF;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The XOR-and-sub construction below does an arithmetic
+ * right shift in a portable way (technically, right-shifting
+ * a negative signed value is implementation-defined in C).
+ */
+#define M ((uint32_t)1 << 16)
+ tta = za >> 15;
+ ttb = zb >> 15;
+ tta = (tta ^ M) - M;
+ ttb = (ttb ^ M) - M;
+ cca = *(int32_t *)&tta;
+ ccb = *(int32_t *)&ttb;
+#undef M
+ }
+ a[len - 1] = (uint32_t)cca;
+ b[len - 1] = (uint32_t)ccb;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point:
+ * -m <= a < 2*m
+ * -m <= b < 2*m
+ * (this is a case of Montgomery reduction)
+ * The top word of 'a' and 'b' may have a 16-th bit set.
+ * We may have to add or subtract the modulus.
+ */
+ finish_mod(a, len, m, (uint32_t)cca >> 31);
+ finish_mod(b, len, m, (uint32_t)ccb >> 31);
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i15_moddiv(uint16_t *x, const uint16_t *y, const uint16_t *m, uint16_t m0i,
+ uint16_t *t)
+{
+ /*
+ * Algorithm is an extended binary GCD. We maintain four values
+ * a, b, u and v, with the following invariants:
+ *
+ * a * x = y * u mod m
+ * b * x = y * v mod m
+ *
+ * Starting values are:
+ *
+ * a = y
+ * b = m
+ * u = x
+ * v = 0
+ *
+ * The formal definition of the algorithm is a sequence of steps:
+ *
+ * - If a is even, then a <- a/2 and u <- u/2 mod m.
+ * - Otherwise, if b is even, then b <- b/2 and v <- v/2 mod m.
+ * - Otherwise, if a > b, then a <- (a-b)/2 and u <- (u-v)/2 mod m.
+ * - Otherwise, b <- (b-a)/2 and v <- (v-u)/2 mod m.
+ *
+ * Algorithm stops when a = b. At that point, they both are equal
+ * to GCD(y,m); the modular division succeeds if that value is 1.
+ * The result of the modular division is then u (or v: both are
+ * equal at that point).
+ *
+ * Each step makes either a or b shrink by at least one bit; hence,
+ * if m has bit length k bits, then 2k-2 steps are sufficient.
+ *
+ *
+ * Though complexity is quadratic in the size of m, the bit-by-bit
+ * processing is not very efficient. We can speed up processing by
+ * remarking that the decisions are taken based only on observation
+ * of the top and low bits of a and b.
+ *
+ * In the loop below, at each iteration, we use the two top words
+ * of a and b, and the low words of a and b, to compute reduction
+ * parameters pa, pb, qa and qb such that the new values for a
+ * and b are:
+ *
+ * a' = (a*pa + b*pb) / (2^15)
+ * b' = (a*qa + b*qb) / (2^15)
+ *
+ * the division being exact.
+ *
+ * Since the choices are based on the top words, they may be slightly
+ * off, requiring an optional correction: if a' < 0, then we replace
+ * pa with -pa, and pb with -pb. The total length of a and b is
+ * thus reduced by at least 14 bits at each iteration.
+ *
+ * The stopping conditions are still the same, though: when a
+ * and b become equal, they must be both odd (since m is odd,
+ * the GCD cannot be even), therefore the next operation is a
+ * subtraction, and one of the values becomes 0. At that point,
+ * nothing else happens, i.e. one value is stuck at 0, and the
+ * other one is the GCD.
+ */
+ size_t len, k;
+ uint16_t *a, *b, *u, *v;
+ uint32_t num, r;
+
+ len = (m[0] + 15) >> 4;
+ a = t;
+ b = a + len;
+ u = x + 1;
+ v = b + len;
+ memcpy(a, y + 1, len * sizeof *y);
+ memcpy(b, m + 1, len * sizeof *m);
+ memset(v, 0, len * sizeof *v);
+
+ /*
+ * Loop below ensures that a and b are reduced by some bits each,
+ * for a total of at least 14 bits.
+ */
+ for (num = ((m[0] - (m[0] >> 4)) << 1) + 14; num >= 14; num -= 14) {
+ size_t j;
+ uint32_t c0, c1;
+ uint32_t a0, a1, b0, b1;
+ uint32_t a_hi, b_hi, a_lo, b_lo;
+ int32_t pa, pb, qa, qb;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Extract top words of a and b. If j is the highest
+ * index >= 1 such that a[j] != 0 or b[j] != 0, then we want
+ * (a[j] << 15) + a[j - 1], and (b[j] << 15) + b[j - 1].
+ * If a and b are down to one word each, then we use a[0]
+ * and b[0].
+ */
+ c0 = (uint32_t)-1;
+ c1 = (uint32_t)-1;
+ a0 = 0;
+ a1 = 0;
+ b0 = 0;
+ b1 = 0;
+ j = len;
+ while (j -- > 0) {
+ uint32_t aw, bw;
+
+ aw = a[j];
+ bw = b[j];
+ a0 ^= (a0 ^ aw) & c0;
+ a1 ^= (a1 ^ aw) & c1;
+ b0 ^= (b0 ^ bw) & c0;
+ b1 ^= (b1 ^ bw) & c1;
+ c1 = c0;
+ c0 &= (((aw | bw) + 0xFFFF) >> 16) - (uint32_t)1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If c1 = 0, then we grabbed two words for a and b.
+ * If c1 != 0 but c0 = 0, then we grabbed one word. It
+ * is not possible that c1 != 0 and c0 != 0, because that
+ * would mean that both integers are zero.
+ */
+ a1 |= a0 & c1;
+ a0 &= ~c1;
+ b1 |= b0 & c1;
+ b0 &= ~c1;
+ a_hi = (a0 << 15) + a1;
+ b_hi = (b0 << 15) + b1;
+ a_lo = a[0];
+ b_lo = b[0];
+
+ /*
+ * Compute reduction factors:
+ *
+ * a' = a*pa + b*pb
+ * b' = a*qa + b*qb
+ *
+ * such that a' and b' are both multiple of 2^15, but are
+ * only marginally larger than a and b.
+ */
+ pa = 1;
+ pb = 0;
+ qa = 0;
+ qb = 1;
+ for (i = 0; i < 15; i ++) {
+ /*
+ * At each iteration:
+ *
+ * a <- (a-b)/2 if: a is odd, b is odd, a_hi > b_hi
+ * b <- (b-a)/2 if: a is odd, b is odd, a_hi <= b_hi
+ * a <- a/2 if: a is even
+ * b <- b/2 if: a is odd, b is even
+ *
+ * We multiply a_lo and b_lo by 2 at each
+ * iteration, thus a division by 2 really is a
+ * non-multiplication by 2.
+ */
+ uint32_t r, oa, ob, cAB, cBA, cA;
+
+ /*
+ * cAB = 1 if b must be subtracted from a
+ * cBA = 1 if a must be subtracted from b
+ * cA = 1 if a is divided by 2, 0 otherwise
+ *
+ * Rules:
+ *
+ * cAB and cBA cannot be both 1.
+ * if a is not divided by 2, b is.
+ */
+ r = GT(a_hi, b_hi);
+ oa = (a_lo >> i) & 1;
+ ob = (b_lo >> i) & 1;
+ cAB = oa & ob & r;
+ cBA = oa & ob & NOT(r);
+ cA = cAB | NOT(oa);
+
+ /*
+ * Conditional subtractions.
+ */
+ a_lo -= b_lo & -cAB;
+ a_hi -= b_hi & -cAB;
+ pa -= qa & -(int32_t)cAB;
+ pb -= qb & -(int32_t)cAB;
+ b_lo -= a_lo & -cBA;
+ b_hi -= a_hi & -cBA;
+ qa -= pa & -(int32_t)cBA;
+ qb -= pb & -(int32_t)cBA;
+
+ /*
+ * Shifting.
+ */
+ a_lo += a_lo & (cA - 1);
+ pa += pa & ((int32_t)cA - 1);
+ pb += pb & ((int32_t)cA - 1);
+ a_hi ^= (a_hi ^ (a_hi >> 1)) & -cA;
+ b_lo += b_lo & -cA;
+ qa += qa & -(int32_t)cA;
+ qb += qb & -(int32_t)cA;
+ b_hi ^= (b_hi ^ (b_hi >> 1)) & (cA - 1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Replace a and b with new values a' and b'.
+ */
+ r = co_reduce(a, b, len, pa, pb, qa, qb);
+ pa -= pa * ((r & 1) << 1);
+ pb -= pb * ((r & 1) << 1);
+ qa -= qa * (r & 2);
+ qb -= qb * (r & 2);
+ co_reduce_mod(u, v, len, pa, pb, qa, qb, m + 1, m0i);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now one of the arrays should be 0, and the other contains
+ * the GCD. If a is 0, then u is 0 as well, and v contains
+ * the division result.
+ * Result is correct if and only if GCD is 1.
+ */
+ r = (a[0] | b[0]) ^ 1;
+ u[0] |= v[0];
+ for (k = 1; k < len; k ++) {
+ r |= a[k] | b[k];
+ u[k] |= v[k];
+ }
+ return EQ0(r);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_modpow.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_modpow.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9bf304e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_modpow.c
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i15_modpow(uint16_t *x,
+ const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
+ const uint16_t *m, uint16_t m0i, uint16_t *t1, uint16_t *t2)
+{
+ size_t mlen;
+ unsigned k;
+
+ mlen = ((m[0] + 31) >> 4) * sizeof m[0];
+ memcpy(t1, x, mlen);
+ br_i15_to_monty(t1, m);
+ br_i15_zero(x, m[0]);
+ x[1] = 1;
+ for (k = 0; k < ((unsigned)elen << 3); k ++) {
+ uint32_t ctl;
+
+ ctl = (e[elen - 1 - (k >> 3)] >> (k & 7)) & 1;
+ br_i15_montymul(t2, x, t1, m, m0i);
+ CCOPY(ctl, x, t2, mlen);
+ br_i15_montymul(t2, t1, t1, m, m0i);
+ memcpy(t1, t2, mlen);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_modpow2.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_modpow2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b32118
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_modpow2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i15_modpow_opt(uint16_t *x,
+ const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
+ const uint16_t *m, uint16_t m0i, uint16_t *tmp, size_t twlen)
+{
+ size_t mlen, mwlen;
+ uint16_t *t1, *t2, *base;
+ size_t u, v;
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len, win_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Get modulus size.
+ */
+ mwlen = (m[0] + 31) >> 4;
+ mlen = mwlen * sizeof m[0];
+ mwlen += (mwlen & 1);
+ t1 = tmp;
+ t2 = tmp + mwlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute possible window size, with a maximum of 5 bits.
+ * When the window has size 1 bit, we use a specific code
+ * that requires only two temporaries. Otherwise, for a
+ * window of k bits, we need 2^k+1 temporaries.
+ */
+ if (twlen < (mwlen << 1)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (win_len = 5; win_len > 1; win_len --) {
+ if ((((uint32_t)1 << win_len) + 1) * mwlen <= twlen) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Everything is done in Montgomery representation.
+ */
+ br_i15_to_monty(x, m);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute window contents. If the window has size one bit only,
+ * then t2 is set to x; otherwise, t2[0] is left untouched, and
+ * t2[k] is set to x^k (for k >= 1).
+ */
+ if (win_len == 1) {
+ memcpy(t2, x, mlen);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(t2 + mwlen, x, mlen);
+ base = t2 + mwlen;
+ for (u = 2; u < ((unsigned)1 << win_len); u ++) {
+ br_i15_montymul(base + mwlen, base, x, m, m0i);
+ base += mwlen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to set x to 1, in Montgomery representation. This can
+ * be done efficiently by setting the high word to 1, then doing
+ * one word-sized shift.
+ */
+ br_i15_zero(x, m[0]);
+ x[(m[0] + 15) >> 4] = 1;
+ br_i15_muladd_small(x, 0, m);
+
+ /*
+ * We process bits from most to least significant. At each
+ * loop iteration, we have acc_len bits in acc.
+ */
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ while (acc_len > 0 || elen > 0) {
+ int i, k;
+ uint32_t bits;
+
+ /*
+ * Get the next bits.
+ */
+ k = win_len;
+ if (acc_len < win_len) {
+ if (elen > 0) {
+ acc = (acc << 8) | *e ++;
+ elen --;
+ acc_len += 8;
+ } else {
+ k = acc_len;
+ }
+ }
+ bits = (acc >> (acc_len - k)) & (((uint32_t)1 << k) - 1);
+ acc_len -= k;
+
+ /*
+ * We could get exactly k bits. Compute k squarings.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < k; i ++) {
+ br_i15_montymul(t1, x, x, m, m0i);
+ memcpy(x, t1, mlen);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Window lookup: we want to set t2 to the window
+ * lookup value, assuming the bits are non-zero. If
+ * the window length is 1 bit only, then t2 is
+ * already set; otherwise, we do a constant-time lookup.
+ */
+ if (win_len > 1) {
+ br_i15_zero(t2, m[0]);
+ base = t2 + mwlen;
+ for (u = 1; u < ((uint32_t)1 << k); u ++) {
+ uint32_t mask;
+
+ mask = -EQ(u, bits);
+ for (v = 1; v < mwlen; v ++) {
+ t2[v] |= mask & base[v];
+ }
+ base += mwlen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Multiply with the looked-up value. We keep the
+ * product only if the exponent bits are not all-zero.
+ */
+ br_i15_montymul(t1, x, t2, m, m0i);
+ CCOPY(NEQ(bits, 0), x, t1, mlen);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert back from Montgomery representation, and exit.
+ */
+ br_i15_from_monty(x, m, m0i);
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_montmul.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_montmul.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e98bc32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_montmul.c
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i15_montymul(uint16_t *d, const uint16_t *x, const uint16_t *y,
+ const uint16_t *m, uint16_t m0i)
+{
+ size_t len, len4, u, v;
+ uint32_t dh;
+
+ len = (m[0] + 15) >> 4;
+ len4 = len & ~(size_t)3;
+ br_i15_zero(d, m[0]);
+ dh = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ uint32_t f, xu, r, zh;
+
+ xu = x[u + 1];
+ f = MUL15((d[1] + MUL15(x[u + 1], y[1])) & 0x7FFF, m0i)
+ & 0x7FFF;
+#if BR_ARMEL_CORTEXM_GCC
+ if (len4 != 0) {
+ uint16_t *limit;
+
+ limit = d + len4;
+ asm volatile (
+"\n\
+ @ carry: r=r2 \n\
+ @ multipliers: xu=r3 f=r4 \n\
+ @ base registers: d+v=r5 y+v=r6 m+v=r7 \n\
+ @ r8 contains 0x7FFF \n\
+ @ r9 contains d+len4 \n\
+ ldr r0, %[limit] \n\
+ ldr r3, %[xu] \n\
+ mov r9, r0 \n\
+ ldr r4, %[f] \n\
+ eor r2, r2 \n\
+ ldr r5, %[d] \n\
+ sub r1, r2, #1 \n\
+ ldr r6, %[y] \n\
+ lsr r1, r1, #17 \n\
+ ldr r7, %[m] \n\
+ mov r8, r1 \n\
+loop%=: \n\
+ ldrh r0, [r6, #2] \n\
+ ldrh r1, [r7, #2] \n\
+ mul r0, r3 \n\
+ mul r1, r4 \n\
+ add r2, r0, r2 \n\
+ ldrh r0, [r5, #2] \n\
+ add r2, r1, r2 \n\
+ mov r1, r8 \n\
+ add r2, r0, r2 \n\
+ and r1, r2 \n\
+ lsr r2, r2, #15 \n\
+ strh r1, [r5, #0] \n\
+ \n\
+ ldrh r0, [r6, #4] \n\
+ ldrh r1, [r7, #4] \n\
+ mul r0, r3 \n\
+ mul r1, r4 \n\
+ add r2, r0, r2 \n\
+ ldrh r0, [r5, #4] \n\
+ add r2, r1, r2 \n\
+ mov r1, r8 \n\
+ add r2, r0, r2 \n\
+ and r1, r2 \n\
+ lsr r2, r2, #15 \n\
+ strh r1, [r5, #2] \n\
+ \n\
+ ldrh r0, [r6, #6] \n\
+ ldrh r1, [r7, #6] \n\
+ mul r0, r3 \n\
+ mul r1, r4 \n\
+ add r2, r0, r2 \n\
+ ldrh r0, [r5, #6] \n\
+ add r2, r1, r2 \n\
+ mov r1, r8 \n\
+ add r2, r0, r2 \n\
+ and r1, r2 \n\
+ lsr r2, r2, #15 \n\
+ strh r1, [r5, #4] \n\
+ \n\
+ ldrh r0, [r6, #8] \n\
+ ldrh r1, [r7, #8] \n\
+ mul r0, r3 \n\
+ mul r1, r4 \n\
+ add r2, r0, r2 \n\
+ ldrh r0, [r5, #8] \n\
+ add r2, r1, r2 \n\
+ mov r1, r8 \n\
+ add r2, r0, r2 \n\
+ and r1, r2 \n\
+ lsr r2, r2, #15 \n\
+ strh r1, [r5, #6] \n\
+ \n\
+ add r5, r5, #8 \n\
+ add r6, r6, #8 \n\
+ add r7, r7, #8 \n\
+ cmp r5, r9 \n\
+ bne loop%= \n\
+ \n\
+ str r2, %[carry] \n\
+"
+: [carry] "=m" (r)
+: [xu] "m" (xu), [f] "m" (f), [d] "m" (d), [y] "m" (y),
+ [m] "m" (m), [limit] "m" (limit)
+: "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" );
+ } else {
+ r = 0;
+ }
+ v = len4;
+#else
+ r = 0;
+ for (v = 0; v < len4; v += 4) {
+ uint32_t z;
+
+ z = d[v + 1] + MUL15(xu, y[v + 1])
+ + MUL15(f, m[v + 1]) + r;
+ r = z >> 15;
+ d[v + 0] = z & 0x7FFF;
+ z = d[v + 2] + MUL15(xu, y[v + 2])
+ + MUL15(f, m[v + 2]) + r;
+ r = z >> 15;
+ d[v + 1] = z & 0x7FFF;
+ z = d[v + 3] + MUL15(xu, y[v + 3])
+ + MUL15(f, m[v + 3]) + r;
+ r = z >> 15;
+ d[v + 2] = z & 0x7FFF;
+ z = d[v + 4] + MUL15(xu, y[v + 4])
+ + MUL15(f, m[v + 4]) + r;
+ r = z >> 15;
+ d[v + 3] = z & 0x7FFF;
+ }
+#endif
+ for (; v < len; v ++) {
+ uint32_t z;
+
+ z = d[v + 1] + MUL15(xu, y[v + 1])
+ + MUL15(f, m[v + 1]) + r;
+ r = z >> 15;
+ d[v + 0] = z & 0x7FFF;
+ }
+
+ zh = dh + r;
+ d[len] = zh & 0x7FFF;
+ dh = zh >> 15;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Restore the bit length (it was overwritten in the loop above).
+ */
+ d[0] = m[0];
+
+ /*
+ * d[] may be greater than m[], but it is still lower than twice
+ * the modulus.
+ */
+ br_i15_sub(d, m, NEQ(dh, 0) | NOT(br_i15_sub(d, m, 0)));
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_mulacc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_mulacc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a073ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_mulacc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i15_mulacc(uint16_t *d, const uint16_t *a, const uint16_t *b)
+{
+ size_t alen, blen, u;
+ unsigned dl, dh;
+
+ alen = (a[0] + 15) >> 4;
+ blen = (b[0] + 15) >> 4;
+
+ /*
+ * Announced bit length of d[] will be the sum of the announced
+ * bit lengths of a[] and b[]; but the lengths are encoded.
+ */
+ dl = (a[0] & 15) + (b[0] & 15);
+ dh = (a[0] >> 4) + (b[0] >> 4);
+ d[0] = (dh << 4) + dl + (~(uint32_t)(dl - 15) >> 31);
+
+ for (u = 0; u < blen; u ++) {
+ uint32_t f;
+ size_t v;
+ uint32_t cc;
+
+ f = b[1 + u];
+ cc = 0;
+ for (v = 0; v < alen; v ++) {
+ uint32_t z;
+
+ z = (uint32_t)d[1 + u + v] + MUL15(f, a[1 + v]) + cc;
+ cc = z >> 15;
+ d[1 + u + v] = z & 0x7FFF;
+ }
+ d[1 + u + alen] = cc;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_muladd.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_muladd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4b7216
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_muladd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Constant-time division. The divisor must not be larger than 16 bits,
+ * and the quotient must fit on 17 bits.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+divrem16(uint32_t x, uint32_t d, uint32_t *r)
+{
+ int i;
+ uint32_t q;
+
+ q = 0;
+ d <<= 16;
+ for (i = 16; i >= 0; i --) {
+ uint32_t ctl;
+
+ ctl = LE(d, x);
+ q |= ctl << i;
+ x -= (-ctl) & d;
+ d >>= 1;
+ }
+ if (r != NULL) {
+ *r = x;
+ }
+ return q;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i15_muladd_small(uint16_t *x, uint16_t z, const uint16_t *m)
+{
+ /*
+ * Constant-time: we accept to leak the exact bit length of the
+ * modulus m.
+ */
+ unsigned m_bitlen, mblr;
+ size_t u, mlen;
+ uint32_t hi, a0, a, b, q;
+ uint32_t cc, tb, over, under;
+
+ /*
+ * Simple case: the modulus fits on one word.
+ */
+ m_bitlen = m[0];
+ if (m_bitlen == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (m_bitlen <= 15) {
+ uint32_t rem;
+
+ divrem16(((uint32_t)x[1] << 15) | z, m[1], &rem);
+ x[1] = rem;
+ return;
+ }
+ mlen = (m_bitlen + 15) >> 4;
+ mblr = m_bitlen & 15;
+
+ /*
+ * Principle: we estimate the quotient (x*2^15+z)/m by
+ * doing a 30/15 division with the high words.
+ *
+ * Let:
+ * w = 2^15
+ * a = (w*a0 + a1) * w^N + a2
+ * b = b0 * w^N + b2
+ * such that:
+ * 0 <= a0 < w
+ * 0 <= a1 < w
+ * 0 <= a2 < w^N
+ * w/2 <= b0 < w
+ * 0 <= b2 < w^N
+ * a < w*b
+ * I.e. the two top words of a are a0:a1, the top word of b is
+ * b0, we ensured that b0 is "full" (high bit set), and a is
+ * such that the quotient q = a/b fits on one word (0 <= q < w).
+ *
+ * If a = b*q + r (with 0 <= r < q), then we can estimate q by
+ * using a division on the top words:
+ * a0*w + a1 = b0*u + v (with 0 <= v < b0)
+ * Then the following holds:
+ * 0 <= u <= w
+ * u-2 <= q <= u
+ */
+ hi = x[mlen];
+ if (mblr == 0) {
+ a0 = x[mlen];
+ memmove(x + 2, x + 1, (mlen - 1) * sizeof *x);
+ x[1] = z;
+ a = (a0 << 15) + x[mlen];
+ b = m[mlen];
+ } else {
+ a0 = (x[mlen] << (15 - mblr)) | (x[mlen - 1] >> mblr);
+ memmove(x + 2, x + 1, (mlen - 1) * sizeof *x);
+ x[1] = z;
+ a = (a0 << 15) | (((x[mlen] << (15 - mblr))
+ | (x[mlen - 1] >> mblr)) & 0x7FFF);
+ b = (m[mlen] << (15 - mblr)) | (m[mlen - 1] >> mblr);
+ }
+ q = divrem16(a, b, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * We computed an estimate for q, but the real one may be q,
+ * q-1 or q-2; moreover, the division may have returned a value
+ * 8000 or even 8001 if the two high words were identical, and
+ * we want to avoid values beyond 7FFF. We thus adjust q so
+ * that the "true" multiplier will be q+1, q or q-1, and q is
+ * in the 0000..7FFF range.
+ */
+ q = MUX(EQ(b, a0), 0x7FFF, q - 1 + ((q - 1) >> 31));
+
+ /*
+ * We subtract q*m from x (x has an extra high word of value 'hi').
+ * Since q may be off by 1 (in either direction), we may have to
+ * add or subtract m afterwards.
+ *
+ * The 'tb' flag will be true (1) at the end of the loop if the
+ * result is greater than or equal to the modulus (not counting
+ * 'hi' or the carry).
+ */
+ cc = 0;
+ tb = 1;
+ for (u = 1; u <= mlen; u ++) {
+ uint32_t mw, zl, xw, nxw;
+
+ mw = m[u];
+ zl = MUL15(mw, q) + cc;
+ cc = zl >> 15;
+ zl &= 0x7FFF;
+ xw = x[u];
+ nxw = xw - zl;
+ cc += nxw >> 31;
+ nxw &= 0x7FFF;
+ x[u] = nxw;
+ tb = MUX(EQ(nxw, mw), tb, GT(nxw, mw));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we underestimated q, then either cc < hi (one extra bit
+ * beyond the top array word), or cc == hi and tb is true (no
+ * extra bit, but the result is not lower than the modulus).
+ *
+ * If we overestimated q, then cc > hi.
+ */
+ over = GT(cc, hi);
+ under = ~over & (tb | LT(cc, hi));
+ br_i15_add(x, m, over);
+ br_i15_sub(x, m, under);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_ninv15.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_ninv15.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de3a3ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_ninv15.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint16_t
+br_i15_ninv15(uint16_t x)
+{
+ uint32_t y;
+
+ y = 2 - x;
+ y = MUL15(y, 2 - MUL15(x, y));
+ y = MUL15(y, 2 - MUL15(x, y));
+ y = MUL15(y, 2 - MUL15(x, y));
+ return MUX(x & 1, -y, 0) & 0x7FFF;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_reduce.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_reduce.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0931b10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_reduce.c
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i15_reduce(uint16_t *x, const uint16_t *a, const uint16_t *m)
+{
+ uint32_t m_bitlen, a_bitlen;
+ size_t mlen, alen, u;
+
+ m_bitlen = m[0];
+ mlen = (m_bitlen + 15) >> 4;
+
+ x[0] = m_bitlen;
+ if (m_bitlen == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the source is shorter, then simply copy all words from a[]
+ * and zero out the upper words.
+ */
+ a_bitlen = a[0];
+ alen = (a_bitlen + 15) >> 4;
+ if (a_bitlen < m_bitlen) {
+ memcpy(x + 1, a + 1, alen * sizeof *a);
+ for (u = alen; u < mlen; u ++) {
+ x[u + 1] = 0;
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The source length is at least equal to that of the modulus.
+ * We must thus copy N-1 words, and input the remaining words
+ * one by one.
+ */
+ memcpy(x + 1, a + 2 + (alen - mlen), (mlen - 1) * sizeof *a);
+ x[mlen] = 0;
+ for (u = 1 + alen - mlen; u > 0; u --) {
+ br_i15_muladd_small(x, a[u], m);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_rshift.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_rshift.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f9991ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_rshift.c
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i15_rshift(uint16_t *x, int count)
+{
+ size_t u, len;
+ unsigned r;
+
+ len = (x[0] + 15) >> 4;
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ r = x[1] >> count;
+ for (u = 2; u <= len; u ++) {
+ unsigned w;
+
+ w = x[u];
+ x[u - 1] = ((w << (15 - count)) | r) & 0x7FFF;
+ r = w >> count;
+ }
+ x[len] = r;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_sub.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_sub.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1983c4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_sub.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i15_sub(uint16_t *a, const uint16_t *b, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ uint32_t cc;
+ size_t u, m;
+
+ cc = 0;
+ m = (a[0] + 31) >> 4;
+ for (u = 1; u < m; u ++) {
+ uint32_t aw, bw, naw;
+
+ aw = a[u];
+ bw = b[u];
+ naw = aw - bw - cc;
+ cc = naw >> 31;
+ a[u] = MUX(ctl, naw & 0x7FFF, aw);
+ }
+ return cc;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_tmont.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_tmont.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d5c4b8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i15_tmont.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i15_to_monty(uint16_t *x, const uint16_t *m)
+{
+ unsigned k;
+
+ for (k = (m[0] + 15) >> 4; k > 0; k --) {
+ br_i15_muladd_small(x, 0, m);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_add.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_add.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ca47c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_add.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i31_add(uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ uint32_t cc;
+ size_t u, m;
+
+ cc = 0;
+ m = (a[0] + 63) >> 5;
+ for (u = 1; u < m; u ++) {
+ uint32_t aw, bw, naw;
+
+ aw = a[u];
+ bw = b[u];
+ naw = aw + bw + cc;
+ cc = naw >> 31;
+ a[u] = MUX(ctl, naw & (uint32_t)0x7FFFFFFF, aw);
+ }
+ return cc;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_bitlen.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_bitlen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e127c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_bitlen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i31_bit_length(uint32_t *x, size_t xlen)
+{
+ uint32_t tw, twk;
+
+ tw = 0;
+ twk = 0;
+ while (xlen -- > 0) {
+ uint32_t w, c;
+
+ c = EQ(tw, 0);
+ w = x[xlen];
+ tw = MUX(c, w, tw);
+ twk = MUX(c, (uint32_t)xlen, twk);
+ }
+ return (twk << 5) + BIT_LENGTH(tw);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_decmod.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_decmod.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3cd7bfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_decmod.c
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i31_decode_mod(uint32_t *x, const void *src, size_t len, const uint32_t *m)
+{
+ /*
+ * Two-pass algorithm: in the first pass, we determine whether the
+ * value fits; in the second pass, we do the actual write.
+ *
+ * During the first pass, 'r' contains the comparison result so
+ * far:
+ * 0x00000000 value is equal to the modulus
+ * 0x00000001 value is greater than the modulus
+ * 0xFFFFFFFF value is lower than the modulus
+ *
+ * Since we iterate starting with the least significant bytes (at
+ * the end of src[]), each new comparison overrides the previous
+ * except when the comparison yields 0 (equal).
+ *
+ * During the second pass, 'r' is either 0xFFFFFFFF (value fits)
+ * or 0x00000000 (value does not fit).
+ *
+ * We must iterate over all bytes of the source, _and_ possibly
+ * some extra virtual bytes (with value 0) so as to cover the
+ * complete modulus as well. We also add 4 such extra bytes beyond
+ * the modulus length because it then guarantees that no accumulated
+ * partial word remains to be processed.
+ */
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t mlen, tlen;
+ int pass;
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ buf = src;
+ mlen = (m[0] + 31) >> 5;
+ tlen = (mlen << 2);
+ if (tlen < len) {
+ tlen = len;
+ }
+ tlen += 4;
+ r = 0;
+ for (pass = 0; pass < 2; pass ++) {
+ size_t u, v;
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len;
+
+ v = 1;
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < tlen; u ++) {
+ uint32_t b;
+
+ if (u < len) {
+ b = buf[len - 1 - u];
+ } else {
+ b = 0;
+ }
+ acc |= (b << acc_len);
+ acc_len += 8;
+ if (acc_len >= 31) {
+ uint32_t xw;
+
+ xw = acc & (uint32_t)0x7FFFFFFF;
+ acc_len -= 31;
+ acc = b >> (8 - acc_len);
+ if (v <= mlen) {
+ if (pass) {
+ x[v] = r & xw;
+ } else {
+ uint32_t cc;
+
+ cc = (uint32_t)CMP(xw, m[v]);
+ r = MUX(EQ(cc, 0), r, cc);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!pass) {
+ r = MUX(EQ(xw, 0), r, 1);
+ }
+ }
+ v ++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * When we reach this point at the end of the first pass:
+ * r is either 0, 1 or -1; we want to set r to 0 if it
+ * is equal to 0 or 1, and leave it to -1 otherwise.
+ *
+ * When we reach this point at the end of the second pass:
+ * r is either 0 or -1; we want to leave that value
+ * untouched. This is a subcase of the previous.
+ */
+ r >>= 1;
+ r |= (r << 1);
+ }
+
+ x[0] = m[0];
+ return r & (uint32_t)1;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_decode.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_decode.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ec6d90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_decode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i31_decode(uint32_t *x, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t u, v;
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len;
+
+ buf = src;
+ u = len;
+ v = 1;
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ while (u -- > 0) {
+ uint32_t b;
+
+ b = buf[u];
+ acc |= (b << acc_len);
+ acc_len += 8;
+ if (acc_len >= 31) {
+ x[v ++] = acc & (uint32_t)0x7FFFFFFF;
+ acc_len -= 31;
+ acc = b >> (8 - acc_len);
+ }
+ }
+ if (acc_len != 0) {
+ x[v ++] = acc;
+ }
+ x[0] = br_i31_bit_length(x + 1, v - 1);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_decred.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_decred.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..43db662
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_decred.c
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i31_decode_reduce(uint32_t *x,
+ const void *src, size_t len, const uint32_t *m)
+{
+ uint32_t m_ebitlen, m_rbitlen;
+ size_t mblen, k;
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Get the encoded bit length.
+ */
+ m_ebitlen = m[0];
+
+ /*
+ * Special case for an invalid (null) modulus.
+ */
+ if (m_ebitlen == 0) {
+ x[0] = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the destination.
+ */
+ br_i31_zero(x, m_ebitlen);
+
+ /*
+ * First decode directly as many bytes as possible. This requires
+ * computing the actual bit length.
+ */
+ m_rbitlen = m_ebitlen >> 5;
+ m_rbitlen = (m_ebitlen & 31) + (m_rbitlen << 5) - m_rbitlen;
+ mblen = (m_rbitlen + 7) >> 3;
+ k = mblen - 1;
+ if (k >= len) {
+ br_i31_decode(x, src, len);
+ x[0] = m_ebitlen;
+ return;
+ }
+ buf = src;
+ br_i31_decode(x, buf, k);
+ x[0] = m_ebitlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Input remaining bytes, using 31-bit words.
+ */
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ while (k < len) {
+ uint32_t v;
+
+ v = buf[k ++];
+ if (acc_len >= 23) {
+ acc_len -= 23;
+ acc <<= (8 - acc_len);
+ acc |= v >> acc_len;
+ br_i31_muladd_small(x, acc, m);
+ acc = v & (0xFF >> (8 - acc_len));
+ } else {
+ acc = (acc << 8) | v;
+ acc_len += 8;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We may have some bits accumulated. We then perform a shift to
+ * be able to inject these bits as a full 31-bit word.
+ */
+ if (acc_len != 0) {
+ acc = (acc | (x[1] << acc_len)) & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ br_i31_rshift(x, 31 - acc_len);
+ br_i31_muladd_small(x, acc, m);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_encode.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_encode.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b6b40c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_encode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i31_encode(void *dst, size_t len, const uint32_t *x)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t k, xlen;
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len;
+
+ xlen = (x[0] + 31) >> 5;
+ if (xlen == 0) {
+ memset(dst, 0, len);
+ return;
+ }
+ buf = (unsigned char *)dst + len;
+ k = 1;
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ while (len != 0) {
+ uint32_t w;
+
+ w = (k <= xlen) ? x[k] : 0;
+ k ++;
+ if (acc_len == 0) {
+ acc = w;
+ acc_len = 31;
+ } else {
+ uint32_t z;
+
+ z = acc | (w << acc_len);
+ acc_len --;
+ acc = w >> (31 - acc_len);
+ if (len >= 4) {
+ buf -= 4;
+ len -= 4;
+ br_enc32be(buf, z);
+ } else {
+ switch (len) {
+ case 3:
+ buf[-3] = (unsigned char)(z >> 16);
+ /* fall through */
+ case 2:
+ buf[-2] = (unsigned char)(z >> 8);
+ /* fall through */
+ case 1:
+ buf[-1] = (unsigned char)z;
+ break;
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_fmont.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_fmont.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c24b417
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_fmont.c
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i31_from_monty(uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i)
+{
+ size_t len, u, v;
+
+ len = (m[0] + 31) >> 5;
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ uint32_t f;
+ uint64_t cc;
+
+ f = MUL31_lo(x[1], m0i);
+ cc = 0;
+ for (v = 0; v < len; v ++) {
+ uint64_t z;
+
+ z = (uint64_t)x[v + 1] + MUL31(f, m[v + 1]) + cc;
+ cc = z >> 31;
+ if (v != 0) {
+ x[v] = (uint32_t)z & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ }
+ }
+ x[len] = (uint32_t)cc;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We may have to do an extra subtraction, but only if the
+ * value in x[] is indeed greater than or equal to that of m[],
+ * which is why we must do two calls (first call computes the
+ * carry, second call performs the subtraction only if the carry
+ * is 0).
+ */
+ br_i31_sub(x, m, NOT(br_i31_sub(x, m, 0)));
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_iszero.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_iszero.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a7ea44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_iszero.c
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i31_iszero(const uint32_t *x)
+{
+ uint32_t z;
+ size_t u;
+
+ z = 0;
+ for (u = (x[0] + 31) >> 5; u > 0; u --) {
+ z |= x[u];
+ }
+ return ~(z | -z) >> 31;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_moddiv.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_moddiv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9950591
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_moddiv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,488 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * In this file, we handle big integers with a custom format, i.e.
+ * without the usual one-word header. Value is split into 31-bit words,
+ * each stored in a 32-bit slot (top bit is zero) in little-endian
+ * order. The length (in words) is provided explicitly. In some cases,
+ * the value can be negative (using two's complement representation). In
+ * some cases, the top word is allowed to have a 32th bit.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Negate big integer conditionally. The value consists of 'len' words,
+ * with 31 bits in each word (the top bit of each word should be 0,
+ * except possibly for the last word). If 'ctl' is 1, the negation is
+ * computed; otherwise, if 'ctl' is 0, then the value is unchanged.
+ */
+static void
+cond_negate(uint32_t *a, size_t len, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ size_t k;
+ uint32_t cc, xm;
+
+ cc = ctl;
+ xm = -ctl >> 1;
+ for (k = 0; k < len; k ++) {
+ uint32_t aw;
+
+ aw = a[k];
+ aw = (aw ^ xm) + cc;
+ a[k] = aw & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ cc = aw >> 31;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finish modular reduction. Rules on input parameters:
+ *
+ * if neg = 1, then -m <= a < 0
+ * if neg = 0, then 0 <= a < 2*m
+ *
+ * If neg = 0, then the top word of a[] may use 32 bits.
+ *
+ * Also, modulus m must be odd.
+ */
+static void
+finish_mod(uint32_t *a, size_t len, const uint32_t *m, uint32_t neg)
+{
+ size_t k;
+ uint32_t cc, xm, ym;
+
+ /*
+ * First pass: compare a (assumed nonnegative) with m.
+ * Note that if the final word uses the top extra bit, then
+ * subtracting m must yield a value less than 2^31, since we
+ * assumed that a < 2*m.
+ */
+ cc = 0;
+ for (k = 0; k < len; k ++) {
+ uint32_t aw, mw;
+
+ aw = a[k];
+ mw = m[k];
+ cc = (aw - mw - cc) >> 31;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * At this point:
+ * if neg = 1, then we must add m (regardless of cc)
+ * if neg = 0 and cc = 0, then we must subtract m
+ * if neg = 0 and cc = 1, then we must do nothing
+ */
+ xm = -neg >> 1;
+ ym = -(neg | (1 - cc));
+ cc = neg;
+ for (k = 0; k < len; k ++) {
+ uint32_t aw, mw;
+
+ aw = a[k];
+ mw = (m[k] ^ xm) & ym;
+ aw = aw - mw - cc;
+ a[k] = aw & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ cc = aw >> 31;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute:
+ * a <- (a*pa+b*pb)/(2^31)
+ * b <- (a*qa+b*qb)/(2^31)
+ * The division is assumed to be exact (i.e. the low word is dropped).
+ * If the final a is negative, then it is negated. Similarly for b.
+ * Returned value is the combination of two bits:
+ * bit 0: 1 if a had to be negated, 0 otherwise
+ * bit 1: 1 if b had to be negated, 0 otherwise
+ *
+ * Factors pa, pb, qa and qb must be at most 2^31 in absolute value.
+ * Source integers a and b must be nonnegative; top word is not allowed
+ * to contain an extra 32th bit.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+co_reduce(uint32_t *a, uint32_t *b, size_t len,
+ int64_t pa, int64_t pb, int64_t qa, int64_t qb)
+{
+ size_t k;
+ int64_t cca, ccb;
+ uint32_t nega, negb;
+
+ cca = 0;
+ ccb = 0;
+ for (k = 0; k < len; k ++) {
+ uint32_t wa, wb;
+ uint64_t za, zb;
+ uint64_t tta, ttb;
+
+ /*
+ * Since:
+ * |pa| <= 2^31
+ * |pb| <= 2^31
+ * 0 <= wa <= 2^31 - 1
+ * 0 <= wb <= 2^31 - 1
+ * |cca| <= 2^32 - 1
+ * Then:
+ * |za| <= (2^31-1)*(2^32) + (2^32-1) = 2^63 - 1
+ *
+ * Thus, the new value of cca is such that |cca| <= 2^32 - 1.
+ * The same applies to ccb.
+ */
+ wa = a[k];
+ wb = b[k];
+ za = wa * (uint64_t)pa + wb * (uint64_t)pb + (uint64_t)cca;
+ zb = wa * (uint64_t)qa + wb * (uint64_t)qb + (uint64_t)ccb;
+ if (k > 0) {
+ a[k - 1] = za & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ b[k - 1] = zb & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For the new values of cca and ccb, we need a signed
+ * right-shift; since, in C, right-shifting a signed
+ * negative value is implementation-defined, we use a
+ * custom portable sign extension expression.
+ */
+#define M ((uint64_t)1 << 32)
+ tta = za >> 31;
+ ttb = zb >> 31;
+ tta = (tta ^ M) - M;
+ ttb = (ttb ^ M) - M;
+ cca = *(int64_t *)&tta;
+ ccb = *(int64_t *)&ttb;
+#undef M
+ }
+ a[len - 1] = (uint32_t)cca;
+ b[len - 1] = (uint32_t)ccb;
+
+ nega = (uint32_t)((uint64_t)cca >> 63);
+ negb = (uint32_t)((uint64_t)ccb >> 63);
+ cond_negate(a, len, nega);
+ cond_negate(b, len, negb);
+ return nega | (negb << 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute:
+ * a <- (a*pa+b*pb)/(2^31) mod m
+ * b <- (a*qa+b*qb)/(2^31) mod m
+ *
+ * m0i is equal to -1/m[0] mod 2^31.
+ *
+ * Factors pa, pb, qa and qb must be at most 2^31 in absolute value.
+ * Source integers a and b must be nonnegative; top word is not allowed
+ * to contain an extra 32th bit.
+ */
+static void
+co_reduce_mod(uint32_t *a, uint32_t *b, size_t len,
+ int64_t pa, int64_t pb, int64_t qa, int64_t qb,
+ const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i)
+{
+ size_t k;
+ int64_t cca, ccb;
+ uint32_t fa, fb;
+
+ cca = 0;
+ ccb = 0;
+ fa = ((a[0] * (uint32_t)pa + b[0] * (uint32_t)pb) * m0i) & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ fb = ((a[0] * (uint32_t)qa + b[0] * (uint32_t)qb) * m0i) & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ for (k = 0; k < len; k ++) {
+ uint32_t wa, wb;
+ uint64_t za, zb;
+ uint64_t tta, ttb;
+
+ /*
+ * In this loop, carries 'cca' and 'ccb' always fit on
+ * 33 bits (in absolute value).
+ */
+ wa = a[k];
+ wb = b[k];
+ za = wa * (uint64_t)pa + wb * (uint64_t)pb
+ + m[k] * (uint64_t)fa + (uint64_t)cca;
+ zb = wa * (uint64_t)qa + wb * (uint64_t)qb
+ + m[k] * (uint64_t)fb + (uint64_t)ccb;
+ if (k > 0) {
+ a[k - 1] = (uint32_t)za & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ b[k - 1] = (uint32_t)zb & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ }
+
+#define M ((uint64_t)1 << 32)
+ tta = za >> 31;
+ ttb = zb >> 31;
+ tta = (tta ^ M) - M;
+ ttb = (ttb ^ M) - M;
+ cca = *(int64_t *)&tta;
+ ccb = *(int64_t *)&ttb;
+#undef M
+ }
+ a[len - 1] = (uint32_t)cca;
+ b[len - 1] = (uint32_t)ccb;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point:
+ * -m <= a < 2*m
+ * -m <= b < 2*m
+ * (this is a case of Montgomery reduction)
+ * The top word of 'a' and 'b' may have a 32-th bit set.
+ * We may have to add or subtract the modulus.
+ */
+ finish_mod(a, len, m, (uint32_t)((uint64_t)cca >> 63));
+ finish_mod(b, len, m, (uint32_t)((uint64_t)ccb >> 63));
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i31_moddiv(uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *y, const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i,
+ uint32_t *t)
+{
+ /*
+ * Algorithm is an extended binary GCD. We maintain four values
+ * a, b, u and v, with the following invariants:
+ *
+ * a * x = y * u mod m
+ * b * x = y * v mod m
+ *
+ * Starting values are:
+ *
+ * a = y
+ * b = m
+ * u = x
+ * v = 0
+ *
+ * The formal definition of the algorithm is a sequence of steps:
+ *
+ * - If a is even, then a <- a/2 and u <- u/2 mod m.
+ * - Otherwise, if b is even, then b <- b/2 and v <- v/2 mod m.
+ * - Otherwise, if a > b, then a <- (a-b)/2 and u <- (u-v)/2 mod m.
+ * - Otherwise, b <- (b-a)/2 and v <- (v-u)/2 mod m.
+ *
+ * Algorithm stops when a = b. At that point, they both are equal
+ * to GCD(y,m); the modular division succeeds if that value is 1.
+ * The result of the modular division is then u (or v: both are
+ * equal at that point).
+ *
+ * Each step makes either a or b shrink by at least one bit; hence,
+ * if m has bit length k bits, then 2k-2 steps are sufficient.
+ *
+ *
+ * Though complexity is quadratic in the size of m, the bit-by-bit
+ * processing is not very efficient. We can speed up processing by
+ * remarking that the decisions are taken based only on observation
+ * of the top and low bits of a and b.
+ *
+ * In the loop below, at each iteration, we use the two top words
+ * of a and b, and the low words of a and b, to compute reduction
+ * parameters pa, pb, qa and qb such that the new values for a
+ * and b are:
+ *
+ * a' = (a*pa + b*pb) / (2^31)
+ * b' = (a*qa + b*qb) / (2^31)
+ *
+ * the division being exact.
+ *
+ * Since the choices are based on the top words, they may be slightly
+ * off, requiring an optional correction: if a' < 0, then we replace
+ * pa with -pa, and pb with -pb. The total length of a and b is
+ * thus reduced by at least 30 bits at each iteration.
+ *
+ * The stopping conditions are still the same, though: when a
+ * and b become equal, they must be both odd (since m is odd,
+ * the GCD cannot be even), therefore the next operation is a
+ * subtraction, and one of the values becomes 0. At that point,
+ * nothing else happens, i.e. one value is stuck at 0, and the
+ * other one is the GCD.
+ */
+ size_t len, k;
+ uint32_t *a, *b, *u, *v;
+ uint32_t num, r;
+
+ len = (m[0] + 31) >> 5;
+ a = t;
+ b = a + len;
+ u = x + 1;
+ v = b + len;
+ memcpy(a, y + 1, len * sizeof *y);
+ memcpy(b, m + 1, len * sizeof *m);
+ memset(v, 0, len * sizeof *v);
+
+ /*
+ * Loop below ensures that a and b are reduced by some bits each,
+ * for a total of at least 30 bits.
+ */
+ for (num = ((m[0] - (m[0] >> 5)) << 1) + 30; num >= 30; num -= 30) {
+ size_t j;
+ uint32_t c0, c1;
+ uint32_t a0, a1, b0, b1;
+ uint64_t a_hi, b_hi;
+ uint32_t a_lo, b_lo;
+ int64_t pa, pb, qa, qb;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Extract top words of a and b. If j is the highest
+ * index >= 1 such that a[j] != 0 or b[j] != 0, then we want
+ * (a[j] << 31) + a[j - 1], and (b[j] << 31) + b[j - 1].
+ * If a and b are down to one word each, then we use a[0]
+ * and b[0].
+ */
+ c0 = (uint32_t)-1;
+ c1 = (uint32_t)-1;
+ a0 = 0;
+ a1 = 0;
+ b0 = 0;
+ b1 = 0;
+ j = len;
+ while (j -- > 0) {
+ uint32_t aw, bw;
+
+ aw = a[j];
+ bw = b[j];
+ a0 ^= (a0 ^ aw) & c0;
+ a1 ^= (a1 ^ aw) & c1;
+ b0 ^= (b0 ^ bw) & c0;
+ b1 ^= (b1 ^ bw) & c1;
+ c1 = c0;
+ c0 &= (((aw | bw) + 0x7FFFFFFF) >> 31) - (uint32_t)1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If c1 = 0, then we grabbed two words for a and b.
+ * If c1 != 0 but c0 = 0, then we grabbed one word. It
+ * is not possible that c1 != 0 and c0 != 0, because that
+ * would mean that both integers are zero.
+ */
+ a1 |= a0 & c1;
+ a0 &= ~c1;
+ b1 |= b0 & c1;
+ b0 &= ~c1;
+ a_hi = ((uint64_t)a0 << 31) + a1;
+ b_hi = ((uint64_t)b0 << 31) + b1;
+ a_lo = a[0];
+ b_lo = b[0];
+
+ /*
+ * Compute reduction factors:
+ *
+ * a' = a*pa + b*pb
+ * b' = a*qa + b*qb
+ *
+ * such that a' and b' are both multiple of 2^31, but are
+ * only marginally larger than a and b.
+ */
+ pa = 1;
+ pb = 0;
+ qa = 0;
+ qb = 1;
+ for (i = 0; i < 31; i ++) {
+ /*
+ * At each iteration:
+ *
+ * a <- (a-b)/2 if: a is odd, b is odd, a_hi > b_hi
+ * b <- (b-a)/2 if: a is odd, b is odd, a_hi <= b_hi
+ * a <- a/2 if: a is even
+ * b <- b/2 if: a is odd, b is even
+ *
+ * We multiply a_lo and b_lo by 2 at each
+ * iteration, thus a division by 2 really is a
+ * non-multiplication by 2.
+ */
+ uint32_t r, oa, ob, cAB, cBA, cA;
+ uint64_t rz;
+
+ /*
+ * r = GT(a_hi, b_hi)
+ * But the GT() function works on uint32_t operands,
+ * so we inline a 64-bit version here.
+ */
+ rz = b_hi - a_hi;
+ r = (uint32_t)((rz ^ ((a_hi ^ b_hi)
+ & (a_hi ^ rz))) >> 63);
+
+ /*
+ * cAB = 1 if b must be subtracted from a
+ * cBA = 1 if a must be subtracted from b
+ * cA = 1 if a is divided by 2, 0 otherwise
+ *
+ * Rules:
+ *
+ * cAB and cBA cannot be both 1.
+ * if a is not divided by 2, b is.
+ */
+ oa = (a_lo >> i) & 1;
+ ob = (b_lo >> i) & 1;
+ cAB = oa & ob & r;
+ cBA = oa & ob & NOT(r);
+ cA = cAB | NOT(oa);
+
+ /*
+ * Conditional subtractions.
+ */
+ a_lo -= b_lo & -cAB;
+ a_hi -= b_hi & -(uint64_t)cAB;
+ pa -= qa & -(int64_t)cAB;
+ pb -= qb & -(int64_t)cAB;
+ b_lo -= a_lo & -cBA;
+ b_hi -= a_hi & -(uint64_t)cBA;
+ qa -= pa & -(int64_t)cBA;
+ qb -= pb & -(int64_t)cBA;
+
+ /*
+ * Shifting.
+ */
+ a_lo += a_lo & (cA - 1);
+ pa += pa & ((int64_t)cA - 1);
+ pb += pb & ((int64_t)cA - 1);
+ a_hi ^= (a_hi ^ (a_hi >> 1)) & -(uint64_t)cA;
+ b_lo += b_lo & -cA;
+ qa += qa & -(int64_t)cA;
+ qb += qb & -(int64_t)cA;
+ b_hi ^= (b_hi ^ (b_hi >> 1)) & ((uint64_t)cA - 1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Replace a and b with new values a' and b'.
+ */
+ r = co_reduce(a, b, len, pa, pb, qa, qb);
+ pa -= pa * ((r & 1) << 1);
+ pb -= pb * ((r & 1) << 1);
+ qa -= qa * (r & 2);
+ qb -= qb * (r & 2);
+ co_reduce_mod(u, v, len, pa, pb, qa, qb, m + 1, m0i);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now one of the arrays should be 0, and the other contains
+ * the GCD. If a is 0, then u is 0 as well, and v contains
+ * the division result.
+ * Result is correct if and only if GCD is 1.
+ */
+ r = (a[0] | b[0]) ^ 1;
+ u[0] |= v[0];
+ for (k = 1; k < len; k ++) {
+ r |= a[k] | b[k];
+ u[k] |= v[k];
+ }
+ return EQ0(r);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_modpow.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_modpow.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ef3f5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_modpow.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i31_modpow(uint32_t *x,
+ const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
+ const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i, uint32_t *t1, uint32_t *t2)
+{
+ size_t mlen;
+ uint32_t k;
+
+ /*
+ * 'mlen' is the length of m[] expressed in bytes (including
+ * the "bit length" first field).
+ */
+ mlen = ((m[0] + 63) >> 5) * sizeof m[0];
+
+ /*
+ * Throughout the algorithm:
+ * -- t1[] is in Montgomery representation; it contains x, x^2,
+ * x^4, x^8...
+ * -- The result is accumulated, in normal representation, in
+ * the x[] array.
+ * -- t2[] is used as destination buffer for each multiplication.
+ *
+ * Note that there is no need to call br_i32_from_monty().
+ */
+ memcpy(t1, x, mlen);
+ br_i31_to_monty(t1, m);
+ br_i31_zero(x, m[0]);
+ x[1] = 1;
+ for (k = 0; k < ((uint32_t)elen << 3); k ++) {
+ uint32_t ctl;
+
+ ctl = (e[elen - 1 - (k >> 3)] >> (k & 7)) & 1;
+ br_i31_montymul(t2, x, t1, m, m0i);
+ CCOPY(ctl, x, t2, mlen);
+ br_i31_montymul(t2, t1, t1, m, m0i);
+ memcpy(t1, t2, mlen);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_modpow2.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_modpow2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b8f8cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_modpow2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i31_modpow_opt(uint32_t *x,
+ const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
+ const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i, uint32_t *tmp, size_t twlen)
+{
+ size_t mlen, mwlen;
+ uint32_t *t1, *t2, *base;
+ size_t u, v;
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int acc_len, win_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Get modulus size.
+ */
+ mwlen = (m[0] + 63) >> 5;
+ mlen = mwlen * sizeof m[0];
+ mwlen += (mwlen & 1);
+ t1 = tmp;
+ t2 = tmp + mwlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute possible window size, with a maximum of 5 bits.
+ * When the window has size 1 bit, we use a specific code
+ * that requires only two temporaries. Otherwise, for a
+ * window of k bits, we need 2^k+1 temporaries.
+ */
+ if (twlen < (mwlen << 1)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (win_len = 5; win_len > 1; win_len --) {
+ if ((((uint32_t)1 << win_len) + 1) * mwlen <= twlen) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Everything is done in Montgomery representation.
+ */
+ br_i31_to_monty(x, m);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute window contents. If the window has size one bit only,
+ * then t2 is set to x; otherwise, t2[0] is left untouched, and
+ * t2[k] is set to x^k (for k >= 1).
+ */
+ if (win_len == 1) {
+ memcpy(t2, x, mlen);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(t2 + mwlen, x, mlen);
+ base = t2 + mwlen;
+ for (u = 2; u < ((unsigned)1 << win_len); u ++) {
+ br_i31_montymul(base + mwlen, base, x, m, m0i);
+ base += mwlen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to set x to 1, in Montgomery representation. This can
+ * be done efficiently by setting the high word to 1, then doing
+ * one word-sized shift.
+ */
+ br_i31_zero(x, m[0]);
+ x[(m[0] + 31) >> 5] = 1;
+ br_i31_muladd_small(x, 0, m);
+
+ /*
+ * We process bits from most to least significant. At each
+ * loop iteration, we have acc_len bits in acc.
+ */
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ while (acc_len > 0 || elen > 0) {
+ int i, k;
+ uint32_t bits;
+
+ /*
+ * Get the next bits.
+ */
+ k = win_len;
+ if (acc_len < win_len) {
+ if (elen > 0) {
+ acc = (acc << 8) | *e ++;
+ elen --;
+ acc_len += 8;
+ } else {
+ k = acc_len;
+ }
+ }
+ bits = (acc >> (acc_len - k)) & (((uint32_t)1 << k) - 1);
+ acc_len -= k;
+
+ /*
+ * We could get exactly k bits. Compute k squarings.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < k; i ++) {
+ br_i31_montymul(t1, x, x, m, m0i);
+ memcpy(x, t1, mlen);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Window lookup: we want to set t2 to the window
+ * lookup value, assuming the bits are non-zero. If
+ * the window length is 1 bit only, then t2 is
+ * already set; otherwise, we do a constant-time lookup.
+ */
+ if (win_len > 1) {
+ br_i31_zero(t2, m[0]);
+ base = t2 + mwlen;
+ for (u = 1; u < ((uint32_t)1 << k); u ++) {
+ uint32_t mask;
+
+ mask = -EQ(u, bits);
+ for (v = 1; v < mwlen; v ++) {
+ t2[v] |= mask & base[v];
+ }
+ base += mwlen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Multiply with the looked-up value. We keep the
+ * product only if the exponent bits are not all-zero.
+ */
+ br_i31_montymul(t1, x, t2, m, m0i);
+ CCOPY(NEQ(bits, 0), x, t1, mlen);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert back from Montgomery representation, and exit.
+ */
+ br_i31_from_monty(x, m, m0i);
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_montmul.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_montmul.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..758f8f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_montmul.c
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i31_montymul(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *y,
+ const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i)
+{
+ /*
+ * Each outer loop iteration computes:
+ * d <- (d + xu*y + f*m) / 2^31
+ * We have xu <= 2^31-1 and f <= 2^31-1.
+ * Thus, if d <= 2*m-1 on input, then:
+ * 2*m-1 + 2*(2^31-1)*m <= (2^32)*m-1
+ * and the new d value is less than 2*m.
+ *
+ * We represent d over 31-bit words, with an extra word 'dh'
+ * which can thus be only 0 or 1.
+ */
+ size_t len, len4, u, v;
+ uint32_t dh;
+
+ len = (m[0] + 31) >> 5;
+ len4 = len & ~(size_t)3;
+ br_i31_zero(d, m[0]);
+ dh = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ /*
+ * The carry for each operation fits on 32 bits:
+ * d[v+1] <= 2^31-1
+ * xu*y[v+1] <= (2^31-1)*(2^31-1)
+ * f*m[v+1] <= (2^31-1)*(2^31-1)
+ * r <= 2^32-1
+ * (2^31-1) + 2*(2^31-1)*(2^31-1) + (2^32-1) = 2^63 - 2^31
+ * After division by 2^31, the new r is then at most 2^32-1
+ *
+ * Using a 32-bit carry has performance benefits on 32-bit
+ * systems; however, on 64-bit architectures, we prefer to
+ * keep the carry (r) in a 64-bit register, thus avoiding some
+ * "clear high bits" operations.
+ */
+ uint32_t f, xu;
+#if BR_64
+ uint64_t r;
+#else
+ uint32_t r;
+#endif
+
+ xu = x[u + 1];
+ f = MUL31_lo((d[1] + MUL31_lo(x[u + 1], y[1])), m0i);
+
+ r = 0;
+ for (v = 0; v < len4; v += 4) {
+ uint64_t z;
+
+ z = (uint64_t)d[v + 1] + MUL31(xu, y[v + 1])
+ + MUL31(f, m[v + 1]) + r;
+ r = z >> 31;
+ d[v + 0] = (uint32_t)z & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ z = (uint64_t)d[v + 2] + MUL31(xu, y[v + 2])
+ + MUL31(f, m[v + 2]) + r;
+ r = z >> 31;
+ d[v + 1] = (uint32_t)z & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ z = (uint64_t)d[v + 3] + MUL31(xu, y[v + 3])
+ + MUL31(f, m[v + 3]) + r;
+ r = z >> 31;
+ d[v + 2] = (uint32_t)z & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ z = (uint64_t)d[v + 4] + MUL31(xu, y[v + 4])
+ + MUL31(f, m[v + 4]) + r;
+ r = z >> 31;
+ d[v + 3] = (uint32_t)z & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ }
+ for (; v < len; v ++) {
+ uint64_t z;
+
+ z = (uint64_t)d[v + 1] + MUL31(xu, y[v + 1])
+ + MUL31(f, m[v + 1]) + r;
+ r = z >> 31;
+ d[v] = (uint32_t)z & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Since the new dh can only be 0 or 1, the addition of
+ * the old dh with the carry MUST fit on 32 bits, and
+ * thus can be done into dh itself.
+ */
+ dh += r;
+ d[len] = dh & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ dh >>= 31;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We must write back the bit length because it was overwritten in
+ * the loop (not overwriting it would require a test in the loop,
+ * which would yield bigger and slower code).
+ */
+ d[0] = m[0];
+
+ /*
+ * d[] may still be greater than m[] at that point; notably, the
+ * 'dh' word may be non-zero.
+ */
+ br_i31_sub(d, m, NEQ(dh, 0) | NOT(br_i31_sub(d, m, 0)));
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_mulacc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_mulacc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7410e54
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_mulacc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i31_mulacc(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ size_t alen, blen, u;
+ uint32_t dl, dh;
+
+ alen = (a[0] + 31) >> 5;
+ blen = (b[0] + 31) >> 5;
+
+ /*
+ * We want to add the two bit lengths, but these are encoded,
+ * which requires some extra care.
+ */
+ dl = (a[0] & 31) + (b[0] & 31);
+ dh = (a[0] >> 5) + (b[0] >> 5);
+ d[0] = (dh << 5) + dl + (~(uint32_t)(dl - 31) >> 31);
+
+ for (u = 0; u < blen; u ++) {
+ uint32_t f;
+ size_t v;
+
+ /*
+ * Carry always fits on 31 bits; we want to keep it in a
+ * 32-bit register on 32-bit architectures (on a 64-bit
+ * architecture, cast down from 64 to 32 bits means
+ * clearing the high bits, which is not free; on a 32-bit
+ * architecture, the same operation really means ignoring
+ * the top register, which has negative or zero cost).
+ */
+#if BR_64
+ uint64_t cc;
+#else
+ uint32_t cc;
+#endif
+
+ f = b[1 + u];
+ cc = 0;
+ for (v = 0; v < alen; v ++) {
+ uint64_t z;
+
+ z = (uint64_t)d[1 + u + v] + MUL31(f, a[1 + v]) + cc;
+ cc = z >> 31;
+ d[1 + u + v] = (uint32_t)z & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ }
+ d[1 + u + alen] = (uint32_t)cc;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_muladd.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_muladd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eecd9e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_muladd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i31_muladd_small(uint32_t *x, uint32_t z, const uint32_t *m)
+{
+ uint32_t m_bitlen;
+ unsigned mblr;
+ size_t u, mlen;
+ uint32_t a0, a1, b0, hi, g, q, tb;
+ uint32_t under, over;
+ uint32_t cc;
+
+ /*
+ * We can test on the modulus bit length since we accept to
+ * leak that length.
+ */
+ m_bitlen = m[0];
+ if (m_bitlen == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (m_bitlen <= 31) {
+ uint32_t lo;
+
+ hi = x[1] >> 1;
+ lo = (x[1] << 31) | z;
+ x[1] = br_rem(hi, lo, m[1]);
+ return;
+ }
+ mlen = (m_bitlen + 31) >> 5;
+ mblr = (unsigned)m_bitlen & 31;
+
+ /*
+ * Principle: we estimate the quotient (x*2^31+z)/m by
+ * doing a 64/32 division with the high words.
+ *
+ * Let:
+ * w = 2^31
+ * a = (w*a0 + a1) * w^N + a2
+ * b = b0 * w^N + b2
+ * such that:
+ * 0 <= a0 < w
+ * 0 <= a1 < w
+ * 0 <= a2 < w^N
+ * w/2 <= b0 < w
+ * 0 <= b2 < w^N
+ * a < w*b
+ * I.e. the two top words of a are a0:a1, the top word of b is
+ * b0, we ensured that b0 is "full" (high bit set), and a is
+ * such that the quotient q = a/b fits on one word (0 <= q < w).
+ *
+ * If a = b*q + r (with 0 <= r < q), we can estimate q by
+ * doing an Euclidean division on the top words:
+ * a0*w+a1 = b0*u + v (with 0 <= v < b0)
+ * Then the following holds:
+ * 0 <= u <= w
+ * u-2 <= q <= u
+ */
+ hi = x[mlen];
+ if (mblr == 0) {
+ a0 = x[mlen];
+ memmove(x + 2, x + 1, (mlen - 1) * sizeof *x);
+ x[1] = z;
+ a1 = x[mlen];
+ b0 = m[mlen];
+ } else {
+ a0 = ((x[mlen] << (31 - mblr)) | (x[mlen - 1] >> mblr))
+ & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ memmove(x + 2, x + 1, (mlen - 1) * sizeof *x);
+ x[1] = z;
+ a1 = ((x[mlen] << (31 - mblr)) | (x[mlen - 1] >> mblr))
+ & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ b0 = ((m[mlen] << (31 - mblr)) | (m[mlen - 1] >> mblr))
+ & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We estimate a divisor q. If the quotient returned by br_div()
+ * is g:
+ * -- If a0 == b0 then g == 0; we want q = 0x7FFFFFFF.
+ * -- Otherwise:
+ * -- if g == 0 then we set q = 0;
+ * -- otherwise, we set q = g - 1.
+ * The properties described above then ensure that the true
+ * quotient is q-1, q or q+1.
+ *
+ * Take care that a0, a1 and b0 are 31-bit words, not 32-bit. We
+ * must adjust the parameters to br_div() accordingly.
+ */
+ g = br_div(a0 >> 1, a1 | (a0 << 31), b0);
+ q = MUX(EQ(a0, b0), 0x7FFFFFFF, MUX(EQ(g, 0), 0, g - 1));
+
+ /*
+ * We subtract q*m from x (with the extra high word of value 'hi').
+ * Since q may be off by 1 (in either direction), we may have to
+ * add or subtract m afterwards.
+ *
+ * The 'tb' flag will be true (1) at the end of the loop if the
+ * result is greater than or equal to the modulus (not counting
+ * 'hi' or the carry).
+ */
+ cc = 0;
+ tb = 1;
+ for (u = 1; u <= mlen; u ++) {
+ uint32_t mw, zw, xw, nxw;
+ uint64_t zl;
+
+ mw = m[u];
+ zl = MUL31(mw, q) + cc;
+ cc = (uint32_t)(zl >> 31);
+ zw = (uint32_t)zl & (uint32_t)0x7FFFFFFF;
+ xw = x[u];
+ nxw = xw - zw;
+ cc += nxw >> 31;
+ nxw &= 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ x[u] = nxw;
+ tb = MUX(EQ(nxw, mw), tb, GT(nxw, mw));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we underestimated q, then either cc < hi (one extra bit
+ * beyond the top array word), or cc == hi and tb is true (no
+ * extra bit, but the result is not lower than the modulus). In
+ * these cases we must subtract m once.
+ *
+ * Otherwise, we may have overestimated, which will show as
+ * cc > hi (thus a negative result). Correction is adding m once.
+ */
+ over = GT(cc, hi);
+ under = ~over & (tb | LT(cc, hi));
+ br_i31_add(x, m, over);
+ br_i31_sub(x, m, under);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_ninv31.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_ninv31.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd83c96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_ninv31.c
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i31_ninv31(uint32_t x)
+{
+ uint32_t y;
+
+ y = 2 - x;
+ y *= 2 - y * x;
+ y *= 2 - y * x;
+ y *= 2 - y * x;
+ y *= 2 - y * x;
+ return MUX(x & 1, -y, 0) & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_reduce.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_reduce.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c9523e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_reduce.c
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i31_reduce(uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *m)
+{
+ uint32_t m_bitlen, a_bitlen;
+ size_t mlen, alen, u;
+
+ m_bitlen = m[0];
+ mlen = (m_bitlen + 31) >> 5;
+
+ x[0] = m_bitlen;
+ if (m_bitlen == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the source is shorter, then simply copy all words from a[]
+ * and zero out the upper words.
+ */
+ a_bitlen = a[0];
+ alen = (a_bitlen + 31) >> 5;
+ if (a_bitlen < m_bitlen) {
+ memcpy(x + 1, a + 1, alen * sizeof *a);
+ for (u = alen; u < mlen; u ++) {
+ x[u + 1] = 0;
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The source length is at least equal to that of the modulus.
+ * We must thus copy N-1 words, and input the remaining words
+ * one by one.
+ */
+ memcpy(x + 1, a + 2 + (alen - mlen), (mlen - 1) * sizeof *a);
+ x[mlen] = 0;
+ for (u = 1 + alen - mlen; u > 0; u --) {
+ br_i31_muladd_small(x, a[u], m);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_rshift.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_rshift.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db6ba0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_rshift.c
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i31_rshift(uint32_t *x, int count)
+{
+ size_t u, len;
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ len = (x[0] + 31) >> 5;
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ r = x[1] >> count;
+ for (u = 2; u <= len; u ++) {
+ uint32_t w;
+
+ w = x[u];
+ x[u - 1] = ((w << (31 - count)) | r) & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ r = w >> count;
+ }
+ x[len] = r;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_sub.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_sub.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3910895
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_sub.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i31_sub(uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ uint32_t cc;
+ size_t u, m;
+
+ cc = 0;
+ m = (a[0] + 63) >> 5;
+ for (u = 1; u < m; u ++) {
+ uint32_t aw, bw, naw;
+
+ aw = a[u];
+ bw = b[u];
+ naw = aw - bw - cc;
+ cc = naw >> 31;
+ a[u] = MUX(ctl, naw & 0x7FFFFFFF, aw);
+ }
+ return cc;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_tmont.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_tmont.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4798ff6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i31_tmont.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i31_to_monty(uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *m)
+{
+ uint32_t k;
+
+ for (k = (m[0] + 31) >> 5; k > 0; k --) {
+ br_i31_muladd_small(x, 0, m);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_add.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_add.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..620baff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_add.c
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i32_add(uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ uint32_t cc;
+ size_t u, m;
+
+ cc = 0;
+ m = (a[0] + 63) >> 5;
+ for (u = 1; u < m; u ++) {
+ uint32_t aw, bw, naw;
+
+ aw = a[u];
+ bw = b[u];
+ naw = aw + bw + cc;
+
+ /*
+ * Carry is 1 if naw < aw. Carry is also 1 if naw == aw
+ * AND the carry was already 1.
+ */
+ cc = (cc & EQ(naw, aw)) | LT(naw, aw);
+ a[u] = MUX(ctl, naw, aw);
+ }
+ return cc;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_bitlen.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_bitlen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..40ce9fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_bitlen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i32_bit_length(uint32_t *x, size_t xlen)
+{
+ uint32_t tw, twk;
+
+ tw = 0;
+ twk = 0;
+ while (xlen -- > 0) {
+ uint32_t w, c;
+
+ c = EQ(tw, 0);
+ w = x[xlen];
+ tw = MUX(c, w, tw);
+ twk = MUX(c, (uint32_t)xlen, twk);
+ }
+ return (twk << 5) + BIT_LENGTH(tw);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_decmod.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_decmod.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a859af1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_decmod.c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i32_decode_mod(uint32_t *x, const void *src, size_t len, const uint32_t *m)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t r;
+ size_t u, v, mlen;
+
+ buf = src;
+
+ /*
+ * First pass: determine whether the value fits. The 'r' value
+ * will contain the comparison result, as 0x00000000 (value is
+ * equal to the modulus), 0x00000001 (value is greater than the
+ * modulus), or 0xFFFFFFFF (value is lower than the modulus).
+ */
+ mlen = (m[0] + 7) >> 3;
+ r = 0;
+ for (u = (mlen > len) ? mlen : len; u > 0; u --) {
+ uint32_t mb, xb;
+
+ v = u - 1;
+ if (v >= mlen) {
+ mb = 0;
+ } else {
+ mb = (m[1 + (v >> 2)] >> ((v & 3) << 3)) & 0xFF;
+ }
+ if (v >= len) {
+ xb = 0;
+ } else {
+ xb = buf[len - u];
+ }
+ r = MUX(EQ(r, 0), (uint32_t)CMP(xb, mb), r);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Only r == 0xFFFFFFFF is acceptable. We want to set r to 0xFF if
+ * the value fits, 0x00 otherwise.
+ */
+ r >>= 24;
+ br_i32_zero(x, m[0]);
+ u = (mlen > len) ? len : mlen;
+ while (u > 0) {
+ uint32_t xb;
+
+ xb = buf[len - u] & r;
+ u --;
+ x[1 + (u >> 2)] |= xb << ((u & 3) << 3);
+ }
+ return r >> 7;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_decode.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_decode.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f289038
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_decode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i32_decode(uint32_t *x, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t u, v;
+
+ buf = src;
+ u = len;
+ v = 1;
+ for (;;) {
+ if (u < 4) {
+ uint32_t w;
+
+ if (u < 2) {
+ if (u == 0) {
+ break;
+ } else {
+ w = buf[0];
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (u == 2) {
+ w = br_dec16be(buf);
+ } else {
+ w = ((uint32_t)buf[0] << 16)
+ | br_dec16be(buf + 1);
+ }
+ }
+ x[v ++] = w;
+ break;
+ } else {
+ u -= 4;
+ x[v ++] = br_dec32be(buf + u);
+ }
+ }
+ x[0] = br_i32_bit_length(x + 1, v - 1);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_decred.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_decred.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc476db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_decred.c
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i32_decode_reduce(uint32_t *x,
+ const void *src, size_t len, const uint32_t *m)
+{
+ uint32_t m_bitlen;
+ size_t mblen, k, q;
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ m_bitlen = m[0];
+
+ /*
+ * Special case for an invalid modulus.
+ */
+ if (m_bitlen == 0) {
+ x[0] = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the destination.
+ */
+ br_i32_zero(x, m_bitlen);
+
+ /*
+ * First decode directly as many bytes as possible without
+ * reduction, taking care to leave a number of bytes which
+ * is a multiple of 4.
+ */
+ mblen = (m_bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+ k = mblen - 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Up to k bytes can be safely decoded.
+ */
+ if (k >= len) {
+ br_i32_decode(x, src, len);
+ x[0] = m_bitlen;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We want to first inject some bytes with direct decoding,
+ * then extra bytes by whole 32-bit words. First compute
+ * the size that should be injected that way.
+ */
+ buf = src;
+ q = (len - k + 3) & ~(size_t)3;
+
+ /*
+ * It may happen that this is more than what we already have
+ * (by at most 3 bytes). Such a case may happen only with
+ * a very short modulus. In that case, we must process the first
+ * bytes "manually".
+ */
+ if (q > len) {
+ int i;
+ uint32_t w;
+
+ w = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i ++) {
+ w <<= 8;
+ if (q <= len) {
+ w |= buf[len - q];
+ }
+ q --;
+ }
+ br_i32_muladd_small(x, w, m);
+ } else {
+ br_i32_decode(x, buf, len - q);
+ x[0] = m_bitlen;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * At that point, we have exactly q bytes to inject, and q is
+ * a multiple of 4.
+ */
+ for (k = len - q; k < len; k += 4) {
+ br_i32_muladd_small(x, br_dec32be(buf + k), m);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_div32.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_div32.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8b8023
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_div32.c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_divrem(uint32_t hi, uint32_t lo, uint32_t d, uint32_t *r)
+{
+ /* TODO: optimize this */
+ uint32_t q;
+ uint32_t ch, cf;
+ int k;
+
+ q = 0;
+ ch = EQ(hi, d);
+ hi = MUX(ch, 0, hi);
+ for (k = 31; k > 0; k --) {
+ int j;
+ uint32_t w, ctl, hi2, lo2;
+
+ j = 32 - k;
+ w = (hi << j) | (lo >> k);
+ ctl = GE(w, d) | (hi >> k);
+ hi2 = (w - d) >> j;
+ lo2 = lo - (d << k);
+ hi = MUX(ctl, hi2, hi);
+ lo = MUX(ctl, lo2, lo);
+ q |= ctl << k;
+ }
+ cf = GE(lo, d) | hi;
+ q |= cf;
+ *r = MUX(cf, lo - d, lo);
+ return q;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_encode.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_encode.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..303652f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_encode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i32_encode(void *dst, size_t len, const uint32_t *x)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t k;
+
+ buf = dst;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the announced size of x in bytes; extra bytes are
+ * filled with zeros.
+ */
+ k = (x[0] + 7) >> 3;
+ while (len > k) {
+ *buf ++ = 0;
+ len --;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we use k as index within x[]. That index starts at 1;
+ * we initialize it to the topmost complete word, and process
+ * any remaining incomplete word.
+ */
+ k = (len + 3) >> 2;
+ switch (len & 3) {
+ case 3:
+ *buf ++ = x[k] >> 16;
+ /* fall through */
+ case 2:
+ *buf ++ = x[k] >> 8;
+ /* fall through */
+ case 1:
+ *buf ++ = x[k];
+ k --;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Encode all complete words.
+ */
+ while (k > 0) {
+ br_enc32be(buf, x[k]);
+ k --;
+ buf += 4;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_fmont.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_fmont.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc1c934
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_fmont.c
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i32_from_monty(uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i)
+{
+ size_t len, u, v;
+
+ len = (m[0] + 31) >> 5;
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ uint32_t f;
+ uint64_t cc;
+
+ f = x[1] * m0i;
+ cc = 0;
+ for (v = 0; v < len; v ++) {
+ uint64_t z;
+
+ z = (uint64_t)x[v + 1] + MUL(f, m[v + 1]) + cc;
+ cc = z >> 32;
+ if (v != 0) {
+ x[v] = (uint32_t)z;
+ }
+ }
+ x[len] = (uint32_t)cc;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We may have to do an extra subtraction, but only if the
+ * value in x[] is indeed greater than or equal to that of m[],
+ * which is why we must do two calls (first call computes the
+ * carry, second call performs the subtraction only if the carry
+ * is 0).
+ */
+ br_i32_sub(x, m, NOT(br_i32_sub(x, m, 0)));
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_iszero.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_iszero.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..659df7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_iszero.c
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i32_iszero(const uint32_t *x)
+{
+ uint32_t z;
+ size_t u;
+
+ z = 0;
+ for (u = (x[0] + 31) >> 5; u > 0; u --) {
+ z |= x[u];
+ }
+ return ~(z | -z) >> 31;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_modpow.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_modpow.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..034aba0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_modpow.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i32_modpow(uint32_t *x,
+ const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
+ const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i, uint32_t *t1, uint32_t *t2)
+{
+ size_t mlen;
+ uint32_t k;
+
+ /*
+ * 'mlen' is the length of m[] expressed in bytes (including
+ * the "bit length" first field).
+ */
+ mlen = ((m[0] + 63) >> 5) * sizeof m[0];
+
+ /*
+ * Throughout the algorithm:
+ * -- t1[] is in Montgomery representation; it contains x, x^2,
+ * x^4, x^8...
+ * -- The result is accumulated, in normal representation, in
+ * the x[] array.
+ * -- t2[] is used as destination buffer for each multiplication.
+ *
+ * Note that there is no need to call br_i32_from_monty().
+ */
+ memcpy(t1, x, mlen);
+ br_i32_to_monty(t1, m);
+ br_i32_zero(x, m[0]);
+ x[1] = 1;
+ for (k = 0; k < ((uint32_t)elen << 3); k ++) {
+ uint32_t ctl;
+
+ ctl = (e[elen - 1 - (k >> 3)] >> (k & 7)) & 1;
+ br_i32_montymul(t2, x, t1, m, m0i);
+ CCOPY(ctl, x, t2, mlen);
+ br_i32_montymul(t2, t1, t1, m, m0i);
+ memcpy(t1, t2, mlen);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_montmul.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_montmul.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7edb376
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_montmul.c
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i32_montymul(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *y,
+ const uint32_t *m, uint32_t m0i)
+{
+ size_t len, u, v;
+ uint64_t dh;
+
+ len = (m[0] + 31) >> 5;
+ br_i32_zero(d, m[0]);
+ dh = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ uint32_t f, xu;
+ uint64_t r1, r2, zh;
+
+ xu = x[u + 1];
+ f = (d[1] + x[u + 1] * y[1]) * m0i;
+ r1 = 0;
+ r2 = 0;
+ for (v = 0; v < len; v ++) {
+ uint64_t z;
+ uint32_t t;
+
+ z = (uint64_t)d[v + 1] + MUL(xu, y[v + 1]) + r1;
+ r1 = z >> 32;
+ t = (uint32_t)z;
+ z = (uint64_t)t + MUL(f, m[v + 1]) + r2;
+ r2 = z >> 32;
+ if (v != 0) {
+ d[v] = (uint32_t)z;
+ }
+ }
+ zh = dh + r1 + r2;
+ d[len] = (uint32_t)zh;
+ dh = zh >> 32;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * d[] may still be greater than m[] at that point; notably, the
+ * 'dh' word may be non-zero.
+ */
+ br_i32_sub(d, m, NEQ(dh, 0) | NOT(br_i32_sub(d, m, 0)));
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_mulacc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_mulacc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55da385
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_mulacc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i32_mulacc(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b)
+{
+ size_t alen, blen, u;
+
+ alen = (a[0] + 31) >> 5;
+ blen = (b[0] + 31) >> 5;
+ d[0] = a[0] + b[0];
+ for (u = 0; u < blen; u ++) {
+ uint32_t f;
+ size_t v;
+#if BR_64
+ uint64_t cc;
+#else
+ uint32_t cc;
+#endif
+
+ f = b[1 + u];
+ cc = 0;
+ for (v = 0; v < alen; v ++) {
+ uint64_t z;
+
+ z = (uint64_t)d[1 + u + v] + MUL(f, a[1 + v]) + cc;
+ cc = z >> 32;
+ d[1 + u + v] = (uint32_t)z;
+ }
+ d[1 + u + alen] = (uint32_t)cc;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_muladd.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_muladd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd526ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_muladd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i32_muladd_small(uint32_t *x, uint32_t z, const uint32_t *m)
+{
+ uint32_t m_bitlen;
+ size_t u, mlen;
+ uint32_t a0, a1, b0, hi, g, q, tb;
+ uint32_t chf, clow, under, over;
+ uint64_t cc;
+
+ /*
+ * We can test on the modulus bit length since we accept to
+ * leak that length.
+ */
+ m_bitlen = m[0];
+ if (m_bitlen == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (m_bitlen <= 32) {
+ x[1] = br_rem(x[1], z, m[1]);
+ return;
+ }
+ mlen = (m_bitlen + 31) >> 5;
+
+ /*
+ * Principle: we estimate the quotient (x*2^32+z)/m by
+ * doing a 64/32 division with the high words.
+ *
+ * Let:
+ * w = 2^32
+ * a = (w*a0 + a1) * w^N + a2
+ * b = b0 * w^N + b2
+ * such that:
+ * 0 <= a0 < w
+ * 0 <= a1 < w
+ * 0 <= a2 < w^N
+ * w/2 <= b0 < w
+ * 0 <= b2 < w^N
+ * a < w*b
+ * I.e. the two top words of a are a0:a1, the top word of b is
+ * b0, we ensured that b0 is "full" (high bit set), and a is
+ * such that the quotient q = a/b fits on one word (0 <= q < w).
+ *
+ * If a = b*q + r (with 0 <= r < q), we can estimate q by
+ * doing an Euclidean division on the top words:
+ * a0*w+a1 = b0*u + v (with 0 <= v < w)
+ * Then the following holds:
+ * 0 <= u <= w
+ * u-2 <= q <= u
+ */
+ a0 = br_i32_word(x, m_bitlen - 32);
+ hi = x[mlen];
+ memmove(x + 2, x + 1, (mlen - 1) * sizeof *x);
+ x[1] = z;
+ a1 = br_i32_word(x, m_bitlen - 32);
+ b0 = br_i32_word(m, m_bitlen - 32);
+
+ /*
+ * We estimate a divisor q. If the quotient returned by br_div()
+ * is g:
+ * -- If a0 == b0 then g == 0; we want q = 0xFFFFFFFF.
+ * -- Otherwise:
+ * -- if g == 0 then we set q = 0;
+ * -- otherwise, we set q = g - 1.
+ * The properties described above then ensure that the true
+ * quotient is q-1, q or q+1.
+ */
+ g = br_div(a0, a1, b0);
+ q = MUX(EQ(a0, b0), 0xFFFFFFFF, MUX(EQ(g, 0), 0, g - 1));
+
+ /*
+ * We subtract q*m from x (with the extra high word of value 'hi').
+ * Since q may be off by 1 (in either direction), we may have to
+ * add or subtract m afterwards.
+ *
+ * The 'tb' flag will be true (1) at the end of the loop if the
+ * result is greater than or equal to the modulus (not counting
+ * 'hi' or the carry).
+ */
+ cc = 0;
+ tb = 1;
+ for (u = 1; u <= mlen; u ++) {
+ uint32_t mw, zw, xw, nxw;
+ uint64_t zl;
+
+ mw = m[u];
+ zl = MUL(mw, q) + cc;
+ cc = (uint32_t)(zl >> 32);
+ zw = (uint32_t)zl;
+ xw = x[u];
+ nxw = xw - zw;
+ cc += (uint64_t)GT(nxw, xw);
+ x[u] = nxw;
+ tb = MUX(EQ(nxw, mw), tb, GT(nxw, mw));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we underestimated q, then either cc < hi (one extra bit
+ * beyond the top array word), or cc == hi and tb is true (no
+ * extra bit, but the result is not lower than the modulus). In
+ * these cases we must subtract m once.
+ *
+ * Otherwise, we may have overestimated, which will show as
+ * cc > hi (thus a negative result). Correction is adding m once.
+ */
+ chf = (uint32_t)(cc >> 32);
+ clow = (uint32_t)cc;
+ over = chf | GT(clow, hi);
+ under = ~over & (tb | (~chf & LT(clow, hi)));
+ br_i32_add(x, m, over);
+ br_i32_sub(x, m, under);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_ninv32.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_ninv32.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6564434
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_ninv32.c
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i32_ninv32(uint32_t x)
+{
+ uint32_t y;
+
+ y = 2 - x;
+ y *= 2 - y * x;
+ y *= 2 - y * x;
+ y *= 2 - y * x;
+ y *= 2 - y * x;
+ return MUX(x & 1, -y, 0);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_reduce.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_reduce.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..90fff09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_reduce.c
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i32_reduce(uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *m)
+{
+ uint32_t m_bitlen, a_bitlen;
+ size_t mlen, alen, u;
+
+ m_bitlen = m[0];
+ mlen = (m_bitlen + 31) >> 5;
+
+ x[0] = m_bitlen;
+ if (m_bitlen == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the source is shorter, then simply copy all words from a[]
+ * and zero out the upper words.
+ */
+ a_bitlen = a[0];
+ alen = (a_bitlen + 31) >> 5;
+ if (a_bitlen < m_bitlen) {
+ memcpy(x + 1, a + 1, alen * sizeof *a);
+ for (u = alen; u < mlen; u ++) {
+ x[u + 1] = 0;
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The source length is at least equal to that of the modulus.
+ * We must thus copy N-1 words, and input the remaining words
+ * one by one.
+ */
+ memcpy(x + 1, a + 2 + (alen - mlen), (mlen - 1) * sizeof *a);
+ x[mlen] = 0;
+ for (u = 1 + alen - mlen; u > 0; u --) {
+ br_i32_muladd_small(x, a[u], m);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_sub.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_sub.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c50023
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_sub.c
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i32_sub(uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *b, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ uint32_t cc;
+ size_t u, m;
+
+ cc = 0;
+ m = (a[0] + 63) >> 5;
+ for (u = 1; u < m; u ++) {
+ uint32_t aw, bw, naw;
+
+ aw = a[u];
+ bw = b[u];
+ naw = aw - bw - cc;
+
+ /*
+ * Carry is 1 if naw > aw. Carry is 1 also if naw == aw
+ * AND the carry was already 1.
+ */
+ cc = (cc & EQ(naw, aw)) | GT(naw, aw);
+ a[u] = MUX(ctl, naw, aw);
+ }
+ return cc;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_tmont.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_tmont.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..058cd88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i32_tmont.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_i32_to_monty(uint32_t *x, const uint32_t *m)
+{
+ uint32_t k;
+
+ for (k = (m[0] + 31) >> 5; k > 0; k --) {
+ br_i32_muladd_small(x, 0, m);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i62_modpow2.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i62_modpow2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2db537f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/int/i62_modpow2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,493 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+
+#if BR_INT128
+
+/*
+ * Compute x*y+v1+v2. Operands are 64-bit, and result is 128-bit, with
+ * high word in "hi" and low word in "lo".
+ */
+#define FMA1(hi, lo, x, y, v1, v2) do { \
+ unsigned __int128 fmaz; \
+ fmaz = (unsigned __int128)(x) * (unsigned __int128)(y) \
+ + (unsigned __int128)(v1) + (unsigned __int128)(v2); \
+ (hi) = (uint64_t)(fmaz >> 64); \
+ (lo) = (uint64_t)fmaz; \
+ } while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Compute x1*y1+x2*y2+v1+v2. Operands are 64-bit, and result is 128-bit,
+ * with high word in "hi" and low word in "lo".
+ *
+ * Callers should ensure that the two inner products, and the v1 and v2
+ * operands, are multiple of 4 (this is not used by this specific definition
+ * but may help other implementations).
+ */
+#define FMA2(hi, lo, x1, y1, x2, y2, v1, v2) do { \
+ unsigned __int128 fmaz; \
+ fmaz = (unsigned __int128)(x1) * (unsigned __int128)(y1) \
+ + (unsigned __int128)(x2) * (unsigned __int128)(y2) \
+ + (unsigned __int128)(v1) + (unsigned __int128)(v2); \
+ (hi) = (uint64_t)(fmaz >> 64); \
+ (lo) = (uint64_t)fmaz; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#elif BR_UMUL128
+
+#include <intrin.h>
+
+#define FMA1(hi, lo, x, y, v1, v2) do { \
+ uint64_t fmahi, fmalo; \
+ unsigned char fmacc; \
+ fmalo = _umul128((x), (y), &fmahi); \
+ fmacc = _addcarry_u64(0, fmalo, (v1), &fmalo); \
+ _addcarry_u64(fmacc, fmahi, 0, &fmahi); \
+ fmacc = _addcarry_u64(0, fmalo, (v2), &(lo)); \
+ _addcarry_u64(fmacc, fmahi, 0, &(hi)); \
+ } while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Normally we should use _addcarry_u64() for FMA2 too, but it makes
+ * Visual Studio crash. Instead we use this version, which leverages
+ * the fact that the vx operands, and the products, are multiple of 4.
+ * This is unfortunately slower.
+ */
+#define FMA2(hi, lo, x1, y1, x2, y2, v1, v2) do { \
+ uint64_t fma1hi, fma1lo; \
+ uint64_t fma2hi, fma2lo; \
+ uint64_t fmatt; \
+ fma1lo = _umul128((x1), (y1), &fma1hi); \
+ fma2lo = _umul128((x2), (y2), &fma2hi); \
+ fmatt = (fma1lo >> 2) + (fma2lo >> 2) \
+ + ((v1) >> 2) + ((v2) >> 2); \
+ (lo) = fmatt << 2; \
+ (hi) = fma1hi + fma2hi + (fmatt >> 62); \
+ } while (0)
+
+/*
+ * The FMA2 macro definition we would prefer to use, but it triggers
+ * an internal compiler error in Visual Studio 2015.
+ *
+#define FMA2(hi, lo, x1, y1, x2, y2, v1, v2) do { \
+ uint64_t fma1hi, fma1lo; \
+ uint64_t fma2hi, fma2lo; \
+ unsigned char fmacc; \
+ fma1lo = _umul128((x1), (y1), &fma1hi); \
+ fma2lo = _umul128((x2), (y2), &fma2hi); \
+ fmacc = _addcarry_u64(0, fma1lo, (v1), &fma1lo); \
+ _addcarry_u64(fmacc, fma1hi, 0, &fma1hi); \
+ fmacc = _addcarry_u64(0, fma2lo, (v2), &fma2lo); \
+ _addcarry_u64(fmacc, fma2hi, 0, &fma2hi); \
+ fmacc = _addcarry_u64(0, fma1lo, fma2lo, &(lo)); \
+ _addcarry_u64(fmacc, fma1hi, fma2hi, &(hi)); \
+ } while (0)
+ */
+
+#endif
+
+#define MASK62 ((uint64_t)0x3FFFFFFFFFFFFFFF)
+#define MUL62_lo(x, y) (((uint64_t)(x) * (uint64_t)(y)) & MASK62)
+
+/*
+ * Subtract b from a, and return the final carry. If 'ctl32' is 0, then
+ * a[] is kept unmodified, but the final carry is still computed and
+ * returned.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+i62_sub(uint64_t *a, const uint64_t *b, size_t num, uint32_t ctl32)
+{
+ uint64_t cc, mask;
+ size_t u;
+
+ cc = 0;
+ ctl32 = -ctl32;
+ mask = (uint64_t)ctl32 | ((uint64_t)ctl32 << 32);
+ for (u = 0; u < num; u ++) {
+ uint64_t aw, bw, dw;
+
+ aw = a[u];
+ bw = b[u];
+ dw = aw - bw - cc;
+ cc = dw >> 63;
+ dw &= MASK62;
+ a[u] = aw ^ (mask & (dw ^ aw));
+ }
+ return (uint32_t)cc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Montgomery multiplication, over arrays of 62-bit values. The
+ * destination array (d) must be distinct from the other operands
+ * (x, y and m). All arrays are in little-endian format (least
+ * significant word comes first) over 'num' words.
+ */
+static void
+montymul(uint64_t *d, const uint64_t *x, const uint64_t *y,
+ const uint64_t *m, size_t num, uint64_t m0i)
+{
+ uint64_t dh;
+ size_t u, num4;
+
+ num4 = 1 + ((num - 1) & ~(size_t)3);
+ memset(d, 0, num * sizeof *d);
+ dh = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < num; u ++) {
+ size_t v;
+ uint64_t f, xu;
+ uint64_t r, zh;
+ uint64_t hi, lo;
+
+ xu = x[u] << 2;
+ f = MUL62_lo(d[0] + MUL62_lo(x[u], y[0]), m0i) << 2;
+
+ FMA2(hi, lo, xu, y[0], f, m[0], d[0] << 2, 0);
+ r = hi;
+
+ for (v = 1; v < num4; v += 4) {
+ FMA2(hi, lo, xu, y[v + 0],
+ f, m[v + 0], d[v + 0] << 2, r << 2);
+ r = hi + (r >> 62);
+ d[v - 1] = lo >> 2;
+ FMA2(hi, lo, xu, y[v + 1],
+ f, m[v + 1], d[v + 1] << 2, r << 2);
+ r = hi + (r >> 62);
+ d[v + 0] = lo >> 2;
+ FMA2(hi, lo, xu, y[v + 2],
+ f, m[v + 2], d[v + 2] << 2, r << 2);
+ r = hi + (r >> 62);
+ d[v + 1] = lo >> 2;
+ FMA2(hi, lo, xu, y[v + 3],
+ f, m[v + 3], d[v + 3] << 2, r << 2);
+ r = hi + (r >> 62);
+ d[v + 2] = lo >> 2;
+ }
+ for (; v < num; v ++) {
+ FMA2(hi, lo, xu, y[v], f, m[v], d[v] << 2, r << 2);
+ r = hi + (r >> 62);
+ d[v - 1] = lo >> 2;
+ }
+
+ zh = dh + r;
+ d[num - 1] = zh & MASK62;
+ dh = zh >> 62;
+ }
+ i62_sub(d, m, num, (uint32_t)dh | NOT(i62_sub(d, m, num, 0)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Conversion back from Montgomery representation.
+ */
+static void
+frommonty(uint64_t *x, const uint64_t *m, size_t num, uint64_t m0i)
+{
+ size_t u, v;
+
+ for (u = 0; u < num; u ++) {
+ uint64_t f, cc;
+
+ f = MUL62_lo(x[0], m0i) << 2;
+ cc = 0;
+ for (v = 0; v < num; v ++) {
+ uint64_t hi, lo;
+
+ FMA1(hi, lo, f, m[v], x[v] << 2, cc);
+ cc = hi << 2;
+ if (v != 0) {
+ x[v - 1] = lo >> 2;
+ }
+ }
+ x[num - 1] = cc >> 2;
+ }
+ i62_sub(x, m, num, NOT(i62_sub(x, m, num, 0)));
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i62_modpow_opt(uint32_t *x31, const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
+ const uint32_t *m31, uint32_t m0i31, uint64_t *tmp, size_t twlen)
+{
+ size_t u, mw31num, mw62num;
+ uint64_t *x, *m, *t1, *t2;
+ uint64_t m0i;
+ uint32_t acc;
+ int win_len, acc_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Get modulus size, in words.
+ */
+ mw31num = (m31[0] + 31) >> 5;
+ mw62num = (mw31num + 1) >> 1;
+
+ /*
+ * In order to apply this function, we must have enough room to
+ * copy the operand and modulus into the temporary array, along
+ * with at least two temporaries. If there is not enough room,
+ * switch to br_i31_modpow(). We also use br_i31_modpow() if the
+ * modulus length is not at least four words (94 bits or more).
+ */
+ if (mw31num < 4 || (mw62num << 2) > twlen) {
+ /*
+ * We assume here that we can split an aligned uint64_t
+ * into two properly aligned uint32_t. Since both types
+ * are supposed to have an exact width with no padding,
+ * then this property must hold.
+ */
+ size_t txlen;
+
+ txlen = mw31num + 1;
+ if (twlen < txlen) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ br_i31_modpow(x31, e, elen, m31, m0i31,
+ (uint32_t *)tmp, (uint32_t *)tmp + txlen);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert x to Montgomery representation: this means that
+ * we replace x with x*2^z mod m, where z is the smallest multiple
+ * of the word size such that 2^z >= m. We want to reuse the 31-bit
+ * functions here (for constant-time operation), but we need z
+ * for a 62-bit word size.
+ */
+ for (u = 0; u < mw62num; u ++) {
+ br_i31_muladd_small(x31, 0, m31);
+ br_i31_muladd_small(x31, 0, m31);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Assemble operands into arrays of 62-bit words. Note that
+ * all the arrays of 62-bit words that we will handle here
+ * are without any leading size word.
+ *
+ * We also adjust tmp and twlen to account for the words used
+ * for these extra arrays.
+ */
+ m = tmp;
+ x = tmp + mw62num;
+ tmp += (mw62num << 1);
+ twlen -= (mw62num << 1);
+ for (u = 0; u < mw31num; u += 2) {
+ size_t v;
+
+ v = u >> 1;
+ if ((u + 1) == mw31num) {
+ m[v] = (uint64_t)m31[u + 1];
+ x[v] = (uint64_t)x31[u + 1];
+ } else {
+ m[v] = (uint64_t)m31[u + 1]
+ + ((uint64_t)m31[u + 2] << 31);
+ x[v] = (uint64_t)x31[u + 1]
+ + ((uint64_t)x31[u + 2] << 31);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute window size. We support windows up to 5 bits; for a
+ * window of size k bits, we need 2^k+1 temporaries (for k = 1,
+ * we use special code that uses only 2 temporaries).
+ */
+ for (win_len = 5; win_len > 1; win_len --) {
+ if ((((uint32_t)1 << win_len) + 1) * mw62num <= twlen) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ t1 = tmp;
+ t2 = tmp + mw62num;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute m0i, which is equal to -(1/m0) mod 2^62. We were
+ * provided with m0i31, which already fulfills this property
+ * modulo 2^31; the single expression below is then sufficient.
+ */
+ m0i = (uint64_t)m0i31;
+ m0i = MUL62_lo(m0i, (uint64_t)2 + MUL62_lo(m0i, m[0]));
+
+ /*
+ * Compute window contents. If the window has size one bit only,
+ * then t2 is set to x; otherwise, t2[0] is left untouched, and
+ * t2[k] is set to x^k (for k >= 1).
+ */
+ if (win_len == 1) {
+ memcpy(t2, x, mw62num * sizeof *x);
+ } else {
+ uint64_t *base;
+
+ memcpy(t2 + mw62num, x, mw62num * sizeof *x);
+ base = t2 + mw62num;
+ for (u = 2; u < ((unsigned)1 << win_len); u ++) {
+ montymul(base + mw62num, base, x, m, mw62num, m0i);
+ base += mw62num;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set x to 1, in Montgomery representation. We again use the
+ * 31-bit code.
+ */
+ br_i31_zero(x31, m31[0]);
+ x31[(m31[0] + 31) >> 5] = 1;
+ br_i31_muladd_small(x31, 0, m31);
+ if (mw31num & 1) {
+ br_i31_muladd_small(x31, 0, m31);
+ }
+ for (u = 0; u < mw31num; u += 2) {
+ size_t v;
+
+ v = u >> 1;
+ if ((u + 1) == mw31num) {
+ x[v] = (uint64_t)x31[u + 1];
+ } else {
+ x[v] = (uint64_t)x31[u + 1]
+ + ((uint64_t)x31[u + 2] << 31);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We process bits from most to least significant. At each
+ * loop iteration, we have acc_len bits in acc.
+ */
+ acc = 0;
+ acc_len = 0;
+ while (acc_len > 0 || elen > 0) {
+ int i, k;
+ uint32_t bits;
+ uint64_t mask1, mask2;
+
+ /*
+ * Get the next bits.
+ */
+ k = win_len;
+ if (acc_len < win_len) {
+ if (elen > 0) {
+ acc = (acc << 8) | *e ++;
+ elen --;
+ acc_len += 8;
+ } else {
+ k = acc_len;
+ }
+ }
+ bits = (acc >> (acc_len - k)) & (((uint32_t)1 << k) - 1);
+ acc_len -= k;
+
+ /*
+ * We could get exactly k bits. Compute k squarings.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < k; i ++) {
+ montymul(t1, x, x, m, mw62num, m0i);
+ memcpy(x, t1, mw62num * sizeof *x);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Window lookup: we want to set t2 to the window
+ * lookup value, assuming the bits are non-zero. If
+ * the window length is 1 bit only, then t2 is
+ * already set; otherwise, we do a constant-time lookup.
+ */
+ if (win_len > 1) {
+ uint64_t *base;
+
+ memset(t2, 0, mw62num * sizeof *t2);
+ base = t2 + mw62num;
+ for (u = 1; u < ((uint32_t)1 << k); u ++) {
+ uint64_t mask;
+ size_t v;
+
+ mask = -(uint64_t)EQ(u, bits);
+ for (v = 0; v < mw62num; v ++) {
+ t2[v] |= mask & base[v];
+ }
+ base += mw62num;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Multiply with the looked-up value. We keep the product
+ * only if the exponent bits are not all-zero.
+ */
+ montymul(t1, x, t2, m, mw62num, m0i);
+ mask1 = -(uint64_t)EQ(bits, 0);
+ mask2 = ~mask1;
+ for (u = 0; u < mw62num; u ++) {
+ x[u] = (mask1 & x[u]) | (mask2 & t1[u]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert back from Montgomery representation.
+ */
+ frommonty(x, m, mw62num, m0i);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert result into 31-bit words.
+ */
+ for (u = 0; u < mw31num; u += 2) {
+ uint64_t zw;
+
+ zw = x[u >> 1];
+ x31[u + 1] = (uint32_t)zw & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ if ((u + 1) < mw31num) {
+ x31[u + 2] = (uint32_t)(zw >> 31);
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i62_modpow_opt(uint32_t *x31, const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
+ const uint32_t *m31, uint32_t m0i31, uint64_t *tmp, size_t twlen)
+{
+ size_t mwlen;
+
+ mwlen = (m31[0] + 63) >> 5;
+ if (twlen < mwlen) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return br_i31_modpow_opt(x31, e, elen, m31, m0i31,
+ (uint32_t *)tmp, twlen << 1);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_i62_modpow_opt_as_i31(uint32_t *x31, const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,
+ const uint32_t *m31, uint32_t m0i31, uint32_t *tmp, size_t twlen)
+{
+ /*
+ * As documented, this function expects the 'tmp' argument to be
+ * 64-bit aligned. This is OK since this function is internal (it
+ * is not part of BearSSL's public API).
+ */
+ return br_i62_modpow_opt(x31, e, elen, m31, m0i31,
+ (uint64_t *)tmp, twlen >> 1);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/kdf/hkdf.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/kdf/hkdf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6a36851
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/kdf/hkdf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+const unsigned char br_hkdf_no_salt = 0;
+
+/* see bearssl_kdf.h */
+void
+br_hkdf_init(br_hkdf_context *hc, const br_hash_class *digest_vtable,
+ const void *salt, size_t salt_len)
+{
+ br_hmac_key_context kc;
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+
+ if (salt == BR_HKDF_NO_SALT) {
+ salt = tmp;
+ salt_len = br_digest_size(digest_vtable);
+ memset(tmp, 0, salt_len);
+ }
+ br_hmac_key_init(&kc, digest_vtable, salt, salt_len);
+ br_hmac_init(&hc->u.hmac_ctx, &kc, 0);
+ hc->dig_len = br_hmac_size(&hc->u.hmac_ctx);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_kdf.h */
+void
+br_hkdf_inject(br_hkdf_context *hc, const void *ikm, size_t ikm_len)
+{
+ br_hmac_update(&hc->u.hmac_ctx, ikm, ikm_len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_kdf.h */
+void
+br_hkdf_flip(br_hkdf_context *hc)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+
+ br_hmac_out(&hc->u.hmac_ctx, tmp);
+ br_hmac_key_init(&hc->u.prk_ctx,
+ br_hmac_get_digest(&hc->u.hmac_ctx), tmp, hc->dig_len);
+ hc->ptr = hc->dig_len;
+ hc->chunk_num = 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_kdf.h */
+size_t
+br_hkdf_produce(br_hkdf_context *hc,
+ const void *info, size_t info_len, void *out, size_t out_len)
+{
+ size_t tlen;
+
+ tlen = 0;
+ while (out_len > 0) {
+ size_t clen;
+
+ if (hc->ptr == hc->dig_len) {
+ br_hmac_context hmac_ctx;
+ unsigned char x;
+
+ hc->chunk_num ++;
+ if (hc->chunk_num == 256) {
+ return tlen;
+ }
+ x = hc->chunk_num;
+ br_hmac_init(&hmac_ctx, &hc->u.prk_ctx, 0);
+ if (x != 1) {
+ br_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, hc->buf, hc->dig_len);
+ }
+ br_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, info, info_len);
+ br_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, &x, 1);
+ br_hmac_out(&hmac_ctx, hc->buf);
+ hc->ptr = 0;
+ }
+ clen = hc->dig_len - hc->ptr;
+ if (clen > out_len) {
+ clen = out_len;
+ }
+ memcpy(out, hc->buf + hc->ptr, clen);
+ out = (unsigned char *)out + clen;
+ out_len -= clen;
+ hc->ptr += clen;
+ tlen += clen;
+ }
+ return tlen;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/kdf/shake.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/kdf/shake.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..80d7176
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/kdf/shake.c
@@ -0,0 +1,590 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Round constants.
+ */
+static const uint64_t RC[] = {
+ 0x0000000000000001, 0x0000000000008082,
+ 0x800000000000808A, 0x8000000080008000,
+ 0x000000000000808B, 0x0000000080000001,
+ 0x8000000080008081, 0x8000000000008009,
+ 0x000000000000008A, 0x0000000000000088,
+ 0x0000000080008009, 0x000000008000000A,
+ 0x000000008000808B, 0x800000000000008B,
+ 0x8000000000008089, 0x8000000000008003,
+ 0x8000000000008002, 0x8000000000000080,
+ 0x000000000000800A, 0x800000008000000A,
+ 0x8000000080008081, 0x8000000000008080,
+ 0x0000000080000001, 0x8000000080008008
+};
+
+/*
+ * XOR a block of data into the provided state. This supports only
+ * blocks whose length is a multiple of 64 bits.
+ */
+static void
+xor_block(uint64_t *A, const void *data, size_t rate)
+{
+ size_t u;
+
+ for (u = 0; u < rate; u += 8) {
+ A[u >> 3] ^= br_dec64le((const unsigned char *)data + u);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process a block with the provided data. The data length must be a
+ * multiple of 8 (in bytes); normally, this is the "rate".
+ */
+static void
+process_block(uint64_t *A)
+{
+ uint64_t t0, t1, t2, t3, t4;
+ uint64_t tt0, tt1, tt2, tt3;
+ uint64_t t, kt;
+ uint64_t c0, c1, c2, c3, c4, bnn;
+ int j;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the 24 rounds. This loop is partially unrolled (each
+ * iteration computes two rounds).
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < 24; j += 2) {
+
+ tt0 = A[ 1] ^ A[ 6];
+ tt1 = A[11] ^ A[16];
+ tt0 ^= A[21] ^ tt1;
+ tt0 = (tt0 << 1) | (tt0 >> 63);
+ tt2 = A[ 4] ^ A[ 9];
+ tt3 = A[14] ^ A[19];
+ tt0 ^= A[24];
+ tt2 ^= tt3;
+ t0 = tt0 ^ tt2;
+
+ tt0 = A[ 2] ^ A[ 7];
+ tt1 = A[12] ^ A[17];
+ tt0 ^= A[22] ^ tt1;
+ tt0 = (tt0 << 1) | (tt0 >> 63);
+ tt2 = A[ 0] ^ A[ 5];
+ tt3 = A[10] ^ A[15];
+ tt0 ^= A[20];
+ tt2 ^= tt3;
+ t1 = tt0 ^ tt2;
+
+ tt0 = A[ 3] ^ A[ 8];
+ tt1 = A[13] ^ A[18];
+ tt0 ^= A[23] ^ tt1;
+ tt0 = (tt0 << 1) | (tt0 >> 63);
+ tt2 = A[ 1] ^ A[ 6];
+ tt3 = A[11] ^ A[16];
+ tt0 ^= A[21];
+ tt2 ^= tt3;
+ t2 = tt0 ^ tt2;
+
+ tt0 = A[ 4] ^ A[ 9];
+ tt1 = A[14] ^ A[19];
+ tt0 ^= A[24] ^ tt1;
+ tt0 = (tt0 << 1) | (tt0 >> 63);
+ tt2 = A[ 2] ^ A[ 7];
+ tt3 = A[12] ^ A[17];
+ tt0 ^= A[22];
+ tt2 ^= tt3;
+ t3 = tt0 ^ tt2;
+
+ tt0 = A[ 0] ^ A[ 5];
+ tt1 = A[10] ^ A[15];
+ tt0 ^= A[20] ^ tt1;
+ tt0 = (tt0 << 1) | (tt0 >> 63);
+ tt2 = A[ 3] ^ A[ 8];
+ tt3 = A[13] ^ A[18];
+ tt0 ^= A[23];
+ tt2 ^= tt3;
+ t4 = tt0 ^ tt2;
+
+ A[ 0] = A[ 0] ^ t0;
+ A[ 5] = A[ 5] ^ t0;
+ A[10] = A[10] ^ t0;
+ A[15] = A[15] ^ t0;
+ A[20] = A[20] ^ t0;
+ A[ 1] = A[ 1] ^ t1;
+ A[ 6] = A[ 6] ^ t1;
+ A[11] = A[11] ^ t1;
+ A[16] = A[16] ^ t1;
+ A[21] = A[21] ^ t1;
+ A[ 2] = A[ 2] ^ t2;
+ A[ 7] = A[ 7] ^ t2;
+ A[12] = A[12] ^ t2;
+ A[17] = A[17] ^ t2;
+ A[22] = A[22] ^ t2;
+ A[ 3] = A[ 3] ^ t3;
+ A[ 8] = A[ 8] ^ t3;
+ A[13] = A[13] ^ t3;
+ A[18] = A[18] ^ t3;
+ A[23] = A[23] ^ t3;
+ A[ 4] = A[ 4] ^ t4;
+ A[ 9] = A[ 9] ^ t4;
+ A[14] = A[14] ^ t4;
+ A[19] = A[19] ^ t4;
+ A[24] = A[24] ^ t4;
+ A[ 5] = (A[ 5] << 36) | (A[ 5] >> (64 - 36));
+ A[10] = (A[10] << 3) | (A[10] >> (64 - 3));
+ A[15] = (A[15] << 41) | (A[15] >> (64 - 41));
+ A[20] = (A[20] << 18) | (A[20] >> (64 - 18));
+ A[ 1] = (A[ 1] << 1) | (A[ 1] >> (64 - 1));
+ A[ 6] = (A[ 6] << 44) | (A[ 6] >> (64 - 44));
+ A[11] = (A[11] << 10) | (A[11] >> (64 - 10));
+ A[16] = (A[16] << 45) | (A[16] >> (64 - 45));
+ A[21] = (A[21] << 2) | (A[21] >> (64 - 2));
+ A[ 2] = (A[ 2] << 62) | (A[ 2] >> (64 - 62));
+ A[ 7] = (A[ 7] << 6) | (A[ 7] >> (64 - 6));
+ A[12] = (A[12] << 43) | (A[12] >> (64 - 43));
+ A[17] = (A[17] << 15) | (A[17] >> (64 - 15));
+ A[22] = (A[22] << 61) | (A[22] >> (64 - 61));
+ A[ 3] = (A[ 3] << 28) | (A[ 3] >> (64 - 28));
+ A[ 8] = (A[ 8] << 55) | (A[ 8] >> (64 - 55));
+ A[13] = (A[13] << 25) | (A[13] >> (64 - 25));
+ A[18] = (A[18] << 21) | (A[18] >> (64 - 21));
+ A[23] = (A[23] << 56) | (A[23] >> (64 - 56));
+ A[ 4] = (A[ 4] << 27) | (A[ 4] >> (64 - 27));
+ A[ 9] = (A[ 9] << 20) | (A[ 9] >> (64 - 20));
+ A[14] = (A[14] << 39) | (A[14] >> (64 - 39));
+ A[19] = (A[19] << 8) | (A[19] >> (64 - 8));
+ A[24] = (A[24] << 14) | (A[24] >> (64 - 14));
+ bnn = ~A[12];
+ kt = A[ 6] | A[12];
+ c0 = A[ 0] ^ kt;
+ kt = bnn | A[18];
+ c1 = A[ 6] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[18] & A[24];
+ c2 = A[12] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[24] | A[ 0];
+ c3 = A[18] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[ 0] & A[ 6];
+ c4 = A[24] ^ kt;
+ A[ 0] = c0;
+ A[ 6] = c1;
+ A[12] = c2;
+ A[18] = c3;
+ A[24] = c4;
+ bnn = ~A[22];
+ kt = A[ 9] | A[10];
+ c0 = A[ 3] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[10] & A[16];
+ c1 = A[ 9] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[16] | bnn;
+ c2 = A[10] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[22] | A[ 3];
+ c3 = A[16] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[ 3] & A[ 9];
+ c4 = A[22] ^ kt;
+ A[ 3] = c0;
+ A[ 9] = c1;
+ A[10] = c2;
+ A[16] = c3;
+ A[22] = c4;
+ bnn = ~A[19];
+ kt = A[ 7] | A[13];
+ c0 = A[ 1] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[13] & A[19];
+ c1 = A[ 7] ^ kt;
+ kt = bnn & A[20];
+ c2 = A[13] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[20] | A[ 1];
+ c3 = bnn ^ kt;
+ kt = A[ 1] & A[ 7];
+ c4 = A[20] ^ kt;
+ A[ 1] = c0;
+ A[ 7] = c1;
+ A[13] = c2;
+ A[19] = c3;
+ A[20] = c4;
+ bnn = ~A[17];
+ kt = A[ 5] & A[11];
+ c0 = A[ 4] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[11] | A[17];
+ c1 = A[ 5] ^ kt;
+ kt = bnn | A[23];
+ c2 = A[11] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[23] & A[ 4];
+ c3 = bnn ^ kt;
+ kt = A[ 4] | A[ 5];
+ c4 = A[23] ^ kt;
+ A[ 4] = c0;
+ A[ 5] = c1;
+ A[11] = c2;
+ A[17] = c3;
+ A[23] = c4;
+ bnn = ~A[ 8];
+ kt = bnn & A[14];
+ c0 = A[ 2] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[14] | A[15];
+ c1 = bnn ^ kt;
+ kt = A[15] & A[21];
+ c2 = A[14] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[21] | A[ 2];
+ c3 = A[15] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[ 2] & A[ 8];
+ c4 = A[21] ^ kt;
+ A[ 2] = c0;
+ A[ 8] = c1;
+ A[14] = c2;
+ A[15] = c3;
+ A[21] = c4;
+ A[ 0] = A[ 0] ^ RC[j + 0];
+
+ tt0 = A[ 6] ^ A[ 9];
+ tt1 = A[ 7] ^ A[ 5];
+ tt0 ^= A[ 8] ^ tt1;
+ tt0 = (tt0 << 1) | (tt0 >> 63);
+ tt2 = A[24] ^ A[22];
+ tt3 = A[20] ^ A[23];
+ tt0 ^= A[21];
+ tt2 ^= tt3;
+ t0 = tt0 ^ tt2;
+
+ tt0 = A[12] ^ A[10];
+ tt1 = A[13] ^ A[11];
+ tt0 ^= A[14] ^ tt1;
+ tt0 = (tt0 << 1) | (tt0 >> 63);
+ tt2 = A[ 0] ^ A[ 3];
+ tt3 = A[ 1] ^ A[ 4];
+ tt0 ^= A[ 2];
+ tt2 ^= tt3;
+ t1 = tt0 ^ tt2;
+
+ tt0 = A[18] ^ A[16];
+ tt1 = A[19] ^ A[17];
+ tt0 ^= A[15] ^ tt1;
+ tt0 = (tt0 << 1) | (tt0 >> 63);
+ tt2 = A[ 6] ^ A[ 9];
+ tt3 = A[ 7] ^ A[ 5];
+ tt0 ^= A[ 8];
+ tt2 ^= tt3;
+ t2 = tt0 ^ tt2;
+
+ tt0 = A[24] ^ A[22];
+ tt1 = A[20] ^ A[23];
+ tt0 ^= A[21] ^ tt1;
+ tt0 = (tt0 << 1) | (tt0 >> 63);
+ tt2 = A[12] ^ A[10];
+ tt3 = A[13] ^ A[11];
+ tt0 ^= A[14];
+ tt2 ^= tt3;
+ t3 = tt0 ^ tt2;
+
+ tt0 = A[ 0] ^ A[ 3];
+ tt1 = A[ 1] ^ A[ 4];
+ tt0 ^= A[ 2] ^ tt1;
+ tt0 = (tt0 << 1) | (tt0 >> 63);
+ tt2 = A[18] ^ A[16];
+ tt3 = A[19] ^ A[17];
+ tt0 ^= A[15];
+ tt2 ^= tt3;
+ t4 = tt0 ^ tt2;
+
+ A[ 0] = A[ 0] ^ t0;
+ A[ 3] = A[ 3] ^ t0;
+ A[ 1] = A[ 1] ^ t0;
+ A[ 4] = A[ 4] ^ t0;
+ A[ 2] = A[ 2] ^ t0;
+ A[ 6] = A[ 6] ^ t1;
+ A[ 9] = A[ 9] ^ t1;
+ A[ 7] = A[ 7] ^ t1;
+ A[ 5] = A[ 5] ^ t1;
+ A[ 8] = A[ 8] ^ t1;
+ A[12] = A[12] ^ t2;
+ A[10] = A[10] ^ t2;
+ A[13] = A[13] ^ t2;
+ A[11] = A[11] ^ t2;
+ A[14] = A[14] ^ t2;
+ A[18] = A[18] ^ t3;
+ A[16] = A[16] ^ t3;
+ A[19] = A[19] ^ t3;
+ A[17] = A[17] ^ t3;
+ A[15] = A[15] ^ t3;
+ A[24] = A[24] ^ t4;
+ A[22] = A[22] ^ t4;
+ A[20] = A[20] ^ t4;
+ A[23] = A[23] ^ t4;
+ A[21] = A[21] ^ t4;
+ A[ 3] = (A[ 3] << 36) | (A[ 3] >> (64 - 36));
+ A[ 1] = (A[ 1] << 3) | (A[ 1] >> (64 - 3));
+ A[ 4] = (A[ 4] << 41) | (A[ 4] >> (64 - 41));
+ A[ 2] = (A[ 2] << 18) | (A[ 2] >> (64 - 18));
+ A[ 6] = (A[ 6] << 1) | (A[ 6] >> (64 - 1));
+ A[ 9] = (A[ 9] << 44) | (A[ 9] >> (64 - 44));
+ A[ 7] = (A[ 7] << 10) | (A[ 7] >> (64 - 10));
+ A[ 5] = (A[ 5] << 45) | (A[ 5] >> (64 - 45));
+ A[ 8] = (A[ 8] << 2) | (A[ 8] >> (64 - 2));
+ A[12] = (A[12] << 62) | (A[12] >> (64 - 62));
+ A[10] = (A[10] << 6) | (A[10] >> (64 - 6));
+ A[13] = (A[13] << 43) | (A[13] >> (64 - 43));
+ A[11] = (A[11] << 15) | (A[11] >> (64 - 15));
+ A[14] = (A[14] << 61) | (A[14] >> (64 - 61));
+ A[18] = (A[18] << 28) | (A[18] >> (64 - 28));
+ A[16] = (A[16] << 55) | (A[16] >> (64 - 55));
+ A[19] = (A[19] << 25) | (A[19] >> (64 - 25));
+ A[17] = (A[17] << 21) | (A[17] >> (64 - 21));
+ A[15] = (A[15] << 56) | (A[15] >> (64 - 56));
+ A[24] = (A[24] << 27) | (A[24] >> (64 - 27));
+ A[22] = (A[22] << 20) | (A[22] >> (64 - 20));
+ A[20] = (A[20] << 39) | (A[20] >> (64 - 39));
+ A[23] = (A[23] << 8) | (A[23] >> (64 - 8));
+ A[21] = (A[21] << 14) | (A[21] >> (64 - 14));
+ bnn = ~A[13];
+ kt = A[ 9] | A[13];
+ c0 = A[ 0] ^ kt;
+ kt = bnn | A[17];
+ c1 = A[ 9] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[17] & A[21];
+ c2 = A[13] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[21] | A[ 0];
+ c3 = A[17] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[ 0] & A[ 9];
+ c4 = A[21] ^ kt;
+ A[ 0] = c0;
+ A[ 9] = c1;
+ A[13] = c2;
+ A[17] = c3;
+ A[21] = c4;
+ bnn = ~A[14];
+ kt = A[22] | A[ 1];
+ c0 = A[18] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[ 1] & A[ 5];
+ c1 = A[22] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[ 5] | bnn;
+ c2 = A[ 1] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[14] | A[18];
+ c3 = A[ 5] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[18] & A[22];
+ c4 = A[14] ^ kt;
+ A[18] = c0;
+ A[22] = c1;
+ A[ 1] = c2;
+ A[ 5] = c3;
+ A[14] = c4;
+ bnn = ~A[23];
+ kt = A[10] | A[19];
+ c0 = A[ 6] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[19] & A[23];
+ c1 = A[10] ^ kt;
+ kt = bnn & A[ 2];
+ c2 = A[19] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[ 2] | A[ 6];
+ c3 = bnn ^ kt;
+ kt = A[ 6] & A[10];
+ c4 = A[ 2] ^ kt;
+ A[ 6] = c0;
+ A[10] = c1;
+ A[19] = c2;
+ A[23] = c3;
+ A[ 2] = c4;
+ bnn = ~A[11];
+ kt = A[ 3] & A[ 7];
+ c0 = A[24] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[ 7] | A[11];
+ c1 = A[ 3] ^ kt;
+ kt = bnn | A[15];
+ c2 = A[ 7] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[15] & A[24];
+ c3 = bnn ^ kt;
+ kt = A[24] | A[ 3];
+ c4 = A[15] ^ kt;
+ A[24] = c0;
+ A[ 3] = c1;
+ A[ 7] = c2;
+ A[11] = c3;
+ A[15] = c4;
+ bnn = ~A[16];
+ kt = bnn & A[20];
+ c0 = A[12] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[20] | A[ 4];
+ c1 = bnn ^ kt;
+ kt = A[ 4] & A[ 8];
+ c2 = A[20] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[ 8] | A[12];
+ c3 = A[ 4] ^ kt;
+ kt = A[12] & A[16];
+ c4 = A[ 8] ^ kt;
+ A[12] = c0;
+ A[16] = c1;
+ A[20] = c2;
+ A[ 4] = c3;
+ A[ 8] = c4;
+ A[ 0] = A[ 0] ^ RC[j + 1];
+ t = A[ 5];
+ A[ 5] = A[18];
+ A[18] = A[11];
+ A[11] = A[10];
+ A[10] = A[ 6];
+ A[ 6] = A[22];
+ A[22] = A[20];
+ A[20] = A[12];
+ A[12] = A[19];
+ A[19] = A[15];
+ A[15] = A[24];
+ A[24] = A[ 8];
+ A[ 8] = t;
+ t = A[ 1];
+ A[ 1] = A[ 9];
+ A[ 9] = A[14];
+ A[14] = A[ 2];
+ A[ 2] = A[13];
+ A[13] = A[23];
+ A[23] = A[ 4];
+ A[ 4] = A[21];
+ A[21] = A[16];
+ A[16] = A[ 3];
+ A[ 3] = A[17];
+ A[17] = A[ 7];
+ A[ 7] = t;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_kdf.h */
+void
+br_shake_init(br_shake_context *sc, int security_level)
+{
+ sc->rate = 200 - (size_t)(security_level >> 2);
+ sc->dptr = 0;
+ memset(sc->A, 0, sizeof sc->A);
+ sc->A[ 1] = ~(uint64_t)0;
+ sc->A[ 2] = ~(uint64_t)0;
+ sc->A[ 8] = ~(uint64_t)0;
+ sc->A[12] = ~(uint64_t)0;
+ sc->A[17] = ~(uint64_t)0;
+ sc->A[20] = ~(uint64_t)0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_kdf.h */
+void
+br_shake_inject(br_shake_context *sc, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t rate, dptr;
+
+ buf = data;
+ rate = sc->rate;
+ dptr = sc->dptr;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ size_t clen;
+
+ clen = rate - dptr;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ clen = len;
+ }
+ memcpy(sc->dbuf + dptr, buf, clen);
+ dptr += clen;
+ buf += clen;
+ len -= clen;
+ if (dptr == rate) {
+ xor_block(sc->A, sc->dbuf, rate);
+ process_block(sc->A);
+ dptr = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ sc->dptr = dptr;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_kdf.h */
+void
+br_shake_flip(br_shake_context *sc)
+{
+ /*
+ * We apply padding and pre-XOR the value into the state. We
+ * set dptr to the end of the buffer, so that first call to
+ * shake_extract() will process the block.
+ */
+ if ((sc->dptr + 1) == sc->rate) {
+ sc->dbuf[sc->dptr ++] = 0x9F;
+ } else {
+ sc->dbuf[sc->dptr ++] = 0x1F;
+ memset(sc->dbuf + sc->dptr, 0x00, sc->rate - sc->dptr - 1);
+ sc->dbuf[sc->rate - 1] = 0x80;
+ sc->dptr = sc->rate;
+ }
+ xor_block(sc->A, sc->dbuf, sc->rate);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_kdf.h */
+void
+br_shake_produce(br_shake_context *sc, void *out, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t dptr, rate;
+
+ buf = out;
+ dptr = sc->dptr;
+ rate = sc->rate;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ size_t clen;
+
+ if (dptr == rate) {
+ unsigned char *dbuf;
+ uint64_t *A;
+
+ A = sc->A;
+ dbuf = sc->dbuf;
+ process_block(A);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 0, A[ 0]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 8, ~A[ 1]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 16, ~A[ 2]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 24, A[ 3]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 32, A[ 4]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 40, A[ 5]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 48, A[ 6]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 56, A[ 7]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 64, ~A[ 8]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 72, A[ 9]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 80, A[10]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 88, A[11]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 96, ~A[12]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 104, A[13]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 112, A[14]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 120, A[15]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 128, A[16]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 136, ~A[17]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 144, A[18]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 152, A[19]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 160, ~A[20]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 168, A[21]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 176, A[22]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 184, A[23]);
+ br_enc64le(dbuf + 192, A[24]);
+ dptr = 0;
+ }
+ clen = rate - dptr;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ clen = len;
+ }
+ memcpy(buf, sc->dbuf + dptr, clen);
+ dptr += clen;
+ buf += clen;
+ len -= clen;
+ }
+ sc->dptr = dptr;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/mac/hmac.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/mac/hmac.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b438798
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/mac/hmac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static inline size_t
+block_size(const br_hash_class *dig)
+{
+ unsigned ls;
+
+ ls = (unsigned)(dig->desc >> BR_HASHDESC_LBLEN_OFF)
+ & BR_HASHDESC_LBLEN_MASK;
+ return (size_t)1 << ls;
+}
+
+static void
+process_key(const br_hash_class **hc, void *ks,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len, unsigned bb)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[256];
+ size_t blen, u;
+
+ blen = block_size(*hc);
+ memcpy(tmp, key, key_len);
+ for (u = 0; u < key_len; u ++) {
+ tmp[u] ^= (unsigned char)bb;
+ }
+ memset(tmp + key_len, bb, blen - key_len);
+ (*hc)->init(hc);
+ (*hc)->update(hc, tmp, blen);
+ (*hc)->state(hc, ks);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_hmac_key_init(br_hmac_key_context *kc,
+ const br_hash_class *dig, const void *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+ br_hash_compat_context hc;
+ unsigned char kbuf[64];
+
+ kc->dig_vtable = dig;
+ hc.vtable = dig;
+ if (key_len > block_size(dig)) {
+ dig->init(&hc.vtable);
+ dig->update(&hc.vtable, key, key_len);
+ dig->out(&hc.vtable, kbuf);
+ key = kbuf;
+ key_len = br_digest_size(dig);
+ }
+ process_key(&hc.vtable, kc->ksi, key, key_len, 0x36);
+ process_key(&hc.vtable, kc->kso, key, key_len, 0x5C);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_hmac_init(br_hmac_context *ctx,
+ const br_hmac_key_context *kc, size_t out_len)
+{
+ const br_hash_class *dig;
+ size_t blen, hlen;
+
+ dig = kc->dig_vtable;
+ blen = block_size(dig);
+ dig->init(&ctx->dig.vtable);
+ dig->set_state(&ctx->dig.vtable, kc->ksi, (uint64_t)blen);
+ memcpy(ctx->kso, kc->kso, sizeof kc->kso);
+ hlen = br_digest_size(dig);
+ if (out_len > 0 && out_len < hlen) {
+ hlen = out_len;
+ }
+ ctx->out_len = hlen;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_hmac_update(br_hmac_context *ctx, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->dig.vtable->update(&ctx->dig.vtable, data, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+size_t
+br_hmac_out(const br_hmac_context *ctx, void *out)
+{
+ const br_hash_class *dig;
+ br_hash_compat_context hc;
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+ size_t blen, hlen;
+
+ dig = ctx->dig.vtable;
+ dig->out(&ctx->dig.vtable, tmp);
+ blen = block_size(dig);
+ dig->init(&hc.vtable);
+ dig->set_state(&hc.vtable, ctx->kso, (uint64_t)blen);
+ hlen = br_digest_size(dig);
+ dig->update(&hc.vtable, tmp, hlen);
+ dig->out(&hc.vtable, tmp);
+ memcpy(out, tmp, ctx->out_len);
+ return ctx->out_len;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/mac/hmac_ct.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/mac/hmac_ct.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1c1d80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/mac/hmac_ct.c
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static inline size_t
+hash_size(const br_hash_class *dig)
+{
+ return (unsigned)(dig->desc >> BR_HASHDESC_OUT_OFF)
+ & BR_HASHDESC_OUT_MASK;
+}
+
+static inline size_t
+block_size(const br_hash_class *dig)
+{
+ unsigned ls;
+
+ ls = (unsigned)(dig->desc >> BR_HASHDESC_LBLEN_OFF)
+ & BR_HASHDESC_LBLEN_MASK;
+ return (size_t)1 << ls;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+size_t
+br_hmac_outCT(const br_hmac_context *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
+ void *out)
+{
+ /*
+ * Method implemented here is inspired from the descriptions on:
+ * https://www.imperialviolet.org/2013/02/04/luckythirteen.html
+ *
+ * Principle: we input bytes one by one. We use a MUX to push
+ * padding bytes instead of data bytes when appropriate. At each
+ * block limit, we get the current hash function state: this is
+ * a potential output, since we handle MD padding ourselves.
+ *
+ * be 1 for big-endian, 0 for little-endian
+ * po minimal MD padding length
+ * bs block size (always a power of 2)
+ * hlen hash output size
+ */
+
+ const br_hash_class *dig;
+ br_hash_compat_context hc;
+ int be;
+ uint32_t po, bs;
+ uint32_t kr, km, kl, kz, u;
+ uint64_t count, ncount, bit_len;
+ unsigned char tmp1[64], tmp2[64];
+ size_t hlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy the current hash context.
+ */
+ hc = ctx->dig;
+
+ /*
+ * Get function-specific information.
+ */
+ dig = hc.vtable;
+ be = (dig->desc & BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING_BE) != 0;
+ po = 9;
+ if (dig->desc & BR_HASHDESC_MD_PADDING_128) {
+ po += 8;
+ }
+ bs = block_size(dig);
+ hlen = hash_size(dig);
+
+ /*
+ * Get current input length and compute total bit length.
+ */
+ count = dig->state(&hc.vtable, tmp1);
+ bit_len = (count + (uint64_t)len) << 3;
+
+ /*
+ * We can input the blocks that we are sure we will use.
+ * This offers better performance (no MUX for these blocks)
+ * and also ensures that the remaining lengths fit on 32 bits.
+ */
+ ncount = (count + (uint64_t)min_len) & ~(uint64_t)(bs - 1);
+ if (ncount > count) {
+ size_t zlen;
+
+ zlen = (size_t)(ncount - count);
+ dig->update(&hc.vtable, data, zlen);
+ data = (const unsigned char *)data + zlen;
+ len -= zlen;
+ max_len -= zlen;
+ count = ncount;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * At that point:
+ * -- 'count' contains the number of bytes already processed
+ * (in total).
+ * -- We must input 'len' bytes. 'min_len' is unimportant: we
+ * used it to know how many full blocks we could process
+ * directly. Now only len and max_len matter.
+ *
+ * We compute kr, kl, kz and km.
+ * kr number of input bytes already in the current block
+ * km index of the first byte after the end of the last padding
+ * block, if length is max_len
+ * kz index of the last byte of the actual last padding block
+ * kl index of the start of the encoded length
+ *
+ * km, kz and kl are counted from the current offset in the
+ * input data.
+ */
+ kr = (uint32_t)count & (bs - 1);
+ kz = ((kr + (uint32_t)len + po + bs - 1) & ~(bs - 1)) - 1 - kr;
+ kl = kz - 7;
+ km = ((kr + (uint32_t)max_len + po + bs - 1) & ~(bs - 1)) - kr;
+
+ /*
+ * We must now process km bytes. For index u from 0 to km-1:
+ * d is from data[] if u < max_len, 0x00 otherwise
+ * e is an encoded length byte or 0x00, depending on u
+ * The tests for d and e need not be constant-time, since
+ * they relate only to u and max_len, not to the actual length.
+ *
+ * Actual input length is then:
+ * d if u < len
+ * 0x80 if u == len
+ * 0x00 if u > len and u < kl
+ * e if u >= kl
+ *
+ * Hash state is obtained whenever we reach a full block. This
+ * is the result we want if and only if u == kz.
+ */
+ memset(tmp2, 0, sizeof tmp2);
+ for (u = 0; u < km; u ++) {
+ uint32_t v;
+ uint32_t d, e, x0, x1;
+ unsigned char x[1];
+
+ d = (u < max_len) ? ((const unsigned char *)data)[u] : 0x00;
+ v = (kr + u) & (bs - 1);
+ if (v >= (bs - 8)) {
+ unsigned j;
+
+ j = (v - (bs - 8)) << 3;
+ if (be) {
+ e = (uint32_t)(bit_len >> (56 - j));
+ } else {
+ e = (uint32_t)(bit_len >> j);
+ }
+ e &= 0xFF;
+ } else {
+ e = 0x00;
+ }
+ x0 = MUX(EQ(u, (uint32_t)len), 0x80, d);
+ x1 = MUX(LT(u, kl), 0x00, e);
+ x[0] = MUX(LE(u, (uint32_t)len), x0, x1);
+ dig->update(&hc.vtable, x, 1);
+ if (v == (bs - 1)) {
+ dig->state(&hc.vtable, tmp1);
+ CCOPY(EQ(u, kz), tmp2, tmp1, hlen);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Inner hash output is in tmp2[]; we finish processing.
+ */
+ dig->init(&hc.vtable);
+ dig->set_state(&hc.vtable, ctx->kso, (uint64_t)bs);
+ dig->update(&hc.vtable, tmp2, hlen);
+ dig->out(&hc.vtable, tmp2);
+ memcpy(out, tmp2, ctx->out_len);
+ return ctx->out_len;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rand/aesctr_drbg.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rand/aesctr_drbg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8dbd501
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rand/aesctr_drbg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rand.h */
+void
+br_aesctr_drbg_init(br_aesctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const br_block_ctr_class *aesctr,
+ const void *seed, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aesctr_drbg_vtable;
+ memset(tmp, 0, sizeof tmp);
+ aesctr->init(&ctx->sk.vtable, tmp, 16);
+ ctx->cc = 0;
+ br_aesctr_drbg_update(ctx, seed, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_rand.h */
+void
+br_aesctr_drbg_generate(br_aesctr_drbg_context *ctx, void *out, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char iv[12];
+
+ buf = out;
+ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv);
+ while (len > 0) {
+ size_t clen;
+
+ /*
+ * We generate data by blocks of at most 65280 bytes. This
+ * allows for unambiguously testing the counter overflow
+ * condition; also, it should work on 16-bit architectures
+ * (where 'size_t' is 16 bits only).
+ */
+ clen = len;
+ if (clen > 65280) {
+ clen = 65280;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We make sure that the counter won't exceed the configured
+ * limit.
+ */
+ if ((uint32_t)(ctx->cc + ((clen + 15) >> 4)) > 32768) {
+ clen = (32768 - ctx->cc) << 4;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ clen = len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Run CTR.
+ */
+ memset(buf, 0, clen);
+ ctx->cc = ctx->sk.vtable->run(&ctx->sk.vtable,
+ iv, ctx->cc, buf, clen);
+ buf += clen;
+ len -= clen;
+
+ /*
+ * Every 32768 blocks, we force a state update.
+ */
+ if (ctx->cc >= 32768) {
+ br_aesctr_drbg_update(ctx, NULL, 0);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_rand.h */
+void
+br_aesctr_drbg_update(br_aesctr_drbg_context *ctx, const void *seed, size_t len)
+{
+ /*
+ * We use a Hirose construction on AES-256 to make a hash function.
+ * Function definition:
+ * - running state consists in two 16-byte blocks G and H
+ * - initial values of G and H are conventional
+ * - there is a fixed block-sized constant C
+ * - for next data block m:
+ * set AES key to H||m
+ * G' = E(G) xor G
+ * H' = E(G xor C) xor G xor C
+ * G <- G', H <- H'
+ * - once all blocks have been processed, output is H||G
+ *
+ * Constants:
+ * G_init = B6 B6 ... B6
+ * H_init = A5 A5 ... A5
+ * C = 01 00 ... 00
+ *
+ * With this hash function h(), we compute the new state as
+ * follows:
+ * - produce a state-dependent value s as encryption of an
+ * all-one block with AES and the current key
+ * - compute the new key as the first 128 bits of h(s||seed)
+ *
+ * Original Hirose article:
+ * https://www.iacr.org/archive/fse2006/40470213/40470213.pdf
+ */
+
+ unsigned char s[16], iv[12];
+ unsigned char G[16], H[16];
+ int first;
+
+ /*
+ * Use an all-one IV to get a fresh output block that depends on the
+ * current seed.
+ */
+ memset(iv, 0xFF, sizeof iv);
+ memset(s, 0, 16);
+ ctx->sk.vtable->run(&ctx->sk.vtable, iv, 0xFFFFFFFF, s, 16);
+
+ /*
+ * Set G[] and H[] to conventional start values.
+ */
+ memset(G, 0xB6, sizeof G);
+ memset(H, 0x5A, sizeof H);
+
+ /*
+ * Process the concatenation of the current state and the seed
+ * with the custom hash function.
+ */
+ first = 1;
+ for (;;) {
+ unsigned char tmp[32];
+ unsigned char newG[16];
+
+ /*
+ * Assemble new key H||m into tmp[].
+ */
+ memcpy(tmp, H, 16);
+ if (first) {
+ memcpy(tmp + 16, s, 16);
+ first = 0;
+ } else {
+ size_t clen;
+
+ if (len == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ clen = len < 16 ? len : 16;
+ memcpy(tmp + 16, seed, clen);
+ memset(tmp + 16 + clen, 0, 16 - clen);
+ seed = (const unsigned char *)seed + clen;
+ len -= clen;
+ }
+ ctx->sk.vtable->init(&ctx->sk.vtable, tmp, 32);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute new G and H values.
+ */
+ memcpy(iv, G, 12);
+ memcpy(newG, G, 16);
+ ctx->sk.vtable->run(&ctx->sk.vtable, iv,
+ br_dec32be(G + 12), newG, 16);
+ iv[0] ^= 0x01;
+ memcpy(H, G, 16);
+ H[0] ^= 0x01;
+ ctx->sk.vtable->run(&ctx->sk.vtable, iv,
+ br_dec32be(G + 12), H, 16);
+ memcpy(G, newG, 16);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Output hash value is H||G. We truncate it to its first 128 bits,
+ * i.e. H; that's our new AES key.
+ */
+ ctx->sk.vtable->init(&ctx->sk.vtable, H, 16);
+ ctx->cc = 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_rand.h */
+const br_prng_class br_aesctr_drbg_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aesctr_drbg_context),
+ (void (*)(const br_prng_class **, const void *, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aesctr_drbg_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_prng_class **, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aesctr_drbg_generate,
+ (void (*)(const br_prng_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aesctr_drbg_update
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rand/hmac_drbg.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rand/hmac_drbg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d746756
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rand/hmac_drbg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_hmac_drbg_init(br_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const br_hash_class *digest_class, const void *seed, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t hlen;
+
+ ctx->vtable = &br_hmac_drbg_vtable;
+ hlen = br_digest_size(digest_class);
+ memset(ctx->K, 0x00, hlen);
+ memset(ctx->V, 0x01, hlen);
+ ctx->digest_class = digest_class;
+ br_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, seed, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_hmac_drbg_generate(br_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, void *out, size_t len)
+{
+ const br_hash_class *dig;
+ br_hmac_key_context kc;
+ br_hmac_context hc;
+ size_t hlen;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char x;
+
+ dig = ctx->digest_class;
+ hlen = br_digest_size(dig);
+ br_hmac_key_init(&kc, dig, ctx->K, hlen);
+ buf = out;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ size_t clen;
+
+ br_hmac_init(&hc, &kc, 0);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, ctx->V, hlen);
+ br_hmac_out(&hc, ctx->V);
+ clen = hlen;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ clen = len;
+ }
+ memcpy(buf, ctx->V, clen);
+ buf += clen;
+ len -= clen;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * To prepare the state for the next request, we should call
+ * br_hmac_drbg_update() with an empty additional seed. However,
+ * we already have an initialized HMAC context with the right
+ * initial key, and we don't want to push another one on the
+ * stack, so we inline that update() call here.
+ */
+ br_hmac_init(&hc, &kc, 0);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, ctx->V, hlen);
+ x = 0x00;
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, &x, 1);
+ br_hmac_out(&hc, ctx->K);
+ br_hmac_key_init(&kc, dig, ctx->K, hlen);
+ br_hmac_init(&hc, &kc, 0);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, ctx->V, hlen);
+ br_hmac_out(&hc, ctx->V);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_hmac_drbg_update(br_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const void *seed, size_t len)
+{
+ const br_hash_class *dig;
+ br_hmac_key_context kc;
+ br_hmac_context hc;
+ size_t hlen;
+ unsigned char x;
+
+ dig = ctx->digest_class;
+ hlen = br_digest_size(dig);
+
+ /*
+ * 1. K = HMAC(K, V || 0x00 || seed)
+ */
+ br_hmac_key_init(&kc, dig, ctx->K, hlen);
+ br_hmac_init(&hc, &kc, 0);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, ctx->V, hlen);
+ x = 0x00;
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, &x, 1);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, seed, len);
+ br_hmac_out(&hc, ctx->K);
+ br_hmac_key_init(&kc, dig, ctx->K, hlen);
+
+ /*
+ * 2. V = HMAC(K, V)
+ */
+ br_hmac_init(&hc, &kc, 0);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, ctx->V, hlen);
+ br_hmac_out(&hc, ctx->V);
+
+ /*
+ * 3. If the additional seed is empty, then stop here.
+ */
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * 4. K = HMAC(K, V || 0x01 || seed)
+ */
+ br_hmac_init(&hc, &kc, 0);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, ctx->V, hlen);
+ x = 0x01;
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, &x, 1);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, seed, len);
+ br_hmac_out(&hc, ctx->K);
+ br_hmac_key_init(&kc, dig, ctx->K, hlen);
+
+ /*
+ * 5. V = HMAC(K, V)
+ */
+ br_hmac_init(&hc, &kc, 0);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, ctx->V, hlen);
+ br_hmac_out(&hc, ctx->V);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+const br_prng_class br_hmac_drbg_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_hmac_drbg_context),
+ (void (*)(const br_prng_class **, const void *, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_hmac_drbg_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_prng_class **, void *, size_t))
+ &br_hmac_drbg_generate,
+ (void (*)(const br_prng_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_hmac_drbg_update
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rand/sysrng.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rand/sysrng.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a92114
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rand/sysrng.c
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define BR_ENABLE_INTRINSICS 1
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_USE_GETENTROPY
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+#if BR_USE_URANDOM
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#endif
+
+#if BR_USE_WIN32_RAND
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <wincrypt.h>
+#pragma comment(lib, "advapi32")
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Seeder that uses the RDRAND opcodes (on x86 CPU).
+ */
+#if BR_RDRAND
+BR_TARGETS_X86_UP
+BR_TARGET("rdrnd")
+static int
+seeder_rdrand(const br_prng_class **ctx)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[32];
+ size_t u;
+
+ for (u = 0; u < sizeof tmp; u += sizeof(uint32_t)) {
+ int j;
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ /*
+ * We use the 32-bit intrinsic so that code is compatible
+ * with both 32-bit and 64-bit architectures.
+ *
+ * Intel recommends trying at least 10 times in case of
+ * failure.
+ *
+ * AMD bug: there are reports that some AMD processors
+ * have a bug that makes them fail silently after a
+ * suspend/resume cycle, in which case RDRAND will report
+ * a success but always return 0xFFFFFFFF.
+ * see: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85911
+ *
+ * As a mitigation, if the 32-bit value is 0 or -1, then
+ * it is considered a failure and tried again. This should
+ * reliably detect the buggy case, at least. This also
+ * implies that the selected seed values can never be
+ * 0x00000000 or 0xFFFFFFFF, which is not a problem since
+ * we are generating a seed for a PRNG, and we overdo it
+ * a bit (we generate 32 bytes of randomness, and 256 bits
+ * of entropy are really overkill).
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < 10; j ++) {
+ if (_rdrand32_step(&x) && x != 0 && x != (uint32_t)-1) {
+ goto next_word;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+ next_word:
+ br_enc32le(tmp + u, x);
+ }
+ (*ctx)->update(ctx, tmp, sizeof tmp);
+ return 1;
+}
+BR_TARGETS_X86_DOWN
+
+static int
+rdrand_supported(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * The RDRND support is bit 30 of ECX, as returned by CPUID.
+ */
+ return br_cpuid(0, 0, 0x40000000, 0);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Seeder that uses /dev/urandom (on Unix-like systems).
+ */
+#if BR_USE_URANDOM
+static int
+seeder_urandom(const br_prng_class **ctx)
+{
+ int f;
+
+ f = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
+ if (f >= 0) {
+ unsigned char tmp[32];
+ size_t u;
+
+ for (u = 0; u < sizeof tmp;) {
+ ssize_t len;
+
+ len = read(f, tmp + u, (sizeof tmp) - u);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ if (errno == EINTR) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ u += (size_t)len;
+ }
+ close(f);
+ if (u == sizeof tmp) {
+ (*ctx)->update(ctx, tmp, sizeof tmp);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Seeder that uses getentropy() (backed by getrandom() on some systems,
+ * e.g. Linux). On failure, it will use the /dev/urandom seeder (if
+ * enabled).
+ */
+#if BR_USE_GETENTROPY
+static int
+seeder_getentropy(const br_prng_class **ctx)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[32];
+
+ if (getentropy(tmp, sizeof tmp) == 0) {
+ (*ctx)->update(ctx, tmp, sizeof tmp);
+ return 1;
+ }
+#if BR_USE_URANDOM
+ return seeder_urandom(ctx);
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Seeder that uses CryptGenRandom() (on Windows).
+ */
+#if BR_USE_WIN32_RAND
+static int
+seeder_win32(const br_prng_class **ctx)
+{
+ HCRYPTPROV hp;
+
+ if (CryptAcquireContext(&hp, 0, 0, PROV_RSA_FULL,
+ CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT))
+ {
+ BYTE buf[32];
+ BOOL r;
+
+ r = CryptGenRandom(hp, sizeof buf, buf);
+ CryptReleaseContext(hp, 0);
+ if (r) {
+ (*ctx)->update(ctx, buf, sizeof buf);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * An aggregate seeder that uses RDRAND, and falls back to an OS-provided
+ * source if RDRAND fails.
+ */
+#if BR_RDRAND && (BR_USE_GETENTROPY || BR_USE_URANDOM || BR_USE_WIN32_RAND)
+static int
+seeder_rdrand_with_fallback(const br_prng_class **ctx)
+{
+ if (!seeder_rdrand(ctx)) {
+#if BR_USE_GETENTROPY
+ return seeder_getentropy(ctx);
+#elif BR_USE_URANDOM
+ return seeder_urandom(ctx);
+#elif BR_USE_WIN32_RAND
+ return seeder_win32(ctx);
+#else
+#error "macro selection has gone wrong"
+#endif
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* see bearssl_rand.h */
+br_prng_seeder
+br_prng_seeder_system(const char **name)
+{
+#if BR_RDRAND
+ if (rdrand_supported()) {
+ if (name != NULL) {
+ *name = "rdrand";
+ }
+#if BR_USE_GETENTROPY || BR_USE_URANDOM || BR_USE_WIN32_RAND
+ return &seeder_rdrand_with_fallback;
+#else
+ return &seeder_rdrand;
+#endif
+ }
+#endif
+#if BR_USE_GETENTROPY
+ if (name != NULL) {
+ *name = "getentropy";
+ }
+ return &seeder_getentropy;
+#elif BR_USE_URANDOM
+ if (name != NULL) {
+ *name = "urandom";
+ }
+ return &seeder_urandom;
+#elif BR_USE_WIN32_RAND
+ if (name != NULL) {
+ *name = "win32";
+ }
+ return &seeder_win32;
+#else
+ if (name != NULL) {
+ *name = "none";
+ }
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_keygen.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_keygen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2e83c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_keygen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_keygen
+br_rsa_keygen_get_default(void)
+{
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return &br_rsa_i62_keygen;
+#elif BR_LOMUL
+ return &br_rsa_i15_keygen;
+#else
+ return &br_rsa_i31_keygen;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_modulus.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_modulus.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..57d4be5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_modulus.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_compute_modulus
+br_rsa_compute_modulus_get_default(void)
+{
+#if BR_LOMUL
+ return &br_rsa_i15_compute_modulus;
+#else
+ return &br_rsa_i31_compute_modulus;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_oaep_decrypt.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_oaep_decrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7345d64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_oaep_decrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_oaep_decrypt
+br_rsa_oaep_decrypt_get_default(void)
+{
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return &br_rsa_i62_oaep_decrypt;
+#elif BR_LOMUL
+ return &br_rsa_i15_oaep_decrypt;
+#else
+ return &br_rsa_i31_oaep_decrypt;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_oaep_encrypt.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_oaep_encrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae33fcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_oaep_encrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_oaep_encrypt
+br_rsa_oaep_encrypt_get_default(void)
+{
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return &br_rsa_i62_oaep_encrypt;
+#elif BR_LOMUL
+ return &br_rsa_i15_oaep_encrypt;
+#else
+ return &br_rsa_i31_oaep_encrypt;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pkcs1_sign.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pkcs1_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e926704
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pkcs1_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_pkcs1_sign
+br_rsa_pkcs1_sign_get_default(void)
+{
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return &br_rsa_i62_pkcs1_sign;
+#elif BR_LOMUL
+ return &br_rsa_i15_pkcs1_sign;
+#else
+ return &br_rsa_i31_pkcs1_sign;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pkcs1_vrfy.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pkcs1_vrfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3dbeb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pkcs1_vrfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy
+br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy_get_default(void)
+{
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return &br_rsa_i62_pkcs1_vrfy;
+#elif BR_LOMUL
+ return &br_rsa_i15_pkcs1_vrfy;
+#else
+ return &br_rsa_i31_pkcs1_vrfy;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_priv.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_priv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb0b2c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_priv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_private
+br_rsa_private_get_default(void)
+{
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return &br_rsa_i62_private;
+#elif BR_LOMUL
+ return &br_rsa_i15_private;
+#else
+ return &br_rsa_i31_private;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_privexp.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_privexp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cda4555
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_privexp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_compute_privexp
+br_rsa_compute_privexp_get_default(void)
+{
+#if BR_LOMUL
+ return &br_rsa_i15_compute_privexp;
+#else
+ return &br_rsa_i31_compute_privexp;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pss_sign.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pss_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce4f3e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pss_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_pss_sign
+br_rsa_pss_sign_get_default(void)
+{
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return &br_rsa_i62_pss_sign;
+#elif BR_LOMUL
+ return &br_rsa_i15_pss_sign;
+#else
+ return &br_rsa_i31_pss_sign;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pss_vrfy.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pss_vrfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e3a9ad9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pss_vrfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_pss_vrfy
+br_rsa_pss_vrfy_get_default(void)
+{
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return &br_rsa_i62_pss_vrfy;
+#elif BR_LOMUL
+ return &br_rsa_i15_pss_vrfy;
+#else
+ return &br_rsa_i31_pss_vrfy;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pub.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pub.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1f03ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pub.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_public
+br_rsa_public_get_default(void)
+{
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ return &br_rsa_i62_public;
+#elif BR_LOMUL
+ return &br_rsa_i15_public;
+#else
+ return &br_rsa_i31_public;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pubexp.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pubexp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..47bc000
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_default_pubexp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_compute_pubexp
+br_rsa_compute_pubexp_get_default(void)
+{
+#if BR_LOMUL
+ return &br_rsa_i15_compute_pubexp;
+#else
+ return &br_rsa_i31_compute_pubexp;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_keygen.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_keygen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8da419
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_keygen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,583 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Make a random integer of the provided size. The size is encoded.
+ * The header word is untouched.
+ */
+static void
+mkrand(const br_prng_class **rng, uint16_t *x, uint32_t esize)
+{
+ size_t u, len;
+ unsigned m;
+
+ len = (esize + 15) >> 4;
+ (*rng)->generate(rng, x + 1, len * sizeof(uint16_t));
+ for (u = 1; u < len; u ++) {
+ x[u] &= 0x7FFF;
+ }
+ m = esize & 15;
+ if (m == 0) {
+ x[len] &= 0x7FFF;
+ } else {
+ x[len] &= 0x7FFF >> (15 - m);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the big-endian unsigned representation of the product of
+ * all small primes from 13 to 1481.
+ */
+static const unsigned char SMALL_PRIMES[] = {
+ 0x2E, 0xAB, 0x92, 0xD1, 0x8B, 0x12, 0x47, 0x31, 0x54, 0x0A,
+ 0x99, 0x5D, 0x25, 0x5E, 0xE2, 0x14, 0x96, 0x29, 0x1E, 0xB7,
+ 0x78, 0x70, 0xCC, 0x1F, 0xA5, 0xAB, 0x8D, 0x72, 0x11, 0x37,
+ 0xFB, 0xD8, 0x1E, 0x3F, 0x5B, 0x34, 0x30, 0x17, 0x8B, 0xE5,
+ 0x26, 0x28, 0x23, 0xA1, 0x8A, 0xA4, 0x29, 0xEA, 0xFD, 0x9E,
+ 0x39, 0x60, 0x8A, 0xF3, 0xB5, 0xA6, 0xEB, 0x3F, 0x02, 0xB6,
+ 0x16, 0xC3, 0x96, 0x9D, 0x38, 0xB0, 0x7D, 0x82, 0x87, 0x0C,
+ 0xF7, 0xBE, 0x24, 0xE5, 0x5F, 0x41, 0x04, 0x79, 0x76, 0x40,
+ 0xE7, 0x00, 0x22, 0x7E, 0xB5, 0x85, 0x7F, 0x8D, 0x01, 0x50,
+ 0xE9, 0xD3, 0x29, 0x42, 0x08, 0xB3, 0x51, 0x40, 0x7B, 0xD7,
+ 0x8D, 0xCC, 0x10, 0x01, 0x64, 0x59, 0x28, 0xB6, 0x53, 0xF3,
+ 0x50, 0x4E, 0xB1, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xCD, 0x6E, 0xF5, 0x56, 0x3E,
+ 0x66, 0x2F, 0xD7, 0x07, 0x7F, 0x52, 0x4C, 0x13, 0x24, 0xDC,
+ 0x8E, 0x8D, 0xCC, 0xED, 0x77, 0xC4, 0x21, 0xD2, 0xFD, 0x08,
+ 0xEA, 0xD7, 0xC0, 0x5C, 0x13, 0x82, 0x81, 0x31, 0x2F, 0x2B,
+ 0x08, 0xE4, 0x80, 0x04, 0x7A, 0x0C, 0x8A, 0x3C, 0xDC, 0x22,
+ 0xE4, 0x5A, 0x7A, 0xB0, 0x12, 0x5E, 0x4A, 0x76, 0x94, 0x77,
+ 0xC2, 0x0E, 0x92, 0xBA, 0x8A, 0xA0, 0x1F, 0x14, 0x51, 0x1E,
+ 0x66, 0x6C, 0x38, 0x03, 0x6C, 0xC7, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x70, 0x80,
+ 0xAF, 0xCA, 0x84, 0x51, 0xD8, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x49, 0xF5, 0xA8,
+ 0x5E, 0x35, 0x4B, 0xAC, 0xCE, 0x29, 0x92, 0x33, 0xB7, 0xA2,
+ 0x69, 0x7D, 0x0C, 0xE0, 0x9C, 0xDB, 0x04, 0xD6, 0xB4, 0xBC,
+ 0x39, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x9E, 0x9D, 0x78, 0x38, 0x7F, 0x51, 0x54,
+ 0x50, 0x8B, 0x9E, 0x9C, 0x03, 0x6C, 0xF5, 0x9D, 0x2C, 0x74,
+ 0x57, 0xF0, 0x27, 0x2A, 0xC3, 0x47, 0xCA, 0xB9, 0xD7, 0x5C,
+ 0xFF, 0xC2, 0xAC, 0x65, 0x4E, 0xBD
+};
+
+/*
+ * We need temporary values for at least 7 integers of the same size
+ * as a factor (including header word); more space helps with performance
+ * (in modular exponentiations), but we much prefer to remain under
+ * 2 kilobytes in total, to save stack space. The macro TEMPS below
+ * exceeds 1024 (which is a count in 16-bit words) when BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE
+ * is greater than 4350 (default value is 4096, so the 2-kB limit is
+ * maintained unless BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE was modified).
+ */
+#define MAX(x, y) ((x) > (y) ? (x) : (y))
+#define TEMPS MAX(1024, 7 * ((((BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE + 1) >> 1) + 29) / 15))
+
+/*
+ * Perform trial division on a candidate prime. This computes
+ * y = SMALL_PRIMES mod x, then tries to compute y/y mod x. The
+ * br_i15_moddiv() function will report an error if y is not invertible
+ * modulo x. Returned value is 1 on success (none of the small primes
+ * divides x), 0 on error (a non-trivial GCD is obtained).
+ *
+ * This function assumes that x is odd.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+trial_divisions(const uint16_t *x, uint16_t *t)
+{
+ uint16_t *y;
+ uint16_t x0i;
+
+ y = t;
+ t += 1 + ((x[0] + 15) >> 4);
+ x0i = br_i15_ninv15(x[1]);
+ br_i15_decode_reduce(y, SMALL_PRIMES, sizeof SMALL_PRIMES, x);
+ return br_i15_moddiv(y, y, x, x0i, t);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform n rounds of Miller-Rabin on the candidate prime x. This
+ * function assumes that x = 3 mod 4.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 on success (all rounds completed successfully),
+ * 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+miller_rabin(const br_prng_class **rng, const uint16_t *x, int n,
+ uint16_t *t, size_t tlen)
+{
+ /*
+ * Since x = 3 mod 4, the Miller-Rabin test is simple:
+ * - get a random base a (such that 1 < a < x-1)
+ * - compute z = a^((x-1)/2) mod x
+ * - if z != 1 and z != x-1, the number x is composite
+ *
+ * We generate bases 'a' randomly with a size which is
+ * one bit less than x, which ensures that a < x-1. It
+ * is not useful to verify that a > 1 because the probability
+ * that we get a value a equal to 0 or 1 is much smaller
+ * than the probability of our Miller-Rabin tests not to
+ * detect a composite, which is already quite smaller than the
+ * probability of the hardware misbehaving and return a
+ * composite integer because of some glitch (e.g. bad RAM
+ * or ill-timed cosmic ray).
+ */
+ unsigned char *xm1d2;
+ size_t xlen, xm1d2_len, xm1d2_len_u16, u;
+ uint32_t asize;
+ unsigned cc;
+ uint16_t x0i;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute (x-1)/2 (encoded).
+ */
+ xm1d2 = (unsigned char *)t;
+ xm1d2_len = ((x[0] - (x[0] >> 4)) + 7) >> 3;
+ br_i15_encode(xm1d2, xm1d2_len, x);
+ cc = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < xm1d2_len; u ++) {
+ unsigned w;
+
+ w = xm1d2[u];
+ xm1d2[u] = (unsigned char)((w >> 1) | cc);
+ cc = w << 7;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We used some words of the provided buffer for (x-1)/2.
+ */
+ xm1d2_len_u16 = (xm1d2_len + 1) >> 1;
+ t += xm1d2_len_u16;
+ tlen -= xm1d2_len_u16;
+
+ xlen = (x[0] + 15) >> 4;
+ asize = x[0] - 1 - EQ0(x[0] & 15);
+ x0i = br_i15_ninv15(x[1]);
+ while (n -- > 0) {
+ uint16_t *a;
+ uint32_t eq1, eqm1;
+
+ /*
+ * Generate a random base. We don't need the base to be
+ * really uniform modulo x, so we just get a random
+ * number which is one bit shorter than x.
+ */
+ a = t;
+ a[0] = x[0];
+ a[xlen] = 0;
+ mkrand(rng, a, asize);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute a^((x-1)/2) mod x. We assume here that the
+ * function will not fail (the temporary array is large
+ * enough).
+ */
+ br_i15_modpow_opt(a, xm1d2, xm1d2_len,
+ x, x0i, t + 1 + xlen, tlen - 1 - xlen);
+
+ /*
+ * We must obtain either 1 or x-1. Note that x is odd,
+ * hence x-1 differs from x only in its low word (no
+ * carry).
+ */
+ eq1 = a[1] ^ 1;
+ eqm1 = a[1] ^ (x[1] - 1);
+ for (u = 2; u <= xlen; u ++) {
+ eq1 |= a[u];
+ eqm1 |= a[u] ^ x[u];
+ }
+
+ if ((EQ0(eq1) | EQ0(eqm1)) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a random prime of the provided size. 'size' is the _encoded_
+ * bit length. The two top bits and the two bottom bits are set to 1.
+ */
+static void
+mkprime(const br_prng_class **rng, uint16_t *x, uint32_t esize,
+ uint32_t pubexp, uint16_t *t, size_t tlen)
+{
+ size_t len;
+
+ x[0] = esize;
+ len = (esize + 15) >> 4;
+ for (;;) {
+ size_t u;
+ uint32_t m3, m5, m7, m11;
+ int rounds;
+
+ /*
+ * Generate random bits. We force the two top bits and the
+ * two bottom bits to 1.
+ */
+ mkrand(rng, x, esize);
+ if ((esize & 15) == 0) {
+ x[len] |= 0x6000;
+ } else if ((esize & 15) == 1) {
+ x[len] |= 0x0001;
+ x[len - 1] |= 0x4000;
+ } else {
+ x[len] |= 0x0003 << ((esize & 15) - 2);
+ }
+ x[1] |= 0x0003;
+
+ /*
+ * Trial division with low primes (3, 5, 7 and 11). We
+ * use the following properties:
+ *
+ * 2^2 = 1 mod 3
+ * 2^4 = 1 mod 5
+ * 2^3 = 1 mod 7
+ * 2^10 = 1 mod 11
+ */
+ m3 = 0;
+ m5 = 0;
+ m7 = 0;
+ m11 = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ uint32_t w;
+
+ w = x[1 + u];
+ m3 += w << (u & 1);
+ m3 = (m3 & 0xFF) + (m3 >> 8);
+ m5 += w << ((4 - u) & 3);
+ m5 = (m5 & 0xFF) + (m5 >> 8);
+ m7 += w;
+ m7 = (m7 & 0x1FF) + (m7 >> 9);
+ m11 += w << (5 & -(u & 1));
+ m11 = (m11 & 0x3FF) + (m11 >> 10);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Maximum values of m* at this point:
+ * m3: 511
+ * m5: 2310
+ * m7: 510
+ * m11: 2047
+ * We use the same properties to make further reductions.
+ */
+
+ m3 = (m3 & 0x0F) + (m3 >> 4); /* max: 46 */
+ m3 = (m3 & 0x0F) + (m3 >> 4); /* max: 16 */
+ m3 = ((m3 * 43) >> 5) & 3;
+
+ m5 = (m5 & 0xFF) + (m5 >> 8); /* max: 263 */
+ m5 = (m5 & 0x0F) + (m5 >> 4); /* max: 30 */
+ m5 = (m5 & 0x0F) + (m5 >> 4); /* max: 15 */
+ m5 -= 10 & -GT(m5, 9);
+ m5 -= 5 & -GT(m5, 4);
+
+ m7 = (m7 & 0x3F) + (m7 >> 6); /* max: 69 */
+ m7 = (m7 & 7) + (m7 >> 3); /* max: 14 */
+ m7 = ((m7 * 147) >> 7) & 7;
+
+ /*
+ * 2^5 = 32 = -1 mod 11.
+ */
+ m11 = (m11 & 0x1F) + 66 - (m11 >> 5); /* max: 97 */
+ m11 -= 88 & -GT(m11, 87);
+ m11 -= 44 & -GT(m11, 43);
+ m11 -= 22 & -GT(m11, 21);
+ m11 -= 11 & -GT(m11, 10);
+
+ /*
+ * If any of these modulo is 0, then the candidate is
+ * not prime. Also, if pubexp is 3, 5, 7 or 11, and the
+ * corresponding modulus is 1, then the candidate must
+ * be rejected, because we need e to be invertible
+ * modulo p-1. We can use simple comparisons here
+ * because they won't leak information on a candidate
+ * that we keep, only on one that we reject (and is thus
+ * not secret).
+ */
+ if (m3 == 0 || m5 == 0 || m7 == 0 || m11 == 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((pubexp == 3 && m3 == 1)
+ || (pubexp == 5 && m5 == 1)
+ || (pubexp == 7 && m7 == 1)
+ || (pubexp == 11 && m11 == 1))
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * More trial divisions.
+ */
+ if (!trial_divisions(x, t)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Miller-Rabin algorithm. Since we selected a random
+ * integer, not a maliciously crafted integer, we can use
+ * relatively few rounds to lower the risk of a false
+ * positive (i.e. declaring prime a non-prime) under
+ * 2^(-80). It is not useful to lower the probability much
+ * below that, since that would be substantially below
+ * the probability of the hardware misbehaving. Sufficient
+ * numbers of rounds are extracted from the Handbook of
+ * Applied Cryptography, note 4.49 (page 149).
+ *
+ * Since we work on the encoded size (esize), we need to
+ * compare with encoded thresholds.
+ */
+ if (esize < 320) {
+ rounds = 12;
+ } else if (esize < 480) {
+ rounds = 9;
+ } else if (esize < 693) {
+ rounds = 6;
+ } else if (esize < 906) {
+ rounds = 4;
+ } else if (esize < 1386) {
+ rounds = 3;
+ } else {
+ rounds = 2;
+ }
+
+ if (miller_rabin(rng, x, rounds, t, tlen)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Let p be a prime (p > 2^33, p = 3 mod 4). Let m = (p-1)/2, provided
+ * as parameter (with announced bit length equal to that of p). This
+ * function computes d = 1/e mod p-1 (for an odd integer e). Returned
+ * value is 1 on success, 0 on error (an error is reported if e is not
+ * invertible modulo p-1).
+ *
+ * The temporary buffer (t) must have room for at least 4 integers of
+ * the size of p.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+invert_pubexp(uint16_t *d, const uint16_t *m, uint32_t e, uint16_t *t)
+{
+ uint16_t *f;
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ f = t;
+ t += 1 + ((m[0] + 15) >> 4);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute d = 1/e mod m. Since p = 3 mod 4, m is odd.
+ */
+ br_i15_zero(d, m[0]);
+ d[1] = 1;
+ br_i15_zero(f, m[0]);
+ f[1] = e & 0x7FFF;
+ f[2] = (e >> 15) & 0x7FFF;
+ f[3] = e >> 30;
+ r = br_i15_moddiv(d, f, m, br_i15_ninv15(m[1]), t);
+
+ /*
+ * We really want d = 1/e mod p-1, with p = 2m. By the CRT,
+ * the result is either the d we got, or d + m.
+ *
+ * Let's write e*d = 1 + k*m, for some integer k. Integers e
+ * and m are odd. If d is odd, then e*d is odd, which implies
+ * that k must be even; in that case, e*d = 1 + (k/2)*2m, and
+ * thus d is already fine. Conversely, if d is even, then k
+ * is odd, and we must add m to d in order to get the correct
+ * result.
+ */
+ br_i15_add(d, m, (uint32_t)(1 - (d[1] & 1)));
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Swap two buffers in RAM. They must be disjoint.
+ */
+static void
+bufswap(void *b1, void *b2, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t u;
+ unsigned char *buf1, *buf2;
+
+ buf1 = b1;
+ buf2 = b2;
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ unsigned w;
+
+ w = buf1[u];
+ buf1[u] = buf2[u];
+ buf2[u] = w;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i15_keygen(const br_prng_class **rng,
+ br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *kbuf_priv,
+ br_rsa_public_key *pk, void *kbuf_pub,
+ unsigned size, uint32_t pubexp)
+{
+ uint32_t esize_p, esize_q;
+ size_t plen, qlen, tlen;
+ uint16_t *p, *q, *t;
+ uint16_t tmp[TEMPS];
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ if (size < BR_MIN_RSA_SIZE || size > BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (pubexp == 0) {
+ pubexp = 3;
+ } else if (pubexp == 1 || (pubexp & 1) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ esize_p = (size + 1) >> 1;
+ esize_q = size - esize_p;
+ sk->n_bitlen = size;
+ sk->p = kbuf_priv;
+ sk->plen = (esize_p + 7) >> 3;
+ sk->q = sk->p + sk->plen;
+ sk->qlen = (esize_q + 7) >> 3;
+ sk->dp = sk->q + sk->qlen;
+ sk->dplen = sk->plen;
+ sk->dq = sk->dp + sk->dplen;
+ sk->dqlen = sk->qlen;
+ sk->iq = sk->dq + sk->dqlen;
+ sk->iqlen = sk->plen;
+
+ if (pk != NULL) {
+ pk->n = kbuf_pub;
+ pk->nlen = (size + 7) >> 3;
+ pk->e = pk->n + pk->nlen;
+ pk->elen = 4;
+ br_enc32be(pk->e, pubexp);
+ while (*pk->e == 0) {
+ pk->e ++;
+ pk->elen --;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We now switch to encoded sizes.
+ *
+ * floor((x * 17477) / (2^18)) is equal to floor(x/15) for all
+ * integers x from 0 to 23833.
+ */
+ esize_p += MUL15(esize_p, 17477) >> 18;
+ esize_q += MUL15(esize_q, 17477) >> 18;
+ plen = (esize_p + 15) >> 4;
+ qlen = (esize_q + 15) >> 4;
+ p = tmp;
+ q = p + 1 + plen;
+ t = q + 1 + qlen;
+ tlen = ((sizeof tmp) / sizeof(uint16_t)) - (2 + plen + qlen);
+
+ /*
+ * When looking for primes p and q, we temporarily divide
+ * candidates by 2, in order to compute the inverse of the
+ * public exponent.
+ */
+
+ for (;;) {
+ mkprime(rng, p, esize_p, pubexp, t, tlen);
+ br_i15_rshift(p, 1);
+ if (invert_pubexp(t, p, pubexp, t + 1 + plen)) {
+ br_i15_add(p, p, 1);
+ p[1] |= 1;
+ br_i15_encode(sk->p, sk->plen, p);
+ br_i15_encode(sk->dp, sk->dplen, t);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ mkprime(rng, q, esize_q, pubexp, t, tlen);
+ br_i15_rshift(q, 1);
+ if (invert_pubexp(t, q, pubexp, t + 1 + qlen)) {
+ br_i15_add(q, q, 1);
+ q[1] |= 1;
+ br_i15_encode(sk->q, sk->qlen, q);
+ br_i15_encode(sk->dq, sk->dqlen, t);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If p and q have the same size, then it is possible that q > p
+ * (when the target modulus size is odd, we generate p with a
+ * greater bit length than q). If q > p, we want to swap p and q
+ * (and also dp and dq) for two reasons:
+ * - The final step below (inversion of q modulo p) is easier if
+ * p > q.
+ * - While BearSSL's RSA code is perfectly happy with RSA keys such
+ * that p < q, some other implementations have restrictions and
+ * require p > q.
+ *
+ * Note that we can do a simple non-constant-time swap here,
+ * because the only information we leak here is that we insist on
+ * returning p and q such that p > q, which is not a secret.
+ */
+ if (esize_p == esize_q && br_i15_sub(p, q, 0) == 1) {
+ bufswap(p, q, (1 + plen) * sizeof *p);
+ bufswap(sk->p, sk->q, sk->plen);
+ bufswap(sk->dp, sk->dq, sk->dplen);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We have produced p, q, dp and dq. We can now compute iq = 1/d mod p.
+ *
+ * We ensured that p >= q, so this is just a matter of updating the
+ * header word for q (and possibly adding an extra word).
+ *
+ * Theoretically, the call below may fail, in case we were
+ * extraordinarily unlucky, and p = q. Another failure case is if
+ * Miller-Rabin failed us _twice_, and p and q are non-prime and
+ * have a factor is common. We report the error mostly because it
+ * is cheap and we can, but in practice this never happens (or, at
+ * least, it happens way less often than hardware glitches).
+ */
+ q[0] = p[0];
+ if (plen > qlen) {
+ q[plen] = 0;
+ t ++;
+ tlen --;
+ }
+ br_i15_zero(t, p[0]);
+ t[1] = 1;
+ r = br_i15_moddiv(t, q, p, br_i15_ninv15(p[1]), t + 1 + plen);
+ br_i15_encode(sk->iq, sk->iqlen, t);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the public modulus too, if required.
+ */
+ if (pk != NULL) {
+ br_i15_zero(t, p[0]);
+ br_i15_mulacc(t, p, q);
+ br_i15_encode(pk->n, pk->nlen, t);
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_modulus.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_modulus.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16458c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_modulus.c
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+size_t
+br_rsa_i15_compute_modulus(void *n, const br_rsa_private_key *sk)
+{
+ uint16_t tmp[4 * (((BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE / 2) + 14) / 15) + 5];
+ uint16_t *t, *p, *q;
+ const unsigned char *pbuf, *qbuf;
+ size_t nlen, plen, qlen, tlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute actual byte and lengths for p and q.
+ */
+ pbuf = sk->p;
+ plen = sk->plen;
+ while (plen > 0 && *pbuf == 0) {
+ pbuf ++;
+ plen --;
+ }
+ qbuf = sk->q;
+ qlen = sk->qlen;
+ while (qlen > 0 && *qbuf == 0) {
+ qbuf ++;
+ qlen --;
+ }
+
+ t = tmp;
+ tlen = (sizeof tmp) / (sizeof tmp[0]);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode p.
+ */
+ if ((15 * tlen) < (plen << 3) + 15) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ br_i15_decode(t, pbuf, plen);
+ p = t;
+ plen = (p[0] + 31) >> 4;
+ t += plen;
+ tlen -= plen;
+
+ /*
+ * Decode q.
+ */
+ if ((15 * tlen) < (qlen << 3) + 15) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ br_i15_decode(t, qbuf, qlen);
+ q = t;
+ qlen = (q[0] + 31) >> 4;
+ t += qlen;
+ tlen -= qlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Computation can proceed only if we have enough room for the
+ * modulus.
+ */
+ if (tlen < (plen + qlen + 1)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Private key already contains the modulus bit length, from which
+ * we can infer the output length. Even if n is NULL, we still had
+ * to decode p and q to make sure that the product can be computed.
+ */
+ nlen = (sk->n_bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+ if (n != NULL) {
+ br_i15_zero(t, p[0]);
+ br_i15_mulacc(t, p, q);
+ br_i15_encode(n, nlen, t);
+ }
+ return nlen;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_oaep_decrypt.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_oaep_decrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..927eecd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_oaep_decrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i15_oaep_decrypt(const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *data, size_t *len)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ if (*len != ((sk->n_bitlen + 7) >> 3)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = br_rsa_i15_private(data, sk);
+ r &= br_rsa_oaep_unpad(dig, label, label_len, data, len);
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_oaep_encrypt.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_oaep_encrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9a6cfa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_oaep_encrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+size_t
+br_rsa_i15_oaep_encrypt(
+ const br_prng_class **rnd, const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk,
+ void *dst, size_t dst_max_len,
+ const void *src, size_t src_len)
+{
+ size_t dlen;
+
+ dlen = br_rsa_oaep_pad(rnd, dig, label, label_len,
+ pk, dst, dst_max_len, src, src_len);
+ if (dlen == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return dlen & -(size_t)br_rsa_i15_public(dst, dlen, pk);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pkcs1_sign.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pkcs1_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f519423
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pkcs1_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i15_pkcs1_sign(const unsigned char *hash_oid,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x)
+{
+ if (!br_rsa_pkcs1_sig_pad(hash_oid, hash, hash_len, sk->n_bitlen, x)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return br_rsa_i15_private(x, sk);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pkcs1_vrfy.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pkcs1_vrfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c35184
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pkcs1_vrfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i15_pkcs1_vrfy(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash_oid, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk, unsigned char *hash_out)
+{
+ unsigned char sig[BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 3];
+
+ if (xlen > (sizeof sig)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(sig, x, xlen);
+ if (!br_rsa_i15_public(sig, xlen, pk)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return br_rsa_pkcs1_sig_unpad(sig, xlen, hash_oid, hash_len, hash_out);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_priv.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_priv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..177cc3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_priv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define U (2 + ((BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR + 14) / 15))
+#define TLEN (8 * U)
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i15_private(unsigned char *x, const br_rsa_private_key *sk)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p, *q;
+ size_t plen, qlen;
+ size_t fwlen;
+ uint16_t p0i, q0i;
+ size_t xlen, u;
+ uint16_t tmp[1 + TLEN];
+ long z;
+ uint16_t *mp, *mq, *s1, *s2, *t1, *t2, *t3;
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the actual lengths of p and q, in bytes.
+ * These lengths are not considered secret (we cannot really hide
+ * them anyway in constant-time code).
+ */
+ p = sk->p;
+ plen = sk->plen;
+ while (plen > 0 && *p == 0) {
+ p ++;
+ plen --;
+ }
+ q = sk->q;
+ qlen = sk->qlen;
+ while (qlen > 0 && *q == 0) {
+ q ++;
+ qlen --;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the maximum factor length, in words.
+ */
+ z = (long)(plen > qlen ? plen : qlen) << 3;
+ fwlen = 1;
+ while (z > 0) {
+ z -= 15;
+ fwlen ++;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Round up the word length to an even number.
+ */
+ fwlen += (fwlen & 1);
+
+ /*
+ * We need to fit at least 6 values in the stack buffer.
+ */
+ if (6 * fwlen > TLEN) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute signature length (in bytes).
+ */
+ xlen = (sk->n_bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure 32-bit alignment for value words.
+ */
+ mq = tmp;
+ if (((uintptr_t)mq & 2) == 0) {
+ mq ++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Decode q.
+ */
+ br_i15_decode(mq, q, qlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode p.
+ */
+ t1 = mq + fwlen;
+ br_i15_decode(t1, p, plen);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the modulus (product of the two factors), to compare
+ * it with the source value. We use br_i15_mulacc(), since it's
+ * already used later on.
+ */
+ t2 = mq + 2 * fwlen;
+ br_i15_zero(t2, mq[0]);
+ br_i15_mulacc(t2, mq, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * We encode the modulus into bytes, to perform the comparison
+ * with bytes. We know that the product length, in bytes, is
+ * exactly xlen.
+ * The comparison actually computes the carry when subtracting
+ * the modulus from the source value; that carry must be 1 for
+ * a value in the correct range. We keep it in r, which is our
+ * accumulator for the error code.
+ */
+ t3 = mq + 4 * fwlen;
+ br_i15_encode(t3, xlen, t2);
+ u = xlen;
+ r = 0;
+ while (u > 0) {
+ uint32_t wn, wx;
+
+ u --;
+ wn = ((unsigned char *)t3)[u];
+ wx = x[u];
+ r = ((wx - (wn + r)) >> 8) & 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Move the decoded p to another temporary buffer.
+ */
+ mp = mq + 2 * fwlen;
+ memmove(mp, t1, fwlen * sizeof *t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute s2 = x^dq mod q.
+ */
+ q0i = br_i15_ninv15(mq[1]);
+ s2 = mq + fwlen;
+ br_i15_decode_reduce(s2, x, xlen, mq);
+ r &= br_i15_modpow_opt(s2, sk->dq, sk->dqlen, mq, q0i,
+ mq + 3 * fwlen, TLEN - 3 * fwlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute s1 = x^dq mod q.
+ */
+ p0i = br_i15_ninv15(mp[1]);
+ s1 = mq + 3 * fwlen;
+ br_i15_decode_reduce(s1, x, xlen, mp);
+ r &= br_i15_modpow_opt(s1, sk->dp, sk->dplen, mp, p0i,
+ mq + 4 * fwlen, TLEN - 4 * fwlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute:
+ * h = (s1 - s2)*(1/q) mod p
+ * s1 is an integer modulo p, but s2 is modulo q. PKCS#1 is
+ * unclear about whether p may be lower than q (some existing,
+ * widely deployed implementations of RSA don't tolerate p < q),
+ * but we want to support that occurrence, so we need to use the
+ * reduction function.
+ *
+ * Since we use br_i15_decode_reduce() for iq (purportedly, the
+ * inverse of q modulo p), we also tolerate improperly large
+ * values for this parameter.
+ */
+ t1 = mq + 4 * fwlen;
+ t2 = mq + 5 * fwlen;
+ br_i15_reduce(t2, s2, mp);
+ br_i15_add(s1, mp, br_i15_sub(s1, t2, 1));
+ br_i15_to_monty(s1, mp);
+ br_i15_decode_reduce(t1, sk->iq, sk->iqlen, mp);
+ br_i15_montymul(t2, s1, t1, mp, p0i);
+
+ /*
+ * h is now in t2. We compute the final result:
+ * s = s2 + q*h
+ * All these operations are non-modular.
+ *
+ * We need mq, s2 and t2. We use the t3 buffer as destination.
+ * The buffers mp, s1 and t1 are no longer needed, so we can
+ * reuse them for t3. Moreover, the first step of the computation
+ * is to copy s2 into t3, after which s2 is not needed. Right
+ * now, mq is in slot 0, s2 is in slot 1, and t2 in slot 5.
+ * Therefore, we have ample room for t3 by simply using s2.
+ */
+ t3 = s2;
+ br_i15_mulacc(t3, mq, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Encode the result. Since we already checked the value of xlen,
+ * we can just use it right away.
+ */
+ br_i15_encode(x, xlen, t3);
+
+ /*
+ * The only error conditions remaining at that point are invalid
+ * values for p and q (even integers).
+ */
+ return p0i & q0i & r;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_privexp.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_privexp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..57d6918
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_privexp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+size_t
+br_rsa_i15_compute_privexp(void *d,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, uint32_t e)
+{
+ /*
+ * We want to invert e modulo phi = (p-1)(q-1). This first
+ * requires computing phi, which is easy since we have the factors
+ * p and q in the private key structure.
+ *
+ * Since p = 3 mod 4 and q = 3 mod 4, phi/4 is an odd integer.
+ * We could invert e modulo phi/4 then patch the result to
+ * modulo phi, but this would involve assembling three modulus-wide
+ * values (phi/4, 1 and e) and calling moddiv, that requires
+ * three more temporaries, for a total of six big integers, or
+ * slightly more than 3 kB of stack space for RSA-4096. This
+ * exceeds our stack requirements.
+ *
+ * Instead, we first use one step of the extended GCD:
+ *
+ * - We compute phi = k*e + r (Euclidean division of phi by e).
+ * If public exponent e is correct, then r != 0 (e must be
+ * invertible modulo phi). We also have k != 0 since we
+ * enforce non-ridiculously-small factors.
+ *
+ * - We find small u, v such that u*e - v*r = 1 (using a
+ * binary GCD; we can arrange for u < r and v < e, i.e. all
+ * values fit on 32 bits).
+ *
+ * - Solution is: d = u + v*k
+ * This last computation is exact: since u < r and v < e,
+ * the above implies d < r + e*((phi-r)/e) = phi
+ */
+
+ uint16_t tmp[4 * ((BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR + 14) / 15) + 12];
+ uint16_t *p, *q, *k, *m, *z, *phi;
+ const unsigned char *pbuf, *qbuf;
+ size_t plen, qlen, u, len, dlen;
+ uint32_t r, a, b, u0, v0, u1, v1, he, hr;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Check that e is correct.
+ */
+ if (e < 3 || (e & 1) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check lengths of p and q, and that they are both odd.
+ */
+ pbuf = sk->p;
+ plen = sk->plen;
+ while (plen > 0 && *pbuf == 0) {
+ pbuf ++;
+ plen --;
+ }
+ if (plen < 5 || plen > (BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR / 8)
+ || (pbuf[plen - 1] & 1) != 1)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ qbuf = sk->q;
+ qlen = sk->qlen;
+ while (qlen > 0 && *qbuf == 0) {
+ qbuf ++;
+ qlen --;
+ }
+ if (qlen < 5 || qlen > (BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR / 8)
+ || (qbuf[qlen - 1] & 1) != 1)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Output length is that of the modulus.
+ */
+ dlen = (sk->n_bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+ if (d == NULL) {
+ return dlen;
+ }
+
+ p = tmp;
+ br_i15_decode(p, pbuf, plen);
+ plen = (p[0] + 15) >> 4;
+ q = p + 1 + plen;
+ br_i15_decode(q, qbuf, qlen);
+ qlen = (q[0] + 15) >> 4;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute phi = (p-1)*(q-1), then move it over p-1 and q-1 (that
+ * we do not need anymore). The mulacc function sets the announced
+ * bit length of t to be the sum of the announced bit lengths of
+ * p-1 and q-1, which is usually exact but may overshoot by one 1
+ * bit in some cases; we readjust it to its true length.
+ */
+ p[1] --;
+ q[1] --;
+ phi = q + 1 + qlen;
+ br_i15_zero(phi, p[0]);
+ br_i15_mulacc(phi, p, q);
+ len = (phi[0] + 15) >> 4;
+ memmove(tmp, phi, (1 + len) * sizeof *phi);
+ phi = tmp;
+ phi[0] = br_i15_bit_length(phi + 1, len);
+ len = (phi[0] + 15) >> 4;
+
+ /*
+ * Divide phi by public exponent e. The final remainder r must be
+ * non-zero (otherwise, the key is invalid). The quotient is k,
+ * which we write over phi, since we don't need phi after that.
+ */
+ r = 0;
+ for (u = len; u >= 1; u --) {
+ /*
+ * Upon entry, r < e, and phi[u] < 2^15; hence,
+ * hi:lo < e*2^15. Thus, the produced word k[u]
+ * must be lower than 2^15, and the new remainder r
+ * is lower than e.
+ */
+ uint32_t hi, lo;
+
+ hi = r >> 17;
+ lo = (r << 15) + phi[u];
+ phi[u] = br_divrem(hi, lo, e, &r);
+ }
+ if (r == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ k = phi;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u and v such that u*e - v*r = GCD(e,r). We use
+ * a binary GCD algorithm, with 6 extra integers a, b,
+ * u0, u1, v0 and v1. Initial values are:
+ * a = e u0 = 1 v0 = 0
+ * b = r u1 = r v1 = e-1
+ * The following invariants are maintained:
+ * a = u0*e - v0*r
+ * b = u1*e - v1*r
+ * 0 < a <= e
+ * 0 < b <= r
+ * 0 <= u0 <= r
+ * 0 <= v0 <= e
+ * 0 <= u1 <= r
+ * 0 <= v1 <= e
+ *
+ * At each iteration, we reduce either a or b by one bit, and
+ * adjust u0, u1, v0 and v1 to maintain the invariants:
+ * - if a is even, then a <- a/2
+ * - otherwise, if b is even, then b <- b/2
+ * - otherwise, if a > b, then a <- (a-b)/2
+ * - otherwise, if b > a, then b <- (b-a)/2
+ * Algorithm stops when a = b. At that point, the common value
+ * is the GCD of e and r; it must be 1 (otherwise, the private
+ * key or public exponent is not valid). The (u0,v0) or (u1,v1)
+ * pairs are the solution we are looking for.
+ *
+ * Since either a or b is reduced by at least 1 bit at each
+ * iteration, 62 iterations are enough to reach the end
+ * condition.
+ *
+ * To maintain the invariants, we must compute the same operations
+ * on the u* and v* values that we do on a and b:
+ * - When a is divided by 2, u0 and v0 must be divided by 2.
+ * - When b is divided by 2, u1 and v1 must be divided by 2.
+ * - When b is subtracted from a, u1 and v1 are subtracted from
+ * u0 and v0, respectively.
+ * - When a is subtracted from b, u0 and v0 are subtracted from
+ * u1 and v1, respectively.
+ *
+ * However, we want to keep the u* and v* values in their proper
+ * ranges. The following remarks apply:
+ *
+ * - When a is divided by 2, then a is even. Therefore:
+ *
+ * * If r is odd, then u0 and v0 must have the same parity;
+ * if they are both odd, then adding r to u0 and e to v0
+ * makes them both even, and the division by 2 brings them
+ * back to the proper range.
+ *
+ * * If r is even, then u0 must be even; if v0 is odd, then
+ * adding r to u0 and e to v0 makes them both even, and the
+ * division by 2 brings them back to the proper range.
+ *
+ * Thus, all we need to do is to look at the parity of v0,
+ * and add (r,e) to (u0,v0) when v0 is odd. In order to avoid
+ * a 32-bit overflow, we can add ((r+1)/2,(e/2)+1) after the
+ * division (r+1 does not overflow since r < e; and (e/2)+1
+ * is equal to (e+1)/2 since e is odd).
+ *
+ * - When we subtract b from a, three cases may occur:
+ *
+ * * u1 <= u0 and v1 <= v0: just do the subtractions
+ *
+ * * u1 > u0 and v1 > v0: compute:
+ * (u0, v0) <- (u0 + r - u1, v0 + e - v1)
+ *
+ * * u1 <= u0 and v1 > v0: compute:
+ * (u0, v0) <- (u0 + r - u1, v0 + e - v1)
+ *
+ * The fourth case (u1 > u0 and v1 <= v0) is not possible
+ * because it would contradict "b < a" (which is the reason
+ * why we subtract b from a).
+ *
+ * The tricky case is the third one: from the equations, it
+ * seems that u0 may go out of range. However, the invariants
+ * and ranges of other values imply that, in that case, the
+ * new u0 does not actually exceed the range.
+ *
+ * We can thus handle the subtraction by adding (r,e) based
+ * solely on the comparison between v0 and v1.
+ */
+ a = e;
+ b = r;
+ u0 = 1;
+ v0 = 0;
+ u1 = r;
+ v1 = e - 1;
+ hr = (r + 1) >> 1;
+ he = (e >> 1) + 1;
+ for (i = 0; i < 62; i ++) {
+ uint32_t oa, ob, agtb, bgta;
+ uint32_t sab, sba, da, db;
+ uint32_t ctl;
+
+ oa = a & 1; /* 1 if a is odd */
+ ob = b & 1; /* 1 if b is odd */
+ agtb = GT(a, b); /* 1 if a > b */
+ bgta = GT(b, a); /* 1 if b > a */
+
+ sab = oa & ob & agtb; /* 1 if a <- a-b */
+ sba = oa & ob & bgta; /* 1 if b <- b-a */
+
+ /* a <- a-b, u0 <- u0-u1, v0 <- v0-v1 */
+ ctl = GT(v1, v0);
+ a -= b & -sab;
+ u0 -= (u1 - (r & -ctl)) & -sab;
+ v0 -= (v1 - (e & -ctl)) & -sab;
+
+ /* b <- b-a, u1 <- u1-u0 mod r, v1 <- v1-v0 mod e */
+ ctl = GT(v0, v1);
+ b -= a & -sba;
+ u1 -= (u0 - (r & -ctl)) & -sba;
+ v1 -= (v0 - (e & -ctl)) & -sba;
+
+ da = NOT(oa) | sab; /* 1 if a <- a/2 */
+ db = (oa & NOT(ob)) | sba; /* 1 if b <- b/2 */
+
+ /* a <- a/2, u0 <- u0/2, v0 <- v0/2 */
+ ctl = v0 & 1;
+ a ^= (a ^ (a >> 1)) & -da;
+ u0 ^= (u0 ^ ((u0 >> 1) + (hr & -ctl))) & -da;
+ v0 ^= (v0 ^ ((v0 >> 1) + (he & -ctl))) & -da;
+
+ /* b <- b/2, u1 <- u1/2 mod r, v1 <- v1/2 mod e */
+ ctl = v1 & 1;
+ b ^= (b ^ (b >> 1)) & -db;
+ u1 ^= (u1 ^ ((u1 >> 1) + (hr & -ctl))) & -db;
+ v1 ^= (v1 ^ ((v1 >> 1) + (he & -ctl))) & -db;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the GCD is indeed 1. If not, then the key is invalid
+ * (and there's no harm in leaking that piece of information).
+ */
+ if (a != 1) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we have u0*e - v0*r = 1. Let's compute the result as:
+ * d = u0 + v0*k
+ * We still have k in the tmp[] array, and its announced bit
+ * length is that of phi.
+ */
+ m = k + 1 + len;
+ m[0] = (2 << 4) + 2; /* bit length is 32 bits, encoded */
+ m[1] = v0 & 0x7FFF;
+ m[2] = (v0 >> 15) & 0x7FFF;
+ m[3] = v0 >> 30;
+ z = m + 4;
+ br_i15_zero(z, k[0]);
+ z[1] = u0 & 0x7FFF;
+ z[2] = (u0 >> 15) & 0x7FFF;
+ z[3] = u0 >> 30;
+ br_i15_mulacc(z, k, m);
+
+ /*
+ * Encode the result.
+ */
+ br_i15_encode(d, dlen, z);
+ return dlen;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pss_sign.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pss_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd9385b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pss_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i15_pss_sign(const br_prng_class **rng,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t salt_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x)
+{
+ if (!br_rsa_pss_sig_pad(rng, hf_data, hf_mgf1, hash,
+ salt_len, sk->n_bitlen, x))
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return br_rsa_i15_private(x, sk);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pss_vrfy.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pss_vrfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7d9f2cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pss_vrfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i15_pss_vrfy(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const void *hash, size_t salt_len, const br_rsa_public_key *pk)
+{
+ unsigned char sig[BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 3];
+
+ if (xlen > (sizeof sig)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(sig, x, xlen);
+ if (!br_rsa_i15_public(sig, xlen, pk)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return br_rsa_pss_sig_unpad(hf_data, hf_mgf1,
+ hash, salt_len, pk, sig);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pub.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pub.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9eab5e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pub.c
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * As a strict minimum, we need four buffers that can hold a
+ * modular integer.
+ */
+#define TLEN (4 * (2 + ((BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE + 14) / 15)))
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i15_public(unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk)
+{
+ const unsigned char *n;
+ size_t nlen;
+ uint16_t tmp[1 + TLEN];
+ uint16_t *m, *a, *t;
+ size_t fwlen;
+ long z;
+ uint16_t m0i;
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ /*
+ * Get the actual length of the modulus, and see if it fits within
+ * our stack buffer. We also check that the length of x[] is valid.
+ */
+ n = pk->n;
+ nlen = pk->nlen;
+ while (nlen > 0 && *n == 0) {
+ n ++;
+ nlen --;
+ }
+ if (nlen == 0 || nlen > (BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 3) || xlen != nlen) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ z = (long)nlen << 3;
+ fwlen = 1;
+ while (z > 0) {
+ z -= 15;
+ fwlen ++;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Round up length to an even number.
+ */
+ fwlen += (fwlen & 1);
+
+ /*
+ * The modulus gets decoded into m[].
+ * The value to exponentiate goes into a[].
+ * The temporaries for modular exponentiations are in t[].
+ *
+ * We want the first value word of each integer to be aligned
+ * on a 32-bit boundary.
+ */
+ m = tmp;
+ if (((uintptr_t)m & 2) == 0) {
+ m ++;
+ }
+ a = m + fwlen;
+ t = m + 2 * fwlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the modulus.
+ */
+ br_i15_decode(m, n, nlen);
+ m0i = br_i15_ninv15(m[1]);
+
+ /*
+ * Note: if m[] is even, then m0i == 0. Otherwise, m0i must be
+ * an odd integer.
+ */
+ r = m0i & 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Decode x[] into a[]; we also check that its value is proper.
+ */
+ r &= br_i15_decode_mod(a, x, xlen, m);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the modular exponentiation.
+ */
+ br_i15_modpow_opt(a, pk->e, pk->elen, m, m0i, t, TLEN - 2 * fwlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Encode the result.
+ */
+ br_i15_encode(x, xlen, a);
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pubexp.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pubexp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..803bff7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i15_pubexp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Recompute public exponent, based on factor p and reduced private
+ * exponent dp.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+get_pubexp(const unsigned char *pbuf, size_t plen,
+ const unsigned char *dpbuf, size_t dplen)
+{
+ /*
+ * dp is the inverse of e modulo p-1. If p = 3 mod 4, then
+ * p-1 = 2*((p-1)/2). Taken modulo 2, e is odd and has inverse 1;
+ * thus, dp must be odd.
+ *
+ * We compute the inverse of dp modulo (p-1)/2. This requires
+ * first reducing dp modulo (p-1)/2 (this can be done with a
+ * conditional subtract, no need to use the generic modular
+ * reduction function); then, we use moddiv.
+ */
+
+ uint16_t tmp[6 * ((BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR + 29) / 15)];
+ uint16_t *p, *dp, *x;
+ size_t len;
+ uint32_t e;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute actual factor length (in bytes) and check that it fits
+ * under our size constraints.
+ */
+ while (plen > 0 && *pbuf == 0) {
+ pbuf ++;
+ plen --;
+ }
+ if (plen == 0 || plen < 5 || plen > (BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR / 8)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute actual reduced exponent length (in bytes) and check that
+ * it is not longer than p.
+ */
+ while (dplen > 0 && *dpbuf == 0) {
+ dpbuf ++;
+ dplen --;
+ }
+ if (dplen > plen || dplen == 0
+ || (dplen == plen && dpbuf[0] > pbuf[0]))
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that p = 3 mod 4 and that dp is odd.
+ */
+ if ((pbuf[plen - 1] & 3) != 3 || (dpbuf[dplen - 1] & 1) != 1) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Decode p and compute (p-1)/2.
+ */
+ p = tmp;
+ br_i15_decode(p, pbuf, plen);
+ len = (p[0] + 31) >> 4;
+ br_i15_rshift(p, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode dp and make sure its announced bit length matches that of
+ * p (we already know that the size of dp, in bits, does not exceed
+ * the size of p, so we just have to copy the header word).
+ */
+ dp = p + len;
+ memset(dp, 0, len * sizeof *dp);
+ br_i15_decode(dp, dpbuf, dplen);
+ dp[0] = p[0];
+
+ /*
+ * Subtract (p-1)/2 from dp if necessary.
+ */
+ br_i15_sub(dp, p, NOT(br_i15_sub(dp, p, 0)));
+
+ /*
+ * If another subtraction is needed, then this means that the
+ * value was invalid. We don't care to leak information about
+ * invalid keys.
+ */
+ if (br_i15_sub(dp, p, 0) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invert dp modulo (p-1)/2. If the inversion fails, then the
+ * key value was invalid.
+ */
+ x = dp + len;
+ br_i15_zero(x, p[0]);
+ x[1] = 1;
+ if (br_i15_moddiv(x, dp, p, br_i15_ninv15(p[1]), x + len) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We now have an inverse. We must set it to zero (error) if its
+ * length is greater than 32 bits and/or if it is an even integer.
+ * Take care that the bit_length function returns an encoded
+ * bit length.
+ */
+ e = (uint32_t)x[1] | ((uint32_t)x[2] << 15) | ((uint32_t)x[3] << 30);
+ e &= -LT(br_i15_bit_length(x + 1, len - 1), 35);
+ e &= -(e & 1);
+ return e;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i15_compute_pubexp(const br_rsa_private_key *sk)
+{
+ /*
+ * Get the public exponent from both p and q. This is the right
+ * exponent if we get twice the same value.
+ */
+ uint32_t ep, eq;
+
+ ep = get_pubexp(sk->p, sk->plen, sk->dp, sk->dplen);
+ eq = get_pubexp(sk->q, sk->qlen, sk->dq, sk->dqlen);
+ return ep & -EQ(ep, eq);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_keygen.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_keygen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77708f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_keygen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i31_keygen(const br_prng_class **rng,
+ br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *kbuf_priv,
+ br_rsa_public_key *pk, void *kbuf_pub,
+ unsigned size, uint32_t pubexp)
+{
+ return br_rsa_i31_keygen_inner(rng,
+ sk, kbuf_priv, pk, kbuf_pub, size, pubexp,
+ &br_i31_modpow_opt);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_keygen_inner.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_keygen_inner.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..98df445
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_keygen_inner.c
@@ -0,0 +1,608 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Make a random integer of the provided size. The size is encoded.
+ * The header word is untouched.
+ */
+static void
+mkrand(const br_prng_class **rng, uint32_t *x, uint32_t esize)
+{
+ size_t u, len;
+ unsigned m;
+
+ len = (esize + 31) >> 5;
+ (*rng)->generate(rng, x + 1, len * sizeof(uint32_t));
+ for (u = 1; u < len; u ++) {
+ x[u] &= 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ }
+ m = esize & 31;
+ if (m == 0) {
+ x[len] &= 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ } else {
+ x[len] &= 0x7FFFFFFF >> (31 - m);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the big-endian unsigned representation of the product of
+ * all small primes from 13 to 1481.
+ */
+static const unsigned char SMALL_PRIMES[] = {
+ 0x2E, 0xAB, 0x92, 0xD1, 0x8B, 0x12, 0x47, 0x31, 0x54, 0x0A,
+ 0x99, 0x5D, 0x25, 0x5E, 0xE2, 0x14, 0x96, 0x29, 0x1E, 0xB7,
+ 0x78, 0x70, 0xCC, 0x1F, 0xA5, 0xAB, 0x8D, 0x72, 0x11, 0x37,
+ 0xFB, 0xD8, 0x1E, 0x3F, 0x5B, 0x34, 0x30, 0x17, 0x8B, 0xE5,
+ 0x26, 0x28, 0x23, 0xA1, 0x8A, 0xA4, 0x29, 0xEA, 0xFD, 0x9E,
+ 0x39, 0x60, 0x8A, 0xF3, 0xB5, 0xA6, 0xEB, 0x3F, 0x02, 0xB6,
+ 0x16, 0xC3, 0x96, 0x9D, 0x38, 0xB0, 0x7D, 0x82, 0x87, 0x0C,
+ 0xF7, 0xBE, 0x24, 0xE5, 0x5F, 0x41, 0x04, 0x79, 0x76, 0x40,
+ 0xE7, 0x00, 0x22, 0x7E, 0xB5, 0x85, 0x7F, 0x8D, 0x01, 0x50,
+ 0xE9, 0xD3, 0x29, 0x42, 0x08, 0xB3, 0x51, 0x40, 0x7B, 0xD7,
+ 0x8D, 0xCC, 0x10, 0x01, 0x64, 0x59, 0x28, 0xB6, 0x53, 0xF3,
+ 0x50, 0x4E, 0xB1, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xCD, 0x6E, 0xF5, 0x56, 0x3E,
+ 0x66, 0x2F, 0xD7, 0x07, 0x7F, 0x52, 0x4C, 0x13, 0x24, 0xDC,
+ 0x8E, 0x8D, 0xCC, 0xED, 0x77, 0xC4, 0x21, 0xD2, 0xFD, 0x08,
+ 0xEA, 0xD7, 0xC0, 0x5C, 0x13, 0x82, 0x81, 0x31, 0x2F, 0x2B,
+ 0x08, 0xE4, 0x80, 0x04, 0x7A, 0x0C, 0x8A, 0x3C, 0xDC, 0x22,
+ 0xE4, 0x5A, 0x7A, 0xB0, 0x12, 0x5E, 0x4A, 0x76, 0x94, 0x77,
+ 0xC2, 0x0E, 0x92, 0xBA, 0x8A, 0xA0, 0x1F, 0x14, 0x51, 0x1E,
+ 0x66, 0x6C, 0x38, 0x03, 0x6C, 0xC7, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x70, 0x80,
+ 0xAF, 0xCA, 0x84, 0x51, 0xD8, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x49, 0xF5, 0xA8,
+ 0x5E, 0x35, 0x4B, 0xAC, 0xCE, 0x29, 0x92, 0x33, 0xB7, 0xA2,
+ 0x69, 0x7D, 0x0C, 0xE0, 0x9C, 0xDB, 0x04, 0xD6, 0xB4, 0xBC,
+ 0x39, 0xD7, 0x7F, 0x9E, 0x9D, 0x78, 0x38, 0x7F, 0x51, 0x54,
+ 0x50, 0x8B, 0x9E, 0x9C, 0x03, 0x6C, 0xF5, 0x9D, 0x2C, 0x74,
+ 0x57, 0xF0, 0x27, 0x2A, 0xC3, 0x47, 0xCA, 0xB9, 0xD7, 0x5C,
+ 0xFF, 0xC2, 0xAC, 0x65, 0x4E, 0xBD
+};
+
+/*
+ * We need temporary values for at least 7 integers of the same size
+ * as a factor (including header word); more space helps with performance
+ * (in modular exponentiations), but we much prefer to remain under
+ * 2 kilobytes in total, to save stack space. The macro TEMPS below
+ * exceeds 512 (which is a count in 32-bit words) when BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE
+ * is greater than 4464 (default value is 4096, so the 2-kB limit is
+ * maintained unless BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE was modified).
+ */
+#define MAX(x, y) ((x) > (y) ? (x) : (y))
+#define ROUND2(x) ((((x) + 1) >> 1) << 1)
+
+#define TEMPS MAX(512, ROUND2(7 * ((((BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE + 1) >> 1) + 61) / 31)))
+
+/*
+ * Perform trial division on a candidate prime. This computes
+ * y = SMALL_PRIMES mod x, then tries to compute y/y mod x. The
+ * br_i31_moddiv() function will report an error if y is not invertible
+ * modulo x. Returned value is 1 on success (none of the small primes
+ * divides x), 0 on error (a non-trivial GCD is obtained).
+ *
+ * This function assumes that x is odd.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+trial_divisions(const uint32_t *x, uint32_t *t)
+{
+ uint32_t *y;
+ uint32_t x0i;
+
+ y = t;
+ t += 1 + ((x[0] + 31) >> 5);
+ x0i = br_i31_ninv31(x[1]);
+ br_i31_decode_reduce(y, SMALL_PRIMES, sizeof SMALL_PRIMES, x);
+ return br_i31_moddiv(y, y, x, x0i, t);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform n rounds of Miller-Rabin on the candidate prime x. This
+ * function assumes that x = 3 mod 4.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 1 on success (all rounds completed successfully),
+ * 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+miller_rabin(const br_prng_class **rng, const uint32_t *x, int n,
+ uint32_t *t, size_t tlen, br_i31_modpow_opt_type mp31)
+{
+ /*
+ * Since x = 3 mod 4, the Miller-Rabin test is simple:
+ * - get a random base a (such that 1 < a < x-1)
+ * - compute z = a^((x-1)/2) mod x
+ * - if z != 1 and z != x-1, the number x is composite
+ *
+ * We generate bases 'a' randomly with a size which is
+ * one bit less than x, which ensures that a < x-1. It
+ * is not useful to verify that a > 1 because the probability
+ * that we get a value a equal to 0 or 1 is much smaller
+ * than the probability of our Miller-Rabin tests not to
+ * detect a composite, which is already quite smaller than the
+ * probability of the hardware misbehaving and return a
+ * composite integer because of some glitch (e.g. bad RAM
+ * or ill-timed cosmic ray).
+ */
+ unsigned char *xm1d2;
+ size_t xlen, xm1d2_len, xm1d2_len_u32, u;
+ uint32_t asize;
+ unsigned cc;
+ uint32_t x0i;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute (x-1)/2 (encoded).
+ */
+ xm1d2 = (unsigned char *)t;
+ xm1d2_len = ((x[0] - (x[0] >> 5)) + 7) >> 3;
+ br_i31_encode(xm1d2, xm1d2_len, x);
+ cc = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < xm1d2_len; u ++) {
+ unsigned w;
+
+ w = xm1d2[u];
+ xm1d2[u] = (unsigned char)((w >> 1) | cc);
+ cc = w << 7;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We used some words of the provided buffer for (x-1)/2.
+ */
+ xm1d2_len_u32 = (xm1d2_len + 3) >> 2;
+ t += xm1d2_len_u32;
+ tlen -= xm1d2_len_u32;
+
+ xlen = (x[0] + 31) >> 5;
+ asize = x[0] - 1 - EQ0(x[0] & 31);
+ x0i = br_i31_ninv31(x[1]);
+ while (n -- > 0) {
+ uint32_t *a, *t2;
+ uint32_t eq1, eqm1;
+ size_t t2len;
+
+ /*
+ * Generate a random base. We don't need the base to be
+ * really uniform modulo x, so we just get a random
+ * number which is one bit shorter than x.
+ */
+ a = t;
+ a[0] = x[0];
+ a[xlen] = 0;
+ mkrand(rng, a, asize);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute a^((x-1)/2) mod x. We assume here that the
+ * function will not fail (the temporary array is large
+ * enough).
+ */
+ t2 = t + 1 + xlen;
+ t2len = tlen - 1 - xlen;
+ if ((t2len & 1) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * Since the source array is 64-bit aligned and
+ * has an even number of elements (TEMPS), we
+ * can use the parity of the remaining length to
+ * detect and adjust alignment.
+ */
+ t2 ++;
+ t2len --;
+ }
+ mp31(a, xm1d2, xm1d2_len, x, x0i, t2, t2len);
+
+ /*
+ * We must obtain either 1 or x-1. Note that x is odd,
+ * hence x-1 differs from x only in its low word (no
+ * carry).
+ */
+ eq1 = a[1] ^ 1;
+ eqm1 = a[1] ^ (x[1] - 1);
+ for (u = 2; u <= xlen; u ++) {
+ eq1 |= a[u];
+ eqm1 |= a[u] ^ x[u];
+ }
+
+ if ((EQ0(eq1) | EQ0(eqm1)) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a random prime of the provided size. 'size' is the _encoded_
+ * bit length. The two top bits and the two bottom bits are set to 1.
+ */
+static void
+mkprime(const br_prng_class **rng, uint32_t *x, uint32_t esize,
+ uint32_t pubexp, uint32_t *t, size_t tlen, br_i31_modpow_opt_type mp31)
+{
+ size_t len;
+
+ x[0] = esize;
+ len = (esize + 31) >> 5;
+ for (;;) {
+ size_t u;
+ uint32_t m3, m5, m7, m11;
+ int rounds, s7, s11;
+
+ /*
+ * Generate random bits. We force the two top bits and the
+ * two bottom bits to 1.
+ */
+ mkrand(rng, x, esize);
+ if ((esize & 31) == 0) {
+ x[len] |= 0x60000000;
+ } else if ((esize & 31) == 1) {
+ x[len] |= 0x00000001;
+ x[len - 1] |= 0x40000000;
+ } else {
+ x[len] |= 0x00000003 << ((esize & 31) - 2);
+ }
+ x[1] |= 0x00000003;
+
+ /*
+ * Trial division with low primes (3, 5, 7 and 11). We
+ * use the following properties:
+ *
+ * 2^2 = 1 mod 3
+ * 2^4 = 1 mod 5
+ * 2^3 = 1 mod 7
+ * 2^10 = 1 mod 11
+ */
+ m3 = 0;
+ m5 = 0;
+ m7 = 0;
+ m11 = 0;
+ s7 = 0;
+ s11 = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ uint32_t w, w3, w5, w7, w11;
+
+ w = x[1 + u];
+ w3 = (w & 0xFFFF) + (w >> 16); /* max: 98302 */
+ w5 = (w & 0xFFFF) + (w >> 16); /* max: 98302 */
+ w7 = (w & 0x7FFF) + (w >> 15); /* max: 98302 */
+ w11 = (w & 0xFFFFF) + (w >> 20); /* max: 1050622 */
+
+ m3 += w3 << (u & 1);
+ m3 = (m3 & 0xFF) + (m3 >> 8); /* max: 1025 */
+
+ m5 += w5 << ((4 - u) & 3);
+ m5 = (m5 & 0xFFF) + (m5 >> 12); /* max: 4479 */
+
+ m7 += w7 << s7;
+ m7 = (m7 & 0x1FF) + (m7 >> 9); /* max: 1280 */
+ if (++ s7 == 3) {
+ s7 = 0;
+ }
+
+ m11 += w11 << s11;
+ if (++ s11 == 10) {
+ s11 = 0;
+ }
+ m11 = (m11 & 0x3FF) + (m11 >> 10); /* max: 526847 */
+ }
+
+ m3 = (m3 & 0x3F) + (m3 >> 6); /* max: 78 */
+ m3 = (m3 & 0x0F) + (m3 >> 4); /* max: 18 */
+ m3 = ((m3 * 43) >> 5) & 3;
+
+ m5 = (m5 & 0xFF) + (m5 >> 8); /* max: 271 */
+ m5 = (m5 & 0x0F) + (m5 >> 4); /* max: 31 */
+ m5 -= 20 & -GT(m5, 19);
+ m5 -= 10 & -GT(m5, 9);
+ m5 -= 5 & -GT(m5, 4);
+
+ m7 = (m7 & 0x3F) + (m7 >> 6); /* max: 82 */
+ m7 = (m7 & 0x07) + (m7 >> 3); /* max: 16 */
+ m7 = ((m7 * 147) >> 7) & 7;
+
+ /*
+ * 2^5 = 32 = -1 mod 11.
+ */
+ m11 = (m11 & 0x3FF) + (m11 >> 10); /* max: 1536 */
+ m11 = (m11 & 0x3FF) + (m11 >> 10); /* max: 1023 */
+ m11 = (m11 & 0x1F) + 33 - (m11 >> 5); /* max: 64 */
+ m11 -= 44 & -GT(m11, 43);
+ m11 -= 22 & -GT(m11, 21);
+ m11 -= 11 & -GT(m11, 10);
+
+ /*
+ * If any of these modulo is 0, then the candidate is
+ * not prime. Also, if pubexp is 3, 5, 7 or 11, and the
+ * corresponding modulus is 1, then the candidate must
+ * be rejected, because we need e to be invertible
+ * modulo p-1. We can use simple comparisons here
+ * because they won't leak information on a candidate
+ * that we keep, only on one that we reject (and is thus
+ * not secret).
+ */
+ if (m3 == 0 || m5 == 0 || m7 == 0 || m11 == 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((pubexp == 3 && m3 == 1)
+ || (pubexp == 5 && m5 == 1)
+ || (pubexp == 7 && m7 == 1)
+ || (pubexp == 11 && m11 == 1))
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * More trial divisions.
+ */
+ if (!trial_divisions(x, t)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Miller-Rabin algorithm. Since we selected a random
+ * integer, not a maliciously crafted integer, we can use
+ * relatively few rounds to lower the risk of a false
+ * positive (i.e. declaring prime a non-prime) under
+ * 2^(-80). It is not useful to lower the probability much
+ * below that, since that would be substantially below
+ * the probability of the hardware misbehaving. Sufficient
+ * numbers of rounds are extracted from the Handbook of
+ * Applied Cryptography, note 4.49 (page 149).
+ *
+ * Since we work on the encoded size (esize), we need to
+ * compare with encoded thresholds.
+ */
+ if (esize < 309) {
+ rounds = 12;
+ } else if (esize < 464) {
+ rounds = 9;
+ } else if (esize < 670) {
+ rounds = 6;
+ } else if (esize < 877) {
+ rounds = 4;
+ } else if (esize < 1341) {
+ rounds = 3;
+ } else {
+ rounds = 2;
+ }
+
+ if (miller_rabin(rng, x, rounds, t, tlen, mp31)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Let p be a prime (p > 2^33, p = 3 mod 4). Let m = (p-1)/2, provided
+ * as parameter (with announced bit length equal to that of p). This
+ * function computes d = 1/e mod p-1 (for an odd integer e). Returned
+ * value is 1 on success, 0 on error (an error is reported if e is not
+ * invertible modulo p-1).
+ *
+ * The temporary buffer (t) must have room for at least 4 integers of
+ * the size of p.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+invert_pubexp(uint32_t *d, const uint32_t *m, uint32_t e, uint32_t *t)
+{
+ uint32_t *f;
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ f = t;
+ t += 1 + ((m[0] + 31) >> 5);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute d = 1/e mod m. Since p = 3 mod 4, m is odd.
+ */
+ br_i31_zero(d, m[0]);
+ d[1] = 1;
+ br_i31_zero(f, m[0]);
+ f[1] = e & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ f[2] = e >> 31;
+ r = br_i31_moddiv(d, f, m, br_i31_ninv31(m[1]), t);
+
+ /*
+ * We really want d = 1/e mod p-1, with p = 2m. By the CRT,
+ * the result is either the d we got, or d + m.
+ *
+ * Let's write e*d = 1 + k*m, for some integer k. Integers e
+ * and m are odd. If d is odd, then e*d is odd, which implies
+ * that k must be even; in that case, e*d = 1 + (k/2)*2m, and
+ * thus d is already fine. Conversely, if d is even, then k
+ * is odd, and we must add m to d in order to get the correct
+ * result.
+ */
+ br_i31_add(d, m, (uint32_t)(1 - (d[1] & 1)));
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Swap two buffers in RAM. They must be disjoint.
+ */
+static void
+bufswap(void *b1, void *b2, size_t len)
+{
+ size_t u;
+ unsigned char *buf1, *buf2;
+
+ buf1 = b1;
+ buf2 = b2;
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ unsigned w;
+
+ w = buf1[u];
+ buf1[u] = buf2[u];
+ buf2[u] = w;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i31_keygen_inner(const br_prng_class **rng,
+ br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *kbuf_priv,
+ br_rsa_public_key *pk, void *kbuf_pub,
+ unsigned size, uint32_t pubexp, br_i31_modpow_opt_type mp31)
+{
+ uint32_t esize_p, esize_q;
+ size_t plen, qlen, tlen;
+ uint32_t *p, *q, *t;
+ union {
+ uint32_t t32[TEMPS];
+ uint64_t t64[TEMPS >> 1]; /* for 64-bit alignment */
+ } tmp;
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ if (size < BR_MIN_RSA_SIZE || size > BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (pubexp == 0) {
+ pubexp = 3;
+ } else if (pubexp == 1 || (pubexp & 1) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ esize_p = (size + 1) >> 1;
+ esize_q = size - esize_p;
+ sk->n_bitlen = size;
+ sk->p = kbuf_priv;
+ sk->plen = (esize_p + 7) >> 3;
+ sk->q = sk->p + sk->plen;
+ sk->qlen = (esize_q + 7) >> 3;
+ sk->dp = sk->q + sk->qlen;
+ sk->dplen = sk->plen;
+ sk->dq = sk->dp + sk->dplen;
+ sk->dqlen = sk->qlen;
+ sk->iq = sk->dq + sk->dqlen;
+ sk->iqlen = sk->plen;
+
+ if (pk != NULL) {
+ pk->n = kbuf_pub;
+ pk->nlen = (size + 7) >> 3;
+ pk->e = pk->n + pk->nlen;
+ pk->elen = 4;
+ br_enc32be(pk->e, pubexp);
+ while (*pk->e == 0) {
+ pk->e ++;
+ pk->elen --;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We now switch to encoded sizes.
+ *
+ * floor((x * 16913) / (2^19)) is equal to floor(x/31) for all
+ * integers x from 0 to 34966; the intermediate product fits on
+ * 30 bits, thus we can use MUL31().
+ */
+ esize_p += MUL31(esize_p, 16913) >> 19;
+ esize_q += MUL31(esize_q, 16913) >> 19;
+ plen = (esize_p + 31) >> 5;
+ qlen = (esize_q + 31) >> 5;
+ p = tmp.t32;
+ q = p + 1 + plen;
+ t = q + 1 + qlen;
+ tlen = ((sizeof tmp.t32) / sizeof(uint32_t)) - (2 + plen + qlen);
+
+ /*
+ * When looking for primes p and q, we temporarily divide
+ * candidates by 2, in order to compute the inverse of the
+ * public exponent.
+ */
+
+ for (;;) {
+ mkprime(rng, p, esize_p, pubexp, t, tlen, mp31);
+ br_i31_rshift(p, 1);
+ if (invert_pubexp(t, p, pubexp, t + 1 + plen)) {
+ br_i31_add(p, p, 1);
+ p[1] |= 1;
+ br_i31_encode(sk->p, sk->plen, p);
+ br_i31_encode(sk->dp, sk->dplen, t);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ mkprime(rng, q, esize_q, pubexp, t, tlen, mp31);
+ br_i31_rshift(q, 1);
+ if (invert_pubexp(t, q, pubexp, t + 1 + qlen)) {
+ br_i31_add(q, q, 1);
+ q[1] |= 1;
+ br_i31_encode(sk->q, sk->qlen, q);
+ br_i31_encode(sk->dq, sk->dqlen, t);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If p and q have the same size, then it is possible that q > p
+ * (when the target modulus size is odd, we generate p with a
+ * greater bit length than q). If q > p, we want to swap p and q
+ * (and also dp and dq) for two reasons:
+ * - The final step below (inversion of q modulo p) is easier if
+ * p > q.
+ * - While BearSSL's RSA code is perfectly happy with RSA keys such
+ * that p < q, some other implementations have restrictions and
+ * require p > q.
+ *
+ * Note that we can do a simple non-constant-time swap here,
+ * because the only information we leak here is that we insist on
+ * returning p and q such that p > q, which is not a secret.
+ */
+ if (esize_p == esize_q && br_i31_sub(p, q, 0) == 1) {
+ bufswap(p, q, (1 + plen) * sizeof *p);
+ bufswap(sk->p, sk->q, sk->plen);
+ bufswap(sk->dp, sk->dq, sk->dplen);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We have produced p, q, dp and dq. We can now compute iq = 1/d mod p.
+ *
+ * We ensured that p >= q, so this is just a matter of updating the
+ * header word for q (and possibly adding an extra word).
+ *
+ * Theoretically, the call below may fail, in case we were
+ * extraordinarily unlucky, and p = q. Another failure case is if
+ * Miller-Rabin failed us _twice_, and p and q are non-prime and
+ * have a factor is common. We report the error mostly because it
+ * is cheap and we can, but in practice this never happens (or, at
+ * least, it happens way less often than hardware glitches).
+ */
+ q[0] = p[0];
+ if (plen > qlen) {
+ q[plen] = 0;
+ t ++;
+ tlen --;
+ }
+ br_i31_zero(t, p[0]);
+ t[1] = 1;
+ r = br_i31_moddiv(t, q, p, br_i31_ninv31(p[1]), t + 1 + plen);
+ br_i31_encode(sk->iq, sk->iqlen, t);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the public modulus too, if required.
+ */
+ if (pk != NULL) {
+ br_i31_zero(t, p[0]);
+ br_i31_mulacc(t, p, q);
+ br_i31_encode(pk->n, pk->nlen, t);
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_modulus.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_modulus.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f5f997f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_modulus.c
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+size_t
+br_rsa_i31_compute_modulus(void *n, const br_rsa_private_key *sk)
+{
+ uint32_t tmp[4 * (((BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE / 2) + 30) / 31) + 5];
+ uint32_t *t, *p, *q;
+ const unsigned char *pbuf, *qbuf;
+ size_t nlen, plen, qlen, tlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute actual byte and lengths for p and q.
+ */
+ pbuf = sk->p;
+ plen = sk->plen;
+ while (plen > 0 && *pbuf == 0) {
+ pbuf ++;
+ plen --;
+ }
+ qbuf = sk->q;
+ qlen = sk->qlen;
+ while (qlen > 0 && *qbuf == 0) {
+ qbuf ++;
+ qlen --;
+ }
+
+ t = tmp;
+ tlen = (sizeof tmp) / (sizeof tmp[0]);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode p.
+ */
+ if ((31 * tlen) < (plen << 3) + 31) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ br_i31_decode(t, pbuf, plen);
+ p = t;
+ plen = (p[0] + 63) >> 5;
+ t += plen;
+ tlen -= plen;
+
+ /*
+ * Decode q.
+ */
+ if ((31 * tlen) < (qlen << 3) + 31) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ br_i31_decode(t, qbuf, qlen);
+ q = t;
+ qlen = (q[0] + 63) >> 5;
+ t += qlen;
+ tlen -= qlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Computation can proceed only if we have enough room for the
+ * modulus.
+ */
+ if (tlen < (plen + qlen + 1)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Private key already contains the modulus bit length, from which
+ * we can infer the output length. Even if n is NULL, we still had
+ * to decode p and q to make sure that the product can be computed.
+ */
+ nlen = (sk->n_bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+ if (n != NULL) {
+ br_i31_zero(t, p[0]);
+ br_i31_mulacc(t, p, q);
+ br_i31_encode(n, nlen, t);
+ }
+ return nlen;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_oaep_decrypt.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_oaep_decrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06fdd93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_oaep_decrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i31_oaep_decrypt(const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *data, size_t *len)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ if (*len != ((sk->n_bitlen + 7) >> 3)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = br_rsa_i31_private(data, sk);
+ r &= br_rsa_oaep_unpad(dig, label, label_len, data, len);
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_oaep_encrypt.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_oaep_encrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..367008c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_oaep_encrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+size_t
+br_rsa_i31_oaep_encrypt(
+ const br_prng_class **rnd, const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk,
+ void *dst, size_t dst_max_len,
+ const void *src, size_t src_len)
+{
+ size_t dlen;
+
+ dlen = br_rsa_oaep_pad(rnd, dig, label, label_len,
+ pk, dst, dst_max_len, src, src_len);
+ if (dlen == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return dlen & -(size_t)br_rsa_i31_public(dst, dlen, pk);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pkcs1_sign.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pkcs1_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..784d3c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pkcs1_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i31_pkcs1_sign(const unsigned char *hash_oid,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x)
+{
+ if (!br_rsa_pkcs1_sig_pad(hash_oid, hash, hash_len, sk->n_bitlen, x)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return br_rsa_i31_private(x, sk);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pkcs1_vrfy.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pkcs1_vrfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e79a002
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pkcs1_vrfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i31_pkcs1_vrfy(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash_oid, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk, unsigned char *hash_out)
+{
+ unsigned char sig[BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 3];
+
+ if (xlen > (sizeof sig)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(sig, x, xlen);
+ if (!br_rsa_i31_public(sig, xlen, pk)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return br_rsa_pkcs1_sig_unpad(sig, xlen, hash_oid, hash_len, hash_out);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_priv.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_priv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1e1244
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_priv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define U (2 + ((BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR + 30) / 31))
+#define TLEN (8 * U)
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i31_private(unsigned char *x, const br_rsa_private_key *sk)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p, *q;
+ size_t plen, qlen;
+ size_t fwlen;
+ uint32_t p0i, q0i;
+ size_t xlen, u;
+ uint32_t tmp[1 + TLEN];
+ long z;
+ uint32_t *mp, *mq, *s1, *s2, *t1, *t2, *t3;
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the actual lengths of p and q, in bytes.
+ * These lengths are not considered secret (we cannot really hide
+ * them anyway in constant-time code).
+ */
+ p = sk->p;
+ plen = sk->plen;
+ while (plen > 0 && *p == 0) {
+ p ++;
+ plen --;
+ }
+ q = sk->q;
+ qlen = sk->qlen;
+ while (qlen > 0 && *q == 0) {
+ q ++;
+ qlen --;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the maximum factor length, in words.
+ */
+ z = (long)(plen > qlen ? plen : qlen) << 3;
+ fwlen = 1;
+ while (z > 0) {
+ z -= 31;
+ fwlen ++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Round up the word length to an even number.
+ */
+ fwlen += (fwlen & 1);
+
+ /*
+ * We need to fit at least 6 values in the stack buffer.
+ */
+ if (6 * fwlen > TLEN) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute modulus length (in bytes).
+ */
+ xlen = (sk->n_bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+
+ /*
+ * Decode q.
+ */
+ mq = tmp;
+ br_i31_decode(mq, q, qlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode p.
+ */
+ t1 = mq + fwlen;
+ br_i31_decode(t1, p, plen);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the modulus (product of the two factors), to compare
+ * it with the source value. We use br_i31_mulacc(), since it's
+ * already used later on.
+ */
+ t2 = mq + 2 * fwlen;
+ br_i31_zero(t2, mq[0]);
+ br_i31_mulacc(t2, mq, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * We encode the modulus into bytes, to perform the comparison
+ * with bytes. We know that the product length, in bytes, is
+ * exactly xlen.
+ * The comparison actually computes the carry when subtracting
+ * the modulus from the source value; that carry must be 1 for
+ * a value in the correct range. We keep it in r, which is our
+ * accumulator for the error code.
+ */
+ t3 = mq + 4 * fwlen;
+ br_i31_encode(t3, xlen, t2);
+ u = xlen;
+ r = 0;
+ while (u > 0) {
+ uint32_t wn, wx;
+
+ u --;
+ wn = ((unsigned char *)t3)[u];
+ wx = x[u];
+ r = ((wx - (wn + r)) >> 8) & 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Move the decoded p to another temporary buffer.
+ */
+ mp = mq + 2 * fwlen;
+ memmove(mp, t1, fwlen * sizeof *t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute s2 = x^dq mod q.
+ */
+ q0i = br_i31_ninv31(mq[1]);
+ s2 = mq + fwlen;
+ br_i31_decode_reduce(s2, x, xlen, mq);
+ r &= br_i31_modpow_opt(s2, sk->dq, sk->dqlen, mq, q0i,
+ mq + 3 * fwlen, TLEN - 3 * fwlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute s1 = x^dp mod p.
+ */
+ p0i = br_i31_ninv31(mp[1]);
+ s1 = mq + 3 * fwlen;
+ br_i31_decode_reduce(s1, x, xlen, mp);
+ r &= br_i31_modpow_opt(s1, sk->dp, sk->dplen, mp, p0i,
+ mq + 4 * fwlen, TLEN - 4 * fwlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute:
+ * h = (s1 - s2)*(1/q) mod p
+ * s1 is an integer modulo p, but s2 is modulo q. PKCS#1 is
+ * unclear about whether p may be lower than q (some existing,
+ * widely deployed implementations of RSA don't tolerate p < q),
+ * but we want to support that occurrence, so we need to use the
+ * reduction function.
+ *
+ * Since we use br_i31_decode_reduce() for iq (purportedly, the
+ * inverse of q modulo p), we also tolerate improperly large
+ * values for this parameter.
+ */
+ t1 = mq + 4 * fwlen;
+ t2 = mq + 5 * fwlen;
+ br_i31_reduce(t2, s2, mp);
+ br_i31_add(s1, mp, br_i31_sub(s1, t2, 1));
+ br_i31_to_monty(s1, mp);
+ br_i31_decode_reduce(t1, sk->iq, sk->iqlen, mp);
+ br_i31_montymul(t2, s1, t1, mp, p0i);
+
+ /*
+ * h is now in t2. We compute the final result:
+ * s = s2 + q*h
+ * All these operations are non-modular.
+ *
+ * We need mq, s2 and t2. We use the t3 buffer as destination.
+ * The buffers mp, s1 and t1 are no longer needed, so we can
+ * reuse them for t3. Moreover, the first step of the computation
+ * is to copy s2 into t3, after which s2 is not needed. Right
+ * now, mq is in slot 0, s2 is in slot 1, and t2 is in slot 5.
+ * Therefore, we have ample room for t3 by simply using s2.
+ */
+ t3 = s2;
+ br_i31_mulacc(t3, mq, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Encode the result. Since we already checked the value of xlen,
+ * we can just use it right away.
+ */
+ br_i31_encode(x, xlen, t3);
+
+ /*
+ * The only error conditions remaining at that point are invalid
+ * values for p and q (even integers).
+ */
+ return p0i & q0i & r;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_privexp.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_privexp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eee62a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_privexp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,318 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+size_t
+br_rsa_i31_compute_privexp(void *d,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, uint32_t e)
+{
+ /*
+ * We want to invert e modulo phi = (p-1)(q-1). This first
+ * requires computing phi, which is easy since we have the factors
+ * p and q in the private key structure.
+ *
+ * Since p = 3 mod 4 and q = 3 mod 4, phi/4 is an odd integer.
+ * We could invert e modulo phi/4 then patch the result to
+ * modulo phi, but this would involve assembling three modulus-wide
+ * values (phi/4, 1 and e) and calling moddiv, that requires
+ * three more temporaries, for a total of six big integers, or
+ * slightly more than 3 kB of stack space for RSA-4096. This
+ * exceeds our stack requirements.
+ *
+ * Instead, we first use one step of the extended GCD:
+ *
+ * - We compute phi = k*e + r (Euclidean division of phi by e).
+ * If public exponent e is correct, then r != 0 (e must be
+ * invertible modulo phi). We also have k != 0 since we
+ * enforce non-ridiculously-small factors.
+ *
+ * - We find small u, v such that u*e - v*r = 1 (using a
+ * binary GCD; we can arrange for u < r and v < e, i.e. all
+ * values fit on 32 bits).
+ *
+ * - Solution is: d = u + v*k
+ * This last computation is exact: since u < r and v < e,
+ * the above implies d < r + e*((phi-r)/e) = phi
+ */
+
+ uint32_t tmp[4 * ((BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR + 30) / 31) + 12];
+ uint32_t *p, *q, *k, *m, *z, *phi;
+ const unsigned char *pbuf, *qbuf;
+ size_t plen, qlen, u, len, dlen;
+ uint32_t r, a, b, u0, v0, u1, v1, he, hr;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Check that e is correct.
+ */
+ if (e < 3 || (e & 1) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check lengths of p and q, and that they are both odd.
+ */
+ pbuf = sk->p;
+ plen = sk->plen;
+ while (plen > 0 && *pbuf == 0) {
+ pbuf ++;
+ plen --;
+ }
+ if (plen < 5 || plen > (BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR / 8)
+ || (pbuf[plen - 1] & 1) != 1)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ qbuf = sk->q;
+ qlen = sk->qlen;
+ while (qlen > 0 && *qbuf == 0) {
+ qbuf ++;
+ qlen --;
+ }
+ if (qlen < 5 || qlen > (BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR / 8)
+ || (qbuf[qlen - 1] & 1) != 1)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Output length is that of the modulus.
+ */
+ dlen = (sk->n_bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+ if (d == NULL) {
+ return dlen;
+ }
+
+ p = tmp;
+ br_i31_decode(p, pbuf, plen);
+ plen = (p[0] + 31) >> 5;
+ q = p + 1 + plen;
+ br_i31_decode(q, qbuf, qlen);
+ qlen = (q[0] + 31) >> 5;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute phi = (p-1)*(q-1), then move it over p-1 and q-1 (that
+ * we do not need anymore). The mulacc function sets the announced
+ * bit length of t to be the sum of the announced bit lengths of
+ * p-1 and q-1, which is usually exact but may overshoot by one 1
+ * bit in some cases; we readjust it to its true length.
+ */
+ p[1] --;
+ q[1] --;
+ phi = q + 1 + qlen;
+ br_i31_zero(phi, p[0]);
+ br_i31_mulacc(phi, p, q);
+ len = (phi[0] + 31) >> 5;
+ memmove(tmp, phi, (1 + len) * sizeof *phi);
+ phi = tmp;
+ phi[0] = br_i31_bit_length(phi + 1, len);
+ len = (phi[0] + 31) >> 5;
+
+ /*
+ * Divide phi by public exponent e. The final remainder r must be
+ * non-zero (otherwise, the key is invalid). The quotient is k,
+ * which we write over phi, since we don't need phi after that.
+ */
+ r = 0;
+ for (u = len; u >= 1; u --) {
+ /*
+ * Upon entry, r < e, and phi[u] < 2^31; hence,
+ * hi:lo < e*2^31. Thus, the produced word k[u]
+ * must be lower than 2^31, and the new remainder r
+ * is lower than e.
+ */
+ uint32_t hi, lo;
+
+ hi = r >> 1;
+ lo = (r << 31) + phi[u];
+ phi[u] = br_divrem(hi, lo, e, &r);
+ }
+ if (r == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ k = phi;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute u and v such that u*e - v*r = GCD(e,r). We use
+ * a binary GCD algorithm, with 6 extra integers a, b,
+ * u0, u1, v0 and v1. Initial values are:
+ * a = e u0 = 1 v0 = 0
+ * b = r u1 = r v1 = e-1
+ * The following invariants are maintained:
+ * a = u0*e - v0*r
+ * b = u1*e - v1*r
+ * 0 < a <= e
+ * 0 < b <= r
+ * 0 <= u0 <= r
+ * 0 <= v0 <= e
+ * 0 <= u1 <= r
+ * 0 <= v1 <= e
+ *
+ * At each iteration, we reduce either a or b by one bit, and
+ * adjust u0, u1, v0 and v1 to maintain the invariants:
+ * - if a is even, then a <- a/2
+ * - otherwise, if b is even, then b <- b/2
+ * - otherwise, if a > b, then a <- (a-b)/2
+ * - otherwise, if b > a, then b <- (b-a)/2
+ * Algorithm stops when a = b. At that point, the common value
+ * is the GCD of e and r; it must be 1 (otherwise, the private
+ * key or public exponent is not valid). The (u0,v0) or (u1,v1)
+ * pairs are the solution we are looking for.
+ *
+ * Since either a or b is reduced by at least 1 bit at each
+ * iteration, 62 iterations are enough to reach the end
+ * condition.
+ *
+ * To maintain the invariants, we must compute the same operations
+ * on the u* and v* values that we do on a and b:
+ * - When a is divided by 2, u0 and v0 must be divided by 2.
+ * - When b is divided by 2, u1 and v1 must be divided by 2.
+ * - When b is subtracted from a, u1 and v1 are subtracted from
+ * u0 and v0, respectively.
+ * - When a is subtracted from b, u0 and v0 are subtracted from
+ * u1 and v1, respectively.
+ *
+ * However, we want to keep the u* and v* values in their proper
+ * ranges. The following remarks apply:
+ *
+ * - When a is divided by 2, then a is even. Therefore:
+ *
+ * * If r is odd, then u0 and v0 must have the same parity;
+ * if they are both odd, then adding r to u0 and e to v0
+ * makes them both even, and the division by 2 brings them
+ * back to the proper range.
+ *
+ * * If r is even, then u0 must be even; if v0 is odd, then
+ * adding r to u0 and e to v0 makes them both even, and the
+ * division by 2 brings them back to the proper range.
+ *
+ * Thus, all we need to do is to look at the parity of v0,
+ * and add (r,e) to (u0,v0) when v0 is odd. In order to avoid
+ * a 32-bit overflow, we can add ((r+1)/2,(e/2)+1) after the
+ * division (r+1 does not overflow since r < e; and (e/2)+1
+ * is equal to (e+1)/2 since e is odd).
+ *
+ * - When we subtract b from a, three cases may occur:
+ *
+ * * u1 <= u0 and v1 <= v0: just do the subtractions
+ *
+ * * u1 > u0 and v1 > v0: compute:
+ * (u0, v0) <- (u0 + r - u1, v0 + e - v1)
+ *
+ * * u1 <= u0 and v1 > v0: compute:
+ * (u0, v0) <- (u0 + r - u1, v0 + e - v1)
+ *
+ * The fourth case (u1 > u0 and v1 <= v0) is not possible
+ * because it would contradict "b < a" (which is the reason
+ * why we subtract b from a).
+ *
+ * The tricky case is the third one: from the equations, it
+ * seems that u0 may go out of range. However, the invariants
+ * and ranges of other values imply that, in that case, the
+ * new u0 does not actually exceed the range.
+ *
+ * We can thus handle the subtraction by adding (r,e) based
+ * solely on the comparison between v0 and v1.
+ */
+ a = e;
+ b = r;
+ u0 = 1;
+ v0 = 0;
+ u1 = r;
+ v1 = e - 1;
+ hr = (r + 1) >> 1;
+ he = (e >> 1) + 1;
+ for (i = 0; i < 62; i ++) {
+ uint32_t oa, ob, agtb, bgta;
+ uint32_t sab, sba, da, db;
+ uint32_t ctl;
+
+ oa = a & 1; /* 1 if a is odd */
+ ob = b & 1; /* 1 if b is odd */
+ agtb = GT(a, b); /* 1 if a > b */
+ bgta = GT(b, a); /* 1 if b > a */
+
+ sab = oa & ob & agtb; /* 1 if a <- a-b */
+ sba = oa & ob & bgta; /* 1 if b <- b-a */
+
+ /* a <- a-b, u0 <- u0-u1, v0 <- v0-v1 */
+ ctl = GT(v1, v0);
+ a -= b & -sab;
+ u0 -= (u1 - (r & -ctl)) & -sab;
+ v0 -= (v1 - (e & -ctl)) & -sab;
+
+ /* b <- b-a, u1 <- u1-u0 mod r, v1 <- v1-v0 mod e */
+ ctl = GT(v0, v1);
+ b -= a & -sba;
+ u1 -= (u0 - (r & -ctl)) & -sba;
+ v1 -= (v0 - (e & -ctl)) & -sba;
+
+ da = NOT(oa) | sab; /* 1 if a <- a/2 */
+ db = (oa & NOT(ob)) | sba; /* 1 if b <- b/2 */
+
+ /* a <- a/2, u0 <- u0/2, v0 <- v0/2 */
+ ctl = v0 & 1;
+ a ^= (a ^ (a >> 1)) & -da;
+ u0 ^= (u0 ^ ((u0 >> 1) + (hr & -ctl))) & -da;
+ v0 ^= (v0 ^ ((v0 >> 1) + (he & -ctl))) & -da;
+
+ /* b <- b/2, u1 <- u1/2 mod r, v1 <- v1/2 mod e */
+ ctl = v1 & 1;
+ b ^= (b ^ (b >> 1)) & -db;
+ u1 ^= (u1 ^ ((u1 >> 1) + (hr & -ctl))) & -db;
+ v1 ^= (v1 ^ ((v1 >> 1) + (he & -ctl))) & -db;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the GCD is indeed 1. If not, then the key is invalid
+ * (and there's no harm in leaking that piece of information).
+ */
+ if (a != 1) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we have u0*e - v0*r = 1. Let's compute the result as:
+ * d = u0 + v0*k
+ * We still have k in the tmp[] array, and its announced bit
+ * length is that of phi.
+ */
+ m = k + 1 + len;
+ m[0] = (1 << 5) + 1; /* bit length is 32 bits, encoded */
+ m[1] = v0 & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ m[2] = v0 >> 31;
+ z = m + 3;
+ br_i31_zero(z, k[0]);
+ z[1] = u0 & 0x7FFFFFFF;
+ z[2] = u0 >> 31;
+ br_i31_mulacc(z, k, m);
+
+ /*
+ * Encode the result.
+ */
+ br_i31_encode(d, dlen, z);
+ return dlen;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pss_sign.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pss_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b06f3e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pss_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i31_pss_sign(const br_prng_class **rng,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t salt_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x)
+{
+ if (!br_rsa_pss_sig_pad(rng, hf_data, hf_mgf1, hash,
+ salt_len, sk->n_bitlen, x))
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return br_rsa_i31_private(x, sk);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pss_vrfy.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pss_vrfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77a9b28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pss_vrfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i31_pss_vrfy(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const void *hash, size_t salt_len, const br_rsa_public_key *pk)
+{
+ unsigned char sig[BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 3];
+
+ if (xlen > (sizeof sig)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(sig, x, xlen);
+ if (!br_rsa_i31_public(sig, xlen, pk)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return br_rsa_pss_sig_unpad(hf_data, hf_mgf1,
+ hash, salt_len, pk, sig);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pub.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pub.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d5f3fe2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pub.c
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * As a strict minimum, we need four buffers that can hold a
+ * modular integer.
+ */
+#define TLEN (4 * (2 + ((BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE + 30) / 31)))
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i31_public(unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk)
+{
+ const unsigned char *n;
+ size_t nlen;
+ uint32_t tmp[1 + TLEN];
+ uint32_t *m, *a, *t;
+ size_t fwlen;
+ long z;
+ uint32_t m0i, r;
+
+ /*
+ * Get the actual length of the modulus, and see if it fits within
+ * our stack buffer. We also check that the length of x[] is valid.
+ */
+ n = pk->n;
+ nlen = pk->nlen;
+ while (nlen > 0 && *n == 0) {
+ n ++;
+ nlen --;
+ }
+ if (nlen == 0 || nlen > (BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 3) || xlen != nlen) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ z = (long)nlen << 3;
+ fwlen = 1;
+ while (z > 0) {
+ z -= 31;
+ fwlen ++;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Round up length to an even number.
+ */
+ fwlen += (fwlen & 1);
+
+ /*
+ * The modulus gets decoded into m[].
+ * The value to exponentiate goes into a[].
+ * The temporaries for modular exponentiation are in t[].
+ */
+ m = tmp;
+ a = m + fwlen;
+ t = m + 2 * fwlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the modulus.
+ */
+ br_i31_decode(m, n, nlen);
+ m0i = br_i31_ninv31(m[1]);
+
+ /*
+ * Note: if m[] is even, then m0i == 0. Otherwise, m0i must be
+ * an odd integer.
+ */
+ r = m0i & 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Decode x[] into a[]; we also check that its value is proper.
+ */
+ r &= br_i31_decode_mod(a, x, xlen, m);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the modular exponentiation.
+ */
+ br_i31_modpow_opt(a, pk->e, pk->elen, m, m0i, t, TLEN - 2 * fwlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Encode the result.
+ */
+ br_i31_encode(x, xlen, a);
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pubexp.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pubexp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f26537d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i31_pubexp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Recompute public exponent, based on factor p and reduced private
+ * exponent dp.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+get_pubexp(const unsigned char *pbuf, size_t plen,
+ const unsigned char *dpbuf, size_t dplen)
+{
+ /*
+ * dp is the inverse of e modulo p-1. If p = 3 mod 4, then
+ * p-1 = 2*((p-1)/2). Taken modulo 2, e is odd and has inverse 1;
+ * thus, dp must be odd.
+ *
+ * We compute the inverse of dp modulo (p-1)/2. This requires
+ * first reducing dp modulo (p-1)/2 (this can be done with a
+ * conditional subtract, no need to use the generic modular
+ * reduction function); then, we use moddiv.
+ */
+
+ uint32_t tmp[6 * ((BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR + 61) / 31)];
+ uint32_t *p, *dp, *x;
+ size_t len;
+ uint32_t e;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute actual factor length (in bytes) and check that it fits
+ * under our size constraints.
+ */
+ while (plen > 0 && *pbuf == 0) {
+ pbuf ++;
+ plen --;
+ }
+ if (plen == 0 || plen < 5 || plen > (BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR / 8)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute actual reduced exponent length (in bytes) and check that
+ * it is not longer than p.
+ */
+ while (dplen > 0 && *dpbuf == 0) {
+ dpbuf ++;
+ dplen --;
+ }
+ if (dplen > plen || dplen == 0
+ || (dplen == plen && dpbuf[0] > pbuf[0]))
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that p = 3 mod 4 and that dp is odd.
+ */
+ if ((pbuf[plen - 1] & 3) != 3 || (dpbuf[dplen - 1] & 1) != 1) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Decode p and compute (p-1)/2.
+ */
+ p = tmp;
+ br_i31_decode(p, pbuf, plen);
+ len = (p[0] + 63) >> 5;
+ br_i31_rshift(p, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode dp and make sure its announced bit length matches that of
+ * p (we already know that the size of dp, in bits, does not exceed
+ * the size of p, so we just have to copy the header word).
+ */
+ dp = p + len;
+ memset(dp, 0, len * sizeof *dp);
+ br_i31_decode(dp, dpbuf, dplen);
+ dp[0] = p[0];
+
+ /*
+ * Subtract (p-1)/2 from dp if necessary.
+ */
+ br_i31_sub(dp, p, NOT(br_i31_sub(dp, p, 0)));
+
+ /*
+ * If another subtraction is needed, then this means that the
+ * value was invalid. We don't care to leak information about
+ * invalid keys.
+ */
+ if (br_i31_sub(dp, p, 0) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invert dp modulo (p-1)/2. If the inversion fails, then the
+ * key value was invalid.
+ */
+ x = dp + len;
+ br_i31_zero(x, p[0]);
+ x[1] = 1;
+ if (br_i31_moddiv(x, dp, p, br_i31_ninv31(p[1]), x + len) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We now have an inverse. We must set it to zero (error) if its
+ * length is greater than 32 bits and/or if it is an even integer.
+ * Take care that the bit_length function returns an encoded
+ * bit length.
+ */
+ e = (uint32_t)x[1] | ((uint32_t)x[2] << 31);
+ e &= -LT(br_i31_bit_length(x + 1, len - 1), 34);
+ e &= -(e & 1);
+ return e;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i31_compute_pubexp(const br_rsa_private_key *sk)
+{
+ /*
+ * Get the public exponent from both p and q. This is the right
+ * exponent if we get twice the same value.
+ */
+ uint32_t ep, eq;
+
+ ep = get_pubexp(sk->p, sk->plen, sk->dp, sk->dplen);
+ eq = get_pubexp(sk->q, sk->qlen, sk->dq, sk->dqlen);
+ return ep & -EQ(ep, eq);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_oaep_decrypt.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_oaep_decrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ecfd92b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_oaep_decrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i32_oaep_decrypt(const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *data, size_t *len)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ if (*len != ((sk->n_bitlen + 7) >> 3)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = br_rsa_i32_private(data, sk);
+ r &= br_rsa_oaep_unpad(dig, label, label_len, data, len);
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_oaep_encrypt.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_oaep_encrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc17f3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_oaep_encrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+size_t
+br_rsa_i32_oaep_encrypt(
+ const br_prng_class **rnd, const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk,
+ void *dst, size_t dst_max_len,
+ const void *src, size_t src_len)
+{
+ size_t dlen;
+
+ dlen = br_rsa_oaep_pad(rnd, dig, label, label_len,
+ pk, dst, dst_max_len, src, src_len);
+ if (dlen == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return dlen & -(size_t)br_rsa_i32_public(dst, dlen, pk);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_pkcs1_sign.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_pkcs1_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..44b6e6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_pkcs1_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i32_pkcs1_sign(const unsigned char *hash_oid,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x)
+{
+ if (!br_rsa_pkcs1_sig_pad(hash_oid, hash, hash_len, sk->n_bitlen, x)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return br_rsa_i32_private(x, sk);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_pkcs1_vrfy.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_pkcs1_vrfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ee7a19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_pkcs1_vrfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i32_pkcs1_vrfy(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash_oid, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk, unsigned char *hash_out)
+{
+ unsigned char sig[BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 3];
+
+ if (xlen > (sizeof sig)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(sig, x, xlen);
+ if (!br_rsa_i32_public(sig, xlen, pk)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return br_rsa_pkcs1_sig_unpad(sig, xlen, hash_oid, hash_len, hash_out);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_priv.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_priv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05c22ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_priv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define U (1 + (BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR >> 5))
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i32_private(unsigned char *x, const br_rsa_private_key *sk)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p, *q;
+ size_t plen, qlen;
+ uint32_t tmp[6 * U];
+ uint32_t *mp, *mq, *s1, *s2, *t1, *t2, *t3;
+ uint32_t p0i, q0i;
+ size_t xlen, u;
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ /*
+ * All our temporary buffers are from the tmp[] array.
+ *
+ * The mp, mq, s1, s2, t1 and t2 buffers are large enough to
+ * contain a RSA factor. The t3 buffer can contain a complete
+ * RSA modulus. t3 shares its storage space with s2, s1 and t1,
+ * in that order (this is important, see below).
+ */
+ mq = tmp;
+ mp = tmp + U;
+ t2 = tmp + 2 * U;
+ s2 = tmp + 3 * U;
+ s1 = tmp + 4 * U;
+ t1 = tmp + 5 * U;
+ t3 = s2;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the actual lengths (in bytes) of p and q, and check
+ * that they fit within our stack buffers.
+ */
+ p = sk->p;
+ plen = sk->plen;
+ while (plen > 0 && *p == 0) {
+ p ++;
+ plen --;
+ }
+ q = sk->q;
+ qlen = sk->qlen;
+ while (qlen > 0 && *q == 0) {
+ q ++;
+ qlen --;
+ }
+ if (plen > (BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR >> 3)
+ || qlen > (BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR >> 3))
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Decode p and q.
+ */
+ br_i32_decode(mp, p, plen);
+ br_i32_decode(mq, q, qlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Recompute modulus, to compare with the source value.
+ */
+ br_i32_zero(t2, mp[0]);
+ br_i32_mulacc(t2, mp, mq);
+ xlen = (sk->n_bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+ br_i32_encode(t2 + 2 * U, xlen, t2);
+ u = xlen;
+ r = 0;
+ while (u > 0) {
+ uint32_t wn, wx;
+
+ u --;
+ wn = ((unsigned char *)(t2 + 2 * U))[u];
+ wx = x[u];
+ r = ((wx - (wn + r)) >> 8) & 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute s1 = x^dp mod p.
+ */
+ p0i = br_i32_ninv32(mp[1]);
+ br_i32_decode_reduce(s1, x, xlen, mp);
+ br_i32_modpow(s1, sk->dp, sk->dplen, mp, p0i, t1, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute s2 = x^dq mod q.
+ */
+ q0i = br_i32_ninv32(mq[1]);
+ br_i32_decode_reduce(s2, x, xlen, mq);
+ br_i32_modpow(s2, sk->dq, sk->dqlen, mq, q0i, t1, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute:
+ * h = (s1 - s2)*(1/q) mod p
+ * s1 is an integer modulo p, but s2 is modulo q. PKCS#1 is
+ * unclear about whether p may be lower than q (some existing,
+ * widely deployed implementations of RSA don't tolerate p < q),
+ * but we want to support that occurrence, so we need to use the
+ * reduction function.
+ *
+ * Since we use br_i32_decode_reduce() for iq (purportedly, the
+ * inverse of q modulo p), we also tolerate improperly large
+ * values for this parameter.
+ */
+ br_i32_reduce(t2, s2, mp);
+ br_i32_add(s1, mp, br_i32_sub(s1, t2, 1));
+ br_i32_to_monty(s1, mp);
+ br_i32_decode_reduce(t1, sk->iq, sk->iqlen, mp);
+ br_i32_montymul(t2, s1, t1, mp, p0i);
+
+ /*
+ * h is now in t2. We compute the final result:
+ * s = s2 + q*h
+ * All these operations are non-modular.
+ *
+ * We need mq, s2 and t2. We use the t3 buffer as destination.
+ * The buffers mp, s1 and t1 are no longer needed. Moreover,
+ * the first step is to copy s2 into the destination buffer t3.
+ * We thus arranged for t3 to actually share space with s2, and
+ * to be followed by the space formerly used by s1 and t1.
+ */
+ br_i32_mulacc(t3, mq, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Encode the result. Since we already checked the value of xlen,
+ * we can just use it right away.
+ */
+ br_i32_encode(x, xlen, t3);
+
+ /*
+ * The only error conditions remaining at that point are invalid
+ * values for p and q (even integers).
+ */
+ return p0i & q0i & r;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_pss_sign.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_pss_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f72f92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_pss_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i32_pss_sign(const br_prng_class **rng,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t salt_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x)
+{
+ if (!br_rsa_pss_sig_pad(rng, hf_data, hf_mgf1, hash,
+ salt_len, sk->n_bitlen, x))
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return br_rsa_i32_private(x, sk);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_pss_vrfy.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_pss_vrfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e70d23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_pss_vrfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i32_pss_vrfy(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const void *hash, size_t salt_len, const br_rsa_public_key *pk)
+{
+ unsigned char sig[BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 3];
+
+ if (xlen > (sizeof sig)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(sig, x, xlen);
+ if (!br_rsa_i32_public(sig, xlen, pk)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return br_rsa_pss_sig_unpad(hf_data, hf_mgf1,
+ hash, salt_len, pk, sig);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_pub.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_pub.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e8d8e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i32_pub.c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i32_public(unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk)
+{
+ const unsigned char *n;
+ size_t nlen;
+ uint32_t m[1 + (BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 5)];
+ uint32_t a[1 + (BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 5)];
+ uint32_t t1[1 + (BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 5)];
+ uint32_t t2[1 + (BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 5)];
+ uint32_t m0i, r;
+
+ /*
+ * Get the actual length of the modulus, and see if it fits within
+ * our stack buffer. We also check that the length of x[] is valid.
+ */
+ n = pk->n;
+ nlen = pk->nlen;
+ while (nlen > 0 && *n == 0) {
+ n ++;
+ nlen --;
+ }
+ if (nlen == 0 || nlen > (BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 3) || xlen != nlen) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ br_i32_decode(m, n, nlen);
+ m0i = br_i32_ninv32(m[1]);
+
+ /*
+ * Note: if m[] is even, then m0i == 0. Otherwise, m0i must be
+ * an odd integer.
+ */
+ r = m0i & 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Decode x[] into a[]; we also check that its value is proper.
+ */
+ r &= br_i32_decode_mod(a, x, xlen, m);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the modular exponentiation.
+ */
+ br_i32_modpow(a, pk->e, pk->elen, m, m0i, t1, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Encode the result.
+ */
+ br_i32_encode(x, xlen, a);
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_keygen.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_keygen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..992fe97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_keygen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i62_keygen(const br_prng_class **rng,
+ br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *kbuf_priv,
+ br_rsa_public_key *pk, void *kbuf_pub,
+ unsigned size, uint32_t pubexp)
+{
+ return br_rsa_i31_keygen_inner(rng,
+ sk, kbuf_priv, pk, kbuf_pub, size, pubexp,
+ &br_i62_modpow_opt_as_i31);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_keygen
+br_rsa_i62_keygen_get(void)
+{
+ return &br_rsa_i62_keygen;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_keygen
+br_rsa_i62_keygen_get(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_oaep_decrypt.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_oaep_decrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38470dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_oaep_decrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i62_oaep_decrypt(const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, void *data, size_t *len)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ if (*len != ((sk->n_bitlen + 7) >> 3)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = br_rsa_i62_private(data, sk);
+ r &= br_rsa_oaep_unpad(dig, label, label_len, data, len);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_oaep_decrypt
+br_rsa_i62_oaep_decrypt_get(void)
+{
+ return &br_rsa_i62_oaep_decrypt;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_oaep_decrypt
+br_rsa_i62_oaep_decrypt_get(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_oaep_encrypt.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_oaep_encrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf41ecb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_oaep_encrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+size_t
+br_rsa_i62_oaep_encrypt(
+ const br_prng_class **rnd, const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk,
+ void *dst, size_t dst_max_len,
+ const void *src, size_t src_len)
+{
+ size_t dlen;
+
+ dlen = br_rsa_oaep_pad(rnd, dig, label, label_len,
+ pk, dst, dst_max_len, src, src_len);
+ if (dlen == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return dlen & -(size_t)br_rsa_i62_public(dst, dlen, pk);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_oaep_encrypt
+br_rsa_i62_oaep_encrypt_get(void)
+{
+ return &br_rsa_i62_oaep_encrypt;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_oaep_encrypt
+br_rsa_i62_oaep_encrypt_get(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_pkcs1_sign.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_pkcs1_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a20a084
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_pkcs1_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i62_pkcs1_sign(const unsigned char *hash_oid,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x)
+{
+ if (!br_rsa_pkcs1_sig_pad(hash_oid, hash, hash_len, sk->n_bitlen, x)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return br_rsa_i62_private(x, sk);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_pkcs1_sign
+br_rsa_i62_pkcs1_sign_get(void)
+{
+ return &br_rsa_i62_pkcs1_sign;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_pkcs1_sign
+br_rsa_i62_pkcs1_sign_get(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_pkcs1_vrfy.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_pkcs1_vrfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6519161
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_pkcs1_vrfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i62_pkcs1_vrfy(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash_oid, size_t hash_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk, unsigned char *hash_out)
+{
+ unsigned char sig[BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 3];
+
+ if (xlen > (sizeof sig)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(sig, x, xlen);
+ if (!br_rsa_i62_public(sig, xlen, pk)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return br_rsa_pkcs1_sig_unpad(sig, xlen, hash_oid, hash_len, hash_out);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy
+br_rsa_i62_pkcs1_vrfy_get(void)
+{
+ return &br_rsa_i62_pkcs1_vrfy;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy
+br_rsa_i62_pkcs1_vrfy_get(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_priv.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_priv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f0da600
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_priv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+
+#define U (2 + ((BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR + 30) / 31))
+#define TLEN (4 * U) /* TLEN is counted in 64-bit words */
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i62_private(unsigned char *x, const br_rsa_private_key *sk)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p, *q;
+ size_t plen, qlen;
+ size_t fwlen;
+ uint32_t p0i, q0i;
+ size_t xlen, u;
+ uint64_t tmp[TLEN];
+ long z;
+ uint32_t *mp, *mq, *s1, *s2, *t1, *t2, *t3;
+ uint32_t r;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the actual lengths of p and q, in bytes.
+ * These lengths are not considered secret (we cannot really hide
+ * them anyway in constant-time code).
+ */
+ p = sk->p;
+ plen = sk->plen;
+ while (plen > 0 && *p == 0) {
+ p ++;
+ plen --;
+ }
+ q = sk->q;
+ qlen = sk->qlen;
+ while (qlen > 0 && *q == 0) {
+ q ++;
+ qlen --;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the maximum factor length, in words.
+ */
+ z = (long)(plen > qlen ? plen : qlen) << 3;
+ fwlen = 1;
+ while (z > 0) {
+ z -= 31;
+ fwlen ++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert size to 62-bit words.
+ */
+ fwlen = (fwlen + 1) >> 1;
+
+ /*
+ * We need to fit at least 6 values in the stack buffer.
+ */
+ if (6 * fwlen > TLEN) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute signature length (in bytes).
+ */
+ xlen = (sk->n_bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+
+ /*
+ * Decode q.
+ */
+ mq = (uint32_t *)tmp;
+ br_i31_decode(mq, q, qlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode p.
+ */
+ t1 = (uint32_t *)(tmp + fwlen);
+ br_i31_decode(t1, p, plen);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the modulus (product of the two factors), to compare
+ * it with the source value. We use br_i31_mulacc(), since it's
+ * already used later on.
+ */
+ t2 = (uint32_t *)(tmp + 2 * fwlen);
+ br_i31_zero(t2, mq[0]);
+ br_i31_mulacc(t2, mq, t1);
+
+ /*
+ * We encode the modulus into bytes, to perform the comparison
+ * with bytes. We know that the product length, in bytes, is
+ * exactly xlen.
+ * The comparison actually computes the carry when subtracting
+ * the modulus from the source value; that carry must be 1 for
+ * a value in the correct range. We keep it in r, which is our
+ * accumulator for the error code.
+ */
+ t3 = (uint32_t *)(tmp + 4 * fwlen);
+ br_i31_encode(t3, xlen, t2);
+ u = xlen;
+ r = 0;
+ while (u > 0) {
+ uint32_t wn, wx;
+
+ u --;
+ wn = ((unsigned char *)t3)[u];
+ wx = x[u];
+ r = ((wx - (wn + r)) >> 8) & 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Move the decoded p to another temporary buffer.
+ */
+ mp = (uint32_t *)(tmp + 2 * fwlen);
+ memmove(mp, t1, 2 * fwlen * sizeof *t1);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute s2 = x^dq mod q.
+ */
+ q0i = br_i31_ninv31(mq[1]);
+ s2 = (uint32_t *)(tmp + fwlen);
+ br_i31_decode_reduce(s2, x, xlen, mq);
+ r &= br_i62_modpow_opt(s2, sk->dq, sk->dqlen, mq, q0i,
+ tmp + 3 * fwlen, TLEN - 3 * fwlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute s1 = x^dp mod p.
+ */
+ p0i = br_i31_ninv31(mp[1]);
+ s1 = (uint32_t *)(tmp + 3 * fwlen);
+ br_i31_decode_reduce(s1, x, xlen, mp);
+ r &= br_i62_modpow_opt(s1, sk->dp, sk->dplen, mp, p0i,
+ tmp + 4 * fwlen, TLEN - 4 * fwlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute:
+ * h = (s1 - s2)*(1/q) mod p
+ * s1 is an integer modulo p, but s2 is modulo q. PKCS#1 is
+ * unclear about whether p may be lower than q (some existing,
+ * widely deployed implementations of RSA don't tolerate p < q),
+ * but we want to support that occurrence, so we need to use the
+ * reduction function.
+ *
+ * Since we use br_i31_decode_reduce() for iq (purportedly, the
+ * inverse of q modulo p), we also tolerate improperly large
+ * values for this parameter.
+ */
+ t1 = (uint32_t *)(tmp + 4 * fwlen);
+ t2 = (uint32_t *)(tmp + 5 * fwlen);
+ br_i31_reduce(t2, s2, mp);
+ br_i31_add(s1, mp, br_i31_sub(s1, t2, 1));
+ br_i31_to_monty(s1, mp);
+ br_i31_decode_reduce(t1, sk->iq, sk->iqlen, mp);
+ br_i31_montymul(t2, s1, t1, mp, p0i);
+
+ /*
+ * h is now in t2. We compute the final result:
+ * s = s2 + q*h
+ * All these operations are non-modular.
+ *
+ * We need mq, s2 and t2. We use the t3 buffer as destination.
+ * The buffers mp, s1 and t1 are no longer needed, so we can
+ * reuse them for t3. Moreover, the first step of the computation
+ * is to copy s2 into t3, after which s2 is not needed. Right
+ * now, mq is in slot 0, s2 is in slot 1, and t2 is in slot 5.
+ * Therefore, we have ample room for t3 by simply using s2.
+ */
+ t3 = s2;
+ br_i31_mulacc(t3, mq, t2);
+
+ /*
+ * Encode the result. Since we already checked the value of xlen,
+ * we can just use it right away.
+ */
+ br_i31_encode(x, xlen, t3);
+
+ /*
+ * The only error conditions remaining at that point are invalid
+ * values for p and q (even integers).
+ */
+ return p0i & q0i & r;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_private
+br_rsa_i62_private_get(void)
+{
+ return &br_rsa_i62_private;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_private
+br_rsa_i62_private_get(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_pss_sign.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_pss_sign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7232f6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_pss_sign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i62_pss_sign(const br_prng_class **rng,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t salt_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned char *x)
+{
+ if (!br_rsa_pss_sig_pad(rng, hf_data, hf_mgf1, hash,
+ salt_len, sk->n_bitlen, x))
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return br_rsa_i62_private(x, sk);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_pss_sign
+br_rsa_i62_pss_sign_get(void)
+{
+ return &br_rsa_i62_pss_sign;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_pss_sign
+br_rsa_i62_pss_sign_get(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_pss_vrfy.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_pss_vrfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e726e82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_pss_vrfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i62_pss_vrfy(const unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const void *hash, size_t salt_len, const br_rsa_public_key *pk)
+{
+ unsigned char sig[BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 3];
+
+ if (xlen > (sizeof sig)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(sig, x, xlen);
+ if (!br_rsa_i62_public(sig, xlen, pk)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return br_rsa_pss_sig_unpad(hf_data, hf_mgf1,
+ hash, salt_len, pk, sig);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_pss_vrfy
+br_rsa_i62_pss_vrfy_get(void)
+{
+ return &br_rsa_i62_pss_vrfy;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_pss_vrfy
+br_rsa_i62_pss_vrfy_get(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_pub.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_pub.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..70cf61b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_i62_pub.c
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+
+/*
+ * As a strict minimum, we need four buffers that can hold a
+ * modular integer. But TLEN is expressed in 64-bit words.
+ */
+#define TLEN (2 * (2 + ((BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE + 30) / 31)))
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_i62_public(unsigned char *x, size_t xlen,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk)
+{
+ const unsigned char *n;
+ size_t nlen;
+ uint64_t tmp[TLEN];
+ uint32_t *m, *a;
+ size_t fwlen;
+ long z;
+ uint32_t m0i, r;
+
+ /*
+ * Get the actual length of the modulus, and see if it fits within
+ * our stack buffer. We also check that the length of x[] is valid.
+ */
+ n = pk->n;
+ nlen = pk->nlen;
+ while (nlen > 0 && *n == 0) {
+ n ++;
+ nlen --;
+ }
+ if (nlen == 0 || nlen > (BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE >> 3) || xlen != nlen) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ z = (long)nlen << 3;
+ fwlen = 1;
+ while (z > 0) {
+ z -= 31;
+ fwlen ++;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Convert fwlen to a count in 62-bit words.
+ */
+ fwlen = (fwlen + 1) >> 1;
+
+ /*
+ * The modulus gets decoded into m[].
+ * The value to exponentiate goes into a[].
+ */
+ m = (uint32_t *)tmp;
+ a = (uint32_t *)(tmp + fwlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the modulus.
+ */
+ br_i31_decode(m, n, nlen);
+ m0i = br_i31_ninv31(m[1]);
+
+ /*
+ * Note: if m[] is even, then m0i == 0. Otherwise, m0i must be
+ * an odd integer.
+ */
+ r = m0i & 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Decode x[] into a[]; we also check that its value is proper.
+ */
+ r &= br_i31_decode_mod(a, x, xlen, m);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the modular exponentiation.
+ */
+ br_i62_modpow_opt(a, pk->e, pk->elen, m, m0i,
+ tmp + 2 * fwlen, TLEN - 2 * fwlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Encode the result.
+ */
+ br_i31_encode(x, xlen, a);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_public
+br_rsa_i62_public_get(void)
+{
+ return &br_rsa_i62_public;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+br_rsa_public
+br_rsa_i62_public_get(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_oaep_pad.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_oaep_pad.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5327dc2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_oaep_pad.c
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Hash some data. This is put as a separate function so that stack
+ * allocation of the hash function context is done only for the duration
+ * of the hash.
+ */
+static void
+hash_data(const br_hash_class *dig, void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ br_hash_compat_context hc;
+
+ hc.vtable = dig;
+ dig->init(&hc.vtable);
+ dig->update(&hc.vtable, src, len);
+ dig->out(&hc.vtable, dst);
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+size_t
+br_rsa_oaep_pad(const br_prng_class **rnd, const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk,
+ void *dst, size_t dst_max_len,
+ const void *src, size_t src_len)
+{
+ size_t k, hlen;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ hlen = br_digest_size(dig);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute actual modulus length (in bytes).
+ */
+ k = pk->nlen;
+ while (k > 0 && pk->n[k - 1] == 0) {
+ k --;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * An error is reported if:
+ * - the modulus is too short;
+ * - the source message length is too long;
+ * - the destination buffer is too short.
+ */
+ if (k < ((hlen << 1) + 2)
+ || src_len > (k - (hlen << 1) - 2)
+ || dst_max_len < k)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Apply padding. At this point, things cannot fail.
+ */
+ buf = dst;
+
+ /*
+ * Assemble: DB = lHash || PS || 0x01 || M
+ * We first place the source message M with memmove(), so that
+ * overlaps between source and destination buffers are supported.
+ */
+ memmove(buf + k - src_len, src, src_len);
+ hash_data(dig, buf + 1 + hlen, label, label_len);
+ memset(buf + 1 + (hlen << 1), 0, k - src_len - (hlen << 1) - 2);
+ buf[k - src_len - 1] = 0x01;
+
+ /*
+ * Make the random seed.
+ */
+ (*rnd)->generate(rnd, buf + 1, hlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Mask DB with the mask generated from the seed.
+ */
+ br_mgf1_xor(buf + 1 + hlen, k - hlen - 1, dig, buf + 1, hlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Mask the seed with the mask generated from the masked DB.
+ */
+ br_mgf1_xor(buf + 1, hlen, dig, buf + 1 + hlen, k - hlen - 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Padding result: EM = 0x00 || maskedSeed || maskedDB.
+ */
+ buf[0] = 0x00;
+ return k;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_oaep_unpad.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_oaep_unpad.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c4be6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_oaep_unpad.c
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Hash some data and XOR the result into the provided buffer. This is put
+ * as a separate function so that stack allocation of the hash function
+ * context is done only for the duration of the hash.
+ */
+static void
+xor_hash_data(const br_hash_class *dig, void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ br_hash_compat_context hc;
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t u, hlen;
+
+ hc.vtable = dig;
+ dig->init(&hc.vtable);
+ dig->update(&hc.vtable, src, len);
+ dig->out(&hc.vtable, tmp);
+ buf = dst;
+ hlen = br_digest_size(dig);
+ for (u = 0; u < hlen; u ++) {
+ buf[u] ^= tmp[u];
+ }
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_oaep_unpad(const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *label, size_t label_len,
+ void *data, size_t *len)
+{
+ size_t u, k, hlen;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t r, s, zlen;
+
+ hlen = br_digest_size(dig);
+ k = *len;
+ buf = data;
+
+ /*
+ * There must be room for the padding.
+ */
+ if (k < ((hlen << 1) + 2)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Unmask the seed, then the DB value.
+ */
+ br_mgf1_xor(buf + 1, hlen, dig, buf + 1 + hlen, k - hlen - 1);
+ br_mgf1_xor(buf + 1 + hlen, k - hlen - 1, dig, buf + 1, hlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Hash the label and XOR it with the value in the array; if
+ * they are equal then these should yield only zeros.
+ */
+ xor_hash_data(dig, buf + 1 + hlen, label, label_len);
+
+ /*
+ * At that point, if the padding was correct, when we should
+ * have: 0x00 || seed || 0x00 ... 0x00 0x01 || M
+ * Padding is valid as long as:
+ * - There is at least hlen+1 leading bytes of value 0x00.
+ * - There is at least one non-zero byte.
+ * - The first (leftmost) non-zero byte has value 0x01.
+ *
+ * Ultimately, we may leak the resulting message length, i.e.
+ * the position of the byte of value 0x01, but we must take care
+ * to do so only if the number of zero bytes has been verified
+ * to be at least hlen+1.
+ *
+ * The loop below counts the number of bytes of value 0x00, and
+ * checks that the next byte has value 0x01, in constant-time.
+ *
+ * - If the initial byte (before the seed) is not 0x00, then
+ * r and s are set to 0, and stay there.
+ * - Value r is 1 until the first non-zero byte is reached
+ * (after the seed); it switches to 0 at that point.
+ * - Value s is set to 1 if and only if the data encountered
+ * at the time of the transition of r from 1 to 0 has value
+ * exactly 0x01.
+ * - Value zlen counts the number of leading bytes of value zero
+ * (after the seed).
+ */
+ r = 1 - ((buf[0] + 0xFF) >> 8);
+ s = 0;
+ zlen = 0;
+ for (u = hlen + 1; u < k; u ++) {
+ uint32_t w, nz;
+
+ w = buf[u];
+
+ /*
+ * nz == 1 only for the first non-zero byte.
+ */
+ nz = r & ((w + 0xFF) >> 8);
+ s |= nz & EQ(w, 0x01);
+ r &= NOT(nz);
+ zlen += r;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Padding is correct only if s == 1, _and_ zlen >= hlen.
+ */
+ s &= GE(zlen, (uint32_t)hlen);
+
+ /*
+ * At that point, padding was verified, and we are now allowed
+ * to make conditional jumps.
+ */
+ if (s) {
+ size_t plen;
+
+ plen = 2 + hlen + zlen;
+ k -= plen;
+ memmove(buf, buf + plen, k);
+ *len = k;
+ }
+ return s;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_pkcs1_sig_pad.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_pkcs1_sig_pad.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06c3bd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_pkcs1_sig_pad.c
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_pkcs1_sig_pad(const unsigned char *hash_oid,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ uint32_t n_bitlen, unsigned char *x)
+{
+ size_t u, x3, xlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Padded hash value has format:
+ * 00 01 FF .. FF 00 30 x1 30 x2 06 x3 OID 05 00 04 x4 HASH
+ *
+ * with the following rules:
+ *
+ * -- Total length is equal to the modulus length (unsigned
+ * encoding).
+ *
+ * -- There must be at least eight bytes of value 0xFF.
+ *
+ * -- x4 is equal to the hash length (hash_len).
+ *
+ * -- x3 is equal to the encoded OID value length (hash_oid[0]).
+ *
+ * -- x2 = x3 + 4.
+ *
+ * -- x1 = x2 + x4 + 4 = x3 + x4 + 8.
+ *
+ * Note: the "05 00" is optional (signatures with and without
+ * that sequence exist in practice), but notes in PKCS#1 seem to
+ * indicate that the presence of that sequence (specifically,
+ * an ASN.1 NULL value for the hash parameters) may be slightly
+ * more "standard" than the opposite.
+ */
+ xlen = (n_bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+
+ if (hash_oid == NULL) {
+ if (xlen < hash_len + 11) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ x[0] = 0x00;
+ x[1] = 0x01;
+ u = xlen - hash_len;
+ memset(x + 2, 0xFF, u - 3);
+ x[u - 1] = 0x00;
+ } else {
+ x3 = hash_oid[0];
+
+ /*
+ * Check that there is enough room for all the elements,
+ * including at least eight bytes of value 0xFF.
+ */
+ if (xlen < (x3 + hash_len + 21)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ x[0] = 0x00;
+ x[1] = 0x01;
+ u = xlen - x3 - hash_len - 11;
+ memset(x + 2, 0xFF, u - 2);
+ x[u] = 0x00;
+ x[u + 1] = 0x30;
+ x[u + 2] = x3 + hash_len + 8;
+ x[u + 3] = 0x30;
+ x[u + 4] = x3 + 4;
+ x[u + 5] = 0x06;
+ memcpy(x + u + 6, hash_oid, x3 + 1);
+ u += x3 + 7;
+ x[u ++] = 0x05;
+ x[u ++] = 0x00;
+ x[u ++] = 0x04;
+ x[u ++] = hash_len;
+ }
+ memcpy(x + u, hash, hash_len);
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_pkcs1_sig_unpad.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_pkcs1_sig_unpad.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c8ae08f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_pkcs1_sig_unpad.c
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_pkcs1_sig_unpad(const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
+ const unsigned char *hash_oid, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *hash_out)
+{
+ static const unsigned char pad1[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF
+ };
+
+ unsigned char pad2[43];
+ size_t u, x2, x3, pad_len, zlen;
+
+ if (sig_len < 11) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Expected format:
+ * 00 01 FF ... FF 00 30 x1 30 x2 06 x3 OID [ 05 00 ] 04 x4 HASH
+ *
+ * with the following rules:
+ *
+ * -- Total length is that of the modulus and the signature
+ * (this was already verified by br_rsa_i31_public()).
+ *
+ * -- There are at least eight bytes of value 0xFF.
+ *
+ * -- x4 is equal to the hash length (hash_len).
+ *
+ * -- x3 is equal to the encoded OID value length (so x3 is the
+ * first byte of hash_oid[]).
+ *
+ * -- If the "05 00" is present, then x2 == x3 + 4; otherwise,
+ * x2 == x3 + 2.
+ *
+ * -- x1 == x2 + x4 + 4.
+ *
+ * So the total length after the last "FF" is either x3 + x4 + 11
+ * (with the "05 00") or x3 + x4 + 9 (without the "05 00").
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Check the "00 01 FF .. FF 00" with at least eight 0xFF bytes.
+ * The comparison is valid because we made sure that the signature
+ * is at least 11 bytes long.
+ */
+ if (memcmp(sig, pad1, sizeof pad1) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (u = sizeof pad1; u < sig_len; u ++) {
+ if (sig[u] != 0xFF) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Remaining length is sig_len - u bytes (including the 00 just
+ * after the last FF). This must be equal to one of the two
+ * possible values (depending on whether the "05 00" sequence is
+ * present or not).
+ */
+ if (hash_oid == NULL) {
+ if (sig_len - u != hash_len + 1 || sig[u] != 0x00) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ x3 = hash_oid[0];
+ pad_len = x3 + 9;
+ memset(pad2, 0, pad_len);
+ zlen = sig_len - u - hash_len;
+ if (zlen == pad_len) {
+ x2 = x3 + 2;
+ } else if (zlen == pad_len + 2) {
+ x2 = x3 + 4;
+ pad_len = zlen;
+ pad2[pad_len - 4] = 0x05;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pad2[1] = 0x30;
+ pad2[2] = x2 + hash_len + 4;
+ pad2[3] = 0x30;
+ pad2[4] = x2;
+ pad2[5] = 0x06;
+ memcpy(pad2 + 6, hash_oid, x3 + 1);
+ pad2[pad_len - 2] = 0x04;
+ pad2[pad_len - 1] = hash_len;
+ if (memcmp(pad2, sig + u, pad_len) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(hash_out, sig + sig_len - hash_len, hash_len);
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_pss_sig_pad.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_pss_sig_pad.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..13e9027
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_pss_sig_pad.c
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_pss_sig_pad(const br_prng_class **rng,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_data, const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t salt_len,
+ uint32_t n_bitlen, unsigned char *x)
+{
+ size_t xlen, hash_len;
+ br_hash_compat_context hc;
+ unsigned char *salt, *seed;
+
+ hash_len = br_digest_size(hf_data);
+
+ /*
+ * The padded string is one bit smaller than the modulus;
+ * notably, if the modulus length is equal to 1 modulo 8, then
+ * the padded string will be one _byte_ smaller, and the first
+ * byte will be set to 0. We apply these transformations here.
+ */
+ n_bitlen --;
+ if ((n_bitlen & 7) == 0) {
+ *x ++ = 0;
+ }
+ xlen = (n_bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the modulus is large enough for the hash value
+ * length combined with the intended salt length.
+ */
+ if (hash_len > xlen || salt_len > xlen
+ || (hash_len + salt_len + 2) > xlen)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Produce a random salt.
+ */
+ salt = x + xlen - hash_len - salt_len - 1;
+ if (salt_len != 0) {
+ (*rng)->generate(rng, salt, salt_len);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the seed for MGF1.
+ */
+ seed = x + xlen - hash_len - 1;
+ hf_data->init(&hc.vtable);
+ memset(seed, 0, 8);
+ hf_data->update(&hc.vtable, seed, 8);
+ hf_data->update(&hc.vtable, hash, hash_len);
+ hf_data->update(&hc.vtable, salt, salt_len);
+ hf_data->out(&hc.vtable, seed);
+
+ /*
+ * Prepare string PS (padded salt). The salt is already at the
+ * right place.
+ */
+ memset(x, 0, xlen - salt_len - hash_len - 2);
+ x[xlen - salt_len - hash_len - 2] = 0x01;
+
+ /*
+ * Generate the mask and XOR it into PS.
+ */
+ br_mgf1_xor(x, xlen - hash_len - 1, hf_mgf1, seed, hash_len);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the top bits to ensure the value is lower than the
+ * modulus.
+ */
+ x[0] &= 0xFF >> (((uint32_t)xlen << 3) - n_bitlen);
+
+ /*
+ * The seed (H) is already in the right place. We just set the
+ * last byte.
+ */
+ x[xlen - 1] = 0xBC;
+
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_pss_sig_unpad.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_pss_sig_unpad.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c6ae99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_pss_sig_unpad.c
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_pss_sig_unpad(const br_hash_class *hf_data,
+ const br_hash_class *hf_mgf1,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t salt_len,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk, unsigned char *x)
+{
+ size_t u, xlen, hash_len;
+ br_hash_compat_context hc;
+ unsigned char *seed, *salt;
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+ uint32_t r, n_bitlen;
+
+ hash_len = br_digest_size(hf_data);
+
+ /*
+ * Value r will be set to a non-zero value is any test fails.
+ */
+ r = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * The value bit length (as an integer) must be strictly less than
+ * that of the modulus.
+ */
+ for (u = 0; u < pk->nlen; u ++) {
+ if (pk->n[u] != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (u == pk->nlen) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ n_bitlen = BIT_LENGTH(pk->n[u]) + ((uint32_t)(pk->nlen - u - 1) << 3);
+ n_bitlen --;
+ if ((n_bitlen & 7) == 0) {
+ r |= *x ++;
+ } else {
+ r |= x[0] & (0xFF << (n_bitlen & 7));
+ }
+ xlen = (n_bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the modulus is large enough for the hash value
+ * length combined with the intended salt length.
+ */
+ if (hash_len > xlen || salt_len > xlen
+ || (hash_len + salt_len + 2) > xlen)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check value of rightmost byte.
+ */
+ r |= x[xlen - 1] ^ 0xBC;
+
+ /*
+ * Generate the mask and XOR it into the first bytes to reveal PS;
+ * we must also mask out the leading bits.
+ */
+ seed = x + xlen - hash_len - 1;
+ br_mgf1_xor(x, xlen - hash_len - 1, hf_mgf1, seed, hash_len);
+ if ((n_bitlen & 7) != 0) {
+ x[0] &= 0xFF >> (8 - (n_bitlen & 7));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check that all padding bytes have the expected value.
+ */
+ for (u = 0; u < (xlen - hash_len - salt_len - 2); u ++) {
+ r |= x[u];
+ }
+ r |= x[xlen - hash_len - salt_len - 2] ^ 0x01;
+
+ /*
+ * Recompute H.
+ */
+ salt = x + xlen - hash_len - salt_len - 1;
+ hf_data->init(&hc.vtable);
+ memset(tmp, 0, 8);
+ hf_data->update(&hc.vtable, tmp, 8);
+ hf_data->update(&hc.vtable, hash, hash_len);
+ hf_data->update(&hc.vtable, salt, salt_len);
+ hf_data->out(&hc.vtable, tmp);
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the recomputed H value matches the one appearing
+ * in the string.
+ */
+ for (u = 0; u < hash_len; u ++) {
+ r |= tmp[u] ^ x[(xlen - hash_len - 1) + u];
+ }
+
+ return EQ0(r);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_ssl_decrypt.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_ssl_decrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..047eb18
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/rsa/rsa_ssl_decrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_rsa.h */
+uint32_t
+br_rsa_ssl_decrypt(br_rsa_private core, const br_rsa_private_key *sk,
+ unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+ uint32_t x;
+ size_t u;
+
+ /*
+ * A first check on length. Since this test works only on the
+ * buffer length, it needs not (and cannot) be constant-time.
+ */
+ if (len < 59 || len != (sk->n_bitlen + 7) >> 3) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ x = core(data, sk);
+
+ x &= EQ(data[0], 0x00);
+ x &= EQ(data[1], 0x02);
+ for (u = 2; u < (len - 49); u ++) {
+ x &= NEQ(data[u], 0);
+ }
+ x &= EQ(data[len - 49], 0x00);
+ memmove(data, data + len - 48, 48);
+ return x;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/settings.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/settings.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..309271c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/settings.c
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static const br_config_option config[] = {
+ { "BR_64",
+#if BR_64
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_AES_X86NI",
+#if BR_AES_X86NI
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_amd64",
+#if BR_amd64
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_ARMEL_CORTEXM_GCC",
+#if BR_ARMEL_CORTEXM_GCC
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_BE_UNALIGNED",
+#if BR_BE_UNALIGNED
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_CLANG",
+#if BR_CLANG
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_CLANG_3_7",
+#if BR_CLANG_3_7
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_CLANG_3_8",
+#if BR_CLANG_3_8
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_CT_MUL15",
+#if BR_CT_MUL15
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_CT_MUL31",
+#if BR_CT_MUL31
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_GCC",
+#if BR_GCC
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_GCC_4_4",
+#if BR_GCC_4_4
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_GCC_4_5",
+#if BR_GCC_4_5
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_GCC_4_6",
+#if BR_GCC_4_6
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_GCC_4_7",
+#if BR_GCC_4_7
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_GCC_4_8",
+#if BR_GCC_4_8
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_GCC_4_9",
+#if BR_GCC_4_9
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_GCC_5_0",
+#if BR_GCC_5_0
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_i386",
+#if BR_i386
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_INT128",
+#if BR_INT128
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_LE_UNALIGNED",
+#if BR_LE_UNALIGNED
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_LOMUL",
+#if BR_LOMUL
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_MAX_EC_SIZE", BR_MAX_EC_SIZE },
+ { "BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE", BR_MAX_RSA_SIZE },
+ { "BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR", BR_MAX_RSA_FACTOR },
+ { "BR_MSC",
+#if BR_MSC
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_MSC_2005",
+#if BR_MSC_2005
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_MSC_2008",
+#if BR_MSC_2008
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_MSC_2010",
+#if BR_MSC_2010
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_MSC_2012",
+#if BR_MSC_2012
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_MSC_2013",
+#if BR_MSC_2013
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_MSC_2015",
+#if BR_MSC_2015
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_POWER8",
+#if BR_POWER8
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_RDRAND",
+#if BR_RDRAND
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_SLOW_MUL",
+#if BR_SLOW_MUL
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_SLOW_MUL15",
+#if BR_SLOW_MUL15
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_SSE2",
+#if BR_SSE2
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_UMUL128",
+#if BR_UMUL128
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_USE_UNIX_TIME",
+#if BR_USE_UNIX_TIME
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_USE_WIN32_RAND",
+#if BR_USE_WIN32_RAND
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+ { "BR_USE_WIN32_TIME",
+#if BR_USE_WIN32_TIME
+ 1
+#else
+ 0
+#endif
+ },
+
+ { NULL, 0 }
+};
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+const br_config_option *
+br_get_config(void)
+{
+ return config;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/prf.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/prf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f04a5fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/prf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_tls_phash(void *dst, size_t len,
+ const br_hash_class *dig,
+ const void *secret, size_t secret_len, const char *label,
+ size_t seed_num, const br_tls_prf_seed_chunk *seed)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char tmp[64], a[64];
+ br_hmac_key_context kc;
+ br_hmac_context hc;
+ size_t label_len, hlen, u;
+
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ buf = dst;
+ for (label_len = 0; label[label_len]; label_len ++);
+ hlen = br_digest_size(dig);
+ br_hmac_key_init(&kc, dig, secret, secret_len);
+ br_hmac_init(&hc, &kc, 0);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, label, label_len);
+ for (u = 0; u < seed_num; u ++) {
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, seed[u].data, seed[u].len);
+ }
+ br_hmac_out(&hc, a);
+ for (;;) {
+ br_hmac_init(&hc, &kc, 0);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, a, hlen);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, label, label_len);
+ for (u = 0; u < seed_num; u ++) {
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, seed[u].data, seed[u].len);
+ }
+ br_hmac_out(&hc, tmp);
+ for (u = 0; u < hlen && u < len; u ++) {
+ buf[u] ^= tmp[u];
+ }
+ buf += u;
+ len -= u;
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ br_hmac_init(&hc, &kc, 0);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, a, hlen);
+ br_hmac_out(&hc, a);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/prf_md5sha1.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/prf_md5sha1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3212833
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/prf_md5sha1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_tls10_prf(void *dst, size_t len,
+ const void *secret, size_t secret_len, const char *label,
+ size_t seed_num, const br_tls_prf_seed_chunk *seed)
+{
+ const unsigned char *s1;
+ size_t slen;
+
+ s1 = secret;
+ slen = (secret_len + 1) >> 1;
+ memset(dst, 0, len);
+ br_tls_phash(dst, len, &br_md5_vtable,
+ s1, slen, label, seed_num, seed);
+ br_tls_phash(dst, len, &br_sha1_vtable,
+ s1 + secret_len - slen, slen, label, seed_num, seed);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/prf_sha256.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/prf_sha256.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..76041de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/prf_sha256.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_tls12_sha256_prf(void *dst, size_t len,
+ const void *secret, size_t secret_len, const char *label,
+ size_t seed_num, const br_tls_prf_seed_chunk *seed)
+{
+ memset(dst, 0, len);
+ br_tls_phash(dst, len, &br_sha256_vtable,
+ secret, secret_len, label, seed_num, seed);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/prf_sha384.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/prf_sha384.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c20c4e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/prf_sha384.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_tls12_sha384_prf(void *dst, size_t len,
+ const void *secret, size_t secret_len, const char *label,
+ size_t seed_num, const br_tls_prf_seed_chunk *seed)
+{
+ memset(dst, 0, len);
+ br_tls_phash(dst, len, &br_sha384_vtable,
+ secret, secret_len, label, seed_num, seed);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_ccert_single_ec.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_ccert_single_ec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e1e54f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_ccert_single_ec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static void
+cc_none0(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx)
+{
+ (void)pctx;
+}
+
+static void
+cc_none1(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx, size_t len)
+{
+ (void)pctx;
+ (void)len;
+}
+
+static void
+cc_none2(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+ (void)pctx;
+ (void)data;
+ (void)len;
+}
+
+static void
+cc_choose(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx,
+ const br_ssl_client_context *cc, uint32_t auth_types,
+ br_ssl_client_certificate *choices)
+{
+ br_ssl_client_certificate_ec_context *zc;
+ int x;
+ int scurve;
+
+ zc = (br_ssl_client_certificate_ec_context *)pctx;
+ scurve = br_ssl_client_get_server_curve(cc);
+
+ if ((zc->allowed_usages & BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX) != 0
+ && scurve == zc->sk->curve)
+ {
+ int x;
+
+ x = (zc->issuer_key_type == BR_KEYTYPE_RSA) ? 16 : 17;
+ if (((auth_types >> x) & 1) != 0) {
+ choices->auth_type = BR_AUTH_ECDH;
+ choices->hash_id = -1;
+ choices->chain = zc->chain;
+ choices->chain_len = zc->chain_len;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For ECDSA authentication, we must choose an appropriate
+ * hash function.
+ */
+ x = br_ssl_choose_hash((unsigned)(auth_types >> 8));
+ if (x == 0 || (zc->allowed_usages & BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN) == 0) {
+ memset(choices, 0, sizeof *choices);
+ return;
+ }
+ choices->auth_type = BR_AUTH_ECDSA;
+ choices->hash_id = x;
+ choices->chain = zc->chain;
+ choices->chain_len = zc->chain_len;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+cc_do_keyx(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx,
+ unsigned char *data, size_t *len)
+{
+ br_ssl_client_certificate_ec_context *zc;
+ uint32_t r;
+ size_t xoff, xlen;
+
+ zc = (br_ssl_client_certificate_ec_context *)pctx;
+ r = zc->iec->mul(data, *len, zc->sk->x, zc->sk->xlen, zc->sk->curve);
+ xoff = zc->iec->xoff(zc->sk->curve, &xlen);
+ memmove(data, data + xoff, xlen);
+ *len = xlen;
+ return r;
+}
+
+static size_t
+cc_do_sign(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx,
+ int hash_id, size_t hv_len, unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+ br_ssl_client_certificate_ec_context *zc;
+ unsigned char hv[64];
+ const br_hash_class *hc;
+
+ zc = (br_ssl_client_certificate_ec_context *)pctx;
+ memcpy(hv, data, hv_len);
+ hc = br_multihash_getimpl(zc->mhash, hash_id);
+ if (hc == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (len < 139) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return zc->iecdsa(zc->iec, hc, hv, zc->sk, data);
+}
+
+static const br_ssl_client_certificate_class ccert_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_ssl_client_certificate_ec_context),
+ cc_none0, /* start_name_list */
+ cc_none1, /* start_name */
+ cc_none2, /* append_name */
+ cc_none0, /* end_name */
+ cc_none0, /* end_name_list */
+ cc_choose,
+ cc_do_keyx,
+ cc_do_sign
+};
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_client_set_single_ec(br_ssl_client_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, unsigned allowed_usages,
+ unsigned cert_issuer_key_type,
+ const br_ec_impl *iec, br_ecdsa_sign iecdsa)
+{
+ cc->client_auth.single_ec.vtable = &ccert_vtable;
+ cc->client_auth.single_ec.chain = chain;
+ cc->client_auth.single_ec.chain_len = chain_len;
+ cc->client_auth.single_ec.sk = sk;
+ cc->client_auth.single_ec.allowed_usages = allowed_usages;
+ cc->client_auth.single_ec.issuer_key_type = cert_issuer_key_type;
+ cc->client_auth.single_ec.mhash = &cc->eng.mhash;
+ cc->client_auth.single_ec.iec = iec;
+ cc->client_auth.single_ec.iecdsa = iecdsa;
+ cc->client_auth_vtable = &cc->client_auth.single_ec.vtable;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_ccert_single_rsa.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_ccert_single_rsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..690df20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_ccert_single_rsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static void
+cc_none0(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx)
+{
+ (void)pctx;
+}
+
+static void
+cc_none1(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx, size_t len)
+{
+ (void)pctx;
+ (void)len;
+}
+
+static void
+cc_none2(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+ (void)pctx;
+ (void)data;
+ (void)len;
+}
+
+static void
+cc_choose(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx,
+ const br_ssl_client_context *cc, uint32_t auth_types,
+ br_ssl_client_certificate *choices)
+{
+ br_ssl_client_certificate_rsa_context *zc;
+ int x;
+
+ (void)cc;
+ zc = (br_ssl_client_certificate_rsa_context *)pctx;
+ x = br_ssl_choose_hash((unsigned)auth_types);
+ if (x == 0 && (auth_types & 1) == 0) {
+ memset(choices, 0, sizeof *choices);
+ }
+ choices->auth_type = BR_AUTH_RSA;
+ choices->hash_id = x;
+ choices->chain = zc->chain;
+ choices->chain_len = zc->chain_len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * OID for hash functions in RSA signatures.
+ */
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA1[] = {
+ 0x05, 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A
+};
+
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA224[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04
+};
+
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA256[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01
+};
+
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA384[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02
+};
+
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA512[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03
+};
+
+static const unsigned char *HASH_OID[] = {
+ HASH_OID_SHA1,
+ HASH_OID_SHA224,
+ HASH_OID_SHA256,
+ HASH_OID_SHA384,
+ HASH_OID_SHA512
+};
+
+static size_t
+cc_do_sign(const br_ssl_client_certificate_class **pctx,
+ int hash_id, size_t hv_len, unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+ br_ssl_client_certificate_rsa_context *zc;
+ unsigned char hv[64];
+ const unsigned char *hash_oid;
+ size_t sig_len;
+
+ zc = (br_ssl_client_certificate_rsa_context *)pctx;
+ memcpy(hv, data, hv_len);
+ if (hash_id == 0) {
+ hash_oid = NULL;
+ } else if (hash_id >= 2 && hash_id <= 6) {
+ hash_oid = HASH_OID[hash_id - 2];
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sig_len = (zc->sk->n_bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+ if (len < sig_len) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return zc->irsasign(hash_oid, hv, hv_len, zc->sk, data) ? sig_len : 0;
+}
+
+static const br_ssl_client_certificate_class ccert_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_ssl_client_certificate_rsa_context),
+ cc_none0, /* start_name_list */
+ cc_none1, /* start_name */
+ cc_none2, /* append_name */
+ cc_none0, /* end_name */
+ cc_none0, /* end_name_list */
+ cc_choose,
+ 0,
+ cc_do_sign
+};
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_client_set_single_rsa(br_ssl_client_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, br_rsa_pkcs1_sign irsasign)
+{
+ cc->client_auth.single_rsa.vtable = &ccert_vtable;
+ cc->client_auth.single_rsa.chain = chain;
+ cc->client_auth.single_rsa.chain_len = chain_len;
+ cc->client_auth.single_rsa.sk = sk;
+ cc->client_auth.single_rsa.irsasign = irsasign;
+ cc->client_auth_vtable = &cc->client_auth.single_rsa.vtable;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_client.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_client.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..28c404b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_client.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_client_zero(br_ssl_client_context *cc)
+{
+ /*
+ * For really standard C, we should explicitly set to NULL all
+ * pointers, and 0 all other fields. However, on all our target
+ * architectures, a direct memset() will work, be faster, and
+ * use a lot less code.
+ */
+ memset(cc, 0, sizeof *cc);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+int
+br_ssl_client_reset(br_ssl_client_context *cc,
+ const char *server_name, int resume_session)
+{
+ size_t n;
+
+ br_ssl_engine_set_buffer(&cc->eng, NULL, 0, 0);
+ cc->eng.version_out = cc->eng.version_min;
+ if (!resume_session) {
+ br_ssl_client_forget_session(cc);
+ }
+ if (!br_ssl_engine_init_rand(&cc->eng)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We always set back the "reneg" flag to 0 because we use it
+ * to distinguish between first handshake and renegotiation.
+ * Note that "renegotiation" and "session resumption" are two
+ * different things.
+ */
+ cc->eng.reneg = 0;
+
+ if (server_name == NULL) {
+ cc->eng.server_name[0] = 0;
+ } else {
+ n = strlen(server_name) + 1;
+ if (n > sizeof cc->eng.server_name) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(&cc->eng, BR_ERR_BAD_PARAM);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(cc->eng.server_name, server_name, n);
+ }
+
+ br_ssl_engine_hs_reset(&cc->eng,
+ br_ssl_hs_client_init_main, br_ssl_hs_client_run);
+ return br_ssl_engine_last_error(&cc->eng) == BR_ERR_OK;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_client_default_rsapub.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_client_default_rsapub.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2cdaab8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_client_default_rsapub.c
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_client_set_default_rsapub(br_ssl_client_context *cc)
+{
+ br_ssl_client_set_rsapub(cc, br_rsa_public_get_default());
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_client_full.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_client_full.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9814349
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_client_full.c
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_client_init_full(br_ssl_client_context *cc,
+ br_x509_minimal_context *xc,
+ const br_x509_trust_anchor *trust_anchors, size_t trust_anchors_num)
+{
+ /*
+ * The "full" profile supports all implemented cipher suites.
+ *
+ * Rationale for suite order, from most important to least
+ * important rule:
+ *
+ * -- Don't use 3DES if AES or ChaCha20 is available.
+ * -- Try to have Forward Secrecy (ECDHE suite) if possible.
+ * -- When not using Forward Secrecy, ECDH key exchange is
+ * better than RSA key exchange (slightly more expensive on the
+ * client, but much cheaper on the server, and it implies smaller
+ * messages).
+ * -- ChaCha20+Poly1305 is better than AES/GCM (faster, smaller code).
+ * -- GCM is better than CCM and CBC. CCM is better than CBC.
+ * -- CCM is preferable over CCM_8 (with CCM_8, forgeries may succeed
+ * with probability 2^(-64)).
+ * -- AES-128 is preferred over AES-256 (AES-128 is already
+ * strong enough, and AES-256 is 40% more expensive).
+ */
+ static const uint16_t suites[] = {
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * All hash functions are activated.
+ * Note: the X.509 validation engine will nonetheless refuse to
+ * validate signatures that use MD5 as hash function.
+ */
+ static const br_hash_class *hashes[] = {
+ &br_md5_vtable,
+ &br_sha1_vtable,
+ &br_sha224_vtable,
+ &br_sha256_vtable,
+ &br_sha384_vtable,
+ &br_sha512_vtable
+ };
+
+ int id;
+
+ /*
+ * Reset client context and set supported versions from TLS-1.0
+ * to TLS-1.2 (inclusive).
+ */
+ br_ssl_client_zero(cc);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_versions(&cc->eng, BR_TLS10, BR_TLS12);
+
+ /*
+ * X.509 engine uses SHA-256 to hash certificate DN (for
+ * comparisons).
+ */
+ br_x509_minimal_init(xc, &br_sha256_vtable,
+ trust_anchors, trust_anchors_num);
+
+ /*
+ * Set suites and asymmetric crypto implementations. We use the
+ * "i31" code for RSA (it is somewhat faster than the "i32"
+ * implementation).
+ * TODO: change that when better implementations are made available.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_suites(&cc->eng, suites,
+ (sizeof suites) / (sizeof suites[0]));
+ br_ssl_client_set_default_rsapub(cc);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_rsavrfy(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_ecdsa(&cc->eng);
+ br_x509_minimal_set_rsa(xc, br_ssl_engine_get_rsavrfy(&cc->eng));
+ br_x509_minimal_set_ecdsa(xc,
+ br_ssl_engine_get_ec(&cc->eng),
+ br_ssl_engine_get_ecdsa(&cc->eng));
+
+ /*
+ * Set supported hash functions, for the SSL engine and for the
+ * X.509 engine.
+ */
+ for (id = br_md5_ID; id <= br_sha512_ID; id ++) {
+ const br_hash_class *hc;
+
+ hc = hashes[id - 1];
+ br_ssl_engine_set_hash(&cc->eng, id, hc);
+ br_x509_minimal_set_hash(xc, id, hc);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Link the X.509 engine in the SSL engine.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_x509(&cc->eng, &xc->vtable);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the PRF implementations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_prf10(&cc->eng, &br_tls10_prf);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_prf_sha256(&cc->eng, &br_tls12_sha256_prf);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_prf_sha384(&cc->eng, &br_tls12_sha384_prf);
+
+ /*
+ * Symmetric encryption. We use the "default" implementations
+ * (fastest among constant-time implementations).
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_cbc(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_ccm(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_gcm(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_des_cbc(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_chapol(&cc->eng);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f59fe1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1584 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if 0
+/* obsolete */
+
+/*
+ * If BR_USE_URANDOM is not defined, then try to autodetect its presence
+ * through compiler macros.
+ */
+#ifndef BR_USE_URANDOM
+
+/*
+ * Macro values documented on:
+ * https://sourceforge.net/p/predef/wiki/OperatingSystems/
+ *
+ * Only the most common systems have been included here for now. This
+ * should be enriched later on.
+ */
+#if defined _AIX \
+ || defined __ANDROID__ \
+ || defined __FreeBSD__ \
+ || defined __NetBSD__ \
+ || defined __OpenBSD__ \
+ || defined __DragonFly__ \
+ || defined __linux__ \
+ || (defined __sun && (defined __SVR4 || defined __svr4__)) \
+ || (defined __APPLE__ && defined __MACH__)
+#define BR_USE_URANDOM 1
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * If BR_USE_WIN32_RAND is not defined, perform autodetection here.
+ */
+#ifndef BR_USE_WIN32_RAND
+
+#if defined _WIN32 || defined _WIN64
+#define BR_USE_WIN32_RAND 1
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
+#if BR_USE_URANDOM
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#endif
+
+#if BR_USE_WIN32_RAND
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <wincrypt.h>
+#pragma comment(lib, "advapi32")
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+/*
+ * This part of the file does the low-level record management.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * IMPLEMENTATION NOTES
+ * ====================
+ *
+ * In this file, we designate by "input" (and the "i" letter) the "recv"
+ * operations: incoming records from the peer, from which payload data
+ * is obtained, and must be extracted by the application (or the SSL
+ * handshake engine). Similarly, "output" (and the "o" letter) is for
+ * "send": payload data injected by the application (and SSL handshake
+ * engine), to be wrapped into records, that are then conveyed to the
+ * peer over the transport medium.
+ *
+ * The input and output buffers may be distinct or shared. When
+ * shared, input and output cannot occur concurrently; the caller
+ * must make sure that it never needs to output data while input
+ * data has been received. In practice, a shared buffer prevents
+ * pipelining of HTTP requests, or similar protocols; however, a
+ * shared buffer saves RAM.
+ *
+ * The input buffer is pointed to by 'ibuf' and has size 'ibuf_len';
+ * the output buffer is pointed to by 'obuf' and has size 'obuf_len'.
+ * From the size of these buffers is derived the maximum fragment
+ * length, which will be honoured upon sending records; regardless of
+ * that length, incoming records will be processed as long as they
+ * fit in the input buffer, and their length still complies with the
+ * protocol specification (maximum plaintext payload length is 16384
+ * bytes).
+ *
+ * Three registers are used to manage buffering in ibuf, called ixa,
+ * ixb and ixc. Similarly, three registers are used to manage buffering
+ * in obuf, called oxa, oxb and oxc.
+ *
+ *
+ * At any time, the engine is in one of the following modes:
+ * -- Failed mode: an error occurs, no I/O can happen.
+ * -- Input mode: the engine can either receive record bytes from the
+ * transport layer, or it has some buffered payload bytes to yield.
+ * -- Output mode: the engine can either receive payload bytes, or it
+ * has some record bytes to send to the transport layer.
+ * -- Input/Output mode: both input and output modes are active. When
+ * the buffer is shared, this can happen only when the buffer is empty
+ * (no buffered payload bytes or record bytes in either direction).
+ *
+ *
+ * Failed mode:
+ * ------------
+ *
+ * I/O failed for some reason (invalid received data, not enough room
+ * for the next record...). No I/O may ever occur again for this context,
+ * until an explicit reset is performed. This mode, and the error code,
+ * are also used for protocol errors, especially handshake errors.
+ *
+ *
+ * Input mode:
+ * -----------
+ *
+ * ixa index within ibuf[] for the currently read data
+ * ixb maximum index within ibuf[] for the currently read data
+ * ixc number of bytes not yet received for the current record
+ *
+ * -- When ixa == ixb, there is no available data for readers. When
+ * ixa != ixb, there is available data and it starts at offset ixa.
+ *
+ * -- When waiting for the next record header, ixa and ixb are equal
+ * and contain a value ranging from 0 to 4; ixc is equal to 5-ixa.
+ *
+ * -- When the header has been received, record data is obtained. The
+ * ixc field records how many bytes are still needed to reach the
+ * end of the current record.
+ *
+ * ** If encryption is active, then ixa and ixb are kept equal, and
+ * point to the end of the currently received record bytes. When
+ * ixc reaches 0, decryption/MAC is applied, and ixa and ixb are
+ * adjusted.
+ *
+ * ** If encryption is not active, then ixa and ixb are distinct
+ * and data can be read right away. Additional record data is
+ * obtained only when ixa == ixb.
+ *
+ * Note: in input mode and no encryption, records larger than the buffer
+ * size are allowed. When encryption is active, the complete record must
+ * fit within the buffer, since it cannot be decrypted/MACed until it
+ * has been completely received.
+ *
+ * -- When receiving the next record header, 'version_in' contains the
+ * expected input version (0 if not expecting a specific version); on
+ * mismatch, the mode switches to 'failed'.
+ *
+ * -- When the header has been received, 'version_in' contains the received
+ * version. It is up to the caller to check and adjust the 'version_in' field
+ * to implement the required semantics.
+ *
+ * -- The 'record_type_in' field is updated with the incoming record type
+ * when the next record header has been received.
+ *
+ *
+ * Output mode:
+ * ------------
+ *
+ * oxa index within obuf[] for the currently accumulated data
+ * oxb maximum index within obuf[] for record data
+ * oxc pointer for start of record data, and for record sending
+ *
+ * -- When oxa != oxb, more data can be accumulated into the current
+ * record; when oxa == oxb, a closed record is being sent.
+ *
+ * -- When accumulating data, oxc points to the start of the data.
+ *
+ * -- During record sending, oxa (and oxb) point to the next record byte
+ * to send, and oxc indicates the end of the current record.
+ *
+ * Note: sent records must fit within the buffer, since the header is
+ * adjusted only when the complete record has been assembled.
+ *
+ * -- The 'version_out' and 'record_type_out' fields are used to build the
+ * record header when the mode is switched to 'sending'.
+ *
+ *
+ * Modes:
+ * ------
+ *
+ * The state register iomode contains one of the following values:
+ *
+ * BR_IO_FAILED I/O failed
+ * BR_IO_IN input mode
+ * BR_IO_OUT output mode
+ * BR_IO_INOUT input/output mode
+ *
+ * Whether encryption is active on incoming records is indicated by the
+ * incrypt flag. For outgoing records, there is no such flag; "encryption"
+ * is always considered active, but initially uses functions that do not
+ * encrypt anything. The 'incrypt' flag is needed because when there is
+ * no active encryption, records larger than the I/O buffer are accepted.
+ *
+ * Note: we do not support no-encryption modes (MAC only).
+ *
+ * TODO: implement GCM support
+ *
+ *
+ * Misc:
+ * -----
+ *
+ * 'max_frag_len' is the maximum plaintext size for an outgoing record.
+ * By default, it is set to the maximum value that fits in the provided
+ * buffers, in the following list: 512, 1024, 2048, 4096, 16384. The
+ * caller may change it if needed, but the new value MUST still fit in
+ * the buffers, and it MUST be one of the list above for compatibility
+ * with the Maximum Fragment Length extension.
+ *
+ * For incoming records, only the total buffer length and current
+ * encryption mode impact the maximum length for incoming records. The
+ * 'max_frag_len' value is still adjusted so that records up to that
+ * length can be both received and sent.
+ *
+ *
+ * Offsets and lengths:
+ * --------------------
+ *
+ * When sending fragments with TLS-1.1+, the maximum overhead is:
+ * 5 bytes for the record header
+ * 16 bytes for the explicit IV
+ * 48 bytes for the MAC (HMAC/SHA-384)
+ * 16 bytes for the padding (AES)
+ * so a total of 85 extra bytes. Note that we support block cipher sizes
+ * up to 16 bytes (AES) and HMAC output sizes up to 48 bytes (SHA-384).
+ *
+ * With TLS-1.0 and CBC mode, we apply a 1/n-1 split, for a maximum
+ * overhead of:
+ * 5 bytes for the first record header
+ * 32 bytes for the first record payload (AES-CBC + HMAC/SHA-1)
+ * 5 bytes for the second record header
+ * 20 bytes for the MAC (HMAC/SHA-1)
+ * 16 bytes for the padding (AES)
+ * -1 byte to account for the payload byte in the first record
+ * so a total of 77 extra bytes at most, less than the 85 bytes above.
+ * Note that with TLS-1.0, the MAC is HMAC with either MD5 or SHA-1, but
+ * no other hash function.
+ *
+ * The implementation does not try to send larger records when the current
+ * encryption mode has less overhead.
+ *
+ * Maximum input record overhead is:
+ * 5 bytes for the record header
+ * 16 bytes for the explicit IV (TLS-1.1+)
+ * 48 bytes for the MAC (HMAC/SHA-384)
+ * 256 bytes for the padding
+ * so a total of 325 extra bytes.
+ *
+ * When receiving the next record header, it is written into the buffer
+ * bytes 0 to 4 (inclusive). Record data is always written into buf[]
+ * starting at offset 5. When encryption is active, the plaintext data
+ * may start at a larger offset (e.g. because of an explicit IV).
+ */
+
+#define MAX_OUT_OVERHEAD 85
+#define MAX_IN_OVERHEAD 325
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_fail(br_ssl_engine_context *rc, int err)
+{
+ if (rc->iomode != BR_IO_FAILED) {
+ rc->iomode = BR_IO_FAILED;
+ rc->err = err;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Adjust registers for a new incoming record.
+ */
+static void
+make_ready_in(br_ssl_engine_context *rc)
+{
+ rc->ixa = rc->ixb = 0;
+ rc->ixc = 5;
+ if (rc->iomode == BR_IO_IN) {
+ rc->iomode = BR_IO_INOUT;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Adjust registers for a new outgoing record.
+ */
+static void
+make_ready_out(br_ssl_engine_context *rc)
+{
+ size_t a, b;
+
+ a = 5;
+ b = rc->obuf_len - a;
+ rc->out.vtable->max_plaintext(&rc->out.vtable, &a, &b);
+ if ((b - a) > rc->max_frag_len) {
+ b = a + rc->max_frag_len;
+ }
+ rc->oxa = a;
+ rc->oxb = b;
+ rc->oxc = a;
+ if (rc->iomode == BR_IO_OUT) {
+ rc->iomode = BR_IO_INOUT;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_new_max_frag_len(br_ssl_engine_context *rc, unsigned max_frag_len)
+{
+ size_t nxb;
+
+ rc->max_frag_len = max_frag_len;
+ nxb = rc->oxc + max_frag_len;
+ if (rc->oxa < rc->oxb && rc->oxb > nxb && rc->oxa < nxb) {
+ rc->oxb = nxb;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_set_buffer(br_ssl_engine_context *rc,
+ void *buf, size_t buf_len, int bidi)
+{
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ br_ssl_engine_set_buffers_bidi(rc, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * In bidirectional mode, we want to maximise input
+ * buffer size, since we support arbitrary fragmentation
+ * when sending, but the peer will not necessarily
+ * comply to any low fragment length (in particular if
+ * we are the server, because the maximum fragment
+ * length extension is under client control).
+ *
+ * We keep a minimum size of 512 bytes for the plaintext
+ * of our outgoing records.
+ *
+ * br_ssl_engine_set_buffers_bidi() will compute the maximum
+ * fragment length for outgoing records by using the minimum
+ * of allocated spaces for both input and output records,
+ * rounded down to a standard length.
+ */
+ if (bidi) {
+ size_t w;
+
+ if (buf_len < (512 + MAX_IN_OVERHEAD
+ + 512 + MAX_OUT_OVERHEAD))
+ {
+ rc->iomode = BR_IO_FAILED;
+ rc->err = BR_ERR_BAD_PARAM;
+ return;
+ } else if (buf_len < (16384 + MAX_IN_OVERHEAD
+ + 512 + MAX_OUT_OVERHEAD))
+ {
+ w = 512 + MAX_OUT_OVERHEAD;
+ } else {
+ w = buf_len - (16384 + MAX_IN_OVERHEAD);
+ }
+ br_ssl_engine_set_buffers_bidi(rc,
+ buf, buf_len - w,
+ (unsigned char *)buf + w, w);
+ } else {
+ br_ssl_engine_set_buffers_bidi(rc,
+ buf, buf_len, NULL, 0);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_set_buffers_bidi(br_ssl_engine_context *rc,
+ void *ibuf, size_t ibuf_len, void *obuf, size_t obuf_len)
+{
+ rc->iomode = BR_IO_INOUT;
+ rc->incrypt = 0;
+ rc->err = BR_ERR_OK;
+ rc->version_in = 0;
+ rc->record_type_in = 0;
+ rc->version_out = 0;
+ rc->record_type_out = 0;
+ if (ibuf == NULL) {
+ if (rc->ibuf == NULL) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(rc, BR_ERR_BAD_PARAM);
+ }
+ } else {
+ unsigned u;
+
+ rc->ibuf = ibuf;
+ rc->ibuf_len = ibuf_len;
+ if (obuf == NULL) {
+ obuf = ibuf;
+ obuf_len = ibuf_len;
+ }
+ rc->obuf = obuf;
+ rc->obuf_len = obuf_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the maximum fragment length, that fits for
+ * both incoming and outgoing records. This length will
+ * be used in fragment length negotiation, so we must
+ * honour it both ways. Regardless, larger incoming
+ * records will be accepted, as long as they fit in the
+ * actual buffer size.
+ */
+ for (u = 14; u >= 9; u --) {
+ size_t flen;
+
+ flen = (size_t)1 << u;
+ if (obuf_len >= flen + MAX_OUT_OVERHEAD
+ && ibuf_len >= flen + MAX_IN_OVERHEAD)
+ {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (u == 8) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(rc, BR_ERR_BAD_PARAM);
+ return;
+ } else if (u == 13) {
+ u = 12;
+ }
+ rc->max_frag_len = (size_t)1 << u;
+ rc->log_max_frag_len = u;
+ rc->peer_log_max_frag_len = 0;
+ }
+ rc->out.vtable = &br_sslrec_out_clear_vtable;
+ make_ready_in(rc);
+ make_ready_out(rc);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clear buffers in both directions.
+ */
+static void
+engine_clearbuf(br_ssl_engine_context *rc)
+{
+ make_ready_in(rc);
+ make_ready_out(rc);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make sure the internal PRNG is initialised (but not necessarily
+ * seeded properly yet).
+ */
+static int
+rng_init(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+ const br_hash_class *h;
+
+ if (cc->rng_init_done != 0) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If using TLS-1.2, then SHA-256 or SHA-384 must be present (or
+ * both); we prefer SHA-256 which is faster for 32-bit systems.
+ *
+ * If using TLS-1.0 or 1.1 then SHA-1 must be present.
+ *
+ * Though HMAC_DRBG/SHA-1 is, as far as we know, as safe as
+ * these things can be, we still prefer the SHA-2 functions over
+ * SHA-1, if only for public relations (known theoretical
+ * weaknesses of SHA-1 with regards to collisions are mostly
+ * irrelevant here, but they still make people nervous).
+ */
+ h = br_multihash_getimpl(&cc->mhash, br_sha256_ID);
+ if (!h) {
+ h = br_multihash_getimpl(&cc->mhash, br_sha384_ID);
+ if (!h) {
+ h = br_multihash_getimpl(&cc->mhash,
+ br_sha1_ID);
+ if (!h) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(cc, BR_ERR_BAD_STATE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ br_hmac_drbg_init(&cc->rng, h, NULL, 0);
+ cc->rng_init_done = 1;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+int
+br_ssl_engine_init_rand(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+ if (!rng_init(cc)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We always try OS/hardware seeding once. If it works, then
+ * we assume proper seeding. If not, then external entropy must
+ * have been injected; otherwise, we report an error.
+ */
+ if (!cc->rng_os_rand_done) {
+ br_prng_seeder sd;
+
+ sd = br_prng_seeder_system(NULL);
+ if (sd != 0 && sd(&cc->rng.vtable)) {
+ cc->rng_init_done = 2;
+ }
+ cc->rng_os_rand_done = 1;
+ }
+ if (cc->rng_init_done < 2) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(cc, BR_ERR_NO_RANDOM);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_inject_entropy(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ /*
+ * Externally provided entropy is assumed to be "good enough"
+ * (we cannot really test its quality) so if the RNG structure
+ * could be initialised at all, then we marked the RNG as
+ * "properly seeded".
+ */
+ if (!rng_init(cc)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ br_hmac_drbg_update(&cc->rng, data, len);
+ cc->rng_init_done = 2;
+}
+
+/*
+ * We define a few internal functions that implement the low-level engine
+ * API for I/O; the external API (br_ssl_engine_sendapp_buf() and similar
+ * functions) is built upon these function, with special processing for
+ * records which are not of type "application data".
+ *
+ * recvrec_buf, recvrec_ack receives bytes from transport medium
+ * sendrec_buf, sendrec_ack send bytes to transport medium
+ * recvpld_buf, recvpld_ack receives payload data from engine
+ * sendpld_buf, sendpld_ack send payload data to engine
+ */
+
+static unsigned char *
+recvrec_buf(const br_ssl_engine_context *rc, size_t *len)
+{
+ if (rc->shutdown_recv) {
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Bytes from the transport can be injected only if the mode is
+ * compatible (in or in/out), and ixa == ixb; ixc then contains
+ * the number of bytes that are still expected (but it may
+ * exceed our buffer size).
+ *
+ * We cannot get "stuck" here (buffer is full, but still more
+ * data is expected) because oversized records are detected when
+ * their header is processed.
+ */
+ switch (rc->iomode) {
+ case BR_IO_IN:
+ case BR_IO_INOUT:
+ if (rc->ixa == rc->ixb) {
+ size_t z;
+
+ z = rc->ixc;
+ if (z > rc->ibuf_len - rc->ixa) {
+ z = rc->ibuf_len - rc->ixa;
+ }
+ *len = z;
+ return rc->ibuf + rc->ixa;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+recvrec_ack(br_ssl_engine_context *rc, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *pbuf;
+ size_t pbuf_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Adjust state if necessary (for a shared input/output buffer):
+ * we got some incoming bytes, so we cannot (temporarily) handle
+ * outgoing data.
+ */
+ if (rc->iomode == BR_IO_INOUT && rc->ibuf == rc->obuf) {
+ rc->iomode = BR_IO_IN;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Adjust data pointers.
+ */
+ rc->ixb = (rc->ixa += len);
+ rc->ixc -= len;
+
+ /*
+ * If we are receiving a header and did not fully obtained it
+ * yet, then just wait for the next bytes.
+ */
+ if (rc->ixa < 5) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we just obtained a full header, process it.
+ */
+ if (rc->ixa == 5) {
+ unsigned version;
+ unsigned rlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Get record type and version. We support only versions
+ * 3.x (if the version major number does not match, then
+ * we suppose that the record format is too alien for us
+ * to process it).
+ *
+ * Note: right now, we reject clients that try to send
+ * a ClientHello in a format compatible with SSL-2.0. It
+ * is unclear whether this will ever be supported; and
+ * if we want to support it, then this might be done in
+ * in the server-specific code, not here.
+ */
+ rc->record_type_in = rc->ibuf[0];
+ version = br_dec16be(rc->ibuf + 1);
+ if ((version >> 8) != 3) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(rc, BR_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We ensure that successive records have the same
+ * version. The handshake code must check and adjust the
+ * variables when necessary to accommodate the protocol
+ * negotiation details.
+ */
+ if (rc->version_in != 0 && rc->version_in != version) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(rc, BR_ERR_BAD_VERSION);
+ return;
+ }
+ rc->version_in = version;
+
+ /*
+ * Decode record length. We must check that the length
+ * is valid (relatively to the current encryption mode)
+ * and also (if encryption is active) that the record
+ * will fit in our buffer.
+ *
+ * When no encryption is active, we can process records
+ * by chunks, and thus accept any record up to the
+ * maximum allowed plaintext length (16384 bytes).
+ */
+ rlen = br_dec16be(rc->ibuf + 3);
+ if (rc->incrypt) {
+ if (!rc->in.vtable->check_length(
+ &rc->in.vtable, rlen))
+ {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(rc, BR_ERR_BAD_LENGTH);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (rlen > (rc->ibuf_len - 5)) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(rc, BR_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
+ return;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (rlen > 16384) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(rc, BR_ERR_BAD_LENGTH);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the record is completely empty then we must switch
+ * to a new record. Note that, in that case, we
+ * completely ignore the record type, which is fitting
+ * since we received no actual data of that type.
+ *
+ * A completely empty record is technically allowed as
+ * long as encryption/MAC is not active, i.e. before
+ * completion of the first handshake. It it still weird;
+ * it might conceptually be useful as a heartbeat or
+ * keep-alive mechanism while some lengthy operation is
+ * going on, e.g. interaction with a human user.
+ */
+ if (rlen == 0) {
+ make_ready_in(rc);
+ } else {
+ rc->ixa = rc->ixb = 5;
+ rc->ixc = rlen;
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If there is no active encryption, then the data can be read
+ * right away. Note that we do not receive bytes from the
+ * transport medium when we still have payload bytes to be
+ * acknowledged.
+ */
+ if (!rc->incrypt) {
+ rc->ixa = 5;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Since encryption is active, we must wait for a full record
+ * before processing it.
+ */
+ if (rc->ixc != 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We got the full record. Decrypt it.
+ */
+ pbuf_len = rc->ixa - 5;
+ pbuf = rc->in.vtable->decrypt(&rc->in.vtable,
+ rc->record_type_in, rc->version_in, rc->ibuf + 5, &pbuf_len);
+ if (pbuf == 0) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(rc, BR_ERR_BAD_MAC);
+ return;
+ }
+ rc->ixa = (size_t)(pbuf - rc->ibuf);
+ rc->ixb = rc->ixa + pbuf_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Decryption may have yielded an empty record, in which case
+ * we get back to "ready" state immediately.
+ */
+ if (rc->ixa == rc->ixb) {
+ make_ready_in(rc);
+ }
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+int
+br_ssl_engine_recvrec_finished(const br_ssl_engine_context *rc)
+{
+ switch (rc->iomode) {
+ case BR_IO_IN:
+ case BR_IO_INOUT:
+ return rc->ixc == 0 || rc->ixa < 5;
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+
+static unsigned char *
+recvpld_buf(const br_ssl_engine_context *rc, size_t *len)
+{
+ /*
+ * There is payload data to be read only if the mode is
+ * compatible, and ixa != ixb.
+ */
+ switch (rc->iomode) {
+ case BR_IO_IN:
+ case BR_IO_INOUT:
+ *len = rc->ixb - rc->ixa;
+ return (*len == 0) ? NULL : (rc->ibuf + rc->ixa);
+ default:
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+recvpld_ack(br_ssl_engine_context *rc, size_t len)
+{
+ rc->ixa += len;
+
+ /*
+ * If we read all the available data, then we either expect
+ * the remainder of the current record (if the current record
+ * was not finished; this may happen when encryption is not
+ * active), or go to "ready" state.
+ */
+ if (rc->ixa == rc->ixb) {
+ if (rc->ixc == 0) {
+ make_ready_in(rc);
+ } else {
+ rc->ixa = rc->ixb = 5;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static unsigned char *
+sendpld_buf(const br_ssl_engine_context *rc, size_t *len)
+{
+ /*
+ * Payload data can be injected only if the current mode is
+ * compatible, and oxa != oxb.
+ */
+ switch (rc->iomode) {
+ case BR_IO_OUT:
+ case BR_IO_INOUT:
+ *len = rc->oxb - rc->oxa;
+ return (*len == 0) ? NULL : (rc->obuf + rc->oxa);
+ default:
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * If some payload bytes have been accumulated, then wrap them into
+ * an outgoing record. Otherwise, this function does nothing, unless
+ * 'force' is non-zero, in which case an empty record is assembled.
+ *
+ * The caller must take care not to invoke this function if the engine
+ * is not currently ready to receive payload bytes to send.
+ */
+static void
+sendpld_flush(br_ssl_engine_context *rc, int force)
+{
+ size_t xlen;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ if (rc->oxa == rc->oxb) {
+ return;
+ }
+ xlen = rc->oxa - rc->oxc;
+ if (xlen == 0 && !force) {
+ return;
+ }
+ buf = rc->out.vtable->encrypt(&rc->out.vtable,
+ rc->record_type_out, rc->version_out,
+ rc->obuf + rc->oxc, &xlen);
+ rc->oxb = rc->oxa = (size_t)(buf - rc->obuf);
+ rc->oxc = rc->oxa + xlen;
+}
+
+static void
+sendpld_ack(br_ssl_engine_context *rc, size_t len)
+{
+ /*
+ * If using a shared buffer, then we may have to modify the
+ * current mode.
+ */
+ if (rc->iomode == BR_IO_INOUT && rc->ibuf == rc->obuf) {
+ rc->iomode = BR_IO_OUT;
+ }
+ rc->oxa += len;
+ if (rc->oxa >= rc->oxb) {
+ /*
+ * Set oxb to one more than oxa so that sendpld_flush()
+ * does not mistakingly believe that a record is
+ * already prepared and being sent.
+ */
+ rc->oxb = rc->oxa + 1;
+ sendpld_flush(rc, 0);
+ }
+}
+
+static unsigned char *
+sendrec_buf(const br_ssl_engine_context *rc, size_t *len)
+{
+ /*
+ * When still gathering payload bytes, oxc points to the start
+ * of the record data, so oxc <= oxa. However, when a full
+ * record has been completed, oxc points to the end of the record,
+ * so oxc > oxa.
+ */
+ switch (rc->iomode) {
+ case BR_IO_OUT:
+ case BR_IO_INOUT:
+ if (rc->oxc > rc->oxa) {
+ *len = rc->oxc - rc->oxa;
+ return rc->obuf + rc->oxa;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+sendrec_ack(br_ssl_engine_context *rc, size_t len)
+{
+ rc->oxb = (rc->oxa += len);
+ if (rc->oxa == rc->oxc) {
+ make_ready_out(rc);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test whether there is some buffered outgoing record that still must
+ * sent.
+ */
+static inline int
+has_rec_tosend(const br_ssl_engine_context *rc)
+{
+ return rc->oxa == rc->oxb && rc->oxa != rc->oxc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The "no encryption" mode has no overhead. It limits the payload size
+ * to the maximum size allowed by the standard (16384 bytes); the caller
+ * is responsible for possibly enforcing a smaller fragment length.
+ */
+static void
+clear_max_plaintext(const br_sslrec_out_clear_context *cc,
+ size_t *start, size_t *end)
+{
+ size_t len;
+
+ (void)cc;
+ len = *end - *start;
+ if (len > 16384) {
+ *end = *start + 16384;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * In "no encryption" mode, encryption is trivial (a no-operation) so
+ * we just have to encode the header.
+ */
+static unsigned char *
+clear_encrypt(br_sslrec_out_clear_context *cc,
+ int record_type, unsigned version, void *data, size_t *data_len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ (void)cc;
+ buf = (unsigned char *)data - 5;
+ buf[0] = record_type;
+ br_enc16be(buf + 1, version);
+ br_enc16be(buf + 3, *data_len);
+ *data_len += 5;
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+const br_sslrec_out_class br_sslrec_out_clear_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_sslrec_out_clear_context),
+ (void (*)(const br_sslrec_out_class *const *, size_t *, size_t *))
+ &clear_max_plaintext,
+ (unsigned char *(*)(const br_sslrec_out_class **,
+ int, unsigned, void *, size_t *))
+ &clear_encrypt
+};
+
+/* ==================================================================== */
+/*
+ * In this part of the file, we handle the various record types, and
+ * communications with the handshake processor.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * IMPLEMENTATION NOTES
+ * ====================
+ *
+ * The handshake processor is written in T0 and runs as a coroutine.
+ * It receives the contents of all records except application data, and
+ * is responsible for producing the contents of all records except
+ * application data.
+ *
+ * A state flag is maintained, which specifies whether application data
+ * is acceptable or not. When it is set:
+ *
+ * -- Application data can be injected as payload data (provided that
+ * the output buffer is ready for that).
+ *
+ * -- Incoming application data records are accepted, and yield data
+ * that the caller may retrieve.
+ *
+ * When the flag is cleared, application data is not accepted from the
+ * application, and incoming application data records trigger an error.
+ *
+ *
+ * Records of type handshake, alert or change-cipher-spec are handled
+ * by the handshake processor. The handshake processor is written in T0
+ * and runs as a coroutine; it gets invoked whenever one of the following
+ * situations is reached:
+ *
+ * -- An incoming record has type handshake, alert or change-cipher-spec,
+ * and yields data that can be read (zero-length records are thus
+ * ignored).
+ *
+ * -- An outgoing record has just finished being sent, and the "application
+ * data" flag is cleared.
+ *
+ * -- The caller wishes to perform a close (call to br_ssl_engine_close()).
+ *
+ * -- The caller wishes to perform a renegotiation (call to
+ * br_ssl_engine_renegotiate()).
+ *
+ * Whenever the handshake processor is entered, access to the payload
+ * buffers is provided, along with some information about explicit
+ * closures or renegotiations.
+ */
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_set_suites(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ const uint16_t *suites, size_t suites_num)
+{
+ if ((suites_num * sizeof *suites) > sizeof cc->suites_buf) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(cc, BR_ERR_BAD_PARAM);
+ return;
+ }
+ memcpy(cc->suites_buf, suites, suites_num * sizeof *suites);
+ cc->suites_num = suites_num;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Give control to handshake processor. 'action' is 1 for a close,
+ * 2 for a renegotiation, or 0 for a jump due to I/O completion.
+ */
+static void
+jump_handshake(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, int action)
+{
+ /*
+ * We use a loop because the handshake processor actions may
+ * allow for more actions; namely, if the processor reads all
+ * input data, then it may allow for output data to be produced,
+ * in case of a shared in/out buffer.
+ */
+ for (;;) {
+ size_t hlen_in, hlen_out;
+
+ /*
+ * Get input buffer. We do not want to provide
+ * application data to the handshake processor (we could
+ * get called with an explicit close or renegotiation
+ * while there is application data ready to be read).
+ */
+ cc->hbuf_in = recvpld_buf(cc, &hlen_in);
+ if (cc->hbuf_in != NULL
+ && cc->record_type_in == BR_SSL_APPLICATION_DATA)
+ {
+ hlen_in = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get output buffer. The handshake processor never
+ * leaves an unfinished outgoing record, so if there is
+ * buffered output, then it MUST be some application
+ * data, so the processor cannot write to it.
+ */
+ cc->saved_hbuf_out = cc->hbuf_out = sendpld_buf(cc, &hlen_out);
+ if (cc->hbuf_out != NULL && br_ssl_engine_has_pld_to_send(cc)) {
+ hlen_out = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Note: hlen_in and hlen_out can be both non-zero only if
+ * the input and output buffers are disjoint. Thus, we can
+ * offer both buffers to the handshake code.
+ */
+
+ cc->hlen_in = hlen_in;
+ cc->hlen_out = hlen_out;
+ cc->action = action;
+ cc->hsrun(&cc->cpu);
+ if (br_ssl_engine_closed(cc)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (cc->hbuf_out != cc->saved_hbuf_out) {
+ sendpld_ack(cc, cc->hbuf_out - cc->saved_hbuf_out);
+ }
+ if (hlen_in != cc->hlen_in) {
+ recvpld_ack(cc, hlen_in - cc->hlen_in);
+ if (cc->hlen_in == 0) {
+ /*
+ * We read all data bytes, which may have
+ * released the output buffer in case it
+ * is shared with the input buffer, and
+ * the handshake code might be waiting for
+ * that.
+ */
+ action = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_flush_record(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+ if (cc->hbuf_out != cc->saved_hbuf_out) {
+ sendpld_ack(cc, cc->hbuf_out - cc->saved_hbuf_out);
+ }
+ if (br_ssl_engine_has_pld_to_send(cc)) {
+ sendpld_flush(cc, 0);
+ }
+ cc->saved_hbuf_out = cc->hbuf_out = sendpld_buf(cc, &cc->hlen_out);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+unsigned char *
+br_ssl_engine_sendapp_buf(const br_ssl_engine_context *cc, size_t *len)
+{
+ if (!(cc->application_data & 1)) {
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return sendpld_buf(cc, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_sendapp_ack(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, size_t len)
+{
+ sendpld_ack(cc, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+unsigned char *
+br_ssl_engine_recvapp_buf(const br_ssl_engine_context *cc, size_t *len)
+{
+ if (!(cc->application_data & 1)
+ || cc->record_type_in != BR_SSL_APPLICATION_DATA)
+ {
+ *len = 0;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return recvpld_buf(cc, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_recvapp_ack(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, size_t len)
+{
+ recvpld_ack(cc, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+unsigned char *
+br_ssl_engine_sendrec_buf(const br_ssl_engine_context *cc, size_t *len)
+{
+ return sendrec_buf(cc, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_sendrec_ack(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, size_t len)
+{
+ sendrec_ack(cc, len);
+ if (len != 0 && !has_rec_tosend(cc)
+ && (cc->record_type_out != BR_SSL_APPLICATION_DATA
+ || (cc->application_data & 1) == 0))
+ {
+ jump_handshake(cc, 0);
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+unsigned char *
+br_ssl_engine_recvrec_buf(const br_ssl_engine_context *cc, size_t *len)
+{
+ return recvrec_buf(cc, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_recvrec_ack(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ recvrec_ack(cc, len);
+ if (br_ssl_engine_closed(cc)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We just received some bytes from the peer. This may have
+ * yielded some payload bytes, in which case we must process
+ * them according to the record type.
+ */
+ buf = recvpld_buf(cc, &len);
+ if (buf != NULL) {
+ switch (cc->record_type_in) {
+ case BR_SSL_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
+ case BR_SSL_ALERT:
+ case BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE:
+ jump_handshake(cc, 0);
+ break;
+ case BR_SSL_APPLICATION_DATA:
+ if (cc->application_data == 1) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we are currently closing, and waiting for
+ * a close_notify from the peer, then incoming
+ * application data should be discarded.
+ */
+ if (cc->application_data == 2) {
+ recvpld_ack(cc, len);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Fall through */
+ default:
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(cc, BR_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_close(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+ if (!br_ssl_engine_closed(cc)) {
+ /*
+ * If we are not already closed, then we need to
+ * initiate the closure. Once closing, any incoming
+ * application data is discarded; we should also discard
+ * application data which is already there but has not
+ * been acknowledged by the application yet (this mimics
+ * usual semantics on BSD sockets: you cannot read()
+ * once you called close(), even if there was some
+ * unread data already buffered).
+ */
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (br_ssl_engine_recvapp_buf(cc, &len) != NULL && len != 0) {
+ br_ssl_engine_recvapp_ack(cc, len);
+ }
+ jump_handshake(cc, 1);
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+int
+br_ssl_engine_renegotiate(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (br_ssl_engine_closed(cc) || cc->reneg == 1
+ || (cc->flags & BR_OPT_NO_RENEGOTIATION) != 0
+ || br_ssl_engine_recvapp_buf(cc, &len) != NULL)
+ {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ jump_handshake(cc, 2);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+unsigned
+br_ssl_engine_current_state(const br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+ unsigned s;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (br_ssl_engine_closed(cc)) {
+ return BR_SSL_CLOSED;
+ }
+
+ s = 0;
+ if (br_ssl_engine_sendrec_buf(cc, &len) != NULL) {
+ s |= BR_SSL_SENDREC;
+ }
+ if (br_ssl_engine_recvrec_buf(cc, &len) != NULL) {
+ s |= BR_SSL_RECVREC;
+ }
+ if (br_ssl_engine_sendapp_buf(cc, &len) != NULL) {
+ s |= BR_SSL_SENDAPP;
+ }
+ if (br_ssl_engine_recvapp_buf(cc, &len) != NULL) {
+ s |= BR_SSL_RECVAPP;
+ }
+ return s;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_flush(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, int force)
+{
+ if (!br_ssl_engine_closed(cc) && (cc->application_data & 1) != 0) {
+ sendpld_flush(cc, force);
+ }
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_hs_reset(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ void (*hsinit)(void *), void (*hsrun)(void *))
+{
+ engine_clearbuf(cc);
+ cc->cpu.dp = cc->dp_stack;
+ cc->cpu.rp = cc->rp_stack;
+ hsinit(&cc->cpu);
+ cc->hsrun = hsrun;
+ cc->shutdown_recv = 0;
+ cc->application_data = 0;
+ cc->alert = 0;
+ jump_handshake(cc, 0);
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+br_tls_prf_impl
+br_ssl_engine_get_PRF(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, int prf_id)
+{
+ if (cc->session.version >= BR_TLS12) {
+ if (prf_id == br_sha384_ID) {
+ return cc->prf_sha384;
+ } else {
+ return cc->prf_sha256;
+ }
+ } else {
+ return cc->prf10;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_compute_master(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int prf_id, const void *pms, size_t pms_len)
+{
+ br_tls_prf_impl iprf;
+ br_tls_prf_seed_chunk seed[2] = {
+ { cc->client_random, sizeof cc->client_random },
+ { cc->server_random, sizeof cc->server_random }
+ };
+
+ iprf = br_ssl_engine_get_PRF(cc, prf_id);
+ iprf(cc->session.master_secret, sizeof cc->session.master_secret,
+ pms, pms_len, "master secret", 2, seed);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute key block.
+ */
+static void
+compute_key_block(br_ssl_engine_context *cc, int prf_id,
+ size_t half_len, unsigned char *kb)
+{
+ br_tls_prf_impl iprf;
+ br_tls_prf_seed_chunk seed[2] = {
+ { cc->server_random, sizeof cc->server_random },
+ { cc->client_random, sizeof cc->client_random }
+ };
+
+ iprf = br_ssl_engine_get_PRF(cc, prf_id);
+ iprf(kb, half_len << 1,
+ cc->session.master_secret, sizeof cc->session.master_secret,
+ "key expansion", 2, seed);
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_switch_cbc_in(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int is_client, int prf_id, int mac_id,
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *bc_impl, size_t cipher_key_len)
+{
+ unsigned char kb[192];
+ unsigned char *cipher_key, *mac_key, *iv;
+ const br_hash_class *imh;
+ size_t mac_key_len, mac_out_len, iv_len;
+
+ imh = br_ssl_engine_get_hash(cc, mac_id);
+ mac_out_len = (imh->desc >> BR_HASHDESC_OUT_OFF) & BR_HASHDESC_OUT_MASK;
+ mac_key_len = mac_out_len;
+
+ /*
+ * TLS 1.1+ uses per-record explicit IV, so no IV to generate here.
+ */
+ if (cc->session.version >= BR_TLS11) {
+ iv_len = 0;
+ } else {
+ iv_len = bc_impl->block_size;
+ }
+ compute_key_block(cc, prf_id,
+ mac_key_len + cipher_key_len + iv_len, kb);
+ if (is_client) {
+ mac_key = &kb[mac_key_len];
+ cipher_key = &kb[(mac_key_len << 1) + cipher_key_len];
+ iv = &kb[((mac_key_len + cipher_key_len) << 1) + iv_len];
+ } else {
+ mac_key = &kb[0];
+ cipher_key = &kb[mac_key_len << 1];
+ iv = &kb[(mac_key_len + cipher_key_len) << 1];
+ }
+ if (iv_len == 0) {
+ iv = NULL;
+ }
+ cc->icbc_in->init(&cc->in.cbc.vtable,
+ bc_impl, cipher_key, cipher_key_len,
+ imh, mac_key, mac_key_len, mac_out_len, iv);
+ cc->incrypt = 1;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_switch_cbc_out(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int is_client, int prf_id, int mac_id,
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *bc_impl, size_t cipher_key_len)
+{
+ unsigned char kb[192];
+ unsigned char *cipher_key, *mac_key, *iv;
+ const br_hash_class *imh;
+ size_t mac_key_len, mac_out_len, iv_len;
+
+ imh = br_ssl_engine_get_hash(cc, mac_id);
+ mac_out_len = (imh->desc >> BR_HASHDESC_OUT_OFF) & BR_HASHDESC_OUT_MASK;
+ mac_key_len = mac_out_len;
+
+ /*
+ * TLS 1.1+ uses per-record explicit IV, so no IV to generate here.
+ */
+ if (cc->session.version >= BR_TLS11) {
+ iv_len = 0;
+ } else {
+ iv_len = bc_impl->block_size;
+ }
+ compute_key_block(cc, prf_id,
+ mac_key_len + cipher_key_len + iv_len, kb);
+ if (is_client) {
+ mac_key = &kb[0];
+ cipher_key = &kb[mac_key_len << 1];
+ iv = &kb[(mac_key_len + cipher_key_len) << 1];
+ } else {
+ mac_key = &kb[mac_key_len];
+ cipher_key = &kb[(mac_key_len << 1) + cipher_key_len];
+ iv = &kb[((mac_key_len + cipher_key_len) << 1) + iv_len];
+ }
+ if (iv_len == 0) {
+ iv = NULL;
+ }
+ cc->icbc_out->init(&cc->out.cbc.vtable,
+ bc_impl, cipher_key, cipher_key_len,
+ imh, mac_key, mac_key_len, mac_out_len, iv);
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_switch_gcm_in(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int is_client, int prf_id,
+ const br_block_ctr_class *bc_impl, size_t cipher_key_len)
+{
+ unsigned char kb[72];
+ unsigned char *cipher_key, *iv;
+
+ compute_key_block(cc, prf_id, cipher_key_len + 4, kb);
+ if (is_client) {
+ cipher_key = &kb[cipher_key_len];
+ iv = &kb[(cipher_key_len << 1) + 4];
+ } else {
+ cipher_key = &kb[0];
+ iv = &kb[cipher_key_len << 1];
+ }
+ cc->igcm_in->init(&cc->in.gcm.vtable.in,
+ bc_impl, cipher_key, cipher_key_len, cc->ighash, iv);
+ cc->incrypt = 1;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_switch_gcm_out(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int is_client, int prf_id,
+ const br_block_ctr_class *bc_impl, size_t cipher_key_len)
+{
+ unsigned char kb[72];
+ unsigned char *cipher_key, *iv;
+
+ compute_key_block(cc, prf_id, cipher_key_len + 4, kb);
+ if (is_client) {
+ cipher_key = &kb[0];
+ iv = &kb[cipher_key_len << 1];
+ } else {
+ cipher_key = &kb[cipher_key_len];
+ iv = &kb[(cipher_key_len << 1) + 4];
+ }
+ cc->igcm_out->init(&cc->out.gcm.vtable.out,
+ bc_impl, cipher_key, cipher_key_len, cc->ighash, iv);
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_switch_chapol_in(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int is_client, int prf_id)
+{
+ unsigned char kb[88];
+ unsigned char *cipher_key, *iv;
+
+ compute_key_block(cc, prf_id, 44, kb);
+ if (is_client) {
+ cipher_key = &kb[32];
+ iv = &kb[76];
+ } else {
+ cipher_key = &kb[0];
+ iv = &kb[64];
+ }
+ cc->ichapol_in->init(&cc->in.chapol.vtable.in,
+ cc->ichacha, cc->ipoly, cipher_key, iv);
+ cc->incrypt = 1;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_switch_chapol_out(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int is_client, int prf_id)
+{
+ unsigned char kb[88];
+ unsigned char *cipher_key, *iv;
+
+ compute_key_block(cc, prf_id, 44, kb);
+ if (is_client) {
+ cipher_key = &kb[0];
+ iv = &kb[64];
+ } else {
+ cipher_key = &kb[32];
+ iv = &kb[76];
+ }
+ cc->ichapol_out->init(&cc->out.chapol.vtable.out,
+ cc->ichacha, cc->ipoly, cipher_key, iv);
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_switch_ccm_in(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int is_client, int prf_id,
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *bc_impl,
+ size_t cipher_key_len, size_t tag_len)
+{
+ unsigned char kb[72];
+ unsigned char *cipher_key, *iv;
+
+ compute_key_block(cc, prf_id, cipher_key_len + 4, kb);
+ if (is_client) {
+ cipher_key = &kb[cipher_key_len];
+ iv = &kb[(cipher_key_len << 1) + 4];
+ } else {
+ cipher_key = &kb[0];
+ iv = &kb[cipher_key_len << 1];
+ }
+ cc->iccm_in->init(&cc->in.ccm.vtable.in,
+ bc_impl, cipher_key, cipher_key_len, iv, tag_len);
+ cc->incrypt = 1;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_switch_ccm_out(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ int is_client, int prf_id,
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *bc_impl,
+ size_t cipher_key_len, size_t tag_len)
+{
+ unsigned char kb[72];
+ unsigned char *cipher_key, *iv;
+
+ compute_key_block(cc, prf_id, cipher_key_len + 4, kb);
+ if (is_client) {
+ cipher_key = &kb[0];
+ iv = &kb[cipher_key_len << 1];
+ } else {
+ cipher_key = &kb[cipher_key_len];
+ iv = &kb[(cipher_key_len << 1) + 4];
+ }
+ cc->iccm_out->init(&cc->out.ccm.vtable.out,
+ bc_impl, cipher_key, cipher_key_len, iv, tag_len);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_aescbc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_aescbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c5cdb5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_aescbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_cbc(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+#if BR_AES_X86NI || BR_POWER8
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *ienc;
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *idec;
+#endif
+
+ br_ssl_engine_set_cbc(cc,
+ &br_sslrec_in_cbc_vtable,
+ &br_sslrec_out_cbc_vtable);
+#if BR_AES_X86NI
+ ienc = br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_get_vtable();
+ idec = br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_get_vtable();
+ if (ienc != NULL && idec != NULL) {
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_cbc(cc, ienc, idec);
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+#if BR_POWER8
+ ienc = br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_get_vtable();
+ idec = br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_get_vtable();
+ if (ienc != NULL && idec != NULL) {
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_cbc(cc, ienc, idec);
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+#if BR_64
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_cbc(cc,
+ &br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_vtable,
+ &br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_vtable);
+#else
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_cbc(cc,
+ &br_aes_ct_cbcenc_vtable,
+ &br_aes_ct_cbcdec_vtable);
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_aesccm.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_aesccm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..15c0a78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_aesccm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_ccm(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+#if BR_AES_X86NI || BR_POWER8
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *ictrcbc;
+#endif
+
+ br_ssl_engine_set_ccm(cc,
+ &br_sslrec_in_ccm_vtable,
+ &br_sslrec_out_ccm_vtable);
+#if BR_AES_X86NI
+ ictrcbc = br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_get_vtable();
+ if (ictrcbc != NULL) {
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctrcbc(cc, ictrcbc);
+ } else {
+#if BR_64
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctrcbc(cc, &br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_vtable);
+#else
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctrcbc(cc, &br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_vtable);
+#endif
+ }
+#elif BR_POWER8
+ ictrcbc = br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_get_vtable();
+ if (ictrcbc != NULL) {
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctrcbc(cc, ictrcbc);
+ } else {
+#if BR_64
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctrcbc(cc, &br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_vtable);
+#else
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctrcbc(cc, &br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_vtable);
+#endif
+ }
+#else
+#if BR_64
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctrcbc(cc, &br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_vtable);
+#else
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctrcbc(cc, &br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_vtable);
+#endif
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_aesgcm.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_aesgcm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c44a707
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_aesgcm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_gcm(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+#if BR_AES_X86NI || BR_POWER8
+ const br_block_ctr_class *ictr;
+ br_ghash ighash;
+#endif
+
+ br_ssl_engine_set_gcm(cc,
+ &br_sslrec_in_gcm_vtable,
+ &br_sslrec_out_gcm_vtable);
+#if BR_AES_X86NI
+ ictr = br_aes_x86ni_ctr_get_vtable();
+ if (ictr != NULL) {
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctr(cc, ictr);
+ } else {
+#if BR_64
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctr(cc, &br_aes_ct64_ctr_vtable);
+#else
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctr(cc, &br_aes_ct_ctr_vtable);
+#endif
+ }
+#elif BR_POWER8
+ ictr = br_aes_pwr8_ctr_get_vtable();
+ if (ictr != NULL) {
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctr(cc, ictr);
+ } else {
+#if BR_64
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctr(cc, &br_aes_ct64_ctr_vtable);
+#else
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctr(cc, &br_aes_ct_ctr_vtable);
+#endif
+ }
+#else
+#if BR_64
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctr(cc, &br_aes_ct64_ctr_vtable);
+#else
+ br_ssl_engine_set_aes_ctr(cc, &br_aes_ct_ctr_vtable);
+#endif
+#endif
+#if BR_AES_X86NI
+ ighash = br_ghash_pclmul_get();
+ if (ighash != 0) {
+ br_ssl_engine_set_ghash(cc, ighash);
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+#if BR_POWER8
+ ighash = br_ghash_pwr8_get();
+ if (ighash != 0) {
+ br_ssl_engine_set_ghash(cc, ighash);
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+#if BR_LOMUL
+ br_ssl_engine_set_ghash(cc, &br_ghash_ctmul32);
+#elif BR_64
+ br_ssl_engine_set_ghash(cc, &br_ghash_ctmul64);
+#else
+ br_ssl_engine_set_ghash(cc, &br_ghash_ctmul);
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_chapol.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_chapol.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..47a0c98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_chapol.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_set_default_chapol(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ br_poly1305_run bp;
+#endif
+#if BR_SSE2
+ br_chacha20_run bc;
+#endif
+
+ br_ssl_engine_set_chapol(cc,
+ &br_sslrec_in_chapol_vtable,
+ &br_sslrec_out_chapol_vtable);
+#if BR_SSE2
+ bc = br_chacha20_sse2_get();
+ if (bc) {
+ br_ssl_engine_set_chacha20(cc, bc);
+ } else {
+#endif
+ br_ssl_engine_set_chacha20(cc, &br_chacha20_ct_run);
+#if BR_SSE2
+ }
+#endif
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ bp = br_poly1305_ctmulq_get();
+ if (bp) {
+ br_ssl_engine_set_poly1305(cc, bp);
+ } else {
+#endif
+#if BR_LOMUL
+ br_ssl_engine_set_poly1305(cc, &br_poly1305_ctmul32_run);
+#else
+ br_ssl_engine_set_poly1305(cc, &br_poly1305_ctmul_run);
+#endif
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+ }
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_descbc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_descbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0253cb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_descbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_set_default_des_cbc(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+ br_ssl_engine_set_cbc(cc,
+ &br_sslrec_in_cbc_vtable,
+ &br_sslrec_out_cbc_vtable);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_des_cbc(cc,
+ &br_des_ct_cbcenc_vtable,
+ &br_des_ct_cbcdec_vtable);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_ec.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_ec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0213ae6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_ec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_set_default_ec(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+#if BR_LOMUL
+ br_ssl_engine_set_ec(cc, &br_ec_all_m15);
+#else
+ br_ssl_engine_set_ec(cc, &br_ec_all_m31);
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_ecdsa.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_ecdsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1304002
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_ecdsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_set_default_ecdsa(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+#if BR_LOMUL
+ br_ssl_engine_set_ec(cc, &br_ec_all_m15);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_ecdsa(cc, &br_ecdsa_i15_vrfy_asn1);
+#else
+ br_ssl_engine_set_ec(cc, &br_ec_all_m31);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_ecdsa(cc, &br_ecdsa_i31_vrfy_asn1);
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_rsavrfy.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_rsavrfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad0628a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_engine_default_rsavrfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_engine_set_default_rsavrfy(br_ssl_engine_context *cc)
+{
+ br_ssl_engine_set_rsavrfy(cc, br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy_get_default());
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hashes.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hashes.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e10a980
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hashes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+int
+br_ssl_choose_hash(unsigned bf)
+{
+ static const unsigned char pref[] = {
+ br_sha256_ID, br_sha384_ID, br_sha512_ID,
+ br_sha224_ID, br_sha1_ID
+ };
+ size_t u;
+
+ for (u = 0; u < sizeof pref; u ++) {
+ int x;
+
+ x = pref[u];
+ if ((bf >> x) & 1) {
+ return x;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hs_client.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hs_client.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de36165
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hs_client.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1915 @@
+/* Automatically generated code; do not modify directly. */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+typedef struct {
+ uint32_t *dp;
+ uint32_t *rp;
+ const unsigned char *ip;
+} t0_context;
+
+static uint32_t
+t0_parse7E_unsigned(const unsigned char **p)
+{
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ x = 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ unsigned y;
+
+ y = *(*p) ++;
+ x = (x << 7) | (uint32_t)(y & 0x7F);
+ if (y < 0x80) {
+ return x;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int32_t
+t0_parse7E_signed(const unsigned char **p)
+{
+ int neg;
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ neg = ((**p) >> 6) & 1;
+ x = (uint32_t)-neg;
+ for (;;) {
+ unsigned y;
+
+ y = *(*p) ++;
+ x = (x << 7) | (uint32_t)(y & 0x7F);
+ if (y < 0x80) {
+ if (neg) {
+ return -(int32_t)~x - 1;
+ } else {
+ return (int32_t)x;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#define T0_VBYTE(x, n) (unsigned char)((((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)) & 0x7F) | 0x80)
+#define T0_FBYTE(x, n) (unsigned char)(((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)) & 0x7F)
+#define T0_SBYTE(x) (unsigned char)((((uint32_t)(x) >> 28) + 0xF8) ^ 0xF8)
+#define T0_INT1(x) T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT2(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT3(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT4(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 21), T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT5(x) T0_SBYTE(x), T0_VBYTE(x, 21), T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+
+/* static const unsigned char t0_datablock[]; */
+
+
+void br_ssl_hs_client_init_main(void *t0ctx);
+
+void br_ssl_hs_client_run(void *t0ctx);
+
+
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * This macro evaluates to a pointer to the current engine context.
+ */
+#define ENG ((br_ssl_engine_context *)(void *)((unsigned char *)t0ctx - offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, cpu)))
+
+
+
+
+
+/*
+ * This macro evaluates to a pointer to the client context, under that
+ * specific name. It must be noted that since the engine context is the
+ * first field of the br_ssl_client_context structure ('eng'), then
+ * pointers values of both types are interchangeable, modulo an
+ * appropriate cast. This also means that "addresses" computed as offsets
+ * within the structure work for both kinds of context.
+ */
+#define CTX ((br_ssl_client_context *)ENG)
+
+/*
+ * Generate the pre-master secret for RSA key exchange, and encrypt it
+ * with the server's public key. Returned value is either the encrypted
+ * data length (in bytes), or -x on error, with 'x' being an error code.
+ *
+ * This code assumes that the public key has been already verified (it
+ * was properly obtained by the X.509 engine, and it has the right type,
+ * i.e. it is of type RSA and suitable for encryption).
+ */
+static int
+make_pms_rsa(br_ssl_client_context *ctx, int prf_id)
+{
+ const br_x509_class **xc;
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk;
+ const unsigned char *n;
+ unsigned char *pms;
+ size_t nlen, u;
+
+ xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
+ pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute actual RSA key length, in case there are leading zeros.
+ */
+ n = pk->key.rsa.n;
+ nlen = pk->key.rsa.nlen;
+ while (nlen > 0 && *n == 0) {
+ n ++;
+ nlen --;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need at least 59 bytes (48 bytes for pre-master secret, and
+ * 11 bytes for the PKCS#1 type 2 padding). Note that the X.509
+ * minimal engine normally blocks RSA keys shorter than 128 bytes,
+ * so this is mostly for public keys provided explicitly by the
+ * caller.
+ */
+ if (nlen < 59) {
+ return -BR_ERR_X509_WEAK_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ }
+ if (nlen > sizeof ctx->eng.pad) {
+ return -BR_ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Make PMS.
+ */
+ pms = ctx->eng.pad + nlen - 48;
+ br_enc16be(pms, ctx->eng.version_max);
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, pms + 2, 46);
+ br_ssl_engine_compute_master(&ctx->eng, prf_id, pms, 48);
+
+ /*
+ * Apply PKCS#1 type 2 padding.
+ */
+ ctx->eng.pad[0] = 0x00;
+ ctx->eng.pad[1] = 0x02;
+ ctx->eng.pad[nlen - 49] = 0x00;
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, ctx->eng.pad + 2, nlen - 51);
+ for (u = 2; u < nlen - 49; u ++) {
+ while (ctx->eng.pad[u] == 0) {
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng,
+ &ctx->eng.pad[u], 1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute RSA encryption.
+ */
+ if (!ctx->irsapub(ctx->eng.pad, nlen, &pk->key.rsa)) {
+ return -BR_ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
+ }
+ return (int)nlen;
+}
+
+/*
+ * OID for hash functions in RSA signatures.
+ */
+static const unsigned char *HASH_OID[] = {
+ BR_HASH_OID_SHA1,
+ BR_HASH_OID_SHA224,
+ BR_HASH_OID_SHA256,
+ BR_HASH_OID_SHA384,
+ BR_HASH_OID_SHA512
+};
+
+/*
+ * Check the RSA signature on the ServerKeyExchange message.
+ *
+ * hash hash function ID (2 to 6), or 0 for MD5+SHA-1 (with RSA only)
+ * use_rsa non-zero for RSA signature, zero for ECDSA
+ * sig_len signature length (in bytes); signature value is in the pad
+ *
+ * Returned value is 0 on success, or an error code.
+ */
+static int
+verify_SKE_sig(br_ssl_client_context *ctx,
+ int hash, int use_rsa, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ const br_x509_class **xc;
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk;
+ br_multihash_context mhc;
+ unsigned char hv[64], head[4];
+ size_t hv_len;
+
+ xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
+ pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc, NULL);
+ br_multihash_zero(&mhc);
+ br_multihash_copyimpl(&mhc, &ctx->eng.mhash);
+ br_multihash_init(&mhc);
+ br_multihash_update(&mhc,
+ ctx->eng.client_random, sizeof ctx->eng.client_random);
+ br_multihash_update(&mhc,
+ ctx->eng.server_random, sizeof ctx->eng.server_random);
+ head[0] = 3;
+ head[1] = 0;
+ head[2] = ctx->eng.ecdhe_curve;
+ head[3] = ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len;
+ br_multihash_update(&mhc, head, sizeof head);
+ br_multihash_update(&mhc,
+ ctx->eng.ecdhe_point, ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len);
+ if (hash) {
+ hv_len = br_multihash_out(&mhc, hash, hv);
+ if (hv_len == 0) {
+ return BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!br_multihash_out(&mhc, br_md5_ID, hv)
+ || !br_multihash_out(&mhc, br_sha1_ID, hv + 16))
+ {
+ return BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+ hv_len = 36;
+ }
+ if (use_rsa) {
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+ const unsigned char *hash_oid;
+
+ if (hash) {
+ hash_oid = HASH_OID[hash - 2];
+ } else {
+ hash_oid = NULL;
+ }
+ if (!ctx->eng.irsavrfy(ctx->eng.pad, sig_len,
+ hash_oid, hv_len, &pk->key.rsa, tmp)
+ || memcmp(tmp, hv, hv_len) != 0)
+ {
+ return BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!ctx->eng.iecdsa(ctx->eng.iec, hv, hv_len, &pk->key.ec,
+ ctx->eng.pad, sig_len))
+ {
+ return BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform client-side ECDH (or ECDHE). The point that should be sent to
+ * the server is written in the pad; returned value is either the point
+ * length (in bytes), or -x on error, with 'x' being an error code.
+ *
+ * The point _from_ the server is taken from ecdhe_point[] if 'ecdhe'
+ * is non-zero, or from the X.509 engine context if 'ecdhe' is zero
+ * (for static ECDH).
+ */
+static int
+make_pms_ecdh(br_ssl_client_context *ctx, unsigned ecdhe, int prf_id)
+{
+ int curve;
+ unsigned char key[66], point[133];
+ const unsigned char *order, *point_src;
+ size_t glen, olen, point_len, xoff, xlen;
+ unsigned char mask;
+
+ if (ecdhe) {
+ curve = ctx->eng.ecdhe_curve;
+ point_src = ctx->eng.ecdhe_point;
+ point_len = ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len;
+ } else {
+ const br_x509_class **xc;
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk;
+
+ xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
+ pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc, NULL);
+ curve = pk->key.ec.curve;
+ point_src = pk->key.ec.q;
+ point_len = pk->key.ec.qlen;
+ }
+ if ((ctx->eng.iec->supported_curves & ((uint32_t)1 << curve)) == 0) {
+ return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to generate our key, as a non-zero random value which
+ * is lower than the curve order, in a "large enough" range. We
+ * force top bit to 0 and bottom bit to 1, which guarantees that
+ * the value is in the proper range.
+ */
+ order = ctx->eng.iec->order(curve, &olen);
+ mask = 0xFF;
+ while (mask >= order[0]) {
+ mask >>= 1;
+ }
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, key, olen);
+ key[0] &= mask;
+ key[olen - 1] |= 0x01;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the common ECDH point, whose X coordinate is the
+ * pre-master secret.
+ */
+ ctx->eng.iec->generator(curve, &glen);
+ if (glen != point_len) {
+ return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(point, point_src, glen);
+ if (!ctx->eng.iec->mul(point, glen, key, olen, curve)) {
+ return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The pre-master secret is the X coordinate.
+ */
+ xoff = ctx->eng.iec->xoff(curve, &xlen);
+ br_ssl_engine_compute_master(&ctx->eng, prf_id, point + xoff, xlen);
+
+ ctx->eng.iec->mulgen(point, key, olen, curve);
+ memcpy(ctx->eng.pad, point, glen);
+ return (int)glen;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform full static ECDH. This occurs only in the context of client
+ * authentication with certificates: the server uses an EC public key,
+ * the cipher suite is of type ECDH (not ECDHE), the server requested a
+ * client certificate and accepts static ECDH, the client has a
+ * certificate with an EC public key in the same curve, and accepts
+ * static ECDH as well.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 0 on success, -1 on error.
+ */
+static int
+make_pms_static_ecdh(br_ssl_client_context *ctx, int prf_id)
+{
+ unsigned char point[133];
+ size_t point_len;
+ const br_x509_class **xc;
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk;
+
+ xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
+ pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc, NULL);
+ point_len = pk->key.ec.qlen;
+ if (point_len > sizeof point) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(point, pk->key.ec.q, point_len);
+ if (!(*ctx->client_auth_vtable)->do_keyx(
+ ctx->client_auth_vtable, point, &point_len))
+ {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ br_ssl_engine_compute_master(&ctx->eng,
+ prf_id, point, point_len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the client-side signature. This is invoked only when a
+ * signature-based client authentication was selected. The computed
+ * signature is in the pad; its length (in bytes) is returned. On
+ * error, 0 is returned.
+ */
+static size_t
+make_client_sign(br_ssl_client_context *ctx)
+{
+ size_t hv_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute hash of handshake messages so far. This "cannot" fail
+ * because the list of supported hash functions provided to the
+ * client certificate handler was trimmed to include only the
+ * hash functions that the multi-hasher supports.
+ */
+ if (ctx->hash_id) {
+ hv_len = br_multihash_out(&ctx->eng.mhash,
+ ctx->hash_id, ctx->eng.pad);
+ } else {
+ br_multihash_out(&ctx->eng.mhash,
+ br_md5_ID, ctx->eng.pad);
+ br_multihash_out(&ctx->eng.mhash,
+ br_sha1_ID, ctx->eng.pad + 16);
+ hv_len = 36;
+ }
+ return (*ctx->client_auth_vtable)->do_sign(
+ ctx->client_auth_vtable, ctx->hash_id, hv_len,
+ ctx->eng.pad, sizeof ctx->eng.pad);
+}
+
+
+
+static const unsigned char t0_datablock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x24, 0x00, 0x2F, 0x01, 0x24, 0x00, 0x35, 0x02,
+ 0x24, 0x00, 0x3C, 0x01, 0x44, 0x00, 0x3D, 0x02, 0x44, 0x00, 0x9C, 0x03,
+ 0x04, 0x00, 0x9D, 0x04, 0x05, 0xC0, 0x03, 0x40, 0x24, 0xC0, 0x04, 0x41,
+ 0x24, 0xC0, 0x05, 0x42, 0x24, 0xC0, 0x08, 0x20, 0x24, 0xC0, 0x09, 0x21,
+ 0x24, 0xC0, 0x0A, 0x22, 0x24, 0xC0, 0x0D, 0x30, 0x24, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0x31,
+ 0x24, 0xC0, 0x0F, 0x32, 0x24, 0xC0, 0x12, 0x10, 0x24, 0xC0, 0x13, 0x11,
+ 0x24, 0xC0, 0x14, 0x12, 0x24, 0xC0, 0x23, 0x21, 0x44, 0xC0, 0x24, 0x22,
+ 0x55, 0xC0, 0x25, 0x41, 0x44, 0xC0, 0x26, 0x42, 0x55, 0xC0, 0x27, 0x11,
+ 0x44, 0xC0, 0x28, 0x12, 0x55, 0xC0, 0x29, 0x31, 0x44, 0xC0, 0x2A, 0x32,
+ 0x55, 0xC0, 0x2B, 0x23, 0x04, 0xC0, 0x2C, 0x24, 0x05, 0xC0, 0x2D, 0x43,
+ 0x04, 0xC0, 0x2E, 0x44, 0x05, 0xC0, 0x2F, 0x13, 0x04, 0xC0, 0x30, 0x14,
+ 0x05, 0xC0, 0x31, 0x33, 0x04, 0xC0, 0x32, 0x34, 0x05, 0xC0, 0x9C, 0x06,
+ 0x04, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x07, 0x04, 0xC0, 0xA0, 0x08, 0x04, 0xC0, 0xA1, 0x09,
+ 0x04, 0xC0, 0xAC, 0x26, 0x04, 0xC0, 0xAD, 0x27, 0x04, 0xC0, 0xAE, 0x28,
+ 0x04, 0xC0, 0xAF, 0x29, 0x04, 0xCC, 0xA8, 0x15, 0x04, 0xCC, 0xA9, 0x25,
+ 0x04, 0x00, 0x00
+};
+
+static const unsigned char t0_codeblock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x0E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x02, 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x25, 0x25, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_CCS), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_CIPHER_SUITE), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_COMPRESSION), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_FINISHED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_FRAGLEN), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_HANDSHAKE), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_HELLO_DONE), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_PARAM), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_SECRENEG), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_SNI), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_VERSION),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT1(BR_ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT1(BR_ERR_OK),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT1(BR_ERR_OVERSIZED_ID), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_RESUME_MISMATCH), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_UNEXPECTED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_WRONG_KEY_USAGE), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, action)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, alert)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, application_data)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_client_context, auth_type)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, session) + offsetof(br_ssl_session_parameters, cipher_suite)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, client_random)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, close_received)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, ecdhe_curve)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, ecdhe_point)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, ecdhe_point_len)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, flags)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_client_context, hash_id)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_client_context, hashes)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, log_max_frag_len)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_client_context, min_clienthello_len)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, pad)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, protocol_names_num)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, record_type_in)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, record_type_out)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, reneg)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, saved_finished)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, selected_protocol)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, server_name)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, server_random)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, session) + offsetof(br_ssl_session_parameters, session_id)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, session) + offsetof(br_ssl_session_parameters, session_id_len)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, shutdown_recv)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, suites_buf)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, suites_num)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, session) + offsetof(br_ssl_session_parameters, version)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, version_in)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, version_max)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, version_min)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, version_out)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x09, 0x26, 0x58, 0x06, 0x02, 0x68, 0x28, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06,
+ 0x08, 0x2C, 0x0E, 0x05, 0x02, 0x71, 0x28, 0x04, 0x01, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x99, 0x26, 0x5E, 0x44, 0x9D, 0x26,
+ 0x05, 0x04, 0x60, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x02, 0x9D,
+ 0x00, 0x5E, 0x04, 0x6B, 0x00, 0x06, 0x02, 0x68, 0x28, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26,
+ 0x89, 0x44, 0x05, 0x03, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x08, 0x44, 0x79, 0x2C, 0xAB, 0x1C,
+ 0x84, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0B, 0x44,
+ 0x5C, 0x1F, 0x08, 0x00, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x77, 0x2E, 0x02, 0x00, 0x36,
+ 0x17, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0B, 0x77, 0x3E, 0x29, 0x1A, 0x36, 0x06, 0x07, 0x02,
+ 0x00, 0xCF, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04, 0x75, 0x01, 0x00, 0xC5, 0x02, 0x00, 0x26,
+ 0x1A, 0x17, 0x06, 0x02, 0x6F, 0x28, 0xCF, 0x04, 0x76, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x77, 0x3E, 0x01, 0x16, 0x87, 0x3E, 0x01, 0x00, 0x8A, 0x3C, 0x34, 0xD5,
+ 0x29, 0xB4, 0x06, 0x09, 0x01, 0x7F, 0xAF, 0x01, 0x7F, 0xD2, 0x04, 0x80,
+ 0x53, 0xB1, 0x79, 0x2C, 0xA1, 0x01, T0_INT1(BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN), 0x17,
+ 0x06, 0x01, 0xB5, 0xB8, 0x26, 0x01, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x07, 0x25, 0xB7,
+ 0xB8, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x0E,
+ 0x05, 0x02, 0x72, 0x28, 0x06, 0x02, 0x67, 0x28, 0x33, 0x06, 0x02, 0x72,
+ 0x28, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x1C, 0xD3, 0x80, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x81, 0x7F, 0x0E,
+ 0x06, 0x0D, 0x25, 0x01, 0x10, 0xDE, 0x01, 0x00, 0xDD, 0x79, 0x2C, 0xAB,
+ 0x24, 0x04, 0x04, 0xD6, 0x06, 0x01, 0xD4, 0x04, 0x01, 0xD6, 0x01, 0x7F,
+ 0xD2, 0x01, 0x7F, 0xAF, 0x01, 0x01, 0x77, 0x3E, 0x01, 0x17, 0x87, 0x3E,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x38, 0x38, 0x00, 0x00, 0x9A, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x11, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x05, 0x25, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_KEYTYPE_RSA | BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX), 0x04, 0x30, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x05, 0x25, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_KEYTYPE_RSA | BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN), 0x04, 0x25, 0x01, 0x02,
+ 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x05, 0x25, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_KEYTYPE_EC | BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN), 0x04, 0x1A, 0x01, 0x03,
+ 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x05, 0x25, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_KEYTYPE_EC | BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX), 0x04, 0x0F, 0x01, 0x04,
+ 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x05, 0x25, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_KEYTYPE_EC | BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX), 0x04, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x44, 0x25, 0x00, 0x00, 0x82, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x06,
+ 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x88, 0x2E, 0x26, 0x06, 0x08, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x11, 0x07, 0x04, 0x03, 0x25, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x41, 0x03, 0x00, 0x25, 0x01, 0x00, 0x43, 0x06, 0x03, 0x02, 0x00, 0x08,
+ 0x42, 0x06, 0x03, 0x02, 0x00, 0x08, 0x26, 0x06, 0x06, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0B,
+ 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x8B, 0x3F, 0x26, 0x06, 0x03, 0x01, 0x09,
+ 0x08, 0x00, 0x01, 0x40, 0x26, 0x06, 0x1E, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x26,
+ 0x06, 0x0E, 0x26, 0x01, 0x01, 0x17, 0x02, 0x00, 0x08, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x11, 0x04, 0x6F, 0x25, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0B, 0x01, 0x06,
+ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7F, 0x2D, 0x44, 0x11, 0x01, 0x01, 0x17, 0x35, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x9F, 0xCE, 0x26, 0x01, 0x07, 0x17, 0x01, 0x00, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06,
+ 0x09, 0x25, 0x01, 0x10, 0x17, 0x06, 0x01, 0x9F, 0x04, 0x35, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x2C, 0x25, 0x25, 0x01, 0x00, 0x77, 0x3E, 0xB3, 0x88,
+ 0x2E, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x01, 0xA8, 0x37, 0x06, 0x17, 0x29, 0x1A,
+ 0x36, 0x06, 0x04, 0xCE, 0x25, 0x04, 0x78, 0x01, 0x80, 0x64, 0xC5, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x77, 0x3E, 0x01, 0x17, 0x87, 0x3E, 0x04, 0x01, 0x9F, 0x04, 0x03,
+ 0x72, 0x28, 0x25, 0x04, 0xFF, 0x34, 0x01, 0x26, 0x03, 0x00, 0x09, 0x26,
+ 0x58, 0x06, 0x02, 0x68, 0x28, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x9A, 0x01, 0x0F,
+ 0x17, 0x00, 0x00, 0x76, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x00, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x10, 0x25,
+ 0x26, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x03, 0x25, 0x01, 0x02, 0x76, 0x3E, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x04, 0x21, 0x01, 0x01, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x14, 0x25, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x76, 0x3E, 0x26, 0x01, 0x80, 0x64, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x05, 0x01, 0x82, 0x00,
+ 0x08, 0x28, 0x5A, 0x04, 0x07, 0x25, 0x01, 0x82, 0x00, 0x08, 0x28, 0x25,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x2F, 0x06, 0x05, 0x3A, 0xAC, 0x37, 0x04, 0x78,
+ 0x26, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x8F, 0x3E, 0x00, 0x01, 0xBF, 0xAA, 0xBF,
+ 0xAA, 0xC1, 0x84, 0x44, 0x26, 0x03, 0x00, 0xB6, 0x9B, 0x9B, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x4D, 0x26, 0x58, 0x06, 0x0A, 0x01, 0x03, 0xA8, 0x06, 0x02, 0x72, 0x28,
+ 0x25, 0x04, 0x03, 0x5C, 0x8A, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2F, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x86,
+ 0x2E, 0x01, 0x14, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x02, 0x72, 0x28, 0x04, 0x11, 0xCE, 0x01,
+ 0x07, 0x17, 0x26, 0x01, 0x02, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x06, 0x06, 0x02, 0x72, 0x28,
+ 0x04, 0x70, 0x25, 0xC2, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0D, 0x33, 0x37, 0x06, 0x02, 0x61,
+ 0x28, 0x26, 0x01, 0x01, 0xC8, 0x36, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x01, 0xB8, 0x01, 0x0B,
+ 0x0E, 0x05, 0x02, 0x72, 0x28, 0x26, 0x01, 0x03, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x08, 0xC0,
+ 0x06, 0x02, 0x68, 0x28, 0x44, 0x25, 0x00, 0x44, 0x57, 0xC0, 0xAA, 0x26,
+ 0x06, 0x23, 0xC0, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x56, 0x26, 0x06, 0x18, 0x26, 0x01, 0x82,
+ 0x00, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x05, 0x01, 0x82, 0x00, 0x04, 0x01, 0x26, 0x03, 0x00,
+ 0x84, 0x02, 0x00, 0xB6, 0x02, 0x00, 0x53, 0x04, 0x65, 0x9B, 0x54, 0x04,
+ 0x5A, 0x9B, 0x9B, 0x55, 0x26, 0x06, 0x02, 0x35, 0x00, 0x25, 0x2B, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x79, 0x2C, 0xA1, 0x01, 0x7F, 0xB0, 0x26, 0x58, 0x06, 0x02, 0x35,
+ 0x28, 0x26, 0x05, 0x02, 0x72, 0x28, 0x38, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x02, 0x74,
+ 0x28, 0x3B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x9C, 0xB8, 0x01, 0x14, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x02, 0x72,
+ 0x28, 0x84, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x08, 0x01, 0x0C, 0xB6, 0x9B, 0x84, 0x26, 0x01,
+ 0x0C, 0x08, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x30, 0x05, 0x02, 0x64, 0x28, 0x00, 0x00, 0xB9,
+ 0x06, 0x02, 0x72, 0x28, 0x06, 0x02, 0x66, 0x28, 0x00, 0x0A, 0xB8, 0x01,
+ 0x02, 0x0E, 0x05, 0x02, 0x72, 0x28, 0xBF, 0x03, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x95,
+ 0x2C, 0x0A, 0x02, 0x00, 0x94, 0x2C, 0x0F, 0x37, 0x06, 0x02, 0x73, 0x28,
+ 0x02, 0x00, 0x93, 0x2C, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x02, 0x6B, 0x28, 0x02, 0x00, 0x96,
+ 0x3C, 0x8C, 0x01, 0x20, 0xB6, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x01, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x02,
+ 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x20, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x02, 0x70, 0x28, 0x84, 0x02, 0x02,
+ 0xB6, 0x02, 0x02, 0x8E, 0x2E, 0x0E, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x17,
+ 0x06, 0x0B, 0x8D, 0x84, 0x02, 0x02, 0x30, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x03,
+ 0x01, 0x8D, 0x84, 0x02, 0x02, 0x31, 0x02, 0x02, 0x8E, 0x3E, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x92, 0x02, 0x01, 0x98, 0xBF, 0x26, 0xC3, 0x58, 0x06, 0x02, 0x62, 0x28,
+ 0x26, 0xCD, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x86, 0x03, 0x0A, 0x17, 0x06, 0x02, 0x62,
+ 0x28, 0x79, 0x02, 0x01, 0x98, 0xC1, 0x06, 0x02, 0x63, 0x28, 0x26, 0x06,
+ 0x81, 0x47, 0xBF, 0xAA, 0xA6, 0x03, 0x03, 0xA4, 0x03, 0x04, 0xA2, 0x03,
+ 0x05, 0xA5, 0x03, 0x06, 0xA7, 0x03, 0x07, 0xA3, 0x03, 0x08, 0x27, 0x03,
+ 0x09, 0x26, 0x06, 0x81, 0x18, 0xBF, 0x01, 0x00, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x0F,
+ 0x25, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x02, 0x6C, 0x28, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x03, 0xBE,
+ 0x04, 0x80, 0x7F, 0x01, 0x01, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x0F, 0x25, 0x02, 0x05,
+ 0x05, 0x02, 0x6C, 0x28, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x05, 0xBC, 0x04, 0x80, 0x6A,
+ 0x01, 0x83, 0xFE, 0x01, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x0F, 0x25, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05,
+ 0x02, 0x6C, 0x28, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x04, 0xBD, 0x04, 0x80, 0x53, 0x01,
+ 0x0D, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x0E, 0x25, 0x02, 0x06, 0x05, 0x02, 0x6C, 0x28,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x06, 0xBA, 0x04, 0x3F, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06,
+ 0x0E, 0x25, 0x02, 0x07, 0x05, 0x02, 0x6C, 0x28, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x07,
+ 0xBA, 0x04, 0x2B, 0x01, 0x0B, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x0E, 0x25, 0x02, 0x08,
+ 0x05, 0x02, 0x6C, 0x28, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x08, 0xBA, 0x04, 0x17, 0x01,
+ 0x10, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x0E, 0x25, 0x02, 0x09, 0x05, 0x02, 0x6C, 0x28,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x09, 0xAE, 0x04, 0x03, 0x6C, 0x28, 0x25, 0x04, 0xFE,
+ 0x64, 0x02, 0x04, 0x06, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x04, 0x01, 0x05, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x02,
+ 0x69, 0x28, 0x01, 0x01, 0x88, 0x3E, 0x9B, 0x04, 0x0C, 0xA4, 0x01, 0x05,
+ 0x0F, 0x06, 0x02, 0x69, 0x28, 0x01, 0x01, 0x88, 0x3E, 0x9B, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x04, 0xB8, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0x05, 0x02, 0x72, 0x28, 0xC1, 0x01,
+ 0x03, 0x0E, 0x05, 0x02, 0x6D, 0x28, 0xBF, 0x26, 0x7C, 0x3E, 0x26, 0x01,
+ 0x20, 0x10, 0x06, 0x02, 0x6D, 0x28, 0x40, 0x44, 0x11, 0x01, 0x01, 0x17,
+ 0x05, 0x02, 0x6D, 0x28, 0xC1, 0x26, 0x01, 0x81, 0x05, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x02,
+ 0x6D, 0x28, 0x26, 0x7E, 0x3E, 0x7D, 0x44, 0xB6, 0x92, 0x2C, 0x01, 0x86,
+ 0x03, 0x10, 0x03, 0x00, 0x79, 0x2C, 0xCB, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03,
+ 0x02, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x21, 0xC1, 0x26, 0x26, 0x01, 0x02, 0x0A, 0x44,
+ 0x01, 0x06, 0x0F, 0x37, 0x06, 0x02, 0x6D, 0x28, 0x03, 0x02, 0xC1, 0x02,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0B, 0x01, 0x03, 0x08, 0x0E, 0x05, 0x02, 0x6D, 0x28,
+ 0x04, 0x08, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x02, 0xBF, 0x26,
+ 0x03, 0x03, 0x26, 0x01, 0x84, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x02, 0x6E, 0x28, 0x84,
+ 0x44, 0xB6, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x50, 0x26, 0x06, 0x01,
+ 0x28, 0x25, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x03, 0x01, 0x02, 0x00, 0x97,
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x00, 0x39, 0x26, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x02, 0x60,
+ 0x00, 0xD0, 0x04, 0x74, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0xC1, 0xAA, 0x26,
+ 0x06, 0x80, 0x43, 0xC1, 0x01, 0x01, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x06, 0x25, 0x01,
+ 0x81, 0x7F, 0x04, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x80, 0x40, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x07, 0x25,
+ 0x01, 0x83, 0xFE, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20, 0x01, 0x80, 0x41, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06,
+ 0x07, 0x25, 0x01, 0x84, 0x80, 0x00, 0x04, 0x12, 0x01, 0x80, 0x42, 0x38,
+ 0x0E, 0x06, 0x07, 0x25, 0x01, 0x88, 0x80, 0x00, 0x04, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x44, 0x25, 0x02, 0x00, 0x37, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04, 0xFF, 0x39, 0x9B, 0x79,
+ 0x2C, 0xC9, 0x05, 0x09, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x83, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0x17, 0x03,
+ 0x00, 0x92, 0x2C, 0x01, 0x86, 0x03, 0x10, 0x06, 0x3A, 0xBB, 0x26, 0x81,
+ 0x3D, 0x41, 0x25, 0x26, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0B, 0x37, 0x01, 0x8C, 0x80, 0x00,
+ 0x37, 0x17, 0x02, 0x00, 0x17, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x8C, 0x80, 0x00, 0x17,
+ 0x06, 0x19, 0x26, 0x01, 0x81, 0x7F, 0x17, 0x06, 0x05, 0x01, 0x84, 0x80,
+ 0x00, 0x37, 0x26, 0x01, 0x83, 0xFE, 0x00, 0x17, 0x06, 0x05, 0x01, 0x88,
+ 0x80, 0x00, 0x37, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04, 0x09, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x8C, 0x88,
+ 0x01, 0x17, 0x03, 0x00, 0x16, 0xBF, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x06, 0x23, 0xBF, 0xAA,
+ 0x26, 0x15, 0x26, 0x06, 0x18, 0x26, 0x01, 0x82, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x05,
+ 0x01, 0x82, 0x00, 0x04, 0x01, 0x26, 0x03, 0x01, 0x84, 0x02, 0x01, 0xB6,
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x12, 0x04, 0x65, 0x9B, 0x13, 0x04, 0x5A, 0x9B, 0x14, 0x9B,
+ 0x02, 0x00, 0x2A, 0x00, 0x00, 0xB9, 0x26, 0x5A, 0x06, 0x07, 0x25, 0x06,
+ 0x02, 0x66, 0x28, 0x04, 0x74, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC2, 0x01, 0x03, 0xC0, 0x44,
+ 0x25, 0x44, 0x00, 0x00, 0xBF, 0xC6, 0x00, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00,
+ 0xBF, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x06, 0x80, 0x50, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x01, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x02,
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x16, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0F, 0x0C,
+ 0x06, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x10, 0x08, 0x0B, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x37, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04, 0x2A, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x10, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x17, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x03, 0x0E, 0x37, 0x17, 0x06, 0x11, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02,
+ 0x5D, 0x01, 0x02, 0x0B, 0x02, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0B, 0x37, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04,
+ 0xFF, 0x2C, 0x9B, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xBF, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x05,
+ 0x02, 0x65, 0x28, 0xC1, 0x01, 0x08, 0x08, 0x82, 0x2E, 0x0E, 0x05, 0x02,
+ 0x65, 0x28, 0x00, 0x00, 0xBF, 0x88, 0x2E, 0x05, 0x15, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0E,
+ 0x05, 0x02, 0x69, 0x28, 0xC1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0E, 0x05, 0x02, 0x69, 0x28,
+ 0x01, 0x02, 0x88, 0x3E, 0x04, 0x1C, 0x01, 0x19, 0x0E, 0x05, 0x02, 0x69,
+ 0x28, 0xC1, 0x01, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x05, 0x02, 0x69, 0x28, 0x84, 0x01, 0x18,
+ 0xB6, 0x89, 0x84, 0x01, 0x18, 0x30, 0x05, 0x02, 0x69, 0x28, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0xBF, 0x06, 0x02, 0x6A, 0x28, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x97, 0xC2, 0x01,
+ 0x08, 0x0B, 0xC2, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x03, 0x97, 0xC2, 0x01, 0x08,
+ 0x0B, 0xC2, 0x08, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0B, 0xC2, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x97, 0xC2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x26, 0x58, 0x05, 0x01, 0x00, 0x25, 0xD0,
+ 0x04, 0x76, 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x91, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x26,
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x06, 0x10, 0x26, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0B, 0x90, 0x08, 0x2C,
+ 0x02, 0x00, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x01, 0x00, 0x5C, 0x04, 0x6A, 0x25, 0x01, 0x7F,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x15, 0x87, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x52, 0x25, 0x52, 0x25, 0x29,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x44, 0xC4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x44, 0x38, 0x97, 0x44,
+ 0x26, 0x06, 0x05, 0xC2, 0x25, 0x5D, 0x04, 0x78, 0x25, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26,
+ 0x01, 0x81, 0xAC, 0x00, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x04, 0x25, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x9A,
+ 0x59, 0x00, 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x79, 0x2C, 0x9A, 0x03, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x0F, 0x17, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x11, 0x01, 0x0F, 0x17, 0x02,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x11, 0x01, 0x0F, 0x17, 0x01, 0x00, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06,
+ 0x10, 0x25, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x18, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x03, 0x49, 0x04,
+ 0x01, 0x4A, 0x04, 0x81, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x10, 0x25,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x03, 0x49, 0x04, 0x01, 0x4A,
+ 0x04, 0x80, 0x77, 0x01, 0x02, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x10, 0x25, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x20, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x03, 0x49, 0x04, 0x01, 0x4A, 0x04, 0x80,
+ 0x61, 0x01, 0x03, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x0F, 0x25, 0x25, 0x01, 0x10, 0x02,
+ 0x00, 0x06, 0x03, 0x47, 0x04, 0x01, 0x48, 0x04, 0x80, 0x4C, 0x01, 0x04,
+ 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x0E, 0x25, 0x25, 0x01, 0x20, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x03,
+ 0x47, 0x04, 0x01, 0x48, 0x04, 0x38, 0x01, 0x05, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x0C,
+ 0x25, 0x25, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x03, 0x4B, 0x04, 0x01, 0x4C, 0x04, 0x26,
+ 0x26, 0x01, 0x09, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x02, 0x68, 0x28, 0x44, 0x25, 0x26, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x17, 0x01, 0x04, 0x0B, 0x01, 0x10, 0x08, 0x44, 0x01, 0x08, 0x17,
+ 0x01, 0x10, 0x44, 0x09, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x03, 0x45, 0x04, 0x01, 0x46,
+ 0x00, 0x25, 0x00, 0x00, 0x9A, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x11, 0x01, 0x02, 0x0F, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x9A, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x11, 0x26, 0x5B, 0x44, 0x01, 0x03, 0x0A, 0x17,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x9A, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x11, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x9A,
+ 0x01, 0x0C, 0x11, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x9A, 0x01, 0x81, 0x70, 0x17, 0x01,
+ 0x20, 0x0D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x00, 0x75, 0x2E, 0x26, 0x06, 0x22,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x06, 0x25, 0x01, 0x00, 0x9E, 0x04, 0x14,
+ 0x01, 0x02, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x0D, 0x25, 0x77, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0E,
+ 0x06, 0x03, 0x01, 0x10, 0x37, 0x04, 0x01, 0x25, 0x04, 0x01, 0x25, 0x7B,
+ 0x2E, 0x05, 0x33, 0x2F, 0x06, 0x30, 0x86, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x14, 0x38, 0x0E,
+ 0x06, 0x06, 0x25, 0x01, 0x02, 0x37, 0x04, 0x22, 0x01, 0x15, 0x38, 0x0E,
+ 0x06, 0x09, 0x25, 0xAD, 0x06, 0x03, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x9E, 0x04, 0x13, 0x01,
+ 0x16, 0x38, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x06, 0x25, 0x01, 0x01, 0x37, 0x04, 0x07, 0x25,
+ 0x01, 0x04, 0x37, 0x01, 0x00, 0x25, 0x1A, 0x06, 0x03, 0x01, 0x08, 0x37,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x1B, 0x26, 0x05, 0x13, 0x2F, 0x06, 0x10, 0x86, 0x2E, 0x01,
+ 0x15, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x08, 0x25, 0xAD, 0x01, 0x00, 0x77, 0x3E, 0x04, 0x01,
+ 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0xCE, 0x01, 0x07, 0x17, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x02,
+ 0x72, 0x28, 0x00, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x29, 0x1A, 0x06, 0x05, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x87, 0x3E, 0x00, 0xCE, 0x25, 0x04, 0x74, 0x00, 0x01, 0x14, 0xD1, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0xDE, 0x29, 0x26, 0x01, 0x00, 0xC8, 0x01, 0x16, 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x29,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x0B, 0xDE, 0x4E, 0x26, 0x26, 0x01, 0x03, 0x08, 0xDD,
+ 0xDD, 0x18, 0x26, 0x58, 0x06, 0x02, 0x25, 0x00, 0xDD, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x06,
+ 0x05, 0x84, 0x44, 0xD8, 0x04, 0x77, 0x25, 0x04, 0x6C, 0x00, 0x21, 0x01,
+ 0x0F, 0xDE, 0x26, 0x92, 0x2C, 0x01, 0x86, 0x03, 0x10, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x01,
+ 0x04, 0x08, 0xDD, 0x80, 0x2E, 0xDE, 0x78, 0x2E, 0xDE, 0x04, 0x02, 0x5E,
+ 0xDD, 0x26, 0xDC, 0x84, 0x44, 0xD8, 0x00, 0x02, 0xA4, 0xA6, 0x08, 0xA2,
+ 0x08, 0xA5, 0x08, 0xA7, 0x08, 0xA3, 0x08, 0x27, 0x08, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0xDE, 0x01, 0x27, 0x8E, 0x2E, 0x08, 0x91, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0B,
+ 0x08, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x04, 0x5E, 0x02, 0x00, 0x08, 0x83, 0x2C, 0x38,
+ 0x09, 0x26, 0x5B, 0x06, 0x24, 0x02, 0x00, 0x05, 0x04, 0x44, 0x5E, 0x44,
+ 0x5F, 0x01, 0x04, 0x09, 0x26, 0x58, 0x06, 0x03, 0x25, 0x01, 0x00, 0x26,
+ 0x01, 0x04, 0x08, 0x02, 0x00, 0x08, 0x03, 0x00, 0x44, 0x01, 0x04, 0x08,
+ 0x38, 0x08, 0x44, 0x04, 0x03, 0x25, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x03, 0x01, 0xDD, 0x94,
+ 0x2C, 0xDC, 0x7A, 0x01, 0x04, 0x19, 0x7A, 0x01, 0x04, 0x08, 0x01, 0x1C,
+ 0x32, 0x7A, 0x01, 0x20, 0xD8, 0x8D, 0x8E, 0x2E, 0xDA, 0x91, 0x2E, 0x26,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x0B, 0xDC, 0x90, 0x44, 0x26, 0x06, 0x0F, 0x5D, 0x38, 0x2C,
+ 0x26, 0xC7, 0x05, 0x02, 0x62, 0x28, 0xDC, 0x44, 0x5E, 0x44, 0x04, 0x6E,
+ 0x60, 0x01, 0x01, 0xDE, 0x01, 0x00, 0xDE, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x81, 0x5A,
+ 0x02, 0x00, 0xDC, 0xA4, 0x06, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x83, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xDC, 0x89,
+ 0xA4, 0x01, 0x04, 0x09, 0x26, 0xDC, 0x5D, 0xDA, 0xA6, 0x06, 0x16, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0xDC, 0x8B, 0xA6, 0x01, 0x04, 0x09, 0x26, 0xDC, 0x01, 0x02, 0x09,
+ 0x26, 0xDC, 0x01, 0x00, 0xDE, 0x01, 0x03, 0x09, 0xD9, 0xA2, 0x06, 0x0C,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0xDC, 0x01, 0x01, 0xDC, 0x82, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x08, 0x09, 0xDE,
+ 0xA5, 0x06, 0x19, 0x01, 0x0D, 0xDC, 0xA5, 0x01, 0x04, 0x09, 0x26, 0xDC,
+ 0x01, 0x02, 0x09, 0xDC, 0x42, 0x06, 0x03, 0x01, 0x03, 0xDB, 0x43, 0x06,
+ 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xDB, 0xA7, 0x26, 0x06, 0x36, 0x01, 0x0A, 0xDC, 0x01,
+ 0x04, 0x09, 0x26, 0xDC, 0x5F, 0xDC, 0x40, 0x01, 0x00, 0x26, 0x01, 0x82,
+ 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x00, 0x17, 0x06, 0x0A, 0x01, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0x7F, 0x17, 0x01, 0x1D, 0xDC, 0x26, 0x01, 0x20, 0x0A, 0x06, 0x0C, 0xA0,
+ 0x11, 0x01, 0x01, 0x17, 0x06, 0x02, 0x26, 0xDC, 0x5C, 0x04, 0x6E, 0x60,
+ 0x04, 0x01, 0x25, 0xA3, 0x06, 0x0A, 0x01, 0x0B, 0xDC, 0x01, 0x02, 0xDC,
+ 0x01, 0x82, 0x00, 0xDC, 0x27, 0x26, 0x06, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x10, 0xDC, 0x01,
+ 0x04, 0x09, 0x26, 0xDC, 0x5F, 0xDC, 0x85, 0x2C, 0x01, 0x00, 0xA0, 0x0F,
+ 0x06, 0x0A, 0x26, 0x1E, 0x26, 0xDE, 0x84, 0x44, 0xD8, 0x5C, 0x04, 0x72,
+ 0x60, 0x04, 0x01, 0x25, 0x02, 0x01, 0x58, 0x05, 0x11, 0x01, 0x15, 0xDC,
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x26, 0xDC, 0x26, 0x06, 0x06, 0x5D, 0x01, 0x00, 0xDE, 0x04,
+ 0x77, 0x25, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x10, 0xDE, 0x79, 0x2C, 0x26, 0xCC, 0x06,
+ 0x0C, 0xAB, 0x23, 0x26, 0x5E, 0xDD, 0x26, 0xDC, 0x84, 0x44, 0xD8, 0x04,
+ 0x0D, 0x26, 0xCA, 0x44, 0xAB, 0x22, 0x26, 0x5C, 0xDD, 0x26, 0xDE, 0x84,
+ 0x44, 0xD8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x9C, 0x01, 0x14, 0xDE, 0x01, 0x0C, 0xDD, 0x84,
+ 0x01, 0x0C, 0xD8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x51, 0x26, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x02,
+ 0x60, 0x00, 0xCE, 0x25, 0x04, 0x73, 0x00, 0x26, 0xDC, 0xD8, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x26, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x00, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x41, 0x25, 0x26, 0x01, 0x10,
+ 0x17, 0x06, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0xDE, 0x02, 0x00, 0xDE, 0x26, 0x01, 0x08,
+ 0x17, 0x06, 0x06, 0x01, 0x03, 0xDE, 0x02, 0x00, 0xDE, 0x26, 0x01, 0x20,
+ 0x17, 0x06, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0xDE, 0x02, 0x00, 0xDE, 0x26, 0x01, 0x80,
+ 0x40, 0x17, 0x06, 0x06, 0x01, 0x06, 0xDE, 0x02, 0x00, 0xDE, 0x01, 0x04,
+ 0x17, 0x06, 0x06, 0x01, 0x02, 0xDE, 0x02, 0x00, 0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26,
+ 0x01, 0x08, 0x4F, 0xDE, 0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26, 0x01, 0x10, 0x4F, 0xDE,
+ 0xDC, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26, 0x52, 0x06, 0x02, 0x25, 0x00, 0xCE, 0x25, 0x04,
+ 0x76
+};
+
+static const uint16_t t0_caddr[] = {
+ 0,
+ 5,
+ 10,
+ 15,
+ 20,
+ 25,
+ 30,
+ 35,
+ 40,
+ 44,
+ 48,
+ 52,
+ 56,
+ 60,
+ 64,
+ 68,
+ 72,
+ 76,
+ 80,
+ 84,
+ 88,
+ 92,
+ 96,
+ 100,
+ 104,
+ 108,
+ 112,
+ 116,
+ 120,
+ 124,
+ 129,
+ 134,
+ 139,
+ 144,
+ 149,
+ 154,
+ 159,
+ 164,
+ 169,
+ 174,
+ 179,
+ 184,
+ 189,
+ 194,
+ 199,
+ 204,
+ 209,
+ 214,
+ 219,
+ 224,
+ 229,
+ 234,
+ 239,
+ 244,
+ 249,
+ 254,
+ 259,
+ 264,
+ 269,
+ 274,
+ 279,
+ 284,
+ 289,
+ 294,
+ 303,
+ 316,
+ 320,
+ 345,
+ 351,
+ 370,
+ 381,
+ 422,
+ 542,
+ 546,
+ 611,
+ 626,
+ 637,
+ 655,
+ 684,
+ 694,
+ 730,
+ 740,
+ 818,
+ 832,
+ 838,
+ 897,
+ 916,
+ 951,
+ 1000,
+ 1076,
+ 1103,
+ 1134,
+ 1145,
+ 1497,
+ 1644,
+ 1668,
+ 1884,
+ 1898,
+ 1907,
+ 1911,
+ 2006,
+ 2027,
+ 2083,
+ 2090,
+ 2101,
+ 2117,
+ 2123,
+ 2134,
+ 2169,
+ 2181,
+ 2187,
+ 2202,
+ 2218,
+ 2411,
+ 2420,
+ 2433,
+ 2442,
+ 2449,
+ 2459,
+ 2565,
+ 2590,
+ 2603,
+ 2619,
+ 2637,
+ 2669,
+ 2703,
+ 3071,
+ 3107,
+ 3120,
+ 3134,
+ 3139,
+ 3144,
+ 3210,
+ 3218,
+ 3226
+};
+
+#define T0_INTERPRETED 88
+
+#define T0_ENTER(ip, rp, slot) do { \
+ const unsigned char *t0_newip; \
+ uint32_t t0_lnum; \
+ t0_newip = &t0_codeblock[t0_caddr[(slot) - T0_INTERPRETED]]; \
+ t0_lnum = t0_parse7E_unsigned(&t0_newip); \
+ (rp) += t0_lnum; \
+ *((rp) ++) = (uint32_t)((ip) - &t0_codeblock[0]) + (t0_lnum << 16); \
+ (ip) = t0_newip; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define T0_DEFENTRY(name, slot) \
+void \
+name(void *ctx) \
+{ \
+ t0_context *t0ctx = ctx; \
+ t0ctx->ip = &t0_codeblock[0]; \
+ T0_ENTER(t0ctx->ip, t0ctx->rp, slot); \
+}
+
+T0_DEFENTRY(br_ssl_hs_client_init_main, 169)
+
+#define T0_NEXT(t0ipp) (*(*(t0ipp)) ++)
+
+void
+br_ssl_hs_client_run(void *t0ctx)
+{
+ uint32_t *dp, *rp;
+ const unsigned char *ip;
+
+#define T0_LOCAL(x) (*(rp - 2 - (x)))
+#define T0_POP() (*-- dp)
+#define T0_POPi() (*(int32_t *)(-- dp))
+#define T0_PEEK(x) (*(dp - 1 - (x)))
+#define T0_PEEKi(x) (*(int32_t *)(dp - 1 - (x)))
+#define T0_PUSH(v) do { *dp = (v); dp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_PUSHi(v) do { *(int32_t *)dp = (v); dp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_RPOP() (*-- rp)
+#define T0_RPOPi() (*(int32_t *)(-- rp))
+#define T0_RPUSH(v) do { *rp = (v); rp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_RPUSHi(v) do { *(int32_t *)rp = (v); rp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_ROLL(x) do { \
+ size_t t0len = (size_t)(x); \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 1 - t0len); \
+ memmove(dp - t0len - 1, dp - t0len, t0len * sizeof *dp); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_SWAP() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_ROT() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 3); \
+ *(dp - 3) = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_NROT() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 3); \
+ *(dp - 3) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_PICK(x) do { \
+ uint32_t t0depth = (x); \
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(t0depth)); \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_CO() do { \
+ goto t0_exit; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_RET() goto t0_next
+
+ dp = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->dp;
+ rp = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->rp;
+ ip = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->ip;
+ goto t0_next;
+ for (;;) {
+ uint32_t t0x;
+
+ t0_next:
+ t0x = T0_NEXT(&ip);
+ if (t0x < T0_INTERPRETED) {
+ switch (t0x) {
+ int32_t t0off;
+
+ case 0: /* ret */
+ t0x = T0_RPOP();
+ rp -= (t0x >> 16);
+ t0x &= 0xFFFF;
+ if (t0x == 0) {
+ ip = NULL;
+ goto t0_exit;
+ }
+ ip = &t0_codeblock[t0x];
+ break;
+ case 1: /* literal constant */
+ T0_PUSHi(t0_parse7E_signed(&ip));
+ break;
+ case 2: /* read local */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_LOCAL(t0_parse7E_unsigned(&ip)));
+ break;
+ case 3: /* write local */
+ T0_LOCAL(t0_parse7E_unsigned(&ip)) = T0_POP();
+ break;
+ case 4: /* jump */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ ip += t0off;
+ break;
+ case 5: /* jump if */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ if (T0_POP()) {
+ ip += t0off;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 6: /* jump if not */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ if (!T0_POP()) {
+ ip += t0off;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 7: {
+ /* * */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a * b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 8: {
+ /* + */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a + b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 9: {
+ /* - */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a - b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 10: {
+ /* < */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a < b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 11: {
+ /* << */
+
+ int c = (int)T0_POPi();
+ uint32_t x = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(x << c);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 12: {
+ /* <= */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a <= b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 13: {
+ /* <> */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a != b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 14: {
+ /* = */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a == b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 15: {
+ /* > */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a > b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 16: {
+ /* >= */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a >= b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 17: {
+ /* >> */
+
+ int c = (int)T0_POPi();
+ int32_t x = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSHi(x >> c);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 18: {
+ /* anchor-dn-append-name */
+
+ size_t len;
+
+ len = T0_POP();
+ if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
+ (*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->append_name(
+ CTX->client_auth_vtable, ENG->pad, len);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 19: {
+ /* anchor-dn-end-name */
+
+ if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
+ (*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->end_name(
+ CTX->client_auth_vtable);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 20: {
+ /* anchor-dn-end-name-list */
+
+ if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
+ (*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->end_name_list(
+ CTX->client_auth_vtable);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 21: {
+ /* anchor-dn-start-name */
+
+ size_t len;
+
+ len = T0_POP();
+ if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
+ (*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->start_name(
+ CTX->client_auth_vtable, len);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 22: {
+ /* anchor-dn-start-name-list */
+
+ if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
+ (*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->start_name_list(
+ CTX->client_auth_vtable);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 23: {
+ /* and */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a & b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 24: {
+ /* begin-cert */
+
+ if (ENG->chain_len == 0) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ } else {
+ ENG->cert_cur = ENG->chain->data;
+ ENG->cert_len = ENG->chain->data_len;
+ ENG->chain ++;
+ ENG->chain_len --;
+ T0_PUSH(ENG->cert_len);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 25: {
+ /* bzero */
+
+ size_t len = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *addr = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ memset(addr, 0, len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 26: {
+ /* can-output? */
+
+ T0_PUSHi(-(ENG->hlen_out > 0));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 27: {
+ /* co */
+ T0_CO();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 28: {
+ /* compute-Finished-inner */
+
+ int prf_id = T0_POP();
+ int from_client = T0_POPi();
+ unsigned char tmp[48];
+ br_tls_prf_seed_chunk seed;
+
+ br_tls_prf_impl prf = br_ssl_engine_get_PRF(ENG, prf_id);
+ seed.data = tmp;
+ if (ENG->session.version >= BR_TLS12) {
+ seed.len = br_multihash_out(&ENG->mhash, prf_id, tmp);
+ } else {
+ br_multihash_out(&ENG->mhash, br_md5_ID, tmp);
+ br_multihash_out(&ENG->mhash, br_sha1_ID, tmp + 16);
+ seed.len = 36;
+ }
+ prf(ENG->pad, 12, ENG->session.master_secret,
+ sizeof ENG->session.master_secret,
+ from_client ? "client finished" : "server finished",
+ 1, &seed);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 29: {
+ /* copy-cert-chunk */
+
+ size_t clen;
+
+ clen = ENG->cert_len;
+ if (clen > sizeof ENG->pad) {
+ clen = sizeof ENG->pad;
+ }
+ memcpy(ENG->pad, ENG->cert_cur, clen);
+ ENG->cert_cur += clen;
+ ENG->cert_len -= clen;
+ T0_PUSH(clen);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 30: {
+ /* copy-protocol-name */
+
+ size_t idx = T0_POP();
+ size_t len = strlen(ENG->protocol_names[idx]);
+ memcpy(ENG->pad, ENG->protocol_names[idx], len);
+ T0_PUSH(len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 31: {
+ /* data-get8 */
+
+ size_t addr = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(t0_datablock[addr]);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 32: {
+ /* discard-input */
+
+ ENG->hlen_in = 0;
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 33: {
+ /* do-client-sign */
+
+ size_t sig_len;
+
+ sig_len = make_client_sign(CTX);
+ if (sig_len == 0) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+ T0_CO();
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(sig_len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 34: {
+ /* do-ecdh */
+
+ unsigned prf_id = T0_POP();
+ unsigned ecdhe = T0_POP();
+ int x;
+
+ x = make_pms_ecdh(CTX, ecdhe, prf_id);
+ if (x < 0) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, -x);
+ T0_CO();
+ } else {
+ T0_PUSH(x);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 35: {
+ /* do-rsa-encrypt */
+
+ int x;
+
+ x = make_pms_rsa(CTX, T0_POP());
+ if (x < 0) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, -x);
+ T0_CO();
+ } else {
+ T0_PUSH(x);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 36: {
+ /* do-static-ecdh */
+
+ unsigned prf_id = T0_POP();
+
+ if (make_pms_static_ecdh(CTX, prf_id) < 0) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+ T0_CO();
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 37: {
+ /* drop */
+ (void)T0_POP();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 38: {
+ /* dup */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(0));
+ }
+ break;
+ case 39: {
+ /* ext-ALPN-length */
+
+ size_t u, len;
+
+ if (ENG->protocol_names_num == 0) {
+ T0_PUSH(0);
+ T0_RET();
+ }
+ len = 6;
+ for (u = 0; u < ENG->protocol_names_num; u ++) {
+ len += 1 + strlen(ENG->protocol_names[u]);
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 40: {
+ /* fail */
+
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, (int)T0_POPi());
+ T0_CO();
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 41: {
+ /* flush-record */
+
+ br_ssl_engine_flush_record(ENG);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 42: {
+ /* get-client-chain */
+
+ uint32_t auth_types;
+
+ auth_types = T0_POP();
+ if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
+ br_ssl_client_certificate ux;
+
+ (*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->choose(CTX->client_auth_vtable,
+ CTX, auth_types, &ux);
+ CTX->auth_type = (unsigned char)ux.auth_type;
+ CTX->hash_id = (unsigned char)ux.hash_id;
+ ENG->chain = ux.chain;
+ ENG->chain_len = ux.chain_len;
+ } else {
+ CTX->hash_id = 0;
+ ENG->chain_len = 0;
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 43: {
+ /* get-key-type-usages */
+
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk;
+ unsigned usages;
+
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ pk = xc->get_pkey(ENG->x509ctx, &usages);
+ if (pk == NULL) {
+ T0_PUSH(0);
+ } else {
+ T0_PUSH(pk->key_type | usages);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 44: {
+ /* get16 */
+
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(*(uint16_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 45: {
+ /* get32 */
+
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(*(uint32_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 46: {
+ /* get8 */
+
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(*((unsigned char *)ENG + addr));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 47: {
+ /* has-input? */
+
+ T0_PUSHi(-(ENG->hlen_in != 0));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 48: {
+ /* memcmp */
+
+ size_t len = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *addr2 = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *addr1 = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ int x = memcmp(addr1, addr2, len);
+ T0_PUSH((uint32_t)-(x == 0));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 49: {
+ /* memcpy */
+
+ size_t len = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *src = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *dst = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ memcpy(dst, src, len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 50: {
+ /* mkrand */
+
+ size_t len = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *addr = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ENG->rng, addr, len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 51: {
+ /* more-incoming-bytes? */
+
+ T0_PUSHi(ENG->hlen_in != 0 || !br_ssl_engine_recvrec_finished(ENG));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 52: {
+ /* multihash-init */
+
+ br_multihash_init(&ENG->mhash);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 53: {
+ /* neg */
+
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-a);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 54: {
+ /* not */
+
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(~a);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 55: {
+ /* or */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a | b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 56: {
+ /* over */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(1));
+ }
+ break;
+ case 57: {
+ /* read-chunk-native */
+
+ size_t clen = ENG->hlen_in;
+ if (clen > 0) {
+ uint32_t addr, len;
+
+ len = T0_POP();
+ addr = T0_POP();
+ if ((size_t)len < clen) {
+ clen = (size_t)len;
+ }
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)ENG + addr, ENG->hbuf_in, clen);
+ if (ENG->record_type_in == BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE) {
+ br_multihash_update(&ENG->mhash, ENG->hbuf_in, clen);
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(addr + (uint32_t)clen);
+ T0_PUSH(len - (uint32_t)clen);
+ ENG->hbuf_in += clen;
+ ENG->hlen_in -= clen;
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 58: {
+ /* read8-native */
+
+ if (ENG->hlen_in > 0) {
+ unsigned char x;
+
+ x = *ENG->hbuf_in ++;
+ if (ENG->record_type_in == BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE) {
+ br_multihash_update(&ENG->mhash, &x, 1);
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(x);
+ ENG->hlen_in --;
+ } else {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 59: {
+ /* set-server-curve */
+
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk;
+
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ pk = xc->get_pkey(ENG->x509ctx, NULL);
+ CTX->server_curve =
+ (pk->key_type == BR_KEYTYPE_EC) ? pk->key.ec.curve : 0;
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 60: {
+ /* set16 */
+
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ *(uint16_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr) = (uint16_t)T0_POP();
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 61: {
+ /* set32 */
+
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ *(uint32_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr) = (uint32_t)T0_POP();
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 62: {
+ /* set8 */
+
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ *((unsigned char *)ENG + addr) = (unsigned char)T0_POP();
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 63: {
+ /* strlen */
+
+ void *str = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH((uint32_t)strlen(str));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 64: {
+ /* supported-curves */
+
+ uint32_t x = ENG->iec == NULL ? 0 : ENG->iec->supported_curves;
+ T0_PUSH(x);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 65: {
+ /* supported-hash-functions */
+
+ int i;
+ unsigned x, num;
+
+ x = 0;
+ num = 0;
+ for (i = br_sha1_ID; i <= br_sha512_ID; i ++) {
+ if (br_multihash_getimpl(&ENG->mhash, i)) {
+ x |= 1U << i;
+ num ++;
+ }
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(x);
+ T0_PUSH(num);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 66: {
+ /* supports-ecdsa? */
+
+ T0_PUSHi(-(ENG->iecdsa != 0));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 67: {
+ /* supports-rsa-sign? */
+
+ T0_PUSHi(-(ENG->irsavrfy != 0));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 68: {
+ /* swap */
+ T0_SWAP();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 69: {
+ /* switch-aesccm-in */
+
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len, tag_len;
+
+ tag_len = T0_POP();
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_ccm_in(ENG, is_client, prf_id,
+ ENG->iaes_ctrcbc, cipher_key_len, tag_len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 70: {
+ /* switch-aesccm-out */
+
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len, tag_len;
+
+ tag_len = T0_POP();
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_ccm_out(ENG, is_client, prf_id,
+ ENG->iaes_ctrcbc, cipher_key_len, tag_len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 71: {
+ /* switch-aesgcm-in */
+
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len;
+
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_gcm_in(ENG, is_client, prf_id,
+ ENG->iaes_ctr, cipher_key_len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 72: {
+ /* switch-aesgcm-out */
+
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len;
+
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_gcm_out(ENG, is_client, prf_id,
+ ENG->iaes_ctr, cipher_key_len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 73: {
+ /* switch-cbc-in */
+
+ int is_client, prf_id, mac_id, aes;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len;
+
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ aes = T0_POP();
+ mac_id = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_cbc_in(ENG, is_client, prf_id, mac_id,
+ aes ? ENG->iaes_cbcdec : ENG->ides_cbcdec, cipher_key_len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 74: {
+ /* switch-cbc-out */
+
+ int is_client, prf_id, mac_id, aes;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len;
+
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ aes = T0_POP();
+ mac_id = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_cbc_out(ENG, is_client, prf_id, mac_id,
+ aes ? ENG->iaes_cbcenc : ENG->ides_cbcenc, cipher_key_len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 75: {
+ /* switch-chapol-in */
+
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_chapol_in(ENG, is_client, prf_id);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 76: {
+ /* switch-chapol-out */
+
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_chapol_out(ENG, is_client, prf_id);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 77: {
+ /* test-protocol-name */
+
+ size_t len = T0_POP();
+ size_t u;
+
+ for (u = 0; u < ENG->protocol_names_num; u ++) {
+ const char *name;
+
+ name = ENG->protocol_names[u];
+ if (len == strlen(name) && memcmp(ENG->pad, name, len) == 0) {
+ T0_PUSH(u);
+ T0_RET();
+ }
+ }
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 78: {
+ /* total-chain-length */
+
+ size_t u;
+ uint32_t total;
+
+ total = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < ENG->chain_len; u ++) {
+ total += 3 + (uint32_t)ENG->chain[u].data_len;
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(total);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 79: {
+ /* u>> */
+
+ int c = (int)T0_POPi();
+ uint32_t x = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(x >> c);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 80: {
+ /* verify-SKE-sig */
+
+ size_t sig_len = T0_POP();
+ int use_rsa = T0_POPi();
+ int hash = T0_POPi();
+
+ T0_PUSH(verify_SKE_sig(CTX, hash, use_rsa, sig_len));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 81: {
+ /* write-blob-chunk */
+
+ size_t clen = ENG->hlen_out;
+ if (clen > 0) {
+ uint32_t addr, len;
+
+ len = T0_POP();
+ addr = T0_POP();
+ if ((size_t)len < clen) {
+ clen = (size_t)len;
+ }
+ memcpy(ENG->hbuf_out, (unsigned char *)ENG + addr, clen);
+ if (ENG->record_type_out == BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE) {
+ br_multihash_update(&ENG->mhash, ENG->hbuf_out, clen);
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(addr + (uint32_t)clen);
+ T0_PUSH(len - (uint32_t)clen);
+ ENG->hbuf_out += clen;
+ ENG->hlen_out -= clen;
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 82: {
+ /* write8-native */
+
+ unsigned char x;
+
+ x = (unsigned char)T0_POP();
+ if (ENG->hlen_out > 0) {
+ if (ENG->record_type_out == BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE) {
+ br_multihash_update(&ENG->mhash, &x, 1);
+ }
+ *ENG->hbuf_out ++ = x;
+ ENG->hlen_out --;
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ } else {
+ T0_PUSHi(0);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 83: {
+ /* x509-append */
+
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+ size_t len;
+
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ len = T0_POP();
+ xc->append(ENG->x509ctx, ENG->pad, len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 84: {
+ /* x509-end-cert */
+
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ xc->end_cert(ENG->x509ctx);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 85: {
+ /* x509-end-chain */
+
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ T0_PUSH(xc->end_chain(ENG->x509ctx));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 86: {
+ /* x509-start-cert */
+
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ xc->start_cert(ENG->x509ctx, T0_POP());
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 87: {
+ /* x509-start-chain */
+
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+ uint32_t bc;
+
+ bc = T0_POP();
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ xc->start_chain(ENG->x509ctx, bc ? ENG->server_name : NULL);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ T0_ENTER(ip, rp, t0x);
+ }
+ }
+t0_exit:
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->dp = dp;
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->rp = rp;
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->ip = ip;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hs_client.t0 b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hs_client.t0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..23b39e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hs_client.t0
@@ -0,0 +1,1276 @@
+\ Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+\
+\ Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+\ a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+\ "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+\ without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+\ distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+\ permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+\ the following conditions:
+\
+\ The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+\ included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+\
+\ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+\ EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+\ MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+\ NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+\ BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+\ ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+\ CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+\ SOFTWARE.
+
+\ ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+\ Handshake processing code, for the client.
+\ The common T0 code (ssl_hs_common.t0) shall be read first.
+
+preamble {
+
+/*
+ * This macro evaluates to a pointer to the client context, under that
+ * specific name. It must be noted that since the engine context is the
+ * first field of the br_ssl_client_context structure ('eng'), then
+ * pointers values of both types are interchangeable, modulo an
+ * appropriate cast. This also means that "addresses" computed as offsets
+ * within the structure work for both kinds of context.
+ */
+#define CTX ((br_ssl_client_context *)ENG)
+
+/*
+ * Generate the pre-master secret for RSA key exchange, and encrypt it
+ * with the server's public key. Returned value is either the encrypted
+ * data length (in bytes), or -x on error, with 'x' being an error code.
+ *
+ * This code assumes that the public key has been already verified (it
+ * was properly obtained by the X.509 engine, and it has the right type,
+ * i.e. it is of type RSA and suitable for encryption).
+ */
+static int
+make_pms_rsa(br_ssl_client_context *ctx, int prf_id)
+{
+ const br_x509_class **xc;
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk;
+ const unsigned char *n;
+ unsigned char *pms;
+ size_t nlen, u;
+
+ xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
+ pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute actual RSA key length, in case there are leading zeros.
+ */
+ n = pk->key.rsa.n;
+ nlen = pk->key.rsa.nlen;
+ while (nlen > 0 && *n == 0) {
+ n ++;
+ nlen --;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need at least 59 bytes (48 bytes for pre-master secret, and
+ * 11 bytes for the PKCS#1 type 2 padding). Note that the X.509
+ * minimal engine normally blocks RSA keys shorter than 128 bytes,
+ * so this is mostly for public keys provided explicitly by the
+ * caller.
+ */
+ if (nlen < 59) {
+ return -BR_ERR_X509_WEAK_PUBLIC_KEY;
+ }
+ if (nlen > sizeof ctx->eng.pad) {
+ return -BR_ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Make PMS.
+ */
+ pms = ctx->eng.pad + nlen - 48;
+ br_enc16be(pms, ctx->eng.version_max);
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, pms + 2, 46);
+ br_ssl_engine_compute_master(&ctx->eng, prf_id, pms, 48);
+
+ /*
+ * Apply PKCS#1 type 2 padding.
+ */
+ ctx->eng.pad[0] = 0x00;
+ ctx->eng.pad[1] = 0x02;
+ ctx->eng.pad[nlen - 49] = 0x00;
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, ctx->eng.pad + 2, nlen - 51);
+ for (u = 2; u < nlen - 49; u ++) {
+ while (ctx->eng.pad[u] == 0) {
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng,
+ &ctx->eng.pad[u], 1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute RSA encryption.
+ */
+ if (!ctx->irsapub(ctx->eng.pad, nlen, &pk->key.rsa)) {
+ return -BR_ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED;
+ }
+ return (int)nlen;
+}
+
+/*
+ * OID for hash functions in RSA signatures.
+ */
+static const unsigned char *HASH_OID[] = {
+ BR_HASH_OID_SHA1,
+ BR_HASH_OID_SHA224,
+ BR_HASH_OID_SHA256,
+ BR_HASH_OID_SHA384,
+ BR_HASH_OID_SHA512
+};
+
+/*
+ * Check the RSA signature on the ServerKeyExchange message.
+ *
+ * hash hash function ID (2 to 6), or 0 for MD5+SHA-1 (with RSA only)
+ * use_rsa non-zero for RSA signature, zero for ECDSA
+ * sig_len signature length (in bytes); signature value is in the pad
+ *
+ * Returned value is 0 on success, or an error code.
+ */
+static int
+verify_SKE_sig(br_ssl_client_context *ctx,
+ int hash, int use_rsa, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ const br_x509_class **xc;
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk;
+ br_multihash_context mhc;
+ unsigned char hv[64], head[4];
+ size_t hv_len;
+
+ xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
+ pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc, NULL);
+ br_multihash_zero(&mhc);
+ br_multihash_copyimpl(&mhc, &ctx->eng.mhash);
+ br_multihash_init(&mhc);
+ br_multihash_update(&mhc,
+ ctx->eng.client_random, sizeof ctx->eng.client_random);
+ br_multihash_update(&mhc,
+ ctx->eng.server_random, sizeof ctx->eng.server_random);
+ head[0] = 3;
+ head[1] = 0;
+ head[2] = ctx->eng.ecdhe_curve;
+ head[3] = ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len;
+ br_multihash_update(&mhc, head, sizeof head);
+ br_multihash_update(&mhc,
+ ctx->eng.ecdhe_point, ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len);
+ if (hash) {
+ hv_len = br_multihash_out(&mhc, hash, hv);
+ if (hv_len == 0) {
+ return BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!br_multihash_out(&mhc, br_md5_ID, hv)
+ || !br_multihash_out(&mhc, br_sha1_ID, hv + 16))
+ {
+ return BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+ hv_len = 36;
+ }
+ if (use_rsa) {
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+ const unsigned char *hash_oid;
+
+ if (hash) {
+ hash_oid = HASH_OID[hash - 2];
+ } else {
+ hash_oid = NULL;
+ }
+ if (!ctx->eng.irsavrfy(ctx->eng.pad, sig_len,
+ hash_oid, hv_len, &pk->key.rsa, tmp)
+ || memcmp(tmp, hv, hv_len) != 0)
+ {
+ return BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!ctx->eng.iecdsa(ctx->eng.iec, hv, hv_len, &pk->key.ec,
+ ctx->eng.pad, sig_len))
+ {
+ return BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform client-side ECDH (or ECDHE). The point that should be sent to
+ * the server is written in the pad; returned value is either the point
+ * length (in bytes), or -x on error, with 'x' being an error code.
+ *
+ * The point _from_ the server is taken from ecdhe_point[] if 'ecdhe'
+ * is non-zero, or from the X.509 engine context if 'ecdhe' is zero
+ * (for static ECDH).
+ */
+static int
+make_pms_ecdh(br_ssl_client_context *ctx, unsigned ecdhe, int prf_id)
+{
+ int curve;
+ unsigned char key[66], point[133];
+ const unsigned char *order, *point_src;
+ size_t glen, olen, point_len, xoff, xlen;
+ unsigned char mask;
+
+ if (ecdhe) {
+ curve = ctx->eng.ecdhe_curve;
+ point_src = ctx->eng.ecdhe_point;
+ point_len = ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len;
+ } else {
+ const br_x509_class **xc;
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk;
+
+ xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
+ pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc, NULL);
+ curve = pk->key.ec.curve;
+ point_src = pk->key.ec.q;
+ point_len = pk->key.ec.qlen;
+ }
+ if ((ctx->eng.iec->supported_curves & ((uint32_t)1 << curve)) == 0) {
+ return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to generate our key, as a non-zero random value which
+ * is lower than the curve order, in a "large enough" range. We
+ * force top bit to 0 and bottom bit to 1, which guarantees that
+ * the value is in the proper range.
+ */
+ order = ctx->eng.iec->order(curve, &olen);
+ mask = 0xFF;
+ while (mask >= order[0]) {
+ mask >>= 1;
+ }
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, key, olen);
+ key[0] &= mask;
+ key[olen - 1] |= 0x01;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the common ECDH point, whose X coordinate is the
+ * pre-master secret.
+ */
+ ctx->eng.iec->generator(curve, &glen);
+ if (glen != point_len) {
+ return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(point, point_src, glen);
+ if (!ctx->eng.iec->mul(point, glen, key, olen, curve)) {
+ return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The pre-master secret is the X coordinate.
+ */
+ xoff = ctx->eng.iec->xoff(curve, &xlen);
+ br_ssl_engine_compute_master(&ctx->eng, prf_id, point + xoff, xlen);
+
+ ctx->eng.iec->mulgen(point, key, olen, curve);
+ memcpy(ctx->eng.pad, point, glen);
+ return (int)glen;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform full static ECDH. This occurs only in the context of client
+ * authentication with certificates: the server uses an EC public key,
+ * the cipher suite is of type ECDH (not ECDHE), the server requested a
+ * client certificate and accepts static ECDH, the client has a
+ * certificate with an EC public key in the same curve, and accepts
+ * static ECDH as well.
+ *
+ * Returned value is 0 on success, -1 on error.
+ */
+static int
+make_pms_static_ecdh(br_ssl_client_context *ctx, int prf_id)
+{
+ unsigned char point[133];
+ size_t point_len;
+ const br_x509_class **xc;
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk;
+
+ xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
+ pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc, NULL);
+ point_len = pk->key.ec.qlen;
+ if (point_len > sizeof point) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(point, pk->key.ec.q, point_len);
+ if (!(*ctx->client_auth_vtable)->do_keyx(
+ ctx->client_auth_vtable, point, &point_len))
+ {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ br_ssl_engine_compute_master(&ctx->eng,
+ prf_id, point, point_len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the client-side signature. This is invoked only when a
+ * signature-based client authentication was selected. The computed
+ * signature is in the pad; its length (in bytes) is returned. On
+ * error, 0 is returned.
+ */
+static size_t
+make_client_sign(br_ssl_client_context *ctx)
+{
+ size_t hv_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute hash of handshake messages so far. This "cannot" fail
+ * because the list of supported hash functions provided to the
+ * client certificate handler was trimmed to include only the
+ * hash functions that the multi-hasher supports.
+ */
+ if (ctx->hash_id) {
+ hv_len = br_multihash_out(&ctx->eng.mhash,
+ ctx->hash_id, ctx->eng.pad);
+ } else {
+ br_multihash_out(&ctx->eng.mhash,
+ br_md5_ID, ctx->eng.pad);
+ br_multihash_out(&ctx->eng.mhash,
+ br_sha1_ID, ctx->eng.pad + 16);
+ hv_len = 36;
+ }
+ return (*ctx->client_auth_vtable)->do_sign(
+ ctx->client_auth_vtable, ctx->hash_id, hv_len,
+ ctx->eng.pad, sizeof ctx->eng.pad);
+}
+
+}
+
+\ =======================================================================
+
+: addr-ctx:
+ next-word { field }
+ "addr-" field + 0 1 define-word
+ 0 8191 "offsetof(br_ssl_client_context, " field + ")" + make-CX
+ postpone literal postpone ; ;
+
+addr-ctx: min_clienthello_len
+addr-ctx: hashes
+addr-ctx: auth_type
+addr-ctx: hash_id
+
+\ Length of the Secure Renegotiation extension. This is 5 for the
+\ first handshake, 17 for a renegotiation (if the server supports the
+\ extension), or 0 if we know that the server does not support the
+\ extension.
+: ext-reneg-length ( -- n )
+ addr-reneg get8 dup if 1 - 17 * else drop 5 then ;
+
+\ Length of SNI extension.
+: ext-sni-length ( -- len )
+ addr-server_name strlen dup if 9 + then ;
+
+\ Length of Maximum Fragment Length extension.
+: ext-frag-length ( -- len )
+ addr-log_max_frag_len get8 14 = if 0 else 5 then ;
+
+\ Length of Signatures extension.
+: ext-signatures-length ( -- len )
+ supported-hash-functions { num } drop 0
+ supports-rsa-sign? if num + then
+ supports-ecdsa? if num + then
+ dup if 1 << 6 + then ;
+
+\ Write supported hash functions ( sign -- )
+: write-hashes
+ { sign }
+ supported-hash-functions drop
+ \ We advertise hash functions in the following preference order:
+ \ SHA-256 SHA-224 SHA-384 SHA-512 SHA-1
+ \ Rationale:
+ \ -- SHA-256 and SHA-224 are more efficient on 32-bit architectures
+ \ -- SHA-1 is less than ideally collision-resistant
+ dup 0x10 and if 4 write8 sign write8 then
+ dup 0x08 and if 3 write8 sign write8 then
+ dup 0x20 and if 5 write8 sign write8 then
+ dup 0x40 and if 6 write8 sign write8 then
+ 0x04 and if 2 write8 sign write8 then ;
+
+\ Length of Supported Curves extension.
+: ext-supported-curves-length ( -- len )
+ supported-curves dup if
+ 0 { x }
+ begin dup while
+ dup 1 and x + >x
+ 1 >>
+ repeat
+ drop x 1 << 6 +
+ then ;
+
+\ Length of Supported Point Formats extension.
+: ext-point-format-length ( -- len )
+ supported-curves if 6 else 0 then ;
+
+\ Length of ALPN extension.
+cc: ext-ALPN-length ( -- len ) {
+ size_t u, len;
+
+ if (ENG->protocol_names_num == 0) {
+ T0_PUSH(0);
+ T0_RET();
+ }
+ len = 6;
+ for (u = 0; u < ENG->protocol_names_num; u ++) {
+ len += 1 + strlen(ENG->protocol_names[u]);
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(len);
+}
+
+\ Write handshake message: ClientHello
+: write-ClientHello ( -- )
+ { ; total-ext-length }
+
+ \ Compute length for extensions (without the general two-byte header).
+ \ This does not take padding extension into account.
+ ext-reneg-length ext-sni-length + ext-frag-length +
+ ext-signatures-length +
+ ext-supported-curves-length + ext-point-format-length +
+ ext-ALPN-length +
+ >total-ext-length
+
+ \ ClientHello type
+ 1 write8
+
+ \ Compute and write length
+ 39 addr-session_id_len get8 + addr-suites_num get8 1 << +
+ total-ext-length if 2+ total-ext-length + then
+ \ Compute padding (if requested).
+ addr-min_clienthello_len get16 over - dup 0> if
+ \ We well add a Pad ClientHello extension, which has its
+ \ own header (4 bytes) and might be the only extension
+ \ (2 extra bytes for the extension list header).
+ total-ext-length ifnot swap 2+ swap 2- then
+ \ Account for the extension header.
+ 4 - dup 0< if drop 0 then
+ \ Adjust total extension length.
+ dup 4 + total-ext-length + >total-ext-length
+ \ Adjust ClientHello length.
+ swap 4 + over + swap
+ else
+ drop
+ -1
+ then
+ { ext-padding-amount }
+ write24
+
+ \ Protocol version
+ addr-version_max get16 write16
+
+ \ Client random
+ addr-client_random 4 bzero
+ addr-client_random 4 + 28 mkrand
+ addr-client_random 32 write-blob
+
+ \ Session ID
+ addr-session_id addr-session_id_len get8 write-blob-head8
+
+ \ Supported cipher suites. We also check here that we indeed
+ \ support all these suites.
+ addr-suites_num get8 dup 1 << write16
+ addr-suites_buf swap
+ begin
+ dup while 1-
+ over get16
+ dup suite-supported? ifnot ERR_BAD_CIPHER_SUITE fail then
+ write16
+ swap 2+ swap
+ repeat
+ 2drop
+
+ \ Compression methods (only "null" compression)
+ 1 write8 0 write8
+
+ \ Extensions
+ total-ext-length if
+ total-ext-length write16
+ ext-reneg-length if
+ 0xFF01 write16 \ extension type (0xFF01)
+ addr-saved_finished
+ ext-reneg-length 4 - dup write16 \ extension length
+ 1- write-blob-head8 \ verify data
+ then
+ ext-sni-length if
+ 0x0000 write16 \ extension type (0)
+ addr-server_name
+ ext-sni-length 4 - dup write16 \ extension length
+ 2 - dup write16 \ ServerNameList length
+ 0 write8 \ name type: host_name
+ 3 - write-blob-head16 \ the name itself
+ then
+ ext-frag-length if
+ 0x0001 write16 \ extension type (1)
+ 0x0001 write16 \ extension length
+ addr-log_max_frag_len get8 8 - write8
+ then
+ ext-signatures-length if
+ 0x000D write16 \ extension type (13)
+ ext-signatures-length 4 - dup write16 \ extension length
+ 2 - write16 \ list length
+ supports-ecdsa? if 3 write-hashes then
+ supports-rsa-sign? if 1 write-hashes then
+ then
+ \ TODO: add an API to specify preference order for curves.
+ \ Right now we send Curve25519 first, then other curves in
+ \ increasing ID values (hence P-256 in second).
+ ext-supported-curves-length dup if
+ 0x000A write16 \ extension type (10)
+ 4 - dup write16 \ extension length
+ 2- write16 \ list length
+ supported-curves 0
+ dup 0x20000000 and if
+ 0xDFFFFFFF and 29 write16
+ then
+ begin dup 32 < while
+ dup2 >> 1 and if dup write16 then
+ 1+
+ repeat
+ 2drop
+ else
+ drop
+ then
+ ext-point-format-length if
+ 0x000B write16 \ extension type (11)
+ 0x0002 write16 \ extension length
+ 0x0100 write16 \ value: 1 format: uncompressed
+ then
+ ext-ALPN-length dup if
+ 0x0010 write16 \ extension type (16)
+ 4 - dup write16 \ extension length
+ 2- write16 \ list length
+ addr-protocol_names_num get16 0
+ begin
+ dup2 > while
+ dup copy-protocol-name
+ dup write8 addr-pad swap write-blob
+ 1+
+ repeat
+ 2drop
+ else
+ drop
+ then
+ ext-padding-amount 0< ifnot
+ 0x0015 write16 \ extension value (21)
+ ext-padding-amount
+ dup write16 \ extension length
+ begin dup while
+ 1- 0 write8 repeat \ value (only zeros)
+ drop
+ then
+ then
+ ;
+
+\ =======================================================================
+
+\ Parse server SNI extension. If present, then it should be empty.
+: read-server-sni ( lim -- lim )
+ read16 if ERR_BAD_SNI fail then ;
+
+\ Parse server Max Fragment Length extension. If present, then it should
+\ advertise the same length as the client. Note that whether the server
+\ sends it or not changes nothing for us: we won't send any record larger
+\ than the advertised value anyway, and we will accept incoming records
+\ up to our input buffer length.
+: read-server-frag ( lim -- lim )
+ read16 1 = ifnot ERR_BAD_FRAGLEN fail then
+ read8 8 + addr-log_max_frag_len get8 = ifnot ERR_BAD_FRAGLEN fail then ;
+
+\ Parse server Secure Renegotiation extension. This is called only if
+\ the client sent that extension, so we only have two cases to
+\ distinguish: first handshake, and renegotiation; in the latter case,
+\ we know that the server supports the extension, otherwise the client
+\ would not have sent it.
+: read-server-reneg ( lim -- lim )
+ read16
+ addr-reneg get8 ifnot
+ \ "reneg" is 0, so this is a first handshake. The server's
+ \ extension MUST be empty. We also learn that the server
+ \ supports the extension.
+ 1 = ifnot ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
+ read8 0 = ifnot ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
+ 2 addr-reneg set8
+ else
+ \ "reneg" is non-zero, and we sent an extension, so it must
+ \ be 2 and this is a renegotiation. We must verify that
+ \ the extension contents have length exactly 24 bytes and
+ \ match the saved client and server "Finished".
+ 25 = ifnot ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
+ read8 24 = ifnot ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
+ addr-pad 24 read-blob
+ addr-saved_finished addr-pad 24 memcmp ifnot
+ ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail
+ then
+ then ;
+
+\ Read the ALPN extension from the server. It must contain a single name,
+\ and that name must match one of our names.
+: read-ALPN-from-server ( lim -- lim )
+ \ Extension contents length.
+ read16 open-elt
+ \ Length of list of names.
+ read16 open-elt
+ \ There should be a single name.
+ read8 addr-pad swap dup { len } read-blob
+ close-elt
+ close-elt
+ len test-protocol-name dup 0< if
+ 3 flag? if ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
+ drop
+ else
+ 1+ addr-selected_protocol set16
+ then ;
+
+\ Save a value in a 16-bit field, or check it in case of session resumption.
+: check-resume ( val addr resume -- )
+ if get16 = ifnot ERR_RESUME_MISMATCH fail then else set16 then ;
+
+cc: DEBUG-BLOB ( addr len -- ) {
+ extern int printf(const char *fmt, ...);
+
+ size_t len = T0_POP();
+ unsigned char *buf = (unsigned char *)CTX + T0_POP();
+ size_t u;
+
+ printf("BLOB:");
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ if (u % 16 == 0) {
+ printf("\n ");
+ }
+ printf(" %02x", buf[u]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+}
+
+\ Parse incoming ServerHello. Returned value is true (-1) on session
+\ resumption.
+: read-ServerHello ( -- bool )
+ \ Get header, and check message type.
+ read-handshake-header 2 = ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
+
+ \ Get protocol version.
+ read16 { version }
+ version addr-version_min get16 < version addr-version_max get16 > or if
+ ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION fail
+ then
+
+ \ Enforce chosen version for subsequent records in both directions.
+ version addr-version_in get16 <> if ERR_BAD_VERSION fail then
+ version addr-version_out set16
+
+ \ Server random.
+ addr-server_random 32 read-blob
+
+ \ The "session resumption" flag.
+ 0 { resume }
+
+ \ Session ID.
+ read8 { idlen }
+ idlen 32 > if ERR_OVERSIZED_ID fail then
+ addr-pad idlen read-blob
+ idlen addr-session_id_len get8 = idlen 0 > and if
+ addr-session_id addr-pad idlen memcmp if
+ \ Server session ID is non-empty and matches what
+ \ we sent, so this is a session resumption.
+ -1 >resume
+ then
+ then
+ addr-session_id addr-pad idlen memcpy
+ idlen addr-session_id_len set8
+
+ \ Record version.
+ version addr-version resume check-resume
+
+ \ Cipher suite. We check that it is part of the list of cipher
+ \ suites that we advertised.
+ read16
+ dup scan-suite 0< if ERR_BAD_CIPHER_SUITE fail then
+ \ Also check that the cipher suite is compatible with the
+ \ announced version: suites that don't use HMAC/SHA-1 are
+ \ for TLS-1.2 only, not older versions.
+ dup use-tls12? version 0x0303 < and if ERR_BAD_CIPHER_SUITE fail then
+ addr-cipher_suite resume check-resume
+
+ \ Compression method. Should be 0 (no compression).
+ read8 if ERR_BAD_COMPRESSION fail then
+
+ \ Parse extensions (if any). If there is no extension, then the
+ \ read limit (on the TOS) should be 0 at that point.
+ dup if
+ \ Length of extension list.
+ \ message size.
+ read16 open-elt
+
+ \ Enumerate extensions. For each of them, check that we
+ \ sent an extension of that type, and did not see it
+ \ yet; and then process it.
+ ext-sni-length { ok-sni }
+ ext-reneg-length { ok-reneg }
+ ext-frag-length { ok-frag }
+ ext-signatures-length { ok-signatures }
+ ext-supported-curves-length { ok-curves }
+ ext-point-format-length { ok-points }
+ ext-ALPN-length { ok-ALPN }
+ begin dup while
+ read16
+ case
+ \ Server Name Indication. The server may
+ \ send such an extension if it uses the SNI
+ \ from the client, but that "response
+ \ extension" is supposed to be empty.
+ 0x0000 of
+ ok-sni ifnot
+ ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
+ then
+ 0 >ok-sni
+ read-server-sni
+ endof
+
+ \ Max Frag Length. The contents shall be
+ \ a single byte whose value matches the one
+ \ sent by the client.
+ 0x0001 of
+ ok-frag ifnot
+ ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
+ then
+ 0 >ok-frag
+ read-server-frag
+ endof
+
+ \ Secure Renegotiation.
+ 0xFF01 of
+ ok-reneg ifnot
+ ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
+ then
+ 0 >ok-reneg
+ read-server-reneg
+ endof
+
+ \ Signature Algorithms.
+ \ Normally, the server should never send this
+ \ extension (so says RFC 5246 #7.4.1.4.1),
+ \ but some existing servers do.
+ 0x000D of
+ ok-signatures ifnot
+ ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
+ then
+ 0 >ok-signatures
+ read-ignore-16
+ endof
+
+ \ Supported Curves.
+ 0x000A of
+ ok-curves ifnot
+ ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
+ then
+ 0 >ok-curves
+ read-ignore-16
+ endof
+
+ \ Supported Point Formats.
+ 0x000B of
+ ok-points ifnot
+ ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
+ then
+ 0 >ok-points
+ read-ignore-16
+ endof
+
+ \ ALPN.
+ 0x0010 of
+ ok-ALPN ifnot
+ ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
+ then
+ 0 >ok-ALPN
+ read-ALPN-from-server
+ endof
+
+ ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION fail
+ endcase
+ repeat
+
+ \ If we sent a secure renegotiation extension but did not
+ \ receive a response, then the server does not support
+ \ secure renegotiation. This is a hard failure if this
+ \ is a renegotiation.
+ ok-reneg if
+ ok-reneg 5 > if ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
+ 1 addr-reneg set8
+ then
+ close-elt
+ else
+ \ No extension received at all, so the server does not
+ \ support secure renegotiation. This is a hard failure
+ \ if the server was previously known to support it (i.e.
+ \ this is a renegotiation).
+ ext-reneg-length 5 > if ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
+ 1 addr-reneg set8
+ then
+ close-elt
+ resume
+ ;
+
+cc: set-server-curve ( -- ) {
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk;
+
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ pk = xc->get_pkey(ENG->x509ctx, NULL);
+ CTX->server_curve =
+ (pk->key_type == BR_KEYTYPE_EC) ? pk->key.ec.curve : 0;
+}
+
+\ Read Certificate message from server.
+: read-Certificate-from-server ( -- )
+ addr-cipher_suite get16 expected-key-type
+ -1 read-Certificate
+ dup 0< if neg fail then
+ dup ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
+ over and <> if ERR_WRONG_KEY_USAGE fail then
+
+ \ Set server curve (used for static ECDH).
+ set-server-curve ;
+
+\ Verify signature on ECDHE point sent by the server.
+\ 'hash' is the hash function to use (1 to 6, or 0 for RSA with MD5+SHA-1)
+\ 'use-rsa' is 0 for ECDSA, -1 for for RSA
+\ 'sig-len' is the signature length (in bytes)
+\ The signature itself is in the pad.
+cc: verify-SKE-sig ( hash use-rsa sig-len -- err ) {
+ size_t sig_len = T0_POP();
+ int use_rsa = T0_POPi();
+ int hash = T0_POPi();
+
+ T0_PUSH(verify_SKE_sig(CTX, hash, use_rsa, sig_len));
+}
+
+\ Parse ServerKeyExchange
+: read-ServerKeyExchange ( -- )
+ \ Get header, and check message type.
+ read-handshake-header 12 = ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
+
+ \ We expect a named curve, and we must support it.
+ read8 3 = ifnot ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
+ read16 dup addr-ecdhe_curve set8
+ dup 32 >= if ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
+ supported-curves swap >> 1 and ifnot ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
+
+ \ Read the server point.
+ read8
+ dup 133 > if ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
+ dup addr-ecdhe_point_len set8
+ addr-ecdhe_point swap read-blob
+
+ \ If using TLS-1.2+, then the hash function and signature algorithm
+ \ are explicitly provided; the signature algorithm must match what
+ \ the cipher suite specifies. With TLS-1.0 and 1.1, the signature
+ \ algorithm is inferred from the cipher suite, and the hash is
+ \ either MD5+SHA-1 (for RSA signatures) or SHA-1 (for ECDSA).
+ addr-version get16 0x0303 >= { tls1.2+ }
+ addr-cipher_suite get16 use-rsa-ecdhe? { use-rsa }
+ 2 { hash }
+ tls1.2+ if
+ \ Read hash function; accept only the SHA-* identifiers
+ \ (from SHA-1 to SHA-512, no MD5 here).
+ read8
+ dup dup 2 < swap 6 > or if ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
+ >hash
+ read8
+ \ Get expected signature algorithm and compare with what
+ \ the server just sent. Expected value is 1 for RSA, 3
+ \ for ECDSA. Note that 'use-rsa' evaluates to -1 for RSA,
+ \ 0 for ECDSA.
+ use-rsa 1 << 3 + = ifnot ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
+ else
+ \ For MD5+SHA-1, we set 'hash' to 0.
+ use-rsa if 0 >hash then
+ then
+
+ \ Read signature into the pad.
+ read16 dup { sig-len }
+
+ dup 512 > if ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED fail then
+ addr-pad swap read-blob
+
+ \ Verify signature.
+ hash use-rsa sig-len verify-SKE-sig
+ dup if fail then drop
+
+ close-elt ;
+
+\ Client certificate: start processing of anchor names.
+cc: anchor-dn-start-name-list ( -- ) {
+ if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
+ (*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->start_name_list(
+ CTX->client_auth_vtable);
+ }
+}
+
+\ Client certificate: start a new anchor DN (length is 16-bit).
+cc: anchor-dn-start-name ( length -- ) {
+ size_t len;
+
+ len = T0_POP();
+ if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
+ (*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->start_name(
+ CTX->client_auth_vtable, len);
+ }
+}
+
+\ Client certificate: push some data for current anchor DN.
+cc: anchor-dn-append-name ( length -- ) {
+ size_t len;
+
+ len = T0_POP();
+ if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
+ (*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->append_name(
+ CTX->client_auth_vtable, ENG->pad, len);
+ }
+}
+
+\ Client certificate: end current anchor DN.
+cc: anchor-dn-end-name ( -- ) {
+ if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
+ (*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->end_name(
+ CTX->client_auth_vtable);
+ }
+}
+
+\ Client certificate: end list of anchor DN.
+cc: anchor-dn-end-name-list ( -- ) {
+ if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
+ (*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->end_name_list(
+ CTX->client_auth_vtable);
+ }
+}
+
+\ Client certificate: obtain the client certificate chain.
+cc: get-client-chain ( auth_types -- ) {
+ uint32_t auth_types;
+
+ auth_types = T0_POP();
+ if (CTX->client_auth_vtable != NULL) {
+ br_ssl_client_certificate ux;
+
+ (*CTX->client_auth_vtable)->choose(CTX->client_auth_vtable,
+ CTX, auth_types, &ux);
+ CTX->auth_type = (unsigned char)ux.auth_type;
+ CTX->hash_id = (unsigned char)ux.hash_id;
+ ENG->chain = ux.chain;
+ ENG->chain_len = ux.chain_len;
+ } else {
+ CTX->hash_id = 0;
+ ENG->chain_len = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+\ Parse CertificateRequest. Header has already been read.
+: read-contents-CertificateRequest ( lim -- )
+ \ Read supported client authentication types. We keep only
+ \ RSA, ECDSA, and ECDH.
+ 0 { auth_types }
+ read8 open-elt
+ begin dup while
+ read8 case
+ 1 of 0x0000FF endof
+ 64 of 0x00FF00 endof
+ 65 of 0x010000 endof
+ 66 of 0x020000 endof
+ 0 swap
+ endcase
+ auth_types or >auth_types
+ repeat
+ close-elt
+
+ \ Full static ECDH is allowed only if the cipher suite is ECDH
+ \ (not ECDHE). It would be theoretically feasible to use static
+ \ ECDH on the client side with an ephemeral key pair from the
+ \ server, but RFC 4492 (section 3) forbids it because ECDHE suites
+ \ are supposed to provide forward secrecy, and static ECDH would
+ \ negate that property.
+ addr-cipher_suite get16 use-ecdh? ifnot
+ auth_types 0xFFFF and >auth_types
+ then
+
+ \ Note: if the cipher suite is ECDH, then the X.509 validation
+ \ engine was invoked with the BR_KEYTYPE_EC | BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX
+ \ combination, so the server's public key has already been
+ \ checked to be fit for a key exchange.
+
+ \ With TLS 1.2:
+ \ - rsa_fixed_ecdh and ecdsa_fixed_ecdh are synoymous.
+ \ - There is an explicit list of supported sign+hash.
+ \ With TLS 1.0,
+ addr-version get16 0x0303 >= if
+ \ With TLS 1.2:
+ \ - There is an explicit list of supported sign+hash.
+ \ - The ECDH flags must be adjusted for RSA/ECDSA
+ \ support.
+ read-list-sign-algos dup addr-hashes set32
+
+ \ Trim down the list depending on what hash functions
+ \ we support (since the hashing itself is done by the SSL
+ \ engine, not by the certificate handler).
+ supported-hash-functions drop dup 8 << or 0x030000 or and
+
+ auth_types and
+ auth_types 0x030000 and if
+ dup 0x0000FF and if 0x010000 or then
+ dup 0x00FF00 and if 0x020000 or then
+ then
+ >auth_types
+ else
+ \ TLS 1.0 or 1.1. The hash function is fixed for signatures
+ \ (MD5+SHA-1 for RSA, SHA-1 for ECDSA).
+ auth_types 0x030401 and >auth_types
+ then
+
+ \ Parse list of anchor DN.
+ anchor-dn-start-name-list
+ read16 open-elt
+ begin dup while
+ read16 open-elt
+ dup anchor-dn-start-name
+
+ \ We read the DN by chunks through the pad, so
+ \ as to use the existing reading function (read-blob)
+ \ that also ensures proper hashing.
+ begin
+ dup while
+ dup 256 > if 256 else dup then { len }
+ addr-pad len read-blob
+ len anchor-dn-append-name
+ repeat
+ close-elt
+ anchor-dn-end-name
+ repeat
+ close-elt
+ anchor-dn-end-name-list
+
+ \ We should have reached the message end.
+ close-elt
+
+ \ Obtain the client chain.
+ auth_types get-client-chain
+ ;
+
+\ (obsolete)
+\ Write an empty Certificate message.
+\ : write-empty-Certificate ( -- )
+\ 11 write8 3 write24 0 write24 ;
+
+cc: do-rsa-encrypt ( prf_id -- nlen ) {
+ int x;
+
+ x = make_pms_rsa(CTX, T0_POP());
+ if (x < 0) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, -x);
+ T0_CO();
+ } else {
+ T0_PUSH(x);
+ }
+}
+
+cc: do-ecdh ( echde prf_id -- ulen ) {
+ unsigned prf_id = T0_POP();
+ unsigned ecdhe = T0_POP();
+ int x;
+
+ x = make_pms_ecdh(CTX, ecdhe, prf_id);
+ if (x < 0) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, -x);
+ T0_CO();
+ } else {
+ T0_PUSH(x);
+ }
+}
+
+cc: do-static-ecdh ( prf-id -- ) {
+ unsigned prf_id = T0_POP();
+
+ if (make_pms_static_ecdh(CTX, prf_id) < 0) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+ T0_CO();
+ }
+}
+
+cc: do-client-sign ( -- sig_len ) {
+ size_t sig_len;
+
+ sig_len = make_client_sign(CTX);
+ if (sig_len == 0) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+ T0_CO();
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(sig_len);
+}
+
+\ Write ClientKeyExchange.
+: write-ClientKeyExchange ( -- )
+ 16 write8
+ addr-cipher_suite get16
+ dup use-rsa-keyx? if
+ prf-id do-rsa-encrypt
+ dup 2+ write24
+ dup write16
+ addr-pad swap write-blob
+ else
+ dup use-ecdhe? swap prf-id do-ecdh
+ dup 1+ write24
+ dup write8
+ addr-pad swap write-blob
+ then ;
+
+\ Write CertificateVerify. This is invoked only if a client certificate
+\ was requested and sent, and the authentication is not full static ECDH.
+: write-CertificateVerify ( -- )
+ do-client-sign
+ 15 write8 dup
+ addr-version get16 0x0303 >= if
+ 4 + write24
+ addr-hash_id get8 write8
+ addr-auth_type get8 write8
+ else
+ 2+ write24
+ then
+ dup write16 addr-pad swap write-blob ;
+
+\ =======================================================================
+
+\ Perform a handshake.
+: do-handshake ( -- )
+ 0 addr-application_data set8
+ 22 addr-record_type_out set8
+ 0 addr-selected_protocol set16
+ multihash-init
+
+ write-ClientHello
+ flush-record
+ read-ServerHello
+
+ if
+ \ Session resumption.
+ -1 read-CCS-Finished
+ -1 write-CCS-Finished
+
+ else
+
+ \ Not a session resumption.
+
+ \ Read certificate; then check key type and usages against
+ \ cipher suite.
+ read-Certificate-from-server
+
+ \ Depending on cipher suite, we may now expect a
+ \ ServerKeyExchange.
+ addr-cipher_suite get16 expected-key-type
+ CX 0 63 { BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN } and if
+ read-ServerKeyExchange
+ then
+
+ \ Get next header.
+ read-handshake-header
+
+ \ If this is a CertificateRequest, parse it, then read
+ \ next header.
+ dup 13 = if
+ drop read-contents-CertificateRequest
+ read-handshake-header
+ -1
+ else
+ 0
+ then
+ { seen-CR }
+
+ \ At that point, we should have a ServerHelloDone,
+ \ whose length must be 0.
+ 14 = ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
+ if ERR_BAD_HELLO_DONE fail then
+
+ \ There should not be more bytes in the record at that point.
+ more-incoming-bytes? if ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
+
+ seen-CR if
+ \ If the server requested a client certificate, then
+ \ we must write a Certificate message (it may be
+ \ empty).
+ write-Certificate
+
+ \ If using static ECDH, then the ClientKeyExchange
+ \ is empty, and there is no CertificateVerify.
+ \ Otherwise, there is a ClientKeyExchange; there
+ \ will then be a CertificateVerify if a client chain
+ \ was indeed sent.
+ addr-hash_id get8 0xFF = if
+ drop
+ 16 write8 0 write24
+ addr-cipher_suite get16 prf-id do-static-ecdh
+ else
+ write-ClientKeyExchange
+ if write-CertificateVerify then
+ then
+ else
+ write-ClientKeyExchange
+ then
+
+ -1 write-CCS-Finished
+ -1 read-CCS-Finished
+ then
+
+ \ Now we should be invoked only in case of renegotiation.
+ 1 addr-application_data set8
+ 23 addr-record_type_out set8 ;
+
+\ Read a HelloRequest message.
+: read-HelloRequest ( -- )
+ \ A HelloRequest has length 0 and type 0.
+ read-handshake-header-core
+ if ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
+ if ERR_BAD_HANDSHAKE fail then ;
+
+\ Entry point.
+: main ( -- ! )
+ \ Perform initial handshake.
+ do-handshake
+
+ begin
+ \ Wait for further invocation. At that point, we should
+ \ get either an explicit call for renegotiation, or
+ \ an incoming HelloRequest handshake message.
+ wait-co
+ dup 0x07 and case
+ 0x00 of
+ 0x10 and if
+ do-handshake
+ then
+ endof
+ 0x01 of
+ drop
+ 0 addr-application_data set8
+ read-HelloRequest
+ \ Reject renegotiations if the peer does not
+ \ support secure renegotiation, or if the
+ \ "no renegotiation" flag is set.
+ addr-reneg get8 1 = 1 flag? or if
+ flush-record
+ begin can-output? not while
+ wait-co drop
+ repeat
+ 100 send-warning
+ \ We rejected the renegotiation,
+ \ but the connection is not dead.
+ \ We must set back things into
+ \ working "application data" state.
+ 1 addr-application_data set8
+ 23 addr-record_type_out set8
+ else
+ do-handshake
+ then
+ endof
+ ERR_UNEXPECTED fail
+ endcase
+ again
+ ;
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hs_common.t0 b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hs_common.t0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4674891
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hs_common.t0
@@ -0,0 +1,1382 @@
+\ Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+\
+\ Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+\ a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+\ "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+\ without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+\ distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+\ permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+\ the following conditions:
+\
+\ The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+\ included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+\
+\ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+\ EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+\ MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+\ NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+\ BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+\ ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+\ CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+\ SOFTWARE.
+
+\ ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+\ This is the common T0 code for processing handshake messages (code that
+\ is used by both client and server).
+
+preamble {
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * This macro evaluates to a pointer to the current engine context.
+ */
+#define ENG ((br_ssl_engine_context *)(void *)((unsigned char *)t0ctx - offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, cpu)))
+
+}
+
+\ IMPLEMENTATION NOTES
+\ ====================
+\
+\ This code handles all records except application data records.
+\ Application data is accepted (incoming records, outgoing payload data)
+\ only when the application_data flag is set, which is done at the end
+\ of the handshake; and it is cleared whenever a renegotiation or a
+\ closure takes place.
+\
+\ Incoming alerts are processed on the fly; fatal alerts terminate the
+\ context, while warnings are ignored, except for close_notify, which
+\ triggers the closure procedure. That procedure never returns (it ends
+\ with an 'ERR_OK fail' call). We can thus make this processing right
+\ into the read functions.
+\
+\ Specific actions from the caller (closure or renegotiation) may happen
+\ only when jumping back into the T0 code, i.e. just after a 'co' call.
+\ Similarly, incoming record type may change only while the caller has
+\ control, so we need to check that type only when returning from a 'co'.
+\
+\ The handshake processor needs to defer back to the caller ('co') only
+\ in one of the following situations:
+\
+\ -- Some handshake data is expected.
+\
+\ -- The handshake is finished, and application data may flow. There may
+\ be some incoming handshake data (HelloRequest from the server). This
+\ is the only situation where a renegotiation call won't be ignored.
+\
+\ -- Some change-cipher-spec data is expected.
+\
+\ -- An alert record is expected. Other types of incoming records will be
+\ skipped.
+\
+\ -- Waiting for the currently accumulated record to be sent and the
+\ output buffer to become free again for another record.
+
+\ Placeholder for handling not yet implemented functionalities.
+: NYI ( -- ! )
+ "NOT YET IMPLEMENTED!" puts cr -1 fail ;
+
+\ Debug function that prints a string (and a newline) on stderr.
+cc: DBG ( addr -- ) {
+ extern void *stderr;
+ extern int fprintf(void *, const char *, ...);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", &t0_datablock[T0_POPi()]);
+}
+
+\ Debug function that prints a string and an integer value (followed
+\ by a newline) on stderr.
+cc: DBG2 ( addr x -- ) {
+ extern void *stderr;
+ extern int fprintf(void *, const char *, ...);
+ int32_t x = T0_POPi();
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: %ld (0x%08lX)\n",
+ &t0_datablock[T0_POPi()], (long)x, (unsigned long)(uint32_t)x);
+}
+
+\ Mark the context as failed with a specific error code. This also
+\ returns control to the caller.
+cc: fail ( err -- ! ) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, (int)T0_POPi());
+ T0_CO();
+}
+
+\ Read a byte from the context (address is offset in context).
+cc: get8 ( addr -- val ) {
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(*((unsigned char *)ENG + addr));
+}
+
+\ Read a 16-bit word from the context (address is offset in context).
+cc: get16 ( addr -- val ) {
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(*(uint16_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr));
+}
+
+\ Read a 32-bit word from the context (address is offset in context).
+cc: get32 ( addr -- val ) {
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(*(uint32_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr));
+}
+
+\ Set a byte in the context (address is offset in context).
+cc: set8 ( val addr -- ) {
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ *((unsigned char *)ENG + addr) = (unsigned char)T0_POP();
+}
+
+\ Set a 16-bit word in the context (address is offset in context).
+cc: set16 ( val addr -- ) {
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ *(uint16_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr) = (uint16_t)T0_POP();
+}
+
+\ Set a 32-bit word in the context (address is offset in context).
+cc: set32 ( val addr -- ) {
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ *(uint32_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr) = (uint32_t)T0_POP();
+}
+
+\ Define a word that evaluates as an address of a field within the
+\ engine context. The field name (C identifier) must follow in the
+\ source. For field 'foo', the defined word is 'addr-foo'.
+: addr-eng:
+ next-word { field }
+ "addr-" field + 0 1 define-word
+ 0 8191 "offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, " field + ")" + make-CX
+ postpone literal postpone ; ;
+
+addr-eng: max_frag_len
+addr-eng: log_max_frag_len
+addr-eng: peer_log_max_frag_len
+addr-eng: shutdown_recv
+addr-eng: record_type_in
+addr-eng: record_type_out
+addr-eng: version_in
+addr-eng: version_out
+addr-eng: application_data
+addr-eng: version_min
+addr-eng: version_max
+addr-eng: suites_buf
+addr-eng: suites_num
+addr-eng: server_name
+addr-eng: client_random
+addr-eng: server_random
+addr-eng: ecdhe_curve
+addr-eng: ecdhe_point
+addr-eng: ecdhe_point_len
+addr-eng: reneg
+addr-eng: saved_finished
+addr-eng: flags
+addr-eng: pad
+addr-eng: action
+addr-eng: alert
+addr-eng: close_received
+addr-eng: protocol_names_num
+addr-eng: selected_protocol
+
+\ Similar to 'addr-eng:', for fields in the 'session' substructure.
+: addr-session-field:
+ next-word { field }
+ "addr-" field + 0 1 define-word
+ 0 8191 "offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, session) + offsetof(br_ssl_session_parameters, " field + ")" + make-CX
+ postpone literal postpone ; ;
+
+addr-session-field: session_id
+addr-session-field: session_id_len
+addr-session-field: version
+addr-session-field: cipher_suite
+addr-session-field: master_secret
+
+\ Check a server flag by index.
+: flag? ( index -- bool )
+ addr-flags get32 swap >> 1 and neg ;
+
+\ Define a word that evaluates to an error constant. This assumes that
+\ all relevant error codes are in the 0..63 range.
+: err:
+ next-word { name }
+ name 0 1 define-word
+ 0 63 "BR_" name + make-CX postpone literal postpone ; ;
+
+err: ERR_OK
+err: ERR_BAD_PARAM
+err: ERR_BAD_STATE
+err: ERR_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION
+err: ERR_BAD_VERSION
+err: ERR_BAD_LENGTH
+err: ERR_TOO_LARGE
+err: ERR_BAD_MAC
+err: ERR_NO_RANDOM
+err: ERR_UNKNOWN_TYPE
+err: ERR_UNEXPECTED
+err: ERR_BAD_CCS
+err: ERR_BAD_ALERT
+err: ERR_BAD_HANDSHAKE
+err: ERR_OVERSIZED_ID
+err: ERR_BAD_CIPHER_SUITE
+err: ERR_BAD_COMPRESSION
+err: ERR_BAD_FRAGLEN
+err: ERR_BAD_SECRENEG
+err: ERR_EXTRA_EXTENSION
+err: ERR_BAD_SNI
+err: ERR_BAD_HELLO_DONE
+err: ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED
+err: ERR_BAD_FINISHED
+err: ERR_RESUME_MISMATCH
+err: ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM
+err: ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE
+err: ERR_WRONG_KEY_USAGE
+err: ERR_NO_CLIENT_AUTH
+
+\ Get supported curves (bit mask).
+cc: supported-curves ( -- x ) {
+ uint32_t x = ENG->iec == NULL ? 0 : ENG->iec->supported_curves;
+ T0_PUSH(x);
+}
+
+\ Get supported hash functions (bit mask and number).
+\ Note: this (on purpose) skips MD5.
+cc: supported-hash-functions ( -- x num ) {
+ int i;
+ unsigned x, num;
+
+ x = 0;
+ num = 0;
+ for (i = br_sha1_ID; i <= br_sha512_ID; i ++) {
+ if (br_multihash_getimpl(&ENG->mhash, i)) {
+ x |= 1U << i;
+ num ++;
+ }
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(x);
+ T0_PUSH(num);
+}
+
+\ Test support for RSA signatures.
+cc: supports-rsa-sign? ( -- bool ) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-(ENG->irsavrfy != 0));
+}
+
+\ Test support for ECDSA signatures.
+cc: supports-ecdsa? ( -- bool ) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-(ENG->iecdsa != 0));
+}
+
+\ (Re)initialise the multihasher.
+cc: multihash-init ( -- ) {
+ br_multihash_init(&ENG->mhash);
+}
+
+\ Flush the current record: if some payload data has been accumulated,
+\ close the record and schedule it for sending. If there is no such data,
+\ this function does nothing.
+cc: flush-record ( -- ) {
+ br_ssl_engine_flush_record(ENG);
+}
+
+\ Yield control to the caller.
+\ When the control is returned to us, react to the new context. Returned
+\ value is a bitwise combination of the following:
+\ 0x01 handshake data is available
+\ 0x02 change-cipher-spec data is available
+\ 0x04 some data other than handshake or change-cipher-spec is available
+\ 0x08 output buffer is ready for a new outgoing record
+\ 0x10 renegotiation is requested and not to be ignored
+\ Flags 0x01, 0x02 and 0x04 are mutually exclusive.
+: wait-co ( -- state )
+ co
+ 0
+ addr-action get8 dup if
+ case
+ 1 of 0 do-close endof
+ 2 of addr-application_data get8 1 = if
+ 0x10 or
+ then endof
+ endcase
+ else
+ drop
+ then
+ addr-close_received get8 ifnot
+ has-input? if
+ addr-record_type_in get8 case
+
+ \ ChangeCipherSpec
+ 20 of 0x02 or endof
+
+ \ Alert -- if close_notify received, trigger
+ \ the closure sequence.
+ 21 of process-alerts if -1 do-close then endof
+
+ \ Handshake
+ 22 of 0x01 or endof
+
+ \ Not CCS, Alert or Handshake.
+ drop 0x04 or 0
+ endcase
+ then
+ then
+ can-output? if 0x08 or then ;
+
+\ Send an alert message. This shall be called only when there is room for
+\ an outgoing record.
+: send-alert ( level alert -- )
+ 21 addr-record_type_out set8
+ swap write8-native drop write8-native drop
+ flush-record ;
+
+\ Send an alert message of level "warning". This shall be called only when
+\ there is room for an outgoing record.
+: send-warning ( alert -- )
+ 1 swap send-alert ;
+
+\ Fail by sending a fatal alert.
+: fail-alert ( alert -- ! )
+ { alert }
+ flush-record
+ begin can-output? not while wait-co drop repeat
+ 2 alert send-alert
+ begin can-output? not while wait-co drop repeat
+ alert 512 + fail ;
+
+\ Perform the close operation:
+\ -- Prevent new application data from the caller.
+\ -- Incoming data is discarded (except alerts).
+\ -- Outgoing data is flushed.
+\ -- A close_notify alert is sent.
+\ -- If 'cnr' is zero, then incoming data is discarded until a close_notify
+\ is received.
+\ -- At the end, the context is terminated.
+\
+\ cnr shall be either 0 or -1.
+: do-close ( cnr -- ! )
+ \ 'cnr' is set to non-zero when a close_notify is received from
+ \ the peer.
+ { cnr }
+
+ \ Get out of application data state. If we were accepting
+ \ application data (flag is 1), and we still expect a close_notify
+ \ from the peer (cnr is 0), then we should set the flag to 2.
+ \ In all other cases, flag should be set to 0.
+ addr-application_data get8 cnr not and 1 << addr-application_data set8
+
+ \ Flush existing payload if any.
+ flush-record
+
+ \ Wait for room to send the close_notify. Since individual records
+ \ can always hold at least 512 bytes, we know that when there is
+ \ room, then there is room for a complete close_notify (two bytes).
+ begin can-output? not while cnr wait-for-close >cnr repeat
+
+ \ Write the close_notify and flush it.
+ \ 21 addr-record_type_out set8
+ \ 1 write8-native 0 write8-native 2drop
+ \ flush-record
+ 0 send-warning
+
+ \ Loop until our record has been sent (we know it's gone when
+ \ writing is again possible) and a close_notify has been received.
+ cnr
+ begin
+ dup can-output? and if ERR_OK fail then
+ wait-for-close
+ again ;
+
+\ Yield control to the engine, with a possible flush. If 'cnr' is 0,
+\ then input is analysed: all input is discarded, until a close_notify
+\ is received.
+: wait-for-close ( cnr -- cnr )
+ co
+ dup ifnot
+ has-input? if
+ addr-record_type_in get8 21 = if
+ drop process-alerts
+ \ If we received a close_notify then we
+ \ no longer accept incoming application
+ \ data records.
+ 0 addr-application_data set8
+ else
+ discard-input
+ then
+ then
+ then ;
+
+\ Test whether there is some accumulated payload that still needs to be
+\ sent.
+cc: payload-to-send? ( -- bool ) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-br_ssl_engine_has_pld_to_send(ENG));
+}
+
+\ Test whether there is some available input data.
+cc: has-input? ( -- bool ) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-(ENG->hlen_in != 0));
+}
+
+\ Test whether some payload bytes may be written.
+cc: can-output? ( -- bool ) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-(ENG->hlen_out > 0));
+}
+
+\ Discard current input entirely.
+cc: discard-input ( -- ) {
+ ENG->hlen_in = 0;
+}
+
+\ Low-level read for one byte. If there is no available byte right
+\ away, then -1 is returned. Otherwise, the byte value is returned.
+\ If the current record type is "handshake" then the read byte is also
+\ injected in the multi-hasher.
+cc: read8-native ( -- x ) {
+ if (ENG->hlen_in > 0) {
+ unsigned char x;
+
+ x = *ENG->hbuf_in ++;
+ if (ENG->record_type_in == BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE) {
+ br_multihash_update(&ENG->mhash, &x, 1);
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(x);
+ ENG->hlen_in --;
+ } else {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ }
+}
+
+\ Low-level read for several bytes. On entry, this expects an address
+\ (offset in the engine context) and a length; these values designate
+\ where the chunk should go. Upon exit, the new address and length
+\ are pushed; that output length contains how many bytes could not be
+\ read. If there is no available byte for reading, the address and
+\ length are unchanged.
+\ If the current record type is "handshake" then the read bytes are
+\ injected in the multi-hasher.
+cc: read-chunk-native ( addr len -- addr len ) {
+ size_t clen = ENG->hlen_in;
+ if (clen > 0) {
+ uint32_t addr, len;
+
+ len = T0_POP();
+ addr = T0_POP();
+ if ((size_t)len < clen) {
+ clen = (size_t)len;
+ }
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)ENG + addr, ENG->hbuf_in, clen);
+ if (ENG->record_type_in == BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE) {
+ br_multihash_update(&ENG->mhash, ENG->hbuf_in, clen);
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(addr + (uint32_t)clen);
+ T0_PUSH(len - (uint32_t)clen);
+ ENG->hbuf_in += clen;
+ ENG->hlen_in -= clen;
+ }
+}
+
+\ Process available alert bytes. If a fatal alert is received, then the
+\ context is terminated; otherwise, this returns either true (-1) if a
+\ close_notify was received, false (0) otherwise.
+: process-alerts ( -- bool )
+ 0
+ begin has-input? while read8-native process-alert-byte or repeat
+ dup if 1 addr-shutdown_recv set8 then ;
+
+\ Process an alert byte. Returned value is non-zero if this is a close_notify,
+\ zero otherwise.
+: process-alert-byte ( x -- bool )
+ addr-alert get8 case
+ 0 of
+ \ 'alert' field is 0, so this byte shall be a level.
+ \ Levels shall be 1 (warning) or 2 (fatal); we convert
+ \ all other values to "fatal".
+ dup 1 <> if drop 2 then
+ addr-alert set8 0
+ endof
+ 1 of
+ 0 addr-alert set8
+ \ close_notify has value 0.
+ \ no_renegotiation has value 100, and we treat it
+ \ as a fatal alert.
+ dup 100 = if 256 + fail then
+ 0=
+ endof
+ \ Fatal alert implies context termination.
+ drop 256 + fail
+ endcase ;
+
+\ In general we only deal with handshake data here. Alerts are processed
+\ in specific code right when they are received, and ChangeCipherSpec has
+\ its own handling code. So we need to check that the data is "handshake"
+\ only when returning from a coroutine call.
+
+\ Yield control to the engine. Alerts are processed; if incoming data is
+\ neither handshake or alert, then an error is triggered.
+: wait-for-handshake ( -- )
+ wait-co 0x07 and 0x01 > if ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then ;
+
+\ Flush outgoing data (if any), then wait for the output buffer to be
+\ clear; when this is done, set the output record type to the specified
+\ value.
+: wait-rectype-out ( rectype -- )
+ { rectype }
+ flush-record
+ begin
+ can-output? if rectype addr-record_type_out set8 ret then
+ wait-co drop
+ again ;
+
+\ Read one byte of handshake data. Block until that byte is available.
+\ This does not check any length.
+: read8-nc ( -- x )
+ begin
+ read8-native dup 0< ifnot ret then
+ drop wait-for-handshake
+ again ;
+
+\ Test whether there are some more bytes in the current record. These
+\ bytes have not necessarily been received yet (processing of unencrypted
+\ records may begin before all bytes are received).
+cc: more-incoming-bytes? ( -- bool ) {
+ T0_PUSHi(ENG->hlen_in != 0 || !br_ssl_engine_recvrec_finished(ENG));
+}
+
+\ For reading functions, the TOS is supposed to contain the number of bytes
+\ that can still be read (from encapsulating structure header), and it is
+\ updated.
+
+: check-len ( lim len -- lim )
+ - dup 0< if ERR_BAD_PARAM fail then ;
+
+\ Read one byte of handshake data. This pushes an integer in the 0..255 range.
+: read8 ( lim -- lim x )
+ 1 check-len read8-nc ;
+
+\ Read a 16-bit value (in the 0..65535 range)
+: read16 ( lim -- lim n )
+ 2 check-len read8-nc 8 << read8-nc + ;
+
+\ Read a 24-bit value (in the 0..16777215 range)
+: read24 ( lim -- lim n )
+ 3 check-len read8-nc 8 << read8-nc + 8 << read8-nc + ;
+
+\ Read some bytes. The "address" is an offset within the context
+\ structure.
+: read-blob ( lim addr len -- lim )
+ { addr len }
+ len check-len
+ addr len
+ begin
+ read-chunk-native
+ dup 0 = if 2drop ret then
+ wait-for-handshake
+ again ;
+
+\ Read some bytes and drop them.
+: skip-blob ( lim len -- lim )
+ swap over check-len swap
+ begin dup while read8-nc drop 1- repeat
+ drop ;
+
+\ Read a 16-bit length, then skip exactly that many bytes.
+: read-ignore-16 ( lim -- lim )
+ read16 skip-blob ;
+
+\ Open a substructure: the inner structure length is checked against,
+\ and subtracted, from the output structure current limit.
+: open-elt ( lim len -- lim-outer lim-inner )
+ dup { len }
+ - dup 0< if ERR_BAD_PARAM fail then
+ len ;
+
+\ Close the current structure. This checks that the limit is 0.
+: close-elt ( lim -- )
+ if ERR_BAD_PARAM fail then ;
+
+\ Write one byte of handshake data.
+: write8 ( n -- )
+ begin
+ dup write8-native if drop ret then
+ wait-co drop
+ again ;
+
+\ Low-level write for one byte. On exit, it pushes either -1 (byte was
+\ written) or 0 (no room in output buffer).
+cc: write8-native ( x -- bool ) {
+ unsigned char x;
+
+ x = (unsigned char)T0_POP();
+ if (ENG->hlen_out > 0) {
+ if (ENG->record_type_out == BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE) {
+ br_multihash_update(&ENG->mhash, &x, 1);
+ }
+ *ENG->hbuf_out ++ = x;
+ ENG->hlen_out --;
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ } else {
+ T0_PUSHi(0);
+ }
+}
+
+\ Write a 16-bit value.
+: write16 ( n -- )
+ dup 8 u>> write8 write8 ;
+
+\ Write a 24-bit value.
+: write24 ( n -- )
+ dup 16 u>> write8 write16 ;
+
+\ Write some bytes. The "address" is an offset within the context
+\ structure.
+: write-blob ( addr len -- )
+ begin
+ write-blob-chunk
+ dup 0 = if 2drop ret then
+ wait-co drop
+ again ;
+
+cc: write-blob-chunk ( addr len -- addr len ) {
+ size_t clen = ENG->hlen_out;
+ if (clen > 0) {
+ uint32_t addr, len;
+
+ len = T0_POP();
+ addr = T0_POP();
+ if ((size_t)len < clen) {
+ clen = (size_t)len;
+ }
+ memcpy(ENG->hbuf_out, (unsigned char *)ENG + addr, clen);
+ if (ENG->record_type_out == BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE) {
+ br_multihash_update(&ENG->mhash, ENG->hbuf_out, clen);
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(addr + (uint32_t)clen);
+ T0_PUSH(len - (uint32_t)clen);
+ ENG->hbuf_out += clen;
+ ENG->hlen_out -= clen;
+ }
+}
+
+\ Write a blob with the length as header (over one byte)
+: write-blob-head8 ( addr len -- )
+ dup write8 write-blob ;
+
+\ Write a blob with the length as header (over two bytes)
+: write-blob-head16 ( addr len -- )
+ dup write16 write-blob ;
+
+\ Perform a byte-to-byte comparison between two blobs. Each blob is
+\ provided as an "address" (offset in the context structure); the
+\ length is common. Returned value is true (-1) if the two blobs are
+\ equal, false (0) otherwise.
+cc: memcmp ( addr1 addr2 len -- bool ) {
+ size_t len = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *addr2 = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *addr1 = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ int x = memcmp(addr1, addr2, len);
+ T0_PUSH((uint32_t)-(x == 0));
+}
+
+\ Copy bytes between two areas, whose addresses are provided as
+\ offsets in the context structure.
+cc: memcpy ( dst src len -- ) {
+ size_t len = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *src = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *dst = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ memcpy(dst, src, len);
+}
+
+\ Get string length (zero-terminated). The string address is provided as
+\ an offset relative to the context start. Returned length does not include
+\ the terminated 0.
+cc: strlen ( str -- len ) {
+ void *str = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH((uint32_t)strlen(str));
+}
+
+\ Fill a buffer with zeros. The buffer address is an offset in the context.
+cc: bzero ( addr len -- ) {
+ size_t len = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *addr = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ memset(addr, 0, len);
+}
+
+\ Scan the list of supported cipher suites for a given value. If found,
+\ then the list index at which it was found is returned; otherwise, -1
+\ is returned.
+: scan-suite ( suite -- index )
+ { suite }
+ addr-suites_num get8 { num }
+ 0
+ begin dup num < while
+ dup 1 << addr-suites_buf + get16 suite = if ret then
+ 1+
+ repeat
+ drop -1 ;
+
+\ =======================================================================
+
+\ Generate random bytes into buffer (address is offset in context).
+cc: mkrand ( addr len -- ) {
+ size_t len = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *addr = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ENG->rng, addr, len);
+}
+
+\ Read a handshake message header: type and length. These are returned
+\ in reverse order (type is TOS, length is below it).
+: read-handshake-header-core ( -- lim type )
+ read8-nc 3 read24 swap drop swap ;
+
+\ Read a handshake message header: type and length. If the header is for
+\ a HelloRequest message, then it is discarded and a new header is read
+\ (repeatedly if necessary).
+: read-handshake-header ( -- lim type )
+ begin
+ read-handshake-header-core dup 0= while
+ drop if ERR_BAD_HANDSHAKE fail then
+ repeat ;
+
+\ =======================================================================
+
+\ Cipher suite processing.
+\
+\ Unfortunately, cipher suite identifiers are attributed mostly arbitrary,
+\ so we have to map the cipher suite numbers we support into aggregate
+\ words that encode the information we need. Table below is organized
+\ as a sequence of pairs of 16-bit words, the first being the cipher suite
+\ identifier, the second encoding the algorithm elements. The suites are
+\ ordered by increasing cipher suite ID, so that fast lookups may be
+\ performed with a binary search (not implemented for the moment, since it
+\ does not appear to matter much in practice).
+\
+\ Algorithm elements are encoded over 4 bits each, in the following order
+\ (most significant to least significant):
+\
+\ -- Server key type:
+\ 0 RSA (RSA key exchange)
+\ 1 ECDHE-RSA (ECDHE key exchange, RSA signature)
+\ 2 ECDHE-ECDSA (ECDHE key exchange, ECDSA signature)
+\ 3 ECDH-RSA (ECDH key exchange, certificate is RSA-signed)
+\ 4 ECDH-ECDSA (ECDH key exchange, certificate is ECDSA-signed)
+\ -- Encryption algorithm:
+\ 0 3DES/CBC
+\ 1 AES-128/CBC
+\ 2 AES-256/CBC
+\ 3 AES-128/GCM
+\ 4 AES-256/GCM
+\ 5 ChaCha20/Poly1305
+\ 6 AES-128/CCM
+\ 7 AES-256/CCM
+\ 8 AES-128/CCM8
+\ 9 AES-256/CCM8
+\ -- MAC algorithm:
+\ 0 none (for suites with AEAD encryption)
+\ 2 HMAC/SHA-1
+\ 4 HMAC/SHA-256
+\ 5 HMAC/SHA-384
+\ -- PRF for TLS-1.2:
+\ 4 with SHA-256
+\ 5 with SHA-384
+\
+\ WARNING: if adding a new cipher suite that does not use SHA-256 for the
+\ PRF (with TLS 1.2), be sure to check the suites_sha384[] array defined
+\ in ssl/ssl_keyexport.c
+
+data: cipher-suite-def
+
+hexb| 000A 0024 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
+hexb| 002F 0124 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+hexb| 0035 0224 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+hexb| 003C 0144 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+hexb| 003D 0244 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
+
+hexb| 009C 0304 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+hexb| 009D 0405 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+
+hexb| C003 4024 | \ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
+hexb| C004 4124 | \ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+hexb| C005 4224 | \ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+hexb| C008 2024 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
+hexb| C009 2124 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+hexb| C00A 2224 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+hexb| C00D 3024 | \ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
+hexb| C00E 3124 | \ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+hexb| C00F 3224 | \ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+hexb| C012 1024 | \ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
+hexb| C013 1124 | \ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+hexb| C014 1224 | \ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+
+hexb| C023 2144 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+hexb| C024 2255 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+hexb| C025 4144 | \ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+hexb| C026 4255 | \ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+hexb| C027 1144 | \ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+hexb| C028 1255 | \ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+hexb| C029 3144 | \ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+hexb| C02A 3255 | \ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+hexb| C02B 2304 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+hexb| C02C 2405 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+hexb| C02D 4304 | \ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+hexb| C02E 4405 | \ TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+hexb| C02F 1304 | \ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+hexb| C030 1405 | \ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+hexb| C031 3304 | \ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+hexb| C032 3405 | \ TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+
+hexb| C09C 0604 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
+hexb| C09D 0704 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
+hexb| C0A0 0804 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
+hexb| C0A1 0904 | \ TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
+hexb| C0AC 2604 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
+hexb| C0AD 2704 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
+hexb| C0AE 2804 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
+hexb| C0AF 2904 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
+
+hexb| CCA8 1504 | \ TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+hexb| CCA9 2504 | \ TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+
+hexb| 0000 | \ List terminator.
+
+\ Convert cipher suite identifier to element words. This returns 0 if
+\ the cipher suite is not known.
+: cipher-suite-to-elements ( suite -- elts )
+ { id }
+ cipher-suite-def
+ begin
+ dup 2+ swap data-get16
+ dup ifnot 2drop 0 ret then
+ id = if data-get16 ret then
+ 2+
+ again ;
+
+\ Check that a given cipher suite is supported. Note that this also
+\ returns true (-1) for the TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV pseudo-ciphersuite.
+: suite-supported? ( suite -- bool )
+ dup 0x5600 = if drop -1 ret then
+ cipher-suite-to-elements 0<> ;
+
+\ Get expected key type for cipher suite. The key type is one of
+\ BR_KEYTYPE_RSA or BR_KEYTYPE_EC, combined with either BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX
+\ (RSA encryption or static ECDH) or BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN (RSA or ECDSA
+\ signature, for ECDHE cipher suites).
+: expected-key-type ( suite -- key-type )
+ cipher-suite-to-elements 12 >>
+ case
+ 0 of CX 0 63 { BR_KEYTYPE_RSA | BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX } endof
+ 1 of CX 0 63 { BR_KEYTYPE_RSA | BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN } endof
+ 2 of CX 0 63 { BR_KEYTYPE_EC | BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN } endof
+ 3 of CX 0 63 { BR_KEYTYPE_EC | BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX } endof
+ 4 of CX 0 63 { BR_KEYTYPE_EC | BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX } endof
+ 0 swap
+ endcase ;
+
+\ Test whether the cipher suite uses RSA key exchange.
+: use-rsa-keyx? ( suite -- bool )
+ cipher-suite-to-elements 12 >> 0= ;
+
+\ Test whether the cipher suite uses ECDHE key exchange, signed with RSA.
+: use-rsa-ecdhe? ( suite -- bool )
+ cipher-suite-to-elements 12 >> 1 = ;
+
+\ Test whether the cipher suite uses ECDHE key exchange, signed with ECDSA.
+: use-ecdsa-ecdhe? ( suite -- bool )
+ cipher-suite-to-elements 12 >> 2 = ;
+
+\ Test whether the cipher suite uses ECDHE key exchange (with RSA or ECDSA).
+: use-ecdhe? ( suite -- bool )
+ cipher-suite-to-elements 12 >> dup 0> swap 3 < and ;
+
+\ Test whether the cipher suite uses ECDH (static) key exchange.
+: use-ecdh? ( suite -- bool )
+ cipher-suite-to-elements 12 >> 2 > ;
+
+\ Get identifier for the PRF (TLS 1.2).
+: prf-id ( suite -- id )
+ cipher-suite-to-elements 15 and ;
+
+\ Test whether a cipher suite is only for TLS-1.2. Cipher suites that
+\ can be used with TLS-1.0 or 1.1 use HMAC/SHA-1. RFC do not formally
+\ forbid using a CBC-based TLS-1.2 cipher suite, e.g. based on HMAC/SHA-256,
+\ with older protocol versions; however, servers should not do that, since
+\ it may confuse clients. Since the server code does not try such games,
+\ for consistency, the client should reject it as well (normal servers
+\ don't do that, so any attempt is a sign of foul play).
+: use-tls12? ( suite -- bool )
+ cipher-suite-to-elements 0xF0 and 0x20 <> ;
+
+\ Switch to negotiated security parameters for input or output.
+: switch-encryption ( is-client for-input -- )
+ { for-input }
+ addr-cipher_suite get16 cipher-suite-to-elements { elts }
+
+ \ prf_id
+ elts 15 and
+
+ \ mac_id
+ elts 4 >> 15 and
+
+ \ cipher type and key length
+ elts 8 >> 15 and case
+ \ 3DES/CBC
+ 0 of 0 24
+ for-input if
+ switch-cbc-in
+ else
+ switch-cbc-out
+ then
+ endof
+
+ \ AES-128/CBC
+ 1 of 1 16
+ for-input if
+ switch-cbc-in
+ else
+ switch-cbc-out
+ then
+ endof
+
+ \ AES-256/CBC
+ 2 of 1 32
+ for-input if
+ switch-cbc-in
+ else
+ switch-cbc-out
+ then
+ endof
+
+ \ AES-128/GCM
+ 3 of drop 16
+ for-input if
+ switch-aesgcm-in
+ else
+ switch-aesgcm-out
+ then
+ endof
+
+ \ AES-256/GCM
+ 4 of drop 32
+ for-input if
+ switch-aesgcm-in
+ else
+ switch-aesgcm-out
+ then
+ endof
+
+ \ ChaCha20+Poly1305
+ 5 of drop
+ for-input if
+ switch-chapol-in
+ else
+ switch-chapol-out
+ then
+ endof
+
+ \ Now we only have AES/CCM suites (6 to 9). Since the
+ \ input is between 0 and 15, and we checked values 0 to 5,
+ \ we only need to reject values larger than 9.
+ dup 9 > if
+ ERR_BAD_PARAM fail
+ then
+
+ \ Stack: is_client prf_id mac_id cipher_id
+ \ We want to remove the mac_id (it is zero for CCM suites)
+ \ and replace the cipher_id with the key and tag lengths.
+ \ The following table applies:
+ \ id key length tag length
+ \ 6 16 16
+ \ 7 32 16
+ \ 8 16 8
+ \ 9 32 8
+ swap drop
+ dup 1 and 4 << 16 + swap
+ 8 and 16 swap -
+ for-input if
+ switch-aesccm-in
+ else
+ switch-aesccm-out
+ then
+ ret
+ endcase
+ ;
+
+cc: switch-cbc-out ( is_client prf_id mac_id aes cipher_key_len -- ) {
+ int is_client, prf_id, mac_id, aes;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len;
+
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ aes = T0_POP();
+ mac_id = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_cbc_out(ENG, is_client, prf_id, mac_id,
+ aes ? ENG->iaes_cbcenc : ENG->ides_cbcenc, cipher_key_len);
+}
+
+cc: switch-cbc-in ( is_client prf_id mac_id aes cipher_key_len -- ) {
+ int is_client, prf_id, mac_id, aes;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len;
+
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ aes = T0_POP();
+ mac_id = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_cbc_in(ENG, is_client, prf_id, mac_id,
+ aes ? ENG->iaes_cbcdec : ENG->ides_cbcdec, cipher_key_len);
+}
+
+cc: switch-aesgcm-out ( is_client prf_id cipher_key_len -- ) {
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len;
+
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_gcm_out(ENG, is_client, prf_id,
+ ENG->iaes_ctr, cipher_key_len);
+}
+
+cc: switch-aesgcm-in ( is_client prf_id cipher_key_len -- ) {
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len;
+
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_gcm_in(ENG, is_client, prf_id,
+ ENG->iaes_ctr, cipher_key_len);
+}
+
+cc: switch-chapol-out ( is_client prf_id -- ) {
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_chapol_out(ENG, is_client, prf_id);
+}
+
+cc: switch-chapol-in ( is_client prf_id -- ) {
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_chapol_in(ENG, is_client, prf_id);
+}
+
+cc: switch-aesccm-out ( is_client prf_id cipher_key_len tag_len -- ) {
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len, tag_len;
+
+ tag_len = T0_POP();
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_ccm_out(ENG, is_client, prf_id,
+ ENG->iaes_ctrcbc, cipher_key_len, tag_len);
+}
+
+cc: switch-aesccm-in ( is_client prf_id cipher_key_len tag_len -- ) {
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len, tag_len;
+
+ tag_len = T0_POP();
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_ccm_in(ENG, is_client, prf_id,
+ ENG->iaes_ctrcbc, cipher_key_len, tag_len);
+}
+
+\ Write Finished message.
+: write-Finished ( from_client -- )
+ compute-Finished
+ 20 write8 12 write24 addr-pad 12 write-blob ;
+
+\ Read Finished message.
+: read-Finished ( from_client -- )
+ compute-Finished
+ read-handshake-header 20 <> if ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
+ addr-pad 12 + 12 read-blob
+ close-elt
+ addr-pad dup 12 + 12 memcmp ifnot ERR_BAD_FINISHED fail then ;
+
+\ Compute the "Finished" contents (either the value to send, or the
+\ expected value). The 12-byte string is written in the pad. The
+\ "from_client" value is non-zero for the Finished sent by the client.
+\ The computed value is also saved in the relevant buffer for handling
+\ secure renegotiation.
+: compute-Finished ( from_client -- )
+ dup addr-saved_finished swap ifnot 12 + then swap
+ addr-cipher_suite get16 prf-id compute-Finished-inner
+ addr-pad 12 memcpy ;
+
+cc: compute-Finished-inner ( from_client prf_id -- ) {
+ int prf_id = T0_POP();
+ int from_client = T0_POPi();
+ unsigned char tmp[48];
+ br_tls_prf_seed_chunk seed;
+
+ br_tls_prf_impl prf = br_ssl_engine_get_PRF(ENG, prf_id);
+ seed.data = tmp;
+ if (ENG->session.version >= BR_TLS12) {
+ seed.len = br_multihash_out(&ENG->mhash, prf_id, tmp);
+ } else {
+ br_multihash_out(&ENG->mhash, br_md5_ID, tmp);
+ br_multihash_out(&ENG->mhash, br_sha1_ID, tmp + 16);
+ seed.len = 36;
+ }
+ prf(ENG->pad, 12, ENG->session.master_secret,
+ sizeof ENG->session.master_secret,
+ from_client ? "client finished" : "server finished",
+ 1, &seed);
+}
+
+\ Receive ChangeCipherSpec and Finished from the peer.
+: read-CCS-Finished ( is-client -- )
+ has-input? if
+ addr-record_type_in get8 20 <> if ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
+ else
+ begin
+ wait-co 0x07 and dup 0x02 <> while
+ if ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
+ repeat
+ drop
+ then
+ read8-nc 1 <> more-incoming-bytes? or if ERR_BAD_CCS fail then
+ dup 1 switch-encryption
+
+ \ Read and verify Finished from peer.
+ not read-Finished ;
+
+\ Send ChangeCipherSpec and Finished to the peer.
+: write-CCS-Finished ( is-client -- )
+ \ Flush and wait for output buffer to be clear, so that we may
+ \ write our ChangeCipherSpec. We must switch immediately after
+ \ triggering the flush.
+ 20 wait-rectype-out
+ 1 write8
+ flush-record
+ dup 0 switch-encryption
+ 22 wait-rectype-out
+ write-Finished
+ flush-record ;
+
+\ Read and parse a list of supported signature algorithms (with hash
+\ functions). The resulting bit field is returned.
+: read-list-sign-algos ( lim -- lim value )
+ 0 { hashes }
+ read16 open-elt
+ begin dup while
+ read8 { hash } read8 { sign }
+
+ \ If hash is 0x08 then this is a "new algorithm" identifier,
+ \ and we set the corresponding bit if it is in the 0..15
+ \ range. Otherwise, we keep the value only if the signature
+ \ is either 1 (RSA) or 3 (ECDSA), and the hash is one of the
+ \ SHA-* functions (2 to 6). Note that we reject MD5.
+ hash 8 = if
+ sign 15 <= if
+ 1 sign 16 + << hashes or >hashes
+ then
+ else
+ hash 2 >= hash 6 <= and
+ sign 1 = sign 3 = or
+ and if
+ hashes 1 sign 1- 2 << hash + << or >hashes
+ then
+ then
+ repeat
+ close-elt
+ hashes ;
+
+\ =======================================================================
+
+\ Compute total chain length. This includes the individual certificate
+\ headers, but not the total chain header. This also sets the cert_cur,
+\ cert_len and chain_len context fields.
+cc: total-chain-length ( -- len ) {
+ size_t u;
+ uint32_t total;
+
+ total = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < ENG->chain_len; u ++) {
+ total += 3 + (uint32_t)ENG->chain[u].data_len;
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(total);
+}
+
+\ Get length for current certificate in the chain; if the chain end was
+\ reached, then this returns -1.
+cc: begin-cert ( -- len ) {
+ if (ENG->chain_len == 0) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ } else {
+ ENG->cert_cur = ENG->chain->data;
+ ENG->cert_len = ENG->chain->data_len;
+ ENG->chain ++;
+ ENG->chain_len --;
+ T0_PUSH(ENG->cert_len);
+ }
+}
+
+\ Copy a chunk of certificate data into the pad. Returned value is the
+\ chunk length, or 0 if the certificate end is reached.
+cc: copy-cert-chunk ( -- len ) {
+ size_t clen;
+
+ clen = ENG->cert_len;
+ if (clen > sizeof ENG->pad) {
+ clen = sizeof ENG->pad;
+ }
+ memcpy(ENG->pad, ENG->cert_cur, clen);
+ ENG->cert_cur += clen;
+ ENG->cert_len -= clen;
+ T0_PUSH(clen);
+}
+
+\ Write a Certificate message. Total chain length (excluding the 3-byte
+\ header) is returned; it is 0 if the chain is empty.
+: write-Certificate ( -- total_chain_len )
+ 11 write8
+ total-chain-length dup
+ dup 3 + write24 write24
+ begin
+ begin-cert
+ dup 0< if drop ret then write24
+ begin copy-cert-chunk dup while
+ addr-pad swap write-blob
+ repeat
+ drop
+ again ;
+
+cc: x509-start-chain ( by_client -- ) {
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+ uint32_t bc;
+
+ bc = T0_POP();
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ xc->start_chain(ENG->x509ctx, bc ? ENG->server_name : NULL);
+}
+
+cc: x509-start-cert ( length -- ) {
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ xc->start_cert(ENG->x509ctx, T0_POP());
+}
+
+cc: x509-append ( length -- ) {
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+ size_t len;
+
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ len = T0_POP();
+ xc->append(ENG->x509ctx, ENG->pad, len);
+}
+
+cc: x509-end-cert ( -- ) {
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ xc->end_cert(ENG->x509ctx);
+}
+
+cc: x509-end-chain ( -- err ) {
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ T0_PUSH(xc->end_chain(ENG->x509ctx));
+}
+
+cc: get-key-type-usages ( -- key-type-usages ) {
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk;
+ unsigned usages;
+
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ pk = xc->get_pkey(ENG->x509ctx, &usages);
+ if (pk == NULL) {
+ T0_PUSH(0);
+ } else {
+ T0_PUSH(pk->key_type | usages);
+ }
+}
+
+\ Read a Certificate message.
+\ Parameter: non-zero if this is a read by the client of a certificate
+\ sent by the server; zero otherwise.
+\ Returned value:
+\ - Empty: 0
+\ - Valid: combination of key type and allowed key usages.
+\ - Invalid: negative (-x for error code x)
+: read-Certificate ( by_client -- key-type-usages )
+ \ Get header, and check message type.
+ read-handshake-header 11 = ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
+
+ \ If the chain is empty, do some special processing.
+ dup 3 = if
+ read24 if ERR_BAD_PARAM fail then
+ swap drop ret
+ then
+
+ \ Start processing the chain through the X.509 engine.
+ swap x509-start-chain
+
+ \ Total chain length is a 24-bit integer.
+ read24 open-elt
+ begin
+ dup while
+ read24 open-elt
+ dup x509-start-cert
+
+ \ We read the certificate by chunks through the pad, so
+ \ as to use the existing reading function (read-blob)
+ \ that also ensures proper hashing.
+ begin
+ dup while
+ dup 256 > if 256 else dup then { len }
+ addr-pad len read-blob
+ len x509-append
+ repeat
+ close-elt
+ x509-end-cert
+ repeat
+
+ \ We must close the chain AND the handshake message.
+ close-elt
+ close-elt
+
+ \ Chain processing is finished; get the error code.
+ x509-end-chain
+ dup if neg ret then drop
+
+ \ Return key type and usages.
+ get-key-type-usages ;
+
+\ =======================================================================
+
+\ Copy a specific protocol name from the list to the pad. The byte
+\ length is returned.
+cc: copy-protocol-name ( idx -- len ) {
+ size_t idx = T0_POP();
+ size_t len = strlen(ENG->protocol_names[idx]);
+ memcpy(ENG->pad, ENG->protocol_names[idx], len);
+ T0_PUSH(len);
+}
+
+\ Compare name in pad with the configured list of protocol names.
+\ If a match is found, then the index is returned; otherwise, -1
+\ is returned.
+cc: test-protocol-name ( len -- n ) {
+ size_t len = T0_POP();
+ size_t u;
+
+ for (u = 0; u < ENG->protocol_names_num; u ++) {
+ const char *name;
+
+ name = ENG->protocol_names[u];
+ if (len == strlen(name) && memcmp(ENG->pad, name, len) == 0) {
+ T0_PUSH(u);
+ T0_RET();
+ }
+ }
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hs_server.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hs_server.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f8cae7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hs_server.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2009 @@
+/* Automatically generated code; do not modify directly. */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+typedef struct {
+ uint32_t *dp;
+ uint32_t *rp;
+ const unsigned char *ip;
+} t0_context;
+
+static uint32_t
+t0_parse7E_unsigned(const unsigned char **p)
+{
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ x = 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ unsigned y;
+
+ y = *(*p) ++;
+ x = (x << 7) | (uint32_t)(y & 0x7F);
+ if (y < 0x80) {
+ return x;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int32_t
+t0_parse7E_signed(const unsigned char **p)
+{
+ int neg;
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ neg = ((**p) >> 6) & 1;
+ x = (uint32_t)-neg;
+ for (;;) {
+ unsigned y;
+
+ y = *(*p) ++;
+ x = (x << 7) | (uint32_t)(y & 0x7F);
+ if (y < 0x80) {
+ if (neg) {
+ return -(int32_t)~x - 1;
+ } else {
+ return (int32_t)x;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#define T0_VBYTE(x, n) (unsigned char)((((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)) & 0x7F) | 0x80)
+#define T0_FBYTE(x, n) (unsigned char)(((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)) & 0x7F)
+#define T0_SBYTE(x) (unsigned char)((((uint32_t)(x) >> 28) + 0xF8) ^ 0xF8)
+#define T0_INT1(x) T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT2(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT3(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT4(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 21), T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT5(x) T0_SBYTE(x), T0_VBYTE(x, 21), T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+
+/* static const unsigned char t0_datablock[]; */
+
+
+void br_ssl_hs_server_init_main(void *t0ctx);
+
+void br_ssl_hs_server_run(void *t0ctx);
+
+
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * This macro evaluates to a pointer to the current engine context.
+ */
+#define ENG ((br_ssl_engine_context *)(void *)((unsigned char *)t0ctx - offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, cpu)))
+
+
+
+
+
+/*
+ * This macro evaluates to a pointer to the server context, under that
+ * specific name. It must be noted that since the engine context is the
+ * first field of the br_ssl_server_context structure ('eng'), then
+ * pointers values of both types are interchangeable, modulo an
+ * appropriate cast. This also means that "addresses" computed as offsets
+ * within the structure work for both kinds of context.
+ */
+#define CTX ((br_ssl_server_context *)ENG)
+
+/*
+ * Decrypt the pre-master secret (RSA key exchange).
+ */
+static void
+do_rsa_decrypt(br_ssl_server_context *ctx, int prf_id,
+ unsigned char *epms, size_t len)
+{
+ uint32_t x;
+ unsigned char rpms[48];
+
+ /*
+ * Decrypt the PMS.
+ */
+ x = (*ctx->policy_vtable)->do_keyx(ctx->policy_vtable, epms, &len);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the first two bytes to the maximum supported client
+ * protocol version. These bytes are used for version rollback
+ * detection; forceing the two bytes will make the master secret
+ * wrong if the bytes are not correct. This process is
+ * recommended by RFC 5246 (section 7.4.7.1).
+ */
+ br_enc16be(epms, ctx->client_max_version);
+
+ /*
+ * Make a random PMS and copy it above the decrypted value if the
+ * decryption failed. Note that we use a constant-time conditional
+ * copy.
+ */
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, rpms, sizeof rpms);
+ br_ccopy(x ^ 1, epms, rpms, sizeof rpms);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute master secret.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_compute_master(&ctx->eng, prf_id, epms, 48);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the pre-master secret from RAM: it is normally a buffer
+ * in the context, hence potentially long-lived.
+ */
+ memset(epms, 0, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Common part for ECDH and ECDHE.
+ */
+static void
+ecdh_common(br_ssl_server_context *ctx, int prf_id,
+ unsigned char *xcoor, size_t xcoor_len, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ unsigned char rpms[80];
+
+ if (xcoor_len > sizeof rpms) {
+ xcoor_len = sizeof rpms;
+ ctl = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Make a random PMS and copy it above the decrypted value if the
+ * decryption failed. Note that we use a constant-time conditional
+ * copy.
+ */
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, rpms, xcoor_len);
+ br_ccopy(ctl ^ 1, xcoor, rpms, xcoor_len);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute master secret.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_compute_master(&ctx->eng, prf_id, xcoor, xcoor_len);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the pre-master secret from RAM: it is normally a buffer
+ * in the context, hence potentially long-lived.
+ */
+ memset(xcoor, 0, xcoor_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do the ECDH key exchange (not ECDHE).
+ */
+static void
+do_ecdh(br_ssl_server_context *ctx, int prf_id,
+ unsigned char *cpoint, size_t cpoint_len)
+{
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ /*
+ * Finalise the key exchange.
+ */
+ x = (*ctx->policy_vtable)->do_keyx(ctx->policy_vtable,
+ cpoint, &cpoint_len);
+ ecdh_common(ctx, prf_id, cpoint, cpoint_len, x);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do the full static ECDH key exchange. When this function is called,
+ * it has already been verified that the cipher suite uses ECDH (not ECDHE),
+ * and the client's public key (from its certificate) has type EC and is
+ * apt for key exchange.
+ */
+static void
+do_static_ecdh(br_ssl_server_context *ctx, int prf_id)
+{
+ unsigned char cpoint[133];
+ size_t cpoint_len;
+ const br_x509_class **xc;
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk;
+
+ xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
+ pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc, NULL);
+ cpoint_len = pk->key.ec.qlen;
+ if (cpoint_len > sizeof cpoint) {
+ /*
+ * If the point is larger than our buffer then we need to
+ * restrict it. Length 2 is not a valid point length, so
+ * the ECDH will fail.
+ */
+ cpoint_len = 2;
+ }
+ memcpy(cpoint, pk->key.ec.q, cpoint_len);
+ do_ecdh(ctx, prf_id, cpoint, cpoint_len);
+}
+
+static size_t
+hash_data(br_ssl_server_context *ctx,
+ void *dst, int hash_id, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ const br_hash_class *hf;
+ br_hash_compat_context hc;
+
+ if (hash_id == 0) {
+ unsigned char tmp[36];
+
+ hf = br_multihash_getimpl(&ctx->eng.mhash, br_md5_ID);
+ if (hf == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ hf->init(&hc.vtable);
+ hf->update(&hc.vtable, src, len);
+ hf->out(&hc.vtable, tmp);
+ hf = br_multihash_getimpl(&ctx->eng.mhash, br_sha1_ID);
+ if (hf == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ hf->init(&hc.vtable);
+ hf->update(&hc.vtable, src, len);
+ hf->out(&hc.vtable, tmp + 16);
+ memcpy(dst, tmp, 36);
+ return 36;
+ } else {
+ hf = br_multihash_getimpl(&ctx->eng.mhash, hash_id);
+ if (hf == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ hf->init(&hc.vtable);
+ hf->update(&hc.vtable, src, len);
+ hf->out(&hc.vtable, dst);
+ return (hf->desc >> BR_HASHDESC_OUT_OFF) & BR_HASHDESC_OUT_MASK;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do the ECDHE key exchange (part 1: generation of transient key, and
+ * computing of the point to send to the client). Returned value is the
+ * signature length (in bytes), or -x on error (with x being an error
+ * code). The encoded point is written in the ecdhe_point[] context buffer
+ * (length in ecdhe_point_len).
+ */
+static int
+do_ecdhe_part1(br_ssl_server_context *ctx, int curve)
+{
+ unsigned algo_id;
+ unsigned mask;
+ const unsigned char *order;
+ size_t olen, glen;
+ size_t hv_len, sig_len;
+
+ if (!((ctx->eng.iec->supported_curves >> curve) & 1)) {
+ return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+ ctx->eng.ecdhe_curve = curve;
+
+ /*
+ * Generate our private key. We need a non-zero random value
+ * which is lower than the curve order, in a "large enough"
+ * range. We force the top bit to 0 and bottom bit to 1, which
+ * does the trick. Note that contrary to what happens in ECDSA,
+ * this is not a problem if we do not cover the full range of
+ * possible values.
+ */
+ order = ctx->eng.iec->order(curve, &olen);
+ mask = 0xFF;
+ while (mask >= order[0]) {
+ mask >>= 1;
+ }
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, ctx->ecdhe_key, olen);
+ ctx->ecdhe_key[0] &= mask;
+ ctx->ecdhe_key[olen - 1] |= 0x01;
+ ctx->ecdhe_key_len = olen;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute our ECDH point.
+ */
+ glen = ctx->eng.iec->mulgen(ctx->eng.ecdhe_point,
+ ctx->ecdhe_key, olen, curve);
+ ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len = glen;
+
+ /*
+ * Assemble the message to be signed, and possibly hash it.
+ */
+ memcpy(ctx->eng.pad, ctx->eng.client_random, 32);
+ memcpy(ctx->eng.pad + 32, ctx->eng.server_random, 32);
+ ctx->eng.pad[64 + 0] = 0x03;
+ ctx->eng.pad[64 + 1] = 0x00;
+ ctx->eng.pad[64 + 2] = curve;
+ ctx->eng.pad[64 + 3] = ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len;
+ memcpy(ctx->eng.pad + 64 + 4,
+ ctx->eng.ecdhe_point, ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len);
+ hv_len = 64 + 4 + ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len;
+ algo_id = ctx->sign_hash_id;
+ if (algo_id >= (unsigned)0xFF00) {
+ hv_len = hash_data(ctx, ctx->eng.pad, algo_id & 0xFF,
+ ctx->eng.pad, hv_len);
+ if (hv_len == 0) {
+ return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ sig_len = (*ctx->policy_vtable)->do_sign(ctx->policy_vtable,
+ algo_id, ctx->eng.pad, hv_len, sizeof ctx->eng.pad);
+ return sig_len ? (int)sig_len : -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do the ECDHE key exchange (part 2: computation of the shared secret
+ * from the point sent by the client).
+ */
+static void
+do_ecdhe_part2(br_ssl_server_context *ctx, int prf_id,
+ unsigned char *cpoint, size_t cpoint_len)
+{
+ int curve;
+ uint32_t ctl;
+ size_t xoff, xlen;
+
+ curve = ctx->eng.ecdhe_curve;
+
+ /*
+ * Finalise the key exchange.
+ */
+ ctl = ctx->eng.iec->mul(cpoint, cpoint_len,
+ ctx->ecdhe_key, ctx->ecdhe_key_len, curve);
+ xoff = ctx->eng.iec->xoff(curve, &xlen);
+ ecdh_common(ctx, prf_id, cpoint + xoff, xlen, ctl);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the ECDHE private key. Forward Secrecy is achieved insofar
+ * as that key does not get stolen, so we'd better destroy it
+ * as soon as it ceases to be useful.
+ */
+ memset(ctx->ecdhe_key, 0, ctx->ecdhe_key_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Offset for hash value within the pad (when obtaining all hash values,
+ * in preparation for verification of the CertificateVerify message).
+ * Order is MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512; last value
+ * is used to get the total length.
+ */
+static const unsigned char HASH_PAD_OFF[] = { 0, 16, 36, 64, 96, 144, 208 };
+
+/*
+ * OID for hash functions in RSA signatures.
+ */
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA1[] = {
+ 0x05, 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A
+};
+
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA224[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04
+};
+
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA256[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01
+};
+
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA384[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02
+};
+
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA512[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03
+};
+
+static const unsigned char *HASH_OID[] = {
+ HASH_OID_SHA1,
+ HASH_OID_SHA224,
+ HASH_OID_SHA256,
+ HASH_OID_SHA384,
+ HASH_OID_SHA512
+};
+
+/*
+ * Verify the signature in CertificateVerify. Returned value is 0 on
+ * success, or a non-zero error code. Lack of implementation of the
+ * designated signature algorithm is reported as a "bad signature"
+ * error (because it means that the peer did not honour our advertised
+ * set of supported signature algorithms).
+ */
+static int
+verify_CV_sig(br_ssl_server_context *ctx, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ const br_x509_class **xc;
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk;
+ int id;
+
+ id = ctx->hash_CV_id;
+ xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
+ pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc, NULL);
+ if (pk->key_type == BR_KEYTYPE_RSA) {
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+ const unsigned char *hash_oid;
+
+ if (id == 0) {
+ hash_oid = NULL;
+ } else {
+ hash_oid = HASH_OID[id - 2];
+ }
+ if (ctx->eng.irsavrfy == 0) {
+ return BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ if (!ctx->eng.irsavrfy(ctx->eng.pad, sig_len,
+ hash_oid, ctx->hash_CV_len, &pk->key.rsa, tmp)
+ || memcmp(tmp, ctx->hash_CV, ctx->hash_CV_len) != 0)
+ {
+ return BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (ctx->eng.iecdsa == 0) {
+ return BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ if (!ctx->eng.iecdsa(ctx->eng.iec,
+ ctx->hash_CV, ctx->hash_CV_len,
+ &pk->key.ec, ctx->eng.pad, sig_len))
+ {
+ return BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+static const unsigned char t0_datablock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x24, 0x00, 0x2F, 0x01, 0x24, 0x00, 0x35, 0x02,
+ 0x24, 0x00, 0x3C, 0x01, 0x44, 0x00, 0x3D, 0x02, 0x44, 0x00, 0x9C, 0x03,
+ 0x04, 0x00, 0x9D, 0x04, 0x05, 0xC0, 0x03, 0x40, 0x24, 0xC0, 0x04, 0x41,
+ 0x24, 0xC0, 0x05, 0x42, 0x24, 0xC0, 0x08, 0x20, 0x24, 0xC0, 0x09, 0x21,
+ 0x24, 0xC0, 0x0A, 0x22, 0x24, 0xC0, 0x0D, 0x30, 0x24, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0x31,
+ 0x24, 0xC0, 0x0F, 0x32, 0x24, 0xC0, 0x12, 0x10, 0x24, 0xC0, 0x13, 0x11,
+ 0x24, 0xC0, 0x14, 0x12, 0x24, 0xC0, 0x23, 0x21, 0x44, 0xC0, 0x24, 0x22,
+ 0x55, 0xC0, 0x25, 0x41, 0x44, 0xC0, 0x26, 0x42, 0x55, 0xC0, 0x27, 0x11,
+ 0x44, 0xC0, 0x28, 0x12, 0x55, 0xC0, 0x29, 0x31, 0x44, 0xC0, 0x2A, 0x32,
+ 0x55, 0xC0, 0x2B, 0x23, 0x04, 0xC0, 0x2C, 0x24, 0x05, 0xC0, 0x2D, 0x43,
+ 0x04, 0xC0, 0x2E, 0x44, 0x05, 0xC0, 0x2F, 0x13, 0x04, 0xC0, 0x30, 0x14,
+ 0x05, 0xC0, 0x31, 0x33, 0x04, 0xC0, 0x32, 0x34, 0x05, 0xC0, 0x9C, 0x06,
+ 0x04, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x07, 0x04, 0xC0, 0xA0, 0x08, 0x04, 0xC0, 0xA1, 0x09,
+ 0x04, 0xC0, 0xAC, 0x26, 0x04, 0xC0, 0xAD, 0x27, 0x04, 0xC0, 0xAE, 0x28,
+ 0x04, 0xC0, 0xAF, 0x29, 0x04, 0xCC, 0xA8, 0x15, 0x04, 0xCC, 0xA9, 0x25,
+ 0x04, 0x00, 0x00
+};
+
+static const unsigned char t0_codeblock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x0F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x02, 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x29, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_CCS), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_FINISHED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_FRAGLEN), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_HANDSHAKE), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_PARAM), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_SECRENEG), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_BAD_VERSION), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_NO_CLIENT_AUTH), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT1(BR_ERR_OK),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT1(BR_ERR_OVERSIZED_ID), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_UNEXPECTED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_WRONG_KEY_USAGE), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, action)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, alert)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, application_data)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, session) + offsetof(br_ssl_session_parameters, cipher_suite)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_server_context, client_max_version)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, client_random)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_server_context, client_suites)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_server_context, client_suites_num)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, close_received)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_server_context, curves)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, ecdhe_point)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, ecdhe_point_len)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, flags)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_server_context, hashes)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x7B, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(BR_MAX_CIPHER_SUITES * sizeof(br_suite_translated)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, log_max_frag_len)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, pad)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, peer_log_max_frag_len)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, protocol_names_num)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, record_type_in)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, record_type_out)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, reneg)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, saved_finished)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, selected_protocol)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, server_name)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, server_random)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, session) + offsetof(br_ssl_session_parameters, session_id)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, session) + offsetof(br_ssl_session_parameters, session_id_len)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, shutdown_recv)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_server_context, sign_hash_id)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, suites_buf)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, suites_num)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, session) + offsetof(br_ssl_session_parameters, version)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, version_in)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, version_max)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, version_min)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(br_ssl_engine_context, version_out)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x02, 0x6A, 0x2B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0x63, 0x47, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x05,
+ 0x04, 0x65, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x02, 0x9F, 0x00,
+ 0x63, 0x04, 0x6B, 0x00, 0x06, 0x02, 0x6A, 0x2B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2A, 0x8B,
+ 0x47, 0x05, 0x03, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x08, 0x47, 0x78, 0x2E, 0xA8, 0x1C, 0x85,
+ 0x01, 0x0C, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2A, 0x22, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0C, 0x47, 0x61,
+ 0x22, 0x08, 0x00, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x77, 0x30, 0x02, 0x00, 0x38, 0x13,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x77, 0x42, 0x2C, 0x19, 0x38, 0x06, 0x07, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0xD0, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04, 0x75, 0x01, 0x00, 0xC7, 0x02, 0x00, 0x2A, 0x19,
+ 0x13, 0x06, 0x02, 0x71, 0x2B, 0xD0, 0x04, 0x76, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x77,
+ 0x42, 0x01, 0x16, 0x89, 0x42, 0x01, 0x00, 0x8C, 0x40, 0x36, 0xB1, 0x35,
+ 0x06, 0x02, 0x73, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x0A, 0xD7, 0x01, 0x00, 0xD3, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0xAD, 0x04, 0x80, 0x46, 0xD7, 0xD4, 0x29, 0xD9, 0x50, 0x06, 0x01, 0xD5,
+ 0xD8, 0x2C, 0x50, 0x06, 0x31, 0x01, 0x00, 0xAE, 0x2A, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0F,
+ 0x01, 0x02, 0xA4, 0x05, 0x02, 0x37, 0x2B, 0x29, 0xB2, 0xB0, 0x2A, 0xC9,
+ 0x29, 0x04, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x29, 0x01, 0x02, 0xA4, 0x05,
+ 0x02, 0x70, 0x2B, 0xB2, 0x04, 0x0A, 0xB4, 0x2A, 0x05, 0x04, 0x29, 0xAB,
+ 0x04, 0x02, 0xB3, 0xAF, 0x04, 0x01, 0xB2, 0x01, 0x00, 0xAD, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0xD3, 0x3E, 0x01, 0x01, 0x77, 0x42, 0x01, 0x17, 0x89, 0x42, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x3A, 0x3A, 0x00, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x2C, 0x19, 0x38, 0x06, 0x04, 0xCF,
+ 0x29, 0x04, 0x78, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x00, 0xC6, 0x19, 0x38, 0x06, 0x04,
+ 0xCF, 0x29, 0x04, 0x78, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x84, 0x00, 0x08, 0x2B, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x81, 0x2F, 0x47, 0x12, 0x01, 0x01, 0x13, 0x37, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2A,
+ 0x05, 0x04, 0x29, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0xA2, 0x12, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x13, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x03, 0x61, 0x04, 0x75, 0x47, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x7F, 0xA1, 0xCF, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x07, 0x13, 0x01, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06,
+ 0x0D, 0x29, 0x01, 0x10, 0x13, 0x06, 0x05, 0x01, 0x00, 0x77, 0x42, 0xC5,
+ 0x04, 0x33, 0x01, 0x01, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x2A, 0x29, 0x29, 0x8A, 0x30,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x0F, 0x01, 0x01, 0xA4, 0x39, 0x06, 0x18, 0xC8, 0x2C, 0x19,
+ 0x38, 0x06, 0x04, 0xCF, 0x29, 0x04, 0x78, 0x01, 0x80, 0x64, 0xC7, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x77, 0x42, 0x01, 0x17, 0x89, 0x42, 0x04, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0xA1,
+ 0x04, 0x03, 0x73, 0x2B, 0x29, 0x04, 0xFF, 0x32, 0x01, 0x2A, 0x03, 0x00,
+ 0x09, 0x2A, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x02, 0x6A, 0x2B, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x9C,
+ 0x01, 0x0F, 0x13, 0x00, 0x00, 0x76, 0x30, 0x01, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06,
+ 0x10, 0x29, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x03, 0x29, 0x01, 0x02, 0x76,
+ 0x42, 0x01, 0x00, 0x04, 0x21, 0x01, 0x01, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x14, 0x29,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x76, 0x42, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x80, 0x64, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x05, 0x01,
+ 0x82, 0x00, 0x08, 0x2B, 0x5F, 0x04, 0x07, 0x29, 0x01, 0x82, 0x00, 0x08,
+ 0x2B, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x31, 0x06, 0x05, 0x3D, 0xA9, 0x39,
+ 0x04, 0x78, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x91, 0x42, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x1F, 0x13, 0x01, 0x12, 0x0F, 0x05, 0x02, 0x74, 0x2B, 0x78, 0x2E, 0x2A,
+ 0xCB, 0x05, 0x02, 0x73, 0x2B, 0xA8, 0x28, 0x00, 0x02, 0x87, 0x2E, 0x05,
+ 0x02, 0xBC, 0x00, 0xC0, 0xA7, 0xC0, 0xA7, 0x01, 0x7E, 0x03, 0x00, 0x2A,
+ 0x06, 0x17, 0xC2, 0x2A, 0x03, 0x01, 0x85, 0x47, 0xB6, 0x02, 0x01, 0x51,
+ 0x2A, 0x02, 0x00, 0x53, 0x06, 0x04, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04, 0x01, 0x29, 0x04,
+ 0x66, 0x9D, 0x9D, 0x02, 0x00, 0x61, 0x8C, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x31, 0x06,
+ 0x0B, 0x88, 0x30, 0x01, 0x14, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x02, 0x73, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x11,
+ 0xCF, 0x01, 0x07, 0x13, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x02, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x06, 0x06, 0x02,
+ 0x73, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x70, 0x29, 0xC3, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x35, 0x39, 0x06,
+ 0x02, 0x66, 0x2B, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x01, 0xCA, 0x38, 0xB5, 0x00, 0x01, 0xBA,
+ 0x01, 0x0B, 0x0F, 0x05, 0x02, 0x73, 0x2B, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x03, 0x0F, 0x06,
+ 0x08, 0xC1, 0x06, 0x02, 0x6A, 0x2B, 0x47, 0x29, 0x00, 0x47, 0x5C, 0xC1,
+ 0xA7, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x23, 0xC1, 0xA7, 0x2A, 0x5B, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x18, 0x2A,
+ 0x01, 0x82, 0x00, 0x10, 0x06, 0x05, 0x01, 0x82, 0x00, 0x04, 0x01, 0x2A,
+ 0x03, 0x00, 0x85, 0x02, 0x00, 0xB6, 0x02, 0x00, 0x58, 0x04, 0x65, 0x9D,
+ 0x59, 0x04, 0x5A, 0x9D, 0x9D, 0x5A, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x02, 0x37, 0x00, 0x29,
+ 0x2D, 0x00, 0x02, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x20, 0x13, 0x05, 0x02, 0x74, 0x2B, 0x01,
+ 0x0F, 0x13, 0x03, 0x00, 0xB0, 0x95, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x86, 0x03, 0x11, 0x06,
+ 0x23, 0xC0, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x81, 0x7F, 0x13, 0x61, 0x01, 0x01, 0x12, 0x02,
+ 0x00, 0x0F, 0x05, 0x02, 0x6C, 0x2B, 0x01, 0x08, 0x12, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x02,
+ 0x0B, 0x3A, 0x01, 0x06, 0x10, 0x39, 0x06, 0x02, 0x6E, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x0D,
+ 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x02, 0x20, 0x05, 0x02, 0x6E, 0x2B, 0xC0, 0x2A, 0x03, 0x01, 0x2A, 0x01,
+ 0x84, 0x00, 0x10, 0x06, 0x02, 0x6F, 0x2B, 0x85, 0x47, 0xB6, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x55, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x01, 0x2B, 0x29, 0x9D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1D, 0xBA, 0x01,
+ 0x0F, 0x0F, 0x05, 0x02, 0x73, 0x2B, 0x00, 0x0A, 0xBA, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0F,
+ 0x05, 0x02, 0x73, 0x2B, 0xC0, 0x2A, 0x03, 0x00, 0x79, 0x40, 0x7A, 0x01,
+ 0x20, 0xB6, 0xC2, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x20, 0x10, 0x06, 0x02, 0x72, 0x2B, 0x2A,
+ 0x90, 0x42, 0x8F, 0x47, 0xB6, 0x1A, 0x03, 0x01, 0xC0, 0xA7, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x03, 0x83, 0xA2, 0x17, 0x3A, 0x08, 0x03,
+ 0x04, 0x03, 0x05, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x80, 0x6D, 0xC0, 0x2A, 0x03, 0x06, 0x02,
+ 0x01, 0x06, 0x0A, 0x2A, 0x78, 0x2E, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x03,
+ 0x03, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x81, 0x7F, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x0A, 0x8A, 0x30, 0x06, 0x02,
+ 0x6B, 0x2B, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x03, 0x02, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x81, 0xAC, 0x00, 0x0F,
+ 0x06, 0x11, 0x02, 0x00, 0x98, 0x2E, 0x11, 0x02, 0x00, 0x97, 0x2E, 0x0B,
+ 0x13, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x03, 0x00, 0xC4, 0x2A, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x03,
+ 0x29, 0x04, 0x26, 0x01, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x01, 0x02, 0x0C, 0x7B,
+ 0x08, 0x02, 0x06, 0x47, 0x40, 0x04, 0x16, 0x29, 0x02, 0x05, 0x02, 0x04,
+ 0x11, 0x06, 0x02, 0x69, 0x2B, 0x02, 0x06, 0x02, 0x05, 0x40, 0x02, 0x05,
+ 0x01, 0x04, 0x08, 0x03, 0x05, 0x04, 0xFF, 0x0F, 0x29, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03,
+ 0x07, 0xC2, 0xA7, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x09, 0xC2, 0x05, 0x04, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x03,
+ 0x07, 0x04, 0x74, 0x9D, 0x01, 0x00, 0x8D, 0x42, 0x01, 0x88, 0x04, 0x82,
+ 0x41, 0x01, 0x84, 0x80, 0x80, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x41, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x80, 0x4E,
+ 0xC0, 0xA7, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x80, 0x47, 0xC0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06,
+ 0x04, 0x29, 0xB9, 0x04, 0x39, 0x01, 0x01, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x04, 0x29,
+ 0xB7, 0x04, 0x2F, 0x01, 0x83, 0xFE, 0x01, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x04, 0x29,
+ 0xB8, 0x04, 0x23, 0x01, 0x0D, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x04, 0x29, 0xBE, 0x04,
+ 0x19, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x04, 0x29, 0xBF, 0x04, 0x0F, 0x01,
+ 0x10, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x04, 0x29, 0xAC, 0x04, 0x05, 0x29, 0xBC, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x29, 0x04, 0xFF, 0x35, 0x9D, 0x9D, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x13,
+ 0x03, 0x01, 0x02, 0x00, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x08, 0x79, 0x2E, 0x99, 0x40, 0x01,
+ 0x80, 0x56, 0xA3, 0x97, 0x2E, 0x2A, 0x02, 0x00, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x29,
+ 0x02, 0x00, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x86, 0x00, 0x0B, 0x06, 0x02, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0x02,
+ 0x00, 0x98, 0x2E, 0x0B, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x80, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x06, 0x10, 0x95, 0x2E, 0x02, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x05, 0x29, 0x95, 0x2E,
+ 0x04, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x01, 0x2A, 0x95, 0x40, 0x2A, 0x96, 0x40,
+ 0x2A, 0x99, 0x40, 0x01, 0x86, 0x03, 0x11, 0x03, 0x08, 0x02, 0x02, 0x06,
+ 0x04, 0x01, 0x02, 0x8A, 0x42, 0x8A, 0x30, 0x05, 0x04, 0x01, 0x01, 0x8A,
+ 0x42, 0x02, 0x07, 0x05, 0x03, 0x01, 0x28, 0xA3, 0x44, 0x29, 0x01, 0x82,
+ 0x01, 0x07, 0x01, 0xFC, 0x80, 0x00, 0x39, 0x82, 0x2F, 0x13, 0x2A, 0x82,
+ 0x41, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x81, 0x7F, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x37, 0x47, 0x01, 0x08, 0x12,
+ 0x5E, 0x01, 0x02, 0x13, 0x39, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x0C, 0x03, 0x09, 0x7E, 0x2F,
+ 0x43, 0x13, 0x2A, 0x7E, 0x41, 0x05, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x09, 0x02,
+ 0x01, 0x06, 0x03, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x8F, 0x01, 0x20, 0x34, 0x01, 0x20,
+ 0x90, 0x42, 0x7B, 0x2A, 0x03, 0x05, 0x2A, 0x02, 0x04, 0x0B, 0x06, 0x80,
+ 0x49, 0x2A, 0x2E, 0x2A, 0x9C, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x12, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x0F, 0x47, 0x01, 0x02, 0x0F, 0x39, 0x06, 0x0A, 0x2A, 0x02, 0x09, 0x13,
+ 0x05, 0x04, 0x65, 0x01, 0x00, 0x2A, 0x02, 0x08, 0x05, 0x0E, 0x2A, 0x01,
+ 0x81, 0x70, 0x13, 0x01, 0x20, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x04, 0x65, 0x01, 0x00, 0x2A,
+ 0x2A, 0x06, 0x10, 0x02, 0x05, 0x63, 0x40, 0x02, 0x05, 0x40, 0x02, 0x05,
+ 0x01, 0x04, 0x08, 0x03, 0x05, 0x04, 0x01, 0x65, 0x01, 0x04, 0x08, 0x04,
+ 0xFF, 0x30, 0x29, 0x02, 0x05, 0x7B, 0x09, 0x01, 0x02, 0x12, 0x2A, 0x05,
+ 0x03, 0x01, 0x28, 0xA3, 0x7C, 0x42, 0x8C, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x83, 0xFF, 0x7F,
+ 0x0F, 0x06, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x03, 0xA4, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x80, 0x78, 0xA3,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x8C, 0x40, 0x18, 0x05, 0x03, 0x01, 0x28, 0xA3, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0xB4, 0xB3, 0x00, 0x04, 0x78, 0x2E, 0xCE, 0x06, 0x16, 0xC0,
+ 0x2A, 0x01, 0x84, 0x00, 0x10, 0x06, 0x02, 0x6F, 0x2B, 0x2A, 0x03, 0x00,
+ 0x85, 0x47, 0xB6, 0x02, 0x00, 0x78, 0x2E, 0xA8, 0x27, 0x78, 0x2E, 0x2A,
+ 0xCC, 0x47, 0xCB, 0x03, 0x01, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x39,
+ 0x06, 0x14, 0xC2, 0x2A, 0x03, 0x03, 0x85, 0x47, 0xB6, 0x02, 0x03, 0x78,
+ 0x2E, 0xA8, 0x02, 0x02, 0x06, 0x03, 0x26, 0x04, 0x01, 0x24, 0x9D, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0xBA, 0x01, 0x10, 0x0F, 0x05, 0x02, 0x73, 0x2B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x9E,
+ 0xBA, 0x01, 0x14, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x02, 0x73, 0x2B, 0x85, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x08,
+ 0x01, 0x0C, 0xB6, 0x9D, 0x85, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x08, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x32,
+ 0x05, 0x02, 0x67, 0x2B, 0x00, 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x03, 0x01, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x9A, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x00, 0x3C, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x02,
+ 0x65, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x04, 0x74, 0x00, 0xC0, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x02,
+ 0x68, 0x2B, 0xC2, 0x2A, 0x2A, 0x5F, 0x47, 0x01, 0x05, 0x11, 0x39, 0x06,
+ 0x02, 0x68, 0x2B, 0x01, 0x08, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x84, 0x30, 0x0B, 0x06, 0x0D,
+ 0x2A, 0x01, 0x01, 0x47, 0x0C, 0x3F, 0x2A, 0x84, 0x42, 0x86, 0x42, 0x04,
+ 0x01, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC0, 0x8A, 0x30, 0x01, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06,
+ 0x13, 0x29, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0F, 0x05, 0x02, 0x6B, 0x2B, 0xC2, 0x06, 0x02,
+ 0x6B, 0x2B, 0x01, 0x02, 0x8A, 0x42, 0x04, 0x28, 0x01, 0x02, 0x3A, 0x0F,
+ 0x06, 0x1F, 0x29, 0x01, 0x0D, 0x0F, 0x05, 0x02, 0x6B, 0x2B, 0xC2, 0x01,
+ 0x0C, 0x0F, 0x05, 0x02, 0x6B, 0x2B, 0x85, 0x01, 0x0C, 0xB6, 0x8B, 0x85,
+ 0x01, 0x0C, 0x32, 0x05, 0x02, 0x6B, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x03, 0x6B, 0x2B, 0x29,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0xC0, 0xA7, 0xC0, 0xA7, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x1D, 0xC2, 0x06, 0x03,
+ 0xBC, 0x04, 0x15, 0xC0, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x81, 0x7F, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x2A,
+ 0x8D, 0x08, 0x01, 0x00, 0x47, 0x42, 0x8D, 0x47, 0xB6, 0x04, 0x01, 0xC9,
+ 0x04, 0x60, 0x9D, 0x9D, 0x00, 0x00, 0xBB, 0x2A, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x07, 0x29,
+ 0x06, 0x02, 0x69, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x74, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC3, 0x01, 0x03, 0xC1,
+ 0x47, 0x29, 0x47, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC0, 0xC9, 0x00, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03,
+ 0x00, 0xC0, 0xA7, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x80, 0x50, 0xC2, 0x03, 0x01, 0xC2, 0x03,
+ 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x16, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0F,
+ 0x0D, 0x06, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x10, 0x08, 0x0C, 0x02,
+ 0x00, 0x39, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04, 0x2A, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x11, 0x02,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x06, 0x0D, 0x13, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0F, 0x02, 0x02,
+ 0x01, 0x03, 0x0F, 0x39, 0x13, 0x06, 0x11, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02,
+ 0x02, 0x62, 0x01, 0x02, 0x0C, 0x02, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0C, 0x39, 0x03, 0x00,
+ 0x04, 0xFF, 0x2C, 0x9D, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC0, 0xA7, 0xBD, 0x82,
+ 0x41, 0x9D, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC0, 0xA7, 0xC0, 0xA7, 0x01, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x41,
+ 0x2A, 0x06, 0x15, 0xC0, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x20, 0x0B, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x47, 0x0C, 0x7E, 0x2F, 0x39, 0x7E, 0x41, 0x04, 0x01, 0x29, 0x04, 0x68,
+ 0x9D, 0x9D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x9A, 0xC3, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0C, 0xC3,
+ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x03, 0x9A, 0xC3, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0C, 0xC3, 0x08,
+ 0x01, 0x08, 0x0C, 0xC3, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x9A, 0xC3, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x3D, 0x2A, 0x5D, 0x05, 0x01, 0x00, 0x29, 0xD1, 0x04, 0x76, 0x02,
+ 0x03, 0x00, 0x94, 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x2A, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0B,
+ 0x06, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x93, 0x08, 0x2E, 0x02, 0x00, 0x0F,
+ 0x06, 0x01, 0x00, 0x61, 0x04, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2C,
+ 0x19, 0x38, 0x06, 0x04, 0xCF, 0x29, 0x04, 0x78, 0x01, 0x16, 0x89, 0x42,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0xE2, 0x01, 0x00, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0x01, 0x17, 0x89, 0x42, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x15, 0x89, 0x42, 0x47, 0x57, 0x29, 0x57, 0x29, 0x2C, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x47, 0xC6, 0x00, 0x00, 0xBB, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0F, 0x05,
+ 0x02, 0x73, 0x2B, 0x2A, 0xC9, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x47, 0x3A, 0x9A, 0x47,
+ 0x2A, 0x06, 0x05, 0xC3, 0x29, 0x62, 0x04, 0x78, 0x29, 0x00, 0x02, 0x03,
+ 0x00, 0x78, 0x2E, 0x9C, 0x03, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0F, 0x13, 0x02,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x12, 0x01, 0x0F, 0x13, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x12,
+ 0x01, 0x0F, 0x13, 0x01, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x10, 0x29, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x18, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x03, 0x4C, 0x04, 0x01, 0x4D, 0x04, 0x81,
+ 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x10, 0x29, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10,
+ 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x03, 0x4C, 0x04, 0x01, 0x4D, 0x04, 0x80, 0x77, 0x01,
+ 0x02, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x10, 0x29, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x20, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x06, 0x03, 0x4C, 0x04, 0x01, 0x4D, 0x04, 0x80, 0x61, 0x01, 0x03, 0x3A,
+ 0x0F, 0x06, 0x0F, 0x29, 0x29, 0x01, 0x10, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x03, 0x4A,
+ 0x04, 0x01, 0x4B, 0x04, 0x80, 0x4C, 0x01, 0x04, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x0E,
+ 0x29, 0x29, 0x01, 0x20, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x03, 0x4A, 0x04, 0x01, 0x4B,
+ 0x04, 0x38, 0x01, 0x05, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x29, 0x29, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x06, 0x03, 0x4E, 0x04, 0x01, 0x4F, 0x04, 0x26, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x09, 0x10,
+ 0x06, 0x02, 0x6A, 0x2B, 0x47, 0x29, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x01, 0x13, 0x01, 0x04,
+ 0x0C, 0x01, 0x10, 0x08, 0x47, 0x01, 0x08, 0x13, 0x01, 0x10, 0x47, 0x09,
+ 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x03, 0x48, 0x04, 0x01, 0x49, 0x00, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x9C, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x12, 0x01, 0x02, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x9C, 0x01, 0x0C,
+ 0x12, 0x2A, 0x60, 0x47, 0x01, 0x03, 0x0B, 0x13, 0x00, 0x00, 0x9C, 0x01,
+ 0x0C, 0x12, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x9C, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x12, 0x5F,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x00, 0x75, 0x30, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x22, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x06, 0x29, 0x01, 0x00, 0xA0, 0x04, 0x14, 0x01, 0x02,
+ 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x0D, 0x29, 0x77, 0x30, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x03,
+ 0x01, 0x10, 0x39, 0x04, 0x01, 0x29, 0x04, 0x01, 0x29, 0x7D, 0x30, 0x05,
+ 0x33, 0x31, 0x06, 0x30, 0x88, 0x30, 0x01, 0x14, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x06,
+ 0x29, 0x01, 0x02, 0x39, 0x04, 0x22, 0x01, 0x15, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x29, 0xAA, 0x06, 0x03, 0x01, 0x7F, 0xA0, 0x04, 0x13, 0x01, 0x16, 0x3A,
+ 0x0F, 0x06, 0x06, 0x29, 0x01, 0x01, 0x39, 0x04, 0x07, 0x29, 0x01, 0x04,
+ 0x39, 0x01, 0x00, 0x29, 0x19, 0x06, 0x03, 0x01, 0x08, 0x39, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x1B, 0x2A, 0x05, 0x13, 0x31, 0x06, 0x10, 0x88, 0x30, 0x01, 0x15, 0x0F,
+ 0x06, 0x08, 0x29, 0xAA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x77, 0x42, 0x04, 0x01, 0x23, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0xCF, 0x01, 0x07, 0x13, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x06, 0x02, 0x73, 0x2B,
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x2C, 0x19, 0x06, 0x05, 0x02, 0x00, 0x89, 0x42,
+ 0x00, 0xCF, 0x29, 0x04, 0x74, 0x00, 0x01, 0x14, 0xD2, 0x01, 0x01, 0xE2,
+ 0x2C, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x00, 0xCA, 0x01, 0x16, 0xD2, 0xD6, 0x2C, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x0B, 0xE2, 0x52, 0x2A, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x03, 0x08, 0xE1, 0xE1, 0x14,
+ 0x2A, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x02, 0x29, 0x00, 0xE1, 0x1E, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x05, 0x85,
+ 0x47, 0xDA, 0x04, 0x77, 0x29, 0x04, 0x6C, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0xDC, 0x95,
+ 0x2E, 0x01, 0x86, 0x03, 0x11, 0x06, 0x05, 0x63, 0x01, 0x00, 0xDD, 0x08,
+ 0x50, 0x08, 0x01, 0x03, 0x08, 0x01, 0x0D, 0xE2, 0xE1, 0x01, 0x00, 0xDC,
+ 0xE2, 0x01, 0x01, 0xDC, 0x29, 0x95, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x86, 0x03, 0x11, 0x06,
+ 0x08, 0x01, 0x00, 0xDD, 0xE0, 0x01, 0x01, 0xDD, 0x29, 0x50, 0xE0, 0x16,
+ 0x15, 0x2A, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x02, 0x29, 0x00, 0xE0, 0x1F, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x05,
+ 0x85, 0x47, 0xDA, 0x04, 0x77, 0x29, 0x04, 0x6C, 0x00, 0x9E, 0x01, 0x14,
+ 0xE2, 0x01, 0x0C, 0xE1, 0x85, 0x01, 0x0C, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x04, 0x03, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x02, 0xE2, 0x01, 0x80, 0x46, 0x8A, 0x30, 0x01, 0x02, 0x0F, 0x06,
+ 0x0C, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x05, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x1D, 0x04,
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x01, 0x86, 0x30, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x05, 0x04,
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x02, 0x8C, 0x2E, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x05, 0x62, 0x21,
+ 0x01, 0x07, 0x08, 0x03, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x08, 0x02, 0x03,
+ 0x08, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x03, 0x01, 0x02, 0x08, 0x08, 0xE1, 0x95, 0x2E, 0xE0,
+ 0x8E, 0x01, 0x04, 0x17, 0x8E, 0x01, 0x04, 0x08, 0x01, 0x1C, 0x34, 0x8E,
+ 0x01, 0x20, 0xDA, 0x01, 0x20, 0xE2, 0x8F, 0x01, 0x20, 0xDA, 0x78, 0x2E,
+ 0xE0, 0x01, 0x00, 0xE2, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x08, 0x02, 0x03, 0x08,
+ 0x2A, 0x06, 0x80, 0x40, 0xE0, 0x02, 0x01, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x10, 0x01, 0x83,
+ 0xFE, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0x04, 0x09, 0x2A, 0xE0, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x47, 0xDB,
+ 0x04, 0x01, 0x29, 0x02, 0x02, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x01, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0xE0, 0x86, 0x30, 0x01, 0x08, 0x09, 0xE2, 0x02, 0x03, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x11,
+ 0x01, 0x10, 0xE0, 0x01, 0x04, 0x09, 0x2A, 0xE0, 0x64, 0x2A, 0xE0, 0x62,
+ 0x85, 0x47, 0xDB, 0x04, 0x01, 0x29, 0x04, 0x01, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x0E, 0xE2, 0x01, 0x00, 0xE1, 0x00, 0x03, 0x78, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x05, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x7E, 0x2F, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x82, 0x80, 0x80, 0x80, 0x00, 0x13, 0x06,
+ 0x05, 0x29, 0x01, 0x1D, 0x04, 0x0E, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x83, 0xC0, 0x80, 0x80,
+ 0x00, 0x13, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x01, 0x47, 0x29, 0xA5, 0x03, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x25, 0x2A, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x02, 0x37, 0x2B, 0x03, 0x01, 0x95, 0x2E, 0x01,
+ 0x86, 0x03, 0x11, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0C, 0xE2, 0x02, 0x01, 0x80, 0x30,
+ 0x08, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x13, 0x08, 0x01, 0x06, 0x08, 0xE1, 0x01,
+ 0x03, 0xE2, 0x02, 0x00, 0xE0, 0x7F, 0x80, 0x30, 0xDB, 0x02, 0x02, 0x06,
+ 0x1C, 0x92, 0x2E, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x83, 0xFE, 0x00, 0x0B, 0x06, 0x03, 0xE0,
+ 0x04, 0x0F, 0x01, 0x81, 0x7F, 0x13, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x2E, 0xCD, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x0C, 0x01, 0x03, 0x08, 0xE2, 0x02, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x85, 0x02, 0x01, 0xDA,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x56, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x02, 0x65, 0x00, 0xCF,
+ 0x29, 0x04, 0x73, 0x00, 0x2A, 0xE2, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x78,
+ 0x2E, 0xCB, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x63, 0x3A, 0x06, 0x08, 0x01, 0x80, 0x41, 0xE2,
+ 0x01, 0x80, 0x42, 0xE2, 0x46, 0x06, 0x07, 0x61, 0x3A, 0x06, 0x03, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0xE2, 0x45, 0x06, 0x08, 0x61, 0x3A, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x80, 0x40,
+ 0xE2, 0x47, 0x29, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x46, 0x45, 0x39,
+ 0x05, 0x14, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x7C, 0xDE, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x03,
+ 0x01, 0x80, 0x7C, 0xDE, 0x02, 0x00, 0x08, 0x47, 0x29, 0x00, 0x46, 0x06,
+ 0x07, 0x01, 0x01, 0x44, 0x29, 0xDE, 0x03, 0x00, 0x45, 0x06, 0x0A, 0x01,
+ 0x03, 0x44, 0x29, 0xDE, 0x02, 0x00, 0x08, 0x03, 0x00, 0x29, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x04, 0xDF, 0x01, 0x05, 0xDF, 0x01, 0x06,
+ 0xDF, 0x01, 0x03, 0xDF, 0x01, 0x02, 0xDF, 0x0A, 0x65, 0x00, 0x01, 0x03,
+ 0x00, 0x3A, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x13, 0x05, 0x01, 0x00, 0x63,
+ 0x01, 0x03, 0x3B, 0x06, 0x07, 0x02, 0x00, 0xE2, 0x01, 0x02, 0x3B, 0xE2,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x08, 0x54, 0xE2, 0xE2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2A, 0x01,
+ 0x10, 0x54, 0xE2, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x2A, 0x57, 0x06, 0x02, 0x29, 0x00,
+ 0xCF, 0x29, 0x04, 0x76
+};
+
+static const uint16_t t0_caddr[] = {
+ 0,
+ 5,
+ 10,
+ 15,
+ 20,
+ 25,
+ 30,
+ 35,
+ 40,
+ 44,
+ 48,
+ 52,
+ 56,
+ 60,
+ 64,
+ 68,
+ 72,
+ 76,
+ 80,
+ 84,
+ 88,
+ 92,
+ 96,
+ 100,
+ 104,
+ 109,
+ 114,
+ 119,
+ 124,
+ 129,
+ 134,
+ 139,
+ 144,
+ 149,
+ 154,
+ 159,
+ 164,
+ 169,
+ 174,
+ 180,
+ 185,
+ 190,
+ 195,
+ 200,
+ 205,
+ 210,
+ 215,
+ 220,
+ 225,
+ 230,
+ 235,
+ 240,
+ 245,
+ 250,
+ 255,
+ 260,
+ 265,
+ 270,
+ 275,
+ 280,
+ 285,
+ 290,
+ 299,
+ 303,
+ 328,
+ 334,
+ 353,
+ 364,
+ 405,
+ 516,
+ 520,
+ 553,
+ 563,
+ 587,
+ 669,
+ 683,
+ 689,
+ 748,
+ 767,
+ 789,
+ 838,
+ 887,
+ 963,
+ 1065,
+ 1076,
+ 1670,
+ 1674,
+ 1741,
+ 1751,
+ 1782,
+ 1806,
+ 1852,
+ 1922,
+ 1962,
+ 1976,
+ 1985,
+ 1989,
+ 2084,
+ 2092,
+ 2128,
+ 2139,
+ 2155,
+ 2161,
+ 2172,
+ 2207,
+ 2233,
+ 2245,
+ 2251,
+ 2264,
+ 2279,
+ 2472,
+ 2481,
+ 2494,
+ 2503,
+ 2510,
+ 2616,
+ 2641,
+ 2654,
+ 2670,
+ 2688,
+ 2720,
+ 2793,
+ 2806,
+ 2987,
+ 2995,
+ 3122,
+ 3136,
+ 3141,
+ 3185,
+ 3242,
+ 3263,
+ 3290,
+ 3298,
+ 3306
+};
+
+#define T0_INTERPRETED 93
+
+#define T0_ENTER(ip, rp, slot) do { \
+ const unsigned char *t0_newip; \
+ uint32_t t0_lnum; \
+ t0_newip = &t0_codeblock[t0_caddr[(slot) - T0_INTERPRETED]]; \
+ t0_lnum = t0_parse7E_unsigned(&t0_newip); \
+ (rp) += t0_lnum; \
+ *((rp) ++) = (uint32_t)((ip) - &t0_codeblock[0]) + (t0_lnum << 16); \
+ (ip) = t0_newip; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define T0_DEFENTRY(name, slot) \
+void \
+name(void *ctx) \
+{ \
+ t0_context *t0ctx = ctx; \
+ t0ctx->ip = &t0_codeblock[0]; \
+ T0_ENTER(t0ctx->ip, t0ctx->rp, slot); \
+}
+
+T0_DEFENTRY(br_ssl_hs_server_init_main, 166)
+
+#define T0_NEXT(t0ipp) (*(*(t0ipp)) ++)
+
+void
+br_ssl_hs_server_run(void *t0ctx)
+{
+ uint32_t *dp, *rp;
+ const unsigned char *ip;
+
+#define T0_LOCAL(x) (*(rp - 2 - (x)))
+#define T0_POP() (*-- dp)
+#define T0_POPi() (*(int32_t *)(-- dp))
+#define T0_PEEK(x) (*(dp - 1 - (x)))
+#define T0_PEEKi(x) (*(int32_t *)(dp - 1 - (x)))
+#define T0_PUSH(v) do { *dp = (v); dp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_PUSHi(v) do { *(int32_t *)dp = (v); dp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_RPOP() (*-- rp)
+#define T0_RPOPi() (*(int32_t *)(-- rp))
+#define T0_RPUSH(v) do { *rp = (v); rp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_RPUSHi(v) do { *(int32_t *)rp = (v); rp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_ROLL(x) do { \
+ size_t t0len = (size_t)(x); \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 1 - t0len); \
+ memmove(dp - t0len - 1, dp - t0len, t0len * sizeof *dp); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_SWAP() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_ROT() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 3); \
+ *(dp - 3) = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_NROT() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 3); \
+ *(dp - 3) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_PICK(x) do { \
+ uint32_t t0depth = (x); \
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(t0depth)); \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_CO() do { \
+ goto t0_exit; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_RET() goto t0_next
+
+ dp = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->dp;
+ rp = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->rp;
+ ip = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->ip;
+ goto t0_next;
+ for (;;) {
+ uint32_t t0x;
+
+ t0_next:
+ t0x = T0_NEXT(&ip);
+ if (t0x < T0_INTERPRETED) {
+ switch (t0x) {
+ int32_t t0off;
+
+ case 0: /* ret */
+ t0x = T0_RPOP();
+ rp -= (t0x >> 16);
+ t0x &= 0xFFFF;
+ if (t0x == 0) {
+ ip = NULL;
+ goto t0_exit;
+ }
+ ip = &t0_codeblock[t0x];
+ break;
+ case 1: /* literal constant */
+ T0_PUSHi(t0_parse7E_signed(&ip));
+ break;
+ case 2: /* read local */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_LOCAL(t0_parse7E_unsigned(&ip)));
+ break;
+ case 3: /* write local */
+ T0_LOCAL(t0_parse7E_unsigned(&ip)) = T0_POP();
+ break;
+ case 4: /* jump */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ ip += t0off;
+ break;
+ case 5: /* jump if */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ if (T0_POP()) {
+ ip += t0off;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 6: /* jump if not */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ if (!T0_POP()) {
+ ip += t0off;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 7: {
+ /* * */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a * b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 8: {
+ /* + */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a + b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 9: {
+ /* - */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a - b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 10: {
+ /* -rot */
+ T0_NROT();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 11: {
+ /* < */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a < b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 12: {
+ /* << */
+
+ int c = (int)T0_POPi();
+ uint32_t x = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(x << c);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 13: {
+ /* <= */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a <= b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 14: {
+ /* <> */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a != b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 15: {
+ /* = */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a == b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 16: {
+ /* > */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a > b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 17: {
+ /* >= */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a >= b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 18: {
+ /* >> */
+
+ int c = (int)T0_POPi();
+ int32_t x = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSHi(x >> c);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 19: {
+ /* and */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a & b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 20: {
+ /* begin-cert */
+
+ if (ENG->chain_len == 0) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ } else {
+ ENG->cert_cur = ENG->chain->data;
+ ENG->cert_len = ENG->chain->data_len;
+ ENG->chain ++;
+ ENG->chain_len --;
+ T0_PUSH(ENG->cert_len);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 21: {
+ /* begin-ta-name */
+
+ const br_x500_name *dn;
+ if (CTX->cur_dn_index >= CTX->num_tas) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ } else {
+ if (CTX->ta_names == NULL) {
+ dn = &CTX->tas[CTX->cur_dn_index].dn;
+ } else {
+ dn = &CTX->ta_names[CTX->cur_dn_index];
+ }
+ CTX->cur_dn_index ++;
+ CTX->cur_dn = dn->data;
+ CTX->cur_dn_len = dn->len;
+ T0_PUSH(CTX->cur_dn_len);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 22: {
+ /* begin-ta-name-list */
+
+ CTX->cur_dn_index = 0;
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 23: {
+ /* bzero */
+
+ size_t len = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *addr = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ memset(addr, 0, len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 24: {
+ /* call-policy-handler */
+
+ int x;
+ br_ssl_server_choices choices;
+
+ x = (*CTX->policy_vtable)->choose(
+ CTX->policy_vtable, CTX, &choices);
+ ENG->session.cipher_suite = choices.cipher_suite;
+ CTX->sign_hash_id = choices.algo_id;
+ ENG->chain = choices.chain;
+ ENG->chain_len = choices.chain_len;
+ T0_PUSHi(-(x != 0));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 25: {
+ /* can-output? */
+
+ T0_PUSHi(-(ENG->hlen_out > 0));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 26: {
+ /* check-resume */
+
+ if (ENG->session.session_id_len == 32
+ && CTX->cache_vtable != NULL && (*CTX->cache_vtable)->load(
+ CTX->cache_vtable, CTX, &ENG->session))
+ {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ } else {
+ T0_PUSH(0);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 27: {
+ /* co */
+ T0_CO();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 28: {
+ /* compute-Finished-inner */
+
+ int prf_id = T0_POP();
+ int from_client = T0_POPi();
+ unsigned char tmp[48];
+ br_tls_prf_seed_chunk seed;
+
+ br_tls_prf_impl prf = br_ssl_engine_get_PRF(ENG, prf_id);
+ seed.data = tmp;
+ if (ENG->session.version >= BR_TLS12) {
+ seed.len = br_multihash_out(&ENG->mhash, prf_id, tmp);
+ } else {
+ br_multihash_out(&ENG->mhash, br_md5_ID, tmp);
+ br_multihash_out(&ENG->mhash, br_sha1_ID, tmp + 16);
+ seed.len = 36;
+ }
+ prf(ENG->pad, 12, ENG->session.master_secret,
+ sizeof ENG->session.master_secret,
+ from_client ? "client finished" : "server finished",
+ 1, &seed);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 29: {
+ /* compute-hash-CV */
+
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i <= 6; i ++) {
+ br_multihash_out(&ENG->mhash, i,
+ ENG->pad + HASH_PAD_OFF[i - 1]);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 30: {
+ /* copy-cert-chunk */
+
+ size_t clen;
+
+ clen = ENG->cert_len;
+ if (clen > sizeof ENG->pad) {
+ clen = sizeof ENG->pad;
+ }
+ memcpy(ENG->pad, ENG->cert_cur, clen);
+ ENG->cert_cur += clen;
+ ENG->cert_len -= clen;
+ T0_PUSH(clen);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 31: {
+ /* copy-dn-chunk */
+
+ size_t clen;
+
+ clen = CTX->cur_dn_len;
+ if (clen > sizeof ENG->pad) {
+ clen = sizeof ENG->pad;
+ }
+ memcpy(ENG->pad, CTX->cur_dn, clen);
+ CTX->cur_dn += clen;
+ CTX->cur_dn_len -= clen;
+ T0_PUSH(clen);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 32: {
+ /* copy-hash-CV */
+
+ int id = T0_POP();
+ size_t off, len;
+
+ if (id == 0) {
+ off = 0;
+ len = 36;
+ } else {
+ if (br_multihash_getimpl(&ENG->mhash, id) == 0) {
+ T0_PUSH(0);
+ T0_RET();
+ }
+ off = HASH_PAD_OFF[id - 1];
+ len = HASH_PAD_OFF[id] - off;
+ }
+ memcpy(CTX->hash_CV, ENG->pad + off, len);
+ CTX->hash_CV_len = len;
+ CTX->hash_CV_id = id;
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 33: {
+ /* copy-protocol-name */
+
+ size_t idx = T0_POP();
+ size_t len = strlen(ENG->protocol_names[idx]);
+ memcpy(ENG->pad, ENG->protocol_names[idx], len);
+ T0_PUSH(len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 34: {
+ /* data-get8 */
+
+ size_t addr = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(t0_datablock[addr]);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 35: {
+ /* discard-input */
+
+ ENG->hlen_in = 0;
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 36: {
+ /* do-ecdh */
+
+ int prf_id = T0_POPi();
+ size_t len = T0_POP();
+ do_ecdh(CTX, prf_id, ENG->pad, len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 37: {
+ /* do-ecdhe-part1 */
+
+ int curve = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSHi(do_ecdhe_part1(CTX, curve));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 38: {
+ /* do-ecdhe-part2 */
+
+ int prf_id = T0_POPi();
+ size_t len = T0_POP();
+ do_ecdhe_part2(CTX, prf_id, ENG->pad, len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 39: {
+ /* do-rsa-decrypt */
+
+ int prf_id = T0_POPi();
+ size_t len = T0_POP();
+ do_rsa_decrypt(CTX, prf_id, ENG->pad, len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 40: {
+ /* do-static-ecdh */
+
+ do_static_ecdh(CTX, T0_POP());
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 41: {
+ /* drop */
+ (void)T0_POP();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 42: {
+ /* dup */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(0));
+ }
+ break;
+ case 43: {
+ /* fail */
+
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(ENG, (int)T0_POPi());
+ T0_CO();
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 44: {
+ /* flush-record */
+
+ br_ssl_engine_flush_record(ENG);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 45: {
+ /* get-key-type-usages */
+
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk;
+ unsigned usages;
+
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ pk = xc->get_pkey(ENG->x509ctx, &usages);
+ if (pk == NULL) {
+ T0_PUSH(0);
+ } else {
+ T0_PUSH(pk->key_type | usages);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 46: {
+ /* get16 */
+
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(*(uint16_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 47: {
+ /* get32 */
+
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(*(uint32_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 48: {
+ /* get8 */
+
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(*((unsigned char *)ENG + addr));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 49: {
+ /* has-input? */
+
+ T0_PUSHi(-(ENG->hlen_in != 0));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 50: {
+ /* memcmp */
+
+ size_t len = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *addr2 = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *addr1 = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ int x = memcmp(addr1, addr2, len);
+ T0_PUSH((uint32_t)-(x == 0));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 51: {
+ /* memcpy */
+
+ size_t len = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *src = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *dst = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ memcpy(dst, src, len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 52: {
+ /* mkrand */
+
+ size_t len = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ void *addr = (unsigned char *)ENG + (size_t)T0_POP();
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ENG->rng, addr, len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 53: {
+ /* more-incoming-bytes? */
+
+ T0_PUSHi(ENG->hlen_in != 0 || !br_ssl_engine_recvrec_finished(ENG));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 54: {
+ /* multihash-init */
+
+ br_multihash_init(&ENG->mhash);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 55: {
+ /* neg */
+
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-a);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 56: {
+ /* not */
+
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(~a);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 57: {
+ /* or */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a | b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 58: {
+ /* over */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(1));
+ }
+ break;
+ case 59: {
+ /* pick */
+ T0_PICK(T0_POP());
+ }
+ break;
+ case 60: {
+ /* read-chunk-native */
+
+ size_t clen = ENG->hlen_in;
+ if (clen > 0) {
+ uint32_t addr, len;
+
+ len = T0_POP();
+ addr = T0_POP();
+ if ((size_t)len < clen) {
+ clen = (size_t)len;
+ }
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)ENG + addr, ENG->hbuf_in, clen);
+ if (ENG->record_type_in == BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE) {
+ br_multihash_update(&ENG->mhash, ENG->hbuf_in, clen);
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(addr + (uint32_t)clen);
+ T0_PUSH(len - (uint32_t)clen);
+ ENG->hbuf_in += clen;
+ ENG->hlen_in -= clen;
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 61: {
+ /* read8-native */
+
+ if (ENG->hlen_in > 0) {
+ unsigned char x;
+
+ x = *ENG->hbuf_in ++;
+ if (ENG->record_type_in == BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE) {
+ br_multihash_update(&ENG->mhash, &x, 1);
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(x);
+ ENG->hlen_in --;
+ } else {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 62: {
+ /* save-session */
+
+ if (CTX->cache_vtable != NULL) {
+ (*CTX->cache_vtable)->save(
+ CTX->cache_vtable, CTX, &ENG->session);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 63: {
+ /* set-max-frag-len */
+
+ size_t max_frag_len = T0_POP();
+
+ br_ssl_engine_new_max_frag_len(ENG, max_frag_len);
+
+ /*
+ * We must adjust our own output limit. Since we call this only
+ * after receiving a ClientHello and before beginning to send
+ * the ServerHello, the next output record should be empty at
+ * that point, so we can use max_frag_len as a limit.
+ */
+ if (ENG->hlen_out > max_frag_len) {
+ ENG->hlen_out = max_frag_len;
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 64: {
+ /* set16 */
+
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ *(uint16_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr) = (uint16_t)T0_POP();
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 65: {
+ /* set32 */
+
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ *(uint32_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)ENG + addr) = (uint32_t)T0_POP();
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 66: {
+ /* set8 */
+
+ size_t addr = (size_t)T0_POP();
+ *((unsigned char *)ENG + addr) = (unsigned char)T0_POP();
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 67: {
+ /* supported-curves */
+
+ uint32_t x = ENG->iec == NULL ? 0 : ENG->iec->supported_curves;
+ T0_PUSH(x);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 68: {
+ /* supported-hash-functions */
+
+ int i;
+ unsigned x, num;
+
+ x = 0;
+ num = 0;
+ for (i = br_sha1_ID; i <= br_sha512_ID; i ++) {
+ if (br_multihash_getimpl(&ENG->mhash, i)) {
+ x |= 1U << i;
+ num ++;
+ }
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(x);
+ T0_PUSH(num);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 69: {
+ /* supports-ecdsa? */
+
+ T0_PUSHi(-(ENG->iecdsa != 0));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 70: {
+ /* supports-rsa-sign? */
+
+ T0_PUSHi(-(ENG->irsavrfy != 0));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 71: {
+ /* swap */
+ T0_SWAP();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 72: {
+ /* switch-aesccm-in */
+
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len, tag_len;
+
+ tag_len = T0_POP();
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_ccm_in(ENG, is_client, prf_id,
+ ENG->iaes_ctrcbc, cipher_key_len, tag_len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 73: {
+ /* switch-aesccm-out */
+
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len, tag_len;
+
+ tag_len = T0_POP();
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_ccm_out(ENG, is_client, prf_id,
+ ENG->iaes_ctrcbc, cipher_key_len, tag_len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 74: {
+ /* switch-aesgcm-in */
+
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len;
+
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_gcm_in(ENG, is_client, prf_id,
+ ENG->iaes_ctr, cipher_key_len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 75: {
+ /* switch-aesgcm-out */
+
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len;
+
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_gcm_out(ENG, is_client, prf_id,
+ ENG->iaes_ctr, cipher_key_len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 76: {
+ /* switch-cbc-in */
+
+ int is_client, prf_id, mac_id, aes;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len;
+
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ aes = T0_POP();
+ mac_id = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_cbc_in(ENG, is_client, prf_id, mac_id,
+ aes ? ENG->iaes_cbcdec : ENG->ides_cbcdec, cipher_key_len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 77: {
+ /* switch-cbc-out */
+
+ int is_client, prf_id, mac_id, aes;
+ unsigned cipher_key_len;
+
+ cipher_key_len = T0_POP();
+ aes = T0_POP();
+ mac_id = T0_POP();
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_cbc_out(ENG, is_client, prf_id, mac_id,
+ aes ? ENG->iaes_cbcenc : ENG->ides_cbcenc, cipher_key_len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 78: {
+ /* switch-chapol-in */
+
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_chapol_in(ENG, is_client, prf_id);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 79: {
+ /* switch-chapol-out */
+
+ int is_client, prf_id;
+
+ prf_id = T0_POP();
+ is_client = T0_POP();
+ br_ssl_engine_switch_chapol_out(ENG, is_client, prf_id);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 80: {
+ /* ta-names-total-length */
+
+ size_t u, len;
+
+ len = 0;
+ if (CTX->ta_names != NULL) {
+ for (u = 0; u < CTX->num_tas; u ++) {
+ len += CTX->ta_names[u].len + 2;
+ }
+ } else if (CTX->tas != NULL) {
+ for (u = 0; u < CTX->num_tas; u ++) {
+ len += CTX->tas[u].dn.len + 2;
+ }
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 81: {
+ /* test-protocol-name */
+
+ size_t len = T0_POP();
+ size_t u;
+
+ for (u = 0; u < ENG->protocol_names_num; u ++) {
+ const char *name;
+
+ name = ENG->protocol_names[u];
+ if (len == strlen(name) && memcmp(ENG->pad, name, len) == 0) {
+ T0_PUSH(u);
+ T0_RET();
+ }
+ }
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 82: {
+ /* total-chain-length */
+
+ size_t u;
+ uint32_t total;
+
+ total = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < ENG->chain_len; u ++) {
+ total += 3 + (uint32_t)ENG->chain[u].data_len;
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(total);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 83: {
+ /* u< */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a < b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 84: {
+ /* u>> */
+
+ int c = (int)T0_POPi();
+ uint32_t x = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(x >> c);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 85: {
+ /* verify-CV-sig */
+
+ int err;
+
+ err = verify_CV_sig(CTX, T0_POP());
+ T0_PUSHi(err);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 86: {
+ /* write-blob-chunk */
+
+ size_t clen = ENG->hlen_out;
+ if (clen > 0) {
+ uint32_t addr, len;
+
+ len = T0_POP();
+ addr = T0_POP();
+ if ((size_t)len < clen) {
+ clen = (size_t)len;
+ }
+ memcpy(ENG->hbuf_out, (unsigned char *)ENG + addr, clen);
+ if (ENG->record_type_out == BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE) {
+ br_multihash_update(&ENG->mhash, ENG->hbuf_out, clen);
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(addr + (uint32_t)clen);
+ T0_PUSH(len - (uint32_t)clen);
+ ENG->hbuf_out += clen;
+ ENG->hlen_out -= clen;
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 87: {
+ /* write8-native */
+
+ unsigned char x;
+
+ x = (unsigned char)T0_POP();
+ if (ENG->hlen_out > 0) {
+ if (ENG->record_type_out == BR_SSL_HANDSHAKE) {
+ br_multihash_update(&ENG->mhash, &x, 1);
+ }
+ *ENG->hbuf_out ++ = x;
+ ENG->hlen_out --;
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ } else {
+ T0_PUSHi(0);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 88: {
+ /* x509-append */
+
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+ size_t len;
+
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ len = T0_POP();
+ xc->append(ENG->x509ctx, ENG->pad, len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 89: {
+ /* x509-end-cert */
+
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ xc->end_cert(ENG->x509ctx);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 90: {
+ /* x509-end-chain */
+
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ T0_PUSH(xc->end_chain(ENG->x509ctx));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 91: {
+ /* x509-start-cert */
+
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ xc->start_cert(ENG->x509ctx, T0_POP());
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 92: {
+ /* x509-start-chain */
+
+ const br_x509_class *xc;
+ uint32_t bc;
+
+ bc = T0_POP();
+ xc = *(ENG->x509ctx);
+ xc->start_chain(ENG->x509ctx, bc ? ENG->server_name : NULL);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ T0_ENTER(ip, rp, t0x);
+ }
+ }
+t0_exit:
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->dp = dp;
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->rp = rp;
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->ip = ip;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hs_server.t0 b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hs_server.t0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f6e934
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_hs_server.t0
@@ -0,0 +1,1510 @@
+\ Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+\
+\ Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+\ a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+\ "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+\ without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+\ distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+\ permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+\ the following conditions:
+\
+\ The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+\ included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+\
+\ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+\ EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+\ MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+\ NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+\ BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+\ ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+\ CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+\ SOFTWARE.
+
+\ ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+\ Handshake processing code, for the server.
+\ The common T0 code (ssl_hs_common.t0) shall be read first.
+
+preamble {
+
+/*
+ * This macro evaluates to a pointer to the server context, under that
+ * specific name. It must be noted that since the engine context is the
+ * first field of the br_ssl_server_context structure ('eng'), then
+ * pointers values of both types are interchangeable, modulo an
+ * appropriate cast. This also means that "addresses" computed as offsets
+ * within the structure work for both kinds of context.
+ */
+#define CTX ((br_ssl_server_context *)ENG)
+
+/*
+ * Decrypt the pre-master secret (RSA key exchange).
+ */
+static void
+do_rsa_decrypt(br_ssl_server_context *ctx, int prf_id,
+ unsigned char *epms, size_t len)
+{
+ uint32_t x;
+ unsigned char rpms[48];
+
+ /*
+ * Decrypt the PMS.
+ */
+ x = (*ctx->policy_vtable)->do_keyx(ctx->policy_vtable, epms, &len);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the first two bytes to the maximum supported client
+ * protocol version. These bytes are used for version rollback
+ * detection; forceing the two bytes will make the master secret
+ * wrong if the bytes are not correct. This process is
+ * recommended by RFC 5246 (section 7.4.7.1).
+ */
+ br_enc16be(epms, ctx->client_max_version);
+
+ /*
+ * Make a random PMS and copy it above the decrypted value if the
+ * decryption failed. Note that we use a constant-time conditional
+ * copy.
+ */
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, rpms, sizeof rpms);
+ br_ccopy(x ^ 1, epms, rpms, sizeof rpms);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute master secret.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_compute_master(&ctx->eng, prf_id, epms, 48);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the pre-master secret from RAM: it is normally a buffer
+ * in the context, hence potentially long-lived.
+ */
+ memset(epms, 0, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Common part for ECDH and ECDHE.
+ */
+static void
+ecdh_common(br_ssl_server_context *ctx, int prf_id,
+ unsigned char *xcoor, size_t xcoor_len, uint32_t ctl)
+{
+ unsigned char rpms[80];
+
+ if (xcoor_len > sizeof rpms) {
+ xcoor_len = sizeof rpms;
+ ctl = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Make a random PMS and copy it above the decrypted value if the
+ * decryption failed. Note that we use a constant-time conditional
+ * copy.
+ */
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, rpms, xcoor_len);
+ br_ccopy(ctl ^ 1, xcoor, rpms, xcoor_len);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute master secret.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_compute_master(&ctx->eng, prf_id, xcoor, xcoor_len);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the pre-master secret from RAM: it is normally a buffer
+ * in the context, hence potentially long-lived.
+ */
+ memset(xcoor, 0, xcoor_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do the ECDH key exchange (not ECDHE).
+ */
+static void
+do_ecdh(br_ssl_server_context *ctx, int prf_id,
+ unsigned char *cpoint, size_t cpoint_len)
+{
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ /*
+ * Finalise the key exchange.
+ */
+ x = (*ctx->policy_vtable)->do_keyx(ctx->policy_vtable,
+ cpoint, &cpoint_len);
+ ecdh_common(ctx, prf_id, cpoint, cpoint_len, x);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do the full static ECDH key exchange. When this function is called,
+ * it has already been verified that the cipher suite uses ECDH (not ECDHE),
+ * and the client's public key (from its certificate) has type EC and is
+ * apt for key exchange.
+ */
+static void
+do_static_ecdh(br_ssl_server_context *ctx, int prf_id)
+{
+ unsigned char cpoint[133];
+ size_t cpoint_len;
+ const br_x509_class **xc;
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk;
+
+ xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
+ pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc, NULL);
+ cpoint_len = pk->key.ec.qlen;
+ if (cpoint_len > sizeof cpoint) {
+ /*
+ * If the point is larger than our buffer then we need to
+ * restrict it. Length 2 is not a valid point length, so
+ * the ECDH will fail.
+ */
+ cpoint_len = 2;
+ }
+ memcpy(cpoint, pk->key.ec.q, cpoint_len);
+ do_ecdh(ctx, prf_id, cpoint, cpoint_len);
+}
+
+static size_t
+hash_data(br_ssl_server_context *ctx,
+ void *dst, int hash_id, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ const br_hash_class *hf;
+ br_hash_compat_context hc;
+
+ if (hash_id == 0) {
+ unsigned char tmp[36];
+
+ hf = br_multihash_getimpl(&ctx->eng.mhash, br_md5_ID);
+ if (hf == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ hf->init(&hc.vtable);
+ hf->update(&hc.vtable, src, len);
+ hf->out(&hc.vtable, tmp);
+ hf = br_multihash_getimpl(&ctx->eng.mhash, br_sha1_ID);
+ if (hf == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ hf->init(&hc.vtable);
+ hf->update(&hc.vtable, src, len);
+ hf->out(&hc.vtable, tmp + 16);
+ memcpy(dst, tmp, 36);
+ return 36;
+ } else {
+ hf = br_multihash_getimpl(&ctx->eng.mhash, hash_id);
+ if (hf == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ hf->init(&hc.vtable);
+ hf->update(&hc.vtable, src, len);
+ hf->out(&hc.vtable, dst);
+ return (hf->desc >> BR_HASHDESC_OUT_OFF) & BR_HASHDESC_OUT_MASK;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do the ECDHE key exchange (part 1: generation of transient key, and
+ * computing of the point to send to the client). Returned value is the
+ * signature length (in bytes), or -x on error (with x being an error
+ * code). The encoded point is written in the ecdhe_point[] context buffer
+ * (length in ecdhe_point_len).
+ */
+static int
+do_ecdhe_part1(br_ssl_server_context *ctx, int curve)
+{
+ unsigned algo_id;
+ unsigned mask;
+ const unsigned char *order;
+ size_t olen, glen;
+ size_t hv_len, sig_len;
+
+ if (!((ctx->eng.iec->supported_curves >> curve) & 1)) {
+ return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+ ctx->eng.ecdhe_curve = curve;
+
+ /*
+ * Generate our private key. We need a non-zero random value
+ * which is lower than the curve order, in a "large enough"
+ * range. We force the top bit to 0 and bottom bit to 1, which
+ * does the trick. Note that contrary to what happens in ECDSA,
+ * this is not a problem if we do not cover the full range of
+ * possible values.
+ */
+ order = ctx->eng.iec->order(curve, &olen);
+ mask = 0xFF;
+ while (mask >= order[0]) {
+ mask >>= 1;
+ }
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&ctx->eng.rng, ctx->ecdhe_key, olen);
+ ctx->ecdhe_key[0] &= mask;
+ ctx->ecdhe_key[olen - 1] |= 0x01;
+ ctx->ecdhe_key_len = olen;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute our ECDH point.
+ */
+ glen = ctx->eng.iec->mulgen(ctx->eng.ecdhe_point,
+ ctx->ecdhe_key, olen, curve);
+ ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len = glen;
+
+ /*
+ * Assemble the message to be signed, and possibly hash it.
+ */
+ memcpy(ctx->eng.pad, ctx->eng.client_random, 32);
+ memcpy(ctx->eng.pad + 32, ctx->eng.server_random, 32);
+ ctx->eng.pad[64 + 0] = 0x03;
+ ctx->eng.pad[64 + 1] = 0x00;
+ ctx->eng.pad[64 + 2] = curve;
+ ctx->eng.pad[64 + 3] = ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len;
+ memcpy(ctx->eng.pad + 64 + 4,
+ ctx->eng.ecdhe_point, ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len);
+ hv_len = 64 + 4 + ctx->eng.ecdhe_point_len;
+ algo_id = ctx->sign_hash_id;
+ if (algo_id >= (unsigned)0xFF00) {
+ hv_len = hash_data(ctx, ctx->eng.pad, algo_id & 0xFF,
+ ctx->eng.pad, hv_len);
+ if (hv_len == 0) {
+ return -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ sig_len = (*ctx->policy_vtable)->do_sign(ctx->policy_vtable,
+ algo_id, ctx->eng.pad, hv_len, sizeof ctx->eng.pad);
+ return sig_len ? (int)sig_len : -BR_ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do the ECDHE key exchange (part 2: computation of the shared secret
+ * from the point sent by the client).
+ */
+static void
+do_ecdhe_part2(br_ssl_server_context *ctx, int prf_id,
+ unsigned char *cpoint, size_t cpoint_len)
+{
+ int curve;
+ uint32_t ctl;
+ size_t xoff, xlen;
+
+ curve = ctx->eng.ecdhe_curve;
+
+ /*
+ * Finalise the key exchange.
+ */
+ ctl = ctx->eng.iec->mul(cpoint, cpoint_len,
+ ctx->ecdhe_key, ctx->ecdhe_key_len, curve);
+ xoff = ctx->eng.iec->xoff(curve, &xlen);
+ ecdh_common(ctx, prf_id, cpoint + xoff, xlen, ctl);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the ECDHE private key. Forward Secrecy is achieved insofar
+ * as that key does not get stolen, so we'd better destroy it
+ * as soon as it ceases to be useful.
+ */
+ memset(ctx->ecdhe_key, 0, ctx->ecdhe_key_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Offset for hash value within the pad (when obtaining all hash values,
+ * in preparation for verification of the CertificateVerify message).
+ * Order is MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512; last value
+ * is used to get the total length.
+ */
+static const unsigned char HASH_PAD_OFF[] = { 0, 16, 36, 64, 96, 144, 208 };
+
+/*
+ * OID for hash functions in RSA signatures.
+ */
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA1[] = {
+ 0x05, 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A
+};
+
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA224[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04
+};
+
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA256[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01
+};
+
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA384[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02
+};
+
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA512[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03
+};
+
+static const unsigned char *HASH_OID[] = {
+ HASH_OID_SHA1,
+ HASH_OID_SHA224,
+ HASH_OID_SHA256,
+ HASH_OID_SHA384,
+ HASH_OID_SHA512
+};
+
+/*
+ * Verify the signature in CertificateVerify. Returned value is 0 on
+ * success, or a non-zero error code. Lack of implementation of the
+ * designated signature algorithm is reported as a "bad signature"
+ * error (because it means that the peer did not honour our advertised
+ * set of supported signature algorithms).
+ */
+static int
+verify_CV_sig(br_ssl_server_context *ctx, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ const br_x509_class **xc;
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk;
+ int id;
+
+ id = ctx->hash_CV_id;
+ xc = ctx->eng.x509ctx;
+ pk = (*xc)->get_pkey(xc, NULL);
+ if (pk->key_type == BR_KEYTYPE_RSA) {
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+ const unsigned char *hash_oid;
+
+ if (id == 0) {
+ hash_oid = NULL;
+ } else {
+ hash_oid = HASH_OID[id - 2];
+ }
+ if (ctx->eng.irsavrfy == 0) {
+ return BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ if (!ctx->eng.irsavrfy(ctx->eng.pad, sig_len,
+ hash_oid, ctx->hash_CV_len, &pk->key.rsa, tmp)
+ || memcmp(tmp, ctx->hash_CV, ctx->hash_CV_len) != 0)
+ {
+ return BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (ctx->eng.iecdsa == 0) {
+ return BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ if (!ctx->eng.iecdsa(ctx->eng.iec,
+ ctx->hash_CV, ctx->hash_CV_len,
+ &pk->key.ec, ctx->eng.pad, sig_len))
+ {
+ return BR_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+}
+
+\ =======================================================================
+
+: addr-ctx:
+ next-word { field }
+ "addr-" field + 0 1 define-word
+ 0 8191 "offsetof(br_ssl_server_context, " field + ")" + make-CX
+ postpone literal postpone ; ;
+
+addr-ctx: client_max_version
+addr-ctx: client_suites
+addr-ctx: client_suites_num
+addr-ctx: hashes
+addr-ctx: curves
+addr-ctx: sign_hash_id
+
+\ Get address and length of the client_suites[] buffer. Length is expressed
+\ in bytes.
+: addr-len-client_suites ( -- addr len )
+ addr-client_suites
+ CX 0 1023 { BR_MAX_CIPHER_SUITES * sizeof(br_suite_translated) } ;
+
+\ Read the client SNI extension.
+: read-client-sni ( lim -- lim )
+ \ Open extension value.
+ read16 open-elt
+
+ \ Open ServerNameList.
+ read16 open-elt
+
+ \ Find if there is a name of type 0 (host_name) with a length
+ \ that fits in our dedicated buffer.
+ begin dup while
+ read8 if
+ read-ignore-16
+ else
+ read16
+ dup 255 <= if
+ dup addr-server_name + 0 swap set8
+ addr-server_name swap read-blob
+ else
+ skip-blob
+ then
+ then
+ repeat
+
+ \ Close ServerNameList.
+ close-elt
+
+ \ Close extension value.
+ close-elt ;
+
+\ Set the new maximum fragment length. BEWARE: this shall be called only
+\ after reading the ClientHello and before writing the ServerHello.
+cc: set-max-frag-len ( len -- ) {
+ size_t max_frag_len = T0_POP();
+
+ br_ssl_engine_new_max_frag_len(ENG, max_frag_len);
+
+ /*
+ * We must adjust our own output limit. Since we call this only
+ * after receiving a ClientHello and before beginning to send
+ * the ServerHello, the next output record should be empty at
+ * that point, so we can use max_frag_len as a limit.
+ */
+ if (ENG->hlen_out > max_frag_len) {
+ ENG->hlen_out = max_frag_len;
+ }
+}
+
+\ Read the client Max Frag Length extension.
+: read-client-frag ( lim -- lim )
+ \ Extension value must have length exactly 1 byte.
+ read16 1 <> if ERR_BAD_FRAGLEN fail then
+ read8
+
+ \ The byte value must be 1, 2, 3 or 4.
+ dup dup 0= swap 5 >= or if ERR_BAD_FRAGLEN fail then
+
+ \ If our own maximum fragment length is greater, then we reduce
+ \ our length.
+ 8 + dup addr-log_max_frag_len get8 < if
+ dup 1 swap << set-max-frag-len
+ dup addr-log_max_frag_len set8
+ addr-peer_log_max_frag_len set8
+ else
+ drop
+ then ;
+
+\ Read the Secure Renegotiation extension from the client.
+: read-client-reneg ( lim -- lim )
+ \ Get value length.
+ read16
+
+ \ The "reneg" value is one of:
+ \ 0 on first handshake, client support is unknown
+ \ 1 client does not support secure renegotiation
+ \ 2 client supports secure renegotiation
+ addr-reneg get8 case
+ 0 of
+ \ First handshake, value length shall be 1.
+ 1 = ifnot ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
+ read8 if ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
+ 2 addr-reneg set8
+ endof
+ 2 of
+ \ Renegotiation, value shall consist of 13 bytes
+ \ (header + copy of the saved client "Finished").
+ 13 = ifnot ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
+ read8 12 = ifnot ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
+ addr-pad 12 read-blob
+ addr-saved_finished addr-pad 12 memcmp ifnot
+ ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail
+ then
+ endof
+
+ \ If "reneg" is 1 then the client is not supposed to support
+ \ the extension, and it sends it nonetheless, which means
+ \ foul play.
+ ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail
+ endcase ;
+
+\ Read the Signature Algorithms extension.
+: read-signatures ( lim -- lim )
+ \ Open extension value.
+ read16 open-elt
+
+ read-list-sign-algos addr-hashes set32
+
+ \ Close extension value.
+ close-elt ;
+
+\ Read the Supported Curves extension.
+: read-supported-curves ( lim -- lim )
+ \ Open extension value.
+ read16 open-elt
+
+ \ Open list of curve identifiers.
+ read16 open-elt
+
+ \ Get all supported curves.
+ 0 addr-curves set32
+ begin dup while
+ read16 dup 32 < if
+ 1 swap << addr-curves get32 or addr-curves set32
+ else
+ drop
+ then
+ repeat
+ close-elt
+ close-elt ;
+
+\ Read the ALPN extension from client.
+: read-ALPN-from-client ( lim -- lim )
+ \ If we do not have configured names, then we just ignore the
+ \ extension.
+ addr-protocol_names_num get16 ifnot read-ignore-16 ret then
+
+ \ Open extension value.
+ read16 open-elt
+
+ \ Open list of protocol names.
+ read16 open-elt
+
+ \ Get all names and test for their support. We keep the one with
+ \ the lowest index (because we apply server's preferences, as
+ \ recommended by RFC 7301, section 3.2. We set the 'found' variable
+ \ to -2 and use an unsigned comparison, making -2 a huge value.
+ -2 { found }
+ begin dup while
+ read8 dup { len } addr-pad swap read-blob
+ len test-protocol-name dup found u< if
+ >found
+ else
+ drop
+ then
+ repeat
+
+ \ End of extension.
+ close-elt
+ close-elt
+
+ \ Write back found name index (or not). If no match was found,
+ \ then we write -1 (0xFFFF) in the index value, not 0, so that
+ \ the caller knows that we tried to match, and failed.
+ found 1+ addr-selected_protocol set16 ;
+
+\ Call policy handler to get cipher suite, hash function identifier and
+\ certificate chain. Returned value is 0 (false) on failure.
+cc: call-policy-handler ( -- bool ) {
+ int x;
+ br_ssl_server_choices choices;
+
+ x = (*CTX->policy_vtable)->choose(
+ CTX->policy_vtable, CTX, &choices);
+ ENG->session.cipher_suite = choices.cipher_suite;
+ CTX->sign_hash_id = choices.algo_id;
+ ENG->chain = choices.chain;
+ ENG->chain_len = choices.chain_len;
+ T0_PUSHi(-(x != 0));
+}
+
+\ Check for a remembered session.
+cc: check-resume ( -- bool ) {
+ if (ENG->session.session_id_len == 32
+ && CTX->cache_vtable != NULL && (*CTX->cache_vtable)->load(
+ CTX->cache_vtable, CTX, &ENG->session))
+ {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ } else {
+ T0_PUSH(0);
+ }
+}
+
+\ Save the current session.
+cc: save-session ( -- ) {
+ if (CTX->cache_vtable != NULL) {
+ (*CTX->cache_vtable)->save(
+ CTX->cache_vtable, CTX, &ENG->session);
+ }
+}
+
+\ Read and drop ClientHello. This is used when a client-triggered
+\ renegotiation attempt is rejected.
+: skip-ClientHello ( -- )
+ read-handshake-header-core
+ 1 = ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
+ dup skip-blob drop ;
+
+\ Read ClientHello. If the session is resumed, then -1 is returned.
+: read-ClientHello ( -- resume )
+ \ Get header, and check message type.
+ read-handshake-header 1 = ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
+
+ \ Get maximum protocol version from client.
+ read16 dup { client-version-max } addr-client_max_version set16
+
+ \ Client random.
+ addr-client_random 32 read-blob
+
+ \ Client session ID.
+ read8 dup 32 > if ERR_OVERSIZED_ID fail then
+ dup addr-session_id_len set8
+ addr-session_id swap read-blob
+
+ \ Lookup session for resumption. We should do that here because
+ \ we need to verify that the remembered cipher suite is still
+ \ matched by this ClientHello.
+ check-resume { resume }
+
+ \ Cipher suites. We read all cipher suites from client, each time
+ \ matching against our own list. We accumulate suites in the
+ \ client_suites[] context buffer: we keep suites that are
+ \ supported by both the client and the server (so the list size
+ \ cannot exceed that of the server list), and we keep them in
+ \ either client or server preference order (depending on the
+ \ relevant flag).
+ \
+ \ We also need to identify the pseudo cipher suite for secure
+ \ renegotiation here.
+ read16 open-elt
+ 0 { reneg-scsv }
+ 0 { resume-suite }
+ addr-len-client_suites dup2 bzero
+ over + { css-off css-max }
+ begin
+ dup while
+ read16 dup { suite }
+
+ \ Check that when resuming a session, the requested
+ \ suite is still valid.
+ resume if
+ dup addr-cipher_suite get16 = if
+ -1 >resume-suite
+ then
+ then
+
+ \ Special handling for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV.
+ \ This fake cipher suite may occur only in the first
+ \ handshake.
+ dup 0x00FF = if
+ addr-reneg get8 if ERR_BAD_SECRENEG fail then
+ -1 >reneg-scsv
+ then
+
+ \ Special handling for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV. If the client
+ \ maximum version is less than our own maximum version,
+ \ then this is an undue downgrade. We mark it by setting
+ \ the client max version to 0x10000.
+ dup 0x5600 = if
+ client-version-max addr-version_min get16 >=
+ client-version-max addr-version_max get16 < and if
+ -1 >client-version-max
+ then
+ then
+
+ \ Test whether the suite is supported by the server.
+ scan-suite dup 0< if
+ \ We do not support this cipher suite. Note
+ \ that this also covers the case of pseudo
+ \ cipher suites.
+ drop
+ else
+ \ If we use server order, then we place the
+ \ suite at the computed offset; otherwise, we
+ \ append it to the list at the current place.
+ 0 flag? if
+ 2 << addr-client_suites + suite swap set16
+ else
+ drop
+ \ We need to test for list length because
+ \ the client list may have duplicates,
+ \ that we do not filter. Duplicates are
+ \ invalid so this is not a problem if we
+ \ reject such clients.
+ css-off css-max >= if
+ ERR_BAD_HANDSHAKE fail
+ then
+ suite css-off set16
+ css-off 4 + >css-off
+ then
+ then
+ repeat
+ drop
+
+ \ Compression methods. We need method 0 (no compression).
+ 0 { ok-compression }
+ read8 open-elt
+ begin dup while
+ read8 ifnot -1 >ok-compression then
+ repeat
+ close-elt
+
+ \ Set default values for parameters that may be affected by
+ \ extensions:
+ \ -- server name is empty
+ \ -- client is reputed to know RSA and ECDSA, both with SHA-1
+ \ -- the default elliptic curve is P-256 (secp256r1, id = 23)
+ 0 addr-server_name set8
+ 0x0404 addr-hashes set32
+ 0x800000 addr-curves set32
+
+ \ Process extensions, if any.
+ dup if
+ read16 open-elt
+ begin dup while
+ read16 case
+ \ Server Name Indication.
+ 0x0000 of
+ read-client-sni
+ endof
+ \ Max Frag Length.
+ 0x0001 of
+ read-client-frag
+ endof
+ \ Secure Renegotiation.
+ 0xFF01 of
+ read-client-reneg
+ endof
+ \ Signature Algorithms.
+ 0x000D of
+ read-signatures
+ endof
+ \ Supported Curves.
+ 0x000A of
+ read-supported-curves
+ endof
+ \ Supported Point Formats.
+ \ We only support "uncompressed", that all
+ \ implementations are supposed to support,
+ \ so we can simply ignore that extension.
+ \ 0x000B of
+ \ read-ignore-16
+ \ endof
+
+ \ ALPN
+ 0x0010 of
+ read-ALPN-from-client
+ endof
+
+ \ Other extensions are ignored.
+ drop read-ignore-16 0
+ endcase
+ repeat
+ close-elt
+ then
+
+ \ Close message.
+ close-elt
+
+ \ Cancel session resumption if the cipher suite was not found.
+ resume resume-suite and >resume
+
+ \ Now check the received data. Since the client is expecting an
+ \ answer, we can send an appropriate fatal alert on any error.
+
+ \ Compute protocol version as the minimum of our maximum version,
+ \ and the maximum version sent by the client. If that is less than
+ \ 0x0300 (SSL-3.0), then fail. Otherwise, we may at least send an
+ \ alert with that version. We still reject versions lower than our
+ \ configured minimum.
+ \ As a special case, in case of undue downgrade, we send a specific
+ \ alert (see RFC 7507). Note that this case may happen only if
+ \ we would otherwise accept the client's version.
+ client-version-max 0< if
+ addr-client_max_version get16 addr-version_out set16
+ 86 fail-alert
+ then
+ addr-version_max get16
+ dup client-version-max > if drop client-version-max then
+ dup 0x0300 < if ERR_BAD_VERSION fail then
+ client-version-max addr-version_min get16 < if
+ 70 fail-alert
+ then
+ \ If resuming the session, then enforce the previously negotiated
+ \ version (if still possible).
+ resume if
+ addr-version get16 client-version-max <= if
+ drop addr-version get16
+ else
+ 0 >resume
+ then
+ then
+ dup addr-version set16
+ dup addr-version_in set16
+ dup addr-version_out set16
+ 0x0303 >= { can-tls12 }
+
+ \ If the client sent TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV, then
+ \ we should mark the client as "supporting secure renegotiation".
+ reneg-scsv if 2 addr-reneg set8 then
+
+ \ If, at that point, the 'reneg' value is still 0, then the client
+ \ did not send the extension or the SCSV, so we have to assume
+ \ that secure renegotiation is not supported by that client.
+ addr-reneg get8 ifnot 1 addr-reneg set8 then
+
+ \ Check compression.
+ ok-compression ifnot 40 fail-alert then
+
+ \ Filter hash function support by what the server also supports.
+ \ If no common hash function remains with RSA and/or ECDSA, then
+ \ the corresponding ECDHE suites are not possible.
+ supported-hash-functions drop 257 * 0xFFFF0000 or
+ addr-hashes get32 and dup addr-hashes set32
+ \ In 'can-ecdhe', bit 12 is set if ECDHE_RSA is possible, bit 13 is
+ \ set if ECDHE_ECDSA is possible.
+ dup 0xFF and 0<> neg
+ swap 8 >> 0<> 2 and or 12 << { can-ecdhe }
+
+ \ Filter supported curves. If there is no common curve between
+ \ client and us, then ECDHE suites cannot be used. Note that we
+ \ may still allow ECDH, depending on the EC key handler.
+ addr-curves get32 supported-curves and dup addr-curves set32
+ ifnot 0 >can-ecdhe then
+
+ \ If resuming a session, then the next steps are not necessary;
+ \ we won't invoke the policy handler.
+ resume if -1 ret then
+
+ \ We are not resuming, so a new session ID should be generated.
+ \ We don't check that the new ID is distinct from the one sent
+ \ by the client because probability of such an event is 2^(-256),
+ \ i.e. much (much) lower than that of an undetected transmission
+ \ error or hardware miscomputation, and with similar consequences
+ \ (handshake simply fails).
+ addr-session_id 32 mkrand
+ 32 addr-session_id_len set8
+
+ \ Translate common cipher suites, then squeeze out holes: there
+ \ may be holes because of the way we fill the list when the
+ \ server preference order is enforced, and also in case some
+ \ suites are filtered out. In particular:
+ \ -- ECDHE suites are removed if there is no common hash function
+ \ (for the relevant signature algorithm) or no common curve.
+ \ -- TLS-1.2-only suites are removed if the negotiated version is
+ \ TLS-1.1 or lower.
+ addr-client_suites dup >css-off
+ begin dup css-max < while
+ dup get16 dup cipher-suite-to-elements
+ dup 12 >> dup 1 = swap 2 = or if
+ dup can-ecdhe and ifnot
+ 2drop 0 dup
+ then
+ then
+ can-tls12 ifnot
+ \ Suites compatible with TLS-1.0 and TLS-1.1 are
+ \ exactly the ones that use HMAC/SHA-1.
+ dup 0xF0 and 0x20 <> if
+ 2drop 0 dup
+ then
+ then
+ dup if
+ css-off 2+ set16 css-off set16
+ css-off 4 + >css-off
+ else
+ 2drop
+ then
+ 4 +
+ repeat
+ drop
+ css-off addr-client_suites - 2 >>
+ dup ifnot
+ \ No common cipher suite: handshake failure.
+ 40 fail-alert
+ then
+ addr-client_suites_num set8
+
+ \ Check ALPN.
+ addr-selected_protocol get16 0xFFFF = if
+ 3 flag? if 120 fail-alert then
+ 0 addr-selected_protocol set16
+ then
+
+ \ Call policy handler to obtain the cipher suite and other
+ \ parameters.
+ call-policy-handler ifnot 40 fail-alert then
+
+ \ We are not resuming a session.
+ 0 ;
+
+\ Write ServerHello.
+: write-ServerHello ( initial -- )
+ { initial }
+ \ Compute ServerHello length.
+ 2 write8 70
+
+ \ Compute length of Secure Renegotiation extension.
+ addr-reneg get8 2 = if
+ initial if 5 else 29 then
+ else
+ 0
+ then
+ { ext-reneg-len }
+
+ \ Compute length of Max Fragment Length extension.
+ addr-peer_log_max_frag_len get8 if 5 else 0 then
+ { ext-max-frag-len }
+
+ \ Compute length of ALPN extension. This also copy the
+ \ selected protocol name into the pad.
+ addr-selected_protocol get16 dup if 1- copy-protocol-name 7 + then
+ { ext-ALPN-len }
+
+ \ Adjust ServerHello length to account for the extensions.
+ ext-reneg-len ext-max-frag-len + ext-ALPN-len + dup if 2 + then +
+ write24
+
+ \ Protocol version
+ addr-version get16 write16
+
+ \ Server random
+ addr-server_random 4 bzero
+ addr-server_random 4 + 28 mkrand
+ addr-server_random 32 write-blob
+
+ \ Session ID
+ \ TODO: if we have no session cache at all, we might send here
+ \ an empty session ID. This would save a bit of network
+ \ bandwidth.
+ 32 write8
+ addr-session_id 32 write-blob
+
+ \ Cipher suite
+ addr-cipher_suite get16 write16
+
+ \ Compression method
+ 0 write8
+
+ \ Extensions
+ ext-reneg-len ext-max-frag-len + ext-ALPN-len + dup if
+ write16
+ ext-reneg-len dup if
+ 0xFF01 write16
+ 4 - dup write16
+ 1- addr-saved_finished swap write-blob-head8
+ else
+ drop
+ then
+ ext-max-frag-len if
+ 0x0001 write16
+ 1 write16 addr-peer_log_max_frag_len get8 8 - write8
+ then
+ ext-ALPN-len dup if
+ \ Note: the selected protocol name was previously
+ \ copied into the pad.
+ 0x0010 write16
+ 4 - dup write16
+ 2- dup write16
+ 1- addr-pad swap write-blob-head8
+ else
+ drop
+ then
+ else
+ drop
+ then ;
+
+\ Do the first part of ECDHE. Returned value is the computed signature
+\ length, or a negative error code on error.
+cc: do-ecdhe-part1 ( curve -- len ) {
+ int curve = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSHi(do_ecdhe_part1(CTX, curve));
+}
+
+\ Get index of first bit set to 1 (in low to high order).
+: lowest-1 ( bits -- n )
+ dup ifnot drop -1 ret then
+ 0 begin dup2 >> 1 and 0= while 1+ repeat
+ swap drop ;
+
+\ Write the Server Key Exchange message (if applicable).
+: write-ServerKeyExchange ( -- )
+ addr-cipher_suite get16 use-ecdhe? ifnot ret then
+
+ \ We must select an appropriate curve among the curves that
+ \ are supported both by us and the peer. Right now, we apply
+ \ a fixed preference order: Curve25519, P-256, P-384, P-521,
+ \ then the common curve with the lowest ID.
+ \ (TODO: add some option to make that behaviour configurable.)
+ \
+ \ This loop always terminates because previous processing made
+ \ sure that ECDHE suites are not selectable if there is no common
+ \ curve.
+ addr-curves get32
+ dup 0x20000000 and if
+ drop 29
+ else
+ dup 0x38000000 and dup if swap then
+ drop lowest-1
+ then
+ { curve-id }
+
+ \ Compute the signed curve point to send.
+ curve-id do-ecdhe-part1 dup 0< if neg fail then { sig-len }
+
+ \ If using TLS-1.2+, then the hash function and signature
+ \ algorithm are explicitly encoded in the message.
+ addr-version get16 0x0303 >= { tls1.2+ }
+
+ 12 write8
+ sig-len addr-ecdhe_point_len get8 + tls1.2+ 2 and + 6 + write24
+
+ \ Curve parameters: named curve with 16-bit ID.
+ 3 write8 curve-id write16
+
+ \ Public point.
+ addr-ecdhe_point addr-ecdhe_point_len get8 write-blob-head8
+
+ \ If TLS-1.2+, write hash and signature identifiers.
+ tls1.2+ if
+ \ sign_hash_id contains either a hash identifier,
+ \ or the complete 16-bit value to write.
+ addr-sign_hash_id get16
+ dup 0xFF00 < if
+ write16
+ else
+ 0xFF and write8
+ \ 'use-rsa-ecdhe?' returns -1 for RSA, 0 for
+ \ ECDSA. The byte on the wire shall be 1 for RSA,
+ \ 3 for ECDSA.
+ addr-cipher_suite get16 use-rsa-ecdhe? 1 << 3 + write8
+ then
+ then
+
+ \ Signature.
+ sig-len write16
+ addr-pad sig-len write-blob ;
+
+\ Get length of the list of anchor names to send to the client. The length
+\ includes the per-name 2-byte header, but _not_ the 2-byte header for
+\ the list itself. If no client certificate is requested, then this
+\ returns 0.
+cc: ta-names-total-length ( -- len ) {
+ size_t u, len;
+
+ len = 0;
+ if (CTX->ta_names != NULL) {
+ for (u = 0; u < CTX->num_tas; u ++) {
+ len += CTX->ta_names[u].len + 2;
+ }
+ } else if (CTX->tas != NULL) {
+ for (u = 0; u < CTX->num_tas; u ++) {
+ len += CTX->tas[u].dn.len + 2;
+ }
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(len);
+}
+
+\ Compute length and optionally write the contents of the list of
+\ supported client authentication methods.
+: write-list-auth ( do_write -- len )
+ 0
+ addr-cipher_suite get16 use-ecdh? if
+ 2+ over if 65 write8 66 write8 then
+ then
+ supports-rsa-sign? if 1+ over if 1 write8 then then
+ supports-ecdsa? if 1+ over if 64 write8 then then
+ swap drop ;
+
+: write-signhash-inner2 ( dow algo hashes len id -- dow algo hashes len )
+ { id }
+ over 1 id << and ifnot ret then
+ 2+
+ 3 pick if id write8 2 pick write8 then ;
+
+: write-signhash-inner1 ( dow algo hashes -- dow len )
+ 0
+ 4 write-signhash-inner2
+ 5 write-signhash-inner2
+ 6 write-signhash-inner2
+ 3 write-signhash-inner2
+ 2 write-signhash-inner2
+ -rot 2drop ;
+
+\ Compute length and optionally write the contents of the list of
+\ supported sign+hash algorithms.
+: write-list-signhash ( do_write -- len )
+ 0 { len }
+ \ If supporting neither RSA nor ECDSA in the engine, then we
+ \ will do only static ECDH, and thus we claim support for
+ \ everything (for the X.509 validator).
+ supports-rsa-sign? supports-ecdsa? or ifnot
+ 1 0x7C write-signhash-inner1 >len
+ 3 0x7C write-signhash-inner1 len +
+ swap drop ret
+ then
+ supports-rsa-sign? if
+ 1 supported-hash-functions drop
+ write-signhash-inner1 >len
+ then
+ supports-ecdsa? if
+ 3 supported-hash-functions drop
+ write-signhash-inner1 len + >len
+ then
+ drop len ;
+
+\ Initialise index for sending the list of anchor DN.
+cc: begin-ta-name-list ( -- ) {
+ CTX->cur_dn_index = 0;
+}
+
+\ Switch to next DN in the list. Returned value is the DN length, or -1
+\ if the end of the list was reached.
+cc: begin-ta-name ( -- len ) {
+ const br_x500_name *dn;
+ if (CTX->cur_dn_index >= CTX->num_tas) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ } else {
+ if (CTX->ta_names == NULL) {
+ dn = &CTX->tas[CTX->cur_dn_index].dn;
+ } else {
+ dn = &CTX->ta_names[CTX->cur_dn_index];
+ }
+ CTX->cur_dn_index ++;
+ CTX->cur_dn = dn->data;
+ CTX->cur_dn_len = dn->len;
+ T0_PUSH(CTX->cur_dn_len);
+ }
+}
+
+\ Copy a chunk of the current DN into the pad. Returned value is the
+\ chunk length; this is 0 when the end of the current DN is reached.
+cc: copy-dn-chunk ( -- len ) {
+ size_t clen;
+
+ clen = CTX->cur_dn_len;
+ if (clen > sizeof ENG->pad) {
+ clen = sizeof ENG->pad;
+ }
+ memcpy(ENG->pad, CTX->cur_dn, clen);
+ CTX->cur_dn += clen;
+ CTX->cur_dn_len -= clen;
+ T0_PUSH(clen);
+}
+
+\ Write a CertificateRequest message.
+: write-CertificateRequest ( -- )
+ \ The list of client authentication types includes:
+ \ rsa_sign (1)
+ \ ecdsa_sign (64)
+ \ rsa_fixed_ecdh (65)
+ \ ecdsa_fixed_ecdh (66)
+ \ rsa_sign and ecdsa_sign require, respectively, RSA and ECDSA
+ \ support. Static ECDH requires that the cipher suite is ECDH.
+ \ When we ask for static ECDH, we always send both rsa_fixed_ecdh
+ \ and ecdsa_fixed_ecdh because what matters there is what the
+ \ X.509 engine may support, and we do not control that.
+ \
+ \ With TLS 1.2, we must also send a list of supported signature
+ \ and hash algorithms. That list is supposed to qualify both
+ \ the engine itself, and the X.509 validator, which are separate
+ \ in BearSSL. There again, we use the engine capabilities in that
+ \ list, and resort to a generic all-support list if only
+ \ static ECDH is accepted.
+ \
+ \ (In practice, client implementations tend to have at most one
+ \ or two certificates, and send the chain regardless of what
+ \ algorithms are used in it.)
+
+ 0 write-list-auth
+ addr-version get16 0x0303 >= if
+ 2+ 0 write-list-signhash +
+ then
+ ta-names-total-length + 3 +
+
+ \ Message header
+ 13 write8 write24
+
+ \ List of authentication methods
+ 0 write-list-auth write8 1 write-list-auth drop
+
+ \ For TLS 1.2+, list of sign+hash
+ addr-version get16 0x0303 >= if
+ 0 write-list-signhash write16 1 write-list-signhash drop
+ then
+
+ \ Trust anchor names
+ ta-names-total-length write16
+ begin-ta-name-list
+ begin
+ begin-ta-name
+ dup 0< if drop ret then write16
+ begin copy-dn-chunk dup while
+ addr-pad swap write-blob
+ repeat
+ drop
+ again ;
+
+\ Write the Server Hello Done message.
+: write-ServerHelloDone ( -- )
+ 14 write8 0 write24 ;
+
+\ Perform RSA decryption of the client-sent pre-master secret. The value
+\ is in the pad, and its length is provided as parameter.
+cc: do-rsa-decrypt ( len prf_id -- ) {
+ int prf_id = T0_POPi();
+ size_t len = T0_POP();
+ do_rsa_decrypt(CTX, prf_id, ENG->pad, len);
+}
+
+\ Perform ECDH (not ECDHE). The point from the client is in the pad, and
+\ its length is provided as parameter.
+cc: do-ecdh ( len prf_id -- ) {
+ int prf_id = T0_POPi();
+ size_t len = T0_POP();
+ do_ecdh(CTX, prf_id, ENG->pad, len);
+}
+
+\ Do the second part of ECDHE.
+cc: do-ecdhe-part2 ( len prf_id -- ) {
+ int prf_id = T0_POPi();
+ size_t len = T0_POP();
+ do_ecdhe_part2(CTX, prf_id, ENG->pad, len);
+}
+
+\ Perform static ECDH. The point from the client is the public key
+\ extracted from its certificate.
+cc: do-static-ecdh ( prf_id -- ) {
+ do_static_ecdh(CTX, T0_POP());
+}
+
+\ Read a ClientKeyExchange header.
+: read-ClientKeyExchange-header ( -- len )
+ read-handshake-header 16 = ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then ;
+
+\ Read the Client Key Exchange contents (non-empty case).
+: read-ClientKeyExchange-contents ( lim -- )
+ \ What we should get depends on the cipher suite.
+ addr-cipher_suite get16 use-rsa-keyx? if
+ \ RSA key exchange: we expect a RSA-encrypted value.
+ read16
+ dup 512 > if ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED fail then
+ dup { enc-rsa-len }
+ addr-pad swap read-blob
+ enc-rsa-len addr-cipher_suite get16 prf-id do-rsa-decrypt
+ then
+ addr-cipher_suite get16 dup use-ecdhe? swap use-ecdh? { ecdhe ecdh }
+ ecdh ecdhe or if
+ \ ECDH or ECDHE key exchange: we expect an EC point.
+ read8 dup { ec-point-len }
+ addr-pad swap read-blob
+ ec-point-len addr-cipher_suite get16 prf-id
+ ecdhe if do-ecdhe-part2 else do-ecdh then
+ then
+ close-elt ;
+
+\ Read the Client Key Exchange (normal case).
+: read-ClientKeyExchange ( -- )
+ read-ClientKeyExchange-header
+ read-ClientKeyExchange-contents ;
+
+\ Obtain all possible hash values for handshake messages so far. This
+\ is done because we need the hash value for the CertificateVerify
+\ _before_ knowing which hash function will actually be used, as this
+\ information is obtained from decoding the message header itself.
+\ All hash values are stored in the pad (208 bytes in total).
+cc: compute-hash-CV ( -- ) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i <= 6; i ++) {
+ br_multihash_out(&ENG->mhash, i,
+ ENG->pad + HASH_PAD_OFF[i - 1]);
+ }
+}
+
+\ Copy the proper hash value from the pad into the dedicated buffer.
+\ Returned value is true (-1) on success, false (0) on error (error
+\ being an unimplemented hash function). The id has already been verified
+\ to be either 0 (for MD5+SHA-1) or one of the SHA-* functions.
+cc: copy-hash-CV ( hash_id -- bool ) {
+ int id = T0_POP();
+ size_t off, len;
+
+ if (id == 0) {
+ off = 0;
+ len = 36;
+ } else {
+ if (br_multihash_getimpl(&ENG->mhash, id) == 0) {
+ T0_PUSH(0);
+ T0_RET();
+ }
+ off = HASH_PAD_OFF[id - 1];
+ len = HASH_PAD_OFF[id] - off;
+ }
+ memcpy(CTX->hash_CV, ENG->pad + off, len);
+ CTX->hash_CV_len = len;
+ CTX->hash_CV_id = id;
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+}
+
+\ Verify signature in CertificateVerify. Output is 0 on success, or a
+\ non-zero error code.
+cc: verify-CV-sig ( sig-len -- err ) {
+ int err;
+
+ err = verify_CV_sig(CTX, T0_POP());
+ T0_PUSHi(err);
+}
+
+\ Process static ECDH.
+: process-static-ECDH ( ktu -- )
+ \ Static ECDH is allowed only if the cipher suite uses ECDH, and
+ \ the client's public key has type EC and allows key exchange.
+ \ BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX is 0x10, and BR_KEYTYPE_EC is 2.
+ 0x1F and 0x12 = ifnot ERR_WRONG_KEY_USAGE fail then
+ addr-cipher_suite get16
+ dup use-ecdh? ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
+ prf-id
+ do-static-ecdh ;
+
+\ Read CertificateVerify header.
+: read-CertificateVerify-header ( -- lim )
+ compute-hash-CV
+ read-handshake-header 15 = ifnot ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then ;
+
+\ Read CertificateVerify. The client key type + usage is expected on the
+\ stack.
+: read-CertificateVerify ( ktu -- )
+ \ Check that the key allows for signatures.
+ dup 0x20 and ifnot ERR_WRONG_KEY_USAGE fail then
+ 0x0F and { key-type }
+
+ \ Get header.
+ read-CertificateVerify-header
+
+ \ With TLS 1.2+, there is an explicit hash + signature indication,
+ \ which must be compatible with the key type.
+ addr-version get16 0x0303 >= if
+ \ Get hash function, then signature algorithm. The
+ \ signature algorithm is 1 (RSA) or 3 (ECDSA) while our
+ \ symbolic constants for key types are 1 (RSA) or 2 (EC).
+ read16
+ dup 0xFF and 1+ 1 >> key-type = ifnot
+ ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE fail
+ then
+ 8 >>
+
+ \ We support only SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384
+ \ and SHA-512. We explicitly reject MD5.
+ dup 2 < over 6 > or if ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
+ else
+ \ With TLS 1.0 and 1.1, hash is MD5+SHA-1 (0) for RSA,
+ \ SHA-1 (2) for ECDSA.
+ key-type 0x01 = if 0 else 2 then
+ then
+ copy-hash-CV ifnot ERR_INVALID_ALGORITHM fail then
+
+ \ Read signature.
+ read16 dup { sig-len }
+ dup 512 > if ERR_LIMIT_EXCEEDED fail then
+ addr-pad swap read-blob
+ sig-len verify-CV-sig
+ dup if fail then drop
+
+ close-elt ;
+
+\ Send a HelloRequest.
+: send-HelloRequest ( -- )
+ flush-record
+ begin can-output? not while wait-co drop repeat
+ 22 addr-record_type_out set8
+ 0 write8 0 write24 flush-record
+ 23 addr-record_type_out set8 ;
+
+\ Make a handshake.
+: do-handshake ( initial -- )
+ 0 addr-application_data set8
+ 22 addr-record_type_out set8
+ 0 addr-selected_protocol set16
+ multihash-init
+ read-ClientHello
+ more-incoming-bytes? if ERR_UNEXPECTED fail then
+ if
+ \ Session resumption
+ write-ServerHello
+ 0 write-CCS-Finished
+ 0 read-CCS-Finished
+ else
+ \ Not a session resumption
+ write-ServerHello
+ write-Certificate drop
+ write-ServerKeyExchange
+ ta-names-total-length if
+ write-CertificateRequest
+ then
+ write-ServerHelloDone
+ flush-record
+
+ \ If we sent a CertificateRequest then we expect a
+ \ Certificate message.
+ ta-names-total-length if
+ \ Read client certificate.
+ 0 read-Certificate
+
+ choice
+ dup 0< uf
+ \ Client certificate validation failed.
+ 2 flag? ifnot neg fail then
+ drop
+ read-ClientKeyExchange
+ read-CertificateVerify-header
+ dup skip-blob drop
+ enduf
+ dup 0= uf
+ \ Client sent no certificate at all.
+ drop
+ 2 flag? ifnot
+ ERR_NO_CLIENT_AUTH fail
+ then
+ read-ClientKeyExchange
+ enduf
+
+ \ Client certificate was validated.
+ read-ClientKeyExchange-header
+ dup ifnot
+ \ Empty ClientKeyExchange.
+ drop
+ process-static-ECDH
+ else
+ read-ClientKeyExchange-contents
+ read-CertificateVerify
+ then
+ endchoice
+ else
+ \ No client certificate request, we just expect
+ \ a non-empty ClientKeyExchange.
+ read-ClientKeyExchange
+ then
+ 0 read-CCS-Finished
+ 0 write-CCS-Finished
+ save-session
+ then
+ 1 addr-application_data set8
+ 23 addr-record_type_out set8 ;
+
+\ Entry point.
+: main ( -- ! )
+ \ Perform initial handshake.
+ -1 do-handshake
+
+ begin
+ \ Wait for further invocation. At that point, we should
+ \ get either an explicit call for renegotiation, or
+ \ an incoming ClientHello handshake message.
+ wait-co
+ dup 0x07 and case
+ 0x00 of
+ 0x10 and if
+ \ The best we can do is ask for a
+ \ renegotiation, then wait for it
+ \ to happen.
+ 0 addr-application_data set8
+ send-HelloRequest
+ then
+ endof
+ 0x01 of
+ \ Reject renegotiations if the peer does not
+ \ support secure renegotiation, or if the
+ \ "no renegotiation" flag is set.
+ drop
+ addr-reneg get8 1 = 1 flag? or if
+ skip-ClientHello
+ flush-record
+ begin can-output? not while
+ wait-co drop
+ repeat
+ 100 send-warning
+ \ Put back connection in "application
+ \ data" state: it's not dead yet.
+ 1 addr-application_data set8
+ 23 addr-record_type_out set8
+ else
+ 0 do-handshake
+ then
+ endof
+ ERR_UNEXPECTED fail
+ endcase
+ again
+ ;
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_io.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_io.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1952615
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_io.c
@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_sslio_init(br_sslio_context *ctx,
+ br_ssl_engine_context *engine,
+ int (*low_read)(void *read_context,
+ unsigned char *data, size_t len),
+ void *read_context,
+ int (*low_write)(void *write_context,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t len),
+ void *write_context)
+{
+ ctx->engine = engine;
+ ctx->low_read = low_read;
+ ctx->read_context = read_context;
+ ctx->low_write = low_write;
+ ctx->write_context = write_context;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Run the engine, until the specified target state is achieved, or
+ * an error occurs. The target state is SENDAPP, RECVAPP, or the
+ * combination of both (the combination matches either). When a match is
+ * achieved, this function returns 0. On error, it returns -1.
+ */
+static int
+run_until(br_sslio_context *ctx, unsigned target)
+{
+ for (;;) {
+ unsigned state;
+
+ state = br_ssl_engine_current_state(ctx->engine);
+ if (state & BR_SSL_CLOSED) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If there is some record data to send, do it. This takes
+ * precedence over everything else.
+ */
+ if (state & BR_SSL_SENDREC) {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t len;
+ int wlen;
+
+ buf = br_ssl_engine_sendrec_buf(ctx->engine, &len);
+ wlen = ctx->low_write(ctx->write_context, buf, len);
+ if (wlen < 0) {
+ /*
+ * If we received a close_notify and we
+ * still send something, then we have our
+ * own response close_notify to send, and
+ * the peer is allowed by RFC 5246 not to
+ * wait for it.
+ */
+ if (!ctx->engine->shutdown_recv) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(
+ ctx->engine, BR_ERR_IO);
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (wlen > 0) {
+ br_ssl_engine_sendrec_ack(ctx->engine, wlen);
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we reached our target, then we are finished.
+ */
+ if (state & target) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If some application data must be read, and we did not
+ * exit, then this means that we are trying to write data,
+ * and that's not possible until the application data is
+ * read. This may happen if using a shared in/out buffer,
+ * and the underlying protocol is not strictly half-duplex.
+ * This is unrecoverable here, so we report an error.
+ */
+ if (state & BR_SSL_RECVAPP) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we reached that point, then either we are trying
+ * to read data and there is some, or the engine is stuck
+ * until a new record is obtained.
+ */
+ if (state & BR_SSL_RECVREC) {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t len;
+ int rlen;
+
+ buf = br_ssl_engine_recvrec_buf(ctx->engine, &len);
+ rlen = ctx->low_read(ctx->read_context, buf, len);
+ if (rlen < 0) {
+ br_ssl_engine_fail(ctx->engine, BR_ERR_IO);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (rlen > 0) {
+ br_ssl_engine_recvrec_ack(ctx->engine, rlen);
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We can reach that point if the target RECVAPP, and
+ * the state contains SENDAPP only. This may happen with
+ * a shared in/out buffer. In that case, we must flush
+ * the buffered data to "make room" for a new incoming
+ * record.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_flush(ctx->engine, 0);
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+int
+br_sslio_read(br_sslio_context *ctx, void *dst, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t alen;
+
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (run_until(ctx, BR_SSL_RECVAPP) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ buf = br_ssl_engine_recvapp_buf(ctx->engine, &alen);
+ if (alen > len) {
+ alen = len;
+ }
+ memcpy(dst, buf, alen);
+ br_ssl_engine_recvapp_ack(ctx->engine, alen);
+ return (int)alen;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+int
+br_sslio_read_all(br_sslio_context *ctx, void *dst, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = dst;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ int rlen;
+
+ rlen = br_sslio_read(ctx, buf, len);
+ if (rlen < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ buf += rlen;
+ len -= (size_t)rlen;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+int
+br_sslio_write(br_sslio_context *ctx, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t alen;
+
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (run_until(ctx, BR_SSL_SENDAPP) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ buf = br_ssl_engine_sendapp_buf(ctx->engine, &alen);
+ if (alen > len) {
+ alen = len;
+ }
+ memcpy(buf, src, alen);
+ br_ssl_engine_sendapp_ack(ctx->engine, alen);
+ return (int)alen;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+int
+br_sslio_write_all(br_sslio_context *ctx, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = src;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ int wlen;
+
+ wlen = br_sslio_write(ctx, buf, len);
+ if (wlen < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ buf += wlen;
+ len -= (size_t)wlen;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+int
+br_sslio_flush(br_sslio_context *ctx)
+{
+ /*
+ * We trigger a flush. We know the data is gone when there is
+ * no longer any record data to send, and we can either read
+ * or write application data. The call to run_until() does the
+ * job because it ensures that any assembled record data is
+ * first sent down the wire before considering anything else.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_flush(ctx->engine, 0);
+ return run_until(ctx, BR_SSL_SENDAPP | BR_SSL_RECVAPP);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+int
+br_sslio_close(br_sslio_context *ctx)
+{
+ br_ssl_engine_close(ctx->engine);
+ while (br_ssl_engine_current_state(ctx->engine) != BR_SSL_CLOSED) {
+ /*
+ * Discard any incoming application data.
+ */
+ size_t len;
+
+ run_until(ctx, BR_SSL_RECVAPP);
+ if (br_ssl_engine_recvapp_buf(ctx->engine, &len) != NULL) {
+ br_ssl_engine_recvapp_ack(ctx->engine, len);
+ }
+ }
+ return br_ssl_engine_last_error(ctx->engine) == BR_ERR_OK;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_keyexport.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_keyexport.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..58e6dc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_keyexport.c
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Supported cipher suites that use SHA-384 for the PRF when selected
+ * for TLS 1.2. All other cipher suites are deemed to use SHA-256.
+ */
+static const uint16_t suites_sha384[] = {
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+};
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+int
+br_ssl_key_export(br_ssl_engine_context *cc,
+ void *dst, size_t len, const char *label,
+ const void *context, size_t context_len)
+{
+ br_tls_prf_seed_chunk chunks[4];
+ br_tls_prf_impl iprf;
+ size_t num_chunks, u;
+ unsigned char tmp[2];
+ int prf_id;
+
+ if (cc->application_data != 1) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ chunks[0].data = cc->client_random;
+ chunks[0].len = sizeof cc->client_random;
+ chunks[1].data = cc->server_random;
+ chunks[1].len = sizeof cc->server_random;
+ if (context != NULL) {
+ br_enc16be(tmp, (unsigned)context_len);
+ chunks[2].data = tmp;
+ chunks[2].len = 2;
+ chunks[3].data = context;
+ chunks[3].len = context_len;
+ num_chunks = 4;
+ } else {
+ num_chunks = 2;
+ }
+ prf_id = BR_SSLPRF_SHA256;
+ for (u = 0; u < (sizeof suites_sha384) / sizeof(uint16_t); u ++) {
+ if (suites_sha384[u] == cc->session.cipher_suite) {
+ prf_id = BR_SSLPRF_SHA384;
+ }
+ }
+ iprf = br_ssl_engine_get_PRF(cc, prf_id);
+ iprf(dst, len,
+ cc->session.master_secret, sizeof cc->session.master_secret,
+ label, num_chunks, chunks);
+ return 1;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_lru.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_lru.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c71011
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_lru.c
@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Each entry consists in a fixed number of bytes. Entries are concatenated
+ * in the store block. "Addresses" are really offsets in the block,
+ * expressed over 32 bits (so the cache may have size at most 4 GB, which
+ * "ought to be enough for everyone"). The "null address" is 0xFFFFFFFF.
+ * Note that since the storage block alignment is in no way guaranteed, we
+ * perform only accesses that can handle unaligned data.
+ *
+ * Two concurrent data structures are maintained:
+ *
+ * -- Entries are organised in a doubly-linked list; saved entries are added
+ * at the head, and loaded entries are moved to the head. Eviction uses
+ * the list tail (this is the LRU algorithm).
+ *
+ * -- Entries are indexed with a binary tree: all left descendants of a
+ * node have a lower session ID (in lexicographic order), while all
+ * right descendants have a higher session ID. The tree is heuristically
+ * balanced.
+ *
+ * Entry format:
+ *
+ * session ID 32 bytes
+ * master secret 48 bytes
+ * protocol version 2 bytes (big endian)
+ * cipher suite 2 bytes (big endian)
+ * list prev 4 bytes (big endian)
+ * list next 4 bytes (big endian)
+ * tree left child 4 bytes (big endian)
+ * tree right child 4 bytes (big endian)
+ *
+ * If an entry has a protocol version set to 0, then it is "disabled":
+ * it was a session pushed to the cache at some point, but it has
+ * been explicitly removed.
+ *
+ * We need to keep the tree balanced because an attacker could make
+ * handshakes, selecting some specific sessions (by reusing them) to
+ * try to make us make an imbalanced tree that makes lookups expensive
+ * (a denial-of-service attack that would persist as long as the cache
+ * remains, i.e. even after the attacker made all his connections).
+ * To do that, we replace the session ID (or the start of the session ID)
+ * with a HMAC value computed over the replaced part; the hash function
+ * implementation and the key are obtained from the server context upon
+ * first save() call.
+ *
+ * Theoretically, an attacker could use the exact timing of the lookup
+ * to infer the current tree topology, and try to revive entries to make
+ * it as unbalanced as possible. However, since the session ID are
+ * chosen randomly by the server, and the attacker cannot see the
+ * indexing values and must thus rely on blind selection, it should be
+ * exponentially difficult for the attacker to maintain a large
+ * imbalance.
+ */
+#define SESSION_ID_LEN 32
+#define MASTER_SECRET_LEN 48
+
+#define SESSION_ID_OFF 0
+#define MASTER_SECRET_OFF 32
+#define VERSION_OFF 80
+#define CIPHER_SUITE_OFF 82
+#define LIST_PREV_OFF 84
+#define LIST_NEXT_OFF 88
+#define TREE_LEFT_OFF 92
+#define TREE_RIGHT_OFF 96
+
+#define LRU_ENTRY_LEN 100
+
+#define ADDR_NULL ((uint32_t)-1)
+
+#define GETSET(name, off) \
+static inline uint32_t get_ ## name(br_ssl_session_cache_lru *cc, uint32_t x) \
+{ \
+ return br_dec32be(cc->store + x + (off)); \
+} \
+static inline void set_ ## name(br_ssl_session_cache_lru *cc, \
+ uint32_t x, uint32_t val) \
+{ \
+ br_enc32be(cc->store + x + (off), val); \
+}
+
+GETSET(prev, LIST_PREV_OFF)
+GETSET(next, LIST_NEXT_OFF)
+GETSET(left, TREE_LEFT_OFF)
+GETSET(right, TREE_RIGHT_OFF)
+
+/*
+ * Transform the session ID by replacing the first N bytes with a HMAC
+ * value computed over these bytes, using the random key K (the HMAC
+ * value is truncated if needed). HMAC will use the same hash function
+ * as the DRBG in the SSL server context, so with SHA-256, SHA-384,
+ * or SHA-1, depending on what is available.
+ *
+ * The risk of collision is considered too small to be a concern; and
+ * the impact of a collision is low (the handshake won't succeed). This
+ * risk is much lower than any transmission error, which would lead to
+ * the same consequences.
+ *
+ * Source and destination arrays msut be disjoint.
+ */
+static void
+mask_id(br_ssl_session_cache_lru *cc,
+ const unsigned char *src, unsigned char *dst)
+{
+ br_hmac_key_context hkc;
+ br_hmac_context hc;
+
+ memcpy(dst, src, SESSION_ID_LEN);
+ br_hmac_key_init(&hkc, cc->hash, cc->index_key, sizeof cc->index_key);
+ br_hmac_init(&hc, &hkc, SESSION_ID_LEN);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, src, SESSION_ID_LEN);
+ br_hmac_out(&hc, dst);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find a node by ID. Returned value is the node address, or ADDR_NULL if
+ * the node is not found.
+ *
+ * If addr_link is not NULL, then '*addr_link' is set to the address of the
+ * last followed link. If the found node is the root, or if the tree is
+ * empty, then '*addr_link' is set to ADDR_NULL.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+find_node(br_ssl_session_cache_lru *cc, const unsigned char *id,
+ uint32_t *addr_link)
+{
+ uint32_t x, y;
+
+ x = cc->root;
+ y = ADDR_NULL;
+ while (x != ADDR_NULL) {
+ int r;
+
+ r = memcmp(id, cc->store + x + SESSION_ID_OFF, SESSION_ID_LEN);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ y = x + TREE_LEFT_OFF;
+ x = get_left(cc, x);
+ } else if (r == 0) {
+ if (addr_link != NULL) {
+ *addr_link = y;
+ }
+ return x;
+ } else {
+ y = x + TREE_RIGHT_OFF;
+ x = get_right(cc, x);
+ }
+ }
+ if (addr_link != NULL) {
+ *addr_link = y;
+ }
+ return ADDR_NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For node x, find its replacement upon removal.
+ *
+ * -- If node x has no child, then this returns ADDR_NULL.
+ * -- Otherwise, if node x has a left child, then the replacement is the
+ * rightmost left-descendent.
+ * -- Otherwise, the replacement is the leftmost right-descendent.
+ *
+ * If a node is returned, then '*al' is set to the address of the field
+ * that points to that node. Otherwise (node x has no child), '*al' is
+ * set to ADDR_NULL.
+ *
+ * Note that the replacement node, when found, is always a descendent
+ * of node 'x', so it cannot be the tree root. Thus, '*al' can be set
+ * to ADDR_NULL only when no node is found and ADDR_NULL is returned.
+ */
+static uint32_t
+find_replacement_node(br_ssl_session_cache_lru *cc, uint32_t x, uint32_t *al)
+{
+ uint32_t y1, y2;
+
+ y1 = get_left(cc, x);
+ if (y1 != ADDR_NULL) {
+ y2 = x + TREE_LEFT_OFF;
+ for (;;) {
+ uint32_t z;
+
+ z = get_right(cc, y1);
+ if (z == ADDR_NULL) {
+ *al = y2;
+ return y1;
+ }
+ y2 = y1 + TREE_RIGHT_OFF;
+ y1 = z;
+ }
+ }
+ y1 = get_right(cc, x);
+ if (y1 != ADDR_NULL) {
+ y2 = x + TREE_RIGHT_OFF;
+ for (;;) {
+ uint32_t z;
+
+ z = get_left(cc, y1);
+ if (z == ADDR_NULL) {
+ *al = y2;
+ return y1;
+ }
+ y2 = y1 + TREE_LEFT_OFF;
+ y1 = z;
+ }
+ }
+ *al = ADDR_NULL;
+ return ADDR_NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the link at address 'alx' to point to node 'x'. If 'alx' is
+ * ADDR_NULL, then this sets the tree root to 'x'.
+ */
+static inline void
+set_link(br_ssl_session_cache_lru *cc, uint32_t alx, uint32_t x)
+{
+ if (alx == ADDR_NULL) {
+ cc->root = x;
+ } else {
+ br_enc32be(cc->store + alx, x);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove node 'x' from the tree. This function shall not be called if
+ * node 'x' is not part of the tree.
+ */
+static void
+remove_node(br_ssl_session_cache_lru *cc, uint32_t x)
+{
+ uint32_t alx, y, aly;
+
+ /*
+ * Removal algorithm:
+ * ------------------
+ *
+ * - If we remove the root, then the tree becomes empty.
+ *
+ * - If the removed node has no child, then we can simply remove
+ * it, with nothing else to do.
+ *
+ * - Otherwise, the removed node must be replaced by either its
+ * rightmost left-descendent, or its leftmost right-descendent.
+ * The replacement node itself must be removed from its current
+ * place. By definition, that replacement node has either no
+ * child, or at most a single child that will replace it in the
+ * tree.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Find node back and its ancestor link. If the node was the
+ * root, then alx is set to ADDR_NULL.
+ */
+ find_node(cc, cc->store + x + SESSION_ID_OFF, &alx);
+
+ /*
+ * Find replacement node 'y', and 'aly' is set to the address of
+ * the link to that replacement node. If the removed node has no
+ * child, then both 'y' and 'aly' are set to ADDR_NULL.
+ */
+ y = find_replacement_node(cc, x, &aly);
+
+ if (y != ADDR_NULL) {
+ uint32_t z;
+
+ /*
+ * The unlinked replacement node may have one child (but
+ * not two) that takes its place.
+ */
+ z = get_left(cc, y);
+ if (z == ADDR_NULL) {
+ z = get_right(cc, y);
+ }
+ set_link(cc, aly, z);
+
+ /*
+ * Link the replacement node in its new place, overwriting
+ * the current link to the node 'x' (which removes 'x').
+ */
+ set_link(cc, alx, y);
+
+ /*
+ * The replacement node adopts the left and right children
+ * of the removed node. Note that this also works even if
+ * the replacement node was a direct descendent of the
+ * removed node, since we unlinked it previously.
+ */
+ set_left(cc, y, get_left(cc, x));
+ set_right(cc, y, get_right(cc, x));
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * No replacement, we simply unlink the node 'x'.
+ */
+ set_link(cc, alx, ADDR_NULL);
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+lru_save(const br_ssl_session_cache_class **ctx,
+ br_ssl_server_context *server_ctx,
+ const br_ssl_session_parameters *params)
+{
+ br_ssl_session_cache_lru *cc;
+ unsigned char id[SESSION_ID_LEN];
+ uint32_t x, alx;
+
+ cc = (br_ssl_session_cache_lru *)ctx;
+
+ /*
+ * If the buffer is too small, we don't record anything. This
+ * test avoids problems in subsequent code.
+ */
+ if (cc->store_len < LRU_ENTRY_LEN) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Upon the first save in a session cache instance, we obtain
+ * a random key for our indexing.
+ */
+ if (!cc->init_done) {
+ br_hmac_drbg_generate(&server_ctx->eng.rng,
+ cc->index_key, sizeof cc->index_key);
+ cc->hash = br_hmac_drbg_get_hash(&server_ctx->eng.rng);
+ cc->init_done = 1;
+ }
+ mask_id(cc, params->session_id, id);
+
+ /*
+ * Look for the node in the tree. If the same ID is already used,
+ * then reject it. This is a collision event, which should be
+ * exceedingly rare.
+ * Note: we do NOT record the emplacement here, because the
+ * removal of an entry may change the tree topology.
+ */
+ if (find_node(cc, id, NULL) != ADDR_NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Find some room for the new parameters. If the cache is not
+ * full yet, add it to the end of the area and bump the pointer up.
+ * Otherwise, evict the list tail entry. Note that we already
+ * filtered out the case of a ridiculously small buffer that
+ * cannot hold any entry at all; thus, if there is no room for an
+ * extra entry, then the cache cannot be empty.
+ */
+ if (cc->store_ptr > (cc->store_len - LRU_ENTRY_LEN)) {
+ /*
+ * Evict tail. If the buffer has room for a single entry,
+ * then this may also be the head.
+ */
+ x = cc->tail;
+ cc->tail = get_prev(cc, x);
+ if (cc->tail == ADDR_NULL) {
+ cc->head = ADDR_NULL;
+ } else {
+ set_next(cc, cc->tail, ADDR_NULL);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Remove the node from the tree.
+ */
+ remove_node(cc, x);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Allocate room for new node.
+ */
+ x = cc->store_ptr;
+ cc->store_ptr += LRU_ENTRY_LEN;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Find the emplacement for the new node, and link it.
+ */
+ find_node(cc, id, &alx);
+ set_link(cc, alx, x);
+ set_left(cc, x, ADDR_NULL);
+ set_right(cc, x, ADDR_NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * New entry becomes new list head. It may also become the list
+ * tail if the cache was empty at that point.
+ */
+ if (cc->head == ADDR_NULL) {
+ cc->tail = x;
+ } else {
+ set_prev(cc, cc->head, x);
+ }
+ set_prev(cc, x, ADDR_NULL);
+ set_next(cc, x, cc->head);
+ cc->head = x;
+
+ /*
+ * Fill data in the entry.
+ */
+ memcpy(cc->store + x + SESSION_ID_OFF, id, SESSION_ID_LEN);
+ memcpy(cc->store + x + MASTER_SECRET_OFF,
+ params->master_secret, MASTER_SECRET_LEN);
+ br_enc16be(cc->store + x + VERSION_OFF, params->version);
+ br_enc16be(cc->store + x + CIPHER_SUITE_OFF, params->cipher_suite);
+}
+
+static int
+lru_load(const br_ssl_session_cache_class **ctx,
+ br_ssl_server_context *server_ctx,
+ br_ssl_session_parameters *params)
+{
+ br_ssl_session_cache_lru *cc;
+ unsigned char id[SESSION_ID_LEN];
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ (void)server_ctx;
+ cc = (br_ssl_session_cache_lru *)ctx;
+ if (!cc->init_done) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ mask_id(cc, params->session_id, id);
+ x = find_node(cc, id, NULL);
+ if (x != ADDR_NULL) {
+ unsigned version;
+
+ version = br_dec16be(cc->store + x + VERSION_OFF);
+ if (version == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Entry is disabled, we pretend we did not find it.
+ * Notably, we don't move it to the front of the
+ * LRU list.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ params->version = version;
+ params->cipher_suite = br_dec16be(
+ cc->store + x + CIPHER_SUITE_OFF);
+ memcpy(params->master_secret,
+ cc->store + x + MASTER_SECRET_OFF,
+ MASTER_SECRET_LEN);
+ if (x != cc->head) {
+ /*
+ * Found node is not at list head, so move
+ * it to the head.
+ */
+ uint32_t p, n;
+
+ p = get_prev(cc, x);
+ n = get_next(cc, x);
+ set_next(cc, p, n);
+ if (n == ADDR_NULL) {
+ cc->tail = p;
+ } else {
+ set_prev(cc, n, p);
+ }
+ set_prev(cc, cc->head, x);
+ set_next(cc, x, cc->head);
+ set_prev(cc, x, ADDR_NULL);
+ cc->head = x;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const br_ssl_session_cache_class lru_class = {
+ sizeof(br_ssl_session_cache_lru),
+ &lru_save,
+ &lru_load
+};
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_ssl_session_cache_lru_init(br_ssl_session_cache_lru *cc,
+ unsigned char *store, size_t store_len)
+{
+ cc->vtable = &lru_class;
+ cc->store = store;
+ cc->store_len = store_len;
+ cc->store_ptr = 0;
+ cc->init_done = 0;
+ cc->head = ADDR_NULL;
+ cc->tail = ADDR_NULL;
+ cc->root = ADDR_NULL;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void br_ssl_session_cache_lru_forget(
+ br_ssl_session_cache_lru *cc, const unsigned char *id)
+{
+ unsigned char mid[SESSION_ID_LEN];
+ uint32_t addr;
+
+ /*
+ * If the cache is not initialised yet, then it is empty, and
+ * there is nothing to forget.
+ */
+ if (!cc->init_done) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Look for the node in the tree. If found, the entry is marked
+ * as "disabled"; it will be reused in due course, as it ages
+ * through the list.
+ *
+ * We do not go through the complex moves of actually releasing
+ * the entry right away because explicitly forgetting sessions
+ * should be a rare event, meant mostly for testing purposes,
+ * so this is not worth the extra code size.
+ */
+ mask_id(cc, id, mid);
+ addr = find_node(cc, mid, NULL);
+ if (addr != ADDR_NULL) {
+ br_enc16be(cc->store + addr + VERSION_OFF, 0);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_rec_cbc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_rec_cbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e89bb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_rec_cbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static void
+in_cbc_init(br_sslrec_in_cbc_context *cc,
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *bc_impl,
+ const void *bc_key, size_t bc_key_len,
+ const br_hash_class *dig_impl,
+ const void *mac_key, size_t mac_key_len, size_t mac_out_len,
+ const void *iv)
+{
+ cc->vtable = &br_sslrec_in_cbc_vtable;
+ cc->seq = 0;
+ bc_impl->init(&cc->bc.vtable, bc_key, bc_key_len);
+ br_hmac_key_init(&cc->mac, dig_impl, mac_key, mac_key_len);
+ cc->mac_len = mac_out_len;
+ if (iv == NULL) {
+ memset(cc->iv, 0, sizeof cc->iv);
+ cc->explicit_IV = 1;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(cc->iv, iv, bc_impl->block_size);
+ cc->explicit_IV = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+cbc_check_length(const br_sslrec_in_cbc_context *cc, size_t rlen)
+{
+ /*
+ * Plaintext size: at most 16384 bytes
+ * Padding: at most 256 bytes
+ * MAC: mac_len extra bytes
+ * TLS 1.1+: each record has an explicit IV
+ *
+ * Minimum length includes at least one byte of padding, and the
+ * MAC.
+ *
+ * Total length must be a multiple of the block size.
+ */
+ size_t blen;
+ size_t min_len, max_len;
+
+ blen = cc->bc.vtable->block_size;
+ min_len = (blen + cc->mac_len) & ~(blen - 1);
+ max_len = (16384 + 256 + cc->mac_len) & ~(blen - 1);
+ if (cc->explicit_IV) {
+ min_len += blen;
+ max_len += blen;
+ }
+ return min_len <= rlen && rlen <= max_len && (rlen & (blen - 1)) == 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Rotate array buf[] of length 'len' to the left (towards low indices)
+ * by 'num' bytes if ctl is 1; otherwise, leave it unchanged. This is
+ * constant-time. 'num' MUST be lower than 'len'. 'len' MUST be lower
+ * than or equal to 64.
+ */
+static void
+cond_rotate(uint32_t ctl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t num)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+ size_t u, v;
+
+ for (u = 0, v = num; u < len; u ++) {
+ tmp[u] = MUX(ctl, buf[v], buf[u]);
+ if (++ v == len) {
+ v = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(buf, tmp, len);
+}
+
+static unsigned char *
+cbc_decrypt(br_sslrec_in_cbc_context *cc,
+ int record_type, unsigned version, void *data, size_t *data_len)
+{
+ /*
+ * We represent all lengths on 32-bit integers, because:
+ * -- SSL record lengths always fit in 32 bits;
+ * -- our constant-time primitives operate on 32-bit integers.
+ */
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t u, v, len, blen, min_len, max_len;
+ uint32_t good, pad_len, rot_count, len_withmac, len_nomac;
+ unsigned char tmp1[64], tmp2[64];
+ int i;
+ br_hmac_context hc;
+
+ buf = data;
+ len = *data_len;
+ blen = cc->bc.vtable->block_size;
+
+ /*
+ * Decrypt data, and skip the explicit IV (if applicable). Note
+ * that the total length is supposed to have been verified by
+ * the caller. If there is an explicit IV, then we actually
+ * "decrypt" it using the implicit IV (from previous record),
+ * which is useless but harmless.
+ */
+ cc->bc.vtable->run(&cc->bc.vtable, cc->iv, data, len);
+ if (cc->explicit_IV) {
+ buf += blen;
+ len -= blen;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute minimum and maximum length of plaintext + MAC. These
+ * lengths can be inferred from the outside: they are not secret.
+ */
+ min_len = (cc->mac_len + 256 < len) ? len - 256 : cc->mac_len;
+ max_len = len - 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Use the last decrypted byte to compute the actual payload
+ * length. Take care not to overflow (we use unsigned types).
+ */
+ pad_len = buf[max_len];
+ good = LE(pad_len, (uint32_t)(max_len - min_len));
+ len = MUX(good, (uint32_t)(max_len - pad_len), min_len);
+
+ /*
+ * Check padding contents: all padding bytes must be equal to
+ * the value of pad_len.
+ */
+ for (u = min_len; u < max_len; u ++) {
+ good &= LT(u, len) | EQ(buf[u], pad_len);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Extract the MAC value. This is done in one pass, but results
+ * in a "rotated" MAC value depending on where it actually
+ * occurs. The 'rot_count' value is set to the offset of the
+ * first MAC byte within tmp1[].
+ *
+ * min_len and max_len are also adjusted to the minimum and
+ * maximum lengths of the plaintext alone (without the MAC).
+ */
+ len_withmac = (uint32_t)len;
+ len_nomac = len_withmac - cc->mac_len;
+ min_len -= cc->mac_len;
+ rot_count = 0;
+ memset(tmp1, 0, cc->mac_len);
+ v = 0;
+ for (u = min_len; u < max_len; u ++) {
+ tmp1[v] |= MUX(GE(u, len_nomac) & LT(u, len_withmac),
+ buf[u], 0x00);
+ rot_count = MUX(EQ(u, len_nomac), v, rot_count);
+ if (++ v == cc->mac_len) {
+ v = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ max_len -= cc->mac_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Rotate back the MAC value. The loop below does the constant-time
+ * rotation in time n*log n for a MAC output of length n. We assume
+ * that the MAC output length is no more than 64 bytes, so the
+ * rotation count fits on 6 bits.
+ */
+ for (i = 5; i >= 0; i --) {
+ uint32_t rc;
+
+ rc = (uint32_t)1 << i;
+ cond_rotate(rot_count >> i, tmp1, cc->mac_len, rc);
+ rot_count &= ~rc;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Recompute the HMAC value. The input is the concatenation of
+ * the sequence number (8 bytes), the record header (5 bytes),
+ * and the payload.
+ *
+ * At that point, min_len is the minimum plaintext length, but
+ * max_len still includes the MAC length.
+ */
+ br_enc64be(tmp2, cc->seq ++);
+ tmp2[8] = (unsigned char)record_type;
+ br_enc16be(tmp2 + 9, version);
+ br_enc16be(tmp2 + 11, len_nomac);
+ br_hmac_init(&hc, &cc->mac, cc->mac_len);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, tmp2, 13);
+ br_hmac_outCT(&hc, buf, len_nomac, min_len, max_len, tmp2);
+
+ /*
+ * Compare the extracted and recomputed MAC values.
+ */
+ for (u = 0; u < cc->mac_len; u ++) {
+ good &= EQ0(tmp1[u] ^ tmp2[u]);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the plaintext length is valid. The previous
+ * check was on the encrypted length, but the padding may have
+ * turned shorter than expected.
+ *
+ * Once this final test is done, the critical "constant-time"
+ * section ends and we can make conditional jumps again.
+ */
+ good &= LE(len_nomac, 16384);
+
+ if (!good) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *data_len = len_nomac;
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+const br_sslrec_in_cbc_class br_sslrec_in_cbc_vtable = {
+ {
+ sizeof(br_sslrec_in_cbc_context),
+ (int (*)(const br_sslrec_in_class *const *, size_t))
+ &cbc_check_length,
+ (unsigned char *(*)(const br_sslrec_in_class **,
+ int, unsigned, void *, size_t *))
+ &cbc_decrypt
+ },
+ (void (*)(const br_sslrec_in_cbc_class **,
+ const br_block_cbcdec_class *, const void *, size_t,
+ const br_hash_class *, const void *, size_t, size_t,
+ const void *))
+ &in_cbc_init
+};
+
+/*
+ * For CBC output:
+ *
+ * -- With TLS 1.1+, there is an explicit IV. Generation method uses
+ * HMAC, computed over the current sequence number, and the current MAC
+ * key. The resulting value is truncated to the size of a block, and
+ * added at the head of the plaintext; it will get encrypted along with
+ * the data. This custom generation mechanism is "safe" under the
+ * assumption that HMAC behaves like a random oracle; since the MAC for
+ * a record is computed over the concatenation of the sequence number,
+ * the record header and the plaintext, the HMAC-for-IV will not collide
+ * with the normal HMAC.
+ *
+ * -- With TLS 1.0, for application data, we want to enforce a 1/n-1
+ * split, as a countermeasure against chosen-plaintext attacks. We thus
+ * need to leave some room in the buffer for that extra record.
+ */
+
+static void
+out_cbc_init(br_sslrec_out_cbc_context *cc,
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *bc_impl,
+ const void *bc_key, size_t bc_key_len,
+ const br_hash_class *dig_impl,
+ const void *mac_key, size_t mac_key_len, size_t mac_out_len,
+ const void *iv)
+{
+ cc->vtable = &br_sslrec_out_cbc_vtable;
+ cc->seq = 0;
+ bc_impl->init(&cc->bc.vtable, bc_key, bc_key_len);
+ br_hmac_key_init(&cc->mac, dig_impl, mac_key, mac_key_len);
+ cc->mac_len = mac_out_len;
+ if (iv == NULL) {
+ memset(cc->iv, 0, sizeof cc->iv);
+ cc->explicit_IV = 1;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(cc->iv, iv, bc_impl->block_size);
+ cc->explicit_IV = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+cbc_max_plaintext(const br_sslrec_out_cbc_context *cc,
+ size_t *start, size_t *end)
+{
+ size_t blen, len;
+
+ blen = cc->bc.vtable->block_size;
+ if (cc->explicit_IV) {
+ *start += blen;
+ } else {
+ *start += 4 + ((cc->mac_len + blen + 1) & ~(blen - 1));
+ }
+ len = (*end - *start) & ~(blen - 1);
+ len -= 1 + cc->mac_len;
+ if (len > 16384) {
+ len = 16384;
+ }
+ *end = *start + len;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *
+cbc_encrypt(br_sslrec_out_cbc_context *cc,
+ int record_type, unsigned version, void *data, size_t *data_len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf, *rbuf;
+ size_t len, blen, plen;
+ unsigned char tmp[13];
+ br_hmac_context hc;
+
+ buf = data;
+ len = *data_len;
+ blen = cc->bc.vtable->block_size;
+
+ /*
+ * If using TLS 1.0, with more than one byte of plaintext, and
+ * the record is application data, then we need to compute
+ * a "split". We do not perform the split on other record types
+ * because it turned out that some existing, deployed
+ * implementations of SSL/TLS do not tolerate the splitting of
+ * some message types (in particular the Finished message).
+ *
+ * If using TLS 1.1+, then there is an explicit IV. We produce
+ * that IV by adding an extra initial plaintext block, whose
+ * value is computed with HMAC over the record sequence number.
+ */
+ if (cc->explicit_IV) {
+ /*
+ * We use here the fact that all the HMAC variants we
+ * support can produce at least 16 bytes, while all the
+ * block ciphers we support have blocks of no more than
+ * 16 bytes. Thus, we can always truncate the HMAC output
+ * down to the block size.
+ */
+ br_enc64be(tmp, cc->seq);
+ br_hmac_init(&hc, &cc->mac, blen);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, tmp, 8);
+ br_hmac_out(&hc, buf - blen);
+ rbuf = buf - blen - 5;
+ } else {
+ if (len > 1 && record_type == BR_SSL_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+ /*
+ * To do the split, we use a recursive invocation;
+ * since we only give one byte to the inner call,
+ * the recursion stops there.
+ *
+ * We need to compute the exact size of the extra
+ * record, so that the two resulting records end up
+ * being sequential in RAM.
+ *
+ * We use here the fact that cbc_max_plaintext()
+ * adjusted the start offset to leave room for the
+ * initial fragment.
+ */
+ size_t xlen;
+
+ rbuf = buf - 4
+ - ((cc->mac_len + blen + 1) & ~(blen - 1));
+ rbuf[0] = buf[0];
+ xlen = 1;
+ rbuf = cbc_encrypt(cc, record_type,
+ version, rbuf, &xlen);
+ buf ++;
+ len --;
+ } else {
+ rbuf = buf - 5;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Compute MAC.
+ */
+ br_enc64be(tmp, cc->seq ++);
+ tmp[8] = record_type;
+ br_enc16be(tmp + 9, version);
+ br_enc16be(tmp + 11, len);
+ br_hmac_init(&hc, &cc->mac, cc->mac_len);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, tmp, 13);
+ br_hmac_update(&hc, buf, len);
+ br_hmac_out(&hc, buf + len);
+ len += cc->mac_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Add padding.
+ */
+ plen = blen - (len & (blen - 1));
+ memset(buf + len, (unsigned)plen - 1, plen);
+ len += plen;
+
+ /*
+ * If an explicit IV is used, the corresponding extra block was
+ * already put in place earlier; we just have to account for it
+ * here.
+ */
+ if (cc->explicit_IV) {
+ buf -= blen;
+ len += blen;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Encrypt the whole thing. If there is an explicit IV, we also
+ * encrypt it, which is fine (encryption of a uniformly random
+ * block is still a uniformly random block).
+ */
+ cc->bc.vtable->run(&cc->bc.vtable, cc->iv, buf, len);
+
+ /*
+ * Add the header and return.
+ */
+ buf[-5] = record_type;
+ br_enc16be(buf - 4, version);
+ br_enc16be(buf - 2, len);
+ *data_len = (size_t)((buf + len) - rbuf);
+ return rbuf;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+const br_sslrec_out_cbc_class br_sslrec_out_cbc_vtable = {
+ {
+ sizeof(br_sslrec_out_cbc_context),
+ (void (*)(const br_sslrec_out_class *const *,
+ size_t *, size_t *))
+ &cbc_max_plaintext,
+ (unsigned char *(*)(const br_sslrec_out_class **,
+ int, unsigned, void *, size_t *))
+ &cbc_encrypt
+ },
+ (void (*)(const br_sslrec_out_cbc_class **,
+ const br_block_cbcenc_class *, const void *, size_t,
+ const br_hash_class *, const void *, size_t, size_t,
+ const void *))
+ &out_cbc_init
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_rec_ccm.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_rec_ccm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..92c3295
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_rec_ccm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * CCM initialisation. This does everything except setting the vtable,
+ * which depends on whether this is a context for encrypting or for
+ * decrypting.
+ */
+static void
+gen_ccm_init(br_sslrec_ccm_context *cc,
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *bc_impl,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len,
+ const void *iv, size_t tag_len)
+{
+ cc->seq = 0;
+ bc_impl->init(&cc->bc.vtable, key, key_len);
+ memcpy(cc->iv, iv, sizeof cc->iv);
+ cc->tag_len = tag_len;
+}
+
+static void
+in_ccm_init(br_sslrec_ccm_context *cc,
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *bc_impl,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len,
+ const void *iv, size_t tag_len)
+{
+ cc->vtable.in = &br_sslrec_in_ccm_vtable;
+ gen_ccm_init(cc, bc_impl, key, key_len, iv, tag_len);
+}
+
+static int
+ccm_check_length(const br_sslrec_ccm_context *cc, size_t rlen)
+{
+ /*
+ * CCM overhead is 8 bytes for nonce_explicit, and the tag
+ * (normally 8 or 16 bytes, depending on cipher suite).
+ */
+ size_t over;
+
+ over = 8 + cc->tag_len;
+ return rlen >= over && rlen <= (16384 + over);
+}
+
+static unsigned char *
+ccm_decrypt(br_sslrec_ccm_context *cc,
+ int record_type, unsigned version, void *data, size_t *data_len)
+{
+ br_ccm_context zc;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char nonce[12], header[13];
+ size_t len;
+
+ buf = (unsigned char *)data + 8;
+ len = *data_len - (8 + cc->tag_len);
+
+ /*
+ * Make nonce (implicit + explicit parts).
+ */
+ memcpy(nonce, cc->iv, sizeof cc->iv);
+ memcpy(nonce + 4, data, 8);
+
+ /*
+ * Assemble synthetic header for the AAD.
+ */
+ br_enc64be(header, cc->seq ++);
+ header[8] = (unsigned char)record_type;
+ br_enc16be(header + 9, version);
+ br_enc16be(header + 11, len);
+
+ /*
+ * Perform CCM decryption.
+ */
+ br_ccm_init(&zc, &cc->bc.vtable);
+ br_ccm_reset(&zc, nonce, sizeof nonce, sizeof header, len, cc->tag_len);
+ br_ccm_aad_inject(&zc, header, sizeof header);
+ br_ccm_flip(&zc);
+ br_ccm_run(&zc, 0, buf, len);
+ if (!br_ccm_check_tag(&zc, buf + len)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ *data_len = len;
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+const br_sslrec_in_ccm_class br_sslrec_in_ccm_vtable = {
+ {
+ sizeof(br_sslrec_ccm_context),
+ (int (*)(const br_sslrec_in_class *const *, size_t))
+ &ccm_check_length,
+ (unsigned char *(*)(const br_sslrec_in_class **,
+ int, unsigned, void *, size_t *))
+ &ccm_decrypt
+ },
+ (void (*)(const br_sslrec_in_ccm_class **,
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *, const void *, size_t,
+ const void *, size_t))
+ &in_ccm_init
+};
+
+static void
+out_ccm_init(br_sslrec_ccm_context *cc,
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *bc_impl,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len,
+ const void *iv, size_t tag_len)
+{
+ cc->vtable.out = &br_sslrec_out_ccm_vtable;
+ gen_ccm_init(cc, bc_impl, key, key_len, iv, tag_len);
+}
+
+static void
+ccm_max_plaintext(const br_sslrec_ccm_context *cc,
+ size_t *start, size_t *end)
+{
+ size_t len;
+
+ *start += 8;
+ len = *end - *start - cc->tag_len;
+ if (len > 16384) {
+ len = 16384;
+ }
+ *end = *start + len;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *
+ccm_encrypt(br_sslrec_ccm_context *cc,
+ int record_type, unsigned version, void *data, size_t *data_len)
+{
+ br_ccm_context zc;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char nonce[12], header[13];
+ size_t len;
+
+ buf = (unsigned char *)data;
+ len = *data_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Make nonce; the explicit part is an encoding of the sequence
+ * number.
+ */
+ memcpy(nonce, cc->iv, sizeof cc->iv);
+ br_enc64be(nonce + 4, cc->seq);
+
+ /*
+ * Assemble synthetic header for the AAD.
+ */
+ br_enc64be(header, cc->seq ++);
+ header[8] = (unsigned char)record_type;
+ br_enc16be(header + 9, version);
+ br_enc16be(header + 11, len);
+
+ /*
+ * Perform CCM encryption.
+ */
+ br_ccm_init(&zc, &cc->bc.vtable);
+ br_ccm_reset(&zc, nonce, sizeof nonce, sizeof header, len, cc->tag_len);
+ br_ccm_aad_inject(&zc, header, sizeof header);
+ br_ccm_flip(&zc);
+ br_ccm_run(&zc, 1, buf, len);
+ br_ccm_get_tag(&zc, buf + len);
+
+ /*
+ * Assemble header and adjust pointer/length.
+ */
+ len += 8 + cc->tag_len;
+ buf -= 13;
+ memcpy(buf + 5, nonce + 4, 8);
+ buf[0] = (unsigned char)record_type;
+ br_enc16be(buf + 1, version);
+ br_enc16be(buf + 3, len);
+ *data_len = len + 5;
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+const br_sslrec_out_ccm_class br_sslrec_out_ccm_vtable = {
+ {
+ sizeof(br_sslrec_ccm_context),
+ (void (*)(const br_sslrec_out_class *const *,
+ size_t *, size_t *))
+ &ccm_max_plaintext,
+ (unsigned char *(*)(const br_sslrec_out_class **,
+ int, unsigned, void *, size_t *))
+ &ccm_encrypt
+ },
+ (void (*)(const br_sslrec_out_ccm_class **,
+ const br_block_ctrcbc_class *, const void *, size_t,
+ const void *, size_t))
+ &out_ccm_init
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_rec_chapol.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_rec_chapol.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73b3c78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_rec_chapol.c
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static void
+gen_chapol_init(br_sslrec_chapol_context *cc,
+ br_chacha20_run ichacha, br_poly1305_run ipoly,
+ const void *key, const void *iv)
+{
+ cc->seq = 0;
+ cc->ichacha = ichacha;
+ cc->ipoly = ipoly;
+ memcpy(cc->key, key, sizeof cc->key);
+ memcpy(cc->iv, iv, sizeof cc->iv);
+}
+
+static void
+gen_chapol_process(br_sslrec_chapol_context *cc,
+ int record_type, unsigned version, void *data, size_t len,
+ void *tag, int encrypt)
+{
+ unsigned char header[13];
+ unsigned char nonce[12];
+ uint64_t seq;
+ size_t u;
+
+ seq = cc->seq ++;
+ br_enc64be(header, seq);
+ header[8] = (unsigned char)record_type;
+ br_enc16be(header + 9, version);
+ br_enc16be(header + 11, len);
+ memcpy(nonce, cc->iv, 12);
+ for (u = 0; u < 8; u ++) {
+ nonce[11 - u] ^= (unsigned char)seq;
+ seq >>= 8;
+ }
+ cc->ipoly(cc->key, nonce, data, len, header, sizeof header,
+ tag, cc->ichacha, encrypt);
+}
+
+static void
+in_chapol_init(br_sslrec_chapol_context *cc,
+ br_chacha20_run ichacha, br_poly1305_run ipoly,
+ const void *key, const void *iv)
+{
+ cc->vtable.in = &br_sslrec_in_chapol_vtable;
+ gen_chapol_init(cc, ichacha, ipoly, key, iv);
+}
+
+static int
+chapol_check_length(const br_sslrec_chapol_context *cc, size_t rlen)
+{
+ /*
+ * Overhead is just the authentication tag (16 bytes).
+ */
+ (void)cc;
+ return rlen >= 16 && rlen <= (16384 + 16);
+}
+
+static unsigned char *
+chapol_decrypt(br_sslrec_chapol_context *cc,
+ int record_type, unsigned version, void *data, size_t *data_len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t u, len;
+ unsigned char tag[16];
+ unsigned bad;
+
+ buf = data;
+ len = *data_len - 16;
+ gen_chapol_process(cc, record_type, version, buf, len, tag, 0);
+ bad = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < 16; u ++) {
+ bad |= tag[u] ^ buf[len + u];
+ }
+ if (bad) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ *data_len = len;
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+const br_sslrec_in_chapol_class br_sslrec_in_chapol_vtable = {
+ {
+ sizeof(br_sslrec_chapol_context),
+ (int (*)(const br_sslrec_in_class *const *, size_t))
+ &chapol_check_length,
+ (unsigned char *(*)(const br_sslrec_in_class **,
+ int, unsigned, void *, size_t *))
+ &chapol_decrypt
+ },
+ (void (*)(const br_sslrec_in_chapol_class **,
+ br_chacha20_run, br_poly1305_run,
+ const void *, const void *))
+ &in_chapol_init
+};
+
+static void
+out_chapol_init(br_sslrec_chapol_context *cc,
+ br_chacha20_run ichacha, br_poly1305_run ipoly,
+ const void *key, const void *iv)
+{
+ cc->vtable.out = &br_sslrec_out_chapol_vtable;
+ gen_chapol_init(cc, ichacha, ipoly, key, iv);
+}
+
+static void
+chapol_max_plaintext(const br_sslrec_chapol_context *cc,
+ size_t *start, size_t *end)
+{
+ size_t len;
+
+ (void)cc;
+ len = *end - *start - 16;
+ if (len > 16384) {
+ len = 16384;
+ }
+ *end = *start + len;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *
+chapol_encrypt(br_sslrec_chapol_context *cc,
+ int record_type, unsigned version, void *data, size_t *data_len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t len;
+
+ buf = data;
+ len = *data_len;
+ gen_chapol_process(cc, record_type, version, buf, len, buf + len, 1);
+ buf -= 5;
+ buf[0] = (unsigned char)record_type;
+ br_enc16be(buf + 1, version);
+ br_enc16be(buf + 3, len + 16);
+ *data_len = len + 21;
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+const br_sslrec_out_chapol_class br_sslrec_out_chapol_vtable = {
+ {
+ sizeof(br_sslrec_chapol_context),
+ (void (*)(const br_sslrec_out_class *const *,
+ size_t *, size_t *))
+ &chapol_max_plaintext,
+ (unsigned char *(*)(const br_sslrec_out_class **,
+ int, unsigned, void *, size_t *))
+ &chapol_encrypt
+ },
+ (void (*)(const br_sslrec_out_chapol_class **,
+ br_chacha20_run, br_poly1305_run,
+ const void *, const void *))
+ &out_chapol_init
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_rec_gcm.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_rec_gcm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..70df277
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_rec_gcm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * GCM initialisation. This does everything except setting the vtable,
+ * which depends on whether this is a context for encrypting or for
+ * decrypting.
+ */
+static void
+gen_gcm_init(br_sslrec_gcm_context *cc,
+ const br_block_ctr_class *bc_impl,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len,
+ br_ghash gh_impl,
+ const void *iv)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[12];
+
+ cc->seq = 0;
+ bc_impl->init(&cc->bc.vtable, key, key_len);
+ cc->gh = gh_impl;
+ memcpy(cc->iv, iv, sizeof cc->iv);
+ memset(cc->h, 0, sizeof cc->h);
+ memset(tmp, 0, sizeof tmp);
+ bc_impl->run(&cc->bc.vtable, tmp, 0, cc->h, sizeof cc->h);
+}
+
+static void
+in_gcm_init(br_sslrec_gcm_context *cc,
+ const br_block_ctr_class *bc_impl,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len,
+ br_ghash gh_impl,
+ const void *iv)
+{
+ cc->vtable.in = &br_sslrec_in_gcm_vtable;
+ gen_gcm_init(cc, bc_impl, key, key_len, gh_impl, iv);
+}
+
+static int
+gcm_check_length(const br_sslrec_gcm_context *cc, size_t rlen)
+{
+ /*
+ * GCM adds a fixed overhead:
+ * 8 bytes for the nonce_explicit (before the ciphertext)
+ * 16 bytes for the authentication tag (after the ciphertext)
+ */
+ (void)cc;
+ return rlen >= 24 && rlen <= (16384 + 24);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the authentication tag. The value written in 'tag' must still
+ * be CTR-encrypted.
+ */
+static void
+do_tag(br_sslrec_gcm_context *cc,
+ int record_type, unsigned version,
+ void *data, size_t len, void *tag)
+{
+ unsigned char header[13];
+ unsigned char footer[16];
+
+ /*
+ * Compute authentication tag. Three elements must be injected in
+ * sequence, each possibly 0-padded to reach a length multiple
+ * of the block size: the 13-byte header (sequence number, record
+ * type, protocol version, record length), the cipher text, and
+ * the word containing the encodings of the bit lengths of the two
+ * other elements.
+ */
+ br_enc64be(header, cc->seq ++);
+ header[8] = (unsigned char)record_type;
+ br_enc16be(header + 9, version);
+ br_enc16be(header + 11, len);
+ br_enc64be(footer, (uint64_t)(sizeof header) << 3);
+ br_enc64be(footer + 8, (uint64_t)len << 3);
+ memset(tag, 0, 16);
+ cc->gh(tag, cc->h, header, sizeof header);
+ cc->gh(tag, cc->h, data, len);
+ cc->gh(tag, cc->h, footer, sizeof footer);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do CTR encryption. This also does CTR encryption of a single block at
+ * address 'xortag' with the counter value appropriate for the final
+ * processing of the authentication tag.
+ */
+static void
+do_ctr(br_sslrec_gcm_context *cc, const void *nonce, void *data, size_t len,
+ void *xortag)
+{
+ unsigned char iv[12];
+
+ memcpy(iv, cc->iv, 4);
+ memcpy(iv + 4, nonce, 8);
+ cc->bc.vtable->run(&cc->bc.vtable, iv, 2, data, len);
+ cc->bc.vtable->run(&cc->bc.vtable, iv, 1, xortag, 16);
+}
+
+static unsigned char *
+gcm_decrypt(br_sslrec_gcm_context *cc,
+ int record_type, unsigned version, void *data, size_t *data_len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t len, u;
+ uint32_t bad;
+ unsigned char tag[16];
+
+ buf = (unsigned char *)data + 8;
+ len = *data_len - 24;
+ do_tag(cc, record_type, version, buf, len, tag);
+ do_ctr(cc, data, buf, len, tag);
+
+ /*
+ * Compare the computed tag with the value from the record. It
+ * is possibly useless to do a constant-time comparison here,
+ * but it does not hurt.
+ */
+ bad = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < 16; u ++) {
+ bad |= tag[u] ^ buf[len + u];
+ }
+ if (bad) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ *data_len = len;
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+const br_sslrec_in_gcm_class br_sslrec_in_gcm_vtable = {
+ {
+ sizeof(br_sslrec_gcm_context),
+ (int (*)(const br_sslrec_in_class *const *, size_t))
+ &gcm_check_length,
+ (unsigned char *(*)(const br_sslrec_in_class **,
+ int, unsigned, void *, size_t *))
+ &gcm_decrypt
+ },
+ (void (*)(const br_sslrec_in_gcm_class **,
+ const br_block_ctr_class *, const void *, size_t,
+ br_ghash, const void *))
+ &in_gcm_init
+};
+
+static void
+out_gcm_init(br_sslrec_gcm_context *cc,
+ const br_block_ctr_class *bc_impl,
+ const void *key, size_t key_len,
+ br_ghash gh_impl,
+ const void *iv)
+{
+ cc->vtable.out = &br_sslrec_out_gcm_vtable;
+ gen_gcm_init(cc, bc_impl, key, key_len, gh_impl, iv);
+}
+
+static void
+gcm_max_plaintext(const br_sslrec_gcm_context *cc,
+ size_t *start, size_t *end)
+{
+ size_t len;
+
+ (void)cc;
+ *start += 8;
+ len = *end - *start - 16;
+ if (len > 16384) {
+ len = 16384;
+ }
+ *end = *start + len;
+}
+
+static unsigned char *
+gcm_encrypt(br_sslrec_gcm_context *cc,
+ int record_type, unsigned version, void *data, size_t *data_len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t u, len;
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+
+ buf = (unsigned char *)data;
+ len = *data_len;
+ memset(tmp, 0, sizeof tmp);
+ br_enc64be(buf - 8, cc->seq);
+ do_ctr(cc, buf - 8, buf, len, tmp);
+ do_tag(cc, record_type, version, buf, len, buf + len);
+ for (u = 0; u < 16; u ++) {
+ buf[len + u] ^= tmp[u];
+ }
+ len += 24;
+ buf -= 13;
+ buf[0] = (unsigned char)record_type;
+ br_enc16be(buf + 1, version);
+ br_enc16be(buf + 3, len);
+ *data_len = len + 5;
+ return buf;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+const br_sslrec_out_gcm_class br_sslrec_out_gcm_vtable = {
+ {
+ sizeof(br_sslrec_gcm_context),
+ (void (*)(const br_sslrec_out_class *const *,
+ size_t *, size_t *))
+ &gcm_max_plaintext,
+ (unsigned char *(*)(const br_sslrec_out_class **,
+ int, unsigned, void *, size_t *))
+ &gcm_encrypt
+ },
+ (void (*)(const br_sslrec_out_gcm_class **,
+ const br_block_ctr_class *, const void *, size_t,
+ br_ghash, const void *))
+ &out_gcm_init
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_scert_single_ec.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_scert_single_ec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce8d753
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_scert_single_ec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static int
+se_choose(const br_ssl_server_policy_class **pctx,
+ const br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ br_ssl_server_choices *choices)
+{
+ br_ssl_server_policy_ec_context *pc;
+ const br_suite_translated *st;
+ size_t u, st_num;
+ unsigned hash_id;
+
+ pc = (br_ssl_server_policy_ec_context *)pctx;
+ st = br_ssl_server_get_client_suites(cc, &st_num);
+ hash_id = br_ssl_choose_hash(br_ssl_server_get_client_hashes(cc) >> 8);
+ if (cc->eng.session.version < BR_TLS12) {
+ hash_id = br_sha1_ID;
+ }
+ choices->chain = pc->chain;
+ choices->chain_len = pc->chain_len;
+ for (u = 0; u < st_num; u ++) {
+ unsigned tt;
+
+ tt = st[u][1];
+ switch (tt >> 12) {
+ case BR_SSLKEYX_ECDH_RSA:
+ if ((pc->allowed_usages & BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX) != 0
+ && pc->cert_issuer_key_type == BR_KEYTYPE_RSA)
+ {
+ choices->cipher_suite = st[u][0];
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case BR_SSLKEYX_ECDH_ECDSA:
+ if ((pc->allowed_usages & BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX) != 0
+ && pc->cert_issuer_key_type == BR_KEYTYPE_EC)
+ {
+ choices->cipher_suite = st[u][0];
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case BR_SSLKEYX_ECDHE_ECDSA:
+ if ((pc->allowed_usages & BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN) != 0
+ && hash_id != 0)
+ {
+ choices->cipher_suite = st[u][0];
+ choices->algo_id = hash_id + 0xFF00;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+se_do_keyx(const br_ssl_server_policy_class **pctx,
+ unsigned char *data, size_t *len)
+{
+ br_ssl_server_policy_ec_context *pc;
+ uint32_t r;
+ size_t xoff, xlen;
+
+ pc = (br_ssl_server_policy_ec_context *)pctx;
+ r = pc->iec->mul(data, *len, pc->sk->x, pc->sk->xlen, pc->sk->curve);
+ xoff = pc->iec->xoff(pc->sk->curve, &xlen);
+ memmove(data, data + xoff, xlen);
+ *len = xlen;
+ return r;
+}
+
+static size_t
+se_do_sign(const br_ssl_server_policy_class **pctx,
+ unsigned algo_id, unsigned char *data, size_t hv_len, size_t len)
+{
+ br_ssl_server_policy_ec_context *pc;
+ unsigned char hv[64];
+ const br_hash_class *hc;
+
+ algo_id &= 0xFF;
+ pc = (br_ssl_server_policy_ec_context *)pctx;
+ hc = br_multihash_getimpl(pc->mhash, algo_id);
+ if (hc == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(hv, data, hv_len);
+ if (len < 139) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return pc->iecdsa(pc->iec, hc, hv, pc->sk, data);
+}
+
+static const br_ssl_server_policy_class se_policy_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_ssl_server_policy_ec_context),
+ se_choose,
+ se_do_keyx,
+ se_do_sign
+};
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_server_set_single_ec(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, unsigned allowed_usages,
+ unsigned cert_issuer_key_type,
+ const br_ec_impl *iec, br_ecdsa_sign iecdsa)
+{
+ cc->chain_handler.single_ec.vtable = &se_policy_vtable;
+ cc->chain_handler.single_ec.chain = chain;
+ cc->chain_handler.single_ec.chain_len = chain_len;
+ cc->chain_handler.single_ec.sk = sk;
+ cc->chain_handler.single_ec.allowed_usages = allowed_usages;
+ cc->chain_handler.single_ec.cert_issuer_key_type = cert_issuer_key_type;
+ cc->chain_handler.single_ec.mhash = &cc->eng.mhash;
+ cc->chain_handler.single_ec.iec = iec;
+ cc->chain_handler.single_ec.iecdsa = iecdsa;
+ cc->policy_vtable = &cc->chain_handler.single_ec.vtable;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_scert_single_rsa.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_scert_single_rsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2c7767
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_scert_single_rsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static int
+sr_choose(const br_ssl_server_policy_class **pctx,
+ const br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ br_ssl_server_choices *choices)
+{
+ br_ssl_server_policy_rsa_context *pc;
+ const br_suite_translated *st;
+ size_t u, st_num;
+ unsigned hash_id;
+ int fh;
+
+ pc = (br_ssl_server_policy_rsa_context *)pctx;
+ st = br_ssl_server_get_client_suites(cc, &st_num);
+ if (cc->eng.session.version < BR_TLS12) {
+ hash_id = 0;
+ fh = 1;
+ } else {
+ hash_id = br_ssl_choose_hash(
+ br_ssl_server_get_client_hashes(cc));
+ fh = (hash_id != 0);
+ }
+ choices->chain = pc->chain;
+ choices->chain_len = pc->chain_len;
+ for (u = 0; u < st_num; u ++) {
+ unsigned tt;
+
+ tt = st[u][1];
+ switch (tt >> 12) {
+ case BR_SSLKEYX_RSA:
+ if ((pc->allowed_usages & BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX) != 0) {
+ choices->cipher_suite = st[u][0];
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case BR_SSLKEYX_ECDHE_RSA:
+ if ((pc->allowed_usages & BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN) != 0 && fh) {
+ choices->cipher_suite = st[u][0];
+ choices->algo_id = hash_id + 0xFF00;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+sr_do_keyx(const br_ssl_server_policy_class **pctx,
+ unsigned char *data, size_t *len)
+{
+ br_ssl_server_policy_rsa_context *pc;
+
+ pc = (br_ssl_server_policy_rsa_context *)pctx;
+ return br_rsa_ssl_decrypt(pc->irsacore, pc->sk, data, *len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * OID for hash functions in RSA signatures.
+ */
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA1[] = {
+ 0x05, 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A
+};
+
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA224[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04
+};
+
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA256[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01
+};
+
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA384[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02
+};
+
+static const unsigned char HASH_OID_SHA512[] = {
+ 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03
+};
+
+static const unsigned char *HASH_OID[] = {
+ HASH_OID_SHA1,
+ HASH_OID_SHA224,
+ HASH_OID_SHA256,
+ HASH_OID_SHA384,
+ HASH_OID_SHA512
+};
+
+static size_t
+sr_do_sign(const br_ssl_server_policy_class **pctx,
+ unsigned algo_id, unsigned char *data, size_t hv_len, size_t len)
+{
+ br_ssl_server_policy_rsa_context *pc;
+ unsigned char hv[64];
+ size_t sig_len;
+ const unsigned char *hash_oid;
+
+ pc = (br_ssl_server_policy_rsa_context *)pctx;
+ memcpy(hv, data, hv_len);
+ algo_id &= 0xFF;
+ if (algo_id == 0) {
+ hash_oid = NULL;
+ } else if (algo_id >= 2 && algo_id <= 6) {
+ hash_oid = HASH_OID[algo_id - 2];
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sig_len = (pc->sk->n_bitlen + 7) >> 3;
+ if (len < sig_len) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return pc->irsasign(hash_oid, hv, hv_len, pc->sk, data) ? sig_len : 0;
+}
+
+static const br_ssl_server_policy_class sr_policy_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_ssl_server_policy_rsa_context),
+ sr_choose,
+ sr_do_keyx,
+ sr_do_sign
+};
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_server_set_single_rsa(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk, unsigned allowed_usages,
+ br_rsa_private irsacore, br_rsa_pkcs1_sign irsasign)
+{
+ cc->chain_handler.single_rsa.vtable = &sr_policy_vtable;
+ cc->chain_handler.single_rsa.chain = chain;
+ cc->chain_handler.single_rsa.chain_len = chain_len;
+ cc->chain_handler.single_rsa.sk = sk;
+ cc->chain_handler.single_rsa.allowed_usages = allowed_usages;
+ cc->chain_handler.single_rsa.irsacore = irsacore;
+ cc->chain_handler.single_rsa.irsasign = irsasign;
+ cc->policy_vtable = &cc->chain_handler.single_rsa.vtable;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5578b63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server.c
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_server_zero(br_ssl_server_context *cc)
+{
+ /*
+ * For really standard C, we should explicitly set to NULL all
+ * pointers, and 0 all other fields. However, on all our target
+ * architectures, a direct memset() will work, be faster, and
+ * use a lot less code.
+ */
+ memset(cc, 0, sizeof *cc);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+int
+br_ssl_server_reset(br_ssl_server_context *cc)
+{
+ br_ssl_engine_set_buffer(&cc->eng, NULL, 0, 0);
+ if (!br_ssl_engine_init_rand(&cc->eng)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ cc->eng.reneg = 0;
+ br_ssl_engine_hs_reset(&cc->eng,
+ br_ssl_hs_server_init_main, br_ssl_hs_server_run);
+ return br_ssl_engine_last_error(&cc->eng) == BR_ERR_OK;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_full_ec.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_full_ec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bccc093
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_full_ec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_server_init_full_ec(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ unsigned cert_issuer_key_type, const br_ec_private_key *sk)
+{
+ /*
+ * The "full" profile supports all implemented cipher suites.
+ *
+ * Rationale for suite order, from most important to least
+ * important rule:
+ *
+ * -- Don't use 3DES if AES is available.
+ * -- Try to have Forward Secrecy (ECDHE suite) if possible.
+ * -- ChaCha20+Poly1305 is better than AES/GCM (faster, smaller).
+ * -- GCM is better than CCM and CBC. CCM is better than CBC.
+ * -- CCM is better than CCM_8.
+ * -- AES-128 is preferred over AES-256 (AES-128 is already
+ * strong enough, and AES-256 is 40% more expensive).
+ *
+ * Note that for ECDH suites, the list will be automatically
+ * filtered based on the issuing CA key type.
+ */
+ static const uint16_t suites[] = {
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * All hash functions are activated.
+ * Note: the X.509 validation engine will nonetheless refuse to
+ * validate signatures that use MD5 as hash function.
+ */
+ static const br_hash_class *hashes[] = {
+ &br_md5_vtable,
+ &br_sha1_vtable,
+ &br_sha224_vtable,
+ &br_sha256_vtable,
+ &br_sha384_vtable,
+ &br_sha512_vtable
+ };
+
+ int id;
+
+ /*
+ * Reset server context and set supported versions from TLS-1.0
+ * to TLS-1.2 (inclusive).
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_zero(cc);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_versions(&cc->eng, BR_TLS10, BR_TLS12);
+
+ /*
+ * Set suites and elliptic curve implementation (for ECDHE).
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_suites(&cc->eng, suites,
+ (sizeof suites) / (sizeof suites[0]));
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_ec(&cc->eng);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the "server policy": handler for the certificate chain
+ * and private key operations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_set_single_ec(cc, chain, chain_len, sk,
+ BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX | BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN,
+ cert_issuer_key_type,
+ br_ssl_engine_get_ec(&cc->eng),
+#if BR_LOMUL
+ br_ecdsa_i15_sign_asn1
+#else
+ br_ecdsa_i31_sign_asn1
+#endif
+ );
+
+ /*
+ * Set supported hash functions.
+ */
+ for (id = br_md5_ID; id <= br_sha512_ID; id ++) {
+ const br_hash_class *hc;
+
+ hc = hashes[id - 1];
+ br_ssl_engine_set_hash(&cc->eng, id, hc);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the PRF implementations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_prf10(&cc->eng, &br_tls10_prf);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_prf_sha256(&cc->eng, &br_tls12_sha256_prf);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_prf_sha384(&cc->eng, &br_tls12_sha384_prf);
+
+ /*
+ * Symmetric encryption.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_cbc(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_ccm(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_gcm(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_des_cbc(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_chapol(&cc->eng);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_full_rsa.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_full_rsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d67c076
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_full_rsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_server_init_full_rsa(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk)
+{
+ /*
+ * The "full" profile supports all implemented cipher suites.
+ *
+ * Rationale for suite order, from most important to least
+ * important rule:
+ *
+ * -- Don't use 3DES if AES is available.
+ * -- Try to have Forward Secrecy (ECDHE suite) if possible.
+ * -- ChaCha20+Poly1305 is better than AES/GCM (faster, smaller).
+ * -- GCM is better than CBC.
+ * -- AES-128 is preferred over AES-256 (AES-128 is already
+ * strong enough, and AES-256 is 40% more expensive).
+ */
+ static const uint16_t suites[] = {
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA,
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * All hash functions are activated.
+ * Note: the X.509 validation engine will nonetheless refuse to
+ * validate signatures that use MD5 as hash function.
+ */
+ static const br_hash_class *hashes[] = {
+ &br_md5_vtable,
+ &br_sha1_vtable,
+ &br_sha224_vtable,
+ &br_sha256_vtable,
+ &br_sha384_vtable,
+ &br_sha512_vtable
+ };
+
+ int id;
+
+ /*
+ * Reset server context and set supported versions from TLS-1.0
+ * to TLS-1.2 (inclusive).
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_zero(cc);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_versions(&cc->eng, BR_TLS10, BR_TLS12);
+
+ /*
+ * Set suites and elliptic curve implementation (for ECDHE).
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_suites(&cc->eng, suites,
+ (sizeof suites) / (sizeof suites[0]));
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_ec(&cc->eng);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the "server policy": handler for the certificate chain
+ * and private key operations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_set_single_rsa(cc, chain, chain_len, sk,
+ BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX | BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN,
+ br_rsa_private_get_default(),
+ br_rsa_pkcs1_sign_get_default());
+
+ /*
+ * Set supported hash functions.
+ */
+ for (id = br_md5_ID; id <= br_sha512_ID; id ++) {
+ const br_hash_class *hc;
+
+ hc = hashes[id - 1];
+ br_ssl_engine_set_hash(&cc->eng, id, hc);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set the PRF implementations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_prf10(&cc->eng, &br_tls10_prf);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_prf_sha256(&cc->eng, &br_tls12_sha256_prf);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_prf_sha384(&cc->eng, &br_tls12_sha384_prf);
+
+ /*
+ * Symmetric encryption.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_cbc(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_ccm(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_gcm(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_des_cbc(&cc->eng);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_chapol(&cc->eng);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_mine2c.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_mine2c.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf61b56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_mine2c.c
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_server_init_mine2c(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk)
+{
+ static const uint16_t suites[] = {
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * Reset server context and set supported versions to TLS-1.2 (only).
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_zero(cc);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_versions(&cc->eng, BR_TLS12, BR_TLS12);
+
+ /*
+ * Set suites and elliptic curve implementation (for ECDHE).
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_suites(&cc->eng, suites,
+ (sizeof suites) / (sizeof suites[0]));
+ br_ssl_engine_set_ec(&cc->eng, &br_ec_all_m15);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the "server policy": handler for the certificate chain
+ * and private key operations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_set_single_rsa(cc, chain, chain_len, sk,
+ BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN, 0, br_rsa_i31_pkcs1_sign);
+
+ /*
+ * Set supported hash functions.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_hash(&cc->eng, br_sha256_ID, &br_sha256_vtable);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the PRF implementations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_prf_sha256(&cc->eng, &br_tls12_sha256_prf);
+
+ /*
+ * Symmetric encryption.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_chapol(&cc->eng);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_mine2g.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_mine2g.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..80fa5b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_mine2g.c
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_server_init_mine2g(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk)
+{
+ static const uint16_t suites[] = {
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * Reset server context and set supported versions to TLS-1.2 (only).
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_zero(cc);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_versions(&cc->eng, BR_TLS12, BR_TLS12);
+
+ /*
+ * Set suites and elliptic curve implementation (for ECDHE).
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_suites(&cc->eng, suites,
+ (sizeof suites) / (sizeof suites[0]));
+ br_ssl_engine_set_ec(&cc->eng, &br_ec_all_m15);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the "server policy": handler for the certificate chain
+ * and private key operations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_set_single_rsa(cc, chain, chain_len, sk,
+ BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN, 0, br_rsa_i31_pkcs1_sign);
+
+ /*
+ * Set supported hash functions.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_hash(&cc->eng, br_sha256_ID, &br_sha256_vtable);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the PRF implementations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_prf_sha256(&cc->eng, &br_tls12_sha256_prf);
+
+ /*
+ * Symmetric encryption.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_gcm(&cc->eng);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_minf2c.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_minf2c.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f44236
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_minf2c.c
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_server_init_minf2c(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk)
+{
+ static const uint16_t suites[] = {
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * Reset server context and set supported versions to TLS-1.2 (only).
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_zero(cc);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_versions(&cc->eng, BR_TLS12, BR_TLS12);
+
+ /*
+ * Set suites and elliptic curve implementation (for ECDHE).
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_suites(&cc->eng, suites,
+ (sizeof suites) / (sizeof suites[0]));
+ br_ssl_engine_set_ec(&cc->eng, &br_ec_all_m15);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the "server policy": handler for the certificate chain
+ * and private key operations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_set_single_ec(cc, chain, chain_len, sk,
+ BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN, 0, &br_ec_all_m15, br_ecdsa_i31_sign_asn1);
+
+ /*
+ * Set supported hash functions.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_hash(&cc->eng, br_sha256_ID, &br_sha256_vtable);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the PRF implementations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_prf_sha256(&cc->eng, &br_tls12_sha256_prf);
+
+ /*
+ * Symmetric encryption.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_chapol(&cc->eng);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_minf2g.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_minf2g.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8613de1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_minf2g.c
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_server_init_minf2g(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk)
+{
+ static const uint16_t suites[] = {
+ BR_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * Reset server context and set supported versions to TLS-1.2 (only).
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_zero(cc);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_versions(&cc->eng, BR_TLS12, BR_TLS12);
+
+ /*
+ * Set suites and elliptic curve implementation (for ECDHE).
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_suites(&cc->eng, suites,
+ (sizeof suites) / (sizeof suites[0]));
+ br_ssl_engine_set_ec(&cc->eng, &br_ec_all_m15);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the "server policy": handler for the certificate chain
+ * and private key operations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_set_single_ec(cc, chain, chain_len, sk,
+ BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN, 0, &br_ec_all_m15, br_ecdsa_i31_sign_asn1);
+
+ /*
+ * Set supported hash functions.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_hash(&cc->eng, br_sha256_ID, &br_sha256_vtable);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the PRF implementations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_prf_sha256(&cc->eng, &br_tls12_sha256_prf);
+
+ /*
+ * Symmetric encryption.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_gcm(&cc->eng);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_minr2g.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_minr2g.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..83c238b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_minr2g.c
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_server_init_minr2g(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_rsa_private_key *sk)
+{
+ static const uint16_t suites[] = {
+ BR_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * Reset server context and set supported versions to TLS-1.2 (only).
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_zero(cc);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_versions(&cc->eng, BR_TLS12, BR_TLS12);
+
+ /*
+ * Set suites.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_suites(&cc->eng, suites,
+ (sizeof suites) / (sizeof suites[0]));
+
+ /*
+ * Set the "server policy": handler for the certificate chain
+ * and private key operations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_set_single_rsa(cc, chain, chain_len, sk,
+ BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX, br_rsa_i31_private, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Set supported hash functions.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_hash(&cc->eng, br_sha256_ID, &br_sha256_vtable);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the PRF implementations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_prf_sha256(&cc->eng, &br_tls12_sha256_prf);
+
+ /*
+ * Symmetric encryption.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_gcm(&cc->eng);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_minu2g.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_minu2g.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6721384
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_minu2g.c
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_server_init_minu2g(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk)
+{
+ static const uint16_t suites[] = {
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * Reset server context and set supported versions to TLS-1.2 (only).
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_zero(cc);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_versions(&cc->eng, BR_TLS12, BR_TLS12);
+
+ /*
+ * Set suites.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_suites(&cc->eng, suites,
+ (sizeof suites) / (sizeof suites[0]));
+
+ /*
+ * Set the "server policy": handler for the certificate chain
+ * and private key operations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_set_single_ec(cc, chain, chain_len, sk,
+ BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX, BR_KEYTYPE_RSA, &br_ec_all_m15, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Set supported hash functions.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_hash(&cc->eng, br_sha256_ID, &br_sha256_vtable);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the PRF implementations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_prf_sha256(&cc->eng, &br_tls12_sha256_prf);
+
+ /*
+ * Symmetric encryption.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_gcm(&cc->eng);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_minv2g.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_minv2g.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..194e654
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/ssl/ssl_server_minv2g.c
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_ssl.h */
+void
+br_ssl_server_init_minv2g(br_ssl_server_context *cc,
+ const br_x509_certificate *chain, size_t chain_len,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk)
+{
+ static const uint16_t suites[] = {
+ BR_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ };
+
+ /*
+ * Reset server context and set supported versions to TLS-1.2 (only).
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_zero(cc);
+ br_ssl_engine_set_versions(&cc->eng, BR_TLS12, BR_TLS12);
+
+ /*
+ * Set suites.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_suites(&cc->eng, suites,
+ (sizeof suites) / (sizeof suites[0]));
+
+ /*
+ * Set the "server policy": handler for the certificate chain
+ * and private key operations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_server_set_single_ec(cc, chain, chain_len, sk,
+ BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX, BR_KEYTYPE_EC, &br_ec_all_m15, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Set supported hash functions.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_hash(&cc->eng, br_sha256_ID, &br_sha256_vtable);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the PRF implementations.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_prf_sha256(&cc->eng, &br_tls12_sha256_prf);
+
+ /*
+ * Symmetric encryption.
+ */
+ br_ssl_engine_set_default_aes_gcm(&cc->eng);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_cbcdec.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_cbcdec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d969a3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_cbcdec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_big_cbcdec_init(br_aes_big_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_big_cbcdec_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_big_keysched_inv(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_big_cbcdec_run(const br_aes_big_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf, *ivbuf;
+
+ ivbuf = iv;
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ int i;
+
+ memcpy(tmp, buf, 16);
+ br_aes_big_decrypt(ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey, buf);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i ++) {
+ buf[i] ^= ivbuf[i];
+ }
+ memcpy(ivbuf, tmp, 16);
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcdec_class br_aes_big_cbcdec_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_big_cbcdec_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcdec_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_big_cbcdec_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcdec_class *const *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_big_cbcdec_run
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_cbcenc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_cbcenc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..265e53b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_cbcenc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_big_cbcenc_init(br_aes_big_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_big_cbcenc_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_big_cbcenc_run(const br_aes_big_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf, *ivbuf;
+
+ ivbuf = iv;
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i ++) {
+ buf[i] ^= ivbuf[i];
+ }
+ br_aes_big_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey, buf);
+ memcpy(ivbuf, buf, 16);
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcenc_class br_aes_big_cbcenc_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_big_cbcenc_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcenc_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_big_cbcenc_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcenc_class *const *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_big_cbcenc_run
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_ctr.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_ctr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18fbb84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_ctr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_big_ctr_init(br_aes_big_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_big_ctr_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+static void
+xorbuf(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *d;
+ const unsigned char *s;
+
+ d = dst;
+ s = src;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ *d ++ ^= *s ++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+uint32_t
+br_aes_big_ctr_run(const br_aes_big_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, iv, 12);
+ br_enc32be(tmp + 12, cc ++);
+ br_aes_big_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey, tmp);
+ if (len <= 16) {
+ xorbuf(buf, tmp, len);
+ break;
+ }
+ xorbuf(buf, tmp, 16);
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+ return cc;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctr_class br_aes_big_ctr_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_big_ctr_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctr_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_big_ctr_init,
+ (uint32_t (*)(const br_block_ctr_class *const *,
+ const void *, uint32_t, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_big_ctr_run
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_ctrcbc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_ctrcbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d45ca76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_ctrcbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_big_ctrcbc_init(br_aes_big_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_big_ctrcbc_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+static void
+xorbuf(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *d;
+ const unsigned char *s;
+
+ d = dst;
+ s = src;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ *d ++ ^= *s ++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_big_ctrcbc_ctr(const br_aes_big_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf, *bctr;
+ uint32_t cc0, cc1, cc2, cc3;
+
+ buf = data;
+ bctr = ctr;
+ cc3 = br_dec32be(bctr + 0);
+ cc2 = br_dec32be(bctr + 4);
+ cc1 = br_dec32be(bctr + 8);
+ cc0 = br_dec32be(bctr + 12);
+ while (len > 0) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ uint32_t carry;
+
+ br_enc32be(tmp + 0, cc3);
+ br_enc32be(tmp + 4, cc2);
+ br_enc32be(tmp + 8, cc1);
+ br_enc32be(tmp + 12, cc0);
+ br_aes_big_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey, tmp);
+ xorbuf(buf, tmp, 16);
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ cc0 ++;
+ carry = (~(cc0 | -cc0)) >> 31;
+ cc1 += carry;
+ carry &= (~(cc1 | -cc1)) >> 31;
+ cc2 += carry;
+ carry &= (~(cc2 | -cc2)) >> 31;
+ cc3 += carry;
+ }
+ br_enc32be(bctr + 0, cc3);
+ br_enc32be(bctr + 4, cc2);
+ br_enc32be(bctr + 8, cc1);
+ br_enc32be(bctr + 12, cc0);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_big_ctrcbc_mac(const br_aes_big_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *cbcmac, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ xorbuf(cbcmac, buf, 16);
+ br_aes_big_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey, cbcmac);
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_big_ctrcbc_encrypt(const br_aes_big_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ br_aes_big_ctrcbc_ctr(ctx, ctr, data, len);
+ br_aes_big_ctrcbc_mac(ctx, cbcmac, data, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_big_ctrcbc_decrypt(const br_aes_big_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ br_aes_big_ctrcbc_mac(ctx, cbcmac, data, len);
+ br_aes_big_ctrcbc_ctr(ctx, ctr, data, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctrcbc_class br_aes_big_ctrcbc_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_big_ctrcbc_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_big_ctrcbc_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_big_ctrcbc_encrypt,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_big_ctrcbc_decrypt,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_big_ctrcbc_ctr,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_big_ctrcbc_mac
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_dec.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_dec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a5d0e3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_dec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Inverse S-box (used in key schedule for decryption).
+ */
+static const unsigned char iS[] = {
+ 0x52, 0x09, 0x6A, 0xD5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xA5, 0x38, 0xBF, 0x40, 0xA3, 0x9E,
+ 0x81, 0xF3, 0xD7, 0xFB, 0x7C, 0xE3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9B, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x87,
+ 0x34, 0x8E, 0x43, 0x44, 0xC4, 0xDE, 0xE9, 0xCB, 0x54, 0x7B, 0x94, 0x32,
+ 0xA6, 0xC2, 0x23, 0x3D, 0xEE, 0x4C, 0x95, 0x0B, 0x42, 0xFA, 0xC3, 0x4E,
+ 0x08, 0x2E, 0xA1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x24, 0xB2, 0x76, 0x5B, 0xA2, 0x49,
+ 0x6D, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x25, 0x72, 0xF8, 0xF6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16,
+ 0xD4, 0xA4, 0x5C, 0xCC, 0x5D, 0x65, 0xB6, 0x92, 0x6C, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50,
+ 0xFD, 0xED, 0xB9, 0xDA, 0x5E, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0x84,
+ 0x90, 0xD8, 0xAB, 0x00, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0xD3, 0x0A, 0xF7, 0xE4, 0x58, 0x05,
+ 0xB8, 0xB3, 0x45, 0x06, 0xD0, 0x2C, 0x1E, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x3F, 0x0F, 0x02,
+ 0xC1, 0xAF, 0xBD, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8A, 0x6B, 0x3A, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41,
+ 0x4F, 0x67, 0xDC, 0xEA, 0x97, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0xCE, 0xF0, 0xB4, 0xE6, 0x73,
+ 0x96, 0xAC, 0x74, 0x22, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x35, 0x85, 0xE2, 0xF9, 0x37, 0xE8,
+ 0x1C, 0x75, 0xDF, 0x6E, 0x47, 0xF1, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x1D, 0x29, 0xC5, 0x89,
+ 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x62, 0x0E, 0xAA, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x1B, 0xFC, 0x56, 0x3E, 0x4B,
+ 0xC6, 0xD2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xCD, 0x5A, 0xF4,
+ 0x1F, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xC7, 0x31, 0xB1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59,
+ 0x27, 0x80, 0xEC, 0x5F, 0x60, 0x51, 0x7F, 0xA9, 0x19, 0xB5, 0x4A, 0x0D,
+ 0x2D, 0xE5, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0x93, 0xC9, 0x9C, 0xEF, 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x3B, 0x4D,
+ 0xAE, 0x2A, 0xF5, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0xEB, 0xBB, 0x3C, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61,
+ 0x17, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x7E, 0xBA, 0x77, 0xD6, 0x26, 0xE1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63,
+ 0x55, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x7D
+};
+
+static const uint32_t iSsm0[] = {
+ 0x51F4A750, 0x7E416553, 0x1A17A4C3, 0x3A275E96, 0x3BAB6BCB, 0x1F9D45F1,
+ 0xACFA58AB, 0x4BE30393, 0x2030FA55, 0xAD766DF6, 0x88CC7691, 0xF5024C25,
+ 0x4FE5D7FC, 0xC52ACBD7, 0x26354480, 0xB562A38F, 0xDEB15A49, 0x25BA1B67,
+ 0x45EA0E98, 0x5DFEC0E1, 0xC32F7502, 0x814CF012, 0x8D4697A3, 0x6BD3F9C6,
+ 0x038F5FE7, 0x15929C95, 0xBF6D7AEB, 0x955259DA, 0xD4BE832D, 0x587421D3,
+ 0x49E06929, 0x8EC9C844, 0x75C2896A, 0xF48E7978, 0x99583E6B, 0x27B971DD,
+ 0xBEE14FB6, 0xF088AD17, 0xC920AC66, 0x7DCE3AB4, 0x63DF4A18, 0xE51A3182,
+ 0x97513360, 0x62537F45, 0xB16477E0, 0xBB6BAE84, 0xFE81A01C, 0xF9082B94,
+ 0x70486858, 0x8F45FD19, 0x94DE6C87, 0x527BF8B7, 0xAB73D323, 0x724B02E2,
+ 0xE31F8F57, 0x6655AB2A, 0xB2EB2807, 0x2FB5C203, 0x86C57B9A, 0xD33708A5,
+ 0x302887F2, 0x23BFA5B2, 0x02036ABA, 0xED16825C, 0x8ACF1C2B, 0xA779B492,
+ 0xF307F2F0, 0x4E69E2A1, 0x65DAF4CD, 0x0605BED5, 0xD134621F, 0xC4A6FE8A,
+ 0x342E539D, 0xA2F355A0, 0x058AE132, 0xA4F6EB75, 0x0B83EC39, 0x4060EFAA,
+ 0x5E719F06, 0xBD6E1051, 0x3E218AF9, 0x96DD063D, 0xDD3E05AE, 0x4DE6BD46,
+ 0x91548DB5, 0x71C45D05, 0x0406D46F, 0x605015FF, 0x1998FB24, 0xD6BDE997,
+ 0x894043CC, 0x67D99E77, 0xB0E842BD, 0x07898B88, 0xE7195B38, 0x79C8EEDB,
+ 0xA17C0A47, 0x7C420FE9, 0xF8841EC9, 0x00000000, 0x09808683, 0x322BED48,
+ 0x1E1170AC, 0x6C5A724E, 0xFD0EFFFB, 0x0F853856, 0x3DAED51E, 0x362D3927,
+ 0x0A0FD964, 0x685CA621, 0x9B5B54D1, 0x24362E3A, 0x0C0A67B1, 0x9357E70F,
+ 0xB4EE96D2, 0x1B9B919E, 0x80C0C54F, 0x61DC20A2, 0x5A774B69, 0x1C121A16,
+ 0xE293BA0A, 0xC0A02AE5, 0x3C22E043, 0x121B171D, 0x0E090D0B, 0xF28BC7AD,
+ 0x2DB6A8B9, 0x141EA9C8, 0x57F11985, 0xAF75074C, 0xEE99DDBB, 0xA37F60FD,
+ 0xF701269F, 0x5C72F5BC, 0x44663BC5, 0x5BFB7E34, 0x8B432976, 0xCB23C6DC,
+ 0xB6EDFC68, 0xB8E4F163, 0xD731DCCA, 0x42638510, 0x13972240, 0x84C61120,
+ 0x854A247D, 0xD2BB3DF8, 0xAEF93211, 0xC729A16D, 0x1D9E2F4B, 0xDCB230F3,
+ 0x0D8652EC, 0x77C1E3D0, 0x2BB3166C, 0xA970B999, 0x119448FA, 0x47E96422,
+ 0xA8FC8CC4, 0xA0F03F1A, 0x567D2CD8, 0x223390EF, 0x87494EC7, 0xD938D1C1,
+ 0x8CCAA2FE, 0x98D40B36, 0xA6F581CF, 0xA57ADE28, 0xDAB78E26, 0x3FADBFA4,
+ 0x2C3A9DE4, 0x5078920D, 0x6A5FCC9B, 0x547E4662, 0xF68D13C2, 0x90D8B8E8,
+ 0x2E39F75E, 0x82C3AFF5, 0x9F5D80BE, 0x69D0937C, 0x6FD52DA9, 0xCF2512B3,
+ 0xC8AC993B, 0x10187DA7, 0xE89C636E, 0xDB3BBB7B, 0xCD267809, 0x6E5918F4,
+ 0xEC9AB701, 0x834F9AA8, 0xE6956E65, 0xAAFFE67E, 0x21BCCF08, 0xEF15E8E6,
+ 0xBAE79BD9, 0x4A6F36CE, 0xEA9F09D4, 0x29B07CD6, 0x31A4B2AF, 0x2A3F2331,
+ 0xC6A59430, 0x35A266C0, 0x744EBC37, 0xFC82CAA6, 0xE090D0B0, 0x33A7D815,
+ 0xF104984A, 0x41ECDAF7, 0x7FCD500E, 0x1791F62F, 0x764DD68D, 0x43EFB04D,
+ 0xCCAA4D54, 0xE49604DF, 0x9ED1B5E3, 0x4C6A881B, 0xC12C1FB8, 0x4665517F,
+ 0x9D5EEA04, 0x018C355D, 0xFA877473, 0xFB0B412E, 0xB3671D5A, 0x92DBD252,
+ 0xE9105633, 0x6DD64713, 0x9AD7618C, 0x37A10C7A, 0x59F8148E, 0xEB133C89,
+ 0xCEA927EE, 0xB761C935, 0xE11CE5ED, 0x7A47B13C, 0x9CD2DF59, 0x55F2733F,
+ 0x1814CE79, 0x73C737BF, 0x53F7CDEA, 0x5FFDAA5B, 0xDF3D6F14, 0x7844DB86,
+ 0xCAAFF381, 0xB968C43E, 0x3824342C, 0xC2A3405F, 0x161DC372, 0xBCE2250C,
+ 0x283C498B, 0xFF0D9541, 0x39A80171, 0x080CB3DE, 0xD8B4E49C, 0x6456C190,
+ 0x7BCB8461, 0xD532B670, 0x486C5C74, 0xD0B85742
+};
+
+static unsigned
+mul2(unsigned x)
+{
+ x <<= 1;
+ return x ^ ((unsigned)(-(int)(x >> 8)) & 0x11B);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+mul9(unsigned x)
+{
+ return x ^ mul2(mul2(mul2(x)));
+}
+
+static unsigned
+mulb(unsigned x)
+{
+ unsigned x2;
+
+ x2 = mul2(x);
+ return x ^ x2 ^ mul2(mul2(x2));
+}
+
+static unsigned
+muld(unsigned x)
+{
+ unsigned x4;
+
+ x4 = mul2(mul2(x));
+ return x ^ x4 ^ mul2(x4);
+}
+
+static unsigned
+mule(unsigned x)
+{
+ unsigned x2, x4;
+
+ x2 = mul2(x);
+ x4 = mul2(x2);
+ return x2 ^ x4 ^ mul2(x4);
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+unsigned
+br_aes_big_keysched_inv(uint32_t *skey, const void *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+ int i, m;
+
+ /*
+ * Sub-keys for decryption are distinct from encryption sub-keys
+ * in that InvMixColumns() is already applied for the inner
+ * rounds.
+ */
+ num_rounds = br_aes_keysched(skey, key, key_len);
+ m = (int)(num_rounds << 2);
+ for (i = 4; i < m; i ++) {
+ uint32_t p;
+ unsigned p0, p1, p2, p3;
+ uint32_t q0, q1, q2, q3;
+
+ p = skey[i];
+ p0 = p >> 24;
+ p1 = (p >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ p2 = (p >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ p3 = p & 0xFF;
+ q0 = mule(p0) ^ mulb(p1) ^ muld(p2) ^ mul9(p3);
+ q1 = mul9(p0) ^ mule(p1) ^ mulb(p2) ^ muld(p3);
+ q2 = muld(p0) ^ mul9(p1) ^ mule(p2) ^ mulb(p3);
+ q3 = mulb(p0) ^ muld(p1) ^ mul9(p2) ^ mule(p3);
+ skey[i] = (q0 << 24) | (q1 << 16) | (q2 << 8) | q3;
+ }
+ return num_rounds;
+}
+
+static inline uint32_t
+rotr(uint32_t x, int n)
+{
+ return (x << (32 - n)) | (x >> n);
+}
+
+#define iSboxExt0(x) (iSsm0[x])
+#define iSboxExt1(x) (rotr(iSsm0[x], 8))
+#define iSboxExt2(x) (rotr(iSsm0[x], 16))
+#define iSboxExt3(x) (rotr(iSsm0[x], 24))
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_aes_big_decrypt(unsigned num_rounds, const uint32_t *skey, void *data)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t s0, s1, s2, s3;
+ uint32_t t0, t1, t2, t3;
+ unsigned u;
+
+ buf = data;
+ s0 = br_dec32be(buf);
+ s1 = br_dec32be(buf + 4);
+ s2 = br_dec32be(buf + 8);
+ s3 = br_dec32be(buf + 12);
+ s0 ^= skey[(num_rounds << 2) + 0];
+ s1 ^= skey[(num_rounds << 2) + 1];
+ s2 ^= skey[(num_rounds << 2) + 2];
+ s3 ^= skey[(num_rounds << 2) + 3];
+ for (u = num_rounds - 1; u > 0; u --) {
+ uint32_t v0 = iSboxExt0(s0 >> 24)
+ ^ iSboxExt1((s3 >> 16) & 0xFF)
+ ^ iSboxExt2((s2 >> 8) & 0xFF)
+ ^ iSboxExt3(s1 & 0xFF);
+ uint32_t v1 = iSboxExt0(s1 >> 24)
+ ^ iSboxExt1((s0 >> 16) & 0xFF)
+ ^ iSboxExt2((s3 >> 8) & 0xFF)
+ ^ iSboxExt3(s2 & 0xFF);
+ uint32_t v2 = iSboxExt0(s2 >> 24)
+ ^ iSboxExt1((s1 >> 16) & 0xFF)
+ ^ iSboxExt2((s0 >> 8) & 0xFF)
+ ^ iSboxExt3(s3 & 0xFF);
+ uint32_t v3 = iSboxExt0(s3 >> 24)
+ ^ iSboxExt1((s2 >> 16) & 0xFF)
+ ^ iSboxExt2((s1 >> 8) & 0xFF)
+ ^ iSboxExt3(s0 & 0xFF);
+ s0 = v0;
+ s1 = v1;
+ s2 = v2;
+ s3 = v3;
+ s0 ^= skey[u << 2];
+ s1 ^= skey[(u << 2) + 1];
+ s2 ^= skey[(u << 2) + 2];
+ s3 ^= skey[(u << 2) + 3];
+ }
+ t0 = ((uint32_t)iS[s0 >> 24] << 24)
+ | ((uint32_t)iS[(s3 >> 16) & 0xFF] << 16)
+ | ((uint32_t)iS[(s2 >> 8) & 0xFF] << 8)
+ | (uint32_t)iS[s1 & 0xFF];
+ t1 = ((uint32_t)iS[s1 >> 24] << 24)
+ | ((uint32_t)iS[(s0 >> 16) & 0xFF] << 16)
+ | ((uint32_t)iS[(s3 >> 8) & 0xFF] << 8)
+ | (uint32_t)iS[s2 & 0xFF];
+ t2 = ((uint32_t)iS[s2 >> 24] << 24)
+ | ((uint32_t)iS[(s1 >> 16) & 0xFF] << 16)
+ | ((uint32_t)iS[(s0 >> 8) & 0xFF] << 8)
+ | (uint32_t)iS[s3 & 0xFF];
+ t3 = ((uint32_t)iS[s3 >> 24] << 24)
+ | ((uint32_t)iS[(s2 >> 16) & 0xFF] << 16)
+ | ((uint32_t)iS[(s1 >> 8) & 0xFF] << 8)
+ | (uint32_t)iS[s0 & 0xFF];
+ s0 = t0 ^ skey[0];
+ s1 = t1 ^ skey[1];
+ s2 = t2 ^ skey[2];
+ s3 = t3 ^ skey[3];
+ br_enc32be(buf, s0);
+ br_enc32be(buf + 4, s1);
+ br_enc32be(buf + 8, s2);
+ br_enc32be(buf + 12, s3);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_enc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bbabb9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_big_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define S br_aes_S
+
+static const uint32_t Ssm0[] = {
+ 0xC66363A5, 0xF87C7C84, 0xEE777799, 0xF67B7B8D, 0xFFF2F20D, 0xD66B6BBD,
+ 0xDE6F6FB1, 0x91C5C554, 0x60303050, 0x02010103, 0xCE6767A9, 0x562B2B7D,
+ 0xE7FEFE19, 0xB5D7D762, 0x4DABABE6, 0xEC76769A, 0x8FCACA45, 0x1F82829D,
+ 0x89C9C940, 0xFA7D7D87, 0xEFFAFA15, 0xB25959EB, 0x8E4747C9, 0xFBF0F00B,
+ 0x41ADADEC, 0xB3D4D467, 0x5FA2A2FD, 0x45AFAFEA, 0x239C9CBF, 0x53A4A4F7,
+ 0xE4727296, 0x9BC0C05B, 0x75B7B7C2, 0xE1FDFD1C, 0x3D9393AE, 0x4C26266A,
+ 0x6C36365A, 0x7E3F3F41, 0xF5F7F702, 0x83CCCC4F, 0x6834345C, 0x51A5A5F4,
+ 0xD1E5E534, 0xF9F1F108, 0xE2717193, 0xABD8D873, 0x62313153, 0x2A15153F,
+ 0x0804040C, 0x95C7C752, 0x46232365, 0x9DC3C35E, 0x30181828, 0x379696A1,
+ 0x0A05050F, 0x2F9A9AB5, 0x0E070709, 0x24121236, 0x1B80809B, 0xDFE2E23D,
+ 0xCDEBEB26, 0x4E272769, 0x7FB2B2CD, 0xEA75759F, 0x1209091B, 0x1D83839E,
+ 0x582C2C74, 0x341A1A2E, 0x361B1B2D, 0xDC6E6EB2, 0xB45A5AEE, 0x5BA0A0FB,
+ 0xA45252F6, 0x763B3B4D, 0xB7D6D661, 0x7DB3B3CE, 0x5229297B, 0xDDE3E33E,
+ 0x5E2F2F71, 0x13848497, 0xA65353F5, 0xB9D1D168, 0x00000000, 0xC1EDED2C,
+ 0x40202060, 0xE3FCFC1F, 0x79B1B1C8, 0xB65B5BED, 0xD46A6ABE, 0x8DCBCB46,
+ 0x67BEBED9, 0x7239394B, 0x944A4ADE, 0x984C4CD4, 0xB05858E8, 0x85CFCF4A,
+ 0xBBD0D06B, 0xC5EFEF2A, 0x4FAAAAE5, 0xEDFBFB16, 0x864343C5, 0x9A4D4DD7,
+ 0x66333355, 0x11858594, 0x8A4545CF, 0xE9F9F910, 0x04020206, 0xFE7F7F81,
+ 0xA05050F0, 0x783C3C44, 0x259F9FBA, 0x4BA8A8E3, 0xA25151F3, 0x5DA3A3FE,
+ 0x804040C0, 0x058F8F8A, 0x3F9292AD, 0x219D9DBC, 0x70383848, 0xF1F5F504,
+ 0x63BCBCDF, 0x77B6B6C1, 0xAFDADA75, 0x42212163, 0x20101030, 0xE5FFFF1A,
+ 0xFDF3F30E, 0xBFD2D26D, 0x81CDCD4C, 0x180C0C14, 0x26131335, 0xC3ECEC2F,
+ 0xBE5F5FE1, 0x359797A2, 0x884444CC, 0x2E171739, 0x93C4C457, 0x55A7A7F2,
+ 0xFC7E7E82, 0x7A3D3D47, 0xC86464AC, 0xBA5D5DE7, 0x3219192B, 0xE6737395,
+ 0xC06060A0, 0x19818198, 0x9E4F4FD1, 0xA3DCDC7F, 0x44222266, 0x542A2A7E,
+ 0x3B9090AB, 0x0B888883, 0x8C4646CA, 0xC7EEEE29, 0x6BB8B8D3, 0x2814143C,
+ 0xA7DEDE79, 0xBC5E5EE2, 0x160B0B1D, 0xADDBDB76, 0xDBE0E03B, 0x64323256,
+ 0x743A3A4E, 0x140A0A1E, 0x924949DB, 0x0C06060A, 0x4824246C, 0xB85C5CE4,
+ 0x9FC2C25D, 0xBDD3D36E, 0x43ACACEF, 0xC46262A6, 0x399191A8, 0x319595A4,
+ 0xD3E4E437, 0xF279798B, 0xD5E7E732, 0x8BC8C843, 0x6E373759, 0xDA6D6DB7,
+ 0x018D8D8C, 0xB1D5D564, 0x9C4E4ED2, 0x49A9A9E0, 0xD86C6CB4, 0xAC5656FA,
+ 0xF3F4F407, 0xCFEAEA25, 0xCA6565AF, 0xF47A7A8E, 0x47AEAEE9, 0x10080818,
+ 0x6FBABAD5, 0xF0787888, 0x4A25256F, 0x5C2E2E72, 0x381C1C24, 0x57A6A6F1,
+ 0x73B4B4C7, 0x97C6C651, 0xCBE8E823, 0xA1DDDD7C, 0xE874749C, 0x3E1F1F21,
+ 0x964B4BDD, 0x61BDBDDC, 0x0D8B8B86, 0x0F8A8A85, 0xE0707090, 0x7C3E3E42,
+ 0x71B5B5C4, 0xCC6666AA, 0x904848D8, 0x06030305, 0xF7F6F601, 0x1C0E0E12,
+ 0xC26161A3, 0x6A35355F, 0xAE5757F9, 0x69B9B9D0, 0x17868691, 0x99C1C158,
+ 0x3A1D1D27, 0x279E9EB9, 0xD9E1E138, 0xEBF8F813, 0x2B9898B3, 0x22111133,
+ 0xD26969BB, 0xA9D9D970, 0x078E8E89, 0x339494A7, 0x2D9B9BB6, 0x3C1E1E22,
+ 0x15878792, 0xC9E9E920, 0x87CECE49, 0xAA5555FF, 0x50282878, 0xA5DFDF7A,
+ 0x038C8C8F, 0x59A1A1F8, 0x09898980, 0x1A0D0D17, 0x65BFBFDA, 0xD7E6E631,
+ 0x844242C6, 0xD06868B8, 0x824141C3, 0x299999B0, 0x5A2D2D77, 0x1E0F0F11,
+ 0x7BB0B0CB, 0xA85454FC, 0x6DBBBBD6, 0x2C16163A
+};
+
+static inline uint32_t
+rotr(uint32_t x, int n)
+{
+ return (x << (32 - n)) | (x >> n);
+}
+
+#define SboxExt0(x) (Ssm0[x])
+#define SboxExt1(x) (rotr(Ssm0[x], 8))
+#define SboxExt2(x) (rotr(Ssm0[x], 16))
+#define SboxExt3(x) (rotr(Ssm0[x], 24))
+
+
+/* see bearssl.h */
+void
+br_aes_big_encrypt(unsigned num_rounds, const uint32_t *skey, void *data)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t s0, s1, s2, s3;
+ uint32_t t0, t1, t2, t3;
+ unsigned u;
+
+ buf = data;
+ s0 = br_dec32be(buf);
+ s1 = br_dec32be(buf + 4);
+ s2 = br_dec32be(buf + 8);
+ s3 = br_dec32be(buf + 12);
+ s0 ^= skey[0];
+ s1 ^= skey[1];
+ s2 ^= skey[2];
+ s3 ^= skey[3];
+ for (u = 1; u < num_rounds; u ++) {
+ uint32_t v0, v1, v2, v3;
+
+ v0 = SboxExt0(s0 >> 24)
+ ^ SboxExt1((s1 >> 16) & 0xFF)
+ ^ SboxExt2((s2 >> 8) & 0xFF)
+ ^ SboxExt3(s3 & 0xFF);
+ v1 = SboxExt0(s1 >> 24)
+ ^ SboxExt1((s2 >> 16) & 0xFF)
+ ^ SboxExt2((s3 >> 8) & 0xFF)
+ ^ SboxExt3(s0 & 0xFF);
+ v2 = SboxExt0(s2 >> 24)
+ ^ SboxExt1((s3 >> 16) & 0xFF)
+ ^ SboxExt2((s0 >> 8) & 0xFF)
+ ^ SboxExt3(s1 & 0xFF);
+ v3 = SboxExt0(s3 >> 24)
+ ^ SboxExt1((s0 >> 16) & 0xFF)
+ ^ SboxExt2((s1 >> 8) & 0xFF)
+ ^ SboxExt3(s2 & 0xFF);
+ s0 = v0;
+ s1 = v1;
+ s2 = v2;
+ s3 = v3;
+ s0 ^= skey[u << 2];
+ s1 ^= skey[(u << 2) + 1];
+ s2 ^= skey[(u << 2) + 2];
+ s3 ^= skey[(u << 2) + 3];
+ }
+ t0 = ((uint32_t)S[s0 >> 24] << 24)
+ | ((uint32_t)S[(s1 >> 16) & 0xFF] << 16)
+ | ((uint32_t)S[(s2 >> 8) & 0xFF] << 8)
+ | (uint32_t)S[s3 & 0xFF];
+ t1 = ((uint32_t)S[s1 >> 24] << 24)
+ | ((uint32_t)S[(s2 >> 16) & 0xFF] << 16)
+ | ((uint32_t)S[(s3 >> 8) & 0xFF] << 8)
+ | (uint32_t)S[s0 & 0xFF];
+ t2 = ((uint32_t)S[s2 >> 24] << 24)
+ | ((uint32_t)S[(s3 >> 16) & 0xFF] << 16)
+ | ((uint32_t)S[(s0 >> 8) & 0xFF] << 8)
+ | (uint32_t)S[s1 & 0xFF];
+ t3 = ((uint32_t)S[s3 >> 24] << 24)
+ | ((uint32_t)S[(s0 >> 16) & 0xFF] << 16)
+ | ((uint32_t)S[(s1 >> 8) & 0xFF] << 8)
+ | (uint32_t)S[s2 & 0xFF];
+ s0 = t0 ^ skey[num_rounds << 2];
+ s1 = t1 ^ skey[(num_rounds << 2) + 1];
+ s2 = t2 ^ skey[(num_rounds << 2) + 2];
+ s3 = t3 ^ skey[(num_rounds << 2) + 3];
+ br_enc32be(buf, s0);
+ br_enc32be(buf + 4, s1);
+ br_enc32be(buf + 8, s2);
+ br_enc32be(buf + 12, s3);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_common.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_common.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72c64fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static const uint32_t Rcon[] = {
+ 0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000, 0x10000000, 0x20000000,
+ 0x40000000, 0x80000000, 0x1B000000, 0x36000000
+};
+
+#define S br_aes_S
+
+/* see inner.h */
+const unsigned char br_aes_S[] = {
+ 0x63, 0x7C, 0x77, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2B,
+ 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xAB, 0x76, 0xCA, 0x82, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x47, 0xF0,
+ 0xAD, 0xD4, 0xA2, 0xAF, 0x9C, 0xA4, 0x72, 0xC0, 0xB7, 0xFD, 0x93, 0x26,
+ 0x36, 0x3F, 0xF7, 0xCC, 0x34, 0xA5, 0xE5, 0xF1, 0x71, 0xD8, 0x31, 0x15,
+ 0x04, 0xC7, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9A, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xE2,
+ 0xEB, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x75, 0x09, 0x83, 0x2C, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xA0,
+ 0x52, 0x3B, 0xD6, 0xB3, 0x29, 0xE3, 0x2F, 0x84, 0x53, 0xD1, 0x00, 0xED,
+ 0x20, 0xFC, 0xB1, 0x5B, 0x6A, 0xCB, 0xBE, 0x39, 0x4A, 0x4C, 0x58, 0xCF,
+ 0xD0, 0xEF, 0xAA, 0xFB, 0x43, 0x4D, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x02, 0x7F,
+ 0x50, 0x3C, 0x9F, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xA3, 0x40, 0x8F, 0x92, 0x9D, 0x38, 0xF5,
+ 0xBC, 0xB6, 0xDA, 0x21, 0x10, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0xD2, 0xCD, 0x0C, 0x13, 0xEC,
+ 0x5F, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xC4, 0xA7, 0x7E, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x5D, 0x19, 0x73,
+ 0x60, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x22, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xEE, 0xB8, 0x14,
+ 0xDE, 0x5E, 0x0B, 0xDB, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x0A, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5C,
+ 0xC2, 0xD3, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xE4, 0x79, 0xE7, 0xC8, 0x37, 0x6D,
+ 0x8D, 0xD5, 0x4E, 0xA9, 0x6C, 0x56, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0x65, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0x08,
+ 0xBA, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2E, 0x1C, 0xA6, 0xB4, 0xC6, 0xE8, 0xDD, 0x74, 0x1F,
+ 0x4B, 0xBD, 0x8B, 0x8A, 0x70, 0x3E, 0xB5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xF6, 0x0E,
+ 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x86, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0x9E, 0xE1, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x11,
+ 0x69, 0xD9, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x9B, 0x1E, 0x87, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0x55, 0x28, 0xDF,
+ 0x8C, 0xA1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2D, 0x0F,
+ 0xB0, 0x54, 0xBB, 0x16
+};
+
+static uint32_t
+SubWord(uint32_t x)
+{
+ return ((uint32_t)S[x >> 24] << 24)
+ | ((uint32_t)S[(x >> 16) & 0xFF] << 16)
+ | ((uint32_t)S[(x >> 8) & 0xFF] << 8)
+ | (uint32_t)S[x & 0xFF];
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+unsigned
+br_aes_keysched(uint32_t *skey, const void *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+ int i, j, k, nk, nkf;
+
+ switch (key_len) {
+ case 16:
+ num_rounds = 10;
+ break;
+ case 24:
+ num_rounds = 12;
+ break;
+ case 32:
+ num_rounds = 14;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* abort(); */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ nk = (int)(key_len >> 2);
+ nkf = (int)((num_rounds + 1) << 2);
+ for (i = 0; i < nk; i ++) {
+ skey[i] = br_dec32be((const unsigned char *)key + (i << 2));
+ }
+ for (i = nk, j = 0, k = 0; i < nkf; i ++) {
+ uint32_t tmp;
+
+ tmp = skey[i - 1];
+ if (j == 0) {
+ tmp = (tmp << 8) | (tmp >> 24);
+ tmp = SubWord(tmp) ^ Rcon[k];
+ } else if (nk > 6 && j == 4) {
+ tmp = SubWord(tmp);
+ }
+ skey[i] = skey[i - nk] ^ tmp;
+ if (++ j == nk) {
+ j = 0;
+ k ++;
+ }
+ }
+ return num_rounds;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..66776d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct.c
@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct_bitslice_Sbox(uint32_t *q)
+{
+ /*
+ * This S-box implementation is a straightforward translation of
+ * the circuit described by Boyar and Peralta in "A new
+ * combinational logic minimization technique with applications
+ * to cryptology" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/191.pdf).
+ *
+ * Note that variables x* (input) and s* (output) are numbered
+ * in "reverse" order (x0 is the high bit, x7 is the low bit).
+ */
+
+ uint32_t x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7;
+ uint32_t y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6, y7, y8, y9;
+ uint32_t y10, y11, y12, y13, y14, y15, y16, y17, y18, y19;
+ uint32_t y20, y21;
+ uint32_t z0, z1, z2, z3, z4, z5, z6, z7, z8, z9;
+ uint32_t z10, z11, z12, z13, z14, z15, z16, z17;
+ uint32_t t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9;
+ uint32_t t10, t11, t12, t13, t14, t15, t16, t17, t18, t19;
+ uint32_t t20, t21, t22, t23, t24, t25, t26, t27, t28, t29;
+ uint32_t t30, t31, t32, t33, t34, t35, t36, t37, t38, t39;
+ uint32_t t40, t41, t42, t43, t44, t45, t46, t47, t48, t49;
+ uint32_t t50, t51, t52, t53, t54, t55, t56, t57, t58, t59;
+ uint32_t t60, t61, t62, t63, t64, t65, t66, t67;
+ uint32_t s0, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7;
+
+ x0 = q[7];
+ x1 = q[6];
+ x2 = q[5];
+ x3 = q[4];
+ x4 = q[3];
+ x5 = q[2];
+ x6 = q[1];
+ x7 = q[0];
+
+ /*
+ * Top linear transformation.
+ */
+ y14 = x3 ^ x5;
+ y13 = x0 ^ x6;
+ y9 = x0 ^ x3;
+ y8 = x0 ^ x5;
+ t0 = x1 ^ x2;
+ y1 = t0 ^ x7;
+ y4 = y1 ^ x3;
+ y12 = y13 ^ y14;
+ y2 = y1 ^ x0;
+ y5 = y1 ^ x6;
+ y3 = y5 ^ y8;
+ t1 = x4 ^ y12;
+ y15 = t1 ^ x5;
+ y20 = t1 ^ x1;
+ y6 = y15 ^ x7;
+ y10 = y15 ^ t0;
+ y11 = y20 ^ y9;
+ y7 = x7 ^ y11;
+ y17 = y10 ^ y11;
+ y19 = y10 ^ y8;
+ y16 = t0 ^ y11;
+ y21 = y13 ^ y16;
+ y18 = x0 ^ y16;
+
+ /*
+ * Non-linear section.
+ */
+ t2 = y12 & y15;
+ t3 = y3 & y6;
+ t4 = t3 ^ t2;
+ t5 = y4 & x7;
+ t6 = t5 ^ t2;
+ t7 = y13 & y16;
+ t8 = y5 & y1;
+ t9 = t8 ^ t7;
+ t10 = y2 & y7;
+ t11 = t10 ^ t7;
+ t12 = y9 & y11;
+ t13 = y14 & y17;
+ t14 = t13 ^ t12;
+ t15 = y8 & y10;
+ t16 = t15 ^ t12;
+ t17 = t4 ^ t14;
+ t18 = t6 ^ t16;
+ t19 = t9 ^ t14;
+ t20 = t11 ^ t16;
+ t21 = t17 ^ y20;
+ t22 = t18 ^ y19;
+ t23 = t19 ^ y21;
+ t24 = t20 ^ y18;
+
+ t25 = t21 ^ t22;
+ t26 = t21 & t23;
+ t27 = t24 ^ t26;
+ t28 = t25 & t27;
+ t29 = t28 ^ t22;
+ t30 = t23 ^ t24;
+ t31 = t22 ^ t26;
+ t32 = t31 & t30;
+ t33 = t32 ^ t24;
+ t34 = t23 ^ t33;
+ t35 = t27 ^ t33;
+ t36 = t24 & t35;
+ t37 = t36 ^ t34;
+ t38 = t27 ^ t36;
+ t39 = t29 & t38;
+ t40 = t25 ^ t39;
+
+ t41 = t40 ^ t37;
+ t42 = t29 ^ t33;
+ t43 = t29 ^ t40;
+ t44 = t33 ^ t37;
+ t45 = t42 ^ t41;
+ z0 = t44 & y15;
+ z1 = t37 & y6;
+ z2 = t33 & x7;
+ z3 = t43 & y16;
+ z4 = t40 & y1;
+ z5 = t29 & y7;
+ z6 = t42 & y11;
+ z7 = t45 & y17;
+ z8 = t41 & y10;
+ z9 = t44 & y12;
+ z10 = t37 & y3;
+ z11 = t33 & y4;
+ z12 = t43 & y13;
+ z13 = t40 & y5;
+ z14 = t29 & y2;
+ z15 = t42 & y9;
+ z16 = t45 & y14;
+ z17 = t41 & y8;
+
+ /*
+ * Bottom linear transformation.
+ */
+ t46 = z15 ^ z16;
+ t47 = z10 ^ z11;
+ t48 = z5 ^ z13;
+ t49 = z9 ^ z10;
+ t50 = z2 ^ z12;
+ t51 = z2 ^ z5;
+ t52 = z7 ^ z8;
+ t53 = z0 ^ z3;
+ t54 = z6 ^ z7;
+ t55 = z16 ^ z17;
+ t56 = z12 ^ t48;
+ t57 = t50 ^ t53;
+ t58 = z4 ^ t46;
+ t59 = z3 ^ t54;
+ t60 = t46 ^ t57;
+ t61 = z14 ^ t57;
+ t62 = t52 ^ t58;
+ t63 = t49 ^ t58;
+ t64 = z4 ^ t59;
+ t65 = t61 ^ t62;
+ t66 = z1 ^ t63;
+ s0 = t59 ^ t63;
+ s6 = t56 ^ ~t62;
+ s7 = t48 ^ ~t60;
+ t67 = t64 ^ t65;
+ s3 = t53 ^ t66;
+ s4 = t51 ^ t66;
+ s5 = t47 ^ t65;
+ s1 = t64 ^ ~s3;
+ s2 = t55 ^ ~t67;
+
+ q[7] = s0;
+ q[6] = s1;
+ q[5] = s2;
+ q[4] = s3;
+ q[3] = s4;
+ q[2] = s5;
+ q[1] = s6;
+ q[0] = s7;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct_ortho(uint32_t *q)
+{
+#define SWAPN(cl, ch, s, x, y) do { \
+ uint32_t a, b; \
+ a = (x); \
+ b = (y); \
+ (x) = (a & (uint32_t)cl) | ((b & (uint32_t)cl) << (s)); \
+ (y) = ((a & (uint32_t)ch) >> (s)) | (b & (uint32_t)ch); \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define SWAP2(x, y) SWAPN(0x55555555, 0xAAAAAAAA, 1, x, y)
+#define SWAP4(x, y) SWAPN(0x33333333, 0xCCCCCCCC, 2, x, y)
+#define SWAP8(x, y) SWAPN(0x0F0F0F0F, 0xF0F0F0F0, 4, x, y)
+
+ SWAP2(q[0], q[1]);
+ SWAP2(q[2], q[3]);
+ SWAP2(q[4], q[5]);
+ SWAP2(q[6], q[7]);
+
+ SWAP4(q[0], q[2]);
+ SWAP4(q[1], q[3]);
+ SWAP4(q[4], q[6]);
+ SWAP4(q[5], q[7]);
+
+ SWAP8(q[0], q[4]);
+ SWAP8(q[1], q[5]);
+ SWAP8(q[2], q[6]);
+ SWAP8(q[3], q[7]);
+}
+
+static const unsigned char Rcon[] = {
+ 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1B, 0x36
+};
+
+static uint32_t
+sub_word(uint32_t x)
+{
+ uint32_t q[8];
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i ++) {
+ q[i] = x;
+ }
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct_bitslice_Sbox(q);
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+ return q[0];
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+unsigned
+br_aes_ct_keysched(uint32_t *comp_skey, const void *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+ int i, j, k, nk, nkf;
+ uint32_t tmp;
+ uint32_t skey[120];
+
+ switch (key_len) {
+ case 16:
+ num_rounds = 10;
+ break;
+ case 24:
+ num_rounds = 12;
+ break;
+ case 32:
+ num_rounds = 14;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* abort(); */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ nk = (int)(key_len >> 2);
+ nkf = (int)((num_rounds + 1) << 2);
+ tmp = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < nk; i ++) {
+ tmp = br_dec32le((const unsigned char *)key + (i << 2));
+ skey[(i << 1) + 0] = tmp;
+ skey[(i << 1) + 1] = tmp;
+ }
+ for (i = nk, j = 0, k = 0; i < nkf; i ++) {
+ if (j == 0) {
+ tmp = (tmp << 24) | (tmp >> 8);
+ tmp = sub_word(tmp) ^ Rcon[k];
+ } else if (nk > 6 && j == 4) {
+ tmp = sub_word(tmp);
+ }
+ tmp ^= skey[(i - nk) << 1];
+ skey[(i << 1) + 0] = tmp;
+ skey[(i << 1) + 1] = tmp;
+ if (++ j == nk) {
+ j = 0;
+ k ++;
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < nkf; i += 4) {
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(skey + (i << 1));
+ }
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < nkf; i ++, j += 2) {
+ comp_skey[i] = (skey[j + 0] & 0x55555555)
+ | (skey[j + 1] & 0xAAAAAAAA);
+ }
+ return num_rounds;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct_skey_expand(uint32_t *skey,
+ unsigned num_rounds, const uint32_t *comp_skey)
+{
+ unsigned u, v, n;
+
+ n = (num_rounds + 1) << 2;
+ for (u = 0, v = 0; u < n; u ++, v += 2) {
+ uint32_t x, y;
+
+ x = y = comp_skey[u];
+ x &= 0x55555555;
+ skey[v + 0] = x | (x << 1);
+ y &= 0xAAAAAAAA;
+ skey[v + 1] = y | (y >> 1);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1523811
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,398 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_bitslice_Sbox(uint64_t *q)
+{
+ /*
+ * This S-box implementation is a straightforward translation of
+ * the circuit described by Boyar and Peralta in "A new
+ * combinational logic minimization technique with applications
+ * to cryptology" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/191.pdf).
+ *
+ * Note that variables x* (input) and s* (output) are numbered
+ * in "reverse" order (x0 is the high bit, x7 is the low bit).
+ */
+
+ uint64_t x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7;
+ uint64_t y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6, y7, y8, y9;
+ uint64_t y10, y11, y12, y13, y14, y15, y16, y17, y18, y19;
+ uint64_t y20, y21;
+ uint64_t z0, z1, z2, z3, z4, z5, z6, z7, z8, z9;
+ uint64_t z10, z11, z12, z13, z14, z15, z16, z17;
+ uint64_t t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9;
+ uint64_t t10, t11, t12, t13, t14, t15, t16, t17, t18, t19;
+ uint64_t t20, t21, t22, t23, t24, t25, t26, t27, t28, t29;
+ uint64_t t30, t31, t32, t33, t34, t35, t36, t37, t38, t39;
+ uint64_t t40, t41, t42, t43, t44, t45, t46, t47, t48, t49;
+ uint64_t t50, t51, t52, t53, t54, t55, t56, t57, t58, t59;
+ uint64_t t60, t61, t62, t63, t64, t65, t66, t67;
+ uint64_t s0, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7;
+
+ x0 = q[7];
+ x1 = q[6];
+ x2 = q[5];
+ x3 = q[4];
+ x4 = q[3];
+ x5 = q[2];
+ x6 = q[1];
+ x7 = q[0];
+
+ /*
+ * Top linear transformation.
+ */
+ y14 = x3 ^ x5;
+ y13 = x0 ^ x6;
+ y9 = x0 ^ x3;
+ y8 = x0 ^ x5;
+ t0 = x1 ^ x2;
+ y1 = t0 ^ x7;
+ y4 = y1 ^ x3;
+ y12 = y13 ^ y14;
+ y2 = y1 ^ x0;
+ y5 = y1 ^ x6;
+ y3 = y5 ^ y8;
+ t1 = x4 ^ y12;
+ y15 = t1 ^ x5;
+ y20 = t1 ^ x1;
+ y6 = y15 ^ x7;
+ y10 = y15 ^ t0;
+ y11 = y20 ^ y9;
+ y7 = x7 ^ y11;
+ y17 = y10 ^ y11;
+ y19 = y10 ^ y8;
+ y16 = t0 ^ y11;
+ y21 = y13 ^ y16;
+ y18 = x0 ^ y16;
+
+ /*
+ * Non-linear section.
+ */
+ t2 = y12 & y15;
+ t3 = y3 & y6;
+ t4 = t3 ^ t2;
+ t5 = y4 & x7;
+ t6 = t5 ^ t2;
+ t7 = y13 & y16;
+ t8 = y5 & y1;
+ t9 = t8 ^ t7;
+ t10 = y2 & y7;
+ t11 = t10 ^ t7;
+ t12 = y9 & y11;
+ t13 = y14 & y17;
+ t14 = t13 ^ t12;
+ t15 = y8 & y10;
+ t16 = t15 ^ t12;
+ t17 = t4 ^ t14;
+ t18 = t6 ^ t16;
+ t19 = t9 ^ t14;
+ t20 = t11 ^ t16;
+ t21 = t17 ^ y20;
+ t22 = t18 ^ y19;
+ t23 = t19 ^ y21;
+ t24 = t20 ^ y18;
+
+ t25 = t21 ^ t22;
+ t26 = t21 & t23;
+ t27 = t24 ^ t26;
+ t28 = t25 & t27;
+ t29 = t28 ^ t22;
+ t30 = t23 ^ t24;
+ t31 = t22 ^ t26;
+ t32 = t31 & t30;
+ t33 = t32 ^ t24;
+ t34 = t23 ^ t33;
+ t35 = t27 ^ t33;
+ t36 = t24 & t35;
+ t37 = t36 ^ t34;
+ t38 = t27 ^ t36;
+ t39 = t29 & t38;
+ t40 = t25 ^ t39;
+
+ t41 = t40 ^ t37;
+ t42 = t29 ^ t33;
+ t43 = t29 ^ t40;
+ t44 = t33 ^ t37;
+ t45 = t42 ^ t41;
+ z0 = t44 & y15;
+ z1 = t37 & y6;
+ z2 = t33 & x7;
+ z3 = t43 & y16;
+ z4 = t40 & y1;
+ z5 = t29 & y7;
+ z6 = t42 & y11;
+ z7 = t45 & y17;
+ z8 = t41 & y10;
+ z9 = t44 & y12;
+ z10 = t37 & y3;
+ z11 = t33 & y4;
+ z12 = t43 & y13;
+ z13 = t40 & y5;
+ z14 = t29 & y2;
+ z15 = t42 & y9;
+ z16 = t45 & y14;
+ z17 = t41 & y8;
+
+ /*
+ * Bottom linear transformation.
+ */
+ t46 = z15 ^ z16;
+ t47 = z10 ^ z11;
+ t48 = z5 ^ z13;
+ t49 = z9 ^ z10;
+ t50 = z2 ^ z12;
+ t51 = z2 ^ z5;
+ t52 = z7 ^ z8;
+ t53 = z0 ^ z3;
+ t54 = z6 ^ z7;
+ t55 = z16 ^ z17;
+ t56 = z12 ^ t48;
+ t57 = t50 ^ t53;
+ t58 = z4 ^ t46;
+ t59 = z3 ^ t54;
+ t60 = t46 ^ t57;
+ t61 = z14 ^ t57;
+ t62 = t52 ^ t58;
+ t63 = t49 ^ t58;
+ t64 = z4 ^ t59;
+ t65 = t61 ^ t62;
+ t66 = z1 ^ t63;
+ s0 = t59 ^ t63;
+ s6 = t56 ^ ~t62;
+ s7 = t48 ^ ~t60;
+ t67 = t64 ^ t65;
+ s3 = t53 ^ t66;
+ s4 = t51 ^ t66;
+ s5 = t47 ^ t65;
+ s1 = t64 ^ ~s3;
+ s2 = t55 ^ ~t67;
+
+ q[7] = s0;
+ q[6] = s1;
+ q[5] = s2;
+ q[4] = s3;
+ q[3] = s4;
+ q[2] = s5;
+ q[1] = s6;
+ q[0] = s7;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_ortho(uint64_t *q)
+{
+#define SWAPN(cl, ch, s, x, y) do { \
+ uint64_t a, b; \
+ a = (x); \
+ b = (y); \
+ (x) = (a & (uint64_t)cl) | ((b & (uint64_t)cl) << (s)); \
+ (y) = ((a & (uint64_t)ch) >> (s)) | (b & (uint64_t)ch); \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define SWAP2(x, y) SWAPN(0x5555555555555555, 0xAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA, 1, x, y)
+#define SWAP4(x, y) SWAPN(0x3333333333333333, 0xCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC, 2, x, y)
+#define SWAP8(x, y) SWAPN(0x0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F, 0xF0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0, 4, x, y)
+
+ SWAP2(q[0], q[1]);
+ SWAP2(q[2], q[3]);
+ SWAP2(q[4], q[5]);
+ SWAP2(q[6], q[7]);
+
+ SWAP4(q[0], q[2]);
+ SWAP4(q[1], q[3]);
+ SWAP4(q[4], q[6]);
+ SWAP4(q[5], q[7]);
+
+ SWAP8(q[0], q[4]);
+ SWAP8(q[1], q[5]);
+ SWAP8(q[2], q[6]);
+ SWAP8(q[3], q[7]);
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_interleave_in(uint64_t *q0, uint64_t *q1, const uint32_t *w)
+{
+ uint64_t x0, x1, x2, x3;
+
+ x0 = w[0];
+ x1 = w[1];
+ x2 = w[2];
+ x3 = w[3];
+ x0 |= (x0 << 16);
+ x1 |= (x1 << 16);
+ x2 |= (x2 << 16);
+ x3 |= (x3 << 16);
+ x0 &= (uint64_t)0x0000FFFF0000FFFF;
+ x1 &= (uint64_t)0x0000FFFF0000FFFF;
+ x2 &= (uint64_t)0x0000FFFF0000FFFF;
+ x3 &= (uint64_t)0x0000FFFF0000FFFF;
+ x0 |= (x0 << 8);
+ x1 |= (x1 << 8);
+ x2 |= (x2 << 8);
+ x3 |= (x3 << 8);
+ x0 &= (uint64_t)0x00FF00FF00FF00FF;
+ x1 &= (uint64_t)0x00FF00FF00FF00FF;
+ x2 &= (uint64_t)0x00FF00FF00FF00FF;
+ x3 &= (uint64_t)0x00FF00FF00FF00FF;
+ *q0 = x0 | (x2 << 8);
+ *q1 = x1 | (x3 << 8);
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_interleave_out(uint32_t *w, uint64_t q0, uint64_t q1)
+{
+ uint64_t x0, x1, x2, x3;
+
+ x0 = q0 & (uint64_t)0x00FF00FF00FF00FF;
+ x1 = q1 & (uint64_t)0x00FF00FF00FF00FF;
+ x2 = (q0 >> 8) & (uint64_t)0x00FF00FF00FF00FF;
+ x3 = (q1 >> 8) & (uint64_t)0x00FF00FF00FF00FF;
+ x0 |= (x0 >> 8);
+ x1 |= (x1 >> 8);
+ x2 |= (x2 >> 8);
+ x3 |= (x3 >> 8);
+ x0 &= (uint64_t)0x0000FFFF0000FFFF;
+ x1 &= (uint64_t)0x0000FFFF0000FFFF;
+ x2 &= (uint64_t)0x0000FFFF0000FFFF;
+ x3 &= (uint64_t)0x0000FFFF0000FFFF;
+ w[0] = (uint32_t)x0 | (uint32_t)(x0 >> 16);
+ w[1] = (uint32_t)x1 | (uint32_t)(x1 >> 16);
+ w[2] = (uint32_t)x2 | (uint32_t)(x2 >> 16);
+ w[3] = (uint32_t)x3 | (uint32_t)(x3 >> 16);
+}
+
+static const unsigned char Rcon[] = {
+ 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10, 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1B, 0x36
+};
+
+static uint32_t
+sub_word(uint32_t x)
+{
+ uint64_t q[8];
+
+ memset(q, 0, sizeof q);
+ q[0] = x;
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct64_bitslice_Sbox(q);
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ return (uint32_t)q[0];
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+unsigned
+br_aes_ct64_keysched(uint64_t *comp_skey, const void *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+ int i, j, k, nk, nkf;
+ uint32_t tmp;
+ uint32_t skey[60];
+
+ switch (key_len) {
+ case 16:
+ num_rounds = 10;
+ break;
+ case 24:
+ num_rounds = 12;
+ break;
+ case 32:
+ num_rounds = 14;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* abort(); */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ nk = (int)(key_len >> 2);
+ nkf = (int)((num_rounds + 1) << 2);
+ br_range_dec32le(skey, (key_len >> 2), key);
+ tmp = skey[(key_len >> 2) - 1];
+ for (i = nk, j = 0, k = 0; i < nkf; i ++) {
+ if (j == 0) {
+ tmp = (tmp << 24) | (tmp >> 8);
+ tmp = sub_word(tmp) ^ Rcon[k];
+ } else if (nk > 6 && j == 4) {
+ tmp = sub_word(tmp);
+ }
+ tmp ^= skey[i - nk];
+ skey[i] = tmp;
+ if (++ j == nk) {
+ j = 0;
+ k ++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < nkf; i += 4, j += 2) {
+ uint64_t q[8];
+
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_in(&q[0], &q[4], skey + i);
+ q[1] = q[0];
+ q[2] = q[0];
+ q[3] = q[0];
+ q[5] = q[4];
+ q[6] = q[4];
+ q[7] = q[4];
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ comp_skey[j + 0] =
+ (q[0] & (uint64_t)0x1111111111111111)
+ | (q[1] & (uint64_t)0x2222222222222222)
+ | (q[2] & (uint64_t)0x4444444444444444)
+ | (q[3] & (uint64_t)0x8888888888888888);
+ comp_skey[j + 1] =
+ (q[4] & (uint64_t)0x1111111111111111)
+ | (q[5] & (uint64_t)0x2222222222222222)
+ | (q[6] & (uint64_t)0x4444444444444444)
+ | (q[7] & (uint64_t)0x8888888888888888);
+ }
+ return num_rounds;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_skey_expand(uint64_t *skey,
+ unsigned num_rounds, const uint64_t *comp_skey)
+{
+ unsigned u, v, n;
+
+ n = (num_rounds + 1) << 1;
+ for (u = 0, v = 0; u < n; u ++, v += 4) {
+ uint64_t x0, x1, x2, x3;
+
+ x0 = x1 = x2 = x3 = comp_skey[u];
+ x0 &= (uint64_t)0x1111111111111111;
+ x1 &= (uint64_t)0x2222222222222222;
+ x2 &= (uint64_t)0x4444444444444444;
+ x3 &= (uint64_t)0x8888888888888888;
+ x1 >>= 1;
+ x2 >>= 2;
+ x3 >>= 3;
+ skey[v + 0] = (x0 << 4) - x0;
+ skey[v + 1] = (x1 << 4) - x1;
+ skey[v + 2] = (x2 << 4) - x2;
+ skey[v + 3] = (x3 << 4) - x3;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_cbcdec.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_cbcdec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a7360b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_cbcdec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_init(br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_ct64_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_run(const br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ uint64_t sk_exp[120];
+ uint32_t ivw[4];
+
+ br_aes_ct64_skey_expand(sk_exp, ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey);
+ br_range_dec32le(ivw, 4, iv);
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ uint64_t q[8];
+ uint32_t w1[16], w2[16];
+ int i;
+
+ if (len >= 64) {
+ br_range_dec32le(w1, 16, buf);
+ } else {
+ br_range_dec32le(w1, len >> 2, buf);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i ++) {
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_in(
+ &q[i], &q[i + 4], w1 + (i << 2));
+ }
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct64_bitslice_decrypt(ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, q);
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i ++) {
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_out(
+ w2 + (i << 2), q[i], q[i + 4]);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i ++) {
+ w2[i] ^= ivw[i];
+ }
+ if (len >= 64) {
+ for (i = 4; i < 16; i ++) {
+ w2[i] ^= w1[i - 4];
+ }
+ memcpy(ivw, w1 + 12, sizeof ivw);
+ br_range_enc32le(buf, w2, 16);
+ } else {
+ int j;
+
+ j = (int)(len >> 2);
+ for (i = 4; i < j; i ++) {
+ w2[i] ^= w1[i - 4];
+ }
+ memcpy(ivw, w1 + j - 4, sizeof ivw);
+ br_range_enc32le(buf, w2, j);
+ break;
+ }
+ buf += 64;
+ len -= 64;
+ }
+ br_range_enc32le(iv, ivw, 4);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcdec_class br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcdec_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcdec_class *const *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct64_cbcdec_run
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_cbcenc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_cbcenc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6cb9dec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_cbcenc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_init(br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_ct64_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_run(const br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ uint64_t sk_exp[120];
+ uint32_t ivw[4];
+
+ br_aes_ct64_skey_expand(sk_exp, ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey);
+ br_range_dec32le(ivw, 4, iv);
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ uint32_t w[4];
+ uint64_t q[8];
+
+ w[0] = ivw[0] ^ br_dec32le(buf);
+ w[1] = ivw[1] ^ br_dec32le(buf + 4);
+ w[2] = ivw[2] ^ br_dec32le(buf + 8);
+ w[3] = ivw[3] ^ br_dec32le(buf + 12);
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_in(&q[0], &q[4], w);
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct64_bitslice_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, q);
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_out(w, q[0], q[4]);
+ memcpy(ivw, w, sizeof w);
+ br_enc32le(buf, w[0]);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 4, w[1]);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 8, w[2]);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 12, w[3]);
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+ br_range_enc32le(iv, ivw, 4);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcenc_class br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcenc_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcenc_class *const *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct64_cbcenc_run
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_ctr.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_ctr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1275873
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_ctr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_ctr_init(br_aes_ct64_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_ct64_ctr_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_ct64_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+static void
+xorbuf(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *d;
+ const unsigned char *s;
+
+ d = dst;
+ s = src;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ *d ++ ^= *s ++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+uint32_t
+br_aes_ct64_ctr_run(const br_aes_ct64_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t ivw[16];
+ uint64_t sk_exp[120];
+
+ br_aes_ct64_skey_expand(sk_exp, ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey);
+ br_range_dec32le(ivw, 3, iv);
+ memcpy(ivw + 4, ivw, 3 * sizeof(uint32_t));
+ memcpy(ivw + 8, ivw, 3 * sizeof(uint32_t));
+ memcpy(ivw + 12, ivw, 3 * sizeof(uint32_t));
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ uint64_t q[8];
+ uint32_t w[16];
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: see if we can save on the first br_aes_ct64_ortho()
+ * call, since iv0/iv1/iv2 are constant for the whole run.
+ */
+ memcpy(w, ivw, sizeof ivw);
+ w[3] = br_swap32(cc);
+ w[7] = br_swap32(cc + 1);
+ w[11] = br_swap32(cc + 2);
+ w[15] = br_swap32(cc + 3);
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i ++) {
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_in(
+ &q[i], &q[i + 4], w + (i << 2));
+ }
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct64_bitslice_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, q);
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i ++) {
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_out(
+ w + (i << 2), q[i], q[i + 4]);
+ }
+ br_range_enc32le(tmp, w, 16);
+ if (len <= 64) {
+ xorbuf(buf, tmp, len);
+ cc += (uint32_t)len >> 4;
+ break;
+ }
+ xorbuf(buf, tmp, 64);
+ buf += 64;
+ len -= 64;
+ cc += 4;
+ }
+ return cc;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctr_class br_aes_ct64_ctr_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_ct64_ctr_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctr_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct64_ctr_init,
+ (uint32_t (*)(const br_block_ctr_class *const *,
+ const void *, uint32_t, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct64_ctr_run
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_ctrcbc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_ctrcbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21bb8ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_ctrcbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,433 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_init(br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_ct64_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+static void
+xorbuf(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *d;
+ const unsigned char *s;
+
+ d = dst;
+ s = src;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ *d ++ ^= *s ++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_ctr(const br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *ivbuf;
+ uint32_t iv0, iv1, iv2, iv3;
+ uint64_t sk_exp[120];
+
+ br_aes_ct64_skey_expand(sk_exp, ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey);
+
+ /*
+ * We keep the counter as four 32-bit values, with big-endian
+ * convention, because that's what is expected for purposes of
+ * incrementing the counter value.
+ */
+ ivbuf = ctr;
+ iv0 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 0);
+ iv1 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 4);
+ iv2 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 8);
+ iv3 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 12);
+
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ uint64_t q[8];
+ uint32_t w[16];
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+ int i, j;
+
+ /*
+ * The bitslice implementation expects values in
+ * little-endian convention, so we have to byteswap them.
+ */
+ j = (len >= 64) ? 16 : (int)(len >> 2);
+ for (i = 0; i < j; i += 4) {
+ uint32_t carry;
+
+ w[i + 0] = br_swap32(iv0);
+ w[i + 1] = br_swap32(iv1);
+ w[i + 2] = br_swap32(iv2);
+ w[i + 3] = br_swap32(iv3);
+ iv3 ++;
+ carry = ~(iv3 | -iv3) >> 31;
+ iv2 += carry;
+ carry &= -(~(iv2 | -iv2) >> 31);
+ iv1 += carry;
+ carry &= -(~(iv1 | -iv1) >> 31);
+ iv0 += carry;
+ }
+ memset(w + i, 0, (16 - i) * sizeof(uint32_t));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i ++) {
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_in(
+ &q[i], &q[i + 4], w + (i << 2));
+ }
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct64_bitslice_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, q);
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i ++) {
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_out(
+ w + (i << 2), q[i], q[i + 4]);
+ }
+
+ br_range_enc32le(tmp, w, 16);
+ if (len <= 64) {
+ xorbuf(buf, tmp, len);
+ break;
+ }
+ xorbuf(buf, tmp, 64);
+ buf += 64;
+ len -= 64;
+ }
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 0, iv0);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 4, iv1);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 8, iv2);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 12, iv3);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_mac(const br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *cbcmac, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t cm0, cm1, cm2, cm3;
+ uint64_t q[8];
+ uint64_t sk_exp[120];
+
+ br_aes_ct64_skey_expand(sk_exp, ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey);
+
+ cm0 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 0);
+ cm1 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 4);
+ cm2 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 8);
+ cm3 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 12);
+
+ buf = data;
+ memset(q, 0, sizeof q);
+ while (len > 0) {
+ uint32_t w[4];
+
+ w[0] = cm0 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 0);
+ w[1] = cm1 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 4);
+ w[2] = cm2 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 8);
+ w[3] = cm3 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 12);
+
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_in(&q[0], &q[4], w);
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct64_bitslice_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, q);
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_out(w, q[0], q[4]);
+
+ cm0 = w[0];
+ cm1 = w[1];
+ cm2 = w[2];
+ cm3 = w[3];
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 0, cm0);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 4, cm1);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 8, cm2);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 12, cm3);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_encrypt(const br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ /*
+ * When encrypting, the CBC-MAC processing must be lagging by
+ * one block, since it operates on the encrypted values, so
+ * it must wait for that encryption to complete.
+ */
+
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *ivbuf;
+ uint32_t iv0, iv1, iv2, iv3;
+ uint32_t cm0, cm1, cm2, cm3;
+ uint64_t sk_exp[120];
+ uint64_t q[8];
+ int first_iter;
+
+ br_aes_ct64_skey_expand(sk_exp, ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey);
+
+ /*
+ * We keep the counter as four 32-bit values, with big-endian
+ * convention, because that's what is expected for purposes of
+ * incrementing the counter value.
+ */
+ ivbuf = ctr;
+ iv0 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 0);
+ iv1 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 4);
+ iv2 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 8);
+ iv3 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 12);
+
+ /*
+ * The current CBC-MAC value is kept in little-endian convention.
+ */
+ cm0 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 0);
+ cm1 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 4);
+ cm2 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 8);
+ cm3 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 12);
+
+ buf = data;
+ first_iter = 1;
+ memset(q, 0, sizeof q);
+ while (len > 0) {
+ uint32_t w[8], carry;
+
+ /*
+ * The bitslice implementation expects values in
+ * little-endian convention, so we have to byteswap them.
+ */
+ w[0] = br_swap32(iv0);
+ w[1] = br_swap32(iv1);
+ w[2] = br_swap32(iv2);
+ w[3] = br_swap32(iv3);
+ iv3 ++;
+ carry = ~(iv3 | -iv3) >> 31;
+ iv2 += carry;
+ carry &= -(~(iv2 | -iv2) >> 31);
+ iv1 += carry;
+ carry &= -(~(iv1 | -iv1) >> 31);
+ iv0 += carry;
+
+ /*
+ * The block for CBC-MAC.
+ */
+ w[4] = cm0;
+ w[5] = cm1;
+ w[6] = cm2;
+ w[7] = cm3;
+
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_in(&q[0], &q[4], w);
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_in(&q[1], &q[5], w + 4);
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct64_bitslice_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, q);
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_out(w, q[0], q[4]);
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_out(w + 4, q[1], q[5]);
+
+ /*
+ * We do the XOR with the plaintext in 32-bit registers,
+ * so that the value are available for CBC-MAC processing
+ * as well.
+ */
+ w[0] ^= br_dec32le(buf + 0);
+ w[1] ^= br_dec32le(buf + 4);
+ w[2] ^= br_dec32le(buf + 8);
+ w[3] ^= br_dec32le(buf + 12);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 0, w[0]);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 4, w[1]);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 8, w[2]);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 12, w[3]);
+
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+
+ /*
+ * We set the cm* values to the block to encrypt in the
+ * next iteration.
+ */
+ if (first_iter) {
+ first_iter = 0;
+ cm0 ^= w[0];
+ cm1 ^= w[1];
+ cm2 ^= w[2];
+ cm3 ^= w[3];
+ } else {
+ cm0 = w[0] ^ w[4];
+ cm1 = w[1] ^ w[5];
+ cm2 = w[2] ^ w[6];
+ cm3 = w[3] ^ w[7];
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If this was the last iteration, then compute the
+ * extra block encryption to complete CBC-MAC.
+ */
+ if (len == 0) {
+ w[0] = cm0;
+ w[1] = cm1;
+ w[2] = cm2;
+ w[3] = cm3;
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_in(&q[0], &q[4], w);
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct64_bitslice_encrypt(
+ ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, q);
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_out(w, q[0], q[4]);
+ cm0 = w[0];
+ cm1 = w[1];
+ cm2 = w[2];
+ cm3 = w[3];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 0, iv0);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 4, iv1);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 8, iv2);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 12, iv3);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 0, cm0);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 4, cm1);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 8, cm2);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 12, cm3);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_decrypt(const br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *ivbuf;
+ uint32_t iv0, iv1, iv2, iv3;
+ uint32_t cm0, cm1, cm2, cm3;
+ uint64_t sk_exp[120];
+ uint64_t q[8];
+
+ br_aes_ct64_skey_expand(sk_exp, ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey);
+
+ /*
+ * We keep the counter as four 32-bit values, with big-endian
+ * convention, because that's what is expected for purposes of
+ * incrementing the counter value.
+ */
+ ivbuf = ctr;
+ iv0 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 0);
+ iv1 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 4);
+ iv2 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 8);
+ iv3 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 12);
+
+ /*
+ * The current CBC-MAC value is kept in little-endian convention.
+ */
+ cm0 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 0);
+ cm1 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 4);
+ cm2 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 8);
+ cm3 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 12);
+
+ buf = data;
+ memset(q, 0, sizeof q);
+ while (len > 0) {
+ uint32_t w[8], carry;
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+
+ /*
+ * The bitslice implementation expects values in
+ * little-endian convention, so we have to byteswap them.
+ */
+ w[0] = br_swap32(iv0);
+ w[1] = br_swap32(iv1);
+ w[2] = br_swap32(iv2);
+ w[3] = br_swap32(iv3);
+ iv3 ++;
+ carry = ~(iv3 | -iv3) >> 31;
+ iv2 += carry;
+ carry &= -(~(iv2 | -iv2) >> 31);
+ iv1 += carry;
+ carry &= -(~(iv1 | -iv1) >> 31);
+ iv0 += carry;
+
+ /*
+ * The block for CBC-MAC.
+ */
+ w[4] = cm0 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 0);
+ w[5] = cm1 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 4);
+ w[6] = cm2 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 8);
+ w[7] = cm3 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 12);
+
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_in(&q[0], &q[4], w);
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_in(&q[1], &q[5], w + 4);
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct64_bitslice_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, q);
+ br_aes_ct64_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_out(w, q[0], q[4]);
+ br_aes_ct64_interleave_out(w + 4, q[1], q[5]);
+
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 0, w[0]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 4, w[1]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 8, w[2]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 12, w[3]);
+ xorbuf(buf, tmp, 16);
+ cm0 = w[4];
+ cm1 = w[5];
+ cm2 = w[6];
+ cm3 = w[7];
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 0, iv0);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 4, iv1);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 8, iv2);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 12, iv3);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 0, cm0);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 4, cm1);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 8, cm2);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 12, cm3);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctrcbc_class br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_encrypt,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_decrypt,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_ctr,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct64_ctrcbc_mac
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_dec.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_dec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab00e09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_dec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_bitslice_invSbox(uint64_t *q)
+{
+ /*
+ * See br_aes_ct_bitslice_invSbox(). This is the natural extension
+ * to 64-bit registers.
+ */
+ uint64_t q0, q1, q2, q3, q4, q5, q6, q7;
+
+ q0 = ~q[0];
+ q1 = ~q[1];
+ q2 = q[2];
+ q3 = q[3];
+ q4 = q[4];
+ q5 = ~q[5];
+ q6 = ~q[6];
+ q7 = q[7];
+ q[7] = q1 ^ q4 ^ q6;
+ q[6] = q0 ^ q3 ^ q5;
+ q[5] = q7 ^ q2 ^ q4;
+ q[4] = q6 ^ q1 ^ q3;
+ q[3] = q5 ^ q0 ^ q2;
+ q[2] = q4 ^ q7 ^ q1;
+ q[1] = q3 ^ q6 ^ q0;
+ q[0] = q2 ^ q5 ^ q7;
+
+ br_aes_ct64_bitslice_Sbox(q);
+
+ q0 = ~q[0];
+ q1 = ~q[1];
+ q2 = q[2];
+ q3 = q[3];
+ q4 = q[4];
+ q5 = ~q[5];
+ q6 = ~q[6];
+ q7 = q[7];
+ q[7] = q1 ^ q4 ^ q6;
+ q[6] = q0 ^ q3 ^ q5;
+ q[5] = q7 ^ q2 ^ q4;
+ q[4] = q6 ^ q1 ^ q3;
+ q[3] = q5 ^ q0 ^ q2;
+ q[2] = q4 ^ q7 ^ q1;
+ q[1] = q3 ^ q6 ^ q0;
+ q[0] = q2 ^ q5 ^ q7;
+}
+
+static void
+add_round_key(uint64_t *q, const uint64_t *sk)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i ++) {
+ q[i] ^= sk[i];
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+inv_shift_rows(uint64_t *q)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i ++) {
+ uint64_t x;
+
+ x = q[i];
+ q[i] = (x & (uint64_t)0x000000000000FFFF)
+ | ((x & (uint64_t)0x000000000FFF0000) << 4)
+ | ((x & (uint64_t)0x00000000F0000000) >> 12)
+ | ((x & (uint64_t)0x000000FF00000000) << 8)
+ | ((x & (uint64_t)0x0000FF0000000000) >> 8)
+ | ((x & (uint64_t)0x000F000000000000) << 12)
+ | ((x & (uint64_t)0xFFF0000000000000) >> 4);
+ }
+}
+
+static inline uint64_t
+rotr32(uint64_t x)
+{
+ return (x << 32) | (x >> 32);
+}
+
+static void
+inv_mix_columns(uint64_t *q)
+{
+ uint64_t q0, q1, q2, q3, q4, q5, q6, q7;
+ uint64_t r0, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7;
+
+ q0 = q[0];
+ q1 = q[1];
+ q2 = q[2];
+ q3 = q[3];
+ q4 = q[4];
+ q5 = q[5];
+ q6 = q[6];
+ q7 = q[7];
+ r0 = (q0 >> 16) | (q0 << 48);
+ r1 = (q1 >> 16) | (q1 << 48);
+ r2 = (q2 >> 16) | (q2 << 48);
+ r3 = (q3 >> 16) | (q3 << 48);
+ r4 = (q4 >> 16) | (q4 << 48);
+ r5 = (q5 >> 16) | (q5 << 48);
+ r6 = (q6 >> 16) | (q6 << 48);
+ r7 = (q7 >> 16) | (q7 << 48);
+
+ q[0] = q5 ^ q6 ^ q7 ^ r0 ^ r5 ^ r7 ^ rotr32(q0 ^ q5 ^ q6 ^ r0 ^ r5);
+ q[1] = q0 ^ q5 ^ r0 ^ r1 ^ r5 ^ r6 ^ r7 ^ rotr32(q1 ^ q5 ^ q7 ^ r1 ^ r5 ^ r6);
+ q[2] = q0 ^ q1 ^ q6 ^ r1 ^ r2 ^ r6 ^ r7 ^ rotr32(q0 ^ q2 ^ q6 ^ r2 ^ r6 ^ r7);
+ q[3] = q0 ^ q1 ^ q2 ^ q5 ^ q6 ^ r0 ^ r2 ^ r3 ^ r5 ^ rotr32(q0 ^ q1 ^ q3 ^ q5 ^ q6 ^ q7 ^ r0 ^ r3 ^ r5 ^ r7);
+ q[4] = q1 ^ q2 ^ q3 ^ q5 ^ r1 ^ r3 ^ r4 ^ r5 ^ r6 ^ r7 ^ rotr32(q1 ^ q2 ^ q4 ^ q5 ^ q7 ^ r1 ^ r4 ^ r5 ^ r6);
+ q[5] = q2 ^ q3 ^ q4 ^ q6 ^ r2 ^ r4 ^ r5 ^ r6 ^ r7 ^ rotr32(q2 ^ q3 ^ q5 ^ q6 ^ r2 ^ r5 ^ r6 ^ r7);
+ q[6] = q3 ^ q4 ^ q5 ^ q7 ^ r3 ^ r5 ^ r6 ^ r7 ^ rotr32(q3 ^ q4 ^ q6 ^ q7 ^ r3 ^ r6 ^ r7);
+ q[7] = q4 ^ q5 ^ q6 ^ r4 ^ r6 ^ r7 ^ rotr32(q4 ^ q5 ^ q7 ^ r4 ^ r7);
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_bitslice_decrypt(unsigned num_rounds,
+ const uint64_t *skey, uint64_t *q)
+{
+ unsigned u;
+
+ add_round_key(q, skey + (num_rounds << 3));
+ for (u = num_rounds - 1; u > 0; u --) {
+ inv_shift_rows(q);
+ br_aes_ct64_bitslice_invSbox(q);
+ add_round_key(q, skey + (u << 3));
+ inv_mix_columns(q);
+ }
+ inv_shift_rows(q);
+ br_aes_ct64_bitslice_invSbox(q);
+ add_round_key(q, skey);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_enc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78631ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct64_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static inline void
+add_round_key(uint64_t *q, const uint64_t *sk)
+{
+ q[0] ^= sk[0];
+ q[1] ^= sk[1];
+ q[2] ^= sk[2];
+ q[3] ^= sk[3];
+ q[4] ^= sk[4];
+ q[5] ^= sk[5];
+ q[6] ^= sk[6];
+ q[7] ^= sk[7];
+}
+
+static inline void
+shift_rows(uint64_t *q)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i ++) {
+ uint64_t x;
+
+ x = q[i];
+ q[i] = (x & (uint64_t)0x000000000000FFFF)
+ | ((x & (uint64_t)0x00000000FFF00000) >> 4)
+ | ((x & (uint64_t)0x00000000000F0000) << 12)
+ | ((x & (uint64_t)0x0000FF0000000000) >> 8)
+ | ((x & (uint64_t)0x000000FF00000000) << 8)
+ | ((x & (uint64_t)0xF000000000000000) >> 12)
+ | ((x & (uint64_t)0x0FFF000000000000) << 4);
+ }
+}
+
+static inline uint64_t
+rotr32(uint64_t x)
+{
+ return (x << 32) | (x >> 32);
+}
+
+static inline void
+mix_columns(uint64_t *q)
+{
+ uint64_t q0, q1, q2, q3, q4, q5, q6, q7;
+ uint64_t r0, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7;
+
+ q0 = q[0];
+ q1 = q[1];
+ q2 = q[2];
+ q3 = q[3];
+ q4 = q[4];
+ q5 = q[5];
+ q6 = q[6];
+ q7 = q[7];
+ r0 = (q0 >> 16) | (q0 << 48);
+ r1 = (q1 >> 16) | (q1 << 48);
+ r2 = (q2 >> 16) | (q2 << 48);
+ r3 = (q3 >> 16) | (q3 << 48);
+ r4 = (q4 >> 16) | (q4 << 48);
+ r5 = (q5 >> 16) | (q5 << 48);
+ r6 = (q6 >> 16) | (q6 << 48);
+ r7 = (q7 >> 16) | (q7 << 48);
+
+ q[0] = q7 ^ r7 ^ r0 ^ rotr32(q0 ^ r0);
+ q[1] = q0 ^ r0 ^ q7 ^ r7 ^ r1 ^ rotr32(q1 ^ r1);
+ q[2] = q1 ^ r1 ^ r2 ^ rotr32(q2 ^ r2);
+ q[3] = q2 ^ r2 ^ q7 ^ r7 ^ r3 ^ rotr32(q3 ^ r3);
+ q[4] = q3 ^ r3 ^ q7 ^ r7 ^ r4 ^ rotr32(q4 ^ r4);
+ q[5] = q4 ^ r4 ^ r5 ^ rotr32(q5 ^ r5);
+ q[6] = q5 ^ r5 ^ r6 ^ rotr32(q6 ^ r6);
+ q[7] = q6 ^ r6 ^ r7 ^ rotr32(q7 ^ r7);
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct64_bitslice_encrypt(unsigned num_rounds,
+ const uint64_t *skey, uint64_t *q)
+{
+ unsigned u;
+
+ add_round_key(q, skey);
+ for (u = 1; u < num_rounds; u ++) {
+ br_aes_ct64_bitslice_Sbox(q);
+ shift_rows(q);
+ mix_columns(q);
+ add_round_key(q, skey + (u << 3));
+ }
+ br_aes_ct64_bitslice_Sbox(q);
+ shift_rows(q);
+ add_round_key(q, skey + (num_rounds << 3));
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_cbcdec.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_cbcdec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..522645a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_cbcdec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct_cbcdec_init(br_aes_ct_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_ct_cbcdec_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_ct_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct_cbcdec_run(const br_aes_ct_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf, *ivbuf;
+ uint32_t iv0, iv1, iv2, iv3;
+ uint32_t sk_exp[120];
+
+ br_aes_ct_skey_expand(sk_exp, ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey);
+ ivbuf = iv;
+ iv0 = br_dec32le(ivbuf);
+ iv1 = br_dec32le(ivbuf + 4);
+ iv2 = br_dec32le(ivbuf + 8);
+ iv3 = br_dec32le(ivbuf + 12);
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ uint32_t q[8], sq[8];
+
+ q[0] = br_dec32le(buf);
+ q[2] = br_dec32le(buf + 4);
+ q[4] = br_dec32le(buf + 8);
+ q[6] = br_dec32le(buf + 12);
+ if (len >= 32) {
+ q[1] = br_dec32le(buf + 16);
+ q[3] = br_dec32le(buf + 20);
+ q[5] = br_dec32le(buf + 24);
+ q[7] = br_dec32le(buf + 28);
+ } else {
+ q[1] = 0;
+ q[3] = 0;
+ q[5] = 0;
+ q[7] = 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(sq, q, sizeof q);
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct_bitslice_decrypt(ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, q);
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+ br_enc32le(buf, q[0] ^ iv0);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 4, q[2] ^ iv1);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 8, q[4] ^ iv2);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 12, q[6] ^ iv3);
+ if (len < 32) {
+ iv0 = sq[0];
+ iv1 = sq[2];
+ iv2 = sq[4];
+ iv3 = sq[6];
+ break;
+ }
+ br_enc32le(buf + 16, q[1] ^ sq[0]);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 20, q[3] ^ sq[2]);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 24, q[5] ^ sq[4]);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 28, q[7] ^ sq[6]);
+ iv0 = sq[1];
+ iv1 = sq[3];
+ iv2 = sq[5];
+ iv3 = sq[7];
+ buf += 32;
+ len -= 32;
+ }
+ br_enc32le(ivbuf, iv0);
+ br_enc32le(ivbuf + 4, iv1);
+ br_enc32le(ivbuf + 8, iv2);
+ br_enc32le(ivbuf + 12, iv3);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcdec_class br_aes_ct_cbcdec_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_ct_cbcdec_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcdec_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct_cbcdec_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcdec_class *const *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct_cbcdec_run
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_cbcenc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_cbcenc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb85977
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_cbcenc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct_cbcenc_init(br_aes_ct_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_ct_cbcenc_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_ct_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct_cbcenc_run(const br_aes_ct_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf, *ivbuf;
+ uint32_t q[8];
+ uint32_t iv0, iv1, iv2, iv3;
+ uint32_t sk_exp[120];
+
+ q[1] = 0;
+ q[3] = 0;
+ q[5] = 0;
+ q[7] = 0;
+ br_aes_ct_skey_expand(sk_exp, ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey);
+ ivbuf = iv;
+ iv0 = br_dec32le(ivbuf);
+ iv1 = br_dec32le(ivbuf + 4);
+ iv2 = br_dec32le(ivbuf + 8);
+ iv3 = br_dec32le(ivbuf + 12);
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ q[0] = iv0 ^ br_dec32le(buf);
+ q[2] = iv1 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 4);
+ q[4] = iv2 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 8);
+ q[6] = iv3 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 12);
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct_bitslice_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, q);
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+ iv0 = q[0];
+ iv1 = q[2];
+ iv2 = q[4];
+ iv3 = q[6];
+ br_enc32le(buf, iv0);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 4, iv1);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 8, iv2);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 12, iv3);
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+ br_enc32le(ivbuf, iv0);
+ br_enc32le(ivbuf + 4, iv1);
+ br_enc32le(ivbuf + 8, iv2);
+ br_enc32le(ivbuf + 12, iv3);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcenc_class br_aes_ct_cbcenc_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_ct_cbcenc_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcenc_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct_cbcenc_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcenc_class *const *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct_cbcenc_run
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_ctr.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_ctr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f407689
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_ctr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct_ctr_init(br_aes_ct_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_ct_ctr_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_ct_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+static void
+xorbuf(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *d;
+ const unsigned char *s;
+
+ d = dst;
+ s = src;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ *d ++ ^= *s ++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+uint32_t
+br_aes_ct_ctr_run(const br_aes_ct_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ const unsigned char *ivbuf;
+ uint32_t iv0, iv1, iv2;
+ uint32_t sk_exp[120];
+
+ br_aes_ct_skey_expand(sk_exp, ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey);
+ ivbuf = iv;
+ iv0 = br_dec32le(ivbuf);
+ iv1 = br_dec32le(ivbuf + 4);
+ iv2 = br_dec32le(ivbuf + 8);
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ uint32_t q[8];
+ unsigned char tmp[32];
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: see if we can save on the first br_aes_ct_ortho()
+ * call, since iv0/iv1/iv2 are constant for the whole run.
+ */
+ q[0] = q[1] = iv0;
+ q[2] = q[3] = iv1;
+ q[4] = q[5] = iv2;
+ q[6] = br_swap32(cc);
+ q[7] = br_swap32(cc + 1);
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct_bitslice_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, q);
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+ br_enc32le(tmp, q[0]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 4, q[2]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 8, q[4]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 12, q[6]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 16, q[1]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 20, q[3]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 24, q[5]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 28, q[7]);
+
+ if (len <= 32) {
+ xorbuf(buf, tmp, len);
+ cc ++;
+ if (len > 16) {
+ cc ++;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ xorbuf(buf, tmp, 32);
+ buf += 32;
+ len -= 32;
+ cc += 2;
+ }
+ return cc;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctr_class br_aes_ct_ctr_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_ct_ctr_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctr_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct_ctr_init,
+ (uint32_t (*)(const br_block_ctr_class *const *,
+ const void *, uint32_t, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct_ctr_run
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_ctrcbc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_ctrcbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8ae9fc7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_ctrcbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,422 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_init(br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_ct_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+static void
+xorbuf(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *d;
+ const unsigned char *s;
+
+ d = dst;
+ s = src;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ *d ++ ^= *s ++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_ctr(const br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *ivbuf;
+ uint32_t iv0, iv1, iv2, iv3;
+ uint32_t sk_exp[120];
+
+ br_aes_ct_skey_expand(sk_exp, ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey);
+
+ /*
+ * We keep the counter as four 32-bit values, with big-endian
+ * convention, because that's what is expected for purposes of
+ * incrementing the counter value.
+ */
+ ivbuf = ctr;
+ iv0 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 0);
+ iv1 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 4);
+ iv2 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 8);
+ iv3 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 12);
+
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ uint32_t q[8], carry;
+ unsigned char tmp[32];
+
+ /*
+ * The bitslice implementation expects values in
+ * little-endian convention, so we have to byteswap them.
+ */
+ q[0] = br_swap32(iv0);
+ q[2] = br_swap32(iv1);
+ q[4] = br_swap32(iv2);
+ q[6] = br_swap32(iv3);
+ iv3 ++;
+ carry = ~(iv3 | -iv3) >> 31;
+ iv2 += carry;
+ carry &= -(~(iv2 | -iv2) >> 31);
+ iv1 += carry;
+ carry &= -(~(iv1 | -iv1) >> 31);
+ iv0 += carry;
+ q[1] = br_swap32(iv0);
+ q[3] = br_swap32(iv1);
+ q[5] = br_swap32(iv2);
+ q[7] = br_swap32(iv3);
+ if (len > 16) {
+ iv3 ++;
+ carry = ~(iv3 | -iv3) >> 31;
+ iv2 += carry;
+ carry &= -(~(iv2 | -iv2) >> 31);
+ iv1 += carry;
+ carry &= -(~(iv1 | -iv1) >> 31);
+ iv0 += carry;
+ }
+
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct_bitslice_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, q);
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+
+ br_enc32le(tmp, q[0]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 4, q[2]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 8, q[4]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 12, q[6]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 16, q[1]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 20, q[3]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 24, q[5]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 28, q[7]);
+
+ if (len <= 32) {
+ xorbuf(buf, tmp, len);
+ break;
+ }
+ xorbuf(buf, tmp, 32);
+ buf += 32;
+ len -= 32;
+ }
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 0, iv0);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 4, iv1);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 8, iv2);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 12, iv3);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_mac(const br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *cbcmac, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t cm0, cm1, cm2, cm3;
+ uint32_t q[8];
+ uint32_t sk_exp[120];
+
+ br_aes_ct_skey_expand(sk_exp, ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey);
+
+ buf = data;
+ cm0 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 0);
+ cm1 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 4);
+ cm2 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 8);
+ cm3 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 12);
+ q[1] = 0;
+ q[3] = 0;
+ q[5] = 0;
+ q[7] = 0;
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ q[0] = cm0 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 0);
+ q[2] = cm1 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 4);
+ q[4] = cm2 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 8);
+ q[6] = cm3 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 12);
+
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct_bitslice_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, q);
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+
+ cm0 = q[0];
+ cm1 = q[2];
+ cm2 = q[4];
+ cm3 = q[6];
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 0, cm0);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 4, cm1);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 8, cm2);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 12, cm3);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_encrypt(const br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ /*
+ * When encrypting, the CBC-MAC processing must be lagging by
+ * one block, since it operates on the encrypted values, so
+ * it must wait for that encryption to complete.
+ */
+
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *ivbuf;
+ uint32_t iv0, iv1, iv2, iv3;
+ uint32_t cm0, cm1, cm2, cm3;
+ uint32_t sk_exp[120];
+ int first_iter;
+
+ br_aes_ct_skey_expand(sk_exp, ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey);
+
+ /*
+ * We keep the counter as four 32-bit values, with big-endian
+ * convention, because that's what is expected for purposes of
+ * incrementing the counter value.
+ */
+ ivbuf = ctr;
+ iv0 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 0);
+ iv1 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 4);
+ iv2 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 8);
+ iv3 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 12);
+
+ /*
+ * The current CBC-MAC value is kept in little-endian convention.
+ */
+ cm0 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 0);
+ cm1 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 4);
+ cm2 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 8);
+ cm3 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 12);
+
+ buf = data;
+ first_iter = 1;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ uint32_t q[8], carry;
+
+ /*
+ * The bitslice implementation expects values in
+ * little-endian convention, so we have to byteswap them.
+ */
+ q[0] = br_swap32(iv0);
+ q[2] = br_swap32(iv1);
+ q[4] = br_swap32(iv2);
+ q[6] = br_swap32(iv3);
+ iv3 ++;
+ carry = ~(iv3 | -iv3) >> 31;
+ iv2 += carry;
+ carry &= -(~(iv2 | -iv2) >> 31);
+ iv1 += carry;
+ carry &= -(~(iv1 | -iv1) >> 31);
+ iv0 += carry;
+
+ /*
+ * The odd values are used for CBC-MAC.
+ */
+ q[1] = cm0;
+ q[3] = cm1;
+ q[5] = cm2;
+ q[7] = cm3;
+
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct_bitslice_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, q);
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+
+ /*
+ * We do the XOR with the plaintext in 32-bit registers,
+ * so that the value are available for CBC-MAC processing
+ * as well.
+ */
+ q[0] ^= br_dec32le(buf + 0);
+ q[2] ^= br_dec32le(buf + 4);
+ q[4] ^= br_dec32le(buf + 8);
+ q[6] ^= br_dec32le(buf + 12);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 0, q[0]);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 4, q[2]);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 8, q[4]);
+ br_enc32le(buf + 12, q[6]);
+
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+
+ /*
+ * We set the cm* values to the block to encrypt in the
+ * next iteration.
+ */
+ if (first_iter) {
+ first_iter = 0;
+ cm0 ^= q[0];
+ cm1 ^= q[2];
+ cm2 ^= q[4];
+ cm3 ^= q[6];
+ } else {
+ cm0 = q[0] ^ q[1];
+ cm1 = q[2] ^ q[3];
+ cm2 = q[4] ^ q[5];
+ cm3 = q[6] ^ q[7];
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If this was the last iteration, then compute the
+ * extra block encryption to complete CBC-MAC.
+ */
+ if (len == 0) {
+ q[0] = cm0;
+ q[2] = cm1;
+ q[4] = cm2;
+ q[6] = cm3;
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct_bitslice_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, q);
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+ cm0 = q[0];
+ cm1 = q[2];
+ cm2 = q[4];
+ cm3 = q[6];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 0, iv0);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 4, iv1);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 8, iv2);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 12, iv3);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 0, cm0);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 4, cm1);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 8, cm2);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 12, cm3);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_decrypt(const br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char *ivbuf;
+ uint32_t iv0, iv1, iv2, iv3;
+ uint32_t cm0, cm1, cm2, cm3;
+ uint32_t sk_exp[120];
+
+ br_aes_ct_skey_expand(sk_exp, ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey);
+
+ /*
+ * We keep the counter as four 32-bit values, with big-endian
+ * convention, because that's what is expected for purposes of
+ * incrementing the counter value.
+ */
+ ivbuf = ctr;
+ iv0 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 0);
+ iv1 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 4);
+ iv2 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 8);
+ iv3 = br_dec32be(ivbuf + 12);
+
+ /*
+ * The current CBC-MAC value is kept in little-endian convention.
+ */
+ cm0 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 0);
+ cm1 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 4);
+ cm2 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 8);
+ cm3 = br_dec32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 12);
+
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ uint32_t q[8], carry;
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+
+ /*
+ * The bitslice implementation expects values in
+ * little-endian convention, so we have to byteswap them.
+ */
+ q[0] = br_swap32(iv0);
+ q[2] = br_swap32(iv1);
+ q[4] = br_swap32(iv2);
+ q[6] = br_swap32(iv3);
+ iv3 ++;
+ carry = ~(iv3 | -iv3) >> 31;
+ iv2 += carry;
+ carry &= -(~(iv2 | -iv2) >> 31);
+ iv1 += carry;
+ carry &= -(~(iv1 | -iv1) >> 31);
+ iv0 += carry;
+
+ /*
+ * The odd values are used for CBC-MAC.
+ */
+ q[1] = cm0 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 0);
+ q[3] = cm1 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 4);
+ q[5] = cm2 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 8);
+ q[7] = cm3 ^ br_dec32le(buf + 12);
+
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+ br_aes_ct_bitslice_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, q);
+ br_aes_ct_ortho(q);
+
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 0, q[0]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 4, q[2]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 8, q[4]);
+ br_enc32le(tmp + 12, q[6]);
+ xorbuf(buf, tmp, 16);
+ cm0 = q[1];
+ cm1 = q[3];
+ cm2 = q[5];
+ cm3 = q[7];
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 0, iv0);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 4, iv1);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 8, iv2);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 12, iv3);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 0, cm0);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 4, cm1);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 8, cm2);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)cbcmac + 12, cm3);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctrcbc_class br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_encrypt,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_decrypt,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_ctr,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_ct_ctrcbc_mac
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_dec.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_dec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f32d2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_dec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct_bitslice_invSbox(uint32_t *q)
+{
+ /*
+ * AES S-box is:
+ * S(x) = A(I(x)) ^ 0x63
+ * where I() is inversion in GF(256), and A() is a linear
+ * transform (0 is formally defined to be its own inverse).
+ * Since inversion is an involution, the inverse S-box can be
+ * computed from the S-box as:
+ * iS(x) = B(S(B(x ^ 0x63)) ^ 0x63)
+ * where B() is the inverse of A(). Indeed, for any y in GF(256):
+ * iS(S(y)) = B(A(I(B(A(I(y)) ^ 0x63 ^ 0x63))) ^ 0x63 ^ 0x63) = y
+ *
+ * Note: we reuse the implementation of the forward S-box,
+ * instead of duplicating it here, so that total code size is
+ * lower. By merging the B() transforms into the S-box circuit
+ * we could make faster CBC decryption, but CBC decryption is
+ * already quite faster than CBC encryption because we can
+ * process two blocks in parallel.
+ */
+ uint32_t q0, q1, q2, q3, q4, q5, q6, q7;
+
+ q0 = ~q[0];
+ q1 = ~q[1];
+ q2 = q[2];
+ q3 = q[3];
+ q4 = q[4];
+ q5 = ~q[5];
+ q6 = ~q[6];
+ q7 = q[7];
+ q[7] = q1 ^ q4 ^ q6;
+ q[6] = q0 ^ q3 ^ q5;
+ q[5] = q7 ^ q2 ^ q4;
+ q[4] = q6 ^ q1 ^ q3;
+ q[3] = q5 ^ q0 ^ q2;
+ q[2] = q4 ^ q7 ^ q1;
+ q[1] = q3 ^ q6 ^ q0;
+ q[0] = q2 ^ q5 ^ q7;
+
+ br_aes_ct_bitslice_Sbox(q);
+
+ q0 = ~q[0];
+ q1 = ~q[1];
+ q2 = q[2];
+ q3 = q[3];
+ q4 = q[4];
+ q5 = ~q[5];
+ q6 = ~q[6];
+ q7 = q[7];
+ q[7] = q1 ^ q4 ^ q6;
+ q[6] = q0 ^ q3 ^ q5;
+ q[5] = q7 ^ q2 ^ q4;
+ q[4] = q6 ^ q1 ^ q3;
+ q[3] = q5 ^ q0 ^ q2;
+ q[2] = q4 ^ q7 ^ q1;
+ q[1] = q3 ^ q6 ^ q0;
+ q[0] = q2 ^ q5 ^ q7;
+}
+
+static void
+add_round_key(uint32_t *q, const uint32_t *sk)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i ++) {
+ q[i] ^= sk[i];
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+inv_shift_rows(uint32_t *q)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i ++) {
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ x = q[i];
+ q[i] = (x & 0x000000FF)
+ | ((x & 0x00003F00) << 2) | ((x & 0x0000C000) >> 6)
+ | ((x & 0x000F0000) << 4) | ((x & 0x00F00000) >> 4)
+ | ((x & 0x03000000) << 6) | ((x & 0xFC000000) >> 2);
+ }
+}
+
+static inline uint32_t
+rotr16(uint32_t x)
+{
+ return (x << 16) | (x >> 16);
+}
+
+static void
+inv_mix_columns(uint32_t *q)
+{
+ uint32_t q0, q1, q2, q3, q4, q5, q6, q7;
+ uint32_t r0, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7;
+
+ q0 = q[0];
+ q1 = q[1];
+ q2 = q[2];
+ q3 = q[3];
+ q4 = q[4];
+ q5 = q[5];
+ q6 = q[6];
+ q7 = q[7];
+ r0 = (q0 >> 8) | (q0 << 24);
+ r1 = (q1 >> 8) | (q1 << 24);
+ r2 = (q2 >> 8) | (q2 << 24);
+ r3 = (q3 >> 8) | (q3 << 24);
+ r4 = (q4 >> 8) | (q4 << 24);
+ r5 = (q5 >> 8) | (q5 << 24);
+ r6 = (q6 >> 8) | (q6 << 24);
+ r7 = (q7 >> 8) | (q7 << 24);
+
+ q[0] = q5 ^ q6 ^ q7 ^ r0 ^ r5 ^ r7 ^ rotr16(q0 ^ q5 ^ q6 ^ r0 ^ r5);
+ q[1] = q0 ^ q5 ^ r0 ^ r1 ^ r5 ^ r6 ^ r7 ^ rotr16(q1 ^ q5 ^ q7 ^ r1 ^ r5 ^ r6);
+ q[2] = q0 ^ q1 ^ q6 ^ r1 ^ r2 ^ r6 ^ r7 ^ rotr16(q0 ^ q2 ^ q6 ^ r2 ^ r6 ^ r7);
+ q[3] = q0 ^ q1 ^ q2 ^ q5 ^ q6 ^ r0 ^ r2 ^ r3 ^ r5 ^ rotr16(q0 ^ q1 ^ q3 ^ q5 ^ q6 ^ q7 ^ r0 ^ r3 ^ r5 ^ r7);
+ q[4] = q1 ^ q2 ^ q3 ^ q5 ^ r1 ^ r3 ^ r4 ^ r5 ^ r6 ^ r7 ^ rotr16(q1 ^ q2 ^ q4 ^ q5 ^ q7 ^ r1 ^ r4 ^ r5 ^ r6);
+ q[5] = q2 ^ q3 ^ q4 ^ q6 ^ r2 ^ r4 ^ r5 ^ r6 ^ r7 ^ rotr16(q2 ^ q3 ^ q5 ^ q6 ^ r2 ^ r5 ^ r6 ^ r7);
+ q[6] = q3 ^ q4 ^ q5 ^ q7 ^ r3 ^ r5 ^ r6 ^ r7 ^ rotr16(q3 ^ q4 ^ q6 ^ q7 ^ r3 ^ r6 ^ r7);
+ q[7] = q4 ^ q5 ^ q6 ^ r4 ^ r6 ^ r7 ^ rotr16(q4 ^ q5 ^ q7 ^ r4 ^ r7);
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct_bitslice_decrypt(unsigned num_rounds,
+ const uint32_t *skey, uint32_t *q)
+{
+ unsigned u;
+
+ add_round_key(q, skey + (num_rounds << 3));
+ for (u = num_rounds - 1; u > 0; u --) {
+ inv_shift_rows(q);
+ br_aes_ct_bitslice_invSbox(q);
+ add_round_key(q, skey + (u << 3));
+ inv_mix_columns(q);
+ }
+ inv_shift_rows(q);
+ br_aes_ct_bitslice_invSbox(q);
+ add_round_key(q, skey);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_enc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..089bf35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_ct_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+static inline void
+add_round_key(uint32_t *q, const uint32_t *sk)
+{
+ q[0] ^= sk[0];
+ q[1] ^= sk[1];
+ q[2] ^= sk[2];
+ q[3] ^= sk[3];
+ q[4] ^= sk[4];
+ q[5] ^= sk[5];
+ q[6] ^= sk[6];
+ q[7] ^= sk[7];
+}
+
+static inline void
+shift_rows(uint32_t *q)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i ++) {
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ x = q[i];
+ q[i] = (x & 0x000000FF)
+ | ((x & 0x0000FC00) >> 2) | ((x & 0x00000300) << 6)
+ | ((x & 0x00F00000) >> 4) | ((x & 0x000F0000) << 4)
+ | ((x & 0xC0000000) >> 6) | ((x & 0x3F000000) << 2);
+ }
+}
+
+static inline uint32_t
+rotr16(uint32_t x)
+{
+ return (x << 16) | (x >> 16);
+}
+
+static inline void
+mix_columns(uint32_t *q)
+{
+ uint32_t q0, q1, q2, q3, q4, q5, q6, q7;
+ uint32_t r0, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7;
+
+ q0 = q[0];
+ q1 = q[1];
+ q2 = q[2];
+ q3 = q[3];
+ q4 = q[4];
+ q5 = q[5];
+ q6 = q[6];
+ q7 = q[7];
+ r0 = (q0 >> 8) | (q0 << 24);
+ r1 = (q1 >> 8) | (q1 << 24);
+ r2 = (q2 >> 8) | (q2 << 24);
+ r3 = (q3 >> 8) | (q3 << 24);
+ r4 = (q4 >> 8) | (q4 << 24);
+ r5 = (q5 >> 8) | (q5 << 24);
+ r6 = (q6 >> 8) | (q6 << 24);
+ r7 = (q7 >> 8) | (q7 << 24);
+
+ q[0] = q7 ^ r7 ^ r0 ^ rotr16(q0 ^ r0);
+ q[1] = q0 ^ r0 ^ q7 ^ r7 ^ r1 ^ rotr16(q1 ^ r1);
+ q[2] = q1 ^ r1 ^ r2 ^ rotr16(q2 ^ r2);
+ q[3] = q2 ^ r2 ^ q7 ^ r7 ^ r3 ^ rotr16(q3 ^ r3);
+ q[4] = q3 ^ r3 ^ q7 ^ r7 ^ r4 ^ rotr16(q4 ^ r4);
+ q[5] = q4 ^ r4 ^ r5 ^ rotr16(q5 ^ r5);
+ q[6] = q5 ^ r5 ^ r6 ^ rotr16(q6 ^ r6);
+ q[7] = q6 ^ r6 ^ r7 ^ rotr16(q7 ^ r7);
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_aes_ct_bitslice_encrypt(unsigned num_rounds,
+ const uint32_t *skey, uint32_t *q)
+{
+ unsigned u;
+
+ add_round_key(q, skey);
+ for (u = 1; u < num_rounds; u ++) {
+ br_aes_ct_bitslice_Sbox(q);
+ shift_rows(q);
+ mix_columns(q);
+ add_round_key(q, skey + (u << 3));
+ }
+ br_aes_ct_bitslice_Sbox(q);
+ shift_rows(q);
+ add_round_key(q, skey + (num_rounds << 3));
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_pwr8.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_pwr8.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2c63c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_pwr8.c
@@ -0,0 +1,445 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define BR_POWER_ASM_MACROS 1
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * This code contains the AES key schedule implementation using the
+ * POWER8 opcodes.
+ */
+
+#if BR_POWER8
+
+static void
+key_schedule_128(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *key)
+{
+ long cc;
+
+ static const uint32_t fmod[] = { 0x11B, 0x11B, 0x11B, 0x11B };
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ static const uint32_t idx2be[] = {
+ 0x03020100, 0x07060504, 0x0B0A0908, 0x0F0E0D0C
+ };
+#endif
+
+ cc = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We use the VSX instructions for loading and storing the
+ * key/subkeys, since they support unaligned accesses. The rest
+ * of the computation is VMX only. VMX register 0 is VSX
+ * register 32.
+ */
+ asm volatile (
+
+ /*
+ * v0 = all-zero word
+ * v1 = constant -8 / +8, copied into four words
+ * v2 = current subkey
+ * v3 = Rcon (x4 words)
+ * v6 = constant 8, copied into four words
+ * v7 = constant 0x11B, copied into four words
+ * v8 = constant for byteswapping words
+ */
+ vspltisw(0, 0)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vspltisw(1, -8)
+#else
+ vspltisw(1, 8)
+#endif
+ lxvw4x(34, 0, %[key])
+ vspltisw(3, 1)
+ vspltisw(6, 8)
+ lxvw4x(39, 0, %[fmod])
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ lxvw4x(40, 0, %[idx2be])
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * First subkey is a copy of the key itself.
+ */
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(4, 2, 2, 8)
+ stxvw4x(36, 0, %[sk])
+#else
+ stxvw4x(34, 0, %[sk])
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Loop must run 10 times.
+ */
+ li(%[cc], 10)
+ mtctr(%[cc])
+ label(loop)
+ /* Increment subkey address */
+ addi(%[sk], %[sk], 16)
+
+ /* Compute SubWord(RotWord(temp)) xor Rcon (into v4, splat) */
+ vrlw(4, 2, 1)
+ vsbox(4, 4)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vxor(4, 4, 3)
+#else
+ vsldoi(5, 3, 0, 3)
+ vxor(4, 4, 5)
+#endif
+ vspltw(4, 4, 3)
+
+ /* XOR words for next subkey */
+ vsldoi(5, 0, 2, 12)
+ vxor(2, 2, 5)
+ vsldoi(5, 0, 2, 12)
+ vxor(2, 2, 5)
+ vsldoi(5, 0, 2, 12)
+ vxor(2, 2, 5)
+ vxor(2, 2, 4)
+
+ /* Store next subkey */
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(4, 2, 2, 8)
+ stxvw4x(36, 0, %[sk])
+#else
+ stxvw4x(34, 0, %[sk])
+#endif
+
+ /* Update Rcon */
+ vadduwm(3, 3, 3)
+ vsrw(4, 3, 6)
+ vsubuwm(4, 0, 4)
+ vand(4, 4, 7)
+ vxor(3, 3, 4)
+
+ bdnz(loop)
+
+: [sk] "+b" (sk), [cc] "+b" (cc)
+: [key] "b" (key), [fmod] "b" (fmod)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ , [idx2be] "b" (idx2be)
+#endif
+: "v0", "v1", "v2", "v3", "v4", "v5", "v6", "v7", "ctr", "memory"
+ );
+}
+
+static void
+key_schedule_192(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *key)
+{
+ long cc;
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ static const uint32_t idx2be[] = {
+ 0x03020100, 0x07060504, 0x0B0A0908, 0x0F0E0D0C
+ };
+#endif
+
+ cc = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We use the VSX instructions for loading and storing the
+ * key/subkeys, since they support unaligned accesses. The rest
+ * of the computation is VMX only. VMX register 0 is VSX
+ * register 32.
+ */
+ asm volatile (
+
+ /*
+ * v0 = all-zero word
+ * v1 = constant -8 / +8, copied into four words
+ * v2, v3 = current subkey
+ * v5 = Rcon (x4 words) (already shifted on big-endian)
+ * v6 = constant 8, copied into four words
+ * v8 = constant for byteswapping words
+ *
+ * The left two words of v3 are ignored.
+ */
+ vspltisw(0, 0)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vspltisw(1, -8)
+#else
+ vspltisw(1, 8)
+#endif
+ li(%[cc], 8)
+ lxvw4x(34, 0, %[key])
+ lxvw4x(35, %[cc], %[key])
+ vsldoi(3, 3, 0, 8)
+ vspltisw(5, 1)
+#if !BR_POWER8_LE
+ vsldoi(5, 5, 0, 3)
+#endif
+ vspltisw(6, 8)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ lxvw4x(40, 0, %[idx2be])
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Loop must run 8 times. Each iteration produces 256
+ * bits of subkeys, with a 64-bit overlap.
+ */
+ li(%[cc], 8)
+ mtctr(%[cc])
+ li(%[cc], 16)
+ label(loop)
+
+ /*
+ * Last 6 words in v2:v3l. Compute next 6 words into
+ * v3r:v4.
+ */
+ vrlw(10, 3, 1)
+ vsbox(10, 10)
+ vxor(10, 10, 5)
+ vspltw(10, 10, 1)
+ vsldoi(11, 0, 10, 8)
+
+ vsldoi(12, 0, 2, 12)
+ vxor(12, 2, 12)
+ vsldoi(13, 0, 12, 12)
+ vxor(12, 12, 13)
+ vsldoi(13, 0, 12, 12)
+ vxor(12, 12, 13)
+
+ vspltw(13, 12, 3)
+ vxor(13, 13, 3)
+ vsldoi(14, 0, 3, 12)
+ vxor(13, 13, 14)
+
+ vsldoi(4, 12, 13, 8)
+ vsldoi(14, 0, 3, 8)
+ vsldoi(3, 14, 12, 8)
+
+ vxor(3, 3, 11)
+ vxor(4, 4, 10)
+
+ /*
+ * Update Rcon. Since for a 192-bit key, we use only 8
+ * such constants, we will not hit the field modulus,
+ * so a simple shift (addition) works well.
+ */
+ vadduwm(5, 5, 5)
+
+ /*
+ * Write out the two left 128-bit words
+ */
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(10, 2, 2, 8)
+ vperm(11, 3, 3, 8)
+ stxvw4x(42, 0, %[sk])
+ stxvw4x(43, %[cc], %[sk])
+#else
+ stxvw4x(34, 0, %[sk])
+ stxvw4x(35, %[cc], %[sk])
+#endif
+ addi(%[sk], %[sk], 24)
+
+ /*
+ * Shift words for next iteration.
+ */
+ vsldoi(2, 3, 4, 8)
+ vsldoi(3, 4, 0, 8)
+
+ bdnz(loop)
+
+ /*
+ * The loop wrote the first 50 subkey words, but we need
+ * to produce 52, so we must do one last write.
+ */
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(10, 2, 2, 8)
+ stxvw4x(42, 0, %[sk])
+#else
+ stxvw4x(34, 0, %[sk])
+#endif
+
+: [sk] "+b" (sk), [cc] "+b" (cc)
+: [key] "b" (key)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ , [idx2be] "b" (idx2be)
+#endif
+: "v0", "v1", "v2", "v3", "v4", "v5", "v6", "v7",
+ "v8", "v9", "v10", "v11", "v12", "v13", "v14", "ctr", "memory"
+ );
+}
+
+static void
+key_schedule_256(unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *key)
+{
+ long cc;
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ static const uint32_t idx2be[] = {
+ 0x03020100, 0x07060504, 0x0B0A0908, 0x0F0E0D0C
+ };
+#endif
+
+ cc = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We use the VSX instructions for loading and storing the
+ * key/subkeys, since they support unaligned accesses. The rest
+ * of the computation is VMX only. VMX register 0 is VSX
+ * register 32.
+ */
+ asm volatile (
+
+ /*
+ * v0 = all-zero word
+ * v1 = constant -8 / +8, copied into four words
+ * v2, v3 = current subkey
+ * v6 = Rcon (x4 words) (already shifted on big-endian)
+ * v7 = constant 8, copied into four words
+ * v8 = constant for byteswapping words
+ *
+ * The left two words of v3 are ignored.
+ */
+ vspltisw(0, 0)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vspltisw(1, -8)
+#else
+ vspltisw(1, 8)
+#endif
+ li(%[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(34, 0, %[key])
+ lxvw4x(35, %[cc], %[key])
+ vspltisw(6, 1)
+#if !BR_POWER8_LE
+ vsldoi(6, 6, 0, 3)
+#endif
+ vspltisw(7, 8)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ lxvw4x(40, 0, %[idx2be])
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Loop must run 7 times. Each iteration produces two
+ * subkeys.
+ */
+ li(%[cc], 7)
+ mtctr(%[cc])
+ li(%[cc], 16)
+ label(loop)
+
+ /*
+ * Current words are in v2:v3. Compute next word in v4.
+ */
+ vrlw(10, 3, 1)
+ vsbox(10, 10)
+ vxor(10, 10, 6)
+ vspltw(10, 10, 3)
+
+ vsldoi(4, 0, 2, 12)
+ vxor(4, 2, 4)
+ vsldoi(5, 0, 4, 12)
+ vxor(4, 4, 5)
+ vsldoi(5, 0, 4, 12)
+ vxor(4, 4, 5)
+ vxor(4, 4, 10)
+
+ /*
+ * Then other word in v5.
+ */
+ vsbox(10, 4)
+ vspltw(10, 10, 3)
+
+ vsldoi(5, 0, 3, 12)
+ vxor(5, 3, 5)
+ vsldoi(11, 0, 5, 12)
+ vxor(5, 5, 11)
+ vsldoi(11, 0, 5, 12)
+ vxor(5, 5, 11)
+ vxor(5, 5, 10)
+
+ /*
+ * Update Rcon. Since for a 256-bit key, we use only 7
+ * such constants, we will not hit the field modulus,
+ * so a simple shift (addition) works well.
+ */
+ vadduwm(6, 6, 6)
+
+ /*
+ * Write out the two left 128-bit words
+ */
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(10, 2, 2, 8)
+ vperm(11, 3, 3, 8)
+ stxvw4x(42, 0, %[sk])
+ stxvw4x(43, %[cc], %[sk])
+#else
+ stxvw4x(34, 0, %[sk])
+ stxvw4x(35, %[cc], %[sk])
+#endif
+ addi(%[sk], %[sk], 32)
+
+ /*
+ * Replace v2:v3 with v4:v5.
+ */
+ vxor(2, 0, 4)
+ vxor(3, 0, 5)
+
+ bdnz(loop)
+
+ /*
+ * The loop wrote the first 14 subkeys, but we need 15,
+ * so we must do an extra write.
+ */
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(10, 2, 2, 8)
+ stxvw4x(42, 0, %[sk])
+#else
+ stxvw4x(34, 0, %[sk])
+#endif
+
+: [sk] "+b" (sk), [cc] "+b" (cc)
+: [key] "b" (key)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ , [idx2be] "b" (idx2be)
+#endif
+: "v0", "v1", "v2", "v3", "v4", "v5", "v6", "v7",
+ "v8", "v9", "v10", "v11", "v12", "v13", "v14", "ctr", "memory"
+ );
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+int
+br_aes_pwr8_supported(void)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+unsigned
+br_aes_pwr8_keysched(unsigned char *sk, const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ switch (len) {
+ case 16:
+ key_schedule_128(sk, key);
+ return 10;
+ case 24:
+ key_schedule_192(sk, key);
+ return 12;
+ default:
+ key_schedule_256(sk, key);
+ return 14;
+ }
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_pwr8_cbcdec.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_pwr8_cbcdec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e535ba6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_pwr8_cbcdec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,670 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define BR_POWER_ASM_MACROS 1
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_POWER8
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_init(br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_pwr8_keysched(ctx->skey.skni, key, len);
+}
+
+static void
+cbcdec_128(const unsigned char *sk,
+ const unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *buf, size_t num_blocks)
+{
+ long cc0, cc1, cc2, cc3;
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ static const uint32_t idx2be[] = {
+ 0x03020100, 0x07060504, 0x0B0A0908, 0x0F0E0D0C
+ };
+#endif
+
+ cc0 = 0;
+ cc1 = 16;
+ cc2 = 32;
+ cc3 = 48;
+ asm volatile (
+
+ /*
+ * Load subkeys into v0..v10
+ */
+ lxvw4x(32, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(33, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(34, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(35, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(36, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(37, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(38, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(39, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(40, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(41, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(42, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ li(%[cc0], 0)
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ /*
+ * v15 = constant for byteswapping words
+ */
+ lxvw4x(47, 0, %[idx2be])
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Load IV into v24.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(56, 0, %[iv])
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(24, 24, 24, 15)
+#endif
+
+ mtctr(%[num_blocks])
+ label(loop)
+ /*
+ * Load next ciphertext words in v16..v19. Also save them
+ * in v20..v23.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(48, %[cc0], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(49, %[cc1], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(50, %[cc2], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(51, %[cc3], %[buf])
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(16, 16, 16, 15)
+ vperm(17, 17, 17, 15)
+ vperm(18, 18, 18, 15)
+ vperm(19, 19, 19, 15)
+#endif
+ vand(20, 16, 16)
+ vand(21, 17, 17)
+ vand(22, 18, 18)
+ vand(23, 19, 19)
+
+ /*
+ * Decrypt the blocks.
+ */
+ vxor(16, 16, 10)
+ vxor(17, 17, 10)
+ vxor(18, 18, 10)
+ vxor(19, 19, 10)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 9)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 9)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 9)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 9)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 8)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 8)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 8)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 8)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 7)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 7)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 7)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 7)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 6)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 6)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 6)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 6)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 5)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 5)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 5)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 5)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 4)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 4)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 4)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 4)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 3)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 3)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 3)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 3)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 2)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 2)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 2)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 2)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 1)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 1)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 1)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 1)
+ vncipherlast(16, 16, 0)
+ vncipherlast(17, 17, 0)
+ vncipherlast(18, 18, 0)
+ vncipherlast(19, 19, 0)
+
+ /*
+ * XOR decrypted blocks with IV / previous block.
+ */
+ vxor(16, 16, 24)
+ vxor(17, 17, 20)
+ vxor(18, 18, 21)
+ vxor(19, 19, 22)
+
+ /*
+ * Store back result (with byteswap)
+ */
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(16, 16, 16, 15)
+ vperm(17, 17, 17, 15)
+ vperm(18, 18, 18, 15)
+ vperm(19, 19, 19, 15)
+#endif
+ stxvw4x(48, %[cc0], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(49, %[cc1], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(50, %[cc2], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(51, %[cc3], %[buf])
+
+ /*
+ * Fourth encrypted block is IV for next run.
+ */
+ vand(24, 23, 23)
+
+ addi(%[buf], %[buf], 64)
+
+ bdnz(loop)
+
+: [cc0] "+b" (cc0), [cc1] "+b" (cc1), [cc2] "+b" (cc2), [cc3] "+b" (cc3),
+ [buf] "+b" (buf)
+: [sk] "b" (sk), [iv] "b" (iv), [num_blocks] "b" (num_blocks >> 2)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ , [idx2be] "b" (idx2be)
+#endif
+: "v0", "v1", "v2", "v3", "v4", "v5", "v6", "v7", "v8", "v9",
+ "v10", "v11", "v12", "v13", "v14", "v15", "v16", "v17", "v18", "v19",
+ "v20", "v21", "v22", "v23", "v24", "v25", "v26", "v27", "v28", "v29",
+ "ctr", "memory"
+ );
+}
+
+static void
+cbcdec_192(const unsigned char *sk,
+ const unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *buf, size_t num_blocks)
+{
+ long cc0, cc1, cc2, cc3;
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ static const uint32_t idx2be[] = {
+ 0x03020100, 0x07060504, 0x0B0A0908, 0x0F0E0D0C
+ };
+#endif
+
+ cc0 = 0;
+ cc1 = 16;
+ cc2 = 32;
+ cc3 = 48;
+ asm volatile (
+
+ /*
+ * Load subkeys into v0..v12
+ */
+ lxvw4x(32, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(33, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(34, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(35, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(36, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(37, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(38, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(39, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(40, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(41, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(42, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(43, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(44, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ li(%[cc0], 0)
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ /*
+ * v15 = constant for byteswapping words
+ */
+ lxvw4x(47, 0, %[idx2be])
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Load IV into v24.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(56, 0, %[iv])
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(24, 24, 24, 15)
+#endif
+
+ mtctr(%[num_blocks])
+ label(loop)
+ /*
+ * Load next ciphertext words in v16..v19. Also save them
+ * in v20..v23.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(48, %[cc0], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(49, %[cc1], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(50, %[cc2], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(51, %[cc3], %[buf])
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(16, 16, 16, 15)
+ vperm(17, 17, 17, 15)
+ vperm(18, 18, 18, 15)
+ vperm(19, 19, 19, 15)
+#endif
+ vand(20, 16, 16)
+ vand(21, 17, 17)
+ vand(22, 18, 18)
+ vand(23, 19, 19)
+
+ /*
+ * Decrypt the blocks.
+ */
+ vxor(16, 16, 12)
+ vxor(17, 17, 12)
+ vxor(18, 18, 12)
+ vxor(19, 19, 12)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 11)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 11)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 11)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 11)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 10)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 10)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 10)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 10)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 9)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 9)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 9)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 9)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 8)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 8)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 8)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 8)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 7)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 7)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 7)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 7)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 6)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 6)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 6)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 6)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 5)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 5)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 5)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 5)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 4)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 4)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 4)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 4)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 3)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 3)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 3)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 3)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 2)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 2)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 2)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 2)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 1)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 1)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 1)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 1)
+ vncipherlast(16, 16, 0)
+ vncipherlast(17, 17, 0)
+ vncipherlast(18, 18, 0)
+ vncipherlast(19, 19, 0)
+
+ /*
+ * XOR decrypted blocks with IV / previous block.
+ */
+ vxor(16, 16, 24)
+ vxor(17, 17, 20)
+ vxor(18, 18, 21)
+ vxor(19, 19, 22)
+
+ /*
+ * Store back result (with byteswap)
+ */
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(16, 16, 16, 15)
+ vperm(17, 17, 17, 15)
+ vperm(18, 18, 18, 15)
+ vperm(19, 19, 19, 15)
+#endif
+ stxvw4x(48, %[cc0], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(49, %[cc1], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(50, %[cc2], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(51, %[cc3], %[buf])
+
+ /*
+ * Fourth encrypted block is IV for next run.
+ */
+ vand(24, 23, 23)
+
+ addi(%[buf], %[buf], 64)
+
+ bdnz(loop)
+
+: [cc0] "+b" (cc0), [cc1] "+b" (cc1), [cc2] "+b" (cc2), [cc3] "+b" (cc3),
+ [buf] "+b" (buf)
+: [sk] "b" (sk), [iv] "b" (iv), [num_blocks] "b" (num_blocks >> 2)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ , [idx2be] "b" (idx2be)
+#endif
+: "v0", "v1", "v2", "v3", "v4", "v5", "v6", "v7", "v8", "v9",
+ "v10", "v11", "v12", "v13", "v14", "v15", "v16", "v17", "v18", "v19",
+ "v20", "v21", "v22", "v23", "v24", "v25", "v26", "v27", "v28", "v29",
+ "ctr", "memory"
+ );
+}
+
+static void
+cbcdec_256(const unsigned char *sk,
+ const unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *buf, size_t num_blocks)
+{
+ long cc0, cc1, cc2, cc3;
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ static const uint32_t idx2be[] = {
+ 0x03020100, 0x07060504, 0x0B0A0908, 0x0F0E0D0C
+ };
+#endif
+
+ cc0 = 0;
+ cc1 = 16;
+ cc2 = 32;
+ cc3 = 48;
+ asm volatile (
+
+ /*
+ * Load subkeys into v0..v14
+ */
+ lxvw4x(32, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(33, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(34, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(35, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(36, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(37, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(38, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(39, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(40, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(41, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(42, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(43, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(44, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(45, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(46, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ li(%[cc0], 0)
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ /*
+ * v15 = constant for byteswapping words
+ */
+ lxvw4x(47, 0, %[idx2be])
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Load IV into v24.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(56, 0, %[iv])
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(24, 24, 24, 15)
+#endif
+
+ mtctr(%[num_blocks])
+ label(loop)
+ /*
+ * Load next ciphertext words in v16..v19. Also save them
+ * in v20..v23.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(48, %[cc0], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(49, %[cc1], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(50, %[cc2], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(51, %[cc3], %[buf])
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(16, 16, 16, 15)
+ vperm(17, 17, 17, 15)
+ vperm(18, 18, 18, 15)
+ vperm(19, 19, 19, 15)
+#endif
+ vand(20, 16, 16)
+ vand(21, 17, 17)
+ vand(22, 18, 18)
+ vand(23, 19, 19)
+
+ /*
+ * Decrypt the blocks.
+ */
+ vxor(16, 16, 14)
+ vxor(17, 17, 14)
+ vxor(18, 18, 14)
+ vxor(19, 19, 14)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 13)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 13)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 13)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 13)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 12)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 12)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 12)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 12)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 11)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 11)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 11)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 11)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 10)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 10)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 10)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 10)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 9)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 9)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 9)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 9)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 8)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 8)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 8)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 8)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 7)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 7)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 7)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 7)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 6)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 6)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 6)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 6)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 5)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 5)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 5)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 5)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 4)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 4)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 4)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 4)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 3)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 3)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 3)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 3)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 2)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 2)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 2)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 2)
+ vncipher(16, 16, 1)
+ vncipher(17, 17, 1)
+ vncipher(18, 18, 1)
+ vncipher(19, 19, 1)
+ vncipherlast(16, 16, 0)
+ vncipherlast(17, 17, 0)
+ vncipherlast(18, 18, 0)
+ vncipherlast(19, 19, 0)
+
+ /*
+ * XOR decrypted blocks with IV / previous block.
+ */
+ vxor(16, 16, 24)
+ vxor(17, 17, 20)
+ vxor(18, 18, 21)
+ vxor(19, 19, 22)
+
+ /*
+ * Store back result (with byteswap)
+ */
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(16, 16, 16, 15)
+ vperm(17, 17, 17, 15)
+ vperm(18, 18, 18, 15)
+ vperm(19, 19, 19, 15)
+#endif
+ stxvw4x(48, %[cc0], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(49, %[cc1], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(50, %[cc2], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(51, %[cc3], %[buf])
+
+ /*
+ * Fourth encrypted block is IV for next run.
+ */
+ vand(24, 23, 23)
+
+ addi(%[buf], %[buf], 64)
+
+ bdnz(loop)
+
+: [cc0] "+b" (cc0), [cc1] "+b" (cc1), [cc2] "+b" (cc2), [cc3] "+b" (cc3),
+ [buf] "+b" (buf)
+: [sk] "b" (sk), [iv] "b" (iv), [num_blocks] "b" (num_blocks >> 2)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ , [idx2be] "b" (idx2be)
+#endif
+: "v0", "v1", "v2", "v3", "v4", "v5", "v6", "v7", "v8", "v9",
+ "v10", "v11", "v12", "v13", "v14", "v15", "v16", "v17", "v18", "v19",
+ "v20", "v21", "v22", "v23", "v24", "v25", "v26", "v27", "v28", "v29",
+ "ctr", "memory"
+ );
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_run(const br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char nextiv[16];
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ buf = data;
+ memcpy(nextiv, buf + len - 16, 16);
+ if (len >= 64) {
+ size_t num_blocks;
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+
+ num_blocks = (len >> 4) & ~(size_t)3;
+ memcpy(tmp, buf + (num_blocks << 4) - 16, 16);
+ switch (ctx->num_rounds) {
+ case 10:
+ cbcdec_128(ctx->skey.skni, iv, buf, num_blocks);
+ break;
+ case 12:
+ cbcdec_192(ctx->skey.skni, iv, buf, num_blocks);
+ break;
+ default:
+ cbcdec_256(ctx->skey.skni, iv, buf, num_blocks);
+ break;
+ }
+ buf += num_blocks << 4;
+ len &= 63;
+ memcpy(iv, tmp, 16);
+ }
+ if (len > 0) {
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, buf, len);
+ memset(tmp + len, 0, (sizeof tmp) - len);
+ switch (ctx->num_rounds) {
+ case 10:
+ cbcdec_128(ctx->skey.skni, iv, tmp, 4);
+ break;
+ case 12:
+ cbcdec_192(ctx->skey.skni, iv, tmp, 4);
+ break;
+ default:
+ cbcdec_256(ctx->skey.skni, iv, tmp, 4);
+ break;
+ }
+ memcpy(buf, tmp, len);
+ }
+ memcpy(iv, nextiv, 16);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcdec_class br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcdec_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcdec_class *const *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_run
+};
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcdec_class *
+br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_get_vtable(void)
+{
+ return br_aes_pwr8_supported() ? &br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_vtable : NULL;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcdec_class *
+br_aes_pwr8_cbcdec_get_vtable(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_pwr8_cbcenc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_pwr8_cbcenc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00f8eca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_pwr8_cbcenc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,417 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define BR_POWER_ASM_MACROS 1
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_POWER8
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_init(br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_pwr8_keysched(ctx->skey.skni, key, len);
+}
+
+static void
+cbcenc_128(const unsigned char *sk,
+ const unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ long cc;
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ static const uint32_t idx2be[] = {
+ 0x03020100, 0x07060504, 0x0B0A0908, 0x0F0E0D0C
+ };
+#endif
+
+ cc = 0;
+ asm volatile (
+
+ /*
+ * Load subkeys into v0..v10
+ */
+ lxvw4x(32, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(33, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(34, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(35, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(36, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(37, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(38, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(39, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(40, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(41, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(42, %[cc], %[sk])
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ /*
+ * v15 = constant for byteswapping words
+ */
+ lxvw4x(47, 0, %[idx2be])
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Load IV into v16.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(48, 0, %[iv])
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(16, 16, 16, 15)
+#endif
+
+ mtctr(%[num_blocks])
+ label(loop)
+ /*
+ * Load next plaintext word and XOR with current IV.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(49, 0, %[buf])
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(17, 17, 17, 15)
+#endif
+ vxor(16, 16, 17)
+
+ /*
+ * Encrypt the block.
+ */
+ vxor(16, 16, 0)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 1)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 2)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 3)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 4)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 5)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 6)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 7)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 8)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 9)
+ vcipherlast(16, 16, 10)
+
+ /*
+ * Store back result (with byteswap)
+ */
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(17, 16, 16, 15)
+ stxvw4x(49, 0, %[buf])
+#else
+ stxvw4x(48, 0, %[buf])
+#endif
+ addi(%[buf], %[buf], 16)
+
+ bdnz(loop)
+
+: [cc] "+b" (cc), [buf] "+b" (buf)
+: [sk] "b" (sk), [iv] "b" (iv), [num_blocks] "b" (len >> 4)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ , [idx2be] "b" (idx2be)
+#endif
+: "v0", "v1", "v2", "v3", "v4", "v5", "v6", "v7", "v8", "v9",
+ "v10", "v11", "v12", "v13", "v14", "v15", "v16", "v17", "v18", "v19",
+ "ctr", "memory"
+ );
+}
+
+static void
+cbcenc_192(const unsigned char *sk,
+ const unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ long cc;
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ static const uint32_t idx2be[] = {
+ 0x03020100, 0x07060504, 0x0B0A0908, 0x0F0E0D0C
+ };
+#endif
+
+ cc = 0;
+ asm volatile (
+
+ /*
+ * Load subkeys into v0..v12
+ */
+ lxvw4x(32, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(33, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(34, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(35, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(36, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(37, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(38, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(39, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(40, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(41, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(42, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(43, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(44, %[cc], %[sk])
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ /*
+ * v15 = constant for byteswapping words
+ */
+ lxvw4x(47, 0, %[idx2be])
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Load IV into v16.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(48, 0, %[iv])
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(16, 16, 16, 15)
+#endif
+
+ mtctr(%[num_blocks])
+ label(loop)
+ /*
+ * Load next plaintext word and XOR with current IV.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(49, 0, %[buf])
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(17, 17, 17, 15)
+#endif
+ vxor(16, 16, 17)
+
+ /*
+ * Encrypt the block.
+ */
+ vxor(16, 16, 0)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 1)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 2)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 3)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 4)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 5)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 6)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 7)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 8)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 9)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 10)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 11)
+ vcipherlast(16, 16, 12)
+
+ /*
+ * Store back result (with byteswap)
+ */
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(17, 16, 16, 15)
+ stxvw4x(49, 0, %[buf])
+#else
+ stxvw4x(48, 0, %[buf])
+#endif
+ addi(%[buf], %[buf], 16)
+
+ bdnz(loop)
+
+: [cc] "+b" (cc), [buf] "+b" (buf)
+: [sk] "b" (sk), [iv] "b" (iv), [num_blocks] "b" (len >> 4)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ , [idx2be] "b" (idx2be)
+#endif
+: "v0", "v1", "v2", "v3", "v4", "v5", "v6", "v7", "v8", "v9",
+ "v10", "v11", "v12", "v13", "v14", "v15", "v16", "v17", "v18", "v19",
+ "ctr", "memory"
+ );
+}
+
+static void
+cbcenc_256(const unsigned char *sk,
+ const unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ long cc;
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ static const uint32_t idx2be[] = {
+ 0x03020100, 0x07060504, 0x0B0A0908, 0x0F0E0D0C
+ };
+#endif
+
+ cc = 0;
+ asm volatile (
+
+ /*
+ * Load subkeys into v0..v14
+ */
+ lxvw4x(32, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(33, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(34, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(35, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(36, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(37, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(38, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(39, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(40, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(41, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(42, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(43, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(44, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(45, %[cc], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16)
+ lxvw4x(46, %[cc], %[sk])
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ /*
+ * v15 = constant for byteswapping words
+ */
+ lxvw4x(47, 0, %[idx2be])
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Load IV into v16.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(48, 0, %[iv])
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(16, 16, 16, 15)
+#endif
+
+ mtctr(%[num_blocks])
+ label(loop)
+ /*
+ * Load next plaintext word and XOR with current IV.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(49, 0, %[buf])
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(17, 17, 17, 15)
+#endif
+ vxor(16, 16, 17)
+
+ /*
+ * Encrypt the block.
+ */
+ vxor(16, 16, 0)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 1)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 2)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 3)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 4)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 5)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 6)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 7)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 8)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 9)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 10)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 11)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 12)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 13)
+ vcipherlast(16, 16, 14)
+
+ /*
+ * Store back result (with byteswap)
+ */
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(17, 16, 16, 15)
+ stxvw4x(49, 0, %[buf])
+#else
+ stxvw4x(48, 0, %[buf])
+#endif
+ addi(%[buf], %[buf], 16)
+
+ bdnz(loop)
+
+: [cc] "+b" (cc), [buf] "+b" (buf)
+: [sk] "b" (sk), [iv] "b" (iv), [num_blocks] "b" (len >> 4)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ , [idx2be] "b" (idx2be)
+#endif
+: "v0", "v1", "v2", "v3", "v4", "v5", "v6", "v7", "v8", "v9",
+ "v10", "v11", "v12", "v13", "v14", "v15", "v16", "v17", "v18", "v19",
+ "ctr", "memory"
+ );
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_run(const br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len > 0) {
+ switch (ctx->num_rounds) {
+ case 10:
+ cbcenc_128(ctx->skey.skni, iv, data, len);
+ break;
+ case 12:
+ cbcenc_192(ctx->skey.skni, iv, data, len);
+ break;
+ default:
+ cbcenc_256(ctx->skey.skni, iv, data, len);
+ break;
+ }
+ memcpy(iv, (unsigned char *)data + (len - 16), 16);
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcenc_class br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcenc_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcenc_class *const *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_run
+};
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcenc_class *
+br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_get_vtable(void)
+{
+ return br_aes_pwr8_supported() ? &br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_vtable : NULL;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcenc_class *
+br_aes_pwr8_cbcenc_get_vtable(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_pwr8_ctr.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_pwr8_ctr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f5d20c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_pwr8_ctr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,717 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define BR_POWER_ASM_MACROS 1
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_POWER8
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_pwr8_ctr_init(br_aes_pwr8_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_pwr8_ctr_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_pwr8_keysched(ctx->skey.skni, key, len);
+}
+
+static void
+ctr_128(const unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *ivbuf,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t num_blocks)
+{
+ long cc0, cc1, cc2, cc3;
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ static const uint32_t idx2be[] = {
+ 0x03020100, 0x07060504, 0x0B0A0908, 0x0F0E0D0C
+ };
+#endif
+ static const uint32_t ctrinc[] = {
+ 0, 0, 0, 4
+ };
+
+ cc0 = 0;
+ cc1 = 16;
+ cc2 = 32;
+ cc3 = 48;
+ asm volatile (
+
+ /*
+ * Load subkeys into v0..v10
+ */
+ lxvw4x(32, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(33, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(34, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(35, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(36, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(37, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(38, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(39, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(40, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(41, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(42, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ li(%[cc0], 0)
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ /*
+ * v15 = constant for byteswapping words
+ */
+ lxvw4x(47, 0, %[idx2be])
+#endif
+ /*
+ * v28 = increment for IV counter.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(60, 0, %[ctrinc])
+
+ /*
+ * Load IV into v16..v19
+ */
+ lxvw4x(48, %[cc0], %[ivbuf])
+ lxvw4x(49, %[cc1], %[ivbuf])
+ lxvw4x(50, %[cc2], %[ivbuf])
+ lxvw4x(51, %[cc3], %[ivbuf])
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(16, 16, 16, 15)
+ vperm(17, 17, 17, 15)
+ vperm(18, 18, 18, 15)
+ vperm(19, 19, 19, 15)
+#endif
+
+ mtctr(%[num_blocks])
+ label(loop)
+ /*
+ * Compute next IV into v24..v27
+ */
+ vadduwm(24, 16, 28)
+ vadduwm(25, 17, 28)
+ vadduwm(26, 18, 28)
+ vadduwm(27, 19, 28)
+
+ /*
+ * Load next data blocks. We do this early on but we
+ * won't need them until IV encryption is done.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(52, %[cc0], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(53, %[cc1], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(54, %[cc2], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(55, %[cc3], %[buf])
+
+ /*
+ * Encrypt the current IV.
+ */
+ vxor(16, 16, 0)
+ vxor(17, 17, 0)
+ vxor(18, 18, 0)
+ vxor(19, 19, 0)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 1)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 1)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 1)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 1)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 2)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 2)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 2)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 2)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 3)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 3)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 3)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 3)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 4)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 4)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 4)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 4)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 5)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 5)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 5)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 5)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 6)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 6)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 6)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 6)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 7)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 7)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 7)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 7)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 8)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 8)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 8)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 8)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 9)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 9)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 9)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 9)
+ vcipherlast(16, 16, 10)
+ vcipherlast(17, 17, 10)
+ vcipherlast(18, 18, 10)
+ vcipherlast(19, 19, 10)
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(16, 16, 16, 15)
+ vperm(17, 17, 17, 15)
+ vperm(18, 18, 18, 15)
+ vperm(19, 19, 19, 15)
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Load next plaintext word and XOR with encrypted IV.
+ */
+ vxor(16, 20, 16)
+ vxor(17, 21, 17)
+ vxor(18, 22, 18)
+ vxor(19, 23, 19)
+ stxvw4x(48, %[cc0], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(49, %[cc1], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(50, %[cc2], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(51, %[cc3], %[buf])
+
+ addi(%[buf], %[buf], 64)
+
+ /*
+ * Update IV.
+ */
+ vand(16, 24, 24)
+ vand(17, 25, 25)
+ vand(18, 26, 26)
+ vand(19, 27, 27)
+
+ bdnz(loop)
+
+: [cc0] "+b" (cc0), [cc1] "+b" (cc1), [cc2] "+b" (cc2), [cc3] "+b" (cc3),
+ [buf] "+b" (buf)
+: [sk] "b" (sk), [ivbuf] "b" (ivbuf), [num_blocks] "b" (num_blocks >> 2),
+ [ctrinc] "b" (ctrinc)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ , [idx2be] "b" (idx2be)
+#endif
+: "v0", "v1", "v2", "v3", "v4", "v5", "v6", "v7", "v8", "v9",
+ "v10", "v11", "v12", "v13", "v14", "v15", "v16", "v17", "v18", "v19",
+ "v20", "v21", "v22", "v23", "v24", "v25", "v26", "v27", "v28", "v29",
+ "ctr", "memory"
+ );
+}
+
+static void
+ctr_192(const unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *ivbuf,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t num_blocks)
+{
+ long cc0, cc1, cc2, cc3;
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ static const uint32_t idx2be[] = {
+ 0x03020100, 0x07060504, 0x0B0A0908, 0x0F0E0D0C
+ };
+#endif
+ static const uint32_t ctrinc[] = {
+ 0, 0, 0, 4
+ };
+
+ cc0 = 0;
+ cc1 = 16;
+ cc2 = 32;
+ cc3 = 48;
+ asm volatile (
+
+ /*
+ * Load subkeys into v0..v12
+ */
+ lxvw4x(32, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(33, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(34, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(35, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(36, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(37, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(38, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(39, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(40, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(41, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(42, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(43, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(44, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ li(%[cc0], 0)
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ /*
+ * v15 = constant for byteswapping words
+ */
+ lxvw4x(47, 0, %[idx2be])
+#endif
+ /*
+ * v28 = increment for IV counter.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(60, 0, %[ctrinc])
+
+ /*
+ * Load IV into v16..v19
+ */
+ lxvw4x(48, %[cc0], %[ivbuf])
+ lxvw4x(49, %[cc1], %[ivbuf])
+ lxvw4x(50, %[cc2], %[ivbuf])
+ lxvw4x(51, %[cc3], %[ivbuf])
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(16, 16, 16, 15)
+ vperm(17, 17, 17, 15)
+ vperm(18, 18, 18, 15)
+ vperm(19, 19, 19, 15)
+#endif
+
+ mtctr(%[num_blocks])
+ label(loop)
+ /*
+ * Compute next IV into v24..v27
+ */
+ vadduwm(24, 16, 28)
+ vadduwm(25, 17, 28)
+ vadduwm(26, 18, 28)
+ vadduwm(27, 19, 28)
+
+ /*
+ * Load next data blocks. We do this early on but we
+ * won't need them until IV encryption is done.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(52, %[cc0], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(53, %[cc1], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(54, %[cc2], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(55, %[cc3], %[buf])
+
+ /*
+ * Encrypt the current IV.
+ */
+ vxor(16, 16, 0)
+ vxor(17, 17, 0)
+ vxor(18, 18, 0)
+ vxor(19, 19, 0)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 1)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 1)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 1)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 1)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 2)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 2)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 2)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 2)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 3)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 3)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 3)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 3)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 4)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 4)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 4)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 4)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 5)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 5)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 5)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 5)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 6)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 6)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 6)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 6)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 7)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 7)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 7)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 7)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 8)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 8)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 8)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 8)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 9)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 9)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 9)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 9)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 10)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 10)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 10)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 10)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 11)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 11)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 11)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 11)
+ vcipherlast(16, 16, 12)
+ vcipherlast(17, 17, 12)
+ vcipherlast(18, 18, 12)
+ vcipherlast(19, 19, 12)
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(16, 16, 16, 15)
+ vperm(17, 17, 17, 15)
+ vperm(18, 18, 18, 15)
+ vperm(19, 19, 19, 15)
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Load next plaintext word and XOR with encrypted IV.
+ */
+ vxor(16, 20, 16)
+ vxor(17, 21, 17)
+ vxor(18, 22, 18)
+ vxor(19, 23, 19)
+ stxvw4x(48, %[cc0], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(49, %[cc1], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(50, %[cc2], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(51, %[cc3], %[buf])
+
+ addi(%[buf], %[buf], 64)
+
+ /*
+ * Update IV.
+ */
+ vand(16, 24, 24)
+ vand(17, 25, 25)
+ vand(18, 26, 26)
+ vand(19, 27, 27)
+
+ bdnz(loop)
+
+: [cc0] "+b" (cc0), [cc1] "+b" (cc1), [cc2] "+b" (cc2), [cc3] "+b" (cc3),
+ [buf] "+b" (buf)
+: [sk] "b" (sk), [ivbuf] "b" (ivbuf), [num_blocks] "b" (num_blocks >> 2),
+ [ctrinc] "b" (ctrinc)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ , [idx2be] "b" (idx2be)
+#endif
+: "v0", "v1", "v2", "v3", "v4", "v5", "v6", "v7", "v8", "v9",
+ "v10", "v11", "v12", "v13", "v14", "v15", "v16", "v17", "v18", "v19",
+ "v20", "v21", "v22", "v23", "v24", "v25", "v26", "v27", "v28", "v29",
+ "ctr", "memory"
+ );
+}
+
+static void
+ctr_256(const unsigned char *sk, const unsigned char *ivbuf,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t num_blocks)
+{
+ long cc0, cc1, cc2, cc3;
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ static const uint32_t idx2be[] = {
+ 0x03020100, 0x07060504, 0x0B0A0908, 0x0F0E0D0C
+ };
+#endif
+ static const uint32_t ctrinc[] = {
+ 0, 0, 0, 4
+ };
+
+ cc0 = 0;
+ cc1 = 16;
+ cc2 = 32;
+ cc3 = 48;
+ asm volatile (
+
+ /*
+ * Load subkeys into v0..v14
+ */
+ lxvw4x(32, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(33, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(34, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(35, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(36, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(37, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(38, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(39, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(40, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(41, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(42, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(43, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(44, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(45, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ addi(%[cc0], %[cc0], 16)
+ lxvw4x(46, %[cc0], %[sk])
+ li(%[cc0], 0)
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ /*
+ * v15 = constant for byteswapping words
+ */
+ lxvw4x(47, 0, %[idx2be])
+#endif
+ /*
+ * v28 = increment for IV counter.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(60, 0, %[ctrinc])
+
+ /*
+ * Load IV into v16..v19
+ */
+ lxvw4x(48, %[cc0], %[ivbuf])
+ lxvw4x(49, %[cc1], %[ivbuf])
+ lxvw4x(50, %[cc2], %[ivbuf])
+ lxvw4x(51, %[cc3], %[ivbuf])
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(16, 16, 16, 15)
+ vperm(17, 17, 17, 15)
+ vperm(18, 18, 18, 15)
+ vperm(19, 19, 19, 15)
+#endif
+
+ mtctr(%[num_blocks])
+ label(loop)
+ /*
+ * Compute next IV into v24..v27
+ */
+ vadduwm(24, 16, 28)
+ vadduwm(25, 17, 28)
+ vadduwm(26, 18, 28)
+ vadduwm(27, 19, 28)
+
+ /*
+ * Load next data blocks. We do this early on but we
+ * won't need them until IV encryption is done.
+ */
+ lxvw4x(52, %[cc0], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(53, %[cc1], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(54, %[cc2], %[buf])
+ lxvw4x(55, %[cc3], %[buf])
+
+ /*
+ * Encrypt the current IV.
+ */
+ vxor(16, 16, 0)
+ vxor(17, 17, 0)
+ vxor(18, 18, 0)
+ vxor(19, 19, 0)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 1)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 1)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 1)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 1)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 2)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 2)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 2)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 2)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 3)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 3)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 3)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 3)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 4)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 4)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 4)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 4)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 5)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 5)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 5)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 5)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 6)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 6)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 6)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 6)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 7)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 7)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 7)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 7)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 8)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 8)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 8)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 8)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 9)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 9)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 9)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 9)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 10)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 10)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 10)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 10)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 11)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 11)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 11)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 11)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 12)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 12)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 12)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 12)
+ vcipher(16, 16, 13)
+ vcipher(17, 17, 13)
+ vcipher(18, 18, 13)
+ vcipher(19, 19, 13)
+ vcipherlast(16, 16, 14)
+ vcipherlast(17, 17, 14)
+ vcipherlast(18, 18, 14)
+ vcipherlast(19, 19, 14)
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ vperm(16, 16, 16, 15)
+ vperm(17, 17, 17, 15)
+ vperm(18, 18, 18, 15)
+ vperm(19, 19, 19, 15)
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Load next plaintext word and XOR with encrypted IV.
+ */
+ vxor(16, 20, 16)
+ vxor(17, 21, 17)
+ vxor(18, 22, 18)
+ vxor(19, 23, 19)
+ stxvw4x(48, %[cc0], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(49, %[cc1], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(50, %[cc2], %[buf])
+ stxvw4x(51, %[cc3], %[buf])
+
+ addi(%[buf], %[buf], 64)
+
+ /*
+ * Update IV.
+ */
+ vand(16, 24, 24)
+ vand(17, 25, 25)
+ vand(18, 26, 26)
+ vand(19, 27, 27)
+
+ bdnz(loop)
+
+: [cc0] "+b" (cc0), [cc1] "+b" (cc1), [cc2] "+b" (cc2), [cc3] "+b" (cc3),
+ [buf] "+b" (buf)
+: [sk] "b" (sk), [ivbuf] "b" (ivbuf), [num_blocks] "b" (num_blocks >> 2),
+ [ctrinc] "b" (ctrinc)
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+ , [idx2be] "b" (idx2be)
+#endif
+: "v0", "v1", "v2", "v3", "v4", "v5", "v6", "v7", "v8", "v9",
+ "v10", "v11", "v12", "v13", "v14", "v15", "v16", "v17", "v18", "v19",
+ "v20", "v21", "v22", "v23", "v24", "v25", "v26", "v27", "v28", "v29",
+ "ctr", "memory"
+ );
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+uint32_t
+br_aes_pwr8_ctr_run(const br_aes_pwr8_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char ivbuf[64];
+
+ buf = data;
+ memcpy(ivbuf + 0, iv, 12);
+ memcpy(ivbuf + 16, iv, 12);
+ memcpy(ivbuf + 32, iv, 12);
+ memcpy(ivbuf + 48, iv, 12);
+ if (len >= 64) {
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 12, cc + 0);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 28, cc + 1);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 44, cc + 2);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 60, cc + 3);
+ switch (ctx->num_rounds) {
+ case 10:
+ ctr_128(ctx->skey.skni, ivbuf, buf,
+ (len >> 4) & ~(size_t)3);
+ break;
+ case 12:
+ ctr_192(ctx->skey.skni, ivbuf, buf,
+ (len >> 4) & ~(size_t)3);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ctr_256(ctx->skey.skni, ivbuf, buf,
+ (len >> 4) & ~(size_t)3);
+ break;
+ }
+ cc += (len >> 4) & ~(size_t)3;
+ buf += len & ~(size_t)63;
+ len &= 63;
+ }
+ if (len > 0) {
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, buf, len);
+ memset(tmp + len, 0, (sizeof tmp) - len);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 12, cc + 0);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 28, cc + 1);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 44, cc + 2);
+ br_enc32be(ivbuf + 60, cc + 3);
+ switch (ctx->num_rounds) {
+ case 10:
+ ctr_128(ctx->skey.skni, ivbuf, tmp, 4);
+ break;
+ case 12:
+ ctr_192(ctx->skey.skni, ivbuf, tmp, 4);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ctr_256(ctx->skey.skni, ivbuf, tmp, 4);
+ break;
+ }
+ memcpy(buf, tmp, len);
+ cc += (len + 15) >> 4;
+ }
+ return cc;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctr_class br_aes_pwr8_ctr_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_pwr8_ctr_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctr_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_pwr8_ctr_init,
+ (uint32_t (*)(const br_block_ctr_class *const *,
+ const void *, uint32_t, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_pwr8_ctr_run
+};
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctr_class *
+br_aes_pwr8_ctr_get_vtable(void)
+{
+ return br_aes_pwr8_supported() ? &br_aes_pwr8_ctr_vtable : NULL;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctr_class *
+br_aes_pwr8_ctr_get_vtable(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_pwr8_ctrcbc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_pwr8_ctrcbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a67d30b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_pwr8_ctrcbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,946 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define BR_POWER_ASM_MACROS 1
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_POWER8
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctrcbc_class *
+br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_get_vtable(void)
+{
+ return br_aes_pwr8_supported() ? &br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_vtable : NULL;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_init(br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_pwr8_keysched(ctx->skey.skni, key, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Register conventions for CTR + CBC-MAC:
+ *
+ * AES subkeys are in registers 0 to 10/12/14 (depending on keys size)
+ * Register v15 contains the byteswap index register (little-endian only)
+ * Register v16 contains the CTR counter value
+ * Register v17 contains the CBC-MAC current value
+ * Registers v18 to v27 are scratch
+ * Counter increment uses v28, v29 and v30
+ *
+ * For CTR alone:
+ *
+ * AES subkeys are in registers 0 to 10/12/14 (depending on keys size)
+ * Register v15 contains the byteswap index register (little-endian only)
+ * Registers v16 to v19 contain the CTR counter values (four blocks)
+ * Registers v20 to v27 are scratch
+ * Counter increment uses v28, v29 and v30
+ */
+
+#define LOAD_SUBKEYS_128 \
+ lxvw4x(32, %[cc], %[sk]) \
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16) \
+ lxvw4x(33, %[cc], %[sk]) \
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16) \
+ lxvw4x(34, %[cc], %[sk]) \
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16) \
+ lxvw4x(35, %[cc], %[sk]) \
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16) \
+ lxvw4x(36, %[cc], %[sk]) \
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16) \
+ lxvw4x(37, %[cc], %[sk]) \
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16) \
+ lxvw4x(38, %[cc], %[sk]) \
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16) \
+ lxvw4x(39, %[cc], %[sk]) \
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16) \
+ lxvw4x(40, %[cc], %[sk]) \
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16) \
+ lxvw4x(41, %[cc], %[sk]) \
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16) \
+ lxvw4x(42, %[cc], %[sk])
+
+#define LOAD_SUBKEYS_192 \
+ LOAD_SUBKEYS_128 \
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16) \
+ lxvw4x(43, %[cc], %[sk]) \
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16) \
+ lxvw4x(44, %[cc], %[sk])
+
+#define LOAD_SUBKEYS_256 \
+ LOAD_SUBKEYS_192 \
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16) \
+ lxvw4x(45, %[cc], %[sk]) \
+ addi(%[cc], %[cc], 16) \
+ lxvw4x(46, %[cc], %[sk])
+
+#define BLOCK_ENCRYPT_128(x) \
+ vxor(x, x, 0) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 1) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 2) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 3) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 4) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 5) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 6) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 7) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 8) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 9) \
+ vcipherlast(x, x, 10)
+
+#define BLOCK_ENCRYPT_192(x) \
+ vxor(x, x, 0) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 1) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 2) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 3) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 4) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 5) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 6) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 7) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 8) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 9) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 10) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 11) \
+ vcipherlast(x, x, 12)
+
+#define BLOCK_ENCRYPT_256(x) \
+ vxor(x, x, 0) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 1) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 2) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 3) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 4) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 5) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 6) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 7) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 8) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 9) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 10) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 11) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 12) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 13) \
+ vcipherlast(x, x, 14)
+
+#define BLOCK_ENCRYPT_X2_128(x, y) \
+ vxor(x, x, 0) \
+ vxor(y, y, 0) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 1) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 1) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 2) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 2) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 3) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 3) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 4) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 4) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 5) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 5) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 6) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 6) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 7) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 7) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 8) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 8) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 9) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 9) \
+ vcipherlast(x, x, 10) \
+ vcipherlast(y, y, 10)
+
+#define BLOCK_ENCRYPT_X2_192(x, y) \
+ vxor(x, x, 0) \
+ vxor(y, y, 0) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 1) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 1) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 2) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 2) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 3) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 3) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 4) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 4) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 5) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 5) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 6) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 6) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 7) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 7) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 8) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 8) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 9) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 9) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 10) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 10) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 11) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 11) \
+ vcipherlast(x, x, 12) \
+ vcipherlast(y, y, 12)
+
+#define BLOCK_ENCRYPT_X2_256(x, y) \
+ vxor(x, x, 0) \
+ vxor(y, y, 0) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 1) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 1) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 2) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 2) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 3) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 3) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 4) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 4) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 5) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 5) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 6) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 6) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 7) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 7) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 8) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 8) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 9) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 9) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 10) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 10) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 11) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 11) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 12) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 12) \
+ vcipher(x, x, 13) \
+ vcipher(y, y, 13) \
+ vcipherlast(x, x, 14) \
+ vcipherlast(y, y, 14)
+
+#define BLOCK_ENCRYPT_X4_128(x0, x1, x2, x3) \
+ vxor(x0, x0, 0) \
+ vxor(x1, x1, 0) \
+ vxor(x2, x2, 0) \
+ vxor(x3, x3, 0) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 1) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 1) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 1) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 1) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 2) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 2) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 2) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 2) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 3) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 3) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 3) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 3) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 4) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 4) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 4) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 4) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 5) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 5) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 5) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 5) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 6) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 6) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 6) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 6) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 7) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 7) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 7) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 7) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 8) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 8) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 8) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 8) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 9) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 9) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 9) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 9) \
+ vcipherlast(x0, x0, 10) \
+ vcipherlast(x1, x1, 10) \
+ vcipherlast(x2, x2, 10) \
+ vcipherlast(x3, x3, 10)
+
+#define BLOCK_ENCRYPT_X4_192(x0, x1, x2, x3) \
+ vxor(x0, x0, 0) \
+ vxor(x1, x1, 0) \
+ vxor(x2, x2, 0) \
+ vxor(x3, x3, 0) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 1) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 1) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 1) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 1) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 2) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 2) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 2) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 2) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 3) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 3) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 3) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 3) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 4) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 4) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 4) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 4) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 5) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 5) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 5) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 5) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 6) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 6) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 6) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 6) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 7) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 7) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 7) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 7) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 8) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 8) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 8) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 8) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 9) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 9) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 9) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 9) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 10) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 10) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 10) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 10) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 11) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 11) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 11) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 11) \
+ vcipherlast(x0, x0, 12) \
+ vcipherlast(x1, x1, 12) \
+ vcipherlast(x2, x2, 12) \
+ vcipherlast(x3, x3, 12)
+
+#define BLOCK_ENCRYPT_X4_256(x0, x1, x2, x3) \
+ vxor(x0, x0, 0) \
+ vxor(x1, x1, 0) \
+ vxor(x2, x2, 0) \
+ vxor(x3, x3, 0) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 1) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 1) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 1) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 1) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 2) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 2) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 2) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 2) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 3) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 3) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 3) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 3) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 4) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 4) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 4) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 4) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 5) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 5) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 5) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 5) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 6) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 6) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 6) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 6) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 7) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 7) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 7) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 7) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 8) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 8) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 8) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 8) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 9) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 9) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 9) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 9) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 10) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 10) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 10) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 10) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 11) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 11) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 11) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 11) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 12) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 12) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 12) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 12) \
+ vcipher(x0, x0, 13) \
+ vcipher(x1, x1, 13) \
+ vcipher(x2, x2, 13) \
+ vcipher(x3, x3, 13) \
+ vcipherlast(x0, x0, 14) \
+ vcipherlast(x1, x1, 14) \
+ vcipherlast(x2, x2, 14) \
+ vcipherlast(x3, x3, 14)
+
+#if BR_POWER8_LE
+static const uint32_t idx2be[] = {
+ 0x03020100, 0x07060504, 0x0B0A0908, 0x0F0E0D0C
+};
+#define BYTESWAP_INIT lxvw4x(47, 0, %[idx2be])
+#define BYTESWAP(x) vperm(x, x, x, 15)
+#define BYTESWAPX(d, s) vperm(d, s, s, 15)
+#define BYTESWAP_REG , [idx2be] "b" (idx2be)
+#else
+#define BYTESWAP_INIT
+#define BYTESWAP(x)
+#define BYTESWAPX(d, s) vand(d, s, s)
+#define BYTESWAP_REG
+#endif
+
+static const uint32_t ctrinc[] = {
+ 0, 0, 0, 1
+};
+static const uint32_t ctrinc_x4[] = {
+ 0, 0, 0, 4
+};
+#define INCR_128_INIT lxvw4x(60, 0, %[ctrinc])
+#define INCR_128_X4_INIT lxvw4x(60, 0, %[ctrinc_x4])
+#define INCR_128(d, s) \
+ vaddcuw(29, s, 28) \
+ vadduwm(d, s, 28) \
+ vsldoi(30, 29, 29, 4) \
+ vaddcuw(29, d, 30) \
+ vadduwm(d, d, 30) \
+ vsldoi(30, 29, 29, 4) \
+ vaddcuw(29, d, 30) \
+ vadduwm(d, d, 30) \
+ vsldoi(30, 29, 29, 4) \
+ vadduwm(d, d, 30)
+
+#define MKCTR(size) \
+static void \
+ctr_ ## size(const unsigned char *sk, \
+ unsigned char *ctrbuf, unsigned char *buf, size_t num_blocks_x4) \
+{ \
+ long cc, cc0, cc1, cc2, cc3; \
+ \
+ cc = 0; \
+ cc0 = 0; \
+ cc1 = 16; \
+ cc2 = 32; \
+ cc3 = 48; \
+ asm volatile ( \
+ \
+ /* \
+ * Load subkeys into v0..v10 \
+ */ \
+ LOAD_SUBKEYS_ ## size \
+ li(%[cc], 0) \
+ \
+ BYTESWAP_INIT \
+ INCR_128_X4_INIT \
+ \
+ /* \
+ * Load current CTR counters into v16 to v19. \
+ */ \
+ lxvw4x(48, %[cc0], %[ctrbuf]) \
+ lxvw4x(49, %[cc1], %[ctrbuf]) \
+ lxvw4x(50, %[cc2], %[ctrbuf]) \
+ lxvw4x(51, %[cc3], %[ctrbuf]) \
+ BYTESWAP(16) \
+ BYTESWAP(17) \
+ BYTESWAP(18) \
+ BYTESWAP(19) \
+ \
+ mtctr(%[num_blocks_x4]) \
+ \
+ label(loop) \
+ /* \
+ * Compute next counter values into v20..v23. \
+ */ \
+ INCR_128(20, 16) \
+ INCR_128(21, 17) \
+ INCR_128(22, 18) \
+ INCR_128(23, 19) \
+ \
+ /* \
+ * Encrypt counter values and XOR into next data blocks. \
+ */ \
+ lxvw4x(56, %[cc0], %[buf]) \
+ lxvw4x(57, %[cc1], %[buf]) \
+ lxvw4x(58, %[cc2], %[buf]) \
+ lxvw4x(59, %[cc3], %[buf]) \
+ BYTESWAP(24) \
+ BYTESWAP(25) \
+ BYTESWAP(26) \
+ BYTESWAP(27) \
+ BLOCK_ENCRYPT_X4_ ## size(16, 17, 18, 19) \
+ vxor(16, 16, 24) \
+ vxor(17, 17, 25) \
+ vxor(18, 18, 26) \
+ vxor(19, 19, 27) \
+ BYTESWAP(16) \
+ BYTESWAP(17) \
+ BYTESWAP(18) \
+ BYTESWAP(19) \
+ stxvw4x(48, %[cc0], %[buf]) \
+ stxvw4x(49, %[cc1], %[buf]) \
+ stxvw4x(50, %[cc2], %[buf]) \
+ stxvw4x(51, %[cc3], %[buf]) \
+ \
+ /* \
+ * Update counters and data pointer. \
+ */ \
+ vand(16, 20, 20) \
+ vand(17, 21, 21) \
+ vand(18, 22, 22) \
+ vand(19, 23, 23) \
+ addi(%[buf], %[buf], 64) \
+ \
+ bdnz(loop) \
+ \
+ /* \
+ * Write back new counter values. \
+ */ \
+ BYTESWAP(16) \
+ BYTESWAP(17) \
+ BYTESWAP(18) \
+ BYTESWAP(19) \
+ stxvw4x(48, %[cc0], %[ctrbuf]) \
+ stxvw4x(49, %[cc1], %[ctrbuf]) \
+ stxvw4x(50, %[cc2], %[ctrbuf]) \
+ stxvw4x(51, %[cc3], %[ctrbuf]) \
+ \
+: [cc] "+b" (cc), [buf] "+b" (buf), \
+ [cc0] "+b" (cc0), [cc1] "+b" (cc1), [cc2] "+b" (cc2), [cc3] "+b" (cc3) \
+: [sk] "b" (sk), [ctrbuf] "b" (ctrbuf), \
+ [num_blocks_x4] "b" (num_blocks_x4), [ctrinc_x4] "b" (ctrinc_x4) \
+ BYTESWAP_REG \
+: "v0", "v1", "v2", "v3", "v4", "v5", "v6", "v7", "v8", "v9", \
+ "v10", "v11", "v12", "v13", "v14", "v15", "v16", "v17", "v18", "v19", \
+ "v20", "v21", "v22", "v23", "v24", "v25", "v26", "v27", "v28", "v29", \
+ "v30", "ctr", "memory" \
+ ); \
+}
+
+MKCTR(128)
+MKCTR(192)
+MKCTR(256)
+
+#define MKCBCMAC(size) \
+static void \
+cbcmac_ ## size(const unsigned char *sk, \
+ unsigned char *cbcmac, const unsigned char *buf, size_t num_blocks) \
+{ \
+ long cc; \
+ \
+ cc = 0; \
+ asm volatile ( \
+ \
+ /* \
+ * Load subkeys into v0..v10 \
+ */ \
+ LOAD_SUBKEYS_ ## size \
+ li(%[cc], 0) \
+ \
+ BYTESWAP_INIT \
+ \
+ /* \
+ * Load current CBC-MAC value into v16. \
+ */ \
+ lxvw4x(48, %[cc], %[cbcmac]) \
+ BYTESWAP(16) \
+ \
+ mtctr(%[num_blocks]) \
+ \
+ label(loop) \
+ /* \
+ * Load next block, XOR into current CBC-MAC value, \
+ * and then encrypt it. \
+ */ \
+ lxvw4x(49, %[cc], %[buf]) \
+ BYTESWAP(17) \
+ vxor(16, 16, 17) \
+ BLOCK_ENCRYPT_ ## size(16) \
+ addi(%[buf], %[buf], 16) \
+ \
+ bdnz(loop) \
+ \
+ /* \
+ * Write back new CBC-MAC value. \
+ */ \
+ BYTESWAP(16) \
+ stxvw4x(48, %[cc], %[cbcmac]) \
+ \
+: [cc] "+b" (cc), [buf] "+b" (buf) \
+: [sk] "b" (sk), [cbcmac] "b" (cbcmac), [num_blocks] "b" (num_blocks) \
+ BYTESWAP_REG \
+: "v0", "v1", "v2", "v3", "v4", "v5", "v6", "v7", "v8", "v9", \
+ "v10", "v11", "v12", "v13", "v14", "v15", "v16", "v17", "v18", "v19", \
+ "v20", "v21", "v22", "v23", "v24", "v25", "v26", "v27", "v28", "v29", \
+ "v30", "ctr", "memory" \
+ ); \
+}
+
+MKCBCMAC(128)
+MKCBCMAC(192)
+MKCBCMAC(256)
+
+#define MKENCRYPT(size) \
+static void \
+ctrcbc_ ## size ## _encrypt(const unsigned char *sk, \
+ unsigned char *ctr, unsigned char *cbcmac, unsigned char *buf, \
+ size_t num_blocks) \
+{ \
+ long cc; \
+ \
+ cc = 0; \
+ asm volatile ( \
+ \
+ /* \
+ * Load subkeys into v0..v10 \
+ */ \
+ LOAD_SUBKEYS_ ## size \
+ li(%[cc], 0) \
+ \
+ BYTESWAP_INIT \
+ INCR_128_INIT \
+ \
+ /* \
+ * Load current CTR counter into v16, and current \
+ * CBC-MAC IV into v17. \
+ */ \
+ lxvw4x(48, %[cc], %[ctr]) \
+ lxvw4x(49, %[cc], %[cbcmac]) \
+ BYTESWAP(16) \
+ BYTESWAP(17) \
+ \
+ /* \
+ * At each iteration, we do two parallel encryption: \
+ * - new counter value for encryption of the next block; \
+ * - CBC-MAC over the previous encrypted block. \
+ * Thus, each plaintext block implies two AES instances, \
+ * over two successive iterations. This requires a single \
+ * counter encryption before the loop, and a single \
+ * CBC-MAC encryption after the loop. \
+ */ \
+ \
+ /* \
+ * Encrypt first block (into v20). \
+ */ \
+ lxvw4x(52, %[cc], %[buf]) \
+ BYTESWAP(20) \
+ INCR_128(22, 16) \
+ BLOCK_ENCRYPT_ ## size(16) \
+ vxor(20, 20, 16) \
+ BYTESWAPX(21, 20) \
+ stxvw4x(53, %[cc], %[buf]) \
+ vand(16, 22, 22) \
+ addi(%[buf], %[buf], 16) \
+ \
+ /* \
+ * Load loop counter; skip the loop if there is only \
+ * one block in total (already handled by the boundary \
+ * conditions). \
+ */ \
+ mtctr(%[num_blocks]) \
+ bdz(fastexit) \
+ \
+ label(loop) \
+ /* \
+ * Upon loop entry: \
+ * v16 counter value for next block \
+ * v17 current CBC-MAC value \
+ * v20 encrypted previous block \
+ */ \
+ vxor(17, 17, 20) \
+ INCR_128(22, 16) \
+ lxvw4x(52, %[cc], %[buf]) \
+ BYTESWAP(20) \
+ BLOCK_ENCRYPT_X2_ ## size(16, 17) \
+ vxor(20, 20, 16) \
+ BYTESWAPX(21, 20) \
+ stxvw4x(53, %[cc], %[buf]) \
+ addi(%[buf], %[buf], 16) \
+ vand(16, 22, 22) \
+ \
+ bdnz(loop) \
+ \
+ label(fastexit) \
+ vxor(17, 17, 20) \
+ BLOCK_ENCRYPT_ ## size(17) \
+ BYTESWAP(16) \
+ BYTESWAP(17) \
+ stxvw4x(48, %[cc], %[ctr]) \
+ stxvw4x(49, %[cc], %[cbcmac]) \
+ \
+: [cc] "+b" (cc), [buf] "+b" (buf) \
+: [sk] "b" (sk), [ctr] "b" (ctr), [cbcmac] "b" (cbcmac), \
+ [num_blocks] "b" (num_blocks), [ctrinc] "b" (ctrinc) \
+ BYTESWAP_REG \
+: "v0", "v1", "v2", "v3", "v4", "v5", "v6", "v7", "v8", "v9", \
+ "v10", "v11", "v12", "v13", "v14", "v15", "v16", "v17", "v18", "v19", \
+ "v20", "v21", "v22", "v23", "v24", "v25", "v26", "v27", "v28", "v29", \
+ "v30", "ctr", "memory" \
+ ); \
+}
+
+MKENCRYPT(128)
+MKENCRYPT(192)
+MKENCRYPT(256)
+
+#define MKDECRYPT(size) \
+static void \
+ctrcbc_ ## size ## _decrypt(const unsigned char *sk, \
+ unsigned char *ctr, unsigned char *cbcmac, unsigned char *buf, \
+ size_t num_blocks) \
+{ \
+ long cc; \
+ \
+ cc = 0; \
+ asm volatile ( \
+ \
+ /* \
+ * Load subkeys into v0..v10 \
+ */ \
+ LOAD_SUBKEYS_ ## size \
+ li(%[cc], 0) \
+ \
+ BYTESWAP_INIT \
+ INCR_128_INIT \
+ \
+ /* \
+ * Load current CTR counter into v16, and current \
+ * CBC-MAC IV into v17. \
+ */ \
+ lxvw4x(48, %[cc], %[ctr]) \
+ lxvw4x(49, %[cc], %[cbcmac]) \
+ BYTESWAP(16) \
+ BYTESWAP(17) \
+ \
+ /* \
+ * At each iteration, we do two parallel encryption: \
+ * - new counter value for decryption of the next block; \
+ * - CBC-MAC over the next encrypted block. \
+ * Each iteration performs the two AES instances related \
+ * to the current block; there is thus no need for some \
+ * extra pre-loop and post-loop work as in encryption. \
+ */ \
+ \
+ mtctr(%[num_blocks]) \
+ \
+ label(loop) \
+ /* \
+ * Upon loop entry: \
+ * v16 counter value for next block \
+ * v17 current CBC-MAC value \
+ */ \
+ lxvw4x(52, %[cc], %[buf]) \
+ BYTESWAP(20) \
+ vxor(17, 17, 20) \
+ INCR_128(22, 16) \
+ BLOCK_ENCRYPT_X2_ ## size(16, 17) \
+ vxor(20, 20, 16) \
+ BYTESWAPX(21, 20) \
+ stxvw4x(53, %[cc], %[buf]) \
+ addi(%[buf], %[buf], 16) \
+ vand(16, 22, 22) \
+ \
+ bdnz(loop) \
+ \
+ /* \
+ * Store back counter and CBC-MAC value. \
+ */ \
+ BYTESWAP(16) \
+ BYTESWAP(17) \
+ stxvw4x(48, %[cc], %[ctr]) \
+ stxvw4x(49, %[cc], %[cbcmac]) \
+ \
+: [cc] "+b" (cc), [buf] "+b" (buf) \
+: [sk] "b" (sk), [ctr] "b" (ctr), [cbcmac] "b" (cbcmac), \
+ [num_blocks] "b" (num_blocks), [ctrinc] "b" (ctrinc) \
+ BYTESWAP_REG \
+: "v0", "v1", "v2", "v3", "v4", "v5", "v6", "v7", "v8", "v9", \
+ "v10", "v11", "v12", "v13", "v14", "v15", "v16", "v17", "v18", "v19", \
+ "v20", "v21", "v22", "v23", "v24", "v25", "v26", "v27", "v28", "v29", \
+ "v30", "ctr", "memory" \
+ ); \
+}
+
+MKDECRYPT(128)
+MKDECRYPT(192)
+MKDECRYPT(256)
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_encrypt(const br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ switch (ctx->num_rounds) {
+ case 10:
+ ctrcbc_128_encrypt(ctx->skey.skni, ctr, cbcmac, data, len >> 4);
+ break;
+ case 12:
+ ctrcbc_192_encrypt(ctx->skey.skni, ctr, cbcmac, data, len >> 4);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ctrcbc_256_encrypt(ctx->skey.skni, ctr, cbcmac, data, len >> 4);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_decrypt(const br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ switch (ctx->num_rounds) {
+ case 10:
+ ctrcbc_128_decrypt(ctx->skey.skni, ctr, cbcmac, data, len >> 4);
+ break;
+ case 12:
+ ctrcbc_192_decrypt(ctx->skey.skni, ctr, cbcmac, data, len >> 4);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ctrcbc_256_decrypt(ctx->skey.skni, ctr, cbcmac, data, len >> 4);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline void
+incr_ctr(void *dst, const void *src)
+{
+ uint64_t hi, lo;
+
+ hi = br_dec64be(src);
+ lo = br_dec64be((const unsigned char *)src + 8);
+ lo ++;
+ hi += ((lo | -lo) >> 63) ^ (uint64_t)1;
+ br_enc64be(dst, hi);
+ br_enc64be((unsigned char *)dst + 8, lo);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_ctr(const br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char ctrbuf[64];
+
+ memcpy(ctrbuf, ctr, 16);
+ incr_ctr(ctrbuf + 16, ctrbuf);
+ incr_ctr(ctrbuf + 32, ctrbuf + 16);
+ incr_ctr(ctrbuf + 48, ctrbuf + 32);
+ if (len >= 64) {
+ switch (ctx->num_rounds) {
+ case 10:
+ ctr_128(ctx->skey.skni, ctrbuf, data, len >> 6);
+ break;
+ case 12:
+ ctr_192(ctx->skey.skni, ctrbuf, data, len >> 6);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ctr_256(ctx->skey.skni, ctrbuf, data, len >> 6);
+ break;
+ }
+ data = (unsigned char *)data + (len & ~(size_t)63);
+ len &= 63;
+ }
+ if (len > 0) {
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+
+ if (len >= 32) {
+ if (len >= 48) {
+ memcpy(ctr, ctrbuf + 48, 16);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(ctr, ctrbuf + 32, 16);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (len >= 16) {
+ memcpy(ctr, ctrbuf + 16, 16);
+ }
+ }
+ memcpy(tmp, data, len);
+ memset(tmp + len, 0, (sizeof tmp) - len);
+ switch (ctx->num_rounds) {
+ case 10:
+ ctr_128(ctx->skey.skni, ctrbuf, tmp, 1);
+ break;
+ case 12:
+ ctr_192(ctx->skey.skni, ctrbuf, tmp, 1);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ctr_256(ctx->skey.skni, ctrbuf, tmp, 1);
+ break;
+ }
+ memcpy(data, tmp, len);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(ctr, ctrbuf, 16);
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_mac(const br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *cbcmac, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len > 0) {
+ switch (ctx->num_rounds) {
+ case 10:
+ cbcmac_128(ctx->skey.skni, cbcmac, data, len >> 4);
+ break;
+ case 12:
+ cbcmac_192(ctx->skey.skni, cbcmac, data, len >> 4);
+ break;
+ default:
+ cbcmac_256(ctx->skey.skni, cbcmac, data, len >> 4);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctrcbc_class br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_encrypt,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_decrypt,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_ctr,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_mac
+};
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctrcbc_class *
+br_aes_pwr8_ctrcbc_get_vtable(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_cbcdec.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_cbcdec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8567244
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_cbcdec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_small_cbcdec_init(br_aes_small_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_small_cbcdec_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_small_cbcdec_run(const br_aes_small_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf, *ivbuf;
+
+ ivbuf = iv;
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ int i;
+
+ memcpy(tmp, buf, 16);
+ br_aes_small_decrypt(ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey, buf);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i ++) {
+ buf[i] ^= ivbuf[i];
+ }
+ memcpy(ivbuf, tmp, 16);
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcdec_class br_aes_small_cbcdec_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_small_cbcdec_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcdec_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_small_cbcdec_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcdec_class *const *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_small_cbcdec_run
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_cbcenc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_cbcenc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0dc2910
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_cbcenc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_small_cbcenc_init(br_aes_small_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_small_cbcenc_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_small_cbcenc_run(const br_aes_small_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf, *ivbuf;
+
+ ivbuf = iv;
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i ++) {
+ buf[i] ^= ivbuf[i];
+ }
+ br_aes_small_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey, buf);
+ memcpy(ivbuf, buf, 16);
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcenc_class br_aes_small_cbcenc_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_small_cbcenc_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcenc_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_small_cbcenc_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcenc_class *const *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_small_cbcenc_run
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_ctr.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_ctr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d5d371c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_ctr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_small_ctr_init(br_aes_small_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_small_ctr_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+static void
+xorbuf(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *d;
+ const unsigned char *s;
+
+ d = dst;
+ s = src;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ *d ++ ^= *s ++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+uint32_t
+br_aes_small_ctr_run(const br_aes_small_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, iv, 12);
+ br_enc32be(tmp + 12, cc ++);
+ br_aes_small_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey, tmp);
+ if (len <= 16) {
+ xorbuf(buf, tmp, len);
+ break;
+ }
+ xorbuf(buf, tmp, 16);
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+ return cc;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctr_class br_aes_small_ctr_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_small_ctr_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctr_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_small_ctr_init,
+ (uint32_t (*)(const br_block_ctr_class *const *,
+ const void *, uint32_t, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_small_ctr_run
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_ctrcbc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_ctrcbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2d6ba32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_ctrcbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_small_ctrcbc_init(br_aes_small_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_small_ctrcbc_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+static void
+xorbuf(void *dst, const void *src, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *d;
+ const unsigned char *s;
+
+ d = dst;
+ s = src;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ *d ++ ^= *s ++;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_small_ctrcbc_ctr(const br_aes_small_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf, *bctr;
+ uint32_t cc0, cc1, cc2, cc3;
+
+ buf = data;
+ bctr = ctr;
+ cc3 = br_dec32be(bctr + 0);
+ cc2 = br_dec32be(bctr + 4);
+ cc1 = br_dec32be(bctr + 8);
+ cc0 = br_dec32be(bctr + 12);
+ while (len > 0) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ uint32_t carry;
+
+ br_enc32be(tmp + 0, cc3);
+ br_enc32be(tmp + 4, cc2);
+ br_enc32be(tmp + 8, cc1);
+ br_enc32be(tmp + 12, cc0);
+ br_aes_small_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey, tmp);
+ xorbuf(buf, tmp, 16);
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ cc0 ++;
+ carry = (~(cc0 | -cc0)) >> 31;
+ cc1 += carry;
+ carry &= (~(cc1 | -cc1)) >> 31;
+ cc2 += carry;
+ carry &= (~(cc2 | -cc2)) >> 31;
+ cc3 += carry;
+ }
+ br_enc32be(bctr + 0, cc3);
+ br_enc32be(bctr + 4, cc2);
+ br_enc32be(bctr + 8, cc1);
+ br_enc32be(bctr + 12, cc0);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_small_ctrcbc_mac(const br_aes_small_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *cbcmac, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ xorbuf(cbcmac, buf, 16);
+ br_aes_small_encrypt(ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey, cbcmac);
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_small_ctrcbc_encrypt(const br_aes_small_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ br_aes_small_ctrcbc_ctr(ctx, ctr, data, len);
+ br_aes_small_ctrcbc_mac(ctx, cbcmac, data, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_small_ctrcbc_decrypt(const br_aes_small_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ br_aes_small_ctrcbc_mac(ctx, cbcmac, data, len);
+ br_aes_small_ctrcbc_ctr(ctx, ctr, data, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctrcbc_class br_aes_small_ctrcbc_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_small_ctrcbc_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_small_ctrcbc_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_small_ctrcbc_encrypt,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_small_ctrcbc_decrypt,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_small_ctrcbc_ctr,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_small_ctrcbc_mac
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_dec.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_dec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59dca8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_dec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Inverse S-box.
+ */
+static const unsigned char iS[] = {
+ 0x52, 0x09, 0x6A, 0xD5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xA5, 0x38, 0xBF, 0x40, 0xA3, 0x9E,
+ 0x81, 0xF3, 0xD7, 0xFB, 0x7C, 0xE3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9B, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x87,
+ 0x34, 0x8E, 0x43, 0x44, 0xC4, 0xDE, 0xE9, 0xCB, 0x54, 0x7B, 0x94, 0x32,
+ 0xA6, 0xC2, 0x23, 0x3D, 0xEE, 0x4C, 0x95, 0x0B, 0x42, 0xFA, 0xC3, 0x4E,
+ 0x08, 0x2E, 0xA1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x24, 0xB2, 0x76, 0x5B, 0xA2, 0x49,
+ 0x6D, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x25, 0x72, 0xF8, 0xF6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16,
+ 0xD4, 0xA4, 0x5C, 0xCC, 0x5D, 0x65, 0xB6, 0x92, 0x6C, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50,
+ 0xFD, 0xED, 0xB9, 0xDA, 0x5E, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0x84,
+ 0x90, 0xD8, 0xAB, 0x00, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0xD3, 0x0A, 0xF7, 0xE4, 0x58, 0x05,
+ 0xB8, 0xB3, 0x45, 0x06, 0xD0, 0x2C, 0x1E, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x3F, 0x0F, 0x02,
+ 0xC1, 0xAF, 0xBD, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8A, 0x6B, 0x3A, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41,
+ 0x4F, 0x67, 0xDC, 0xEA, 0x97, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0xCE, 0xF0, 0xB4, 0xE6, 0x73,
+ 0x96, 0xAC, 0x74, 0x22, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x35, 0x85, 0xE2, 0xF9, 0x37, 0xE8,
+ 0x1C, 0x75, 0xDF, 0x6E, 0x47, 0xF1, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x1D, 0x29, 0xC5, 0x89,
+ 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x62, 0x0E, 0xAA, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x1B, 0xFC, 0x56, 0x3E, 0x4B,
+ 0xC6, 0xD2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xCD, 0x5A, 0xF4,
+ 0x1F, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xC7, 0x31, 0xB1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59,
+ 0x27, 0x80, 0xEC, 0x5F, 0x60, 0x51, 0x7F, 0xA9, 0x19, 0xB5, 0x4A, 0x0D,
+ 0x2D, 0xE5, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0x93, 0xC9, 0x9C, 0xEF, 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x3B, 0x4D,
+ 0xAE, 0x2A, 0xF5, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0xEB, 0xBB, 0x3C, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61,
+ 0x17, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x7E, 0xBA, 0x77, 0xD6, 0x26, 0xE1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63,
+ 0x55, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x7D
+};
+
+static void
+add_round_key(unsigned *state, const uint32_t *skeys)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i += 4) {
+ uint32_t k;
+
+ k = *skeys ++;
+ state[i + 0] ^= (unsigned)(k >> 24);
+ state[i + 1] ^= (unsigned)(k >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ state[i + 2] ^= (unsigned)(k >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ state[i + 3] ^= (unsigned)k & 0xFF;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+inv_sub_bytes(unsigned *state)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i ++) {
+ state[i] = iS[state[i]];
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+inv_shift_rows(unsigned *state)
+{
+ unsigned tmp;
+
+ tmp = state[13];
+ state[13] = state[9];
+ state[9] = state[5];
+ state[5] = state[1];
+ state[1] = tmp;
+
+ tmp = state[2];
+ state[2] = state[10];
+ state[10] = tmp;
+ tmp = state[6];
+ state[6] = state[14];
+ state[14] = tmp;
+
+ tmp = state[3];
+ state[3] = state[7];
+ state[7] = state[11];
+ state[11] = state[15];
+ state[15] = tmp;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned
+gf256red(unsigned x)
+{
+ unsigned y;
+
+ y = x >> 8;
+ return (x ^ y ^ (y << 1) ^ (y << 3) ^ (y << 4)) & 0xFF;
+}
+
+static void
+inv_mix_columns(unsigned *state)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i += 4) {
+ unsigned s0, s1, s2, s3;
+ unsigned t0, t1, t2, t3;
+
+ s0 = state[i + 0];
+ s1 = state[i + 1];
+ s2 = state[i + 2];
+ s3 = state[i + 3];
+ t0 = (s0 << 1) ^ (s0 << 2) ^ (s0 << 3)
+ ^ s1 ^ (s1 << 1) ^ (s1 << 3)
+ ^ s2 ^ (s2 << 2) ^ (s2 << 3)
+ ^ s3 ^ (s3 << 3);
+ t1 = s0 ^ (s0 << 3)
+ ^ (s1 << 1) ^ (s1 << 2) ^ (s1 << 3)
+ ^ s2 ^ (s2 << 1) ^ (s2 << 3)
+ ^ s3 ^ (s3 << 2) ^ (s3 << 3);
+ t2 = s0 ^ (s0 << 2) ^ (s0 << 3)
+ ^ s1 ^ (s1 << 3)
+ ^ (s2 << 1) ^ (s2 << 2) ^ (s2 << 3)
+ ^ s3 ^ (s3 << 1) ^ (s3 << 3);
+ t3 = s0 ^ (s0 << 1) ^ (s0 << 3)
+ ^ s1 ^ (s1 << 2) ^ (s1 << 3)
+ ^ s2 ^ (s2 << 3)
+ ^ (s3 << 1) ^ (s3 << 2) ^ (s3 << 3);
+ state[i + 0] = gf256red(t0);
+ state[i + 1] = gf256red(t1);
+ state[i + 2] = gf256red(t2);
+ state[i + 3] = gf256red(t3);
+ }
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_aes_small_decrypt(unsigned num_rounds, const uint32_t *skey, void *data)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned state[16];
+ unsigned u;
+
+ buf = data;
+ for (u = 0; u < 16; u ++) {
+ state[u] = buf[u];
+ }
+ add_round_key(state, skey + (num_rounds << 2));
+ for (u = num_rounds - 1; u > 0; u --) {
+ inv_shift_rows(state);
+ inv_sub_bytes(state);
+ add_round_key(state, skey + (u << 2));
+ inv_mix_columns(state);
+ }
+ inv_shift_rows(state);
+ inv_sub_bytes(state);
+ add_round_key(state, skey);
+ for (u = 0; u < 16; u ++) {
+ buf[u] = state[u];
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_enc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29f48a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_small_enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define S br_aes_S
+
+static void
+add_round_key(unsigned *state, const uint32_t *skeys)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i += 4) {
+ uint32_t k;
+
+ k = *skeys ++;
+ state[i + 0] ^= (unsigned)(k >> 24);
+ state[i + 1] ^= (unsigned)(k >> 16) & 0xFF;
+ state[i + 2] ^= (unsigned)(k >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ state[i + 3] ^= (unsigned)k & 0xFF;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+sub_bytes(unsigned *state)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i ++) {
+ state[i] = S[state[i]];
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+shift_rows(unsigned *state)
+{
+ unsigned tmp;
+
+ tmp = state[1];
+ state[1] = state[5];
+ state[5] = state[9];
+ state[9] = state[13];
+ state[13] = tmp;
+
+ tmp = state[2];
+ state[2] = state[10];
+ state[10] = tmp;
+ tmp = state[6];
+ state[6] = state[14];
+ state[14] = tmp;
+
+ tmp = state[15];
+ state[15] = state[11];
+ state[11] = state[7];
+ state[7] = state[3];
+ state[3] = tmp;
+}
+
+static void
+mix_columns(unsigned *state)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i += 4) {
+ unsigned s0, s1, s2, s3;
+ unsigned t0, t1, t2, t3;
+
+ s0 = state[i + 0];
+ s1 = state[i + 1];
+ s2 = state[i + 2];
+ s3 = state[i + 3];
+ t0 = (s0 << 1) ^ s1 ^ (s1 << 1) ^ s2 ^ s3;
+ t1 = s0 ^ (s1 << 1) ^ s2 ^ (s2 << 1) ^ s3;
+ t2 = s0 ^ s1 ^ (s2 << 1) ^ s3 ^ (s3 << 1);
+ t3 = s0 ^ (s0 << 1) ^ s1 ^ s2 ^ (s3 << 1);
+ state[i + 0] = t0 ^ ((unsigned)(-(int)(t0 >> 8)) & 0x11B);
+ state[i + 1] = t1 ^ ((unsigned)(-(int)(t1 >> 8)) & 0x11B);
+ state[i + 2] = t2 ^ ((unsigned)(-(int)(t2 >> 8)) & 0x11B);
+ state[i + 3] = t3 ^ ((unsigned)(-(int)(t3 >> 8)) & 0x11B);
+ }
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_aes_small_encrypt(unsigned num_rounds, const uint32_t *skey, void *data)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned state[16];
+ unsigned u;
+
+ buf = data;
+ for (u = 0; u < 16; u ++) {
+ state[u] = buf[u];
+ }
+ add_round_key(state, skey);
+ for (u = 1; u < num_rounds; u ++) {
+ sub_bytes(state);
+ shift_rows(state);
+ mix_columns(state);
+ add_round_key(state, skey + (u << 2));
+ }
+ sub_bytes(state);
+ shift_rows(state);
+ add_round_key(state, skey + (num_rounds << 2));
+ for (u = 0; u < 16; u ++) {
+ buf[u] = state[u];
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_x86ni.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_x86ni.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d5408f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_x86ni.c
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define BR_ENABLE_INTRINSICS 1
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * This code contains the AES key schedule implementation using the
+ * AES-NI opcodes.
+ */
+
+#if BR_AES_X86NI
+
+/* see inner.h */
+int
+br_aes_x86ni_supported(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Bit mask for features in ECX:
+ * 19 SSE4.1 (used for _mm_insert_epi32(), for AES-CTR)
+ * 25 AES-NI
+ */
+ return br_cpuid(0, 0, 0x02080000, 0);
+}
+
+BR_TARGETS_X86_UP
+
+BR_TARGET("sse2,aes")
+static inline __m128i
+expand_step128(__m128i k, __m128i k2)
+{
+ k = _mm_xor_si128(k, _mm_slli_si128(k, 4));
+ k = _mm_xor_si128(k, _mm_slli_si128(k, 4));
+ k = _mm_xor_si128(k, _mm_slli_si128(k, 4));
+ k2 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(k2, 0xFF);
+ return _mm_xor_si128(k, k2);
+}
+
+BR_TARGET("sse2,aes")
+static inline void
+expand_step192(__m128i *t1, __m128i *t2, __m128i *t3)
+{
+ __m128i t4;
+
+ *t2 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(*t2, 0x55);
+ t4 = _mm_slli_si128(*t1, 0x4);
+ *t1 = _mm_xor_si128(*t1, t4);
+ t4 = _mm_slli_si128(t4, 0x4);
+ *t1 = _mm_xor_si128(*t1, t4);
+ t4 = _mm_slli_si128(t4, 0x4);
+ *t1 = _mm_xor_si128(*t1, t4);
+ *t1 = _mm_xor_si128(*t1, *t2);
+ *t2 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(*t1, 0xFF);
+ t4 = _mm_slli_si128(*t3, 0x4);
+ *t3 = _mm_xor_si128(*t3, t4);
+ *t3 = _mm_xor_si128(*t3, *t2);
+}
+
+BR_TARGET("sse2,aes")
+static inline void
+expand_step256_1(__m128i *t1, __m128i *t2)
+{
+ __m128i t4;
+
+ *t2 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(*t2, 0xFF);
+ t4 = _mm_slli_si128(*t1, 0x4);
+ *t1 = _mm_xor_si128(*t1, t4);
+ t4 = _mm_slli_si128(t4, 0x4);
+ *t1 = _mm_xor_si128(*t1, t4);
+ t4 = _mm_slli_si128(t4, 0x4);
+ *t1 = _mm_xor_si128(*t1, t4);
+ *t1 = _mm_xor_si128(*t1, *t2);
+}
+
+BR_TARGET("sse2,aes")
+static inline void
+expand_step256_2(__m128i *t1, __m128i *t3)
+{
+ __m128i t2, t4;
+
+ t4 = _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(*t1, 0x0);
+ t2 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(t4, 0xAA);
+ t4 = _mm_slli_si128(*t3, 0x4);
+ *t3 = _mm_xor_si128(*t3, t4);
+ t4 = _mm_slli_si128(t4, 0x4);
+ *t3 = _mm_xor_si128(*t3, t4);
+ t4 = _mm_slli_si128(t4, 0x4);
+ *t3 = _mm_xor_si128(*t3, t4);
+ *t3 = _mm_xor_si128(*t3, t2);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform key schedule for AES, encryption direction. Subkeys are written
+ * in sk[], and the number of rounds is returned. Key length MUST be 16,
+ * 24 or 32 bytes.
+ */
+BR_TARGET("sse2,aes")
+static unsigned
+x86ni_keysched(__m128i *sk, const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *kb;
+
+#define KEXP128(k, i, rcon) do { \
+ k = expand_step128(k, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(k, rcon)); \
+ sk[i] = k; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define KEXP192(i, rcon1, rcon2) do { \
+ sk[(i) + 0] = t1; \
+ sk[(i) + 1] = t3; \
+ t2 = _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(t3, rcon1); \
+ expand_step192(&t1, &t2, &t3); \
+ sk[(i) + 1] = _mm_castpd_si128(_mm_shuffle_pd( \
+ _mm_castsi128_pd(sk[(i) + 1]), \
+ _mm_castsi128_pd(t1), 0)); \
+ sk[(i) + 2] = _mm_castpd_si128(_mm_shuffle_pd( \
+ _mm_castsi128_pd(t1), \
+ _mm_castsi128_pd(t3), 1)); \
+ t2 = _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(t3, rcon2); \
+ expand_step192(&t1, &t2, &t3); \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define KEXP256(i, rcon) do { \
+ sk[(i) + 0] = t3; \
+ t2 = _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(t3, rcon); \
+ expand_step256_1(&t1, &t2); \
+ sk[(i) + 1] = t1; \
+ expand_step256_2(&t1, &t3); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ kb = key;
+ switch (len) {
+ __m128i t1, t2, t3;
+
+ case 16:
+ t1 = _mm_loadu_si128((const void *)kb);
+ sk[0] = t1;
+ KEXP128(t1, 1, 0x01);
+ KEXP128(t1, 2, 0x02);
+ KEXP128(t1, 3, 0x04);
+ KEXP128(t1, 4, 0x08);
+ KEXP128(t1, 5, 0x10);
+ KEXP128(t1, 6, 0x20);
+ KEXP128(t1, 7, 0x40);
+ KEXP128(t1, 8, 0x80);
+ KEXP128(t1, 9, 0x1B);
+ KEXP128(t1, 10, 0x36);
+ return 10;
+
+ case 24:
+ t1 = _mm_loadu_si128((const void *)kb);
+ t3 = _mm_loadu_si128((const void *)(kb + 8));
+ t3 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(t3, 0x4E);
+ KEXP192(0, 0x01, 0x02);
+ KEXP192(3, 0x04, 0x08);
+ KEXP192(6, 0x10, 0x20);
+ KEXP192(9, 0x40, 0x80);
+ sk[12] = t1;
+ return 12;
+
+ case 32:
+ t1 = _mm_loadu_si128((const void *)kb);
+ t3 = _mm_loadu_si128((const void *)(kb + 16));
+ sk[0] = t1;
+ KEXP256( 1, 0x01);
+ KEXP256( 3, 0x02);
+ KEXP256( 5, 0x04);
+ KEXP256( 7, 0x08);
+ KEXP256( 9, 0x10);
+ KEXP256(11, 0x20);
+ sk[13] = t3;
+ t2 = _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(t3, 0x40);
+ expand_step256_1(&t1, &t2);
+ sk[14] = t1;
+ return 14;
+
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#undef KEXP128
+#undef KEXP192
+#undef KEXP256
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+BR_TARGET("sse2,aes")
+unsigned
+br_aes_x86ni_keysched_enc(unsigned char *skni, const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ __m128i sk[15];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+
+ num_rounds = x86ni_keysched(sk, key, len);
+ memcpy(skni, sk, (num_rounds + 1) << 4);
+ return num_rounds;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+BR_TARGET("sse2,aes")
+unsigned
+br_aes_x86ni_keysched_dec(unsigned char *skni, const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ __m128i sk[15];
+ unsigned u, num_rounds;
+
+ num_rounds = x86ni_keysched(sk, key, len);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)skni, sk[num_rounds]);
+ for (u = 1; u < num_rounds; u ++) {
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(skni + (u << 4)),
+ _mm_aesimc_si128(sk[num_rounds - u]));
+ }
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(skni + (num_rounds << 4)), sk[0]);
+ return num_rounds;
+}
+
+BR_TARGETS_X86_DOWN
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_x86ni_cbcdec.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_x86ni_cbcdec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..862b1b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_x86ni_cbcdec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define BR_ENABLE_INTRINSICS 1
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_AES_X86NI
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcdec_class *
+br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_get_vtable(void)
+{
+ return br_aes_x86ni_supported() ? &br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_vtable : NULL;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_init(br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_x86ni_keysched_dec(ctx->skey.skni, key, len);
+}
+
+BR_TARGETS_X86_UP
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+BR_TARGET("sse2,aes")
+void
+br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_run(const br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+ __m128i sk[15], ivx;
+ unsigned u;
+
+ buf = data;
+ ivx = _mm_loadu_si128(iv);
+ num_rounds = ctx->num_rounds;
+ for (u = 0; u <= num_rounds; u ++) {
+ sk[u] = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(ctx->skey.skni + (u << 4)));
+ }
+ while (len > 0) {
+ __m128i x0, x1, x2, x3, e0, e1, e2, e3;
+
+ x0 = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf + 0));
+ if (len >= 64) {
+ x1 = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf + 16));
+ x2 = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf + 32));
+ x3 = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf + 48));
+ } else {
+ x0 = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf + 0));
+ if (len >= 32) {
+ x1 = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf + 16));
+ if (len >= 48) {
+ x2 = _mm_loadu_si128(
+ (void *)(buf + 32));
+ x3 = x2;
+ } else {
+ x2 = x0;
+ x3 = x1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ x1 = x0;
+ x2 = x0;
+ x3 = x0;
+ }
+ }
+ e0 = x0;
+ e1 = x1;
+ e2 = x2;
+ e3 = x3;
+ x0 = _mm_xor_si128(x0, sk[0]);
+ x1 = _mm_xor_si128(x1, sk[0]);
+ x2 = _mm_xor_si128(x2, sk[0]);
+ x3 = _mm_xor_si128(x3, sk[0]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x0, sk[1]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x1, sk[1]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x2, sk[1]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x3, sk[1]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x0, sk[2]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x1, sk[2]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x2, sk[2]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x3, sk[2]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x0, sk[3]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x1, sk[3]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x2, sk[3]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x3, sk[3]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x0, sk[4]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x1, sk[4]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x2, sk[4]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x3, sk[4]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x0, sk[5]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x1, sk[5]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x2, sk[5]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x3, sk[5]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x0, sk[6]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x1, sk[6]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x2, sk[6]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x3, sk[6]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x0, sk[7]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x1, sk[7]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x2, sk[7]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x3, sk[7]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x0, sk[8]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x1, sk[8]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x2, sk[8]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x3, sk[8]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x0, sk[9]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x1, sk[9]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x2, sk[9]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x3, sk[9]);
+ if (num_rounds == 10) {
+ x0 = _mm_aesdeclast_si128(x0, sk[10]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdeclast_si128(x1, sk[10]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdeclast_si128(x2, sk[10]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdeclast_si128(x3, sk[10]);
+ } else if (num_rounds == 12) {
+ x0 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x0, sk[10]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x1, sk[10]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x2, sk[10]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x3, sk[10]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x0, sk[11]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x1, sk[11]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x2, sk[11]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x3, sk[11]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesdeclast_si128(x0, sk[12]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdeclast_si128(x1, sk[12]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdeclast_si128(x2, sk[12]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdeclast_si128(x3, sk[12]);
+ } else {
+ x0 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x0, sk[10]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x1, sk[10]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x2, sk[10]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x3, sk[10]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x0, sk[11]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x1, sk[11]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x2, sk[11]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x3, sk[11]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x0, sk[12]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x1, sk[12]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x2, sk[12]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x3, sk[12]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x0, sk[13]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x1, sk[13]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x2, sk[13]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdec_si128(x3, sk[13]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesdeclast_si128(x0, sk[14]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesdeclast_si128(x1, sk[14]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesdeclast_si128(x2, sk[14]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesdeclast_si128(x3, sk[14]);
+ }
+ x0 = _mm_xor_si128(x0, ivx);
+ x1 = _mm_xor_si128(x1, e0);
+ x2 = _mm_xor_si128(x2, e1);
+ x3 = _mm_xor_si128(x3, e2);
+ ivx = e3;
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(buf + 0), x0);
+ if (len >= 64) {
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(buf + 16), x1);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(buf + 32), x2);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(buf + 48), x3);
+ buf += 64;
+ len -= 64;
+ } else {
+ if (len >= 32) {
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(buf + 16), x1);
+ if (len >= 48) {
+ _mm_storeu_si128(
+ (void *)(buf + 32), x2);
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ _mm_storeu_si128(iv, ivx);
+}
+
+BR_TARGETS_X86_DOWN
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcdec_class br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcdec_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcdec_class *const *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_run
+};
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcdec_class *
+br_aes_x86ni_cbcdec_get_vtable(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_x86ni_cbcenc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_x86ni_cbcenc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85feecd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_x86ni_cbcenc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define BR_ENABLE_INTRINSICS 1
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_AES_X86NI
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcenc_class *
+br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_get_vtable(void)
+{
+ return br_aes_x86ni_supported() ? &br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_vtable : NULL;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_init(br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_x86ni_keysched_enc(ctx->skey.skni, key, len);
+}
+
+BR_TARGETS_X86_UP
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+BR_TARGET("sse2,aes")
+void
+br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_run(const br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+ __m128i sk[15], ivx;
+ unsigned u;
+
+ buf = data;
+ ivx = _mm_loadu_si128(iv);
+ num_rounds = ctx->num_rounds;
+ for (u = 0; u <= num_rounds; u ++) {
+ sk[u] = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(ctx->skey.skni + (u << 4)));
+ }
+ while (len > 0) {
+ __m128i x;
+
+ x = _mm_xor_si128(_mm_loadu_si128((void *)buf), ivx);
+ x = _mm_xor_si128(x, sk[0]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[1]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[2]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[3]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[4]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[5]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[6]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[7]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[8]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[9]);
+ if (num_rounds == 10) {
+ x = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x, sk[10]);
+ } else if (num_rounds == 12) {
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[10]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[11]);
+ x = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x, sk[12]);
+ } else {
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[10]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[11]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[12]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[13]);
+ x = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x, sk[14]);
+ }
+ ivx = x;
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)buf, x);
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+ _mm_storeu_si128(iv, ivx);
+}
+
+BR_TARGETS_X86_DOWN
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcenc_class br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcenc_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcenc_class *const *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_run
+};
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcenc_class *
+br_aes_x86ni_cbcenc_get_vtable(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_x86ni_ctr.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_x86ni_ctr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1cddd60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_x86ni_ctr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define BR_ENABLE_INTRINSICS 1
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_AES_X86NI
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctr_class *
+br_aes_x86ni_ctr_get_vtable(void)
+{
+ return br_aes_x86ni_supported() ? &br_aes_x86ni_ctr_vtable : NULL;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_x86ni_ctr_init(br_aes_x86ni_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_x86ni_ctr_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_x86ni_keysched_enc(ctx->skey.skni, key, len);
+}
+
+BR_TARGETS_X86_UP
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+BR_TARGET("sse2,sse4.1,aes")
+uint32_t
+br_aes_x86ni_ctr_run(const br_aes_x86ni_ctr_keys *ctx,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned char ivbuf[16];
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+ __m128i sk[15];
+ __m128i ivx;
+ unsigned u;
+
+ buf = data;
+ memcpy(ivbuf, iv, 12);
+ num_rounds = ctx->num_rounds;
+ for (u = 0; u <= num_rounds; u ++) {
+ sk[u] = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(ctx->skey.skni + (u << 4)));
+ }
+ ivx = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)ivbuf);
+ while (len > 0) {
+ __m128i x0, x1, x2, x3;
+
+ x0 = _mm_insert_epi32(ivx, br_bswap32(cc + 0), 3);
+ x1 = _mm_insert_epi32(ivx, br_bswap32(cc + 1), 3);
+ x2 = _mm_insert_epi32(ivx, br_bswap32(cc + 2), 3);
+ x3 = _mm_insert_epi32(ivx, br_bswap32(cc + 3), 3);
+ x0 = _mm_xor_si128(x0, sk[0]);
+ x1 = _mm_xor_si128(x1, sk[0]);
+ x2 = _mm_xor_si128(x2, sk[0]);
+ x3 = _mm_xor_si128(x3, sk[0]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[1]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[1]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[1]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[1]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[2]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[2]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[2]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[2]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[3]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[3]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[3]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[3]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[4]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[4]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[4]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[4]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[5]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[5]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[5]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[5]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[6]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[6]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[6]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[6]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[7]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[7]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[7]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[7]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[8]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[8]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[8]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[8]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[9]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[9]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[9]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[9]);
+ if (num_rounds == 10) {
+ x0 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x0, sk[10]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x1, sk[10]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x2, sk[10]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x3, sk[10]);
+ } else if (num_rounds == 12) {
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[10]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[10]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[10]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[10]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[11]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[11]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[11]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[11]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x0, sk[12]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x1, sk[12]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x2, sk[12]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x3, sk[12]);
+ } else {
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[10]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[10]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[10]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[10]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[11]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[11]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[11]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[11]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[12]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[12]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[12]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[12]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[13]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[13]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[13]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[13]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x0, sk[14]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x1, sk[14]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x2, sk[14]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x3, sk[14]);
+ }
+ if (len >= 64) {
+ x0 = _mm_xor_si128(x0,
+ _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf + 0)));
+ x1 = _mm_xor_si128(x1,
+ _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf + 16)));
+ x2 = _mm_xor_si128(x2,
+ _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf + 32)));
+ x3 = _mm_xor_si128(x3,
+ _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf + 48)));
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(buf + 0), x0);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(buf + 16), x1);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(buf + 32), x2);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(buf + 48), x3);
+ buf += 64;
+ len -= 64;
+ cc += 4;
+ } else {
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(tmp + 0), x0);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(tmp + 16), x1);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(tmp + 32), x2);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(tmp + 48), x3);
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ buf[u] ^= tmp[u];
+ }
+ cc += (uint32_t)len >> 4;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return cc;
+}
+
+BR_TARGETS_X86_DOWN
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctr_class br_aes_x86ni_ctr_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_x86ni_ctr_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctr_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_x86ni_ctr_init,
+ (uint32_t (*)(const br_block_ctr_class *const *,
+ const void *, uint32_t, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_x86ni_ctr_run
+};
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctr_class *
+br_aes_x86ni_ctr_get_vtable(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_x86ni_ctrcbc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_x86ni_ctrcbc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f57fead
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/aes_x86ni_ctrcbc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,596 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define BR_ENABLE_INTRINSICS 1
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_AES_X86NI
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctrcbc_class *
+br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_get_vtable(void)
+{
+ return br_aes_x86ni_supported() ? &br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_vtable : NULL;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_init(br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_aes_x86ni_keysched_enc(ctx->skey.skni, key, len);
+}
+
+BR_TARGETS_X86_UP
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+BR_TARGET("sse2,sse4.1,aes")
+void
+br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_ctr(const br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+ __m128i sk[15];
+ __m128i ivx0, ivx1, ivx2, ivx3;
+ __m128i erev, zero, one, four, notthree;
+ unsigned u;
+
+ buf = data;
+ num_rounds = ctx->num_rounds;
+ for (u = 0; u <= num_rounds; u ++) {
+ sk[u] = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(ctx->skey.skni + (u << 4)));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Some SSE2 constants.
+ */
+ erev = _mm_set_epi8(0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
+ 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15);
+ zero = _mm_setzero_si128();
+ one = _mm_set_epi64x(0, 1);
+ four = _mm_set_epi64x(0, 4);
+ notthree = _mm_sub_epi64(zero, four);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the counter in big-endian and pre-increment the other
+ * three counters.
+ */
+ ivx0 = _mm_shuffle_epi8(_mm_loadu_si128((void *)ctr), erev);
+ ivx1 = _mm_add_epi64(ivx0, one);
+ ivx1 = _mm_sub_epi64(ivx1,
+ _mm_slli_si128(_mm_cmpeq_epi64(ivx1, zero), 8));
+ ivx2 = _mm_add_epi64(ivx1, one);
+ ivx2 = _mm_sub_epi64(ivx2,
+ _mm_slli_si128(_mm_cmpeq_epi64(ivx2, zero), 8));
+ ivx3 = _mm_add_epi64(ivx2, one);
+ ivx3 = _mm_sub_epi64(ivx3,
+ _mm_slli_si128(_mm_cmpeq_epi64(ivx3, zero), 8));
+ while (len > 0) {
+ __m128i x0, x1, x2, x3;
+
+ /*
+ * Load counter values; we need to byteswap them because
+ * the specification says that they use big-endian.
+ */
+ x0 = _mm_shuffle_epi8(ivx0, erev);
+ x1 = _mm_shuffle_epi8(ivx1, erev);
+ x2 = _mm_shuffle_epi8(ivx2, erev);
+ x3 = _mm_shuffle_epi8(ivx3, erev);
+
+ x0 = _mm_xor_si128(x0, sk[0]);
+ x1 = _mm_xor_si128(x1, sk[0]);
+ x2 = _mm_xor_si128(x2, sk[0]);
+ x3 = _mm_xor_si128(x3, sk[0]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[1]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[1]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[1]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[1]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[2]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[2]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[2]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[2]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[3]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[3]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[3]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[3]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[4]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[4]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[4]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[4]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[5]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[5]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[5]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[5]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[6]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[6]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[6]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[6]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[7]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[7]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[7]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[7]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[8]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[8]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[8]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[8]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[9]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[9]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[9]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[9]);
+ if (num_rounds == 10) {
+ x0 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x0, sk[10]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x1, sk[10]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x2, sk[10]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x3, sk[10]);
+ } else if (num_rounds == 12) {
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[10]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[10]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[10]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[10]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[11]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[11]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[11]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[11]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x0, sk[12]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x1, sk[12]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x2, sk[12]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x3, sk[12]);
+ } else {
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[10]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[10]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[10]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[10]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[11]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[11]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[11]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[11]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[12]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[12]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[12]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[12]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[13]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[13]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x2, sk[13]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x3, sk[13]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x0, sk[14]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x1, sk[14]);
+ x2 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x2, sk[14]);
+ x3 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x3, sk[14]);
+ }
+ if (len >= 64) {
+ x0 = _mm_xor_si128(x0,
+ _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf + 0)));
+ x1 = _mm_xor_si128(x1,
+ _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf + 16)));
+ x2 = _mm_xor_si128(x2,
+ _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf + 32)));
+ x3 = _mm_xor_si128(x3,
+ _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(buf + 48)));
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(buf + 0), x0);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(buf + 16), x1);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(buf + 32), x2);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(buf + 48), x3);
+ buf += 64;
+ len -= 64;
+ } else {
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(tmp + 0), x0);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(tmp + 16), x1);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(tmp + 32), x2);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(tmp + 48), x3);
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ buf[u] ^= tmp[u];
+ }
+ switch (len) {
+ case 16:
+ ivx0 = ivx1;
+ break;
+ case 32:
+ ivx0 = ivx2;
+ break;
+ case 48:
+ ivx0 = ivx3;
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Add 4 to each counter value. For carry propagation
+ * into the upper 64-bit words, we would need to compare
+ * the results with 4, but SSE2+ has only _signed_
+ * comparisons. Instead, we mask out the low two bits,
+ * and check whether the remaining bits are zero.
+ */
+ ivx0 = _mm_add_epi64(ivx0, four);
+ ivx1 = _mm_add_epi64(ivx1, four);
+ ivx2 = _mm_add_epi64(ivx2, four);
+ ivx3 = _mm_add_epi64(ivx3, four);
+ ivx0 = _mm_sub_epi64(ivx0,
+ _mm_slli_si128(_mm_cmpeq_epi64(
+ _mm_and_si128(ivx0, notthree), zero), 8));
+ ivx1 = _mm_sub_epi64(ivx1,
+ _mm_slli_si128(_mm_cmpeq_epi64(
+ _mm_and_si128(ivx1, notthree), zero), 8));
+ ivx2 = _mm_sub_epi64(ivx2,
+ _mm_slli_si128(_mm_cmpeq_epi64(
+ _mm_and_si128(ivx2, notthree), zero), 8));
+ ivx3 = _mm_sub_epi64(ivx3,
+ _mm_slli_si128(_mm_cmpeq_epi64(
+ _mm_and_si128(ivx3, notthree), zero), 8));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Write back new counter value. The loop took care to put the
+ * right counter value in ivx0.
+ */
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)ctr, _mm_shuffle_epi8(ivx0, erev));
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+BR_TARGET("sse2,sse4.1,aes")
+void
+br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_mac(const br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *cbcmac, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+ __m128i sk[15], ivx;
+ unsigned u;
+
+ buf = data;
+ ivx = _mm_loadu_si128(cbcmac);
+ num_rounds = ctx->num_rounds;
+ for (u = 0; u <= num_rounds; u ++) {
+ sk[u] = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(ctx->skey.skni + (u << 4)));
+ }
+ while (len > 0) {
+ __m128i x;
+
+ x = _mm_xor_si128(_mm_loadu_si128((void *)buf), ivx);
+ x = _mm_xor_si128(x, sk[0]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[1]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[2]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[3]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[4]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[5]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[6]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[7]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[8]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[9]);
+ if (num_rounds == 10) {
+ x = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x, sk[10]);
+ } else if (num_rounds == 12) {
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[10]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[11]);
+ x = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x, sk[12]);
+ } else {
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[10]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[11]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[12]);
+ x = _mm_aesenc_si128(x, sk[13]);
+ x = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x, sk[14]);
+ }
+ ivx = x;
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+ _mm_storeu_si128(cbcmac, ivx);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+BR_TARGET("sse2,sse4.1,aes")
+void
+br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_encrypt(const br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+ __m128i sk[15];
+ __m128i ivx, cmx;
+ __m128i erev, zero, one;
+ unsigned u;
+ int first_iter;
+
+ num_rounds = ctx->num_rounds;
+ for (u = 0; u <= num_rounds; u ++) {
+ sk[u] = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(ctx->skey.skni + (u << 4)));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Some SSE2 constants.
+ */
+ erev = _mm_set_epi8(0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
+ 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15);
+ zero = _mm_setzero_si128();
+ one = _mm_set_epi64x(0, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the counter in big-endian.
+ */
+ ivx = _mm_shuffle_epi8(_mm_loadu_si128(ctr), erev);
+ cmx = _mm_loadu_si128(cbcmac);
+
+ buf = data;
+ first_iter = 1;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ __m128i dx, x0, x1;
+
+ /*
+ * Load initial values:
+ * dx encrypted block of data
+ * x0 counter (for CTR encryption)
+ * x1 input for CBC-MAC
+ */
+ dx = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)buf);
+ x0 = _mm_shuffle_epi8(ivx, erev);
+ x1 = cmx;
+
+ x0 = _mm_xor_si128(x0, sk[0]);
+ x1 = _mm_xor_si128(x1, sk[0]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[1]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[1]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[2]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[2]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[3]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[3]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[4]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[4]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[5]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[5]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[6]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[6]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[7]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[7]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[8]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[8]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[9]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[9]);
+ if (num_rounds == 10) {
+ x0 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x0, sk[10]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x1, sk[10]);
+ } else if (num_rounds == 12) {
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[10]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[10]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[11]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[11]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x0, sk[12]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x1, sk[12]);
+ } else {
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[10]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[10]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[11]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[11]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[12]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[12]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[13]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[13]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x0, sk[14]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x1, sk[14]);
+ }
+
+ x0 = _mm_xor_si128(x0, dx);
+ if (first_iter) {
+ cmx = _mm_xor_si128(cmx, x0);
+ first_iter = 0;
+ } else {
+ cmx = _mm_xor_si128(x1, x0);
+ }
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)buf, x0);
+
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+
+ /*
+ * Increment the counter value.
+ */
+ ivx = _mm_add_epi64(ivx, one);
+ ivx = _mm_sub_epi64(ivx,
+ _mm_slli_si128(_mm_cmpeq_epi64(ivx, zero), 8));
+
+ /*
+ * If this was the last iteration, then compute the
+ * extra block encryption to complete CBC-MAC.
+ */
+ if (len == 0) {
+ cmx = _mm_xor_si128(cmx, sk[0]);
+ cmx = _mm_aesenc_si128(cmx, sk[1]);
+ cmx = _mm_aesenc_si128(cmx, sk[2]);
+ cmx = _mm_aesenc_si128(cmx, sk[3]);
+ cmx = _mm_aesenc_si128(cmx, sk[4]);
+ cmx = _mm_aesenc_si128(cmx, sk[5]);
+ cmx = _mm_aesenc_si128(cmx, sk[6]);
+ cmx = _mm_aesenc_si128(cmx, sk[7]);
+ cmx = _mm_aesenc_si128(cmx, sk[8]);
+ cmx = _mm_aesenc_si128(cmx, sk[9]);
+ if (num_rounds == 10) {
+ cmx = _mm_aesenclast_si128(cmx, sk[10]);
+ } else if (num_rounds == 12) {
+ cmx = _mm_aesenc_si128(cmx, sk[10]);
+ cmx = _mm_aesenc_si128(cmx, sk[11]);
+ cmx = _mm_aesenclast_si128(cmx, sk[12]);
+ } else {
+ cmx = _mm_aesenc_si128(cmx, sk[10]);
+ cmx = _mm_aesenc_si128(cmx, sk[11]);
+ cmx = _mm_aesenc_si128(cmx, sk[12]);
+ cmx = _mm_aesenc_si128(cmx, sk[13]);
+ cmx = _mm_aesenclast_si128(cmx, sk[14]);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Write back new counter value and CBC-MAC value.
+ */
+ _mm_storeu_si128(ctr, _mm_shuffle_epi8(ivx, erev));
+ _mm_storeu_si128(cbcmac, cmx);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+BR_TARGET("sse2,sse4.1,aes")
+void
+br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_decrypt(const br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_keys *ctx,
+ void *ctr, void *cbcmac, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ unsigned num_rounds;
+ __m128i sk[15];
+ __m128i ivx, cmx;
+ __m128i erev, zero, one;
+ unsigned u;
+
+ num_rounds = ctx->num_rounds;
+ for (u = 0; u <= num_rounds; u ++) {
+ sk[u] = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)(ctx->skey.skni + (u << 4)));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Some SSE2 constants.
+ */
+ erev = _mm_set_epi8(0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
+ 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15);
+ zero = _mm_setzero_si128();
+ one = _mm_set_epi64x(0, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the counter in big-endian.
+ */
+ ivx = _mm_shuffle_epi8(_mm_loadu_si128(ctr), erev);
+ cmx = _mm_loadu_si128(cbcmac);
+
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ __m128i dx, x0, x1;
+
+ /*
+ * Load initial values:
+ * dx encrypted block of data
+ * x0 counter (for CTR encryption)
+ * x1 input for CBC-MAC
+ */
+ dx = _mm_loadu_si128((void *)buf);
+ x0 = _mm_shuffle_epi8(ivx, erev);
+ x1 = _mm_xor_si128(cmx, dx);
+
+ x0 = _mm_xor_si128(x0, sk[0]);
+ x1 = _mm_xor_si128(x1, sk[0]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[1]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[1]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[2]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[2]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[3]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[3]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[4]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[4]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[5]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[5]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[6]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[6]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[7]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[7]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[8]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[8]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[9]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[9]);
+ if (num_rounds == 10) {
+ x0 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x0, sk[10]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x1, sk[10]);
+ } else if (num_rounds == 12) {
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[10]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[10]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[11]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[11]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x0, sk[12]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x1, sk[12]);
+ } else {
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[10]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[10]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[11]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[11]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[12]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[12]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x0, sk[13]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenc_si128(x1, sk[13]);
+ x0 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x0, sk[14]);
+ x1 = _mm_aesenclast_si128(x1, sk[14]);
+ }
+ x0 = _mm_xor_si128(x0, dx);
+ cmx = x1;
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)buf, x0);
+
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+
+ /*
+ * Increment the counter value.
+ */
+ ivx = _mm_add_epi64(ivx, one);
+ ivx = _mm_sub_epi64(ivx,
+ _mm_slli_si128(_mm_cmpeq_epi64(ivx, zero), 8));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Write back new counter value and CBC-MAC value.
+ */
+ _mm_storeu_si128(ctr, _mm_shuffle_epi8(ivx, erev));
+ _mm_storeu_si128(cbcmac, cmx);
+}
+
+BR_TARGETS_X86_DOWN
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctrcbc_class br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_keys),
+ 16,
+ 4,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_encrypt,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_decrypt,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_ctr,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_ctrcbc_class *const *,
+ void *, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_mac
+};
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_ctrcbc_class *
+br_aes_x86ni_ctrcbc_get_vtable(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/chacha20_ct.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/chacha20_ct.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9961eb1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/chacha20_ct.c
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+uint32_t
+br_chacha20_ct_run(const void *key,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t kw[8], ivw[3];
+ size_t u;
+
+ static const uint32_t CW[] = {
+ 0x61707865, 0x3320646e, 0x79622d32, 0x6b206574
+ };
+
+ buf = data;
+ for (u = 0; u < 8; u ++) {
+ kw[u] = br_dec32le((const unsigned char *)key + (u << 2));
+ }
+ for (u = 0; u < 3; u ++) {
+ ivw[u] = br_dec32le((const unsigned char *)iv + (u << 2));
+ }
+ while (len > 0) {
+ uint32_t state[16];
+ int i;
+ size_t clen;
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+
+ memcpy(&state[0], CW, sizeof CW);
+ memcpy(&state[4], kw, sizeof kw);
+ state[12] = cc;
+ memcpy(&state[13], ivw, sizeof ivw);
+ for (i = 0; i < 10; i ++) {
+
+#define QROUND(a, b, c, d) do { \
+ state[a] += state[b]; \
+ state[d] ^= state[a]; \
+ state[d] = (state[d] << 16) | (state[d] >> 16); \
+ state[c] += state[d]; \
+ state[b] ^= state[c]; \
+ state[b] = (state[b] << 12) | (state[b] >> 20); \
+ state[a] += state[b]; \
+ state[d] ^= state[a]; \
+ state[d] = (state[d] << 8) | (state[d] >> 24); \
+ state[c] += state[d]; \
+ state[b] ^= state[c]; \
+ state[b] = (state[b] << 7) | (state[b] >> 25); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ QROUND( 0, 4, 8, 12);
+ QROUND( 1, 5, 9, 13);
+ QROUND( 2, 6, 10, 14);
+ QROUND( 3, 7, 11, 15);
+ QROUND( 0, 5, 10, 15);
+ QROUND( 1, 6, 11, 12);
+ QROUND( 2, 7, 8, 13);
+ QROUND( 3, 4, 9, 14);
+
+#undef QROUND
+
+ }
+ for (u = 0; u < 4; u ++) {
+ br_enc32le(&tmp[u << 2], state[u] + CW[u]);
+ }
+ for (u = 4; u < 12; u ++) {
+ br_enc32le(&tmp[u << 2], state[u] + kw[u - 4]);
+ }
+ br_enc32le(&tmp[48], state[12] + cc);
+ for (u = 13; u < 16; u ++) {
+ br_enc32le(&tmp[u << 2], state[u] + ivw[u - 13]);
+ }
+
+ clen = len < 64 ? len : 64;
+ for (u = 0; u < clen; u ++) {
+ buf[u] ^= tmp[u];
+ }
+ buf += clen;
+ len -= clen;
+ cc ++;
+ }
+ return cc;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/chacha20_sse2.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/chacha20_sse2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..92b4a4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/chacha20_sse2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define BR_ENABLE_INTRINSICS 1
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_SSE2
+
+/*
+ * This file contains a ChaCha20 implementation that leverages SSE2
+ * opcodes for better performance.
+ */
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+br_chacha20_run
+br_chacha20_sse2_get(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * If using 64-bit mode, then SSE2 opcodes should be automatically
+ * available, since they are part of the ABI.
+ *
+ * In 32-bit mode, we use CPUID to detect the SSE2 feature.
+ */
+
+#if BR_amd64
+ return &br_chacha20_sse2_run;
+#else
+
+ /*
+ * SSE2 support is indicated by bit 26 in EDX.
+ */
+ if (br_cpuid(0, 0, 0, 0x04000000)) {
+ return &br_chacha20_sse2_run;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+BR_TARGETS_X86_UP
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+BR_TARGET("sse2")
+uint32_t
+br_chacha20_sse2_run(const void *key,
+ const void *iv, uint32_t cc, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t ivtmp[4];
+ __m128i kw0, kw1;
+ __m128i iw, cw;
+ __m128i one;
+
+ static const uint32_t CW[] = {
+ 0x61707865, 0x3320646e, 0x79622d32, 0x6b206574
+ };
+
+ buf = data;
+ kw0 = _mm_loadu_si128(key);
+ kw1 = _mm_loadu_si128((const void *)((const unsigned char *)key + 16));
+ ivtmp[0] = cc;
+ memcpy(ivtmp + 1, iv, 12);
+ iw = _mm_loadu_si128((const void *)ivtmp);
+ cw = _mm_loadu_si128((const void *)CW);
+ one = _mm_set_epi32(0, 0, 0, 1);
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ /*
+ * sj contains state words 4*j to 4*j+3.
+ */
+ __m128i s0, s1, s2, s3;
+ int i;
+
+ s0 = cw;
+ s1 = kw0;
+ s2 = kw1;
+ s3 = iw;
+ for (i = 0; i < 10; i ++) {
+ /*
+ * Even round is straightforward application on
+ * the state words.
+ */
+ s0 = _mm_add_epi32(s0, s1);
+ s3 = _mm_xor_si128(s3, s0);
+ s3 = _mm_or_si128(
+ _mm_slli_epi32(s3, 16),
+ _mm_srli_epi32(s3, 16));
+
+ s2 = _mm_add_epi32(s2, s3);
+ s1 = _mm_xor_si128(s1, s2);
+ s1 = _mm_or_si128(
+ _mm_slli_epi32(s1, 12),
+ _mm_srli_epi32(s1, 20));
+
+ s0 = _mm_add_epi32(s0, s1);
+ s3 = _mm_xor_si128(s3, s0);
+ s3 = _mm_or_si128(
+ _mm_slli_epi32(s3, 8),
+ _mm_srli_epi32(s3, 24));
+
+ s2 = _mm_add_epi32(s2, s3);
+ s1 = _mm_xor_si128(s1, s2);
+ s1 = _mm_or_si128(
+ _mm_slli_epi32(s1, 7),
+ _mm_srli_epi32(s1, 25));
+
+ /*
+ * For the odd round, we must rotate some state
+ * words so that the computations apply on the
+ * right combinations of words.
+ */
+ s1 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(s1, 0x39);
+ s2 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(s2, 0x4E);
+ s3 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(s3, 0x93);
+
+ s0 = _mm_add_epi32(s0, s1);
+ s3 = _mm_xor_si128(s3, s0);
+ s3 = _mm_or_si128(
+ _mm_slli_epi32(s3, 16),
+ _mm_srli_epi32(s3, 16));
+
+ s2 = _mm_add_epi32(s2, s3);
+ s1 = _mm_xor_si128(s1, s2);
+ s1 = _mm_or_si128(
+ _mm_slli_epi32(s1, 12),
+ _mm_srli_epi32(s1, 20));
+
+ s0 = _mm_add_epi32(s0, s1);
+ s3 = _mm_xor_si128(s3, s0);
+ s3 = _mm_or_si128(
+ _mm_slli_epi32(s3, 8),
+ _mm_srli_epi32(s3, 24));
+
+ s2 = _mm_add_epi32(s2, s3);
+ s1 = _mm_xor_si128(s1, s2);
+ s1 = _mm_or_si128(
+ _mm_slli_epi32(s1, 7),
+ _mm_srli_epi32(s1, 25));
+
+ /*
+ * After the odd round, we rotate back the values
+ * to undo the rotate at the start of the odd round.
+ */
+ s1 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(s1, 0x93);
+ s2 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(s2, 0x4E);
+ s3 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(s3, 0x39);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Addition with the initial state.
+ */
+ s0 = _mm_add_epi32(s0, cw);
+ s1 = _mm_add_epi32(s1, kw0);
+ s2 = _mm_add_epi32(s2, kw1);
+ s3 = _mm_add_epi32(s3, iw);
+
+ /*
+ * Increment block counter.
+ */
+ iw = _mm_add_epi32(iw, one);
+
+ /*
+ * XOR final state with the data.
+ */
+ if (len < 64) {
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+ size_t u;
+
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(tmp + 0), s0);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(tmp + 16), s1);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(tmp + 32), s2);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(tmp + 48), s3);
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ buf[u] ^= tmp[u];
+ }
+ break;
+ } else {
+ __m128i b0, b1, b2, b3;
+
+ b0 = _mm_loadu_si128((const void *)(buf + 0));
+ b1 = _mm_loadu_si128((const void *)(buf + 16));
+ b2 = _mm_loadu_si128((const void *)(buf + 32));
+ b3 = _mm_loadu_si128((const void *)(buf + 48));
+ b0 = _mm_xor_si128(b0, s0);
+ b1 = _mm_xor_si128(b1, s1);
+ b2 = _mm_xor_si128(b2, s2);
+ b3 = _mm_xor_si128(b3, s3);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(buf + 0), b0);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(buf + 16), b1);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(buf + 32), b2);
+ _mm_storeu_si128((void *)(buf + 48), b3);
+ buf += 64;
+ len -= 64;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * _mm_extract_epi32() requires SSE4.1. We prefer to stick to
+ * raw SSE2, thus we use _mm_extract_epi16().
+ */
+ return (uint32_t)_mm_extract_epi16(iw, 0)
+ | ((uint32_t)_mm_extract_epi16(iw, 1) << 16);
+}
+
+BR_TARGETS_X86_DOWN
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+br_chacha20_run
+br_chacha20_sse2_get(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_ct.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_ct.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..581c0ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_ct.c
@@ -0,0 +1,411 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * During key schedule, we need to apply bit extraction PC-2 then permute
+ * things into our bitslice representation. PC-2 extracts 48 bits out
+ * of two 28-bit words (kl and kr), and we store these bits into two
+ * 32-bit words sk0 and sk1.
+ *
+ * -- bit 16+x of sk0 comes from bit QL0[x] of kl
+ * -- bit x of sk0 comes from bit QR0[x] of kr
+ * -- bit 16+x of sk1 comes from bit QL1[x] of kl
+ * -- bit x of sk1 comes from bit QR1[x] of kr
+ */
+
+static const unsigned char QL0[] = {
+ 17, 4, 27, 23, 13, 22, 7, 18,
+ 16, 24, 2, 20, 1, 8, 15, 26
+};
+
+static const unsigned char QR0[] = {
+ 25, 19, 9, 1, 5, 11, 23, 8,
+ 17, 0, 22, 3, 6, 20, 27, 24
+};
+
+static const unsigned char QL1[] = {
+ 28, 28, 14, 11, 28, 28, 25, 0,
+ 28, 28, 5, 9, 28, 28, 12, 21
+};
+
+static const unsigned char QR1[] = {
+ 28, 28, 15, 4, 28, 28, 26, 16,
+ 28, 28, 12, 7, 28, 28, 10, 14
+};
+
+/*
+ * 32-bit rotation. The C compiler is supposed to recognize it as a
+ * rotation and use the local architecture rotation opcode (if available).
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+rotl(uint32_t x, int n)
+{
+ return (x << n) | (x >> (32 - n));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute key schedule for 8 key bytes (produces 32 subkey words).
+ */
+static void
+keysched_unit(uint32_t *skey, const void *key)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ br_des_keysched_unit(skey, key);
+
+ /*
+ * Apply PC-2 + bitslicing.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i ++) {
+ uint32_t kl, kr, sk0, sk1;
+ int j;
+
+ kl = skey[(i << 1) + 0];
+ kr = skey[(i << 1) + 1];
+ sk0 = 0;
+ sk1 = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < 16; j ++) {
+ sk0 <<= 1;
+ sk1 <<= 1;
+ sk0 |= ((kl >> QL0[j]) & (uint32_t)1) << 16;
+ sk0 |= (kr >> QR0[j]) & (uint32_t)1;
+ sk1 |= ((kl >> QL1[j]) & (uint32_t)1) << 16;
+ sk1 |= (kr >> QR1[j]) & (uint32_t)1;
+ }
+
+ skey[(i << 1) + 0] = sk0;
+ skey[(i << 1) + 1] = sk1;
+ }
+
+#if 0
+ /*
+ * Speed-optimized version for PC-2 + bitslicing.
+ * (Unused. Kept for reference only.)
+ */
+ sk0 = kl & (uint32_t)0x00100000;
+ sk0 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x08008000) << 2;
+ sk0 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x00400000) << 4;
+ sk0 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x00800000) << 5;
+ sk0 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x00040000) << 6;
+ sk0 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x00010000) << 7;
+ sk0 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x00000100) << 10;
+ sk0 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x00022000) << 14;
+ sk0 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x00000082) << 18;
+ sk0 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x00000004) << 19;
+ sk0 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x04000000) >> 10;
+ sk0 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x00000010) << 26;
+ sk0 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x01000000) >> 2;
+
+ sk0 |= kr & (uint32_t)0x00000100;
+ sk0 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x00000008) << 1;
+ sk0 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x00000200) << 4;
+ sk0 |= rotl(kr & (uint32_t)0x08000021, 6);
+ sk0 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x01000000) >> 24;
+ sk0 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x00000002) << 11;
+ sk0 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x00100000) >> 18;
+ sk0 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x00400000) >> 17;
+ sk0 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x00800000) >> 14;
+ sk0 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x02020000) >> 10;
+ sk0 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x00080000) >> 5;
+ sk0 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x00000040) >> 3;
+ sk0 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x00000800) >> 1;
+
+ sk1 = kl & (uint32_t)0x02000000;
+ sk1 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x00001000) << 5;
+ sk1 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x00000200) << 11;
+ sk1 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x00004000) << 15;
+ sk1 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x00000020) << 16;
+ sk1 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x00000800) << 17;
+ sk1 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x00000001) << 24;
+ sk1 |= (kl & (uint32_t)0x00200000) >> 5;
+
+ sk1 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x00000010) << 8;
+ sk1 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x04000000) >> 17;
+ sk1 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x00004000) >> 14;
+ sk1 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x00000400) >> 9;
+ sk1 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x00010000) >> 8;
+ sk1 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x00001000) >> 7;
+ sk1 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x00000080) >> 3;
+ sk1 |= (kr & (uint32_t)0x00008000) >> 2;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+unsigned
+br_des_ct_keysched(uint32_t *skey, const void *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+ switch (key_len) {
+ case 8:
+ keysched_unit(skey, key);
+ return 1;
+ case 16:
+ keysched_unit(skey, key);
+ keysched_unit(skey + 32, (const unsigned char *)key + 8);
+ br_des_rev_skey(skey + 32);
+ memcpy(skey + 64, skey, 32 * sizeof *skey);
+ return 3;
+ default:
+ keysched_unit(skey, key);
+ keysched_unit(skey + 32, (const unsigned char *)key + 8);
+ br_des_rev_skey(skey + 32);
+ keysched_unit(skey + 64, (const unsigned char *)key + 16);
+ return 3;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * DES confusion function. This function performs expansion E (32 to
+ * 48 bits), XOR with subkey, S-boxes, and permutation P.
+ */
+static inline uint32_t
+Fconf(uint32_t r0, const uint32_t *sk)
+{
+ /*
+ * Each 6->4 S-box is virtually turned into four 6->1 boxes; we
+ * thus end up with 32 boxes that we call "T-boxes" here. We will
+ * evaluate them with bitslice code.
+ *
+ * Each T-box is a circuit of multiplexers (sort of) and thus
+ * takes 70 inputs: the 6 actual T-box inputs, and 64 constants
+ * that describe the T-box output for all combinations of the
+ * 6 inputs. With this model, all T-boxes are identical (with
+ * distinct inputs) and thus can be executed in parallel with
+ * bitslice code.
+ *
+ * T-boxes are numbered from 0 to 31, in least-to-most
+ * significant order. Thus, S-box S1 corresponds to T-boxes 31,
+ * 30, 29 and 28, in that order. T-box 'n' is computed with the
+ * bits at rank 'n' in the 32-bit words.
+ *
+ * Words x0 to x5 contain the T-box inputs 0 to 5.
+ */
+ uint32_t x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, z0;
+ uint32_t y0, y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6, y7, y8, y9;
+ uint32_t y10, y11, y12, y13, y14, y15, y16, y17, y18, y19;
+ uint32_t y20, y21, y22, y23, y24, y25, y26, y27, y28, y29;
+ uint32_t y30;
+
+ /*
+ * Spread input bits over the 6 input words x*.
+ */
+ x1 = r0 & (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ x2 = (r0 >> 1) & (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ x3 = (r0 >> 2) & (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ x4 = (r0 >> 3) & (uint32_t)0x11111111;
+ x1 = (x1 << 4) - x1;
+ x2 = (x2 << 4) - x2;
+ x3 = (x3 << 4) - x3;
+ x4 = (x4 << 4) - x4;
+ x0 = (x4 << 4) | (x4 >> 28);
+ x5 = (x1 >> 4) | (x1 << 28);
+
+ /*
+ * XOR with the subkey for this round.
+ */
+ x0 ^= sk[0];
+ x1 ^= sk[1];
+ x2 ^= sk[2];
+ x3 ^= sk[3];
+ x4 ^= sk[4];
+ x5 ^= sk[5];
+
+ /*
+ * The T-boxes are done in parallel, since they all use a
+ * "tree of multiplexer". We use "fake multiplexers":
+ *
+ * y = a ^ (x & b)
+ *
+ * computes y as either 'a' (if x == 0) or 'a ^ b' (if x == 1).
+ */
+ y0 = (uint32_t)0xEFA72C4D ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0xEC7AC69C);
+ y1 = (uint32_t)0xAEAAEDFF ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x500FB821);
+ y2 = (uint32_t)0x37396665 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x40EFA809);
+ y3 = (uint32_t)0x68D7B833 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0xA5EC0B28);
+ y4 = (uint32_t)0xC9C755BB ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x252CF820);
+ y5 = (uint32_t)0x73FC3606 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x40205801);
+ y6 = (uint32_t)0xA2A0A918 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0xE220F929);
+ y7 = (uint32_t)0x8222BD90 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x44A3F9E1);
+ y8 = (uint32_t)0xD6B6AC77 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x794F104A);
+ y9 = (uint32_t)0x3069300C ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x026F320B);
+ y10 = (uint32_t)0x6CE0D5CC ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x7640B01A);
+ y11 = (uint32_t)0x59A9A22D ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x238F1572);
+ y12 = (uint32_t)0xAC6D0BD4 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x7A63C083);
+ y13 = (uint32_t)0x21C83200 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x11CCA000);
+ y14 = (uint32_t)0xA0E62188 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x202F69AA);
+ /* y15 = (uint32_t)0x00000000 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x00000000); */
+ y16 = (uint32_t)0xAF7D655A ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x51B33BE9);
+ y17 = (uint32_t)0xF0168AA3 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x3B0FE8AE);
+ y18 = (uint32_t)0x90AA30C6 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x90BF8816);
+ y19 = (uint32_t)0x5AB2750A ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x09E34F9B);
+ y20 = (uint32_t)0x5391BE65 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x0103BE88);
+ y21 = (uint32_t)0x93372BAF ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x49AC8E25);
+ y22 = (uint32_t)0xF288210C ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x922C313D);
+ y23 = (uint32_t)0x920AF5C0 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x70EF31B0);
+ y24 = (uint32_t)0x63D312C0 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x6A707100);
+ y25 = (uint32_t)0x537B3006 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0xB97C9011);
+ y26 = (uint32_t)0xA2EFB0A5 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0xA320C959);
+ y27 = (uint32_t)0xBC8F96A5 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x6EA0AB4A);
+ y28 = (uint32_t)0xFAD176A5 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x6953DDF8);
+ y29 = (uint32_t)0x665A14A3 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0xF74F3E2B);
+ y30 = (uint32_t)0xF2EFF0CC ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0xF0306CAD);
+ /* y31 = (uint32_t)0x00000000 ^ (x0 & (uint32_t)0x00000000); */
+
+ y0 = y0 ^ (x1 & y1);
+ y1 = y2 ^ (x1 & y3);
+ y2 = y4 ^ (x1 & y5);
+ y3 = y6 ^ (x1 & y7);
+ y4 = y8 ^ (x1 & y9);
+ y5 = y10 ^ (x1 & y11);
+ y6 = y12 ^ (x1 & y13);
+ y7 = y14; /* was: y14 ^ (x1 & y15) */
+ y8 = y16 ^ (x1 & y17);
+ y9 = y18 ^ (x1 & y19);
+ y10 = y20 ^ (x1 & y21);
+ y11 = y22 ^ (x1 & y23);
+ y12 = y24 ^ (x1 & y25);
+ y13 = y26 ^ (x1 & y27);
+ y14 = y28 ^ (x1 & y29);
+ y15 = y30; /* was: y30 ^ (x1 & y31) */
+
+ y0 = y0 ^ (x2 & y1);
+ y1 = y2 ^ (x2 & y3);
+ y2 = y4 ^ (x2 & y5);
+ y3 = y6 ^ (x2 & y7);
+ y4 = y8 ^ (x2 & y9);
+ y5 = y10 ^ (x2 & y11);
+ y6 = y12 ^ (x2 & y13);
+ y7 = y14 ^ (x2 & y15);
+
+ y0 = y0 ^ (x3 & y1);
+ y1 = y2 ^ (x3 & y3);
+ y2 = y4 ^ (x3 & y5);
+ y3 = y6 ^ (x3 & y7);
+
+ y0 = y0 ^ (x4 & y1);
+ y1 = y2 ^ (x4 & y3);
+
+ y0 = y0 ^ (x5 & y1);
+
+ /*
+ * The P permutation:
+ * -- Each bit move is converted into a mask + left rotation.
+ * -- Rotations that use the same movement are coalesced together.
+ * -- Left and right shifts are used as alternatives to a rotation
+ * where appropriate (this will help architectures that do not have
+ * a rotation opcode).
+ */
+ z0 = (y0 & (uint32_t)0x00000004) << 3;
+ z0 |= (y0 & (uint32_t)0x00004000) << 4;
+ z0 |= rotl(y0 & 0x12020120, 5);
+ z0 |= (y0 & (uint32_t)0x00100000) << 6;
+ z0 |= (y0 & (uint32_t)0x00008000) << 9;
+ z0 |= (y0 & (uint32_t)0x04000000) >> 22;
+ z0 |= (y0 & (uint32_t)0x00000001) << 11;
+ z0 |= rotl(y0 & 0x20000200, 12);
+ z0 |= (y0 & (uint32_t)0x00200000) >> 19;
+ z0 |= (y0 & (uint32_t)0x00000040) << 14;
+ z0 |= (y0 & (uint32_t)0x00010000) << 15;
+ z0 |= (y0 & (uint32_t)0x00000002) << 16;
+ z0 |= rotl(y0 & 0x40801800, 17);
+ z0 |= (y0 & (uint32_t)0x00080000) >> 13;
+ z0 |= (y0 & (uint32_t)0x00000010) << 21;
+ z0 |= (y0 & (uint32_t)0x01000000) >> 10;
+ z0 |= rotl(y0 & 0x88000008, 24);
+ z0 |= (y0 & (uint32_t)0x00000480) >> 7;
+ z0 |= (y0 & (uint32_t)0x00442000) >> 6;
+ return z0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process one block through 16 successive rounds, omitting the swap
+ * in the final round.
+ */
+static void
+process_block_unit(uint32_t *pl, uint32_t *pr, const uint32_t *sk_exp)
+{
+ int i;
+ uint32_t l, r;
+
+ l = *pl;
+ r = *pr;
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i ++) {
+ uint32_t t;
+
+ t = l ^ Fconf(r, sk_exp);
+ l = r;
+ r = t;
+ sk_exp += 6;
+ }
+ *pl = r;
+ *pr = l;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_des_ct_process_block(unsigned num_rounds,
+ const uint32_t *sk_exp, void *block)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t l, r;
+
+ buf = block;
+ l = br_dec32be(buf);
+ r = br_dec32be(buf + 4);
+ br_des_do_IP(&l, &r);
+ while (num_rounds -- > 0) {
+ process_block_unit(&l, &r, sk_exp);
+ sk_exp += 96;
+ }
+ br_des_do_invIP(&l, &r);
+ br_enc32be(buf, l);
+ br_enc32be(buf + 4, r);
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_des_ct_skey_expand(uint32_t *sk_exp,
+ unsigned num_rounds, const uint32_t *skey)
+{
+ num_rounds <<= 4;
+ while (num_rounds -- > 0) {
+ uint32_t v, w0, w1, w2, w3;
+
+ v = *skey ++;
+ w0 = v & 0x11111111;
+ w1 = (v >> 1) & 0x11111111;
+ w2 = (v >> 2) & 0x11111111;
+ w3 = (v >> 3) & 0x11111111;
+ *sk_exp ++ = (w0 << 4) - w0;
+ *sk_exp ++ = (w1 << 4) - w1;
+ *sk_exp ++ = (w2 << 4) - w2;
+ *sk_exp ++ = (w3 << 4) - w3;
+ v = *skey ++;
+ w0 = v & 0x11111111;
+ w1 = (v >> 1) & 0x11111111;
+ *sk_exp ++ = (w0 << 4) - w0;
+ *sk_exp ++ = (w1 << 4) - w1;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_ct_cbcdec.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_ct_cbcdec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d208a3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_ct_cbcdec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_des_ct_cbcdec_init(br_des_ct_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_des_ct_cbcdec_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_des_ct_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+ if (len == 8) {
+ br_des_rev_skey(ctx->skey);
+ } else {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 48; i += 2) {
+ uint32_t t;
+
+ t = ctx->skey[i];
+ ctx->skey[i] = ctx->skey[94 - i];
+ ctx->skey[94 - i] = t;
+ t = ctx->skey[i + 1];
+ ctx->skey[i + 1] = ctx->skey[95 - i];
+ ctx->skey[95 - i] = t;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_des_ct_cbcdec_run(const br_des_ct_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf, *ivbuf;
+ uint32_t sk_exp[288];
+
+ br_des_ct_skey_expand(sk_exp, ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey);
+ ivbuf = iv;
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ unsigned char tmp[8];
+ int i;
+
+ memcpy(tmp, buf, 8);
+ br_des_ct_process_block(ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, buf);
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i ++) {
+ buf[i] ^= ivbuf[i];
+ }
+ memcpy(ivbuf, tmp, 8);
+ buf += 8;
+ len -= 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcdec_class br_des_ct_cbcdec_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_des_ct_cbcdec_keys),
+ 8,
+ 3,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcdec_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_des_ct_cbcdec_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcdec_class *const *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_des_ct_cbcdec_run
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_ct_cbcenc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_ct_cbcenc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b3610e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_ct_cbcenc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_des_ct_cbcenc_init(br_des_ct_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_des_ct_cbcenc_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_des_ct_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_des_ct_cbcenc_run(const br_des_ct_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf, *ivbuf;
+ uint32_t sk_exp[288];
+
+ br_des_ct_skey_expand(sk_exp, ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey);
+ ivbuf = iv;
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i ++) {
+ buf[i] ^= ivbuf[i];
+ }
+ br_des_ct_process_block(ctx->num_rounds, sk_exp, buf);
+ memcpy(ivbuf, buf, 8);
+ buf += 8;
+ len -= 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcenc_class br_des_ct_cbcenc_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_des_ct_cbcenc_keys),
+ 8,
+ 3,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcenc_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_des_ct_cbcenc_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcenc_class *const *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_des_ct_cbcenc_run
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_support.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_support.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37f6db3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_support.c
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_des_do_IP(uint32_t *xl, uint32_t *xr)
+{
+ /*
+ * Permutation algorithm is initially from Richard Outerbridge;
+ * implementation here is adapted from Crypto++ "des.cpp" file
+ * (which is in public domain).
+ */
+ uint32_t l, r, t;
+
+ l = *xl;
+ r = *xr;
+ t = ((l >> 4) ^ r) & (uint32_t)0x0F0F0F0F;
+ r ^= t;
+ l ^= t << 4;
+ t = ((l >> 16) ^ r) & (uint32_t)0x0000FFFF;
+ r ^= t;
+ l ^= t << 16;
+ t = ((r >> 2) ^ l) & (uint32_t)0x33333333;
+ l ^= t;
+ r ^= t << 2;
+ t = ((r >> 8) ^ l) & (uint32_t)0x00FF00FF;
+ l ^= t;
+ r ^= t << 8;
+ t = ((l >> 1) ^ r) & (uint32_t)0x55555555;
+ r ^= t;
+ l ^= t << 1;
+ *xl = l;
+ *xr = r;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_des_do_invIP(uint32_t *xl, uint32_t *xr)
+{
+ /*
+ * See br_des_do_IP().
+ */
+ uint32_t l, r, t;
+
+ l = *xl;
+ r = *xr;
+ t = ((l >> 1) ^ r) & 0x55555555;
+ r ^= t;
+ l ^= t << 1;
+ t = ((r >> 8) ^ l) & 0x00FF00FF;
+ l ^= t;
+ r ^= t << 8;
+ t = ((r >> 2) ^ l) & 0x33333333;
+ l ^= t;
+ r ^= t << 2;
+ t = ((l >> 16) ^ r) & 0x0000FFFF;
+ r ^= t;
+ l ^= t << 16;
+ t = ((l >> 4) ^ r) & 0x0F0F0F0F;
+ r ^= t;
+ l ^= t << 4;
+ *xl = l;
+ *xr = r;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_des_keysched_unit(uint32_t *skey, const void *key)
+{
+ uint32_t xl, xr, kl, kr;
+ int i;
+
+ xl = br_dec32be(key);
+ xr = br_dec32be((const unsigned char *)key + 4);
+
+ /*
+ * Permutation PC-1 is quite similar to the IP permutation.
+ * Definition of IP (in FIPS 46-3 notations) is:
+ * 58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2
+ * 60 52 44 36 28 20 12 4
+ * 62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6
+ * 64 56 48 40 32 24 16 8
+ * 57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1
+ * 59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3
+ * 61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5
+ * 63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7
+ *
+ * Definition of PC-1 is:
+ * 57 49 41 33 25 17 9 1
+ * 58 50 42 34 26 18 10 2
+ * 59 51 43 35 27 19 11 3
+ * 60 52 44 36
+ * 63 55 47 39 31 23 15 7
+ * 62 54 46 38 30 22 14 6
+ * 61 53 45 37 29 21 13 5
+ * 28 20 12 4
+ */
+ br_des_do_IP(&xl, &xr);
+ kl = ((xr & (uint32_t)0xFF000000) >> 4)
+ | ((xl & (uint32_t)0xFF000000) >> 12)
+ | ((xr & (uint32_t)0x00FF0000) >> 12)
+ | ((xl & (uint32_t)0x00FF0000) >> 20);
+ kr = ((xr & (uint32_t)0x000000FF) << 20)
+ | ((xl & (uint32_t)0x0000FF00) << 4)
+ | ((xr & (uint32_t)0x0000FF00) >> 4)
+ | ((xl & (uint32_t)0x000F0000) >> 16);
+
+ /*
+ * For each round, rotate the two 28-bit words kl and kr.
+ * The extraction of the 48-bit subkey (PC-2) is not done yet.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i ++) {
+ if ((1 << i) & 0x8103) {
+ kl = (kl << 1) | (kl >> 27);
+ kr = (kr << 1) | (kr >> 27);
+ } else {
+ kl = (kl << 2) | (kl >> 26);
+ kr = (kr << 2) | (kr >> 26);
+ }
+ kl &= (uint32_t)0x0FFFFFFF;
+ kr &= (uint32_t)0x0FFFFFFF;
+ skey[(i << 1) + 0] = kl;
+ skey[(i << 1) + 1] = kr;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_des_rev_skey(uint32_t *skey)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i += 2) {
+ uint32_t t;
+
+ t = skey[i + 0];
+ skey[i + 0] = skey[30 - i];
+ skey[30 - i] = t;
+ t = skey[i + 1];
+ skey[i + 1] = skey[31 - i];
+ skey[31 - i] = t;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_tab.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_tab.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f8e4f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_tab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * PC2left[x] tells where bit x goes when applying PC-2. 'x' is a bit
+ * position in the left rotated key word. Both position are in normal
+ * order (rightmost bit is 0).
+ */
+static const unsigned char PC2left[] = {
+ 16, 3, 7, 24, 20, 11, 24,
+ 13, 2, 10, 24, 22, 5, 15,
+ 23, 1, 9, 21, 12, 24, 6,
+ 4, 14, 18, 8, 17, 0, 19
+};
+
+/*
+ * Similar to PC2left[x], for the right rotated key word.
+ */
+static const unsigned char PC2right[] = {
+ 8, 18, 24, 6, 22, 15, 3,
+ 10, 12, 19, 5, 14, 11, 24,
+ 4, 23, 16, 9, 24, 20, 2,
+ 24, 7, 13, 0, 21, 17, 1
+};
+
+/*
+ * S-boxes and PC-1 merged.
+ */
+static const uint32_t S1[] = {
+ 0x00808200, 0x00000000, 0x00008000, 0x00808202,
+ 0x00808002, 0x00008202, 0x00000002, 0x00008000,
+ 0x00000200, 0x00808200, 0x00808202, 0x00000200,
+ 0x00800202, 0x00808002, 0x00800000, 0x00000002,
+ 0x00000202, 0x00800200, 0x00800200, 0x00008200,
+ 0x00008200, 0x00808000, 0x00808000, 0x00800202,
+ 0x00008002, 0x00800002, 0x00800002, 0x00008002,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00000202, 0x00008202, 0x00800000,
+ 0x00008000, 0x00808202, 0x00000002, 0x00808000,
+ 0x00808200, 0x00800000, 0x00800000, 0x00000200,
+ 0x00808002, 0x00008000, 0x00008200, 0x00800002,
+ 0x00000200, 0x00000002, 0x00800202, 0x00008202,
+ 0x00808202, 0x00008002, 0x00808000, 0x00800202,
+ 0x00800002, 0x00000202, 0x00008202, 0x00808200,
+ 0x00000202, 0x00800200, 0x00800200, 0x00000000,
+ 0x00008002, 0x00008200, 0x00000000, 0x00808002
+};
+
+static const uint32_t S2[] = {
+ 0x40084010, 0x40004000, 0x00004000, 0x00084010,
+ 0x00080000, 0x00000010, 0x40080010, 0x40004010,
+ 0x40000010, 0x40084010, 0x40084000, 0x40000000,
+ 0x40004000, 0x00080000, 0x00000010, 0x40080010,
+ 0x00084000, 0x00080010, 0x40004010, 0x00000000,
+ 0x40000000, 0x00004000, 0x00084010, 0x40080000,
+ 0x00080010, 0x40000010, 0x00000000, 0x00084000,
+ 0x00004010, 0x40084000, 0x40080000, 0x00004010,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00084010, 0x40080010, 0x00080000,
+ 0x40004010, 0x40080000, 0x40084000, 0x00004000,
+ 0x40080000, 0x40004000, 0x00000010, 0x40084010,
+ 0x00084010, 0x00000010, 0x00004000, 0x40000000,
+ 0x00004010, 0x40084000, 0x00080000, 0x40000010,
+ 0x00080010, 0x40004010, 0x40000010, 0x00080010,
+ 0x00084000, 0x00000000, 0x40004000, 0x00004010,
+ 0x40000000, 0x40080010, 0x40084010, 0x00084000
+};
+
+static const uint32_t S3[] = {
+ 0x00000104, 0x04010100, 0x00000000, 0x04010004,
+ 0x04000100, 0x00000000, 0x00010104, 0x04000100,
+ 0x00010004, 0x04000004, 0x04000004, 0x00010000,
+ 0x04010104, 0x00010004, 0x04010000, 0x00000104,
+ 0x04000000, 0x00000004, 0x04010100, 0x00000100,
+ 0x00010100, 0x04010000, 0x04010004, 0x00010104,
+ 0x04000104, 0x00010100, 0x00010000, 0x04000104,
+ 0x00000004, 0x04010104, 0x00000100, 0x04000000,
+ 0x04010100, 0x04000000, 0x00010004, 0x00000104,
+ 0x00010000, 0x04010100, 0x04000100, 0x00000000,
+ 0x00000100, 0x00010004, 0x04010104, 0x04000100,
+ 0x04000004, 0x00000100, 0x00000000, 0x04010004,
+ 0x04000104, 0x00010000, 0x04000000, 0x04010104,
+ 0x00000004, 0x00010104, 0x00010100, 0x04000004,
+ 0x04010000, 0x04000104, 0x00000104, 0x04010000,
+ 0x00010104, 0x00000004, 0x04010004, 0x00010100
+};
+
+static const uint32_t S4[] = {
+ 0x80401000, 0x80001040, 0x80001040, 0x00000040,
+ 0x00401040, 0x80400040, 0x80400000, 0x80001000,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00401000, 0x00401000, 0x80401040,
+ 0x80000040, 0x00000000, 0x00400040, 0x80400000,
+ 0x80000000, 0x00001000, 0x00400000, 0x80401000,
+ 0x00000040, 0x00400000, 0x80001000, 0x00001040,
+ 0x80400040, 0x80000000, 0x00001040, 0x00400040,
+ 0x00001000, 0x00401040, 0x80401040, 0x80000040,
+ 0x00400040, 0x80400000, 0x00401000, 0x80401040,
+ 0x80000040, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00401000,
+ 0x00001040, 0x00400040, 0x80400040, 0x80000000,
+ 0x80401000, 0x80001040, 0x80001040, 0x00000040,
+ 0x80401040, 0x80000040, 0x80000000, 0x00001000,
+ 0x80400000, 0x80001000, 0x00401040, 0x80400040,
+ 0x80001000, 0x00001040, 0x00400000, 0x80401000,
+ 0x00000040, 0x00400000, 0x00001000, 0x00401040
+};
+
+static const uint32_t S5[] = {
+ 0x00000080, 0x01040080, 0x01040000, 0x21000080,
+ 0x00040000, 0x00000080, 0x20000000, 0x01040000,
+ 0x20040080, 0x00040000, 0x01000080, 0x20040080,
+ 0x21000080, 0x21040000, 0x00040080, 0x20000000,
+ 0x01000000, 0x20040000, 0x20040000, 0x00000000,
+ 0x20000080, 0x21040080, 0x21040080, 0x01000080,
+ 0x21040000, 0x20000080, 0x00000000, 0x21000000,
+ 0x01040080, 0x01000000, 0x21000000, 0x00040080,
+ 0x00040000, 0x21000080, 0x00000080, 0x01000000,
+ 0x20000000, 0x01040000, 0x21000080, 0x20040080,
+ 0x01000080, 0x20000000, 0x21040000, 0x01040080,
+ 0x20040080, 0x00000080, 0x01000000, 0x21040000,
+ 0x21040080, 0x00040080, 0x21000000, 0x21040080,
+ 0x01040000, 0x00000000, 0x20040000, 0x21000000,
+ 0x00040080, 0x01000080, 0x20000080, 0x00040000,
+ 0x00000000, 0x20040000, 0x01040080, 0x20000080
+};
+
+static const uint32_t S6[] = {
+ 0x10000008, 0x10200000, 0x00002000, 0x10202008,
+ 0x10200000, 0x00000008, 0x10202008, 0x00200000,
+ 0x10002000, 0x00202008, 0x00200000, 0x10000008,
+ 0x00200008, 0x10002000, 0x10000000, 0x00002008,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00200008, 0x10002008, 0x00002000,
+ 0x00202000, 0x10002008, 0x00000008, 0x10200008,
+ 0x10200008, 0x00000000, 0x00202008, 0x10202000,
+ 0x00002008, 0x00202000, 0x10202000, 0x10000000,
+ 0x10002000, 0x00000008, 0x10200008, 0x00202000,
+ 0x10202008, 0x00200000, 0x00002008, 0x10000008,
+ 0x00200000, 0x10002000, 0x10000000, 0x00002008,
+ 0x10000008, 0x10202008, 0x00202000, 0x10200000,
+ 0x00202008, 0x10202000, 0x00000000, 0x10200008,
+ 0x00000008, 0x00002000, 0x10200000, 0x00202008,
+ 0x00002000, 0x00200008, 0x10002008, 0x00000000,
+ 0x10202000, 0x10000000, 0x00200008, 0x10002008
+};
+
+static const uint32_t S7[] = {
+ 0x00100000, 0x02100001, 0x02000401, 0x00000000,
+ 0x00000400, 0x02000401, 0x00100401, 0x02100400,
+ 0x02100401, 0x00100000, 0x00000000, 0x02000001,
+ 0x00000001, 0x02000000, 0x02100001, 0x00000401,
+ 0x02000400, 0x00100401, 0x00100001, 0x02000400,
+ 0x02000001, 0x02100000, 0x02100400, 0x00100001,
+ 0x02100000, 0x00000400, 0x00000401, 0x02100401,
+ 0x00100400, 0x00000001, 0x02000000, 0x00100400,
+ 0x02000000, 0x00100400, 0x00100000, 0x02000401,
+ 0x02000401, 0x02100001, 0x02100001, 0x00000001,
+ 0x00100001, 0x02000000, 0x02000400, 0x00100000,
+ 0x02100400, 0x00000401, 0x00100401, 0x02100400,
+ 0x00000401, 0x02000001, 0x02100401, 0x02100000,
+ 0x00100400, 0x00000000, 0x00000001, 0x02100401,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00100401, 0x02100000, 0x00000400,
+ 0x02000001, 0x02000400, 0x00000400, 0x00100001
+};
+
+static const uint32_t S8[] = {
+ 0x08000820, 0x00000800, 0x00020000, 0x08020820,
+ 0x08000000, 0x08000820, 0x00000020, 0x08000000,
+ 0x00020020, 0x08020000, 0x08020820, 0x00020800,
+ 0x08020800, 0x00020820, 0x00000800, 0x00000020,
+ 0x08020000, 0x08000020, 0x08000800, 0x00000820,
+ 0x00020800, 0x00020020, 0x08020020, 0x08020800,
+ 0x00000820, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x08020020,
+ 0x08000020, 0x08000800, 0x00020820, 0x00020000,
+ 0x00020820, 0x00020000, 0x08020800, 0x00000800,
+ 0x00000020, 0x08020020, 0x00000800, 0x00020820,
+ 0x08000800, 0x00000020, 0x08000020, 0x08020000,
+ 0x08020020, 0x08000000, 0x00020000, 0x08000820,
+ 0x00000000, 0x08020820, 0x00020020, 0x08000020,
+ 0x08020000, 0x08000800, 0x08000820, 0x00000000,
+ 0x08020820, 0x00020800, 0x00020800, 0x00000820,
+ 0x00000820, 0x00020020, 0x08000000, 0x08020800
+};
+
+static inline uint32_t
+Fconf(uint32_t r0, uint32_t skl, uint32_t skr)
+{
+ uint32_t r1;
+
+ r1 = (r0 << 16) | (r0 >> 16);
+ return
+ S1[((r1 >> 11) ^ (skl >> 18)) & 0x3F]
+ | S2[((r0 >> 23) ^ (skl >> 12)) & 0x3F]
+ | S3[((r0 >> 19) ^ (skl >> 6)) & 0x3F]
+ | S4[((r0 >> 15) ^ (skl )) & 0x3F]
+ | S5[((r0 >> 11) ^ (skr >> 18)) & 0x3F]
+ | S6[((r0 >> 7) ^ (skr >> 12)) & 0x3F]
+ | S7[((r0 >> 3) ^ (skr >> 6)) & 0x3F]
+ | S8[((r1 >> 15) ^ (skr )) & 0x3F];
+}
+
+static void
+process_block_unit(uint32_t *pl, uint32_t *pr, const uint32_t *skey)
+{
+ int i;
+ uint32_t l, r;
+
+ l = *pl;
+ r = *pr;
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i ++) {
+ uint32_t t;
+
+ t = l ^ Fconf(r, skey[(i << 1) + 0], skey[(i << 1) + 1]);
+ l = r;
+ r = t;
+ }
+ *pl = r;
+ *pr = l;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+void
+br_des_tab_process_block(unsigned num_rounds, const uint32_t *skey, void *block)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t l, r;
+
+ buf = block;
+ l = br_dec32be(buf);
+ r = br_dec32be(buf + 4);
+ br_des_do_IP(&l, &r);
+ while (num_rounds -- > 0) {
+ process_block_unit(&l, &r, skey);
+ skey += 32;
+ }
+ br_des_do_invIP(&l, &r);
+ br_enc32be(buf, l);
+ br_enc32be(buf + 4, r);
+}
+
+static void
+keysched_unit(uint32_t *skey, const void *key)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ br_des_keysched_unit(skey, key);
+
+ /*
+ * Apply PC-2 to get the 48-bit subkeys.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i ++) {
+ uint32_t xl, xr, ul, ur;
+ int j;
+
+ xl = skey[(i << 1) + 0];
+ xr = skey[(i << 1) + 1];
+ ul = 0;
+ ur = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < 28; j ++) {
+ ul |= (xl & 1) << PC2left[j];
+ ur |= (xr & 1) << PC2right[j];
+ xl >>= 1;
+ xr >>= 1;
+ }
+ skey[(i << 1) + 0] = ul;
+ skey[(i << 1) + 1] = ur;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+unsigned
+br_des_tab_keysched(uint32_t *skey, const void *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+ switch (key_len) {
+ case 8:
+ keysched_unit(skey, key);
+ return 1;
+ case 16:
+ keysched_unit(skey, key);
+ keysched_unit(skey + 32, (const unsigned char *)key + 8);
+ br_des_rev_skey(skey + 32);
+ memcpy(skey + 64, skey, 32 * sizeof *skey);
+ return 3;
+ default:
+ keysched_unit(skey, key);
+ keysched_unit(skey + 32, (const unsigned char *)key + 8);
+ br_des_rev_skey(skey + 32);
+ keysched_unit(skey + 64, (const unsigned char *)key + 16);
+ return 3;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_tab_cbcdec.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_tab_cbcdec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e7eabe9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_tab_cbcdec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_des_tab_cbcdec_init(br_des_tab_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_des_tab_cbcdec_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_des_tab_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+ if (len == 8) {
+ br_des_rev_skey(ctx->skey);
+ } else {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 48; i += 2) {
+ uint32_t t;
+
+ t = ctx->skey[i];
+ ctx->skey[i] = ctx->skey[94 - i];
+ ctx->skey[94 - i] = t;
+ t = ctx->skey[i + 1];
+ ctx->skey[i + 1] = ctx->skey[95 - i];
+ ctx->skey[95 - i] = t;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_des_tab_cbcdec_run(const br_des_tab_cbcdec_keys *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf, *ivbuf;
+
+ ivbuf = iv;
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ unsigned char tmp[8];
+ int i;
+
+ memcpy(tmp, buf, 8);
+ br_des_tab_process_block(ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey, buf);
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i ++) {
+ buf[i] ^= ivbuf[i];
+ }
+ memcpy(ivbuf, tmp, 8);
+ buf += 8;
+ len -= 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcdec_class br_des_tab_cbcdec_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_des_tab_cbcdec_keys),
+ 8,
+ 3,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcdec_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_des_tab_cbcdec_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcdec_class *const *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_des_tab_cbcdec_run
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_tab_cbcenc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_tab_cbcenc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a45ba3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/des_tab_cbcenc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_des_tab_cbcenc_init(br_des_tab_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ const void *key, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_des_tab_cbcenc_vtable;
+ ctx->num_rounds = br_des_tab_keysched(ctx->skey, key, len);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_des_tab_cbcenc_run(const br_des_tab_cbcenc_keys *ctx,
+ void *iv, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf, *ivbuf;
+
+ ivbuf = iv;
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i ++) {
+ buf[i] ^= ivbuf[i];
+ }
+ br_des_tab_process_block(ctx->num_rounds, ctx->skey, buf);
+ memcpy(ivbuf, buf, 8);
+ buf += 8;
+ len -= 8;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+const br_block_cbcenc_class br_des_tab_cbcenc_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_des_tab_cbcenc_keys),
+ 8,
+ 3,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcenc_class **, const void *, size_t))
+ &br_des_tab_cbcenc_init,
+ (void (*)(const br_block_cbcenc_class *const *, void *, void *, size_t))
+ &br_des_tab_cbcenc_run
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/poly1305_ctmul.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/poly1305_ctmul.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..150e610
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/poly1305_ctmul.c
@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Perform the inner processing of blocks for Poly1305. The accumulator
+ * and the r key are provided as arrays of 26-bit words (these words
+ * are allowed to have an extra bit, i.e. use 27 bits).
+ *
+ * On output, all accumulator words fit on 26 bits, except acc[1], which
+ * may be slightly larger (but by a very small amount only).
+ */
+static void
+poly1305_inner(uint32_t *acc, const uint32_t *r, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ /*
+ * Implementation notes: we split the 130-bit values into five
+ * 26-bit words. This gives us some space for carries.
+ *
+ * This code is inspired from the public-domain code available
+ * on:
+ * https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna
+ *
+ * Since we compute modulo 2^130-5, the "upper words" become
+ * low words with a factor of 5; that is, x*2^130 = x*5 mod p.
+ */
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ uint32_t a0, a1, a2, a3, a4;
+ uint32_t r0, r1, r2, r3, r4;
+ uint32_t u1, u2, u3, u4;
+
+ r0 = r[0];
+ r1 = r[1];
+ r2 = r[2];
+ r3 = r[3];
+ r4 = r[4];
+
+ u1 = r1 * 5;
+ u2 = r2 * 5;
+ u3 = r3 * 5;
+ u4 = r4 * 5;
+
+ a0 = acc[0];
+ a1 = acc[1];
+ a2 = acc[2];
+ a3 = acc[3];
+ a4 = acc[4];
+
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ uint64_t w0, w1, w2, w3, w4;
+ uint64_t c;
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+
+ /*
+ * If there is a partial block, right-pad it with zeros.
+ */
+ if (len < 16) {
+ memset(tmp, 0, sizeof tmp);
+ memcpy(tmp, buf, len);
+ buf = tmp;
+ len = 16;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Decode next block and apply the "high bit"; that value
+ * is added to the accumulator.
+ */
+ a0 += br_dec32le(buf) & 0x03FFFFFF;
+ a1 += (br_dec32le(buf + 3) >> 2) & 0x03FFFFFF;
+ a2 += (br_dec32le(buf + 6) >> 4) & 0x03FFFFFF;
+ a3 += (br_dec32le(buf + 9) >> 6) & 0x03FFFFFF;
+ a4 += (br_dec32le(buf + 12) >> 8) | 0x01000000;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute multiplication.
+ */
+#define M(x, y) ((uint64_t)(x) * (uint64_t)(y))
+
+ w0 = M(a0, r0) + M(a1, u4) + M(a2, u3) + M(a3, u2) + M(a4, u1);
+ w1 = M(a0, r1) + M(a1, r0) + M(a2, u4) + M(a3, u3) + M(a4, u2);
+ w2 = M(a0, r2) + M(a1, r1) + M(a2, r0) + M(a3, u4) + M(a4, u3);
+ w3 = M(a0, r3) + M(a1, r2) + M(a2, r1) + M(a3, r0) + M(a4, u4);
+ w4 = M(a0, r4) + M(a1, r3) + M(a2, r2) + M(a3, r1) + M(a4, r0);
+
+#undef M
+ /*
+ * Perform some (partial) modular reduction. This step is
+ * enough to keep values in ranges such that there won't
+ * be carry overflows. Most of the reduction was done in
+ * the multiplication step (by using the 'u*' values, and
+ * using the fact that 2^130 = -5 mod p); here we perform
+ * some carry propagation.
+ */
+ c = w0 >> 26;
+ a0 = (uint32_t)w0 & 0x3FFFFFF;
+ w1 += c;
+ c = w1 >> 26;
+ a1 = (uint32_t)w1 & 0x3FFFFFF;
+ w2 += c;
+ c = w2 >> 26;
+ a2 = (uint32_t)w2 & 0x3FFFFFF;
+ w3 += c;
+ c = w3 >> 26;
+ a3 = (uint32_t)w3 & 0x3FFFFFF;
+ w4 += c;
+ c = w4 >> 26;
+ a4 = (uint32_t)w4 & 0x3FFFFFF;
+ a0 += (uint32_t)c * 5;
+ a1 += a0 >> 26;
+ a0 &= 0x3FFFFFF;
+
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+
+ acc[0] = a0;
+ acc[1] = a1;
+ acc[2] = a2;
+ acc[3] = a3;
+ acc[4] = a4;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_poly1305_ctmul_run(const void *key, const void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len, const void *aad, size_t aad_len,
+ void *tag, br_chacha20_run ichacha, int encrypt)
+{
+ unsigned char pkey[32], foot[16];
+ uint32_t r[5], acc[5], cc, ctl, hi;
+ uint64_t w;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the MAC key. The 'r' value is the first 16 bytes of
+ * pkey[].
+ */
+ memset(pkey, 0, sizeof pkey);
+ ichacha(key, iv, 0, pkey, sizeof pkey);
+
+ /*
+ * If encrypting, ChaCha20 must run first, followed by Poly1305.
+ * When decrypting, the operations are reversed.
+ */
+ if (encrypt) {
+ ichacha(key, iv, 1, data, len);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Run Poly1305. We must process the AAD, then ciphertext, then
+ * the footer (with the lengths). Note that the AAD and ciphertext
+ * are meant to be padded with zeros up to the next multiple of 16,
+ * and the length of the footer is 16 bytes as well.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the 'r' value into 26-bit words, with the "clamping"
+ * operation applied.
+ */
+ r[0] = br_dec32le(pkey) & 0x03FFFFFF;
+ r[1] = (br_dec32le(pkey + 3) >> 2) & 0x03FFFF03;
+ r[2] = (br_dec32le(pkey + 6) >> 4) & 0x03FFC0FF;
+ r[3] = (br_dec32le(pkey + 9) >> 6) & 0x03F03FFF;
+ r[4] = (br_dec32le(pkey + 12) >> 8) & 0x000FFFFF;
+
+ /*
+ * Accumulator is 0.
+ */
+ memset(acc, 0, sizeof acc);
+
+ /*
+ * Process the additional authenticated data, ciphertext, and
+ * footer in due order.
+ */
+ br_enc64le(foot, (uint64_t)aad_len);
+ br_enc64le(foot + 8, (uint64_t)len);
+ poly1305_inner(acc, r, aad, aad_len);
+ poly1305_inner(acc, r, data, len);
+ poly1305_inner(acc, r, foot, sizeof foot);
+
+ /*
+ * Finalise modular reduction. This is done with carry propagation
+ * and applying the '2^130 = -5 mod p' rule. Note that the output
+ * of poly1035_inner() is already mostly reduced, since only
+ * acc[1] may be (very slightly) above 2^26. A single loop back
+ * to acc[1] will be enough to make the value fit in 130 bits.
+ */
+ cc = 0;
+ for (i = 1; i <= 6; i ++) {
+ int j;
+
+ j = (i >= 5) ? i - 5 : i;
+ acc[j] += cc;
+ cc = acc[j] >> 26;
+ acc[j] &= 0x03FFFFFF;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We may still have a value in the 2^130-5..2^130-1 range, in
+ * which case we must reduce it again. The code below selects,
+ * in constant-time, between 'acc' and 'acc-p',
+ */
+ ctl = GT(acc[0], 0x03FFFFFA);
+ for (i = 1; i < 5; i ++) {
+ ctl &= EQ(acc[i], 0x03FFFFFF);
+ }
+ cc = 5;
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; i ++) {
+ uint32_t t;
+
+ t = (acc[i] + cc);
+ cc = t >> 26;
+ t &= 0x03FFFFFF;
+ acc[i] = MUX(ctl, t, acc[i]);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert back the accumulator to 32-bit words, and add the
+ * 's' value (second half of pkey[]). That addition is done
+ * modulo 2^128.
+ */
+ w = (uint64_t)acc[0] + ((uint64_t)acc[1] << 26) + br_dec32le(pkey + 16);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)tag, (uint32_t)w);
+ w = (w >> 32) + ((uint64_t)acc[2] << 20) + br_dec32le(pkey + 20);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)tag + 4, (uint32_t)w);
+ w = (w >> 32) + ((uint64_t)acc[3] << 14) + br_dec32le(pkey + 24);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)tag + 8, (uint32_t)w);
+ hi = (uint32_t)(w >> 32) + (acc[4] << 8) + br_dec32le(pkey + 28);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)tag + 12, hi);
+
+ /*
+ * If decrypting, then ChaCha20 runs _after_ Poly1305.
+ */
+ if (!encrypt) {
+ ichacha(key, iv, 1, data, len);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/poly1305_ctmul32.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/poly1305_ctmul32.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..15d9635
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/poly1305_ctmul32.c
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Perform the inner processing of blocks for Poly1305.
+ */
+static void
+poly1305_inner(uint32_t *a, const uint32_t *r, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ /*
+ * Implementation notes: we split the 130-bit values into ten
+ * 13-bit words. This gives us some space for carries and allows
+ * using only 32x32->32 multiplications, which are way faster than
+ * 32x32->64 multiplications on the ARM Cortex-M0/M0+, and also
+ * help in making constant-time code on the Cortex-M3.
+ *
+ * Since we compute modulo 2^130-5, the "upper words" become
+ * low words with a factor of 5; that is, x*2^130 = x*5 mod p.
+ * This has already been integrated in the r[] array, which
+ * is extended to the 0..18 range.
+ *
+ * In each loop iteration, a[] and r[] words are 13-bit each,
+ * except a[1] which may use 14 bits.
+ */
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ uint32_t b[10];
+ unsigned u, v;
+ uint32_t z, cc1, cc2;
+
+ /*
+ * If there is a partial block, right-pad it with zeros.
+ */
+ if (len < 16) {
+ memset(tmp, 0, sizeof tmp);
+ memcpy(tmp, buf, len);
+ buf = tmp;
+ len = 16;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Decode next block and apply the "high bit"; that value
+ * is added to the accumulator.
+ */
+ v = br_dec16le(buf);
+ a[0] += v & 0x01FFF;
+ v >>= 13;
+ v |= buf[2] << 3;
+ v |= buf[3] << 11;
+ a[1] += v & 0x01FFF;
+ v >>= 13;
+ v |= buf[4] << 6;
+ a[2] += v & 0x01FFF;
+ v >>= 13;
+ v |= buf[5] << 1;
+ v |= buf[6] << 9;
+ a[3] += v & 0x01FFF;
+ v >>= 13;
+ v |= buf[7] << 4;
+ v |= buf[8] << 12;
+ a[4] += v & 0x01FFF;
+ v >>= 13;
+ v |= buf[9] << 7;
+ a[5] += v & 0x01FFF;
+ v >>= 13;
+ v |= buf[10] << 2;
+ v |= buf[11] << 10;
+ a[6] += v & 0x01FFF;
+ v >>= 13;
+ v |= buf[12] << 5;
+ a[7] += v & 0x01FFF;
+ v = br_dec16le(buf + 13);
+ a[8] += v & 0x01FFF;
+ v >>= 13;
+ v |= buf[15] << 3;
+ a[9] += v | 0x00800;
+
+ /*
+ * At that point, all a[] values fit on 14 bits, while
+ * all r[] values fit on 13 bits. Thus products fit on
+ * 27 bits, and we can accumulate up to 31 of them in
+ * a 32-bit word and still have some room for carries.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Now a[] contains words with values up to 14 bits each.
+ * We perform the multiplication with r[].
+ *
+ * The extended words of r[] may be larger than 13 bits
+ * (they are 5 times a 13-bit word) so the full summation
+ * may yield values up to 46 times a 27-bit word, which
+ * does not fit on a 32-bit word. To avoid that issue, we
+ * must split the loop below in two, with a carry
+ * propagation operation in the middle.
+ */
+ cc1 = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < 10; u ++) {
+ uint32_t s;
+
+ s = cc1
+ + MUL15(a[0], r[u + 9 - 0])
+ + MUL15(a[1], r[u + 9 - 1])
+ + MUL15(a[2], r[u + 9 - 2])
+ + MUL15(a[3], r[u + 9 - 3])
+ + MUL15(a[4], r[u + 9 - 4]);
+ b[u] = s & 0x1FFF;
+ cc1 = s >> 13;
+ }
+ cc2 = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < 10; u ++) {
+ uint32_t s;
+
+ s = b[u] + cc2
+ + MUL15(a[5], r[u + 9 - 5])
+ + MUL15(a[6], r[u + 9 - 6])
+ + MUL15(a[7], r[u + 9 - 7])
+ + MUL15(a[8], r[u + 9 - 8])
+ + MUL15(a[9], r[u + 9 - 9]);
+ b[u] = s & 0x1FFF;
+ cc2 = s >> 13;
+ }
+ memcpy(a, b, sizeof b);
+
+ /*
+ * The two carries "loop back" with a factor of 5. We
+ * propagate them into a[0] and a[1].
+ */
+ z = cc1 + cc2;
+ z += (z << 2) + a[0];
+ a[0] = z & 0x1FFF;
+ a[1] += z >> 13;
+
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_poly1305_ctmul32_run(const void *key, const void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len, const void *aad, size_t aad_len,
+ void *tag, br_chacha20_run ichacha, int encrypt)
+{
+ unsigned char pkey[32], foot[16];
+ uint32_t z, r[19], acc[10], cc, ctl;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the MAC key. The 'r' value is the first 16 bytes of
+ * pkey[].
+ */
+ memset(pkey, 0, sizeof pkey);
+ ichacha(key, iv, 0, pkey, sizeof pkey);
+
+ /*
+ * If encrypting, ChaCha20 must run first, followed by Poly1305.
+ * When decrypting, the operations are reversed.
+ */
+ if (encrypt) {
+ ichacha(key, iv, 1, data, len);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Run Poly1305. We must process the AAD, then ciphertext, then
+ * the footer (with the lengths). Note that the AAD and ciphertext
+ * are meant to be padded with zeros up to the next multiple of 16,
+ * and the length of the footer is 16 bytes as well.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the 'r' value into 13-bit words, with the "clamping"
+ * operation applied.
+ */
+ z = br_dec32le(pkey) & 0x03FFFFFF;
+ r[9] = z & 0x1FFF;
+ r[10] = z >> 13;
+ z = (br_dec32le(pkey + 3) >> 2) & 0x03FFFF03;
+ r[11] = z & 0x1FFF;
+ r[12] = z >> 13;
+ z = (br_dec32le(pkey + 6) >> 4) & 0x03FFC0FF;
+ r[13] = z & 0x1FFF;
+ r[14] = z >> 13;
+ z = (br_dec32le(pkey + 9) >> 6) & 0x03F03FFF;
+ r[15] = z & 0x1FFF;
+ r[16] = z >> 13;
+ z = (br_dec32le(pkey + 12) >> 8) & 0x000FFFFF;
+ r[17] = z & 0x1FFF;
+ r[18] = z >> 13;
+
+ /*
+ * Extend r[] with the 5x factor pre-applied.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 9; i ++) {
+ r[i] = MUL15(5, r[i + 10]);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Accumulator is 0.
+ */
+ memset(acc, 0, sizeof acc);
+
+ /*
+ * Process the additional authenticated data, ciphertext, and
+ * footer in due order.
+ */
+ br_enc64le(foot, (uint64_t)aad_len);
+ br_enc64le(foot + 8, (uint64_t)len);
+ poly1305_inner(acc, r, aad, aad_len);
+ poly1305_inner(acc, r, data, len);
+ poly1305_inner(acc, r, foot, sizeof foot);
+
+ /*
+ * Finalise modular reduction. This is done with carry propagation
+ * and applying the '2^130 = -5 mod p' rule. Note that the output
+ * of poly1035_inner() is already mostly reduced, since only
+ * acc[1] may be (very slightly) above 2^13. A single loop back
+ * to acc[1] will be enough to make the value fit in 130 bits.
+ */
+ cc = 0;
+ for (i = 1; i < 10; i ++) {
+ z = acc[i] + cc;
+ acc[i] = z & 0x1FFF;
+ cc = z >> 13;
+ }
+ z = acc[0] + cc + (cc << 2);
+ acc[0] = z & 0x1FFF;
+ acc[1] += z >> 13;
+
+ /*
+ * We may still have a value in the 2^130-5..2^130-1 range, in
+ * which case we must reduce it again. The code below selects,
+ * in constant-time, between 'acc' and 'acc-p',
+ */
+ ctl = GT(acc[0], 0x1FFA);
+ for (i = 1; i < 10; i ++) {
+ ctl &= EQ(acc[i], 0x1FFF);
+ }
+ acc[0] = MUX(ctl, acc[0] - 0x1FFB, acc[0]);
+ for (i = 1; i < 10; i ++) {
+ acc[i] &= ~(-ctl);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert back the accumulator to 32-bit words, and add the
+ * 's' value (second half of pkey[]). That addition is done
+ * modulo 2^128.
+ */
+ z = acc[0] + (acc[1] << 13) + br_dec16le(pkey + 16);
+ br_enc16le((unsigned char *)tag, z & 0xFFFF);
+ z = (z >> 16) + (acc[2] << 10) + br_dec16le(pkey + 18);
+ br_enc16le((unsigned char *)tag + 2, z & 0xFFFF);
+ z = (z >> 16) + (acc[3] << 7) + br_dec16le(pkey + 20);
+ br_enc16le((unsigned char *)tag + 4, z & 0xFFFF);
+ z = (z >> 16) + (acc[4] << 4) + br_dec16le(pkey + 22);
+ br_enc16le((unsigned char *)tag + 6, z & 0xFFFF);
+ z = (z >> 16) + (acc[5] << 1) + (acc[6] << 14) + br_dec16le(pkey + 24);
+ br_enc16le((unsigned char *)tag + 8, z & 0xFFFF);
+ z = (z >> 16) + (acc[7] << 11) + br_dec16le(pkey + 26);
+ br_enc16le((unsigned char *)tag + 10, z & 0xFFFF);
+ z = (z >> 16) + (acc[8] << 8) + br_dec16le(pkey + 28);
+ br_enc16le((unsigned char *)tag + 12, z & 0xFFFF);
+ z = (z >> 16) + (acc[9] << 5) + br_dec16le(pkey + 30);
+ br_enc16le((unsigned char *)tag + 14, z & 0xFFFF);
+
+ /*
+ * If decrypting, then ChaCha20 runs _after_ Poly1305.
+ */
+ if (!encrypt) {
+ ichacha(key, iv, 1, data, len);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/poly1305_ctmulq.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/poly1305_ctmulq.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b00683a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/poly1305_ctmulq.c
@@ -0,0 +1,475 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#if BR_INT128 || BR_UMUL128
+
+#if BR_INT128
+
+#define MUL128(hi, lo, x, y) do { \
+ unsigned __int128 mul128tmp; \
+ mul128tmp = (unsigned __int128)(x) * (unsigned __int128)(y); \
+ (hi) = (uint64_t)(mul128tmp >> 64); \
+ (lo) = (uint64_t)mul128tmp; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#elif BR_UMUL128
+
+#include <intrin.h>
+
+#define MUL128(hi, lo, x, y) do { \
+ (lo) = _umul128((x), (y), &(hi)); \
+ } while (0)
+
+#endif
+
+#define MASK42 ((uint64_t)0x000003FFFFFFFFFF)
+#define MASK44 ((uint64_t)0x00000FFFFFFFFFFF)
+
+/*
+ * The "accumulator" word is nominally a 130-bit value. We split it into
+ * words of 44 bits, each held in a 64-bit variable.
+ *
+ * If the current accumulator is a = a0 + a1*W + a2*W^2 (where W = 2^44)
+ * and r = r0 + r1*W + r2*W^2, then:
+ *
+ * a*r = (a0*r0)
+ * + (a0*r1 + a1*r0) * W
+ * + (a0*r2 + a1*r1 + a2*r0) * W^2
+ * + (a1*r2 + a2*r1) * W^3
+ * + (a2*r2) * W^4
+ *
+ * We want to reduce that value modulo p = 2^130-5, so W^3 = 20 mod p,
+ * and W^4 = 20*W mod p. Thus, if we define u1 = 20*r1 and u2 = 20*r2,
+ * then the equations above become:
+ *
+ * b0 = a0*r0 + a1*u2 + a2*u1
+ * b1 = a0*r1 + a1*r0 + a2*u2
+ * b2 = a0*r2 + a1*r1 + a2*r0
+ *
+ * In order to make u1 fit in 44 bits, we can change these equations
+ * into:
+ *
+ * b0 = a0*r0 + a1*u2 + a2*t1
+ * b1 = a0*r1 + a1*r0 + a2*t2
+ * b2 = a0*r2 + a1*r1 + a2*r0
+ *
+ * Where t1 is u1 truncated to 44 bits, and t2 is u2 added to the extra
+ * bits of u1. Note that since r is clamped down to a 124-bit value, the
+ * values u2 and t2 fit on 44 bits too.
+ *
+ * The bx values are larger than 44 bits, so we may split them into a
+ * lower half (cx, 44 bits) and an upper half (dx). The new values for
+ * the accumulator are then:
+ *
+ * e0 = c0 + 20*d2
+ * e1 = c1 + d0
+ * e2 = c2 + d1
+ *
+ * The equations allow for some room, i.e. the ax values may be larger
+ * than 44 bits. Similarly, the ex values will usually be larger than
+ * the ax. Thus, some sort of carry propagation must be done regularly,
+ * though not necessarily at each iteration. In particular, we do not
+ * need to compute the additions (for the bx values) over 128-bit
+ * quantities; we can stick to 64-bit computations.
+ *
+ *
+ * Since the 128-bit result of a 64x64 multiplication is actually
+ * represented over two 64-bit registers, it is cheaper to arrange for
+ * any split that happens between the "high" and "low" halves to be on
+ * that 64-bit boundary. This is done by left shifting the rx, ux and tx
+ * by 20 bits (since they all fit on 44 bits each, this shift is
+ * always possible).
+ */
+
+static void
+poly1305_inner_big(uint64_t *acc, uint64_t *r, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+
+#define MX(hi, lo, m0, m1, m2) do { \
+ uint64_t mxhi, mxlo; \
+ MUL128(mxhi, mxlo, a0, m0); \
+ (hi) = mxhi; \
+ (lo) = mxlo >> 20; \
+ MUL128(mxhi, mxlo, a1, m1); \
+ (hi) += mxhi; \
+ (lo) += mxlo >> 20; \
+ MUL128(mxhi, mxlo, a2, m2); \
+ (hi) += mxhi; \
+ (lo) += mxlo >> 20; \
+ } while (0)
+
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ uint64_t a0, a1, a2;
+ uint64_t r0, r1, r2, t1, t2, u2;
+
+ r0 = r[0];
+ r1 = r[1];
+ r2 = r[2];
+ t1 = r[3];
+ t2 = r[4];
+ u2 = r[5];
+ a0 = acc[0];
+ a1 = acc[1];
+ a2 = acc[2];
+ buf = data;
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ uint64_t v0, v1, v2;
+ uint64_t c0, c1, c2, d0, d1, d2;
+
+ v0 = br_dec64le(buf + 0);
+ v1 = br_dec64le(buf + 8);
+ v2 = v1 >> 24;
+ v1 = ((v0 >> 44) | (v1 << 20)) & MASK44;
+ v0 &= MASK44;
+ a0 += v0;
+ a1 += v1;
+ a2 += v2 + ((uint64_t)1 << 40);
+ MX(d0, c0, r0, u2, t1);
+ MX(d1, c1, r1, r0, t2);
+ MX(d2, c2, r2, r1, r0);
+ a0 = c0 + 20 * d2;
+ a1 = c1 + d0;
+ a2 = c2 + d1;
+
+ v0 = br_dec64le(buf + 16);
+ v1 = br_dec64le(buf + 24);
+ v2 = v1 >> 24;
+ v1 = ((v0 >> 44) | (v1 << 20)) & MASK44;
+ v0 &= MASK44;
+ a0 += v0;
+ a1 += v1;
+ a2 += v2 + ((uint64_t)1 << 40);
+ MX(d0, c0, r0, u2, t1);
+ MX(d1, c1, r1, r0, t2);
+ MX(d2, c2, r2, r1, r0);
+ a0 = c0 + 20 * d2;
+ a1 = c1 + d0;
+ a2 = c2 + d1;
+
+ v0 = br_dec64le(buf + 32);
+ v1 = br_dec64le(buf + 40);
+ v2 = v1 >> 24;
+ v1 = ((v0 >> 44) | (v1 << 20)) & MASK44;
+ v0 &= MASK44;
+ a0 += v0;
+ a1 += v1;
+ a2 += v2 + ((uint64_t)1 << 40);
+ MX(d0, c0, r0, u2, t1);
+ MX(d1, c1, r1, r0, t2);
+ MX(d2, c2, r2, r1, r0);
+ a0 = c0 + 20 * d2;
+ a1 = c1 + d0;
+ a2 = c2 + d1;
+
+ v0 = br_dec64le(buf + 48);
+ v1 = br_dec64le(buf + 56);
+ v2 = v1 >> 24;
+ v1 = ((v0 >> 44) | (v1 << 20)) & MASK44;
+ v0 &= MASK44;
+ a0 += v0;
+ a1 += v1;
+ a2 += v2 + ((uint64_t)1 << 40);
+ MX(d0, c0, r0, u2, t1);
+ MX(d1, c1, r1, r0, t2);
+ MX(d2, c2, r2, r1, r0);
+ a0 = c0 + 20 * d2;
+ a1 = c1 + d0;
+ a2 = c2 + d1;
+
+ a1 += a0 >> 44;
+ a0 &= MASK44;
+ a2 += a1 >> 44;
+ a1 &= MASK44;
+ a0 += 20 * (a2 >> 44);
+ a2 &= MASK44;
+
+ buf += 64;
+ len -= 64;
+ }
+ acc[0] = a0;
+ acc[1] = a1;
+ acc[2] = a2;
+
+#undef MX
+}
+
+static void
+poly1305_inner_small(uint64_t *acc, uint64_t *r, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+ uint64_t a0, a1, a2;
+ uint64_t r0, r1, r2, t1, t2, u2;
+
+ r0 = r[0];
+ r1 = r[1];
+ r2 = r[2];
+ t1 = r[3];
+ t2 = r[4];
+ u2 = r[5];
+ a0 = acc[0];
+ a1 = acc[1];
+ a2 = acc[2];
+ buf = data;
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ uint64_t v0, v1, v2;
+ uint64_t c0, c1, c2, d0, d1, d2;
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+
+ if (len < 16) {
+ memcpy(tmp, buf, len);
+ memset(tmp + len, 0, (sizeof tmp) - len);
+ buf = tmp;
+ len = 16;
+ }
+ v0 = br_dec64le(buf + 0);
+ v1 = br_dec64le(buf + 8);
+
+ v2 = v1 >> 24;
+ v1 = ((v0 >> 44) | (v1 << 20)) & MASK44;
+ v0 &= MASK44;
+
+ a0 += v0;
+ a1 += v1;
+ a2 += v2 + ((uint64_t)1 << 40);
+
+#define MX(hi, lo, m0, m1, m2) do { \
+ uint64_t mxhi, mxlo; \
+ MUL128(mxhi, mxlo, a0, m0); \
+ (hi) = mxhi; \
+ (lo) = mxlo >> 20; \
+ MUL128(mxhi, mxlo, a1, m1); \
+ (hi) += mxhi; \
+ (lo) += mxlo >> 20; \
+ MUL128(mxhi, mxlo, a2, m2); \
+ (hi) += mxhi; \
+ (lo) += mxlo >> 20; \
+ } while (0)
+
+ MX(d0, c0, r0, u2, t1);
+ MX(d1, c1, r1, r0, t2);
+ MX(d2, c2, r2, r1, r0);
+
+#undef MX
+
+ a0 = c0 + 20 * d2;
+ a1 = c1 + d0;
+ a2 = c2 + d1;
+
+ a1 += a0 >> 44;
+ a0 &= MASK44;
+ a2 += a1 >> 44;
+ a1 &= MASK44;
+ a0 += 20 * (a2 >> 44);
+ a2 &= MASK44;
+
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+ acc[0] = a0;
+ acc[1] = a1;
+ acc[2] = a2;
+}
+
+static inline void
+poly1305_inner(uint64_t *acc, uint64_t *r, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len >= 64) {
+ size_t len2;
+
+ len2 = len & ~(size_t)63;
+ poly1305_inner_big(acc, r, data, len2);
+ data = (const unsigned char *)data + len2;
+ len -= len2;
+ }
+ if (len > 0) {
+ poly1305_inner_small(acc, r, data, len);
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_poly1305_ctmulq_run(const void *key, const void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len, const void *aad, size_t aad_len,
+ void *tag, br_chacha20_run ichacha, int encrypt)
+{
+ unsigned char pkey[32], foot[16];
+ uint64_t r[6], acc[3], r0, r1;
+ uint32_t v0, v1, v2, v3, v4;
+ uint64_t w0, w1, w2, w3;
+ uint32_t ctl;
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the MAC key. The 'r' value is the first 16 bytes of
+ * pkey[].
+ */
+ memset(pkey, 0, sizeof pkey);
+ ichacha(key, iv, 0, pkey, sizeof pkey);
+
+ /*
+ * If encrypting, ChaCha20 must run first, followed by Poly1305.
+ * When decrypting, the operations are reversed.
+ */
+ if (encrypt) {
+ ichacha(key, iv, 1, data, len);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Run Poly1305. We must process the AAD, then ciphertext, then
+ * the footer (with the lengths). Note that the AAD and ciphertext
+ * are meant to be padded with zeros up to the next multiple of 16,
+ * and the length of the footer is 16 bytes as well.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Apply the "clamping" on r.
+ */
+ pkey[ 3] &= 0x0F;
+ pkey[ 4] &= 0xFC;
+ pkey[ 7] &= 0x0F;
+ pkey[ 8] &= 0xFC;
+ pkey[11] &= 0x0F;
+ pkey[12] &= 0xFC;
+ pkey[15] &= 0x0F;
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the 'r' value into 44-bit words, left-shifted by 20 bits.
+ * Also compute the u1 and u2 values.
+ */
+ r0 = br_dec64le(pkey + 0);
+ r1 = br_dec64le(pkey + 8);
+ r[0] = r0 << 20;
+ r[1] = ((r0 >> 24) | (r1 << 40)) & ~(uint64_t)0xFFFFF;
+ r[2] = (r1 >> 4) & ~(uint64_t)0xFFFFF;
+ r1 = 20 * (r[1] >> 20);
+ r[3] = r1 << 20;
+ r[5] = 20 * r[2];
+ r[4] = (r[5] + (r1 >> 24)) & ~(uint64_t)0xFFFFF;
+
+ /*
+ * Accumulator is 0.
+ */
+ acc[0] = 0;
+ acc[1] = 0;
+ acc[2] = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Process the additional authenticated data, ciphertext, and
+ * footer in due order.
+ */
+ br_enc64le(foot, (uint64_t)aad_len);
+ br_enc64le(foot + 8, (uint64_t)len);
+ poly1305_inner(acc, r, aad, aad_len);
+ poly1305_inner(acc, r, data, len);
+ poly1305_inner_small(acc, r, foot, sizeof foot);
+
+ /*
+ * Finalise modular reduction. At that point, the value consists
+ * in three 44-bit values (the lowest one might be slightly above
+ * 2^44). Two loops shall be sufficient.
+ */
+ acc[1] += (acc[0] >> 44);
+ acc[0] &= MASK44;
+ acc[2] += (acc[1] >> 44);
+ acc[1] &= MASK44;
+ acc[0] += 5 * (acc[2] >> 42);
+ acc[2] &= MASK42;
+ acc[1] += (acc[0] >> 44);
+ acc[0] &= MASK44;
+ acc[2] += (acc[1] >> 44);
+ acc[1] &= MASK44;
+ acc[0] += 5 * (acc[2] >> 42);
+ acc[2] &= MASK42;
+
+ /*
+ * The value may still fall in the 2^130-5..2^130-1 range, in
+ * which case we must reduce it again. The code below selects,
+ * in constant-time, between 'acc' and 'acc-p'. We encode the
+ * value over four 32-bit integers to finish the operation.
+ */
+ v0 = (uint32_t)acc[0];
+ v1 = (uint32_t)(acc[0] >> 32) | ((uint32_t)acc[1] << 12);
+ v2 = (uint32_t)(acc[1] >> 20) | ((uint32_t)acc[2] << 24);
+ v3 = (uint32_t)(acc[2] >> 8);
+ v4 = (uint32_t)(acc[2] >> 40);
+
+ ctl = GT(v0, 0xFFFFFFFA);
+ ctl &= EQ(v1, 0xFFFFFFFF);
+ ctl &= EQ(v2, 0xFFFFFFFF);
+ ctl &= EQ(v3, 0xFFFFFFFF);
+ ctl &= EQ(v4, 0x00000003);
+ v0 = MUX(ctl, v0 + 5, v0);
+ v1 = MUX(ctl, 0, v1);
+ v2 = MUX(ctl, 0, v2);
+ v3 = MUX(ctl, 0, v3);
+
+ /*
+ * Add the "s" value. This is done modulo 2^128. Don't forget
+ * carry propagation...
+ */
+ w0 = (uint64_t)v0 + (uint64_t)br_dec32le(pkey + 16);
+ w1 = (uint64_t)v1 + (uint64_t)br_dec32le(pkey + 20) + (w0 >> 32);
+ w2 = (uint64_t)v2 + (uint64_t)br_dec32le(pkey + 24) + (w1 >> 32);
+ w3 = (uint64_t)v3 + (uint64_t)br_dec32le(pkey + 28) + (w2 >> 32);
+ v0 = (uint32_t)w0;
+ v1 = (uint32_t)w1;
+ v2 = (uint32_t)w2;
+ v3 = (uint32_t)w3;
+
+ /*
+ * Encode the tag.
+ */
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)tag + 0, v0);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)tag + 4, v1);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)tag + 8, v2);
+ br_enc32le((unsigned char *)tag + 12, v3);
+
+ /*
+ * If decrypting, then ChaCha20 runs _after_ Poly1305.
+ */
+ if (!encrypt) {
+ ichacha(key, iv, 1, data, len);
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+br_poly1305_run
+br_poly1305_ctmulq_get(void)
+{
+ return &br_poly1305_ctmulq_run;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+br_poly1305_run
+br_poly1305_ctmulq_get(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/poly1305_i15.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/poly1305_i15.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f89212
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/symcipher/poly1305_i15.c
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * This is a "reference" implementation of Poly1305 that uses the
+ * generic "i15" code for big integers. It is slow, but it handles all
+ * big-integer operations with generic code, thereby avoiding most
+ * tricky situations with carry propagation and modular reduction.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Modulus: 2^130-5.
+ */
+static const uint16_t P1305[] = {
+ 0x008A,
+ 0x7FFB, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x7FFF, 0x03FF
+};
+
+/*
+ * -p mod 2^15.
+ */
+#define P0I 0x4CCD
+
+/*
+ * R^2 mod p, for conversion to Montgomery representation (R = 2^135,
+ * since we use 9 words of 15 bits each, and 15*9 = 135).
+ */
+static const uint16_t R2[] = {
+ 0x008A,
+ 0x6400, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000
+};
+
+/*
+ * Perform the inner processing of blocks for Poly1305. The "r" array
+ * is in Montgomery representation, while the "a" array is not.
+ */
+static void
+poly1305_inner(uint16_t *a, const uint16_t *r, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = data;
+ while (len > 0) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16], rev[16];
+ uint16_t b[10];
+ uint32_t ctl;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * If there is a partial block, right-pad it with zeros.
+ */
+ if (len < 16) {
+ memset(tmp, 0, sizeof tmp);
+ memcpy(tmp, buf, len);
+ buf = tmp;
+ len = 16;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Decode next block and apply the "high bit". Since
+ * decoding is little-endian, we must byte-swap the buffer.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i ++) {
+ rev[i] = buf[15 - i];
+ }
+ br_i15_decode_mod(b, rev, sizeof rev, P1305);
+ b[9] |= 0x0100;
+
+ /*
+ * Add the accumulator to the decoded block (modular
+ * addition).
+ */
+ ctl = br_i15_add(b, a, 1);
+ ctl |= NOT(br_i15_sub(b, P1305, 0));
+ br_i15_sub(b, P1305, ctl);
+
+ /*
+ * Multiply by r, result is the new accumulator value.
+ */
+ br_i15_montymul(a, b, r, P1305, P0I);
+
+ buf += 16;
+ len -= 16;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Byteswap a 16-byte value.
+ */
+static void
+byteswap16(unsigned char *buf)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i ++) {
+ unsigned x;
+
+ x = buf[i];
+ buf[i] = buf[15 - i];
+ buf[15 - i] = x;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_block.h */
+void
+br_poly1305_i15_run(const void *key, const void *iv,
+ void *data, size_t len, const void *aad, size_t aad_len,
+ void *tag, br_chacha20_run ichacha, int encrypt)
+{
+ unsigned char pkey[32], foot[16];
+ uint16_t t[10], r[10], acc[10];
+
+ /*
+ * Compute the MAC key. The 'r' value is the first 16 bytes of
+ * pkey[].
+ */
+ memset(pkey, 0, sizeof pkey);
+ ichacha(key, iv, 0, pkey, sizeof pkey);
+
+ /*
+ * If encrypting, ChaCha20 must run first, followed by Poly1305.
+ * When decrypting, the operations are reversed.
+ */
+ if (encrypt) {
+ ichacha(key, iv, 1, data, len);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Run Poly1305. We must process the AAD, then ciphertext, then
+ * the footer (with the lengths). Note that the AAD and ciphertext
+ * are meant to be padded with zeros up to the next multiple of 16,
+ * and the length of the footer is 16 bytes as well.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Apply the "clamping" operation on the encoded 'r' value.
+ */
+ pkey[ 3] &= 0x0F;
+ pkey[ 7] &= 0x0F;
+ pkey[11] &= 0x0F;
+ pkey[15] &= 0x0F;
+ pkey[ 4] &= 0xFC;
+ pkey[ 8] &= 0xFC;
+ pkey[12] &= 0xFC;
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the clamped 'r' value. Decoding should use little-endian
+ * so we must byteswap the value first.
+ */
+ byteswap16(pkey);
+ br_i15_decode_mod(t, pkey, 16, P1305);
+
+ /*
+ * Convert 'r' to Montgomery representation.
+ */
+ br_i15_montymul(r, t, R2, P1305, P0I);
+
+ /*
+ * Accumulator is 0.
+ */
+ br_i15_zero(acc, 0x8A);
+
+ /*
+ * Process the additional authenticated data, ciphertext, and
+ * footer in due order.
+ */
+ br_enc64le(foot, (uint64_t)aad_len);
+ br_enc64le(foot + 8, (uint64_t)len);
+ poly1305_inner(acc, r, aad, aad_len);
+ poly1305_inner(acc, r, data, len);
+ poly1305_inner(acc, r, foot, sizeof foot);
+
+ /*
+ * Decode the value 's'. Again, a byteswap is needed.
+ */
+ byteswap16(pkey + 16);
+ br_i15_decode_mod(t, pkey + 16, 16, P1305);
+
+ /*
+ * Add the value 's' to the accumulator. That addition is done
+ * modulo 2^128, so we just ignore the carry.
+ */
+ br_i15_add(acc, t, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * Encode the result (128 low bits) to the tag. Encoding should
+ * be little-endian.
+ */
+ br_i15_encode(tag, 16, acc);
+ byteswap16(tag);
+
+ /*
+ * If decrypting, then ChaCha20 runs _after_ Poly1305.
+ */
+ if (!encrypt) {
+ ichacha(key, iv, 1, data, len);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/asn1.t0 b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/asn1.t0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c329514
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/asn1.t0
@@ -0,0 +1,757 @@
+\ Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+\
+\ Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+\ a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+\ "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+\ without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+\ distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+\ permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+\ the following conditions:
+\
+\ The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+\ included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+\
+\ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+\ EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+\ MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+\ NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+\ BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+\ ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+\ CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+\ SOFTWARE.
+
+\ =======================================================================
+
+\ This file contains code which is common to all engines that do some
+\ ASN.1 decoding. It should not be compiled on its own, but only along
+\ with another file (e.g. x509_minimal.t0) which uses it.
+\
+\ Users must define several things:
+\
+\ -- In the preamble, a macro called "CTX" that evaluates to the current
+\ context structure.
+\
+\ -- In the preamble, a macro called "CONTEXT_NAME" that evaluates to the
+\ context structure type. This will be invoked during compilation.
+\
+\ -- A word called "read8-low" ( -- x ) that reads the next byte, or -1
+\ if the input buffer is empty. That word is usually written in C.
+\
+\ -- A word called "read-blob-inner" ( addr len -- addr len ) that is
+\ the multi-byte version of read8-low.
+\
+\ -- A word called "skip-remaining-inner" ( lim -- lim ) which reads but
+\ drops some input bytes.
+
+preamble {
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+}
+
+\ Read next source character, skipping blanks.
+: skip-blanks begin char dup 32 > if ret then drop again ;
+
+: fail-oid
+ "Invalid OID" puts cr exitvm ;
+
+\ Read a decimal integer, followed by either a dot or whitespace.
+\ Note: this does not check for overflows.
+: parse-number ( -- val nextchar )
+ char decval
+ begin
+ char
+ dup dup `. = swap 32 <= or if ret then
+ decval swap 10 * +
+ again ;
+
+\ Encode a number in unsigned 7E format.
+: encode7E ( val -- )
+ 0 encode7E-inner ;
+
+: encode7E-inner ( val eb -- )
+ swap dup 0x7F > if
+ dup 7 u>> 0x80 encode7E-inner 0x7F and
+ then
+ or data-add8 ;
+
+\ Decode an OID from source, and encode it. First byte is length,
+\ followed by encoded ASN.1 DER value. The OID is encoded in the
+\ current data block.
+: OID
+ \ Get current data address, and push a 0 for length.
+ current-data 0 data-add8
+ \ Skip blanks and get first digit, which must be 0, 1 or 2.
+ skip-blanks decval dup 2 > if fail-oid then
+ 40 *
+ \ Next character must be a dot.
+ char `. <> if fail-oid then
+ \ Second group must be one or two digits.
+ parse-number { nextchar }
+ dup 40 >= if fail-oid then
+ + encode7E
+ \ While next character is a dot, keep encoding numbers.
+ begin nextchar `. = while
+ parse-number >nextchar
+ encode7E
+ repeat
+ \ Write back length in the first byte.
+ dup current-data swap - 1- swap data-set8
+ ; immediate
+
+\ Define a new data word for an encoded OID. The OID is read from the
+\ source.
+: OID:
+ new-data-block next-word define-data-word postpone OID ;
+
+\ Define a word that evaluates to the address of a field within the
+\ context.
+: addr:
+ next-word { field }
+ "addr-" field + 0 1 define-word
+ 0 8191 "offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, " field + ")" + make-CX
+ postpone literal postpone ; ;
+
+addr: pad
+
+\ Define a word that evaluates to an error code through a macro name.
+: err:
+ next-word { name }
+ name 0 1 define-word
+ 0 63 "BR_" name + make-CX postpone literal postpone ; ;
+
+err: ERR_X509_INVALID_VALUE
+err: ERR_X509_TRUNCATED
+err: ERR_X509_EMPTY_CHAIN
+err: ERR_X509_INNER_TRUNC
+err: ERR_X509_BAD_TAG_CLASS
+err: ERR_X509_BAD_TAG_VALUE
+err: ERR_X509_INDEFINITE_LENGTH
+err: ERR_X509_EXTRA_ELEMENT
+err: ERR_X509_UNEXPECTED
+err: ERR_X509_NOT_CONSTRUCTED
+err: ERR_X509_NOT_PRIMITIVE
+err: ERR_X509_PARTIAL_BYTE
+err: ERR_X509_BAD_BOOLEAN
+err: ERR_X509_OVERFLOW
+err: ERR_X509_BAD_DN
+err: ERR_X509_BAD_TIME
+err: ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED
+err: ERR_X509_LIMIT_EXCEEDED
+err: ERR_X509_WRONG_KEY_TYPE
+err: ERR_X509_BAD_SIGNATURE
+err: ERR_X509_EXPIRED
+err: ERR_X509_DN_MISMATCH
+err: ERR_X509_BAD_SERVER_NAME
+err: ERR_X509_CRITICAL_EXTENSION
+err: ERR_X509_NOT_CA
+err: ERR_X509_FORBIDDEN_KEY_USAGE
+err: ERR_X509_WEAK_PUBLIC_KEY
+
+: KEYTYPE_RSA CX 0 15 { BR_KEYTYPE_RSA } ;
+: KEYTYPE_EC CX 0 15 { BR_KEYTYPE_EC } ;
+
+cc: fail ( err -- ! ) {
+ CTX->err = T0_POPi();
+ T0_CO();
+}
+
+\ Read one byte from the stream.
+: read8-nc ( -- x )
+ begin
+ read8-low dup 0 >= if ret then
+ drop co
+ again ;
+
+\ Read one byte, enforcing current read limit.
+: read8 ( lim -- lim x )
+ dup ifnot ERR_X509_INNER_TRUNC fail then
+ 1- read8-nc ;
+
+\ Read a 16-bit value, big-endian encoding.
+: read16be ( lim -- lim x )
+ read8 8 << swap read8 rot + ;
+
+\ Read a 16-bit value, little-endian encoding.
+: read16le ( lim -- lim x )
+ read8 swap read8 8 << rot + ;
+
+\ Read all bytes from the current element, then close it (i.e. drop the
+\ limit). Destination address is an offset within the context.
+: read-blob ( lim addr -- )
+ swap
+ begin dup while read-blob-inner dup if co then repeat
+ 2drop ;
+
+\ Skip remaining bytes in the current structure, but do not close it
+\ (thus, this leaves the value 0 on the stack).
+: skip-remaining ( lim -- lim )
+ begin dup while skip-remaining-inner dup if co then repeat ;
+
+: skip-remaining-inner ( lim -- lim )
+ 0 over read-blob-inner -rot 2drop ;
+
+cc: set8 ( val addr -- ) {
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ *((unsigned char *)CTX + addr) = (unsigned char)T0_POP();
+}
+
+cc: set16 ( val addr -- ) {
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ *(uint16_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)CTX + addr) = T0_POP();
+}
+
+cc: set32 ( val addr -- ) {
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ *(uint32_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)CTX + addr) = T0_POP();
+}
+
+cc: get8 ( addr -- val ) {
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(*((unsigned char *)CTX + addr));
+}
+
+cc: get16 ( addr -- val ) {
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(*(uint16_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)CTX + addr));
+}
+
+cc: get32 ( addr -- val ) {
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(*(uint32_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)CTX + addr));
+}
+
+\ Read an ASN.1 tag. This function returns the "constructed" status
+\ and the tag value. The constructed status is a boolean (-1 for
+\ constructed, 0 for primitive). The tag value is either 0 to 31 for
+\ a universal tag, or 32+x for a contextual tag of value x. Tag classes
+\ "application" and "private" are rejected. Universal tags beyond 30
+\ are rejected. Contextual tags beyond 30 are rejected. Thus, accepted
+\ tags will necessarily fit on exactly one byte. This does not support
+\ the whole of ASN.1/BER, but is sufficient for certificate parsing.
+: read-tag ( lim -- lim constructed value )
+ read8 { fb }
+
+ \ Constructed flag is bit 5.
+ fb 5 >> 0x01 and neg
+
+ \ Class is in bits 6 and 7. Accepted classes are 00 (universal)
+ \ and 10 (context). We check that bit 6 is 0, and shift back
+ \ bit 7 so that we get 0 (universal) or 32 (context).
+ fb 6 >> dup 0x01 and if ERR_X509_BAD_TAG_CLASS fail then
+ 4 <<
+
+ \ Tag value is in bits 0..4. If the value is 31, then this is
+ \ an extended tag, encoded over subsequent bytes, and we do
+ \ not support that.
+ fb 0x1F and dup 0x1F = if ERR_X509_BAD_TAG_VALUE fail then
+ + ;
+
+\ Read a tag, but only if not at the end of the current object. If there
+\ is no room for another element (limit is zero), then this will push a
+\ synthetic "no tag" value (primitive, with value -1).
+: read-tag-or-end ( lim -- lim constructed value )
+ dup ifnot 0 -1 ret then
+ read-tag ;
+
+\ Compare the read tag with the provided value. If equal, then the
+\ element is skipped, and a new tag is read (or end of object).
+: iftag-skip ( lim constructed value ref -- lim constructed value )
+ over = if
+ 2drop
+ read-length-open-elt skip-close-elt
+ read-tag-or-end
+ then ;
+
+\ Read an ASN.1 length. This supports only definite lengths (theoretically,
+\ certificates may use an indefinite length for the outer structure, using
+\ DER only in the TBS, but this never happens in practice, except in a
+\ single example certificate from 15 years ago that also fails to decode
+\ properly for other reasons).
+: read-length ( lim -- lim length )
+ read8
+ \ Lengths in 0x00..0x7F get encoded as a single byte.
+ dup 0x80 < if ret then
+
+ \ If the byte is 0x80 then this is an indefinite length, and we
+ \ do not support that.
+ 0x80 - dup ifnot ERR_X509_INDEFINITE_LENGTH fail then
+
+ \ Masking out bit 7, this yields the number of bytes over which
+ \ the value is encoded. Since the total certificate length must
+ \ fit over 3 bytes (this is a consequence of SSL/TLS message
+ \ format), we can reject big lengths and keep the length in a
+ \ single integer.
+ { n } 0
+ begin n 0 > while n 1- >n
+ dup 0x7FFFFF > if ERR_X509_INNER_TRUNC fail then
+ 8 << swap read8 rot +
+ repeat ;
+
+\ Open a sub-structure. This subtracts the length from the limit, and
+\ pushes the length back as new limit.
+: open-elt ( lim length -- lim_outer lim_inner )
+ dup2 < if ERR_X509_INNER_TRUNC fail then
+ dup { len } - len ;
+
+\ Read a length and open the value as a sub-structure.
+: read-length-open-elt ( lim -- lim_outer lim_inner )
+ read-length open-elt ;
+
+\ Close a sub-structure. This verifies that there is no remaining
+\ element to read.
+: close-elt ( lim -- )
+ if ERR_X509_EXTRA_ELEMENT fail then ;
+
+\ Skip remaining bytes in the current structure, then close it.
+: skip-close-elt ( lim -- )
+ skip-remaining drop ;
+
+\ Read a length and then skip the value.
+: read-length-skip ( lim -- lim )
+ read-length-open-elt skip-close-elt ;
+
+\ Check that a given tag is constructed and has the expected value.
+: check-tag-constructed ( constructed value refvalue -- )
+ = ifnot ERR_X509_UNEXPECTED fail then
+ check-constructed ;
+
+\ Check that the top value is true; report a "not constructed"
+\ error otherwise.
+: check-constructed ( constructed -- )
+ ifnot ERR_X509_NOT_CONSTRUCTED fail then ;
+
+\ Check that a given tag is primitive and has the expected value.
+: check-tag-primitive ( constructed value refvalue -- )
+ = ifnot ERR_X509_UNEXPECTED fail then
+ check-primitive ;
+
+\ Check that the top value is true; report a "not primitive"
+\ error otherwise.
+: check-primitive ( constructed -- )
+ if ERR_X509_NOT_PRIMITIVE fail then ;
+
+\ Check that the tag is for a constructed SEQUENCE.
+: check-sequence ( constructed value -- )
+ 0x10 check-tag-constructed ;
+
+\ Read a tag, check that it is for a constructed SEQUENCE, and open
+\ it as a sub-element.
+: read-sequence-open ( lim -- lim_outer lim_inner )
+ read-tag check-sequence read-length-open-elt ;
+
+\ Read the next element as a BIT STRING with no ignore bits, and open
+\ it as a sub-element.
+: read-bits-open ( lim -- lim_outer lim_inner )
+ read-tag 0x03 check-tag-primitive
+ read-length-open-elt
+ read8 if ERR_X509_PARTIAL_BYTE fail then ;
+
+OID: rsaEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1
+
+OID: sha1WithRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5
+OID: sha224WithRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.14
+OID: sha256WithRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11
+OID: sha384WithRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12
+OID: sha512WithRSAEncryption 1.2.840.113549.1.1.13
+
+OID: id-sha1 1.3.14.3.2.26
+OID: id-sha224 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.4
+OID: id-sha256 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1
+OID: id-sha384 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2
+OID: id-sha512 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3
+
+OID: id-ecPublicKey 1.2.840.10045.2.1
+
+OID: ansix9p256r1 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7
+OID: ansix9p384r1 1.3.132.0.34
+OID: ansix9p521r1 1.3.132.0.35
+
+OID: ecdsa-with-SHA1 1.2.840.10045.4.1
+OID: ecdsa-with-SHA224 1.2.840.10045.4.3.1
+OID: ecdsa-with-SHA256 1.2.840.10045.4.3.2
+OID: ecdsa-with-SHA384 1.2.840.10045.4.3.3
+OID: ecdsa-with-SHA512 1.2.840.10045.4.3.4
+
+OID: id-at-commonName 2.5.4.3
+
+\ Read a "small value". This assumes that the tag has just been read
+\ and processed, but not the length. The first pad byte is set to the
+\ value length; the encoded value itself follows. If the value length
+\ exceeds 255 bytes, then a single 0 is written in the pad, and this
+\ method returns false (0). Otherwise, it returns true (-1).
+\ Either way, the element is fully read.
+: read-small-value ( lim -- lim bool )
+ read-length-open-elt
+ dup 255 > if skip-close-elt 0 addr-pad set8 0 ret then
+ dup addr-pad set8
+ addr-pad 1+ read-blob
+ -1 ;
+
+\ Read an OID as a "small value" (tag, length and value). A boolean
+\ value is returned, which is true (-1) if the OID value fits on the pad,
+\ false (0) otherwise.
+: read-OID ( lim -- lim bool )
+ read-tag 0x06 check-tag-primitive read-small-value ;
+
+\ Read a UTF-8 code point. On error, return 0. Reading a code point of
+\ value 0 is considered to be an error.
+: read-UTF8 ( lim -- lim val )
+ read8
+ choice
+ dup 0x80 < uf ret enduf
+ dup 0xC0 < uf drop 0 ret enduf
+ dup 0xE0 < uf 0x1F and 1 read-UTF8-next 0x80 0x7FF enduf
+ dup 0xF0 < uf 0x0F and 2 read-UTF8-next 0x800 0xFFFF enduf
+ dup 0xF8 < uf 0x07 and 3 read-UTF8-next 0x10000 0x10FFFF enduf
+ drop 0 ret
+ endchoice
+ between? ifnot drop 0 then
+ ;
+
+\ Read n subsequent bytes to complete the provided first byte. The final
+\ value is -1 on error, or the code point numerical value. The final
+\ value is duplicated.
+: read-UTF8-next ( lim val n -- lim val val )
+ begin dup while
+ -rot
+ read-UTF8-chunk
+ rot 1-
+ repeat
+ drop dup ;
+
+\ Read one byte, that should be a trailing UTF-8 byte, and complement the
+\ current value. On error, value is set to -1.
+: read-UTF8-chunk ( lim val -- lim val )
+ swap
+ \ If we are at the end of the value, report an error but don't fail.
+ dup ifnot 2drop 0 -1 ret then
+ read8 rot
+ dup 0< if swap drop ret then 6 <<
+ swap dup 6 >> 2 <> if 2drop -1 ret then
+ 0x3F and + ;
+
+: high-surrogate? ( x -- x bool )
+ dup 0xD800 0xDBFF between? ;
+
+: low-surrogate? ( x -- x bool )
+ dup 0xDC00 0xDFFF between? ;
+
+: assemble-surrogate-pair ( hi lim lo -- lim val )
+ low-surrogate? ifnot rot 2drop 0 ret then
+ rot 10 << + 0x35FDC00 - ;
+
+\ Read a UTF-16 code point (big-endian). Returned value is 0 on error.
+: read-UTF16BE ( lim -- lim val )
+ read16be
+ choice
+ high-surrogate? uf
+ swap dup ifnot 2drop 0 0 ret then
+ read16be assemble-surrogate-pair
+ enduf
+ low-surrogate? uf
+ drop 0
+ enduf
+ endchoice ;
+
+\ Read a UTF-16 code point (little-endian). Returned value is 0 on error.
+: read-UTF16LE ( lim -- lim val )
+ read16le
+ choice
+ high-surrogate? uf
+ swap dup ifnot 2drop 0 0 ret then
+ read16le assemble-surrogate-pair
+ enduf
+ low-surrogate? uf
+ drop 0
+ enduf
+ endchoice ;
+
+\ Add byte to current pad value. Offset is updated, or set to 0 on error.
+: pad-append ( off val -- off )
+ over dup 0= swap 256 >= or if 2drop 0 ret then
+ over addr-pad + set8 1+ ;
+
+\ Add UTF-8 chunk byte to the pad. The 'nn' parameter is the shift count.
+: pad-append-UTF8-chunk ( off val nn -- off )
+ >> 0x3F and 0x80 or pad-append ;
+
+\ Test whether a code point is invalid when encoding. This rejects the
+\ 66 noncharacters, and also the surrogate range; this function does NOT
+\ check that the value is in the 0..10FFFF range.
+: valid-unicode? ( val -- bool )
+ dup 0xFDD0 0xFDEF between? if drop 0 ret then
+ dup 0xD800 0xDFFF between? if drop 0 ret then
+ 0xFFFF and 0xFFFE < ;
+
+\ Encode a code point in UTF-8. Offset is in the pad; it is updated, or
+\ set to 0 on error. Leading BOM are ignored.
+: encode-UTF8 ( val off -- off )
+ \ Skip leading BOM (U+FEFF when off is 1).
+ dup2 1 = swap 0xFEFF = and if swap drop ret then
+
+ swap dup { val }
+ dup valid-unicode? ifnot 2drop 0 ret then
+ choice
+ dup 0x80 < uf pad-append enduf
+ dup 0x800 < uf
+ 6 >> 0xC0 or pad-append
+ val 0 pad-append-UTF8-chunk
+ enduf
+ dup 0xFFFF < uf
+ 12 >> 0xE0 or pad-append
+ val 6 pad-append-UTF8-chunk
+ val 0 pad-append-UTF8-chunk
+ enduf
+ 18 >> 0xF0 or pad-append
+ val 12 pad-append-UTF8-chunk
+ val 6 pad-append-UTF8-chunk
+ val 0 pad-append-UTF8-chunk
+ endchoice ;
+
+\ Read a string value into the pad; this function checks that the source
+\ characters are UTF-8 and non-zero. The string length (in bytes) is
+\ written in the first pad byte. Returned value is true (-1) on success,
+\ false (0) on error.
+: read-value-UTF8 ( lim -- lim bool )
+ read-length-open-elt
+ 1 { off }
+ begin dup while
+ read-UTF8 dup ifnot drop skip-close-elt 0 ret then
+ off encode-UTF8 >off
+ repeat
+ drop off dup ifnot ret then 1- addr-pad set8 -1 ;
+
+\ Decode a UTF-16 string into the pad. The string is converted to UTF-8,
+\ and the length is written in the first pad byte. A leading BOM is
+\ honoured (big-endian is assumed if there is no BOM). A code point of
+\ value 0 is an error. Returned value is true (-1) on success, false (0)
+\ on error.
+: read-value-UTF16 ( lim -- lim bool )
+ read-length-open-elt
+ dup ifnot addr-pad set8 -1 ret then
+ 1 { off }
+ read-UTF16BE dup 0xFFFE = if
+ \ Leading BOM, and indicates little-endian.
+ drop
+ begin dup while
+ read-UTF16LE dup ifnot drop skip-close-elt 0 ret then
+ off encode-UTF8 >off
+ repeat
+ else
+ dup ifnot drop skip-close-elt 0 ret then
+ \ Big-endian BOM, or no BOM.
+ begin
+ off encode-UTF8 >off
+ dup while
+ read-UTF16BE dup ifnot drop skip-close-elt 0 ret then
+ repeat
+ then
+ drop off dup ifnot ret then 1- addr-pad set8 -1 ;
+
+\ Decode a latin-1 string into the pad. The string is converted to UTF-8,
+\ and the length is written in the first pad byte. A source byte of
+\ value 0 is an error. Returned value is true (-1) on success, false (0)
+\ on error.
+: read-value-latin1 ( lim -- lim bool )
+ read-length-open-elt
+ 1 { off }
+ begin dup while
+ read8 dup ifnot drop skip-close-elt 0 ret then
+ off encode-UTF8 >off
+ repeat
+ drop off dup ifnot ret then 1- addr-pad set8 -1 ;
+
+\ Read a value and interpret it as an INTEGER or ENUMERATED value. If
+\ the integer value does not fit on an unsigned 32-bit value, an error
+\ is reported. This function assumes that the tag has just been read
+\ and processed, but not the length.
+: read-small-int-value ( lim -- lim x )
+ read-length-open-elt
+ dup ifnot ERR_X509_OVERFLOW fail then
+ read8 dup 0x80 >= if ERR_X509_OVERFLOW fail then
+ { x }
+ begin dup while
+ read8 x dup 0xFFFFFF >= if ERR_X509_OVERFLOW fail then
+ 8 << + >x
+ repeat
+ drop x ;
+
+\ Compare the OID in the pad with an OID in the constant data block.
+\ Returned value is -1 on equality, 0 otherwise.
+cc: eqOID ( addrConst -- bool ) {
+ const unsigned char *a2 = &t0_datablock[T0_POP()];
+ const unsigned char *a1 = &CTX->pad[0];
+ size_t len = a1[0];
+ int x;
+ if (len == a2[0]) {
+ x = -(memcmp(a1 + 1, a2 + 1, len) == 0);
+ } else {
+ x = 0;
+ }
+ T0_PUSH((uint32_t)x);
+}
+
+\ Compare two blobs in the context. Returned value is -1 on equality, 0
+\ otherwise.
+cc: eqblob ( addr1 addr2 len -- bool ) {
+ size_t len = T0_POP();
+ const unsigned char *a2 = (const unsigned char *)CTX + T0_POP();
+ const unsigned char *a1 = (const unsigned char *)CTX + T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSHi(-(memcmp(a1, a2, len) == 0));
+}
+
+\ Check that a value is in a given range (inclusive).
+: between? ( x min max -- bool )
+ { min max } dup min >= swap max <= and ;
+
+\ Convert the provided byte value into a number in the 0..9 range,
+\ assuming that it is an ASCII digit. A non-digit triggers an error
+\ (a "bad time" error since this is used in date/time decoding).
+: digit-dec ( char -- value )
+ `0 - dup 0 9 between? ifnot ERR_X509_BAD_TIME fail then ;
+
+\ Read two ASCII digits and return the value in the 0..99 range. An
+\ error is reported if the characters are not ASCII digits.
+: read-dec2 ( lim -- lim x )
+ read8 digit-dec 10 * { x } read8 digit-dec x + ;
+
+\ Read two ASCII digits and check that the value is in the provided
+\ range (inclusive).
+: read-dec2-range ( lim min max -- lim x )
+ { min max }
+ read-dec2 dup min max between? ifnot ERR_X509_BAD_TIME fail then ;
+
+\ Maximum days in a month and accumulated day count. Each
+\ 16-bit value contains the month day count in its lower 5 bits. The first
+\ 12 values are for a normal year, the other 12 for a leap year.
+data: month-to-days
+hexb| 001F 03FC 077F 0B5E 0F1F 12FE 16BF 1A9F 1E7E 223F 261E 29DF |
+hexb| 001F 03FD 079F 0B7E 0F3F 131E 16DF 1ABF 1E9E 225F 263E 29FF |
+
+\ Read a date (UTCTime or GeneralizedTime). The date value is converted
+\ to a day count and a second count. The day count starts at 0 for
+\ January 1st, 0 AD (that's they year before 1 AD, also known as 1 BC)
+\ in a proleptic Gregorian calendar (i.e. Gregorian rules are assumed to
+\ extend indefinitely in the past). The second count is between 0 and
+\ 86400 (inclusive, in case of a leap second).
+: read-date ( lim -- lim days seconds )
+ \ Read tag; must be UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. Year count is
+ \ 4 digits with GeneralizedTime, 2 digits with UTCTime.
+ read-tag
+ dup 0x17 0x18 between? ifnot ERR_X509_BAD_TIME fail then
+ 0x18 = { y4d }
+ check-primitive
+ read-length-open-elt
+
+ \ We compute the days and seconds counts during decoding, in
+ \ order to minimize the number of needed temporary variables.
+ { ; days seconds x }
+
+ \ Year is 4-digit with GeneralizedTime. With UTCTime, the year
+ \ is in the 1950..2049 range, and only the last two digits are
+ \ present in the encoding.
+ read-dec2
+ y4d if
+ 100 * >x read-dec2 x +
+ else
+ dup 50 < if 100 + then 1900 +
+ then
+ >x
+ x 365 * x 3 + 4 / + x 99 + 100 / - x 399 + 400 / + >days
+
+ \ Month is 1..12. Number of days in a months depend on the
+ \ month and on the year (year count is in x at that point).
+ 1 12 read-dec2-range
+ 1- 1 <<
+ x 4 % 0= x 100 % 0<> x 400 % 0= or and if 24 + then
+ month-to-days + data-get16
+ dup 5 >> days + >days
+ 0x1F and
+
+ \ Day. At this point, the TOS contains the maximum day count for
+ \ the current month.
+ 1 swap read-dec2-range
+ days + 1- >days
+
+ \ Hour, minute and seconds. Count of seconds is allowed to go to
+ \ 60 in case of leap seconds (in practice, leap seconds really
+ \ occur only at the very end of the day, so this computation is
+ \ exact for a real leap second, and a spurious leap second only
+ \ implies a one-second shift that we can ignore).
+ 0 23 read-dec2-range 3600 * >seconds
+ 0 59 read-dec2-range 60 * seconds + >seconds
+ 0 60 read-dec2-range seconds + >seconds
+
+ \ At this point, we may have fractional seconds. This should
+ \ happen only with GeneralizedTime, but we accept it for UTCTime
+ \ too (and, anyway, we ignore these fractional seconds).
+ read8 dup `. = if
+ drop
+ begin read8 dup `0 `9 between? while drop repeat
+ then
+
+ \ The time zone should be 'Z', not followed by anything. Other
+ \ time zone indications are not DER and thus not supposed to
+ \ appear in certificates.
+ `Z <> if ERR_X509_BAD_TIME fail then
+ close-elt
+ days seconds ;
+
+\ Read an INTEGER (tag, length and value). The INTEGER is supposed to be
+\ positive; its unsigned big-endian encoding is stored in the provided
+\ in-context buffer. Returned value is the decoded length. If the integer
+\ did not fit, or the value is negative, then an error is reported.
+: read-integer ( lim addr len -- lim dlen )
+ rot read-tag 0x02 check-tag-primitive -rot
+ read-integer-next ;
+
+\ Identical to read-integer, but the tag has already been read and checked.
+: read-integer-next ( lim addr len -- lim dlen )
+ dup { addr len origlen }
+ read-length-open-elt
+ \ Read first byte; sign bit must be 0.
+ read8 dup 0x80 >= if ERR_X509_OVERFLOW fail then
+ \ Skip leading bytes of value 0. If there are only bytes of
+ \ value 0, then return.
+ begin dup 0 = while
+ drop dup ifnot drop 0 ret then
+ read8
+ repeat
+ \ At that point, we have the first non-zero byte on the stack.
+ begin
+ len dup ifnot ERR_X509_LIMIT_EXCEEDED fail then 1- >len
+ addr set8 addr 1+ >addr
+ dup while read8
+ repeat
+ drop origlen len - ;
+
+\ Read a BOOLEAN value. This should be called immediately after reading
+\ the tag.
+: read-boolean ( lim constructed value -- lim bool )
+ 0x01 check-tag-primitive
+ read-length 1 <> if ERR_X509_BAD_BOOLEAN fail then
+ read8 0<> ;
+
+\ Identify an elliptic curve: read the OID, then check it against the
+\ known curve OID.
+: read-curve-ID ( lim -- lim curve )
+ read-OID ifnot ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail then
+ choice
+ ansix9p256r1 eqOID uf 23 enduf
+ ansix9p384r1 eqOID uf 24 enduf
+ ansix9p521r1 eqOID uf 25 enduf
+ ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail
+ endchoice ;
+
+\ A convenient debug word: print the current data stack contents.
+cc: DEBUG ( -- ) {
+ extern int printf(const char *fmt, ...);
+ uint32_t *p;
+
+ printf("<stack:");
+ for (p = &CTX->dp_stack[0]; p != dp; p ++) {
+ printf(" %lu", (unsigned long)*p);
+ }
+ printf(" >\n");
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/asn1enc.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/asn1enc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a74963
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/asn1enc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+br_asn1_uint
+br_asn1_uint_prepare(const void *xdata, size_t xlen)
+{
+ const unsigned char *x;
+ br_asn1_uint t;
+
+ x = xdata;
+ while (xlen > 0 && *x == 0) {
+ x ++;
+ xlen --;
+ }
+ t.data = x;
+ t.len = xlen;
+ t.asn1len = xlen;
+ if (xlen == 0 || x[0] >= 0x80) {
+ t.asn1len ++;
+ }
+ return t;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+size_t
+br_asn1_encode_length(void *dest, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t z;
+ int i, j;
+
+ buf = dest;
+ if (len < 0x80) {
+ if (buf != NULL) {
+ *buf = len;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+ i = 0;
+ for (z = len; z != 0; z >>= 8) {
+ i ++;
+ }
+ if (buf != NULL) {
+ *buf ++ = 0x80 + i;
+ for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j --) {
+ *buf ++ = len >> (j << 3);
+ }
+ }
+ return i + 1;
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+size_t
+br_asn1_encode_uint(void *dest, br_asn1_uint pp)
+{
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t lenlen;
+
+ if (dest == NULL) {
+ return 1 + br_asn1_encode_length(NULL, pp.asn1len) + pp.asn1len;
+ }
+ buf = dest;
+ *buf ++ = 0x02;
+ lenlen = br_asn1_encode_length(buf, pp.asn1len);
+ buf += lenlen;
+ *buf = 0x00;
+ memcpy(buf + pp.asn1len - pp.len, pp.data, pp.len);
+ return 1 + lenlen + pp.asn1len;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/encode_ec_pk8der.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/encode_ec_pk8der.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..53717ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/encode_ec_pk8der.c
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+size_t
+br_encode_ec_pkcs8_der(void *dest,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, const br_ec_public_key *pk)
+{
+ /*
+ * ASN.1 format:
+ *
+ * OneAsymmetricKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version Version,
+ * privateKeyAlgorithm PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,
+ * privateKey PrivateKey,
+ * attributes [0] Attributes OPTIONAL,
+ * ...,
+ * [[2: publicKey [1] PublicKey OPTIONAL ]],
+ * ...
+ * }
+ *
+ * We don't include attributes or public key (the public key
+ * is included in the private key value instead). The
+ * 'version' field is an INTEGER that we will set to 0
+ * (meaning 'v1', compatible with previous versions of PKCS#8).
+ * The 'privateKeyAlgorithm' structure is an AlgorithmIdentifier
+ * whose OID should be id-ecPublicKey, with, as parameters, the
+ * curve OID. The 'privateKey' is an OCTET STRING, whose value
+ * is the "raw DER" encoding of the key pair.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * OID id-ecPublicKey (1.2.840.10045.2.1), DER-encoded (with
+ * the tag).
+ */
+ static const unsigned char OID_ECPUBKEY[] = {
+ 0x06, 0x07, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01
+ };
+
+ size_t len_version, len_privateKeyAlgorithm, len_privateKeyValue;
+ size_t len_privateKey, len_seq;
+ const unsigned char *oid;
+
+ oid = br_get_curve_OID(sk->curve);
+ if (oid == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ len_version = 3;
+ len_privateKeyAlgorithm = 2 + sizeof OID_ECPUBKEY + 2 + oid[0];
+ len_privateKeyValue = br_encode_ec_raw_der_inner(NULL, sk, pk, 0);
+ len_privateKey = 1 + len_of_len(len_privateKeyValue)
+ + len_privateKeyValue;
+ len_seq = len_version + len_privateKeyAlgorithm + len_privateKey;
+
+ if (dest == NULL) {
+ return 1 + len_of_len(len_seq) + len_seq;
+ } else {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t lenlen;
+
+ buf = dest;
+ *buf ++ = 0x30; /* SEQUENCE tag */
+ lenlen = br_asn1_encode_length(buf, len_seq);
+ buf += lenlen;
+
+ /* version */
+ *buf ++ = 0x02;
+ *buf ++ = 0x01;
+ *buf ++ = 0x00;
+
+ /* privateKeyAlgorithm */
+ *buf ++ = 0x30;
+ *buf ++ = (sizeof OID_ECPUBKEY) + 2 + oid[0];
+ memcpy(buf, OID_ECPUBKEY, sizeof OID_ECPUBKEY);
+ buf += sizeof OID_ECPUBKEY;
+ *buf ++ = 0x06;
+ memcpy(buf, oid, 1 + oid[0]);
+ buf += 1 + oid[0];
+
+ /* privateKey */
+ *buf ++ = 0x04;
+ buf += br_asn1_encode_length(buf, len_privateKeyValue);
+ br_encode_ec_raw_der_inner(buf, sk, pk, 0);
+
+ return 1 + lenlen + len_seq;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/encode_ec_rawder.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/encode_ec_rawder.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5985909
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/encode_ec_rawder.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see inner.h */
+const unsigned char *
+br_get_curve_OID(int curve)
+{
+ static const unsigned char OID_secp256r1[] = {
+ 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07
+ };
+ static const unsigned char OID_secp384r1[] = {
+ 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22
+ };
+ static const unsigned char OID_secp521r1[] = {
+ 0x05, 0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x23
+ };
+
+ switch (curve) {
+ case BR_EC_secp256r1: return OID_secp256r1;
+ case BR_EC_secp384r1: return OID_secp384r1;
+ case BR_EC_secp521r1: return OID_secp521r1;
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see inner.h */
+size_t
+br_encode_ec_raw_der_inner(void *dest,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, const br_ec_public_key *pk,
+ int include_curve_oid)
+{
+ /*
+ * ASN.1 format:
+ *
+ * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1),
+ * privateKey OCTET STRING,
+ * parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL,
+ * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL
+ * }
+ *
+ * The tages '[0]' and '[1]' are explicit. The 'ECParameters'
+ * is a CHOICE; in our case, it will always be an OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ * that identifies the curve.
+ *
+ * The value of the 'privateKey' field is the raw unsigned big-endian
+ * encoding of the private key (integer modulo the curve subgroup
+ * order); there is no INTEGER tag, and the leading bit may be 1.
+ * Also, leading bytes of value 0x00 are _not_ removed.
+ *
+ * The 'publicKey' contents are the raw encoded public key point,
+ * normally uncompressed (leading byte of value 0x04, followed
+ * by the unsigned big-endian encodings of the X and Y coordinates,
+ * padded to the full field length if necessary).
+ */
+
+ size_t len_version, len_privateKey, len_parameters, len_publicKey;
+ size_t len_publicKey_bits, len_seq;
+ const unsigned char *oid;
+
+ if (include_curve_oid) {
+ oid = br_get_curve_OID(sk->curve);
+ if (oid == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ oid = NULL;
+ }
+ len_version = 3;
+ len_privateKey = 1 + len_of_len(sk->xlen) + sk->xlen;
+ if (include_curve_oid) {
+ len_parameters = 4 + oid[0];
+ } else {
+ len_parameters = 0;
+ }
+ if (pk == NULL) {
+ len_publicKey = 0;
+ len_publicKey_bits = 0;
+ } else {
+ len_publicKey_bits = 2 + len_of_len(pk->qlen) + pk->qlen;
+ len_publicKey = 1 + len_of_len(len_publicKey_bits)
+ + len_publicKey_bits;
+ }
+ len_seq = len_version + len_privateKey + len_parameters + len_publicKey;
+ if (dest == NULL) {
+ return 1 + len_of_len(len_seq) + len_seq;
+ } else {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t lenlen;
+
+ buf = dest;
+ *buf ++ = 0x30; /* SEQUENCE tag */
+ lenlen = br_asn1_encode_length(buf, len_seq);
+ buf += lenlen;
+
+ /* version */
+ *buf ++ = 0x02;
+ *buf ++ = 0x01;
+ *buf ++ = 0x01;
+
+ /* privateKey */
+ *buf ++ = 0x04;
+ buf += br_asn1_encode_length(buf, sk->xlen);
+ memcpy(buf, sk->x, sk->xlen);
+ buf += sk->xlen;
+
+ /* parameters */
+ if (include_curve_oid) {
+ *buf ++ = 0xA0;
+ *buf ++ = oid[0] + 2;
+ *buf ++ = 0x06;
+ memcpy(buf, oid, oid[0] + 1);
+ buf += oid[0] + 1;
+ }
+
+ /* publicKey */
+ if (pk != NULL) {
+ *buf ++ = 0xA1;
+ buf += br_asn1_encode_length(buf, len_publicKey_bits);
+ *buf ++ = 0x03;
+ buf += br_asn1_encode_length(buf, pk->qlen + 1);
+ *buf ++ = 0x00;
+ memcpy(buf, pk->q, pk->qlen);
+ /* buf += pk->qlen; */
+ }
+
+ return 1 + lenlen + len_seq;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+size_t
+br_encode_ec_raw_der(void *dest,
+ const br_ec_private_key *sk, const br_ec_public_key *pk)
+{
+ return br_encode_ec_raw_der_inner(dest, sk, pk, 1);
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/encode_rsa_pk8der.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/encode_rsa_pk8der.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c053503
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/encode_rsa_pk8der.c
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+size_t
+br_encode_rsa_pkcs8_der(void *dest, const br_rsa_private_key *sk,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk, const void *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+ /*
+ * ASN.1 format:
+ *
+ * OneAsymmetricKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version Version,
+ * privateKeyAlgorithm PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,
+ * privateKey PrivateKey,
+ * attributes [0] Attributes OPTIONAL,
+ * ...,
+ * [[2: publicKey [1] PublicKey OPTIONAL ]],
+ * ...
+ * }
+ *
+ * We don't include attributes or public key. The 'version' field
+ * is an INTEGER that we will set to 0 (meaning 'v1', compatible
+ * with previous versions of PKCS#8). The 'privateKeyAlgorithm'
+ * structure is an AlgorithmIdentifier whose OID should be
+ * rsaEncryption, with NULL parameters. The 'privateKey' is an
+ * OCTET STRING, whose value is the "raw DER" encoding of the
+ * key pair.
+ *
+ * Since the private key value comes last, this function really
+ * adds a header, which is mostly fixed (only some lengths have
+ * to be modified.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Concatenation of:
+ * - DER encoding of an INTEGER of value 0 (the 'version' field)
+ * - DER encoding of a PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier that uses
+ * the rsaEncryption OID, and NULL parameters
+ * - An OCTET STRING tag
+ */
+ static const unsigned char PK8_HEAD[] = {
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86,
+ 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00,
+ 0x04
+ };
+
+ size_t len_raw, len_seq;
+
+ len_raw = br_encode_rsa_raw_der(NULL, sk, pk, d, dlen);
+ len_seq = (sizeof PK8_HEAD) + len_of_len(len_raw) + len_raw;
+ if (dest == NULL) {
+ return 1 + len_of_len(len_seq) + len_seq;
+ } else {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t lenlen;
+
+ buf = dest;
+ *buf ++ = 0x30; /* SEQUENCE tag */
+ lenlen = br_asn1_encode_length(buf, len_seq);
+ buf += lenlen;
+
+ /* version, privateKeyAlgorithm, privateKey tag */
+ memcpy(buf, PK8_HEAD, sizeof PK8_HEAD);
+ buf += sizeof PK8_HEAD;
+
+ /* privateKey */
+ buf += br_asn1_encode_length(buf, len_raw);
+ br_encode_rsa_raw_der(buf, sk, pk, d, dlen);
+
+ return 1 + lenlen + len_seq;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/encode_rsa_rawder.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/encode_rsa_rawder.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a8052b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/encode_rsa_rawder.c
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+size_t
+br_encode_rsa_raw_der(void *dest, const br_rsa_private_key *sk,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk, const void *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+ /*
+ * ASN.1 format:
+ *
+ * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version Version,
+ * modulus INTEGER, -- n
+ * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e
+ * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d
+ * prime1 INTEGER, -- p
+ * prime2 INTEGER, -- q
+ * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1)
+ * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1)
+ * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p
+ * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL
+ * }
+ *
+ * The 'version' field is an INTEGER of value 0 (meaning: there
+ * are exactly two prime factors), and 'otherPrimeInfos' will
+ * be absent (because there are exactly two prime factors).
+ */
+
+ br_asn1_uint num[9];
+ size_t u, slen;
+
+ /*
+ * For all INTEGER values, get the pointer and length for the
+ * data bytes.
+ */
+ num[0] = br_asn1_uint_prepare(NULL, 0);
+ num[1] = br_asn1_uint_prepare(pk->n, pk->nlen);
+ num[2] = br_asn1_uint_prepare(pk->e, pk->elen);
+ num[3] = br_asn1_uint_prepare(d, dlen);
+ num[4] = br_asn1_uint_prepare(sk->p, sk->plen);
+ num[5] = br_asn1_uint_prepare(sk->q, sk->qlen);
+ num[6] = br_asn1_uint_prepare(sk->dp, sk->dplen);
+ num[7] = br_asn1_uint_prepare(sk->dq, sk->dqlen);
+ num[8] = br_asn1_uint_prepare(sk->iq, sk->iqlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Get the length of the SEQUENCE contents.
+ */
+ slen = 0;
+ for (u = 0; u < 9; u ++) {
+ uint32_t ilen;
+
+ ilen = num[u].asn1len;
+ slen += 1 + len_of_len(ilen) + ilen;
+ }
+
+ if (dest == NULL) {
+ return 1 + len_of_len(slen) + slen;
+ } else {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t lenlen;
+
+ buf = dest;
+ *buf ++ = 0x30; /* SEQUENCE tag */
+ lenlen = br_asn1_encode_length(buf, slen);
+ buf += lenlen;
+ for (u = 0; u < 9; u ++) {
+ buf += br_asn1_encode_uint(buf, num[u]);
+ }
+ return 1 + lenlen + slen;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/skey_decoder.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/skey_decoder.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9fe22bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/skey_decoder.c
@@ -0,0 +1,653 @@
+/* Automatically generated code; do not modify directly. */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+typedef struct {
+ uint32_t *dp;
+ uint32_t *rp;
+ const unsigned char *ip;
+} t0_context;
+
+static uint32_t
+t0_parse7E_unsigned(const unsigned char **p)
+{
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ x = 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ unsigned y;
+
+ y = *(*p) ++;
+ x = (x << 7) | (uint32_t)(y & 0x7F);
+ if (y < 0x80) {
+ return x;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int32_t
+t0_parse7E_signed(const unsigned char **p)
+{
+ int neg;
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ neg = ((**p) >> 6) & 1;
+ x = (uint32_t)-neg;
+ for (;;) {
+ unsigned y;
+
+ y = *(*p) ++;
+ x = (x << 7) | (uint32_t)(y & 0x7F);
+ if (y < 0x80) {
+ if (neg) {
+ return -(int32_t)~x - 1;
+ } else {
+ return (int32_t)x;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#define T0_VBYTE(x, n) (unsigned char)((((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)) & 0x7F) | 0x80)
+#define T0_FBYTE(x, n) (unsigned char)(((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)) & 0x7F)
+#define T0_SBYTE(x) (unsigned char)((((uint32_t)(x) >> 28) + 0xF8) ^ 0xF8)
+#define T0_INT1(x) T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT2(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT3(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT4(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 21), T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT5(x) T0_SBYTE(x), T0_VBYTE(x, 21), T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+
+/* static const unsigned char t0_datablock[]; */
+
+
+void br_skey_decoder_init_main(void *t0ctx);
+
+void br_skey_decoder_run(void *t0ctx);
+
+
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+
+
+
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define CTX ((br_skey_decoder_context *)(void *)((unsigned char *)t0ctx - offsetof(br_skey_decoder_context, cpu)))
+#define CONTEXT_NAME br_skey_decoder_context
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+void
+br_skey_decoder_init(br_skey_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof *ctx);
+ ctx->cpu.dp = &ctx->dp_stack[0];
+ ctx->cpu.rp = &ctx->rp_stack[0];
+ br_skey_decoder_init_main(&ctx->cpu);
+ br_skey_decoder_run(&ctx->cpu);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+void
+br_skey_decoder_push(br_skey_decoder_context *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ if (ctx->err != 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ ctx->hbuf = data;
+ ctx->hlen = len;
+ br_skey_decoder_run(&ctx->cpu);
+}
+
+
+
+static const unsigned char t0_datablock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x07,
+ 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x02, 0x01, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE,
+ 0x3D, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22, 0x05, 0x2B,
+ 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x23
+};
+
+static const unsigned char t0_codeblock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x13,
+ 0x13, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_BAD_TAG_CLASS), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_BAD_TAG_VALUE), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_EXTRA_ELEMENT), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_INDEFINITE_LENGTH), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_INNER_TRUNC), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_INVALID_VALUE), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_LIMIT_EXCEEDED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_NOT_CONSTRUCTED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_NOT_PRIMITIVE), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_OVERFLOW), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_UNEXPECTED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_KEYTYPE_EC), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT1(BR_KEYTYPE_RSA),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, key_data)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, key_type)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x33, 0x48, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, pad)),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x13, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x22,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, 0x02, 0x2C, 0x16, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x02, 0x2D, 0x16,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x10, 0x3D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x05, 0x02, 0x2F, 0x16,
+ 0x3A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x05, 0x02, 0x2F, 0x16, 0x3B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06,
+ 0x02, 0x27, 0x16, 0x00, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x54, 0x57, 0x01, 0x02, 0x3E,
+ 0x55, 0x23, 0x06, 0x02, 0x30, 0x16, 0x57, 0x01, 0x04, 0x3E, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x41, 0x3F, 0x00, 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x53, 0x14, 0x14, 0x03, 0x01, 0x48,
+ 0x0E, 0x06, 0x02, 0x30, 0x16, 0x33, 0x4C, 0x58, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x19, 0x0D,
+ 0x06, 0x04, 0x13, 0x13, 0x04, 0x29, 0x01, 0x20, 0x19, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x16,
+ 0x13, 0x3A, 0x53, 0x4D, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x09, 0x02, 0x00, 0x0C, 0x06,
+ 0x02, 0x2A, 0x16, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x3F, 0x04, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x21,
+ 0x19, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x04, 0x13, 0x3A, 0x04, 0x03, 0x30, 0x16, 0x13, 0x5D,
+ 0x02, 0x00, 0x05, 0x02, 0x30, 0x16, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x1D, 0x00,
+ 0x02, 0x53, 0x4B, 0x05, 0x02, 0x30, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x15, 0x06, 0x07, 0x5D,
+ 0x01, 0x7F, 0x03, 0x01, 0x04, 0x16, 0x46, 0x15, 0x06, 0x10, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x03, 0x01, 0x14, 0x06, 0x03, 0x4D, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00,
+ 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x16, 0x3F, 0x57, 0x01, 0x04, 0x3E, 0x53, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x06, 0x03, 0x43, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x00, 0x40, 0x3F, 0x5D, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x06, 0x03, 0x32, 0x04, 0x01, 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x54, 0x57, 0x01, 0x02,
+ 0x3E, 0x55, 0x06, 0x02, 0x30, 0x16, 0x57, 0x01, 0x02, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x3F,
+ 0x00, 0x07, 0x35, 0x50, 0x14, 0x05, 0x02, 0x2F, 0x16, 0x23, 0x01, 0x03,
+ 0x0B, 0x33, 0x17, 0x47, 0x07, 0x03, 0x00, 0x4F, 0x4F, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x14,
+ 0x14, 0x03, 0x01, 0x03, 0x02, 0x51, 0x14, 0x03, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x07,
+ 0x14, 0x03, 0x02, 0x51, 0x14, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x07, 0x14, 0x03,
+ 0x02, 0x51, 0x14, 0x03, 0x05, 0x02, 0x02, 0x07, 0x14, 0x03, 0x02, 0x51,
+ 0x03, 0x06, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x02, 0x04, 0x02, 0x05,
+ 0x02, 0x06, 0x1E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x19, 0x19, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x0B, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x20, 0x14, 0x06, 0x08, 0x01, 0x01, 0x21, 0x20, 0x22,
+ 0x20, 0x04, 0x75, 0x13, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(3 * BR_X509_BUFSIZE_SIG), 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x87, 0xFF, 0xFF,
+ 0x7F, 0x54, 0x57, 0x01, 0x02, 0x3E, 0x55, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x02,
+ 0x30, 0x16, 0x57, 0x01, 0x02, 0x19, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x06, 0x13, 0x3B, 0x44,
+ 0x32, 0x04, 0x1C, 0x01, 0x04, 0x19, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x08, 0x13, 0x3B, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x41, 0x31, 0x04, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x10, 0x19, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x05, 0x13,
+ 0x3A, 0x42, 0x04, 0x03, 0x30, 0x16, 0x13, 0x03, 0x00, 0x3F, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x34, 0x1F, 0x5A, 0x27, 0x16, 0x00, 0x01, 0x45, 0x0A, 0x06, 0x02, 0x29,
+ 0x16, 0x14, 0x03, 0x00, 0x08, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x57, 0x01, 0x06,
+ 0x3E, 0x56, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x14, 0x06, 0x07, 0x1A, 0x14, 0x06, 0x01,
+ 0x12, 0x04, 0x76, 0x24, 0x00, 0x00, 0x4B, 0x05, 0x02, 0x30, 0x16, 0x37,
+ 0x15, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x17, 0x04, 0x12, 0x38, 0x15, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01,
+ 0x18, 0x04, 0x0A, 0x39, 0x15, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x19, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30,
+ 0x16, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1C, 0x57, 0x01, 0x02, 0x3E, 0x09, 0x50, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x35, 0x4E, 0x13, 0x00, 0x03, 0x14, 0x03, 0x00, 0x03, 0x01, 0x03, 0x02,
+ 0x53, 0x59, 0x14, 0x01, 0x81, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x02, 0x2E, 0x16, 0x14,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x13, 0x14, 0x05, 0x04, 0x13, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x59, 0x04, 0x6F, 0x02, 0x01, 0x14, 0x05, 0x02, 0x2B, 0x16, 0x23,
+ 0x03, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x1F, 0x02, 0x02, 0x22, 0x03, 0x02, 0x14, 0x06,
+ 0x03, 0x59, 0x04, 0x68, 0x13, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x14, 0x35, 0x1C, 0x08, 0x20, 0x1C, 0x07, 0x20, 0x4E, 0x00, 0x01, 0x59,
+ 0x14, 0x01, 0x81, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x06, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x81, 0x00, 0x08,
+ 0x14, 0x05, 0x02, 0x28, 0x16, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x19, 0x02, 0x00, 0x23, 0x03, 0x00, 0x14, 0x01, 0x83,
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x02, 0x29, 0x16, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0B, 0x20,
+ 0x59, 0x1C, 0x07, 0x04, 0x60, 0x00, 0x00, 0x52, 0x4A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x57,
+ 0x3C, 0x53, 0x00, 0x01, 0x53, 0x14, 0x05, 0x02, 0x2E, 0x16, 0x59, 0x14,
+ 0x01, 0x81, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x02, 0x2E, 0x16, 0x03, 0x00, 0x14, 0x06,
+ 0x16, 0x59, 0x02, 0x00, 0x14, 0x01, 0x87, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0x0F, 0x06,
+ 0x02, 0x2E, 0x16, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0B, 0x07, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04, 0x67, 0x13,
+ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x53, 0x14, 0x01, 0x81, 0x7F, 0x0E, 0x06, 0x08,
+ 0x5C, 0x01, 0x00, 0x36, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14, 0x36, 0x1F, 0x36,
+ 0x22, 0x4C, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x01, 0x59, 0x03, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x05, 0x10, 0x01, 0x01, 0x11, 0x18, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x06, 0x10, 0x14,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x11, 0x06, 0x02, 0x25, 0x16, 0x01, 0x04, 0x0B, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x1F, 0x11, 0x14, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x02, 0x26, 0x16, 0x07,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x14, 0x05, 0x05, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x57, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x14, 0x05, 0x02, 0x29, 0x16, 0x23, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1B, 0x14,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x06, 0x01, 0x00, 0x13, 0x12, 0x04, 0x74, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x5D, 0x13, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14, 0x06, 0x07, 0x5E, 0x14,
+ 0x06, 0x01, 0x12, 0x04, 0x76, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x09,
+ 0x24, 0x00
+};
+
+static const uint16_t t0_caddr[] = {
+ 0,
+ 5,
+ 10,
+ 14,
+ 18,
+ 22,
+ 26,
+ 30,
+ 34,
+ 38,
+ 42,
+ 46,
+ 50,
+ 54,
+ 58,
+ 62,
+ 66,
+ 70,
+ 75,
+ 80,
+ 84,
+ 89,
+ 93,
+ 97,
+ 101,
+ 107,
+ 113,
+ 118,
+ 126,
+ 134,
+ 140,
+ 163,
+ 244,
+ 311,
+ 329,
+ 404,
+ 408,
+ 412,
+ 429,
+ 434,
+ 505,
+ 519,
+ 526,
+ 540,
+ 573,
+ 582,
+ 587,
+ 654,
+ 665,
+ 721,
+ 725,
+ 730,
+ 778,
+ 804,
+ 848,
+ 859,
+ 868,
+ 881,
+ 885,
+ 889,
+ 901
+};
+
+#define T0_INTERPRETED 34
+
+#define T0_ENTER(ip, rp, slot) do { \
+ const unsigned char *t0_newip; \
+ uint32_t t0_lnum; \
+ t0_newip = &t0_codeblock[t0_caddr[(slot) - T0_INTERPRETED]]; \
+ t0_lnum = t0_parse7E_unsigned(&t0_newip); \
+ (rp) += t0_lnum; \
+ *((rp) ++) = (uint32_t)((ip) - &t0_codeblock[0]) + (t0_lnum << 16); \
+ (ip) = t0_newip; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define T0_DEFENTRY(name, slot) \
+void \
+name(void *ctx) \
+{ \
+ t0_context *t0ctx = ctx; \
+ t0ctx->ip = &t0_codeblock[0]; \
+ T0_ENTER(t0ctx->ip, t0ctx->rp, slot); \
+}
+
+T0_DEFENTRY(br_skey_decoder_init_main, 73)
+
+#define T0_NEXT(t0ipp) (*(*(t0ipp)) ++)
+
+void
+br_skey_decoder_run(void *t0ctx)
+{
+ uint32_t *dp, *rp;
+ const unsigned char *ip;
+
+#define T0_LOCAL(x) (*(rp - 2 - (x)))
+#define T0_POP() (*-- dp)
+#define T0_POPi() (*(int32_t *)(-- dp))
+#define T0_PEEK(x) (*(dp - 1 - (x)))
+#define T0_PEEKi(x) (*(int32_t *)(dp - 1 - (x)))
+#define T0_PUSH(v) do { *dp = (v); dp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_PUSHi(v) do { *(int32_t *)dp = (v); dp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_RPOP() (*-- rp)
+#define T0_RPOPi() (*(int32_t *)(-- rp))
+#define T0_RPUSH(v) do { *rp = (v); rp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_RPUSHi(v) do { *(int32_t *)rp = (v); rp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_ROLL(x) do { \
+ size_t t0len = (size_t)(x); \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 1 - t0len); \
+ memmove(dp - t0len - 1, dp - t0len, t0len * sizeof *dp); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_SWAP() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_ROT() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 3); \
+ *(dp - 3) = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_NROT() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 3); \
+ *(dp - 3) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_PICK(x) do { \
+ uint32_t t0depth = (x); \
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(t0depth)); \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_CO() do { \
+ goto t0_exit; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_RET() goto t0_next
+
+ dp = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->dp;
+ rp = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->rp;
+ ip = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->ip;
+ goto t0_next;
+ for (;;) {
+ uint32_t t0x;
+
+ t0_next:
+ t0x = T0_NEXT(&ip);
+ if (t0x < T0_INTERPRETED) {
+ switch (t0x) {
+ int32_t t0off;
+
+ case 0: /* ret */
+ t0x = T0_RPOP();
+ rp -= (t0x >> 16);
+ t0x &= 0xFFFF;
+ if (t0x == 0) {
+ ip = NULL;
+ goto t0_exit;
+ }
+ ip = &t0_codeblock[t0x];
+ break;
+ case 1: /* literal constant */
+ T0_PUSHi(t0_parse7E_signed(&ip));
+ break;
+ case 2: /* read local */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_LOCAL(t0_parse7E_unsigned(&ip)));
+ break;
+ case 3: /* write local */
+ T0_LOCAL(t0_parse7E_unsigned(&ip)) = T0_POP();
+ break;
+ case 4: /* jump */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ ip += t0off;
+ break;
+ case 5: /* jump if */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ if (T0_POP()) {
+ ip += t0off;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 6: /* jump if not */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ if (!T0_POP()) {
+ ip += t0off;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 7: {
+ /* + */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a + b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 8: {
+ /* - */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a - b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 9: {
+ /* -rot */
+ T0_NROT();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 10: {
+ /* < */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a < b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 11: {
+ /* << */
+
+ int c = (int)T0_POPi();
+ uint32_t x = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(x << c);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 12: {
+ /* <> */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a != b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 13: {
+ /* = */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a == b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 14: {
+ /* > */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a > b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 15: {
+ /* >= */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a >= b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 16: {
+ /* >> */
+
+ int c = (int)T0_POPi();
+ int32_t x = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSHi(x >> c);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 17: {
+ /* and */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a & b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 18: {
+ /* co */
+ T0_CO();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 19: {
+ /* drop */
+ (void)T0_POP();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 20: {
+ /* dup */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(0));
+ }
+ break;
+ case 21: {
+ /* eqOID */
+
+ const unsigned char *a2 = &t0_datablock[T0_POP()];
+ const unsigned char *a1 = &CTX->pad[0];
+ size_t len = a1[0];
+ int x;
+ if (len == a2[0]) {
+ x = -(memcmp(a1 + 1, a2 + 1, len) == 0);
+ } else {
+ x = 0;
+ }
+ T0_PUSH((uint32_t)x);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 22: {
+ /* fail */
+
+ CTX->err = T0_POPi();
+ T0_CO();
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 23: {
+ /* get8 */
+
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(*((unsigned char *)CTX + addr));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 24: {
+ /* neg */
+
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-a);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 25: {
+ /* over */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(1));
+ }
+ break;
+ case 26: {
+ /* read-blob-inner */
+
+ uint32_t len = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ size_t clen = CTX->hlen;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ clen = (size_t)len;
+ }
+ if (addr != 0) {
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)CTX + addr, CTX->hbuf, clen);
+ }
+ CTX->hbuf += clen;
+ CTX->hlen -= clen;
+ T0_PUSH(addr + clen);
+ T0_PUSH(len - clen);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 27: {
+ /* read8-low */
+
+ if (CTX->hlen == 0) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ } else {
+ CTX->hlen --;
+ T0_PUSH(*CTX->hbuf ++);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 28: {
+ /* rot */
+ T0_ROT();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 29: {
+ /* set-ec-key */
+
+ size_t xlen = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t curve = T0_POP();
+ CTX->key.ec.curve = curve;
+ CTX->key.ec.x = CTX->key_data;
+ CTX->key.ec.xlen = xlen;
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 30: {
+ /* set-rsa-key */
+
+ size_t iqlen = T0_POP();
+ size_t dqlen = T0_POP();
+ size_t dplen = T0_POP();
+ size_t qlen = T0_POP();
+ size_t plen = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t n_bitlen = T0_POP();
+ size_t off;
+
+ CTX->key.rsa.n_bitlen = n_bitlen;
+ CTX->key.rsa.p = CTX->key_data;
+ CTX->key.rsa.plen = plen;
+ off = plen;
+ CTX->key.rsa.q = CTX->key_data + off;
+ CTX->key.rsa.qlen = qlen;
+ off += qlen;
+ CTX->key.rsa.dp = CTX->key_data + off;
+ CTX->key.rsa.dplen = dplen;
+ off += dplen;
+ CTX->key.rsa.dq = CTX->key_data + off;
+ CTX->key.rsa.dqlen = dqlen;
+ off += dqlen;
+ CTX->key.rsa.iq = CTX->key_data + off;
+ CTX->key.rsa.iqlen = iqlen;
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 31: {
+ /* set8 */
+
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ *((unsigned char *)CTX + addr) = (unsigned char)T0_POP();
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 32: {
+ /* swap */
+ T0_SWAP();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 33: {
+ /* u>> */
+
+ int c = (int)T0_POPi();
+ uint32_t x = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(x >> c);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ T0_ENTER(ip, rp, t0x);
+ }
+ }
+t0_exit:
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->dp = dp;
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->rp = rp;
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->ip = ip;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/skey_decoder.t0 b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/skey_decoder.t0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..76b415a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/skey_decoder.t0
@@ -0,0 +1,376 @@
+\ Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+\
+\ Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+\ a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+\ "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+\ without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+\ distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+\ permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+\ the following conditions:
+\
+\ The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+\ included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+\
+\ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+\ EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+\ MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+\ NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+\ BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+\ ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+\ CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+\ SOFTWARE.
+
+preamble {
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define CTX ((br_skey_decoder_context *)(void *)((unsigned char *)t0ctx - offsetof(br_skey_decoder_context, cpu)))
+#define CONTEXT_NAME br_skey_decoder_context
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+void
+br_skey_decoder_init(br_skey_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof *ctx);
+ ctx->cpu.dp = &ctx->dp_stack[0];
+ ctx->cpu.rp = &ctx->rp_stack[0];
+ br_skey_decoder_init_main(&ctx->cpu);
+ br_skey_decoder_run(&ctx->cpu);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+void
+br_skey_decoder_push(br_skey_decoder_context *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ if (ctx->err != 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ ctx->hbuf = data;
+ ctx->hlen = len;
+ br_skey_decoder_run(&ctx->cpu);
+}
+
+}
+
+addr: key_type
+addr: key_data
+
+cc: read8-low ( -- x ) {
+ if (CTX->hlen == 0) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ } else {
+ CTX->hlen --;
+ T0_PUSH(*CTX->hbuf ++);
+ }
+}
+
+cc: read-blob-inner ( addr len -- addr len ) {
+ uint32_t len = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ size_t clen = CTX->hlen;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ clen = (size_t)len;
+ }
+ if (addr != 0) {
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)CTX + addr, CTX->hbuf, clen);
+ }
+ CTX->hbuf += clen;
+ CTX->hlen -= clen;
+ T0_PUSH(addr + clen);
+ T0_PUSH(len - clen);
+}
+
+\ Get the length of the key_data buffer.
+: len-key_data
+ CX 0 8191 { 3 * BR_X509_BUFSIZE_SIG } ;
+
+\ Get the address and length for the key_data buffer.
+: addr-len-key_data ( -- addr len )
+ addr-key_data len-key_data ;
+
+\ Set the private key (RSA).
+cc: set-rsa-key ( n_bitlen plen qlen dplen dqlen iqlen -- ) {
+ size_t iqlen = T0_POP();
+ size_t dqlen = T0_POP();
+ size_t dplen = T0_POP();
+ size_t qlen = T0_POP();
+ size_t plen = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t n_bitlen = T0_POP();
+ size_t off;
+
+ CTX->key.rsa.n_bitlen = n_bitlen;
+ CTX->key.rsa.p = CTX->key_data;
+ CTX->key.rsa.plen = plen;
+ off = plen;
+ CTX->key.rsa.q = CTX->key_data + off;
+ CTX->key.rsa.qlen = qlen;
+ off += qlen;
+ CTX->key.rsa.dp = CTX->key_data + off;
+ CTX->key.rsa.dplen = dplen;
+ off += dplen;
+ CTX->key.rsa.dq = CTX->key_data + off;
+ CTX->key.rsa.dqlen = dqlen;
+ off += dqlen;
+ CTX->key.rsa.iq = CTX->key_data + off;
+ CTX->key.rsa.iqlen = iqlen;
+}
+
+\ Set the private key (EC).
+cc: set-ec-key ( curve xlen -- ) {
+ size_t xlen = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t curve = T0_POP();
+ CTX->key.ec.curve = curve;
+ CTX->key.ec.x = CTX->key_data;
+ CTX->key.ec.xlen = xlen;
+}
+
+\ Get the bit length for an integer (unsigned).
+: int-bit-length ( x -- bitlen )
+ 0 swap
+ begin dup while 1 u>> swap 1+ swap repeat
+ drop ;
+
+\ Read an INTEGER into the key_data buffer, but then ignore it.
+: read-integer-ignore ( lim -- lim )
+ addr-len-key_data read-integer drop ;
+
+\ Read an INTEGER into the key_data buffer, at the provided offset.
+\ Returned value is the integer length (in bytes).
+: read-integer-off ( lim off -- lim dlen )
+ dup addr-len-key_data rot - swap rot + swap read-integer ;
+
+\ Decode RSA key, starting with the SEQUENCE tag.
+: decode-RSA ( lim -- lim )
+ read-sequence-open
+
+ \ Version should be 0.
+ read-tag 0x02 check-tag-primitive read-small-int-value if
+ ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail
+ then
+
+ \ Read tag for the modulus; should be INTEGER. Then use the
+ \ decode-RSA-next function for the remainder of the key.
+ read-tag 0x02 check-tag-primitive
+ decode-RSA-next
+
+ \ Close the SEQUENCE.
+ close-elt ;
+
+\ Decode RSA key; the version, and the tag for the modulus, have been
+\ read.
+: decode-RSA-next ( lim -- lim )
+ \ Modulus: we read it but we do not keep it; we merely gather
+ \ the modulus bit length.
+ addr-len-key_data read-integer-next
+ dup ifnot ERR_X509_UNEXPECTED fail then
+ 1- 3 << addr-key_data get8 int-bit-length + { n_bitlen }
+
+ \ Public exponent: read but skip.
+ read-integer-ignore
+
+ \ Private exponent: read but skip.
+ read-integer-ignore
+
+ \ First prime factor.
+ addr-len-key_data read-integer dup dup { off plen }
+
+ \ Second prime factor.
+ read-integer-off dup { qlen } off + dup >off
+
+ \ First reduced private exponent.
+ read-integer-off dup { dplen } off + dup >off
+
+ \ Second reduced private exponent.
+ read-integer-off dup { dqlen } off + dup >off
+
+ \ CRT coefficient.
+ read-integer-off { iqlen }
+
+ \ Set RSA key.
+ n_bitlen plen qlen dplen dqlen iqlen set-rsa-key
+
+ \ The caller will close the sequence, thereby validating that there
+ \ is no extra field.
+ ;
+
+\ Decode an EC key, starting with the SEQUENCE tag.
+: decode-EC ( lim curve -- lim )
+ { curve }
+ read-sequence-open
+
+ \ Version should be 1.
+ read-tag 0x02 check-tag-primitive read-small-int-value 1- if
+ ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail
+ then
+
+ \ Read tag for the private key; should be OCTET STRING. Then use the
+ \ decode-EC-next function for the remainder of the key.
+ read-tag 0x04 check-tag-primitive
+ curve decode-EC-next
+
+ \ Close the SEQUENCE.
+ close-elt ;
+
+\ Decode an EC key; the version, and the tag for the OCTET STRING, have
+\ already been read. The curve ID is provided (0 if unknown).
+: decode-EC-next ( lim curve -- lim )
+ { curve }
+
+ \ Read the private key proper.
+ read-length-open-elt
+ dup dup { xlen } len-key_data > if ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail then
+ addr-key_data read-blob
+
+ \ Next element might be the curve identifier.
+ read-tag-or-end
+ case
+
+ \ End of structure.
+ -1 of drop endof
+
+ \ Curve parameters; we support only named curves.
+ 0x20 of
+ check-constructed read-length-open-elt
+ read-curve-ID
+ curve if
+ curve <> if ERR_X509_INVALID_VALUE fail then
+ else
+ >curve
+ then
+ close-elt
+ endof
+
+ \ Public key. We ignore it.
+ 0x21 of check-constructed endof
+
+ ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail
+ endcase
+ skip-remaining
+
+ \ The curve must have been defined one way or another.
+ curve ifnot ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail then
+
+ \ Set the EC key.
+ curve xlen set-ec-key
+
+ \ The caller will close the sequence.
+ ;
+
+\ Decode a PKCS#8 object. The version and the tag for the AlgorithmIdentifier
+\ structure have already been read. This function returns the key type.
+: decode-PKCS8-next ( lim -- lim keytype )
+ \ Decode the AlgorithmIdentifier.
+ read-length-open-elt
+ read-OID ifnot ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail then
+ { ; is-rsa curve }
+ choice
+ rsaEncryption eqOID uf
+ \ RSA private key. We ignore the parameters.
+ skip-remaining -1 >is-rsa
+ enduf
+ id-ecPublicKey eqOID uf
+ \ EC private key. Parameters, if present, shall
+ \ identify the curve.
+ 0 >is-rsa
+ dup if read-curve-ID else 0 then >curve
+ enduf
+
+ ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail
+ endchoice
+ close-elt
+
+ \ Open private key value and decode it.
+ read-tag 0x04 check-tag-primitive
+ read-length-open-elt
+ is-rsa if
+ decode-RSA
+ else
+ curve decode-EC
+ then
+ close-elt
+
+ \ We ignore any extra field, i.e. attributes or public key.
+ skip-remaining
+
+ \ Return the key type.
+ is-rsa if KEYTYPE_RSA else KEYTYPE_EC then
+ ;
+
+\ Decode a private key.
+: main ( -- ! )
+ \ RSA private key format is defined in PKCS#1 (RFC 3447):
+ \ RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ \ version INTEGER, -- 0 or 1
+ \ n INTEGER,
+ \ e INTEGER,
+ \ d INTEGER,
+ \ p INTEGER,
+ \ q INTEGER,
+ \ dp INTEGER,
+ \ dq INTEGER,
+ \ iq INTEGER,
+ \ other OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL
+ \ }
+ \ We do not support keys with more than two primes (these have
+ \ version 1); thus, we expect the version field to be 0, and
+ \ the 'other' field to be absent.
+ \
+ \ EC private key format is defined in RFC 5915:
+ \ ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ \ version INTEGER, -- always 1
+ \ privateKey OCTET STRING,
+ \ parameters [0] EXPLICIT OBJECT IDENTIFIER OPTIONAL,
+ \ publicKey [1] EXPLICIT BIT STRING OPTIONAL
+ \ }
+ \ The "parameters" might conceptually be a complex curve description
+ \ structure but we support only named curves. The private key
+ \ contents are the unsigned big-endian encoding of the key value,
+ \ which is exactly what we want.
+ \
+ \ PKCS#8 (unencrypted) is:
+ \ OneAsymmetricKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ \ version INTEGER, -- 0 or 1
+ \ algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ \ privateKey OCTET STRING,
+ \ attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL,
+ \ publicKey [1] IMPLICIT BIT STRING OPTIONAL
+ \ }
+ \ The 'publicKey' field is an add-on from RFC 5958 and may be
+ \ present only if the 'version' is v2 (i.e. has value 1). We
+ \ ignore it anyway.
+
+ \ An arbitrary upper limit on the private key size.
+ 0xFFFFFF
+
+ \ Open the outer SEQUENCE.
+ read-sequence-open
+
+ \ All our schemas begin with a small INTEGER which is either 0 or
+ \ 1. We don't care which it is.
+ read-tag 0x02 check-tag-primitive read-small-int-value 1 > if
+ ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail
+ then
+
+ \ Get next tag: it should be either an INTEGER (RSA private key),
+ \ an OCTET STRING (EC private key), or a SEQUENCE (for an
+ \ AlgorithmIdentifier, in a PKCS#8 object).
+ read-tag
+ case
+ 0x02 of check-primitive decode-RSA-next KEYTYPE_RSA endof
+ 0x04 of check-primitive 0 decode-EC-next KEYTYPE_EC endof
+ 0x10 of check-constructed decode-PKCS8-next endof
+ ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail
+ endcase
+ { key-type }
+
+ \ Close the SEQUENCE.
+ close-elt
+
+ \ Set the key type, which marks the decoding as a success.
+ key-type addr-key_type set8
+
+ \ Read one byte, then fail: if the read succeeds, then there is
+ \ some trailing byte.
+ read8-nc ERR_X509_EXTRA_ELEMENT fail
+ ;
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_decoder.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_decoder.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d87e576
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_decoder.c
@@ -0,0 +1,776 @@
+/* Automatically generated code; do not modify directly. */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+typedef struct {
+ uint32_t *dp;
+ uint32_t *rp;
+ const unsigned char *ip;
+} t0_context;
+
+static uint32_t
+t0_parse7E_unsigned(const unsigned char **p)
+{
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ x = 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ unsigned y;
+
+ y = *(*p) ++;
+ x = (x << 7) | (uint32_t)(y & 0x7F);
+ if (y < 0x80) {
+ return x;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int32_t
+t0_parse7E_signed(const unsigned char **p)
+{
+ int neg;
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ neg = ((**p) >> 6) & 1;
+ x = (uint32_t)-neg;
+ for (;;) {
+ unsigned y;
+
+ y = *(*p) ++;
+ x = (x << 7) | (uint32_t)(y & 0x7F);
+ if (y < 0x80) {
+ if (neg) {
+ return -(int32_t)~x - 1;
+ } else {
+ return (int32_t)x;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#define T0_VBYTE(x, n) (unsigned char)((((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)) & 0x7F) | 0x80)
+#define T0_FBYTE(x, n) (unsigned char)(((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)) & 0x7F)
+#define T0_SBYTE(x) (unsigned char)((((uint32_t)(x) >> 28) + 0xF8) ^ 0xF8)
+#define T0_INT1(x) T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT2(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT3(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT4(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 21), T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT5(x) T0_SBYTE(x), T0_VBYTE(x, 21), T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+
+/* static const unsigned char t0_datablock[]; */
+
+
+void br_x509_decoder_init_main(void *t0ctx);
+
+void br_x509_decoder_run(void *t0ctx);
+
+
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+
+
+
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define CTX ((br_x509_decoder_context *)(void *)((unsigned char *)t0ctx - offsetof(br_x509_decoder_context, cpu)))
+#define CONTEXT_NAME br_x509_decoder_context
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+void
+br_x509_decoder_init(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx,
+ void (*append_dn)(void *ctx, const void *buf, size_t len),
+ void *append_dn_ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof *ctx);
+ /* obsolete
+ ctx->err = 0;
+ ctx->hbuf = NULL;
+ ctx->hlen = 0;
+ */
+ ctx->append_dn = append_dn;
+ ctx->append_dn_ctx = append_dn_ctx;
+ ctx->cpu.dp = &ctx->dp_stack[0];
+ ctx->cpu.rp = &ctx->rp_stack[0];
+ br_x509_decoder_init_main(&ctx->cpu);
+ br_x509_decoder_run(&ctx->cpu);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+void
+br_x509_decoder_push(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ if (ctx->err != 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ ctx->hbuf = data;
+ ctx->hlen = len;
+ br_x509_decoder_run(&ctx->cpu);
+}
+
+
+
+static const unsigned char t0_datablock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x09,
+ 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86,
+ 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86,
+ 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0B, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x0D, 0x07, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x02, 0x01, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86,
+ 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22,
+ 0x05, 0x2B, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x23, 0x07, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D,
+ 0x04, 0x01, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x04, 0x03, 0x01, 0x08,
+ 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48,
+ 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x04, 0x03, 0x03, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x04,
+ 0x03, 0x04, 0x00, 0x1F, 0x03, 0xFC, 0x07, 0x7F, 0x0B, 0x5E, 0x0F, 0x1F,
+ 0x12, 0xFE, 0x16, 0xBF, 0x1A, 0x9F, 0x1E, 0x7E, 0x22, 0x3F, 0x26, 0x1E,
+ 0x29, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x1F, 0x03, 0xFD, 0x07, 0x9F, 0x0B, 0x7E, 0x0F, 0x3F,
+ 0x13, 0x1E, 0x16, 0xDF, 0x1A, 0xBF, 0x1E, 0x9E, 0x22, 0x5F, 0x26, 0x3E,
+ 0x29, 0xFF, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x13
+};
+
+static const unsigned char t0_codeblock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1A, 0x1A, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_BAD_BOOLEAN), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_BAD_TAG_CLASS), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_BAD_TAG_VALUE), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_BAD_TIME), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_EXTRA_ELEMENT), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_INDEFINITE_LENGTH), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_INNER_TRUNC), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_LIMIT_EXCEEDED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_NOT_CONSTRUCTED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_NOT_PRIMITIVE), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_OVERFLOW), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_PARTIAL_BYTE), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_UNEXPECTED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_KEYTYPE_EC), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT1(BR_KEYTYPE_RSA),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, copy_dn)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, decoded)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, isCA)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_x509_decoder_context, pkey_data)), 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(BR_X509_BUFSIZE_KEY), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, notafter_days)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, notafter_seconds)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, notbefore_days)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, notbefore_seconds)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, pad)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, signer_hash_id)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, signer_key_type)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x80, 0x45, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x80, 0x4E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x80, 0x54,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x81, 0x36, 0x00, 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x03, 0x01, 0x1B,
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x13, 0x26, 0x02, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x15, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, 0x02,
+ 0x34, 0x1D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x02, 0x35, 0x1D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x10,
+ 0x4F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x11, 0x05, 0x02, 0x38, 0x1D, 0x4C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x11,
+ 0x05, 0x02, 0x38, 0x1D, 0x4D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x02, 0x30, 0x1D, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x1B, 0x19, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0E, 0x26, 0x29, 0x19, 0x09, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x30, 0x0A, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x09, 0x4B, 0x05, 0x02, 0x2F,
+ 0x1D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x80, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x80, 0x62, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x80,
+ 0x74, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x80, 0x7D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x20, 0x11, 0x06, 0x04, 0x2B, 0x6B, 0x7A, 0x71, 0x00, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x3D, 0x25, 0x01, 0x00, 0x3C, 0x25, 0x01, 0x87, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0x6D,
+ 0x6D, 0x70, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x20, 0x11, 0x06, 0x11, 0x1A, 0x4C, 0x6B, 0x70,
+ 0x01, 0x02, 0x50, 0x6E, 0x01, 0x02, 0x12, 0x06, 0x02, 0x39, 0x1D, 0x51,
+ 0x70, 0x01, 0x02, 0x50, 0x6C, 0x6D, 0x7A, 0x6D, 0x7A, 0x6D, 0x65, 0x43,
+ 0x24, 0x42, 0x24, 0x65, 0x41, 0x24, 0x40, 0x24, 0x51, 0x01, 0x01, 0x3C,
+ 0x25, 0x6D, 0x7A, 0x01, 0x00, 0x3C, 0x25, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x60, 0x05, 0x02,
+ 0x39, 0x1D, 0x74, 0x1C, 0x06, 0x1C, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x3F, 0x68, 0x03,
+ 0x00, 0x3F, 0x26, 0x02, 0x00, 0x09, 0x26, 0x02, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x68, 0x03,
+ 0x01, 0x51, 0x51, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x18, 0x04, 0x1E, 0x5A, 0x1C,
+ 0x06, 0x18, 0x64, 0x03, 0x02, 0x51, 0x61, 0x1B, 0x03, 0x03, 0x1B, 0x3F,
+ 0x23, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x02, 0x33, 0x1D, 0x62, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x03, 0x17,
+ 0x04, 0x02, 0x39, 0x1D, 0x51, 0x01, 0x00, 0x3E, 0x25, 0x71, 0x01, 0x21,
+ 0x5B, 0x01, 0x22, 0x5B, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x23, 0x11, 0x06, 0x28, 0x1A, 0x4C,
+ 0x6B, 0x6D, 0x1B, 0x06, 0x1D, 0x6D, 0x60, 0x1A, 0x70, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x63, 0x1A, 0x70, 0x01, 0x04, 0x50, 0x6B, 0x4A, 0x1C,
+ 0x06, 0x03, 0x5F, 0x04, 0x01, 0x7B, 0x51, 0x51, 0x04, 0x60, 0x51, 0x51,
+ 0x04, 0x08, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x11, 0x05, 0x02, 0x38, 0x1D, 0x1A, 0x51, 0x6D,
+ 0x60, 0x06, 0x80, 0x63, 0x75, 0x1C, 0x06, 0x06, 0x01, 0x02, 0x3B, 0x04,
+ 0x80, 0x57, 0x76, 0x1C, 0x06, 0x06, 0x01, 0x03, 0x3B, 0x04, 0x80, 0x4D,
+ 0x77, 0x1C, 0x06, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x3B, 0x04, 0x80, 0x43, 0x78, 0x1C,
+ 0x06, 0x05, 0x01, 0x05, 0x3B, 0x04, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x1C, 0x06, 0x05, 0x01,
+ 0x06, 0x3B, 0x04, 0x31, 0x55, 0x1C, 0x06, 0x05, 0x01, 0x02, 0x3A, 0x04,
+ 0x28, 0x56, 0x1C, 0x06, 0x05, 0x01, 0x03, 0x3A, 0x04, 0x1F, 0x57, 0x1C,
+ 0x06, 0x05, 0x01, 0x04, 0x3A, 0x04, 0x16, 0x58, 0x1C, 0x06, 0x05, 0x01,
+ 0x05, 0x3A, 0x04, 0x0D, 0x59, 0x1C, 0x06, 0x05, 0x01, 0x06, 0x3A, 0x04,
+ 0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x04, 0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x46,
+ 0x25, 0x45, 0x25, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x7A, 0x51, 0x1A, 0x01, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x25,
+ 0x73, 0x30, 0x1D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x81, 0x06, 0x00, 0x01, 0x54, 0x0D,
+ 0x06, 0x02, 0x32, 0x1D, 0x1B, 0x03, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x6D, 0x71, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x01, 0x11, 0x06, 0x08, 0x63, 0x01, 0x01, 0x15,
+ 0x3E, 0x25, 0x04, 0x01, 0x2B, 0x7A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x70, 0x01, 0x06, 0x50,
+ 0x6F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x70, 0x01, 0x03, 0x50, 0x6B, 0x72, 0x06, 0x02, 0x37,
+ 0x1D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26, 0x1B, 0x06, 0x07, 0x21, 0x1B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x16,
+ 0x04, 0x76, 0x2B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x50, 0x6A, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10,
+ 0x06, 0x02, 0x2C, 0x1D, 0x72, 0x27, 0x00, 0x00, 0x60, 0x05, 0x02, 0x39,
+ 0x1D, 0x47, 0x1C, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x17, 0x04, 0x12, 0x48, 0x1C, 0x06,
+ 0x04, 0x01, 0x18, 0x04, 0x0A, 0x49, 0x1C, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x19, 0x04,
+ 0x02, 0x39, 0x1D, 0x00, 0x04, 0x70, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x17, 0x01, 0x18, 0x4B,
+ 0x05, 0x02, 0x2F, 0x1D, 0x01, 0x18, 0x11, 0x03, 0x00, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x66,
+ 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x01, 0x80, 0x64, 0x08, 0x03, 0x01, 0x66, 0x02,
+ 0x01, 0x09, 0x04, 0x0E, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x32, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x80,
+ 0x64, 0x09, 0x01, 0x8E, 0x6C, 0x09, 0x03, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x82,
+ 0x6D, 0x08, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x03, 0x09, 0x01, 0x04, 0x0C, 0x09, 0x02,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x63, 0x09, 0x01, 0x80, 0x64, 0x0C, 0x0A, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x83, 0x0F, 0x09, 0x01, 0x83, 0x10, 0x0C, 0x09, 0x03, 0x03, 0x01,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x67, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04,
+ 0x07, 0x28, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x64, 0x07, 0x27, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x83, 0x10, 0x07, 0x28, 0x1F, 0x15, 0x06, 0x03, 0x01, 0x18, 0x09, 0x5D,
+ 0x09, 0x52, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x05, 0x14, 0x02, 0x03, 0x09, 0x03, 0x03, 0x01,
+ 0x1F, 0x15, 0x01, 0x01, 0x26, 0x67, 0x02, 0x03, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x03, 0x03,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x17, 0x67, 0x01, 0x9C, 0x10, 0x08, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x3B, 0x67, 0x01, 0x3C, 0x08, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x03, 0x02,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x3C, 0x67, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x03, 0x02, 0x72, 0x1B,
+ 0x01, 0x2E, 0x11, 0x06, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0x72, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x30, 0x01, 0x39,
+ 0x4B, 0x06, 0x03, 0x1A, 0x04, 0x74, 0x01, 0x80, 0x5A, 0x10, 0x06, 0x02,
+ 0x2F, 0x1D, 0x51, 0x02, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x72, 0x53, 0x01,
+ 0x0A, 0x08, 0x03, 0x00, 0x72, 0x53, 0x02, 0x00, 0x09, 0x00, 0x02, 0x03,
+ 0x00, 0x03, 0x01, 0x66, 0x1B, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x00, 0x4B, 0x05, 0x02,
+ 0x2F, 0x1D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x23, 0x70, 0x01, 0x02, 0x50, 0x0B, 0x69, 0x00,
+ 0x03, 0x1B, 0x03, 0x00, 0x03, 0x01, 0x03, 0x02, 0x6B, 0x72, 0x1B, 0x01,
+ 0x81, 0x00, 0x13, 0x06, 0x02, 0x36, 0x1D, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x00, 0x11, 0x06,
+ 0x0B, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x05, 0x04, 0x1A, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x72, 0x04, 0x6F,
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x1B, 0x05, 0x02, 0x33, 0x1D, 0x2A, 0x03, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02,
+ 0x25, 0x02, 0x02, 0x29, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1B, 0x06, 0x03, 0x72, 0x04, 0x68,
+ 0x1A, 0x02, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x01, 0x72, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x81,
+ 0x00, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x81, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x1B, 0x05, 0x02,
+ 0x31, 0x1D, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x12, 0x06,
+ 0x19, 0x02, 0x00, 0x2A, 0x03, 0x00, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x83, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F,
+ 0x12, 0x06, 0x02, 0x32, 0x1D, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0E, 0x26, 0x72, 0x23, 0x09,
+ 0x04, 0x60, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6A, 0x5E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6B, 0x7A, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x70, 0x4E, 0x6B, 0x00, 0x01, 0x6B, 0x1B, 0x05, 0x02, 0x36, 0x1D, 0x72,
+ 0x1B, 0x01, 0x81, 0x00, 0x13, 0x06, 0x02, 0x36, 0x1D, 0x03, 0x00, 0x1B,
+ 0x06, 0x16, 0x72, 0x02, 0x00, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x87, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0x13,
+ 0x06, 0x02, 0x36, 0x1D, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0E, 0x09, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04, 0x67,
+ 0x1A, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6B, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x81, 0x7F, 0x12, 0x06,
+ 0x08, 0x7A, 0x01, 0x00, 0x44, 0x25, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1B, 0x44, 0x25,
+ 0x44, 0x29, 0x62, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x01, 0x72, 0x03, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x05, 0x14, 0x01, 0x01, 0x15, 0x1E, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x06, 0x14,
+ 0x1B, 0x01, 0x01, 0x15, 0x06, 0x02, 0x2D, 0x1D, 0x01, 0x04, 0x0E, 0x02,
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x15, 0x1B, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x11, 0x06, 0x02, 0x2E, 0x1D,
+ 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1B, 0x05, 0x05, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x70,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x1B, 0x05, 0x02, 0x32, 0x1D, 0x2A, 0x73, 0x00, 0x00, 0x22,
+ 0x1B, 0x01, 0x00, 0x13, 0x06, 0x01, 0x00, 0x1A, 0x16, 0x04, 0x74, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x0B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x15, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x7B, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1B, 0x06, 0x07, 0x7C, 0x1B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x16,
+ 0x04, 0x76, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x20, 0x21, 0x0B, 0x2B, 0x00
+};
+
+static const uint16_t t0_caddr[] = {
+ 0,
+ 5,
+ 10,
+ 15,
+ 20,
+ 24,
+ 28,
+ 32,
+ 36,
+ 40,
+ 44,
+ 48,
+ 52,
+ 56,
+ 60,
+ 64,
+ 68,
+ 72,
+ 76,
+ 80,
+ 84,
+ 88,
+ 93,
+ 98,
+ 103,
+ 111,
+ 116,
+ 121,
+ 126,
+ 131,
+ 136,
+ 141,
+ 146,
+ 151,
+ 156,
+ 161,
+ 166,
+ 181,
+ 187,
+ 193,
+ 198,
+ 206,
+ 214,
+ 220,
+ 231,
+ 246,
+ 250,
+ 255,
+ 260,
+ 265,
+ 270,
+ 275,
+ 279,
+ 289,
+ 620,
+ 625,
+ 639,
+ 659,
+ 666,
+ 678,
+ 692,
+ 707,
+ 740,
+ 960,
+ 974,
+ 991,
+ 1000,
+ 1067,
+ 1123,
+ 1127,
+ 1131,
+ 1136,
+ 1184,
+ 1210,
+ 1254,
+ 1265,
+ 1274,
+ 1287,
+ 1291,
+ 1295,
+ 1299,
+ 1303,
+ 1307,
+ 1311,
+ 1315,
+ 1327
+};
+
+#define T0_INTERPRETED 39
+
+#define T0_ENTER(ip, rp, slot) do { \
+ const unsigned char *t0_newip; \
+ uint32_t t0_lnum; \
+ t0_newip = &t0_codeblock[t0_caddr[(slot) - T0_INTERPRETED]]; \
+ t0_lnum = t0_parse7E_unsigned(&t0_newip); \
+ (rp) += t0_lnum; \
+ *((rp) ++) = (uint32_t)((ip) - &t0_codeblock[0]) + (t0_lnum << 16); \
+ (ip) = t0_newip; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define T0_DEFENTRY(name, slot) \
+void \
+name(void *ctx) \
+{ \
+ t0_context *t0ctx = ctx; \
+ t0ctx->ip = &t0_codeblock[0]; \
+ T0_ENTER(t0ctx->ip, t0ctx->rp, slot); \
+}
+
+T0_DEFENTRY(br_x509_decoder_init_main, 92)
+
+#define T0_NEXT(t0ipp) (*(*(t0ipp)) ++)
+
+void
+br_x509_decoder_run(void *t0ctx)
+{
+ uint32_t *dp, *rp;
+ const unsigned char *ip;
+
+#define T0_LOCAL(x) (*(rp - 2 - (x)))
+#define T0_POP() (*-- dp)
+#define T0_POPi() (*(int32_t *)(-- dp))
+#define T0_PEEK(x) (*(dp - 1 - (x)))
+#define T0_PEEKi(x) (*(int32_t *)(dp - 1 - (x)))
+#define T0_PUSH(v) do { *dp = (v); dp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_PUSHi(v) do { *(int32_t *)dp = (v); dp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_RPOP() (*-- rp)
+#define T0_RPOPi() (*(int32_t *)(-- rp))
+#define T0_RPUSH(v) do { *rp = (v); rp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_RPUSHi(v) do { *(int32_t *)rp = (v); rp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_ROLL(x) do { \
+ size_t t0len = (size_t)(x); \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 1 - t0len); \
+ memmove(dp - t0len - 1, dp - t0len, t0len * sizeof *dp); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_SWAP() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_ROT() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 3); \
+ *(dp - 3) = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_NROT() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 3); \
+ *(dp - 3) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_PICK(x) do { \
+ uint32_t t0depth = (x); \
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(t0depth)); \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_CO() do { \
+ goto t0_exit; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_RET() goto t0_next
+
+ dp = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->dp;
+ rp = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->rp;
+ ip = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->ip;
+ goto t0_next;
+ for (;;) {
+ uint32_t t0x;
+
+ t0_next:
+ t0x = T0_NEXT(&ip);
+ if (t0x < T0_INTERPRETED) {
+ switch (t0x) {
+ int32_t t0off;
+
+ case 0: /* ret */
+ t0x = T0_RPOP();
+ rp -= (t0x >> 16);
+ t0x &= 0xFFFF;
+ if (t0x == 0) {
+ ip = NULL;
+ goto t0_exit;
+ }
+ ip = &t0_codeblock[t0x];
+ break;
+ case 1: /* literal constant */
+ T0_PUSHi(t0_parse7E_signed(&ip));
+ break;
+ case 2: /* read local */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_LOCAL(t0_parse7E_unsigned(&ip)));
+ break;
+ case 3: /* write local */
+ T0_LOCAL(t0_parse7E_unsigned(&ip)) = T0_POP();
+ break;
+ case 4: /* jump */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ ip += t0off;
+ break;
+ case 5: /* jump if */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ if (T0_POP()) {
+ ip += t0off;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 6: /* jump if not */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ if (!T0_POP()) {
+ ip += t0off;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 7: {
+ /* %25 */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSHi(a % b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 8: {
+ /* * */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a * b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 9: {
+ /* + */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a + b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 10: {
+ /* - */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a - b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 11: {
+ /* -rot */
+ T0_NROT();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 12: {
+ /* / */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSHi(a / b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 13: {
+ /* < */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a < b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 14: {
+ /* << */
+
+ int c = (int)T0_POPi();
+ uint32_t x = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(x << c);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 15: {
+ /* <= */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a <= b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 16: {
+ /* <> */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a != b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 17: {
+ /* = */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a == b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 18: {
+ /* > */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a > b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 19: {
+ /* >= */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a >= b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 20: {
+ /* >> */
+
+ int c = (int)T0_POPi();
+ int32_t x = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSHi(x >> c);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 21: {
+ /* and */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a & b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 22: {
+ /* co */
+ T0_CO();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 23: {
+ /* copy-ec-pkey */
+
+ size_t qlen = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t curve = T0_POP();
+ CTX->pkey.key_type = BR_KEYTYPE_EC;
+ CTX->pkey.key.ec.curve = curve;
+ CTX->pkey.key.ec.q = CTX->pkey_data;
+ CTX->pkey.key.ec.qlen = qlen;
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 24: {
+ /* copy-rsa-pkey */
+
+ size_t elen = T0_POP();
+ size_t nlen = T0_POP();
+ CTX->pkey.key_type = BR_KEYTYPE_RSA;
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.n = CTX->pkey_data;
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.nlen = nlen;
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.e = CTX->pkey_data + nlen;
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.elen = elen;
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 25: {
+ /* data-get8 */
+
+ size_t addr = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(t0_datablock[addr]);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 26: {
+ /* drop */
+ (void)T0_POP();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 27: {
+ /* dup */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(0));
+ }
+ break;
+ case 28: {
+ /* eqOID */
+
+ const unsigned char *a2 = &t0_datablock[T0_POP()];
+ const unsigned char *a1 = &CTX->pad[0];
+ size_t len = a1[0];
+ int x;
+ if (len == a2[0]) {
+ x = -(memcmp(a1 + 1, a2 + 1, len) == 0);
+ } else {
+ x = 0;
+ }
+ T0_PUSH((uint32_t)x);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 29: {
+ /* fail */
+
+ CTX->err = T0_POPi();
+ T0_CO();
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 30: {
+ /* neg */
+
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-a);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 31: {
+ /* or */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a | b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 32: {
+ /* over */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(1));
+ }
+ break;
+ case 33: {
+ /* read-blob-inner */
+
+ uint32_t len = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ size_t clen = CTX->hlen;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ clen = (size_t)len;
+ }
+ if (addr != 0) {
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)CTX + addr, CTX->hbuf, clen);
+ }
+ if (CTX->copy_dn && CTX->append_dn) {
+ CTX->append_dn(CTX->append_dn_ctx, CTX->hbuf, clen);
+ }
+ CTX->hbuf += clen;
+ CTX->hlen -= clen;
+ T0_PUSH(addr + clen);
+ T0_PUSH(len - clen);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 34: {
+ /* read8-low */
+
+ if (CTX->hlen == 0) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ } else {
+ unsigned char x = *CTX->hbuf ++;
+ if (CTX->copy_dn && CTX->append_dn) {
+ CTX->append_dn(CTX->append_dn_ctx, &x, 1);
+ }
+ CTX->hlen --;
+ T0_PUSH(x);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 35: {
+ /* rot */
+ T0_ROT();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 36: {
+ /* set32 */
+
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ *(uint32_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)CTX + addr) = T0_POP();
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 37: {
+ /* set8 */
+
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ *((unsigned char *)CTX + addr) = (unsigned char)T0_POP();
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 38: {
+ /* swap */
+ T0_SWAP();
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ T0_ENTER(ip, rp, t0x);
+ }
+ }
+t0_exit:
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->dp = dp;
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->rp = rp;
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->ip = ip;
+}
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_decoder.t0 b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_decoder.t0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..036f501
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_decoder.t0
@@ -0,0 +1,324 @@
+\ Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+\
+\ Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+\ a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+\ "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+\ without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+\ distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+\ permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+\ the following conditions:
+\
+\ The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+\ included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+\
+\ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+\ EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+\ MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+\ NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+\ BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+\ ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+\ CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+\ SOFTWARE.
+
+preamble {
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+#define CTX ((br_x509_decoder_context *)(void *)((unsigned char *)t0ctx - offsetof(br_x509_decoder_context, cpu)))
+#define CONTEXT_NAME br_x509_decoder_context
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+void
+br_x509_decoder_init(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx,
+ void (*append_dn)(void *ctx, const void *buf, size_t len),
+ void *append_dn_ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof *ctx);
+ /* obsolete
+ ctx->err = 0;
+ ctx->hbuf = NULL;
+ ctx->hlen = 0;
+ */
+ ctx->append_dn = append_dn;
+ ctx->append_dn_ctx = append_dn_ctx;
+ ctx->cpu.dp = &ctx->dp_stack[0];
+ ctx->cpu.rp = &ctx->rp_stack[0];
+ br_x509_decoder_init_main(&ctx->cpu);
+ br_x509_decoder_run(&ctx->cpu);
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+void
+br_x509_decoder_push(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ if (ctx->err != 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ ctx->hbuf = data;
+ ctx->hlen = len;
+ br_x509_decoder_run(&ctx->cpu);
+}
+
+}
+
+addr: decoded
+addr: notbefore_days
+addr: notbefore_seconds
+addr: notafter_days
+addr: notafter_seconds
+addr: isCA
+addr: copy_dn
+addr: signer_key_type
+addr: signer_hash_id
+
+cc: read8-low ( -- x ) {
+ if (CTX->hlen == 0) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ } else {
+ unsigned char x = *CTX->hbuf ++;
+ if (CTX->copy_dn && CTX->append_dn) {
+ CTX->append_dn(CTX->append_dn_ctx, &x, 1);
+ }
+ CTX->hlen --;
+ T0_PUSH(x);
+ }
+}
+
+cc: read-blob-inner ( addr len -- addr len ) {
+ uint32_t len = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ size_t clen = CTX->hlen;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ clen = (size_t)len;
+ }
+ if (addr != 0) {
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)CTX + addr, CTX->hbuf, clen);
+ }
+ if (CTX->copy_dn && CTX->append_dn) {
+ CTX->append_dn(CTX->append_dn_ctx, CTX->hbuf, clen);
+ }
+ CTX->hbuf += clen;
+ CTX->hlen -= clen;
+ T0_PUSH(addr + clen);
+ T0_PUSH(len - clen);
+}
+
+\ Get the address and length for the pkey_data buffer.
+: addr-len-pkey_data ( -- addr len )
+ CX 0 8191 { offsetof(br_x509_decoder_context, pkey_data) }
+ CX 0 8191 { BR_X509_BUFSIZE_KEY } ;
+
+\ Copy the public key (RSA) to the permanent buffer.
+cc: copy-rsa-pkey ( nlen elen -- ) {
+ size_t elen = T0_POP();
+ size_t nlen = T0_POP();
+ CTX->pkey.key_type = BR_KEYTYPE_RSA;
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.n = CTX->pkey_data;
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.nlen = nlen;
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.e = CTX->pkey_data + nlen;
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.elen = elen;
+}
+
+\ Copy the public key (EC) to the permanent buffer.
+cc: copy-ec-pkey ( curve qlen -- ) {
+ size_t qlen = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t curve = T0_POP();
+ CTX->pkey.key_type = BR_KEYTYPE_EC;
+ CTX->pkey.key.ec.curve = curve;
+ CTX->pkey.key.ec.q = CTX->pkey_data;
+ CTX->pkey.key.ec.qlen = qlen;
+}
+
+\ Extensions with specific processing.
+OID: basicConstraints 2.5.29.19
+
+\ Process a Basic Constraints extension. We want the "CA" flag only.
+: process-basicConstraints ( lim -- lim )
+ read-sequence-open
+ read-tag-or-end dup 0x01 = if
+ read-boolean 1 and addr-isCA set8
+ else
+ 2drop
+ then
+ skip-close-elt
+ ;
+
+\ Decode a certificate.
+: main ( -- ! )
+
+ \ Initialise state flags.
+ 0 addr-decoded set8
+ 0 addr-copy_dn set8
+
+ \ An arbitrary limit for the total certificate size.
+ 0xFFFFFF
+
+ \ Open the outer SEQUENCE.
+ read-sequence-open
+
+ \ TBS
+ read-sequence-open
+
+ \ First element may be an explicit version. We accept only
+ \ versions 0 to 2 (certificates v1 to v3).
+ read-tag dup 0x20 = if
+ drop check-constructed read-length-open-elt
+ read-tag
+ 0x02 check-tag-primitive
+ read-small-int-value
+ 2 > if ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail then
+ close-elt
+ read-tag
+ then
+
+ \ Serial number. We just check that the tag is correct.
+ 0x02 check-tag-primitive read-length-skip
+
+ \ Signature algorithm.
+ read-sequence-open skip-close-elt
+
+ \ Issuer name.
+ read-sequence-open skip-close-elt
+
+ \ Validity dates.
+ read-sequence-open
+ read-date addr-notbefore_seconds set32 addr-notbefore_days set32
+ read-date addr-notafter_seconds set32 addr-notafter_days set32
+ close-elt
+
+ \ Subject name.
+ 1 addr-copy_dn set8
+ read-sequence-open skip-close-elt
+ 0 addr-copy_dn set8
+
+ \ Public Key.
+ read-sequence-open
+ \ Algorithm Identifier. Right now we are only interested in the
+ \ OID, since we only support RSA keys.
+ \ TODO: support EC keys
+ read-sequence-open
+ read-OID ifnot ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail then
+ choice
+ \ RSA public key.
+ rsaEncryption eqOID uf
+ skip-close-elt
+ \ Public key itself: the BIT STRING contains bytes
+ \ (no partial byte) and these bytes encode the
+ \ actual value.
+ read-bits-open
+ \ RSA public key is a SEQUENCE of two
+ \ INTEGER. We get both INTEGER values into
+ \ the pkey_data[] buffer, if they fit.
+ read-sequence-open
+ addr-len-pkey_data
+ read-integer { nlen }
+ addr-len-pkey_data swap nlen + swap nlen -
+ read-integer { elen }
+ close-elt
+ close-elt
+ nlen elen copy-rsa-pkey
+ enduf
+
+ \ EC public key.
+ id-ecPublicKey eqOID uf
+ \ We support only named curves, for which the
+ \ "parameters" field in the AlgorithmIdentifier
+ \ field should be an OID.
+ read-curve-ID { curve }
+ close-elt
+ read-bits-open
+ dup { qlen }
+ dup addr-len-pkey_data rot < if
+ ERR_X509_LIMIT_EXCEEDED fail
+ then
+ read-blob
+ curve qlen copy-ec-pkey
+ enduf
+ ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail
+ endchoice
+ close-elt
+
+ \ This flag will be set to true if the Basic Constraints extension
+ \ is encountered.
+ 0 addr-isCA set8
+
+ \ Skip issuerUniqueID and subjectUniqueID, and process extensions
+ \ if present. Extensions are an explicit context tag of value 3
+ \ around a SEQUENCE OF extensions. Each extension is a SEQUENCE
+ \ with an OID, an optional boolean, and a value; the value is
+ \ an OCTET STRING.
+ read-tag-or-end
+ 0x21 iftag-skip
+ 0x22 iftag-skip
+ dup 0x23 = if
+ drop
+ check-constructed read-length-open-elt
+ read-sequence-open
+ begin dup while
+ read-sequence-open
+ read-OID drop
+ read-tag dup 0x01 = if
+ read-boolean drop
+ read-tag
+ then
+ 0x04 check-tag-primitive read-length-open-elt
+ choice
+ \ Extensions with specific processing.
+ basicConstraints eqOID uf
+ process-basicConstraints
+ enduf
+ skip-remaining
+ endchoice
+ close-elt
+ close-elt
+ repeat
+ close-elt
+ close-elt
+ else
+ -1 = ifnot ERR_X509_UNEXPECTED fail then
+ drop
+ then
+
+ close-elt
+
+ \ signature algorithm
+ read-sequence-open
+ read-OID if
+ choice
+ sha1WithRSAEncryption eqOID uf 2 KEYTYPE_RSA enduf
+ sha224WithRSAEncryption eqOID uf 3 KEYTYPE_RSA enduf
+ sha256WithRSAEncryption eqOID uf 4 KEYTYPE_RSA enduf
+ sha384WithRSAEncryption eqOID uf 5 KEYTYPE_RSA enduf
+ sha512WithRSAEncryption eqOID uf 6 KEYTYPE_RSA enduf
+
+ ecdsa-with-SHA1 eqOID uf 2 KEYTYPE_EC enduf
+ ecdsa-with-SHA224 eqOID uf 3 KEYTYPE_EC enduf
+ ecdsa-with-SHA256 eqOID uf 4 KEYTYPE_EC enduf
+ ecdsa-with-SHA384 eqOID uf 5 KEYTYPE_EC enduf
+ ecdsa-with-SHA512 eqOID uf 6 KEYTYPE_EC enduf
+
+ 0 0
+ endchoice
+ else
+ 0 0
+ then
+ addr-signer_key_type set8
+ addr-signer_hash_id set8
+ skip-close-elt
+ \ read-sequence-open skip-close-elt
+
+ \ signature value
+ read-bits-open skip-close-elt
+
+ \ Close the outer SEQUENCE.
+ close-elt
+ drop
+
+ \ Mark the decoding as successful.
+ 1 addr-decoded set8
+
+ \ Read one byte, then fail: if the read succeeds, then there is
+ \ some trailing byte.
+ read8-nc ERR_X509_EXTRA_ELEMENT fail
+ ;
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_knownkey.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_knownkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7674f3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_knownkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+void
+br_x509_knownkey_init_rsa(br_x509_knownkey_context *ctx,
+ const br_rsa_public_key *pk, unsigned usages)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_x509_knownkey_vtable;
+ ctx->pkey.key_type = BR_KEYTYPE_RSA;
+ ctx->pkey.key.rsa = *pk;
+ ctx->usages = usages;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+void
+br_x509_knownkey_init_ec(br_x509_knownkey_context *ctx,
+ const br_ec_public_key *pk, unsigned usages)
+{
+ ctx->vtable = &br_x509_knownkey_vtable;
+ ctx->pkey.key_type = BR_KEYTYPE_EC;
+ ctx->pkey.key.ec = *pk;
+ ctx->usages = usages;
+}
+
+static void
+kk_start_chain(const br_x509_class **ctx, const char *server_name)
+{
+ (void)ctx;
+ (void)server_name;
+}
+
+static void
+kk_start_cert(const br_x509_class **ctx, uint32_t length)
+{
+ (void)ctx;
+ (void)length;
+}
+
+static void
+kk_append(const br_x509_class **ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ (void)ctx;
+ (void)buf;
+ (void)len;
+}
+
+static void
+kk_end_cert(const br_x509_class **ctx)
+{
+ (void)ctx;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+kk_end_chain(const br_x509_class **ctx)
+{
+ (void)ctx;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const br_x509_pkey *
+kk_get_pkey(const br_x509_class *const *ctx, unsigned *usages)
+{
+ const br_x509_knownkey_context *xc;
+
+ xc = (const br_x509_knownkey_context *)ctx;
+ if (usages != NULL) {
+ *usages = xc->usages;
+ }
+ return &xc->pkey;
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+const br_x509_class br_x509_knownkey_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_x509_knownkey_context),
+ kk_start_chain,
+ kk_start_cert,
+ kk_append,
+ kk_end_cert,
+ kk_end_chain,
+ kk_get_pkey
+};
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_minimal.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_minimal.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..04f149b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_minimal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1722 @@
+/* Automatically generated code; do not modify directly. */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+typedef struct {
+ uint32_t *dp;
+ uint32_t *rp;
+ const unsigned char *ip;
+} t0_context;
+
+static uint32_t
+t0_parse7E_unsigned(const unsigned char **p)
+{
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ x = 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ unsigned y;
+
+ y = *(*p) ++;
+ x = (x << 7) | (uint32_t)(y & 0x7F);
+ if (y < 0x80) {
+ return x;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int32_t
+t0_parse7E_signed(const unsigned char **p)
+{
+ int neg;
+ uint32_t x;
+
+ neg = ((**p) >> 6) & 1;
+ x = (uint32_t)-neg;
+ for (;;) {
+ unsigned y;
+
+ y = *(*p) ++;
+ x = (x << 7) | (uint32_t)(y & 0x7F);
+ if (y < 0x80) {
+ if (neg) {
+ return -(int32_t)~x - 1;
+ } else {
+ return (int32_t)x;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#define T0_VBYTE(x, n) (unsigned char)((((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)) & 0x7F) | 0x80)
+#define T0_FBYTE(x, n) (unsigned char)(((uint32_t)(x) >> (n)) & 0x7F)
+#define T0_SBYTE(x) (unsigned char)((((uint32_t)(x) >> 28) + 0xF8) ^ 0xF8)
+#define T0_INT1(x) T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT2(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT3(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT4(x) T0_VBYTE(x, 21), T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+#define T0_INT5(x) T0_SBYTE(x), T0_VBYTE(x, 21), T0_VBYTE(x, 14), T0_VBYTE(x, 7), T0_FBYTE(x, 0)
+
+/* static const unsigned char t0_datablock[]; */
+
+
+void br_x509_minimal_init_main(void *t0ctx);
+
+void br_x509_minimal_run(void *t0ctx);
+
+
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+
+
+
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Implementation Notes
+ * --------------------
+ *
+ * The C code pushes the data by chunks; all decoding is done in the
+ * T0 code. The cert_length value is set to the certificate length when
+ * a new certificate is started; the T0 code picks it up as outer limit,
+ * and decoding functions use it to ensure that no attempt is made at
+ * reading past it. The T0 code also checks that once the certificate is
+ * decoded, there are no trailing bytes.
+ *
+ * The T0 code sets cert_length to 0 when the certificate is fully
+ * decoded.
+ *
+ * The C code must still perform two checks:
+ *
+ * -- If the certificate length is 0, then the T0 code will not be
+ * invoked at all. This invalid condition must thus be reported by the
+ * C code.
+ *
+ * -- When reaching the end of certificate, the C code must verify that
+ * the certificate length has been set to 0, thereby signaling that
+ * the T0 code properly decoded a certificate.
+ *
+ * Processing of a chain works in the following way:
+ *
+ * -- The error flag is set to a non-zero value when validation is
+ * finished. The value is either BR_ERR_X509_OK (validation is
+ * successful) or another non-zero error code. When a non-zero error
+ * code is obtained, the remaining bytes in the current certificate and
+ * the subsequent certificates (if any) are completely ignored.
+ *
+ * -- Each certificate is decoded in due course, with the following
+ * "interesting points":
+ *
+ * -- Start of the TBS: the multihash engine is reset and activated.
+ *
+ * -- Start of the issuer DN: the secondary hash engine is started,
+ * to process the encoded issuer DN.
+ *
+ * -- End of the issuer DN: the secondary hash engine is stopped. The
+ * resulting hash value is computed and then copied into the
+ * next_dn_hash[] buffer.
+ *
+ * -- Start of the subject DN: the secondary hash engine is started,
+ * to process the encoded subject DN.
+ *
+ * -- For the EE certificate only: the Common Name, if any, is matched
+ * against the expected server name.
+ *
+ * -- End of the subject DN: the secondary hash engine is stopped. The
+ * resulting hash value is computed into the pad. It is then processed:
+ *
+ * -- If this is the EE certificate, then the hash is ignored
+ * (except for direct trust processing, see later; the hash is
+ * simply left in current_dn_hash[]).
+ *
+ * -- Otherwise, the hashed subject DN is compared with the saved
+ * hash value (in saved_dn_hash[]). They must match.
+ *
+ * Either way, the next_dn_hash[] value is then copied into the
+ * saved_dn_hash[] value. Thus, at that point, saved_dn_hash[]
+ * contains the hash of the issuer DN for the current certificate,
+ * and current_dn_hash[] contains the hash of the subject DN for the
+ * current certificate.
+ *
+ * -- Public key: it is decoded into the cert_pkey[] buffer. Unknown
+ * key types are reported at that point.
+ *
+ * -- If this is the EE certificate, then the key type is compared
+ * with the expected key type (initialization parameter). The public
+ * key data is copied to ee_pkey_data[]. The key and hashed subject
+ * DN are also compared with the "direct trust" keys; if the key
+ * and DN are matched, then validation ends with a success.
+ *
+ * -- Otherwise, the saved signature (cert_sig[]) is verified
+ * against the saved TBS hash (tbs_hash[]) and that freshly
+ * decoded public key. Failure here ends validation with an error.
+ *
+ * -- Extensions: extension values are processed in due order.
+ *
+ * -- Basic Constraints: for all certificates except EE, must be
+ * present, indicate a CA, and have a path length compatible with
+ * the chain length so far.
+ *
+ * -- Key Usage: for the EE, if present, must allow signatures
+ * or encryption/key exchange, as required for the cipher suite.
+ * For non-EE, if present, must have the "certificate sign" bit.
+ *
+ * -- Subject Alt Name: for the EE, dNSName names are matched
+ * against the server name. Ignored for non-EE.
+ *
+ * -- Authority Key Identifier, Subject Key Identifier, Issuer
+ * Alt Name, Subject Directory Attributes, CRL Distribution Points
+ * Freshest CRL, Authority Info Access and Subject Info Access
+ * extensions are always ignored: they either contain only
+ * informative data, or they relate to revocation processing, which
+ * we explicitly do not support.
+ *
+ * -- All other extensions are ignored if non-critical. If a
+ * critical extension other than the ones above is encountered,
+ * then a failure is reported.
+ *
+ * -- End of the TBS: the multihash engine is stopped.
+ *
+ * -- Signature algorithm: the signature algorithm on the
+ * certificate is decoded. A failure is reported if that algorithm
+ * is unknown. The hashed TBS corresponding to the signature hash
+ * function is computed and stored in tbs_hash[] (if not supported,
+ * then a failure is reported). The hash OID and length are stored
+ * in cert_sig_hash_oid and cert_sig_hash_len.
+ *
+ * -- Signature value: the signature value is copied into the
+ * cert_sig[] array.
+ *
+ * -- Certificate end: the hashed issuer DN (saved_dn_hash[]) is
+ * looked up in the trust store (CA trust anchors only); for all
+ * that match, the signature (cert_sig[]) is verified against the
+ * anchor public key (hashed TBS is in tbs_hash[]). If one of these
+ * signatures is valid, then validation ends with a success.
+ *
+ * -- If the chain end is reached without obtaining a validation success,
+ * then validation is reported as failed.
+ */
+
+#if BR_USE_UNIX_TIME
+#include <time.h>
+#endif
+
+#if BR_USE_WIN32_TIME
+#include <windows.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The T0 compiler will produce these prototypes declarations in the
+ * header.
+ *
+void br_x509_minimal_init_main(void *ctx);
+void br_x509_minimal_run(void *ctx);
+ */
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+void
+br_x509_minimal_init(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+ const br_hash_class *dn_hash_impl,
+ const br_x509_trust_anchor *trust_anchors, size_t trust_anchors_num)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof *ctx);
+ ctx->vtable = &br_x509_minimal_vtable;
+ ctx->dn_hash_impl = dn_hash_impl;
+ ctx->trust_anchors = trust_anchors;
+ ctx->trust_anchors_num = trust_anchors_num;
+}
+
+static void
+xm_start_chain(const br_x509_class **ctx, const char *server_name)
+{
+ br_x509_minimal_context *cc;
+ size_t u;
+
+ cc = (br_x509_minimal_context *)(void *)ctx;
+ for (u = 0; u < cc->num_name_elts; u ++) {
+ cc->name_elts[u].status = 0;
+ cc->name_elts[u].buf[0] = 0;
+ }
+ memset(&cc->pkey, 0, sizeof cc->pkey);
+ cc->num_certs = 0;
+ cc->err = 0;
+ cc->cpu.dp = cc->dp_stack;
+ cc->cpu.rp = cc->rp_stack;
+ br_x509_minimal_init_main(&cc->cpu);
+ if (server_name == NULL || *server_name == 0) {
+ cc->server_name = NULL;
+ } else {
+ cc->server_name = server_name;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+xm_start_cert(const br_x509_class **ctx, uint32_t length)
+{
+ br_x509_minimal_context *cc;
+
+ cc = (br_x509_minimal_context *)(void *)ctx;
+ if (cc->err != 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (length == 0) {
+ cc->err = BR_ERR_X509_TRUNCATED;
+ return;
+ }
+ cc->cert_length = length;
+}
+
+static void
+xm_append(const br_x509_class **ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ br_x509_minimal_context *cc;
+
+ cc = (br_x509_minimal_context *)(void *)ctx;
+ if (cc->err != 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ cc->hbuf = buf;
+ cc->hlen = len;
+ br_x509_minimal_run(&cc->cpu);
+}
+
+static void
+xm_end_cert(const br_x509_class **ctx)
+{
+ br_x509_minimal_context *cc;
+
+ cc = (br_x509_minimal_context *)(void *)ctx;
+ if (cc->err == 0 && cc->cert_length != 0) {
+ cc->err = BR_ERR_X509_TRUNCATED;
+ }
+ cc->num_certs ++;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+xm_end_chain(const br_x509_class **ctx)
+{
+ br_x509_minimal_context *cc;
+
+ cc = (br_x509_minimal_context *)(void *)ctx;
+ if (cc->err == 0) {
+ if (cc->num_certs == 0) {
+ cc->err = BR_ERR_X509_EMPTY_CHAIN;
+ } else {
+ cc->err = BR_ERR_X509_NOT_TRUSTED;
+ }
+ } else if (cc->err == BR_ERR_X509_OK) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return (unsigned)cc->err;
+}
+
+static const br_x509_pkey *
+xm_get_pkey(const br_x509_class *const *ctx, unsigned *usages)
+{
+ br_x509_minimal_context *cc;
+
+ cc = (br_x509_minimal_context *)(void *)ctx;
+ if (cc->err == BR_ERR_X509_OK
+ || cc->err == BR_ERR_X509_NOT_TRUSTED)
+ {
+ if (usages != NULL) {
+ *usages = cc->key_usages;
+ }
+ return &((br_x509_minimal_context *)(void *)ctx)->pkey;
+ } else {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+const br_x509_class br_x509_minimal_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_x509_minimal_context),
+ xm_start_chain,
+ xm_start_cert,
+ xm_append,
+ xm_end_cert,
+ xm_end_chain,
+ xm_get_pkey
+};
+
+#define CTX ((br_x509_minimal_context *)(void *)((unsigned char *)t0ctx - offsetof(br_x509_minimal_context, cpu)))
+#define CONTEXT_NAME br_x509_minimal_context
+
+#define DNHASH_LEN ((CTX->dn_hash_impl->desc >> BR_HASHDESC_OUT_OFF) & BR_HASHDESC_OUT_MASK)
+
+/*
+ * Hash a DN (from a trust anchor) into the provided buffer. This uses the
+ * DN hash implementation and context structure from the X.509 engine
+ * context.
+ */
+static void
+hash_dn(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx, const void *dn, size_t len,
+ unsigned char *out)
+{
+ ctx->dn_hash_impl->init(&ctx->dn_hash.vtable);
+ ctx->dn_hash_impl->update(&ctx->dn_hash.vtable, dn, len);
+ ctx->dn_hash_impl->out(&ctx->dn_hash.vtable, out);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two big integers for equality. The integers use unsigned big-endian
+ * encoding; extra leading bytes (of value 0) are allowed.
+ */
+static int
+eqbigint(const unsigned char *b1, size_t len1,
+ const unsigned char *b2, size_t len2)
+{
+ while (len1 > 0 && *b1 == 0) {
+ b1 ++;
+ len1 --;
+ }
+ while (len2 > 0 && *b2 == 0) {
+ b2 ++;
+ len2 --;
+ }
+ if (len1 != len2) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return memcmp(b1, b2, len1) == 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two strings for equality, in a case-insensitive way. This
+ * function handles casing only for ASCII letters.
+ */
+static int
+eqnocase(const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf1, *buf2;
+
+ buf1 = s1;
+ buf2 = s2;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ int x1, x2;
+
+ x1 = *buf1 ++;
+ x2 = *buf2 ++;
+ if (x1 >= 'A' && x1 <= 'Z') {
+ x1 += 'a' - 'A';
+ }
+ if (x2 >= 'A' && x2 <= 'Z') {
+ x2 += 'a' - 'A';
+ }
+ if (x1 != x2) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int verify_signature(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk);
+
+
+
+static const unsigned char t0_datablock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x09,
+ 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86,
+ 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86,
+ 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0B, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x0D, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01,
+ 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03,
+ 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02,
+ 0x02, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x07,
+ 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x02, 0x01, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE,
+ 0x3D, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22, 0x05, 0x2B,
+ 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x23, 0x07, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x04, 0x01,
+ 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x04, 0x03, 0x01, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86,
+ 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D,
+ 0x04, 0x03, 0x03, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x04, 0x03, 0x04,
+ 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x00, 0x1F, 0x03, 0xFC, 0x07, 0x7F, 0x0B, 0x5E,
+ 0x0F, 0x1F, 0x12, 0xFE, 0x16, 0xBF, 0x1A, 0x9F, 0x1E, 0x7E, 0x22, 0x3F,
+ 0x26, 0x1E, 0x29, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x1F, 0x03, 0xFD, 0x07, 0x9F, 0x0B, 0x7E,
+ 0x0F, 0x3F, 0x13, 0x1E, 0x16, 0xDF, 0x1A, 0xBF, 0x1E, 0x9E, 0x22, 0x5F,
+ 0x26, 0x3E, 0x29, 0xFF, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x13, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x0F,
+ 0x03, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x11, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x20, 0x08, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01,
+ 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x02, 0x01, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x23, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1D,
+ 0x0E, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x12, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x09, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1D,
+ 0x1F, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x2E, 0x08, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x08, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x01, 0x0B
+};
+
+static const unsigned char t0_codeblock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0A,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x25, 0x25, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_BAD_BOOLEAN), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_BAD_DN), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_BAD_SERVER_NAME), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_BAD_TAG_CLASS), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_BAD_TAG_VALUE), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_BAD_TIME), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_CRITICAL_EXTENSION), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_DN_MISMATCH), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_EXPIRED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_EXTRA_ELEMENT), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_FORBIDDEN_KEY_USAGE), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_INDEFINITE_LENGTH), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_INNER_TRUNC), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_LIMIT_EXCEEDED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_NOT_CA), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_NOT_CONSTRUCTED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_NOT_PRIMITIVE), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_OVERFLOW), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_PARTIAL_BYTE), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_UNEXPECTED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_ERR_X509_WEAK_PUBLIC_KEY), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT1(BR_KEYTYPE_EC), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT1(BR_KEYTYPE_RSA),
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, cert_length)), 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, cert_sig)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, cert_sig_hash_len)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, cert_sig_hash_oid)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, cert_sig_len)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, cert_signer_key_type)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, current_dn_hash)), 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, key_usages)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(br_x509_minimal_context, pkey_data)), 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(BR_X509_BUFSIZE_KEY), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, min_rsa_size)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, next_dn_hash)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, num_certs)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, pad)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ T0_INT2(offsetof(CONTEXT_NAME, saved_dn_hash)), 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x80,
+ 0x73, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x80, 0x7C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x81, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x8F, 0x05, 0x05, 0x33, 0x41, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x33, 0x01, 0x0A,
+ 0x0E, 0x09, 0x01, 0x9A, 0xFF, 0xB8, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x82,
+ 0x19, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x82, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x81, 0x68, 0x00,
+ 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x03, 0x01, 0x26, 0x02, 0x01, 0x13, 0x3A, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x0F, 0x15, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x81, 0x74, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, 0x02, 0x51,
+ 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x02, 0x52, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x10, 0x74,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x11, 0x05, 0x02, 0x55, 0x29, 0x71, 0x00, 0x00, 0x11, 0x05,
+ 0x02, 0x55, 0x29, 0x72, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x02, 0x4B, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x82, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26, 0x21, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0E, 0x3A, 0x3F,
+ 0x21, 0x09, 0x00, 0x0B, 0x03, 0x00, 0x5A, 0x2B, 0xAC, 0x38, 0xAC, 0xB0,
+ 0x26, 0x01, 0x20, 0x11, 0x06, 0x11, 0x25, 0x71, 0xAA, 0xB0, 0x01, 0x02,
+ 0x75, 0xAD, 0x01, 0x02, 0x12, 0x06, 0x02, 0x56, 0x29, 0x76, 0xB0, 0x01,
+ 0x02, 0x75, 0xAB, 0xAC, 0xBF, 0x99, 0x64, 0x60, 0x22, 0x16, 0xAC, 0xA4,
+ 0x03, 0x01, 0x03, 0x02, 0xA4, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x19, 0x06, 0x02,
+ 0x4A, 0x29, 0x76, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x05, 0x9A, 0x03, 0x03, 0x04, 0x09,
+ 0x99, 0x60, 0x67, 0x22, 0x28, 0x05, 0x02, 0x49, 0x29, 0x67, 0x64, 0x22,
+ 0x16, 0xAC, 0xAC, 0x9B, 0x05, 0x02, 0x56, 0x29, 0xB9, 0x27, 0x06, 0x27,
+ 0xBF, 0xA1, 0xAC, 0x62, 0xA7, 0x03, 0x05, 0x62, 0x3A, 0x02, 0x05, 0x09,
+ 0x3A, 0x02, 0x05, 0x0A, 0xA7, 0x03, 0x06, 0x76, 0x63, 0x2A, 0x01, 0x81,
+ 0x00, 0x09, 0x02, 0x05, 0x12, 0x06, 0x02, 0x57, 0x29, 0x76, 0x59, 0x03,
+ 0x04, 0x04, 0x3A, 0x85, 0x27, 0x06, 0x34, 0x9B, 0x05, 0x02, 0x56, 0x29,
+ 0x68, 0x27, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x17, 0x04, 0x12, 0x69, 0x27, 0x06, 0x04,
+ 0x01, 0x18, 0x04, 0x0A, 0x6A, 0x27, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x19, 0x04, 0x02,
+ 0x56, 0x29, 0x03, 0x07, 0x76, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x03, 0x08, 0x26, 0x62, 0x33,
+ 0x0D, 0x06, 0x02, 0x4F, 0x29, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x03, 0x04, 0x04, 0x02, 0x56,
+ 0x29, 0x76, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x21, 0x02, 0x04, 0x59, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06,
+ 0x08, 0x25, 0x02, 0x05, 0x02, 0x06, 0x1E, 0x04, 0x10, 0x58, 0x30, 0x11,
+ 0x06, 0x08, 0x25, 0x02, 0x07, 0x02, 0x08, 0x1D, 0x04, 0x03, 0x56, 0x29,
+ 0x25, 0x04, 0x24, 0x02, 0x04, 0x59, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x08, 0x25, 0x02,
+ 0x05, 0x02, 0x06, 0x24, 0x04, 0x10, 0x58, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x08, 0x25,
+ 0x02, 0x07, 0x02, 0x08, 0x23, 0x04, 0x03, 0x56, 0x29, 0x25, 0x26, 0x06,
+ 0x01, 0x29, 0x25, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x09, 0xB1, 0x01, 0x21, 0x8C, 0x01,
+ 0x22, 0x8C, 0x26, 0x01, 0x23, 0x11, 0x06, 0x81, 0x26, 0x25, 0x71, 0xAA,
+ 0xAC, 0x26, 0x06, 0x81, 0x1A, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x0A, 0xAC, 0x9B, 0x25,
+ 0xB0, 0x26, 0x01, 0x01, 0x11, 0x06, 0x04, 0xA3, 0x03, 0x0A, 0xB0, 0x01,
+ 0x04, 0x75, 0xAA, 0x6E, 0x27, 0x06, 0x0F, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x03, 0xC0,
+ 0x04, 0x05, 0x96, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x03, 0x09, 0x04, 0x80, 0x6C, 0x8E, 0x27,
+ 0x06, 0x06, 0x02, 0x00, 0x98, 0x04, 0x80, 0x62, 0xC2, 0x27, 0x06, 0x11,
+ 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x09, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x03, 0x95, 0x03, 0x03, 0x04,
+ 0x01, 0xC0, 0x04, 0x80, 0x4D, 0x70, 0x27, 0x06, 0x0A, 0x02, 0x0A, 0x06,
+ 0x03, 0x97, 0x04, 0x01, 0xC0, 0x04, 0x3F, 0x6D, 0x27, 0x06, 0x03, 0xC0,
+ 0x04, 0x38, 0xC5, 0x27, 0x06, 0x03, 0xC0, 0x04, 0x31, 0x8D, 0x27, 0x06,
+ 0x03, 0xC0, 0x04, 0x2A, 0xC3, 0x27, 0x06, 0x03, 0xC0, 0x04, 0x23, 0x77,
+ 0x27, 0x06, 0x03, 0xC0, 0x04, 0x1C, 0x82, 0x27, 0x06, 0x03, 0xC0, 0x04,
+ 0x15, 0x6C, 0x27, 0x06, 0x03, 0xC0, 0x04, 0x0E, 0xC4, 0x27, 0x06, 0x03,
+ 0xC0, 0x04, 0x07, 0x02, 0x0A, 0x06, 0x02, 0x48, 0x29, 0xC0, 0x76, 0x76,
+ 0x04, 0xFE, 0x62, 0x76, 0x76, 0x04, 0x08, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x11, 0x05, 0x02,
+ 0x55, 0x29, 0x25, 0x76, 0x39, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x08, 0x02, 0x03, 0x3B,
+ 0x2F, 0x05, 0x02, 0x44, 0x29, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x01, 0x17, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x02, 0x09, 0x2F, 0x05, 0x02, 0x50, 0x29, 0xB0, 0x73, 0xAA, 0x9B, 0x06,
+ 0x80, 0x77, 0xBA, 0x27, 0x06, 0x07, 0x01, 0x02, 0x59, 0x87, 0x04, 0x80,
+ 0x5E, 0xBB, 0x27, 0x06, 0x07, 0x01, 0x03, 0x59, 0x88, 0x04, 0x80, 0x53,
+ 0xBC, 0x27, 0x06, 0x07, 0x01, 0x04, 0x59, 0x89, 0x04, 0x80, 0x48, 0xBD,
+ 0x27, 0x06, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x59, 0x8A, 0x04, 0x3E, 0xBE, 0x27, 0x06,
+ 0x06, 0x01, 0x06, 0x59, 0x8B, 0x04, 0x34, 0x7C, 0x27, 0x06, 0x06, 0x01,
+ 0x02, 0x58, 0x87, 0x04, 0x2A, 0x7D, 0x27, 0x06, 0x06, 0x01, 0x03, 0x58,
+ 0x88, 0x04, 0x20, 0x7E, 0x27, 0x06, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x58, 0x89, 0x04,
+ 0x16, 0x7F, 0x27, 0x06, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x58, 0x8A, 0x04, 0x0C, 0x80,
+ 0x27, 0x06, 0x06, 0x01, 0x06, 0x58, 0x8B, 0x04, 0x02, 0x56, 0x29, 0x5D,
+ 0x34, 0x5F, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x26, 0x05, 0x02, 0x56, 0x29, 0x5C, 0x36, 0x04,
+ 0x02, 0x56, 0x29, 0xBF, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x01, T0_INT2(BR_X509_BUFSIZE_SIG),
+ 0x12, 0x06, 0x02, 0x4F, 0x29, 0x26, 0x5E, 0x34, 0x5B, 0xA2, 0x76, 0x76,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x5A, 0x35, 0x18, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x30, 0x0A, 0x26, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x09, 0x6F, 0x05, 0x02, 0x47, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x30,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x81, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x81, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x81, 0x19, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x81, 0x22, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x81,
+ 0x2B, 0x00, 0x01, 0x7B, 0x01, 0x01, 0x11, 0x3A, 0x01, 0x83, 0xFD, 0x7F,
+ 0x11, 0x15, 0x06, 0x03, 0x3A, 0x25, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x26, 0x03, 0x00, 0x26,
+ 0xC6, 0x05, 0x04, 0x41, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26, 0x01, 0x81, 0x00, 0x0D,
+ 0x06, 0x04, 0x93, 0x04, 0x80, 0x49, 0x26, 0x01, 0x90, 0x00, 0x0D, 0x06,
+ 0x0F, 0x01, 0x06, 0x14, 0x01, 0x81, 0x40, 0x2F, 0x93, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x94, 0x04, 0x33, 0x26, 0x01, 0x83, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x14,
+ 0x01, 0x0C, 0x14, 0x01, 0x81, 0x60, 0x2F, 0x93, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x06,
+ 0x94, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x94, 0x04, 0x17, 0x01, 0x12, 0x14, 0x01,
+ 0x81, 0x70, 0x2F, 0x93, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x06, 0x94, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x94, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x82, 0x15,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x26, 0x01, 0x83, 0xB0, 0x00, 0x01, 0x83, 0xB7, 0x7F, 0x6F,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x81, 0x34, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x81, 0x78, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x80, 0x43,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x80, 0x4D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x80, 0x57, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x80, 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x04, 0x41, 0xAA, 0xBF,
+ 0xB1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x82, 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x81, 0x6C, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x26, 0x01, 0x83, 0xB8, 0x00, 0x01, 0x83, 0xBF, 0x7F, 0x6F, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x30, 0x61, 0x36, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x01, 0x00, 0x79,
+ 0x1A, 0x04, 0x7A, 0x00, 0x01, 0x81, 0x38, 0x00, 0x01, 0x7B, 0x0D, 0x06,
+ 0x02, 0x4E, 0x29, 0x26, 0x03, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30,
+ 0x26, 0x3E, 0x3A, 0x01, 0x82, 0x00, 0x13, 0x2F, 0x06, 0x04, 0x41, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x66, 0x09, 0x36, 0x3F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14, 0x01, 0x3F,
+ 0x15, 0x01, 0x81, 0x00, 0x2F, 0x93, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00,
+ 0xAC, 0x26, 0x06, 0x80, 0x59, 0xB0, 0x01, 0x20, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x17,
+ 0x25, 0x71, 0xAA, 0x9B, 0x25, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x01, 0xB0, 0x01,
+ 0x20, 0x74, 0xAA, 0xAF, 0x02, 0x01, 0x20, 0x76, 0x76, 0x04, 0x38, 0x01,
+ 0x21, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x08, 0x25, 0x72, 0xB3, 0x01, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x04,
+ 0x2A, 0x01, 0x22, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x11, 0x25, 0x72, 0xB3, 0x26, 0x06,
+ 0x06, 0x2C, 0x02, 0x00, 0x2F, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x1F, 0x04, 0x13,
+ 0x01, 0x26, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x08, 0x25, 0x72, 0xB3, 0x01, 0x06, 0x1F,
+ 0x04, 0x05, 0x41, 0xAB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x25, 0x04, 0xFF, 0x23, 0x76, 0x02,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xAC, 0xB1, 0x26, 0x01, 0x01, 0x11, 0x06, 0x08, 0xA3,
+ 0x05, 0x02, 0x50, 0x29, 0xB1, 0x04, 0x02, 0x50, 0x29, 0x26, 0x01, 0x02,
+ 0x11, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x25, 0x72, 0xAD, 0x65, 0x2B, 0x40, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x02,
+ 0x50, 0x29, 0xB1, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x10, 0x06, 0x02, 0x55, 0x29, 0x25, 0x76,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0xAC, 0x26, 0x06, 0x1A, 0xAC, 0x9B, 0x25, 0x26, 0x06, 0x11,
+ 0xAC, 0x26, 0x06, 0x0C, 0xAC, 0x9B, 0x25, 0x86, 0x27, 0x05, 0x02, 0x48,
+ 0x29, 0xBF, 0x04, 0x71, 0x76, 0x76, 0x04, 0x63, 0x76, 0x00, 0x02, 0x03,
+ 0x00, 0xB0, 0x01, 0x03, 0x75, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0x03, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x07, 0x12, 0x06, 0x02, 0x55, 0x29, 0x26, 0x01, 0x00, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06,
+ 0x05, 0x25, 0x4C, 0x29, 0x04, 0x15, 0x01, 0x01, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x0A,
+ 0x25, 0xB7, 0x02, 0x01, 0x14, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x04, 0x05, 0x25, 0xB7,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x25, 0x02, 0x00, 0x06, 0x19, 0x01, 0x00, 0x30, 0x01, 0x38,
+ 0x15, 0x06, 0x03, 0x01, 0x10, 0x2F, 0x3A, 0x01, 0x81, 0x40, 0x15, 0x06,
+ 0x03, 0x01, 0x20, 0x2F, 0x61, 0x36, 0x04, 0x07, 0x01, 0x04, 0x15, 0x05,
+ 0x02, 0x4C, 0x29, 0xBF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x37, 0xAC, 0xBF, 0x1B, 0x00, 0x03,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x37, 0xAC, 0x26, 0x06, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x01, 0x11,
+ 0x74, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x05, 0x02, 0x43, 0x29, 0x26, 0x06, 0x20, 0xAC, 0x9B,
+ 0x25, 0x84, 0x27, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x02, 0xAF, 0x26,
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x15, 0x06, 0x07, 0x2C, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x03, 0x00,
+ 0x02, 0x02, 0x20, 0x76, 0x04, 0x5D, 0x76, 0x04, 0x4D, 0x76, 0x1B, 0x02,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xB0, 0x01, 0x06, 0x75, 0xAE, 0x00, 0x00, 0xB5, 0x83,
+ 0x06, 0x0E, 0x3A, 0x26, 0x05, 0x06, 0x41, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0xB5, 0x6B, 0x04, 0x08, 0x8F, 0x06, 0x05, 0x25, 0x01, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0xB6, 0x83, 0x06, 0x0E, 0x3A, 0x26, 0x05, 0x06, 0x41, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0xB6, 0x6B, 0x04, 0x08, 0x8F, 0x06, 0x05, 0x25,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xB7, 0x26, 0x01, 0x81, 0x00, 0x0D,
+ 0x06, 0x04, 0x00, 0x04, 0x80, 0x55, 0x26, 0x01, 0x81, 0x40, 0x0D, 0x06,
+ 0x07, 0x25, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x80, 0x47, 0x26, 0x01, 0x81, 0x60,
+ 0x0D, 0x06, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x15, 0x01, 0x01, 0xA0, 0x01, 0x81, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x8F, 0x7F, 0x04, 0x32, 0x26, 0x01, 0x81, 0x70, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x0F,
+ 0x01, 0x0F, 0x15, 0x01, 0x02, 0xA0, 0x01, 0x90, 0x00, 0x01, 0x83, 0xFF,
+ 0x7F, 0x04, 0x1C, 0x26, 0x01, 0x81, 0x78, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x11, 0x01, 0x07,
+ 0x15, 0x01, 0x03, 0xA0, 0x01, 0x84, 0x80, 0x00, 0x01, 0x80, 0xC3, 0xFF,
+ 0x7F, 0x04, 0x04, 0x25, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6F, 0x05, 0x03, 0x25, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x26, 0x05, 0x06, 0x41, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x7F,
+ 0x00, 0xB7, 0x33, 0x26, 0x3C, 0x06, 0x03, 0x3A, 0x25, 0x00, 0x01, 0x06,
+ 0x0E, 0x3A, 0x26, 0x01, 0x06, 0x14, 0x01, 0x02, 0x10, 0x06, 0x04, 0x41,
+ 0x01, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x01, 0x3F, 0x15, 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26, 0x06, 0x06,
+ 0x0B, 0x9F, 0x33, 0x40, 0x04, 0x77, 0x25, 0x26, 0x00, 0x00, 0xB0, 0x01,
+ 0x03, 0x75, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x02, 0x54, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x26,
+ 0x06, 0x07, 0x31, 0x26, 0x06, 0x01, 0x1A, 0x04, 0x76, 0x41, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x75, 0xA9, 0x01, 0x01, 0x10, 0x06, 0x02, 0x42, 0x29, 0xB7,
+ 0x3D, 0x00, 0x04, 0xB0, 0x26, 0x01, 0x17, 0x01, 0x18, 0x6F, 0x05, 0x02,
+ 0x47, 0x29, 0x01, 0x18, 0x11, 0x03, 0x00, 0x72, 0xAA, 0xA5, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x06, 0x0C, 0x01, 0x80, 0x64, 0x08, 0x03, 0x01, 0xA5, 0x02, 0x01, 0x09,
+ 0x04, 0x0E, 0x26, 0x01, 0x32, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x04, 0x01, 0x80, 0x64, 0x09,
+ 0x01, 0x8E, 0x6C, 0x09, 0x03, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x82, 0x6D, 0x08,
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x03, 0x09, 0x01, 0x04, 0x0C, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x80, 0x63, 0x09, 0x01, 0x80, 0x64, 0x0C, 0x0A, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x83,
+ 0x0F, 0x09, 0x01, 0x83, 0x10, 0x0C, 0x09, 0x03, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+ 0x0C, 0xA6, 0x40, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x07, 0x3E,
+ 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x80, 0x64, 0x07, 0x3D, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x83, 0x10,
+ 0x07, 0x3E, 0x2F, 0x15, 0x06, 0x03, 0x01, 0x18, 0x09, 0x91, 0x09, 0x78,
+ 0x26, 0x01, 0x05, 0x14, 0x02, 0x03, 0x09, 0x03, 0x03, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x15,
+ 0x01, 0x01, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0x02, 0x03, 0x09, 0x40, 0x03, 0x03, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x17, 0xA6, 0x01, 0x9C, 0x10, 0x08, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x3B, 0xA6, 0x01, 0x3C, 0x08, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x3C, 0xA6, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x03, 0x02, 0xB7, 0x26, 0x01, 0x2E,
+ 0x11, 0x06, 0x0D, 0x25, 0xB7, 0x26, 0x01, 0x30, 0x01, 0x39, 0x6F, 0x06,
+ 0x03, 0x25, 0x04, 0x74, 0x01, 0x80, 0x5A, 0x10, 0x06, 0x02, 0x47, 0x29,
+ 0x76, 0x02, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0xB7, 0x7A, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x08,
+ 0x03, 0x00, 0xB7, 0x7A, 0x02, 0x00, 0x09, 0x00, 0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x03,
+ 0x01, 0xA5, 0x26, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x00, 0x6F, 0x05, 0x02, 0x47, 0x29,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x33, 0xB0, 0x01, 0x02, 0x75, 0x0B, 0xA8, 0x00, 0x03, 0x26,
+ 0x03, 0x00, 0x03, 0x01, 0x03, 0x02, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0x26, 0x01, 0x81, 0x00,
+ 0x13, 0x06, 0x02, 0x53, 0x29, 0x26, 0x01, 0x00, 0x11, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x25,
+ 0x26, 0x05, 0x04, 0x25, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0xB7, 0x04, 0x6F, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x26, 0x05, 0x02, 0x4F, 0x29, 0x40, 0x03, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x36, 0x02,
+ 0x02, 0x3F, 0x03, 0x02, 0x26, 0x06, 0x03, 0xB7, 0x04, 0x68, 0x25, 0x02,
+ 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0A, 0x00, 0x01, 0xB7, 0x26, 0x01, 0x81, 0x00, 0x0D,
+ 0x06, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x81, 0x00, 0x0A, 0x26, 0x05, 0x02, 0x4D, 0x29,
+ 0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x12, 0x06, 0x19, 0x02,
+ 0x00, 0x40, 0x03, 0x00, 0x26, 0x01, 0x83, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0x12, 0x06,
+ 0x02, 0x4E, 0x29, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0E, 0x3A, 0xB7, 0x33, 0x09, 0x04, 0x60,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0xA9, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0xAA, 0xBF, 0x00, 0x00, 0xB0, 0x73,
+ 0xAA, 0x00, 0x01, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x05, 0x02, 0x53, 0x29, 0xB7, 0x26, 0x01,
+ 0x81, 0x00, 0x13, 0x06, 0x02, 0x53, 0x29, 0x03, 0x00, 0x26, 0x06, 0x16,
+ 0xB7, 0x02, 0x00, 0x26, 0x01, 0x87, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0x13, 0x06, 0x02,
+ 0x53, 0x29, 0x01, 0x08, 0x0E, 0x09, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04, 0x67, 0x25, 0x02,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x01, 0x81, 0x7F, 0x12, 0x06, 0x08, 0xBF,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x66, 0x36, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26, 0x66, 0x36, 0x66, 0x3F,
+ 0xA2, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x00, 0xB0, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x05,
+ 0x25, 0x72, 0xB3, 0x04, 0x3E, 0x01, 0x12, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x05, 0x25,
+ 0x72, 0xB4, 0x04, 0x33, 0x01, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x05, 0x25, 0x72,
+ 0xB4, 0x04, 0x28, 0x01, 0x14, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x05, 0x25, 0x72, 0xB4,
+ 0x04, 0x1D, 0x01, 0x16, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x05, 0x25, 0x72, 0xB4, 0x04,
+ 0x12, 0x01, 0x1E, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x05, 0x25, 0x72, 0xB2, 0x04, 0x07,
+ 0x41, 0xAB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x25, 0x00, 0x01, 0xB7, 0x03, 0x00,
+ 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x05, 0x14, 0x01, 0x01, 0x15, 0x2D, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x06, 0x14, 0x26, 0x01, 0x01, 0x15, 0x06, 0x02, 0x45, 0x29, 0x01, 0x04,
+ 0x0E, 0x02, 0x00, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x15, 0x26, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x11, 0x06, 0x02,
+ 0x46, 0x29, 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26, 0x05, 0x05, 0x01, 0x00, 0x01, 0x7F,
+ 0x00, 0xB0, 0x00, 0x01, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x05, 0x05, 0x66, 0x36, 0x01, 0x7F,
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x9C, 0x26, 0x01, 0x83, 0xFF, 0x7E, 0x11,
+ 0x06, 0x16, 0x25, 0x26, 0x06, 0x10, 0x9D, 0x26, 0x05, 0x05, 0x25, 0xBF,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x81, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04, 0x6D, 0x04, 0x1B,
+ 0x26, 0x05, 0x05, 0x25, 0xBF, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x81, 0x03,
+ 0x00, 0x26, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x9C, 0x26, 0x05, 0x05, 0x25, 0xBF, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x04, 0x6D, 0x25, 0x02, 0x00, 0x26, 0x05, 0x01, 0x00, 0x40, 0x66,
+ 0x36, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x01, 0xAA, 0x01, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00, 0x26, 0x06,
+ 0x10, 0x9E, 0x26, 0x05, 0x05, 0x25, 0xBF, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00,
+ 0x81, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04, 0x6D, 0x25, 0x02, 0x00, 0x26, 0x05, 0x01, 0x00,
+ 0x40, 0x66, 0x36, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x01, 0xAA, 0x01, 0x01, 0x03, 0x00,
+ 0x26, 0x06, 0x10, 0xB7, 0x26, 0x05, 0x05, 0x25, 0xBF, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x02, 0x00, 0x81, 0x03, 0x00, 0x04, 0x6D, 0x25, 0x02, 0x00, 0x26, 0x05,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x40, 0x66, 0x36, 0x01, 0x7F, 0x00, 0x00, 0xB7, 0x01, 0x08,
+ 0x0E, 0x3A, 0xB7, 0x33, 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0xB7, 0x3A, 0xB7, 0x01, 0x08,
+ 0x0E, 0x33, 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26, 0x05, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x29, 0x40, 0xB8,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x32, 0x26, 0x01, 0x00, 0x13, 0x06, 0x01, 0x00, 0x25, 0x1A,
+ 0x04, 0x74, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x0B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x15, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC0, 0x25, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26, 0x06, 0x07, 0xC1, 0x26,
+ 0x06, 0x01, 0x1A, 0x04, 0x76, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x30, 0x31, 0x0B,
+ 0x41, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x81, 0x70, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x82, 0x0D, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x82, 0x22, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x82, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26,
+ 0x01, 0x83, 0xFB, 0x50, 0x01, 0x83, 0xFB, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x06, 0x04, 0x25,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26, 0x01, 0x83, 0xB0, 0x00, 0x01, 0x83, 0xBF, 0x7F,
+ 0x6F, 0x06, 0x04, 0x25, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x83, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0x15,
+ 0x01, 0x83, 0xFF, 0x7E, 0x0D, 0x00
+};
+
+static const uint16_t t0_caddr[] = {
+ 0,
+ 5,
+ 10,
+ 15,
+ 20,
+ 25,
+ 29,
+ 33,
+ 37,
+ 41,
+ 45,
+ 49,
+ 53,
+ 57,
+ 61,
+ 65,
+ 69,
+ 73,
+ 77,
+ 81,
+ 85,
+ 89,
+ 93,
+ 97,
+ 101,
+ 105,
+ 109,
+ 113,
+ 117,
+ 121,
+ 125,
+ 130,
+ 135,
+ 140,
+ 145,
+ 150,
+ 155,
+ 160,
+ 165,
+ 173,
+ 178,
+ 183,
+ 188,
+ 193,
+ 198,
+ 203,
+ 208,
+ 213,
+ 234,
+ 239,
+ 244,
+ 249,
+ 264,
+ 269,
+ 275,
+ 281,
+ 286,
+ 294,
+ 302,
+ 308,
+ 313,
+ 324,
+ 960,
+ 975,
+ 979,
+ 984,
+ 989,
+ 994,
+ 999,
+ 1004,
+ 1118,
+ 1123,
+ 1135,
+ 1140,
+ 1145,
+ 1150,
+ 1154,
+ 1159,
+ 1164,
+ 1169,
+ 1174,
+ 1184,
+ 1189,
+ 1194,
+ 1206,
+ 1221,
+ 1226,
+ 1240,
+ 1262,
+ 1273,
+ 1376,
+ 1423,
+ 1456,
+ 1547,
+ 1553,
+ 1616,
+ 1623,
+ 1651,
+ 1679,
+ 1784,
+ 1826,
+ 1839,
+ 1851,
+ 1865,
+ 1880,
+ 2100,
+ 2114,
+ 2131,
+ 2140,
+ 2207,
+ 2263,
+ 2267,
+ 2271,
+ 2276,
+ 2324,
+ 2350,
+ 2426,
+ 2470,
+ 2481,
+ 2566,
+ 2604,
+ 2642,
+ 2652,
+ 2662,
+ 2671,
+ 2684,
+ 2688,
+ 2692,
+ 2696,
+ 2700,
+ 2704,
+ 2708,
+ 2712,
+ 2724,
+ 2732,
+ 2737,
+ 2742,
+ 2747,
+ 2752
+};
+
+#define T0_INTERPRETED 60
+
+#define T0_ENTER(ip, rp, slot) do { \
+ const unsigned char *t0_newip; \
+ uint32_t t0_lnum; \
+ t0_newip = &t0_codeblock[t0_caddr[(slot) - T0_INTERPRETED]]; \
+ t0_lnum = t0_parse7E_unsigned(&t0_newip); \
+ (rp) += t0_lnum; \
+ *((rp) ++) = (uint32_t)((ip) - &t0_codeblock[0]) + (t0_lnum << 16); \
+ (ip) = t0_newip; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define T0_DEFENTRY(name, slot) \
+void \
+name(void *ctx) \
+{ \
+ t0_context *t0ctx = ctx; \
+ t0ctx->ip = &t0_codeblock[0]; \
+ T0_ENTER(t0ctx->ip, t0ctx->rp, slot); \
+}
+
+T0_DEFENTRY(br_x509_minimal_init_main, 144)
+
+#define T0_NEXT(t0ipp) (*(*(t0ipp)) ++)
+
+void
+br_x509_minimal_run(void *t0ctx)
+{
+ uint32_t *dp, *rp;
+ const unsigned char *ip;
+
+#define T0_LOCAL(x) (*(rp - 2 - (x)))
+#define T0_POP() (*-- dp)
+#define T0_POPi() (*(int32_t *)(-- dp))
+#define T0_PEEK(x) (*(dp - 1 - (x)))
+#define T0_PEEKi(x) (*(int32_t *)(dp - 1 - (x)))
+#define T0_PUSH(v) do { *dp = (v); dp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_PUSHi(v) do { *(int32_t *)dp = (v); dp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_RPOP() (*-- rp)
+#define T0_RPOPi() (*(int32_t *)(-- rp))
+#define T0_RPUSH(v) do { *rp = (v); rp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_RPUSHi(v) do { *(int32_t *)rp = (v); rp ++; } while (0)
+#define T0_ROLL(x) do { \
+ size_t t0len = (size_t)(x); \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 1 - t0len); \
+ memmove(dp - t0len - 1, dp - t0len, t0len * sizeof *dp); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_SWAP() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_ROT() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 3); \
+ *(dp - 3) = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_NROT() do { \
+ uint32_t t0tmp = *(dp - 1); \
+ *(dp - 1) = *(dp - 2); \
+ *(dp - 2) = *(dp - 3); \
+ *(dp - 3) = t0tmp; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_PICK(x) do { \
+ uint32_t t0depth = (x); \
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(t0depth)); \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_CO() do { \
+ goto t0_exit; \
+} while (0)
+#define T0_RET() goto t0_next
+
+ dp = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->dp;
+ rp = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->rp;
+ ip = ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->ip;
+ goto t0_next;
+ for (;;) {
+ uint32_t t0x;
+
+ t0_next:
+ t0x = T0_NEXT(&ip);
+ if (t0x < T0_INTERPRETED) {
+ switch (t0x) {
+ int32_t t0off;
+
+ case 0: /* ret */
+ t0x = T0_RPOP();
+ rp -= (t0x >> 16);
+ t0x &= 0xFFFF;
+ if (t0x == 0) {
+ ip = NULL;
+ goto t0_exit;
+ }
+ ip = &t0_codeblock[t0x];
+ break;
+ case 1: /* literal constant */
+ T0_PUSHi(t0_parse7E_signed(&ip));
+ break;
+ case 2: /* read local */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_LOCAL(t0_parse7E_unsigned(&ip)));
+ break;
+ case 3: /* write local */
+ T0_LOCAL(t0_parse7E_unsigned(&ip)) = T0_POP();
+ break;
+ case 4: /* jump */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ ip += t0off;
+ break;
+ case 5: /* jump if */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ if (T0_POP()) {
+ ip += t0off;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 6: /* jump if not */
+ t0off = t0_parse7E_signed(&ip);
+ if (!T0_POP()) {
+ ip += t0off;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 7: {
+ /* %25 */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSHi(a % b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 8: {
+ /* * */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a * b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 9: {
+ /* + */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a + b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 10: {
+ /* - */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a - b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 11: {
+ /* -rot */
+ T0_NROT();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 12: {
+ /* / */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSHi(a / b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 13: {
+ /* < */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a < b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 14: {
+ /* << */
+
+ int c = (int)T0_POPi();
+ uint32_t x = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(x << c);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 15: {
+ /* <= */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a <= b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 16: {
+ /* <> */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a != b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 17: {
+ /* = */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a == b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 18: {
+ /* > */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a > b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 19: {
+ /* >= */
+
+ int32_t b = T0_POPi();
+ int32_t a = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSH(-(uint32_t)(a >= b));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 20: {
+ /* >> */
+
+ int c = (int)T0_POPi();
+ int32_t x = T0_POPi();
+ T0_PUSHi(x >> c);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 21: {
+ /* and */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a & b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 22: {
+ /* blobcopy */
+
+ size_t len = T0_POP();
+ unsigned char *src = (unsigned char *)CTX + T0_POP();
+ unsigned char *dst = (unsigned char *)CTX + T0_POP();
+ memcpy(dst, src, len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 23: {
+ /* check-direct-trust */
+
+ size_t u;
+
+ for (u = 0; u < CTX->trust_anchors_num; u ++) {
+ const br_x509_trust_anchor *ta;
+ unsigned char hashed_DN[64];
+ int kt;
+
+ ta = &CTX->trust_anchors[u];
+ if (ta->flags & BR_X509_TA_CA) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ hash_dn(CTX, ta->dn.data, ta->dn.len, hashed_DN);
+ if (memcmp(hashed_DN, CTX->current_dn_hash, DNHASH_LEN)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ kt = CTX->pkey.key_type;
+ if ((ta->pkey.key_type & 0x0F) != kt) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ switch (kt) {
+
+ case BR_KEYTYPE_RSA:
+ if (!eqbigint(CTX->pkey.key.rsa.n,
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.nlen,
+ ta->pkey.key.rsa.n,
+ ta->pkey.key.rsa.nlen)
+ || !eqbigint(CTX->pkey.key.rsa.e,
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.elen,
+ ta->pkey.key.rsa.e,
+ ta->pkey.key.rsa.elen))
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case BR_KEYTYPE_EC:
+ if (CTX->pkey.key.ec.curve != ta->pkey.key.ec.curve
+ || CTX->pkey.key.ec.qlen != ta->pkey.key.ec.qlen
+ || memcmp(CTX->pkey.key.ec.q,
+ ta->pkey.key.ec.q,
+ ta->pkey.key.ec.qlen) != 0)
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Direct trust match!
+ */
+ CTX->err = BR_ERR_X509_OK;
+ T0_CO();
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 24: {
+ /* check-trust-anchor-CA */
+
+ size_t u;
+
+ for (u = 0; u < CTX->trust_anchors_num; u ++) {
+ const br_x509_trust_anchor *ta;
+ unsigned char hashed_DN[64];
+
+ ta = &CTX->trust_anchors[u];
+ if (!(ta->flags & BR_X509_TA_CA)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ hash_dn(CTX, ta->dn.data, ta->dn.len, hashed_DN);
+ if (memcmp(hashed_DN, CTX->saved_dn_hash, DNHASH_LEN)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (verify_signature(CTX, &ta->pkey) == 0) {
+ CTX->err = BR_ERR_X509_OK;
+ T0_CO();
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 25: {
+ /* check-validity-range */
+
+ uint32_t nbs = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t nbd = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t nas = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t nad = T0_POP();
+ int r;
+ if (CTX->itime != 0) {
+ r = CTX->itime(CTX->itime_ctx, nbd, nbs, nad, nas);
+ if (r < -1 || r > 1) {
+ CTX->err = BR_ERR_X509_TIME_UNKNOWN;
+ T0_CO();
+ }
+ } else {
+ uint32_t vd = CTX->days;
+ uint32_t vs = CTX->seconds;
+ if (vd == 0 && vs == 0) {
+#if BR_USE_UNIX_TIME
+ time_t x = time(NULL);
+
+ vd = (uint32_t)(x / 86400) + 719528;
+ vs = (uint32_t)(x % 86400);
+#elif BR_USE_WIN32_TIME
+ FILETIME ft;
+ uint64_t x;
+
+ GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&ft);
+ x = ((uint64_t)ft.dwHighDateTime << 32)
+ + (uint64_t)ft.dwLowDateTime;
+ x = (x / 10000000);
+ vd = (uint32_t)(x / 86400) + 584754;
+ vs = (uint32_t)(x % 86400);
+#else
+ CTX->err = BR_ERR_X509_TIME_UNKNOWN;
+ T0_CO();
+#endif
+ }
+ if (vd < nbd || (vd == nbd && vs < nbs)) {
+ r = -1;
+ } else if (vd > nad || (vd == nad && vs > nas)) {
+ r = 1;
+ } else {
+ r = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ T0_PUSHi(r);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 26: {
+ /* co */
+ T0_CO();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 27: {
+ /* compute-dn-hash */
+
+ CTX->dn_hash_impl->out(&CTX->dn_hash.vtable, CTX->current_dn_hash);
+ CTX->do_dn_hash = 0;
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 28: {
+ /* compute-tbs-hash */
+
+ int id = T0_POPi();
+ size_t len;
+ len = br_multihash_out(&CTX->mhash, id, CTX->tbs_hash);
+ T0_PUSH(len);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 29: {
+ /* copy-ee-ec-pkey */
+
+ size_t qlen = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t curve = T0_POP();
+ memcpy(CTX->ee_pkey_data, CTX->pkey_data, qlen);
+ CTX->pkey.key_type = BR_KEYTYPE_EC;
+ CTX->pkey.key.ec.curve = curve;
+ CTX->pkey.key.ec.q = CTX->ee_pkey_data;
+ CTX->pkey.key.ec.qlen = qlen;
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 30: {
+ /* copy-ee-rsa-pkey */
+
+ size_t elen = T0_POP();
+ size_t nlen = T0_POP();
+ memcpy(CTX->ee_pkey_data, CTX->pkey_data, nlen + elen);
+ CTX->pkey.key_type = BR_KEYTYPE_RSA;
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.n = CTX->ee_pkey_data;
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.nlen = nlen;
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.e = CTX->ee_pkey_data + nlen;
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.elen = elen;
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 31: {
+ /* copy-name-SAN */
+
+ unsigned tag = T0_POP();
+ unsigned ok = T0_POP();
+ size_t u, len;
+
+ len = CTX->pad[0];
+ for (u = 0; u < CTX->num_name_elts; u ++) {
+ br_name_element *ne;
+
+ ne = &CTX->name_elts[u];
+ if (ne->status == 0 && ne->oid[0] == 0 && ne->oid[1] == tag) {
+ if (ok && ne->len > len) {
+ memcpy(ne->buf, CTX->pad + 1, len);
+ ne->buf[len] = 0;
+ ne->status = 1;
+ } else {
+ ne->status = -1;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 32: {
+ /* copy-name-element */
+
+ size_t len;
+ int32_t off = T0_POPi();
+ int ok = T0_POPi();
+
+ if (off >= 0) {
+ br_name_element *ne = &CTX->name_elts[off];
+
+ if (ok) {
+ len = CTX->pad[0];
+ if (len < ne->len) {
+ memcpy(ne->buf, CTX->pad + 1, len);
+ ne->buf[len] = 0;
+ ne->status = 1;
+ } else {
+ ne->status = -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ne->status = -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 33: {
+ /* data-get8 */
+
+ size_t addr = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(t0_datablock[addr]);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 34: {
+ /* dn-hash-length */
+
+ T0_PUSH(DNHASH_LEN);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 35: {
+ /* do-ecdsa-vrfy */
+
+ size_t qlen = T0_POP();
+ int curve = T0_POP();
+ br_x509_pkey pk;
+
+ pk.key_type = BR_KEYTYPE_EC;
+ pk.key.ec.curve = curve;
+ pk.key.ec.q = CTX->pkey_data;
+ pk.key.ec.qlen = qlen;
+ T0_PUSH(verify_signature(CTX, &pk));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 36: {
+ /* do-rsa-vrfy */
+
+ size_t elen = T0_POP();
+ size_t nlen = T0_POP();
+ br_x509_pkey pk;
+
+ pk.key_type = BR_KEYTYPE_RSA;
+ pk.key.rsa.n = CTX->pkey_data;
+ pk.key.rsa.nlen = nlen;
+ pk.key.rsa.e = CTX->pkey_data + nlen;
+ pk.key.rsa.elen = elen;
+ T0_PUSH(verify_signature(CTX, &pk));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 37: {
+ /* drop */
+ (void)T0_POP();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 38: {
+ /* dup */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(0));
+ }
+ break;
+ case 39: {
+ /* eqOID */
+
+ const unsigned char *a2 = &t0_datablock[T0_POP()];
+ const unsigned char *a1 = &CTX->pad[0];
+ size_t len = a1[0];
+ int x;
+ if (len == a2[0]) {
+ x = -(memcmp(a1 + 1, a2 + 1, len) == 0);
+ } else {
+ x = 0;
+ }
+ T0_PUSH((uint32_t)x);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 40: {
+ /* eqblob */
+
+ size_t len = T0_POP();
+ const unsigned char *a2 = (const unsigned char *)CTX + T0_POP();
+ const unsigned char *a1 = (const unsigned char *)CTX + T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSHi(-(memcmp(a1, a2, len) == 0));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 41: {
+ /* fail */
+
+ CTX->err = T0_POPi();
+ T0_CO();
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 42: {
+ /* get16 */
+
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(*(uint16_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)CTX + addr));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 43: {
+ /* get32 */
+
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(*(uint32_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)CTX + addr));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 44: {
+ /* match-server-name */
+
+ size_t n1, n2;
+
+ if (CTX->server_name == NULL) {
+ T0_PUSH(0);
+ T0_RET();
+ }
+ n1 = strlen(CTX->server_name);
+ n2 = CTX->pad[0];
+ if (n1 == n2 && eqnocase(&CTX->pad[1], CTX->server_name, n1)) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ T0_RET();
+ }
+ if (n2 >= 2 && CTX->pad[1] == '*' && CTX->pad[2] == '.') {
+ size_t u;
+
+ u = 0;
+ while (u < n1 && CTX->server_name[u] != '.') {
+ u ++;
+ }
+ u ++;
+ n1 -= u;
+ if ((n2 - 2) == n1
+ && eqnocase(&CTX->pad[3], CTX->server_name + u, n1))
+ {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ T0_RET();
+ }
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(0);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 45: {
+ /* neg */
+
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(-a);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 46: {
+ /* offset-name-element */
+
+ unsigned san = T0_POP();
+ size_t u;
+
+ for (u = 0; u < CTX->num_name_elts; u ++) {
+ if (CTX->name_elts[u].status == 0) {
+ const unsigned char *oid;
+ size_t len, off;
+
+ oid = CTX->name_elts[u].oid;
+ if (san) {
+ if (oid[0] != 0 || oid[1] != 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ off = 2;
+ } else {
+ off = 0;
+ }
+ len = oid[off];
+ if (len != 0 && len == CTX->pad[0]
+ && memcmp(oid + off + 1,
+ CTX->pad + 1, len) == 0)
+ {
+ T0_PUSH(u);
+ T0_RET();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 47: {
+ /* or */
+
+ uint32_t b = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t a = T0_POP();
+ T0_PUSH(a | b);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 48: {
+ /* over */
+ T0_PUSH(T0_PEEK(1));
+ }
+ break;
+ case 49: {
+ /* read-blob-inner */
+
+ uint32_t len = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ size_t clen = CTX->hlen;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ clen = (size_t)len;
+ }
+ if (addr != 0) {
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)CTX + addr, CTX->hbuf, clen);
+ }
+ if (CTX->do_mhash) {
+ br_multihash_update(&CTX->mhash, CTX->hbuf, clen);
+ }
+ if (CTX->do_dn_hash) {
+ CTX->dn_hash_impl->update(
+ &CTX->dn_hash.vtable, CTX->hbuf, clen);
+ }
+ CTX->hbuf += clen;
+ CTX->hlen -= clen;
+ T0_PUSH(addr + clen);
+ T0_PUSH(len - clen);
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 50: {
+ /* read8-low */
+
+ if (CTX->hlen == 0) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ } else {
+ unsigned char x = *CTX->hbuf ++;
+ if (CTX->do_mhash) {
+ br_multihash_update(&CTX->mhash, &x, 1);
+ }
+ if (CTX->do_dn_hash) {
+ CTX->dn_hash_impl->update(&CTX->dn_hash.vtable, &x, 1);
+ }
+ CTX->hlen --;
+ T0_PUSH(x);
+ }
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 51: {
+ /* rot */
+ T0_ROT();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 52: {
+ /* set16 */
+
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ *(uint16_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)CTX + addr) = T0_POP();
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 53: {
+ /* set32 */
+
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ *(uint32_t *)(void *)((unsigned char *)CTX + addr) = T0_POP();
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 54: {
+ /* set8 */
+
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ *((unsigned char *)CTX + addr) = (unsigned char)T0_POP();
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 55: {
+ /* start-dn-hash */
+
+ CTX->dn_hash_impl->init(&CTX->dn_hash.vtable);
+ CTX->do_dn_hash = 1;
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 56: {
+ /* start-tbs-hash */
+
+ br_multihash_init(&CTX->mhash);
+ CTX->do_mhash = 1;
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 57: {
+ /* stop-tbs-hash */
+
+ CTX->do_mhash = 0;
+
+ }
+ break;
+ case 58: {
+ /* swap */
+ T0_SWAP();
+ }
+ break;
+ case 59: {
+ /* zero-server-name */
+
+ T0_PUSHi(-(CTX->server_name == NULL));
+
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ T0_ENTER(ip, rp, t0x);
+ }
+ }
+t0_exit:
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->dp = dp;
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->rp = rp;
+ ((t0_context *)t0ctx)->ip = ip;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Verify the signature on the certificate with the provided public key.
+ * This function checks the public key type with regards to the expected
+ * type. Returned value is either 0 on success, or a non-zero error code.
+ */
+static int
+verify_signature(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx, const br_x509_pkey *pk)
+{
+ int kt;
+
+ kt = ctx->cert_signer_key_type;
+ if ((pk->key_type & 0x0F) != kt) {
+ return BR_ERR_X509_WRONG_KEY_TYPE;
+ }
+ switch (kt) {
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+
+ case BR_KEYTYPE_RSA:
+ if (ctx->irsa == 0) {
+ return BR_ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+ if (!ctx->irsa(ctx->cert_sig, ctx->cert_sig_len,
+ &t0_datablock[ctx->cert_sig_hash_oid],
+ ctx->cert_sig_hash_len, &pk->key.rsa, tmp))
+ {
+ return BR_ERR_X509_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ if (memcmp(ctx->tbs_hash, tmp, ctx->cert_sig_hash_len) != 0) {
+ return BR_ERR_X509_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ case BR_KEYTYPE_EC:
+ if (ctx->iecdsa == 0) {
+ return BR_ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+ if (!ctx->iecdsa(ctx->iec, ctx->tbs_hash,
+ ctx->cert_sig_hash_len, &pk->key.ec,
+ ctx->cert_sig, ctx->cert_sig_len))
+ {
+ return BR_ERR_X509_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ default:
+ return BR_ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+}
+
+
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_minimal.t0 b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_minimal.t0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..80a3701
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_minimal.t0
@@ -0,0 +1,1526 @@
+\ Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+\
+\ Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+\ a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+\ "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+\ without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+\ distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+\ permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+\ the following conditions:
+\
+\ The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+\ included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+\
+\ THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+\ EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+\ MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+\ NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+\ BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+\ ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+\ CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+\ SOFTWARE.
+
+preamble {
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/*
+ * Implementation Notes
+ * --------------------
+ *
+ * The C code pushes the data by chunks; all decoding is done in the
+ * T0 code. The cert_length value is set to the certificate length when
+ * a new certificate is started; the T0 code picks it up as outer limit,
+ * and decoding functions use it to ensure that no attempt is made at
+ * reading past it. The T0 code also checks that once the certificate is
+ * decoded, there are no trailing bytes.
+ *
+ * The T0 code sets cert_length to 0 when the certificate is fully
+ * decoded.
+ *
+ * The C code must still perform two checks:
+ *
+ * -- If the certificate length is 0, then the T0 code will not be
+ * invoked at all. This invalid condition must thus be reported by the
+ * C code.
+ *
+ * -- When reaching the end of certificate, the C code must verify that
+ * the certificate length has been set to 0, thereby signaling that
+ * the T0 code properly decoded a certificate.
+ *
+ * Processing of a chain works in the following way:
+ *
+ * -- The error flag is set to a non-zero value when validation is
+ * finished. The value is either BR_ERR_X509_OK (validation is
+ * successful) or another non-zero error code. When a non-zero error
+ * code is obtained, the remaining bytes in the current certificate and
+ * the subsequent certificates (if any) are completely ignored.
+ *
+ * -- Each certificate is decoded in due course, with the following
+ * "interesting points":
+ *
+ * -- Start of the TBS: the multihash engine is reset and activated.
+ *
+ * -- Start of the issuer DN: the secondary hash engine is started,
+ * to process the encoded issuer DN.
+ *
+ * -- End of the issuer DN: the secondary hash engine is stopped. The
+ * resulting hash value is computed and then copied into the
+ * next_dn_hash[] buffer.
+ *
+ * -- Start of the subject DN: the secondary hash engine is started,
+ * to process the encoded subject DN.
+ *
+ * -- For the EE certificate only: the Common Name, if any, is matched
+ * against the expected server name.
+ *
+ * -- End of the subject DN: the secondary hash engine is stopped. The
+ * resulting hash value is computed into the pad. It is then processed:
+ *
+ * -- If this is the EE certificate, then the hash is ignored
+ * (except for direct trust processing, see later; the hash is
+ * simply left in current_dn_hash[]).
+ *
+ * -- Otherwise, the hashed subject DN is compared with the saved
+ * hash value (in saved_dn_hash[]). They must match.
+ *
+ * Either way, the next_dn_hash[] value is then copied into the
+ * saved_dn_hash[] value. Thus, at that point, saved_dn_hash[]
+ * contains the hash of the issuer DN for the current certificate,
+ * and current_dn_hash[] contains the hash of the subject DN for the
+ * current certificate.
+ *
+ * -- Public key: it is decoded into the cert_pkey[] buffer. Unknown
+ * key types are reported at that point.
+ *
+ * -- If this is the EE certificate, then the key type is compared
+ * with the expected key type (initialization parameter). The public
+ * key data is copied to ee_pkey_data[]. The key and hashed subject
+ * DN are also compared with the "direct trust" keys; if the key
+ * and DN are matched, then validation ends with a success.
+ *
+ * -- Otherwise, the saved signature (cert_sig[]) is verified
+ * against the saved TBS hash (tbs_hash[]) and that freshly
+ * decoded public key. Failure here ends validation with an error.
+ *
+ * -- Extensions: extension values are processed in due order.
+ *
+ * -- Basic Constraints: for all certificates except EE, must be
+ * present, indicate a CA, and have a path length compatible with
+ * the chain length so far.
+ *
+ * -- Key Usage: for the EE, if present, must allow signatures
+ * or encryption/key exchange, as required for the cipher suite.
+ * For non-EE, if present, must have the "certificate sign" bit.
+ *
+ * -- Subject Alt Name: for the EE, dNSName names are matched
+ * against the server name. Ignored for non-EE.
+ *
+ * -- Authority Key Identifier, Subject Key Identifier, Issuer
+ * Alt Name, Subject Directory Attributes, CRL Distribution Points
+ * Freshest CRL, Authority Info Access and Subject Info Access
+ * extensions are always ignored: they either contain only
+ * informative data, or they relate to revocation processing, which
+ * we explicitly do not support.
+ *
+ * -- All other extensions are ignored if non-critical. If a
+ * critical extension other than the ones above is encountered,
+ * then a failure is reported.
+ *
+ * -- End of the TBS: the multihash engine is stopped.
+ *
+ * -- Signature algorithm: the signature algorithm on the
+ * certificate is decoded. A failure is reported if that algorithm
+ * is unknown. The hashed TBS corresponding to the signature hash
+ * function is computed and stored in tbs_hash[] (if not supported,
+ * then a failure is reported). The hash OID and length are stored
+ * in cert_sig_hash_oid and cert_sig_hash_len.
+ *
+ * -- Signature value: the signature value is copied into the
+ * cert_sig[] array.
+ *
+ * -- Certificate end: the hashed issuer DN (saved_dn_hash[]) is
+ * looked up in the trust store (CA trust anchors only); for all
+ * that match, the signature (cert_sig[]) is verified against the
+ * anchor public key (hashed TBS is in tbs_hash[]). If one of these
+ * signatures is valid, then validation ends with a success.
+ *
+ * -- If the chain end is reached without obtaining a validation success,
+ * then validation is reported as failed.
+ */
+
+#if BR_USE_UNIX_TIME
+#include <time.h>
+#endif
+
+#if BR_USE_WIN32_TIME
+#include <windows.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The T0 compiler will produce these prototypes declarations in the
+ * header.
+ *
+void br_x509_minimal_init_main(void *ctx);
+void br_x509_minimal_run(void *ctx);
+ */
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+void
+br_x509_minimal_init(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+ const br_hash_class *dn_hash_impl,
+ const br_x509_trust_anchor *trust_anchors, size_t trust_anchors_num)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof *ctx);
+ ctx->vtable = &br_x509_minimal_vtable;
+ ctx->dn_hash_impl = dn_hash_impl;
+ ctx->trust_anchors = trust_anchors;
+ ctx->trust_anchors_num = trust_anchors_num;
+}
+
+static void
+xm_start_chain(const br_x509_class **ctx, const char *server_name)
+{
+ br_x509_minimal_context *cc;
+ size_t u;
+
+ cc = (br_x509_minimal_context *)(void *)ctx;
+ for (u = 0; u < cc->num_name_elts; u ++) {
+ cc->name_elts[u].status = 0;
+ cc->name_elts[u].buf[0] = 0;
+ }
+ memset(&cc->pkey, 0, sizeof cc->pkey);
+ cc->num_certs = 0;
+ cc->err = 0;
+ cc->cpu.dp = cc->dp_stack;
+ cc->cpu.rp = cc->rp_stack;
+ br_x509_minimal_init_main(&cc->cpu);
+ if (server_name == NULL || *server_name == 0) {
+ cc->server_name = NULL;
+ } else {
+ cc->server_name = server_name;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+xm_start_cert(const br_x509_class **ctx, uint32_t length)
+{
+ br_x509_minimal_context *cc;
+
+ cc = (br_x509_minimal_context *)(void *)ctx;
+ if (cc->err != 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ if (length == 0) {
+ cc->err = BR_ERR_X509_TRUNCATED;
+ return;
+ }
+ cc->cert_length = length;
+}
+
+static void
+xm_append(const br_x509_class **ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ br_x509_minimal_context *cc;
+
+ cc = (br_x509_minimal_context *)(void *)ctx;
+ if (cc->err != 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+ cc->hbuf = buf;
+ cc->hlen = len;
+ br_x509_minimal_run(&cc->cpu);
+}
+
+static void
+xm_end_cert(const br_x509_class **ctx)
+{
+ br_x509_minimal_context *cc;
+
+ cc = (br_x509_minimal_context *)(void *)ctx;
+ if (cc->err == 0 && cc->cert_length != 0) {
+ cc->err = BR_ERR_X509_TRUNCATED;
+ }
+ cc->num_certs ++;
+}
+
+static unsigned
+xm_end_chain(const br_x509_class **ctx)
+{
+ br_x509_minimal_context *cc;
+
+ cc = (br_x509_minimal_context *)(void *)ctx;
+ if (cc->err == 0) {
+ if (cc->num_certs == 0) {
+ cc->err = BR_ERR_X509_EMPTY_CHAIN;
+ } else {
+ cc->err = BR_ERR_X509_NOT_TRUSTED;
+ }
+ } else if (cc->err == BR_ERR_X509_OK) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return (unsigned)cc->err;
+}
+
+static const br_x509_pkey *
+xm_get_pkey(const br_x509_class *const *ctx, unsigned *usages)
+{
+ br_x509_minimal_context *cc;
+
+ cc = (br_x509_minimal_context *)(void *)ctx;
+ if (cc->err == BR_ERR_X509_OK
+ || cc->err == BR_ERR_X509_NOT_TRUSTED)
+ {
+ if (usages != NULL) {
+ *usages = cc->key_usages;
+ }
+ return &((br_x509_minimal_context *)(void *)ctx)->pkey;
+ } else {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+const br_x509_class br_x509_minimal_vtable = {
+ sizeof(br_x509_minimal_context),
+ xm_start_chain,
+ xm_start_cert,
+ xm_append,
+ xm_end_cert,
+ xm_end_chain,
+ xm_get_pkey
+};
+
+#define CTX ((br_x509_minimal_context *)(void *)((unsigned char *)t0ctx - offsetof(br_x509_minimal_context, cpu)))
+#define CONTEXT_NAME br_x509_minimal_context
+
+#define DNHASH_LEN ((CTX->dn_hash_impl->desc >> BR_HASHDESC_OUT_OFF) & BR_HASHDESC_OUT_MASK)
+
+/*
+ * Hash a DN (from a trust anchor) into the provided buffer. This uses the
+ * DN hash implementation and context structure from the X.509 engine
+ * context.
+ */
+static void
+hash_dn(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx, const void *dn, size_t len,
+ unsigned char *out)
+{
+ ctx->dn_hash_impl->init(&ctx->dn_hash.vtable);
+ ctx->dn_hash_impl->update(&ctx->dn_hash.vtable, dn, len);
+ ctx->dn_hash_impl->out(&ctx->dn_hash.vtable, out);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two big integers for equality. The integers use unsigned big-endian
+ * encoding; extra leading bytes (of value 0) are allowed.
+ */
+static int
+eqbigint(const unsigned char *b1, size_t len1,
+ const unsigned char *b2, size_t len2)
+{
+ while (len1 > 0 && *b1 == 0) {
+ b1 ++;
+ len1 --;
+ }
+ while (len2 > 0 && *b2 == 0) {
+ b2 ++;
+ len2 --;
+ }
+ if (len1 != len2) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return memcmp(b1, b2, len1) == 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two strings for equality, in a case-insensitive way. This
+ * function handles casing only for ASCII letters.
+ */
+static int
+eqnocase(const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *buf1, *buf2;
+
+ buf1 = s1;
+ buf2 = s2;
+ while (len -- > 0) {
+ int x1, x2;
+
+ x1 = *buf1 ++;
+ x2 = *buf2 ++;
+ if (x1 >= 'A' && x1 <= 'Z') {
+ x1 += 'a' - 'A';
+ }
+ if (x2 >= 'A' && x2 <= 'Z') {
+ x2 += 'a' - 'A';
+ }
+ if (x1 != x2) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int verify_signature(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+ const br_x509_pkey *pk);
+
+}
+
+postamble {
+
+/*
+ * Verify the signature on the certificate with the provided public key.
+ * This function checks the public key type with regards to the expected
+ * type. Returned value is either 0 on success, or a non-zero error code.
+ */
+static int
+verify_signature(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx, const br_x509_pkey *pk)
+{
+ int kt;
+
+ kt = ctx->cert_signer_key_type;
+ if ((pk->key_type & 0x0F) != kt) {
+ return BR_ERR_X509_WRONG_KEY_TYPE;
+ }
+ switch (kt) {
+ unsigned char tmp[64];
+
+ case BR_KEYTYPE_RSA:
+ if (ctx->irsa == 0) {
+ return BR_ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+ if (!ctx->irsa(ctx->cert_sig, ctx->cert_sig_len,
+ &t0_datablock[ctx->cert_sig_hash_oid],
+ ctx->cert_sig_hash_len, &pk->key.rsa, tmp))
+ {
+ return BR_ERR_X509_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ if (memcmp(ctx->tbs_hash, tmp, ctx->cert_sig_hash_len) != 0) {
+ return BR_ERR_X509_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ case BR_KEYTYPE_EC:
+ if (ctx->iecdsa == 0) {
+ return BR_ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+ if (!ctx->iecdsa(ctx->iec, ctx->tbs_hash,
+ ctx->cert_sig_hash_len, &pk->key.ec,
+ ctx->cert_sig, ctx->cert_sig_len))
+ {
+ return BR_ERR_X509_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ default:
+ return BR_ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED;
+ }
+}
+
+}
+
+cc: read8-low ( -- x ) {
+ if (CTX->hlen == 0) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ } else {
+ unsigned char x = *CTX->hbuf ++;
+ if (CTX->do_mhash) {
+ br_multihash_update(&CTX->mhash, &x, 1);
+ }
+ if (CTX->do_dn_hash) {
+ CTX->dn_hash_impl->update(&CTX->dn_hash.vtable, &x, 1);
+ }
+ CTX->hlen --;
+ T0_PUSH(x);
+ }
+}
+
+addr: cert_length
+addr: num_certs
+
+cc: read-blob-inner ( addr len -- addr len ) {
+ uint32_t len = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t addr = T0_POP();
+ size_t clen = CTX->hlen;
+ if (clen > len) {
+ clen = (size_t)len;
+ }
+ if (addr != 0) {
+ memcpy((unsigned char *)CTX + addr, CTX->hbuf, clen);
+ }
+ if (CTX->do_mhash) {
+ br_multihash_update(&CTX->mhash, CTX->hbuf, clen);
+ }
+ if (CTX->do_dn_hash) {
+ CTX->dn_hash_impl->update(
+ &CTX->dn_hash.vtable, CTX->hbuf, clen);
+ }
+ CTX->hbuf += clen;
+ CTX->hlen -= clen;
+ T0_PUSH(addr + clen);
+ T0_PUSH(len - clen);
+}
+
+\ Compute the TBS hash, using the provided hash ID. The hash value is
+\ written in the tbs_hash[] array, and the hash length is returned. If
+\ the requested hash function is not supported, then 0 is returned.
+cc: compute-tbs-hash ( id -- hashlen ) {
+ int id = T0_POPi();
+ size_t len;
+ len = br_multihash_out(&CTX->mhash, id, CTX->tbs_hash);
+ T0_PUSH(len);
+}
+
+\ Push true (-1) if no server name is expected in the EE certificate.
+cc: zero-server-name ( -- bool ) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-(CTX->server_name == NULL));
+}
+
+addr: key_usages
+addr: cert_sig
+addr: cert_sig_len
+addr: cert_signer_key_type
+addr: cert_sig_hash_oid
+addr: cert_sig_hash_len
+addr: tbs_hash
+addr: min_rsa_size
+
+\ Start TBS hash computation. The hash functions are reinitialised.
+cc: start-tbs-hash ( -- ) {
+ br_multihash_init(&CTX->mhash);
+ CTX->do_mhash = 1;
+}
+
+\ Stop TBS hash computation.
+cc: stop-tbs-hash ( -- ) {
+ CTX->do_mhash = 0;
+}
+
+\ Start DN hash computation.
+cc: start-dn-hash ( -- ) {
+ CTX->dn_hash_impl->init(&CTX->dn_hash.vtable);
+ CTX->do_dn_hash = 1;
+}
+
+\ Terminate DN hash computation and write the DN hash into the
+\ current_dn_hash buffer.
+cc: compute-dn-hash ( -- ) {
+ CTX->dn_hash_impl->out(&CTX->dn_hash.vtable, CTX->current_dn_hash);
+ CTX->do_dn_hash = 0;
+}
+
+\ Get the length of hash values obtained with the DN hasher.
+cc: dn-hash-length ( -- len ) {
+ T0_PUSH(DNHASH_LEN);
+}
+
+\ Copy data between two areas in the context.
+cc: blobcopy ( addr-dst addr-src len -- ) {
+ size_t len = T0_POP();
+ unsigned char *src = (unsigned char *)CTX + T0_POP();
+ unsigned char *dst = (unsigned char *)CTX + T0_POP();
+ memcpy(dst, src, len);
+}
+
+addr: current_dn_hash
+addr: next_dn_hash
+addr: saved_dn_hash
+
+\ Read a DN, hashing it into current_dn_hash. The DN contents are not
+\ inspected (only the outer tag, for SEQUENCE, is checked).
+: read-DN ( lim -- lim )
+ start-dn-hash
+ read-sequence-open skip-close-elt
+ compute-dn-hash ;
+
+cc: offset-name-element ( san -- n ) {
+ unsigned san = T0_POP();
+ size_t u;
+
+ for (u = 0; u < CTX->num_name_elts; u ++) {
+ if (CTX->name_elts[u].status == 0) {
+ const unsigned char *oid;
+ size_t len, off;
+
+ oid = CTX->name_elts[u].oid;
+ if (san) {
+ if (oid[0] != 0 || oid[1] != 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ off = 2;
+ } else {
+ off = 0;
+ }
+ len = oid[off];
+ if (len != 0 && len == CTX->pad[0]
+ && memcmp(oid + off + 1,
+ CTX->pad + 1, len) == 0)
+ {
+ T0_PUSH(u);
+ T0_RET();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+}
+
+cc: copy-name-element ( bool offbuf -- ) {
+ size_t len;
+ int32_t off = T0_POPi();
+ int ok = T0_POPi();
+
+ if (off >= 0) {
+ br_name_element *ne = &CTX->name_elts[off];
+
+ if (ok) {
+ len = CTX->pad[0];
+ if (len < ne->len) {
+ memcpy(ne->buf, CTX->pad + 1, len);
+ ne->buf[len] = 0;
+ ne->status = 1;
+ } else {
+ ne->status = -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ne->status = -1;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+cc: copy-name-SAN ( bool tag -- ) {
+ unsigned tag = T0_POP();
+ unsigned ok = T0_POP();
+ size_t u, len;
+
+ len = CTX->pad[0];
+ for (u = 0; u < CTX->num_name_elts; u ++) {
+ br_name_element *ne;
+
+ ne = &CTX->name_elts[u];
+ if (ne->status == 0 && ne->oid[0] == 0 && ne->oid[1] == tag) {
+ if (ok && ne->len > len) {
+ memcpy(ne->buf, CTX->pad + 1, len);
+ ne->buf[len] = 0;
+ ne->status = 1;
+ } else {
+ ne->status = -1;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+\ Read a value, decoding string types. If the string type is recognised
+\ and the value could be converted to UTF-8 into the pad, then true (-1)
+\ is returned; in all other cases, false (0) is returned. Either way, the
+\ object is consumed.
+: read-string ( lim -- lim bool )
+ read-tag case
+ \ UTF8String
+ 12 of check-primitive read-value-UTF8 endof
+ \ NumericString
+ 18 of check-primitive read-value-latin1 endof
+ \ PrintableString
+ 19 of check-primitive read-value-latin1 endof
+ \ TeletexString
+ 20 of check-primitive read-value-latin1 endof
+ \ IA5String
+ 22 of check-primitive read-value-latin1 endof
+ \ BMPString
+ 30 of check-primitive read-value-UTF16 endof
+ 2drop read-length-skip 0 0
+ endcase ;
+
+\ Read a DN for the EE. The normalized DN hash is computed and stored in the
+\ current_dn_hash.
+\ Name elements are gathered. Also, the Common Name is matched against the
+\ intended server name.
+\ Returned value is true (-1) if the CN matches the intended server name,
+\ false (0) otherwise.
+: read-DN-EE ( lim -- lim bool )
+ \ Flag will be set to true if there is a CN and it matches the
+ \ intended server name.
+ 0 { eename-matches }
+
+ \ Activate DN hashing.
+ start-dn-hash
+
+ \ Parse the DN structure: it is a SEQUENCE of SET of
+ \ AttributeTypeAndValue. Each AttributeTypeAndValue is a
+ \ SEQUENCE { OBJECT IDENTIFIER, ANY }.
+ read-sequence-open
+ begin
+ dup while
+
+ read-tag 0x11 check-tag-constructed read-length-open-elt
+ dup ifnot ERR_X509_BAD_DN fail then
+ begin
+ dup while
+
+ read-sequence-open
+
+ \ Read the OID. If the OID could not be read (too
+ \ long) then the first pad byte will be 0.
+ read-OID drop
+
+ \ If it is the Common Name then we'll need to
+ \ match it against the intended server name (if
+ \ applicable).
+ id-at-commonName eqOID { isCN }
+
+ \ Get offset for reception buffer for that element
+ \ (or -1).
+ 0 offset-name-element { offbuf }
+
+ \ Try to read the value as a string.
+ read-string
+
+ \ If the value could be decoded as a string,
+ \ copy it and/or match it, as appropriate.
+ dup isCN and if
+ match-server-name if
+ -1 >eename-matches
+ then
+ then
+ offbuf copy-name-element
+
+ \ Close the SEQUENCE
+ close-elt
+
+ repeat
+ close-elt
+ repeat
+ close-elt
+
+ \ Compute DN hash and deactivate DN hashing.
+ compute-dn-hash
+
+ \ Return the CN match flag.
+ eename-matches ;
+
+\ Check the provided validity range against the current (or configured)
+\ date and time ("na" = notAfter, "nb = notBefore). Returned value:
+\ -1 current date/time is before the notBefore date
+\ 0 current date/time is within the allowed range
+\ +1 current date/time is after the notAfter range
+\ If the current date/time is not available, then this function triggers a
+\ failure and does not return.
+cc: check-validity-range ( na-days na-seconds nb-days nb-seconds -- int ) {
+ uint32_t nbs = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t nbd = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t nas = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t nad = T0_POP();
+ int r;
+ if (CTX->itime != 0) {
+ r = CTX->itime(CTX->itime_ctx, nbd, nbs, nad, nas);
+ if (r < -1 || r > 1) {
+ CTX->err = BR_ERR_X509_TIME_UNKNOWN;
+ T0_CO();
+ }
+ } else {
+ uint32_t vd = CTX->days;
+ uint32_t vs = CTX->seconds;
+ if (vd == 0 && vs == 0) {
+#if BR_USE_UNIX_TIME
+ time_t x = time(NULL);
+
+ vd = (uint32_t)(x / 86400) + 719528;
+ vs = (uint32_t)(x % 86400);
+#elif BR_USE_WIN32_TIME
+ FILETIME ft;
+ uint64_t x;
+
+ GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&ft);
+ x = ((uint64_t)ft.dwHighDateTime << 32)
+ + (uint64_t)ft.dwLowDateTime;
+ x = (x / 10000000);
+ vd = (uint32_t)(x / 86400) + 584754;
+ vs = (uint32_t)(x % 86400);
+#else
+ CTX->err = BR_ERR_X509_TIME_UNKNOWN;
+ T0_CO();
+#endif
+ }
+ if (vd < nbd || (vd == nbd && vs < nbs)) {
+ r = -1;
+ } else if (vd > nad || (vd == nad && vs > nas)) {
+ r = 1;
+ } else {
+ r = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ T0_PUSHi(r);
+}
+
+\ Swap the top two elements with the two elements immediately below.
+: swap2 ( a b c d -- c d a b )
+ 3 roll 3 roll ;
+
+\ Match the name in the pad with the expected server name. Returned value
+\ is true (-1) on match, false (0) otherwise. If there is no expected
+\ server name, then 0 is returned.
+\ Match conditions: either an exact match (case insensitive), or a
+\ wildcard match, if the found name starts with "*.". We only match a
+\ starting wildcard, and only against a complete DN name component.
+cc: match-server-name ( -- bool ) {
+ size_t n1, n2;
+
+ if (CTX->server_name == NULL) {
+ T0_PUSH(0);
+ T0_RET();
+ }
+ n1 = strlen(CTX->server_name);
+ n2 = CTX->pad[0];
+ if (n1 == n2 && eqnocase(&CTX->pad[1], CTX->server_name, n1)) {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ T0_RET();
+ }
+ if (n2 >= 2 && CTX->pad[1] == '*' && CTX->pad[2] == '.') {
+ size_t u;
+
+ u = 0;
+ while (u < n1 && CTX->server_name[u] != '.') {
+ u ++;
+ }
+ u ++;
+ n1 -= u;
+ if ((n2 - 2) == n1
+ && eqnocase(&CTX->pad[3], CTX->server_name + u, n1))
+ {
+ T0_PUSHi(-1);
+ T0_RET();
+ }
+ }
+ T0_PUSH(0);
+}
+
+\ Get the address and length for the pkey_data buffer.
+: addr-len-pkey_data ( -- addr len )
+ CX 0 8191 { offsetof(br_x509_minimal_context, pkey_data) }
+ CX 0 8191 { BR_X509_BUFSIZE_KEY } ;
+
+\ Copy the EE public key to the permanent buffer (RSA).
+cc: copy-ee-rsa-pkey ( nlen elen -- ) {
+ size_t elen = T0_POP();
+ size_t nlen = T0_POP();
+ memcpy(CTX->ee_pkey_data, CTX->pkey_data, nlen + elen);
+ CTX->pkey.key_type = BR_KEYTYPE_RSA;
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.n = CTX->ee_pkey_data;
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.nlen = nlen;
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.e = CTX->ee_pkey_data + nlen;
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.elen = elen;
+}
+
+\ Copy the EE public key to the permanent buffer (EC).
+cc: copy-ee-ec-pkey ( curve qlen -- ) {
+ size_t qlen = T0_POP();
+ uint32_t curve = T0_POP();
+ memcpy(CTX->ee_pkey_data, CTX->pkey_data, qlen);
+ CTX->pkey.key_type = BR_KEYTYPE_EC;
+ CTX->pkey.key.ec.curve = curve;
+ CTX->pkey.key.ec.q = CTX->ee_pkey_data;
+ CTX->pkey.key.ec.qlen = qlen;
+}
+
+\ Check whether the current certificate (EE) is directly trusted.
+cc: check-direct-trust ( -- ) {
+ size_t u;
+
+ for (u = 0; u < CTX->trust_anchors_num; u ++) {
+ const br_x509_trust_anchor *ta;
+ unsigned char hashed_DN[64];
+ int kt;
+
+ ta = &CTX->trust_anchors[u];
+ if (ta->flags & BR_X509_TA_CA) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ hash_dn(CTX, ta->dn.data, ta->dn.len, hashed_DN);
+ if (memcmp(hashed_DN, CTX->current_dn_hash, DNHASH_LEN)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ kt = CTX->pkey.key_type;
+ if ((ta->pkey.key_type & 0x0F) != kt) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ switch (kt) {
+
+ case BR_KEYTYPE_RSA:
+ if (!eqbigint(CTX->pkey.key.rsa.n,
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.nlen,
+ ta->pkey.key.rsa.n,
+ ta->pkey.key.rsa.nlen)
+ || !eqbigint(CTX->pkey.key.rsa.e,
+ CTX->pkey.key.rsa.elen,
+ ta->pkey.key.rsa.e,
+ ta->pkey.key.rsa.elen))
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case BR_KEYTYPE_EC:
+ if (CTX->pkey.key.ec.curve != ta->pkey.key.ec.curve
+ || CTX->pkey.key.ec.qlen != ta->pkey.key.ec.qlen
+ || memcmp(CTX->pkey.key.ec.q,
+ ta->pkey.key.ec.q,
+ ta->pkey.key.ec.qlen) != 0)
+ {
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Direct trust match!
+ */
+ CTX->err = BR_ERR_X509_OK;
+ T0_CO();
+ }
+}
+
+\ Check the signature on the certificate with regards to all trusted CA.
+\ We use the issuer hash (in saved_dn_hash[]) as CA identifier.
+cc: check-trust-anchor-CA ( -- ) {
+ size_t u;
+
+ for (u = 0; u < CTX->trust_anchors_num; u ++) {
+ const br_x509_trust_anchor *ta;
+ unsigned char hashed_DN[64];
+
+ ta = &CTX->trust_anchors[u];
+ if (!(ta->flags & BR_X509_TA_CA)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ hash_dn(CTX, ta->dn.data, ta->dn.len, hashed_DN);
+ if (memcmp(hashed_DN, CTX->saved_dn_hash, DNHASH_LEN)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (verify_signature(CTX, &ta->pkey) == 0) {
+ CTX->err = BR_ERR_X509_OK;
+ T0_CO();
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+\ Verify RSA signature. This uses the public key that was just decoded
+\ into CTX->pkey_data; the modulus and exponent length are provided as
+\ parameters. The resulting hash value is compared with the one in
+\ tbs_hash. Returned value is 0 on success, or a non-zero error code.
+cc: do-rsa-vrfy ( nlen elen -- err ) {
+ size_t elen = T0_POP();
+ size_t nlen = T0_POP();
+ br_x509_pkey pk;
+
+ pk.key_type = BR_KEYTYPE_RSA;
+ pk.key.rsa.n = CTX->pkey_data;
+ pk.key.rsa.nlen = nlen;
+ pk.key.rsa.e = CTX->pkey_data + nlen;
+ pk.key.rsa.elen = elen;
+ T0_PUSH(verify_signature(CTX, &pk));
+}
+
+\ Verify ECDSA signature. This uses the public key that was just decoded
+\ into CTX->pkey_dayta; the curve ID and public point length are provided
+\ as parameters. The hash value in tbs_hash is used. Returned value is 0
+\ on success, or non-zero error code.
+cc: do-ecdsa-vrfy ( curve qlen -- err ) {
+ size_t qlen = T0_POP();
+ int curve = T0_POP();
+ br_x509_pkey pk;
+
+ pk.key_type = BR_KEYTYPE_EC;
+ pk.key.ec.curve = curve;
+ pk.key.ec.q = CTX->pkey_data;
+ pk.key.ec.qlen = qlen;
+ T0_PUSH(verify_signature(CTX, &pk));
+}
+
+cc: print-bytes ( addr len -- ) {
+ extern int printf(const char *fmt, ...);
+ size_t len = T0_POP();
+ unsigned char *buf = (unsigned char *)CTX + T0_POP();
+ size_t u;
+
+ for (u = 0; u < len; u ++) {
+ printf("%02X", buf[u]);
+ }
+}
+
+cc: printOID ( -- ) {
+ extern int printf(const char *fmt, ...);
+ size_t u, len;
+
+ len = CTX->pad[0];
+ if (len == 0) {
+ printf("*");
+ T0_RET();
+ }
+ printf("%u.%u", CTX->pad[1] / 40, CTX->pad[1] % 40);
+ u = 2;
+ while (u <= len) {
+ unsigned long ul;
+
+ ul = 0;
+ for (;;) {
+ int x;
+
+ if (u > len) {
+ printf("BAD");
+ T0_RET();
+ }
+ x = CTX->pad[u ++];
+ ul = (ul << 7) + (x & 0x7F);
+ if (!(x & 0x80)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ printf(".%lu", ul);
+ }
+}
+
+\ Extensions with specific processing.
+OID: basicConstraints 2.5.29.19
+OID: keyUsage 2.5.29.15
+OID: subjectAltName 2.5.29.17
+OID: certificatePolicies 2.5.29.32
+
+\ Policy qualifier "pointer to CPS"
+OID: id-qt-cps 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.2.1
+
+\ Extensions which are ignored when encountered, even if critical.
+OID: authorityKeyIdentifier 2.5.29.35
+OID: subjectKeyIdentifier 2.5.29.14
+OID: issuerAltName 2.5.29.18
+OID: subjectDirectoryAttributes 2.5.29.9
+OID: crlDistributionPoints 2.5.29.31
+OID: freshestCRL 2.5.29.46
+OID: authorityInfoAccess 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.1
+OID: subjectInfoAccess 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.11
+
+\ Process a Basic Constraints extension. This should be called only if
+\ the certificate is not the EE. We check that the extension contains
+\ the "CA" flag, and that the path length, if specified, is compatible
+\ with the current chain length.
+: process-basicConstraints ( lim -- lim )
+ read-sequence-open
+ read-tag-or-end
+ dup 0x01 = if
+ read-boolean ifnot ERR_X509_NOT_CA fail then
+ read-tag-or-end
+ else
+ ERR_X509_NOT_CA fail
+ then
+ dup 0x02 = if
+ drop check-primitive read-small-int-value
+ addr-num_certs get32 1- < if ERR_X509_NOT_CA fail then
+ read-tag-or-end
+ then
+ -1 <> if ERR_X509_UNEXPECTED fail then
+ drop
+ close-elt
+ ;
+
+\ Process a Key Usage extension.
+\ For the EE certificate:
+\ -- if the key usage contains keyEncipherment (2), dataEncipherment (3)
+\ or keyAgreement (4), then the "key exchange" usage is allowed;
+\ -- if the key usage contains digitalSignature (0) or nonRepudiation (1),
+\ then the "signature" usage is allowed.
+\ For CA certificates, the extension must contain keyCertSign (5).
+: process-keyUsage ( lim ee -- lim )
+ { ee }
+
+ \ Read tag for the BIT STRING and open it.
+ read-tag 0x03 check-tag-primitive
+ read-length-open-elt
+ \ First byte indicates number of ignored bits in the last byte. It
+ \ must be between 0 and 7.
+ read8 { ign }
+ ign 7 > if ERR_X509_UNEXPECTED fail then
+ \ Depending on length, we have either 0, 1 or more bytes to read.
+ dup case
+ 0 of ERR_X509_FORBIDDEN_KEY_USAGE fail endof
+ 1 of read8 ign >> ign << endof
+ drop read8 0
+ endcase
+
+ \ Check bits.
+ ee if
+ \ EE: get usages.
+ 0
+ over 0x38 and if 0x10 or then
+ swap 0xC0 and if 0x20 or then
+ addr-key_usages set8
+ else
+ \ Not EE: keyCertSign must be set.
+ 0x04 and ifnot ERR_X509_FORBIDDEN_KEY_USAGE fail then
+ then
+
+ \ We don't care about subsequent bytes.
+ skip-close-elt ;
+
+\ Process a Certificate Policies extension.
+\
+\ Since we don't actually support full policies processing, this function
+\ only checks that the extension contents can be safely ignored. Indeed,
+\ we don't validate against a specific set of policies (in RFC 5280
+\ terminology, user-initial-policy-set only contains the special value
+\ any-policy). Moreover, we don't support policy constraints (if a
+\ critical Policy Constraints extension is encountered, the validation
+\ will fail). Therefore, we can safely ignore the contents of this
+\ extension, except if it is critical AND one of the policy OID has a
+\ qualifier which is distinct from id-qt-cps (because id-qt-cps is
+\ specially designated by RFC 5280 has having no mandated action).
+\
+\ This function is called only if the extension is critical.
+: process-certPolicies ( lim -- lim )
+ \ Extension value is a SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation.
+ read-sequence-open
+ begin dup while
+ \ PolicyInformation ::= SEQUENCE {
+ \ policyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ \ policyQualifiers SEQUENCE OF PolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL
+ \ }
+ read-sequence-open
+ read-OID drop
+ dup if
+ read-sequence-open
+ begin dup while
+ \ PolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ \ policyQualifierId OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ \ qualifier ANY
+ \ }
+ read-sequence-open
+ read-OID drop id-qt-cps eqOID ifnot
+ ERR_X509_CRITICAL_EXTENSION fail
+ then
+ skip-close-elt
+ repeat
+ close-elt
+ then
+ close-elt
+ repeat
+ close-elt ;
+
+\ Process a Subject Alt Name extension. Returned value is a boolean set
+\ to true if the expected server name was matched against a dNSName in
+\ the extension.
+: process-SAN ( lim -- lim bool )
+ 0 { m }
+ read-sequence-open
+ begin dup while
+ \ Read the tag. If the tag is context-0, then parse an
+ \ 'otherName'. If the tag is context-2, then parse a
+ \ dNSName. If the tag is context-1 or context-6,
+ \ parse
+ read-tag case
+ \ OtherName
+ 0x20 of
+ \ OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
+ \ type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ \ value [0] EXPLICIT ANY
+ \ }
+ check-constructed read-length-open-elt
+ read-OID drop
+ -1 offset-name-element { offbuf }
+ read-tag 0x20 check-tag-constructed
+ read-length-open-elt
+ read-string offbuf copy-name-element
+ close-elt
+ close-elt
+ endof
+ \ rfc822Name (IA5String)
+ 0x21 of
+ check-primitive
+ read-value-UTF8 1 copy-name-SAN
+ endof
+ \ dNSName (IA5String)
+ 0x22 of
+ check-primitive
+ read-value-UTF8
+ dup if match-server-name m or >m then
+ 2 copy-name-SAN
+ endof
+ \ uniformResourceIdentifier (IA5String)
+ 0x26 of
+ check-primitive
+ read-value-UTF8 6 copy-name-SAN
+ endof
+ 2drop read-length-skip 0
+ endcase
+
+ \ We check only names of type dNSName; they use IA5String,
+ \ which is basically ASCII.
+ \ read-tag 0x22 = if
+ \ check-primitive
+ \ read-small-value drop
+ \ match-server-name m or >m
+ \ else
+ \ drop read-length-skip
+ \ then
+ repeat
+ close-elt
+ m ;
+
+\ Decode a certificate. The "ee" boolean must be true for the EE.
+: decode-certificate ( ee -- )
+ { ee }
+
+ \ Obtain the total certificate length.
+ addr-cert_length get32
+
+ \ Open the outer SEQUENCE.
+ read-sequence-open
+
+ \ TBS
+ \ Activate hashing.
+ start-tbs-hash
+ read-sequence-open
+
+ \ First element may be an explicit version. We accept only
+ \ versions 0 to 2 (certificates v1 to v3).
+ read-tag dup 0x20 = if
+ drop check-constructed read-length-open-elt
+ read-tag
+ 0x02 check-tag-primitive
+ read-small-int-value
+ 2 > if ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail then
+ close-elt
+ read-tag
+ then
+
+ \ Serial number. We just check that the tag is correct.
+ 0x02 check-tag-primitive
+ read-length-skip
+
+ \ Signature algorithm. This structure is redundant with the one
+ \ on the outside; we just skip it.
+ read-sequence-open skip-close-elt
+
+ \ Issuer name: hashed, then copied into next_dn_hash[].
+ read-DN
+ addr-next_dn_hash addr-current_dn_hash dn-hash-length blobcopy
+
+ \ Validity dates.
+ read-sequence-open
+ read-date { nbd nbs } read-date nbd nbs check-validity-range
+ if ERR_X509_EXPIRED fail then
+ close-elt
+
+ \ Subject name.
+ ee if
+ \ For the EE, we must check whether the Common Name, if
+ \ any, matches the expected server name.
+ read-DN-EE { eename }
+ else
+ \ For a non-EE certificate, the hashed subject DN must match
+ \ the saved hashed issuer DN from the previous certificate.
+ read-DN
+ addr-current_dn_hash addr-saved_dn_hash dn-hash-length eqblob
+ ifnot ERR_X509_DN_MISMATCH fail then
+ then
+ \ Move the hashed issuer DN for this certificate into the
+ \ saved_dn_hash[] array.
+ addr-saved_dn_hash addr-next_dn_hash dn-hash-length blobcopy
+
+ \ Public Key.
+ read-sequence-open
+ \ Algorithm Identifier. Right now we are only interested in the
+ \ OID, since we only support RSA keys.
+ read-sequence-open
+ read-OID ifnot ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail then
+ { ; pkey-type }
+ choice
+ \ RSA public key.
+ rsaEncryption eqOID uf
+ skip-close-elt
+ \ Public key itself: the BIT STRING contains bytes
+ \ (no partial byte) and these bytes encode the
+ \ actual value.
+ read-bits-open
+ \ RSA public key is a SEQUENCE of two
+ \ INTEGER. We get both INTEGER values into
+ \ the pkey_data[] buffer, if they fit.
+ read-sequence-open
+ addr-len-pkey_data
+ read-integer { nlen }
+ addr-len-pkey_data swap nlen + swap nlen -
+ read-integer { elen }
+ close-elt
+
+ \ Check that the public key fits our minimal
+ \ size requirements. Note that the integer
+ \ decoder already skipped the leading bytes
+ \ of value 0, so we are working on the true
+ \ modulus length here.
+ addr-min_rsa_size get16 128 + nlen > if
+ ERR_X509_WEAK_PUBLIC_KEY fail
+ then
+ close-elt
+ KEYTYPE_RSA >pkey-type
+ enduf
+
+ \ EC public key.
+ id-ecPublicKey eqOID uf
+ \ We support only named curves, for which the
+ \ "parameters" field in the AlgorithmIdentifier
+ \ field should be an OID.
+ read-OID ifnot ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail then
+ choice
+ ansix9p256r1 eqOID uf 23 enduf
+ ansix9p384r1 eqOID uf 24 enduf
+ ansix9p521r1 eqOID uf 25 enduf
+ ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail
+ endchoice
+ { curve }
+ close-elt
+ read-bits-open
+ dup { qlen }
+ dup addr-len-pkey_data rot < if
+ ERR_X509_LIMIT_EXCEEDED fail
+ then
+ read-blob
+ KEYTYPE_EC >pkey-type
+ enduf
+
+ \ Not a recognised public key type.
+ ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail
+ endchoice
+ close-elt
+
+ \ Process public key.
+ ee if
+ \ For the EE certificate, copy the key data to the
+ \ relevant buffer.
+ pkey-type case
+ KEYTYPE_RSA of nlen elen copy-ee-rsa-pkey endof
+ KEYTYPE_EC of curve qlen copy-ee-ec-pkey endof
+ ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail
+ endcase
+ else
+ \ Verify signature on previous certificate. We invoke
+ \ the RSA implementation.
+ pkey-type case
+ KEYTYPE_RSA of nlen elen do-rsa-vrfy endof
+ KEYTYPE_EC of curve qlen do-ecdsa-vrfy endof
+ ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail
+ endcase
+ dup if fail then
+ drop
+ then
+
+ \ This flag will be set to true if the Basic Constraints extension
+ \ is encountered.
+ 0 { seenBC }
+
+ \ Skip issuerUniqueID and subjectUniqueID, and process extensions
+ \ if present. Extensions are an explicit context tag of value 3
+ \ around a SEQUENCE OF extensions. Each extension is a SEQUENCE
+ \ with an OID, an optional boolean, and a value; the value is
+ \ an OCTET STRING.
+ read-tag-or-end
+ 0x21 iftag-skip
+ 0x22 iftag-skip
+ dup 0x23 = if
+ drop
+ check-constructed read-length-open-elt
+ read-sequence-open
+ begin dup while
+ 0 { critical }
+ read-sequence-open
+ read-OID drop
+ read-tag dup 0x01 = if
+ read-boolean >critical
+ read-tag
+ then
+ 0x04 check-tag-primitive read-length-open-elt
+ choice
+ \ Extensions with specific processing.
+ basicConstraints eqOID uf
+ ee if
+ skip-remaining
+ else
+ process-basicConstraints
+ -1 >seenBC
+ then
+ enduf
+ keyUsage eqOID uf
+ ee process-keyUsage
+ enduf
+ subjectAltName eqOID uf
+ ee if
+ 0 >eename
+ process-SAN >eename
+ else
+ skip-remaining
+ then
+ enduf
+
+ \ We don't implement full processing of
+ \ policies. The call below mostly checks
+ \ that the contents of the Certificate
+ \ Policies extension can be safely ignored.
+ certificatePolicies eqOID uf
+ critical if
+ process-certPolicies
+ else
+ skip-remaining
+ then
+ enduf
+
+ \ Extensions which are always ignored,
+ \ even if critical.
+ authorityKeyIdentifier eqOID uf
+ skip-remaining
+ enduf
+ subjectKeyIdentifier eqOID uf
+ skip-remaining
+ enduf
+ issuerAltName eqOID uf
+ skip-remaining
+ enduf
+ subjectDirectoryAttributes eqOID uf
+ skip-remaining
+ enduf
+ crlDistributionPoints eqOID uf
+ skip-remaining
+ enduf
+ freshestCRL eqOID uf
+ skip-remaining
+ enduf
+ authorityInfoAccess eqOID uf
+ skip-remaining
+ enduf
+ subjectInfoAccess eqOID uf
+ skip-remaining
+ enduf
+
+ \ Unrecognized extensions trigger a failure
+ \ if critical; otherwise, they are just
+ \ ignored.
+ critical if
+ ERR_X509_CRITICAL_EXTENSION fail
+ then
+ skip-remaining
+ endchoice
+ close-elt
+ close-elt
+ repeat
+ close-elt
+ close-elt
+ else
+ -1 = ifnot ERR_X509_UNEXPECTED fail then
+ drop
+ then
+
+ close-elt
+ \ Terminate hashing.
+ stop-tbs-hash
+
+ \ For the EE certificate, verify that the intended server name
+ \ was matched.
+ ee if
+ eename zero-server-name or ifnot
+ ERR_X509_BAD_SERVER_NAME fail
+ then
+ then
+
+ \ If this is the EE certificate, then direct trust may apply.
+ \ Note: we do this at this point, not immediately after decoding
+ \ the public key, because even in case of direct trust we still
+ \ want to check the server name with regards to the SAN extension.
+ \ However, we want to check direct trust before trying to decode
+ \ the signature algorithm, because it should work even if that
+ \ algorithm is not supported.
+ ee if check-direct-trust then
+
+ \ Non-EE certificates MUST have a Basic Constraints extension
+ \ (that marks them as being CA).
+ ee seenBC or ifnot ERR_X509_NOT_CA fail then
+
+ \ signature algorithm
+ read-tag check-sequence read-length-open-elt
+ \ Read and understand the OID. Right now, we support only
+ \ RSA with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding, and hash functions SHA-1,
+ \ SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512. We purposely do NOT
+ \ support MD5 here.
+ \ TODO: add support for RSA/PSS
+ read-OID if
+ \ Based on the signature OID, we get:
+ \ -- the signing key type
+ \ -- the hash function numeric identifier
+ \ -- the hash function OID
+ choice
+ sha1WithRSAEncryption eqOID
+ uf 2 KEYTYPE_RSA id-sha1 enduf
+ sha224WithRSAEncryption eqOID
+ uf 3 KEYTYPE_RSA id-sha224 enduf
+ sha256WithRSAEncryption eqOID
+ uf 4 KEYTYPE_RSA id-sha256 enduf
+ sha384WithRSAEncryption eqOID
+ uf 5 KEYTYPE_RSA id-sha384 enduf
+ sha512WithRSAEncryption eqOID
+ uf 6 KEYTYPE_RSA id-sha512 enduf
+
+ ecdsa-with-SHA1 eqOID
+ uf 2 KEYTYPE_EC id-sha1 enduf
+ ecdsa-with-SHA224 eqOID
+ uf 3 KEYTYPE_EC id-sha224 enduf
+ ecdsa-with-SHA256 eqOID
+ uf 4 KEYTYPE_EC id-sha256 enduf
+ ecdsa-with-SHA384 eqOID
+ uf 5 KEYTYPE_EC id-sha384 enduf
+ ecdsa-with-SHA512 eqOID
+ uf 6 KEYTYPE_EC id-sha512 enduf
+ ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail
+ endchoice
+ addr-cert_sig_hash_oid set16
+ addr-cert_signer_key_type set8
+
+ \ Compute the TBS hash into tbs_hash.
+ compute-tbs-hash
+ dup ifnot ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail then
+ addr-cert_sig_hash_len set8
+ else
+ ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED fail
+ then
+ \ We ignore the parameters, whether they are present or not,
+ \ because we got all the information from the OID.
+ skip-close-elt
+
+ \ signature value
+ read-bits-open
+ dup CX 0 8191 { BR_X509_BUFSIZE_SIG } > if
+ ERR_X509_LIMIT_EXCEEDED fail
+ then
+ dup addr-cert_sig_len set16
+ addr-cert_sig read-blob
+
+ \ Close the outer SEQUENCE.
+ close-elt
+
+ \ Close the advertised total certificate length. This checks that
+ \ there is no trailing garbage after the certificate.
+ close-elt
+
+ \ Flag the certificate as fully processed.
+ 0 addr-cert_length set32
+
+ \ Check whether the issuer for the current certificate is known
+ \ as a trusted CA; in which case, verify the signature.
+ check-trust-anchor-CA ;
+
+: main
+ \ Unless restricted by a Key Usage extension, all usages are
+ \ deemed allowed.
+ 0x30 addr-key_usages set8
+ -1 decode-certificate
+ co
+ begin
+ 0 decode-certificate co
+ again
+ ;
diff --git a/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_minimal_full.c b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_minimal_full.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b54426
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/bearssl/src/x509/x509_minimal_full.c
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "inner.h"
+
+/* see bearssl_x509.h */
+void
+br_x509_minimal_init_full(br_x509_minimal_context *xc,
+ const br_x509_trust_anchor *trust_anchors, size_t trust_anchors_num)
+{
+ /*
+ * All hash functions are activated.
+ * Note: the X.509 validation engine will nonetheless refuse to
+ * validate signatures that use MD5 as hash function.
+ */
+ static const br_hash_class *hashes[] = {
+ &br_md5_vtable,
+ &br_sha1_vtable,
+ &br_sha224_vtable,
+ &br_sha256_vtable,
+ &br_sha384_vtable,
+ &br_sha512_vtable
+ };
+
+ int id;
+
+ br_x509_minimal_init(xc, &br_sha256_vtable,
+ trust_anchors, trust_anchors_num);
+ br_x509_minimal_set_rsa(xc, &br_rsa_i31_pkcs1_vrfy);
+ br_x509_minimal_set_ecdsa(xc,
+ &br_ec_prime_i31, &br_ecdsa_i31_vrfy_asn1);
+ for (id = br_md5_ID; id <= br_sha512_ID; id ++) {
+ const br_hash_class *hc;
+
+ hc = hashes[id - 1];
+ br_x509_minimal_set_hash(xc, id, hc);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/LICENSE b/third_party/mbedtls/LICENSE
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..776ac77
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/LICENSE
@@ -0,0 +1,553 @@
+Mbed TLS files are provided under a dual [Apache-2.0](https://spdx.org/licenses/Apache-2.0.html)
+OR [GPL-2.0-or-later](https://spdx.org/licenses/GPL-2.0-or-later.html) license.
+This means that users may choose which of these licenses they take the code
+under.
+
+The full text of each of these licenses is given below.
+
+
+ Apache License
+ Version 2.0, January 2004
+ http://www.apache.org/licenses/
+
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+above, provided that you also meet all of these conditions:
+
+ a) You must cause the modified files to carry prominent notices
+ stating that you changed the files and the date of any change.
+
+ b) You must cause any work that you distribute or publish, that in
+ whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any
+ part thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third
+ parties under the terms of this License.
+
+ c) If the modified program normally reads commands interactively
+ when run, you must cause it, when started running for such
+ interactive use in the most ordinary way, to print or display an
+ announcement including an appropriate copyright notice and a
+ notice that there is no warranty (or else, saying that you provide
+ a warranty) and that users may redistribute the program under
+ these conditions, and telling the user how to view a copy of this
+ License. (Exception: if the Program itself is interactive but
+ does not normally print such an announcement, your work based on
+ the Program is not required to print an announcement.)
+
+These requirements apply to the modified work as a whole. If
+identifiable sections of that work are not derived from the Program,
+and can be reasonably considered independent and separate works in
+themselves, then this License, and its terms, do not apply to those
+sections when you distribute them as separate works. But when you
+distribute the same sections as part of a whole which is a work based
+on the Program, the distribution of the whole must be on the terms of
+this License, whose permissions for other licensees extend to the
+entire whole, and thus to each and every part regardless of who wrote it.
+
+Thus, it is not the intent of this section to claim rights or contest
+your rights to work written entirely by you; rather, the intent is to
+exercise the right to control the distribution of derivative or
+collective works based on the Program.
+
+In addition, mere aggregation of another work not based on the Program
+with the Program (or with a work based on the Program) on a volume of
+a storage or distribution medium does not bring the other work under
+the scope of this License.
+
+ 3. You may copy and distribute the Program (or a work based on it,
+under Section 2) in object code or executable form under the terms of
+Sections 1 and 2 above provided that you also do one of the following:
+
+ a) Accompany it with the complete corresponding machine-readable
+ source code, which must be distributed under the terms of Sections
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+ b) Accompany it with a written offer, valid for at least three
+ years, to give any third party, for a charge no more than your
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+
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+
+ 4. You may not copy, modify, sublicense, or distribute the Program
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+otherwise to copy, modify, sublicense or distribute the Program is
+void, and will automatically terminate your rights under this License.
+However, parties who have received copies, or rights, from you under
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+
+ 5. You are not required to accept this License, since you have not
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+distribute the Program or its derivative works. These actions are
+prohibited by law if you do not accept this License. Therefore, by
+modifying or distributing the Program (or any work based on the
+Program), you indicate your acceptance of this License to do so, and
+all its terms and conditions for copying, distributing or modifying
+the Program or works based on it.
+
+ 6. Each time you redistribute the Program (or any work based on the
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+these terms and conditions. You may not impose any further
+restrictions on the recipients' exercise of the rights granted herein.
+You are not responsible for enforcing compliance by third parties to
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+
+ 7. If, as a consequence of a court judgment or allegation of patent
+infringement or for any other reason (not limited to patent issues),
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+excuse you from the conditions of this License. If you cannot
+distribute so as to satisfy simultaneously your obligations under this
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+may not distribute the Program at all. For example, if a patent
+license would not permit royalty-free redistribution of the Program by
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+refrain entirely from distribution of the Program.
+
+If any portion of this section is held invalid or unenforceable under
+any particular circumstance, the balance of the section is intended to
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+
+It is not the purpose of this section to induce you to infringe any
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+implemented by public license practices. Many people have made
+generous contributions to the wide range of software distributed
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+system; it is up to the author/donor to decide if he or she is willing
+to distribute software through any other system and a licensee cannot
+impose that choice.
+
+This section is intended to make thoroughly clear what is believed to
+be a consequence of the rest of this License.
+
+ 8. If the distribution and/or use of the Program is restricted in
+certain countries either by patents or by copyrighted interfaces, the
+original copyright holder who places the Program under this License
+may add an explicit geographical distribution limitation excluding
+those countries, so that distribution is permitted only in or among
+countries not thus excluded. In such case, this License incorporates
+the limitation as if written in the body of this License.
+
+ 9. The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions
+of the General Public License from time to time. Such new versions will
+be similar in spirit to the present version, but may differ in detail to
+address new problems or concerns.
+
+Each version is given a distinguishing version number. If the Program
+specifies a version number of this License which applies to it and "any
+later version", you have the option of following the terms and conditions
+either of that version or of any later version published by the Free
+Software Foundation. If the Program does not specify a version number of
+this License, you may choose any version ever published by the Free Software
+Foundation.
+
+ 10. If you wish to incorporate parts of the Program into other free
+programs whose distribution conditions are different, write to the author
+to ask for permission. For software which is copyrighted by the Free
+Software Foundation, write to the Free Software Foundation; we sometimes
+make exceptions for this. Our decision will be guided by the two goals
+of preserving the free status of all derivatives of our free software and
+of promoting the sharing and reuse of software generally.
+
+ NO WARRANTY
+
+ 11. BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
+FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN
+OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
+PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
+OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
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+TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE
+PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
+REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
+
+ 12. IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
+WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
+REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
+INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
+OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
+TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
+YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
+PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
+POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+
+ END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
+
+ How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs
+
+ If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest
+possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it
+free software which everyone can redistribute and change under these terms.
+
+ To do so, attach the following notices to the program. It is safest
+to attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively
+convey the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at least
+the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found.
+
+ <one line to give the program's name and a brief idea of what it does.>
+ Copyright (C) <year> <name of author>
+
+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
+ with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
+ 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+
+Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail.
+
+If the program is interactive, make it output a short notice like this
+when it starts in an interactive mode:
+
+ Gnomovision version 69, Copyright (C) year name of author
+ Gnomovision comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'.
+ This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it
+ under certain conditions; type `show c' for details.
+
+The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate
+parts of the General Public License. Of course, the commands you use may
+be called something other than `show w' and `show c'; they could even be
+mouse-clicks or menu items--whatever suits your program.
+
+You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or your
+school, if any, to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if
+necessary. Here is a sample; alter the names:
+
+ Yoyodyne, Inc., hereby disclaims all copyright interest in the program
+ `Gnomovision' (which makes passes at compilers) written by James Hacker.
+
+ <signature of Ty Coon>, 1 April 1989
+ Ty Coon, President of Vice
+
+This General Public License does not permit incorporating your program into
+proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine library, you may
+consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with the
+library. If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General
+Public License instead of this License.
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/.gitignore b/third_party/mbedtls/include/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf67d02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+Makefile
+*.sln
+*.vcxproj
+mbedtls/check_config
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/CMakeLists.txt b/third_party/mbedtls/include/CMakeLists.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e11e271
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+option(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS "Install Mbed TLS headers." ON)
+
+if(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS)
+
+ file(GLOB headers "mbedtls/*.h")
+ file(GLOB psa_headers "psa/*.h")
+
+ install(FILES ${headers}
+ DESTINATION include/mbedtls
+ PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ)
+
+ install(FILES ${psa_headers}
+ DESTINATION include/psa
+ PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ)
+
+endif(INSTALL_MBEDTLS_HEADERS)
+
+# Make mbedtls_config.h available in an out-of-source build. ssl-opt.sh requires it.
+if (ENABLE_TESTING AND NOT ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR} STREQUAL ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR})
+ link_to_source(mbedtls)
+ link_to_source(psa)
+endif()
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aes.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aes.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d5eb1fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aes.h
@@ -0,0 +1,631 @@
+/**
+ * \file aes.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains AES definitions and functions.
+ *
+ * The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) specifies a FIPS-approved
+ * cryptographic algorithm that can be used to protect electronic
+ * data.
+ *
+ * The AES algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that can
+ * encrypt and decrypt information. For more information, see
+ * <em>FIPS Publication 197: Advanced Encryption Standard</em> and
+ * <em>ISO/IEC 18033-2:2006: Information technology -- Security
+ * techniques -- Encryption algorithms -- Part 2: Asymmetric
+ * ciphers</em>.
+ *
+ * The AES-XTS block mode is standardized by NIST SP 800-38E
+ * <https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/legacy/sp/nistspecialpublication800-38e.pdf>
+ * and described in detail by IEEE P1619
+ * <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/servlet/opac?punumber=4375278>.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_AES_H
+#define MBEDTLS_AES_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/* padlock.c and aesni.c rely on these values! */
+#define MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT 1 /**< AES encryption. */
+#define MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT 0 /**< AES decryption. */
+
+/* Error codes in range 0x0020-0x0022 */
+/** Invalid key length. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH -0x0020
+/** Invalid data input length. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0022
+
+/* Error codes in range 0x0021-0x0025 */
+/** Invalid input data. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0021
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT)
+// Regular implementation
+//
+
+/**
+ * \brief The AES context-type definition.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_aes_context {
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nr); /*!< The number of rounds. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rk_offset); /*!< The offset in array elements to AES
+ round keys in the buffer. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C)
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf)[44]; /*!< Aligned data buffer to hold
+ 10 round keys for 128-bit case. */
+#else
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf)[68]; /*!< Unaligned data buffer. This buffer can
+ hold 32 extra Bytes, which can be used for
+ one of the following purposes:
+ <ul><li>Alignment if VIA padlock is
+ used.</li>
+ <li>Simplifying key expansion in the 256-bit
+ case by generating an extra round key.
+ </li></ul> */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH && !MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */
+}
+mbedtls_aes_context;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+/**
+ * \brief The AES XTS context-type definition.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_aes_xts_context {
+ mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(crypt); /*!< The AES context to use for AES block
+ encryption or decryption. */
+ mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tweak); /*!< The AES context used for tweak
+ computation. */
+} mbedtls_aes_xts_context;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */
+#include "aes_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes the specified AES context.
+ *
+ * It must be the first API called before using
+ * the context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The AES context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_aes_init(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function releases and clears the specified AES context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The AES context to clear.
+ * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing.
+ * Otherwise, the context must have been at least initialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_aes_free(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes the specified AES XTS context.
+ *
+ * It must be the first API called before using
+ * the context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The AES XTS context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_aes_xts_init(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function releases and clears the specified AES XTS context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The AES XTS context to clear.
+ * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing.
+ * Otherwise, the context must have been at least initialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_aes_xts_free(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets the encryption key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The AES context to which the key should be bound.
+ * It must be initialized.
+ * \param key The encryption key.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits.
+ * \param keybits The size of data passed in bits. Valid options are:
+ * <ul><li>128 bits</li>
+ * <li>192 bits</li>
+ * <li>256 bits</li></ul>
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets the decryption key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The AES context to which the key should be bound.
+ * It must be initialized.
+ * \param key The decryption key.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits.
+ * \param keybits The size of data passed. Valid options are:
+ * <ul><li>128 bits</li>
+ * <li>192 bits</li>
+ * <li>256 bits</li></ul>
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+/**
+ * \brief This function prepares an XTS context for encryption and
+ * sets the encryption key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The AES XTS context to which the key should be bound.
+ * It must be initialized.
+ * \param key The encryption key. This is comprised of the XTS key1
+ * concatenated with the XTS key2.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits.
+ * \param keybits The size of \p key passed in bits. Valid options are:
+ * <ul><li>256 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 128-bit key)</li>
+ * <li>512 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 256-bit key)</li></ul>
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function prepares an XTS context for decryption and
+ * sets the decryption key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The AES XTS context to which the key should be bound.
+ * It must be initialized.
+ * \param key The decryption key. This is comprised of the XTS key1
+ * concatenated with the XTS key2.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of size \p keybits bits.
+ * \param keybits The size of \p key passed in bits. Valid options are:
+ * <ul><li>256 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 128-bit key)</li>
+ * <li>512 bits (each of key1 and key2 is a 256-bit key)</li></ul>
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH on failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs an AES single-block encryption or
+ * decryption operation.
+ *
+ * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode parameter
+ * (encrypt or decrypt), on the input data buffer defined in
+ * the \p input parameter.
+ *
+ * mbedtls_aes_init(), and either mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc() or
+ * mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec() must be called before the first
+ * call to this API with the same context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption.
+ * It must be initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or
+ * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * It must be readable and at least \c 16 Bytes long.
+ * \param output The buffer where the output data will be written.
+ * It must be writeable and at least \c 16 Bytes long.
+
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16]);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs an AES-CBC encryption or decryption operation
+ * on full blocks.
+ *
+ * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode
+ * parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer defined in
+ * the \p input parameter.
+ *
+ * It can be called as many times as needed, until all the input
+ * data is processed. mbedtls_aes_init(), and either
+ * mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc() or mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec() must be called
+ * before the first call to this API with the same context.
+ *
+ * \note This function operates on full blocks, that is, the input size
+ * must be a multiple of the AES block size of \c 16 Bytes.
+ *
+ * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can
+ * call the same function again on the next
+ * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was
+ * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage.
+ * If you need to retain the contents of the IV, you should
+ * either save it manually or use the cipher module instead.
+ *
+ *
+ * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption.
+ * It must be initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or
+ * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT.
+ * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. This must be a
+ * multiple of the block size (\c 16 Bytes).
+ * \param iv Initialization vector (updated after use).
+ * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer holding the output data.
+ * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH
+ * on failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ unsigned char iv[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs an AES-XTS encryption or decryption
+ * operation for an entire XTS data unit.
+ *
+ * AES-XTS encrypts or decrypts blocks based on their location as
+ * defined by a data unit number. The data unit number must be
+ * provided by \p data_unit.
+ *
+ * NIST SP 800-38E limits the maximum size of a data unit to 2^20
+ * AES blocks. If the data unit is larger than this, this function
+ * returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The AES XTS context to use for AES XTS operations.
+ * It must be initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or
+ * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT.
+ * \param length The length of a data unit in Bytes. This can be any
+ * length between 16 bytes and 2^24 bytes inclusive
+ * (between 1 and 2^20 block cipher blocks).
+ * \param data_unit The address of the data unit encoded as an array of 16
+ * bytes in little-endian format. For disk encryption, this
+ * is typically the index of the block device sector that
+ * contains the data.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data (which is an entire
+ * data unit). This function reads \p length Bytes from \p
+ * input.
+ * \param output The buffer holding the output data (which is an entire
+ * data unit). This function writes \p length Bytes to \p
+ * output.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if \p length is
+ * smaller than an AES block in size (16 Bytes) or if \p
+ * length is larger than 2^20 blocks (16 MiB).
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ const unsigned char data_unit[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs an AES-CFB128 encryption or decryption
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode
+ * parameter (encrypt or decrypt), on the input data buffer
+ * defined in the \p input parameter.
+ *
+ * For CFB, you must set up the context with mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(),
+ * regardless of whether you are performing an encryption or decryption
+ * operation, that is, regardless of the \p mode parameter. This is
+ * because CFB mode uses the same key schedule for encryption and
+ * decryption.
+ *
+ * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can
+ * call the same function again on the next
+ * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was
+ * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage.
+ * If you need to retain the contents of the
+ * IV, you must either save it manually or use the cipher
+ * module instead.
+ *
+ *
+ * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption.
+ * It must be initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or
+ * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT.
+ * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ * \param iv_off The offset in IV (updated after use).
+ * It must point to a valid \c size_t.
+ * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use).
+ * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer holding the output data.
+ * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ size_t *iv_off,
+ unsigned char iv[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs an AES-CFB8 encryption or decryption
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode
+ * parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer defined
+ * in the \p input parameter.
+ *
+ * Due to the nature of CFB, you must use the same key schedule for
+ * both encryption and decryption operations. Therefore, you must
+ * use the context initialized with mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc() for
+ * both #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT and #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT.
+ *
+ * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can
+ * call the same function again on the next
+ * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was
+ * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage.
+ * If you need to retain the contents of the
+ * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher
+ * module instead.
+ *
+ *
+ * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption.
+ * It must be initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param mode The AES operation: #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or
+ * #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT
+ * \param length The length of the input data.
+ * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use).
+ * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer holding the output data.
+ * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ unsigned char iv[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif /*MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs an AES-OFB (Output Feedback Mode)
+ * encryption or decryption operation.
+ *
+ * For OFB, you must set up the context with
+ * mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(), regardless of whether you are
+ * performing an encryption or decryption operation. This is
+ * because OFB mode uses the same key schedule for encryption and
+ * decryption.
+ *
+ * The OFB operation is identical for encryption or decryption,
+ * therefore no operation mode needs to be specified.
+ *
+ * \note Upon exit, the content of iv, the Initialisation Vector, is
+ * updated so that you can call the same function again on the next
+ * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was encrypted
+ * in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage, by initialising
+ * iv_off to 0 before the first call, and preserving its value
+ * between calls.
+ *
+ * For non-streaming use, the iv should be initialised on each call
+ * to a unique value, and iv_off set to 0 on each call.
+ *
+ * If you need to retain the contents of the initialisation vector,
+ * you must either save it manually or use the cipher module
+ * instead.
+ *
+ * \warning For the OFB mode, the initialisation vector must be unique
+ * every encryption operation. Reuse of an initialisation vector
+ * will compromise security.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption.
+ * It must be initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param length The length of the input data.
+ * \param iv_off The offset in IV (updated after use).
+ * It must point to a valid \c size_t.
+ * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use).
+ * It must be a readable and writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer holding the output data.
+ * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ size_t length,
+ size_t *iv_off,
+ unsigned char iv[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs an AES-CTR encryption or decryption
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * Due to the nature of CTR, you must use the same key schedule
+ * for both encryption and decryption operations. Therefore, you
+ * must use the context initialized with mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc()
+ * for both #MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT and #MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT.
+ *
+ * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so
+ * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with
+ * the same nonce and key.
+ *
+ * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR:
+ *
+ * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over
+ * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to
+ * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and
+ * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p
+ * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be
+ * updated by this function.
+ *
+ * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**128
+ * blocks of data with the same key.
+ *
+ * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p
+ * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a
+ * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one
+ * updated by this function internally.
+ *
+ * For example, you might reserve the first 12 bytes for the
+ * per-message nonce, and the last 4 bytes for internal use. In that
+ * case, before calling this function on a new message you need to
+ * set the first 12 bytes of \p nonce_counter to your chosen nonce
+ * value, the last 4 to 0, and \p nc_off to 0 (which will cause \p
+ * stream_block to be ignored). That way, you can encrypt at most
+ * 2**96 messages of up to 2**32 blocks each with the same key.
+ *
+ * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct
+ * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be unique.
+ * The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a message
+ * counter. An alternative is to generate random nonces, but this
+ * limits the number of messages that can be securely encrypted:
+ * for example, with 96-bit random nonces, you should not encrypt
+ * more than 2**32 messages with the same key.
+ *
+ * Note that for both strategies, sizes are measured in blocks and
+ * that an AES block is 16 bytes.
+ *
+ * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its
+ * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be
+ * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption or decryption.
+ * It must be initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param length The length of the input data.
+ * \param nc_off The offset in the current \p stream_block, for
+ * resuming within the current cipher stream. The
+ * offset pointer should be 0 at the start of a stream.
+ * It must point to a valid \c size_t.
+ * \param nonce_counter The 128-bit nonce and counter.
+ * It must be a readable-writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes.
+ * \param stream_block The saved stream block for resuming. This is
+ * overwritten by the function.
+ * It must be a readable-writeable buffer of \c 16 Bytes.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * It must be readable and of size \p length Bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer holding the output data.
+ * It must be writeable and of size \p length Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ size_t length,
+ size_t *nc_off,
+ unsigned char nonce_counter[16],
+ unsigned char stream_block[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal AES block encryption function. This is only
+ * exposed to allow overriding it using
+ * \c MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The AES context to use for encryption.
+ * \param input The plaintext block.
+ * \param output The output (ciphertext) block.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16]);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+/**
+ * \brief Internal AES block decryption function. This is only
+ * exposed to allow overriding it using see
+ * \c MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The AES context to use for decryption.
+ * \param input The ciphertext block.
+ * \param output The output (plaintext) block.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16]);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/**
+ * \brief Checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c 1 on failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+int mbedtls_aes_self_test(int verbose);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* aes.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aria.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aria.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c685fc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/aria.h
@@ -0,0 +1,343 @@
+/**
+ * \file aria.h
+ *
+ * \brief ARIA block cipher
+ *
+ * The ARIA algorithm is a symmetric block cipher that can encrypt and
+ * decrypt information. It is defined by the Korean Agency for
+ * Technology and Standards (KATS) in <em>KS X 1213:2004</em> (in
+ * Korean, but see http://210.104.33.10/ARIA/index-e.html in English)
+ * and also described by the IETF in <em>RFC 5794</em>.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_ARIA_H
+#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT 1 /**< ARIA encryption. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT 0 /**< ARIA decryption. */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE 16 /**< ARIA block size in bytes. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS 16 /**< Maximum number of rounds in ARIA. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_KEYSIZE 32 /**< Maximum size of an ARIA key in bytes. */
+
+/** Bad input data. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x005C
+
+/** Invalid data input length. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x005E
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT)
+// Regular implementation
+//
+
+/**
+ * \brief The ARIA context-type definition.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_aria_context {
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nr); /*!< The number of rounds (12, 14 or 16) */
+ /*! The ARIA round keys. */
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rk)[MBEDTLS_ARIA_MAX_ROUNDS + 1][MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE / 4];
+}
+mbedtls_aria_context;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */
+#include "aria_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes the specified ARIA context.
+ *
+ * It must be the first API called before using
+ * the context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ARIA context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_aria_init(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function releases and clears the specified ARIA context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ARIA context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which
+ * case this function returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL,
+ * it must point to an initialized ARIA context.
+ */
+void mbedtls_aria_free(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets the encryption key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ARIA context to which the key should be bound.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param key The encryption key. This must be a readable buffer
+ * of size \p keybits Bits.
+ * \param keybits The size of \p key in Bits. Valid options are:
+ * <ul><li>128 bits</li>
+ * <li>192 bits</li>
+ * <li>256 bits</li></ul>
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets the decryption key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ARIA context to which the key should be bound.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param key The decryption key. This must be a readable buffer
+ * of size \p keybits Bits.
+ * \param keybits The size of data passed. Valid options are:
+ * <ul><li>128 bits</li>
+ * <li>192 bits</li>
+ * <li>256 bits</li></ul>
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs an ARIA single-block encryption or
+ * decryption operation.
+ *
+ * It performs encryption or decryption (depending on whether
+ * the key was set for encryption on decryption) on the input
+ * data buffer defined in the \p input parameter.
+ *
+ * mbedtls_aria_init(), and either mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc() or
+ * mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec() must be called before the first
+ * call to this API with the same context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption.
+ * This must be initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param input The 16-Byte buffer holding the input data.
+ * \param output The 16-Byte buffer holding the output data.
+
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE],
+ unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs an ARIA-CBC encryption or decryption operation
+ * on full blocks.
+ *
+ * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode
+ * parameter (encrypt/decrypt), on the input data buffer defined in
+ * the \p input parameter.
+ *
+ * It can be called as many times as needed, until all the input
+ * data is processed. mbedtls_aria_init(), and either
+ * mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc() or mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec() must be called
+ * before the first call to this API with the same context.
+ *
+ * \note This function operates on aligned blocks, that is, the input size
+ * must be a multiple of the ARIA block size of 16 Bytes.
+ *
+ * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can
+ * call the same function again on the next
+ * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was
+ * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage.
+ * If you need to retain the contents of the IV, you should
+ * either save it manually or use the cipher module instead.
+ *
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption.
+ * This must be initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
+ * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT for encryption, or
+ * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT for decryption.
+ * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes. This must be a
+ * multiple of the block size (16 Bytes).
+ * \param iv Initialization vector (updated after use).
+ * This must be a readable buffer of size 16 Bytes.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must
+ * be a readable buffer of length \p length Bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must
+ * be a writable buffer of length \p length Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs an ARIA-CFB128 encryption or decryption
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * It performs the operation defined in the \p mode
+ * parameter (encrypt or decrypt), on the input data buffer
+ * defined in the \p input parameter.
+ *
+ * For CFB, you must set up the context with mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(),
+ * regardless of whether you are performing an encryption or decryption
+ * operation, that is, regardless of the \p mode parameter. This is
+ * because CFB mode uses the same key schedule for encryption and
+ * decryption.
+ *
+ * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can
+ * call the same function again on the next
+ * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was
+ * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage.
+ * If you need to retain the contents of the
+ * IV, you must either save it manually or use the cipher
+ * module instead.
+ *
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption.
+ * This must be initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
+ * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT for encryption, or
+ * #MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT for decryption.
+ * \param length The length of the input data \p input in Bytes.
+ * \param iv_off The offset in IV (updated after use).
+ * This must not be larger than 15.
+ * \param iv The initialization vector (updated after use).
+ * This must be a readable buffer of size 16 Bytes.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must
+ * be a readable buffer of length \p length Bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must
+ * be a writable buffer of length \p length Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ size_t *iv_off,
+ unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs an ARIA-CTR encryption or decryption
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * Due to the nature of CTR, you must use the same key schedule
+ * for both encryption and decryption operations. Therefore, you
+ * must use the context initialized with mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc()
+ * for both #MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT and #MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT.
+ *
+ * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so
+ * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with
+ * the same nonce and key.
+ *
+ * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR:
+ *
+ * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over
+ * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to
+ * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and
+ * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p
+ * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be
+ * updated by this function.
+ *
+ * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**128
+ * blocks of data with the same key.
+ *
+ * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p
+ * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a
+ * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one
+ * updated by this function internally.
+ *
+ * For example, you might reserve the first 12 bytes for the
+ * per-message nonce, and the last 4 bytes for internal use. In that
+ * case, before calling this function on a new message you need to
+ * set the first 12 bytes of \p nonce_counter to your chosen nonce
+ * value, the last 4 to 0, and \p nc_off to 0 (which will cause \p
+ * stream_block to be ignored). That way, you can encrypt at most
+ * 2**96 messages of up to 2**32 blocks each with the same key.
+ *
+ * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct
+ * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be unique.
+ * The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a message
+ * counter. An alternative is to generate random nonces, but this
+ * limits the number of messages that can be securely encrypted:
+ * for example, with 96-bit random nonces, you should not encrypt
+ * more than 2**32 messages with the same key.
+ *
+ * Note that for both strategies, sizes are measured in blocks and
+ * that an ARIA block is 16 bytes.
+ *
+ * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its
+ * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be
+ * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ARIA context to use for encryption or decryption.
+ * This must be initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param length The length of the input data \p input in Bytes.
+ * \param nc_off The offset in Bytes in the current \p stream_block,
+ * for resuming within the current cipher stream. The
+ * offset pointer should be \c 0 at the start of a
+ * stream. This must not be larger than \c 15 Bytes.
+ * \param nonce_counter The 128-bit nonce and counter. This must point to
+ * a read/write buffer of length \c 16 bytes.
+ * \param stream_block The saved stream block for resuming. This must
+ * point to a read/write buffer of length \c 16 bytes.
+ * This is overwritten by the function.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must
+ * be a readable buffer of length \p length Bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must
+ * be a writable buffer of length \p length Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
+ size_t length,
+ size_t *nc_off,
+ unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE],
+ unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/**
+ * \brief Checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success, or \c 1 on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_aria_self_test(int verbose);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* aria.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff019f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1.h
@@ -0,0 +1,642 @@
+/**
+ * \file asn1.h
+ *
+ * \brief Generic ASN.1 parsing
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_ASN1_H
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \addtogroup asn1_module
+ * \{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \name ASN1 Error codes
+ * These error codes are combined with other error codes for
+ * higher error granularity.
+ * e.g. X.509 and PKCS #7 error codes
+ * ASN1 is a standard to specify data structures.
+ * \{
+ */
+/** Out of data when parsing an ASN1 data structure. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA -0x0060
+/** ASN1 tag was of an unexpected value. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG -0x0062
+/** Error when trying to determine the length or invalid length. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH -0x0064
+/** Actual length differs from expected length. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH -0x0066
+/** Data is invalid. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA -0x0068
+/** Memory allocation failed */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED -0x006A
+/** Buffer too small when writing ASN.1 data structure. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL -0x006C
+
+/** \} name ASN1 Error codes */
+
+/**
+ * \name DER constants
+ * These constants comply with the DER encoded ASN.1 type tags.
+ * DER encoding uses hexadecimal representation.
+ * An example DER sequence is:\n
+ * - 0x02 -- tag indicating INTEGER
+ * - 0x01 -- length in octets
+ * - 0x05 -- value
+ * Such sequences are typically read into \c ::mbedtls_x509_buf.
+ * \{
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN 0x01
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER 0x02
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING 0x03
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 0x04
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL 0x05
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID 0x06
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED 0x0A
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING 0x0C
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE 0x10
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET 0x11
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING 0x13
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING 0x14
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING 0x16
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTC_TIME 0x17
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_GENERALIZED_TIME 0x18
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING 0x1C
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING 0x1E
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRIMITIVE 0x00
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED 0x20
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 0x80
+
+/* Slightly smaller way to check if tag is a string tag
+ * compared to canonical implementation. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_IS_STRING_TAG(tag) \
+ ((unsigned int) (tag) < 32u && ( \
+ ((1u << (tag)) & ((1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_BMP_STRING) | \
+ (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING) | \
+ (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_T61_STRING) | \
+ (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING) | \
+ (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_UNIVERSAL_STRING) | \
+ (1u << MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING))) != 0))
+
+/*
+ * Bit masks for each of the components of an ASN.1 tag as specified in
+ * ITU X.690 (08/2015), section 8.1 "General rules for encoding",
+ * paragraph 8.1.2.2:
+ *
+ * Bit 8 7 6 5 1
+ * +-------+-----+------------+
+ * | Class | P/C | Tag number |
+ * +-------+-----+------------+
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_CLASS_MASK 0xC0
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_PC_MASK 0x20
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_TAG_VALUE_MASK 0x1F
+
+/** \} name DER constants */
+
+/** Returns the size of the binary string, without the trailing \\0 */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) - 1)
+
+/**
+ * Compares an mbedtls_asn1_buf structure to a reference OID.
+ *
+ * Only works for 'defined' oid_str values (MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1), you cannot use a
+ * 'unsigned char *oid' here!
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(oid_str, oid_buf) \
+ ((MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(oid_str) != (oid_buf)->len) || \
+ memcmp((oid_str), (oid_buf)->p, (oid_buf)->len) != 0)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(oid_str, oid_buf, oid_buf_len) \
+ ((MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(oid_str) != (oid_buf_len)) || \
+ memcmp((oid_str), (oid_buf), (oid_buf_len)) != 0)
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \name Functions to parse ASN.1 data structures
+ * \{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Type-length-value structure that allows for ASN1 using DER.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_buf {
+ int tag; /**< ASN1 type, e.g. MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING. */
+ size_t len; /**< ASN1 length, in octets. */
+ unsigned char *p; /**< ASN1 data, e.g. in ASCII. */
+}
+mbedtls_asn1_buf;
+
+/**
+ * Container for ASN1 bit strings.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_bitstring {
+ size_t len; /**< ASN1 length, in octets. */
+ unsigned char unused_bits; /**< Number of unused bits at the end of the string */
+ unsigned char *p; /**< Raw ASN1 data for the bit string */
+}
+mbedtls_asn1_bitstring;
+
+/**
+ * Container for a sequence of ASN.1 items
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence {
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf buf; /**< Buffer containing the given ASN.1 item. */
+
+ /** The next entry in the sequence.
+ *
+ * The details of memory management for sequences are not documented and
+ * may change in future versions. Set this field to \p NULL when
+ * initializing a structure, and do not modify it except via Mbed TLS
+ * library functions.
+ */
+ struct mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next;
+}
+mbedtls_asn1_sequence;
+
+/**
+ * Container for a sequence or list of 'named' ASN.1 data items
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data {
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf val; /**< The named value. */
+
+ /** The next entry in the sequence.
+ *
+ * The details of memory management for named data sequences are not
+ * documented and may change in future versions. Set this field to \p NULL
+ * when initializing a structure, and do not modify it except via Mbed TLS
+ * library functions.
+ */
+ struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data *next;
+
+ /** Merge next item into the current one?
+ *
+ * This field exists for the sake of Mbed TLS's X.509 certificate parsing
+ * code and may change in future versions of the library.
+ */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_merged);
+}
+mbedtls_asn1_named_data;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA)
+/**
+ * \brief Get the length of an ASN.1 element.
+ * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the length.
+ *
+ * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the first byte of the length,
+ * i.e. immediately after the tag.
+ * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte
+ * after the length, i.e. the first byte of the content.
+ * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined.
+ * \param end End of data.
+ * \param len On successful completion, \c *len contains the length
+ * read from the ASN.1 input.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA if the ASN.1 element
+ * would end beyond \p end.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the length is unparsable.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_len(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the tag and length of the element.
+ * Check for the requested tag.
+ * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the tag and length.
+ *
+ * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element.
+ * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte
+ * after the length, i.e. the first byte of the content.
+ * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined.
+ * \param end End of data.
+ * \param len On successful completion, \c *len contains the length
+ * read from the ASN.1 input.
+ * \param tag The expected tag.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the data does not start
+ * with the requested tag.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA if the ASN.1 element
+ * would end beyond \p end.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the length is unparsable.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *len, int tag);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Retrieve a boolean ASN.1 tag and its value.
+ * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag.
+ *
+ * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element.
+ * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte
+ * beyond the ASN.1 element.
+ * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined.
+ * \param end End of data.
+ * \param val On success, the parsed value (\c 0 or \c 1).
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful.
+ * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with
+ * a valid ASN.1 BOOLEAN.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ int *val);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Retrieve an integer ASN.1 tag and its value.
+ * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag.
+ *
+ * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element.
+ * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte
+ * beyond the ASN.1 element.
+ * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined.
+ * \param end End of data.
+ * \param val On success, the parsed value.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful.
+ * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with
+ * a valid ASN.1 INTEGER.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the parsed value does
+ * not fit in an \c int.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_int(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ int *val);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Retrieve an enumerated ASN.1 tag and its value.
+ * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag.
+ *
+ * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element.
+ * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte
+ * beyond the ASN.1 element.
+ * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined.
+ * \param end End of data.
+ * \param val On success, the parsed value.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful.
+ * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with
+ * a valid ASN.1 ENUMERATED.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the parsed value does
+ * not fit in an \c int.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_enum(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ int *val);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Retrieve a bitstring ASN.1 tag and its value.
+ * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag.
+ *
+ * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element.
+ * On successful completion, \c *p is equal to \p end.
+ * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined.
+ * \param end End of data.
+ * \param bs On success, ::mbedtls_asn1_bitstring information about
+ * the parsed value.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the input contains
+ * extra data after a valid BIT STRING.
+ * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with
+ * a valid ASN.1 BIT STRING.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_asn1_bitstring *bs);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Retrieve a bitstring ASN.1 tag without unused bits and its
+ * value.
+ * Updates the pointer to the beginning of the bit/octet string.
+ *
+ * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element.
+ * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte
+ * of the content of the BIT STRING.
+ * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined.
+ * \param end End of data.
+ * \param len On success, \c *len is the length of the content in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA if the input starts with
+ * a valid BIT STRING with a nonzero number of unused bits.
+ * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with
+ * a valid ASN.1 BIT STRING.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Parses and splits an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF <tag>".
+ * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full sequence tag.
+ *
+ * This function allocates memory for the sequence elements. You can free
+ * the allocated memory with mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free().
+ *
+ * \note On error, this function may return a partial list in \p cur.
+ * You must set `cur->next = NULL` before calling this function!
+ * Otherwise it is impossible to distinguish a previously non-null
+ * pointer from a pointer to an object allocated by this function.
+ *
+ * \note If the sequence is empty, this function does not modify
+ * \c *cur. If the sequence is valid and non-empty, this
+ * function sets `cur->buf.tag` to \p tag. This allows
+ * callers to distinguish between an empty sequence and
+ * a one-element sequence.
+ *
+ * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element.
+ * On successful completion, \c *p is equal to \p end.
+ * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined.
+ * \param end End of data.
+ * \param cur A ::mbedtls_asn1_sequence which this function fills.
+ * When this function returns, \c *cur is the head of a linked
+ * list. Each node in this list is allocated with
+ * mbedtls_calloc() apart from \p cur itself, and should
+ * therefore be freed with mbedtls_free().
+ * The list describes the content of the sequence.
+ * The head of the list (i.e. \c *cur itself) describes the
+ * first element, `*cur->next` describes the second element, etc.
+ * For each element, `buf.tag == tag`, `buf.len` is the length
+ * of the content of the content of the element, and `buf.p`
+ * points to the first byte of the content (i.e. immediately
+ * past the length of the element).
+ * Note that list elements may be allocated even on error.
+ * \param tag Each element of the sequence must have this tag.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the input contains
+ * extra data after a valid SEQUENCE OF \p tag.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the input starts with
+ * an ASN.1 SEQUENCE in which an element has a tag that
+ * is different from \p tag.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with
+ * a valid ASN.1 SEQUENCE.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur,
+ int tag);
+/**
+ * \brief Free a heap-allocated linked list presentation of
+ * an ASN.1 sequence, including the first element.
+ *
+ * There are two common ways to manage the memory used for the representation
+ * of a parsed ASN.1 sequence:
+ * - Allocate a head node `mbedtls_asn1_sequence *head` with mbedtls_calloc().
+ * Pass this node as the `cur` argument to mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of().
+ * When you have finished processing the sequence,
+ * call mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free() on `head`.
+ * - Allocate a head node `mbedtls_asn1_sequence *head` in any manner,
+ * for example on the stack. Make sure that `head->next == NULL`.
+ * Pass `head` as the `cur` argument to mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of().
+ * When you have finished processing the sequence,
+ * call mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free() on `head->cur`,
+ * then free `head` itself in the appropriate manner.
+ *
+ * \param seq The address of the first sequence component. This may
+ * be \c NULL, in which case this functions returns
+ * immediately.
+ */
+void mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(mbedtls_asn1_sequence *seq);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Traverse an ASN.1 SEQUENCE container and
+ * call a callback for each entry.
+ *
+ * This function checks that the input is a SEQUENCE of elements that
+ * each have a "must" tag, and calls a callback function on the elements
+ * that have a "may" tag.
+ *
+ * For example, to validate that the input is a SEQUENCE of `tag1` and call
+ * `cb` on each element, use
+ * ```
+ * mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(&p, end, 0xff, tag1, 0, 0, cb, ctx);
+ * ```
+ *
+ * To validate that the input is a SEQUENCE of ANY and call `cb` on
+ * each element, use
+ * ```
+ * mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(&p, end, 0, 0, 0, 0, cb, ctx);
+ * ```
+ *
+ * To validate that the input is a SEQUENCE of CHOICE {NULL, OCTET STRING}
+ * and call `cb` on each element that is an OCTET STRING, use
+ * ```
+ * mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(&p, end, 0xfe, 0x04, 0xff, 0x04, cb, ctx);
+ * ```
+ *
+ * The callback is called on the elements with a "may" tag from left to
+ * right. If the input is not a valid SEQUENCE of elements with a "must" tag,
+ * the callback is called on the elements up to the leftmost point where
+ * the input is invalid.
+ *
+ * \warning This function is still experimental and may change
+ * at any time.
+ *
+ * \param p The address of the pointer to the beginning of
+ * the ASN.1 SEQUENCE header. This is updated to
+ * point to the end of the ASN.1 SEQUENCE container
+ * on a successful invocation.
+ * \param end The end of the ASN.1 SEQUENCE container.
+ * \param tag_must_mask A mask to be applied to the ASN.1 tags found within
+ * the SEQUENCE before comparing to \p tag_must_val.
+ * \param tag_must_val The required value of each ASN.1 tag found in the
+ * SEQUENCE, after masking with \p tag_must_mask.
+ * Mismatching tags lead to an error.
+ * For example, a value of \c 0 for both \p tag_must_mask
+ * and \p tag_must_val means that every tag is allowed,
+ * while a value of \c 0xFF for \p tag_must_mask means
+ * that \p tag_must_val is the only allowed tag.
+ * \param tag_may_mask A mask to be applied to the ASN.1 tags found within
+ * the SEQUENCE before comparing to \p tag_may_val.
+ * \param tag_may_val The desired value of each ASN.1 tag found in the
+ * SEQUENCE, after masking with \p tag_may_mask.
+ * Mismatching tags will be silently ignored.
+ * For example, a value of \c 0 for \p tag_may_mask and
+ * \p tag_may_val means that any tag will be considered,
+ * while a value of \c 0xFF for \p tag_may_mask means
+ * that all tags with value different from \p tag_may_val
+ * will be ignored.
+ * \param cb The callback to trigger for each component
+ * in the ASN.1 SEQUENCE that matches \p tag_may_val.
+ * The callback function is called with the following
+ * parameters:
+ * - \p ctx.
+ * - The tag of the current element.
+ * - A pointer to the start of the current element's
+ * content inside the input.
+ * - The length of the content of the current element.
+ * If the callback returns a non-zero value,
+ * the function stops immediately,
+ * forwarding the callback's return value.
+ * \param ctx The context to be passed to the callback \p cb.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful the entire ASN.1 SEQUENCE
+ * was traversed without parsing or callback errors.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the input
+ * contains extra data after a valid SEQUENCE
+ * of elements with an accepted tag.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the input starts
+ * with an ASN.1 SEQUENCE in which an element has a tag
+ * that is not accepted.
+ * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with
+ * a valid ASN.1 SEQUENCE.
+ * \return A non-zero error code forwarded from the callback
+ * \p cb in case the latter returns a non-zero value.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(
+ unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ unsigned char tag_must_mask, unsigned char tag_must_val,
+ unsigned char tag_may_mask, unsigned char tag_may_val,
+ int (*cb)(void *ctx, int tag,
+ unsigned char *start, size_t len),
+ void *ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Retrieve an integer ASN.1 tag and its value.
+ * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full tag.
+ *
+ * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element.
+ * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte
+ * beyond the ASN.1 element.
+ * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined.
+ * \param end End of data.
+ * \param X On success, the parsed value.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful.
+ * \return An ASN.1 error code if the input does not start with
+ * a valid ASN.1 INTEGER.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH if the parsed value does
+ * not fit in an \c int.
+ * \return An MPI error code if the parsed value is too large.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_mpi *X);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Retrieve an AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 sequence.
+ * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full
+ * AlgorithmIdentifier.
+ *
+ * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element.
+ * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte
+ * beyond the AlgorithmIdentifier element.
+ * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined.
+ * \param end End of data.
+ * \param alg The buffer to receive the OID.
+ * \param params The buffer to receive the parameters.
+ * This is zeroized if there are no parameters.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful or a specific ASN.1 or MPI error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Retrieve an AlgorithmIdentifier ASN.1 sequence with NULL or no
+ * params.
+ * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the full
+ * AlgorithmIdentifier.
+ *
+ * \param p On entry, \c *p points to the start of the ASN.1 element.
+ * On successful completion, \c *p points to the first byte
+ * beyond the AlgorithmIdentifier element.
+ * On error, the value of \c *p is undefined.
+ * \param end End of data.
+ * \param alg The buffer to receive the OID.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful or a specific ASN.1 or MPI error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Find a specific named_data entry in a sequence or list based on
+ * the OID.
+ *
+ * \param list The list to seek through
+ * \param oid The OID to look for
+ * \param len Size of the OID
+ *
+ * \return NULL if not found, or a pointer to the existing entry.
+ */
+const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list,
+ const char *oid, size_t len);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+/**
+ * \brief Free a mbedtls_asn1_named_data entry
+ *
+ * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a
+ * future version of the library.
+ * Please use mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list()
+ * or mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow().
+ *
+ * \param entry The named data entry to free.
+ * This function calls mbedtls_free() on
+ * `entry->oid.p` and `entry->val.p`.
+ */
+void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *entry);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free all entries in a mbedtls_asn1_named_data list.
+ *
+ * \param head Pointer to the head of the list of named data entries to free.
+ * This function calls mbedtls_free() on
+ * `entry->oid.p` and `entry->val.p` and then on `entry`
+ * for each list entry, and sets \c *head to \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free all shallow entries in a mbedtls_asn1_named_data list,
+ * but do not free internal pointer targets.
+ *
+ * \param name Head of the list of named data entries to free.
+ * This function calls mbedtls_free() on each list element.
+ */
+void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *name);
+
+/** \} name Functions to parse ASN.1 data structures */
+/** \} addtogroup asn1_module */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* asn1.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c5a85a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h
@@ -0,0 +1,390 @@
+/**
+ * \file asn1write.h
+ *
+ * \brief ASN.1 buffer writing functionality
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(g, f) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ if ((ret = (f)) < 0) \
+ return ret; \
+ else \
+ (g) += ret; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_CLEANUP_ADD(g, f) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ if ((ret = (f)) < 0) \
+ goto cleanup; \
+ else \
+ (g) += ret; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA)
+/**
+ * \brief Write a length field in ASN.1 format.
+ *
+ * \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
+ * \param len The length value to write.
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_len(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ size_t len);
+/**
+ * \brief Write an ASN.1 tag in ASN.1 format.
+ *
+ * \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
+ * \param tag The tag to write.
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ unsigned char tag);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA*/
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Write raw buffer data.
+ *
+ * \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
+ * \param buf The data buffer to write.
+ * \param size The length of the data buffer.
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t size);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Write an arbitrary-precision number (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)
+ * in ASN.1 format.
+ *
+ * \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
+ * \param X The MPI to write.
+ * It must be non-negative.
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *X);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write a NULL tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL) with zero data
+ * in ASN.1 format.
+ *
+ * \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write an OID tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID) and data
+ * in ASN.1 format.
+ *
+ * \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
+ * \param oid The OID to write.
+ * \param oid_len The length of the OID.
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ const char *oid, size_t oid_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write an AlgorithmIdentifier sequence in ASN.1 format.
+ *
+ * \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
+ * \param oid The OID of the algorithm to write.
+ * \param oid_len The length of the algorithm's OID.
+ * \param par_len The length of the parameters, which must be already written.
+ * If 0, NULL parameters are added
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *start,
+ const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
+ size_t par_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write an AlgorithmIdentifier sequence in ASN.1 format.
+ *
+ * \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
+ * \param oid The OID of the algorithm to write.
+ * \param oid_len The length of the algorithm's OID.
+ * \param par_len The length of the parameters, which must be already written.
+ * \param has_par If there are any parameters. If 0, par_len must be 0. If 1
+ * and \p par_len is 0, NULL parameters are added.
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *start,
+ const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
+ size_t par_len, int has_par);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write a boolean tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN) and value
+ * in ASN.1 format.
+ *
+ * \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
+ * \param boolean The boolean value to write, either \c 0 or \c 1.
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ int boolean);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write an int tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER) and value
+ * in ASN.1 format.
+ *
+ * \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
+ * \param val The integer value to write.
+ * It must be non-negative.
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_int(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write an enum tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED) and value
+ * in ASN.1 format.
+ *
+ * \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
+ * \param val The integer value to write.
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using a specific
+ * string encoding tag.
+
+ * \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
+ * \param tag The string encoding tag to write, e.g.
+ * #MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING.
+ * \param text The string to write.
+ * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might
+ * be strictly larger than the number of characters).
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ int tag, const char *text,
+ size_t text_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using the PrintableString
+ * string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING).
+ *
+ * \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
+ * \param text The string to write.
+ * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might
+ * be strictly larger than the number of characters).
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *start,
+ const char *text, size_t text_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write a UTF8 string in ASN.1 format using the UTF8String
+ * string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING).
+ *
+ * \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
+ * \param text The string to write.
+ * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might
+ * be strictly larger than the number of characters).
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ const char *text, size_t text_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write a string in ASN.1 format using the IA5String
+ * string encoding tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING).
+ *
+ * \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
+ * \param text The string to write.
+ * \param text_len The length of \p text in bytes (which might
+ * be strictly larger than the number of characters).
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ const char *text, size_t text_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write a bitstring tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING) and
+ * value in ASN.1 format.
+ *
+ * \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
+ * \param buf The bitstring to write.
+ * \param bits The total number of bits in the bitstring.
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function writes a named bitstring tag
+ * (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING) and value in ASN.1 format.
+ *
+ * As stated in RFC 5280 Appendix B, trailing zeroes are
+ * omitted when encoding named bitstrings in DER.
+ *
+ * \note This function works backwards within the data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer which is used for bounds-checking.
+ * \param buf The bitstring to write.
+ * \param bits The total number of bits in the bitstring.
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *start,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t bits);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write an octet string tag (#MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+ * and value in ASN.1 format.
+ *
+ * \note This function works backwards in data buffer.
+ *
+ * \param p The reference to the current position pointer.
+ * \param start The start of the buffer, for bounds-checking.
+ * \param buf The buffer holding the data to write.
+ * \param size The length of the data buffer \p buf.
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes written to \p p on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t size);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Create or find a specific named_data entry for writing in a
+ * sequence or list based on the OID. If not already in there,
+ * a new entry is added to the head of the list.
+ * Warning: Destructive behaviour for the val data!
+ *
+ * \param list The pointer to the location of the head of the list to seek
+ * through (will be updated in case of a new entry).
+ * \param oid The OID to look for.
+ * \param oid_len The size of the OID.
+ * \param val The associated data to store. If this is \c NULL,
+ * no data is copied to the new or existing buffer.
+ * \param val_len The minimum length of the data buffer needed.
+ * If this is 0, do not allocate a buffer for the associated
+ * data.
+ * If the OID was already present, enlarge, shrink or free
+ * the existing buffer to fit \p val_len.
+ *
+ * \return A pointer to the new / existing entry on success.
+ * \return \c NULL if there was a memory allocation error.
+ */
+mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **list,
+ const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
+ const unsigned char *val,
+ size_t val_len);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/base64.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/base64.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f459b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/base64.h
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/**
+ * \file base64.h
+ *
+ * \brief RFC 1521 base64 encoding/decoding
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_BASE64_H
+#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+/** Output buffer too small. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x002A
+/** Invalid character in input. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER -0x002C
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encode a buffer into base64 format
+ *
+ * \param dst destination buffer
+ * \param dlen size of the destination buffer
+ * \param olen number of bytes written
+ * \param src source buffer
+ * \param slen amount of data to be encoded
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
+ * *olen is always updated to reflect the amount
+ * of data that has (or would have) been written.
+ * If that length cannot be represented, then no data is
+ * written to the buffer and *olen is set to the maximum
+ * length representable as a size_t.
+ *
+ * \note Call this function with dlen = 0 to obtain the
+ * required buffer size in *olen
+ */
+int mbedtls_base64_encode(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen,
+ const unsigned char *src, size_t slen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Decode a base64-formatted buffer
+ *
+ * \param dst destination buffer (can be NULL for checking size)
+ * \param dlen size of the destination buffer
+ * \param olen number of bytes written
+ * \param src source buffer
+ * \param slen amount of data to be decoded
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, or
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER if the input data is
+ * not correct. *olen is always updated to reflect the amount
+ * of data that has (or would have) been written.
+ *
+ * \note Call this function with *dst = NULL or dlen = 0 to obtain
+ * the required buffer size in *olen
+ */
+int mbedtls_base64_decode(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen,
+ const unsigned char *src, size_t slen);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/**
+ * \brief Checkup routine
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed
+ */
+int mbedtls_base64_self_test(int verbose);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* base64.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bignum.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1e1c063
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/bignum.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1085 @@
+/**
+ * \file bignum.h
+ *
+ * \brief Multi-precision integer library
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+#include <stdio.h>
+#endif
+
+/** An error occurred while reading from or writing to a file. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x0002
+/** Bad input parameters to function. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0004
+/** There is an invalid character in the digit string. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER -0x0006
+/** The buffer is too small to write to. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x0008
+/** The input arguments are negative or result in illegal output. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE -0x000A
+/** The input argument for division is zero, which is not allowed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO -0x000C
+/** The input arguments are not acceptable. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE -0x000E
+/** Memory allocation failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED -0x0010
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(f) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ if ((ret = (f)) != 0) \
+ goto cleanup; \
+ } while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Maximum size MPIs are allowed to grow to in number of limbs.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS 10000
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE)
+/*
+ * Maximum window size used for modular exponentiation. Default: 3
+ * Minimum value: 1. Maximum value: 6.
+ *
+ * Result is an array of ( 2 ** MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE ) MPIs used
+ * for the sliding window calculation. (So 8 by default)
+ *
+ * Reduction in size, reduces speed.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 3 /**< Maximum window size used. */
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE)
+/*
+ * Maximum size of MPIs allowed in bits and bytes for user-MPIs.
+ * ( Default: 512 bytes => 4096 bits, Maximum tested: 2048 bytes => 16384 bits )
+ *
+ * Note: Calculations can temporarily result in larger MPIs. So the number
+ * of limbs required (MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS) is higher.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum number of bytes for usable MPIs. */
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS (8 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE) /**< Maximum number of bits for usable MPIs. */
+
+/*
+ * When reading from files with mbedtls_mpi_read_file() and writing to files with
+ * mbedtls_mpi_write_file() the buffer should have space
+ * for a (short) label, the MPI (in the provided radix), the newline
+ * characters and the '\0'.
+ *
+ * By default we assume at least a 10 char label, a minimum radix of 10
+ * (decimal) and a maximum of 4096 bit numbers (1234 decimal chars).
+ * Autosized at compile time for at least a 10 char label, a minimum radix
+ * of 10 (decimal) for a number of MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS size.
+ *
+ * This used to be statically sized to 1250 for a maximum of 4096 bit
+ * numbers (1234 decimal chars).
+ *
+ * Calculate using the formula:
+ * MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE = ceil(MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS / ln(10) * ln(2)) +
+ * LabelSize + 6
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 (100 * MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS)
+#define MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 332
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE (((MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS_SCALE100 + \
+ MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100 - 1) / \
+ MBEDTLS_LN_2_DIV_LN_10_SCALE100) + 10 + 6)
+
+/*
+ * Define the base integer type, architecture-wise.
+ *
+ * 32 or 64-bit integer types can be forced regardless of the underlying
+ * architecture by defining MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 or MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64
+ * respectively and undefining MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM.
+ *
+ * Double-width integers (e.g. 128-bit in 64-bit architectures) can be
+ * disabled by defining MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION.
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32)
+ #if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_AMD64)
+/* Always choose 64-bit when using MSC */
+ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64)
+ #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64
+ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */
+typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint;
+typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint;
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX UINT64_MAX
+ #elif defined(__GNUC__) && ( \
+ defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+ defined(__ppc64__) || defined(__powerpc64__) || \
+ defined(__ia64__) || defined(__alpha__) || \
+ (defined(__sparc__) && defined(__arch64__)) || \
+ defined(__s390x__) || defined(__mips64) || \
+ defined(__aarch64__))
+ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64)
+ #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64
+ #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */
+typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint;
+typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint;
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX UINT64_MAX
+ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION)
+/* mbedtls_t_udbl defined as 128-bit unsigned int */
+typedef unsigned int mbedtls_t_udbl __attribute__((mode(TI)));
+ #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL
+ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */
+ #elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && defined(__aarch64__)
+/*
+ * __ARMCC_VERSION is defined for both armcc and armclang and
+ * __aarch64__ is only defined by armclang when compiling 64-bit code
+ */
+ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64)
+ #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64
+ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */
+typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint;
+typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint;
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX UINT64_MAX
+ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION)
+/* mbedtls_t_udbl defined as 128-bit unsigned int */
+typedef __uint128_t mbedtls_t_udbl;
+ #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL
+ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */
+ #elif defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64)
+/* Force 64-bit integers with unknown compiler */
+typedef int64_t mbedtls_mpi_sint;
+typedef uint64_t mbedtls_mpi_uint;
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX UINT64_MAX
+ #endif
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64)
+/* Default to 32-bit compilation */
+ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32)
+ #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32
+ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 */
+typedef int32_t mbedtls_mpi_sint;
+typedef uint32_t mbedtls_mpi_uint;
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX UINT32_MAX
+ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION)
+typedef uint64_t mbedtls_t_udbl;
+ #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL
+ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION */
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */
+
+/*
+ * Sanity check that exactly one of MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 or MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 is defined,
+ * so that code elsewhere doesn't have to check.
+ */
+#if (!(defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) || defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64))) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64))
+#error "Only 32-bit or 64-bit limbs are supported in bignum"
+#endif
+
+/** \typedef mbedtls_mpi_uint
+ * \brief The type of machine digits in a bignum, called _limbs_.
+ *
+ * This is always an unsigned integer type with no padding bits. The size
+ * is platform-dependent.
+ */
+
+/** \typedef mbedtls_mpi_sint
+ * \brief The signed type corresponding to #mbedtls_mpi_uint.
+ *
+ * This is always an signed integer type with no padding bits. The size
+ * is platform-dependent.
+ */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief MPI structure
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_mpi {
+ /** Pointer to limbs.
+ *
+ * This may be \c NULL if \c n is 0.
+ */
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p);
+
+ /** Sign: -1 if the mpi is negative, 1 otherwise.
+ *
+ * The number 0 must be represented with `s = +1`. Although many library
+ * functions treat all-limbs-zero as equivalent to a valid representation
+ * of 0 regardless of the sign bit, there are exceptions, so bignum
+ * functions and external callers must always set \c s to +1 for the
+ * number zero.
+ *
+ * Note that this implies that calloc() or `... = {0}` does not create
+ * a valid MPI representation. You must call mbedtls_mpi_init().
+ */
+ signed short MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(s);
+
+ /** Total number of limbs in \c p. */
+ unsigned short MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(n);
+ /* Make sure that MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS fits in n.
+ * Use the same limit value on all platforms so that we don't have to
+ * think about different behavior on the rare platforms where
+ * unsigned short can store values larger than the minimum required by
+ * the C language, which is 65535.
+ */
+#if MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS > 65535
+#error "MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS > 65535 is not supported"
+#endif
+}
+mbedtls_mpi;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize an MPI context.
+ *
+ * This makes the MPI ready to be set or freed,
+ * but does not define a value for the MPI.
+ *
+ * \param X The MPI context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_init(mbedtls_mpi *X);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function frees the components of an MPI context.
+ *
+ * \param X The MPI context to be cleared. This may be \c NULL,
+ * in which case this function is a no-op. If it is
+ * not \c NULL, it must point to an initialized MPI.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_free(mbedtls_mpi *X);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Enlarge an MPI to the specified number of limbs.
+ *
+ * \note This function does nothing if the MPI is
+ * already large enough.
+ *
+ * \param X The MPI to grow. It must be initialized.
+ * \param nblimbs The target number of limbs.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_grow(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function resizes an MPI downwards, keeping at least the
+ * specified number of limbs.
+ *
+ * If \c X is smaller than \c nblimbs, it is resized up
+ * instead.
+ *
+ * \param X The MPI to shrink. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param nblimbs The minimum number of limbs to keep.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed
+ * (this can only happen when resizing up).
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_shrink(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Make a copy of an MPI.
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param Y The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ *
+ * \note The limb-buffer in the destination MPI is enlarged
+ * if necessary to hold the value in the source MPI.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_copy(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Swap the contents of two MPIs.
+ *
+ * \param X The first MPI. It must be initialized.
+ * \param Y The second MPI. It must be initialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a safe conditional copy of MPI which doesn't
+ * reveal whether the condition was true or not.
+ *
+ * \param X The MPI to conditionally assign to. This must point
+ * to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param Y The MPI to be assigned from. This must point to an
+ * initialized MPI.
+ * \param assign The condition deciding whether to perform the
+ * assignment or not. Must be either 0 or 1:
+ * * \c 1: Perform the assignment `X = Y`.
+ * * \c 0: Keep the original value of \p X.
+ *
+ * \note This function is equivalent to
+ * `if( assign ) mbedtls_mpi_copy( X, Y );`
+ * except that it avoids leaking any information about whether
+ * the assignment was done or not (the above code may leak
+ * information through branch prediction and/or memory access
+ * patterns analysis).
+ *
+ * \warning If \p assign is neither 0 nor 1, the result of this function
+ * is indeterminate, and the resulting value in \p X might be
+ * neither its original value nor the value in \p Y.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char assign);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a safe conditional swap which doesn't
+ * reveal whether the condition was true or not.
+ *
+ * \param X The first MPI. This must be initialized.
+ * \param Y The second MPI. This must be initialized.
+ * \param swap The condition deciding whether to perform
+ * the swap or not. Must be either 0 or 1:
+ * * \c 1: Swap the values of \p X and \p Y.
+ * * \c 0: Keep the original values of \p X and \p Y.
+ *
+ * \note This function is equivalent to
+ * if( swap ) mbedtls_mpi_swap( X, Y );
+ * except that it avoids leaking any information about whether
+ * the swap was done or not (the above code may leak
+ * information through branch prediction and/or memory access
+ * patterns analysis).
+ *
+ * \warning If \p swap is neither 0 nor 1, the result of this function
+ * is indeterminate, and both \p X and \p Y might end up with
+ * values different to either of the original ones.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y, unsigned char swap);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Store integer value in MPI.
+ *
+ * \param X The MPI to set. This must be initialized.
+ * \param z The value to use.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_lset(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get a specific bit from an MPI.
+ *
+ * \param X The MPI to query. This must be initialized.
+ * \param pos Zero-based index of the bit to query.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 or \c 1 on success, depending on whether bit \c pos
+ * of \c X is unset or set.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Modify a specific bit in an MPI.
+ *
+ * \note This function will grow the target MPI if necessary to set a
+ * bit to \c 1 in a not yet existing limb. It will not grow if
+ * the bit should be set to \c 0.
+ *
+ * \param X The MPI to modify. This must be initialized.
+ * \param pos Zero-based index of the bit to modify.
+ * \param val The desired value of bit \c pos: \c 0 or \c 1.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return the number of bits of value \c 0 before the
+ * least significant bit of value \c 1.
+ *
+ * \note This is the same as the zero-based index of
+ * the least significant bit of value \c 1.
+ *
+ * \param X The MPI to query.
+ *
+ * \return The number of bits of value \c 0 before the least significant
+ * bit of value \c 1 in \p X.
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_lsb(const mbedtls_mpi *X);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return the number of bits up to and including the most
+ * significant bit of value \c 1.
+ *
+ * * \note This is same as the one-based index of the most
+ * significant bit of value \c 1.
+ *
+ * \param X The MPI to query. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ *
+ * \return The number of bits up to and including the most
+ * significant bit of value \c 1.
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(const mbedtls_mpi *X);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return the total size of an MPI value in bytes.
+ *
+ * \param X The MPI to use. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ *
+ * \note The value returned by this function may be less than
+ * the number of bytes used to store \p X internally.
+ * This happens if and only if there are trailing bytes
+ * of value zero.
+ *
+ * \return The least number of bytes capable of storing
+ * the absolute value of \p X.
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_size(const mbedtls_mpi *X);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Import an MPI from an ASCII string.
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param radix The numeric base of the input string.
+ * \param s Null-terminated string buffer.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_read_string(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Export an MPI to an ASCII string.
+ *
+ * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param radix The numeric base of the output string.
+ * \param buf The buffer to write the string to. This must be writable
+ * buffer of length \p buflen Bytes.
+ * \param buflen The available size in Bytes of \p buf.
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the length of the string
+ * written, including the final \c NULL byte. This must
+ * not be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \note You can call this function with `buflen == 0` to obtain the
+ * minimum required buffer size in `*olen`.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the target buffer \p buf
+ * is too small to hold the value of \p X in the desired base.
+ * In this case, `*olen` is nonetheless updated to contain the
+ * size of \p buf required for a successful call.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_write_string(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix,
+ char *buf, size_t buflen, size_t *olen);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+/**
+ * \brief Read an MPI from a line in an opened file.
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param radix The numeric base of the string representation used
+ * in the source line.
+ * \param fin The input file handle to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \note On success, this function advances the file stream
+ * to the end of the current line or to EOF.
+ *
+ * The function returns \c 0 on an empty line.
+ *
+ * Leading whitespaces are ignored, as is a
+ * '0x' prefix for radix \c 16.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the file read buffer
+ * is too small.
+ * \return Another negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_read_file(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Export an MPI into an opened file.
+ *
+ * \param p A string prefix to emit prior to the MPI data.
+ * For example, this might be a label, or "0x" when
+ * printing in base \c 16. This may be \c NULL if no prefix
+ * is needed.
+ * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param radix The numeric base to be used in the emitted string.
+ * \param fout The output file handle. This may be \c NULL, in which case
+ * the output is written to \c stdout.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_write_file(const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ int radix, FILE *fout);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Import an MPI from unsigned big endian binary data.
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param buf The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer of length
+ * \p buflen Bytes.
+ * \param buflen The length of the input buffer \p buf in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Import X from unsigned binary data, little endian
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param buf The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer of length
+ * \p buflen Bytes.
+ * \param buflen The length of the input buffer \p buf in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le(mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Export X into unsigned binary data, big endian.
+ * Always fills the whole buffer, which will start with zeros
+ * if the number is smaller.
+ *
+ * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer of length
+ * \p buflen Bytes.
+ * \param buflen The size of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't
+ * large enough to hold the value of \p X.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(const mbedtls_mpi *X, unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Export X into unsigned binary data, little endian.
+ * Always fills the whole buffer, which will end with zeros
+ * if the number is smaller.
+ *
+ * \param X The source MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer of length
+ * \p buflen Bytes.
+ * \param buflen The size of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't
+ * large enough to hold the value of \p X.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(const mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a left-shift on an MPI: X <<= count
+ *
+ * \param X The MPI to shift. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * The MPI pointed by \p X may be resized to fit
+ * the resulting number.
+ * \param count The number of bits to shift by.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a right-shift on an MPI: X >>= count
+ *
+ * \param X The MPI to shift. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param count The number of bits to shift by.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compare the absolute values of two MPIs.
+ *
+ * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param Y The right-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ *
+ * \return \c 1 if `|X|` is greater than `|Y|`.
+ * \return \c -1 if `|X|` is lesser than `|Y|`.
+ * \return \c 0 if `|X|` is equal to `|Y|`.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compare two MPIs.
+ *
+ * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param Y The right-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ *
+ * \return \c 1 if \p X is greater than \p Y.
+ * \return \c -1 if \p X is lesser than \p Y.
+ * \return \c 0 if \p X is equal to \p Y.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Check if an MPI is less than the other in constant time.
+ *
+ * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI
+ * with the same allocated length as Y.
+ * \param Y The right-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI
+ * with the same allocated length as X.
+ * \param ret The result of the comparison:
+ * \c 1 if \p X is less than \p Y.
+ * \c 0 if \p X is greater than or equal to \p Y.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success.
+ * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the allocated length of
+ * the two input MPIs is not the same.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y,
+ unsigned *ret);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compare an MPI with an integer.
+ *
+ * \param X The left-hand MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param z The integer value to compare \p X to.
+ *
+ * \return \c 1 if \p X is greater than \p z.
+ * \return \c -1 if \p X is lesser than \p z.
+ * \return \c 0 if \p X is equal to \p z.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform an unsigned addition of MPIs: X = |A| + |B|
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param A The first summand. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param B The second summand. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *B);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform an unsigned subtraction of MPIs: X = |A| - |B|
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param A The minuend. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param B The subtrahend. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p B is greater than \p A.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *B);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a signed addition of MPIs: X = A + B
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param A The first summand. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param B The second summand. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *B);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a signed subtraction of MPIs: X = A - B
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param A The minuend. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param B The subtrahend. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *B);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a signed addition of an MPI and an integer: X = A + b
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param A The first summand. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param b The second summand.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_add_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ mbedtls_mpi_sint b);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a signed subtraction of an MPI and an integer:
+ * X = A - b
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param A The minuend. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param b The subtrahend.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ mbedtls_mpi_sint b);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a multiplication of two MPIs: X = A * B
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param A The first factor. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param B The second factor. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *B);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a multiplication of an MPI with an unsigned integer:
+ * X = A * b
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param A The first factor. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param b The second factor.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint b);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a division with remainder of two MPIs:
+ * A = Q * B + R
+ *
+ * \param Q The destination MPI for the quotient.
+ * This may be \c NULL if the value of the
+ * quotient is not needed. This must not alias A or B.
+ * \param R The destination MPI for the remainder value.
+ * This may be \c NULL if the value of the
+ * remainder is not needed. This must not alias A or B.
+ * \param A The dividend. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param B The divisor. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p B equals zero.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *B);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a division with remainder of an MPI by an integer:
+ * A = Q * b + R
+ *
+ * \param Q The destination MPI for the quotient.
+ * This may be \c NULL if the value of the
+ * quotient is not needed. This must not alias A.
+ * \param R The destination MPI for the remainder value.
+ * This may be \c NULL if the value of the
+ * remainder is not needed. This must not alias A.
+ * \param A The dividend. This must point to an initialized MPi.
+ * \param b The divisor.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p b equals zero.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_div_int(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ mbedtls_mpi_sint b);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a modular reduction. R = A mod B
+ *
+ * \param R The destination MPI for the residue value.
+ * This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param A The MPI to compute the residue of.
+ * This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param B The base of the modular reduction.
+ * This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p B equals zero.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p B is negative.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *B);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a modular reduction with respect to an integer.
+ * r = A mod b
+ *
+ * \param r The address at which to store the residue.
+ * This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param A The MPI to compute the residue of.
+ * This must point to an initialized MPi.
+ * \param b The integer base of the modular reduction.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p b equals zero.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p b is negative.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ mbedtls_mpi_sint b);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a modular exponentiation: X = A^E mod N
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * This must not alias E or N.
+ * \param A The base of the exponentiation.
+ * This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param E The exponent MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param N The base for the modular reduction. This must point to an
+ * initialized MPI.
+ * \param prec_RR A helper MPI depending solely on \p N which can be used to
+ * speed-up multiple modular exponentiations for the same value
+ * of \p N. This may be \c NULL. If it is not \c NULL, it must
+ * point to an initialized MPI. If it hasn't been used after
+ * the call to mbedtls_mpi_init(), this function will compute
+ * the helper value and store it in \p prec_RR for reuse on
+ * subsequent calls to this function. Otherwise, the function
+ * will assume that \p prec_RR holds the helper value set by a
+ * previous call to mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(), and reuse it.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \c N is negative or
+ * even, or if \c E is negative.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failures.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N,
+ mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Fill an MPI with a number of random bytes.
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param size The number of random bytes to generate.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on failure.
+ *
+ * \note The bytes obtained from the RNG are interpreted
+ * as a big-endian representation of an MPI; this can
+ * be relevant in applications like deterministic ECDSA.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/** Generate a random number uniformly in a range.
+ *
+ * This function generates a random number between \p min inclusive and
+ * \p N exclusive.
+ *
+ * The procedure complies with RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA)
+ * when the RNG is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG
+ * and \p min is \c 1.
+ *
+ * \note There are `N - min` possible outputs. The lower bound
+ * \p min can be reached, but the upper bound \p N cannot.
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param min The minimum value to return.
+ * It must be nonnegative.
+ * \param N The upper bound of the range, exclusive.
+ * In other words, this is one plus the maximum value to return.
+ * \p N must be strictly larger than \p min.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p min or \p N is invalid
+ * or if they are incompatible.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if the implementation was
+ * unable to find a suitable value within a limited number
+ * of attempts. This has a negligible probability if \p N
+ * is significantly larger than \p min, which is the case
+ * for all usual cryptographic applications.
+ * \return Another negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_random(mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ mbedtls_mpi_sint min,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *N,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute the greatest common divisor: G = gcd(A, B)
+ *
+ * \param G The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param A The first operand. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param B The second operand. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_gcd(mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *B);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compute the modular inverse: X = A^-1 mod N
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param A The MPI to calculate the modular inverse of. This must point
+ * to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param N The base of the modular inversion. This must point to an
+ * initialized MPI.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p N is less than
+ * or equal to one.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p A has no modular
+ * inverse with respect to \p N.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *N);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Miller-Rabin primality test.
+ *
+ * \warning If \p X is potentially generated by an adversary, for example
+ * when validating cryptographic parameters that you didn't
+ * generate yourself and that are supposed to be prime, then
+ * \p rounds should be at least the half of the security
+ * strength of the cryptographic algorithm. On the other hand,
+ * if \p X is chosen uniformly or non-adversarially (as is the
+ * case when mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime calls this function), then
+ * \p rounds can be much lower.
+ *
+ * \param X The MPI to check for primality.
+ * This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param rounds The number of bases to perform the Miller-Rabin primality
+ * test for. The probability of returning 0 on a composite is
+ * at most 2<sup>-2*\p rounds </sup>.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng.
+ * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use
+ * a context parameter.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful, i.e. \p X is probably prime.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if \p X is not prime.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+/**
+ * \brief Flags for mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime()
+ *
+ * Each of these flags is a constraint on the result X returned by
+ * mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime().
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH = 0x0001, /**< (X-1)/2 is prime too */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR = 0x0002, /**< lower error rate from 2<sup>-80</sup> to 2<sup>-128</sup> */
+} mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime_flag_t;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Generate a prime number.
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI to store the generated prime in.
+ * This must point to an initialized MPi.
+ * \param nbits The required size of the destination MPI in bits.
+ * This must be between \c 3 and #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS.
+ * \param flags A mask of flags of type #mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime_flag_t.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng.
+ * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use
+ * a context parameter.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful, in which case \p X holds a
+ * probably prime number.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if `nbits` is not between
+ * \c 3 and #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Checkup routine
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_self_test(int verbose);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* bignum.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/block_cipher.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/block_cipher.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f60f6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/block_cipher.h
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/**
+ * \file block_cipher.h
+ *
+ * \brief Internal abstraction layer.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_H
+#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+#include "mbedtls/aria.h"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+#include "mbedtls/camellia.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
+#include "psa/crypto_types.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE = 0, /**< Unset. */
+ MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES, /**< The AES cipher. */
+ MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, /**< The Camellia cipher. */
+ MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, /**< The Aria cipher. */
+} mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t;
+
+/**
+ * Used internally to indicate whether a context uses legacy or PSA.
+ *
+ * Internal use only.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_LEGACY = 0,
+ MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA,
+} mbedtls_block_cipher_engine_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
+ mbedtls_block_cipher_engine_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(engine);
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_key_id);
+#endif
+ union {
+ unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+ mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aes);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+ mbedtls_aria_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aria);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+ mbedtls_camellia_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(camellia);
+#endif
+ } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
+} mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t;
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/build_info.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/build_info.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e18e823
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/build_info.h
@@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
+/**
+ * \file mbedtls/build_info.h
+ *
+ * \brief Build-time configuration info
+ *
+ * Include this file if you need to depend on the
+ * configuration options defined in mbedtls_config.h or MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_BUILD_INFO_H
+#define MBEDTLS_BUILD_INFO_H
+
+/*
+ * This set of compile-time defines can be used to determine the version number
+ * of the Mbed TLS library used. Run-time variables for the same can be found in
+ * version.h
+ */
+
+/**
+ * The version number x.y.z is split into three parts.
+ * Major, Minor, Patchlevel
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 3
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 6
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 4
+
+/**
+ * The single version number has the following structure:
+ * MMNNPP00
+ * Major version | Minor version | Patch version
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x03060400
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "3.6.4"
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "Mbed TLS 3.6.4"
+
+/* Macros for build-time platform detection */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) && \
+ (defined(__aarch64__) || defined(_M_ARM64) || defined(_M_ARM64EC))
+#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) && \
+ (defined(__arm__) || defined(_M_ARM) || \
+ defined(_M_ARMT) || defined(__thumb__) || defined(__thumb2__))
+#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) && \
+ (defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
+ ((defined(_M_X64) || defined(_M_AMD64)) && !defined(_M_ARM64EC)))
+#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) && \
+ (defined(__i386__) || defined(_X86_) || \
+ (defined(_M_IX86) && !defined(_M_I86)))
+#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) && \
+ (defined(_M_ARM64) || defined(_M_ARM64EC))
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64
+#endif
+
+/* This is defined if the architecture is Armv8-A, or higher */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A)
+#if defined(__ARM_ARCH) && defined(__ARM_ARCH_PROFILE)
+#if (__ARM_ARCH >= 8) && (__ARM_ARCH_PROFILE == 'A')
+/* GCC, clang, armclang and IAR */
+#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A
+#endif
+#elif defined(__ARM_ARCH_8A)
+/* Alternative defined by clang */
+#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A
+#elif defined(_M_ARM64) || defined(_M_ARM64EC)
+/* MSVC ARM64 is at least Armv8.0-A */
+#define MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && !defined(__clang__) \
+ && !defined(__llvm__) && !defined(__INTEL_COMPILER)
+/* Defined if the compiler really is gcc and not clang, etc */
+#define MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC
+#define MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION \
+ (__GNUC__ * 10000 + __GNUC_MINOR__ * 100 + __GNUC_PATCHLEVEL__)
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE)
+#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1
+#endif
+
+/* Define `inline` on some non-C99-compliant compilers. */
+#if (defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || defined(_MSC_VER)) && \
+ !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus)
+#define inline __inline
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILES_READ)
+#error "Something went wrong: MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILES_READ defined before reading the config files!"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_IS_FINALIZED)
+#error "Something went wrong: MBEDTLS_CONFIG_IS_FINALIZED defined before reading the config files!"
+#endif
+
+/* X.509, TLS and non-PSA crypto configuration */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
+#include "mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h"
+#else
+#include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION) && ( \
+ MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION < 0x03000000 || \
+ MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION > MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER)
+#error "Invalid config version, defined value of MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION is unsupported"
+#endif
+
+/* Target and application specific configurations
+ *
+ * Allow user to override any previous default.
+ *
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE)
+#include MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE
+#endif
+
+/* PSA crypto configuration */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE)
+#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE
+#else
+#include "psa/crypto_config.h"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE)
+#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE
+#endif
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) */
+
+/* Indicate that all configuration files have been read.
+ * It is now time to adjust the configuration (follow through on dependencies,
+ * make PSA and legacy crypto consistent, etc.).
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILES_READ
+
+/* Auto-enable MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY if
+ * MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH and MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C defined
+ * to ensure a 128-bit key size in CTR_DRBG.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY
+#endif
+
+/* Auto-enable MBEDTLS_MD_C if needed by a module that didn't require it
+ * in a previous release, to ensure backwards compatibility.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_C
+#endif
+
+/* PSA crypto specific configuration options
+ * - If config_psa.h reads a configuration option in preprocessor directive,
+ * this symbol should be set before its inclusion. (e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+ * - If config_psa.h writes a configuration option in conditional directive,
+ * this symbol should be consulted after its inclusion.
+ * (e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT)
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) /* PSA_WANT_xxx influences MBEDTLS_xxx */ || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) /* MBEDTLS_xxx influences PSA_WANT_xxx */ || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) /* The same as the previous, but with separation only */
+#include "mbedtls/config_psa.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h"
+
+/* Indicate that all configuration symbols are set,
+ * even the ones that are calculated programmatically.
+ * It is now safe to query the configuration (to check it, to size buffers,
+ * etc.).
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_IS_FINALIZED
+
+#include "mbedtls/check_config.h"
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BUILD_INFO_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/camellia.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/camellia.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..557f472
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/camellia.h
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+/**
+ * \file camellia.h
+ *
+ * \brief Camellia block cipher
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT 1
+#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT 0
+
+/** Bad input data. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0024
+
+/** Invalid data input length. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0026
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT)
+// Regular implementation
+//
+
+/**
+ * \brief CAMELLIA context structure
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_camellia_context {
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nr); /*!< number of rounds */
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rk)[68]; /*!< CAMELLIA round keys */
+}
+mbedtls_camellia_context;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */
+#include "camellia_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a CAMELLIA context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to be initialized.
+ * This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_camellia_init(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Clear a CAMELLIA context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to be cleared. This may be \c NULL,
+ * in which case this function returns immediately. If it is not
+ * \c NULL, it must be initialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_camellia_free(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA key schedule operation for encryption.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized.
+ * \param key The encryption key to use. This must be a readable buffer
+ * of size \p keybits Bits.
+ * \param keybits The length of \p key in Bits. This must be either \c 128,
+ * \c 192 or \c 256.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA key schedule operation for decryption.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized.
+ * \param key The decryption key. This must be a readable buffer
+ * of size \p keybits Bits.
+ * \param keybits The length of \p key in Bits. This must be either \c 128,
+ * \c 192 or \c 256.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-ECB block encryption/decryption operation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized
+ * and bound to a key.
+ * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
+ * #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT.
+ * \param input The input block. This must be a readable buffer
+ * of size \c 16 Bytes.
+ * \param output The output block. This must be a writable buffer
+ * of size \c 16 Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16]);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-CBC buffer encryption/decryption operation.
+ *
+ * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can
+ * call the function same function again on the following
+ * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was
+ * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage.
+ * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the
+ * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher
+ * module instead.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized
+ * and bound to a key.
+ * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
+ * #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT.
+ * \param length The length in Bytes of the input data \p input.
+ * This must be a multiple of \c 16 Bytes.
+ * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer
+ * of length \c 16 Bytes. It is updated to allow streaming
+ * use as explained above.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must point to a
+ * readable buffer of length \p length Bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer holding the output data. This must point to a
+ * writable buffer of length \p length Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ unsigned char iv[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * \note Due to the nature of CFB mode, you should use the same
+ * key for both encryption and decryption. In particular, calls
+ * to this function should be preceded by a key-schedule via
+ * mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc() regardless of whether \p mode
+ * is #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT.
+ *
+ * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can
+ * call the function same function again on the following
+ * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was
+ * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage.
+ * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the
+ * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher
+ * module instead.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized
+ * and bound to a key.
+ * \param mode The mode of operation. This must be either
+ * #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT.
+ * \param length The length of the input data \p input. Any value is allowed.
+ * \param iv_off The current offset in the IV. This must be smaller
+ * than \c 16 Bytes. It is updated after this call to allow
+ * the aforementioned streaming usage.
+ * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a read/write buffer
+ * of length \c 16 Bytes. It is updated after this call to
+ * allow the aforementioned streaming usage.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of size \p length Bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer to hold the output data. This must be a writable
+ * buffer of length \p length Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ size_t *iv_off,
+ unsigned char iv[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a CAMELLIA-CTR buffer encryption/decryption operation.
+ *
+ * *note Due to the nature of CTR mode, you should use the same
+ * key for both encryption and decryption. In particular, calls
+ * to this function should be preceded by a key-schedule via
+ * mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc() regardless of whether the mode
+ * is #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT.
+ *
+ * \warning You must never reuse a nonce value with the same key. Doing so
+ * would void the encryption for the two messages encrypted with
+ * the same nonce and key.
+ *
+ * There are two common strategies for managing nonces with CTR:
+ *
+ * 1. You can handle everything as a single message processed over
+ * successive calls to this function. In that case, you want to
+ * set \p nonce_counter and \p nc_off to 0 for the first call, and
+ * then preserve the values of \p nonce_counter, \p nc_off and \p
+ * stream_block across calls to this function as they will be
+ * updated by this function.
+ *
+ * With this strategy, you must not encrypt more than 2**128
+ * blocks of data with the same key.
+ *
+ * 2. You can encrypt separate messages by dividing the \p
+ * nonce_counter buffer in two areas: the first one used for a
+ * per-message nonce, handled by yourself, and the second one
+ * updated by this function internally.
+ *
+ * For example, you might reserve the first \c 12 Bytes for the
+ * per-message nonce, and the last \c 4 Bytes for internal use.
+ * In that case, before calling this function on a new message you
+ * need to set the first \c 12 Bytes of \p nonce_counter to your
+ * chosen nonce value, the last four to \c 0, and \p nc_off to \c 0
+ * (which will cause \p stream_block to be ignored). That way, you
+ * can encrypt at most \c 2**96 messages of up to \c 2**32 blocks
+ * each with the same key.
+ *
+ * The per-message nonce (or information sufficient to reconstruct
+ * it) needs to be communicated with the ciphertext and must be
+ * unique. The recommended way to ensure uniqueness is to use a
+ * message counter. An alternative is to generate random nonces,
+ * but this limits the number of messages that can be securely
+ * encrypted: for example, with 96-bit random nonces, you should
+ * not encrypt more than 2**32 messages with the same key.
+ *
+ * Note that for both strategies, sizes are measured in blocks and
+ * that a CAMELLIA block is \c 16 Bytes.
+ *
+ * \warning Upon return, \p stream_block contains sensitive data. Its
+ * content must not be written to insecure storage and should be
+ * securely discarded as soon as it's no longer needed.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CAMELLIA context to use. This must be initialized
+ * and bound to a key.
+ * \param length The length of the input data \p input in Bytes.
+ * Any value is allowed.
+ * \param nc_off The offset in the current \p stream_block (for resuming
+ * within current cipher stream). The offset pointer to
+ * should be \c 0 at the start of a stream. It is updated
+ * at the end of this call.
+ * \param nonce_counter The 128-bit nonce and counter. This must be a read/write
+ * buffer of length \c 16 Bytes.
+ * \param stream_block The saved stream-block for resuming. This must be a
+ * read/write buffer of length \c 16 Bytes.
+ * \param input The input data stream. This must be a readable buffer of
+ * size \p length Bytes.
+ * \param output The output data stream. This must be a writable buffer
+ * of size \p length Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx,
+ size_t length,
+ size_t *nc_off,
+ unsigned char nonce_counter[16],
+ unsigned char stream_block[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Checkup routine
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed
+ */
+int mbedtls_camellia_self_test(int verbose);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* camellia.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ccm.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ccm.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1da57c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ccm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,526 @@
+/**
+ * \file ccm.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file provides an API for the CCM authenticated encryption
+ * mode for block ciphers.
+ *
+ * CCM combines Counter mode encryption with CBC-MAC authentication
+ * for 128-bit block ciphers.
+ *
+ * Input to CCM includes the following elements:
+ * <ul><li>Payload - data that is both authenticated and encrypted.</li>
+ * <li>Associated data (Adata) - data that is authenticated but not
+ * encrypted, For example, a header.</li>
+ * <li>Nonce - A unique value that is assigned to the payload and the
+ * associated data.</li></ul>
+ *
+ * Definition of CCM:
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C_updated-July20_2007.pdf
+ * RFC 3610 "Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)"
+ *
+ * Related:
+ * RFC 5116 "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption"
+ *
+ * Definition of CCM*:
+ * IEEE 802.15.4 - IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks
+ * Integer representation is fixed most-significant-octet-first order and
+ * the representation of octets is most-significant-bit-first order. This is
+ * consistent with RFC 3610.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CCM_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CCM_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+#include "mbedtls/block_cipher.h"
+#endif
+
+#define MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT 0
+#define MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT 1
+#define MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT 2
+#define MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT 3
+
+/** Bad input parameters to the function. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT -0x000D
+/** Authenticated decryption failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED -0x000F
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT)
+// Regular implementation
+//
+
+/**
+ * \brief The CCM context-type definition. The CCM context is passed
+ * to the APIs called.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ccm_context {
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(y)[16]; /*!< The Y working buffer */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctr)[16]; /*!< The counter buffer */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(plaintext_len); /*!< Total plaintext length */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(add_len); /*!< Total authentication data length */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tag_len); /*!< Total tag length */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(processed); /*!< Track how many bytes of input data
+ were processed (chunked input).
+ Used independently for both auth data
+ and plaintext/ciphertext.
+ This variable is set to zero after
+ auth data input is finished. */
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(q); /*!< The Q working value */
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); /*!< The operation to perform:
+ #MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT or
+ #MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT or
+ #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT or
+ #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
+#else
+ mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
+#endif
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); /*!< Working value holding context's
+ state. Used for chunked data input */
+}
+mbedtls_ccm_context;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */
+#include "ccm_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes the specified CCM context,
+ * to make references valid, and prepare the context
+ * for mbedtls_ccm_setkey() or mbedtls_ccm_free().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CCM context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ccm_init(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes the CCM context set in the
+ * \p ctx parameter and sets the encryption key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CCM context to initialize. This must be an initialized
+ * context.
+ * \param cipher The 128-bit block cipher to use.
+ * \param key The encryption key. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param keybits The key size in bits. This must be acceptable by the cipher.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A CCM or cipher-specific error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ccm_setkey(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function releases and clears the specified CCM context
+ * and underlying cipher sub-context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CCM context to clear. If this is \c NULL, the function
+ * has no effect. Otherwise, this must be initialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ccm_free(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function encrypts a buffer using CCM.
+ *
+ * \note The tag is written to a separate buffer. To concatenate
+ * the \p tag with the \p output, as done in <em>RFC-3610:
+ * Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)</em>, use
+ * \p tag = \p output + \p length, and make sure that the
+ * output buffer is at least \p length + \p tag_len wide.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CCM context to use for encryption. This must be
+ * initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable
+ * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes.
+ * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
+ * or 13. The length L of the message length field is
+ * 15 - \p iv_len.
+ * \param ad The additional data field. If \p ad_len is greater than
+ * zero, \p ad must be a readable buffer of at least that
+ * length.
+ * \param ad_len The length of additional data in Bytes.
+ * This must be less than `2^16 - 2^8`.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater
+ * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least
+ * that length.
+ * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater
+ * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least
+ * that length.
+ * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a
+ * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
+ * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field to generate in Bytes:
+ * 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A CCM or cipher-specific error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function encrypts a buffer using CCM*.
+ *
+ * \note The tag is written to a separate buffer. To concatenate
+ * the \p tag with the \p output, as done in <em>RFC-3610:
+ * Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)</em>, use
+ * \p tag = \p output + \p length, and make sure that the
+ * output buffer is at least \p length + \p tag_len wide.
+ *
+ * \note When using this function in a variable tag length context,
+ * the tag length has to be encoded into the \p iv passed to
+ * this function.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CCM context to use for encryption. This must be
+ * initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ * For tag length = 0, input length is ignored.
+ * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable
+ * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes.
+ * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
+ * or 13. The length L of the message length field is
+ * 15 - \p iv_len.
+ * \param ad The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of
+ * at least \p ad_len Bytes.
+ * \param ad_len The length of additional data in Bytes.
+ * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater
+ * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least
+ * that length.
+ * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater
+ * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least
+ * that length.
+ * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a
+ * writable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
+ * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field to generate in Bytes:
+ * 0, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16.
+ *
+ * \warning Passing \c 0 as \p tag_len means that the message is no
+ * longer authenticated.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A CCM or cipher-specific error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a CCM authenticated decryption of a
+ * buffer.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CCM context to use for decryption. This must be
+ * initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable
+ * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes.
+ * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
+ * or 13. The length L of the message length field is
+ * 15 - \p iv_len.
+ * \param ad The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer
+ * of at least that \p ad_len Bytes..
+ * \param ad_len The length of additional data in Bytes.
+ * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater
+ * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least
+ * that length.
+ * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater
+ * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least
+ * that length.
+ * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a
+ * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
+ * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field to generate in Bytes:
+ * 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success. This indicates that the message is authentic.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED if the tag does not match.
+ * \return A cipher-specific error code on calculation failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+ const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a CCM* authenticated decryption of a
+ * buffer.
+ *
+ * \note When using this function in a variable tag length context,
+ * the tag length has to be decoded from \p iv and passed to
+ * this function as \p tag_len. (\p tag needs to be adjusted
+ * accordingly.)
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CCM context to use for decryption. This must be
+ * initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param length The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ * For tag length = 0, input length is ignored.
+ * \param iv The initialization vector (nonce). This must be a readable
+ * buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes.
+ * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
+ * or 13. The length L of the message length field is
+ * 15 - \p iv_len.
+ * \param ad The additional data field. This must be a readable buffer of
+ * at least that \p ad_len Bytes.
+ * \param ad_len The length of additional data in Bytes.
+ * This must be less than 2^16 - 2^8.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater
+ * than zero, \p input must be a readable buffer of at least
+ * that length.
+ * \param output The buffer holding the output data. If \p length is greater
+ * than zero, \p output must be a writable buffer of at least
+ * that length.
+ * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication field. This must be a
+ * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
+ * \param tag_len The length of the authentication field in Bytes.
+ * 0, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16.
+ *
+ * \warning Passing \c 0 as \p tag_len means that the message is nos
+ * longer authenticated.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED if the tag does not match.
+ * \return A cipher-specific error code on calculation failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+ const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function starts a CCM encryption or decryption
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * This function and mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() must be called
+ * before calling mbedtls_ccm_update_ad() or
+ * mbedtls_ccm_update(). This function can be called before
+ * or after mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths().
+ *
+ * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CCM context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param mode The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT or
+ * #MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT or #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT or
+ * #MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT.
+ * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer
+ * of at least \p iv_len Bytes.
+ * \param iv_len The length of the nonce in Bytes: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
+ * or 13. The length L of the message length field is
+ * 15 - \p iv_len.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure:
+ * \p ctx is in an invalid state,
+ * \p mode is invalid,
+ * \p iv_len is invalid (lower than \c 7 or greater than
+ * \c 13).
+ */
+int mbedtls_ccm_starts(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const unsigned char *iv,
+ size_t iv_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function declares the lengths of the message
+ * and additional data for a CCM encryption or decryption
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * This function and mbedtls_ccm_starts() must be called
+ * before calling mbedtls_ccm_update_ad() or
+ * mbedtls_ccm_update(). This function can be called before
+ * or after mbedtls_ccm_starts().
+ *
+ * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CCM context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param total_ad_len The total length of additional data in bytes.
+ * This must be less than `2^16 - 2^8`.
+ * \param plaintext_len The length in bytes of the plaintext to encrypt or
+ * result of the decryption (thus not encompassing the
+ * additional data that are not encrypted).
+ * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate in Bytes:
+ * 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 or 16.
+ * For CCM*, zero is also valid.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure:
+ * \p ctx is in an invalid state,
+ * \p total_ad_len is greater than \c 0xFF00.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ size_t total_ad_len,
+ size_t plaintext_len,
+ size_t tag_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function feeds an input buffer as associated data
+ * (authenticated but not encrypted data) in a CCM
+ * encryption or decryption operation.
+ *
+ * You may call this function zero, one or more times
+ * to pass successive parts of the additional data. The
+ * lengths \p ad_len of the data parts should eventually add
+ * up exactly to the total length of additional data
+ * \c total_ad_len passed to mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(). You
+ * may not call this function after calling
+ * mbedtls_ccm_update().
+ *
+ * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CCM context. This must have been started with
+ * mbedtls_ccm_starts(), the lengths of the message and
+ * additional data must have been declared with
+ * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() and this must not have yet
+ * received any input with mbedtls_ccm_update().
+ * \param ad The buffer holding the additional data, or \c NULL
+ * if \p ad_len is \c 0.
+ * \param ad_len The length of the additional data. If \c 0,
+ * \p ad may be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure:
+ * \p ctx is in an invalid state,
+ * total input length too long.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *ad,
+ size_t ad_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing CCM
+ * encryption or decryption operation.
+ *
+ * You may call this function zero, one or more times
+ * to pass successive parts of the input: the plaintext to
+ * encrypt, or the ciphertext (not including the tag) to
+ * decrypt. After the last part of the input, call
+ * mbedtls_ccm_finish(). The lengths \p input_len of the
+ * data parts should eventually add up exactly to the
+ * plaintext length \c plaintext_len passed to
+ * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths().
+ *
+ * This function may produce output in one of the following
+ * ways:
+ * - Immediate output: the output length is always equal
+ * to the input length.
+ * - Buffered output: except for the last part of input data,
+ * the output consists of a whole number of 16-byte blocks.
+ * If the total input length so far (not including
+ * associated data) is 16 \* *B* + *A* with *A* < 16 then
+ * the total output length is 16 \* *B*.
+ * For the last part of input data, the output length is
+ * equal to the input length plus the number of bytes (*A*)
+ * buffered in the previous call to the function (if any).
+ * The function uses the plaintext length
+ * \c plaintext_len passed to mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths()
+ * to detect the last part of input data.
+ *
+ * In particular:
+ * - It is always correct to call this function with
+ * \p output_size >= \p input_len + 15.
+ * - If \p input_len is a multiple of 16 for all the calls
+ * to this function during an operation (not necessary for
+ * the last one) then it is correct to use \p output_size
+ * =\p input_len.
+ *
+ * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CCM context. This must have been started with
+ * mbedtls_ccm_starts() and the lengths of the message and
+ * additional data must have been declared with
+ * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths().
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p input_len
+ * is greater than zero, this must be a readable buffer
+ * of at least \p input_len bytes.
+ * \param input_len The length of the input data in bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer for the output data. If \p output_size
+ * is greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of
+ * at least \p output_size bytes.
+ * \param output_size The size of the output buffer in bytes.
+ * See the function description regarding the output size.
+ * \param output_len On success, \p *output_len contains the actual
+ * length of the output written in \p output.
+ * On failure, the content of \p *output_len is
+ * unspecified.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure:
+ * \p ctx is in an invalid state,
+ * total input length too long,
+ * or \p output_size too small.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ccm_update(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function finishes the CCM operation and generates
+ * the authentication tag.
+ *
+ * It wraps up the CCM stream, and generates the
+ * tag. The tag can have a maximum length of 16 Bytes.
+ *
+ * \note This function is not implemented in Mbed TLS yet.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CCM context. This must have been started with
+ * mbedtls_ccm_starts() and the lengths of the message and
+ * additional data must have been declared with
+ * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths().
+ * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. If \p tag_len is greater
+ * than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at least \p
+ * tag_len Bytes.
+ * \param tag_len The length of the tag. Must match the tag length passed to
+ * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() function.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT on failure:
+ * \p ctx is in an invalid state,
+ * invalid value of \p tag_len,
+ * the total amount of additional data passed to
+ * mbedtls_ccm_update_ad() was lower than the total length of
+ * additional data \c total_ad_len passed to
+ * mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(),
+ * the total amount of input data passed to
+ * mbedtls_ccm_update() was lower than the plaintext length
+ * \c plaintext_len passed to mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths().
+ */
+int mbedtls_ccm_finish(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES)
+/**
+ * \brief The CCM checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c 1 on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ccm_self_test(int verbose);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..680fe36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chacha20.h
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+/**
+ * \file chacha20.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains ChaCha20 definitions and functions.
+ *
+ * ChaCha20 is a stream cipher that can encrypt and decrypt
+ * information. ChaCha was created by Daniel Bernstein as a variant of
+ * its Salsa cipher https://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf
+ * ChaCha20 is the variant with 20 rounds, that was also standardized
+ * in RFC 7539.
+ *
+ * \author Daniel King <damaki.gh@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+/** Invalid input parameter(s). */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0051
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT)
+
+typedef struct mbedtls_chacha20_context {
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[16]; /*! The state (before round operations). */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keystream8)[64]; /*! Leftover keystream bytes. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keystream_bytes_used); /*! Number of keystream bytes already used. */
+}
+mbedtls_chacha20_context;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */
+#include "chacha20_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes the specified ChaCha20 context.
+ *
+ * It must be the first API called before using
+ * the context.
+ *
+ * It is usually followed by calls to
+ * \c mbedtls_chacha20_setkey() and
+ * \c mbedtls_chacha20_starts(), then one or more calls to
+ * to \c mbedtls_chacha20_update(), and finally to
+ * \c mbedtls_chacha20_free().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to initialize.
+ * This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_chacha20_init(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function releases and clears the specified
+ * ChaCha20 context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to clear. This may be \c NULL,
+ * in which case this function is a no-op. If it is not
+ * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized context.
+ *
+ */
+void mbedtls_chacha20_free(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets the encryption/decryption key.
+ *
+ * \note After using this function, you must also call
+ * \c mbedtls_chacha20_starts() to set a nonce before you
+ * start encrypting/decrypting data with
+ * \c mbedtls_chacha_update().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to which the key should be bound.
+ * It must be initialized.
+ * \param key The encryption/decryption key. This must be \c 32 Bytes
+ * in length.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA if ctx or key is NULL.
+ */
+int mbedtls_chacha20_setkey(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char key[32]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets the nonce and initial counter value.
+ *
+ * \note A ChaCha20 context can be re-used with the same key by
+ * calling this function to change the nonce.
+ *
+ * \warning You must never use the same nonce twice with the same key.
+ * This would void any confidentiality guarantees for the
+ * messages encrypted with the same nonce and key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to which the nonce should be bound.
+ * It must be initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param nonce The nonce. This must be \c 12 Bytes in size.
+ * \param counter The initial counter value. This is usually \c 0.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA if ctx or nonce is
+ * NULL.
+ */
+int mbedtls_chacha20_starts(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char nonce[12],
+ uint32_t counter);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function encrypts or decrypts data.
+ *
+ * Since ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, the same operation is
+ * used for encrypting and decrypting data.
+ *
+ * \note The \p input and \p output pointers must either be equal or
+ * point to non-overlapping buffers.
+ *
+ * \note \c mbedtls_chacha20_setkey() and
+ * \c mbedtls_chacha20_starts() must be called at least once
+ * to setup the context before this function can be called.
+ *
+ * \note This function can be called multiple times in a row in
+ * order to encrypt of decrypt data piecewise with the same
+ * key and nonce.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ChaCha20 context to use for encryption or decryption.
+ * It must be initialized and bound to a key and nonce.
+ * \param size The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`.
+ * \param output The buffer holding the output data.
+ * This must be able to hold \p size Bytes.
+ * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_chacha20_update(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx,
+ size_t size,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function encrypts or decrypts data with ChaCha20 and
+ * the given key and nonce.
+ *
+ * Since ChaCha20 is a stream cipher, the same operation is
+ * used for encrypting and decrypting data.
+ *
+ * \warning You must never use the same (key, nonce) pair more than
+ * once. This would void any confidentiality guarantees for
+ * the messages encrypted with the same nonce and key.
+ *
+ * \note The \p input and \p output pointers must either be equal or
+ * point to non-overlapping buffers.
+ *
+ * \param key The encryption/decryption key.
+ * This must be \c 32 Bytes in length.
+ * \param nonce The nonce. This must be \c 12 Bytes in size.
+ * \param counter The initial counter value. This is usually \c 0.
+ * \param size The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`.
+ * \param output The buffer holding the output data.
+ * This must be able to hold \p size Bytes.
+ * This pointer can be \c NULL if `size == 0`.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_chacha20_crypt(const unsigned char key[32],
+ const unsigned char nonce[12],
+ uint32_t counter,
+ size_t size,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/**
+ * \brief The ChaCha20 checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c 1 on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_chacha20_self_test(int verbose);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3dc21e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/chachapoly.h
@@ -0,0 +1,342 @@
+/**
+ * \file chachapoly.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains the AEAD-ChaCha20-Poly1305 definitions and
+ * functions.
+ *
+ * ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an algorithm for Authenticated Encryption
+ * with Associated Data (AEAD) that can be used to encrypt and
+ * authenticate data. It is based on ChaCha20 and Poly1305 by Daniel
+ * Bernstein and was standardized in RFC 7539.
+ *
+ * \author Daniel King <damaki.gh@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+/* for shared error codes */
+#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h"
+
+/** The requested operation is not permitted in the current state. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE -0x0054
+/** Authenticated decryption failed: data was not authentic. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED -0x0056
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT, /**< The mode value for performing encryption. */
+ MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT /**< The mode value for performing decryption. */
+}
+mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT)
+
+#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h"
+
+typedef struct mbedtls_chachapoly_context {
+ mbedtls_chacha20_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chacha20_ctx); /**< The ChaCha20 context. */
+ mbedtls_poly1305_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(poly1305_ctx); /**< The Poly1305 context. */
+ uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aad_len); /**< The length (bytes) of the Additional Authenticated Data. */
+ uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphertext_len); /**< The length (bytes) of the ciphertext. */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); /**< The current state of the context. */
+ mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); /**< Cipher mode (encrypt or decrypt). */
+}
+mbedtls_chachapoly_context;
+
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */
+#include "chachapoly_alt.h"
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes the specified ChaCha20-Poly1305 context.
+ *
+ * It must be the first API called before using
+ * the context. It must be followed by a call to
+ * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey() before any operation can be
+ * done, and to \c mbedtls_chachapoly_free() once all
+ * operations with that context have been finished.
+ *
+ * In order to encrypt or decrypt full messages at once, for
+ * each message you should make a single call to
+ * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_crypt_and_tag() or
+ * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt().
+ *
+ * In order to encrypt messages piecewise, for each
+ * message you should make a call to
+ * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_starts(), then 0 or more calls to
+ * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad(), then 0 or more calls to
+ * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update(), then one call to
+ * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_finish().
+ *
+ * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged! Always
+ * use \c mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt() when possible!
+ *
+ * If however this is not possible because the data is too
+ * large to fit in memory, you need to:
+ *
+ * - call \c mbedtls_chachapoly_starts() and (if needed)
+ * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad() as above,
+ * - call \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update() multiple times and
+ * ensure its output (the plaintext) is NOT used in any other
+ * way than placing it in temporary storage at this point,
+ * - call \c mbedtls_chachapoly_finish() to compute the
+ * authentication tag and compared it in constant time to the
+ * tag received with the ciphertext.
+ *
+ * If the tags are not equal, you must immediately discard
+ * all previous outputs of \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update(),
+ * otherwise you can now safely use the plaintext.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ChachaPoly context to initialize. Must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_chachapoly_init(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function releases and clears the specified
+ * ChaCha20-Poly1305 context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ChachaPoly context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which
+ * case this function is a no-op.
+ */
+void mbedtls_chachapoly_free(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets the ChaCha20-Poly1305
+ * symmetric encryption key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to which the key should be
+ * bound. This must be initialized.
+ * \param key The \c 256 Bit (\c 32 Bytes) key.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char key[32]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function starts a ChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption or
+ * decryption operation.
+ *
+ * \warning You must never use the same nonce twice with the same key.
+ * This would void any confidentiality and authenticity
+ * guarantees for the messages encrypted with the same nonce
+ * and key.
+ *
+ * \note If the context is being used for AAD only (no data to
+ * encrypt or decrypt) then \p mode can be set to any value.
+ *
+ * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the
+ * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. This must be initialized
+ * and bound to a key.
+ * \param nonce The nonce/IV to use for the message.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of length \c 12 Bytes.
+ * \param mode The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT or
+ * #MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT (discouraged, see warning).
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_chachapoly_starts(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char nonce[12],
+ mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function feeds additional data to be authenticated
+ * into an ongoing ChaCha20-Poly1305 operation.
+ *
+ * The Additional Authenticated Data (AAD), also called
+ * Associated Data (AD) is only authenticated but not
+ * encrypted nor included in the encrypted output. It is
+ * usually transmitted separately from the ciphertext or
+ * computed locally by each party.
+ *
+ * \note This function is called before data is encrypted/decrypted.
+ * I.e. call this function to process the AAD before calling
+ * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update().
+ *
+ * You may call this function multiple times to process
+ * an arbitrary amount of AAD. It is permitted to call
+ * this function 0 times, if no AAD is used.
+ *
+ * This function cannot be called any more if data has
+ * been processed by \c mbedtls_chachapoly_update(),
+ * or if the context has been finished.
+ *
+ * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the
+ * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context. This must be initialized
+ * and bound to a key.
+ * \param aad_len The length in Bytes of the AAD. The length has no
+ * restrictions.
+ * \param aad Buffer containing the AAD.
+ * This pointer can be \c NULL if `aad_len == 0`.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+ * if \p ctx or \p aad are NULL.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE
+ * if the operations has not been started or has been
+ * finished, or if the AAD has been finished.
+ */
+int mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *aad,
+ size_t aad_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Thus function feeds data to be encrypted or decrypted
+ * into an on-going ChaCha20-Poly1305
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * The direction (encryption or decryption) depends on the
+ * mode that was given when calling
+ * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_starts().
+ *
+ * You may call this function multiple times to process
+ * an arbitrary amount of data. It is permitted to call
+ * this function 0 times, if no data is to be encrypted
+ * or decrypted.
+ *
+ * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the
+ * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use. This must be initialized.
+ * \param len The length (in bytes) of the data to encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param input The buffer containing the data to encrypt or decrypt.
+ * This pointer can be \c NULL if `len == 0`.
+ * \param output The buffer to where the encrypted or decrypted data is
+ * written. This must be able to hold \p len bytes.
+ * This pointer can be \c NULL if `len == 0`.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE
+ * if the operation has not been started or has been
+ * finished.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_chachapoly_update(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx,
+ size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function finished the ChaCha20-Poly1305 operation and
+ * generates the MAC (authentication tag).
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use. This must be initialized.
+ * \param mac The buffer to where the 128-bit (16 bytes) MAC is written.
+ *
+ * \warning Decryption with the piecewise API is discouraged, see the
+ * warning on \c mbedtls_chachapoly_init().
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE
+ * if the operation has not been started or has been
+ * finished.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char mac[16]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a complete ChaCha20-Poly1305
+ * authenticated encryption with the previously-set key.
+ *
+ * \note Before using this function, you must set the key with
+ * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey().
+ *
+ * \warning You must never use the same nonce twice with the same key.
+ * This would void any confidentiality and authenticity
+ * guarantees for the messages encrypted with the same nonce
+ * and key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use (holds the key).
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param length The length (in bytes) of the data to encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param nonce The 96-bit (12 bytes) nonce/IV to use.
+ * \param aad The buffer containing the additional authenticated
+ * data (AAD). This pointer can be \c NULL if `aad_len == 0`.
+ * \param aad_len The length (in bytes) of the AAD data to process.
+ * \param input The buffer containing the data to encrypt or decrypt.
+ * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`.
+ * \param output The buffer to where the encrypted or decrypted data
+ * is written. This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`.
+ * \param tag The buffer to where the computed 128-bit (16 bytes) MAC
+ * is written. This must not be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx,
+ size_t length,
+ const unsigned char nonce[12],
+ const unsigned char *aad,
+ size_t aad_len,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned char tag[16]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a complete ChaCha20-Poly1305
+ * authenticated decryption with the previously-set key.
+ *
+ * \note Before using this function, you must set the key with
+ * \c mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context to use (holds the key).
+ * \param length The length (in Bytes) of the data to decrypt.
+ * \param nonce The \c 96 Bit (\c 12 bytes) nonce/IV to use.
+ * \param aad The buffer containing the additional authenticated data (AAD).
+ * This pointer can be \c NULL if `aad_len == 0`.
+ * \param aad_len The length (in bytes) of the AAD data to process.
+ * \param tag The buffer holding the authentication tag.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of length \c 16 Bytes.
+ * \param input The buffer containing the data to decrypt.
+ * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`.
+ * \param output The buffer to where the decrypted data is written.
+ * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED
+ * if the data was not authentic.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx,
+ size_t length,
+ const unsigned char nonce[12],
+ const unsigned char *aad,
+ size_t aad_len,
+ const unsigned char tag[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/**
+ * \brief The ChaCha20-Poly1305 checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c 1 on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_chachapoly_self_test(int verbose);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aec5050
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/check_config.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1149 @@
+/**
+ * \file check_config.h
+ *
+ * \brief Consistency checks for configuration options
+ *
+ * This is an internal header. Do not include it directly.
+ *
+ * This header is included automatically by all public Mbed TLS headers
+ * (via mbedtls/build_info.h). Do not include it directly in a configuration
+ * file such as mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h or #MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE!
+ * It would run at the wrong time due to missing derived symbols.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H
+
+/* *INDENT-OFF* */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_IS_FINALIZED)
+#warning "Do not include mbedtls/check_config.h manually! " \
+ "This may cause spurious errors. " \
+ "It is included automatically at the right point since Mbed TLS 3.0."
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CONFIG_IS_FINALIZED */
+
+/*
+ * We assume CHAR_BIT is 8 in many places. In practice, this is true on our
+ * target platforms, so not an issue, but let's just be extra sure.
+ */
+#include <limits.h>
+#if CHAR_BIT != 8
+#error "Mbed TLS requires a platform with 8-bit chars"
+#endif
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1900)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C is required on Windows"
+#endif
+/* See auto-enabling SNPRINTF_ALT and VSNPRINTF_ALT
+ * in * config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h */
+#endif /* _MINGW32__ || (_MSC_VER && (_MSC_VER <= 1900)) */
+
+#if defined(TARGET_LIKE_MBED) && defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C)
+#error "The NET module is not available for mbed OS - please use the network functions provided by Mbed OS"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) && \
+ !defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__clang__)
+#error "MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING only works with GCC and Clang"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+#error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME does not make sense"
+#endif
+
+/* Limitations on ECC key types acceleration: if we have any of `PUBLIC_KEY`,
+ * `KEY_PAIR_BASIC`, `KEY_PAIR_IMPORT`, `KEY_PAIR_EXPORT` then we must have
+ * all 4 of them.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)
+#error "Unsupported partial support for ECC key type acceleration, see docs/driver-only-builds.md"
+#endif /* not all of public, basic, import, export */
+#endif /* one of public, basic, import, export */
+
+/* Limitations on ECC curves acceleration: partial curve acceleration is only
+ * supported with crypto excluding PK, X.509 or TLS.
+ * Note: no need to check X.509 as it depends on PK. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
+#error "Unsupported partial support for ECC curves acceleration, see docs/driver-only-builds.md"
+#endif /* modules beyond what's supported */
+#endif /* not all curves accelerated */
+#endif /* some curve accelerated */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && !(defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) && \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING)))
+#error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_DHM_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C ) || ( !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) ) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_CMAC_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT) && defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG)
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING)
+#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7)
+#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING)
+#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES)
+#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and MBEDTLS_DES_C cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT and MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECDH_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || \
+ !( defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) ) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PK_C with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO needs MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C for ECDSA signature"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PK_C with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO needs MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C for ECDSA verification"
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \
+ ( defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but it cannot coexist with an alternative ECP implementation"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || ( \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) ) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_C defined (or a subset enabled), but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \
+ !(defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256))
+#error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) && (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN > 64)
+#error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN value too high"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512)) \
+ && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) && (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN > 32)
+#error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN value too high"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)
+#error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__has_feature)
+#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer)
+#define MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN // #undef at the end of this paragraph
+#endif
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN)
+#error "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN requires building with MemorySanitizer"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM)
+#error "MemorySanitizer does not support assembly implementation"
+#endif
+#undef MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN // temporary macro defined above
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && \
+ !(defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_ARIA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_CAMELLIA))
+#error "MBEDTLS_CCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && \
+ !(defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_ARIA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_CAMELLIA))
+#error "MBEDTLS_GCM_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK defined, but no alternative implementation enabled"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_HKDF_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH)
+#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH) || !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \
+ ( !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) || \
+ !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \
+ !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+/* Use of EC J-PAKE in TLS requires SHA-256. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)
+#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
+#error "!MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE requires SHA-512, SHA-256 or SHA-1".
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512)
+#error "MBEDTLS_MD_C defined, but no hash algorithm"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) && \
+ ! ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_LMS_C requires MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE requires MBEDTLS_LMS_C"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PK_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && \
+ (!defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C))
+#error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && \
+ (!defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C))
+#error "MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO) &&\
+ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) ||\
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO) &&\
+ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF) ||\
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) &&\
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) ||\
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO) &&\
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) ||\
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) &&\
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) &&\
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) ||\
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO) &&\
+ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) ||\
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO) &&\
+ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) ||\
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO) &&\
+ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF) ||\
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) &&\
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) &&\
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO must be defined if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO is"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) &&\
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) &&\
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO must be defined if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO is"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO) &&\
+ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) ||\
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) &&\
+ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF) ||\
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) &&\
+ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF) ||\
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF/MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR) &&\
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT) &&\
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME) &&\
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT) ||\
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF) &&\
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF) &&\
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF) &&\
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) &&\
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) &&\
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ) &&\
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE) &&\
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO) &&\
+ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ) ||\
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO) &&\
+ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE) ||\
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \
+ !( ( ( defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C) ) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) ) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C defined, but not all prerequisites (missing RNG)"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE) && \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER) && !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) && \
+ ! ( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS"
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
+#warning "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS"
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) && \
+ ! defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \
+ !( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY is not compatible with actual entropy sources"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY is not compatible with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_STATIC_KEY_SLOTS)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC and MBEDTLS_PSA_STATIC_KEY_SLOTS cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_RSA_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_RSA_C defined, but none of the PKCS1 versions enabled"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY)
+#error "Must only define one of MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_* defined without MBEDTLS_SHA512_C"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SHA512_*ALT can't be used with MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_*"
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT || MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) && !defined(__aarch64__)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY defined on non-Aarch64 system"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY)
+#error "Must only define one of MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_* defined without MBEDTLS_SHA256_C"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SHA256_*ALT can't be used with MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_*"
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY defined on non-Armv8-A system"
+#endif
+
+/* TLS 1.3 requires separate HKDF parts from PSA,
+ * and at least one ciphersuite, so at least SHA-256 or SHA-384
+ * from PSA to use with HKDF.
+ *
+ * Note: for dependencies common with TLS 1.2 (running handshake hash),
+ * see MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \
+ !(defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) && \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) && \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384)))
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+#if !( (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
+ ( defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) || defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) ) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+#if !( defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The current implementation of TLS 1.3 requires MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 defined without MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
+ !(defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) )
+#error "One or more versions of the TLS protocol are enabled " \
+ "but no key exchange methods defined with MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_xxxx"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) || \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) ) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE) && \
+ ((MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE < 0) || \
+ (MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE > UINT32_MAX))
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE must be in the range(0..UINT32_MAX)"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && !(defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO))
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+/* TLS 1.2 and 1.3 require SHA-256 or SHA-384 (running handshake hash) */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if !(defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384))
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) || \
+ !(defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384))
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) && \
+ !( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but no protocols are active"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX) && \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX > 255
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX too large (max 255)"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX) && \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > 255
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX too large (max 255)"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT) && MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT != 0
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS"
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
+#warning "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT is deprecated and will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS"
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT && MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT != 0 */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C) && \
+ !( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH) && \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH >= 256
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH must be less than 256"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL)
+#error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL // undef at the end of this paragraph
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL)
+#error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL // undef at the end of this paragraph
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL)
+#error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_C defined, single threading implementation required"
+#endif
+#undef MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL // temporary macro defined above
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
+#error "MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES) && !defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)
+#error "MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) && \
+ (!defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) ) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) && \
+ (!defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) ) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK) && \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64)
+#error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 and MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 && MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 */
+
+#if ( defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) || defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) ) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM)
+#error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32/MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64 and MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM cannot be defined simultaneously"
+#endif /* (MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32 || MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64) && MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) && ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) && \
+ !( defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+/* Reject attempts to enable options that have been removed and that could
+ * cause a build to succeed but with features removed. */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C) //no-check-names
+#error "MBEDTLS_HAVEGE_C was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/2599"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL) //no-check-names
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_HW_RECORD_ACCEL was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4031"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) //no-check-names
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 (SSL v3.0 support) was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4031"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) //no-check-names
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO (SSL v2 ClientHello support) was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4031"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT) //no-check-names
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_COMPAT (compatibility with the buggy implementation of truncated HMAC in Mbed TLS up to 2.7) was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4031"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES) //no-check-names
+#error "MBEDTLS_TLS_DEFAULT_ALLOW_SHA1_IN_CERTIFICATES was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See the ChangeLog entry if you really need SHA-1-signed certificates."
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) //no-check-names
+#error "MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4031"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS) //no-check-names
+#error "MBEDTLS_CHECK_PARAMS was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4313"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY) //no-check-names
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_PADDING_GRANULARITY was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4335"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) //no-check-names
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4335"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) //no-check-names
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC was removed in Mbed TLS 3.0. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4341"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C) && ( ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) ) || \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C) ) || ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) ) || \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) ) || \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) ) || \
+ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) ) )
+#error "MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C is defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Avoid warning from -pedantic. This is a convenient place for this
+ * workaround since this is included by every single file before the
+ * #if defined(MBEDTLS_xxx_C) that results in empty translation units.
+ */
+typedef int mbedtls_iso_c_forbids_empty_translation_units;
+
+/* *INDENT-ON* */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_CONFIG_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1dc31c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cipher.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1173 @@
+/**
+ * \file cipher.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains an abstraction interface for use with the cipher
+ * primitives provided by the library. It provides a common interface to all of
+ * the available cipher operations.
+ *
+ * \author Adriaan de Jong <dejong@fox-it.com>
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM
+#endif
+
+/** The selected feature is not available. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x6080
+/** Bad input parameters. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x6100
+/** Failed to allocate memory. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED -0x6180
+/** Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING -0x6200
+/** Decryption of block requires a full block. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED -0x6280
+/** Authentication failed (for AEAD modes). */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED -0x6300
+/** The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT -0x6380
+
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN 0x01 /**< Cipher accepts IVs of variable length. */
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN 0x02 /**< Cipher accepts keys of variable length. */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Supported cipher types.
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering stronger
+ * ciphers instead.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NONE = 0, /**< Placeholder to mark the end of cipher ID lists. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NULL, /**< The identity cipher, treated as a stream cipher. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, /**< The AES cipher. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES, /**< The DES cipher. \warning DES is considered weak. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES, /**< The Triple DES cipher. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA, /**< The Camellia cipher. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA, /**< The Aria cipher. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20, /**< The ChaCha20 cipher. */
+} mbedtls_cipher_id_t;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Supported {cipher type, cipher mode} pairs.
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering stronger
+ * ciphers instead.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE = 0, /**< Placeholder to mark the end of cipher-pair lists. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, /**< The identity stream cipher. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit ECB mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit ECB mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit ECB mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CBC mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CBC mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CBC mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CFB128 mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CFB128 mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CFB128 mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CTR mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CTR mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CTR mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit GCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit GCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit GCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit ECB mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit ECB mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit ECB mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CBC mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CBC mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CBC mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CFB128 mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CFB128 mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CFB128 mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CTR mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CTR mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CTR mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit GCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit GCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit GCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB, /**< DES cipher with ECB mode. \warning DES is considered weak. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, /**< DES cipher with CBC mode. \warning DES is considered weak. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB, /**< DES cipher with EDE ECB mode. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE CBC mode. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 ECB mode. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, /**< DES cipher with EDE3 CBC mode. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Camellia cipher with 128-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Camellia cipher with 192-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Camellia cipher with 256-bit CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and ECB mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and ECB mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and ECB mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CBC mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CBC mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CBC mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CFB128, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CFB-128 mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CFB128, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CFB-128 mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CFB128, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CFB-128 mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CTR, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CTR mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CTR, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CTR mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CTR, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CTR mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and GCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and GCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and GCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CCM mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Aria cipher with 128-bit key and CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Aria cipher with 192-bit key and CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< Aria cipher with 256-bit key and CCM_STAR_NO_TAG mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, /**< AES 128-bit cipher in OFB mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, /**< AES 192-bit cipher in OFB mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, /**< AES 256-bit cipher in OFB mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS, /**< AES 128-bit cipher in XTS block mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, /**< AES 256-bit cipher in XTS block mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, /**< ChaCha20 stream cipher. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, /**< ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD cipher. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit NIST KW mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit NIST KW mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit NIST KW mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, /**< AES cipher with 128-bit NIST KWP mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, /**< AES cipher with 192-bit NIST KWP mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, /**< AES cipher with 256-bit NIST KWP mode. */
+} mbedtls_cipher_type_t;
+
+/** Supported cipher modes. */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE = 0, /**< None. */
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, /**< The ECB cipher mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC, /**< The CBC cipher mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB, /**< The CFB cipher mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB, /**< The OFB cipher mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR, /**< The CTR cipher mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM, /**< The GCM cipher mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM, /**< The stream cipher mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM, /**< The CCM cipher mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, /**< The CCM*-no-tag cipher mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS, /**< The XTS cipher mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY, /**< The ChaCha-Poly cipher mode. */
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_KW, /**< The SP800-38F KW mode */
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP, /**< The SP800-38F KWP mode */
+} mbedtls_cipher_mode_t;
+
+/** Supported cipher padding types. */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7 = 0, /**< PKCS7 padding (default). */
+ MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS, /**< ISO/IEC 7816-4 padding. */
+ MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN, /**< ANSI X.923 padding. */
+ MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS, /**< Zero padding (not reversible). */
+ MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE, /**< Never pad (full blocks only). */
+} mbedtls_cipher_padding_t;
+
+/** Type of operation. */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE = -1,
+ MBEDTLS_DECRYPT = 0,
+ MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT,
+} mbedtls_operation_t;
+
+enum {
+ /** Undefined key length. */
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE = 0,
+ /** Key length, in bits (including parity), for DES keys. \warning DES is considered weak. */
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES = 64,
+ /** Key length in bits, including parity, for DES in two-key EDE. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE = 128,
+ /** Key length in bits, including parity, for DES in three-key EDE. \warning 3DES is considered weak. */
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 = 192,
+};
+
+/** Maximum length of any IV, in Bytes. */
+/* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers.
+ * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH defined
+ * in library/ssl_misc.h. */
+#define MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16
+
+/** Maximum block size of any cipher, in Bytes. */
+/* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers.
+ * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH defined
+ * in library/ssl_misc.h. */
+#define MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16
+
+/** Maximum key length, in Bytes. */
+/* This should ideally be derived automatically from list of ciphers.
+ * For now, only check whether XTS is enabled which uses 64 Byte keys,
+ * and use 32 Bytes as an upper bound for the maximum key length otherwise.
+ * This should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH defined
+ * in library/ssl_misc.h, which however deliberately ignores the case of XTS
+ * since the latter isn't used in SSL/TLS. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+#define MBEDTLS_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 64
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */
+
+/**
+ * Base cipher information (opaque struct).
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_base_t mbedtls_cipher_base_t;
+
+/**
+ * CMAC context (opaque struct).
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_cmac_context_t mbedtls_cmac_context_t;
+
+/**
+ * Cipher information. Allows calling cipher functions
+ * in a generic way.
+ *
+ * \note The library does not support custom cipher info structures,
+ * only built-in structures returned by the functions
+ * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string(),
+ * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(),
+ * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(),
+ * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_psa().
+ *
+ * \note Some fields store a value that has been right-shifted to save
+ * code-size, so should not be used directly. The accessor
+ * functions adjust for this and return the "natural" value.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_info_t {
+ /** Name of the cipher. */
+ const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name);
+
+ /** The block size, in bytes. */
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_size) : 5;
+
+ /** IV or nonce size, in bytes (right shifted by #MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT).
+ * For ciphers that accept variable IV sizes,
+ * this is the recommended size.
+ */
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size) : 3;
+
+ /** The cipher key length, in bits (right shifted by #MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT).
+ * This is the default length for variable sized ciphers.
+ * Includes parity bits for ciphers like DES.
+ */
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen) : 4;
+
+ /** The cipher mode (as per mbedtls_cipher_mode_t).
+ * For example, MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC.
+ */
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode) : 4;
+
+ /** Full cipher identifier (as per mbedtls_cipher_type_t).
+ * For example, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC.
+ *
+ * This could be 7 bits, but 8 bits retains byte alignment for the
+ * next field, which reduces code size to access that field.
+ */
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type) : 8;
+
+ /** Bitflag comprised of MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN and
+ * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN indicating whether the
+ * cipher supports variable IV or variable key sizes, respectively.
+ */
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags) : 2;
+
+ /** Index to LUT for base cipher information and functions. */
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(base_idx) : 5;
+
+} mbedtls_cipher_info_t;
+
+/* For internal use only.
+ * These are used to more compactly represent the fields above. */
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT 6
+#define MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT 2
+/**
+ * Generic cipher context.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_cipher_context_t {
+ /** Information about the associated cipher. */
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info);
+
+ /** Key length to use. */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen);
+
+ /** Operation that the key of the context has been
+ * initialized for.
+ */
+ mbedtls_operation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(operation);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING)
+ /** Padding functions to use, if relevant for
+ * the specific cipher mode.
+ */
+ void(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(add_padding))(unsigned char *output, size_t olen, size_t data_len);
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(get_padding))(unsigned char *input, size_t ilen, size_t *data_len);
+#endif
+
+ /** Buffer for input that has not been processed yet. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_data)[MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+
+ /** Number of Bytes that have not been processed yet. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_len);
+
+ /** Current IV or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode, data unit (or sector) number
+ * for XTS-mode. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv)[MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+
+ /** IV size in Bytes, for ciphers with variable-length IVs. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size);
+
+ /** The cipher-specific context. */
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
+ /** CMAC-specific context. */
+ mbedtls_cmac_context_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cmac_ctx);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ /** Indicates whether the cipher operations should be performed
+ * by Mbed TLS' own crypto library or an external implementation
+ * of the PSA Crypto API.
+ * This is unset if the cipher context was established through
+ * mbedtls_cipher_setup(), and set if it was established through
+ * mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa().
+ */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_enabled);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+} mbedtls_cipher_context_t;
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function retrieves the list of ciphers supported
+ * by the generic cipher module.
+ *
+ * For any cipher identifier in the returned list, you can
+ * obtain the corresponding generic cipher information structure
+ * via mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(), which can then be used
+ * to prepare a cipher context via mbedtls_cipher_setup().
+ *
+ *
+ * \return A statically-allocated array of cipher identifiers
+ * of type cipher_type_t. The last entry is zero.
+ */
+const int *mbedtls_cipher_list(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function retrieves the cipher-information
+ * structure associated with the given cipher name.
+ *
+ * \param cipher_name Name of the cipher to search for. This must not be
+ * \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return The cipher information structure associated with the
+ * given \p cipher_name.
+ * \return \c NULL if the associated cipher information is not found.
+ */
+const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string(const char *cipher_name);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function retrieves the cipher-information
+ * structure associated with the given cipher type.
+ *
+ * \param cipher_type Type of the cipher to search for.
+ *
+ * \return The cipher information structure associated with the
+ * given \p cipher_type.
+ * \return \c NULL if the associated cipher information is not found.
+ */
+const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function retrieves the cipher-information
+ * structure associated with the given cipher ID,
+ * key size and mode.
+ *
+ * \param cipher_id The ID of the cipher to search for. For example,
+ * #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES.
+ * \param key_bitlen The length of the key in bits.
+ * \param mode The cipher mode. For example, #MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC.
+ *
+ * \return The cipher information structure associated with the
+ * given \p cipher_id.
+ * \return \c NULL if the associated cipher information is not found.
+ */
+const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(const mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id,
+ int key_bitlen,
+ const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Retrieve the identifier for a cipher info structure.
+ *
+ * \param[in] info The cipher info structure to query.
+ * This may be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return The full cipher identifier (\c MBEDTLS_CIPHER_xxx).
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE if \p info is \c NULL.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_type(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info)
+{
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE;
+ } else {
+ return (mbedtls_cipher_type_t) info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Retrieve the operation mode for a cipher info structure.
+ *
+ * \param[in] info The cipher info structure to query.
+ * This may be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return The cipher mode (\c MBEDTLS_MODE_xxx).
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE if \p info is \c NULL.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_mode(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info)
+{
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE;
+ } else {
+ return (mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Retrieve the key size for a cipher info structure.
+ *
+ * \param[in] info The cipher info structure to query.
+ * This may be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return The key length in bits.
+ * For variable-sized ciphers, this is the default length.
+ * For DES, this includes the parity bits.
+ * \return \c 0 if \p info is \c NULL.
+ */
+static inline size_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info)
+{
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ return ((size_t) info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen)) << MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Retrieve the human-readable name for a
+ * cipher info structure.
+ *
+ * \param[in] info The cipher info structure to query.
+ * This may be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return The cipher name, which is a human readable string,
+ * with static storage duration.
+ * \return \c NULL if \p info is \c NULL.
+ */
+static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_info_get_name(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info)
+{
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ } else {
+ return info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the size of the IV or nonce
+ * for the cipher info structure, in bytes.
+ *
+ * \param info The cipher info structure. This may be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return The recommended IV size.
+ * \return \c 0 for ciphers not using an IV or a nonce.
+ * \return \c 0 if \p info is \c NULL.
+ */
+static inline size_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info)
+{
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ((size_t) info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size)) << MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the block size of the given
+ * cipher info structure in bytes.
+ *
+ * \param info The cipher info structure. This may be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return The block size of the cipher.
+ * \return \c 1 if the cipher is a stream cipher.
+ * \return \c 0 if \p info is \c NULL.
+ */
+static inline size_t mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info)
+{
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return (size_t) (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_size));
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns a non-zero value if the key length for
+ * the given cipher is variable.
+ *
+ * \param info The cipher info structure. This may be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return Non-zero if the key length is variable, \c 0 otherwise.
+ * \return \c 0 if the given pointer is \c NULL.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_cipher_info_has_variable_key_bitlen(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info)
+{
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags) & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns a non-zero value if the IV size for
+ * the given cipher is variable.
+ *
+ * \param info The cipher info structure. This may be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return Non-zero if the IV size is variable, \c 0 otherwise.
+ * \return \c 0 if the given pointer is \c NULL.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_cipher_info_has_variable_iv_size(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info)
+{
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags) & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes a \p ctx as NONE.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to be initialized. This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_cipher_init(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function frees and clears the cipher-specific
+ * context of \p ctx. Freeing \p ctx itself remains the
+ * responsibility of the caller.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to be freed. If this is \c NULL, the
+ * function has no effect, otherwise this must point to an
+ * initialized context.
+ */
+void mbedtls_cipher_free(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx);
+
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function prepares a cipher context for
+ * use with the given cipher primitive.
+ *
+ * \note After calling this function, you should call
+ * mbedtls_cipher_setkey() and, if the mode uses padding,
+ * mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(), then for each
+ * message to encrypt or decrypt with this key, either:
+ * - mbedtls_cipher_crypt() for one-shot processing with
+ * non-AEAD modes;
+ * - mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext() or
+ * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() for one-shot
+ * processing with AEAD modes or NIST_KW;
+ * - for multi-part processing, see the documentation of
+ * mbedtls_cipher_reset().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to prepare. This must be initialized by
+ * a call to mbedtls_cipher_init() first.
+ * \param cipher_info The cipher to use.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
+ * parameter-verification failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the
+ * cipher-specific context fails.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_setup(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes a cipher context for
+ * PSA-based use with the given cipher primitive.
+ *
+ * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a
+ * future version of the library.
+ * Please use psa_aead_xxx() / psa_cipher_xxx() directly
+ * instead.
+ *
+ * \note See #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO for information on PSA.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to initialize. May not be \c NULL.
+ * \param cipher_info The cipher to use.
+ * \param taglen For AEAD ciphers, the length in bytes of the
+ * authentication tag to use. Subsequent uses of
+ * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext() or
+ * mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext() must provide
+ * the same tag length.
+ * For non-AEAD ciphers, the value must be \c 0.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
+ * parameter-verification failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED if allocation of the
+ * cipher-specific context fails.
+ */
+int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info,
+ size_t taglen);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the block size of the given cipher
+ * in bytes.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context of the cipher.
+ *
+ * \return The block size of the underlying cipher.
+ * \return \c 1 if the cipher is a stream cipher.
+ * \return \c 0 if \p ctx has not been initialized.
+ */
+static inline unsigned int mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return (unsigned int) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_size);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the mode of operation for
+ * the cipher. For example, MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized.
+ *
+ * \return The mode of operation.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE;
+ }
+
+ return (mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the size of the IV or nonce
+ * of the cipher, in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized.
+ *
+ * \return The recommended IV size if no IV has been set.
+ * \return \c 0 for ciphers not using an IV or a nonce.
+ * \return The actual size if an IV has been set.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size) != 0) {
+ return (int) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size);
+ }
+
+ return (int) (((int) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_size)) <<
+ MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the type of the given cipher.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized.
+ *
+ * \return The type of the cipher.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_get_type(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE;
+ }
+
+ return (mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the name of the given cipher
+ * as a string.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized.
+ *
+ * \return The name of the cipher.
+ * \return NULL if \p ctx has not been not initialized.
+ */
+static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_get_name(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the key length of the cipher.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized.
+ *
+ * \return The key length of the cipher in bits.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE if \p ctx has not been
+ * initialized.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE;
+ }
+
+ return (int) ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info)->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bitlen) <<
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the operation of the given cipher.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context of the cipher. This must be initialized.
+ *
+ * \return The type of operation: #MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_DECRYPT.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE if \p ctx has not been initialized.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_operation_t mbedtls_cipher_get_operation(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE;
+ }
+
+ return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(operation);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets the key to use with the given context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and
+ * bound to a cipher information structure.
+ * \param key The key to use. This must be a readable buffer of at
+ * least \p key_bitlen Bits.
+ * \param key_bitlen The key length to use, in Bits.
+ * \param operation The operation that the key will be used for:
+ * #MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT or #MBEDTLS_DECRYPT.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
+ * parameter-verification failure.
+ * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ int key_bitlen,
+ const mbedtls_operation_t operation);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING)
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets the padding mode, for cipher modes
+ * that use padding.
+ *
+ *
+ * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and
+ * bound to a cipher information structure.
+ * \param mode The padding mode.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE
+ * if the selected padding mode is not supported.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the cipher mode
+ * does not support padding.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets the initialization vector (IV)
+ * or nonce.
+ *
+ * \note Some ciphers do not use IVs nor nonce. For these
+ * ciphers, this function has no effect.
+ *
+ * \note For #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, the nonce length must
+ * be 12, and the initial counter value is 0.
+ *
+ * \note For #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, the nonce length
+ * must be 12.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and
+ * bound to a cipher information structure.
+ * \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers. This
+ * must be a readable buffer of at least \p iv_len Bytes.
+ * \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV.
+ * This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size IV.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
+ * parameter-verification failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *iv,
+ size_t iv_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function resets the cipher state.
+ *
+ * \note With non-AEAD ciphers, the order of calls for each message
+ * is as follows:
+ * 1. mbedtls_cipher_set_iv() if the mode uses an IV/nonce.
+ * 2. mbedtls_cipher_reset()
+ * 3. mbedtls_cipher_update() one or more times
+ * 4. mbedtls_cipher_finish()
+ * .
+ * This sequence can be repeated to encrypt or decrypt multiple
+ * messages with the same key.
+ *
+ * \note With AEAD ciphers, the order of calls for each message
+ * is as follows:
+ * 1. mbedtls_cipher_set_iv() if the mode uses an IV/nonce.
+ * 2. mbedtls_cipher_reset()
+ * 3. mbedtls_cipher_update_ad()
+ * 4. mbedtls_cipher_update() one or more times
+ * 5. mbedtls_cipher_finish()
+ * 6. mbedtls_cipher_check_tag() (for decryption) or
+ * mbedtls_cipher_write_tag() (for encryption).
+ * .
+ * This sequence can be repeated to encrypt or decrypt multiple
+ * messages with the same key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be bound to a key.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
+ * parameter-verification failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_reset(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+/**
+ * \brief This function adds additional data for AEAD ciphers.
+ * Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param ad The additional data to use. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes.
+ * \param ad_len The length of \p ad in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A specific error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief The generic cipher update function. It encrypts or
+ * decrypts using the given cipher context. Writes as
+ * many block-sized blocks of data as possible to output.
+ * Any data that cannot be written immediately is either
+ * added to the next block, or flushed when
+ * mbedtls_cipher_finish() is called.
+ * Exception: For MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB, expects a single block
+ * in size. For example, 16 Bytes for AES.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and
+ * bound to a key.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a
+ * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data.
+ * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be able to
+ * hold at least `ilen + block_size`. This must not be the
+ * same buffer as \p input.
+ * \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the
+ * actual number of Bytes written. This must not be
+ * \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
+ * parameter-verification failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE on an
+ * unsupported mode for a cipher.
+ * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen, unsigned char *output,
+ size_t *olen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief The generic cipher finalization function. If data still
+ * needs to be flushed from an incomplete block, the data
+ * contained in it is padded to the size of
+ * the last block, and written to the \p output buffer.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and
+ * bound to a key.
+ * \param output The buffer to write data to. This needs to be a writable
+ * buffer of at least block_size Bytes.
+ * \param olen The length of the data written to the \p output buffer.
+ * This may not be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
+ * parameter-verification failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED on decryption
+ * expecting a full block but not receiving one.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING on invalid padding
+ * while decrypting.
+ * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+/**
+ * \brief This function writes a tag for AEAD ciphers.
+ * Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305.
+ * This must be called after mbedtls_cipher_finish().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized,
+ * bound to a key, and have just completed a cipher
+ * operation through mbedtls_cipher_finish() the tag for
+ * which should be written.
+ * \param tag The buffer to write the tag to. This must be a writable
+ * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
+ * \param tag_len The length of the tag to write.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A specific error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function checks the tag for AEAD ciphers.
+ * Currently supported with GCM and ChaCha20+Poly1305.
+ * This must be called after mbedtls_cipher_finish().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param tag The buffer holding the tag. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
+ * \param tag_len The length of the tag to check.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A specific error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief The generic all-in-one encryption/decryption function,
+ * for all ciphers except AEAD constructs.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param iv The IV to use, or NONCE_COUNTER for CTR-mode ciphers.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p iv_len
+ * Bytes.
+ * \param iv_len The IV length for ciphers with variable-size IV.
+ * This parameter is discarded by ciphers with fixed-size
+ * IV.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a
+ * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be able to
+ * hold at least `ilen + block_size`. This must not be the
+ * same buffer as \p input.
+ * \param olen The length of the output data, to be updated with the
+ * actual number of Bytes written. This must not be
+ * \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \note Some ciphers do not use IVs nor nonce. For these
+ * ciphers, use \p iv = NULL and \p iv_len = 0.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
+ * parameter-verification failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED on decryption
+ * expecting a full block but not receiving one.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING on invalid padding
+ * while decrypting.
+ * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_crypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
+/**
+ * \brief The authenticated encryption (AEAD/NIST_KW) function.
+ *
+ * \note For AEAD modes, the tag will be appended to the
+ * ciphertext, as recommended by RFC 5116.
+ * (NIST_KW doesn't have a separate tag.)
+ *
+ * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and
+ * bound to a key, with an AEAD algorithm or NIST_KW.
+ * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of
+ * at least \p iv_len Bytes and may be \c NULL if \p
+ * iv_len is \c 0.
+ * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. For AEAD ciphers, this must
+ * satisfy the constraints imposed by the cipher used.
+ * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0.
+ * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a
+ * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may
+ * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0.
+ * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a
+ * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be
+ * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data.
+ * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a
+ * writable buffer of at least \p output_len Bytes, and
+ * must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param output_len The length of the \p output buffer in Bytes. For AEAD
+ * ciphers, this must be at least \p ilen + \p tag_len.
+ * For NIST_KW, this must be at least \p ilen + 8
+ * (rounded up to a multiple of 8 if KWP is used);
+ * \p ilen + 15 is always a safe value.
+ * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes
+ * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a
+ * writable object of type \c size_t.
+ * \param tag_len The desired length of the authentication tag. For AEAD
+ * ciphers, this must match the constraints imposed by
+ * the cipher used, and in particular must not be \c 0.
+ * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
+ * parameter-verification failure.
+ * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_len,
+ size_t *olen, size_t tag_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief The authenticated encryption (AEAD/NIST_KW) function.
+ *
+ * \note If the data is not authentic, then the output buffer
+ * is zeroed out to prevent the unauthentic plaintext being
+ * used, making this interface safer.
+ *
+ * \note For AEAD modes, the tag must be appended to the
+ * ciphertext, as recommended by RFC 5116.
+ * (NIST_KW doesn't have a separate tag.)
+ *
+ * \param ctx The generic cipher context. This must be initialized and
+ * bound to a key, with an AEAD algorithm or NIST_KW.
+ * \param iv The nonce to use. This must be a readable buffer of
+ * at least \p iv_len Bytes and may be \c NULL if \p
+ * iv_len is \c 0.
+ * \param iv_len The length of the nonce. For AEAD ciphers, this must
+ * satisfy the constraints imposed by the cipher used.
+ * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0.
+ * \param ad The additional data to authenticate. This must be a
+ * readable buffer of at least \p ad_len Bytes, and may
+ * be \c NULL is \p ad_len is \c 0.
+ * \param ad_len The length of \p ad. For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be a
+ * readable buffer of at least \p ilen Bytes, and may be
+ * \c NULL if \p ilen is \c 0.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data. For AEAD ciphers this
+ * must be at least \p tag_len. For NIST_KW this must be
+ * at least \c 8.
+ * \param output The buffer for the output data. This must be a
+ * writable buffer of at least \p output_len Bytes, and
+ * may be \c NULL if \p output_len is \c 0.
+ * \param output_len The length of the \p output buffer in Bytes. For AEAD
+ * ciphers, this must be at least \p ilen - \p tag_len.
+ * For NIST_KW, this must be at least \p ilen - 8.
+ * \param olen This will be filled with the actual number of Bytes
+ * written to the \p output buffer. This must point to a
+ * writable object of type \c size_t.
+ * \param tag_len The actual length of the authentication tag. For AEAD
+ * ciphers, this must match the constraints imposed by
+ * the cipher used, and in particular must not be \c 0.
+ * For NIST_KW, this must be \c 0.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
+ * parameter-verification failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED if data is not authentic.
+ * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_len,
+ size_t *olen, size_t tag_len);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD || MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cmac.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cmac.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97b86fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/cmac.h
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+/**
+ * \file cmac.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains CMAC definitions and functions.
+ *
+ * The Cipher-based Message Authentication Code (CMAC) Mode for
+ * Authentication is defined in <em>RFC-4493: The AES-CMAC Algorithm</em>.
+ * It is supported with AES and DES.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CMAC_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#define MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+#define MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE 8
+
+/* We don't support Camellia or ARIA in this module */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 16 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of AES. */
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 8 /**< The longest block used by CMAC is that of 3DES. */
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+/** The longest block supported by the cipher module.
+ *
+ * \deprecated
+ * For the maximum block size of a cipher supported by the CMAC module,
+ * use #MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE.
+ * For the maximum block size of a cipher supported by the cipher module,
+ * use #MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH.
+ */
+/* Before Mbed TLS 3.5, this was the maximum block size supported by the CMAC
+ * module, so it didn't take Camellia or ARIA into account. Since the name
+ * of the macro doesn't even convey "CMAC", this was misleading. Now the size
+ * is sufficient for any cipher, but the name is defined in cmac.h for
+ * backward compatibility. */
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BLKSIZE_MAX MBEDTLS_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT)
+
+/**
+ * The CMAC context structure.
+ */
+struct mbedtls_cmac_context_t {
+ /** The internal state of the CMAC algorithm. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ /** Unprocessed data - either data that was not block aligned and is still
+ * pending processing, or the final block. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_block)[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ /** The length of data pending processing. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(unprocessed_len);
+};
+
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */
+#include "cmac_alt.h"
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function starts a new CMAC computation
+ * by setting the CMAC key, and preparing to authenticate
+ * the input data.
+ * It must be called with an initialized cipher context.
+ *
+ * Once this function has completed, data can be supplied
+ * to the CMAC computation by calling
+ * mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update().
+ *
+ * To start a CMAC computation using the same key as a previous
+ * CMAC computation, use mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish().
+ *
+ * \note When the CMAC implementation is supplied by an alternate
+ * implementation (through #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT), some ciphers
+ * may not be supported by that implementation, and thus
+ * return an error. Alternate implementations must support
+ * AES-128 and AES-256, and may support AES-192 and 3DES.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The cipher context used for the CMAC operation, initialized
+ * as one of the following types: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB,
+ * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB,
+ * or MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB.
+ * \param key The CMAC key.
+ * \param keybits The length of the CMAC key in bits.
+ * Must be supported by the cipher.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t keybits);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing CMAC
+ * computation.
+ *
+ * The CMAC computation must have previously been started
+ * by calling mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts() or
+ * mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset().
+ *
+ * Call this function as many times as needed to input the
+ * data to be authenticated.
+ * Once all of the required data has been input,
+ * call mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish() to obtain the result
+ * of the CMAC operation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The cipher context used for the CMAC operation.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+ * if parameter verification fails.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function finishes an ongoing CMAC operation, and
+ * writes the result to the output buffer.
+ *
+ * It should be followed either by
+ * mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset(), which starts another CMAC
+ * operation with the same key, or mbedtls_cipher_free(),
+ * which clears the cipher context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The cipher context used for the CMAC operation.
+ * \param output The output buffer for the CMAC checksum result.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+ * if parameter verification fails.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function starts a new CMAC operation with the same
+ * key as the previous one.
+ *
+ * It should be called after finishing the previous CMAC
+ * operation with mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish().
+ * After calling this function,
+ * call mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update() to supply the new
+ * CMAC operation with data.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The cipher context used for the CMAC operation.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+ * if parameter verification fails.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function calculates the full generic CMAC
+ * on the input buffer with the provided key.
+ *
+ * The function allocates the context, performs the
+ * calculation, and frees the context.
+ *
+ * The CMAC result is calculated as
+ * output = generic CMAC(cmac key, input buffer).
+ *
+ * \note When the CMAC implementation is supplied by an alternate
+ * implementation (through #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT), some ciphers
+ * may not be supported by that implementation, and thus
+ * return an error. Alternate implementations must support
+ * AES-128 and AES-256, and may support AES-192 and 3DES.
+ *
+ * \param cipher_info The cipher information.
+ * \param key The CMAC key.
+ * \param keylen The length of the CMAC key in bits.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data.
+ * \param output The buffer for the generic CMAC result.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+ * if parameter verification fails.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_cmac(const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+/**
+ * \brief This function implements the AES-CMAC-PRF-128 pseudorandom
+ * function, as defined in
+ * <em>RFC-4615: The Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher-based
+ * Message Authentication Code-Pseudo-Random Function-128
+ * (AES-CMAC-PRF-128) Algorithm for the Internet Key
+ * Exchange Protocol (IKE).</em>
+ *
+ * \param key The key to use.
+ * \param key_len The key length in Bytes.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * \param in_len The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer holding the generated 16 Bytes of
+ * pseudorandom output.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ */
+int mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128(const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len,
+ unsigned char output[16]);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && (defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C))
+/**
+ * \brief The CMAC checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \note In case the CMAC routines are provided by an alternative
+ * implementation (i.e. #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT is defined), the
+ * checkup routine will succeed even if the implementation does
+ * not support the less widely used AES-192 or 3DES primitives.
+ * The self-test requires at least AES-128 and AES-256 to be
+ * supported by the underlying implementation.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c 1 on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cmac_self_test(int verbose);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..096341b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/compat-2.x.h
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/**
+ * \file compat-2.x.h
+ *
+ * \brief Compatibility definitions
+ *
+ * \deprecated Use the new names directly instead
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
+#warning "Including compat-2.x.h is deprecated"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_COMPAT2X_H
+#define MBEDTLS_COMPAT2X_H
+
+/*
+ * Macros for renamed functions
+ */
+#define mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_ret mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update
+#define mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_ret mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update
+#define mbedtls_md5_starts_ret mbedtls_md5_starts
+#define mbedtls_md5_update_ret mbedtls_md5_update
+#define mbedtls_md5_finish_ret mbedtls_md5_finish
+#define mbedtls_md5_ret mbedtls_md5
+#define mbedtls_ripemd160_starts_ret mbedtls_ripemd160_starts
+#define mbedtls_ripemd160_update_ret mbedtls_ripemd160_update
+#define mbedtls_ripemd160_finish_ret mbedtls_ripemd160_finish
+#define mbedtls_ripemd160_ret mbedtls_ripemd160
+#define mbedtls_sha1_starts_ret mbedtls_sha1_starts
+#define mbedtls_sha1_update_ret mbedtls_sha1_update
+#define mbedtls_sha1_finish_ret mbedtls_sha1_finish
+#define mbedtls_sha1_ret mbedtls_sha1
+#define mbedtls_sha256_starts_ret mbedtls_sha256_starts
+#define mbedtls_sha256_update_ret mbedtls_sha256_update
+#define mbedtls_sha256_finish_ret mbedtls_sha256_finish
+#define mbedtls_sha256_ret mbedtls_sha256
+#define mbedtls_sha512_starts_ret mbedtls_sha512_starts
+#define mbedtls_sha512_update_ret mbedtls_sha512_update
+#define mbedtls_sha512_finish_ret mbedtls_sha512_finish
+#define mbedtls_sha512_ret mbedtls_sha512
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_COMPAT2X_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..331ac9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h
@@ -0,0 +1,535 @@
+/**
+ * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h
+ * \brief Adjust legacy configuration configuration
+ *
+ * This is an internal header. Do not include it directly.
+ *
+ * Automatically enable certain dependencies. Generally, MBEDTLS_xxx
+ * configurations need to be explicitly enabled by the user: enabling
+ * MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not MBEDTLS_xxx_B when A requires B results in a
+ * compilation error. However, we do automatically enable certain options
+ * in some circumstances. One case is if MBEDTLS_xxx_B is an internal option
+ * used to identify parts of a module that are used by other module, and we
+ * don't want to make the symbol MBEDTLS_xxx_B part of the public API.
+ * Another case is if A didn't depend on B in earlier versions, and we
+ * want to use B in A but we need to preserve backward compatibility with
+ * configurations that explicitly activate MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not
+ * MBEDTLS_xxx_B.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_CRYPTO_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_CRYPTO_H
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILES_READ)
+#error "Do not include mbedtls/config_adjust_*.h manually! This can lead to problems, " \
+ "up to and including runtime errors such as buffer overflows. " \
+ "If you're trying to fix a complaint from check_config.h, just remove " \
+ "it from your configuration file: since Mbed TLS 3.0, it is included " \
+ "automatically at the right point."
+#endif /* */
+
+/* Ideally, we'd set those as defaults in mbedtls_config.h, but
+ * putting an #ifdef _WIN32 in mbedtls_config.h would confuse config.py.
+ *
+ * So, adjust it here.
+ * Not related to crypto, but this is the bottom of the stack. */
+#if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1900)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT
+#endif
+#endif /* _MINGW32__ || (_MSC_VER && (_MSC_VER <= 1900)) */
+
+/* If MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined, make sure MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT
+ * is defined as well to include all PSA code.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
+
+/* Auto-enable CIPHER_C when any of the unauthenticated ciphers is builtin
+ * in PSA. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC))
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
+#endif
+
+/* Auto-enable MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT based on MBEDTLS_MD_C.
+ * This allows checking for MD_LIGHT rather than MD_LIGHT || MD_C.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT
+#endif
+
+/* Auto-enable MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT if needed by a module that didn't require it
+ * in a previous release, to ensure backwards compatibility.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT)
+/*
+ * - MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_xxx is defined if the md module can perform xxx.
+ * - MBEDTLS_MD_xxx_VIA_PSA is defined if the md module may perform xxx via PSA
+ * (see below).
+ * - MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA is defined if at least one algorithm may be performed
+ * via PSA (see below).
+ * - MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY is defined if at least one algorithm may be performed
+ * via a direct legacy call (see below).
+ *
+ * The md module performs an algorithm via PSA if there is a PSA hash
+ * accelerator and the PSA driver subsytem is initialized at the time the
+ * operation is started, and makes a direct legacy call otherwise.
+ */
+
+/* PSA accelerated implementations */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_MD5_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_224)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_256)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_384)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_512)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_MD5_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT && !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
+
+/* Built-in implementations */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_LEGACY
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT */
+
+/* BLOCK_CIPHER module can dispatch to PSA when:
+ * - PSA is enabled and drivers have been initialized
+ * - desired key type is supported on the PSA side
+ * If the above conditions are not met, but the legacy support is enabled, then
+ * BLOCK_CIPHER will dynamically fallback to it.
+ *
+ * In case BLOCK_CIPHER is defined (see below) the following symbols/helpers
+ * can be used to define its capabilities:
+ * - MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA: there is at least 1 key type between AES,
+ * ARIA and Camellia which is supported through a driver;
+ * - MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_xxx_VIA_PSA: xxx key type is supported through a
+ * driver;
+ * - MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_xxx_VIA_LEGACY: xxx key type is supported through
+ * a legacy module (i.e. MBEDTLS_xxx_C)
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES)
+#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA)
+#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)
+#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_PSA
+#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_LEGACY
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_LEGACY
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_LEGACY
+#endif
+
+/* Helpers to state that BLOCK_CIPHER module supports AES, ARIA and/or Camellia
+ * block ciphers via either PSA or legacy. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_PSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_LEGACY)
+#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_AES
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_PSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_LEGACY)
+#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_ARIA
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_PSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_LEGACY)
+#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_CAMELLIA
+#endif
+
+/* GCM_C and CCM_C can either depend on (in order of preference) BLOCK_CIPHER_C
+ * or CIPHER_C. The former is auto-enabled when:
+ * - CIPHER_C is not defined, which is also the legacy solution;
+ * - BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA because in this case BLOCK_CIPHER can take advantage
+ * of the driver's acceleration.
+ */
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)) && \
+ (!defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA))
+#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C
+#endif
+
+/* Helpers for GCM/CCM capabilities */
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_AES))
+#define MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_ARIA))
+#define MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_ARIA
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAN_CAMELLIA))
+#define MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_CAMELLIA
+#endif
+
+/* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT is auto-enabled by the following symbols:
+ * - MBEDTLS_ECP_C because now it consists of MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT plus functions
+ * for curve arithmetic. As a consequence if MBEDTLS_ECP_C is required for
+ * some reason, then MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT should be enabled as well.
+ * - MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED and MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED because
+ * these features are not supported in PSA so the only way to have them is
+ * to enable the built-in solution.
+ * Both of them are temporary dependencies:
+ * - PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED will be removed after #7779 and #7789
+ * - support for compressed points should also be added to PSA, but in this
+ * case there is no associated issue to track it yet.
+ * - PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE because Weierstrass key derivation
+ * still depends on ECP_LIGHT.
+ * - PK_C + USE_PSA + PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA is a temporary dependency which will
+ * be fixed by #7453.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT
+#endif
+
+/* Backward compatibility: after #8740 the RSA module offers functions to parse
+ * and write RSA private/public keys without relying on the PK one. Of course
+ * this needs ASN1 support to do so, so we enable it here. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C
+#endif
+
+/* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED is introduced in Mbed TLS version 3.5, while
+ * in previous version compressed points were automatically supported as long
+ * as PK_PARSE_C and ECP_C were enabled. As a consequence, for backward
+ * compatibility, we auto-enable PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED when these conditions
+ * are met. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED
+#endif
+
+/* Helper symbol to state that there is support for ECDH, either through
+ * library implementation (ECDH_C) or through PSA. */
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH)) || \
+ (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C))
+#define MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH
+#endif
+
+/* PK module can achieve ECDSA functionalities by means of either software
+ * implementations (ECDSA_C) or through a PSA driver. The following defines
+ * are meant to list these capabilities in a general way which abstracts how
+ * they are implemented under the hood. */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA)
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) || defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN)
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME
+#endif
+
+/* Helpers to state that each key is supported either on the builtin or PSA side. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1
+#endif
+
+/* Helper symbol to state that the PK module has support for EC keys. This
+ * can either be provided through the legacy ECP solution or through the
+ * PSA friendly MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA (see pk.h for its description). */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY))
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA || MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
+/* Historically pkparse did not check the CBC padding when decrypting
+ * a key. This was a bug, which is now fixed. As a consequence, pkparse
+ * now needs PKCS7 padding support, but existing configurations might not
+ * enable it, so we enable it here. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+#endif
+
+/* Backwards compatibility for some macros which were renamed to reflect that
+ * they are related to Armv8, not aarch64. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT)
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY) && !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY)
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY
+#endif
+
+/* psa_util file features some ECDSA conversion functions, to convert between
+ * legacy's ASN.1 DER format and PSA's raw one. */
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)))
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA
+#endif
+
+/* Some internal helpers to determine which keys are available. */
+#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES))
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES
+#endif
+#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA))
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_ARIA
+#endif
+#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA))
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CAMELLIA
+#endif
+
+/* Some internal helpers to determine which operation modes are available. */
+#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING))
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CBC
+#endif
+
+#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM))
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM
+#endif
+
+#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM))
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM
+#endif
+
+#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305))
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CCM) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AEAD
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_CRYPTO_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..48f1bab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h
@@ -0,0 +1,873 @@
+/**
+ * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h
+ * \brief Adjust PSA configuration: activate legacy implementations
+ *
+ * This is an internal header. Do not include it directly.
+ *
+ * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled, activate legacy implementations
+ * of cryptographic mechanisms as needed to fulfill the needs of the PSA
+ * configuration. Generally speaking, we activate a legacy mechanism if
+ * it's needed for a requested PSA mechanism and there is no PSA driver
+ * for it.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_FROM_PSA_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_FROM_PSA_H
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILES_READ)
+#error "Do not include mbedtls/config_adjust_*.h manually! This can lead to problems, " \
+ "up to and including runtime errors such as buffer overflows. " \
+ "If you're trying to fix a complaint from check_config.h, just remove " \
+ "it from your configuration file: since Mbed TLS 3.0, it is included " \
+ "automatically at the right point."
+#endif /* */
+
+/* Define appropriate ACCEL macros for the p256-m driver.
+ * In the future, those should be generated from the drivers JSON description.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * ECC: support for a feature is controlled by a triplet or a pair:
+ * (curve, key_type public/basic, alg) or (curve, key_type_<action>).
+ *
+ * A triplet/pair is accelerated if all of is components are accelerated;
+ * otherwise each component needs to be built in.
+ *
+ * We proceed in two passes:
+ * 1. Check if acceleration is complete for curves, key types, algs.
+ * 2. Then enable built-ins for each thing that's either not accelerated of
+ * doesn't have complete acceleration of the other triplet/pair components.
+ *
+ * Note: this needs psa/crypto_adjust_keypair_types.h to have been included
+ * already, so that we know the full set of key types that are requested.
+ */
+
+/* ECC: curves: is acceleration complete? */
+#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256))
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448))
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES
+#endif
+
+/* ECC: algs: is acceleration complete? */
+#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_JPAKE))
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS
+#endif
+
+/* ECC: key types: is acceleration complete? */
+#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC))
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC
+#endif
+
+/* Special case: we don't support cooked key derivation in drivers yet */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)
+#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE
+#endif
+
+/* Note: the condition about key derivation is always true as DERIVE can't be
+ * accelerated yet */
+#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE))
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES
+#endif
+
+/* ECC: curves: enable built-ins as needed.
+ *
+ * We need the curve built-in:
+ * - if it's not accelerated, or
+ * - if there's a key type with missing acceleration, or
+ * - if there's a alg with missing acceleration.
+ */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */
+
+/* ECC: algs: enable built-ins as needed.
+ *
+ * We need the alg built-in:
+ * - if it's not accelerated, or
+ * - if there's a relevant curve (see below) with missing acceleration, or
+ * - if there's a key type among (public, basic) with missing acceleration.
+ *
+ * Relevant curves are:
+ * - all curves for ECDH
+ * - Weierstrass curves for (deterministic) ECDSA
+ * - secp256r1 for EC J-PAKE
+ */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC
+#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_C
+#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_JPAKE) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C
+#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */
+
+/* ECC: key types: enable built-ins as needed.
+ *
+ * We need the key type built-in:
+ * - if it's not accelerated, or
+ * - if there's a curve with missing acceleration, or
+ * - only for public/basic: if there's an alg with missing acceleration.
+ */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */
+
+/* Note: the condition is always true as DERIVE can't be accelerated yet */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1
+#endif /* missing accel */
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
+#endif
+
+/* End of ECC section */
+
+/*
+ * DH key types follow the same pattern used above for EC keys. They are defined
+ * by a triplet (group, key_type, alg). A triplet is accelerated if all its
+ * component are accelerated, otherwise each component needs to be builtin.
+ */
+
+/* DH: groups: is acceleration complete? */
+#if (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192))
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS
+#endif
+
+/* DH: algs: is acceleration complete? */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS
+#endif
+
+/* DH: key types: is acceleration complete? */
+#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE))
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH 1
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */
+
+/* End of DH section */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF)
+/*
+ * The PSA implementation has its own implementation of HKDF, separate from
+ * hkdf.c. No need to enable MBEDTLS_HKDF_C here.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT)
+/*
+ * The PSA implementation has its own implementation of HKDF, separate from
+ * hkdf.c. No need to enable MBEDTLS_HKDF_C here.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND)
+/*
+ * The PSA implementation has its own implementation of HKDF, separate from
+ * hkdf.c. No need to enable MBEDTLS_HKDF_C here.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_MD5)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5 1
+#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RIPEMD160)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160 1
+#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1
+#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_C
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1
+#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_C
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1
+#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_C
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1
+#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_C
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PSS */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_1)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_224)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_256)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_384)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA_512)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_224)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_C
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_256)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_C
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_384)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_C
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_SHA3_512)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_C
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC 1
+#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_HMAC 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
+#define MBEDTLS_GENPRIME
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1
+#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_C
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */
+
+/* If any of the block modes are requested that don't have an
+ * associated HW assist, define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE for checking
+ * in the block cipher key types. */
+#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC))
+#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 1
+#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_CMAC 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES)
+#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_AES */
+#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES 1
+#define MBEDTLS_AES_C
+#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA)
+#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ARIA */
+#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C
+#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)
+#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA */
+#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1
+#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
+#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DES)
+#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DES */
+#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES 1
+#define MBEDTLS_DES_C
+#endif /*PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_MODE */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1
+#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C
+#endif /*!MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */
+
+/* If any of the software block ciphers are selected, define
+ * PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER, which can be used in any of these
+ * situations. */
+#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_DES) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)
+#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC 1
+#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CMAC */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC */
+
+#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_HMAC) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_CMAC)
+#define PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 1
+#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_HMAC || PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2_CMAC */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CTR) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR 1
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+#endif
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CFB) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB 1
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB
+#endif
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_OFB) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB 1
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB
+#endif
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER)
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1
+#endif
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_BLOCK_CIPHER)
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+#endif
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM 1
+#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+#endif
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG 1
+#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+#endif
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_GCM) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \
+ defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM 1
+#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C
+#endif
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20)
+#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C
+#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C
+#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 */
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_FROM_PSA_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14ca146
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
+/**
+ * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h
+ * \brief Adjust PSA configuration: construct PSA configuration from legacy
+ *
+ * This is an internal header. Do not include it directly.
+ *
+ * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled, we automatically enable
+ * cryptographic mechanisms through the PSA interface when the corresponding
+ * legacy mechanism is enabled. In many cases, this just enables the PSA
+ * wrapper code around the legacy implementation, but we also do this for
+ * some mechanisms where PSA has its own independent implementation so
+ * that high-level modules that can use either cryptographic API have the
+ * same feature set in both cases.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_FROM_LEGACY_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_FROM_LEGACY_H
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILES_READ)
+#error "Do not include mbedtls/config_adjust_*.h manually! This can lead to problems, " \
+ "up to and including runtime errors such as buffer overflows. " \
+ "If you're trying to fix a complaint from check_config.h, just remove " \
+ "it from your configuration file: since Mbed TLS 3.0, it is included " \
+ "automatically at the right point."
+#endif /* */
+
+/*
+ * Ensure PSA_WANT_* defines are setup properly if MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG
+ * is not defined
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM 1
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG 1
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH 1
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY 1
+
+// Only add in DETERMINISTIC support if ECDSA is also enabled
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
+/* Normally we wouldn't enable this because it's not implemented in ecp.c,
+ * but since it used to be available any time ECP_C was enabled, let's enable
+ * it anyway for the sake of backwards compatibility */
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
+/* See comment for PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE above. */
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH 1
+#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 1
+#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 1
+#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 1
+#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 1
+#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 1
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM 1
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
+
+/* Enable PSA HKDF algorithm if mbedtls HKDF is supported.
+ * PSA HKDF EXTRACT and PSA HKDF EXPAND have minimal cost when
+ * PSA HKDF is enabled, so enable both algorithms together
+ * with PSA HKDF. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND 1
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC 1
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW 1
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PSS 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_AES 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DES 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1
+/* ALG_STREAM_CIPHER requires CIPHER_C in order to be supported in PSA */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1
+#endif
+
+/* SECP224K1 is buggy via the PSA API (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/3541) */
+#if 0 && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_FROM_LEGACY_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a232cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+/**
+ * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h
+ * \brief Adjust PSA configuration: automatic enablement from legacy
+ *
+ * This is an internal header. Do not include it directly.
+ *
+ * To simplify some edge cases, we automatically enable certain cryptographic
+ * mechanisms in the PSA API if they are enabled in the legacy API. The general
+ * idea is that if legacy module M uses mechanism A internally, and A has
+ * both a legacy and a PSA implementation, we enable A through PSA whenever
+ * it's enabled through legacy. This facilitates the transition to PSA
+ * implementations of A for users of M.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_SUPERSET_LEGACY_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_SUPERSET_LEGACY_H
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILES_READ)
+#error "Do not include mbedtls/config_adjust_*.h manually! This can lead to problems, " \
+ "up to and including runtime errors such as buffer overflows. " \
+ "If you're trying to fix a complaint from check_config.h, just remove " \
+ "it from your configuration file: since Mbed TLS 3.0, it is included " \
+ "automatically at the right point."
+#endif /* */
+
+/****************************************************************/
+/* Hashes that are built in are also enabled in PSA.
+ * This simplifies dependency declarations especially
+ * for modules that obey MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO. */
+/****************************************************************/
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512 1
+#endif
+
+/* Ensure that the PSA's supported curves (PSA_WANT_ECC_xxx) are always a
+ * superset of the builtin ones (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx). */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED)
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256)
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED)
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384)
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 */
+#endif /*MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED)
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512)
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255)
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448)
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192)
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224)
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256)
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384)
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521)
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192)
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256)
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_PSA_SUPERSET_LEGACY_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f82d9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/**
+ * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h
+ * \brief Adjust TLS configuration
+ *
+ * This is an internal header. Do not include it directly.
+ *
+ * Automatically enable certain dependencies. Generally, MBEDTLS_xxx
+ * configurations need to be explicitly enabled by the user: enabling
+ * MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not MBEDTLS_xxx_B when A requires B results in a
+ * compilation error. However, we do automatically enable certain options
+ * in some circumstances. One case is if MBEDTLS_xxx_B is an internal option
+ * used to identify parts of a module that are used by other module, and we
+ * don't want to make the symbol MBEDTLS_xxx_B part of the public API.
+ * Another case is if A didn't depend on B in earlier versions, and we
+ * want to use B in A but we need to preserve backward compatibility with
+ * configurations that explicitly activate MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not
+ * MBEDTLS_xxx_B.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_SSL_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_SSL_H
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILES_READ)
+#error "Do not include mbedtls/config_adjust_*.h manually! This can lead to problems, " \
+ "up to and including runtime errors such as buffer overflows. " \
+ "If you're trying to fix a complaint from check_config.h, just remove " \
+ "it from your configuration file: since Mbed TLS 3.0, it is included " \
+ "automatically at the right point."
+#endif /* */
+
+/* The following blocks make it easier to disable all of TLS,
+ * or of TLS 1.2 or 1.3 or DTLS, without having to manually disable all
+ * key exchanges, options and extensions related to them. */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
+#endif
+
+#if !(defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS))
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION
+#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED
+#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED
+#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED
+#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
+#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED
+#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED
+#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED
+#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED
+#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED
+#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED
+#undef MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA
+#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED))
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_2_SOME_ECC
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_SSL_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cfb2d88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/**
+ * \file mbedtls/config_adjust_x509.h
+ * \brief Adjust X.509 configuration
+ *
+ * This is an internal header. Do not include it directly.
+ *
+ * Automatically enable certain dependencies. Generally, MBEDTLS_xxx
+ * configurations need to be explicitly enabled by the user: enabling
+ * MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not MBEDTLS_xxx_B when A requires B results in a
+ * compilation error. However, we do automatically enable certain options
+ * in some circumstances. One case is if MBEDTLS_xxx_B is an internal option
+ * used to identify parts of a module that are used by other module, and we
+ * don't want to make the symbol MBEDTLS_xxx_B part of the public API.
+ * Another case is if A didn't depend on B in earlier versions, and we
+ * want to use B in A but we need to preserve backward compatibility with
+ * configurations that explicitly activate MBEDTLS_xxx_A but not
+ * MBEDTLS_xxx_B.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_X509_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_X509_H
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILES_READ)
+#error "Do not include mbedtls/config_adjust_*.h manually! This can lead to problems, " \
+ "up to and including runtime errors such as buffer overflows. " \
+ "If you're trying to fix a complaint from check_config.h, just remove " \
+ "it from your configuration file: since Mbed TLS 3.0, it is included " \
+ "automatically at the right point."
+#endif /* */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_X509_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f3d0f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/config_psa.h
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/**
+ * \file mbedtls/config_psa.h
+ * \brief PSA crypto configuration options (set of defines)
+ *
+ * This set of compile-time options takes settings defined in
+ * include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h and include/psa/crypto_config.h and uses
+ * those definitions to define symbols used in the library code.
+ *
+ * Users and integrators should not edit this file, please edit
+ * include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h for MBEDTLS_XXX settings or
+ * include/psa/crypto_config.h for PSA_WANT_XXX settings.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H
+
+#include "psa/crypto_legacy.h"
+
+#include "psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h"
+
+#include "psa/crypto_adjust_config_dependencies.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG)
+
+/* Require built-in implementations based on PSA requirements */
+
+/* We need this to have a complete list of requirements
+ * before we deduce what built-ins are required. */
+#include "psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+/* If we are implementing PSA crypto ourselves, then we want to enable the
+ * required built-ins. Otherwise, PSA features will be provided by the server. */
+#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h"
+#endif
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */
+
+/* Infer PSA requirements from Mbed TLS capabilities */
+
+#include "mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h"
+
+/* Hopefully the file above will have enabled keypair symbols in a consistent
+ * way, but including this here fixes them if that wasn't the case. */
+#include "psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h"
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SOME_PAKE 1
+#endif
+
+#include "psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h"
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONFIG_PSA_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d31bff6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/constant_time.h
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/**
+ * Constant-time functions
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_H
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+/** Constant-time buffer comparison without branches.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to the standard memcmp function, but is likely to be
+ * compiled to code using bitwise operations rather than a branch, such that
+ * the time taken is constant w.r.t. the data pointed to by \p a and \p b,
+ * and w.r.t. whether \p a and \p b are equal or not. It is not constant-time
+ * w.r.t. \p n .
+ *
+ * This function can be used to write constant-time code by replacing branches
+ * with bit operations using masks.
+ *
+ * \param a Pointer to the first buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL.
+ * \param b Pointer to the second buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL.
+ * \param n The number of bytes to compare.
+ *
+ * \return Zero if the contents of the two buffers are the same,
+ * otherwise non-zero.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ct_memcmp(const void *a,
+ const void *b,
+ size_t n);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b7cce1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h
@@ -0,0 +1,597 @@
+/**
+ * \file ctr_drbg.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains definitions and functions for the
+ * CTR_DRBG pseudorandom generator.
+ *
+ * CTR_DRBG is a standardized way of building a PRNG from a block-cipher
+ * in counter mode operation, as defined in <em>NIST SP 800-90A:
+ * Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random
+ * Bit Generators</em>.
+ *
+ * The Mbed TLS implementation of CTR_DRBG uses AES-256 (default) or AES-128
+ * (if \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled at compile time)
+ * as the underlying block cipher, with a derivation function.
+ *
+ * The security strength as defined in NIST SP 800-90A is
+ * 128 bits when AES-128 is used (\c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY enabled)
+ * and 256 bits otherwise, provided that #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN is
+ * kept at its default value (and not overridden in mbedtls_config.h) and that the
+ * DRBG instance is set up with default parameters.
+ * See the documentation of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() for more
+ * information.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+/* The CTR_DRBG implementation can either directly call the low-level AES
+ * module (gated by MBEDTLS_AES_C) or call the PSA API to perform AES
+ * operations. Calling the AES module directly is the default, both for
+ * maximum backward compatibility and because it's a bit more efficient
+ * (less glue code).
+ *
+ * When MBEDTLS_AES_C is disabled, the CTR_DRBG module calls PSA crypto and
+ * thus benefits from the PSA AES accelerator driver.
+ * It is technically possible to enable MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+ * to use PSA even when MBEDTLS_AES_C is enabled, but there is very little
+ * reason to do so other than testing purposes and this is not officially
+ * supported.
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#else
+#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "entropy.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
+#endif
+
+/** The entropy source failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -0x0034
+/** The requested random buffer length is too big. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG -0x0036
+/** The input (entropy + additional data) is too large. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG -0x0038
+/** Read or write error in file. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x003A
+
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE 16 /**< The block size used by the cipher. */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY)
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE 16
+/**< The key size in bytes used by the cipher.
+ *
+ * Compile-time choice: 16 bytes (128 bits)
+ * because #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled.
+ */
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE 32
+/**< The key size in bytes used by the cipher.
+ *
+ * Compile-time choice: 32 bytes (256 bits)
+ * because \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is disabled.
+ */
+#endif
+
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 8) /**< The key size for the DRBG operation, in bits. */
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) /**< The seed length, calculated as (counter + AES key). */
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: Module settings
+ *
+ * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section.
+ * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them using the compiler command
+ * line.
+ * \{
+ */
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN
+ *
+ * \brief The amount of entropy used per seed by default, in bytes.
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR)
+/** This is 48 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-512.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 48
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR */
+
+/** This is 32 bytes because the entropy module uses SHA-256.
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY)
+/** \warning To achieve a 256-bit security strength, you must pass a nonce
+ * to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed().
+ */
+#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY) */
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 32
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR */
+#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL)
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000
+/**< The interval before reseed is performed by default. */
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT)
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256
+/**< The maximum number of additional input Bytes. */
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST)
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024
+/**< The maximum number of requested Bytes per call. */
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT)
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384
+/**< The maximum size of seed or reseed buffer in bytes. */
+#endif
+
+/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF 0
+/**< Prediction resistance is disabled. */
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON 1
+/**< Prediction resistance is enabled. */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 3 / 2
+/** The default length of the nonce read from the entropy source.
+ *
+ * This is \c 0 because a single read from the entropy source is sufficient
+ * to include a nonce.
+ * See the documentation of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() for more information.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN 0
+#else
+/** The default length of the nonce read from the entropy source.
+ *
+ * This is half of the default entropy length because a single read from
+ * the entropy source does not provide enough material to form a nonce.
+ * See the documentation of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() for more information.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN + 1) / 2
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+typedef struct mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context {
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id;
+ psa_cipher_operation_t operation;
+} mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context;
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief The CTR_DRBG context structure.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context {
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(counter)[16]; /*!< The counter (V). */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(reseed_counter); /*!< The reseed counter.
+ * This is the number of requests that have
+ * been made since the last (re)seeding,
+ * minus one.
+ * Before the initial seeding, this field
+ * contains the amount of entropy in bytes
+ * to use as a nonce for the initial seeding,
+ * or -1 if no nonce length has been explicitly
+ * set (see mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()).
+ */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(prediction_resistance); /*!< This determines whether prediction
+ resistance is enabled, that is
+ whether to systematically reseed before
+ each random generation. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(entropy_len); /*!< The amount of entropy grabbed on each
+ seed or reseed operation, in bytes. */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(reseed_interval); /*!< The reseed interval.
+ * This is the maximum number of requests
+ * that can be made between reseedings. */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_ctx); /*!< The PSA context. */
+#else
+ mbedtls_aes_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aes_ctx); /*!< The AES context. */
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Callbacks (Entropy)
+ */
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_entropy))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t);
+ /*!< The entropy callback function. */
+
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_entropy); /*!< The context for the entropy function. */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized if and only if f_entropy != NULL.
+ * This means that the mutex is initialized during the initial seeding
+ * in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() and freed in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free().
+ *
+ * Note that this invariant may change without notice. Do not rely on it
+ * and do not access the mutex directly in application code.
+ */
+ mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex);
+#endif
+}
+mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes the CTR_DRBG context,
+ * and prepares it for mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed()
+ * or mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free().
+ *
+ * \note The reseed interval is
+ * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL by default.
+ * You can override it by calling
+ * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context to initialize.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function seeds and sets up the CTR_DRBG
+ * entropy source for future reseeds.
+ *
+ * A typical choice for the \p f_entropy and \p p_entropy parameters is
+ * to use the entropy module:
+ * - \p f_entropy is mbedtls_entropy_func();
+ * - \p p_entropy is an instance of ::mbedtls_entropy_context initialized
+ * with mbedtls_entropy_init() (which registers the platform's default
+ * entropy sources).
+ *
+ * The entropy length is #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN by default.
+ * You can override it by calling mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len().
+ *
+ * The entropy nonce length is:
+ * - \c 0 if the entropy length is at least 3/2 times the entropy length,
+ * which guarantees that the security strength is the maximum permitted
+ * by the key size and entropy length according to NIST SP 800-90A §10.2.1;
+ * - Half the entropy length otherwise.
+ * You can override it by calling mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len().
+ * With the default entropy length, the entropy nonce length is
+ * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN.
+ *
+ * You can provide a nonce and personalization string in addition to the
+ * entropy source, to make this instantiation as unique as possible.
+ * See SP 800-90A §8.6.7 for more details about nonces.
+ *
+ * The _seed_material_ value passed to the derivation function in
+ * the CTR_DRBG Instantiate Process described in NIST SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2
+ * is the concatenation of the following strings:
+ * - A string obtained by calling \p f_entropy function for the entropy
+ * length.
+ */
+#if MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_NONCE_LEN == 0
+/**
+ * - If mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len() has been called, a string
+ * obtained by calling \p f_entropy function for the specified length.
+ */
+#else
+/**
+ * - A string obtained by calling \p f_entropy function for the entropy nonce
+ * length. If the entropy nonce length is \c 0, this function does not
+ * make a second call to \p f_entropy.
+ */
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+/**
+ * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support,
+ * after this function returns successfully,
+ * it is safe to call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random()
+ * from multiple threads. Other operations, including
+ * reseeding, are not thread-safe.
+ */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
+/**
+ * - The \p custom string.
+ *
+ * \note To achieve the nominal security strength permitted
+ * by CTR_DRBG, the entropy length must be:
+ * - at least 16 bytes for a 128-bit strength
+ * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-128);
+ * - at least 32 bytes for a 256-bit strength
+ * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-256).
+ *
+ * In addition, if you do not pass a nonce in \p custom,
+ * the sum of the entropy length
+ * and the entropy nonce length must be:
+ * - at least 24 bytes for a 128-bit strength
+ * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-128);
+ * - at least 48 bytes for a 256-bit strength
+ * (maximum achievable strength when using AES-256).
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context to seed.
+ * It must have been initialized with
+ * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init().
+ * After a successful call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(),
+ * you may not call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() again on
+ * the same context unless you call
+ * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free() and mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init()
+ * again first.
+ * After a failed call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(),
+ * you must call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free().
+ * \param f_entropy The entropy callback, taking as arguments the
+ * \p p_entropy context, the buffer to fill, and the
+ * length of the buffer.
+ * \p f_entropy is always called with a buffer size
+ * less than or equal to the entropy length.
+ * \param p_entropy The entropy context to pass to \p f_entropy.
+ * \param custom The personalization string.
+ * This can be \c NULL, in which case the personalization
+ * string is empty regardless of the value of \p len.
+ * \param len The length of the personalization string.
+ * This must be at most
+ * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT
+ * - #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_entropy,
+ const unsigned char *custom,
+ size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function resets CTR_DRBG context to the state immediately
+ * after initial call of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context to clear.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function turns prediction resistance on or off.
+ * The default value is off.
+ *
+ * \note If enabled, entropy is gathered at the beginning of
+ * every call to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add()
+ * or mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random().
+ * Only use this if your entropy source has sufficient
+ * throughput.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context.
+ * \param resistance #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON or #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_OFF.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ int resistance);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets the amount of entropy grabbed on each
+ * seed or reseed.
+ *
+ * The default value is #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN.
+ *
+ * \note The security strength of CTR_DRBG is bounded by the
+ * entropy length. Thus:
+ * - When using AES-256
+ * (\c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is disabled,
+ * which is the default),
+ * \p len must be at least 32 (in bytes)
+ * to achieve a 256-bit strength.
+ * - When using AES-128
+ * (\c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY is enabled)
+ * \p len must be at least 16 (in bytes)
+ * to achieve a 128-bit strength.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context.
+ * \param len The amount of entropy to grab, in bytes.
+ * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT
+ * and at most the maximum length accepted by the
+ * entropy function that is set in the context.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets the amount of entropy grabbed
+ * as a nonce for the initial seeding.
+ *
+ * Call this function before calling mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() to read
+ * a nonce from the entropy source during the initial seeding.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context.
+ * \param len The amount of entropy to grab for the nonce, in bytes.
+ * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT
+ * and at most the maximum length accepted by the
+ * entropy function that is set in the context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if \p len is
+ * more than #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+ * if the initial seeding has already taken place.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets the reseed interval.
+ *
+ * The reseed interval is the number of calls to mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random()
+ * or mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add() after which the entropy function
+ * is called again.
+ *
+ * The default value is #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context.
+ * \param interval The reseed interval.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ int interval);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function reseeds the CTR_DRBG context, that is
+ * extracts data from the entropy source.
+ *
+ * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe
+ * to call this function if another thread might be
+ * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same
+ * context or updating or reseeding the same context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context.
+ * \param additional Additional data to add to the state. Can be \c NULL.
+ * \param len The length of the additional data.
+ * This must be less than
+ * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \c entropy_len
+ * where \c entropy_len is the entropy length
+ * configured for the context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *additional, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function updates the state of the CTR_DRBG context.
+ *
+ * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe
+ * to call this function if another thread might be
+ * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same
+ * context or updating or reseeding the same context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context.
+ * \param additional The data to update the state with. This must not be
+ * \c NULL unless \p add_len is \c 0.
+ * \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes. This must be at
+ * most #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if
+ * \p add_len is more than
+ * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT.
+ * \return An error from the underlying AES cipher on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *additional,
+ size_t add_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function updates a CTR_DRBG instance with additional
+ * data and uses it to generate random data.
+ *
+ * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded
+ * or prediction resistance is enabled.
+ *
+ * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe
+ * to call this function if another thread might be
+ * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same
+ * context or updating or reseeding the same context.
+ *
+ * \param p_rng The CTR_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a
+ * #mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context structure.
+ * \param output The buffer to fill.
+ * \param output_len The length of the buffer in bytes.
+ * \param additional Additional data to update. Can be \c NULL, in which
+ * case the additional data is empty regardless of
+ * the value of \p add_len.
+ * \param add_len The length of the additional data
+ * if \p additional is not \c NULL.
+ * This must be less than #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT
+ * and less than
+ * #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \c entropy_len
+ * where \c entropy_len is the entropy length
+ * configured for the context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED or
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_len,
+ const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function uses CTR_DRBG to generate random data.
+ *
+ * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded
+ * or prediction resistance is enabled.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+/**
+ * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support,
+ * it is safe to call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random()
+ * from multiple threads. Other operations, including
+ * reseeding, are not thread-safe.
+ */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
+/**
+ * \param p_rng The CTR_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a
+ * #mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context structure.
+ * \param output The buffer to fill.
+ * \param output_len The length of the buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED or
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(void *p_rng,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_len);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+/**
+ * \brief This function writes a seed file.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context.
+ * \param path The name of the file.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on reseed
+ * failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function reads and updates a seed file. The seed
+ * is added to this instance.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The CTR_DRBG context.
+ * \param path The name of the file.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on
+ * reseed failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if the existing
+ * seed file is too large.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+/**
+ * \brief The CTR_DRBG checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c 1 on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test(int verbose);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ctr_drbg.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e6f5dad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/debug.h
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+/**
+ * \file debug.h
+ *
+ * \brief Functions for controlling and providing debug output from the library.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H
+#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_STRIP_PARENS(...) __VA_ARGS__
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(level, args) \
+ mbedtls_debug_print_msg(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, \
+ MBEDTLS_DEBUG_STRIP_PARENS args)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(level, text, ret) \
+ mbedtls_debug_print_ret(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, ret)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(level, text, buf, len) \
+ mbedtls_debug_print_buf(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, buf, len)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(level, text, X) \
+ mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, X)
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP(level, text, X) \
+ mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, X)
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(level, text, crt) \
+ mbedtls_debug_print_crt(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, text, crt)
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(level, text, crt) do { } while (0)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(level, ecdh, attr) \
+ mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, ecdh, attr)
+#endif
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(level, args) do { } while (0)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(level, text, ret) do { } while (0)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF(level, text, buf, len) do { } while (0)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI(level, text, X) do { } while (0)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP(level, text, X) do { } while (0)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT(level, text, crt) do { } while (0)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH(level, ecdh, attr) do { } while (0)
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE
+ *
+ * Mark a function as having printf attributes, and thus enable checking
+ * via -wFormat and other flags. This does nothing on builds with compilers
+ * that do not support the format attribute
+ *
+ * Module: library/debug.c
+ * Caller:
+ *
+ * This module provides debugging functions.
+ */
+#if defined(__has_attribute)
+#if __has_attribute(format)
+#if defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 1
+#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check) \
+ __attribute__((__format__(gnu_printf, string_index, first_to_check)))
+#else /* defined(__MINGW32__) && __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO == 1 */
+#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check) \
+ __attribute__((format(printf, string_index, first_to_check)))
+#endif
+#else /* __has_attribute(format) */
+#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check)
+#endif /* __has_attribute(format) */
+#else /* defined(__has_attribute) */
+#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(string_index, first_to_check)
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET
+ *
+ * MBEDTLS_PRINTF_xxx: Due to issues with older window compilers
+ * and MinGW we need to define the printf specifier for size_t
+ * and long long per platform.
+ *
+ * Module: library/debug.c
+ * Caller:
+ *
+ * This module provides debugging functions.
+ */
+#if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1900)
+ #include <inttypes.h>
+ #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET PRIuPTR
+ #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG "I64d"
+#else \
+ /* defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1900) */
+ #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET "zu"
+ #define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG "lld"
+#endif \
+ /* defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER < 1900) */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME)
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#if !defined(PRId64)
+#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME PRId64
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the threshold error level to handle globally all debug output.
+ * Debug messages that have a level over the threshold value are
+ * discarded.
+ * (Default value: 0 = No debug )
+ *
+ * \param threshold threshold level of messages to filter on. Messages at a
+ * higher level will be discarded.
+ * - Debug levels
+ * - 0 No debug
+ * - 1 Error
+ * - 2 State change
+ * - 3 Informational
+ * - 4 Verbose
+ */
+void mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(int threshold);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/des.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/des.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b097a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/des.h
@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
+/**
+ * \file des.h
+ *
+ * \brief DES block cipher
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_DES_H
+#define MBEDTLS_DES_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT 1
+#define MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT 0
+
+/** The data input has an invalid length. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH -0x0032
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE 8
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT)
+// Regular implementation
+//
+
+/**
+ * \brief DES context structure
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_des_context {
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sk)[32]; /*!< DES subkeys */
+}
+mbedtls_des_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Triple-DES context structure
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_des3_context {
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sk)[96]; /*!< 3DES subkeys */
+}
+mbedtls_des3_context;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */
+#include "des_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize DES context
+ *
+ * \param ctx DES context to be initialized
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+void mbedtls_des_init(mbedtls_des_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Clear DES context
+ *
+ * \param ctx DES context to be cleared
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+void mbedtls_des_free(mbedtls_des_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize Triple-DES context
+ *
+ * \param ctx DES3 context to be initialized
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+void mbedtls_des3_init(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Clear Triple-DES context
+ *
+ * \param ctx DES3 context to be cleared
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+void mbedtls_des3_free(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set key parity on the given key to odd.
+ *
+ * DES keys are 56 bits long, but each byte is padded with
+ * a parity bit to allow verification.
+ *
+ * \param key 8-byte secret key
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+void mbedtls_des_key_set_parity(unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Check that key parity on the given key is odd.
+ *
+ * DES keys are 56 bits long, but each byte is padded with
+ * a parity bit to allow verification.
+ *
+ * \param key 8-byte secret key
+ *
+ * \return 0 is parity was ok, 1 if parity was not correct.
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity(const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Check that key is not a weak or semi-weak DES key
+ *
+ * \param key 8-byte secret key
+ *
+ * \return 0 if no weak key was found, 1 if a weak key was identified.
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_des_key_check_weak(const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief DES key schedule (56-bit, encryption)
+ *
+ * \param ctx DES context to be initialized
+ * \param key 8-byte secret key
+ *
+ * \return 0
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_des_setkey_enc(mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief DES key schedule (56-bit, decryption)
+ *
+ * \param ctx DES context to be initialized
+ * \param key 8-byte secret key
+ *
+ * \return 0
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_des_setkey_dec(mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Triple-DES key schedule (112-bit, encryption)
+ *
+ * \param ctx 3DES context to be initialized
+ * \param key 16-byte secret key
+ *
+ * \return 0
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Triple-DES key schedule (112-bit, decryption)
+ *
+ * \param ctx 3DES context to be initialized
+ * \param key 16-byte secret key
+ *
+ * \return 0
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Triple-DES key schedule (168-bit, encryption)
+ *
+ * \param ctx 3DES context to be initialized
+ * \param key 24-byte secret key
+ *
+ * \return 0
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Triple-DES key schedule (168-bit, decryption)
+ *
+ * \param ctx 3DES context to be initialized
+ * \param key 24-byte secret key
+ *
+ * \return 0
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief DES-ECB block encryption/decryption
+ *
+ * \param ctx DES context
+ * \param input 64-bit input block
+ * \param output 64-bit output block
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_des_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char input[8],
+ unsigned char output[8]);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+/**
+ * \brief DES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption
+ *
+ * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can
+ * call the function same function again on the following
+ * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was
+ * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage.
+ * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the
+ * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher
+ * module instead.
+ *
+ * \param ctx DES context
+ * \param mode MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT
+ * \param length length of the input data
+ * \param iv initialization vector (updated after use)
+ * \param input buffer holding the input data
+ * \param output buffer holding the output data
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ unsigned char iv[8],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+/**
+ * \brief 3DES-ECB block encryption/decryption
+ *
+ * \param ctx 3DES context
+ * \param input 64-bit input block
+ * \param output 64-bit output block
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char input[8],
+ unsigned char output[8]);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+/**
+ * \brief 3DES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption
+ *
+ * \note Upon exit, the content of the IV is updated so that you can
+ * call the function same function again on the following
+ * block(s) of data and get the same result as if it was
+ * encrypted in one call. This allows a "streaming" usage.
+ * If on the other hand you need to retain the contents of the
+ * IV, you should either save it manually or use the cipher
+ * module instead.
+ *
+ * \param ctx 3DES context
+ * \param mode MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT
+ * \param length length of the input data
+ * \param iv initialization vector (updated after use)
+ * \param input buffer holding the input data
+ * \param output buffer holding the output data
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ unsigned char iv[8],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal function for key expansion.
+ * (Only exposed to allow overriding it,
+ * see MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT)
+ *
+ * \param SK Round keys
+ * \param key Base key
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers
+ * instead.
+ */
+void mbedtls_des_setkey(uint32_t SK[32],
+ const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE]);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Checkup routine
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
+int mbedtls_des_self_test(int verbose);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* des.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/dhm.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/dhm.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bbfe6ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/dhm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,972 @@
+/**
+ * \file dhm.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains Diffie-Hellman-Merkle (DHM) key exchange
+ * definitions and functions.
+ *
+ * Diffie-Hellman-Merkle (DHM) key exchange is defined in
+ * <em>RFC-2631: Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method</em> and
+ * <em>Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #3: Diffie
+ * Hellman Key Agreement Standard</em>.
+ *
+ * <em>RFC-3526: More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for
+ * Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</em> defines a number of standardized
+ * Diffie-Hellman groups for IKE.
+ *
+ * <em>RFC-5114: Additional Diffie-Hellman Groups for Use with IETF
+ * Standards</em> defines a number of standardized Diffie-Hellman
+ * groups that can be used.
+ *
+ * \warning The security of the DHM key exchange relies on the proper choice
+ * of prime modulus - optimally, it should be a safe prime. The usage
+ * of non-safe primes both decreases the difficulty of the underlying
+ * discrete logarithm problem and can lead to small subgroup attacks
+ * leaking private exponent bits when invalid public keys are used
+ * and not detected. This is especially relevant if the same DHM
+ * parameters are reused for multiple key exchanges as in static DHM,
+ * while the criticality of small-subgroup attacks is lower for
+ * ephemeral DHM.
+ *
+ * \warning For performance reasons, the code does neither perform primality
+ * nor safe primality tests, nor the expensive checks for invalid
+ * subgroups. Moreover, even if these were performed, non-standardized
+ * primes cannot be trusted because of the possibility of backdoors
+ * that can't be effectively checked for.
+ *
+ * \warning Diffie-Hellman-Merkle is therefore a security risk when not using
+ * standardized primes generated using a trustworthy ("nothing up
+ * my sleeve") method, such as the RFC 3526 / 7919 primes. In the TLS
+ * protocol, DH parameters need to be negotiated, so using the default
+ * primes systematically is not always an option. If possible, use
+ * Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), which has better performance,
+ * and for which the TLS protocol mandates the use of standard
+ * parameters.
+ *
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_DHM_H
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+
+/*
+ * DHM Error codes
+ */
+/** Bad input parameters. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x3080
+/** Reading of the DHM parameters failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED -0x3100
+/** Making of the DHM parameters failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED -0x3180
+/** Reading of the public values failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED -0x3200
+/** Making of the public value failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED -0x3280
+/** Calculation of the DHM secret failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED -0x3300
+/** The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctly. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT -0x3380
+/** Allocation of memory failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED -0x3400
+/** Read or write of file failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x3480
+/** Setting the modulus and generator failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED -0x3580
+
+/** Which parameter to access in mbedtls_dhm_get_value(). */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_P, /*!< The prime modulus. */
+ MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_G, /*!< The generator. */
+ MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_X, /*!< Our secret value. */
+ MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GX, /*!< Our public key = \c G^X mod \c P. */
+ MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GY, /*!< The public key of the peer = \c G^Y mod \c P. */
+ MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_K, /*!< The shared secret = \c G^(XY) mod \c P. */
+} mbedtls_dhm_parameter;
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT)
+
+/**
+ * \brief The DHM context structure.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_dhm_context {
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(P); /*!< The prime modulus. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(G); /*!< The generator. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(X); /*!< Our secret value. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(GX); /*!< Our public key = \c G^X mod \c P. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(GY); /*!< The public key of the peer = \c G^Y mod \c P. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(K); /*!< The shared secret = \c G^(XY) mod \c P. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(RP); /*!< The cached value = \c R^2 mod \c P. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vi); /*!< The blinding value. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vf); /*!< The unblinding value. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pX); /*!< The previous \c X. */
+}
+mbedtls_dhm_context;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */
+#include "dhm_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes the DHM context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The DHM context to initialize.
+ */
+void mbedtls_dhm_init(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function parses the DHM parameters in a
+ * TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake message
+ * (DHM modulus, generator, and public key).
+ *
+ * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the client
+ * sets up its DHM context from the server's public
+ * DHM key material.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized.
+ * \param p On input, *p must be the start of the input buffer.
+ * On output, *p is updated to point to the end of the data
+ * that has been read. On success, this is the first byte
+ * past the end of the ServerKeyExchange parameters.
+ * On error, this is the point at which an error has been
+ * detected, which is usually not useful except to debug
+ * failures.
+ * \param end The end of the input buffer.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_read_params(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function generates a DHM key pair and exports its
+ * public part together with the DHM parameters in the format
+ * used in a TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake message.
+ *
+ * \note This function assumes that the DHM parameters \c ctx->P
+ * and \c ctx->G have already been properly set. For that, use
+ * mbedtls_dhm_set_group() below in conjunction with
+ * mbedtls_mpi_read_binary() and mbedtls_mpi_read_string().
+ *
+ * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the server generates
+ * and exports its DHM key material.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized
+ * and have the DHM parameters set. It may or may not
+ * already have imported the peer's public key.
+ * \param x_size The private key size in Bytes.
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes
+ * written on success. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param output The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer of
+ * sufficient size to hold the reduced binary presentation of
+ * the modulus, the generator and the public key, each wrapped
+ * with a 2-byte length field. It is the responsibility of the
+ * caller to ensure that enough space is available. Refer to
+ * mbedtls_mpi_size() to computing the byte-size of an MPI.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. Must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_make_params(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets the prime modulus and generator.
+ *
+ * \note This function can be used to set \c ctx->P, \c ctx->G
+ * in preparation for mbedtls_dhm_make_params().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The DHM context to configure. This must be initialized.
+ * \param P The MPI holding the DHM prime modulus. This must be
+ * an initialized MPI.
+ * \param G The MPI holding the DHM generator. This must be an
+ * initialized MPI.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_set_group(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *P,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *G);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function imports the raw public value of the peer.
+ *
+ * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the server imports
+ * the Client's public DHM key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized and have
+ * its DHM parameters set, e.g. via mbedtls_dhm_set_group().
+ * It may or may not already have generated its own private key.
+ * \param input The input buffer containing the \c G^Y value of the peer.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of size \p ilen Bytes.
+ * \param ilen The size of the input buffer \p input in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_read_public(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function creates a DHM key pair and exports
+ * the raw public key in big-endian format.
+ *
+ * \note The destination buffer is always fully written
+ * so as to contain a big-endian representation of G^X mod P.
+ * If it is larger than \c ctx->len, it is padded accordingly
+ * with zero-bytes at the beginning.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized and
+ * have the DHM parameters set. It may or may not already
+ * have imported the peer's public key.
+ * \param x_size The private key size in Bytes.
+ * \param output The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer of
+ * size \p olen Bytes.
+ * \param olen The length of the destination buffer. This must be at least
+ * equal to `ctx->len` (the size of \c P).
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL
+ * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_make_public(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t olen,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function derives and exports the shared secret
+ * \c (G^Y)^X mod \c P.
+ *
+ * \note If \p f_rng is not \c NULL, it is used to blind the input as
+ * a countermeasure against timing attacks. Blinding is used
+ * only if our private key \c X is re-used, and not used
+ * otherwise. We recommend always passing a non-NULL
+ * \p f_rng argument.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The DHM context to use. This must be initialized
+ * and have its own private key generated and the peer's
+ * public key imported.
+ * \param output The buffer to write the generated shared key to. This
+ * must be a writable buffer of size \p output_size Bytes.
+ * \param output_size The size of the destination buffer. This must be at
+ * least the size of \c ctx->len (the size of \c P).
+ * \param olen On exit, holds the actual number of Bytes written.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. Must not be \c NULL. Used for
+ * blinding.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, size_t *olen,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the size of the prime modulus in bits.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The DHM context to query.
+ *
+ * \return The size of the prime modulus in bits,
+ * i.e. the number n such that 2^(n-1) <= P < 2^n.
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the size of the prime modulus in bytes.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The DHM context to query.
+ *
+ * \return The size of the prime modulus in bytes,
+ * i.e. the number n such that 2^(8*(n-1)) <= P < 2^(8*n).
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_len(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function copies a parameter of a DHM key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The DHM context to query.
+ * \param param The parameter to copy.
+ * \param dest The MPI object to copy the value into. It must be
+ * initialized.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p param is invalid.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code if the copy fails.
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_get_value(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_dhm_parameter param,
+ mbedtls_mpi *dest);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function frees and clears the components
+ * of a DHM context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The DHM context to free and clear. This may be \c NULL,
+ * in which case this function is a no-op. If it is not \c NULL,
+ * it must point to an initialized DHM context.
+ */
+void mbedtls_dhm_free(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief This function parses DHM parameters in PEM or DER format.
+ *
+ * \param dhm The DHM context to import the DHM parameters into.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param dhmin The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer of
+ * length \p dhminlen Bytes.
+ * \param dhminlen The size of the input buffer \p dhmin, including the
+ * terminating \c NULL Byte for PEM data.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_XXX error
+ * code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm(mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin,
+ size_t dhminlen);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+/**
+ * \brief This function loads and parses DHM parameters from a file.
+ *
+ * \param dhm The DHM context to load the parameters to.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param path The filename to read the DHM parameters from.
+ * This must not be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_XXX
+ * error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile(mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+/**
+ * \brief The DMH checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c 1 on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_self_test(int verbose);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * RFC 3526, RFC 5114 and RFC 7919 standardize a number of
+ * Diffie-Hellman groups, some of which are included here
+ * for use within the SSL/TLS module and the user's convenience
+ * when configuring the Diffie-Hellman parameters by hand
+ * through \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param.
+ *
+ * The following lists the source of the above groups in the standards:
+ * - RFC 5114 section 2.2: 2048-bit MODP Group with 224-bit Prime Order Subgroup
+ * - RFC 3526 section 3: 2048-bit MODP Group
+ * - RFC 3526 section 4: 3072-bit MODP Group
+ * - RFC 3526 section 5: 4096-bit MODP Group
+ * - RFC 7919 section A.1: ffdhe2048
+ * - RFC 7919 section A.2: ffdhe3072
+ * - RFC 7919 section A.3: ffdhe4096
+ * - RFC 7919 section A.4: ffdhe6144
+ * - RFC 7919 section A.5: ffdhe8192
+ *
+ * The constants with suffix "_p" denote the chosen prime moduli, while
+ * the constants with suffix "_g" denote the chosen generator
+ * of the associated prime field.
+ *
+ * The constants further suffixed with "_bin" are provided in binary format,
+ * while all other constants represent null-terminated strings holding the
+ * hexadecimal presentation of the respective numbers.
+ *
+ * The primes from RFC 3526 and RFC 7919 have been generating by the following
+ * trust-worthy procedure:
+ * - Fix N in { 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192 } and consider the N-bit number
+ * the first and last 64 bits are all 1, and the remaining N - 128 bits of
+ * which are 0x7ff...ff.
+ * - Add the smallest multiple of the first N - 129 bits of the binary expansion
+ * of pi (for RFC 5236) or e (for RFC 7919) to this intermediate bit-string
+ * such that the resulting integer is a safe-prime.
+ * - The result is the respective RFC 3526 / 7919 prime, and the corresponding
+ * generator is always chosen to be 2 (which is a square for these prime,
+ * hence the corresponding subgroup has order (p-1)/2 and avoids leaking a
+ * bit in the private exponent).
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Trustworthy DHM parameters in binary form
+ */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_P_BIN { \
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \
+ 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, \
+ 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, \
+ 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, \
+ 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, \
+ 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, \
+ 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, \
+ 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, \
+ 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, \
+ 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, \
+ 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, \
+ 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, \
+ 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, \
+ 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, \
+ 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, \
+ 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, \
+ 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, \
+ 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, \
+ 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, \
+ 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, \
+ 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, \
+ 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, \
+ 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, \
+ 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, \
+ 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, \
+ 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, \
+ 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, \
+ 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, \
+ 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, \
+ 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, \
+ 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x68, \
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_G_BIN { 0x02 }
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_P_BIN { \
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \
+ 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, \
+ 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, \
+ 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, \
+ 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, \
+ 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, \
+ 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, \
+ 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, \
+ 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, \
+ 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, \
+ 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, \
+ 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, \
+ 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, \
+ 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, \
+ 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, \
+ 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, \
+ 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, \
+ 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, \
+ 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, \
+ 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, \
+ 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, \
+ 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, \
+ 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, \
+ 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, \
+ 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, \
+ 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, \
+ 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, \
+ 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, \
+ 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, \
+ 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, \
+ 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D, \
+ 0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33, \
+ 0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64, \
+ 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A, \
+ 0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D, \
+ 0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7, \
+ 0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7, \
+ 0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D, \
+ 0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B, \
+ 0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64, \
+ 0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64, \
+ 0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C, \
+ 0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C, \
+ 0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2, \
+ 0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31, \
+ 0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E, \
+ 0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x3A, 0xD2, 0xCA, \
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_3072_G_BIN { 0x02 }
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_P_BIN { \
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \
+ 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xC2, 0x34, \
+ 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x80, 0xDC, 0x1C, 0xD1, \
+ 0x29, 0x02, 0x4E, 0x08, 0x8A, 0x67, 0xCC, 0x74, \
+ 0x02, 0x0B, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0x3B, 0x13, 0x9B, 0x22, \
+ 0x51, 0x4A, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x34, 0x04, 0xDD, \
+ 0xEF, 0x95, 0x19, 0xB3, 0xCD, 0x3A, 0x43, 0x1B, \
+ 0x30, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0x14, 0x37, \
+ 0x4F, 0xE1, 0x35, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0x51, 0xC2, 0x45, \
+ 0xE4, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5E, 0x7E, 0xC6, \
+ 0xF4, 0x4C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xED, 0x6B, \
+ 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x5C, 0xB6, 0xF4, 0x06, 0xB7, 0xED, \
+ 0xEE, 0x38, 0x6B, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x9F, 0xA5, \
+ 0xAE, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x4B, 0x1F, 0xE6, \
+ 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xEC, 0xE4, 0x5B, 0x3D, \
+ 0xC2, 0x00, 0x7C, 0xB8, 0xA1, 0x63, 0xBF, 0x05, \
+ 0x98, 0xDA, 0x48, 0x36, 0x1C, 0x55, 0xD3, 0x9A, \
+ 0x69, 0x16, 0x3F, 0xA8, 0xFD, 0x24, 0xCF, 0x5F, \
+ 0x83, 0x65, 0x5D, 0x23, 0xDC, 0xA3, 0xAD, 0x96, \
+ 0x1C, 0x62, 0xF3, 0x56, 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xBB, \
+ 0x9E, 0xD5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6D, \
+ 0x67, 0x0C, 0x35, 0x4E, 0x4A, 0xBC, 0x98, 0x04, \
+ 0xF1, 0x74, 0x6C, 0x08, 0xCA, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7C, \
+ 0x32, 0x90, 0x5E, 0x46, 0x2E, 0x36, 0xCE, 0x3B, \
+ 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0x2C, 0x18, 0x0E, 0x86, 0x03, \
+ 0x9B, 0x27, 0x83, 0xA2, 0xEC, 0x07, 0xA2, 0x8F, \
+ 0xB5, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0xF0, 0x6F, 0x4C, 0x52, 0xC9, \
+ 0xDE, 0x2B, 0xCB, 0xF6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, \
+ 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7C, 0xEA, 0x95, 0x6A, 0xE5, \
+ 0x15, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x10, \
+ 0x15, 0x72, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xC4, 0x2D, \
+ 0xAD, 0x33, 0x17, 0x0D, 0x04, 0x50, 0x7A, 0x33, \
+ 0xA8, 0x55, 0x21, 0xAB, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xBA, 0x64, \
+ 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x85, 0x04, 0x58, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x0A, \
+ 0x8A, 0xEA, 0x71, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x06, 0x0C, 0x7D, \
+ 0xB3, 0x97, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA6, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xC7, \
+ 0xAB, 0xF5, 0xAE, 0x8C, 0xDB, 0x09, 0x33, 0xD7, \
+ 0x1E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x25, 0x61, 0x9D, \
+ 0xCE, 0xE3, 0xD2, 0x26, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x6B, \
+ 0xF1, 0x2F, 0xFA, 0x06, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x08, 0x64, \
+ 0xD8, 0x76, 0x02, 0x73, 0x3E, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0x64, \
+ 0x52, 0x1F, 0x2B, 0x18, 0x17, 0x7B, 0x20, 0x0C, \
+ 0xBB, 0xE1, 0x17, 0x57, 0x7A, 0x61, 0x5D, 0x6C, \
+ 0x77, 0x09, 0x88, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0xD9, 0x46, 0xE2, \
+ 0x08, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x74, 0xE5, 0xAB, 0x31, \
+ 0x43, 0xDB, 0x5B, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0xFD, 0x10, 0x8E, \
+ 0x4B, 0x82, 0xD1, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x21, 0x08, 0x01, \
+ 0x1A, 0x72, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xA7, 0x87, 0xE6, 0xD7, \
+ 0x88, 0x71, 0x9A, 0x10, 0xBD, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x26, \
+ 0x99, 0xC3, 0x27, 0x18, 0x6A, 0xF4, 0xE2, 0x3C, \
+ 0x1A, 0x94, 0x68, 0x34, 0xB6, 0x15, 0x0B, 0xDA, \
+ 0x25, 0x83, 0xE9, 0xCA, 0x2A, 0xD4, 0x4C, 0xE8, \
+ 0xDB, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xDB, 0x04, 0xDE, 0x8E, 0xF9, \
+ 0x2E, 0x8E, 0xFC, 0x14, 0x1F, 0xBE, 0xCA, 0xA6, \
+ 0x28, 0x7C, 0x59, 0x47, 0x4E, 0x6B, 0xC0, 0x5D, \
+ 0x99, 0xB2, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xA0, 0x90, 0xC3, 0xA2, \
+ 0x23, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x86, 0x51, 0x5B, 0xE7, 0xED, \
+ 0x1F, 0x61, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0xAF, \
+ 0xB8, 0x1B, 0xDD, 0x76, 0x21, 0x70, 0x48, 0x1C, \
+ 0xD0, 0x06, 0x91, 0x27, 0xD5, 0xB0, 0x5A, 0xA9, \
+ 0x93, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x8D, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0xC1, \
+ 0x86, 0xFF, 0xB7, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xC0, 0x8F, \
+ 0x4D, 0xF4, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x34, 0x06, 0x31, 0x99, \
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_4096_G_BIN { 0x02 }
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_P_BIN { \
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \
+ 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \
+ 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \
+ 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \
+ 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \
+ 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \
+ 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \
+ 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \
+ 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \
+ 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \
+ 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \
+ 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \
+ 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \
+ 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \
+ 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \
+ 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \
+ 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \
+ 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \
+ 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \
+ 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \
+ 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \
+ 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \
+ 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \
+ 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \
+ 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \
+ 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \
+ 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \
+ 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \
+ 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \
+ 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \
+ 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x97, \
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, }
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_G_BIN { 0x02 }
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_P_BIN { \
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \
+ 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \
+ 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \
+ 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \
+ 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \
+ 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \
+ 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \
+ 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \
+ 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \
+ 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \
+ 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \
+ 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \
+ 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \
+ 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \
+ 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \
+ 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \
+ 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \
+ 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \
+ 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \
+ 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \
+ 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \
+ 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \
+ 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \
+ 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \
+ 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \
+ 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \
+ 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \
+ 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \
+ 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \
+ 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \
+ 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, \
+ 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, \
+ 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, \
+ 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, \
+ 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, \
+ 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, \
+ 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, \
+ 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, \
+ 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, \
+ 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, \
+ 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, \
+ 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, \
+ 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, \
+ 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, \
+ 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, \
+ 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, \
+ 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0xC6, 0x2E, 0x37, \
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_G_BIN { 0x02 }
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_P_BIN { \
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \
+ 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \
+ 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \
+ 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \
+ 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \
+ 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \
+ 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \
+ 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \
+ 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \
+ 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \
+ 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \
+ 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \
+ 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \
+ 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \
+ 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \
+ 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \
+ 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \
+ 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \
+ 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \
+ 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \
+ 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \
+ 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \
+ 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \
+ 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \
+ 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \
+ 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \
+ 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \
+ 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \
+ 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \
+ 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \
+ 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, \
+ 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, \
+ 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, \
+ 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, \
+ 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, \
+ 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, \
+ 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, \
+ 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, \
+ 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, \
+ 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, \
+ 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, \
+ 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, \
+ 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, \
+ 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, \
+ 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, \
+ 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, \
+ 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0x9E, 0x1E, 0xF1, \
+ 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x52, 0xC3, 0x16, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0xFB, \
+ 0x79, 0x30, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0x88, 0x57, 0xB6, \
+ 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x6D, 0x18, \
+ 0x77, 0x63, 0xCF, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x03, 0x40, 0x04, \
+ 0x87, 0xF5, 0x5B, 0xA5, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x7A, \
+ 0x71, 0x35, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xEF, 0xB4, 0x31, 0x8A, \
+ 0xED, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x01, 0x2D, 0x9E, 0x68, 0x32, \
+ 0xA9, 0x07, 0x60, 0x0A, 0x91, 0x81, 0x30, 0xC4, \
+ 0x6D, 0xC7, 0x78, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x38, \
+ 0x09, 0x29, 0x99, 0xA3, 0x33, 0xCB, 0x8B, 0x7A, \
+ 0x1A, 0x1D, 0xB9, 0x3D, 0x71, 0x40, 0x00, 0x3C, \
+ 0x2A, 0x4E, 0xCE, 0xA9, 0xF9, 0x8D, 0x0A, 0xCC, \
+ 0x0A, 0x82, 0x91, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xCF, \
+ 0x8E, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x7F, 0x88, 0xA4, 0x6B, \
+ 0x4D, 0xB5, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x82, 0xE1, \
+ 0xC6, 0x8A, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x65, 0x5F, 0x6A, \
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_G_BIN { 0x02 }
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_P_BIN { \
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \
+ 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \
+ 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \
+ 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \
+ 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \
+ 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \
+ 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \
+ 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \
+ 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \
+ 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \
+ 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \
+ 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \
+ 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \
+ 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \
+ 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \
+ 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \
+ 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \
+ 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \
+ 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \
+ 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \
+ 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \
+ 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \
+ 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \
+ 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \
+ 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \
+ 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \
+ 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \
+ 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \
+ 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \
+ 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \
+ 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, \
+ 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, \
+ 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, \
+ 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, \
+ 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, \
+ 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, \
+ 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, \
+ 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, \
+ 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, \
+ 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, \
+ 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, \
+ 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, \
+ 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, \
+ 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, \
+ 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, \
+ 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, \
+ 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0x9E, 0x1E, 0xF1, \
+ 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x52, 0xC3, 0x16, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0xFB, \
+ 0x79, 0x30, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0x88, 0x57, 0xB6, \
+ 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x6D, 0x18, \
+ 0x77, 0x63, 0xCF, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x03, 0x40, 0x04, \
+ 0x87, 0xF5, 0x5B, 0xA5, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x7A, \
+ 0x71, 0x35, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xEF, 0xB4, 0x31, 0x8A, \
+ 0xED, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x01, 0x2D, 0x9E, 0x68, 0x32, \
+ 0xA9, 0x07, 0x60, 0x0A, 0x91, 0x81, 0x30, 0xC4, \
+ 0x6D, 0xC7, 0x78, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x38, \
+ 0x09, 0x29, 0x99, 0xA3, 0x33, 0xCB, 0x8B, 0x7A, \
+ 0x1A, 0x1D, 0xB9, 0x3D, 0x71, 0x40, 0x00, 0x3C, \
+ 0x2A, 0x4E, 0xCE, 0xA9, 0xF9, 0x8D, 0x0A, 0xCC, \
+ 0x0A, 0x82, 0x91, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xCF, \
+ 0x8E, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x7F, 0x88, 0xA4, 0x6B, \
+ 0x4D, 0xB5, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x82, 0xE1, \
+ 0xC6, 0x8A, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x0D, 0xD9, 0x02, \
+ 0x0B, 0xFD, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x45, 0x03, 0x6C, 0x7A, \
+ 0x4E, 0x67, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0x38, 0x53, 0x2A, 0x3A, \
+ 0x23, 0xBA, 0x44, 0x42, 0xCA, 0xF5, 0x3E, 0xA6, \
+ 0x3B, 0xB4, 0x54, 0x32, 0x9B, 0x76, 0x24, 0xC8, \
+ 0x91, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0x64, 0xB1, 0xC0, 0xFD, 0x4C, \
+ 0xB3, 0x8E, 0x8C, 0x33, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x1C, 0x3A, \
+ 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x06, 0x57, 0xFC, 0xCF, 0xEC, 0x71, \
+ 0x9B, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x46, 0x04, 0x1F, \
+ 0x38, 0x81, 0x47, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0xFD, 0xB4, 0x77, \
+ 0xA5, 0x24, 0x71, 0xF7, 0xA9, 0xA9, 0x69, 0x10, \
+ 0xB8, 0x55, 0x32, 0x2E, 0xDB, 0x63, 0x40, 0xD8, \
+ 0xA0, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x92, 0x35, 0x05, 0x11, 0xE3, \
+ 0x0A, 0xBE, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xF9, 0xE3, 0xA2, 0x6E, \
+ 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0x18, 0x30, 0x23, 0xC3, \
+ 0x58, 0x7E, 0x38, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x77, 0xD9, 0xB4, \
+ 0x76, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x4B, 0x94, 0xB2, 0xBB, 0xC1, \
+ 0x94, 0xC6, 0x65, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x92, \
+ 0xEE, 0xAA, 0xC0, 0x23, 0x2A, 0x28, 0x1B, 0xF6, \
+ 0xB3, 0xA7, 0x39, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x61, 0x16, 0x82, \
+ 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDB, 0x58, 0x47, 0xA6, 0x7C, 0xBE, \
+ 0xF9, 0xC9, 0x09, 0x1B, 0x46, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x8C, \
+ 0xD7, 0x2B, 0x03, 0x74, 0x6A, 0xE7, 0x7F, 0x5E, \
+ 0x62, 0x29, 0x2C, 0x31, 0x15, 0x62, 0xA8, 0x46, \
+ 0x50, 0x5D, 0xC8, 0x2D, 0xB8, 0x54, 0x33, 0x8A, \
+ 0xE4, 0x9F, 0x52, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x5B, 0x91, 0x17, \
+ 0x8C, 0xCF, 0x2D, 0xD5, 0xCA, 0xCE, 0xF4, 0x03, \
+ 0xEC, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x10, 0xC6, 0x27, 0x2B, 0x04, \
+ 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x71, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0x6B, 0x80, 0xD6, \
+ 0x3F, 0xDD, 0x4A, 0x8E, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0x1E, 0x69, \
+ 0x62, 0xA6, 0x95, 0x26, 0xD4, 0x31, 0x61, 0xC1, \
+ 0xA4, 0x1D, 0x57, 0x0D, 0x79, 0x38, 0xDA, 0xD4, \
+ 0xA4, 0x0E, 0x32, 0x9C, 0xD0, 0xE4, 0x0E, 0x65, \
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_G_BIN { 0x02 }
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_P_BIN { \
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, \
+ 0xAD, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x58, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0x4A, 0x9A, \
+ 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x56, 0x20, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0xF1, \
+ 0xD8, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x83, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0x36, 0x95, \
+ 0xA9, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x41, 0x14, 0x64, 0x33, 0xFB, \
+ 0xCC, 0x93, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x24, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0xF9, \
+ 0x7D, 0x2F, 0xE3, 0x63, 0x63, 0x0C, 0x75, 0xD8, \
+ 0xF6, 0x81, 0xB2, 0x02, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x61, 0x7A, \
+ 0xD3, 0xDF, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0xD5, 0xFD, 0x65, 0x61, \
+ 0x24, 0x33, 0xF5, 0x1F, 0x5F, 0x06, 0x6E, 0xD0, \
+ 0x85, 0x63, 0x65, 0x55, 0x3D, 0xED, 0x1A, 0xF3, \
+ 0xB5, 0x57, 0x13, 0x5E, 0x7F, 0x57, 0xC9, 0x35, \
+ 0x98, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x70, 0xE0, 0xE6, 0x8B, 0x77, \
+ 0xE2, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xE8, 0x72, \
+ 0x1D, 0xF1, 0x58, 0xA1, 0x36, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x35, \
+ 0x30, 0xAC, 0xCA, 0x4F, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x79, 0x7A, \
+ 0xBC, 0x0A, 0xB1, 0x82, 0xB3, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x61, \
+ 0xD1, 0x08, 0xA9, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0xC8, 0xE3, 0xFB, \
+ 0xB9, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0xB7, 0x60, 0xD7, 0xF4, 0x68, \
+ 0x1D, 0x4F, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xDE, 0x39, 0x4D, 0xF4, \
+ 0xAE, 0x56, 0xED, 0xE7, 0x63, 0x72, 0xBB, 0x19, \
+ 0x0B, 0x07, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x0A, 0x6D, 0x70, \
+ 0x9E, 0x02, 0xFC, 0xE1, 0xCD, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0xEC, \
+ 0xC0, 0x34, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x28, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x61, \
+ 0x91, 0x72, 0xFE, 0x9C, 0xE9, 0x85, 0x83, 0xFF, \
+ 0x8E, 0x4F, 0x12, 0x32, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x83, \
+ 0xC3, 0xFE, 0x3B, 0x1B, 0x4C, 0x6F, 0xAD, 0x73, \
+ 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0x20, 0x05, \
+ 0xC5, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x83, 0x7D, 0x16, 0x83, 0xB2, \
+ 0xC6, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x26, 0xC1, 0xB2, 0xEF, 0xFA, \
+ 0x88, 0x6B, 0x42, 0x38, 0x61, 0x1F, 0xCF, 0xDC, \
+ 0xDE, 0x35, 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x65, 0x19, 0x03, 0x5B, \
+ 0xBC, 0x34, 0xF4, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x9C, 0x02, 0x38, \
+ 0x61, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xD6, 0xE6, 0xC9, 0x07, \
+ 0x7A, 0xD9, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xF7, 0xEE, \
+ 0x59, 0x8C, 0xB0, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x86, 0xD9, 0x1C, \
+ 0xAE, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x09, 0x85, 0x13, 0x92, 0x70, \
+ 0xB4, 0x13, 0x0C, 0x93, 0xBC, 0x43, 0x79, 0x44, \
+ 0xF4, 0xFD, 0x44, 0x52, 0xE2, 0xD7, 0x4D, 0xD3, \
+ 0x64, 0xF2, 0xE2, 0x1E, 0x71, 0xF5, 0x4B, 0xFF, \
+ 0x5C, 0xAE, 0x82, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0x9D, 0xF6, 0x9E, \
+ 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x2B, 0xC5, 0x22, 0x36, 0x3A, 0x0D, \
+ 0xAB, 0xC5, 0x21, 0x97, 0x9B, 0x0D, 0xEA, 0xDA, \
+ 0x1D, 0xBF, 0x9A, 0x42, 0xD5, 0xC4, 0x48, 0x4E, \
+ 0x0A, 0xBC, 0xD0, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x53, 0xDD, 0xEF, \
+ 0x3C, 0x1B, 0x20, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xD5, 0x9D, 0x7C, \
+ 0x25, 0xE4, 0x1D, 0x2B, 0x66, 0x9E, 0x1E, 0xF1, \
+ 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x52, 0xC3, 0x16, 0x4D, 0xF4, 0xFB, \
+ 0x79, 0x30, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0xE5, 0x88, 0x57, 0xB6, \
+ 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x6D, 0x18, \
+ 0x77, 0x63, 0xCF, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x03, 0x40, 0x04, \
+ 0x87, 0xF5, 0x5B, 0xA5, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x7A, \
+ 0x71, 0x35, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xEF, 0xB4, 0x31, 0x8A, \
+ 0xED, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x01, 0x2D, 0x9E, 0x68, 0x32, \
+ 0xA9, 0x07, 0x60, 0x0A, 0x91, 0x81, 0x30, 0xC4, \
+ 0x6D, 0xC7, 0x78, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x38, \
+ 0x09, 0x29, 0x99, 0xA3, 0x33, 0xCB, 0x8B, 0x7A, \
+ 0x1A, 0x1D, 0xB9, 0x3D, 0x71, 0x40, 0x00, 0x3C, \
+ 0x2A, 0x4E, 0xCE, 0xA9, 0xF9, 0x8D, 0x0A, 0xCC, \
+ 0x0A, 0x82, 0x91, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xCF, \
+ 0x8E, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x7F, 0x88, 0xA4, 0x6B, \
+ 0x4D, 0xB5, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xF4, 0x41, 0x82, 0xE1, \
+ 0xC6, 0x8A, 0x00, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x0D, 0xD9, 0x02, \
+ 0x0B, 0xFD, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x45, 0x03, 0x6C, 0x7A, \
+ 0x4E, 0x67, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0x38, 0x53, 0x2A, 0x3A, \
+ 0x23, 0xBA, 0x44, 0x42, 0xCA, 0xF5, 0x3E, 0xA6, \
+ 0x3B, 0xB4, 0x54, 0x32, 0x9B, 0x76, 0x24, 0xC8, \
+ 0x91, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0x64, 0xB1, 0xC0, 0xFD, 0x4C, \
+ 0xB3, 0x8E, 0x8C, 0x33, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x1C, 0x3A, \
+ 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x06, 0x57, 0xFC, 0xCF, 0xEC, 0x71, \
+ 0x9B, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x46, 0x04, 0x1F, \
+ 0x38, 0x81, 0x47, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0xFD, 0xB4, 0x77, \
+ 0xA5, 0x24, 0x71, 0xF7, 0xA9, 0xA9, 0x69, 0x10, \
+ 0xB8, 0x55, 0x32, 0x2E, 0xDB, 0x63, 0x40, 0xD8, \
+ 0xA0, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x92, 0x35, 0x05, 0x11, 0xE3, \
+ 0x0A, 0xBE, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xF9, 0xE3, 0xA2, 0x6E, \
+ 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0x18, 0x30, 0x23, 0xC3, \
+ 0x58, 0x7E, 0x38, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x77, 0xD9, 0xB4, \
+ 0x76, 0x3E, 0x4E, 0x4B, 0x94, 0xB2, 0xBB, 0xC1, \
+ 0x94, 0xC6, 0x65, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x92, \
+ 0xEE, 0xAA, 0xC0, 0x23, 0x2A, 0x28, 0x1B, 0xF6, \
+ 0xB3, 0xA7, 0x39, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x61, 0x16, 0x82, \
+ 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDB, 0x58, 0x47, 0xA6, 0x7C, 0xBE, \
+ 0xF9, 0xC9, 0x09, 0x1B, 0x46, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x8C, \
+ 0xD7, 0x2B, 0x03, 0x74, 0x6A, 0xE7, 0x7F, 0x5E, \
+ 0x62, 0x29, 0x2C, 0x31, 0x15, 0x62, 0xA8, 0x46, \
+ 0x50, 0x5D, 0xC8, 0x2D, 0xB8, 0x54, 0x33, 0x8A, \
+ 0xE4, 0x9F, 0x52, 0x35, 0xC9, 0x5B, 0x91, 0x17, \
+ 0x8C, 0xCF, 0x2D, 0xD5, 0xCA, 0xCE, 0xF4, 0x03, \
+ 0xEC, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x10, 0xC6, 0x27, 0x2B, 0x04, \
+ 0x5B, 0x3B, 0x71, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0x6B, 0x80, 0xD6, \
+ 0x3F, 0xDD, 0x4A, 0x8E, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0x1E, 0x69, \
+ 0x62, 0xA6, 0x95, 0x26, 0xD4, 0x31, 0x61, 0xC1, \
+ 0xA4, 0x1D, 0x57, 0x0D, 0x79, 0x38, 0xDA, 0xD4, \
+ 0xA4, 0x0E, 0x32, 0x9C, 0xCF, 0xF4, 0x6A, 0xAA, \
+ 0x36, 0xAD, 0x00, 0x4C, 0xF6, 0x00, 0xC8, 0x38, \
+ 0x1E, 0x42, 0x5A, 0x31, 0xD9, 0x51, 0xAE, 0x64, \
+ 0xFD, 0xB2, 0x3F, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x50, 0x9D, 0x43, \
+ 0x68, 0x7F, 0xEB, 0x69, 0xED, 0xD1, 0xCC, 0x5E, \
+ 0x0B, 0x8C, 0xC3, 0xBD, 0xF6, 0x4B, 0x10, 0xEF, \
+ 0x86, 0xB6, 0x31, 0x42, 0xA3, 0xAB, 0x88, 0x29, \
+ 0x55, 0x5B, 0x2F, 0x74, 0x7C, 0x93, 0x26, 0x65, \
+ 0xCB, 0x2C, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0xC0, 0x1B, 0xD7, 0x02, \
+ 0x29, 0x38, 0x88, 0x39, 0xD2, 0xAF, 0x05, 0xE4, \
+ 0x54, 0x50, 0x4A, 0xC7, 0x8B, 0x75, 0x82, 0x82, \
+ 0x28, 0x46, 0xC0, 0xBA, 0x35, 0xC3, 0x5F, 0x5C, \
+ 0x59, 0x16, 0x0C, 0xC0, 0x46, 0xFD, 0x82, 0x51, \
+ 0x54, 0x1F, 0xC6, 0x8C, 0x9C, 0x86, 0xB0, 0x22, \
+ 0xBB, 0x70, 0x99, 0x87, 0x6A, 0x46, 0x0E, 0x74, \
+ 0x51, 0xA8, 0xA9, 0x31, 0x09, 0x70, 0x3F, 0xEE, \
+ 0x1C, 0x21, 0x7E, 0x6C, 0x38, 0x26, 0xE5, 0x2C, \
+ 0x51, 0xAA, 0x69, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0x42, 0x3C, 0xFC, \
+ 0x99, 0xE9, 0xE3, 0x16, 0x50, 0xC1, 0x21, 0x7B, \
+ 0x62, 0x48, 0x16, 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x9A, 0x95, 0xF9, \
+ 0xD5, 0xB8, 0x01, 0x94, 0x88, 0xD9, 0xC0, 0xA0, \
+ 0xA1, 0xFE, 0x30, 0x75, 0xA5, 0x77, 0xE2, 0x31, \
+ 0x83, 0xF8, 0x1D, 0x4A, 0x3F, 0x2F, 0xA4, 0x57, \
+ 0x1E, 0xFC, 0x8C, 0xE0, 0xBA, 0x8A, 0x4F, 0xE8, \
+ 0xB6, 0x85, 0x5D, 0xFE, 0x72, 0xB0, 0xA6, 0x6E, \
+ 0xDE, 0xD2, 0xFB, 0xAB, 0xFB, 0xE5, 0x8A, 0x30, \
+ 0xFA, 0xFA, 0xBE, 0x1C, 0x5D, 0x71, 0xA8, 0x7E, \
+ 0x2F, 0x74, 0x1E, 0xF8, 0xC1, 0xFE, 0x86, 0xFE, \
+ 0xA6, 0xBB, 0xFD, 0xE5, 0x30, 0x67, 0x7F, 0x0D, \
+ 0x97, 0xD1, 0x1D, 0x49, 0xF7, 0xA8, 0x44, 0x3D, \
+ 0x08, 0x22, 0xE5, 0x06, 0xA9, 0xF4, 0x61, 0x4E, \
+ 0x01, 0x1E, 0x2A, 0x94, 0x83, 0x8F, 0xF8, 0x8C, \
+ 0xD6, 0x8C, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0xC5, 0xC6, 0x42, 0x4C, \
+ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF }
+
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_G_BIN { 0x02 }
+
+#endif /* dhm.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a919ad2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdh.h
@@ -0,0 +1,454 @@
+/**
+ * \file ecdh.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains ECDH definitions and functions.
+ *
+ * The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) protocol is an anonymous
+ * key agreement protocol allowing two parties to establish a shared
+ * secret over an insecure channel. Each party must have an
+ * elliptic-curve public–private key pair.
+ *
+ * For more information, see <em>NIST SP 800-56A Rev. 2: Recommendation for
+ * Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm
+ * Cryptography</em>.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECDH_H
+#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+
+/*
+ * Mbed TLS supports two formats for ECDH contexts (#mbedtls_ecdh_context
+ * defined in `ecdh.h`). For most applications, the choice of format makes
+ * no difference, since all library functions can work with either format,
+ * except that the new format is incompatible with MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE.
+
+ * The new format used when this option is disabled is smaller
+ * (56 bytes on a 32-bit platform). In future versions of the library, it
+ * will support alternative implementations of ECDH operations.
+ * The new format is incompatible with applications that access
+ * context fields directly and with restartable ECP operations.
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT
+#else
+#undef MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED)
+#undef MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT
+#include "everest/everest.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Defines the source of the imported EC key.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS, /**< Our key. */
+ MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS, /**< The key of the peer. */
+} mbedtls_ecdh_side;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+/**
+ * Defines the ECDH implementation used.
+ *
+ * Later versions of the library may add new variants, therefore users should
+ * not make any assumptions about them.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_NONE = 0, /*!< Implementation not defined. */
+ MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0,/*!< The default Mbed TLS implementation */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED)
+ MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST /*!< Everest implementation */
+#endif
+} mbedtls_ecdh_variant;
+
+/**
+ * The context used by the default ECDH implementation.
+ *
+ * Later versions might change the structure of this context, therefore users
+ * should not make any assumptions about the structure of
+ * mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed {
+ mbedtls_ecp_group MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp); /*!< The elliptic curve used. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(d); /*!< The private key. */
+ mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q); /*!< The public key. */
+ mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Qp); /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(z); /*!< The shared secret. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rs); /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */
+#endif
+} mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed;
+#endif
+
+/**
+ *
+ * \warning Performing multiple operations concurrently on the same
+ * ECDSA context is not supported; objects of this type
+ * should not be shared between multiple threads.
+ * \brief The ECDH context structure.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ecdh_context {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+ mbedtls_ecp_group MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp); /*!< The elliptic curve used. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(d); /*!< The private key. */
+ mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q); /*!< The public key. */
+ mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Qp); /*!< The value of the public key of the peer. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(z); /*!< The shared secret. */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(point_format); /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages. */
+ mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vi); /*!< The blinding value. */
+ mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vf); /*!< The unblinding value. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(_d); /*!< The previous \p d. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(restart_enabled); /*!< The flag for restartable mode. */
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rs); /*!< The restart context for EC computations. */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+#else
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(point_format); /*!< The format of point export in TLS messages
+ as defined in RFC 4492. */
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp_id);/*!< The elliptic curve used. */
+ mbedtls_ecdh_variant MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(var); /*!< The ECDH implementation/structure used. */
+ union {
+ mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mbed_ecdh);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED)
+ mbedtls_ecdh_context_everest MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(everest_ecdh);
+#endif
+ } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); /*!< Implementation-specific context. The
+ context in use is specified by the \c var
+ field. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(restart_enabled); /*!< The flag for restartable mode. Functions of
+ an alternative implementation not supporting
+ restartable mode must return
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED error
+ if this flag is set. */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */
+}
+mbedtls_ecdh_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return the ECP group for provided context.
+ *
+ * \note To access group specific fields, users should use
+ * `mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id` or
+ * `mbedtls_ecp_group_load` on the extracted `group_id`.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDH context to parse. This must not be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return The \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id of the context.
+ */
+mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecdh_get_grp_id(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Check whether a given group can be used for ECDH.
+ *
+ * \param gid The ECP group ID to check.
+ *
+ * \return \c 1 if the group can be used, \c 0 otherwise
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_can_do(mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function generates an ECDH keypair on an elliptic
+ * curve.
+ *
+ * This function performs the first of two core computations
+ * implemented during the ECDH key exchange. The second core
+ * computation is performed by mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared().
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param grp The ECP group to use. This must be initialized and have
+ * domain parameters loaded, for example through
+ * mbedtls_ecp_load() or mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group().
+ * \param d The destination MPI (private key).
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param Q The destination point (public key).
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL in case \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or
+ * \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function computes the shared secret.
+ *
+ * This function performs the second of two core computations
+ * implemented during the ECDH key exchange. The first core
+ * computation is performed by mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public().
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to implement
+ * countermeasures against side-channel attacks.
+ * For more information, see mbedtls_ecp_mul().
+ *
+ * \param grp The ECP group to use. This must be initialized and have
+ * domain parameters loaded, for example through
+ * mbedtls_ecp_load() or mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group().
+ * \param z The destination MPI (shared secret).
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param Q The public key from another party.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param d Our secret exponent (private key).
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't need a
+ * context argument.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or
+ * \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes an ECDH context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDH context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecdh_init(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets up the ECDH context with the information
+ * given.
+ *
+ * This function should be called after mbedtls_ecdh_init() but
+ * before mbedtls_ecdh_make_params(). There is no need to call
+ * this function before mbedtls_ecdh_read_params().
+ *
+ * This is the first function used by a TLS server for ECDHE
+ * ciphersuites.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDH context to set up. This must be initialized.
+ * \param grp_id The group id of the group to set up the context for.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_setup(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function frees a context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to free. This may be \c NULL, in which
+ * case this function does nothing. If it is not \c NULL,
+ * it must point to an initialized ECDH context.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecdh_free(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function generates an EC key pair and exports its
+ * in the format used in a TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake
+ * message.
+ *
+ * This is the second function used by a TLS server for ECDHE
+ * ciphersuites. (It is called after mbedtls_ecdh_setup().)
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized
+ * and bound to a group, for example via mbedtls_ecdh_setup().
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes written.
+ * \param buf The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer of
+ * length \p blen Bytes.
+ * \param blen The length of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL in case \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
+ * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
+ * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function parses the ECDHE parameters in a
+ * TLS ServerKeyExchange handshake message.
+ *
+ * \note In a TLS handshake, this is the how the client
+ * sets up its ECDHE context from the server's public
+ * ECDHE key material.
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDHE context to use. This must be initialized.
+ * \param buf On input, \c *buf must be the start of the input buffer.
+ * On output, \c *buf is updated to point to the end of the
+ * data that has been read. On success, this is the first byte
+ * past the end of the ServerKeyExchange parameters.
+ * On error, this is the point at which an error has been
+ * detected, which is usually not useful except to debug
+ * failures.
+ * \param end The end of the input buffer.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_read_params(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char **buf,
+ const unsigned char *end);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets up an ECDH context from an EC key.
+ *
+ * It is used by clients and servers in place of the
+ * ServerKeyExchange for static ECDH, and imports ECDH
+ * parameters from the EC key information of a certificate.
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDH context to set up. This must be initialized.
+ * \param key The EC key to use. This must be initialized.
+ * \param side Defines the source of the key. Possible values are:
+ * - #MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS: The key is ours.
+ * - #MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS: The key is that of the peer.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
+ mbedtls_ecdh_side side);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function generates a public key and exports it
+ * as a TLS ClientKeyExchange payload.
+ *
+ * This is the second function used by a TLS client for ECDH(E)
+ * ciphersuites.
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized
+ * and bound to a group, the latter usually by
+ * mbedtls_ecdh_read_params().
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes written.
+ * This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param buf The destination buffer. This must be a writable buffer
+ * of length \p blen Bytes.
+ * \param blen The size of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL in case \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
+ * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
+ * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function parses and processes the ECDHE payload of a
+ * TLS ClientKeyExchange message.
+ *
+ * This is the third function used by a TLS server for ECDH(E)
+ * ciphersuites. (It is called after mbedtls_ecdh_setup() and
+ * mbedtls_ecdh_make_params().)
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized
+ * and bound to a group, for example via mbedtls_ecdh_setup().
+ * \param buf The pointer to the ClientKeyExchange payload. This must
+ * be a readable buffer of length \p blen Bytes.
+ * \param blen The length of the input buffer \p buf in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function derives and exports the shared secret.
+ *
+ * This is the last function used by both TLS client
+ * and servers.
+ *
+ * \note If \p f_rng is not NULL, it is used to implement
+ * countermeasures against side-channel attacks.
+ * For more information, see mbedtls_ecp_mul().
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+
+ * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized
+ * and have its own private key generated and the peer's
+ * public key imported.
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of
+ * Bytes written on success. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param buf The buffer to write the generated shared key to. This
+ * must be a writable buffer of size \p blen Bytes.
+ * \param blen The length of the destination buffer \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context. This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng
+ * doesn't need a context argument.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
+ * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
+ * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+/**
+ * \brief This function enables restartable EC computations for this
+ * context. (Default: disabled.)
+ *
+ * \see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()
+ *
+ * \note It is not possible to safely disable restartable
+ * computations once enabled, except by free-ing the context,
+ * which cancels possible in-progress operations.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDH context to use. This must be initialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ecdh.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c161661
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecdsa.h
@@ -0,0 +1,674 @@
+/**
+ * \file ecdsa.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains ECDSA definitions and functions.
+ *
+ * The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined in
+ * <em>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG):
+ * SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em>.
+ * The use of ECDSA for TLS is defined in <em>RFC-4492: Elliptic Curve
+ * Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)</em>.
+ *
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H
+#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+
+/**
+ * \brief Maximum ECDSA signature size for a given curve bit size
+ *
+ * \param bits Curve size in bits
+ * \return Maximum signature size in bytes
+ *
+ * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument
+ * is one. It may evaluate its argument multiple times.
+ */
+/*
+ * Ecdsa-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * r INTEGER,
+ * s INTEGER
+ * }
+ *
+ * For each of r and s, the value (V) may include an extra initial "0" bit.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN(bits) \
+ (/*T,L of SEQUENCE*/ ((bits) >= 61 * 8 ? 3 : 2) + \
+ /*T,L of r,s*/ 2 * (((bits) >= 127 * 8 ? 3 : 2) + \
+ /*V of r,s*/ ((bits) + 8) / 8))
+
+/** The maximal size of an ECDSA signature in Bytes. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN(MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS)
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief The ECDSA context structure.
+ *
+ * \warning Performing multiple operations concurrently on the same
+ * ECDSA context is not supported; objects of this type
+ * should not be shared between multiple threads.
+ *
+ * \note pk_wrap module assumes that "ecdsa_context" is identical
+ * to "ecp_keypair" (see for example structure
+ * "mbedtls_eckey_info" where ECDSA sign/verify functions
+ * are used also for EC key)
+ */
+typedef mbedtls_ecp_keypair mbedtls_ecdsa_context;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_verify()
+ *
+ * \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_sign()
+ *
+ * \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+/**
+ * \brief Internal restart context for ecdsa_sign_det()
+ *
+ * \note Opaque struct, defined in ecdsa.c
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx;
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief General context for resuming ECDSA operations
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ecp); /*!< base context for ECP restart and
+ shared administrative info */
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ver); /*!< ecdsa_verify() sub-context */
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig); /*!< ecdsa_sign() sub-context */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(det); /*!< ecdsa_sign_det() sub-context */
+#endif
+} mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+/* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */
+typedef void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx;
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function checks whether a given group can be used
+ * for ECDSA.
+ *
+ * \param gid The ECP group ID to check.
+ *
+ * \return \c 1 if the group can be used, \c 0 otherwise
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a
+ * previously-hashed message.
+ *
+ * \note The deterministic version implemented in
+ * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() is usually preferred.
+ *
+ * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the
+ * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated
+ * as defined in <em>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group
+ * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em>, section
+ * 4.1.3, step 5.
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part
+ * the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part
+ * the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized.
+ * \param buf The content to be signed. This is usually the hash of
+ * the original data to be signed. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
+ * \p blen is zero.
+ * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function, used both to generate the ECDSA nonce
+ * and for blinding. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX
+ * or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng, void *p_rng);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+/**
+ * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a
+ * previously-hashed message, deterministic version.
+ *
+ * For more information, see <em>RFC-6979: Deterministic
+ * Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic
+ * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)</em>.
+ *
+ * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the
+ * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as
+ * defined in <em>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group
+ * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em>, section
+ * 4.1.3, step 5.
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part
+ * the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part
+ * the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized
+ * and setup, for example through mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey().
+ * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
+ * \p blen is zero.
+ * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data.
+ * \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be
+ * \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng_blind. This
+ * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng_blind doesn't need a context
+ * parameter.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX
+ * error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng_blind,
+ void *p_rng_blind);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
+/**
+ * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a
+ * previously-hashed message, in a restartable way.
+ *
+ * \note The deterministic version implemented in
+ * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable() is usually
+ * preferred.
+ *
+ * \note This function is like \c mbedtls_ecdsa_sign() but
+ * it can return early and restart according to the
+ * limit set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to
+ * reduce blocking.
+ *
+ * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger
+ * than the bitlength of the group order, then the
+ * hash is truncated as defined in <em>Standards for
+ * Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic
+ * Curve Cryptography</em>, section 4.1.3, step 5.
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part
+ * the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part
+ * the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized
+ * and setup, for example through
+ * mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey().
+ * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
+ * \p blen is zero.
+ * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function used to generate the ECDSA nonce.
+ * This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter.
+ * \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be
+ * \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context parameter.
+ * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL
+ * to disable restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it
+ * must point to an initialized restart context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
+ * operations was reached: see \c
+ * mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
+ * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX
+ * error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(
+ mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng_blind,
+ void *p_rng_blind,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx);
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature of a
+ * previously-hashed message, in a restartable way.
+ *
+ * \note This function is like \c
+ * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext() but it can return
+ * early and restart according to the limit set with
+ * \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking.
+ *
+ * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger
+ * than the bitlength of the group order, then the
+ * hash is truncated as defined in <em>Standards for
+ * Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic
+ * Curve Cryptography</em>, section 4.1.3, step 5.
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param grp The context for the elliptic curve to use.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param r The MPI context in which to store the first part
+ * the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param s The MPI context in which to store the second part
+ * the signature. This must be initialized.
+ * \param d The private signing key. This must be initialized
+ * and setup, for example through
+ * mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey().
+ * \param buf The hashed content to be signed. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
+ * \p blen is zero.
+ * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param md_alg The hash algorithm used to hash the original data.
+ * \param f_rng_blind The RNG function used for blinding. This must not be
+ * \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng_blind The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng_blind. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng_blind doesn't need a context parameter.
+ * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL
+ * to disable restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it
+ * must point to an initialized restart context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
+ * operations was reached: see \c
+ * mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
+ * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX
+ * error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(
+ mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng_blind,
+ void *p_rng_blind,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function verifies the ECDSA signature of a
+ * previously-hashed message.
+ *
+ * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the
+ * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as
+ * defined in <em>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group
+ * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em>, section
+ * 4.1.4, step 3.
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param grp The ECP group to use.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param buf The hashed content that was signed. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
+ * \p blen is zero.
+ * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param Q The public key to use for verification. This must be
+ * initialized and setup.
+ * \param r The first integer of the signature.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param s The second integer of the signature.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX
+ * error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *s);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT)
+/**
+ * \brief This function verifies the ECDSA signature of a
+ * previously-hashed message, in a restartable manner
+ *
+ * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the
+ * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as
+ * defined in <em>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group
+ * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em>, section
+ * 4.1.4, step 3.
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param grp The ECP group to use.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param buf The hashed content that was signed. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p blen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
+ * \p blen is zero.
+ * \param blen The length of \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param Q The public key to use for verification. This must be
+ * initialized and setup.
+ * \param r The first integer of the signature.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param s The second integer of the signature.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL to disable
+ * restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it must point to an
+ * initialized restart context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
+ * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX
+ * error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *s,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx);
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature and writes it
+ * to a buffer, serialized as defined in <em>RFC-4492:
+ * Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for
+ * Transport Layer Security (TLS)</em>.
+ *
+ * \warning It is not thread-safe to use the same context in
+ * multiple threads.
+ *
+ * \note The deterministic version is used if
+ * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is defined. For more
+ * information, see <em>RFC-6979: Deterministic Usage
+ * of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic
+ * Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)</em>.
+ *
+ * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the
+ * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as
+ * defined in <em>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group
+ * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em>, section
+ * 4.1.3, step 5.
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized
+ * and have a group and private key bound to it, for example
+ * via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair().
+ * \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message.
+ * \param hash The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p hlen Bytes.
+ * \param hlen The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes.
+ * \param sig The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a
+ * writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the
+ * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if
+ * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of
+ * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe.
+ * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes.
+ * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of
+ * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding.
+ * If #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is unset, this is also
+ * used to generate the ECDSA nonce.
+ * This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't use a context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or
+ * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function computes the ECDSA signature and writes it
+ * to a buffer, in a restartable way.
+ *
+ * \see \c mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature()
+ *
+ * \note This function is like \c mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature()
+ * but it can return early and restart according to the limit
+ * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized
+ * and have a group and private key bound to it, for example
+ * via mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey() or mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair().
+ * \param md_alg The message digest that was used to hash the message.
+ * \param hash The message hash to be signed. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p hlen Bytes.
+ * \param hlen The length of the hash \p hash in Bytes.
+ * \param sig The buffer to which to write the signature. This must be a
+ * writable buffer of length at least twice as large as the
+ * size of the curve used, plus 9. For example, 73 Bytes if
+ * a 256-bit curve is used. A buffer length of
+ * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN is always safe.
+ * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes.
+ * \param slen The address at which to store the actual length of
+ * the signature written. Must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding.
+ * If #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is unset, this is also
+ * used to generate the ECDSA nonce.
+ * This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng is \c NULL or doesn't use a context.
+ * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL to disable
+ * restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it must point to an
+ * initialized restart context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
+ * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
+ * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX or
+ * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function reads and verifies an ECDSA signature.
+ *
+ * \note If the bitlength of the message hash is larger than the
+ * bitlength of the group order, then the hash is truncated as
+ * defined in <em>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group
+ * (SECG): SEC1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em>, section
+ * 4.1.4, step 3.
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized
+ * and have a group and public key bound to it.
+ * \param hash The message hash that was signed. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p hlen Bytes.
+ * \param hlen The size of the hash \p hash.
+ * \param sig The signature to read and verify. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p slen Bytes.
+ * \param slen The size of \p sig in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if signature is invalid.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid
+ * signature in \p sig, but its length is less than \p siglen.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX
+ * error code on failure for any other reason.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function reads and verifies an ECDSA signature,
+ * in a restartable way.
+ *
+ * \see \c mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature()
+ *
+ * \note This function is like \c mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature()
+ * but it can return early and restart according to the limit
+ * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDSA context to use. This must be initialized
+ * and have a group and public key bound to it.
+ * \param hash The message hash that was signed. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p hlen Bytes.
+ * \param hlen The size of the hash \p hash.
+ * \param sig The signature to read and verify. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p slen Bytes.
+ * \param slen The size of \p sig in Bytes.
+ * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be \c NULL to disable
+ * restarting. If it is not \c NULL, it must point to an
+ * initialized restart context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if signature is invalid.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid
+ * signature in \p sig, but its length is less than \p siglen.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
+ * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
+ * \return Another \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX
+ * error code on failure for any other reason.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function generates an ECDSA keypair on the given curve.
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDSA context to store the keypair in.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param gid The elliptic curve to use. One of the various
+ * \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX macros depending on configuration.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng, void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets up an ECDSA context from an EC key pair.
+ *
+ * \see ecp.h
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDSA context to setup. This must be initialized.
+ * \param key The EC key to use. This must be initialized and hold
+ * a private-public key pair or a public key. In the former
+ * case, the ECDSA context may be used for signature creation
+ * and verification after this call. In the latter case, it
+ * may be used for signature verification.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes an ECDSA context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDSA context to initialize.
+ * This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecdsa_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function frees an ECDSA context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECDSA context to free. This may be \c NULL,
+ * in which case this function does nothing. If it
+ * is not \c NULL, it must be initialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecdsa_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a restart context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The restart context to initialize.
+ * This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free the components of a restart context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The restart context to free. This may be \c NULL,
+ * in which case this function does nothing. If it
+ * is not \c NULL, it must be initialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ecdsa.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7da8cb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecjpake.h
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+/**
+ * \file ecjpake.h
+ *
+ * \brief Elliptic curve J-PAKE
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_H
+#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+/*
+ * J-PAKE is a password-authenticated key exchange that allows deriving a
+ * strong shared secret from a (potentially low entropy) pre-shared
+ * passphrase, with forward secrecy and mutual authentication.
+ * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_Authenticated_Key_Exchange_by_Juggling
+ *
+ * This file implements the Elliptic Curve variant of J-PAKE,
+ * as defined in Chapter 7.4 of the Thread v1.0 Specification,
+ * available to members of the Thread Group http://threadgroup.org/
+ *
+ * As the J-PAKE algorithm is inherently symmetric, so is our API.
+ * Each party needs to send its first round message, in any order, to the
+ * other party, then each sends its second round message, in any order.
+ * The payloads are serialized in a way suitable for use in TLS, but could
+ * also be use outside TLS.
+ */
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Roles in the EC J-PAKE exchange
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT = 0, /**< Client */
+ MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER, /**< Server */
+ MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_NONE, /**< Undefined */
+} mbedtls_ecjpake_role;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT)
+/**
+ * EC J-PAKE context structure.
+ *
+ * J-PAKE is a symmetric protocol, except for the identifiers used in
+ * Zero-Knowledge Proofs, and the serialization of the second message
+ * (KeyExchange) as defined by the Thread spec.
+ *
+ * In order to benefit from this symmetry, we choose a different naming
+ * convention from the Thread v1.0 spec. Correspondence is indicated in the
+ * description as a pair C: client name, S: server name
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ecjpake_context {
+ mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_type); /**< Hash to use */
+ mbedtls_ecp_group MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp); /**< Elliptic curve */
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_role MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(role); /**< Are we client or server? */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(point_format); /**< Format for point export */
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xm1); /**< My public key 1 C: X1, S: X3 */
+ mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xm2); /**< My public key 2 C: X2, S: X4 */
+ mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xp1); /**< Peer public key 1 C: X3, S: X1 */
+ mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xp2); /**< Peer public key 2 C: X4, S: X2 */
+ mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Xp); /**< Peer public key C: Xs, S: Xc */
+
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(xm1); /**< My private key 1 C: x1, S: x3 */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(xm2); /**< My private key 2 C: x2, S: x4 */
+
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(s); /**< Pre-shared secret (passphrase) */
+} mbedtls_ecjpake_context;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */
+#include "ecjpake_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize an ECJPAKE context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to initialize.
+ * This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecjpake_init(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set up an ECJPAKE context for use.
+ *
+ * \note Currently the only values for hash/curve allowed by the
+ * standard are #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256/#MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to set up. This must be initialized.
+ * \param role The role of the caller. This must be either
+ * #MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT or #MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER.
+ * \param hash The identifier of the hash function to use,
+ * for example #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256.
+ * \param curve The identifier of the elliptic curve to use,
+ * for example #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1.
+ * \param secret The pre-shared secret (passphrase). This must be
+ * a readable not empty buffer of length \p len Bytes. It need
+ * only be valid for the duration of this call.
+ * \param len The length of the pre-shared secret \p secret.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_role role,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t hash,
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve,
+ const unsigned char *secret,
+ size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the point format for future reads and writes.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to configure.
+ * \param point_format The point format to use:
+ * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED (default)
+ * or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p point_format
+ * is invalid.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ int point_format);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Check if an ECJPAKE context is ready for use.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to check. This must be
+ * initialized.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the context is ready for use.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA otherwise.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_check(const mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Generate and write the first round message
+ * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerHello extension,
+ * excluding extension type and length bytes).
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be
+ * initialized and set up.
+ * \param buf The buffer to write the contents to. This must be a
+ * writable buffer of length \p len Bytes.
+ * \param len The length of \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the total number
+ * of Bytes written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This
+ * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Read and process the first round message
+ * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerHello extension,
+ * excluding extension type and length bytes).
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized
+ * and set up.
+ * \param buf The buffer holding the first round message. This must
+ * be a readable buffer of length \p len Bytes.
+ * \param len The length in Bytes of \p buf.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Generate and write the second round message
+ * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerKeyExchange).
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized,
+ * set up, and already have performed round one.
+ * \param buf The buffer to write the round two contents to.
+ * This must be a writable buffer of length \p len Bytes.
+ * \param len The size of \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of Bytes
+ * written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This
+ * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Read and process the second round message
+ * (TLS: contents of the Client/ServerKeyExchange).
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized
+ * and set up and already have performed round one.
+ * \param buf The buffer holding the second round message. This must
+ * be a readable buffer of length \p len Bytes.
+ * \param len The length in Bytes of \p buf.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Derive the shared secret
+ * (TLS: Pre-Master Secret).
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized,
+ * set up and have performed both round one and two.
+ * \param buf The buffer to write the derived secret to. This must
+ * be a writable buffer of length \p len Bytes.
+ * \param len The length of \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of Bytes
+ * written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This
+ * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write the shared key material to be passed to a Key
+ * Derivation Function as described in RFC8236.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to use. This must be initialized,
+ * set up and have performed both round one and two.
+ * \param buf The buffer to write the derived secret to. This must
+ * be a writable buffer of length \p len Bytes.
+ * \param len The length of \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the total number of bytes
+ * written to \p buf. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This
+ * may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't use a context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This clears an ECJPAKE context and frees any
+ * embedded data structure.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ECJPAKE context to free. This may be \c NULL,
+ * in which case this function does nothing. If it is not
+ * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized ECJPAKE context.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecjpake_free(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Checkup routine
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test(int verbose);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+
+#endif /* ecjpake.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5cc0271
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ecp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1528 @@
+/**
+ * \file ecp.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file provides an API for Elliptic Curves over GF(P) (ECP).
+ *
+ * The use of ECP in cryptography and TLS is defined in
+ * <em>Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG): SEC1
+ * Elliptic Curve Cryptography</em> and
+ * <em>RFC-4492: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
+ * for Transport Layer Security (TLS)</em>.
+ *
+ * <em>RFC-2409: The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</em> defines ECP
+ * group types.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_H
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+
+/*
+ * ECP error codes
+ */
+/** Bad input parameters to function. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x4F80
+/** The buffer is too small to write to. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x4F00
+/** The requested feature is not available, for example, the requested curve is not supported. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x4E80
+/** The signature is not valid. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED -0x4E00
+/** Memory allocation failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED -0x4D80
+/** Generation of random value, such as ephemeral key, failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED -0x4D00
+/** Invalid private or public key. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY -0x4C80
+/** The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x4C00
+/** Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS -0x4B00
+
+/* Flags indicating whether to include code that is specific to certain
+ * types of curves. These flags are for internal library use only. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Domain-parameter identifiers: curve, subgroup, and generator.
+ *
+ * \note Only curves over prime fields are supported.
+ *
+ * \warning This library does not support validation of arbitrary domain
+ * parameters. Therefore, only standardized domain parameters from trusted
+ * sources should be used. See mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ */
+/* Note: when adding a new curve:
+ * - Add it at the end of this enum, otherwise you'll break the ABI by
+ * changing the numerical value for existing curves.
+ * - Increment MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX below if needed.
+ * - Update the calculation of MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS below.
+ * - Add the corresponding MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx_ENABLED macro definition to
+ * mbedtls_config.h.
+ * - List the curve as a dependency of MBEDTLS_ECP_C and
+ * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C if supported in check_config.h.
+ * - Add the curve to the appropriate curve type macro
+ * MBEDTLS_ECP_yyy_ENABLED above.
+ * - Add the necessary definitions to ecp_curves.c.
+ * - Add the curve to the ecp_supported_curves array in ecp.c.
+ * - Add the curve to applicable profiles in x509_crt.c.
+ * - Add the curve to applicable presets in ssl_tls.c.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE = 0, /*!< Curve not defined. */
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 192-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 224-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 256-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 384-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, /*!< Domain parameters for the 521-bit curve defined by FIPS 186-4 and SEC1. */
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, /*!< Domain parameters for 256-bit Brainpool curve. */
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, /*!< Domain parameters for 384-bit Brainpool curve. */
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, /*!< Domain parameters for 512-bit Brainpool curve. */
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, /*!< Domain parameters for Curve25519. */
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, /*!< Domain parameters for 192-bit "Koblitz" curve. */
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, /*!< Domain parameters for 224-bit "Koblitz" curve. */
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, /*!< Domain parameters for 256-bit "Koblitz" curve. */
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, /*!< Domain parameters for Curve448. */
+} mbedtls_ecp_group_id;
+
+/**
+ * The number of supported curves, plus one for #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX 14
+
+/*
+ * Curve types
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_NONE = 0,
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS, /* y^2 = x^3 + a x + b */
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY, /* y^2 = x^3 + a x^2 + x */
+} mbedtls_ecp_curve_type;
+
+/**
+ * Curve information, for use by other modules.
+ *
+ * The fields of this structure are part of the public API and can be
+ * accessed directly by applications. Future versions of the library may
+ * add extra fields or reorder existing fields.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_curve_info {
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id; /*!< An internal identifier. */
+ uint16_t tls_id; /*!< The TLS NamedCurve identifier. */
+ uint16_t bit_size; /*!< The curve size in bits. */
+ const char *name; /*!< A human-friendly name. */
+} mbedtls_ecp_curve_info;
+
+/**
+ * \brief The ECP point structure, in Jacobian coordinates.
+ *
+ * \note All functions expect and return points satisfying
+ * the following condition: <code>Z == 0</code> or
+ * <code>Z == 1</code>. Other values of \p Z are
+ * used only by internal functions.
+ * The point is zero, or "at infinity", if <code>Z == 0</code>.
+ * Otherwise, \p X and \p Y are its standard (affine)
+ * coordinates.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_point {
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(X); /*!< The X coordinate of the ECP point. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Y); /*!< The Y coordinate of the ECP point. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Z); /*!< The Z coordinate of the ECP point. */
+}
+mbedtls_ecp_point;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT)
+/*
+ * default Mbed TLS elliptic curve arithmetic implementation
+ *
+ * (in case MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT is defined then the developer has to provide an
+ * alternative implementation for the whole module and it will replace this
+ * one.)
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief The ECP group structure.
+ *
+ * We consider two types of curve equations:
+ * <ul><li>Short Weierstrass: <code>y^2 = x^3 + A x + B mod P</code>
+ * (SEC1 + RFC-4492)</li>
+ * <li>Montgomery: <code>y^2 = x^3 + A x^2 + x mod P</code> (Curve25519,
+ * Curve448)</li></ul>
+ * In both cases, the generator (\p G) for a prime-order subgroup is fixed.
+ *
+ * For Short Weierstrass, this subgroup is the whole curve, and its
+ * cardinality is denoted by \p N. Our code requires that \p N is an
+ * odd prime as mbedtls_ecp_mul() requires an odd number, and
+ * mbedtls_ecdsa_sign() requires that it is prime for blinding purposes.
+ *
+ * The default implementation only initializes \p A without setting it to the
+ * authentic value for curves with <code>A = -3</code>(SECP256R1, etc), in which
+ * case you need to load \p A by yourself when using domain parameters directly,
+ * for example:
+ * \code
+ * mbedtls_mpi_init(&A);
+ * mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp);
+ * CHECK_RETURN(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, grp_id));
+ * if (mbedtls_ecp_group_a_is_minus_3(&grp)) {
+ * CHECK_RETURN(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&A, &grp.P, 3));
+ * } else {
+ * CHECK_RETURN(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&A, &grp.A));
+ * }
+ *
+ * do_something_with_a(&A);
+ *
+ * cleanup:
+ * mbedtls_mpi_free(&A);
+ * mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
+ * \endcode
+ *
+ * For Montgomery curves, we do not store \p A, but <code>(A + 2) / 4</code>,
+ * which is the quantity used in the formulas. Additionally, \p nbits is
+ * not the size of \p N but the required size for private keys.
+ *
+ * If \p modp is NULL, reduction modulo \p P is done using a generic algorithm.
+ * Otherwise, \p modp must point to a function that takes an \p mbedtls_mpi in the
+ * range of <code>0..2^(2*pbits)-1</code>, and transforms it in-place to an integer
+ * which is congruent mod \p P to the given MPI, and is close enough to \p pbits
+ * in size, so that it may be efficiently brought in the 0..P-1 range by a few
+ * additions or subtractions. Therefore, it is only an approximate modular
+ * reduction. It must return 0 on success and non-zero on failure.
+ *
+ * \note Alternative implementations of the ECP module must obey the
+ * following constraints.
+ * * Group IDs must be distinct: if two group structures have
+ * the same ID, then they must be identical.
+ * * The fields \c id, \c P, \c A, \c B, \c G, \c N,
+ * \c pbits and \c nbits must have the same type and semantics
+ * as in the built-in implementation.
+ * They must be available for reading, but direct modification
+ * of these fields does not need to be supported.
+ * They do not need to be at the same offset in the structure.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_group {
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id id; /*!< An internal group identifier. */
+ mbedtls_mpi P; /*!< The prime modulus of the base field. */
+ mbedtls_mpi A; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: \p A in the equation. Note that
+ \p A is not set to the authentic value in some cases.
+ Refer to detailed description of ::mbedtls_ecp_group if
+ using domain parameters in the structure.
+ For Montgomery curves: <code>(A + 2) / 4</code>. */
+ mbedtls_mpi B; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: \p B in the equation.
+ For Montgomery curves: unused. */
+ mbedtls_ecp_point G; /*!< The generator of the subgroup used. */
+ mbedtls_mpi N; /*!< The order of \p G. */
+ size_t pbits; /*!< The number of bits in \p P.*/
+ size_t nbits; /*!< For Short Weierstrass: The number of bits in \p P.
+ For Montgomery curves: the number of bits in the
+ private keys. */
+ /* End of public fields */
+
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(h); /*!< \internal 1 if the constants are static. */
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(modp))(mbedtls_mpi *); /*!< The function for fast pseudo-reduction
+ mod \p P (see above).*/
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(t_pre))(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(t_post))(mbedtls_ecp_point *, void *); /*!< Unused. */
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(t_data); /*!< Unused. */
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(T); /*!< Pre-computed points for ecp_mul_comb(). */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(T_size); /*!< The number of dynamic allocated pre-computed points. */
+}
+mbedtls_ecp_group;
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: Module settings
+ *
+ * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section.
+ * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h, or define them using the compiler command line.
+ * \{
+ */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE)
+/*
+ * Maximum "window" size used for point multiplication.
+ * Default: a point where higher memory usage yields diminishing performance
+ * returns.
+ * Minimum value: 2. Maximum value: 7.
+ *
+ * Result is an array of at most ( 1 << ( MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE - 1 ) )
+ * points used for point multiplication. This value is directly tied to EC
+ * peak memory usage, so decreasing it by one should roughly cut memory usage
+ * by two (if large curves are in use).
+ *
+ * Reduction in size may reduce speed, but larger curves are impacted first.
+ * Sample performances (in ECDHE handshakes/s, with FIXED_POINT_OPTIM = 1):
+ * w-size: 6 5 4 3 2
+ * 521 145 141 135 120 97
+ * 384 214 209 198 177 146
+ * 256 320 320 303 262 226
+ * 224 475 475 453 398 342
+ * 192 640 640 633 587 476
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 4 /**< The maximum window size used. */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM)
+/*
+ * Trade code size for speed on fixed-point multiplication.
+ *
+ * This speeds up repeated multiplication of the generator (that is, the
+ * multiplication in ECDSA signatures, and half of the multiplications in
+ * ECDSA verification and ECDHE) by a factor roughly 3 to 4.
+ *
+ * For each n-bit Short Weierstrass curve that is enabled, this adds 4n bytes
+ * of code size if n < 384 and 8n otherwise.
+ *
+ * Change this value to 0 to reduce code size.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up. */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM */
+
+/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */
+#include "ecp_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * The maximum size of the groups, that is, of \c N and \c P.
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
+/* Dummy definition to help code that has optional ECP support and
+ * defines an MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES-sized array unconditionally. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 1
+/* Note: the curves must be listed in DECREASING size! */
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 521
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 512
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 448
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 384
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 384
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 256
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 256
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 256
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 255
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 225 // n is slightly above 2^224
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 224
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 192
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS 192
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */
+#error "Missing definition of MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS"
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES ((MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 7) / 8)
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN (2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES + 1)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal restart context for multiplication
+ *
+ * \note Opaque struct
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal restart context for ecp_muladd()
+ *
+ * \note Opaque struct
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx;
+
+/**
+ * \brief General context for resuming ECC operations
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ops_done); /*!< current ops count */
+ unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(depth); /*!< call depth (0 = top-level) */
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rsm); /*!< ecp_mul_comb() sub-context */
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ma); /*!< ecp_muladd() sub-context */
+} mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx;
+
+/*
+ * Operation counts for restartable functions
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK 3 /*!< basic ops count for ecp_check_pubkey() */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL 8 /*!< basic ops count for ecp_double_jac() */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD 11 /*!< basic ops count for see ecp_add_mixed() */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV 120 /*!< empirical equivalent for mpi_mod_inv() */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal; for restartable functions in other modules.
+ * Check and update basic ops budget.
+ *
+ * \param grp Group structure
+ * \param rs_ctx Restart context
+ * \param ops Number of basic ops to do
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if doing \p ops basic ops is still allowed,
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx,
+ unsigned ops);
+
+/* Utility macro for checking and updating ops budget */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(ops) \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_budget(grp, rs_ctx, \
+ (unsigned) (ops)));
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(ops) /* no-op; for compatibility */
+
+/* We want to declare restartable versions of existing functions anyway */
+typedef void mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx;
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+/**
+ * \brief The ECP key-pair structure.
+ *
+ * A generic key-pair that may be used for ECDSA and fixed ECDH, for example.
+ *
+ * \note Members are deliberately in the same order as in the
+ * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context structure.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ecp_keypair {
+ mbedtls_ecp_group MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp); /*!< Elliptic curve and base point */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(d); /*!< our secret value */
+ mbedtls_ecp_point MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q); /*!< our public value */
+}
+mbedtls_ecp_keypair;
+
+/**
+ * The uncompressed point format for Short Weierstrass curves
+ * (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP_XXX and MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP_XXX).
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED 0
+/**
+ * The compressed point format for Short Weierstrass curves
+ * (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP_XXX and MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP_XXX).
+ *
+ * \warning While this format is supported for all concerned curves for
+ * writing, when it comes to parsing, it is not supported for all
+ * curves. Specifically, parsing compressed points on
+ * MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 and MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 is not
+ * supported.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED 1
+
+/*
+ * Some other constants from RFC 4492
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE 3 /**< The named_curve of ECCurveType. */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the maximum number of basic operations done in a row.
+ *
+ * If more operations are needed to complete a computation,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS will be returned by the
+ * function performing the computation. It is then the
+ * caller's responsibility to either call again with the same
+ * parameters until it returns 0 or an error code; or to free
+ * the restart context if the operation is to be aborted.
+ *
+ * It is strictly required that all input parameters and the
+ * restart context be the same on successive calls for the
+ * same operation, but output parameters need not be the
+ * same; they must not be used until the function finally
+ * returns 0.
+ *
+ * This only applies to functions whose documentation
+ * mentions they may return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS (or
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS for functions in the
+ * SSL module). For functions that accept a "restart context"
+ * argument, passing NULL disables restart and makes the
+ * function equivalent to the function with the same name
+ * with \c _restartable removed. For functions in the ECDH
+ * module, restart is disabled unless the function accepts
+ * an "ECDH context" argument and
+ * mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart() was previously called on
+ * that context. For function in the SSL module, restart is
+ * only enabled for specific sides and key exchanges
+ * (currently only for clients and ECDHE-ECDSA).
+ *
+ * \warning Using the PSA interruptible interfaces with keys in local
+ * storage and no accelerator driver will also call this
+ * function to set the values specified via those interfaces,
+ * overwriting values previously set. Care should be taken if
+ * mixing these two interfaces.
+ *
+ * \param max_ops Maximum number of basic operations done in a row.
+ * Default: 0 (unlimited).
+ * Lower (non-zero) values mean ECC functions will block for
+ * a lesser maximum amount of time.
+ *
+ * \note A "basic operation" is defined as a rough equivalent of a
+ * multiplication in GF(p) for the NIST P-256 curve.
+ * As an indication, with default settings, a scalar
+ * multiplication (full run of \c mbedtls_ecp_mul()) is:
+ * - about 3300 basic operations for P-256
+ * - about 9400 basic operations for P-384
+ *
+ * \note Very low values are not always respected: sometimes
+ * functions need to block for a minimum number of
+ * operations, and will do so even if max_ops is set to a
+ * lower value. That minimum depends on the curve size, and
+ * can be made lower by decreasing the value of
+ * \c MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE. As an indication, here is the
+ * lowest effective value for various curves and values of
+ * that parameter (w for short):
+ * w=6 w=5 w=4 w=3 w=2
+ * P-256 208 208 160 136 124
+ * P-384 682 416 320 272 248
+ * P-521 1364 832 640 544 496
+ *
+ * \note This setting is currently ignored by Curve25519.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(unsigned max_ops);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Check if restart is enabled (max_ops != 0)
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if \c max_ops == 0 (restart disabled)
+ * \return \c 1 otherwise (restart enabled)
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled(void);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+/*
+ * Get the type of a curve
+ */
+mbedtls_ecp_curve_type mbedtls_ecp_get_type(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function retrieves the information defined in
+ * mbedtls_ecp_curve_info() for all supported curves.
+ *
+ * \note This function returns information about all curves
+ * supported by the library. Some curves may not be
+ * supported for all algorithms. Call mbedtls_ecdh_can_do()
+ * or mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do() to check if a curve is
+ * supported for ECDH or ECDSA.
+ *
+ * \return A statically allocated array. The last entry is 0.
+ */
+const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function retrieves the list of internal group
+ * identifiers of all supported curves in the order of
+ * preference.
+ *
+ * \note This function returns information about all curves
+ * supported by the library. Some curves may not be
+ * supported for all algorithms. Call mbedtls_ecdh_can_do()
+ * or mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do() to check if a curve is
+ * supported for ECDH or ECDSA.
+ *
+ * \return A statically allocated array,
+ * terminated with MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE.
+ */
+const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function retrieves curve information from an internal
+ * group identifier.
+ *
+ * \param grp_id An \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX value.
+ *
+ * \return The associated curve information on success.
+ * \return NULL on failure.
+ */
+const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function retrieves curve information from a TLS
+ * NamedCurve value.
+ *
+ * \param tls_id An \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX value.
+ *
+ * \return The associated curve information on success.
+ * \return NULL on failure.
+ */
+const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function retrieves curve information from a
+ * human-readable name.
+ *
+ * \param name The human-readable name.
+ *
+ * \return The associated curve information on success.
+ * \return NULL on failure.
+ */
+const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name(const char *name);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes a point as zero.
+ *
+ * \param pt The point to initialize.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_point_init(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes an ECP group context
+ * without loading any domain parameters.
+ *
+ * \note After this function is called, domain parameters
+ * for various ECP groups can be loaded through the
+ * mbedtls_ecp_group_load() or mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group()
+ * functions.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_group_init(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes a key pair as an invalid one.
+ *
+ * \param key The key pair to initialize.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function frees the components of a point.
+ *
+ * \param pt The point to free.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_point_free(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function frees the components of an ECP group.
+ *
+ * \param grp The group to free. This may be \c NULL, in which
+ * case this function returns immediately. If it is not
+ * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized ECP group.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_group_free(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function frees the components of a key pair.
+ *
+ * \param key The key pair to free. This may be \c NULL, in which
+ * case this function returns immediately. If it is not
+ * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized ECP key pair.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a restart context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The restart context to initialize. This must
+ * not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_restart_init(mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free the components of a restart context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The restart context to free. This may be \c NULL, in which
+ * case this function returns immediately. If it is not
+ * \c NULL, it must point to an initialized restart context.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_restart_free(mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function copies the contents of point \p Q into
+ * point \p P.
+ *
+ * \param P The destination point. This must be initialized.
+ * \param Q The source point. This must be initialized.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
+ * \return Another negative error code for other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_copy(mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function copies the contents of group \p src into
+ * group \p dst.
+ *
+ * \param dst The destination group. This must be initialized.
+ * \param src The source group. This must be initialized.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(mbedtls_ecp_group *dst,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group *src);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets a point to the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * \param pt The point to set. This must be initialized.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_set_zero(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function checks if a point is the point at infinity.
+ *
+ * \param pt The point to test. This must be initialized.
+ *
+ * \return \c 1 if the point is zero.
+ * \return \c 0 if the point is non-zero.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function compares two points.
+ *
+ * \note This assumes that the points are normalized. Otherwise,
+ * they may compare as "not equal" even if they are.
+ *
+ * \param P The first point to compare. This must be initialized.
+ * \param Q The second point to compare. This must be initialized.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the points are equal.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the points are not equal.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp(const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function imports a non-zero point from two ASCII
+ * strings.
+ *
+ * \param P The destination point. This must be initialized.
+ * \param radix The numeric base of the input.
+ * \param x The first affine coordinate, as a null-terminated string.
+ * \param y The second affine coordinate, as a null-terminated string.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string(mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int radix,
+ const char *x, const char *y);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function exports a point into unsigned binary data.
+ *
+ * \param grp The group to which the point should belong.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param P The point to export. This must be initialized.
+ * \param format The point format. This must be either
+ * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED.
+ * (For groups without these formats, this parameter is
+ * ignored. But it still has to be either of the above
+ * values.)
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the length of
+ * the output in Bytes. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer
+ * of length \p buflen Bytes.
+ * \param buflen The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the output buffer
+ * is too small to hold the point.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the point format
+ * or the export for the given group is not implemented.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ int format, size_t *olen,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function imports a point from unsigned binary data.
+ *
+ * \note This function does not check that the point actually
+ * belongs to the given group, see mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey()
+ * for that.
+ *
+ * \note For compressed points, see #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED for
+ * limitations.
+ *
+ * \param grp The group to which the point should belong.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param P The destination context to import the point to.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param buf The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer
+ * of length \p ilen Bytes.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input buffer \p buf in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the input is invalid.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the import for the
+ * given group is not implemented.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t ilen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function imports a point from a TLS ECPoint record.
+ *
+ * \note On function return, \p *buf is updated to point immediately
+ * after the ECPoint record.
+ *
+ * \param grp The ECP group to use.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param pt The destination point.
+ * \param buf The address of the pointer to the start of the input buffer.
+ * \param len The length of the buffer.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX error code on initialization
+ * failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input is invalid.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *pt,
+ const unsigned char **buf, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function exports a point as a TLS ECPoint record
+ * defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4.
+ *
+ * \param grp The ECP group to use.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param pt The point to be exported. This must be initialized.
+ * \param format The point format to use. This must be either
+ * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED.
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the length in Bytes
+ * of the data written.
+ * \param buf The target buffer. This must be a writable buffer of
+ * length \p blen Bytes.
+ * \param blen The length of the target buffer \p buf in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the input is invalid.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the target buffer
+ * is too small to hold the exported point.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt,
+ int format, size_t *olen,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t blen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets up an ECP group context
+ * from a standardized set of domain parameters.
+ *
+ * \note The index should be a value of the NamedCurve enum,
+ * as defined in <em>RFC-4492: Elliptic Curve Cryptography
+ * (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)</em>,
+ * usually in the form of an \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX macro.
+ *
+ * \param grp The group context to setup. This must be initialized.
+ * \param id The identifier of the domain parameter set to load.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if \p id doesn't
+ * correspond to a known group.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets up an ECP group context from a TLS
+ * ECParameters record as defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4.
+ *
+ * \note The read pointer \p buf is updated to point right after
+ * the ECParameters record on exit.
+ *
+ * \param grp The group context to setup. This must be initialized.
+ * \param buf The address of the pointer to the start of the input buffer.
+ * \param len The length of the input buffer \c *buf in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input is invalid.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the group is not
+ * recognized.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const unsigned char **buf, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function extracts an elliptic curve group ID from a
+ * TLS ECParameters record as defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4.
+ *
+ * \note The read pointer \p buf is updated to point right after
+ * the ECParameters record on exit.
+ *
+ * \param grp The address at which to store the group id.
+ * This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param buf The address of the pointer to the start of the input buffer.
+ * \param len The length of the input buffer \c *buf in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input is invalid.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the group is not
+ * recognized.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp,
+ const unsigned char **buf,
+ size_t len);
+/**
+ * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve as a TLS
+ * ECParameters record as defined in RFC 4492, Section 5.4.
+ *
+ * \param grp The ECP group to be exported.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the number of Bytes written.
+ * This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param buf The buffer to write to. This must be a writable buffer
+ * of length \p blen Bytes.
+ * \param blen The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the output
+ * buffer is too small to hold the exported group.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ size_t *olen,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t blen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a scalar multiplication of a point
+ * by an integer: \p R = \p m * \p P.
+ *
+ * It is not thread-safe to use same group in multiple threads.
+ *
+ * \note To prevent timing attacks, this function
+ * executes the exact same sequence of base-field
+ * operations for any valid \p m. It avoids any if-branch or
+ * array index depending on the value of \p m. It also uses
+ * \p f_rng to randomize some intermediate results.
+ *
+ * \param grp The ECP group to use.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param m The integer by which to multiply. This must be initialized.
+ * \param P The point to multiply. This must be initialized.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c
+ * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m is not a valid private
+ * key, or \p P is not a valid public key.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_mul(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng, void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs multiplication of a point by
+ * an integer: \p R = \p m * \p P in a restartable way.
+ *
+ * \see mbedtls_ecp_mul()
+ *
+ * \note This function does the same as \c mbedtls_ecp_mul(), but
+ * it can return early and restart according to the limit set
+ * with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking.
+ *
+ * \param grp The ECP group to use.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param m The integer by which to multiply. This must be initialized.
+ * \param P The point to multiply. This must be initialized.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c
+ * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
+ * \param rs_ctx The restart context (NULL disables restart).
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m is not a valid private
+ * key, or \p P is not a valid public key.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
+ * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng, void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+/**
+ * \brief This function checks if domain parameter A of the curve is
+ * \c -3.
+ *
+ * \note This function is only defined for short Weierstrass curves.
+ * It may not be included in builds without any short
+ * Weierstrass curve.
+ *
+ * \param grp The ECP group to use.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ *
+ * \return \c 1 if <code>A = -3</code>.
+ * \return \c 0 Otherwise.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_ecp_group_a_is_minus_3(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp)
+{
+ return grp->A.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p) == NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs multiplication and addition of two
+ * points by integers: \p R = \p m * \p P + \p n * \p Q
+ *
+ * It is not thread-safe to use same group in multiple threads.
+ *
+ * \note In contrast to mbedtls_ecp_mul(), this function does not
+ * guarantee a constant execution flow and timing.
+ *
+ * \note This function is only defined for short Weierstrass curves.
+ * It may not be included in builds without any short
+ * Weierstrass curve.
+ *
+ * \param grp The ECP group to use.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param m The integer by which to multiply \p P.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param P The point to multiply by \p m. This must be initialized.
+ * \param n The integer by which to multiply \p Q.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param Q The point to be multiplied by \p n.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m or \p n are not
+ * valid private keys, or \p P or \p Q are not valid public
+ * keys.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if \p grp does not
+ * designate a short Weierstrass curve.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_muladd(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs multiplication and addition of two
+ * points by integers: \p R = \p m * \p P + \p n * \p Q in a
+ * restartable way.
+ *
+ * \see \c mbedtls_ecp_muladd()
+ *
+ * \note This function works the same as \c mbedtls_ecp_muladd(),
+ * but it can return early and restart according to the limit
+ * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking.
+ *
+ * \note This function is only defined for short Weierstrass curves.
+ * It may not be included in builds without any short
+ * Weierstrass curve.
+ *
+ * \param grp The ECP group to use.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param R The point in which to store the result of the calculation.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param m The integer by which to multiply \p P.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param P The point to multiply by \p m. This must be initialized.
+ * \param n The integer by which to multiply \p Q.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param Q The point to be multiplied by \p n.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param rs_ctx The restart context (NULL disables restart).
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if \p m or \p n are not
+ * valid private keys, or \p P or \p Q are not valid public
+ * keys.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if \p grp does not
+ * designate a short Weierstrass curve.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
+ * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable(
+ mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function checks that a point is a valid public key
+ * on this curve.
+ *
+ * It only checks that the point is non-zero, has
+ * valid coordinates and lies on the curve. It does not verify
+ * that it is indeed a multiple of \c G. This additional
+ * check is computationally more expensive, is not required
+ * by standards, and should not be necessary if the group
+ * used has a small cofactor. In particular, it is useless for
+ * the NIST groups which all have a cofactor of 1.
+ *
+ * \note This function uses bare components rather than an
+ * ::mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure, to ease use with other
+ * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or
+ * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context.
+ *
+ * \param grp The ECP group the point should belong to.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param pt The point to check. This must be initialized.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the point is a valid public key.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if the point is not
+ * a valid public key for the given curve.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function checks that an \c mbedtls_mpi is a
+ * valid private key for this curve.
+ *
+ * \note This function uses bare components rather than an
+ * ::mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure to ease use with other
+ * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or
+ * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context.
+ *
+ * \param grp The ECP group the private key should belong to.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param d The integer to check. This must be initialized.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the point is a valid private key.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY if the point is not a valid
+ * private key for the given curve.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *d);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function generates a private key.
+ *
+ * \param grp The ECP group to generate a private key for.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param d The destination MPI (secret part). This must be initialized.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code
+ * on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function generates a keypair with a configurable base
+ * point.
+ *
+ * \note This function uses bare components rather than an
+ * ::mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure to ease use with other
+ * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or
+ * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context.
+ *
+ * \param grp The ECP group to generate a key pair for.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param G The base point to use. This must be initialized
+ * and belong to \p grp. It replaces the default base
+ * point \c grp->G used by mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair().
+ * \param d The destination MPI (secret part).
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param Q The destination point (public part).
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may
+ * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code
+ * on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *G,
+ mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function generates an ECP keypair.
+ *
+ * \note This function uses bare components rather than an
+ * ::mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure to ease use with other
+ * structures, such as ::mbedtls_ecdh_context or
+ * ::mbedtls_ecdsa_context.
+ *
+ * \param grp The ECP group to generate a key pair for.
+ * This must be initialized and have group parameters
+ * set, for example through mbedtls_ecp_group_load().
+ * \param d The destination MPI (secret part).
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param Q The destination point (public part).
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may
+ * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code
+ * on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function generates an ECP key.
+ *
+ * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier.
+ * \param key The destination key. This must be initialized.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may
+ * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_MPI_XXX error code
+ * on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/** \brief Set the public key in a key pair object.
+ *
+ * \note This function does not check that the point actually
+ * belongs to the given group. Call mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey()
+ * on \p Q before calling this function to check that.
+ *
+ * \note This function does not check that the public key matches
+ * the private key that is already in \p key, if any.
+ * To check the consistency of the resulting key pair object,
+ * call mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() after setting both
+ * the public key and the private key.
+ *
+ * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier.
+ * \param key The key pair object. It must be initialized.
+ * If its group has already been set, it must match \p grp_id.
+ * If its group has not been set, it will be set to \p grp_id.
+ * If the public key has already been set, it is overwritten.
+ * \param Q The public key to copy. This must be a point on the
+ * curve indicated by \p grp_id.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p key does not
+ * match \p grp_id.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the operation for
+ * the group is not implemented.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id,
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function reads an elliptic curve private key.
+ *
+ * \note This function does not set the public key in the
+ * key pair object. Without a public key, the key pair object
+ * cannot be used with operations that require the public key.
+ * Call mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public() to set the public
+ * key from the private key. Alternatively, you can call
+ * mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key() to set the public key part,
+ * and then optionally mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() to check
+ * that the private and public parts are consistent.
+ *
+ * \note If a public key has already been set in the key pair
+ * object, this function does not check that it is consistent
+ * with the private key. Call mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv()
+ * after setting both the public key and the private key
+ * to make that check.
+ *
+ * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier.
+ * \param key The destination key.
+ * \param buf The buffer containing the binary representation of the
+ * key. (Big endian integer for Weierstrass curves, byte
+ * string for Montgomery curves.)
+ * \param buflen The length of the buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY error if the key is
+ * invalid.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the operation for
+ * the group is not implemented.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+/**
+ * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve private key.
+ *
+ * \deprecated Note that although this function accepts an output
+ * buffer that is smaller or larger than the key, most key
+ * import interfaces require the output to have exactly
+ * key's nominal length. It is generally simplest to
+ * pass the key's nominal length as \c buflen, after
+ * checking that the output buffer is large enough.
+ * See the description of the \p buflen parameter for
+ * how to calculate the nominal length.
+ * To avoid this difficulty, use mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext()
+ * instead.
+ * mbedtls_ecp_write_key() is deprecated and will be
+ * removed in a future version of the library.
+ *
+ * \note If the private key was not set in \p key,
+ * the output is unspecified. Future versions
+ * may return an error in that case.
+ *
+ * \param key The private key.
+ * \param buf The output buffer for containing the binary representation
+ * of the key.
+ * For Weierstrass curves, this is the big-endian
+ * representation, padded with null bytes at the beginning
+ * to reach \p buflen bytes.
+ * For Montgomery curves, this is the standard byte string
+ * representation (which is little-endian), padded with
+ * null bytes at the end to reach \p buflen bytes.
+ * \param buflen The total length of the buffer in bytes.
+ * The length of the output is
+ * (`grp->nbits` + 7) / 8 bytes
+ * where `grp->nbits` is the private key size in bits.
+ * For Weierstrass keys, if the output buffer is smaller,
+ * leading zeros are trimmed to fit if possible. For
+ * Montgomery keys, the output buffer must always be large
+ * enough for the nominal length.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the \p key
+ * representation is larger than the available space in \p buf.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve private key.
+ *
+ * \param key The private key.
+ * \param olen On success, the length of the private key.
+ * This is always (`grp->nbits` + 7) / 8 bytes
+ * where `grp->nbits` is the private key size in bits.
+ * \param buf The output buffer for containing the binary representation
+ * of the key.
+ * \param buflen The total length of the buffer in bytes.
+ * #MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES is always sufficient.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the \p key
+ * representation is larger than the available space in \p buf.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if no private key is
+ * set in \p key.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
+ size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve public key.
+ *
+ * \note If the public key was not set in \p key,
+ * the output is unspecified. Future versions
+ * may return an error in that case.
+ *
+ * \param key The public key.
+ * \param format The point format. This must be either
+ * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED.
+ * (For groups without these formats, this parameter is
+ * ignored. But it still has to be either of the above
+ * values.)
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the length of
+ * the output in Bytes. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer
+ * of length \p buflen Bytes.
+ * \param buflen The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the output buffer
+ * is too small to hold the point.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the point format
+ * or the export for the given group is not implemented.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
+ int format, size_t *olen,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function checks that the keypair objects
+ * \p pub and \p prv have the same group and the
+ * same public point, and that the private key in
+ * \p prv is consistent with the public key.
+ *
+ * \param pub The keypair structure holding the public key. This
+ * must be initialized. If it contains a private key, that
+ * part is ignored.
+ * \param prv The keypair structure holding the full keypair.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c
+ * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success, meaning that the keys are valid and match.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the keys are invalid or do not match.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX
+ * error code on calculation failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(
+ const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng, void *p_rng);
+
+/** \brief Calculate the public key from a private key in a key pair.
+ *
+ * \param key A keypair structure. It must have a private key set.
+ * If the public key is set, it will be overwritten.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c
+ * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success. The key pair object can be used for
+ * operations that require the public key.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX
+ * error code on calculation failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public(
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng, void *p_rng);
+
+/** \brief Query the group that a key pair belongs to.
+ *
+ * \param key The key pair to query.
+ *
+ * \return The group ID for the group registered in the key pair
+ * object.
+ * This is \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if no group has been set
+ * in the key pair object.
+ */
+mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(
+ const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function exports generic key-pair parameters.
+ *
+ * Each of the output parameters can be a null pointer
+ * if you do not need that parameter.
+ *
+ * \note If the private key or the public key was not set in \p key,
+ * the corresponding output is unspecified. Future versions
+ * may return an error in that case.
+ *
+ * \param key The key pair to export from.
+ * \param grp Slot for exported ECP group.
+ * It must either be null or point to an initialized ECP group.
+ * \param d Slot for the exported secret value.
+ * It must either be null or point to an initialized mpi.
+ * \param Q Slot for the exported public value.
+ * It must either be null or point to an initialized ECP point.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success,
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if key id doesn't
+ * correspond to a known group.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_export(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+/**
+ * \brief The ECP checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c 1 on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_self_test(int verbose);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ecp.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c64e3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/entropy.h
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+/**
+ * \file entropy.h
+ *
+ * \brief Entropy accumulator implementation
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#include "md.h"
+
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512)) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256)
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE 64 /**< Block size of entropy accumulator (SHA-512) */
+#else
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256))
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA256_ACCUMULATOR
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE 32 /**< Block size of entropy accumulator (SHA-256) */
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
+#endif
+
+
+/** Critical entropy source failure. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -0x003C
+/** No more sources can be added. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES -0x003E
+/** No sources have been added to poll. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED -0x0040
+/** No strong sources have been added to poll. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE -0x003D
+/** Read/write error in file. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x003F
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: Module settings
+ *
+ * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section.
+ * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line.
+ * \{
+ */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES)
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 20 /**< Maximum number of sources supported */
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER)
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER 128 /**< Maximum amount requested from entropy sources */
+#endif
+
+/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum size of seed we read from seed file */
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES
+
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG 1 /**< Entropy source is strong */
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK 0 /**< Entropy source is weak */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Entropy poll callback pointer
+ *
+ * \param data Callback-specific data pointer
+ * \param output Data to fill
+ * \param len Maximum size to provide
+ * \param olen The actual amount of bytes put into the buffer (Can be 0)
+ *
+ * \return 0 if no critical failures occurred,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED otherwise
+ */
+typedef int (*mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr)(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len,
+ size_t *olen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Entropy source state
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_entropy_source_state {
+ mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_source); /**< The entropy source callback */
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_source); /**< The callback data pointer */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(size); /**< Amount received in bytes */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(threshold); /**< Minimum bytes required before release */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(strong); /**< Is the source strong? */
+}
+mbedtls_entropy_source_state;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Entropy context structure
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_entropy_context {
+ mbedtls_md_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(accumulator);
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(accumulator_started); /* 0 after init.
+ * 1 after the first update.
+ * -1 after free. */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(source_count); /* Number of entries used in source. */
+ mbedtls_entropy_source_state MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(source)[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES];
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); /*!< mutex */
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED)
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(initial_entropy_run);
+#endif
+}
+mbedtls_entropy_context;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY)
+/**
+ * \brief Platform-specific entropy poll callback
+ */
+int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize the context
+ *
+ * \param ctx Entropy context to initialize
+ */
+void mbedtls_entropy_init(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free the data in the context
+ *
+ * \param ctx Entropy context to free
+ */
+void mbedtls_entropy_free(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Adds an entropy source to poll
+ * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled)
+ *
+ * \param ctx Entropy context
+ * \param f_source Entropy function
+ * \param p_source Function data
+ * \param threshold Minimum required from source before entropy is released
+ * ( with mbedtls_entropy_func() ) (in bytes)
+ * \param strong MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG or
+ * MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK.
+ * At least one strong source needs to be added.
+ * Weaker sources (such as the cycle counter) can be used as
+ * a complement.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES
+ */
+int mbedtls_entropy_add_source(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source, void *p_source,
+ size_t threshold, int strong);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Trigger an extra gather poll for the accumulator
+ * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled)
+ *
+ * \param ctx Entropy context
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_entropy_gather(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Retrieve entropy from the accumulator
+ * (Maximum length: MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)
+ * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled)
+ *
+ * \param data Entropy context
+ * \param output Buffer to fill
+ * \param len Number of bytes desired, must be at most MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_entropy_func(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Add data to the accumulator manually
+ * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled)
+ *
+ * \param ctx Entropy context
+ * \param data Data to add
+ * \param len Length of data
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ */
+int mbedtls_entropy_update_manual(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t len);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED)
+/**
+ * \brief Trigger an update of the seed file in NV by using the
+ * current entropy pool.
+ *
+ * \param ctx Entropy context
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ */
+int mbedtls_entropy_update_nv_seed(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+/**
+ * \brief Write a seed file
+ *
+ * \param ctx Entropy context
+ * \param path Name of the file
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error, or
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Read and update a seed file. Seed is added to this
+ * instance. No more than MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE bytes are
+ * read from the seed file. The rest is ignored.
+ *
+ * \param ctx Entropy context
+ * \param path Name of the file
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/**
+ * \brief Checkup routine
+ *
+ * This module self-test also calls the entropy self-test,
+ * mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test();
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed
+ */
+int mbedtls_entropy_self_test(int verbose);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT)
+/**
+ * \brief Checkup routine
+ *
+ * Verifies the integrity of the hardware entropy source
+ * provided by the function 'mbedtls_hardware_poll()'.
+ *
+ * Note this is the only hardware entropy source that is known
+ * at link time, and other entropy sources configured
+ * dynamically at runtime by the function
+ * mbedtls_entropy_add_source() will not be tested.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed
+ */
+int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test(int verbose);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* entropy.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..635f7cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/error.h
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+/**
+ * \file error.h
+ *
+ * \brief Error to string translation
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_ERROR_H
+#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+/**
+ * Error code layout.
+ *
+ * Currently we try to keep all error codes within the negative space of 16
+ * bits signed integers to support all platforms (-0x0001 - -0x7FFF). In
+ * addition we'd like to give two layers of information on the error if
+ * possible.
+ *
+ * For that purpose the error codes are segmented in the following manner:
+ *
+ * 16 bit error code bit-segmentation
+ *
+ * 1 bit - Unused (sign bit)
+ * 3 bits - High level module ID
+ * 5 bits - Module-dependent error code
+ * 7 bits - Low level module errors
+ *
+ * For historical reasons, low-level error codes are divided in even and odd,
+ * even codes were assigned first, and -1 is reserved for other errors.
+ *
+ * Low-level module errors (0x0002-0x007E, 0x0001-0x007F)
+ *
+ * Module Nr Codes assigned
+ * ERROR 2 0x006E 0x0001
+ * MPI 7 0x0002-0x0010
+ * GCM 3 0x0012-0x0016 0x0013-0x0013
+ * THREADING 3 0x001A-0x001E
+ * AES 5 0x0020-0x0022 0x0021-0x0025
+ * CAMELLIA 3 0x0024-0x0026 0x0027-0x0027
+ * BASE64 2 0x002A-0x002C
+ * OID 1 0x002E-0x002E 0x000B-0x000B
+ * PADLOCK 1 0x0030-0x0030
+ * DES 2 0x0032-0x0032 0x0033-0x0033
+ * CTR_DBRG 4 0x0034-0x003A
+ * ENTROPY 3 0x003C-0x0040 0x003D-0x003F
+ * NET 13 0x0042-0x0052 0x0043-0x0049
+ * ARIA 4 0x0058-0x005E
+ * ASN1 7 0x0060-0x006C
+ * CMAC 1 0x007A-0x007A
+ * PBKDF2 1 0x007C-0x007C
+ * HMAC_DRBG 4 0x0003-0x0009
+ * CCM 3 0x000D-0x0011
+ * MD5 1 0x002F-0x002F
+ * RIPEMD160 1 0x0031-0x0031
+ * SHA1 1 0x0035-0x0035 0x0073-0x0073
+ * SHA256 1 0x0037-0x0037 0x0074-0x0074
+ * SHA512 1 0x0039-0x0039 0x0075-0x0075
+ * SHA-3 1 0x0076-0x0076
+ * CHACHA20 3 0x0051-0x0055
+ * POLY1305 3 0x0057-0x005B
+ * CHACHAPOLY 2 0x0054-0x0056
+ * PLATFORM 2 0x0070-0x0072
+ * LMS 5 0x0011-0x0019
+ *
+ * High-level module nr (3 bits - 0x0...-0x7...)
+ * Name ID Nr of Errors
+ * PEM 1 9
+ * PKCS#12 1 4 (Started from top)
+ * X509 2 20
+ * PKCS5 2 4 (Started from top)
+ * DHM 3 11
+ * PK 3 15 (Started from top)
+ * RSA 4 11
+ * ECP 4 10 (Started from top)
+ * MD 5 5
+ * HKDF 5 1 (Started from top)
+ * PKCS7 5 12 (Started from 0x5300)
+ * SSL 5 3 (Started from 0x5F00)
+ * CIPHER 6 8 (Started from 0x6080)
+ * SSL 6 22 (Started from top, plus 0x6000)
+ * SSL 7 20 (Started from 0x7000, gaps at
+ * 0x7380, 0x7900-0x7980, 0x7A80-0x7E80)
+ *
+ * Module dependent error code (5 bits 0x.00.-0x.F8.)
+ */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** Generic error */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR -0x0001
+/** This is a bug in the library */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED -0x006E
+
+/** Hardware accelerator failed */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x0070
+/** The requested feature is not supported by the platform */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED -0x0072
+
+/**
+ * \brief Combines a high-level and low-level error code together.
+ *
+ * Wrapper macro for mbedtls_error_add(). See that function for
+ * more details.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(high, low) \
+ mbedtls_error_add(high, low, __FILE__, __LINE__)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+/**
+ * \brief Testing hook called before adding/combining two error codes together.
+ * Only used when invasive testing is enabled via MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS.
+ */
+extern void (*mbedtls_test_hook_error_add)(int, int, const char *, int);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Combines a high-level and low-level error code together.
+ *
+ * This function can be called directly however it is usually
+ * called via the #MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD macro.
+ *
+ * While a value of zero is not a negative error code, it is still an
+ * error code (that denotes success) and can be combined with both a
+ * negative error code or another value of zero.
+ *
+ * \note When invasive testing is enabled via #MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS, also try to
+ * call \link mbedtls_test_hook_error_add \endlink.
+ *
+ * \param high high-level error code. See error.h for more details.
+ * \param low low-level error code. See error.h for more details.
+ * \param file file where this error code addition occurred.
+ * \param line line where this error code addition occurred.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_error_add(int high, int low,
+ const char *file, int line)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+ if (*mbedtls_test_hook_error_add != NULL) {
+ (*mbedtls_test_hook_error_add)(high, low, file, line);
+ }
+#endif
+ (void) file;
+ (void) line;
+
+ return high + low;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate an Mbed TLS error code into a string representation.
+ * The result is truncated if necessary and always includes a
+ * terminating null byte.
+ *
+ * \param errnum error code
+ * \param buffer buffer to place representation in
+ * \param buflen length of the buffer
+ */
+void mbedtls_strerror(int errnum, char *buffer, size_t buflen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate the high-level part of an Mbed TLS error code into a string
+ * representation.
+ *
+ * This function returns a const pointer to an un-modifiable string. The caller
+ * must not try to modify the string. It is intended to be used mostly for
+ * logging purposes.
+ *
+ * \param error_code error code
+ *
+ * \return The string representation of the error code, or \c NULL if the error
+ * code is unknown.
+ */
+const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate the low-level part of an Mbed TLS error code into a string
+ * representation.
+ *
+ * This function returns a const pointer to an un-modifiable string. The caller
+ * must not try to modify the string. It is intended to be used mostly for
+ * logging purposes.
+ *
+ * \param error_code error code
+ *
+ * \return The string representation of the error code, or \c NULL if the error
+ * code is unknown.
+ */
+const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* error.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..390ed4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/gcm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+/**
+ * \file gcm.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains GCM definitions and functions.
+ *
+ * The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for 128-bit block ciphers is defined
+ * in <em>D. McGrew, J. Viega, The Galois/Counter Mode of Operation
+ * (GCM), Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol.</em>
+ *
+ * For more information on GCM, see <em>NIST SP 800-38D: Recommendation for
+ * Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC</em>.
+ *
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_GCM_H
+#define MBEDTLS_GCM_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+#include "mbedtls/block_cipher.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT 1
+#define MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT 0
+
+/** Authenticated decryption failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED -0x0012
+/** Bad input parameters to function. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT -0x0014
+/** An output buffer is too small. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x0016
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE)
+#define MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE 256
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE 16
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief The GCM context structure.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_gcm_context {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
+#else
+ mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
+#endif
+ uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(H)[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE][2]; /*!< Precalculated HTable. */
+ uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len); /*!< The total length of the encrypted data. */
+ uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(add_len); /*!< The total length of the additional data. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(base_ectr)[16]; /*!< The first ECTR for tag. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(y)[16]; /*!< The Y working value. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf)[16]; /*!< The buf working value. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mode); /*!< The operation to perform:
+ #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT or
+ #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(acceleration); /*!< The acceleration to use. */
+}
+mbedtls_gcm_context;
+
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */
+#include "gcm_alt.h"
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes the specified GCM context,
+ * to make references valid, and prepares the context
+ * for mbedtls_gcm_setkey() or mbedtls_gcm_free().
+ *
+ * The function does not bind the GCM context to a particular
+ * cipher, nor set the key. For this purpose, use
+ * mbedtls_gcm_setkey().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The GCM context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_gcm_init(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function associates a GCM context with a
+ * cipher algorithm and a key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param cipher The 128-bit block cipher to use.
+ * \param key The encryption key. This must be a readable buffer of at
+ * least \p keybits bits.
+ * \param keybits The key size in bits. Valid options are:
+ * <ul><li>128 bits</li>
+ * <li>192 bits</li>
+ * <li>256 bits</li></ul>
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A cipher-specific error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_gcm_setkey(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs GCM encryption or decryption of a buffer.
+ *
+ * \note The output buffer \p output can be the same as the input
+ * buffer \p input. If \p output is greater than \p input, they
+ * cannot overlap.
+ *
+ * \warning When this function performs a decryption, it outputs the
+ * authentication tag and does not verify that the data is
+ * authentic. You should use this function to perform encryption
+ * only. For decryption, use mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt() instead.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The GCM context to use for encryption or decryption. This
+ * must be initialized.
+ * \param mode The operation to perform:
+ * - #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT to perform authenticated encryption.
+ * The ciphertext is written to \p output and the
+ * authentication tag is written to \p tag.
+ * - #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT to perform decryption.
+ * The plaintext is written to \p output and the
+ * authentication tag is written to \p tag.
+ * Note that this mode is not recommended, because it does
+ * not verify the authenticity of the data. For this reason,
+ * you should use mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt() instead of
+ * calling this function in decryption mode.
+ * \param length The length of the input data, which is equal to the length
+ * of the output data.
+ * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer of
+ * at least \p iv_len Bytes.
+ * \param iv_len The length of the IV.
+ * \param add The buffer holding the additional data. This must be of at
+ * least that size in Bytes.
+ * \param add_len The length of the additional data.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p length is greater
+ * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that
+ * size in Bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer for holding the output data. If \p length is greater
+ * than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at least that
+ * size in Bytes.
+ * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate.
+ * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a writable
+ * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the encryption or decryption was performed
+ * successfully. Note that in #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT mode,
+ * this does not indicate that the data is authentic.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths or pointers are
+ * not valid or a cipher-specific error code if the encryption
+ * or decryption failed.
+ */
+int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *iv,
+ size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *add,
+ size_t add_len,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t tag_len,
+ unsigned char *tag);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a GCM authenticated decryption of a
+ * buffer.
+ *
+ * \note The output buffer \p output can be the same as the input
+ * buffer \p input. If \p output is greater than \p input, they
+ * cannot overlap. Implementations which require
+ * MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT to be enabled may not provide support for
+ * overlapping buffers.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param length The length of the ciphertext to decrypt, which is also
+ * the length of the decrypted plaintext.
+ * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer
+ * of at least \p iv_len Bytes.
+ * \param iv_len The length of the IV.
+ * \param add The buffer holding the additional data. This must be of at
+ * least that size in Bytes.
+ * \param add_len The length of the additional data.
+ * \param tag The buffer holding the tag to verify. This must be a
+ * readable buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
+ * \param tag_len The length of the tag to verify.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the ciphertext. If \p length is greater
+ * than zero, this must be a readable buffer of at least that
+ * size.
+ * \param output The buffer for holding the decrypted plaintext. If \p length
+ * is greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of at
+ * least that size.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful and authenticated.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED if the tag does not match.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT if the lengths or pointers are
+ * not valid or a cipher-specific error code if the decryption
+ * failed.
+ */
+int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
+ size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *iv,
+ size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *add,
+ size_t add_len,
+ const unsigned char *tag,
+ size_t tag_len,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function starts a GCM encryption or decryption
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param mode The operation to perform: #MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT or
+ * #MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT.
+ * \param iv The initialization vector. This must be a readable buffer of
+ * at least \p iv_len Bytes.
+ * \param iv_len The length of the IV.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ */
+int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const unsigned char *iv,
+ size_t iv_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function feeds an input buffer as associated data
+ * (authenticated but not encrypted data) in a GCM
+ * encryption or decryption operation.
+ *
+ * Call this function after mbedtls_gcm_starts() to pass
+ * the associated data. If the associated data is empty,
+ * you do not need to call this function. You may not
+ * call this function after calling mbedtls_cipher_update().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The GCM context. This must have been started with
+ * mbedtls_gcm_starts() and must not have yet received
+ * any input with mbedtls_gcm_update().
+ * \param add The buffer holding the additional data, or \c NULL
+ * if \p add_len is \c 0.
+ * \param add_len The length of the additional data. If \c 0,
+ * \p add may be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ */
+int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *add,
+ size_t add_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing GCM
+ * encryption or decryption operation.
+ *
+ * You may call this function zero, one or more times
+ * to pass successive parts of the input: the plaintext to
+ * encrypt, or the ciphertext (not including the tag) to
+ * decrypt. After the last part of the input, call
+ * mbedtls_gcm_finish().
+ *
+ * This function may produce output in one of the following
+ * ways:
+ * - Immediate output: the output length is always equal
+ * to the input length.
+ * - Buffered output: the output consists of a whole number
+ * of 16-byte blocks. If the total input length so far
+ * (not including associated data) is 16 \* *B* + *A*
+ * with *A* < 16 then the total output length is 16 \* *B*.
+ *
+ * In particular:
+ * - It is always correct to call this function with
+ * \p output_size >= \p input_length + 15.
+ * - If \p input_length is a multiple of 16 for all the calls
+ * to this function during an operation, then it is
+ * correct to use \p output_size = \p input_length.
+ *
+ * \note The output buffer \p output can be the same as the input
+ * buffer \p input. If \p output is greater than \p input, they
+ * cannot overlap. Implementations which require
+ * MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT to be enabled may not provide support for
+ * overlapping buffers.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. If \p input_length
+ * is greater than zero, this must be a readable buffer
+ * of at least \p input_length bytes.
+ * \param input_length The length of the input data in bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer for the output data. If \p output_size
+ * is greater than zero, this must be a writable buffer of
+ * of at least \p output_size bytes.
+ * \param output_size The size of the output buffer in bytes.
+ * See the function description regarding the output size.
+ * \param output_length On success, \p *output_length contains the actual
+ * length of the output written in \p output.
+ * On failure, the content of \p *output_length is
+ * unspecified.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure:
+ * total input length too long,
+ * unsupported input/output buffer overlap detected,
+ * or \p output_size too small.
+ */
+int mbedtls_gcm_update(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t input_length,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function finishes the GCM operation and generates
+ * the authentication tag.
+ *
+ * It wraps up the GCM stream, and generates the
+ * tag. The tag can have a maximum length of 16 Bytes.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The GCM context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param tag The buffer for holding the tag. This must be a writable
+ * buffer of at least \p tag_len Bytes.
+ * \param tag_len The length of the tag to generate. This must be at least
+ * four.
+ * \param output The buffer for the final output.
+ * If \p output_size is nonzero, this must be a writable
+ * buffer of at least \p output_size bytes.
+ * \param output_size The size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
+ * This must be large enough for the output that
+ * mbedtls_gcm_update() has not produced. In particular:
+ * - If mbedtls_gcm_update() produces immediate output,
+ * or if the total input size is a multiple of \c 16,
+ * then mbedtls_gcm_finish() never produces any output,
+ * so \p output_size can be \c 0.
+ * - \p output_size never needs to be more than \c 15.
+ * \param output_length On success, \p *output_length contains the actual
+ * length of the output written in \p output.
+ * On failure, the content of \p *output_length is
+ * unspecified.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT on failure:
+ * invalid value of \p tag_len,
+ * or \p output_size too small.
+ */
+int mbedtls_gcm_finish(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_length,
+ unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function clears a GCM context and the underlying
+ * cipher sub-context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The GCM context to clear. If this is \c NULL, the call has
+ * no effect. Otherwise, this must be initialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_gcm_free(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+/**
+ * \brief The GCM checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c 1 on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_gcm_self_test(int verbose);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+
+#endif /* gcm.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..930e93f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hkdf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+/**
+ * \file hkdf.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains the HKDF interface.
+ *
+ * The HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF) is
+ * specified by RFC 5869.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_HKDF_H
+#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+
+/**
+ * \name HKDF Error codes
+ * \{
+ */
+/** Bad input parameters to function. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x5F80
+/** \} name */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief This is the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function
+ * (HKDF).
+ *
+ * \param md A hash function; md.size denotes the length of the hash
+ * function output in bytes.
+ * \param salt An optional salt value (a non-secret random value);
+ * if the salt is not provided, a string of all zeros of
+ * md.size length is used as the salt.
+ * \param salt_len The length in bytes of the optional \p salt.
+ * \param ikm The input keying material.
+ * \param ikm_len The length in bytes of \p ikm.
+ * \param info An optional context and application specific information
+ * string. This can be a zero-length string.
+ * \param info_len The length of \p info in bytes.
+ * \param okm The output keying material of \p okm_len bytes.
+ * \param okm_len The length of the output keying material in bytes. This
+ * must be less than or equal to 255 * md.size bytes.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the parameters are invalid.
+ * \return An MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_* error for errors returned from the underlying
+ * MD layer.
+ */
+int mbedtls_hkdf(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *salt,
+ size_t salt_len, const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
+ const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
+ unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Take the input keying material \p ikm and extract from it a
+ * fixed-length pseudorandom key \p prk.
+ *
+ * \warning This function should only be used if the security of it has been
+ * studied and established in that particular context (eg. TLS 1.3
+ * key schedule). For standard HKDF security guarantees use
+ * \c mbedtls_hkdf instead.
+ *
+ * \param md A hash function; md.size denotes the length of the
+ * hash function output in bytes.
+ * \param salt An optional salt value (a non-secret random value);
+ * if the salt is not provided, a string of all zeros
+ * of md.size length is used as the salt.
+ * \param salt_len The length in bytes of the optional \p salt.
+ * \param ikm The input keying material.
+ * \param ikm_len The length in bytes of \p ikm.
+ * \param[out] prk A pseudorandom key of at least md.size bytes.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the parameters are invalid.
+ * \return An MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_* error for errors returned from the underlying
+ * MD layer.
+ */
+int mbedtls_hkdf_extract(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md,
+ const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
+ const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
+ unsigned char *prk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Expand the supplied \p prk into several additional pseudorandom
+ * keys, which is the output of the HKDF.
+ *
+ * \warning This function should only be used if the security of it has been
+ * studied and established in that particular context (eg. TLS 1.3
+ * key schedule). For standard HKDF security guarantees use
+ * \c mbedtls_hkdf instead.
+ *
+ * \param md A hash function; md.size denotes the length of the hash
+ * function output in bytes.
+ * \param prk A pseudorandom key of at least md.size bytes. \p prk is
+ * usually the output from the HKDF extract step.
+ * \param prk_len The length in bytes of \p prk.
+ * \param info An optional context and application specific information
+ * string. This can be a zero-length string.
+ * \param info_len The length of \p info in bytes.
+ * \param okm The output keying material of \p okm_len bytes.
+ * \param okm_len The length of the output keying material in bytes. This
+ * must be less than or equal to 255 * md.size bytes.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the parameters are invalid.
+ * \return An MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_* error for errors returned from the underlying
+ * MD layer.
+ */
+int mbedtls_hkdf_expand(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *prk,
+ size_t prk_len, const unsigned char *info,
+ size_t info_len, unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* hkdf.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18b1b75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h
@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+/**
+ * \file hmac_drbg.h
+ *
+ * \brief The HMAC_DRBG pseudorandom generator.
+ *
+ * This module implements the HMAC_DRBG pseudorandom generator described
+ * in <em>NIST SP 800-90A: Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using
+ * Deterministic Random Bit Generators</em>.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H
+#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Error codes
+ */
+/** Too many random requested in single call. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG -0x0003
+/** Input too large (Entropy + additional). */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG -0x0005
+/** Read/write error in file. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x0007
+/** The entropy source failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED -0x0009
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: Module settings
+ *
+ * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section.
+ * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line.
+ * \{
+ */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL)
+#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT)
+#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST)
+#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT)
+#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */
+#endif
+
+/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF 0 /**< No prediction resistance */
+#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON 1 /**< Prediction resistance enabled */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * HMAC_DRBG context.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context {
+ /* Working state: the key K is not stored explicitly,
+ * but is implied by the HMAC context */
+ mbedtls_md_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_ctx); /*!< HMAC context (inc. K) */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(V)[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; /*!< V in the spec */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(reseed_counter); /*!< reseed counter */
+
+ /* Administrative state */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(entropy_len); /*!< entropy bytes grabbed on each (re)seed */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(prediction_resistance); /*!< enable prediction resistance (Automatic
+ reseed before every random generation) */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(reseed_interval); /*!< reseed interval */
+
+ /* Callbacks */
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_entropy))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t); /*!< entropy function */
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_entropy); /*!< context for the entropy function */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized if and only if
+ * md_ctx->md_info != NULL. This means that the mutex is initialized
+ * during the initial seeding in mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed() or
+ * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf() and freed in mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free().
+ *
+ * Note that this invariant may change without notice. Do not rely on it
+ * and do not access the mutex directly in application code.
+ */
+ mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex);
+#endif
+} mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief HMAC_DRBG context initialization.
+ *
+ * This function makes the context ready for mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(),
+ * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf() or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free().
+ *
+ * \note The reseed interval is #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL
+ * by default. Override this value by calling
+ * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval().
+ *
+ * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be initialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief HMAC_DRBG initial seeding.
+ *
+ * Set the initial seed and set up the entropy source for future reseeds.
+ *
+ * A typical choice for the \p f_entropy and \p p_entropy parameters is
+ * to use the entropy module:
+ * - \p f_entropy is mbedtls_entropy_func();
+ * - \p p_entropy is an instance of ::mbedtls_entropy_context initialized
+ * with mbedtls_entropy_init() (which registers the platform's default
+ * entropy sources).
+ *
+ * You can provide a personalization string in addition to the
+ * entropy source, to make this instantiation as unique as possible.
+ *
+ * \note By default, the security strength as defined by NIST is:
+ * - 128 bits if \p md_info is SHA-1;
+ * - 192 bits if \p md_info is SHA-224;
+ * - 256 bits if \p md_info is SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512.
+ * Note that SHA-256 is just as efficient as SHA-224.
+ * The security strength can be reduced if a smaller
+ * entropy length is set with
+ * mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len().
+ *
+ * \note The default entropy length is the security strength
+ * (converted from bits to bytes). You can override
+ * it by calling mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len().
+ *
+ * \note During the initial seeding, this function calls
+ * the entropy source to obtain a nonce
+ * whose length is half the entropy length.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+/**
+ * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support,
+ * after this function returns successfully,
+ * it is safe to call mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random()
+ * from multiple threads. Other operations, including
+ * reseeding, are not thread-safe.
+ */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
+/**
+ * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be seeded.
+ * \param md_info MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG.
+ * \param f_entropy The entropy callback, taking as arguments the
+ * \p p_entropy context, the buffer to fill, and the
+ * length of the buffer.
+ * \p f_entropy is always called with a length that is
+ * less than or equal to the entropy length.
+ * \param p_entropy The entropy context to pass to \p f_entropy.
+ * \param custom The personalization string.
+ * This can be \c NULL, in which case the personalization
+ * string is empty regardless of the value of \p len.
+ * \param len The length of the personalization string.
+ * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT
+ * and also at most
+ * #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \c entropy_len * 3 / 2
+ * where \c entropy_len is the entropy length
+ * described above.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p md_info is
+ * invalid.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED if there was not enough
+ * memory to allocate context data.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+ * if the call to \p f_entropy failed.
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info,
+ int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_entropy,
+ const unsigned char *custom,
+ size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialisation of simplified HMAC_DRBG (never reseeds).
+ *
+ * This function is meant for use in algorithms that need a pseudorandom
+ * input such as deterministic ECDSA.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+/**
+ * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support,
+ * after this function returns successfully,
+ * it is safe to call mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random()
+ * from multiple threads. Other operations, including
+ * reseeding, are not thread-safe.
+ */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
+/**
+ * \param ctx HMAC_DRBG context to be initialised.
+ * \param md_info MD algorithm to use for HMAC_DRBG.
+ * \param data Concatenation of the initial entropy string and
+ * the additional data.
+ * \param data_len Length of \p data in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful. or
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p md_info is
+ * invalid.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED if there was not enough
+ * memory to allocate context data.
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function turns prediction resistance on or off.
+ * The default value is off.
+ *
+ * \note If enabled, entropy is gathered at the beginning of
+ * every call to mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add()
+ * or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random().
+ * Only use this if your entropy source has sufficient
+ * throughput.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context.
+ * \param resistance #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON or #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_OFF.
+ */
+void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ int resistance);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets the amount of entropy grabbed on each
+ * seed or reseed.
+ *
+ * See the documentation of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed() for the default value.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context.
+ * \param len The amount of entropy to grab, in bytes.
+ */
+void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the reseed interval.
+ *
+ * The reseed interval is the number of calls to mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random()
+ * or mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add() after which the entropy function
+ * is called again.
+ *
+ * The default value is #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context.
+ * \param interval The reseed interval.
+ */
+void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ int interval);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function updates the state of the HMAC_DRBG context.
+ *
+ * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe
+ * to call this function if another thread might be
+ * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same
+ * context or updating or reseeding the same context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context.
+ * \param additional The data to update the state with.
+ * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data.
+ * \param add_len Length of \p additional in bytes.
+ * Unused if \p additional is \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success, or an error from the underlying
+ * hash calculation.
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function reseeds the HMAC_DRBG context, that is
+ * extracts data from the entropy source.
+ *
+ * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe
+ * to call this function if another thread might be
+ * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same
+ * context or updating or reseeding the same context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context.
+ * \param additional Additional data to add to the state.
+ * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data
+ * and \p len should be \c 0.
+ * \param len The length of the additional data.
+ * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT
+ * and also at most
+ * #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - \c entropy_len
+ * where \c entropy_len is the entropy length
+ * (see mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len()).
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+ * if a call to the entropy function failed.
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *additional, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function updates an HMAC_DRBG instance with additional
+ * data and uses it to generate random data.
+ *
+ * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded
+ * or prediction resistance is enabled.
+ *
+ * \note This function is not thread-safe. It is not safe
+ * to call this function if another thread might be
+ * concurrently obtaining random numbers from the same
+ * context or updating or reseeding the same context.
+ *
+ * \param p_rng The HMAC_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a
+ * #mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context structure.
+ * \param output The buffer to fill.
+ * \param output_len The length of the buffer in bytes.
+ * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST.
+ * \param additional Additional data to update with.
+ * If this is \c NULL, there is no additional data
+ * and \p add_len should be \c 0.
+ * \param add_len The length of the additional data.
+ * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+ * if a call to the entropy source failed.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG if
+ * \p output_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if
+ * \p add_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT.
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_len,
+ const unsigned char *additional,
+ size_t add_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function uses HMAC_DRBG to generate random data.
+ *
+ * This function automatically reseeds if the reseed counter is exceeded
+ * or prediction resistance is enabled.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+/**
+ * \note When Mbed TLS is built with threading support,
+ * it is safe to call mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random()
+ * from multiple threads. Other operations, including
+ * reseeding, are not thread-safe.
+ */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
+/**
+ * \param p_rng The HMAC_DRBG context. This must be a pointer to a
+ * #mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context structure.
+ * \param output The buffer to fill.
+ * \param out_len The length of the buffer in bytes.
+ * This must be at most #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED
+ * if a call to the entropy source failed.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG if
+ * \p out_len > #MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST.
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function resets HMAC_DRBG context to the state immediately
+ * after initial call of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context to free.
+ */
+void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+/**
+ * \brief This function writes a seed file.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context.
+ * \param path The name of the file.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on reseed
+ * failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function reads and updates a seed file. The seed
+ * is added to this instance.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The HMAC_DRBG context.
+ * \param path The name of the file.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR on file error.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED on
+ * reseed failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG if the existing
+ * seed file is too large.
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/**
+ * \brief The HMAC_DRBG Checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return \c 1 if the test failed.
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test(int verbose);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* hmac_drbg.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/lms.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/lms.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f29791
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/lms.h
@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@
+/**
+ * \file lms.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file provides an API for the LMS post-quantum-safe stateful-hash
+ public-key signature scheme as defined in RFC8554 and NIST.SP.200-208.
+ * This implementation currently only supports a single parameter set
+ * MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10 in order to reduce complexity. This is one
+ * of the signature schemes recommended by the IETF draft SUIT standard
+ * for IOT firmware upgrades (RFC9019).
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_LMS_H
+#define MBEDTLS_LMS_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0011 /**< Bad data has been input to an LMS function */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_OUT_OF_PRIVATE_KEYS -0x0013 /**< Specified LMS key has utilised all of its private keys */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED -0x0015 /**< LMS signature verification failed */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED -0x0017 /**< LMS failed to allocate space for a private key */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x0019 /**< Input/output buffer is too small to contain requited data */
+
+/* Currently only defined for SHA256, 32 is the max hash output size */
+#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX (32u)
+#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX (34u)
+#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(type) ((type) == MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8 ? 32u : 0)
+#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN (16u)
+#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN (4u)
+#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN (4u)
+#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(type) ((type) == MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8 ? 34u : 0)
+#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(type) (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(type))
+
+#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(type) (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(type) + \
+ (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(type) * \
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(type)))
+
+
+#define MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN (4)
+#define MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type) ((type) == MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10 ? 10u : 0)
+
+/* The length of a hash output, Currently only implemented for SHA256.
+ * Max is 32 bytes.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(type) ((type) == MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10 ? 32 : 0)
+#define MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES_MAX 32
+
+#define MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(type, otstype) (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(otstype) + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN + \
+ (MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type) * \
+ MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(type)))
+
+#define MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(type) (MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(type))
+
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** The Identifier of the LMS parameter set, as per
+ * https://www.iana.org/assignments/leighton-micali-signatures/leighton-micali-signatures.xhtml
+ * We are only implementing a subset of the types, particularly H10, for the sake of simplicity.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10 = 0x6,
+} mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t;
+
+/** The Identifier of the LMOTS parameter set, as per
+ * https://www.iana.org/assignments/leighton-micali-signatures/leighton-micali-signatures.xhtml.
+ * We are only implementing a subset of the types, particularly N32_W8, for the sake of simplicity.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8 = 4
+} mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t;
+
+/** LMOTS parameters structure.
+ *
+ * This contains the metadata associated with an LMOTS key, detailing the
+ * algorithm type, the key ID, and the leaf identifier should be key be part of
+ * a LMS key.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(I_key_identifier[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN]); /*!< The key
+ identifier. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(q_leaf_identifier[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN]); /*!< Which
+ leaf of the LMS key this is.
+ 0 if the key is not part of an LMS key. */
+ mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); /*!< The LM-OTS key type identifier as
+ per IANA. Only SHA256_N32_W8 is
+ currently supported. */
+} mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t;
+
+/** LMOTS public context structure.
+ *
+ * A LMOTS public key is a hash output, and the applicable parameter set.
+ *
+ * The context must be initialized before it is used. A public key must either
+ * be imported or generated from a private context.
+ *
+ * \dot
+ * digraph lmots_public_t {
+ * UNINITIALIZED -> INIT [label="init"];
+ * HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY -> INIT [label="free"];
+ * INIT -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="import_public_key"];
+ * INIT -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="calculate_public_key from private key"];
+ * HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="export_public_key"];
+ * }
+ * \enddot
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(params);
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(public_key)[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX];
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(have_public_key); /*!< Whether the context contains a public key.
+ Boolean values only. */
+} mbedtls_lmots_public_t;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE)
+/** LMOTS private context structure.
+ *
+ * A LMOTS private key is one hash output for each of digit of the digest +
+ * checksum, and the applicable parameter set.
+ *
+ * The context must be initialized before it is used. A public key must either
+ * be imported or generated from a private context.
+ *
+ * \dot
+ * digraph lmots_public_t {
+ * UNINITIALIZED -> INIT [label="init"];
+ * HAVE_PRIVATE_KEY -> INIT [label="free"];
+ * INIT -> HAVE_PRIVATE_KEY [label="generate_private_key"];
+ * HAVE_PRIVATE_KEY -> INIT [label="sign"];
+ * }
+ * \enddot
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(params);
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(private_key)[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX][
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX];
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(have_private_key); /*!< Whether the context contains a private key.
+ Boolean values only. */
+} mbedtls_lmots_private_t;
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */
+
+
+/** LMS parameters structure.
+ *
+ * This contains the metadata associated with an LMS key, detailing the
+ * algorithm type, the type of the underlying OTS algorithm, and the key ID.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(I_key_identifier[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN]); /*!< The key
+ identifier. */
+ mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(otstype); /*!< The LM-OTS key type identifier as
+ per IANA. Only SHA256_N32_W8 is
+ currently supported. */
+ mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); /*!< The LMS key type identifier as per
+ IANA. Only SHA256_M32_H10 is currently
+ supported. */
+} mbedtls_lms_parameters_t;
+
+/** LMS public context structure.
+ *
+ * A LMS public key is the hash output that is the root of the Merkle tree, and
+ * the applicable parameter set
+ *
+ * The context must be initialized before it is used. A public key must either
+ * be imported or generated from a private context.
+ *
+ * \dot
+ * digraph lms_public_t {
+ * UNINITIALIZED -> INIT [label="init"];
+ * HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY -> INIT [label="free"];
+ * INIT -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="import_public_key"];
+ * INIT -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="calculate_public_key from private key"];
+ * HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY -> HAVE_PUBLIC_KEY [label="export_public_key"];
+ * }
+ * \enddot
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_lms_parameters_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(params);
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(T_1_pub_key)[MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES_MAX]; /*!< The public key, in
+ the form of the Merkle tree root node. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(have_public_key); /*!< Whether the context contains a public key.
+ Boolean values only. */
+} mbedtls_lms_public_t;
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE)
+/** LMS private context structure.
+ *
+ * A LMS private key is a set of LMOTS private keys, an index to the next usable
+ * key, and the applicable parameter set.
+ *
+ * The context must be initialized before it is used. A public key must either
+ * be imported or generated from a private context.
+ *
+ * \dot
+ * digraph lms_public_t {
+ * UNINITIALIZED -> INIT [label="init"];
+ * HAVE_PRIVATE_KEY -> INIT [label="free"];
+ * INIT -> HAVE_PRIVATE_KEY [label="generate_private_key"];
+ * }
+ * \enddot
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_lms_parameters_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(params);
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(q_next_usable_key); /*!< The index of the next OTS key that has not
+ been used. */
+ mbedtls_lmots_private_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ots_private_keys); /*!< The private key material. One OTS key
+ for each leaf node in the Merkle tree. NULL
+ when have_private_key is 0 and non-NULL otherwise.
+ is 2^MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type) in length. */
+ mbedtls_lmots_public_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ots_public_keys); /*!< The OTS key public keys, used to
+ build the Merkle tree. NULL
+ when have_private_key is 0 and
+ non-NULL otherwise.
+ Is 2^MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type)
+ in length. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(have_private_key); /*!< Whether the context contains a private key.
+ Boolean values only. */
+} mbedtls_lms_private_t;
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes an LMS public context
+ *
+ * \param ctx The uninitialized LMS context that will then be
+ * initialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_lms_public_init(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function uninitializes an LMS public context
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized LMS context that will then be
+ * uninitialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_lms_public_free(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function imports an LMS public key into a
+ * public LMS context.
+ *
+ * \note Before this function is called, the context must
+ * have been initialized.
+ *
+ * \note See IETF RFC8554 for details of the encoding of
+ * this public key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized LMS context store the key in.
+ * \param key The buffer from which the key will be read.
+ * #MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN bytes will be read from
+ * this.
+ * \param key_size The size of the key being imported.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A non-zero error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_lms_import_public_key(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t key_size);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function exports an LMS public key from a
+ * LMS public context that already contains a public
+ * key.
+ *
+ * \note Before this function is called, the context must
+ * have been initialized and the context must contain
+ * a public key.
+ *
+ * \note See IETF RFC8554 for details of the encoding of
+ * this public key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized LMS public context that contains
+ * the public key.
+ * \param key The buffer into which the key will be output. Must
+ * be at least #MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN in size.
+ * \param key_size The size of the key buffer.
+ * \param key_len If not NULL, will be written with the size of the
+ * key.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A non-zero error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_lms_export_public_key(const mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t key_size,
+ size_t *key_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function verifies a LMS signature, using a
+ * LMS context that contains a public key.
+ *
+ * \note Before this function is called, the context must
+ * have been initialized and must contain a public key
+ * (either by import or generation).
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized LMS public context from which the
+ * public key will be read.
+ * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read.
+ * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read.
+ * \param sig The buf from which the signature will be read.
+ * #MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN bytes will be read from
+ * this.
+ * \param sig_size The size of the signature to be verified.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on successful verification.
+ * \return A non-zero error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_lms_verify(const mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE)
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes an LMS private context
+ *
+ * \param ctx The uninitialized LMS private context that will
+ * then be initialized. */
+void mbedtls_lms_private_init(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function uninitializes an LMS private context
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized LMS private context that will then
+ * be uninitialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_lms_private_free(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function generates an LMS private key, and
+ * stores in into an LMS private context.
+ *
+ * \warning This function is **not intended for use in
+ * production**, due to as-yet unsolved problems with
+ * handling stateful keys. The API for this function
+ * may change considerably in future versions.
+ *
+ * \note The seed must have at least 256 bits of entropy.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context to generate the key
+ * into.
+ * \param type The LMS parameter set identifier.
+ * \param otstype The LMOTS parameter set identifier.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to be used to generate the key ID.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to f_rng
+ * \param seed The seed used to deterministically generate the
+ * key.
+ * \param seed_size The length of the seed.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A non-zero error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_lms_generate_private_key(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx,
+ mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t type,
+ mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t otstype,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng, const unsigned char *seed,
+ size_t seed_size);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function calculates an LMS public key from a
+ * LMS context that already contains a private key.
+ *
+ * \note Before this function is called, the context must
+ * have been initialized and the context must contain
+ * a private key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized LMS public context to calculate the key
+ * from and store it into.
+ *
+ * \param priv_ctx The LMS private context to read the private key
+ * from. This must have been initialized and contain a
+ * private key.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A non-zero error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_lms_calculate_public_key(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_lms_private_t *priv_ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function creates a LMS signature, using a
+ * LMS context that contains unused private keys.
+ *
+ * \warning This function is **not intended for use in
+ * production**, due to as-yet unsolved problems with
+ * handling stateful keys. The API for this function
+ * may change considerably in future versions.
+ *
+ * \note Before this function is called, the context must
+ * have been initialized and must contain a private
+ * key.
+ *
+ * \note Each of the LMOTS private keys inside a LMS private
+ * key can only be used once. If they are reused, then
+ * attackers may be able to forge signatures with that
+ * key. This is all handled transparently, but it is
+ * important to not perform copy operations on LMS
+ * contexts that contain private key material.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized LMS private context from which the
+ * private key will be read.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to be used for signature
+ * generation.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to f_rng
+ * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read.
+ * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read.
+ * \param sig The buf into which the signature will be stored.
+ * Must be at least #MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN in size.
+ * \param sig_size The size of the buffer the signature will be
+ * written into.
+ * \param sig_len If not NULL, will be written with the size of the
+ * signature.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A non-zero error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_lms_sign(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng, const unsigned char *msg,
+ unsigned int msg_size, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size,
+ size_t *sig_len);
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_LMS_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d283136
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
@@ -0,0 +1,4380 @@
+/**
+ * \file mbedtls_config.h
+ *
+ * \brief Configuration options (set of defines)
+ *
+ * This set of compile-time options may be used to enable
+ * or disable features selectively, and reduce the global
+ * memory footprint.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/**
+ * This is an optional version symbol that enables compatibility handling of
+ * config files.
+ *
+ * It is equal to the #MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER of the Mbed TLS version that
+ * introduced the config format we want to be compatible with.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_VERSION 0x03000000
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: System support
+ *
+ * This section sets system specific settings.
+ * \{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM
+ *
+ * The compiler has support for asm().
+ *
+ * Requires support for asm() in compiler.
+ *
+ * Used in:
+ * library/aesni.h
+ * library/aria.c
+ * library/bn_mul.h
+ * library/constant_time.c
+ * library/padlock.h
+ *
+ * Required by:
+ * MBEDTLS_AESCE_C
+ * MBEDTLS_AESNI_C (on some platforms)
+ * MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
+ *
+ * Comment to disable the use of assembly code.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION
+ *
+ * The platform lacks support for double-width integer division (64-bit
+ * division on a 32-bit platform, 128-bit division on a 64-bit platform).
+ *
+ * Used in:
+ * include/mbedtls/bignum.h
+ * library/bignum.c
+ *
+ * The bignum code uses double-width division to speed up some operations.
+ * Double-width division is often implemented in software that needs to
+ * be linked with the program. The presence of a double-width integer
+ * type is usually detected automatically through preprocessor macros,
+ * but the automatic detection cannot know whether the code needs to
+ * and can be linked with an implementation of division for that type.
+ * By default division is assumed to be usable if the type is present.
+ * Uncomment this option to prevent the use of double-width division.
+ *
+ * Note that division for the native integer type is always required.
+ * Furthermore, a 64-bit type is always required even on a 32-bit
+ * platform, but it need not support multiplication or division. In some
+ * cases it is also desirable to disable some double-width operations. For
+ * example, if double-width division is implemented in software, disabling
+ * it can reduce code size in some embedded targets.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_NO_UDBL_DIVISION
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION
+ *
+ * The platform lacks support for 32x32 -> 64-bit multiplication.
+ *
+ * Used in:
+ * library/poly1305.c
+ *
+ * Some parts of the library may use multiplication of two unsigned 32-bit
+ * operands with a 64-bit result in order to speed up computations. On some
+ * platforms, this is not available in hardware and has to be implemented in
+ * software, usually in a library provided by the toolchain.
+ *
+ * Sometimes it is not desirable to have to link to that library. This option
+ * removes the dependency of that library on platforms that lack a hardware
+ * 64-bit multiplier by embedding a software implementation in Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * Note that depending on the compiler, this may decrease performance compared
+ * to using the library function provided by the toolchain.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_NO_64BIT_MULTIPLICATION
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2
+ *
+ * CPU supports SSE2 instruction set.
+ *
+ * Uncomment if the CPU supports SSE2 (IA-32 specific).
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME
+ *
+ * System has time.h and time().
+ * The time does not need to be correct, only time differences are used,
+ * by contrast with MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE
+ *
+ * Defining MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME allows you to specify MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT,
+ * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO and
+ * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME.
+ *
+ * Comment if your system does not support time functions.
+ *
+ * \note If MBEDTLS_TIMING_C is set - to enable the semi-portable timing
+ * interface - timing.c will include time.h on suitable platforms
+ * regardless of the setting of MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME, unless
+ * MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT is used. See timing.c for more information.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE
+ *
+ * System has time.h, time(), and an implementation for
+ * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() (see below).
+ * The time needs to be correct (not necessarily very accurate, but at least
+ * the date should be correct). This is used to verify the validity period of
+ * X.509 certificates.
+ *
+ * Comment if your system does not have a correct clock.
+ *
+ * \note mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() is an abstraction in platform_util.h that
+ * behaves similarly to the gmtime_r() function from the C standard. Refer to
+ * the documentation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() for more information.
+ *
+ * \note It is possible to configure an implementation for
+ * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() at compile-time by using the macro
+ * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY
+ *
+ * Enable the memory allocation layer.
+ *
+ * By default Mbed TLS uses the system-provided calloc() and free().
+ * This allows different allocators (self-implemented or provided) to be
+ * provided to the platform abstraction layer.
+ *
+ * Enabling #MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY without the
+ * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE,CALLOC}_MACROs will provide
+ * "mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free()" allowing you to set an alternative calloc() and
+ * free() function pointer at runtime.
+ *
+ * Enabling #MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY and specifying
+ * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{CALLOC,FREE}_MACROs will allow you to specify the
+ * alternate function at compile time.
+ *
+ * An overview of how the value of mbedtls_calloc is determined:
+ *
+ * - if !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY
+ * - mbedtls_calloc = calloc
+ * - if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY
+ * - if (MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO && MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO):
+ * - mbedtls_calloc = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO
+ * - if !(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO && MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO):
+ * - Dynamic setup via mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free is now possible with a default value MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC.
+ * - How is MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC handled?
+ * - if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS:
+ * - MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC is not set to anything;
+ * - MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR can be included if present;
+ * - if !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS:
+ * - if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC is present:
+ * - User-defined MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC is respected;
+ * - if !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC:
+ * - MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC = calloc
+ *
+ * - At this point the presence of MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC is checked.
+ * - if !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC
+ * - MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC = uninitialized_calloc
+ *
+ * - mbedtls_calloc = MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC.
+ *
+ * Defining MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO and #MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC at the same time is not possible.
+ * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO must both be defined or undefined at the same time.
+ * #MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC and #MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE do not have to be defined at the same time, as, if they are used,
+ * dynamic setup of these functions is possible. See the tree above to see how are they handled in all cases.
+ * An uninitialized #MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC always fails, returning a null pointer.
+ * An uninitialized #MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE does not do anything.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C
+ *
+ * Enable this layer to allow use of alternative memory allocators.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS
+ *
+ * Do not assign standard functions in the platform layer (e.g. calloc() to
+ * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC and printf() to MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF)
+ *
+ * This makes sure there are no linking errors on platforms that do not support
+ * these functions. You will HAVE to provide alternatives, either at runtime
+ * via the platform_set_xxx() functions or at compile time by setting
+ * the MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_XXX defines, or enabling a
+ * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C
+ *
+ * Uncomment to prevent default assignment of standard functions in the
+ * platform layer.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT
+ *
+ * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT: Uncomment a macro to let Mbed TLS support the
+ * function in the platform abstraction layer.
+ *
+ * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT, Mbed TLS will
+ * provide a function "mbedtls_platform_set_printf()" that allows you to set an
+ * alternative printf function pointer.
+ *
+ * All these define require MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C to be defined!
+ *
+ * \note MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT is required on Windows;
+ * it will be enabled automatically by check_config.h
+ *
+ * \warning MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT cannot be defined at the same time as
+ * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO!
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT requires MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME
+ *
+ * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of specific base
+ * platform function
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT
+
+/**
+ * Uncomment the macro to let Mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of
+ * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(). This replaces the default implementation in
+ * platform_util.c.
+ *
+ * gmtime() is not a thread-safe function as defined in the C standard. The
+ * library will try to use safer implementations of this function, such as
+ * gmtime_r() when available. However, if Mbed TLS cannot identify the target
+ * system, the implementation of mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() will default to
+ * using the standard gmtime(). In this case, calls from the library to
+ * gmtime() will be guarded by the global mutex mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex
+ * if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled. We recommend that calls from outside the
+ * library are also guarded with this mutex to avoid race conditions. However,
+ * if the macro MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT is defined, Mbed TLS will
+ * unconditionally use the implementation for mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r()
+ * supplied at compile time.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT
+
+/**
+ * Uncomment the macro to let Mbed TLS use your alternate implementation of
+ * mbedtls_platform_zeroize(), to wipe sensitive data in memory. This replaces
+ * the default implementation in platform_util.c.
+ *
+ * By default, the library uses a system function such as memset_s()
+ * (optional feature of C11), explicit_bzero() (BSD and compatible), or
+ * SecureZeroMemory (Windows). If no such function is detected, the library
+ * falls back to a plain C implementation. Compilers are technically
+ * permitted to optimize this implementation out, meaning that the memory is
+ * not actually wiped. The library tries to prevent that, but the C language
+ * makes it impossible to guarantee that the memory will always be wiped.
+ *
+ * If your platform provides a guaranteed method to wipe memory which
+ * `platform_util.c` does not detect, define this macro to the name of
+ * a function that takes two arguments, a `void *` pointer and a length,
+ * and wipes that many bytes starting at the specified address. For example,
+ * if your platform has explicit_bzero() but `platform_util.c` does not
+ * detect its presence, define `MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT` to be
+ * `explicit_bzero` to use that function as mbedtls_platform_zeroize().
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING
+ *
+ * Mark deprecated functions and features so that they generate a warning if
+ * used. Functionality deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the
+ * next version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a
+ * new major version by making sure your code is not using this functionality.
+ *
+ * This only works with GCC and Clang. With other compilers, you may want to
+ * use MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED
+ *
+ * Uncomment to get warnings on using deprecated functions and features.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED
+ *
+ * Remove deprecated functions and features so that they generate an error if
+ * used. Functionality deprecated in one version will usually be removed in the
+ * next version. You can enable this to help you prepare the transition to a
+ * new major version by making sure your code is not using this functionality.
+ *
+ * Uncomment to get errors on using deprecated functions and features.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED
+
+/** \} name SECTION: System support */
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: Mbed TLS feature support
+ *
+ * This section sets support for features that are or are not needed
+ * within the modules that are enabled.
+ * \{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT
+ *
+ * Uncomment to provide your own alternate implementation for
+ * mbedtls_timing_get_timer(), mbedtls_set_alarm(), mbedtls_set/get_delay()
+ *
+ * Only works if you have MBEDTLS_TIMING_C enabled.
+ *
+ * You will need to provide a header "timing_alt.h" and an implementation at
+ * compile time.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ALT
+ *
+ * MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let Mbed TLS use your
+ * alternate core implementation of a symmetric crypto, an arithmetic or hash
+ * module (e.g. platform specific assembly optimized implementations). Keep
+ * in mind that the function prototypes should remain the same.
+ *
+ * This replaces the whole module. If you only want to replace one of the
+ * functions, use one of the MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT flags.
+ *
+ * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_AES_ALT, Mbed TLS will no longer
+ * provide the "struct mbedtls_aes_context" definition and omit the base
+ * function declarations and implementations. "aes_alt.h" will be included from
+ * "aes.h" to include the new function definitions.
+ *
+ * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding
+ * module.
+ *
+ * \warning MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their
+ * use constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend
+ * avoiding dependencies on them, and considering stronger message
+ * digests and ciphers instead.
+ *
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_DES_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT
+
+/*
+ * When replacing the elliptic curve module, please consider, that it is
+ * implemented with two .c files:
+ * - ecp.c
+ * - ecp_curves.c
+ * You can replace them very much like all the other MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT
+ * macros as described above. The only difference is that you have to make sure
+ * that you provide functionality for both .c files.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT
+ *
+ * MBEDTLS__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let Mbed TLS use you
+ * alternate core implementation of symmetric crypto or hash function. Keep in
+ * mind that function prototypes should remain the same.
+ *
+ * This replaces only one function. The header file from Mbed TLS is still
+ * used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS__MODULE_NAME__ALT flags.
+ *
+ * Example: In case you uncomment MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT, Mbed TLS will
+ * no longer provide the mbedtls_sha1_process() function, but it will still provide
+ * the other function (using your mbedtls_sha1_process() function) and the definition
+ * of mbedtls_sha1_context, so your implementation of mbedtls_sha1_process must be compatible
+ * with this definition.
+ *
+ * \note If you use the AES_xxx_ALT macros, then it is recommended to also set
+ * MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES in order to help the linker garbage-collect the AES
+ * tables.
+ *
+ * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding
+ * function.
+ *
+ * \warning MD5, DES and SHA-1 are considered weak and their use
+ * constitutes a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding
+ * dependencies on them, and considering stronger message digests
+ * and ciphers instead.
+ *
+ * \warning If both MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT and MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC are
+ * enabled, then the deterministic ECDH signature functions pass the
+ * the static HMAC-DRBG as RNG to mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(). Therefore
+ * alternative implementations should use the RNG only for generating
+ * the ephemeral key and nothing else. If this is not possible, then
+ * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC should be disabled and an alternative
+ * implementation should be provided for mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext().
+ *
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_PROCESS_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_PROCESS_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_PROCESS_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_PROCESS_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT
+ *
+ * Expose a part of the internal interface of the Elliptic Curve Point module.
+ *
+ * MBEDTLS_ECP__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT: Uncomment a macro to let Mbed TLS use your
+ * alternative core implementation of elliptic curve arithmetic. Keep in mind
+ * that function prototypes should remain the same.
+ *
+ * This partially replaces one function. The header file from Mbed TLS is still
+ * used, in contrast to the MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT flag. The original implementation
+ * is still present and it is used for group structures not supported by the
+ * alternative.
+ *
+ * The original implementation can in addition be removed by setting the
+ * MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK option, in which case any function for which the
+ * corresponding MBEDTLS_ECP__FUNCTION_NAME__ALT macro is defined will not be
+ * able to fallback to curves not supported by the alternative implementation.
+ *
+ * Any of these options become available by defining MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT
+ * and implementing the following functions:
+ * unsigned char mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(
+ * const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp )
+ * int mbedtls_internal_ecp_init( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp )
+ * void mbedtls_internal_ecp_free( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp )
+ * The mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable function should return 1 if the
+ * replacement functions implement arithmetic for the given group and 0
+ * otherwise.
+ * The functions mbedtls_internal_ecp_init and mbedtls_internal_ecp_free are
+ * called before and after each point operation and provide an opportunity to
+ * implement optimized set up and tear down instructions.
+ *
+ * Example: In case you set MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT and
+ * MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT, Mbed TLS will still provide the ecp_double_jac()
+ * function, but will use your mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac() if the group
+ * for the operation is supported by your implementation (i.e. your
+ * mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable() function returns 1 for this group). If the
+ * group is not supported by your implementation, then the original Mbed TLS
+ * implementation of ecp_double_jac() is used instead, unless this fallback
+ * behaviour is disabled by setting MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK (in which case
+ * ecp_double_jac() will return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE).
+ *
+ * The function prototypes and the definition of mbedtls_ecp_group and
+ * mbedtls_ecp_point will not change based on MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT, so your
+ * implementation of mbedtls_internal_ecp__function_name__ must be compatible
+ * with their definitions.
+ *
+ * Uncomment a macro to enable alternate implementation of the corresponding
+ * function.
+ */
+/* Required for all the functions in this section */
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT
+/* Turn off software fallback for curves not supported in hardware */
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK
+/* Support for Weierstrass curves with Jacobi representation */
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT
+/* Support for curves with Montgomery arithmetic */
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT
+ *
+ * Uncomment this macro to let Mbed TLS use your own implementation of a
+ * hardware entropy collector.
+ *
+ * Your function must be called \c mbedtls_hardware_poll(), have the same
+ * prototype as declared in library/entropy_poll.h, and accept NULL as first
+ * argument.
+ *
+ * Uncomment to use your own hardware entropy collector.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES
+ *
+ * Use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM.
+ *
+ * Uncomment this macro to use precomputed AES tables stored in ROM.
+ * Comment this macro to generate AES tables in RAM at runtime.
+ *
+ * Tradeoff: Using precomputed ROM tables reduces RAM usage by ~8kb
+ * (or ~2kb if \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES is used) and reduces the
+ * initialization time before the first AES operation can be performed.
+ * It comes at the cost of additional ~8kb ROM use (resp. ~2kb if \c
+ * MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES below is used), and potentially degraded
+ * performance if ROM access is slower than RAM access.
+ *
+ * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES
+ *
+ * Use less ROM/RAM for AES tables.
+ *
+ * Uncommenting this macro omits 75% of the AES tables from
+ * ROM / RAM (depending on the value of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES)
+ * by computing their values on the fly during operations
+ * (the tables are entry-wise rotations of one another).
+ *
+ * Tradeoff: Uncommenting this reduces the RAM / ROM footprint
+ * by ~6kb but at the cost of more arithmetic operations during
+ * runtime. Specifically, one has to compare 4 accesses within
+ * different tables to 4 accesses with additional arithmetic
+ * operations within the same table. The performance gain/loss
+ * depends on the system and memory details.
+ *
+ * This option is independent of \c MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+ *
+ * Use only 128-bit keys in AES operations to save ROM.
+ *
+ * Uncomment this macro to remove support for AES operations that use 192-
+ * or 256-bit keys.
+ *
+ * Uncommenting this macro reduces the size of AES code by ~300 bytes
+ * on v8-M/Thumb2.
+ *
+ * Module: library/aes.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH
+
+/*
+ * Disable plain C implementation for AES.
+ *
+ * When the plain C implementation is enabled, and an implementation using a
+ * special CPU feature (such as MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) is also enabled, runtime
+ * detection will be used to select between them.
+ *
+ * If only one implementation is present, runtime detection will not be used.
+ * This configuration will crash at runtime if running on a CPU without the
+ * necessary features. It will not build unless at least one of MBEDTLS_AESCE_C
+ * and/or MBEDTLS_AESNI_C is enabled & present in the build.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY
+ *
+ * Use less ROM for the Camellia implementation (saves about 768 bytes).
+ *
+ * Uncomment this macro to use less memory for Camellia.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING
+ *
+ * If this macro is defined, emit a compile-time warning if application code
+ * calls a function without checking its return value, but the return value
+ * should generally be checked in portable applications.
+ *
+ * This is only supported on platforms where #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN is
+ * implemented. Otherwise this option has no effect.
+ *
+ * Uncomment to get warnings on using fallible functions without checking
+ * their return value.
+ *
+ * \note This feature is a work in progress.
+ * Warnings will be added to more functions in the future.
+ *
+ * \note A few functions are considered critical, and ignoring the return
+ * value of these functions will trigger a warning even if this
+ * macro is not defined. To completely disable return value check
+ * warnings, define #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN with an empty expansion.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+ *
+ * Enable Cipher Block Chaining mode (CBC) for symmetric ciphers.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB
+ *
+ * Enable Cipher Feedback mode (CFB) for symmetric ciphers.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+ *
+ * Enable Counter Block Cipher mode (CTR) for symmetric ciphers.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB
+ *
+ * Enable Output Feedback mode (OFB) for symmetric ciphers.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS
+ *
+ * Enable Xor-encrypt-xor with ciphertext stealing mode (XTS) for AES.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER
+ *
+ * Enable NULL cipher.
+ * Warning: Only do so when you know what you are doing. This allows for
+ * encryption or channels without any security!
+ *
+ * To enable the following ciphersuites:
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA
+ *
+ * Uncomment this macro to enable the NULL cipher and ciphersuites
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+ *
+ * MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_XXX: Uncomment or comment macros to add support for
+ * specific padding modes in the cipher layer with cipher modes that support
+ * padding (e.g. CBC)
+ *
+ * If you disable all padding modes, only full blocks can be used with CBC.
+ *
+ * Enable padding modes in the cipher layer.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY
+ *
+ * Uncomment this macro to use a 128-bit key in the CTR_DRBG module.
+ * Without this, CTR_DRBG uses a 256-bit key
+ * unless \c MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH is set.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY
+
+/**
+ * Enable the verified implementations of ECDH primitives from Project Everest
+ * (currently only Curve25519). This feature changes the layout of ECDH
+ * contexts and therefore is a compatibility break for applications that access
+ * fields of a mbedtls_ecdh_context structure directly. See also
+ * MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT in include/mbedtls/ecdh.h.
+ *
+ * The Everest code is provided under the Apache 2.0 license only; therefore enabling this
+ * option is not compatible with taking the library under the GPL v2.0-or-later license.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
+ *
+ * MBEDTLS_ECP_XXXX_ENABLED: Enables specific curves within the Elliptic Curve
+ * module. By default all supported curves are enabled.
+ *
+ * Comment macros to disable the curve and functions for it
+ */
+/* Short Weierstrass curves (supporting ECP, ECDH, ECDSA) */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED
+/* Montgomery curves (supporting ECP) */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM
+ *
+ * Enable specific 'modulo p' routines for each NIST prime.
+ * Depending on the prime and architecture, makes operations 4 to 8 times
+ * faster on the corresponding curve.
+ *
+ * Comment this macro to disable NIST curves optimisation.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE
+ *
+ * Enable "non-blocking" ECC operations that can return early and be resumed.
+ *
+ * This allows various functions to pause by returning
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS (or, for functions in the SSL module,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) and then be called later again in
+ * order to further progress and eventually complete their operation. This is
+ * controlled through mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() which limits the maximum
+ * number of ECC operations a function may perform before pausing; see
+ * mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() for more information.
+ *
+ * This is useful in non-threaded environments if you want to avoid blocking
+ * for too long on ECC (and, hence, X.509 or SSL/TLS) operations.
+ *
+ * This option:
+ * - Adds xxx_restartable() variants of existing operations in the
+ * following modules, with corresponding restart context types:
+ * - ECP (for Short Weierstrass curves only): scalar multiplication (mul),
+ * linear combination (muladd);
+ * - ECDSA: signature generation & verification;
+ * - PK: signature generation & verification;
+ * - X509: certificate chain verification.
+ * - Adds mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart() in the ECDH module.
+ * - Changes the behaviour of TLS 1.2 clients (not servers) when using the
+ * ECDHE-ECDSA key exchange (not other key exchanges) to make all ECC
+ * computations restartable:
+ * - ECDH operations from the key exchange, only for Short Weierstrass
+ * curves, only when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is not enabled.
+ * - verification of the server's key exchange signature;
+ * - verification of the server's certificate chain;
+ * - generation of the client's signature if client authentication is used,
+ * with an ECC key/certificate.
+ *
+ * \note In the cases above, the usual SSL/TLS functions, such as
+ * mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), can now return
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS.
+ *
+ * \note When this option and MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO are both enabled,
+ * restartable operations in PK, X.509 and TLS (see above) are not
+ * using PSA. On the other hand, ECDH computations in TLS are using
+ * PSA, and are not restartable. These are temporary limitations that
+ * should be lifted in the future.
+ *
+ * \note This option only works with the default software implementation of
+ * elliptic curve functionality. It is incompatible with
+ * MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDH_XXX_ALT, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_XXX_ALT.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C
+ *
+ * Uncomment this macro to enable restartable ECC computations.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE
+
+/**
+ * Uncomment to enable using new bignum code in the ECC modules.
+ *
+ * \warning This is currently experimental, incomplete and therefore should not
+ * be used in production.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC
+ *
+ * Enable deterministic ECDSA (RFC 6979).
+ * Standard ECDSA is "fragile" in the sense that lack of entropy when signing
+ * may result in a compromise of the long-term signing key. This is avoided by
+ * the deterministic variant.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C, MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+ *
+ * Comment this macro to disable deterministic ECDSA.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED
+ *
+ * Enable the PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
+ *
+ * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
+ * enabled as well):
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED
+ *
+ * Enable the DHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_DHM_C
+ *
+ * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
+ * enabled as well):
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ *
+ * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it
+ * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters.
+ * If possible, it is recommended users should consider
+ * preferring other methods of key exchange.
+ * See dhm.h for more details.
+ *
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED
+ *
+ * Enable the ECDHE-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH)
+ *
+ * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
+ * enabled as well):
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED
+ *
+ * Enable the RSA-PSK based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15,
+ * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+ *
+ * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
+ * enabled as well):
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED
+ *
+ * Enable the RSA-only based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15,
+ * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+ *
+ * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
+ * enabled as well):
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED
+ *
+ * Enable the DHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_DHM_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C, MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15,
+ * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+ *
+ * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
+ * enabled as well):
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
+ *
+ * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it
+ * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters.
+ * If possible, it is recommended users should consider
+ * preferring other methods of key exchange.
+ * See dhm.h for more details.
+ *
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED
+ *
+ * Enable the ECDHE-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH)
+ * MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+ * MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
+ * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+ *
+ * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
+ * enabled as well):
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
+ *
+ * Enable the ECDHE-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH)
+ * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA)
+ * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+ *
+ * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
+ * enabled as well):
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED
+ *
+ * Enable the ECDH-ECDSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH)
+ * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA)
+ * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+ *
+ * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
+ * enabled as well):
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED
+ *
+ * Enable the ECDH-RSA based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECDH_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH)
+ * MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+ * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+ *
+ * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
+ * enabled as well):
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED
+ *
+ * Enable the ECJPAKE based ciphersuite modes in SSL / TLS.
+ *
+ * \warning This is currently experimental. EC J-PAKE support is based on the
+ * Thread v1.0.0 specification; incompatible changes to the specification
+ * might still happen. For this reason, this is disabled by default.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE)
+ * SHA-256 (via MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or a PSA driver)
+ * MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
+ *
+ * \warning If SHA-256 is provided only by a PSA driver, you must call
+ * psa_crypto_init() before the first handshake (even if
+ * MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is disabled).
+ *
+ * This enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
+ * enabled as well):
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED
+ *
+ * Enhance support for reading EC keys using variants of SEC1 not allowed by
+ * RFC 5915 and RFC 5480.
+ *
+ * Currently this means parsing the SpecifiedECDomain choice of EC
+ * parameters (only known groups are supported, not arbitrary domains, to
+ * avoid validation issues).
+ *
+ * Disable if you only need to support RFC 5915 + 5480 key formats.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED
+ *
+ * Enable the support for parsing public keys of type Short Weierstrass
+ * (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP_XXX and MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP_XXX) which are using the
+ * compressed point format. This parsing is done through ECP module's functions.
+ *
+ * \note As explained in the description of MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED (in ecp.h)
+ * the only unsupported curves are MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 and
+ * MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY
+ *
+ * Enable a dummy error function to make use of mbedtls_strerror() in
+ * third party libraries easier when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is disabled
+ * (no effect when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled).
+ *
+ * You can safely disable this if MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is enabled, or if you're
+ * not using mbedtls_strerror() or error_strerror() in your application.
+ *
+ * Disable if you run into name conflicts and want to really remove the
+ * mbedtls_strerror()
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_GENPRIME
+ *
+ * Enable the prime-number generation code.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GENPRIME
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_FS_IO
+ *
+ * Enable functions that use the filesystem.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_FS_IO
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES
+ *
+ * Do not add default entropy sources in mbedtls_entropy_init().
+ *
+ * This is useful to have more control over the added entropy sources in an
+ * application.
+ *
+ * Uncomment this macro to prevent loading of default entropy functions.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY
+ *
+ * Do not use built-in platform entropy functions.
+ * This is useful if your platform does not support
+ * standards like the /dev/urandom or Windows CryptoAPI.
+ *
+ * Uncomment this macro to disable the built-in platform entropy functions.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256
+ *
+ * Force the entropy accumulator to use a SHA-256 accumulator instead of the
+ * default SHA-512 based one (if both are available).
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+ *
+ * On 32-bit systems SHA-256 can be much faster than SHA-512. Use this option
+ * if you have performance concerns.
+ *
+ * This option is only useful if both MBEDTLS_SHA256_C and
+ * MBEDTLS_SHA512_C are defined. Otherwise the available hash module is used.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
+ *
+ * Enable the non-volatile (NV) seed file-based entropy source.
+ * (Also enables the NV seed read/write functions in the platform layer)
+ *
+ * This is crucial (if not required) on systems that do not have a
+ * cryptographic entropy source (in hardware or kernel) available.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C
+ *
+ * \note The read/write functions that are used by the entropy source are
+ * determined in the platform layer, and can be modified at runtime and/or
+ * compile-time depending on the flags (MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_*) used.
+ *
+ * \note If you use the default implementation functions that read a seedfile
+ * with regular fopen(), please make sure you make a seedfile with the
+ * proper name (defined in MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE) and at
+ * least MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE bytes in size that can be read from
+ * and written to or you will get an entropy source error! The default
+ * implementation will only use the first MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE
+ * bytes from the file.
+ *
+ * \note The entropy collector will write to the seed file before entropy is
+ * given to an external source, to update it.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
+
+/* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+ *
+ * Enable key identifiers that encode a key owner identifier.
+ *
+ * The owner of a key is identified by a value of type ::mbedtls_key_owner_id_t
+ * which is currently hard-coded to be int32_t.
+ *
+ * Note that this option is meant for internal use only and may be removed
+ * without notice.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG
+ *
+ * Enable debugging of buffer allocator memory issues. Automatically prints
+ * (to stderr) all (fatal) messages on memory allocation issues. Enables
+ * function for 'debug output' of allocated memory.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C
+ *
+ * Uncomment this macro to let the buffer allocator print out error messages.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE
+ *
+ * Include backtrace information with each allocated block.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C
+ * GLIBC-compatible backtrace() and backtrace_symbols() support
+ *
+ * Uncomment this macro to include backtrace information
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT
+ *
+ * Support external private RSA keys (eg from a HSM) in the PK layer.
+ *
+ * Comment this macro to disable support for external private RSA keys.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
+ *
+ * Enable support for PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+ *
+ * This enables support for PKCS#1 v1.5 operations.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
+ *
+ * Enable support for PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+ *
+ * \warning If using a hash that is only provided by PSA drivers, you must
+ * call psa_crypto_init() before doing any PKCS#1 v2.1 operation.
+ *
+ * This enables support for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS operations.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS
+ *
+ * Enable support for platform built-in keys. If you enable this feature,
+ * you must implement the function mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key().
+ * See the documentation of that function for more information.
+ *
+ * Built-in keys are typically derived from a hardware unique key or
+ * stored in a secure element.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C.
+ *
+ * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed
+ * without notice.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT
+ *
+ * Enable support for PSA crypto client.
+ *
+ * \note This option allows to include the code necessary for a PSA
+ * crypto client when the PSA crypto implementation is not included in
+ * the library (MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C disabled). The code included is the
+ * code to set and get PSA key attributes.
+ * The development of PSA drivers partially relying on the library to
+ * fulfill the hardware gaps is another possible usage of this option.
+ *
+ * \warning This interface is experimental and may change or be removed
+ * without notice.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG
+ *
+ * Make the PSA Crypto module use an external random generator provided
+ * by a driver, instead of Mbed TLS's entropy and DRBG modules.
+ *
+ * \note This random generator must deliver random numbers with cryptographic
+ * quality and high performance. It must supply unpredictable numbers
+ * with a uniform distribution. The implementation of this function
+ * is responsible for ensuring that the random generator is seeded
+ * with sufficient entropy. If you have a hardware TRNG which is slow
+ * or delivers non-uniform output, declare it as an entropy source
+ * with mbedtls_entropy_add_source() instead of enabling this option.
+ *
+ * If you enable this option, you must configure the type
+ * ::mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t in psa/crypto_platform.h
+ * and define a function called mbedtls_psa_external_get_random()
+ * with the following prototype:
+ * ```
+ * psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(
+ * mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context,
+ * uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length);
+ * );
+ * ```
+ * The \c context value is initialized to 0 before the first call.
+ * The function must fill the \c output buffer with \c output_size bytes
+ * of random data and set \c *output_length to \c output_size.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
+ *
+ * \warning If you enable this option, code that uses the PSA cryptography
+ * interface will not use any of the entropy sources set up for
+ * the entropy module, nor the NV seed that MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
+ * enables.
+ *
+ * \note This option is experimental and may be removed without notice.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM
+ *
+ * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is built for SPM (Secure
+ * Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two parts: a
+ * NSPE (Non-Secure Process Environment) and an SPE (Secure Process
+ * Environment).
+ *
+ * If you enable this option, your build environment must include a header
+ * file `"crypto_spe.h"` (either in the `psa` subdirectory of the Mbed TLS
+ * header files, or in another directory on the compiler's include search
+ * path). Alternatively, your platform may customize the header
+ * `psa/crypto_platform.h`, in which case it can skip or replace the
+ * inclusion of `"crypto_spe.h"`.
+ *
+ * Module: library/psa_crypto.c
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
+ *
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC
+ *
+ * Dynamically resize the PSA key store to accommodate any number of
+ * volatile keys (until the heap memory is exhausted).
+ *
+ * If this option is disabled, the key store has a fixed size
+ * #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT for volatile keys and loaded persistent keys
+ * together.
+ *
+ * This option has no effect when #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is disabled.
+ *
+ * Module: library/psa_crypto.c
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC
+
+/**
+ * Uncomment to enable p256-m. This is an alternative implementation of
+ * key generation, ECDH and (randomized) ECDSA on the curve SECP256R1.
+ * Compared to the default implementation:
+ *
+ * - p256-m has a much smaller code size and RAM footprint.
+ * - p256-m is only available via the PSA API. This includes the pk module
+ * when #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled.
+ * - p256-m does not support deterministic ECDSA, EC-JPAKE, custom protocols
+ * over the core arithmetic, or deterministic derivation of keys.
+ *
+ * We recommend enabling this option if your application uses the PSA API
+ * and the only elliptic curve support it needs is ECDH and ECDSA over
+ * SECP256R1.
+ *
+ * If you enable this option, you do not need to enable any ECC-related
+ * MBEDTLS_xxx option. You do need to separately request support for the
+ * cryptographic mechanisms through the PSA API:
+ * - #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C and #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG for PSA-based
+ * configuration;
+ * - #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO if you want to use p256-m from PK, X.509 or TLS;
+ * - #PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256;
+ * - #PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH and/or #PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA as needed;
+ * - #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY, #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC,
+ * #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT,
+ * #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT and/or
+ * #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE as needed.
+ *
+ * \note To benefit from the smaller code size of p256-m, make sure that you
+ * do not enable any ECC-related option not supported by p256-m: this
+ * would cause the built-in ECC implementation to be built as well, in
+ * order to provide the required option.
+ * Make sure #PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA, #PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE and
+ * #PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE, and curves other than
+ * SECP256R1 are disabled as they are not supported by this driver.
+ * Also, avoid defining #MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED or
+ * #MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED as those currently require a subset of
+ * the built-in ECC implementation, see docs/driver-only-builds.md.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY
+ *
+ * Enable support for entropy injection at first boot. This feature is
+ * required on systems that do not have a built-in entropy source (TRNG).
+ * This feature is currently not supported on systems that have a built-in
+ * entropy source.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED
+ *
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS
+ *
+ * Assume all buffers passed to PSA functions are owned exclusively by the
+ * PSA function and are not stored in shared memory.
+ *
+ * This option may be enabled if all buffers passed to any PSA function reside
+ * in memory that is accessible only to the PSA function during its execution.
+ *
+ * This option MUST be disabled whenever buffer arguments are in memory shared
+ * with an untrusted party, for example where arguments to PSA calls are passed
+ * across a trust boundary.
+ *
+ * \note Enabling this option reduces memory usage and code size.
+ *
+ * \note Enabling this option causes overlap of input and output buffers
+ * not to be supported by PSA functions.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ASSUME_EXCLUSIVE_BUFFERS
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT
+ *
+ * Do not use the Chinese Remainder Theorem
+ * for the RSA private operation.
+ *
+ * Uncomment this macro to disable the use of CRT in RSA.
+ *
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST
+ *
+ * Enable the checkup functions (*_self_test).
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER
+ *
+ * Enable an implementation of SHA-256 that has lower ROM footprint but also
+ * lower performance.
+ *
+ * The default implementation is meant to be a reasonable compromise between
+ * performance and size. This version optimizes more aggressively for size at
+ * the expense of performance. Eg on Cortex-M4 it reduces the size of
+ * mbedtls_sha256_process() from ~2KB to ~0.5KB for a performance hit of about
+ * 30%.
+ *
+ * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA256.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_SMALLER
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER
+ *
+ * Enable an implementation of SHA-512 that has lower ROM footprint but also
+ * lower performance.
+ *
+ * Uncomment to enable the smaller implementation of SHA512.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_SMALLER
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES
+ *
+ * Enable sending of alert messages in case of encountered errors as per RFC.
+ * If you choose not to send the alert messages, Mbed TLS can still communicate
+ * with other servers, only debugging of failures is harder.
+ *
+ * The advantage of not sending alert messages, is that no information is given
+ * about reasons for failures thus preventing adversaries of gaining intel.
+ *
+ * Enable sending of all alert messages
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID
+ *
+ * Enable support for the DTLS Connection ID (CID) extension,
+ * which allows to identify DTLS connections across changes
+ * in the underlying transport. The CID functionality is described
+ * in RFC 9146.
+ *
+ * Setting this option enables the SSL APIs `mbedtls_ssl_set_cid()`,
+ * mbedtls_ssl_get_own_cid()`, `mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid()` and
+ * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid()`. See the corresponding documentation for
+ * more information.
+ *
+ * The maximum lengths of outgoing and incoming CIDs can be configured
+ * through the options
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
+ *
+ * Uncomment to enable the Connection ID extension.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID
+
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT
+ *
+ * Defines whether RFC 9146 (default) or the legacy version
+ * (version draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05,
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05)
+ * is used.
+ *
+ * Set the value to 0 for the standard version, and
+ * 1 for the legacy draft version.
+ *
+ * \deprecated Support for the legacy version of the DTLS
+ * Connection ID feature is deprecated. Please
+ * switch to the standardized version defined
+ * in RFC 9146 enabled by utilizing
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID without use
+ * of MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT 0
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE
+ *
+ * Enable asynchronous external private key operations in SSL. This allows
+ * you to configure an SSL connection to call an external cryptographic
+ * module to perform private key operations instead of performing the
+ * operation inside the library.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
+ *
+ * In TLS clients, when a client authenticates a server through its
+ * certificate, the client normally checks three things:
+ * - the certificate chain must be valid;
+ * - the chain must start from a trusted CA;
+ * - the certificate must cover the server name that is expected by the client.
+ *
+ * Omitting any of these checks is generally insecure, and can allow a
+ * malicious server to impersonate a legitimate server.
+ *
+ * The third check may be safely skipped in some unusual scenarios,
+ * such as networks where eavesdropping is a risk but not active attacks,
+ * or a private PKI where the client equally trusts all servers that are
+ * accredited by the root CA.
+ *
+ * You should call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() with the expected server name
+ * before starting a TLS handshake on a client (unless the client is
+ * set up to only use PSK-based authentication, which does not rely on the
+ * host name). This configuration option controls what happens if a TLS client
+ * is configured with the authentication mode #MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED
+ * (default), certificate authentication is enabled and the client does not
+ * call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname():
+ *
+ * - If this option is unset (default), the connection attempt is aborted
+ * with the error #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME.
+ * - If this option is set, the TLS library does not check the server name
+ * that the certificate is valid for. This is the historical behavior
+ * of Mbed TLS, but may be insecure as explained above.
+ *
+ * Enable this option for strict backward compatibility if you have
+ * determined that it is secure in the scenario where you are using
+ * Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * \deprecated This option exists only for backward compatibility and will
+ * be removed in the next major version of Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION
+ *
+ * Enable serialization of the TLS context structures, through use of the
+ * functions mbedtls_ssl_context_save() and mbedtls_ssl_context_load().
+ *
+ * This pair of functions allows one side of a connection to serialize the
+ * context associated with the connection, then free or re-use that context
+ * while the serialized state is persisted elsewhere, and finally deserialize
+ * that state to a live context for resuming read/write operations on the
+ * connection. From a protocol perspective, the state of the connection is
+ * unaffected, in particular this is entirely transparent to the peer.
+ *
+ * Note: this is distinct from TLS session resumption, which is part of the
+ * protocol and fully visible by the peer. TLS session resumption enables
+ * establishing new connections associated to a saved session with shorter,
+ * lighter handshakes, while context serialization is a local optimization in
+ * handling a single, potentially long-lived connection.
+ *
+ * Enabling these APIs makes some SSL structures larger, as 64 extra bytes are
+ * saved after the handshake to allow for more efficient serialization, so if
+ * you don't need this feature you'll save RAM by disabling it.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_GCM_C or MBEDTLS_CCM_C or MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C
+ *
+ * Comment to disable the context serialization APIs.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL
+ *
+ * Enable the debug messages in SSL module for all issues.
+ * Debug messages have been disabled in some places to prevent timing
+ * attacks due to (unbalanced) debugging function calls.
+ *
+ * If you need all error reporting you should enable this during debugging,
+ * but remove this for production servers that should log as well.
+ *
+ * Uncomment this macro to report all debug messages on errors introducing
+ * a timing side-channel.
+ *
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
+ *
+ * Enable support for Encrypt-then-MAC, RFC 7366.
+ *
+ * This allows peers that both support it to use a more robust protection for
+ * ciphersuites using CBC, providing deep resistance against timing attacks
+ * on the padding or underlying cipher.
+ *
+ * This only affects CBC ciphersuites, and is useless if none is defined.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+ *
+ * Comment this macro to disable support for Encrypt-then-MAC
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET
+ *
+ * Enable support for RFC 7627: Session Hash and Extended Master Secret
+ * Extension.
+ *
+ * This was introduced as "the proper fix" to the Triple Handshake family of
+ * attacks, but it is recommended to always use it (even if you disable
+ * renegotiation), since it actually fixes a more fundamental issue in the
+ * original SSL/TLS design, and has implications beyond Triple Handshake.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+ *
+ * Comment this macro to disable support for Extended Master Secret.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE
+ *
+ * This option controls the availability of the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert()
+ * giving access to the peer's certificate after completion of the handshake.
+ *
+ * Unless you need mbedtls_ssl_peer_cert() in your application, it is
+ * recommended to disable this option for reduced RAM usage.
+ *
+ * \note If this option is disabled, mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert() is still
+ * defined, but always returns \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \note This option has no influence on the protection against the
+ * triple handshake attack. Even if it is disabled, Mbed TLS will
+ * still ensure that certificates do not change during renegotiation,
+ * for example by keeping a hash of the peer's certificate.
+ *
+ * \note This option is required if MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is set.
+ *
+ * Comment this macro to disable storing the peer's certificate
+ * after the handshake.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_KEYING_MATERIAL_EXPORT
+ *
+ * When this option is enabled, the client and server can extract additional
+ * shared symmetric keys after an SSL handshake using the function
+ * mbedtls_ssl_export_keying_material().
+ *
+ * The process for deriving the keys is specified in RFC 5705 for TLS 1.2 and
+ * in RFC 8446, Section 7.5, for TLS 1.3.
+ *
+ * Comment this macro to disable mbedtls_ssl_export_keying_material().
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_KEYING_MATERIAL_EXPORT
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION
+ *
+ * Enable support for TLS renegotiation.
+ *
+ * The two main uses of renegotiation are (1) refresh keys on long-lived
+ * connections and (2) client authentication after the initial handshake.
+ * If you don't need renegotiation, it's probably better to disable it, since
+ * it has been associated with security issues in the past and is easy to
+ * misuse/misunderstand.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+ *
+ * Comment this to disable support for renegotiation.
+ *
+ * \note Even if this option is disabled, both client and server are aware
+ * of the Renegotiation Indication Extension (RFC 5746) used to
+ * prevent the SSL renegotiation attack (see RFC 5746 Sect. 1).
+ * (See \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation for the
+ * configuration of this extension).
+ *
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
+ *
+ * Enable support for RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension in SSL.
+ *
+ * Comment this macro to disable support for the max_fragment_length extension
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT
+ *
+ * Enable support for RFC 8449 record_size_limit extension in SSL (TLS 1.3 only).
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+ *
+ * Uncomment this macro to enable support for the record_size_limit extension
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+ *
+ * Enable support for TLS 1.2 (and DTLS 1.2 if DTLS is enabled).
+ *
+ * Requires: Without MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO: MBEDTLS_MD_C and
+ * (MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA384_C or
+ * SHA-256 or SHA-512 provided by a PSA driver)
+ * With MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO:
+ * PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 or PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384
+ *
+ * \warning If building with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, or if the hash(es) used
+ * are only provided by PSA drivers, you must call psa_crypto_init() before
+ * doing any TLS operations.
+ *
+ * Comment this macro to disable support for TLS 1.2 / DTLS 1.2
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+ *
+ * Enable support for TLS 1.3.
+ *
+ * \note See docs/architecture/tls13-support.md for a description of the TLS
+ * 1.3 support that this option enables.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
+ *
+ * \note TLS 1.3 uses PSA crypto for cryptographic operations that are
+ * directly performed by TLS 1.3 code. As a consequence, when TLS 1.3
+ * is enabled, a TLS handshake may call psa_crypto_init(), even
+ * if it ends up negotiating a different TLS version.
+ *
+ * \note Cryptographic operations performed indirectly via another module
+ * (X.509, PK) or by code shared with TLS 1.2 (record protection,
+ * running handshake hash) only use PSA crypto if
+ * #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled.
+ *
+ * \note In multithreaded applications, you must also enable
+ * #MBEDTLS_THREADING_C, even if individual TLS contexts are not
+ * shared between threads, unless only one thread ever calls
+ * TLS functions.
+ *
+ * Uncomment this macro to enable the support for TLS 1.3.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+ *
+ * Enable TLS 1.3 middlebox compatibility mode.
+ *
+ * As specified in Section D.4 of RFC 8446, TLS 1.3 offers a compatibility
+ * mode to make a TLS 1.3 connection more likely to pass through middle boxes
+ * expecting TLS 1.2 traffic.
+ *
+ * Turning on the compatibility mode comes at the cost of a few added bytes
+ * on the wire, but it doesn't affect compatibility with TLS 1.3 implementations
+ * that don't use it. Therefore, unless transmission bandwidth is critical and
+ * you know that middlebox compatibility issues won't occur, it is therefore
+ * recommended to set this option.
+ *
+ * Comment to disable compatibility mode for TLS 1.3. If
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is not enabled, this option does not have any
+ * effect on the build.
+ *
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED
+ *
+ * Enable TLS 1.3 PSK key exchange mode.
+ *
+ * Comment to disable support for the PSK key exchange mode in TLS 1.3. If
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is not enabled, this option does not have any
+ * effect on the build.
+ *
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+ *
+ * Enable TLS 1.3 ephemeral key exchange mode.
+ *
+ * Requires: PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH or PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH
+ * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+ * and at least one of:
+ * MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C or (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA)
+ * MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
+ *
+ * Comment to disable support for the ephemeral key exchange mode in TLS 1.3.
+ * If MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is not enabled, this option does not have any
+ * effect on the build.
+ *
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+ *
+ * Enable TLS 1.3 PSK ephemeral key exchange mode.
+ *
+ * Requires: PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH or PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH
+ *
+ * Comment to disable support for the PSK ephemeral key exchange mode in
+ * TLS 1.3. If MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 is not enabled, this option does not
+ * have any effect on the build.
+ *
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA
+ *
+ * Enable support for RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 early data.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS and either
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED or
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+ *
+ * Comment this to disable support for early data. If MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
+ * is not enabled, this option does not have any effect on the build.
+ *
+ * \note The maximum amount of early data can be set with
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE.
+ *
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
+ *
+ * Enable support for DTLS (all available versions).
+ *
+ * Enable this and MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 to enable DTLS 1.2.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2
+ *
+ * Comment this macro to disable support for DTLS
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN
+ *
+ * Enable support for RFC 7301 Application Layer Protocol Negotiation.
+ *
+ * Comment this macro to disable support for ALPN.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY
+ *
+ * Enable support for the anti-replay mechanism in DTLS.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
+ *
+ * \warning Disabling this is often a security risk!
+ * See mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay() for details.
+ *
+ * Comment this to disable anti-replay in DTLS.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY
+ *
+ * Enable support for HelloVerifyRequest on DTLS servers.
+ *
+ * This feature is highly recommended to prevent DTLS servers being used as
+ * amplifiers in DoS attacks against other hosts. It should always be enabled
+ * unless you know for sure amplification cannot be a problem in the
+ * environment in which your server operates.
+ *
+ * \warning Disabling this can be a security risk! (see above)
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
+ *
+ * Comment this to disable support for HelloVerifyRequest.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP
+ *
+ * Enable support for negotiation of DTLS-SRTP (RFC 5764)
+ * through the use_srtp extension.
+ *
+ * \note This feature provides the minimum functionality required
+ * to negotiate the use of DTLS-SRTP and to allow the derivation of
+ * the associated SRTP packet protection key material.
+ * In particular, the SRTP packet protection itself, as well as the
+ * demultiplexing of RTP and DTLS packets at the datagram layer
+ * (see Section 5 of RFC 5764), are not handled by this feature.
+ * Instead, after successful completion of a handshake negotiating
+ * the use of DTLS-SRTP, the extended key exporter API
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_cb() should be used to implement
+ * the key exporter described in Section 4.2 of RFC 5764 and RFC 5705
+ * (this is implemented in the SSL example programs).
+ * The resulting key should then be passed to an SRTP stack.
+ *
+ * Setting this option enables the runtime API
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles()
+ * through which the supported DTLS-SRTP protection
+ * profiles can be configured. You must call this API at
+ * runtime if you wish to negotiate the use of DTLS-SRTP.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS
+ *
+ * Uncomment this to enable support for use_srtp extension.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE
+ *
+ * Enable server-side support for clients that reconnect from the same port.
+ *
+ * Some clients unexpectedly close the connection and try to reconnect using the
+ * same source port. This needs special support from the server to handle the
+ * new connection securely, as described in section 4.2.8 of RFC 6347. This
+ * flag enables that support.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY
+ *
+ * Comment this to disable support for clients reusing the source port.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CLIENT_PORT_REUSE
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
+ *
+ * Enable support for RFC 5077 session tickets in SSL.
+ * Client-side, provides full support for session tickets (maintenance of a
+ * session store remains the responsibility of the application, though).
+ * Server-side, you also need to provide callbacks for writing and parsing
+ * tickets, including authenticated encryption and key management. Example
+ * callbacks are provided by MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C.
+ *
+ * Comment this macro to disable support for SSL session tickets
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION
+ *
+ * Enable support for RFC 6066 server name indication (SNI) in SSL.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+ *
+ * Comment this macro to disable support for server name indication in SSL
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH
+ *
+ * When this option is enabled, the SSL buffer will be resized automatically
+ * based on the negotiated maximum fragment length in each direction.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN
+ *
+ * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with
+ * clang's MemorySanitizer. This causes some existing tests to also test
+ * this non-functional property of the code under test.
+ *
+ * This setting requires compiling with clang -fsanitize=memory. The test
+ * suites can then be run normally.
+ *
+ * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered
+ * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time.
+ *
+ * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND
+ *
+ * Enable testing of the constant-flow nature of some sensitive functions with
+ * valgrind's memcheck tool. This causes some existing tests to also test
+ * this non-functional property of the code under test.
+ *
+ * This setting requires valgrind headers for building, and is only useful for
+ * testing if the tests suites are run with valgrind's memcheck. This can be
+ * done for an individual test suite with 'valgrind ./test_suite_xxx', or when
+ * using CMake, this can be done for all test suites with 'make memcheck'.
+ *
+ * \warning This macro is only used for extended testing; it is not considered
+ * part of the library's API, so it may change or disappear at any time.
+ *
+ * Uncomment to enable testing of the constant-flow nature of selected code.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS
+ *
+ * Enable features for invasive testing such as introspection functions and
+ * hooks for fault injection. This enables additional unit tests.
+ *
+ * Merely enabling this feature should not change the behavior of the product.
+ * It only adds new code, and new branching points where the default behavior
+ * is the same as when this feature is disabled.
+ * However, this feature increases the attack surface: there is an added
+ * risk of vulnerabilities, and more gadgets that can make exploits easier.
+ * Therefore this feature must never be enabled in production.
+ *
+ * See `docs/architecture/testing/mbed-crypto-invasive-testing.md` for more
+ * information.
+ *
+ * Uncomment to enable invasive tests.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT
+ *
+ * Provide your own alternate threading implementation.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
+ *
+ * Uncomment this to allow your own alternate threading implementation.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+ *
+ * Enable the pthread wrapper layer for the threading layer.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
+ *
+ * Uncomment this to enable pthread mutexes.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+ *
+ * Make the X.509 and TLS libraries use PSA for cryptographic operations as
+ * much as possible, and enable new APIs for using keys handled by PSA Crypto.
+ *
+ * \note Development of this option is currently in progress, and parts of Mbed
+ * TLS's X.509 and TLS modules are not ported to PSA yet. However, these parts
+ * will still continue to work as usual, so enabling this option should not
+ * break backwards compatibility.
+ *
+ * \warning If you enable this option, you need to call `psa_crypto_init()`
+ * before calling any function from the SSL/TLS, X.509 or PK modules, except
+ * for the various mbedtls_xxx_init() functions which can be called at any time.
+ *
+ * \warning In multithreaded applications, you must also enable
+ * #MBEDTLS_THREADING_C, unless only one thread ever calls PSA functions
+ * (`psa_xxx()`), including indirect calls through SSL/TLS, X.509 or PK.
+ *
+ * \note An important and desirable effect of this option is that it allows
+ * PK, X.509 and TLS to take advantage of PSA drivers. For example, enabling
+ * this option is what allows use of drivers for ECDSA, ECDH and EC J-PAKE in
+ * those modules. However, note that even with this option disabled, some code
+ * in PK, X.509, TLS or the crypto library might still use PSA drivers, if it
+ * can determine it's safe to do so; currently that's the case for hashes.
+ *
+ * \note See docs/use-psa-crypto.md for a complete description this option.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C.
+ *
+ * Uncomment this to enable internal use of PSA Crypto and new associated APIs.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG
+ *
+ * This setting allows support for cryptographic mechanisms through the PSA
+ * API to be configured separately from support through the mbedtls API.
+ *
+ * When this option is disabled, the PSA API exposes the cryptographic
+ * mechanisms that can be implemented on top of the `mbedtls_xxx` API
+ * configured with `MBEDTLS_XXX` symbols.
+ *
+ * When this option is enabled, the PSA API exposes the cryptographic
+ * mechanisms requested by the `PSA_WANT_XXX` symbols defined in
+ * include/psa/crypto_config.h. The corresponding `MBEDTLS_XXX` settings are
+ * automatically enabled if required (i.e. if no PSA driver provides the
+ * mechanism). You may still freely enable additional `MBEDTLS_XXX` symbols
+ * in mbedtls_config.h.
+ *
+ * If the symbol #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE is defined, it specifies
+ * an alternative header to include instead of include/psa/crypto_config.h.
+ *
+ * \warning This option is experimental, in that the set of `PSA_WANT_XXX`
+ * symbols is not completely finalized yet, and the configuration
+ * tooling is not ideally adapted to having two separate configuration
+ * files.
+ * Future minor releases of Mbed TLS may make minor changes to those
+ * symbols, but we will endeavor to provide a transition path.
+ * Nonetheless, this option is considered mature enough to use in
+ * production, as long as you accept that you may need to make
+ * minor changes to psa/crypto_config.h when upgrading Mbed TLS.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES
+ *
+ * Allow run-time checking of compile-time enabled features. Thus allowing users
+ * to check at run-time if the library is for instance compiled with threading
+ * support via mbedtls_version_check_feature().
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
+ *
+ * Comment this to disable run-time checking and save ROM space
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_FEATURES
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
+ *
+ * If set, this enables the X.509 API `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()`
+ * and the SSL API `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` which allow users to configure
+ * the set of trusted certificates through a callback instead of a linked
+ * list.
+ *
+ * This is useful for example in environments where a large number of trusted
+ * certificates is present and storing them in a linked list isn't efficient
+ * enough, or when the set of trusted certificates changes frequently.
+ *
+ * See the documentation of `mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()` and
+ * `mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb()` for more information.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+ *
+ * Uncomment to enable trusted certificate callbacks.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
+ *
+ * Disable mbedtls_x509_*_info() and related APIs.
+ *
+ * Uncomment to omit mbedtls_x509_*_info(), as well as mbedtls_debug_print_crt()
+ * and other functions/constants only used by these functions, thus reducing
+ * the code footprint by several KB.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT
+ *
+ * Enable parsing and verification of X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRS
+ * signed with RSASSA-PSS (aka PKCS#1 v2.1).
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21
+ *
+ * Comment this macro to disallow using RSASSA-PSS in certificates.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT
+/** \} name SECTION: Mbed TLS feature support */
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: Mbed TLS modules
+ *
+ * This section enables or disables entire modules in Mbed TLS
+ * \{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_AESNI_C
+ *
+ * Enable AES-NI support on x86-64 or x86-32.
+ *
+ * \note AESNI is only supported with certain compilers and target options:
+ * - Visual Studio: supported
+ * - GCC, x86-64, target not explicitly supporting AESNI:
+ * requires MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM.
+ * - GCC, x86-32, target not explicitly supporting AESNI:
+ * not supported.
+ * - GCC, x86-64 or x86-32, target supporting AESNI: supported.
+ * For this assembly-less implementation, you must currently compile
+ * `library/aesni.c` and `library/aes.c` with machine options to enable
+ * SSE2 and AESNI instructions: `gcc -msse2 -maes -mpclmul` or
+ * `clang -maes -mpclmul`.
+ * - Non-x86 targets: this option is silently ignored.
+ * - Other compilers: this option is silently ignored.
+ *
+ * \note
+ * Above, "GCC" includes compatible compilers such as Clang.
+ * The limitations on target support are likely to be relaxed in the future.
+ *
+ * Module: library/aesni.c
+ * Caller: library/aes.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM (on some platforms, see note)
+ *
+ * This modules adds support for the AES-NI instructions on x86.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_AESCE_C
+ *
+ * Enable AES cryptographic extension support on Armv8.
+ *
+ * Module: library/aesce.c
+ * Caller: library/aes.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C
+ *
+ * \warning Runtime detection only works on Linux. For non-Linux operating
+ * system, Armv8-A Cryptographic Extensions must be supported by
+ * the CPU when this option is enabled.
+ *
+ * \note Minimum compiler versions for this feature when targeting aarch64
+ * are Clang 4.0; armclang 6.6; GCC 6.0; or MSVC 2019 version 16.11.2.
+ * Minimum compiler versions for this feature when targeting 32-bit
+ * Arm or Thumb are Clang 11.0; armclang 6.20; or GCC 6.0.
+ *
+ * \note \c CFLAGS must be set to a minimum of \c -march=armv8-a+crypto for
+ * armclang <= 6.9
+ *
+ * This module adds support for the AES Armv8-A Cryptographic Extensions on Armv8 systems.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_AES_C
+ *
+ * Enable the AES block cipher.
+ *
+ * Module: library/aes.c
+ * Caller: library/cipher.c
+ * library/pem.c
+ * library/ctr_drbg.c
+ *
+ * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
+ * enabled as well):
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ *
+ * PEM_PARSE uses AES for decrypting encrypted keys.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_AES_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C
+ *
+ * Enable the generic ASN1 parser.
+ *
+ * Module: library/asn1.c
+ * Caller: library/x509.c
+ * library/dhm.c
+ * library/pkcs12.c
+ * library/pkcs5.c
+ * library/pkparse.c
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C
+ *
+ * Enable the generic ASN1 writer.
+ *
+ * Module: library/asn1write.c
+ * Caller: library/ecdsa.c
+ * library/pkwrite.c
+ * library/x509_create.c
+ * library/x509write_crt.c
+ * library/x509write_csr.c
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_BASE64_C
+ *
+ * Enable the Base64 module.
+ *
+ * Module: library/base64.c
+ * Caller: library/pem.c
+ *
+ * This module is required for PEM support (required by X.509).
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT
+ *
+ * Remove decryption operation for AES, ARIA and Camellia block cipher.
+ *
+ * \note This feature is incompatible with insecure block cipher,
+ * MBEDTLS_DES_C, and cipher modes which always require decryption
+ * operation, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS and
+ * MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C. When #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled,
+ * this feature is incompatible with following supported PSA equivalence,
+ * PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING, PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING,
+ * PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 and PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES.
+ *
+ * Module: library/aes.c
+ * library/aesce.c
+ * library/aesni.c
+ * library/aria.c
+ * library/camellia.c
+ * library/cipher.c
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
+ *
+ * Enable the multi-precision integer library.
+ *
+ * Module: library/bignum.c
+ * library/bignum_core.c
+ * library/bignum_mod.c
+ * library/bignum_mod_raw.c
+ * Caller: library/dhm.c
+ * library/ecp.c
+ * library/ecdsa.c
+ * library/rsa.c
+ * library/rsa_alt_helpers.c
+ * library/ssl_tls.c
+ *
+ * This module is required for RSA, DHM and ECC (ECDH, ECDSA) support.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
+ *
+ * Enable the Camellia block cipher.
+ *
+ * Module: library/camellia.c
+ * Caller: library/cipher.c
+ *
+ * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
+ * enabled as well):
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ARIA_C
+ *
+ * Enable the ARIA block cipher.
+ *
+ * Module: library/aria.c
+ * Caller: library/cipher.c
+ *
+ * This module enables the following ciphersuites (if other requisites are
+ * enabled as well):
+ *
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ARIA_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+ *
+ * Enable the Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode for 128-bit block cipher.
+ *
+ * Module: library/ccm.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C or
+ * MBEDTLS_ARIA_C
+ *
+ * This module enables the AES-CCM ciphersuites, if other requisites are
+ * enabled as well.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CCM_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C
+ *
+ * Enable the ChaCha20 stream cipher.
+ *
+ * Module: library/chacha20.c
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C
+ *
+ * Enable the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm.
+ *
+ * Module: library/chachapoly.c
+ *
+ * This module requires: MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C, MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
+ *
+ * Enable the generic cipher layer.
+ *
+ * Module: library/cipher.c
+ * Caller: library/ccm.c
+ * library/cmac.c
+ * library/gcm.c
+ * library/nist_kw.c
+ * library/pkcs12.c
+ * library/pkcs5.c
+ * library/psa_crypto_aead.c
+ * library/psa_crypto_mac.c
+ * library/ssl_ciphersuites.c
+ * library/ssl_msg.c
+ * library/ssl_ticket.c (unless MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled)
+ * Auto-enabled by: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C depending on which ciphers are enabled
+ * (see the documentation of that option for details).
+ *
+ * Uncomment to enable generic cipher wrappers.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CMAC_C
+ *
+ * Enable the CMAC (Cipher-based Message Authentication Code) mode for block
+ * ciphers.
+ *
+ * \note When #MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT is active, meaning that the underlying
+ * implementation of the CMAC algorithm is provided by an alternate
+ * implementation, that alternate implementation may opt to not support
+ * AES-192 or 3DES as underlying block ciphers for the CMAC operation.
+ *
+ * Module: library/cmac.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_DES_C
+ *
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CMAC_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C
+ *
+ * Enable the CTR_DRBG AES-based random generator.
+ * The CTR_DRBG generator uses AES-256 by default.
+ * To use AES-128 instead, enable \c MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY above.
+ *
+ * AES support can either be achieved through builtin (MBEDTLS_AES_C) or PSA.
+ * Builtin is the default option when MBEDTLS_AES_C is defined otherwise PSA
+ * is used.
+ *
+ * \warning When using PSA, the user should call `psa_crypto_init()` before
+ * using any CTR_DRBG operation (except `mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init()`).
+ *
+ * \note AES-128 will be used if \c MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH is set.
+ *
+ * \note To achieve a 256-bit security strength with CTR_DRBG,
+ * you must use AES-256 *and* use sufficient entropy.
+ * See ctr_drbg.h for more details.
+ *
+ * Module: library/ctr_drbg.c
+ * Caller:
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C or
+ * (PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES and PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING and
+ * MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+ *
+ * This module provides the CTR_DRBG AES random number generator.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+ *
+ * Enable the debug functions.
+ *
+ * Module: library/debug.c
+ * Caller: library/ssl_msg.c
+ * library/ssl_tls.c
+ * library/ssl_tls12_*.c
+ * library/ssl_tls13_*.c
+ *
+ * This module provides debugging functions.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_DES_C
+ *
+ * Enable the DES block cipher.
+ *
+ * Module: library/des.c
+ * Caller: library/pem.c
+ * library/cipher.c
+ *
+ * PEM_PARSE uses DES/3DES for decrypting encrypted keys.
+ *
+ * \warning DES/3DES are considered weak ciphers and their use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger ciphers instead.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_DES_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_DHM_C
+ *
+ * Enable the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle module.
+ *
+ * Module: library/dhm.c
+ * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c
+ * library/ssl*_client.c
+ * library/ssl*_server.c
+ *
+ * This module is used by the following key exchanges:
+ * DHE-RSA, DHE-PSK
+ *
+ * \warning Using DHE constitutes a security risk as it
+ * is not possible to validate custom DH parameters.
+ * If possible, it is recommended users should consider
+ * preferring other methods of key exchange.
+ * See dhm.h for more details.
+ *
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
+ *
+ * Enable the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman library.
+ *
+ * Module: library/ecdh.c
+ * Caller: library/psa_crypto.c
+ * library/ssl_tls.c
+ * library/ssl*_client.c
+ * library/ssl*_server.c
+ *
+ * This module is used by the following key exchanges:
+ * ECDHE-ECDSA, ECDHE-RSA, DHE-PSK
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECDH_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+ *
+ * Enable the elliptic curve DSA library.
+ *
+ * Module: library/ecdsa.c
+ * Caller:
+ *
+ * This module is used by the following key exchanges:
+ * ECDHE-ECDSA
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C,
+ * and at least one MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX_ENABLED for a
+ * short Weierstrass curve.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C
+ *
+ * Enable the elliptic curve J-PAKE library.
+ *
+ * \note EC J-PAKE support is based on the Thread v1.0.0 specification.
+ * It has not been reviewed for compliance with newer standards such as
+ * Thread v1.1 or RFC 8236.
+ *
+ * Module: library/ecjpake.c
+ * Caller:
+ *
+ * This module is used by the following key exchanges:
+ * ECJPAKE
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ECP_C and either MBEDTLS_MD_C or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
+ *
+ * \warning If using a hash that is only provided by PSA drivers, you must
+ * call psa_crypto_init() before doing any EC J-PAKE operations.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ECP_C
+ *
+ * Enable the elliptic curve over GF(p) library.
+ *
+ * Module: library/ecp.c
+ * Caller: library/ecdh.c
+ * library/ecdsa.c
+ * library/ecjpake.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C and at least one MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_XXX_ENABLED
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C
+ *
+ * Enable the platform-specific entropy code.
+ *
+ * Module: library/entropy.c
+ * Caller:
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C or MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+ *
+ * This module provides a generic entropy pool
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
+ *
+ * Enable error code to error string conversion.
+ *
+ * Module: library/error.c
+ * Caller:
+ *
+ * This module enables mbedtls_strerror().
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERROR_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_GCM_C
+ *
+ * Enable the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM).
+ *
+ * Module: library/gcm.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_AES_C or MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C or
+ * MBEDTLS_ARIA_C
+ *
+ * This module enables the AES-GCM and CAMELLIA-GCM ciphersuites, if other
+ * requisites are enabled as well.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GCM_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE
+ *
+ * Enable large pre-computed tables for Galois/Counter Mode (GCM).
+ * Can significantly increase throughput on systems without GCM hardware
+ * acceleration (e.g., AESNI, AESCE).
+ *
+ * The mbedtls_gcm_context size will increase by 3840 bytes.
+ * The code size will increase by roughly 344 bytes.
+ *
+ * Module: library/gcm.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_GCM_C
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_HKDF_C
+ *
+ * Enable the HKDF algorithm (RFC 5869).
+ *
+ * Module: library/hkdf.c
+ * Caller:
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C
+ *
+ * This module adds support for the Hashed Message Authentication Code
+ * (HMAC)-based key derivation function (HKDF).
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_HKDF_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
+ *
+ * Enable the HMAC_DRBG random generator.
+ *
+ * Module: library/hmac_drbg.c
+ * Caller:
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C
+ *
+ * Uncomment to enable the HMAC_DRBG random number generator.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_LMS_C
+ *
+ * Enable the LMS stateful-hash asymmetric signature algorithm.
+ *
+ * Module: library/lms.c
+ * Caller:
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
+ *
+ * Uncomment to enable the LMS verification algorithm and public key operations.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_LMS_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE
+ *
+ * Enable LMS private-key operations and signing code. Functions enabled by this
+ * option are experimental, and should not be used in production.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_LMS_C
+ *
+ * Uncomment to enable the LMS signature algorithm and private key operations.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C
+ *
+ * Enable the Key Wrapping mode for 128-bit block ciphers,
+ * as defined in NIST SP 800-38F. Only KW and KWP modes
+ * are supported. At the moment, only AES is approved by NIST.
+ *
+ * Module: library/nist_kw.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_AES_C and MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_MD_C
+ *
+ * Enable the generic layer for message digest (hashing) and HMAC.
+ *
+ * Requires: one of: MBEDTLS_MD5_C, MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C, MBEDTLS_SHA1_C,
+ * MBEDTLS_SHA224_C, MBEDTLS_SHA256_C, MBEDTLS_SHA384_C,
+ * MBEDTLS_SHA512_C, or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C with at least
+ * one hash.
+ * Module: library/md.c
+ * Caller: library/constant_time.c
+ * library/ecdsa.c
+ * library/ecjpake.c
+ * library/hkdf.c
+ * library/hmac_drbg.c
+ * library/pk.c
+ * library/pkcs5.c
+ * library/pkcs12.c
+ * library/psa_crypto_ecp.c
+ * library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
+ * library/rsa.c
+ * library/ssl_cookie.c
+ * library/ssl_msg.c
+ * library/ssl_tls.c
+ * library/x509.c
+ * library/x509_crt.c
+ * library/x509write_crt.c
+ * library/x509write_csr.c
+ *
+ * Uncomment to enable generic message digest wrappers.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_MD5_C
+ *
+ * Enable the MD5 hash algorithm.
+ *
+ * Module: library/md5.c
+ * Caller: library/md.c
+ * library/pem.c
+ * library/ssl_tls.c
+ *
+ * This module is required for TLS 1.2 depending on the handshake parameters.
+ * Further, it is used for checking MD5-signed certificates, and for PBKDF1
+ * when decrypting PEM-encoded encrypted keys.
+ *
+ * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a
+ * security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies on
+ * it, and considering stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_MD5_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C
+ *
+ * Enable the buffer allocator implementation that makes use of a (stack)
+ * based buffer to 'allocate' dynamic memory. (replaces calloc() and free()
+ * calls)
+ *
+ * Module: library/memory_buffer_alloc.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C
+ * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY (to use it within Mbed TLS)
+ *
+ * Enable this module to enable the buffer memory allocator.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_NET_C
+ *
+ * Enable the TCP and UDP over IPv6/IPv4 networking routines.
+ *
+ * \note This module only works on POSIX/Unix (including Linux, BSD and OS X)
+ * and Windows. For other platforms, you'll want to disable it, and write your
+ * own networking callbacks to be passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio().
+ *
+ * \note See also our Knowledge Base article about porting to a new
+ * environment:
+ * https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS
+ *
+ * Module: library/net_sockets.c
+ *
+ * This module provides networking routines.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_NET_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_OID_C
+ *
+ * Enable the OID database.
+ *
+ * Module: library/oid.c
+ * Caller: library/asn1write.c
+ * library/pkcs5.c
+ * library/pkparse.c
+ * library/pkwrite.c
+ * library/rsa.c
+ * library/x509.c
+ * library/x509_create.c
+ * library/x509_crl.c
+ * library/x509_crt.c
+ * library/x509_csr.c
+ * library/x509write_crt.c
+ * library/x509write_csr.c
+ *
+ * This modules translates between OIDs and internal values.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
+ *
+ * Enable VIA Padlock support on x86.
+ *
+ * Module: library/padlock.c
+ * Caller: library/aes.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM
+ *
+ * This modules adds support for the VIA PadLock on x86.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C
+ *
+ * Enable PEM decoding / parsing.
+ *
+ * Module: library/pem.c
+ * Caller: library/dhm.c
+ * library/pkparse.c
+ * library/x509_crl.c
+ * library/x509_crt.c
+ * library/x509_csr.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C
+ * optionally MBEDTLS_MD5_C, or PSA Crypto with MD5 (see below)
+ *
+ * \warning When parsing password-protected files, if MD5 is provided only by
+ * a PSA driver, you must call psa_crypto_init() before the first file.
+ *
+ * This modules adds support for decoding / parsing PEM files.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C
+ *
+ * Enable PEM encoding / writing.
+ *
+ * Module: library/pem.c
+ * Caller: library/pkwrite.c
+ * library/x509write_crt.c
+ * library/x509write_csr.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_BASE64_C
+ *
+ * This modules adds support for encoding / writing PEM files.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PK_C
+ *
+ * Enable the generic public (asymmetric) key layer.
+ *
+ * Module: library/pk.c
+ * Caller: library/psa_crypto_rsa.c
+ * library/ssl_tls.c
+ * library/ssl*_client.c
+ * library/ssl*_server.c
+ * library/x509.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_MD_C, MBEDTLS_RSA_C or MBEDTLS_ECP_C
+ *
+ * Uncomment to enable generic public key wrappers.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
+ *
+ * Enable the generic public (asymmetric) key parser.
+ *
+ * Module: library/pkparse.c
+ * Caller: library/x509_crt.c
+ * library/x509_csr.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_C
+ *
+ * Uncomment to enable generic public key parse functions.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
+ *
+ * Enable the generic public (asymmetric) key writer.
+ *
+ * Module: library/pkwrite.c
+ * Caller: library/x509write.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_C
+ *
+ * Uncomment to enable generic public key write functions.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C
+ *
+ * Enable PKCS#5 functions.
+ *
+ * Module: library/pkcs5.c
+ *
+ * Auto-enables: MBEDTLS_MD_C
+ *
+ * \warning If using a hash that is only provided by PSA drivers, you must
+ * call psa_crypto_init() before doing any PKCS5 operations.
+ *
+ * This module adds support for the PKCS#5 functions.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C
+ *
+ * Enable PKCS #7 core for using PKCS #7-formatted signatures.
+ * RFC Link - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315
+ *
+ * Module: library/pkcs7.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C,
+ * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C,
+ * MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C
+ *
+ * This module is required for the PKCS #7 parsing modules.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C
+ *
+ * Enable PKCS#12 PBE functions.
+ * Adds algorithms for parsing PKCS#8 encrypted private keys
+ *
+ * Module: library/pkcs12.c
+ * Caller: library/pkparse.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C and either MBEDTLS_MD_C or
+ * MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C.
+ *
+ * \warning If using a hash that is only provided by PSA drivers, you must
+ * call psa_crypto_init() before doing any PKCS12 operations.
+ *
+ * This module enables PKCS#12 functions.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C
+ *
+ * Enable the platform abstraction layer that allows you to re-assign
+ * functions like calloc(), free(), snprintf(), printf(), fprintf(), exit().
+ *
+ * Enabling MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C enables to use of MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT
+ * or MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO directives, allowing the functions mentioned
+ * above to be specified at runtime or compile time respectively.
+ *
+ * \note This abstraction layer must be enabled on Windows (including MSYS2)
+ * as other modules rely on it for a fixed snprintf implementation.
+ *
+ * Module: library/platform.c
+ * Caller: Most other .c files
+ *
+ * This module enables abstraction of common (libc) functions.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C
+ *
+ * Enable the Poly1305 MAC algorithm.
+ *
+ * Module: library/poly1305.c
+ * Caller: library/chachapoly.c
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
+ *
+ * Enable the Platform Security Architecture (PSA) cryptography API.
+ *
+ * \note In multithreaded applications, you must enable #MBEDTLS_THREADING_C,
+ * unless only one thread ever calls `psa_xxx()` functions.
+ * That includes indirect calls, such as:
+ * - performing a TLS handshake if support for TLS 1.3 is enabled;
+ * - using a TLS 1.3 connection;
+ * - indirect calls from PK, X.509 or SSL functions when
+ * #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled;
+ * - indirect calls to calculate a hash when #MBEDTLS_MD_C is disabled;
+ * - any other call to a function that requires calling psa_crypto_init()
+ * beforehand.
+ *
+ * Module: library/psa_crypto.c
+ *
+ * Requires: either MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C,
+ * or MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C and MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C,
+ * or MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG.
+ * Auto-enables: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C if any unauthenticated (ie, non-AEAD) cipher
+ * is enabled in PSA (unless it's fully accelerated, see
+ * docs/driver-only-builds.md about that).
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C
+ *
+ * Enable dynamic secure element support in the Platform Security Architecture
+ * cryptography API.
+ *
+ * \deprecated This feature is deprecated. Please switch to the PSA driver
+ * interface.
+ *
+ * \warning This feature is not thread-safe, and should not be used in a
+ * multi-threaded environment.
+ *
+ * Module: library/psa_crypto_se.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
+ *
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
+ *
+ * Enable the Platform Security Architecture persistent key storage.
+ *
+ * Module: library/psa_crypto_storage.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C,
+ * either MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C or a native implementation of
+ * the PSA ITS interface
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C
+ *
+ * Enable the emulation of the Platform Security Architecture
+ * Internal Trusted Storage (PSA ITS) over files.
+ *
+ * Module: library/psa_its_file.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_FS_IO
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_STATIC_KEY_SLOTS
+ *
+ * Statically preallocate memory to store keys' material in PSA instead
+ * of allocating it dynamically when required. This allows builds without a
+ * heap, if none of the enabled cryptographic implementations or other features
+ * require it.
+ * This feature affects both volatile and persistent keys which means that
+ * it's not possible to persistently store a key which is larger than
+ * #MBEDTLS_PSA_STATIC_KEY_SLOT_BUFFER_SIZE.
+ *
+ * \note This feature comes with a (potentially) higher RAM usage since:
+ * - All the key slots are allocated no matter if they are used or not.
+ * - Each key buffer's length is #MBEDTLS_PSA_STATIC_KEY_SLOT_BUFFER_SIZE bytes.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C
+ *
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_STATIC_KEY_SLOTS
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
+ *
+ * Enable the RIPEMD-160 hash algorithm.
+ *
+ * Module: library/ripemd160.c
+ * Caller: library/md.c
+ *
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+ *
+ * Enable the RSA public-key cryptosystem.
+ *
+ * Module: library/rsa.c
+ * library/rsa_alt_helpers.c
+ * Caller: library/pk.c
+ * library/psa_crypto.c
+ * library/ssl_tls.c
+ * library/ssl*_client.c
+ * library/ssl*_server.c
+ *
+ * This module is used by the following key exchanges:
+ * RSA, DHE-RSA, ECDHE-RSA, RSA-PSK
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_RSA_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
+ *
+ * Enable the SHA1 cryptographic hash algorithm.
+ *
+ * Module: library/sha1.c
+ * Caller: library/md.c
+ * library/psa_crypto_hash.c
+ *
+ * This module is required for TLS 1.2 depending on the handshake parameters,
+ * and for SHA1-signed certificates.
+ *
+ * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes
+ * a security risk. If possible, we recommend avoiding dependencies
+ * on it, and considering stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SHA224_C
+ *
+ * Enable the SHA-224 cryptographic hash algorithm.
+ *
+ * Module: library/sha256.c
+ * Caller: library/md.c
+ * library/ssl_cookie.c
+ *
+ * This module adds support for SHA-224.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA224_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+ *
+ * Enable the SHA-256 cryptographic hash algorithm.
+ *
+ * Module: library/sha256.c
+ * Caller: library/entropy.c
+ * library/md.c
+ * library/ssl_tls.c
+ * library/ssl*_client.c
+ * library/ssl*_server.c
+ *
+ * This module adds support for SHA-256.
+ * This module is required for the SSL/TLS 1.2 PRF function.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
+ *
+ * Enable acceleration of the SHA-256 and SHA-224 cryptographic hash algorithms
+ * with the ARMv8 cryptographic extensions if they are available at runtime.
+ * If not, the library will fall back to the C implementation.
+ *
+ * \note If MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT is defined when building
+ * for a non-Armv8-A build it will be silently ignored.
+ *
+ * \note Minimum compiler versions for this feature are Clang 4.0,
+ * armclang 6.6 or GCC 6.0.
+ *
+ * \note \c CFLAGS must be set to a minimum of \c -march=armv8-a+crypto for
+ * armclang <= 6.9
+ *
+ * \note This was previously known as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT.
+ * That name is deprecated, but may still be used as an alternative form for this
+ * option.
+ *
+ * \warning MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT cannot be defined at the
+ * same time as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA256_C.
+ *
+ * Module: library/sha256.c
+ *
+ * Uncomment to have the library check for the Armv8-A SHA-256 crypto extensions
+ * and use them if available.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
+ *
+ * \deprecated This is now known as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT.
+ * This name is now deprecated, but may still be used as an alternative form for
+ * this option.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY
+ *
+ * Enable acceleration of the SHA-256 and SHA-224 cryptographic hash algorithms
+ * with the ARMv8 cryptographic extensions, which must be available at runtime
+ * or else an illegal instruction fault will occur.
+ *
+ * \note This allows builds with a smaller code size than with
+ * MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
+ *
+ * \note Minimum compiler versions for this feature are Clang 4.0,
+ * armclang 6.6 or GCC 6.0.
+ *
+ * \note \c CFLAGS must be set to a minimum of \c -march=armv8-a+crypto for
+ * armclang <= 6.9
+ *
+ * \note This was previously known as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY.
+ * That name is deprecated, but may still be used as an alternative form for this
+ * option.
+ *
+ * \warning MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY cannot be defined at the same
+ * time as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA256_C.
+ *
+ * Module: library/sha256.c
+ *
+ * Uncomment to have the library use the Armv8-A SHA-256 crypto extensions
+ * unconditionally.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY
+ *
+ * \deprecated This is now known as MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY.
+ * This name is now deprecated, but may still be used as an alternative form for
+ * this option.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SHA384_C
+ *
+ * Enable the SHA-384 cryptographic hash algorithm.
+ *
+ * Module: library/sha512.c
+ * Caller: library/md.c
+ * library/psa_crypto_hash.c
+ * library/ssl_tls.c
+ * library/ssl*_client.c
+ * library/ssl*_server.c
+ *
+ * Comment to disable SHA-384
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA384_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
+ *
+ * Enable SHA-512 cryptographic hash algorithms.
+ *
+ * Module: library/sha512.c
+ * Caller: library/entropy.c
+ * library/md.c
+ * library/ssl_tls.c
+ * library/ssl_cookie.c
+ *
+ * This module adds support for SHA-512.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SHA3_C
+ *
+ * Enable the SHA3 cryptographic hash algorithm.
+ *
+ * Module: library/sha3.c
+ *
+ * This module adds support for SHA3.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
+ *
+ * Enable acceleration of the SHA-512 and SHA-384 cryptographic hash algorithms
+ * with the ARMv8 cryptographic extensions if they are available at runtime.
+ * If not, the library will fall back to the C implementation.
+ *
+ * \note If MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT is defined when building
+ * for a non-Aarch64 build it will be silently ignored.
+ *
+ * \note Minimum compiler versions for this feature are Clang 7.0,
+ * armclang 6.9 or GCC 8.0.
+ *
+ * \note \c CFLAGS must be set to a minimum of \c -march=armv8.2-a+sha3 for
+ * armclang 6.9
+ *
+ * \warning MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT cannot be defined at the
+ * same time as MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C.
+ *
+ * Module: library/sha512.c
+ *
+ * Uncomment to have the library check for the A64 SHA-512 crypto extensions
+ * and use them if available.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY
+ *
+ * Enable acceleration of the SHA-512 and SHA-384 cryptographic hash algorithms
+ * with the ARMv8 cryptographic extensions, which must be available at runtime
+ * or else an illegal instruction fault will occur.
+ *
+ * \note This allows builds with a smaller code size than with
+ * MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT
+ *
+ * \note Minimum compiler versions for this feature are Clang 7.0,
+ * armclang 6.9 or GCC 8.0.
+ *
+ * \note \c CFLAGS must be set to a minimum of \c -march=armv8.2-a+sha3 for
+ * armclang 6.9
+ *
+ * \warning MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY cannot be defined at the same
+ * time as MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT.
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SHA512_C.
+ *
+ * Module: library/sha512.c
+ *
+ * Uncomment to have the library use the A64 SHA-512 crypto extensions
+ * unconditionally.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C
+ *
+ * Enable simple SSL cache implementation.
+ *
+ * Module: library/ssl_cache.c
+ * Caller:
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C
+ *
+ * Enable basic implementation of DTLS cookies for hello verification.
+ *
+ * Module: library/ssl_cookie.c
+ * Caller:
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C
+ *
+ * Enable an implementation of TLS server-side callbacks for session tickets.
+ *
+ * Module: library/ssl_ticket.c
+ * Caller:
+ *
+ * Requires: (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C || MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) &&
+ * (MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+ *
+ * Enable the SSL/TLS client code.
+ *
+ * Module: library/ssl*_client.c
+ * Caller:
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C
+ *
+ * This module is required for SSL/TLS client support.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+ *
+ * Enable the SSL/TLS server code.
+ *
+ * Module: library/ssl*_server.c
+ * Caller:
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C
+ *
+ * This module is required for SSL/TLS server support.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C
+ *
+ * Enable the generic SSL/TLS code.
+ *
+ * Module: library/ssl_tls.c
+ * Caller: library/ssl*_client.c
+ * library/ssl*_server.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C, MBEDTLS_MD_C
+ * and at least one of the MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_XXX defines
+ *
+ * This module is required for SSL/TLS.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
+ *
+ * Enable the threading abstraction layer.
+ *
+ * Traditionally, Mbed TLS assumes it is used in a non-threaded environment or
+ * that contexts are not shared between threads. If you do intend to use contexts
+ * between threads, you will need to enable this layer to prevent race
+ * conditions.
+ *
+ * The PSA subsystem has an implicit shared context. Therefore, you must
+ * enable this option if more than one thread may use any part of
+ * Mbed TLS that is implemented on top of the PSA subsystem.
+ *
+ * You must enable this option in multithreaded applications where more than
+ * one thread performs any of the following operations:
+ *
+ * - Any call to a PSA function (`psa_xxx()`).
+ * - Any call to a TLS, X.509 or PK function (`mbedtls_ssl_xxx()`,
+ * `mbedtls_x509_xxx()`, `mbedtls_pkcs7_xxx()`, `mbedtls_pk_xxx()`)
+ * if `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled (regardless of whether individual
+ * TLS, X.509 or PK contexts are shared between threads).
+ * - A TLS 1.3 connection, regardless of the compile-time configuration.
+ * - Any library feature that calculates a hash, if `MBEDTLS_MD_C` is disabled.
+ * As an exception, algorithm-specific low-level modules do not require
+ * threading protection unless the contexts are shared between threads.
+ * - Any library feature that performs symmetric encryption or decryption,
+ * if `MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C` is disabled.
+ * As an exception, algorithm-specific low-level modules do not require
+ * threading protection unless the contexts are shared between threads.
+ * - Any use of a cryptographic context if the same context is used in
+ * multiple threads.
+ * - Any call to a function where the documentation specifies that
+ * psa_crypto_init() must be called prior to that function.
+ *
+ * See also our Knowledge Base article about threading:
+ * https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/development/thread-safety-and-multi-threading
+ *
+ * Module: library/threading.c
+ *
+ * This allows different threading implementations (self-implemented or
+ * provided).
+ *
+ * You will have to enable either MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT or
+ * MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD.
+ *
+ * Enable this layer to allow use of mutexes within Mbed TLS
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_TIMING_C
+ *
+ * Enable the semi-portable timing interface.
+ *
+ * \note The provided implementation only works on POSIX/Unix (including Linux,
+ * BSD and OS X) and Windows. On other platforms, you can either disable that
+ * module and provide your own implementations of the callbacks needed by
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb() for DTLS, or leave it enabled and provide
+ * your own implementation of the whole module by setting
+ * \c MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT in the current file.
+ *
+ * \note The timing module will include time.h on suitable platforms
+ * regardless of the setting of MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME, unless
+ * MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT is used. See timing.c for more information.
+ *
+ * \note See also our Knowledge Base article about porting to a new
+ * environment:
+ * https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/how-to/how-do-i-port-mbed-tls-to-a-new-environment-OS
+ *
+ * Module: library/timing.c
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
+ *
+ * Enable run-time version information.
+ *
+ * Module: library/version.c
+ *
+ * This module provides run-time version information.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C
+ *
+ * Enable X.509 core for using certificates.
+ *
+ * Module: library/x509.c
+ * Caller: library/x509_crl.c
+ * library/x509_crt.c
+ * library/x509_csr.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C, MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C,
+ * (MBEDTLS_MD_C or MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ *
+ * \warning If building with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, you must call
+ * psa_crypto_init() before doing any X.509 operation.
+ *
+ * This module is required for the X.509 parsing modules.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+ *
+ * Enable X.509 certificate parsing.
+ *
+ * Module: library/x509_crt.c
+ * Caller: library/ssl_tls.c
+ * library/ssl*_client.c
+ * library/ssl*_server.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C
+ *
+ * This module is required for X.509 certificate parsing.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C
+ *
+ * Enable X.509 CRL parsing.
+ *
+ * Module: library/x509_crl.c
+ * Caller: library/x509_crt.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C
+ *
+ * This module is required for X.509 CRL parsing.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C
+ *
+ * Enable X.509 Certificate Signing Request (CSR) parsing.
+ *
+ * Module: library/x509_csr.c
+ * Caller: library/x509_crt_write.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C
+ *
+ * This module is used for reading X.509 certificate request.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C
+ *
+ * Enable X.509 core for creating certificates.
+ *
+ * Module: library/x509_create.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C, MBEDTLS_OID_C, MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C,
+ * (MBEDTLS_MD_C or MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ *
+ * \warning If building with MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, you must call
+ * psa_crypto_init() before doing any X.509 create operation.
+ *
+ * This module is the basis for creating X.509 certificates and CSRs.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C
+ *
+ * Enable creating X.509 certificates.
+ *
+ * Module: library/x509_crt_write.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C
+ *
+ * This module is required for X.509 certificate creation.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C
+ *
+ * Enable creating X.509 Certificate Signing Requests (CSR).
+ *
+ * Module: library/x509_csr_write.c
+ *
+ * Requires: MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C
+ *
+ * This module is required for X.509 certificate request writing.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C
+
+/** \} name SECTION: Mbed TLS modules */
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: General configuration options
+ *
+ * This section contains Mbed TLS build settings that are not associated
+ * with a particular module.
+ *
+ * \{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
+ *
+ * If defined, this is a header which will be included instead of
+ * `"mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h"`.
+ * This header file specifies the compile-time configuration of Mbed TLS.
+ * Unlike other configuration options, this one must be defined on the
+ * compiler command line: a definition in `mbedtls_config.h` would have
+ * no effect.
+ *
+ * This macro is expanded after an <tt>\#include</tt> directive. This is a popular but
+ * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available
+ * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an <tt>\#include</tt> line.
+ *
+ * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either
+ * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE "mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h"
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE
+ *
+ * If defined, this is a header which will be included after
+ * `"mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h"` or #MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE.
+ * This allows you to modify the default configuration, including the ability
+ * to undefine options that are enabled by default.
+ *
+ * This macro is expanded after an <tt>\#include</tt> directive. This is a popular but
+ * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available
+ * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an <tt>\#include</tt> line.
+ *
+ * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either
+ * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE "/dev/null"
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE
+ *
+ * If defined, this is a header which will be included instead of
+ * `"psa/crypto_config.h"`.
+ * This header file specifies which cryptographic mechanisms are available
+ * through the PSA API when #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled, and
+ * is not used when #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled.
+ *
+ * This macro is expanded after an <tt>\#include</tt> directive. This is a popular but
+ * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available
+ * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an <tt>\#include</tt> line.
+ *
+ * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either
+ * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE "psa/crypto_config.h"
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE
+ *
+ * If defined, this is a header which will be included after
+ * `"psa/crypto_config.h"` or #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE.
+ * This allows you to modify the default configuration, including the ability
+ * to undefine options that are enabled by default.
+ *
+ * This macro is expanded after an <tt>\#include</tt> directive. This is a popular but
+ * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available
+ * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an <tt>\#include</tt> line.
+ *
+ * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either
+ * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_USER_CONFIG_FILE "/dev/null"
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE
+ *
+ * If defined, this is a header which will be included instead of
+ * `"psa/crypto_platform.h"`. This file should declare the same identifiers
+ * as the one in Mbed TLS, but with definitions adapted to the platform on
+ * which the library code will run.
+ *
+ * \note The required content of this header can vary from one version of
+ * Mbed TLS to the next. Integrators who provide an alternative file
+ * should review the changes in the original file whenever they
+ * upgrade Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * This macro is expanded after an <tt>\#include</tt> directive. This is a popular but
+ * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available
+ * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an <tt>\#include</tt> line.
+ *
+ * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either
+ * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE "psa/crypto_platform_alt.h"
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_FILE
+ *
+ * If defined, this is a header which will be included instead of
+ * `"psa/crypto_struct.h"`. This file should declare the same identifiers
+ * as the one in Mbed TLS, but with definitions adapted to the environment
+ * in which the library code will run. The typical use for this feature
+ * is to provide alternative type definitions on the client side in
+ * client-server integrations of PSA crypto, where operation structures
+ * contain handles instead of cryptographic data.
+ *
+ * \note The required content of this header can vary from one version of
+ * Mbed TLS to the next. Integrators who provide an alternative file
+ * should review the changes in the original file whenever they
+ * upgrade Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * This macro is expanded after an <tt>\#include</tt> directive. This is a popular but
+ * non-standard feature of the C language, so this feature is only available
+ * with compilers that perform macro expansion on an <tt>\#include</tt> line.
+ *
+ * The value of this symbol is typically a path in double quotes, either
+ * absolute or relative to a directory on the include search path.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_FILE "psa/crypto_struct_alt.h"
+
+/** \} name SECTION: General configuration options */
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: Module configuration options
+ *
+ * This section allows for the setting of module specific sizes and
+ * configuration options. The default values are already present in the
+ * relevant header files and should suffice for the regular use cases.
+ *
+ * Our advice is to enable options and change their values here
+ * only if you have a good reason and know the consequences.
+ * \{
+ */
+/* The Doxygen documentation here is used when a user comments out a
+ * setting and runs doxygen themselves. On the other hand, when we typeset
+ * the full documentation including disabled settings, the documentation
+ * in specific modules' header files is used if present. When editing this
+ * file, make sure that each option is documented in exactly one place,
+ * plus optionally a same-line Doxygen comment here if there is a Doxygen
+ * comment in the specific module. */
+
+/* MPI / BIGNUM options */
+//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE 2 /**< Maximum window size used. */
+//#define MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE 1024 /**< Maximum number of bytes for usable MPIs. */
+
+/* CTR_DRBG options */
+//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN 48 /**< Amount of entropy used per seed by default (48 with SHA-512, 32 with SHA-256) */
+//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */
+//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */
+//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */
+//#define MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */
+
+/* HMAC_DRBG options */
+//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL 10000 /**< Interval before reseed is performed by default */
+//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT 256 /**< Maximum number of additional input bytes */
+//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST 1024 /**< Maximum number of requested bytes per call */
+//#define MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT 384 /**< Maximum size of (re)seed buffer */
+
+/* ECP options */
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE 4 /**< Maximum window size used */
+//#define MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM 1 /**< Enable fixed-point speed-up */
+
+/* Entropy options */
+//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES 20 /**< Maximum number of sources supported */
+//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER 128 /**< Maximum amount requested from entropy sources */
+//#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Default minimum number of bytes required for the hardware entropy source mbedtls_hardware_poll() before entropy is released */
+
+/* Memory buffer allocator options */
+//#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE 4 /**< Align on multiples of this value */
+
+/* Platform options */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR <stdlib.h> /**< Header to include if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS is defined. Don't define if no header is needed. */
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC
+ *
+ * Default allocator to use, can be undefined.
+ * It must initialize the allocated buffer memory to zeroes.
+ * The size of the buffer is the product of the two parameters.
+ * The calloc function returns either a null pointer or a pointer to the allocated space.
+ * If the product is 0, the function may either return NULL or a valid pointer to an array of size 0 which is a valid input to the deallocation function.
+ * An uninitialized #MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC always fails, returning a null pointer.
+ * See the description of #MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY for more details.
+ * The corresponding deallocation function is #MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC calloc
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE
+ *
+ * Default free to use, can be undefined.
+ * NULL is a valid parameter, and the function must do nothing.
+ * A non-null parameter will always be a pointer previously returned by #MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC and not yet freed.
+ * An uninitialized #MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE does not do anything.
+ * See the description of #MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY for more details (same principles as for MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC apply).
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE free
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF setbuf /**< Default setbuf to use, can be undefined */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT exit /**< Default exit to use, can be undefined */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME time /**< Default time to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF fprintf /**< Default fprintf to use, can be undefined */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF printf /**< Default printf to use, can be undefined */
+/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF snprintf /**< Default snprintf to use, can be undefined */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS 0 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE 1 /**< Default exit value to use, can be undefined */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE "seedfile" /**< Seed file to read/write with default implementation */
+
+/* To use the following function macros, MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C must be enabled. */
+/* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_MACRO and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_XXX_ALT cannot both be defined */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO calloc /**< Default allocator macro to use, can be undefined. See MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC for requirements. */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO free /**< Default free macro to use, can be undefined. See MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE for requirements. */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO exit /**< Default exit macro to use, can be undefined */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO setbuf /**< Default setbuf macro to use, can be undefined */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO time /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO time_t /**< Default time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO fprintf /**< Default fprintf macro to use, can be undefined */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO printf /**< Default printf macro to use, can be undefined */
+/* Note: your snprintf must correctly zero-terminate the buffer! */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO snprintf /**< Default snprintf macro to use, can be undefined */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO vsnprintf /**< Default vsnprintf macro to use, can be undefined */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read /**< Default nv_seed_read function to use, can be undefined */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write /**< Default nv_seed_write function to use, can be undefined */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO int64_t //#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO int64_t /**< Default milliseconds time macro to use, can be undefined. MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME must be enabled. It must be signed, and at least 64 bits. If it is changed from the default, MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME must be updated to match.*/
+//#define MBEDTLS_PRINTF_MS_TIME PRId64 /**< Default fmt for printf. That's avoid compiler warning if mbedtls_ms_time_t is redefined */
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN
+ *
+ * This macro is used at the beginning of the declaration of a function
+ * to indicate that its return value should be checked. It should
+ * instruct the compiler to emit a warning or an error if the function
+ * is called without checking its return value.
+ *
+ * There is a default implementation for popular compilers in platform_util.h.
+ * You can override the default implementation by defining your own here.
+ *
+ * If the implementation here is empty, this will effectively disable the
+ * checking of functions' return values.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN __attribute__((__warn_unused_result__))
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN
+ *
+ * This macro requires one argument, which should be a C function call.
+ * If that function call would cause a #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN warning, this
+ * warning is suppressed.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN( result ) ((void) !(result))
+
+/* PSA options */
+/**
+ * Use HMAC_DRBG with the specified hash algorithm for HMAC_DRBG for the
+ * PSA crypto subsystem.
+ *
+ * If this option is unset, the library chooses a hash (currently between
+ * #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 and #MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256) based on availability and
+ * unspecified heuristics.
+ *
+ * \note The PSA crypto subsystem uses the first available mechanism amongst
+ * the following:
+ * - #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG if enabled;
+ * - Entropy from #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C plus CTR_DRBG with AES
+ * if #MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C is enabled;
+ * - Entropy from #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C plus HMAC_DRBG.
+ *
+ * A future version may reevaluate the prioritization of DRBG mechanisms.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_DRBG_MD_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT
+ *
+ * When #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC is disabled,
+ * the maximum amount of PSA keys simultaneously in memory. This counts all
+ * volatile keys, plus loaded persistent keys.
+ *
+ * When #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_STORE_DYNAMIC is enabled,
+ * the maximum number of loaded persistent keys.
+ *
+ * Currently, persistent keys do not need to be loaded all the time while
+ * a multipart operation is in progress, only while the operation is being
+ * set up. This may change in future versions of the library.
+ *
+ * Currently, the library traverses of the whole table on each access to a
+ * persistent key. Therefore large values may cause poor performance.
+ *
+ * This option has no effect when #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is disabled.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_PSA_STATIC_KEY_SLOT_BUFFER_SIZE
+ *
+ * Define the size (in bytes) of each static key buffer when
+ * #MBEDTLS_PSA_STATIC_KEY_SLOTS is set. If not
+ * explicitly defined then it's automatically guessed from available PSA keys
+ * enabled in the build through PSA_WANT_xxx symbols.
+ * If required by the application this parameter can be set to higher values
+ * in order to store larger objects (ex: raw keys), but please note that this
+ * will increase RAM usage.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSA_STATIC_KEY_SLOT_BUFFER_SIZE 256
+
+/* RSA OPTIONS */
+//#define MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS 1024 /**< Minimum RSA key size that can be generated in bits (Minimum possible value is 128 bits) */
+
+/* SSL Cache options */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT 86400 /**< 1 day */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES 50 /**< Maximum entries in cache */
+
+/* SSL options */
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN
+ *
+ * Maximum length (in bytes) of incoming plaintext fragments.
+ *
+ * This determines the size of the incoming TLS I/O buffer in such a way
+ * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data,
+ * regardless of the protection mechanism used.
+ *
+ * \note When using a value less than the default of 16KB on the client, it is
+ * recommended to use the Maximum Fragment Length (MFL) extension to
+ * inform the server about this limitation. On the server, there
+ * is no supported, standardized way of informing the client about
+ * restriction on the maximum size of incoming messages, and unless
+ * the limitation has been communicated by other means, it is recommended
+ * to only change the outgoing buffer size #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN
+ * while keeping the default value of 16KB for the incoming buffer.
+ *
+ * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the incoming I/O buffer.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
+ *
+ * The maximum length of CIDs used for incoming DTLS messages.
+ *
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX 32
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX
+ *
+ * The maximum length of CIDs used for outgoing DTLS messages.
+ *
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY
+ *
+ * This option controls the use of record plaintext padding
+ * in TLS 1.3 and when using the Connection ID extension in DTLS 1.2.
+ *
+ * The padding will always be chosen so that the length of the
+ * padded plaintext is a multiple of the value of this option.
+ *
+ * Note: A value of \c 1 means that no padding will be used
+ * for outgoing records.
+ *
+ * Note: On systems lacking division instructions,
+ * a power of two should be preferred.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN
+ *
+ * Maximum length (in bytes) of outgoing plaintext fragments.
+ *
+ * This determines the size of the outgoing TLS I/O buffer in such a way
+ * that it is capable of holding the specified amount of plaintext data,
+ * regardless of the protection mechanism used.
+ *
+ * It is possible to save RAM by setting a smaller outward buffer, while keeping
+ * the default inward 16384 byte buffer to conform to the TLS specification.
+ *
+ * The minimum required outward buffer size is determined by the handshake
+ * protocol's usage. Handshaking will fail if the outward buffer is too small.
+ * The specific size requirement depends on the configured ciphers and any
+ * certificate data which is sent during the handshake.
+ *
+ * Uncomment to set the maximum plaintext size of the outgoing I/O buffer.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING
+ *
+ * Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of
+ * DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering.
+ *
+ * This should be at least 9/8 * MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN
+ * to account for a reassembled handshake message of maximum size,
+ * together with its reassembly bitmap.
+ *
+ * A value of 2 * MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN (32768 by default)
+ * should be sufficient for all practical situations as it allows
+ * to reassembly a large handshake message (such as a certificate)
+ * while buffering multiple smaller handshake messages.
+ *
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768
+
+//#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /**< Max size of TLS pre-shared keys, in bytes (default 256 or 384 bits) */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT 60 /**< Default expiration delay of DTLS cookies, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies issued */
+
+/**
+ * Complete list of ciphersuites to use, in order of preference.
+ *
+ * \warning No dependency checking is done on that field! This option can only
+ * be used to restrict the set of available ciphersuites. It is your
+ * responsibility to make sure the needed modules are active.
+ *
+ * Use this to save a few hundred bytes of ROM (default ordering of all
+ * available ciphersuites) and a few to a few hundred bytes of RAM.
+ *
+ * The value below is only an example, not the default.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE
+ *
+ * The default maximum amount of 0-RTT data. See the documentation of
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_early_data_size() for more information.
+ *
+ * It must be positive and smaller than UINT32_MAX.
+ *
+ * If MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA is not defined, this default value does not
+ * have any impact on the build.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE 1024
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE
+ *
+ * Maximum allowed ticket age difference in milliseconds tolerated between
+ * server and client. Default value is 6000. This is not used in TLS 1.2.
+ *
+ * - The client ticket age is the time difference between the time when the
+ * client proposes to the server to use the ticket and the time the client
+ * received the ticket from the server.
+ * - The server ticket age is the time difference between the time when the
+ * server receives a proposition from the client to use the ticket and the
+ * time when the ticket was created by the server.
+ *
+ * The ages might be different due to the client and server clocks not running
+ * at the same pace. The typical accuracy of an RTC crystal is ±100 to ±20 parts
+ * per million (360 to 72 milliseconds per hour). Default tolerance window is
+ * 6s, thus in the worst case clients and servers must sync up their system time
+ * every 6000/360/2~=8 hours.
+ *
+ * See section 8.3 of the TLS 1.3 specification(RFC 8446) for more information.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE 6000
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH
+ *
+ * Size in bytes of a ticket nonce. This is not used in TLS 1.2.
+ *
+ * This must be less than 256.
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH 32
+
+/**
+ * \def MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS
+ *
+ * Default number of NewSessionTicket messages to be sent by a TLS 1.3 server
+ * after handshake completion. This is not used in TLS 1.2 and relevant only if
+ * the MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS option is enabled.
+ *
+ */
+//#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS 1
+
+/* X509 options */
+//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8 /**< Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain. */
+//#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512 /**< Maximum length of a path/filename string in bytes including the null terminator character ('\0'). */
+
+/** \} name SECTION: Module configuration options */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..478e9f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md.h
@@ -0,0 +1,526 @@
+/**
+ * \file md.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains the generic functions for message-digest
+ * (hashing) and HMAC.
+ *
+ * \author Adriaan de Jong <dejong@fox-it.com>
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_H
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+/** The selected feature is not available. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x5080
+/** Bad input parameters to function. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x5100
+/** Failed to allocate memory. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED -0x5180
+/** Opening or reading of file failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x5200
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Supported message digests.
+ *
+ * \warning MD5 and SHA-1 are considered weak message digests and
+ * their use constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ */
+/* Note: these are aligned with the definitions of PSA_ALG_ macros for hashes,
+ * in order to enable an efficient implementation of conversion functions.
+ * This is tested by md_to_from_psa() in test_suite_md. */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_MD_NONE=0, /**< None. */
+ MBEDTLS_MD_MD5=0x03, /**< The MD5 message digest. */
+ MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160=0x04, /**< The RIPEMD-160 message digest. */
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1=0x05, /**< The SHA-1 message digest. */
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224=0x08, /**< The SHA-224 message digest. */
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256=0x09, /**< The SHA-256 message digest. */
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384=0x0a, /**< The SHA-384 message digest. */
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512=0x0b, /**< The SHA-512 message digest. */
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224=0x10, /**< The SHA3-224 message digest. */
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256=0x11, /**< The SHA3-256 message digest. */
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384=0x12, /**< The SHA3-384 message digest. */
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512=0x13, /**< The SHA3-512 message digest. */
+} mbedtls_md_type_t;
+
+/* Note: this should always be >= PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE
+ * in all builds with both CRYPTO_C and MD_LIGHT.
+ *
+ * This is to make things easier for modules such as TLS that may define a
+ * buffer size using MD_MAX_SIZE in a part of the code that's common to PSA
+ * and legacy, then assume the buffer's size is PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE in another
+ * part of the code based on PSA.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 64 /* longest known is SHA512 */
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 48 /* longest known is SHA384 */
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 32 /* longest known is SHA256 */
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 28 /* longest known is SHA224 */
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 20 /* longest known is SHA1 or RIPE MD-160
+ or smaller (MD5 and earlier) */
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 144 /* the longest known is SHA3-224 */
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 136
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 128
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 104
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512)
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 72
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 64
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Opaque struct.
+ *
+ * Constructed using either #mbedtls_md_info_from_string or
+ * #mbedtls_md_info_from_type.
+ *
+ * Fields can be accessed with #mbedtls_md_get_size,
+ * #mbedtls_md_get_type and #mbedtls_md_get_name.
+ */
+/* Defined internally in library/md_wrap.h. */
+typedef struct mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md_info_t;
+
+/**
+ * Used internally to indicate whether a context uses legacy or PSA.
+ *
+ * Internal use only.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_LEGACY = 0,
+ MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA,
+} mbedtls_md_engine_t;
+
+/**
+ * The generic message-digest context.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_md_context_t {
+ /** Information about the associated message digest. */
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_info);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA)
+ /** Are hash operations dispatched to PSA or legacy? */
+ mbedtls_md_engine_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(engine);
+#endif
+
+ /** The digest-specific context (legacy) or the PSA operation. */
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+ /** The HMAC part of the context. */
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hmac_ctx);
+#endif
+} mbedtls_md_context_t;
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the message-digest information
+ * associated with the given digest type.
+ *
+ * \param md_type The type of digest to search for.
+ *
+ * \return The message-digest information associated with \p md_type.
+ * \return NULL if the associated message-digest information is not found.
+ */
+const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes a message-digest context without
+ * binding it to a particular message-digest algorithm.
+ *
+ * This function should always be called first. It prepares the
+ * context for mbedtls_md_setup() for binding it to a
+ * message-digest algorithm.
+ */
+void mbedtls_md_init(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function clears the internal structure of \p ctx and
+ * frees any embedded internal structure, but does not free
+ * \p ctx itself.
+ *
+ * If you have called mbedtls_md_setup() on \p ctx, you must
+ * call mbedtls_md_free() when you are no longer using the
+ * context.
+ * Calling this function if you have previously
+ * called mbedtls_md_init() and nothing else is optional.
+ * You must not call this function if you have not called
+ * mbedtls_md_init().
+ */
+void mbedtls_md_free(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx);
+
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function selects the message digest algorithm to use,
+ * and allocates internal structures.
+ *
+ * It should be called after mbedtls_md_init() or
+ * mbedtls_md_free(). Makes it necessary to call
+ * mbedtls_md_free() later.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to set up.
+ * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm
+ * to use.
+ * \param hmac Defines if HMAC is used. 0: HMAC is not used (saves some memory),
+ * or non-zero: HMAC is used with this context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification
+ * failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_md_setup(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int hmac);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function clones the state of a message-digest
+ * context.
+ *
+ * \note You must call mbedtls_md_setup() on \c dst before calling
+ * this function.
+ *
+ * \note The two contexts must have the same type,
+ * for example, both are SHA-256.
+ *
+ * \warning This function clones the message-digest state, not the
+ * HMAC state.
+ *
+ * \param dst The destination context.
+ * \param src The context to be cloned.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification failure.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if both contexts are
+ * not using the same engine. This can be avoided by moving
+ * the call to psa_crypto_init() before the first call to
+ * mbedtls_md_setup().
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_md_clone(mbedtls_md_context_t *dst,
+ const mbedtls_md_context_t *src);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function extracts the message-digest size from the
+ * message-digest information structure.
+ *
+ * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm
+ * to use.
+ *
+ * \return The size of the message-digest output in Bytes.
+ */
+unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function gives the message-digest size associated to
+ * message-digest type.
+ *
+ * \param md_type The message-digest type.
+ *
+ * \return The size of the message-digest output in Bytes,
+ * or 0 if the message-digest type is not known.
+ */
+static inline unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type)
+{
+ return mbedtls_md_get_size(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type));
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function extracts the message-digest type from the
+ * message-digest information structure.
+ *
+ * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm
+ * to use.
+ *
+ * \return The type of the message digest.
+ */
+mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function starts a message-digest computation.
+ *
+ * You must call this function after setting up the context
+ * with mbedtls_md_setup(), and before passing data with
+ * mbedtls_md_update().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The generic message-digest context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification
+ * failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_md_starts(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing
+ * message-digest computation.
+ *
+ * You must call mbedtls_md_starts() before calling this
+ * function. You may call this function multiple times.
+ * Afterwards, call mbedtls_md_finish().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The generic message-digest context.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification
+ * failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_md_update(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function finishes the digest operation,
+ * and writes the result to the output buffer.
+ *
+ * Call this function after a call to mbedtls_md_starts(),
+ * followed by any number of calls to mbedtls_md_update().
+ * Afterwards, you may either clear the context with
+ * mbedtls_md_free(), or call mbedtls_md_starts() to reuse
+ * the context for another digest operation with the same
+ * algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The generic message-digest context.
+ * \param output The buffer for the generic message-digest checksum result.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification
+ * failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_md_finish(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function calculates the message-digest of a buffer,
+ * with respect to a configurable message-digest algorithm
+ * in a single call.
+ *
+ * The result is calculated as
+ * Output = message_digest(input buffer).
+ *
+ * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm
+ * to use.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the data.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data.
+ * \param output The generic message-digest checksum result.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification
+ * failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_md(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the list of digests supported by the
+ * generic digest module.
+ *
+ * \note The list starts with the strongest available hashes.
+ *
+ * \return A statically allocated array of digests. Each element
+ * in the returned list is an integer belonging to the
+ * message-digest enumeration #mbedtls_md_type_t.
+ * The last entry is 0.
+ */
+const int *mbedtls_md_list(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the message-digest information
+ * associated with the given digest name.
+ *
+ * \param md_name The name of the digest to search for.
+ *
+ * \return The message-digest information associated with \p md_name.
+ * \return NULL if the associated message-digest information is not found.
+ */
+const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string(const char *md_name);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the name of the message digest for
+ * the message-digest information structure given.
+ *
+ * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm
+ * to use.
+ *
+ * \return The name of the message digest.
+ */
+const char *mbedtls_md_get_name(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the message-digest information
+ * from the given context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context from which to extract the information.
+ * This must be initialized (or \c NULL).
+ *
+ * \return The message-digest information associated with \p ctx.
+ * \return \c NULL if \p ctx is \c NULL.
+ */
+const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_ctx(
+ const mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+/**
+ * \brief This function calculates the message-digest checksum
+ * result of the contents of the provided file.
+ *
+ * The result is calculated as
+ * Output = message_digest(file contents).
+ *
+ * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm
+ * to use.
+ * \param path The input file name.
+ * \param output The generic message-digest checksum result.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR on an I/O error accessing
+ * the file pointed by \p path.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p md_info was NULL.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_md_file(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *path,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets the HMAC key and prepares to
+ * authenticate a new message.
+ *
+ * Call this function after mbedtls_md_setup(), to use
+ * the MD context for an HMAC calculation, then call
+ * mbedtls_md_hmac_update() to provide the input data, and
+ * mbedtls_md_hmac_finish() to get the HMAC value.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The message digest context containing an embedded HMAC
+ * context.
+ * \param key The HMAC secret key.
+ * \param keylen The length of the HMAC key in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification
+ * failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ size_t keylen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing HMAC
+ * computation.
+ *
+ * Call mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() or mbedtls_md_hmac_reset()
+ * before calling this function.
+ * You may call this function multiple times to pass the
+ * input piecewise.
+ * Afterwards, call mbedtls_md_hmac_finish().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The message digest context containing an embedded HMAC
+ * context.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification
+ * failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_md_hmac_update(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function finishes the HMAC operation, and writes
+ * the result to the output buffer.
+ *
+ * Call this function after mbedtls_md_hmac_starts() and
+ * mbedtls_md_hmac_update() to get the HMAC value. Afterwards
+ * you may either call mbedtls_md_free() to clear the context,
+ * or call mbedtls_md_hmac_reset() to reuse the context with
+ * the same HMAC key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The message digest context containing an embedded HMAC
+ * context.
+ * \param output The generic HMAC checksum result.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification
+ * failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function prepares to authenticate a new message with
+ * the same key as the previous HMAC operation.
+ *
+ * You may call this function after mbedtls_md_hmac_finish().
+ * Afterwards call mbedtls_md_hmac_update() to pass the new
+ * input.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The message digest context containing an embedded HMAC
+ * context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification
+ * failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function calculates the full generic HMAC
+ * on the input buffer with the provided key.
+ *
+ * The function allocates the context, performs the
+ * calculation, and frees the context.
+ *
+ * The HMAC result is calculated as
+ * output = generic HMAC(hmac key, input buffer).
+ *
+ * \param md_info The information structure of the message-digest algorithm
+ * to use.
+ * \param key The HMAC secret key.
+ * \param keylen The length of the HMAC secret key in Bytes.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data.
+ * \param output The generic HMAC result.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA on parameter-verification
+ * failure.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+int mbedtls_md_hmac(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md5.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md5.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6bf0754
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/md5.h
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/**
+ * \file md5.h
+ *
+ * \brief MD5 message digest algorithm (hash function)
+ *
+ * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes a
+ * security risk. We recommend considering stronger message
+ * digests instead.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD5_H
+#define MBEDTLS_MD5_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT)
+// Regular implementation
+//
+
+/**
+ * \brief MD5 context structure
+ *
+ * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_md5_context {
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[4]; /*!< intermediate digest state */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[64]; /*!< data block being processed */
+}
+mbedtls_md5_context;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */
+#include "md5_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize MD5 context
+ *
+ * \param ctx MD5 context to be initialized
+ *
+ * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ */
+void mbedtls_md5_init(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Clear MD5 context
+ *
+ * \param ctx MD5 context to be cleared
+ *
+ * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ */
+void mbedtls_md5_free(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Clone (the state of) an MD5 context
+ *
+ * \param dst The destination context
+ * \param src The context to be cloned
+ *
+ * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ */
+void mbedtls_md5_clone(mbedtls_md5_context *dst,
+ const mbedtls_md5_context *src);
+
+/**
+ * \brief MD5 context setup
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to be initialized
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ *
+ * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_md5_starts(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief MD5 process buffer
+ *
+ * \param ctx MD5 context
+ * \param input buffer holding the data
+ * \param ilen length of the input data
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ *
+ * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_md5_update(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief MD5 final digest
+ *
+ * \param ctx MD5 context
+ * \param output MD5 checksum result
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ *
+ * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_md5_finish(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char output[16]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief MD5 process data block (internal use only)
+ *
+ * \param ctx MD5 context
+ * \param data buffer holding one block of data
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ *
+ * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_internal_md5_process(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char data[64]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Output = MD5( input buffer )
+ *
+ * \param input buffer holding the data
+ * \param ilen length of the input data
+ * \param output MD5 checksum result
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ *
+ * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_md5(const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char output[16]);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Checkup routine
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed
+ *
+ * \warning MD5 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_md5_self_test(int verbose);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* mbedtls_md5.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b527d9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/**
+ * \file memory_buffer_alloc.h
+ *
+ * \brief Buffer-based memory allocator
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H
+#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: Module settings
+ *
+ * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section.
+ * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line.
+ * \{
+ */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE)
+#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE 4 /**< Align on multiples of this value */
+#endif
+
+/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE 0
+#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC (1 << 0)
+#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE (1 << 1)
+#define MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS (MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC | \
+ MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE)
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize use of stack-based memory allocator.
+ * The stack-based allocator does memory management inside the
+ * presented buffer and does not call calloc() and free().
+ * It sets the global mbedtls_calloc() and mbedtls_free() pointers
+ * to its own functions.
+ * (Provided mbedtls_calloc() and mbedtls_free() are thread-safe if
+ * MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is defined)
+ *
+ * \note This code is not optimized and provides a straight-forward
+ * implementation of a stack-based memory allocator.
+ *
+ * \param buf buffer to use as heap
+ * \param len size of the buffer
+ */
+void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free the mutex for thread-safety and clear remaining memory
+ */
+void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Determine when the allocator should automatically verify the state
+ * of the entire chain of headers / meta-data.
+ * (Default: MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE)
+ *
+ * \param verify One of MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_NONE, MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC,
+ * MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE or MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALWAYS
+ */
+void mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify(int verify);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+/**
+ * \brief Print out the status of the allocated memory (primarily for use
+ * after a program should have de-allocated all memory)
+ * Prints out a list of 'still allocated' blocks and their stack
+ * trace if MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE is defined.
+ */
+void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the number of alloc/free so far.
+ *
+ * \param alloc_count Number of allocations.
+ * \param free_count Number of frees.
+ */
+void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_count_get(size_t *alloc_count, size_t *free_count);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the peak heap usage so far
+ *
+ * \param max_used Peak number of bytes in use or committed. This
+ * includes bytes in allocated blocks too small to split
+ * into smaller blocks but larger than the requested size.
+ * \param max_blocks Peak number of blocks in use, including free and used
+ */
+void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get(size_t *max_used, size_t *max_blocks);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Reset peak statistics
+ */
+void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the current heap usage
+ *
+ * \param cur_used Current number of bytes in use or committed. This
+ * includes bytes in allocated blocks too small to split
+ * into smaller blocks but larger than the requested size.
+ * \param cur_blocks Current number of blocks in use, including free and used
+ */
+void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get(size_t *cur_used, size_t *cur_blocks);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Verifies that all headers in the memory buffer are correct
+ * and contain sane values. Helps debug buffer-overflow errors.
+ *
+ * Prints out first failure if MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG is defined.
+ * Prints out full header information if MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG
+ * is defined. (Includes stack trace information for each block if
+ * MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE is defined as well).
+ *
+ * \return 0 if verified, 1 otherwise
+ */
+int mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify(void);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/**
+ * \brief Checkup routine
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if a test failed
+ */
+int mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test(int verbose);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* memory_buffer_alloc.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e69bc0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/net_sockets.h
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+/**
+ * \file net_sockets.h
+ *
+ * \brief Network sockets abstraction layer to integrate Mbed TLS into a
+ * BSD-style sockets API.
+ *
+ * The network sockets module provides an example integration of the
+ * Mbed TLS library into a BSD sockets implementation. The module is
+ * intended to be an example of how Mbed TLS can be integrated into a
+ * networking stack, as well as to be Mbed TLS's network integration
+ * for its supported platforms.
+ *
+ * The module is intended only to be used with the Mbed TLS library and
+ * is not intended to be used by third party application software
+ * directly.
+ *
+ * The supported platforms are as follows:
+ * * Microsoft Windows and Windows CE
+ * * POSIX/Unix platforms including Linux, OS X
+ *
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H
+#define MBEDTLS_NET_SOCKETS_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/** Failed to open a socket. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED -0x0042
+/** The connection to the given server / port failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED -0x0044
+/** Binding of the socket failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED -0x0046
+/** Could not listen on the socket. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED -0x0048
+/** Could not accept the incoming connection. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED -0x004A
+/** Reading information from the socket failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED -0x004C
+/** Sending information through the socket failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED -0x004E
+/** Connection was reset by peer. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET -0x0050
+/** Failed to get an IP address for the given hostname. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST -0x0052
+/** Buffer is too small to hold the data. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x0043
+/** The context is invalid, eg because it was free()ed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT -0x0045
+/** Polling the net context failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED -0x0047
+/** Input invalid. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0049
+
+#define MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG 10 /**< The backlog that listen() should use. */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP 0 /**< The TCP transport protocol */
+#define MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP 1 /**< The UDP transport protocol */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ 1 /**< Used in \c mbedtls_net_poll to check for pending data */
+#define MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE 2 /**< Used in \c mbedtls_net_poll to check if write possible */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Wrapper type for sockets.
+ *
+ * Currently backed by just a file descriptor, but might be more in the future
+ * (eg two file descriptors for combined IPv4 + IPv6 support, or additional
+ * structures for hand-made UDP demultiplexing).
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_net_context {
+ /** The underlying file descriptor.
+ *
+ * This field is only guaranteed to be present on POSIX/Unix-like platforms.
+ * On other platforms, it may have a different type, have a different
+ * meaning, or be absent altogether.
+ */
+ int fd;
+}
+mbedtls_net_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a context
+ * Just makes the context ready to be used or freed safely.
+ *
+ * \param ctx Context to initialize
+ */
+void mbedtls_net_init(mbedtls_net_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initiate a connection with host:port in the given protocol
+ *
+ * \param ctx Socket to use
+ * \param host Host to connect to
+ * \param port Port to connect to
+ * \param proto Protocol: MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP or MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or one of:
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED
+ *
+ * \note Sets the socket in connected mode even with UDP.
+ */
+int mbedtls_net_connect(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *host, const char *port, int proto);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Create a receiving socket on bind_ip:port in the chosen
+ * protocol. If bind_ip == NULL, all interfaces are bound.
+ *
+ * \param ctx Socket to use
+ * \param bind_ip IP to bind to, can be NULL
+ * \param port Port number to use
+ * \param proto Protocol: MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP or MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or one of:
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED
+ *
+ * \note Regardless of the protocol, opens the sockets and binds it.
+ * In addition, make the socket listening if protocol is TCP.
+ */
+int mbedtls_net_bind(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char *port, int proto);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Accept a connection from a remote client
+ *
+ * \param bind_ctx Relevant socket
+ * \param client_ctx Will contain the connected client socket
+ * \param client_ip Will contain the client IP address, can be NULL
+ * \param buf_size Size of the client_ip buffer
+ * \param cip_len Will receive the size of the client IP written,
+ * can be NULL if client_ip is null
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED, or
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if buf_size is too small,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ if bind_fd was set to
+ * non-blocking and accept() would block.
+ */
+int mbedtls_net_accept(mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx,
+ mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx,
+ void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *cip_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Check and wait for the context to be ready for read/write
+ *
+ * \note The current implementation of this function uses
+ * select() and returns an error if the file descriptor
+ * is \c FD_SETSIZE or greater.
+ *
+ * \param ctx Socket to check
+ * \param rw Bitflag composed of MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ and
+ * MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE specifying the events
+ * to wait for:
+ * - If MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ is set, the function
+ * will return as soon as the net context is available
+ * for reading.
+ * - If MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE is set, the function
+ * will return as soon as the net context is available
+ * for writing.
+ * \param timeout Maximal amount of time to wait before returning,
+ * in milliseconds. If \c timeout is zero, the
+ * function returns immediately. If \c timeout is
+ * -1u, the function blocks potentially indefinitely.
+ *
+ * \return Bitmask composed of MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ/WRITE
+ * on success or timeout, or a negative return code otherwise.
+ */
+int mbedtls_net_poll(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, uint32_t rw, uint32_t timeout);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the socket blocking
+ *
+ * \param ctx Socket to set
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a non-zero error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_net_set_block(mbedtls_net_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the socket non-blocking
+ *
+ * \param ctx Socket to set
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a non-zero error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_net_set_nonblock(mbedtls_net_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Portable usleep helper
+ *
+ * \param usec Amount of microseconds to sleep
+ *
+ * \note Real amount of time slept will not be less than
+ * select()'s timeout granularity (typically, 10ms).
+ */
+void mbedtls_net_usleep(unsigned long usec);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Read at most 'len' characters. If no error occurs,
+ * the actual amount read is returned.
+ *
+ * \param ctx Socket
+ * \param buf The buffer to write to
+ * \param len Maximum length of the buffer
+ *
+ * \return the number of bytes received,
+ * or a non-zero error code; with a non-blocking socket,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ indicates read() would block.
+ */
+int mbedtls_net_recv(void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write at most 'len' characters. If no error occurs,
+ * the actual amount written is returned.
+ *
+ * \param ctx Socket
+ * \param buf The buffer to read from
+ * \param len The length of the buffer
+ *
+ * \return the number of bytes sent,
+ * or a non-zero error code; with a non-blocking socket,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE indicates write() would block.
+ */
+int mbedtls_net_send(void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Read at most 'len' characters, blocking for at most
+ * 'timeout' seconds. If no error occurs, the actual amount
+ * read is returned.
+ *
+ * \note The current implementation of this function uses
+ * select() and returns an error if the file descriptor
+ * is \c FD_SETSIZE or greater.
+ *
+ * \param ctx Socket
+ * \param buf The buffer to write to
+ * \param len Maximum length of the buffer
+ * \param timeout Maximum number of milliseconds to wait for data
+ * 0 means no timeout (wait forever)
+ *
+ * \return The number of bytes received if successful.
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT if the operation timed out.
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ if interrupted by a signal.
+ * Another negative error code (MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_xxx)
+ * for other failures.
+ *
+ * \note This function will block (until data becomes available or
+ * timeout is reached) even if the socket is set to
+ * non-blocking. Handling timeouts with non-blocking reads
+ * requires a different strategy.
+ */
+int mbedtls_net_recv_timeout(void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
+ uint32_t timeout);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Closes down the connection and free associated data
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to close
+ *
+ * \note This function frees and clears data associated with the
+ * context but does not free the memory pointed to by \p ctx.
+ * This memory is the responsibility of the caller.
+ */
+void mbedtls_net_close(mbedtls_net_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Gracefully shutdown the connection and free associated data
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to free
+ *
+ * \note This function frees and clears data associated with the
+ * context but does not free the memory pointed to by \p ctx.
+ * This memory is the responsibility of the caller.
+ */
+void mbedtls_net_free(mbedtls_net_context *ctx);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* net_sockets.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d353f3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/nist_kw.h
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+/**
+ * \file nist_kw.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file provides an API for key wrapping (KW) and key wrapping with
+ * padding (KWP) as defined in NIST SP 800-38F.
+ * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
+ *
+ * Key wrapping specifies a deterministic authenticated-encryption mode
+ * of operation, according to <em>NIST SP 800-38F: Recommendation for
+ * Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping</em>. Its
+ * purpose is to protect cryptographic keys.
+ *
+ * Its equivalent is RFC 3394 for KW, and RFC 5649 for KWP.
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3394
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5649
+ *
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H
+#define MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW = 0,
+ MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP = 1
+} mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT)
+// Regular implementation
+//
+
+/**
+ * \brief The key wrapping context-type definition. The key wrapping context is passed
+ * to the APIs called.
+ *
+ * \note The definition of this type may change in future library versions.
+ * Don't make any assumptions on this context!
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_ctx); /*!< The cipher context used. */
+} mbedtls_nist_kw_context;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_NIST_key wrapping_ALT */
+#include "nist_kw_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes the specified key wrapping context
+ * to make references valid and prepare the context
+ * for mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey() or mbedtls_nist_kw_free().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The key wrapping context to initialize.
+ *
+ */
+void mbedtls_nist_kw_init(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes the key wrapping context set in the
+ * \p ctx parameter and sets the encryption key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The key wrapping context.
+ * \param cipher The 128-bit block cipher to use. Only AES is supported.
+ * \param key The Key Encryption Key (KEK).
+ * \param keybits The KEK size in bits. This must be acceptable by the cipher.
+ * \param is_wrap Specify whether the operation within the context is wrapping or unwrapping
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA for any invalid input.
+ * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for 128-bit block ciphers
+ * which are not supported.
+ * \return cipher-specific error code on failure of the underlying cipher.
+ */
+int mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits,
+ const int is_wrap);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function releases and clears the specified key wrapping context
+ * and underlying cipher sub-context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The key wrapping context to clear.
+ */
+void mbedtls_nist_kw_free(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function encrypts a buffer using key wrapping.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The key wrapping context to use for encryption.
+ * \param mode The key wrapping mode to use (MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW or MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP)
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * \param in_len The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ * The input uses units of 8 Bytes called semiblocks.
+ * <ul><li>For KW mode: a multiple of 8 bytes between 16 and 2^57-8 inclusive. </li>
+ * <li>For KWP mode: any length between 1 and 2^32-1 inclusive.</li></ul>
+ * \param[out] output The buffer holding the output data.
+ * <ul><li>For KW mode: Must be at least 8 bytes larger than \p in_len.</li>
+ * <li>For KWP mode: Must be at least 8 bytes larger rounded up to a multiple of
+ * 8 bytes for KWP (15 bytes at most).</li></ul>
+ * \param[out] out_len The number of bytes written to the output buffer. \c 0 on failure.
+ * \param[in] out_size The capacity of the output buffer.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA for invalid input length.
+ * \return cipher-specific error code on failure of the underlying cipher.
+ */
+int mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *out_len, size_t out_size);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function decrypts a buffer using key wrapping.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The key wrapping context to use for decryption.
+ * \param mode The key wrapping mode to use (MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW or MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP)
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * \param in_len The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ * The input uses units of 8 Bytes called semiblocks.
+ * The input must be a multiple of semiblocks.
+ * <ul><li>For KW mode: a multiple of 8 bytes between 24 and 2^57 inclusive. </li>
+ * <li>For KWP mode: a multiple of 8 bytes between 16 and 2^32 inclusive.</li></ul>
+ * \param[out] output The buffer holding the output data.
+ * The output buffer's minimal length is 8 bytes shorter than \p in_len.
+ * \param[out] out_len The number of bytes written to the output buffer. \c 0 on failure.
+ * For KWP mode, the length could be up to 15 bytes shorter than \p in_len,
+ * depending on how much padding was added to the data.
+ * \param[in] out_size The capacity of the output buffer.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA for invalid input length.
+ * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED for verification failure of the ciphertext.
+ * \return cipher-specific error code on failure of the underlying cipher.
+ */
+int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx, mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *out_len, size_t out_size);
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+/**
+ * \brief The key wrapping checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c 1 on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_nist_kw_self_test(int verbose);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/oid.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/oid.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fdc25eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/oid.h
@@ -0,0 +1,727 @@
+/**
+ * \file oid.h
+ *
+ * \brief Object Identifier (OID) database
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_OID_H
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+
+/** OID is not found. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND -0x002E
+/** output buffer is too small */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL -0x000B
+
+/* This is for the benefit of X.509, but defined here in order to avoid
+ * having a "backwards" include of x.509.h here */
+/*
+ * X.509 extension types (internal, arbitrary values for bitsets)
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER (1 << 0)
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER (1 << 1)
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE (1 << 2)
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES (1 << 3)
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS (1 << 4)
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME (1 << 5)
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME (1 << 6)
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS (1 << 7)
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 8)
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 9)
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS (1 << 10)
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE (1 << 11)
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS (1 << 12)
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY (1 << 13)
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL (1 << 14)
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE (1 << 16)
+
+/*
+ * Maximum number of OID components allowed
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_MAX_COMPONENTS 128
+
+/*
+ * Top level OID tuples
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES "\x2a" /* {iso(1) member-body(2)} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG "\x2b" /* {iso(1) identified-organization(3)} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS "\x55" /* {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5)} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY "\x60" /* {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16)} */
+
+/*
+ * ISO Member bodies OID parts
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US "\x86\x48" /* {us(840)} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY "\x86\xf7\x0d" /* {rsadsi(113549)} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US \
+ MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_RSA_DATA_SECURITY /* {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62 "\xce\x3d" /* ansi-X9-62(10045) */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_MEMBER_BODIES MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US \
+ MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_ANSI_X9_62
+
+/*
+ * ISO Identified organization OID parts
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_DOD "\x06" /* {dod(6)} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_OIW "\x0e"
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_OIW "\x03"
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG "\x02"
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG "\x1a"
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_THAWTE "\x65" /* thawte(101) */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_THAWTE MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG \
+ MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_THAWTE
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM "\x81\x04" /* certicom(132) */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG \
+ MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_CERTICOM
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_TELETRUST "\x24" /* teletrust(36) */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG \
+ MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_TELETRUST
+
+/*
+ * ISO ITU OID parts
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORGANIZATION "\x01" /* {organization(1)} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_COUNTRY_US \
+ MBEDTLS_OID_ORGANIZATION /* {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1)} */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_GOV "\x65" /* {gov(101)} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_GOV MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_GOV /* {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)} */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_NETSCAPE "\x86\xF8\x42" /* {netscape(113730)} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_ITU_US_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_NETSCAPE /* Netscape OID {joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) netscape(113730)} */
+
+/* ISO arc for standard certificate and CRL extensions */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS "\x1D" /**< id-ce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 29} */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG MBEDTLS_OID_GOV "\x03\x04" /** { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) */
+
+/**
+ * Private Internet Extensions
+ * { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
+ * security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) }
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG MBEDTLS_OID_ORG_DOD \
+ "\x01"
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET "\x05\x05\x07"
+
+/*
+ * Arc for standard naming attributes
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_CCITT_DS "\x04" /**< id-at OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {joint-iso-ccitt(2) ds(5) 4} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x03" /**< id-at-commonName AttributeType:= {id-at 3} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x04" /**< id-at-surName AttributeType:= {id-at 4} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x05" /**< id-at-serialNumber AttributeType:= {id-at 5} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x06" /**< id-at-countryName AttributeType:= {id-at 6} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x07" /**< id-at-locality AttributeType:= {id-at 7} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x08" /**< id-at-state AttributeType:= {id-at 8} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x0A" /**< id-at-organizationName AttributeType:= {id-at 10} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x0B" /**< id-at-organizationalUnitName AttributeType:= {id-at 11} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x0C" /**< id-at-title AttributeType:= {id-at 12} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x10" /**< id-at-postalAddress AttributeType:= {id-at 16} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x11" /**< id-at-postalCode AttributeType:= {id-at 17} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2A" /**< id-at-givenName AttributeType:= {id-at 42} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2B" /**< id-at-initials AttributeType:= {id-at 43} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2C" /**< id-at-generationQualifier AttributeType:= {id-at 44} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2D" /**< id-at-uniqueIdentifier AttributeType:= {id-at 45} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x2E" /**< id-at-dnQualifier AttributeType:= {id-at 46} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM MBEDTLS_OID_AT "\x41" /**< id-at-pseudonym AttributeType:= {id-at 65} */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_UID "\x09\x92\x26\x89\x93\xF2\x2C\x64\x01\x01" /** id-domainComponent AttributeType:= {itu-t(0) data(9) pss(2342) ucl(19200300) pilot(100) pilotAttributeType(1) uid(1)} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT "\x09\x92\x26\x89\x93\xF2\x2C\x64\x01\x19" /** id-domainComponent AttributeType:= {itu-t(0) data(9) pss(2342) ucl(19200300) pilot(100) pilotAttributeType(1) domainComponent(25)} */
+
+/*
+ * OIDs for standard certificate extensions
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x23" /**< id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 35 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x0E" /**< id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 14 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x0F" /**< id-ce-keyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 15 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x20" /**< id-ce-certificatePolicies OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 32 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x21" /**< id-ce-policyMappings OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 33 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x11" /**< id-ce-subjectAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 17 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x12" /**< id-ce-issuerAltName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 18 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x09" /**< id-ce-subjectDirectoryAttributes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 9 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x13" /**< id-ce-basicConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 19 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x1E" /**< id-ce-nameConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 30 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x24" /**< id-ce-policyConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 36 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x25" /**< id-ce-extKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 37 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x1F" /**< id-ce-cRLDistributionPoints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 31 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x36" /**< id-ce-inhibitAnyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 54 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x2E" /**< id-ce-freshestCRL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 46 } */
+
+/*
+ * Certificate policies
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES "\x00" /**< anyPolicy OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-certificatePolicies 0 } */
+
+/*
+ * Netscape certificate extensions
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE "\x01"
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x01"
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_BASE_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x02"
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x03"
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x04"
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_RENEWAL_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x07"
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x08"
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_SSL_SERVER_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x0C"
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_COMMENT MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT "\x0D"
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_DATA_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_NETSCAPE "\x02"
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_SEQUENCE MBEDTLS_OID_NS_DATA_TYPE "\x05"
+
+/*
+ * OIDs for CRL extensions
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PRIVATE_KEY_USAGE_PERIOD MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x10"
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_CRL_NUMBER MBEDTLS_OID_ID_CE "\x14" /**< id-ce-cRLNumber OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce 20 } */
+
+/*
+ * X.509 v3 Extended key usage OIDs
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE "\x00" /**< anyExtendedKeyUsage OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce-extKeyUsage 0 } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_KP MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX "\x03" /**< id-kp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 3 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x01" /**< id-kp-serverAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 1 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x02" /**< id-kp-clientAuth OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 2 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x03" /**< id-kp-codeSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 3 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x04" /**< id-kp-emailProtection OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 4 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x08" /**< id-kp-timeStamping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 8 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING MBEDTLS_OID_KP "\x09" /**< id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 } */
+
+/**
+ * Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network
+ * { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
+ * private(4) enterprise(1) WiSUN(45605) FieldAreaNetwork(1) }
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_WISUN_FAN MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET "\x04\x01\x82\xe4\x25\x01"
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ON MBEDTLS_OID_PKIX "\x08" /**< id-on OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 8 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ON_HW_MODULE_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_ON "\x04" /**< id-on-hardwareModuleName OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-on 4 } */
+
+/*
+ * PKCS definition OIDs
+ */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x01" /**< pkcs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 1 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x01" /**< pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x05" /**< pkcs-5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 5 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x07" /**< pkcs-7 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 7 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x09" /**< pkcs-9 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 9 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS "\x0c" /**< pkcs-12 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 12 } */
+
+/*
+ * PKCS#1 OIDs
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x01" /**< rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x04" /**< md5WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 4 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x05" /**< sha1WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 5 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0e" /**< sha224WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 14 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0b" /**< sha256WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 11 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0c" /**< sha384WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 12 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0d" /**< sha512WithRSAEncryption ::= { pkcs-1 13 } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS "\x2B\x0E\x03\x02\x1D"
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 "\x01" /**< emailAddress AttributeType ::= { pkcs-9 1 } */
+
+/* RFC 4055 */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x0a" /**< id-RSASSA-PSS ::= { pkcs-1 10 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_MGF1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1 "\x08" /**< id-mgf1 ::= { pkcs-1 8 } */
+
+/*
+ * Digest algorithms
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x05" /**< id-mbedtls_md5 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 5 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG \
+ MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_SHA1 /**< id-mbedtls_sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x04" /**< id-sha224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 4 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x01" /**< id-mbedtls_sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x02" /**< id-sha384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 2 } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x03" /**< id-mbedtls_sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST "\x03\x02\x01" /**< id-ripemd160 OBJECT IDENTIFIER :: { iso(1) identified-organization(3) teletrust(36) algorithm(3) hashAlgorithm(2) ripemd160(1) } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_224 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x07" /**< id-sha3-224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) sha3-224(7) } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_256 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x08" /**< id-sha3-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) sha3-256(8) } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_384 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x09" /**< id-sha3-384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) sha3-384(9) } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_512 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x0a" /**< id-sha3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) sha3-512(10) } */
+
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x07" /**< id-hmacWithSHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 7 } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x08" /**< id-hmacWithSHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 8 } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x09" /**< id-hmacWithSHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 9 } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x0A" /**< id-hmacWithSHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 10 } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x02\x0B" /**< id-hmacWithSHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) digestAlgorithm(2) 11 } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_224 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x0d" /**< id-hmacWithSHA3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) hmacWithSHA3-224(13) } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_256 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x0e" /**< id-hmacWithSHA3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) hmacWithSHA3-256(14) } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_384 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x0f" /**< id-hmacWithSHA3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) hmacWithSHA3-384(15) } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_512 MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x02\x10" /**< id-hmacWithSHA3-512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) hashalgs(2) hmacWithSHA3-512(16) } */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET "\x05\x05\x08\x01\x04" /**< id-hmacWithSHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) iso-identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) ipsec(8) isakmpOakley(1) hmacRIPEMD160(4)} */
+
+/*
+ * Encryption algorithms,
+ * the following standardized object identifiers are specified at
+ * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8018#appendix-C.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG \
+ MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG "\x07" /**< desCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 7 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x03\x07" /**< des-ede3-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) -- us(840) rsadsi(113549) encryptionAlgorithm(3) 7 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x01" /** aes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 1 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x02" /** aes128-cbc-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) aes(1) aes128-CBC-PAD(2) } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES_192_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x16" /** aes192-cbc-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) aes(1) aes192-CBC-PAD(22) } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES_256_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x2a" /** aes256-cbc-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) aes(1) aes256-CBC-PAD(42) } */
+
+/*
+ * Key Wrapping algorithms
+ */
+/*
+ * RFC 5649
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES128_KW MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x05" /** id-aes128-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 5 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES128_KWP MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x08" /** id-aes128-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 8 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES192_KW MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x19" /** id-aes192-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 25 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES192_KWP MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x1c" /** id-aes192-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 28 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES256_KW MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x2d" /** id-aes256-wrap OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 45 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES256_KWP MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x30" /** id-aes256-wrap-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { aes 48 } */
+/*
+ * PKCS#5 OIDs
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0c" /**< id-PBKDF2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 12} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBES2 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0d" /**< id-PBES2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 13} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBMAC1 MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0e" /**< id-PBMAC1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 14} */
+
+/*
+ * PKCS#5 PBES1 algorithms
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x03" /**< pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 3} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_MD5_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x06" /**< pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 6} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0a" /**< pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 10} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBE_SHA1_RC2_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5 "\x0b" /**< pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-5 11} */
+
+/*
+ * PKCS#7 OIDs
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x01" /**< Content type is Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 1} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x02" /**< Content type is Signed Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 2} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x03" /**< Content type is Enveloped Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 3} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_AND_ENVELOPED_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x04" /**< Content type is Signed and Enveloped Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 4} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x05" /**< Content type is Digested Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 5} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7 "\x06" /**< Content type is Encrypted Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-7 6} */
+
+/*
+ * PKCS#8 OIDs
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_CSR_EXT_REQ MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9 "\x0e" /**< extensionRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-9 14} */
+
+/*
+ * PKCS#12 PBE OIDs
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12 "\x01" /**< pkcs-12PbeIds OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12 1} */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x03" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 3} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x04" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 4} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x05" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd128BitRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 5} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE "\x06" /**< pbeWithSHAAnd40BitRC2-CBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {pkcs-12PbeIds 6} */
+
+/*
+ * EC key algorithms from RFC 5480
+ */
+
+/* id-ecPublicKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) keyType(2) 1 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x02\01"
+
+/* id-ecDH OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132)
+ * schemes(1) ecdh(12) } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x01\x0c"
+
+/*
+ * ECParameters namedCurve identifiers, from RFC 5480, RFC 5639, and SEC2
+ */
+
+/* secp192r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 1 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x03\x01\x01"
+
+/* secp224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 33 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x21"
+
+/* secp256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) curves(3) prime(1) 7 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x03\x01\x07"
+
+/* secp384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 34 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x22"
+
+/* secp521r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 35 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x23"
+
+/* secp192k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 31 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x1f"
+
+/* secp224k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 32 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x20"
+
+/* secp256k1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ * iso(1) identified-organization(3) certicom(132) curve(0) 10 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1 MBEDTLS_OID_CERTICOM "\x00\x0a"
+
+/* RFC 5639 4.1
+ * ecStdCurvesAndGeneration OBJECT IDENTIFIER::= {iso(1)
+ * identified-organization(3) teletrust(36) algorithm(3) signature-
+ * algorithm(3) ecSign(2) 8}
+ * ellipticCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {ecStdCurvesAndGeneration 1}
+ * versionOne OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {ellipticCurve 1} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 MBEDTLS_OID_TELETRUST "\x03\x03\x02\x08\x01\x01"
+
+/* brainpoolP256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 7} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 "\x07"
+
+/* brainpoolP384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 11} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 "\x0B"
+
+/* brainpoolP512r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 13} */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1 MBEDTLS_OID_EC_BRAINPOOL_V1 "\x0D"
+
+/*
+ * SEC1 C.1
+ *
+ * prime-field OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-fieldType 1 }
+ * id-fieldType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { ansi-X9-62 fieldType(1)}
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x01"
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_FIELD_TYPE "\x01"
+
+/*
+ * ECDSA signature identifiers, from RFC 5480
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62 "\x04" /* signatures(4) */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG "\x03" /* ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) */
+
+/* ecdsa-with-SHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) 1 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG "\x01"
+
+/* ecdsa-with-SHA224 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
+ * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x01"
+
+/* ecdsa-with-SHA256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
+ * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 2 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x02"
+
+/* ecdsa-with-SHA384 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
+ * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x03"
+
+/* ecdsa-with-SHA512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
+ * iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4)
+ * ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512 MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_SIG_SHA2 "\x04"
+
+/*
+ * EC key algorithms from RFC 8410
+ */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X25519 MBEDTLS_OID_THAWTE "\x6e" /**< id-X25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 110 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_X448 MBEDTLS_OID_THAWTE "\x6f" /**< id-X448 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 111 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ED25519 MBEDTLS_OID_THAWTE "\x70" /**< id-Ed25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 112 } */
+#define MBEDTLS_OID_ED448 MBEDTLS_OID_THAWTE "\x71" /**< id-Ed448 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 101 113 } */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Base OID descriptor structure
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t {
+ const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(asn1); /*!< OID ASN.1 representation */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(asn1_len); /*!< length of asn1 */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
+ const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); /*!< official name (e.g. from RFC) */
+ const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(description); /*!< human friendly description */
+#endif
+} mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate an ASN.1 OID into its numeric representation
+ * (e.g. "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D" into "1.2.840.113549")
+ *
+ * \param buf buffer to put representation in
+ * \param size size of the buffer
+ * \param oid OID to translate
+ *
+ * \return Length of the string written (excluding final NULL) or
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL in case of error
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate a string containing a dotted-decimal
+ * representation of an ASN.1 OID into its encoded form
+ * (e.g. "1.2.840.113549" into "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x0D").
+ * On success, this function allocates oid->buf from the
+ * heap. It must be freed by the caller using mbedtls_free().
+ *
+ * \param oid #mbedtls_asn1_buf to populate with the DER-encoded OID
+ * \param oid_str string representation of the OID to parse
+ * \param size length of the OID string, not including any null terminator
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA if \p oid_str does not
+ * represent a valid OID
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED if the function fails to
+ * allocate oid->buf
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_from_numeric_string(mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char *oid_str, size_t size);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate an X.509 extension OID into local values
+ *
+ * \param oid OID to use
+ * \param ext_type place to store the extension type
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, int *ext_type);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate an X.509 attribute type OID into the short name
+ * (e.g. the OID for an X520 Common Name into "CN")
+ *
+ * \param oid OID to use
+ * \param short_name place to store the string pointer
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **short_name);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate PublicKeyAlgorithm OID into pk_type
+ *
+ * \param oid OID to use
+ * \param pk_alg place to store public key algorithm
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate pk_type into PublicKeyAlgorithm OID
+ *
+ * \param pk_alg Public key type to look for
+ * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer
+ * \param olen length of the OID
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg,
+ const char **oid, size_t *olen);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+/**
+ * \brief Translate NamedCurve OID into an EC group identifier
+ *
+ * \param oid OID to use
+ * \param grp_id place to store group id
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate EC group identifier into NamedCurve OID
+ *
+ * \param grp_id EC group identifier
+ * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer
+ * \param olen length of the OID
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id,
+ const char **oid, size_t *olen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate AlgorithmIdentifier OID into an EC group identifier,
+ * for curves that are directly encoded at this level
+ *
+ * \param oid OID to use
+ * \param grp_id place to store group id
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp_algid(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate EC group identifier into AlgorithmIdentifier OID,
+ * for curves that are directly encoded at this level
+ *
+ * \param grp_id EC group identifier
+ * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer
+ * \param olen length of the OID
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp_algid(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id,
+ const char **oid, size_t *olen);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate SignatureAlgorithm OID into md_type and pk_type
+ *
+ * \param oid OID to use
+ * \param md_alg place to store message digest algorithm
+ * \param pk_alg place to store public key algorithm
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate SignatureAlgorithm OID into description
+ *
+ * \param oid OID to use
+ * \param desc place to store string pointer
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **desc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate md_type and pk_type into SignatureAlgorithm OID
+ *
+ * \param md_alg message digest algorithm
+ * \param pk_alg public key algorithm
+ * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer
+ * \param olen length of the OID
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const char **oid, size_t *olen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate hmac algorithm OID into md_type
+ *
+ * \param oid OID to use
+ * \param md_hmac place to store message hmac algorithm
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_hmac);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate hash algorithm OID into md_type
+ *
+ * \param oid OID to use
+ * \param md_alg place to store message digest algorithm
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
+/**
+ * \brief Translate Extended Key Usage OID into description
+ *
+ * \param oid OID to use
+ * \param desc place to store string pointer
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **desc);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate certificate policies OID into description
+ *
+ * \param oid OID to use
+ * \param desc place to store string pointer
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, const char **desc);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Translate md_type into hash algorithm OID
+ *
+ * \param md_alg message digest algorithm
+ * \param oid place to store ASN.1 OID string pointer
+ * \param olen length of the OID
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, const char **oid, size_t *olen);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Translate encryption algorithm OID into cipher_type
+ *
+ * \param oid OID to use
+ * \param cipher_alg place to store cipher algorithm
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_cipher_type_t *cipher_alg);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Translate PKCS#12 PBE algorithm OID into md_type and
+ * cipher_type
+ *
+ * \param oid OID to use
+ * \param md_alg place to store message digest algorithm
+ * \param cipher_alg place to store cipher algorithm
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND
+ */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg,
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t *cipher_alg);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* oid.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pem.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pem.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c6a28d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pem.h
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+/**
+ * \file pem.h
+ *
+ * \brief Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) decoding
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_PEM_H
+#define MBEDTLS_PEM_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+/**
+ * \name PEM Error codes
+ * These error codes are returned in case of errors reading the
+ * PEM data.
+ * \{
+ */
+/** No PEM header or footer found. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT -0x1080
+/** PEM string is not as expected. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA -0x1100
+/** Failed to allocate memory. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED -0x1180
+/** RSA IV is not in hex-format. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV -0x1200
+/** Unsupported key encryption algorithm. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG -0x1280
+/** Private key password can't be empty. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED -0x1300
+/** Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x1380
+/** Unavailable feature, e.g. hashing/encryption combination. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x1400
+/** Bad input parameters to function. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x1480
+/** \} name PEM Error codes */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief PEM context structure
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_pem_context {
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf); /*!< buffer for decoded data */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buflen); /*!< length of the buffer */
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(info); /*!< buffer for extra header information */
+}
+mbedtls_pem_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief PEM context setup
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to be initialized
+ */
+void mbedtls_pem_init(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Read a buffer for PEM information and store the resulting
+ * data into the specified context buffers.
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to use
+ * \param header header string to seek and expect
+ * \param footer footer string to seek and expect
+ * \param data source data to look in (must be nul-terminated)
+ * \param pwd password for decryption (can be NULL)
+ * \param pwdlen length of password
+ * \param use_len destination for total length used from data buffer. It is
+ * set after header is correctly read, so unless you get
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA or
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT, use_len is
+ * the length to skip.
+ *
+ * \note Attempts to check password correctness by verifying if
+ * the decrypted text starts with an ASN.1 sequence of
+ * appropriate length
+ *
+ * \note \c mbedtls_pem_free must be called on PEM context before
+ * the PEM context can be reused in another call to
+ * \c mbedtls_pem_read_buffer
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success, or a specific PEM error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const char *footer,
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ const unsigned char *pwd,
+ size_t pwdlen, size_t *use_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the pointer to the decoded binary data in a PEM context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx PEM context to access.
+ * \param buflen On success, this will contain the length of the binary data.
+ * This must be a valid (non-null) pointer.
+ *
+ * \return A pointer to the decoded binary data.
+ *
+ * \note The returned pointer remains valid only until \p ctx is
+ modified or freed.
+ */
+static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_pem_get_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, size_t *buflen)
+{
+ *buflen = ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buflen);
+ return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buf);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * \brief PEM context memory freeing
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to be freed
+ */
+void mbedtls_pem_free(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Write a buffer of PEM information from a DER encoded
+ * buffer.
+ *
+ * \param header The header string to write.
+ * \param footer The footer string to write.
+ * \param der_data The DER data to encode.
+ * \param der_len The length of the DER data \p der_data in Bytes.
+ * \param buf The buffer to write to.
+ * \param buf_len The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes.
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the total length written
+ * or required (if \p buf_len is not enough).
+ *
+ * \note You may pass \c NULL for \p buf and \c 0 for \p buf_len
+ * to request the length of the resulting PEM buffer in
+ * `*olen`.
+ *
+ * \note This function may be called with overlapping \p der_data
+ * and \p buf buffers.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't large
+ * enough to hold the PEM buffer. In this case, `*olen` holds
+ * the required minimum size of \p buf.
+ * \return Another PEM or BASE64 error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(const char *header, const char *footer,
+ const unsigned char *der_data, size_t der_len,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* pem.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b7f34b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pk.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1296 @@
+/**
+ * \file pk.h
+ *
+ * \brief Public Key abstraction layer
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_H
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#endif
+
+/** Memory allocation failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED -0x3F80
+/** Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA key */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -0x3F00
+/** Bad input parameters to function. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x3E80
+/** Read/write of file failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x3E00
+/** Unsupported key version */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION -0x3D80
+/** Invalid key tag or value. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT -0x3D00
+/** Key algorithm is unsupported (only RSA and EC are supported). */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG -0x3C80
+/** Private key password can't be empty. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED -0x3C00
+/** Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x3B80
+/** The pubkey tag or value is invalid (only RSA and EC are supported). */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY -0x3B00
+/** The algorithm tag or value is invalid. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG -0x3A80
+/** Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported). */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE -0x3A00
+/** Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x3980
+/** The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH -0x3900
+/** The output buffer is too small. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x3880
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Public key types
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_PK_NONE=0,
+ MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
+ MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY,
+ MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH,
+ MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
+ MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT,
+ MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS,
+ MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE,
+} mbedtls_pk_type_t;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Options for RSASSA-PSS signature verification.
+ * See \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext()
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options {
+ /** The digest to use for MGF1 in PSS.
+ *
+ * \note When #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled and #MBEDTLS_RSA_C is
+ * disabled, this must be equal to the \c md_alg argument passed
+ * to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(). In a future version of the library,
+ * this constraint may apply whenever #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is
+ * enabled regardless of the status of #MBEDTLS_RSA_C.
+ */
+ mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id;
+
+ /** The expected length of the salt, in bytes. This may be
+ * #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY to accept any salt length.
+ *
+ * \note When #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, only
+ * #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY is valid. Any other value may be
+ * ignored (allowing any salt length).
+ */
+ int expected_salt_len;
+
+} mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Maximum size of a signature made by mbedtls_pk_sign().
+ */
+/* We need to set MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE to the maximum signature
+ * size among the supported signature types. Do it by starting at 0,
+ * then incrementally increasing to be large enough for each supported
+ * signature mechanism.
+ *
+ * The resulting value can be 0, for example if MBEDTLS_ECDH_C is enabled
+ * (which allows the pk module to be included) but neither MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C
+ * nor MBEDTLS_RSA_C nor any opaque signature mechanism (PSA or RSA_ALT).
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE 0
+
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)) && \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
+/* For RSA, the signature can be as large as the bignum module allows.
+ * For RSA_ALT, the signature size is not necessarily tied to what the
+ * bignum module can do, but in the absence of any specific setting,
+ * we use that (rsa_alt_sign_wrap in library/pk_wrap.h will check). */
+#undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && \
+ MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
+/* For ECDSA, the ecdsa module exports a constant for the maximum
+ * signature size. */
+#undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
+/* PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is the maximum size of a signature made
+ * through the PSA API in the PSA representation. */
+#undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
+#endif
+
+#if PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE + 11 > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
+/* The Mbed TLS representation is different for ECDSA signatures:
+ * PSA uses the raw concatenation of r and s,
+ * whereas Mbed TLS uses the ASN.1 representation (SEQUENCE of two INTEGERs).
+ * Add the overhead of ASN.1: up to (1+2) + 2 * (1+2+1) for the
+ * types, lengths (represented by up to 2 bytes), and potential leading
+ * zeros of the INTEGERs and the SEQUENCE. */
+#undef MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE (PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE + 11)
+#endif
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) */
+
+/* Internal helper to define which fields in the pk_context structure below
+ * should be used for EC keys: legacy ecp_keypair or the raw (PSA friendly)
+ * format. It should be noted that this only affects how data is stored, not
+ * which functions are used for various operations. The overall picture looks
+ * like this:
+ * - if USE_PSA is not defined and ECP_C is defined then use ecp_keypair data
+ * structure and legacy functions
+ * - if USE_PSA is defined and
+ * - if ECP_C then use ecp_keypair structure, convert data to a PSA friendly
+ * format and use PSA functions
+ * - if !ECP_C then use new raw data and PSA functions directly.
+ *
+ * The main reason for the "intermediate" (USE_PSA + ECP_C) above is that as long
+ * as ECP_C is defined mbedtls_pk_ec() gives the user a read/write access to the
+ * ecp_keypair structure inside the pk_context so they can modify it using
+ * ECP functions which are not under PK module's control.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Types for interfacing with the debug module
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_NONE = 0,
+ MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI,
+ MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP,
+ MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_PSA_EC,
+} mbedtls_pk_debug_type;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Item to send to the debug module
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_pk_debug_item {
+ mbedtls_pk_debug_type MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type);
+ const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name);
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(value);
+} mbedtls_pk_debug_item;
+
+/** Maximum number of item send for debugging, plus 1 */
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS 3
+
+/**
+ * \brief Public key information and operations
+ *
+ * \note The library does not support custom pk info structures,
+ * only built-in structures returned by
+ * mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type().
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_pk_info_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN \
+ PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)
+/**
+ * \brief Public key container
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_pk_context {
+ const mbedtls_pk_info_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_info); /**< Public key information */
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx); /**< Underlying public key context */
+ /* The following field is used to store the ID of a private key in the
+ * following cases:
+ * - opaque key when MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is defined
+ * - normal key when MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is defined. In this case:
+ * - the pk_ctx above is not not used to store the private key anymore.
+ * Actually that field not populated at all in this case because also
+ * the public key will be stored in raw format as explained below
+ * - this ID is used for all private key operations (ex: sign, check
+ * key pair, key write, etc) using PSA functions
+ *
+ * Note: this private key storing solution only affects EC keys, not the
+ * other ones. The latters still use the pk_ctx to store their own
+ * context. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(priv_id); /**< Key ID for opaque keys */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ /* The following fields are meant for storing the public key in raw format
+ * which is handy for:
+ * - easily importing it into the PSA context
+ * - reducing the ECP module dependencies in the PK one.
+ *
+ * When MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is enabled:
+ * - the pk_ctx above is not used anymore for storing the public key
+ * inside the ecp_keypair structure
+ * - the following fields are used for all public key operations: signature
+ * verify, key pair check and key write.
+ * - For a key pair, priv_id contains the private key. For a public key,
+ * priv_id is null.
+ * Of course, when MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is not enabled, the legacy
+ * ecp_keypair structure is used for storing the public key and performing
+ * all the operations.
+ *
+ * Note: This new public key storing solution only works for EC keys, not
+ * other ones. The latters still use pk_ctx to store their own
+ * context.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pub_raw)[MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN]; /**< Raw public key */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pub_raw_len); /**< Valid bytes in "pub_raw" */
+ psa_ecc_family_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ec_family); /**< EC family of pk */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ec_bits); /**< Curve's bits of pk */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+} mbedtls_pk_context;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+/**
+ * \brief Context for resuming operations
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ const mbedtls_pk_info_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_info); /**< Public key information */
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(rs_ctx); /**< Underlying restart context */
+} mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx;
+#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+/* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */
+typedef void mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
+/**
+ * \brief Types for RSA-alt abstraction
+ */
+typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func)(void *ctx, size_t *olen,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_max_len);
+typedef int (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func)(void *ctx,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig);
+typedef size_t (*mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func)(void *ctx);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return information associated with the given PK type
+ *
+ * \param pk_type PK type to search for.
+ *
+ * \return The PK info associated with the type or NULL if not found.
+ */
+const mbedtls_pk_info_t *mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a #mbedtls_pk_context (as NONE).
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to initialize.
+ * This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_pk_init(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free the components of a #mbedtls_pk_context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to clear. It must have been initialized.
+ * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing.
+ *
+ * \note For contexts that have been set up with
+ * mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(), this does not free the underlying
+ * PSA key and you still need to call psa_destroy_key()
+ * independently if you want to destroy that key.
+ */
+void mbedtls_pk_free(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a restart context
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to initialize.
+ * This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_pk_restart_init(mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free the components of a restart context
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to clear. It must have been initialized.
+ * If this is \c NULL, this function does nothing.
+ */
+void mbedtls_pk_restart_free(mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a PK context with the information given
+ * and allocates the type-specific PK subcontext.
+ *
+ * \param ctx Context to initialize. It must not have been set
+ * up yet (type #MBEDTLS_PK_NONE).
+ * \param info Information to use
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA on invalid input,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED on allocation failure.
+ *
+ * \note For contexts holding an RSA-alt key, use
+ * \c mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt() instead.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_setup(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a PK context to wrap a PSA key.
+ *
+ * This function creates a PK context which wraps a PSA key. The PSA wrapped
+ * key must be an EC or RSA key pair (DH is not suported in the PK module).
+ *
+ * Under the hood PSA functions will be used to perform the required
+ * operations and, based on the key type, used algorithms will be:
+ * * EC:
+ * * verify, verify_ext, sign, sign_ext: ECDSA.
+ * * RSA:
+ * * sign, decrypt: use the primary algorithm in the wrapped PSA key;
+ * * sign_ext: RSA PSS if the pk_type is #MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, otherwise
+ * it falls back to the sign() case;
+ * * verify, verify_ext, encrypt: not supported.
+ *
+ * In order for the above operations to succeed, the policy of the wrapped PSA
+ * key must allow the specified algorithm.
+ *
+ * Opaque PK contexts wrapping an EC keys also support \c mbedtls_pk_check_pair(),
+ * whereas RSA ones do not.
+ *
+ * \warning The PSA wrapped key must remain valid as long as the wrapping PK
+ * context is in use, that is at least between the point this function
+ * is called and the point mbedtls_pk_free() is called on this context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to initialize. It must be empty (type NONE).
+ * \param key The PSA key to wrap, which must hold an ECC or RSA key pair.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA on invalid input (context already
+ * used, invalid key identifier).
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the key is not an ECC or
+ * RSA key pair.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED on allocation failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize an RSA-alt context
+ *
+ * \param ctx Context to initialize. It must not have been set
+ * up yet (type #MBEDTLS_PK_NONE).
+ * \param key RSA key pointer
+ * \param decrypt_func Decryption function
+ * \param sign_func Signing function
+ * \param key_len_func Function returning key length in bytes
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success, or MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the
+ * context wasn't already initialized as RSA_ALT.
+ *
+ * \note This function replaces \c mbedtls_pk_setup() for RSA-alt.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, void *key,
+ mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func decrypt_func,
+ mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func sign_func,
+ mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func key_len_func);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the size in bits of the underlying key
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized.
+ *
+ * \return Key size in bits, or 0 on error
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the length in bytes of the underlying key
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized.
+ *
+ * \return Key length in bytes, or 0 on error
+ */
+static inline size_t mbedtls_pk_get_len(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx)
+{
+ return (mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(ctx) + 7) / 8;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Tell if a context can do the operation given by type
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized.
+ * \param type The desired type.
+ *
+ * \return 1 if the context can do operations on the given type.
+ * \return 0 if the context cannot do the operations on the given
+ * type. This is always the case for a context that has
+ * been initialized but not set up, or that has been
+ * cleared with mbedtls_pk_free().
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_can_do(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_type_t type);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+/**
+ * \brief Tell if context can do the operation given by PSA algorithm
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to query. It must have been initialized.
+ * \param alg PSA algorithm to check against, the following are allowed:
+ * PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash),
+ * PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash),
+ * PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT,
+ * PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash),
+ * PSA_ALG_ECDH, where hash is a specific hash.
+ * \param usage PSA usage flag to check against, must be composed of:
+ * PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH
+ * PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT
+ * PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
+ * Context key must match all passed usage flags.
+ *
+ * \warning Since the set of allowed algorithms and usage flags may be
+ * expanded in the future, the return value \c 0 should not
+ * be taken in account for non-allowed algorithms and usage
+ * flags.
+ *
+ * \return 1 if the context can do operations on the given type.
+ * \return 0 if the context cannot do the operations on the given
+ * type, for non-allowed algorithms and usage flags, or
+ * for a context that has been initialized but not set up
+ * or that has been cleared with mbedtls_pk_free().
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ psa_key_usage_t usage);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
+/**
+ * \brief Determine valid PSA attributes that can be used to
+ * import a key into PSA.
+ *
+ * The attributes determined by this function are suitable
+ * for calling mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa() to create
+ * a PSA key with the same key material.
+ *
+ * The typical flow of operations involving this function is
+ * ```
+ * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ * int ret = mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(pk, &attributes);
+ * if (ret != 0) ...; // error handling omitted
+ * // Tweak attributes if desired
+ * psa_key_id_t key_id = 0;
+ * ret = mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(pk, &attributes, &key_id);
+ * if (ret != 0) ...; // error handling omitted
+ * ```
+ *
+ * \note This function does not support RSA-alt contexts
+ * (set up with mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt()).
+ *
+ * \param[in] pk The PK context to use. It must have been set up.
+ * It can either contain a key pair or just a public key.
+ * \param usage A single `PSA_KEY_USAGE_xxx` flag among the following:
+ * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT: \p pk must contain a
+ * key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a
+ * key pair type, and the usage policy will allow
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT as well as
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT.
+ * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE: \p pk must contain a
+ * key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a
+ * key pair type.
+ * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT: The output
+ * \p attributes will contain a public key type.
+ * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: \p pk must contain a
+ * key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a
+ * key pair type, and the usage policy will allow
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH as well as
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH.
+ * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: \p pk must contain a
+ * key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a
+ * key pair type, and the usage policy will allow
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE as well as
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE.
+ * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: The output
+ * \p attributes will contain a public key type.
+ * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: The output
+ * \p attributes will contain a public key type.
+ * \param[out] attributes
+ * On success, valid attributes to import the key into PSA.
+ * - The lifetime and key identifier are unchanged. If the
+ * attribute structure was initialized or reset before
+ * calling this function, this will result in a volatile
+ * key. Call psa_set_key_identifier() before or after this
+ * function if you wish to create a persistent key. Call
+ * psa_set_key_lifetime() before or after this function if
+ * you wish to import the key in a secure element.
+ * - The key type and bit-size are determined by the contents
+ * of the PK context. If the PK context contains a key
+ * pair, the key type can be either a key pair type or
+ * the corresponding public key type, depending on
+ * \p usage. If the PK context contains a public key,
+ * the key type is a public key type.
+ * - The key's policy is determined by the key type and
+ * the \p usage parameter. The usage always allows
+ * \p usage, exporting and copying the key, and
+ * possibly other permissions as documented for the
+ * \p usage parameter.
+ * The permitted algorithm policy is determined as follows
+ * based on the #mbedtls_pk_type_t type of \p pk,
+ * the chosen \p usage and other factors:
+ * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA whose underlying
+ * #mbedtls_rsa_context has the padding mode
+ * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15:
+ * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
+ * if \p usage is SIGN/VERIFY, and
+ * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT
+ * if \p usage is ENCRYPT/DECRYPT.
+ * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA whose underlying
+ * #mbedtls_rsa_context has the padding mode
+ * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 and the digest type
+ * corresponding to the PSA algorithm \c hash:
+ * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
+ * if \p usage is SIGN/VERIFY, and
+ * #PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(\c hash)
+ * if \p usage is ENCRYPT/DECRYPT.
+ * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT: not supported.
+ * - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA or #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY
+ * if \p usage is SIGN/VERIFY:
+ * #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
+ * if #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is enabled,
+ * otherwise #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH).
+ * - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH or #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY
+ * if \p usage is DERIVE:
+ * #PSA_ALG_ECDH.
+ * - #MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: same as the primary algorithm
+ * set for the underlying PSA key, except that
+ * sign/decrypt flags are removed if the type is
+ * set to a public key type.
+ * The underlying key must allow \p usage.
+ * Note that the enrollment algorithm set with
+ * psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm() is not copied.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success.
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH if \p pk does not contain
+ * a key of the type identified in \p attributes.
+ * Another error code on other failures.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ psa_key_usage_t usage,
+ psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Import a key into the PSA key store.
+ *
+ * This function is equivalent to calling psa_import_key()
+ * with the key material from \p pk.
+ *
+ * The typical way to use this function is:
+ * -# Call mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes() to obtain
+ * attributes for the given key.
+ * -# If desired, modify the attributes, for example:
+ * - To create a persistent key, call
+ * psa_set_key_identifier() and optionally
+ * psa_set_key_lifetime().
+ * - To import only the public part of a key pair:
+ *
+ * psa_set_key_type(&attributes,
+ * PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(
+ * psa_get_key_type(&attributes)));
+ * - Restrict the key usage if desired.
+ * -# Call mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa().
+ *
+ * \note This function does not support RSA-alt contexts
+ * (set up with mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt()).
+ *
+ * \param[in] pk The PK context to use. It must have been set up.
+ * It can either contain a key pair or just a public key.
+ * \param[in] attributes
+ * The attributes to use for the new key. They must be
+ * compatible with \p pk. In particular, the key type
+ * must match the content of \p pk.
+ * If \p pk contains a key pair, the key type in
+ * attributes can be either the key pair type or the
+ * corresponding public key type (to import only the
+ * public part).
+ * \param[out] key_id
+ * On success, the identifier of the newly created key.
+ * On error, this is #MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success.
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH if \p pk does not contain
+ * a key of the type identified in \p attributes.
+ * Another error code on other failures.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_id);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Create a PK context starting from a key stored in PSA.
+ * This key:
+ * - must be exportable and
+ * - must be an RSA or EC key pair or public key (FFDH is not supported in PK).
+ *
+ * The resulting PK object will be a transparent type:
+ * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA for RSA keys or
+ * - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY for EC keys.
+ *
+ * Once this functions returns the PK object will be completely
+ * independent from the original PSA key that it was generated
+ * from.
+ * Calling mbedtls_pk_sign(), mbedtls_pk_verify(),
+ * mbedtls_pk_encrypt(), mbedtls_pk_decrypt() on the resulting
+ * PK context will perform the corresponding algorithm for that
+ * PK context type.
+ * * For ECDSA, the choice of deterministic vs randomized will
+ * be based on the compile-time setting #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC.
+ * * For an RSA key, the output PK context will allow both
+ * encrypt/decrypt and sign/verify regardless of the original
+ * key's policy.
+ * The original key's policy determines the output key's padding
+ * mode: PCKS1 v2.1 is set if the PSA key policy is OAEP or PSS,
+ * otherwise PKCS1 v1.5 is set.
+ *
+ * \param key_id The key identifier of the key stored in PSA.
+ * \param pk The PK context that will be filled. It must be initialized,
+ * but not set up.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA in case the provided input
+ * parameters are not correct.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_pk_context *pk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Create a PK context for the public key of a PSA key.
+ *
+ * The key must be an RSA or ECC key. It can be either a
+ * public key or a key pair, and only the public key is copied.
+ * The resulting PK object will be a transparent type:
+ * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA for RSA keys or
+ * - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY for EC keys.
+ *
+ * Once this functions returns the PK object will be completely
+ * independent from the original PSA key that it was generated
+ * from.
+ * Calling mbedtls_pk_verify() or
+ * mbedtls_pk_encrypt() on the resulting
+ * PK context will perform the corresponding algorithm for that
+ * PK context type.
+ *
+ * For an RSA key, the output PK context will allow both
+ * encrypt and verify regardless of the original key's policy.
+ * The original key's policy determines the output key's padding
+ * mode: PCKS1 v2.1 is set if the PSA key policy is OAEP or PSS,
+ * otherwise PKCS1 v1.5 is set.
+ *
+ * \param key_id The key identifier of the key stored in PSA.
+ * \param pk The PK context that will be filled. It must be initialized,
+ * but not set up.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success.
+ * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA in case the provided input
+ * parameters are not correct.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_pk_context *pk);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Verify signature (including padding if relevant).
+ *
+ * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up.
+ * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used.
+ * This can be #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if the signature algorithm
+ * does not rely on a hash algorithm (non-deterministic
+ * ECDSA, RSA PKCS#1 v1.5).
+ * For PKCS#1 v1.5, if \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, then
+ * \p hash is the DigestInfo structure used by RFC 8017
+ * §9.2 steps 3–6. If \p md_alg is a valid hash
+ * algorithm then \p hash is the digest itself, and this
+ * function calculates the DigestInfo encoding internally.
+ * \param hash Hash of the message to sign
+ * \param hash_len Hash length
+ * \param sig Signature to verify
+ * \param sig_len Signature length
+ *
+ * \note For keys of type #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, the signature algorithm is
+ * either PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS (accepting any salt length),
+ * depending on the padding mode in the underlying RSA context.
+ * For a pk object constructed by parsing, this is PKCS#1 v1.5
+ * by default. Use mbedtls_pk_verify_ext() to explicitly select
+ * a different algorithm.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success (signature is valid),
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid
+ * signature in \p sig but its length is less than \p sig_len,
+ * or a specific error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_verify(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_pk_verify()
+ *
+ * \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_pk_verify(), but can
+ * return early and restart according to the limit set with
+ * \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking for ECC
+ * operations. For RSA, same as \c mbedtls_pk_verify().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up.
+ * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes)
+ * \param hash Hash of the message to sign
+ * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes)
+ * \param sig Signature to verify
+ * \param sig_len Signature length
+ * \param rs_ctx Restart context (NULL to disable restart)
+ *
+ * \return See \c mbedtls_pk_verify(), or
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
+ * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
+ mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Verify signature, with options.
+ * (Includes verification of the padding depending on type.)
+ *
+ * \param type Signature type (inc. possible padding type) to verify
+ * \param options Pointer to type-specific options, or NULL
+ * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up.
+ * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes)
+ * \param hash Hash of the message to sign
+ * \param hash_len Hash length or 0 (see notes)
+ * \param sig Signature to verify
+ * \param sig_len Signature length
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success (signature is valid),
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH if the PK context can't be
+ * used for this type of signatures,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH if there is a valid
+ * signature in \p sig but its length is less than \p sig_len,
+ * or a specific error code.
+ *
+ * \note If hash_len is 0, then the length associated with md_alg
+ * is used instead, or an error returned if it is invalid.
+ *
+ * \note md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, only if hash_len != 0
+ *
+ * \note If type is MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS, then options must point
+ * to a mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options structure,
+ * otherwise it must be NULL. Note that if
+ * #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is defined, the salt length is not
+ * verified as PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT is used.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Make signature, including padding if relevant.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up
+ * with a private key.
+ * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes)
+ * \param hash Hash of the message to sign
+ * \param hash_len Hash length
+ * \param sig Place to write the signature.
+ * It must have enough room for the signature.
+ * #MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is always enough.
+ * You may use a smaller buffer if it is large enough
+ * given the key type.
+ * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes.
+ * \param sig_len On successful return,
+ * the number of bytes written to \p sig.
+ * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
+ *
+ * \note For keys of type #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, the signature algorithm is
+ * either PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS (using the largest possible salt
+ * length up to the hash length), depending on the padding mode
+ * in the underlying RSA context. For a pk object constructed
+ * by parsing, this is PKCS#1 v1.5 by default. Use
+ * mbedtls_pk_verify_ext() to explicitly select a different
+ * algorithm.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code.
+ *
+ * \note For RSA, md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if hash_len != 0.
+ * For ECDSA, md_alg may never be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng, void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Make signature given a signature type.
+ *
+ * \param pk_type Signature type.
+ * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up
+ * with a private key.
+ * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes)
+ * \param hash Hash of the message to sign
+ * \param hash_len Hash length
+ * \param sig Place to write the signature.
+ * It must have enough room for the signature.
+ * #MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is always enough.
+ * You may use a smaller buffer if it is large enough
+ * given the key type.
+ * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes.
+ * \param sig_len On successful return,
+ * the number of bytes written to \p sig.
+ * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code.
+ *
+ * \note When \p pk_type is #MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS,
+ * see #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS for a description of PSS options used.
+ *
+ * \note For RSA, md_alg may be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if hash_len != 0.
+ * For ECDSA, md_alg may never be MBEDTLS_MD_NONE.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_sign_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_pk_sign()
+ *
+ * \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_pk_sign(), but can
+ * return early and restart according to the limit set with
+ * \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking for ECC
+ * operations. For RSA, same as \c mbedtls_pk_sign().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up
+ * with a private key.
+ * \param md_alg Hash algorithm used (see notes for mbedtls_pk_sign())
+ * \param hash Hash of the message to sign
+ * \param hash_len Hash length
+ * \param sig Place to write the signature.
+ * It must have enough room for the signature.
+ * #MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE is always enough.
+ * You may use a smaller buffer if it is large enough
+ * given the key type.
+ * \param sig_size The size of the \p sig buffer in bytes.
+ * \param sig_len On successful return,
+ * the number of bytes written to \p sig.
+ * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
+ * \param rs_ctx Restart context (NULL to disable restart)
+ *
+ * \return See \c mbedtls_pk_sign().
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
+ * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng, void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Decrypt message (including padding if relevant).
+ *
+ * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up
+ * with a private key.
+ * \param input Input to decrypt
+ * \param ilen Input size
+ * \param output Decrypted output
+ * \param olen Decrypted message length
+ * \param osize Size of the output buffer
+ * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
+ *
+ * \note For keys of type #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, the signature algorithm is
+ * either PKCS#1 v1.5 or OAEP, depending on the padding mode in
+ * the underlying RSA context. For a pk object constructed by
+ * parsing, this is PKCS#1 v1.5 by default.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_decrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng, void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encrypt message (including padding if relevant).
+ *
+ * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been set up.
+ * \param input Message to encrypt
+ * \param ilen Message size
+ * \param output Encrypted output
+ * \param olen Encrypted output length
+ * \param osize Size of the output buffer
+ * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
+ *
+ * \note For keys of type #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, the signature algorithm is
+ * either PKCS#1 v1.5 or OAEP, depending on the padding mode in
+ * the underlying RSA context. For a pk object constructed by
+ * parsing, this is PKCS#1 v1.5 by default.
+ *
+ * \note \p f_rng is used for padding generation.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success, or a specific error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_encrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng, void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Check if a public-private pair of keys matches.
+ *
+ * \param pub Context holding a public key.
+ * \param prv Context holding a private (and public) key.
+ * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success (keys were checked and match each other).
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the keys could not
+ * be checked - in that case they may or may not match.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a context is invalid.
+ * \return Another non-zero value if the keys do not match.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_check_pair(const mbedtls_pk_context *pub,
+ const mbedtls_pk_context *prv,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Export debug information
+ *
+ * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been initialized.
+ * \param items Place to write debug items
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_debug(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Access the type name
+ *
+ * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been initialized.
+ *
+ * \return Type name on success, or "invalid PK"
+ */
+const char *mbedtls_pk_get_name(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the key type
+ *
+ * \param ctx The PK context to use. It must have been initialized.
+ *
+ * \return Type on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_PK_NONE for a context that has not been set up.
+ */
+mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+/**
+ * Quick access to an RSA context inside a PK context.
+ *
+ * \warning This function can only be used when the type of the context, as
+ * returned by mbedtls_pk_get_type(), is #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA.
+ * Ensuring that is the caller's responsibility.
+ * Alternatively, you can check whether this function returns NULL.
+ *
+ * \return The internal RSA context held by the PK context, or NULL.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_rsa_context *mbedtls_pk_rsa(const mbedtls_pk_context pk)
+{
+ switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk)) {
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:
+ return (mbedtls_rsa_context *) (pk).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx);
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+/**
+ * Quick access to an EC context inside a PK context.
+ *
+ * \warning This function can only be used when the type of the context, as
+ * returned by mbedtls_pk_get_type(), is #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY,
+ * #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH, or #MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA.
+ * Ensuring that is the caller's responsibility.
+ * Alternatively, you can check whether this function returns NULL.
+ *
+ * \return The internal EC context held by the PK context, or NULL.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec(const mbedtls_pk_context pk)
+{
+ switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk)) {
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
+ return (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx);
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C)
+/** \ingroup pk_module */
+/**
+ * \brief Parse a private key in PEM or DER format
+ *
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized
+ * but not set up.
+ * \param key Input buffer to parse.
+ * The buffer must contain the input exactly, with no
+ * extra trailing material. For PEM, the buffer must
+ * contain a null-terminated string.
+ * \param keylen Size of \b key in bytes.
+ * For PEM data, this includes the terminating null byte,
+ * so \p keylen must be equal to `strlen(key) + 1`.
+ * \param pwd Optional password for decryption.
+ * Pass \c NULL if expecting a non-encrypted key.
+ * Pass a string of \p pwdlen bytes if expecting an encrypted
+ * key; a non-encrypted key will also be accepted.
+ * The empty password is not supported.
+ * \param pwdlen Size of the password in bytes.
+ * Ignored if \p pwd is \c NULL.
+ * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. Used for blinding.
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
+ *
+ * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised
+ * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a
+ * specific key type, check the result with mbedtls_pk_can_do().
+ *
+ * \note The key is also checked for correctness.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng, void *p_rng);
+
+/** \ingroup pk_module */
+/**
+ * \brief Parse a public key in PEM or DER format
+ *
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized
+ * but not set up.
+ * \param key Input buffer to parse.
+ * The buffer must contain the input exactly, with no
+ * extra trailing material. For PEM, the buffer must
+ * contain a null-terminated string.
+ * \param keylen Size of \b key in bytes.
+ * For PEM data, this includes the terminating null byte,
+ * so \p keylen must be equal to `strlen(key) + 1`.
+ *
+ * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised
+ * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a
+ * specific key type, check the result with mbedtls_pk_can_do().
+ *
+ * \note For compressed points, see #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED for
+ * limitations.
+ *
+ * \note The key is also checked for correctness.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+/** \ingroup pk_module */
+/**
+ * \brief Load and parse a private key
+ *
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized
+ * but not set up.
+ * \param path filename to read the private key from
+ * \param password Optional password to decrypt the file.
+ * Pass \c NULL if expecting a non-encrypted key.
+ * Pass a null-terminated string if expecting an encrypted
+ * key; a non-encrypted key will also be accepted.
+ * The empty password is not supported.
+ * \param f_rng RNG function, must not be \c NULL. Used for blinding.
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
+ *
+ * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised
+ * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If you need a
+ * specific key type, check the result with mbedtls_pk_can_do().
+ *
+ * \note The key is also checked for correctness.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
+ const char *path, const char *password,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng, void *p_rng);
+
+/** \ingroup pk_module */
+/**
+ * \brief Load and parse a public key
+ *
+ * \param ctx The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized
+ * but not set up.
+ * \param path filename to read the public key from
+ *
+ * \note On entry, ctx must be empty, either freshly initialised
+ * with mbedtls_pk_init() or reset with mbedtls_pk_free(). If
+ * you need a specific key type, check the result with
+ * mbedtls_pk_can_do().
+ *
+ * \note The key is also checked for correctness.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK or PEM error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_keyfile(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const char *path);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Write a private key to a PKCS#1 or SEC1 DER structure
+ * Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the
+ * return value to determine where you should start
+ * using the buffer
+ *
+ * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid private key.
+ * \param buf buffer to write to
+ * \param size size of the buffer
+ *
+ * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific
+ * error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write a public key to a SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER structure
+ * Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the
+ * return value to determine where you should start
+ * using the buffer
+ *
+ * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid public or private key.
+ * \param buf buffer to write to
+ * \param size size of the buffer
+ *
+ * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific
+ * error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Write a public key to a PEM string
+ *
+ * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid public or private key.
+ * \param buf Buffer to write to. The output includes a
+ * terminating null byte.
+ * \param size Size of the buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_pem(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write a private key to a PKCS#1 or SEC1 PEM string
+ *
+ * \param ctx PK context which must contain a valid private key.
+ * \param buf Buffer to write to. The output includes a
+ * terminating null byte.
+ * \param size Size of the buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_write_key_pem(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */
+
+/*
+ * WARNING: Low-level functions. You probably do not want to use these unless
+ * you are certain you do ;)
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Parse a SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER structure
+ *
+ * \param p the position in the ASN.1 data
+ * \param end end of the buffer
+ * \param pk The PK context to fill. It must have been initialized
+ * but not set up.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific PK error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Write a subjectPublicKey to ASN.1 data
+ * Note: function works backwards in data buffer
+ *
+ * \param p reference to current position pointer
+ * \param start start of the buffer (for bounds-checking)
+ * \param key PK context which must contain a valid public or private key.
+ *
+ * \return the length written or a negative error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
+ const mbedtls_pk_context *key);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..87f7681
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs12.h
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+/**
+ * \file pkcs12.h
+ *
+ * \brief PKCS#12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+/** Bad input parameters to function. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x1F80
+/** Feature not available, e.g. unsupported encryption scheme. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x1F00
+/** PBE ASN.1 data not as expected. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT -0x1E80
+/** Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x1E00
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY 1 /**< encryption/decryption key */
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV 2 /**< initialization vector */
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY 3 /**< integrity / MAC key */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DECRYPT
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+/**
+ * \brief PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption)
+ * for cipher-based and mbedtls_md-based PBE's
+ *
+ * \note When encrypting, #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 must
+ * be enabled at compile time.
+ *
+ * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a
+ * future version of the library.
+ * Please use mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext() instead.
+ *
+ * \warning When decrypting:
+ * - if #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is enabled at compile
+ * time, this function validates the CBC padding and returns
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH if the padding is
+ * invalid. Note that this can help active adversaries
+ * attempting to brute-forcing the password. Note also that
+ * there is no guarantee that an invalid password will be
+ * detected (the chances of a valid padding with a random
+ * password are about 1/255).
+ * - if #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is disabled at compile
+ * time, this function does not validate the CBC padding.
+ *
+ * \param pbe_params an ASN1 buffer containing the pkcs-12 PbeParams structure
+ * \param mode either #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT or
+ * #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT
+ * \param cipher_type the cipher used
+ * \param md_type the mbedtls_md used
+ * \param pwd Latin1-encoded password used. This may only be \c NULL when
+ * \p pwdlen is 0. No null terminator should be used.
+ * \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0)
+ * \param data the input data
+ * \param len data length
+ * \param output Output buffer.
+ * On success, it contains the encrypted or decrypted data,
+ * possibly followed by the CBC padding.
+ * On failure, the content is indeterminate.
+ * For decryption, there must be enough room for \p len
+ * bytes.
+ * For encryption, there must be enough room for
+ * \p len + 1 bytes, rounded up to the block size of
+ * the block cipher identified by \p pbe_params.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code
+ */
+int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t len,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+
+/**
+ * \brief PKCS12 Password Based function (encryption / decryption)
+ * for cipher-based and mbedtls_md-based PBE's
+ *
+ *
+ * \warning When decrypting:
+ * - This function validates the CBC padding and returns
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH if the padding is
+ * invalid. Note that this can help active adversaries
+ * attempting to brute-forcing the password. Note also that
+ * there is no guarantee that an invalid password will be
+ * detected (the chances of a valid padding with a random
+ * password are about 1/255).
+ *
+ * \param pbe_params an ASN1 buffer containing the pkcs-12 PbeParams structure
+ * \param mode either #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT or
+ * #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT
+ * \param cipher_type the cipher used
+ * \param md_type the mbedtls_md used
+ * \param pwd Latin1-encoded password used. This may only be \c NULL when
+ * \p pwdlen is 0. No null terminator should be used.
+ * \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0)
+ * \param data the input data
+ * \param len data length
+ * \param output Output buffer.
+ * On success, it contains the encrypted or decrypted data,
+ * possibly followed by the CBC padding.
+ * On failure, the content is indeterminate.
+ * For decryption, there must be enough room for \p len
+ * bytes.
+ * For encryption, there must be enough room for
+ * \p len + 1 bytes, rounded up to the block size of
+ * the block cipher identified by \p pbe_params.
+ * \param output_size size of output buffer.
+ * This must be big enough to accommodate for output plus
+ * padding data.
+ * \param output_len On success, length of actual data written to the output buffer.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code
+ */
+int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t len,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_len);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief The PKCS#12 derivation function uses a password and a salt
+ * to produce pseudo-random bits for a particular "purpose".
+ *
+ * Depending on the given id, this function can produce an
+ * encryption/decryption key, an initialization vector or an
+ * integrity key.
+ *
+ * \param data buffer to store the derived data in
+ * \param datalen length of buffer to fill
+ * \param pwd The password to use. For compliance with PKCS#12 §B.1, this
+ * should be a BMPString, i.e. a Unicode string where each
+ * character is encoded as 2 bytes in big-endian order, with
+ * no byte order mark and with a null terminator (i.e. the
+ * last two bytes should be 0x00 0x00).
+ * \param pwdlen length of the password (may be 0).
+ * \param salt Salt buffer to use. This may only be \c NULL when
+ * \p saltlen is 0.
+ * \param saltlen length of the salt (may be zero)
+ * \param mbedtls_md mbedtls_md type to use during the derivation
+ * \param id id that describes the purpose (can be
+ * #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY, #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV or
+ * #MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_MAC_KEY)
+ * \param iterations number of iterations
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a MD, BIGNUM type error.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md, int id, int iterations);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* pkcs12.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ba5689
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs5.h
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+/**
+ * \file pkcs5.h
+ *
+ * \brief PKCS#5 functions
+ *
+ * \author Mathias Olsson <mathias@kompetensum.com>
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/** Bad input parameters to function. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x2f80
+/** Unexpected ASN.1 data. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT -0x2f00
+/** Requested encryption or digest alg not available. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x2e80
+/** Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH -0x2e00
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT MBEDTLS_DECRYPT
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+/**
+ * \brief PKCS#5 PBES2 function
+ *
+ * \note When encrypting, #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 must
+ * be enabled at compile time.
+ *
+ * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a
+ * future version of the library.
+ * Please use mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext() instead.
+ *
+ * \warning When decrypting:
+ * - if #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is enabled at compile
+ * time, this function validates the CBC padding and returns
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH if the padding is
+ * invalid. Note that this can help active adversaries
+ * attempting to brute-forcing the password. Note also that
+ * there is no guarantee that an invalid password will be
+ * detected (the chances of a valid padding with a random
+ * password are about 1/255).
+ * - if #MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 is disabled at compile
+ * time, this function does not validate the CBC padding.
+ *
+ * \param pbe_params the ASN.1 algorithm parameters
+ * \param mode either #MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT or #MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT
+ * \param pwd password to use when generating key
+ * \param pwdlen length of password
+ * \param data data to process
+ * \param datalen length of data
+ * \param output Output buffer.
+ * On success, it contains the encrypted or decrypted data,
+ * possibly followed by the CBC padding.
+ * On failure, the content is indeterminate.
+ * For decryption, there must be enough room for \p datalen
+ * bytes.
+ * For encryption, there must be enough room for
+ * \p datalen + 1 bytes, rounded up to the block size of
+ * the block cipher identified by \p pbe_params.
+ *
+ * \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if verification fails.
+ */
+int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+
+/**
+ * \brief PKCS#5 PBES2 function
+ *
+ * \warning When decrypting:
+ * - This function validates the CBC padding and returns
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH if the padding is
+ * invalid. Note that this can help active adversaries
+ * attempting to brute-forcing the password. Note also that
+ * there is no guarantee that an invalid password will be
+ * detected (the chances of a valid padding with a random
+ * password are about 1/255).
+ *
+ * \param pbe_params the ASN.1 algorithm parameters
+ * \param mode either #MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT or #MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT
+ * \param pwd password to use when generating key
+ * \param pwdlen length of password
+ * \param data data to process
+ * \param datalen length of data
+ * \param output Output buffer.
+ * On success, it contains the decrypted data.
+ * On failure, the content is indetermidate.
+ * For decryption, there must be enough room for \p datalen
+ * bytes.
+ * For encryption, there must be enough room for
+ * \p datalen + 1 bytes, rounded up to the block size of
+ * the block cipher identified by \p pbe_params.
+ * \param output_size size of output buffer.
+ * This must be big enough to accommodate for output plus
+ * padding data.
+ * \param output_len On success, length of actual data written to the output buffer.
+ *
+ * \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if parsing or decryption fails.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_len);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C*/
+
+/**
+ * \brief PKCS#5 PBKDF2 using HMAC without using the HMAC context
+ *
+ * \param md_type Hash algorithm used
+ * \param password Password to use when generating key
+ * \param plen Length of password
+ * \param salt Salt to use when generating key
+ * \param slen Length of salt
+ * \param iteration_count Iteration count
+ * \param key_length Length of generated key in bytes
+ * \param output Generated key. Must be at least as big as key_length
+ *
+ * \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if verification fails.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+ const unsigned char *password,
+ size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen,
+ unsigned int iteration_count,
+ uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+/**
+ * \brief PKCS#5 PBKDF2 using HMAC
+ *
+ * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext().
+ *
+ * \param ctx Generic HMAC context
+ * \param password Password to use when generating key
+ * \param plen Length of password
+ * \param salt Salt to use when generating key
+ * \param slen Length of salt
+ * \param iteration_count Iteration count
+ * \param key_length Length of generated key in bytes
+ * \param output Generated key. Must be at least as big as key_length
+ *
+ * \returns 0 on success, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code if verification fails.
+ */
+int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *password,
+ size_t plen,
+ const unsigned char *salt,
+ size_t slen,
+ unsigned int iteration_count,
+ uint32_t key_length,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Checkup routine
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed
+ */
+int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test(int verbose);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* pkcs5.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e9b4822
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+/**
+ * \file pkcs7.h
+ *
+ * \brief PKCS #7 generic defines and structures
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Note: For the time being, this implementation of the PKCS #7 cryptographic
+ * message syntax is a partial implementation of RFC 2315.
+ * Differences include:
+ * - The RFC specifies 6 different content types. The only type currently
+ * supported in Mbed TLS is the signed-data content type.
+ * - The only supported PKCS #7 Signed Data syntax version is version 1
+ * - The RFC specifies support for BER. This implementation is limited to
+ * DER only.
+ * - The RFC specifies that multiple digest algorithms can be specified
+ * in the Signed Data type. Only one digest algorithm is supported in Mbed TLS.
+ * - The RFC specifies the Signed Data type can contain multiple X.509 or PKCS #6 extended
+ * certificates. In Mbed TLS, this list can only contain 0 or 1 certificates
+ * and they must be in X.509 format.
+ * - The RFC specifies the Signed Data type can contain
+ * certificate-revocation lists (CRLs). This implementation has no support
+ * for CRLs so it is assumed to be an empty list.
+ * - The RFC allows for SignerInfo structure to optionally contain
+ * unauthenticatedAttributes and authenticatedAttributes. In Mbed TLS it is
+ * assumed these fields are empty.
+ * - The RFC allows for the signed Data type to contain contentInfo. This
+ * implementation assumes the type is DATA and the content is empty.
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_PKCS7_H
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS7_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
+
+/**
+ * \name PKCS #7 Module Error codes
+ * \{
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT -0x5300 /**< The format is invalid, e.g. different type expected. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x5380 /**< Unavailable feature, e.g. anything other than signed data. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION -0x5400 /**< The PKCS #7 version element is invalid or cannot be parsed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO -0x5480 /**< The PKCS #7 content info is invalid or cannot be parsed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG -0x5500 /**< The algorithm tag or value is invalid or cannot be parsed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT -0x5580 /**< The certificate tag or value is invalid or cannot be parsed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNATURE -0x5600 /**< Error parsing the signature */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO -0x5680 /**< Error parsing the signer's info */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x5700 /**< Input invalid. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED -0x5780 /**< Allocation of memory failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL -0x5800 /**< Verification Failed */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_CERT_DATE_INVALID -0x5880 /**< The PKCS #7 date issued/expired dates are invalid */
+/* \} name */
+
+/**
+ * \name PKCS #7 Supported Version
+ * \{
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SUPPORTED_VERSION 0x01
+/* \} name */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Type-length-value structure that allows for ASN.1 using DER.
+ */
+typedef mbedtls_asn1_buf mbedtls_pkcs7_buf;
+
+/**
+ * Container for ASN.1 named information objects.
+ * It allows for Relative Distinguished Names (e.g. cn=localhost,ou=code,etc.).
+ */
+typedef mbedtls_asn1_named_data mbedtls_pkcs7_name;
+
+/**
+ * Container for a sequence of ASN.1 items
+ */
+typedef mbedtls_asn1_sequence mbedtls_pkcs7_sequence;
+
+/**
+ * PKCS #7 types
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_PKCS7_NONE=0,
+ MBEDTLS_PKCS7_DATA,
+ MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA,
+ MBEDTLS_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA,
+ MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_AND_ENVELOPED_DATA,
+ MBEDTLS_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA,
+ MBEDTLS_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA,
+}
+mbedtls_pkcs7_type;
+
+/**
+ * Structure holding PKCS #7 signer info
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info {
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version);
+ mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial);
+ mbedtls_x509_name MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer);
+ mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer_raw);
+ mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg_identifier);
+ mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_alg_identifier);
+ mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig);
+ struct mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next);
+}
+mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info;
+
+/**
+ * Structure holding the signed data section
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data {
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version);
+ mbedtls_pkcs7_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(digest_alg_identifiers);
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(no_of_certs);
+ mbedtls_x509_crt MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(certs);
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(no_of_crls);
+ mbedtls_x509_crl MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(crl);
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(no_of_signers);
+ mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(signers);
+}
+mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data;
+
+/**
+ * Structure holding PKCS #7 structure, only signed data for now
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_pkcs7 {
+ mbedtls_pkcs7_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(raw);
+ mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(signed_data);
+}
+mbedtls_pkcs7;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize mbedtls_pkcs7 structure.
+ *
+ * \param pkcs7 mbedtls_pkcs7 structure.
+ */
+void mbedtls_pkcs7_init(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Parse a single DER formatted PKCS #7 detached signature.
+ *
+ * \param pkcs7 The mbedtls_pkcs7 structure to be filled by the parser.
+ * \param buf The buffer holding only the DER encoded PKCS #7 content.
+ * \param buflen The size in bytes of \p buf. The size must be exactly the
+ * length of the DER encoded PKCS #7 content.
+ *
+ * \note This function makes an internal copy of the PKCS #7 buffer
+ * \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed or reused
+ * after this call returns.
+ * \note Signatures with internal data are not supported.
+ *
+ * \return The \c mbedtls_pkcs7_type of \p buf, if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pkcs7_parse_der(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, const unsigned char *buf,
+ const size_t buflen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Verification of PKCS #7 signature against a caller-supplied
+ * certificate.
+ *
+ * For each signer in the PKCS structure, this function computes
+ * a signature over the supplied data, using the supplied
+ * certificate and the same digest algorithm as specified by the
+ * signer. It then compares this signature against the
+ * signer's signature; verification succeeds if any comparison
+ * matches.
+ *
+ * This function does not use the certificates held within the
+ * PKCS #7 structure itself, and does not check that the
+ * certificate is signed by a trusted certification authority.
+ *
+ * \param pkcs7 mbedtls_pkcs7 structure containing signature.
+ * \param cert Certificate containing key to verify signature.
+ * \param data Plain data on which signature has to be verified.
+ * \param datalen Length of the data.
+ *
+ * \note This function internally calculates the hash on the supplied
+ * plain data for signature verification.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if the signature verifies, or a negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t datalen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Verification of PKCS #7 signature against a caller-supplied
+ * certificate.
+ *
+ * For each signer in the PKCS structure, this function
+ * validates a signature over the supplied hash, using the
+ * supplied certificate and the same digest algorithm as
+ * specified by the signer. Verification succeeds if any
+ * signature is good.
+ *
+ * This function does not use the certificates held within the
+ * PKCS #7 structure itself, and does not check that the
+ * certificate is signed by a trusted certification authority.
+ *
+ * \param pkcs7 PKCS #7 structure containing signature.
+ * \param cert Certificate containing key to verify signature.
+ * \param hash Hash of the plain data on which signature has to be verified.
+ * \param hashlen Length of the hash.
+ *
+ * \note This function is different from mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify()
+ * in that it is directly passed the hash of the data.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if the signature verifies, or a negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_hash_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hashlen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Unallocate all PKCS #7 data and zeroize the memory.
+ * It doesn't free \p pkcs7 itself. This should be done by the caller.
+ *
+ * \param pkcs7 mbedtls_pkcs7 structure to free.
+ */
+void mbedtls_pkcs7_free(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* pkcs7.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de3d71d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform.h
@@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
+/**
+ * \file platform.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains the definitions and functions of the
+ * Mbed TLS platform abstraction layer.
+ *
+ * The platform abstraction layer removes the need for the library
+ * to directly link to standard C library functions or operating
+ * system services, making the library easier to port and embed.
+ * Application developers and users of the library can provide their own
+ * implementations of these functions, or implementations specific to
+ * their platform, which can be statically linked to the library or
+ * dynamically configured at runtime.
+ *
+ * When all compilation options related to platform abstraction are
+ * disabled, this header just defines `mbedtls_xxx` function names
+ * as aliases to the standard `xxx` function.
+ *
+ * Most modules in the library and example programs are expected to
+ * include this header.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: Module settings
+ *
+ * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section.
+ * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line.
+ * \{
+ */
+
+/* The older Microsoft Windows common runtime provides non-conforming
+ * implementations of some standard library functions, including snprintf
+ * and vsnprintf. This affects MSVC and MinGW builds.
+ */
+#if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1900)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS)
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+#include <time.h>
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf /**< The default \c snprintf function to use. */
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF snprintf /**< The default \c snprintf function to use. */
+#endif
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf /**< The default \c vsnprintf function to use. */
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_VSNPRINTF vsnprintf /**< The default \c vsnprintf function to use. */
+#endif
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_PRINTF printf /**< The default \c printf function to use. */
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FPRINTF fprintf /**< The default \c fprintf function to use. */
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC calloc /**< The default \c calloc function to use. */
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE free /**< The default \c free function to use. */
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SETBUF setbuf /**< The default \c setbuf function to use. */
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT exit /**< The default \c exit function to use. */
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_TIME time /**< The default \c time function to use. */
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS EXIT_SUCCESS /**< The default exit value to use. */
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE EXIT_FAILURE /**< The default exit value to use. */
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_READ mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_WRITE mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_NV_SEED_FILE "seedfile"
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR)
+#include MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_MEM_HDR
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS */
+
+/* Enable certain documented defines only when generating doxygen to avoid
+ * an "unrecognized define" error. */
+#if defined(__DOXYGEN__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__DOXYGEN__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE)
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE
+#endif
+
+/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */
+
+/*
+ * The function pointers for calloc and free.
+ * Please see MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC and MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_FREE
+ * in mbedtls_config.h for more information about behaviour and requirements.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO)
+#undef mbedtls_free
+#undef mbedtls_calloc
+#define mbedtls_free MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO
+#define mbedtls_calloc MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO
+#else
+/* For size_t */
+#include <stddef.h>
+extern void *mbedtls_calloc(size_t n, size_t size);
+extern void mbedtls_free(void *ptr);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function dynamically sets the memory-management
+ * functions used by the library, during runtime.
+ *
+ * \param calloc_func The \c calloc function implementation.
+ * \param free_func The \c free function implementation.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0.
+ */
+int mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free(void *(*calloc_func)(size_t, size_t),
+ void (*free_func)(void *));
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO && MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO */
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY */
+#undef mbedtls_free
+#undef mbedtls_calloc
+#define mbedtls_free free
+#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE,CALLOC}_MACRO */
+
+/*
+ * The function pointers for fprintf
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT)
+/* We need FILE * */
+#include <stdio.h>
+extern int (*mbedtls_fprintf)(FILE *stream, const char *format, ...);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function dynamically configures the fprintf
+ * function that is called when the
+ * mbedtls_fprintf() function is invoked by the library.
+ *
+ * \param fprintf_func The \c fprintf function implementation.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0.
+ */
+int mbedtls_platform_set_fprintf(int (*fprintf_func)(FILE *stream, const char *,
+ ...));
+#else
+#undef mbedtls_fprintf
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO)
+#define mbedtls_fprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO
+#else
+#define mbedtls_fprintf fprintf
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_MACRO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FPRINTF_ALT */
+
+/*
+ * The function pointers for printf
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT)
+extern int (*mbedtls_printf)(const char *format, ...);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function dynamically configures the snprintf
+ * function that is called when the mbedtls_snprintf()
+ * function is invoked by the library.
+ *
+ * \param printf_func The \c printf function implementation.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ */
+int mbedtls_platform_set_printf(int (*printf_func)(const char *, ...));
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */
+#undef mbedtls_printf
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO)
+#define mbedtls_printf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO
+#else
+#define mbedtls_printf printf
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_MACRO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_PRINTF_ALT */
+
+/*
+ * The function pointers for snprintf
+ *
+ * The snprintf implementation should conform to C99:
+ * - it *must* always correctly zero-terminate the buffer
+ * (except when n == 0, then it must leave the buffer untouched)
+ * - however it is acceptable to return -1 instead of the required length when
+ * the destination buffer is too short.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_SNPRINTF)
+/* For Windows (inc. MSYS2), we provide our own fixed implementation */
+int mbedtls_platform_win32_snprintf(char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, ...);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT)
+extern int (*mbedtls_snprintf)(char *s, size_t n, const char *format, ...);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function allows configuring a custom
+ * \c snprintf function pointer.
+ *
+ * \param snprintf_func The \c snprintf function implementation.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ */
+int mbedtls_platform_set_snprintf(int (*snprintf_func)(char *s, size_t n,
+ const char *format, ...));
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */
+#undef mbedtls_snprintf
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO)
+#define mbedtls_snprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO
+#else
+#define mbedtls_snprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_SNPRINTF
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT */
+
+/*
+ * The function pointers for vsnprintf
+ *
+ * The vsnprintf implementation should conform to C99:
+ * - it *must* always correctly zero-terminate the buffer
+ * (except when n == 0, then it must leave the buffer untouched)
+ * - however it is acceptable to return -1 instead of the required length when
+ * the destination buffer is too short.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_NON_CONFORMING_VSNPRINTF)
+#include <stdarg.h>
+/* For Older Windows (inc. MSYS2), we provide our own fixed implementation */
+int mbedtls_platform_win32_vsnprintf(char *s, size_t n, const char *fmt, va_list arg);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT)
+#include <stdarg.h>
+extern int (*mbedtls_vsnprintf)(char *s, size_t n, const char *format, va_list arg);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set your own snprintf function pointer
+ *
+ * \param vsnprintf_func The \c vsnprintf function implementation
+ *
+ * \return \c 0
+ */
+int mbedtls_platform_set_vsnprintf(int (*vsnprintf_func)(char *s, size_t n,
+ const char *format, va_list arg));
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */
+#undef mbedtls_vsnprintf
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO)
+#define mbedtls_vsnprintf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO
+#else
+#define mbedtls_vsnprintf vsnprintf
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT */
+
+/*
+ * The function pointers for setbuf
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT)
+#include <stdio.h>
+/**
+ * \brief Function pointer to call for `setbuf()` functionality
+ * (changing the internal buffering on stdio calls).
+ *
+ * \note The library calls this function to disable
+ * buffering when reading or writing sensitive data,
+ * to avoid having extra copies of sensitive data
+ * remaining in stdio buffers after the file is
+ * closed. If this is not a concern, for example if
+ * your platform's stdio doesn't have any buffering,
+ * you can set mbedtls_setbuf to a function that
+ * does nothing.
+ *
+ * The library always calls this function with
+ * `buf` equal to `NULL`.
+ */
+extern void (*mbedtls_setbuf)(FILE *stream, char *buf);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Dynamically configure the function that is called
+ * when the mbedtls_setbuf() function is called by the
+ * library.
+ *
+ * \param setbuf_func The \c setbuf function implementation
+ *
+ * \return \c 0
+ */
+int mbedtls_platform_set_setbuf(void (*setbuf_func)(
+ FILE *stream, char *buf));
+#else
+#undef mbedtls_setbuf
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO)
+/**
+ * \brief Macro defining the function for the library to
+ * call for `setbuf` functionality (changing the
+ * internal buffering on stdio calls).
+ *
+ * \note See extra comments on the mbedtls_setbuf() function
+ * pointer above.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success, negative on error.
+ */
+#define mbedtls_setbuf MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO
+#else
+#define mbedtls_setbuf setbuf
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_MACRO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETBUF_ALT */
+
+/*
+ * The function pointers for exit
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT)
+extern void (*mbedtls_exit)(int status);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function dynamically configures the exit
+ * function that is called when the mbedtls_exit()
+ * function is invoked by the library.
+ *
+ * \param exit_func The \c exit function implementation.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ */
+int mbedtls_platform_set_exit(void (*exit_func)(int status));
+#else
+#undef mbedtls_exit
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO)
+#define mbedtls_exit MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO
+#else
+#define mbedtls_exit exit
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_MACRO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_EXIT_ALT */
+
+/*
+ * The default exit values
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS)
+#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_SUCCESS
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS 0
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE)
+#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_EXIT_FAILURE
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE 1
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The function pointers for reading from and writing a seed file to
+ * Non-Volatile storage (NV) in a platform-independent way
+ *
+ * Only enabled when the NV seed entropy source is enabled
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+/* Internal standard platform definitions */
+int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len);
+int mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT)
+extern int (*mbedtls_nv_seed_read)(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len);
+extern int (*mbedtls_nv_seed_write)(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function allows configuring custom seed file writing and
+ * reading functions.
+ *
+ * \param nv_seed_read_func The seed reading function implementation.
+ * \param nv_seed_write_func The seed writing function implementation.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ */
+int mbedtls_platform_set_nv_seed(
+ int (*nv_seed_read_func)(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len),
+ int (*nv_seed_write_func)(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len)
+ );
+#else
+#undef mbedtls_nv_seed_read
+#undef mbedtls_nv_seed_write
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO)
+#define mbedtls_nv_seed_read MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_READ_MACRO
+#define mbedtls_nv_seed_write MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_WRITE_MACRO
+#else
+#define mbedtls_nv_seed_read mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_read
+#define mbedtls_nv_seed_write mbedtls_platform_std_nv_seed_write
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT)
+
+/**
+ * \brief The platform context structure.
+ *
+ * \note This structure may be used to assist platform-specific
+ * setup or teardown operations.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_platform_context {
+ char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); /**< A placeholder member, as empty structs are not portable. */
+}
+mbedtls_platform_context;
+
+#else
+#include "platform_alt.h"
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SETUP_TEARDOWN_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs any platform-specific initialization
+ * operations.
+ *
+ * \note This function should be called before any other library functions.
+ *
+ * Its implementation is platform-specific, and unless
+ * platform-specific code is provided, it does nothing.
+ *
+ * \note The usage and necessity of this function is dependent on the platform.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The platform context.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ */
+int mbedtls_platform_setup(mbedtls_platform_context *ctx);
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs any platform teardown operations.
+ *
+ * \note This function should be called after every other Mbed TLS module
+ * has been correctly freed using the appropriate free function.
+ *
+ * Its implementation is platform-specific, and unless
+ * platform-specific code is provided, it does nothing.
+ *
+ * \note The usage and necessity of this function is dependent on the platform.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The platform context.
+ *
+ */
+void mbedtls_platform_teardown(mbedtls_platform_context *ctx);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* platform.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97f1963
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_time.h
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/**
+ * \file platform_time.h
+ *
+ * \brief Mbed TLS Platform time abstraction
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_H
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The time_t datatype
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO)
+typedef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO mbedtls_time_t;
+#else
+/* For time_t */
+#include <time.h>
+typedef time_t mbedtls_time_t;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_TYPE_MACRO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO)
+typedef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO mbedtls_ms_time_t;
+#else
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+typedef int64_t mbedtls_ms_time_t;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_TYPE_MACRO */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get time in milliseconds.
+ *
+ * \return Monotonically-increasing current time in milliseconds.
+ *
+ * \note Define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT to be able to provide an
+ * alternative implementation
+ *
+ * \warning This function returns a monotonically-increasing time value from a
+ * start time that will differ from platform to platform, and possibly
+ * from run to run of the process.
+ *
+ */
+mbedtls_ms_time_t mbedtls_ms_time(void);
+
+/*
+ * The function pointers for time
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT)
+extern mbedtls_time_t (*mbedtls_time)(mbedtls_time_t *time);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set your own time function pointer
+ *
+ * \param time_func the time function implementation
+ *
+ * \return 0
+ */
+int mbedtls_platform_set_time(mbedtls_time_t (*time_func)(mbedtls_time_t *time));
+#else
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO)
+#define mbedtls_time MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO
+#else
+#define mbedtls_time time
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_MACRO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_TIME_ALT */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* platform_time.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..adad6bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+/**
+ * \file platform_util.h
+ *
+ * \brief Common and shared functions used by multiple modules in the Mbed TLS
+ * library.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H
+#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
+#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
+#include <time.h>
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Internal helper macros for deprecating API constants. */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
+#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED __attribute__((deprecated))
+MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef char const *mbedtls_deprecated_string_constant_t;
+#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT(VAL) \
+ ((mbedtls_deprecated_string_constant_t) (VAL))
+MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED typedef int mbedtls_deprecated_numeric_constant_t;
+#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(VAL) \
+ ((mbedtls_deprecated_numeric_constant_t) (VAL))
+#else /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */
+#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED
+#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_STRING_CONSTANT(VAL) VAL
+#define MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(VAL) VAL
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+/* Implementation of the check-return facility.
+ * See the user documentation in mbedtls_config.h.
+ *
+ * Do not use this macro directly to annotate function: instead,
+ * use one of MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL or MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+ * depending on how important it is to check the return value.
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN)
+#if defined(__GNUC__)
+#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN __attribute__((__warn_unused_result__))
+#elif defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER >= 1700
+#include <sal.h>
+#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN _Check_return_
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/** Critical-failure function
+ *
+ * This macro appearing at the beginning of the declaration of a function
+ * indicates that its return value should be checked in all applications.
+ * Omitting the check is very likely to indicate a bug in the application
+ * and will result in a compile-time warning if #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN
+ * is implemented for the compiler in use.
+ *
+ * \note The use of this macro is a work in progress.
+ * This macro may be added to more functions in the future.
+ * Such an extension is not considered an API break, provided that
+ * there are near-unavoidable circumstances under which the function
+ * can fail. For example, signature/MAC/AEAD verification functions,
+ * and functions that require a random generator, are considered
+ * return-check-critical.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN
+
+/** Ordinary-failure function
+ *
+ * This macro appearing at the beginning of the declaration of a function
+ * indicates that its return value should be generally be checked in portable
+ * applications. Omitting the check will result in a compile-time warning if
+ * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN is implemented for the compiler in use and
+ * #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING is enabled in the compile-time configuration.
+ *
+ * You can use #MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN to explicitly ignore the return value
+ * of a function that is annotated with #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN.
+ *
+ * \note The use of this macro is a work in progress.
+ * This macro will be added to more functions in the future.
+ * Eventually this should appear before most functions returning
+ * an error code (as \c int in the \c mbedtls_xxx API or
+ * as ::psa_status_t in the \c psa_xxx API).
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_WARNING)
+#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_TYPICAL
+#endif
+
+/** Benign-failure function
+ *
+ * This macro appearing at the beginning of the declaration of a function
+ * indicates that it is rarely useful to check its return value.
+ *
+ * This macro has an empty expansion. It exists for documentation purposes:
+ * a #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_OPTIONAL annotation indicates that the function
+ * has been analyzed for return-check usefulness, whereas the lack of
+ * an annotation indicates that the function has not been analyzed and its
+ * return-check usefulness is unknown.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_OPTIONAL
+
+/** \def MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN
+ *
+ * Call this macro with one argument, a function call, to suppress a warning
+ * from #MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN due to that function call.
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN)
+/* GCC doesn't silence the warning with just (void)(result).
+ * (void)!(result) is known to work up at least up to GCC 10, as well
+ * as with Clang and MSVC.
+ *
+ * https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-3.4.6/gcc/Non_002dbugs.html
+ * https://stackoverflow.com/questions/40576003/ignoring-warning-wunused-result
+ * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=66425#c34
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_IGNORE_RETURN(result) ((void) !(result))
+#endif
+
+/* If the following macro is defined, the library is being built by the test
+ * framework, and the framework is going to provide a replacement
+ * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() using a preprocessor macro, so the function
+ * declaration should be omitted. */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_DEFINES_ZEROIZE) //no-check-names
+/**
+ * \brief Securely zeroize a buffer
+ *
+ * The function is meant to wipe the data contained in a buffer so
+ * that it can no longer be recovered even if the program memory
+ * is later compromised. Call this function on sensitive data
+ * stored on the stack before returning from a function, and on
+ * sensitive data stored on the heap before freeing the heap
+ * object.
+ *
+ * It is extremely difficult to guarantee that calls to
+ * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() are not removed by aggressive
+ * compiler optimizations in a portable way. For this reason, Mbed
+ * TLS provides the configuration option
+ * MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT, which allows users to configure
+ * mbedtls_platform_zeroize() to use a suitable implementation for
+ * their platform and needs
+ *
+ * \param buf Buffer to be zeroized
+ * \param len Length of the buffer in bytes
+ *
+ */
+void mbedtls_platform_zeroize(void *buf, size_t len);
+#endif
+
+/** \brief The type of custom random generator (RNG) callbacks.
+ *
+ * Many Mbed TLS functions take two parameters
+ * `mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng, void *p_rng`. The
+ * library will call \c f_rng to generate
+ * random values.
+ *
+ * \note This is typically one of the following:
+ * - mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random() with \c p_rng
+ * pointing to a #mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context;
+ * - mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random() with \c p_rng
+ * pointing to a #mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context;
+ * - mbedtls_psa_get_random() with
+ * `prng = MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE`.
+ *
+ * \note Generally, given a call
+ * `mbedtls_foo(f_rng, p_rng, ....)`, the RNG callback
+ * and the context only need to remain valid until
+ * the call to `mbedtls_foo` returns. However, there
+ * are a few exceptions where the callback is stored
+ * in for future use. Check the documentation of
+ * the calling function.
+ *
+ * \warning In a multithreaded environment, calling the
+ * function should be thread-safe. The standard
+ * functions provided by the library are thread-safe
+ * when #MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled.
+ *
+ * \warning This function must either provide as many
+ * bytes as requested of **cryptographic quality**
+ * random data, or return a negative error code.
+ *
+ * \param p_rng The \c p_rng argument that was passed along \c f_rng.
+ * The library always passes \c p_rng unchanged.
+ * This is typically a pointer to the random generator
+ * state, or \c NULL if the custom random generator
+ * doesn't need a context-specific state.
+ * \param[out] output On success, this must be filled with \p output_size
+ * bytes of cryptographic-quality random data.
+ * \param output_size The number of bytes to output.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success, or a negative error code on failure.
+ * Library functions will generally propagate this
+ * error code, so \c MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx values are
+ * recommended. #MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED is
+ * typically sensible for RNG failures.
+ */
+typedef int mbedtls_f_rng_t(void *p_rng,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_size);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
+/**
+ * \brief Platform-specific implementation of gmtime_r()
+ *
+ * The function is a thread-safe abstraction that behaves
+ * similarly to the gmtime_r() function from Unix/POSIX.
+ *
+ * Mbed TLS will try to identify the underlying platform and
+ * make use of an appropriate underlying implementation (e.g.
+ * gmtime_r() for POSIX and gmtime_s() for Windows). If this is
+ * not possible, then gmtime() will be used. In this case, calls
+ * from the library to gmtime() will be guarded by the mutex
+ * mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is
+ * enabled. It is recommended that calls from outside the library
+ * are also guarded by this mutex.
+ *
+ * If MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT is defined, then Mbed TLS will
+ * unconditionally use the alternative implementation for
+ * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r() supplied by the user at compile time.
+ *
+ * \param tt Pointer to an object containing time (in seconds) since the
+ * epoch to be converted
+ * \param tm_buf Pointer to an object where the results will be stored
+ *
+ * \return Pointer to an object of type struct tm on success, otherwise
+ * NULL
+ */
+struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(const mbedtls_time_t *tt,
+ struct tm *tm_buf);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_UTIL_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61bcaa6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/poly1305.h
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+/**
+ * \file poly1305.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains Poly1305 definitions and functions.
+ *
+ * Poly1305 is a one-time message authenticator that can be used to
+ * authenticate messages. Poly1305-AES was created by Daniel
+ * Bernstein https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf The generic
+ * Poly1305 algorithm (not tied to AES) was also standardized in RFC
+ * 7539.
+ *
+ * \author Daniel King <damaki.gh@gmail.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H
+#define MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+/** Invalid input parameter(s). */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0057
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT)
+
+typedef struct mbedtls_poly1305_context {
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(r)[4]; /** The value for 'r' (low 128 bits of the key). */
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(s)[4]; /** The value for 's' (high 128 bits of the key). */
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(acc)[5]; /** The accumulator number. */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(queue)[16]; /** The current partial block of data. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(queue_len); /** The number of bytes stored in 'queue'. */
+}
+mbedtls_poly1305_context;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */
+#include "poly1305_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes the specified Poly1305 context.
+ *
+ * It must be the first API called before using
+ * the context.
+ *
+ * It is usually followed by a call to
+ * \c mbedtls_poly1305_starts(), then one or more calls to
+ * \c mbedtls_poly1305_update(), then one call to
+ * \c mbedtls_poly1305_finish(), then finally
+ * \c mbedtls_poly1305_free().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to initialize. This must
+ * not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_poly1305_init(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function releases and clears the specified
+ * Poly1305 context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which
+ * case this function is a no-op. If it is not \c NULL, it must
+ * point to an initialized Poly1305 context.
+ */
+void mbedtls_poly1305_free(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets the one-time authentication key.
+ *
+ * \warning The key must be unique and unpredictable for each
+ * invocation of Poly1305.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to which the key should be bound.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param key The buffer containing the \c 32 Byte (\c 256 Bit) key.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_poly1305_starts(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char key[32]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This functions feeds an input buffer into an ongoing
+ * Poly1305 computation.
+ *
+ * It is called between \c mbedtls_cipher_poly1305_starts() and
+ * \c mbedtls_cipher_poly1305_finish().
+ * It can be called repeatedly to process a stream of data.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to use for the Poly1305 operation.
+ * This must be initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ * Any value is accepted.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_poly1305_update(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function generates the Poly1305 Message
+ * Authentication Code (MAC).
+ *
+ * \param ctx The Poly1305 context to use for the Poly1305 operation.
+ * This must be initialized and bound to a key.
+ * \param mac The buffer to where the MAC is written. This must
+ * be a writable buffer of length \c 16 Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_poly1305_finish(mbedtls_poly1305_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char mac[16]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function calculates the Poly1305 MAC of the input
+ * buffer with the provided key.
+ *
+ * \warning The key must be unique and unpredictable for each
+ * invocation of Poly1305.
+ *
+ * \param key The buffer containing the \c 32 Byte (\c 256 Bit) key.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ * Any value is accepted.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * This pointer can be \c NULL if `ilen == 0`.
+ * \param mac The buffer to where the MAC is written. This must be
+ * a writable buffer of length \c 16 Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_poly1305_mac(const unsigned char key[32],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char mac[16]);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/**
+ * \brief The Poly1305 checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c 1 on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_poly1305_self_test(int verbose);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/private_access.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/private_access.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..580f3eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/private_access.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/**
+ * \file private_access.h
+ *
+ * \brief Macro wrapper for struct's members.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_PRIVATE_ACCESS_H
+#define MBEDTLS_PRIVATE_ACCESS_H
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS
+#define MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(member) private_##member
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(member) member
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PRIVATE_ACCESS_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b898f1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa_util.h
+ *
+ * \brief Utility functions for the use of the PSA Crypto library.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+
+/* ASN1 defines used in the ECDSA conversion functions.
+ * Note: intentionally not adding MBEDTLS_ASN1_[PARSE|WRITE]_C guards here
+ * otherwise error codes would be unknown in test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data.*/
+#include <mbedtls/asn1write.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
+
+/** The random generator function for the PSA subsystem.
+ *
+ * This function is suitable as the `f_rng` random generator function
+ * parameter of many `mbedtls_xxx` functions.
+ *
+ * The implementation of this function depends on the configuration of the
+ * library.
+ *
+ * \note This function may only be used if the PSA crypto subsystem is active.
+ * This means that you must call psa_crypto_init() before any call to
+ * this function, and you must not call this function after calling
+ * mbedtls_psa_crypto_free().
+ *
+ * \param p_rng This parameter is only kept for backward compatibility
+ * reasons with legacy `f_rng` functions and it's ignored.
+ * Set to #MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE or NULL.
+ * \param output The buffer to fill. It must have room for
+ * \c output_size bytes.
+ * \param output_size The number of bytes to write to \p output.
+ * This function may fail if \p output_size is too
+ * large. It is guaranteed to accept any output size
+ * requested by Mbed TLS library functions. The
+ * maximum request size depends on the library
+ * configuration.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An `MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_xxx`,
+ * `MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_xxx,
+ * `MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_xxx` or
+ * `MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_xxx` on error.
+ */
+int mbedtls_psa_get_random(void *p_rng,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_size);
+
+/** The random generator state for the PSA subsystem.
+ *
+ * This macro always expands to NULL because the `p_rng` parameter is unused
+ * in mbedtls_psa_get_random(), but it's kept for interface's backward
+ * compatibility.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE NULL
+
+/** \defgroup psa_tls_helpers TLS helper functions
+ * @{
+ */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
+#include <mbedtls/ecp.h>
+
+/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the Mbed TLS encoding to PSA.
+ *
+ * \param grpid An Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier
+ * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`).
+ * \param[out] bits On success the bit size of the curve; 0 on failure.
+ *
+ * \return If the curve is supported in the PSA API, this function
+ * returns the proper PSA curve identifier
+ * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). This holds even if the curve is
+ * not supported by the ECP module.
+ * \return \c 0 if the curve is not supported in the PSA API.
+ */
+psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid,
+ size_t *bits);
+
+/** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the PSA encoding to Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * \param family A PSA elliptic curve family identifier
+ * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`).
+ * \param bits The bit-length of a private key on \p curve.
+ *
+ * \return If the curve is supported in the PSA API, this function
+ * returns the corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve
+ * identifier (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`).
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if the combination of \c curve
+ * and \p bits is not supported.
+ */
+mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family,
+ size_t bits);
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the PSA algorithm identifier
+ * associated with the given digest type.
+ *
+ * \param md_type The type of digest to search for. Must not be NONE.
+ *
+ * \warning If \p md_type is \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this function will
+ * not return \c PSA_ALG_NONE, but an invalid algorithm.
+ *
+ * \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is
+ * supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier.
+ *
+ * \return The PSA algorithm identifier associated with \p md_type,
+ * regardless of whether it is supported or not.
+ */
+static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type)
+{
+ return PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | (psa_algorithm_t) md_type;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function returns the given digest type
+ * associated with the PSA algorithm identifier.
+ *
+ * \param psa_alg The PSA algorithm identifier to search for.
+ *
+ * \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is
+ * supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier.
+ *
+ * \return The MD type associated with \p psa_alg,
+ * regardless of whether it is supported or not.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg)
+{
+ return (mbedtls_md_type_t) (psa_alg & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA)
+
+/** Convert an ECDSA signature from raw format to DER ASN.1 format.
+ *
+ * \param bits Size of each coordinate in bits.
+ * \param raw Buffer that contains the signature in raw format.
+ * \param raw_len Length of \p raw in bytes. This must be
+ * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) bytes.
+ * \param[out] der Buffer that will be filled with the converted DER
+ * output. It can overlap with raw buffer.
+ * \param der_size Size of \p der in bytes. It is enough if \p der_size
+ * is at least the size of the actual output. (The size
+ * of the output can vary depending on the presence of
+ * leading zeros in the data.) You can use
+ * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN(\p bits) to determine a
+ * size that is large enough for all signatures for a
+ * given value of \p bits.
+ * \param[out] der_len On success it contains the amount of valid data
+ * (in bytes) written to \p der. It's undefined
+ * in case of failure.
+ *
+ * \note The behavior is undefined if \p der is null,
+ * even if \p der_size is 0.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL if \p der_size
+ * is too small or if \p bits is larger than the
+ * largest supported curve.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA if one of the
+ * numbers in the signature is 0.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len,
+ unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len);
+
+/** Convert an ECDSA signature from DER ASN.1 format to raw format.
+ *
+ * \param bits Size of each coordinate in bits.
+ * \param der Buffer that contains the signature in DER format.
+ * \param der_len Size of \p der in bytes.
+ * \param[out] raw Buffer that will be filled with the converted raw
+ * signature. It can overlap with der buffer.
+ * \param raw_size Size of \p raw in bytes. Must be at least
+ * 2 * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) bytes.
+ * \param[out] raw_len On success it is updated with the amount of valid
+ * data (in bytes) written to \p raw. It's undefined
+ * in case of failure.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL if \p raw_size
+ * is too small or if \p bits is larger than the
+ * largest supported curve.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA if the data in
+ * \p der is inconsistent with \p bits.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx error code if
+ * \p der is malformed.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(size_t bits, const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len,
+ unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */
+
+/**@}*/
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..279f92b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ripemd160.h
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+/**
+ * \file ripemd160.h
+ *
+ * \brief RIPE MD-160 message digest
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H
+#define MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT)
+// Regular implementation
+//
+
+/**
+ * \brief RIPEMD-160 context structure
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ripemd160_context {
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< number of bytes processed */
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[5]; /*!< intermediate digest state */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[64]; /*!< data block being processed */
+}
+mbedtls_ripemd160_context;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */
+#include "ripemd160_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize RIPEMD-160 context
+ *
+ * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context to be initialized
+ */
+void mbedtls_ripemd160_init(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Clear RIPEMD-160 context
+ *
+ * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context to be cleared
+ */
+void mbedtls_ripemd160_free(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Clone (the state of) a RIPEMD-160 context
+ *
+ * \param dst The destination context
+ * \param src The context to be cloned
+ */
+void mbedtls_ripemd160_clone(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *dst,
+ const mbedtls_ripemd160_context *src);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RIPEMD-160 context setup
+ *
+ * \param ctx context to be initialized
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ */
+int mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RIPEMD-160 process buffer
+ *
+ * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context
+ * \param input buffer holding the data
+ * \param ilen length of the input data
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ */
+int mbedtls_ripemd160_update(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RIPEMD-160 final digest
+ *
+ * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context
+ * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ */
+int mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char output[20]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief RIPEMD-160 process data block (internal use only)
+ *
+ * \param ctx RIPEMD-160 context
+ * \param data buffer holding one block of data
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ */
+int mbedtls_internal_ripemd160_process(mbedtls_ripemd160_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char data[64]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Output = RIPEMD-160( input buffer )
+ *
+ * \param input buffer holding the data
+ * \param ilen length of the input data
+ * \param output RIPEMD-160 checksum result
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ */
+int mbedtls_ripemd160(const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char output[20]);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Checkup routine
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed
+ */
+int mbedtls_ripemd160_self_test(int verbose);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* mbedtls_ripemd160.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f0881a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/rsa.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1164 @@
+/**
+ * \file rsa.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file provides an API for the RSA public-key cryptosystem.
+ *
+ * The RSA public-key cryptosystem is defined in <em>Public-Key
+ * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v1.5: RSA Encryption</em>
+ * and <em>Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1:
+ * RSA Cryptography Specifications</em>.
+ *
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_RSA_H
+#define MBEDTLS_RSA_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * RSA Error codes
+ */
+/** Bad input parameters to function. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x4080
+/** Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING -0x4100
+/** Something failed during generation of a key. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED -0x4180
+/** Key failed to pass the validity check of the library. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED -0x4200
+/** The public key operation failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED -0x4280
+/** The private key operation failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED -0x4300
+/** The PKCS#1 verification failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED -0x4380
+/** The output buffer for decryption is not large enough. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE -0x4400
+/** The random generator failed to generate non-zeros. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED -0x4480
+
+/*
+ * RSA constants
+ */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 0 /**< Use PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding. */
+#define MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 1 /**< Use PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding. */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN 1 /**< Identifier for RSA signature operations. */
+#define MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT 2 /**< Identifier for RSA encryption and decryption operations. */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY -1
+
+/*
+ * The above constants may be used even if the RSA module is compile out,
+ * eg for alternative (PKCS#11) RSA implementations in the PK layers.
+ */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+// Regular implementation
+//
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS)
+#define MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS 1024
+#elif MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS < 128
+#error "MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS must be at least 128 bits"
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief The RSA context structure.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_rsa_context {
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ver); /*!< Reserved for internal purposes.
+ * Do not set this field in application
+ * code. Its meaning might change without
+ * notice. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len); /*!< The size of \p N in Bytes. */
+
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(N); /*!< The public modulus. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(E); /*!< The public exponent. */
+
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(D); /*!< The private exponent. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(P); /*!< The first prime factor. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q); /*!< The second prime factor. */
+
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(DP); /*!< <code>D % (P - 1)</code>. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(DQ); /*!< <code>D % (Q - 1)</code>. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(QP); /*!< <code>1 / (Q % P)</code>. */
+
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(RN); /*!< cached <code>R^2 mod N</code>. */
+
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(RP); /*!< cached <code>R^2 mod P</code>. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(RQ); /*!< cached <code>R^2 mod Q</code>. */
+
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vi); /*!< The cached blinding value. */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Vf); /*!< The cached un-blinding value. */
+
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(padding); /*!< Selects padding mode:
+ #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 for 1.5 padding and
+ #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 for OAEP or PSS. */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hash_id); /*!< Hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type,
+ as specified in md.h for use in the MGF
+ mask generating function used in the
+ EME-OAEP and EMSA-PSS encodings. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ /* Invariant: the mutex is initialized iff ver != 0. */
+ mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); /*!< Thread-safety mutex. */
+#endif
+}
+mbedtls_rsa_context;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
+#include "rsa_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes an RSA context.
+ *
+ * \note This function initializes the padding and the hash
+ * identifier to respectively #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 and
+ * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. See mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() for more
+ * information about those parameters.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The RSA context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_rsa_init(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function sets padding for an already initialized RSA
+ * context.
+ *
+ * \note Set padding to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 for the RSAES-OAEP
+ * encryption scheme and the RSASSA-PSS signature scheme.
+ *
+ * \note The \p hash_id parameter is ignored when using
+ * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 padding.
+ *
+ * \note The choice of padding mode is strictly enforced for private
+ * key operations, since there might be security concerns in
+ * mixing padding modes. For public key operations it is
+ * a default value, which can be overridden by calling specific
+ * \c mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_xxx or \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_xxx
+ * functions.
+ *
+ * \note The hash selected in \p hash_id is always used for OEAP
+ * encryption. For PSS signatures, it is always used for
+ * making signatures, but can be overridden for verifying them.
+ * If set to #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, it is always overridden.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to be configured.
+ * \param padding The padding mode to use. This must be either
+ * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 or #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21.
+ * \param hash_id The hash identifier for PSS or OAEP, if \p padding is
+ * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21. #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE is accepted by this
+ * function but may be not suitable for some operations.
+ * Ignored if \p padding is #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING failure:
+ * \p padding or \p hash_id is invalid.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t hash_id);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function retrieves padding mode of initialized
+ * RSA context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context.
+ *
+ * \return RSA padding mode.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function retrieves hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t
+ * type.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context.
+ *
+ * \return Hash identifier of mbedtls_md_type_t type.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function imports a set of core parameters into an
+ * RSA context.
+ *
+ * \note This function can be called multiple times for successive
+ * imports, if the parameters are not simultaneously present.
+ *
+ * Any sequence of calls to this function should be followed
+ * by a call to mbedtls_rsa_complete(), which checks and
+ * completes the provided information to a ready-for-use
+ * public or private RSA key.
+ *
+ * \note See mbedtls_rsa_complete() for more information on which
+ * parameters are necessary to set up a private or public
+ * RSA key.
+ *
+ * \note The imported parameters are copied and need not be preserved
+ * for the lifetime of the RSA context being set up.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to store the parameters in.
+ * \param N The RSA modulus. This may be \c NULL.
+ * \param P The first prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL.
+ * \param Q The second prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL.
+ * \param D The private exponent. This may be \c NULL.
+ * \param E The public exponent. This may be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A non-zero error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_import(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *N,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function imports core RSA parameters, in raw big-endian
+ * binary format, into an RSA context.
+ *
+ * \note This function can be called multiple times for successive
+ * imports, if the parameters are not simultaneously present.
+ *
+ * Any sequence of calls to this function should be followed
+ * by a call to mbedtls_rsa_complete(), which checks and
+ * completes the provided information to a ready-for-use
+ * public or private RSA key.
+ *
+ * \note See mbedtls_rsa_complete() for more information on which
+ * parameters are necessary to set up a private or public
+ * RSA key.
+ *
+ * \note The imported parameters are copied and need not be preserved
+ * for the lifetime of the RSA context being set up.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to store the parameters in.
+ * \param N The RSA modulus. This may be \c NULL.
+ * \param N_len The Byte length of \p N; it is ignored if \p N == NULL.
+ * \param P The first prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL.
+ * \param P_len The Byte length of \p P; it is ignored if \p P == NULL.
+ * \param Q The second prime factor of \p N. This may be \c NULL.
+ * \param Q_len The Byte length of \p Q; it is ignored if \p Q == NULL.
+ * \param D The private exponent. This may be \c NULL.
+ * \param D_len The Byte length of \p D; it is ignored if \p D == NULL.
+ * \param E The public exponent. This may be \c NULL.
+ * \param E_len The Byte length of \p E; it is ignored if \p E == NULL.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A non-zero error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char const *N, size_t N_len,
+ unsigned char const *P, size_t P_len,
+ unsigned char const *Q, size_t Q_len,
+ unsigned char const *D, size_t D_len,
+ unsigned char const *E, size_t E_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function completes an RSA context from
+ * a set of imported core parameters.
+ *
+ * To setup an RSA public key, precisely \c N and \c E
+ * must have been imported.
+ *
+ * To setup an RSA private key, sufficient information must
+ * be present for the other parameters to be derivable.
+ *
+ * The default implementation supports the following:
+ * <ul><li>Derive \c P, \c Q from \c N, \c D, \c E.</li>
+ * <li>Derive \c N, \c D from \c P, \c Q, \c E.</li></ul>
+ * Alternative implementations need not support these.
+ *
+ * If this function runs successfully, it guarantees that
+ * the RSA context can be used for RSA operations without
+ * the risk of failure or crash.
+ *
+ * \warning This function need not perform consistency checks
+ * for the imported parameters. In particular, parameters that
+ * are not needed by the implementation might be silently
+ * discarded and left unchecked. To check the consistency
+ * of the key material, see mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context holding imported parameters.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the attempted derivations
+ * failed.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_complete(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function exports the core parameters of an RSA key.
+ *
+ * If this function runs successfully, the non-NULL buffers
+ * pointed to by \p N, \p P, \p Q, \p D, and \p E are fully
+ * written, with additional unused space filled leading by
+ * zero Bytes.
+ *
+ * Possible reasons for returning
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED:<ul>
+ * <li>An alternative RSA implementation is in use, which
+ * stores the key externally, and either cannot or should
+ * not export it into RAM.</li>
+ * <li>A SW or HW implementation might not support a certain
+ * deduction. For example, \p P, \p Q from \p N, \p D,
+ * and \p E if the former are not part of the
+ * implementation.</li></ul>
+ *
+ * If the function fails due to an unsupported operation,
+ * the RSA context stays intact and remains usable.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context.
+ * \param N The MPI to hold the RSA modulus.
+ * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported.
+ * \param P The MPI to hold the first prime factor of \p N.
+ * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported.
+ * \param Q The MPI to hold the second prime factor of \p N.
+ * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported.
+ * \param D The MPI to hold the private exponent.
+ * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported.
+ * \param E The MPI to hold the public exponent.
+ * This may be \c NULL if this field need not be exported.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED if exporting the
+ * requested parameters cannot be done due to missing
+ * functionality or because of security policies.
+ * \return A non-zero return code on any other failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_export(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q,
+ mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *E);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function exports core parameters of an RSA key
+ * in raw big-endian binary format.
+ *
+ * If this function runs successfully, the non-NULL buffers
+ * pointed to by \p N, \p P, \p Q, \p D, and \p E are fully
+ * written, with additional unused space filled leading by
+ * zero Bytes.
+ *
+ * Possible reasons for returning
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED:<ul>
+ * <li>An alternative RSA implementation is in use, which
+ * stores the key externally, and either cannot or should
+ * not export it into RAM.</li>
+ * <li>A SW or HW implementation might not support a certain
+ * deduction. For example, \p P, \p Q from \p N, \p D,
+ * and \p E if the former are not part of the
+ * implementation.</li></ul>
+ * If the function fails due to an unsupported operation,
+ * the RSA context stays intact and remains usable.
+ *
+ * \note The length parameters are ignored if the corresponding
+ * buffer pointers are NULL.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context.
+ * \param N The Byte array to store the RSA modulus,
+ * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported.
+ * \param N_len The size of the buffer for the modulus.
+ * \param P The Byte array to hold the first prime factor of \p N,
+ * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported.
+ * \param P_len The size of the buffer for the first prime factor.
+ * \param Q The Byte array to hold the second prime factor of \p N,
+ * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported.
+ * \param Q_len The size of the buffer for the second prime factor.
+ * \param D The Byte array to hold the private exponent,
+ * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported.
+ * \param D_len The size of the buffer for the private exponent.
+ * \param E The Byte array to hold the public exponent,
+ * or \c NULL if this field need not be exported.
+ * \param E_len The size of the buffer for the public exponent.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED if exporting the
+ * requested parameters cannot be done due to missing
+ * functionality or because of security policies.
+ * \return A non-zero return code on any other failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *N, size_t N_len,
+ unsigned char *P, size_t P_len,
+ unsigned char *Q, size_t Q_len,
+ unsigned char *D, size_t D_len,
+ unsigned char *E, size_t E_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function exports CRT parameters of a private RSA key.
+ *
+ * \note Alternative RSA implementations not using CRT-parameters
+ * internally can implement this function based on
+ * mbedtls_rsa_deduce_opt().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context.
+ * \param DP The MPI to hold \c D modulo `P-1`,
+ * or \c NULL if it need not be exported.
+ * \param DQ The MPI to hold \c D modulo `Q-1`,
+ * or \c NULL if it need not be exported.
+ * \param QP The MPI to hold modular inverse of \c Q modulo \c P,
+ * or \c NULL if it need not be exported.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A non-zero error code on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function retrieves the length of the RSA modulus in bits.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context.
+ *
+ * \return The length of the RSA modulus in bits.
+ *
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function retrieves the length of RSA modulus in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context.
+ *
+ * \return The length of the RSA modulus in Bytes.
+ *
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function generates an RSA keypair.
+ *
+ * \note mbedtls_rsa_init() must be called before this function,
+ * to set up the RSA context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context used to hold the key.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to be used for key generation.
+ * This is mandatory and must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng.
+ * This may be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
+ * \param nbits The size of the public key in bits.
+ * \param exponent The public exponent to use. For example, \c 65537.
+ * This must be odd and greater than \c 1.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng,
+ unsigned int nbits, int exponent);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function checks if a context contains at least an RSA
+ * public key.
+ *
+ * If the function runs successfully, it is guaranteed that
+ * enough information is present to perform an RSA public key
+ * operation using mbedtls_rsa_public().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to check.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function checks if a context contains an RSA private key
+ * and perform basic consistency checks.
+ *
+ * \note The consistency checks performed by this function not only
+ * ensure that mbedtls_rsa_private() can be called successfully
+ * on the given context, but that the various parameters are
+ * mutually consistent with high probability, in the sense that
+ * mbedtls_rsa_public() and mbedtls_rsa_private() are inverses.
+ *
+ * \warning This function should catch accidental misconfigurations
+ * like swapping of parameters, but it cannot establish full
+ * trust in neither the quality nor the consistency of the key
+ * material that was used to setup the given RSA context:
+ * <ul><li>Consistency: Imported parameters that are irrelevant
+ * for the implementation might be silently dropped. If dropped,
+ * the current function does not have access to them,
+ * and therefore cannot check them. See mbedtls_rsa_complete().
+ * If you want to check the consistency of the entire
+ * content of a PKCS1-encoded RSA private key, for example, you
+ * should use mbedtls_rsa_validate_params() before setting
+ * up the RSA context.
+ * Additionally, if the implementation performs empirical checks,
+ * these checks substantiate but do not guarantee consistency.</li>
+ * <li>Quality: This function is not expected to perform
+ * extended quality assessments like checking that the prime
+ * factors are safe. Additionally, it is the responsibility of the
+ * user to ensure the trustworthiness of the source of his RSA
+ * parameters, which goes beyond what is effectively checkable
+ * by the library.</li></ul>
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to check.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function checks a public-private RSA key pair.
+ *
+ * It checks each of the contexts, and makes sure they match.
+ *
+ * \param pub The initialized RSA context holding the public key.
+ * \param prv The initialized RSA context holding the private key.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv(const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub,
+ const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs an RSA public key operation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
+ * \param input The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer
+ * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer
+ * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ *
+ * \note This function does not handle message padding.
+ *
+ * \note Make sure to set \p input[0] = 0 or ensure that
+ * input is smaller than \c N.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_public(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs an RSA private key operation.
+ *
+ * \note Blinding is used if and only if a PRNG is provided.
+ *
+ * \note If blinding is used, both the base of exponentiation
+ * and the exponent are blinded, providing protection
+ * against some side-channel attacks.
+ *
+ * \warning It is deprecated and a security risk to not provide
+ * a PRNG here and thereby prevent the use of blinding.
+ * Future versions of the library may enforce the presence
+ * of a PRNG.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function, used for blinding. It is mandatory.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to pass to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL
+ * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
+ * \param input The input buffer. This must be a readable buffer
+ * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer
+ * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function adds the message padding, then performs an RSA
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 encryption
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG to use. It is used for padding generation
+ * and it is mandatory.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. May be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ * \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes.
+ * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
+ * `ilen == 0`.
+ * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer
+ * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng,
+ size_t ilen,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption operation
+ * (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5-ENCRYPT).
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. It is mandatory and used for
+ * padding generation.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may
+ * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ * \param ilen The length of the plaintext in Bytes.
+ * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
+ * `ilen == 0`.
+ * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer
+ * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng,
+ size_t ilen,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 OAEP encryption
+ * operation (RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT).
+ *
+ * \note The output buffer must be as large as the size
+ * of ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This is needed for padding
+ * generation and is mandatory.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may
+ * be \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ * \param label The buffer holding the custom label to use.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of length \p label_len
+ * Bytes. It may be \c NULL if \p label_len is \c 0.
+ * \param label_len The length of the label in Bytes.
+ * \param ilen The length of the plaintext buffer \p input in Bytes.
+ * \param input The input data to encrypt. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of size \p ilen Bytes. It may be \c NULL if
+ * `ilen == 0`.
+ * \param output The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer
+ * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng,
+ const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
+ size_t ilen,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs an RSA operation, then removes the
+ * message padding.
+ *
+ * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 decryption
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * \warning When \p ctx->padding is set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15,
+ * mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt() is called, which is an
+ * inherently dangerous function (CWE-242).
+ *
+ * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be
+ * as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N (for example,
+ * 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used) to be able to hold an
+ * arbitrary decrypted message. If it is not large enough to
+ * hold the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided,
+ * the function returns \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is
+ * mandatory; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the length of
+ * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer
+ * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ * \param output The buffer used to hold the plaintext. This must
+ * be a writable buffer of length \p output_max_len Bytes.
+ * \param output_max_len The length in Bytes of the output buffer \p output.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng,
+ size_t *olen,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_max_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption
+ * operation (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5-DECRYPT).
+ *
+ * \warning This is an inherently dangerous function (CWE-242). Unless
+ * it is used in a side channel free and safe way (eg.
+ * implementing the TLS protocol as per 7.4.7.1 of RFC 5246),
+ * the calling code is vulnerable.
+ *
+ * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be
+ * as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N, for example,
+ * 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used, to be able to hold an
+ * arbitrary decrypted message. If it is not large enough to
+ * hold the decryption of the particular ciphertext provided,
+ * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is
+ * mandatory; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the length of
+ * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer
+ * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ * \param output The buffer used to hold the plaintext. This must
+ * be a writable buffer of length \p output_max_len Bytes.
+ * \param output_max_len The length in Bytes of the output buffer \p output.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng,
+ size_t *olen,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_max_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 OAEP decryption
+ * operation (RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT).
+ *
+ * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be
+ * as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N, for
+ * example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used, to be able to
+ * hold an arbitrary decrypted message. If it is not
+ * large enough to hold the decryption of the particular
+ * ciphertext provided, the function returns
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is
+ * mandatory.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context.
+ * \param label The buffer holding the custom label to use.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of length \p label_len
+ * Bytes. It may be \c NULL if \p label_len is \c 0.
+ * \param label_len The length of the label in Bytes.
+ * \param olen The address at which to store the length of
+ * the plaintext. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param input The ciphertext buffer. This must be a readable buffer
+ * of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ * \param output The buffer used to hold the plaintext. This must
+ * be a writable buffer of length \p output_max_len Bytes.
+ * \param output_max_len The length in Bytes of the output buffer \p output.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng,
+ const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
+ size_t *olen,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_max_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a private RSA operation to sign
+ * a message digest using PKCS#1.
+ *
+ * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1
+ * signature.
+ *
+ * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size
+ * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used.
+ *
+ * \note For PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding, see comments on
+ * mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign() for details on
+ * \p md_alg and \p hash_id.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This is mandatory and
+ * must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL
+ * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
+ * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data.
+ * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes.
+ * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the
+ * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm.
+ * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes.
+ * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable
+ * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of
+ * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ unsigned char *sig);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature
+ * operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-SIGN).
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. This is used for blinding and is
+ * mandatory; see mbedtls_rsa_private() for more.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL
+ * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
+ * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data.
+ * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes.
+ * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the
+ * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm.
+ * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes.
+ * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable
+ * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of
+ * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ unsigned char *sig);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS signature
+ * operation (RSASSA-PSS-SIGN).
+ *
+ * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx by calling
+ * mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() selects the hash used for the
+ * encoding operation and for the mask generation function
+ * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the
+ * mask generation function, consult <em>RFC-3447: Public-Key
+ * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography
+ * Specifications</em>.
+ *
+ * \note This function enforces that the provided salt length complies
+ * with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017 (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1
+ * step 3. The constraint is that the hash length plus the salt
+ * length plus 2 bytes must be at most the key length. If this
+ * constraint is not met, this function returns
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. It is mandatory and must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL
+ * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
+ * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data.
+ * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes.
+ * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the
+ * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm.
+ * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes.
+ * \param saltlen The length of the salt that should be used.
+ * If passed #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, the function will use
+ * the largest possible salt length up to the hash length,
+ * which is the largest permitted by some standards including
+ * FIPS 186-4 §5.5.
+ * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable
+ * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of
+ * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ int saltlen,
+ unsigned char *sig);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS signature
+ * operation (RSASSA-PSS-SIGN).
+ *
+ * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx by calling
+ * mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() selects the hash used for the
+ * encoding operation and for the mask generation function
+ * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the
+ * mask generation function, consult <em>RFC-3447: Public-Key
+ * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography
+ * Specifications</em>.
+ *
+ * \note This function always uses the maximum possible salt size,
+ * up to the length of the payload hash. This choice of salt
+ * size complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017 (PKCS#1
+ * v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. Furthermore this function enforces a
+ * minimum salt size which is the hash size minus 2 bytes. If
+ * this minimum size is too large given the key size (the salt
+ * size, plus the hash size, plus 2 bytes must be no more than
+ * the key size in bytes), this function returns
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA context to use.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function. It is mandatory and must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c NULL
+ * if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
+ * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data.
+ * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes.
+ * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the
+ * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm.
+ * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes.
+ * \param sig The buffer to hold the signature. This must be a writable
+ * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus. A buffer length of
+ * #MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE is always safe.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the signing operation was successful.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ unsigned char *sig);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a public RSA operation and checks
+ * the message digest.
+ *
+ * This is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1
+ * verification.
+ *
+ * \note For PKCS#1 v2.1 encoding, see comments on
+ * mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify() about \c md_alg and
+ * \c hash_id.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use.
+ * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
+ * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data.
+ * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes.
+ * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the
+ * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm.
+ * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes.
+ * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ const unsigned char *sig);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 verification
+ * operation (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY).
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use.
+ * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
+ * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data.
+ * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes.
+ * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the
+ * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm.
+ * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes.
+ * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ const unsigned char *sig);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS verification
+ * operation (RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY).
+ *
+ * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx by calling
+ * mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() selects the hash used for the
+ * encoding operation and for the mask generation function
+ * (MGF1). For more details on the encoding operation and the
+ * mask generation function, consult <em>RFC-3447: Public-Key
+ * Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography
+ * Specifications</em>. If the \c hash_id set in \p ctx by
+ * mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, the \p md_alg
+ * parameter is used.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use.
+ * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
+ * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data.
+ * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes.
+ * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the
+ * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm.
+ * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes.
+ * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ const unsigned char *sig);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS verification
+ * operation (RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY).
+ *
+ * \note The \p sig buffer must be as large as the size
+ * of \p ctx->N. For example, 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used.
+ *
+ * \note The \c hash_id set in \p ctx by mbedtls_rsa_set_padding() is
+ * ignored.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized RSA public key context to use.
+ * \param md_alg The message-digest algorithm used to hash the original data.
+ * Use #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE for signing raw data.
+ * \param hashlen The length of the message digest or raw data in Bytes.
+ * If \p md_alg is not #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this must match the
+ * output length of the corresponding hash algorithm.
+ * \param hash The buffer holding the message digest or raw data.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of at least \p hashlen Bytes.
+ * \param mgf1_hash_id The message digest algorithm used for the
+ * verification operation and the mask generation
+ * function (MGF1). For more details on the encoding
+ * operation and the mask generation function, consult
+ * <em>RFC-3447: Public-Key Cryptography Standards
+ * (PKCS) #1 v2.1: RSA Cryptography
+ * Specifications</em>.
+ * \param expected_salt_len The length of the salt used in padding. Use
+ * #MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY to accept any salt length.
+ * \param sig The buffer holding the signature. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \c ctx->len Bytes. For example, \c 256 Bytes
+ * for an 2048-bit RSA modulus.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the verify operation was successful.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ unsigned int hashlen,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id,
+ int expected_salt_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function copies the components of an RSA context.
+ *
+ * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param src The source context. This must be initialized.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory allocation failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_copy(mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function frees the components of an RSA key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The RSA context to free. May be \c NULL, in which case
+ * this function is a no-op. If it is not \c NULL, it must
+ * point to an initialized RSA context.
+ */
+void mbedtls_rsa_free(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+/**
+ * \brief The RSA checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c 1 on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_rsa_self_test(int verbose);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* rsa.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha1.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha1.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..592ffd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha1.h
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+/**
+ * \file sha1.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains SHA-1 definitions and functions.
+ *
+ * The Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) cryptographic hash function is defined in
+ * <em>FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)</em>.
+ *
+ * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use constitutes
+ * a security risk. We recommend considering stronger message
+ * digests instead.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA1_H
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA1_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/** SHA-1 input data was malformed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0073
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT)
+// Regular implementation
+//
+
+/**
+ * \brief The SHA-1 context structure.
+ *
+ * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_sha1_context {
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[5]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */
+}
+mbedtls_sha1_context;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */
+#include "sha1_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes a SHA-1 context.
+ *
+ * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to initialize.
+ * This must not be \c NULL.
+ *
+ */
+void mbedtls_sha1_init(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function clears a SHA-1 context.
+ *
+ * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to clear. This may be \c NULL,
+ * in which case this function does nothing. If it is
+ * not \c NULL, it must point to an initialized
+ * SHA-1 context.
+ *
+ */
+void mbedtls_sha1_free(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function clones the state of a SHA-1 context.
+ *
+ * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ * \param dst The SHA-1 context to clone to. This must be initialized.
+ * \param src The SHA-1 context to clone from. This must be initialized.
+ *
+ */
+void mbedtls_sha1_clone(mbedtls_sha1_context *dst,
+ const mbedtls_sha1_context *src);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function starts a SHA-1 checksum calculation.
+ *
+ * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to initialize. This must be initialized.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha1_starts(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing SHA-1
+ * checksum calculation.
+ *
+ * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-1 context. This must be initialized
+ * and have a hash operation started.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha1_update(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function finishes the SHA-1 operation, and writes
+ * the result to the output buffer.
+ *
+ * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to use. This must be initialized and
+ * have a hash operation started.
+ * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result. This must be a writable
+ * buffer of length \c 20 Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha1_finish(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char output[20]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief SHA-1 process data block (internal use only).
+ *
+ * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-1 context to use. This must be initialized.
+ * \param data The data block being processed. This must be a
+ * readable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_internal_sha1_process(mbedtls_sha1_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char data[64]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function calculates the SHA-1 checksum of a buffer.
+ *
+ * The function allocates the context, performs the
+ * calculation, and frees the context.
+ *
+ * The SHA-1 result is calculated as
+ * output = SHA-1(input buffer).
+ *
+ * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data.
+ * This must be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data \p input in Bytes.
+ * \param output The SHA-1 checksum result.
+ * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 20 Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha1(const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char output[20]);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+/**
+ * \brief The SHA-1 checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \warning SHA-1 is considered a weak message digest and its use
+ * constitutes a security risk. We recommend considering
+ * stronger message digests instead.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c 1 on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha1_self_test(int verbose);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* mbedtls_sha1.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha256.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha256.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca568e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha256.h
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
+/**
+ * \file sha256.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains SHA-224 and SHA-256 definitions and functions.
+ *
+ * The Secure Hash Algorithms 224 and 256 (SHA-224 and SHA-256) cryptographic
+ * hash functions are defined in <em>FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)</em>.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA256_H
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA256_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/** SHA-256 input data was malformed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0074
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT)
+// Regular implementation
+//
+
+/**
+ * \brief The SHA-256 context structure.
+ *
+ * The structure is used both for SHA-256 and for SHA-224
+ * checksum calculations. The choice between these two is
+ * made in the call to mbedtls_sha256_starts().
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_sha256_context {
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[64]; /*!< The data block being processed. */
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is224); /*!< Determines which function to use:
+ 0: Use SHA-256, or 1: Use SHA-224. */
+#endif
+}
+mbedtls_sha256_context;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */
+#include "sha256_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes a SHA-256 context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_sha256_init(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function clears a SHA-256 context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-256 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which
+ * case this function returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL,
+ * it must point to an initialized SHA-256 context.
+ */
+void mbedtls_sha256_free(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function clones the state of a SHA-256 context.
+ *
+ * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param src The context to clone. This must be initialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_sha256_clone(mbedtls_sha256_context *dst,
+ const mbedtls_sha256_context *src);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function starts a SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum
+ * calculation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to use. This must be initialized.
+ * \param is224 This determines which function to use. This must be
+ * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224.
+ *
+ * \note is224 must be defined accordingly to the enabled
+ * MBEDTLS_SHA224_C/MBEDTLS_SHA256_C symbols otherwise the
+ * function will return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha256_starts(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx, int is224);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing
+ * SHA-256 checksum calculation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized
+ * and have a hash operation started.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha256_update(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function finishes the SHA-256 operation, and writes
+ * the result to the output buffer.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized
+ * and have a hash operation started.
+ * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result.
+ * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 32 bytes
+ * for SHA-256, \c 28 bytes for SHA-224.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha256_finish(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function processes a single data block within
+ * the ongoing SHA-256 computation. This function is for
+ * internal use only.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-256 context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This must
+ * be a readable buffer of length \c 64 Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_internal_sha256_process(mbedtls_sha256_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char data[64]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function calculates the SHA-224 or SHA-256
+ * checksum of a buffer.
+ *
+ * The function allocates the context, performs the
+ * calculation, and frees the context.
+ *
+ * The SHA-256 result is calculated as
+ * output = SHA-256(input buffer).
+ *
+ * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ * \param output The SHA-224 or SHA-256 checksum result.
+ * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 32 bytes
+ * for SHA-256, \c 28 bytes for SHA-224.
+ * \param is224 Determines which function to use. This must be
+ * either \c 0 for SHA-256, or \c 1 for SHA-224.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha256(const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ int is224);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
+/**
+ * \brief The SHA-224 checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c 1 on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha224_self_test(int verbose);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA224_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+/**
+ * \brief The SHA-256 checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c 1 on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha256_self_test(int verbose);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* mbedtls_sha256.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha3.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha3.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3eeee65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha3.h
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+/**
+ * \file sha3.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains SHA-3 definitions and functions.
+ *
+ * The Secure Hash Algorithms cryptographic
+ * hash functions are defined in <em>FIPS 202: SHA-3 Standard:
+ * Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions </em>.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA3_H
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA3_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** SHA-3 input data was malformed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA3_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0076
+
+/**
+ * SHA-3 family id.
+ *
+ * It identifies the family (SHA3-256, SHA3-512, etc.)
+ */
+
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_SHA3_NONE = 0, /*!< Operation not defined. */
+ MBEDTLS_SHA3_224, /*!< SHA3-224 */
+ MBEDTLS_SHA3_256, /*!< SHA3-256 */
+ MBEDTLS_SHA3_384, /*!< SHA3-384 */
+ MBEDTLS_SHA3_512, /*!< SHA3-512 */
+} mbedtls_sha3_id;
+
+/**
+ * \brief The SHA-3 context structure.
+ *
+ * The structure is used SHA-3 checksum calculations.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state[25]);
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(index);
+ uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(olen);
+ uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_block_size);
+}
+mbedtls_sha3_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes a SHA-3 context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-3 context to initialize. This must not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_sha3_init(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function clears a SHA-3 context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-3 context to clear. This may be \c NULL, in which
+ * case this function returns immediately. If it is not \c NULL,
+ * it must point to an initialized SHA-3 context.
+ */
+void mbedtls_sha3_free(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function clones the state of a SHA-3 context.
+ *
+ * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param src The context to clone. This must be initialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_sha3_clone(mbedtls_sha3_context *dst,
+ const mbedtls_sha3_context *src);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function starts a SHA-3 checksum
+ * calculation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to use. This must be initialized.
+ * \param id The id of the SHA-3 family.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha3_starts(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, mbedtls_sha3_id id);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing
+ * SHA-3 checksum calculation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-3 context. This must be initialized
+ * and have a hash operation started.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha3_update(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t ilen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function finishes the SHA-3 operation, and writes
+ * the result to the output buffer.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-3 context. This must be initialized
+ * and have a hash operation started.
+ * \param output The SHA-3 checksum result.
+ * This must be a writable buffer of length \c olen bytes.
+ * \param olen Defines the length of output buffer (in bytes). For SHA-3 224, SHA-3 256,
+ * SHA-3 384 and SHA-3 512 \c olen must equal to 28, 32, 48 and 64,
+ * respectively.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha3_finish(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx,
+ uint8_t *output, size_t olen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function calculates the SHA-3
+ * checksum of a buffer.
+ *
+ * The function allocates the context, performs the
+ * calculation, and frees the context.
+ *
+ * The SHA-3 result is calculated as
+ * output = SHA-3(id, input buffer, d).
+ *
+ * \param id The id of the SHA-3 family.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the data. This must be a readable
+ * buffer of length \p ilen Bytes.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ * \param output The SHA-3 checksum result.
+ * This must be a writable buffer of length \c olen bytes.
+ * \param olen Defines the length of output buffer (in bytes). For SHA-3 224, SHA-3 256,
+ * SHA-3 384 and SHA-3 512 \c olen must equal to 28, 32, 48 and 64,
+ * respectively.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha3(mbedtls_sha3_id id, const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t ilen,
+ uint8_t *output,
+ size_t olen);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/**
+ * \brief Checkup routine for the algorithms implemented
+ * by this module: SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or 1 if the test failed.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha3_self_test(int verbose);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* mbedtls_sha3.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha512.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha512.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c20e4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/sha512.h
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+/**
+ * \file sha512.h
+ * \brief This file contains SHA-384 and SHA-512 definitions and functions.
+ *
+ * The Secure Hash Algorithms 384 and 512 (SHA-384 and SHA-512) cryptographic
+ * hash functions are defined in <em>FIPS 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)</em>.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_SHA512_H
+#define MBEDTLS_SHA512_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/** SHA-512 input data was malformed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x0075
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT)
+// Regular implementation
+//
+
+/**
+ * \brief The SHA-512 context structure.
+ *
+ * The structure is used both for SHA-384 and for SHA-512
+ * checksum calculations. The choice between these two is
+ * made in the call to mbedtls_sha512_starts().
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_sha512_context {
+ uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total)[2]; /*!< The number of Bytes processed. */
+ uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state)[8]; /*!< The intermediate digest state. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer)[128]; /*!< The data block being processed. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is384); /*!< Determines which function to use:
+ 0: Use SHA-512, or 1: Use SHA-384. */
+#endif
+}
+mbedtls_sha512_context;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */
+#include "sha512_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_ALT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes a SHA-512 context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to initialize. This must
+ * not be \c NULL.
+ */
+void mbedtls_sha512_init(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function clears a SHA-512 context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to clear. This may be \c NULL,
+ * in which case this function does nothing. If it
+ * is not \c NULL, it must point to an initialized
+ * SHA-512 context.
+ */
+void mbedtls_sha512_free(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function clones the state of a SHA-512 context.
+ *
+ * \param dst The destination context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param src The context to clone. This must be initialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_sha512_clone(mbedtls_sha512_context *dst,
+ const mbedtls_sha512_context *src);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function starts a SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum
+ * calculation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-512 context to use. This must be initialized.
+ * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be
+ * either \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384.
+ *
+ * \note is384 must be defined accordingly to the enabled
+ * MBEDTLS_SHA384_C/MBEDTLS_SHA512_C symbols otherwise the
+ * function will return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha512_starts(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx, int is384);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function feeds an input buffer into an ongoing
+ * SHA-512 checksum calculation.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized
+ * and have a hash operation started.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must
+ * be a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha512_update(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function finishes the SHA-512 operation, and writes
+ * the result to the output buffer.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized
+ * and have a hash operation started.
+ * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result.
+ * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 bytes
+ * for SHA-512, \c 48 bytes for SHA-384.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha512_finish(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function processes a single data block within
+ * the ongoing SHA-512 computation.
+ * This function is for internal use only.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The SHA-512 context. This must be initialized.
+ * \param data The buffer holding one block of data. This
+ * must be a readable buffer of length \c 128 Bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_internal_sha512_process(mbedtls_sha512_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char data[128]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function calculates the SHA-512 or SHA-384
+ * checksum of a buffer.
+ *
+ * The function allocates the context, performs the
+ * calculation, and frees the context.
+ *
+ * The SHA-512 result is calculated as
+ * output = SHA-512(input buffer).
+ *
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input data. This must be
+ * a readable buffer of length \p ilen Bytes.
+ * \param ilen The length of the input data in Bytes.
+ * \param output The SHA-384 or SHA-512 checksum result.
+ * This must be a writable buffer of length \c 64 bytes
+ * for SHA-512, \c 48 bytes for SHA-384.
+ * \param is384 Determines which function to use. This must be either
+ * \c 0 for SHA-512, or \c 1 for SHA-384.
+ *
+ * \note is384 must be defined accordingly with the supported
+ * symbols in the config file. If:
+ * - is384 is 0, but \c MBEDTLS_SHA384_C is not defined, or
+ * - is384 is 1, but \c MBEDTLS_SHA512_C is not defined
+ * then the function will return
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha512(const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ int is384);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+/**
+ * \brief The SHA-384 checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c 1 on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha384_self_test(int verbose);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA384_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+/**
+ * \brief The SHA-512 checkup routine.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c 1 on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_sha512_self_test(int verbose);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* mbedtls_sha512.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3cdddf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,5821 @@
+/**
+ * \file ssl.h
+ *
+ * \brief SSL/TLS functions.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_H
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_H
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
+#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/dhm.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED)
+#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+
+/*
+ * SSL Error codes
+ */
+/** A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS -0x7000
+/** The requested feature is not available. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x7080
+/** Bad input parameters to function. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x7100
+/** Verification of the message MAC failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC -0x7180
+/** An invalid SSL record was received. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD -0x7200
+/** The connection indicated an EOF. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF -0x7280
+/** A message could not be parsed due to a syntactic error. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR -0x7300
+/* Error space gap */
+/** No RNG was provided to the SSL module. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG -0x7400
+/** No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE -0x7480
+/** Client received an extended server hello containing an unsupported extension */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION -0x7500
+/** No ALPN protocols supported that the client advertises */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL -0x7580
+/** The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED -0x7600
+/** No CA Chain is set, but required to operate. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED -0x7680
+/** An unexpected message was received from our peer. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE -0x7700
+/** A fatal alert message was received from our peer. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE -0x7780
+/** No server could be identified matching the client's SNI. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME -0x7800
+/** The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY -0x7880
+/* Error space gap */
+/* Error space gap */
+/** Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE -0x7A00
+/* Error space gap */
+/** A TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket message has been received. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -0x7B00
+/** Not possible to read early data */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA -0x7B80
+/**
+ * Early data has been received as part of an on-going handshake.
+ * This error code can be returned only on server side if and only if early
+ * data has been enabled by means of the mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() API.
+ * This error code can then be returned by mbedtls_ssl_handshake(),
+ * mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() if
+ * early data has been received as part of the handshake sequence they
+ * triggered. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data().
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA -0x7C00
+/** Not possible to write early data */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA -0x7C80
+/* Error space gap */
+/* Error space gap */
+/* Error space gap */
+/* Error space gap */
+/** Cache entry not found */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND -0x7E80
+/** Memory allocation failed */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED -0x7F00
+/** Hardware acceleration function returned with error */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x7F80
+/** Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH -0x6F80
+/** Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION -0x6E80
+/** The handshake negotiation failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE -0x6E00
+/** Session ticket has expired. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED -0x6D80
+/** Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key) */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -0x6D00
+/** Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity) */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY -0x6C80
+/** Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module) */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR -0x6C00
+/** A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged). */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING -0x6B80
+/** Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO -0x6B00
+/** DTLS client must retry for hello verification */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED -0x6A80
+/** A buffer is too small to receive or write a message */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x6A00
+/* Error space gap */
+/** No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ -0x6900
+/** Connection requires a write call. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE -0x6880
+/** The operation timed out. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT -0x6800
+/** The client initiated a reconnect from the same port. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT -0x6780
+/** Record header looks valid but is not expected. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD -0x6700
+/** The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL -0x6680
+/** A field in a message was incorrect or inconsistent with other fields. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER -0x6600
+/** Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING -0x6580
+/** The asynchronous operation is not completed yet. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS -0x6500
+/** Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE -0x6480
+/* Error space gap */
+/* Error space gap */
+/* Error space gap */
+/* Error space gap */
+/* Error space gap */
+/* Error space gap */
+/* Error space gap */
+/* Error space gap */
+/** An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was received. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID -0x6000
+/** An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configuration. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH -0x5F00
+/** Invalid value in SSL config */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG -0x5E80
+/* Error space gap */
+/** Attempt to verify a certificate without an expected hostname.
+ * This is usually insecure.
+ *
+ * In TLS clients, when a client authenticates a server through its
+ * certificate, the client normally checks three things:
+ * - the certificate chain must be valid;
+ * - the chain must start from a trusted CA;
+ * - the certificate must cover the server name that is expected by the client.
+ *
+ * Omitting any of these checks is generally insecure, and can allow a
+ * malicious server to impersonate a legitimate server.
+ *
+ * The third check may be safely skipped in some unusual scenarios,
+ * such as networks where eavesdropping is a risk but not active attacks,
+ * or a private PKI where the client equally trusts all servers that are
+ * accredited by the root CA.
+ *
+ * You should call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() with the expected server name
+ * before starting a TLS handshake on a client (unless the client is
+ * set up to only use PSK-based authentication, which does not rely on the
+ * host name). If you have determined that server name verification is not
+ * required for security in your scenario, call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname()
+ * with \p NULL as the server name.
+ *
+ * This error is raised if all of the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * - A TLS client is configured with the authentication mode
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED (default).
+ * - Certificate authentication is enabled.
+ * - The client does not call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname().
+ * - The configuration option
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
+ * is not enabled.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME -0x5D80
+
+/*
+ * Constants from RFC 8446 for TLS 1.3 PSK modes
+ *
+ * Those are used in the Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes extension.
+ * See Section 4.2.9 in RFC 8446.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_PURE 0 /* Pure PSK-based exchange */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_ECDHE 1 /* PSK+ECDHE-based exchange */
+
+/*
+ * TLS 1.3 NamedGroup values
+ *
+ * From RF 8446
+ * enum {
+ * // Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE)
+ * secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019),
+ * x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E),
+ * // Finite Field Groups (DHE)
+ * ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102),
+ * ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104),
+ * // Reserved Code Points
+ * ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF),
+ * ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF),
+ * (0xFFFF)
+ * } NamedGroup;
+ *
+ */
+
+/* Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1 0x0012
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1 0x0013
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1 0x0014
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1 0x0015
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1 0x0016
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 0x0017
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1 0x0018
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1 0x0019
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1 0x001A
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1 0x001B
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1 0x001C
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519 0x001D
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448 0x001E
+/* Finite Field Groups (DHE) */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048 0x0100
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072 0x0101
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096 0x0102
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144 0x0103
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192 0x0104
+
+/*
+ * TLS 1.3 Key Exchange Modes
+ *
+ * Mbed TLS internal identifiers for use with the SSL configuration API
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes().
+ */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK (1u << 0) /*!< Pure-PSK TLS 1.3 key exchange,
+ * encompassing both externally agreed PSKs
+ * as well as resumption PSKs. */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL (1u << 1) /*!< Pure-Ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges,
+ * including for example ECDHE and DHE
+ * key exchanges. */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL (1u << 2) /*!< PSK-Ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges,
+ * using both a PSK and an ephemeral
+ * key exchange. */
+
+/* Convenience macros for sets of key exchanges. */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL \
+ (MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK | \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL | \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL) /*!< All TLS 1.3 key exchanges */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL \
+ (MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK | \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL) /*!< All PSK-based TLS 1.3 key exchanges */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL \
+ (MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL | \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL) /*!< All ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE (0)
+
+/*
+ * Various constants
+ */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+/* These are the high and low bytes of ProtocolVersion as defined by:
+ * - RFC 5246: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 3 }; // TLS v1.2
+ * - RFC 8446: see section 4.2.1
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 3
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 3 /*!< TLS v1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 4 /*!< TLS v1.3 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM 0 /*!< TLS */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM 1 /*!< DTLS */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN 255 /*!< Maximum host name defined in RFC 1035 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN 255 /*!< Maximum size in bytes of a protocol name in alpn ext., RFC 7301 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_LIST_LEN 65535 /*!< Maximum size in bytes of list in alpn ext., RFC 7301 */
+
+/* RFC 6066 section 4, see also mfl_code_to_length in ssl_tls.c
+ * NONE must be zero so that memset()ing structure to zero works */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE 0 /*!< don't use this extension */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 1 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^9 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 2 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^10 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 3 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^11 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 4 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^12 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID 5 /*!< first invalid value */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER 1
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED 1
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED 1
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED 1
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL 0
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED 2
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET 3 /* Used only for sni_authmode */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION 1
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED 1
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED 1
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED -1
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT 16
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE 2
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN 10 /* 80 bits, rfc 6066 section 7 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED 1
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED 1
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB 2
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED 0
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED 1
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED 1
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER 0
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN 48
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN 32
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+/*
+ * Default range for DTLS retransmission timer value, in milliseconds.
+ * RFC 6347 4.2.4.1 says from 1 second to 60 seconds.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN 1000
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX 60000
+
+/*
+ * Whether early data record should be discarded or not and how.
+ *
+ * The client has indicated early data and the server has rejected them.
+ * The server has then to skip past early data by either:
+ * - attempting to deprotect received records using the handshake traffic
+ * key, discarding records which fail deprotection (up to the configured
+ * max_early_data_size). Once a record is deprotected successfully,
+ * it is treated as the start of the client's second flight and the
+ * server proceeds as with an ordinary 1-RTT handshake.
+ * - skipping all records with an external content type of
+ * "application_data" (indicating that they are encrypted), up to the
+ * configured max_early_data_size. This is the expected behavior if the
+ * server has sent an HelloRetryRequest message. The server ignores
+ * application data message before 2nd ClientHello.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD 2
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: Module settings
+ *
+ * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section.
+ * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line.
+ * \{
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Maximum fragment length in bytes,
+ * determines the size of each of the two internal I/O buffers.
+ *
+ * Note: the RFC defines the default size of SSL / TLS messages. If you
+ * change the value here, other clients / servers may not be able to
+ * communicate with you anymore. Only change this value if you control
+ * both sides of the connection and have it reduced at both sides, or
+ * if you're using the Max Fragment Length extension and you know all your
+ * peers are using it too!
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of
+ * DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering.
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Maximum length of CIDs for incoming and outgoing messages.
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX 32
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE 1024
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE 6000
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH 32
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS 1
+#endif
+
+/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */
+
+/*
+ * Default to standard CID mode
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT 0
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Length of the verify data for secure renegotiation
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN 12
+
+/*
+ * Signaling ciphersuite values (SCSV)
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF /**< renegotiation info ext */
+
+/*
+ * Supported Signature and Hash algorithms (For TLS 1.2)
+ * RFC 5246 section 7.4.1.4.1
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1 2
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224 3
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256 4
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384 5
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512 6
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA 3
+
+/*
+ * TLS 1.3 signature algorithms
+ * RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3
+ */
+
+/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 0x0401
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 0x0501
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 0x0601
+
+/* ECDSA algorithms */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256 0x0403
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384 0x0503
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512 0x0603
+
+/* RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID rsaEncryption */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256 0x0804
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384 0x0805
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512 0x0806
+
+/* EdDSA algorithms */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED25519 0x0807
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED448 0x0808
+
+/* RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID RSASSA-PSS */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256 0x0809
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384 0x080A
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512 0x080B
+
+/* LEGACY ALGORITHMS */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 0x0201
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SHA1 0x0203
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE 0x0
+
+/*
+ * Client Certificate Types
+ * RFC 5246 section 7.4.4 plus RFC 4492 section 5.5
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN 64
+
+/*
+ * Message, alert and handshake types
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 20
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT 21
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE 22
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA 23
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID 25
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL 2
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY 0 /* 0x00 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 10 /* 0x0A */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC 20 /* 0x14 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED 21 /* 0x15 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW 22 /* 0x16 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 30 /* 0x1E */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 40 /* 0x28 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT 41 /* 0x29 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT 42 /* 0x2A */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT 43 /* 0x2B */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED 44 /* 0x2C */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED 45 /* 0x2D */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN 46 /* 0x2E */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 47 /* 0x2F */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA 48 /* 0x30 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED 49 /* 0x31 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR 50 /* 0x32 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR 51 /* 0x33 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 60 /* 0x3C */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70 /* 0x46 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71 /* 0x47 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR 80 /* 0x50 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86 /* 0x56 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED 90 /* 0x5A */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100 /* 0x64 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_MISSING_EXTENSION 109 /* 0x6d -- new in TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT 110 /* 0x6E */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 112 /* 0x70 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 115 /* 0x73 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REQUIRED 116 /* 0x74 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 120 /* 0x78 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO 1
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO 2
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 4
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA 5
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS 8
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE 11
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE 14
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED 20
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_MESSAGE_HASH 254
+
+/*
+ * TLS extensions
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME 0
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME 0
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 1
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC 4
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST 5 /* RFC 6066 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES 10
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS 10 /* RFC 8422,7919 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS 11
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG 13 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP 14
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT 15 /* RFC 6520 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN 16
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SCT 18 /* RFC 6962 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CLI_CERT_TYPE 19 /* RFC 7250 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERV_CERT_TYPE 20 /* RFC 7250 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PADDING 21 /* RFC 7685 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 22 /* 0x16 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 0x0017 /* 23 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT 28 /* RFC 8449 (implemented for TLS 1.3 only) */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET 35
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY 41 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA 42 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS 43 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE 44 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES 45 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CERT_AUTH 47 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_OID_FILTERS 48 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH 49 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG_CERT 50 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE 51 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
+
+#if MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 54 /* RFC 9146 DTLS 1.2 CID */
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 254 /* Pre-RFC 9146 DTLS 1.2 CID */
+#endif
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP 256 /* experimental */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF01
+
+/*
+ * Size defines
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN)
+/*
+ * If the library supports TLS 1.3 tickets and the cipher suite
+ * TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, set the PSK maximum length to 48 instead of 32.
+ * That way, the TLS 1.3 client and server are able to resume sessions where
+ * the cipher suite is TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 (pre-shared keys are 48
+ * bytes long in that case).
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 48 /* 384 bits */
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /* 256 bits */
+#endif
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN */
+
+/* Dummy type used only for its size */
+union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret {
+ unsigned char dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with SSL disabled */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
+ unsigned char _pms_rsa[48]; /* RFC 5246 8.1.1 */
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED)
+ unsigned char _pms_dhm[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; /* RFC 5246 8.1.2 */
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+ unsigned char _pms_ecdh[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; /* RFC 4492 5.10 */
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
+ unsigned char _pms_psk[4 + 2 * MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 2 */
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+ unsigned char _pms_dhe_psk[4 + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+ + MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 3 */
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
+ unsigned char _pms_rsa_psk[52 + MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 4 */
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+ unsigned char _pms_ecdhe_psk[4 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES
+ + MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 5489 2 */
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+ unsigned char _pms_ecjpake[32]; /* Thread spec: SHA-256 output */
+#endif
+};
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE sizeof(union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE
+
+
+/* Length in number of bytes of the TLS sequence number */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN 8
+
+/* Helper to state that client_random and server_random need to be stored
+ * after the handshake is complete. This is required for context serialization
+ * and for the keying material exporter in TLS 1.2. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEYING_MATERIAL_EXPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2))
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_RANDBYTES
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * SSL state machine
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH,
+}
+mbedtls_ssl_states;
+
+/*
+ * Early data status, client side only.
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+typedef enum {
+/*
+ * See documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status().
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED,
+} mbedtls_ssl_early_data_status;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: send data on the network.
+ *
+ * \note That callback may be either blocking or non-blocking.
+ *
+ * \param ctx Context for the send callback (typically a file descriptor)
+ * \param buf Buffer holding the data to send
+ * \param len Length of the data to send
+ *
+ * \return The callback must return the number of bytes sent if any,
+ * or a non-zero error code.
+ * If performing non-blocking I/O, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE
+ * must be returned when the operation would block.
+ *
+ * \note The callback is allowed to send fewer bytes than requested.
+ * It must always return the number of bytes actually sent.
+ */
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_send_t(void *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: receive data from the network.
+ *
+ * \note That callback may be either blocking or non-blocking.
+ *
+ * \param ctx Context for the receive callback (typically a file
+ * descriptor)
+ * \param buf Buffer to write the received data to
+ * \param len Length of the receive buffer
+ *
+ * \returns If data has been received, the positive number of bytes received.
+ * \returns \c 0 if the connection has been closed.
+ * \returns If performing non-blocking I/O, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ
+ * must be returned when the operation would block.
+ * \returns Another negative error code on other kinds of failures.
+ *
+ * \note The callback may receive fewer bytes than the length of the
+ * buffer. It must always return the number of bytes actually
+ * received and written to the buffer.
+ */
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_recv_t(void *ctx,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: receive data from the network, with timeout
+ *
+ * \note That callback must block until data is received, or the
+ * timeout delay expires, or the operation is interrupted by a
+ * signal.
+ *
+ * \param ctx Context for the receive callback (typically a file descriptor)
+ * \param buf Buffer to write the received data to
+ * \param len Length of the receive buffer
+ * \param timeout Maximum number of milliseconds to wait for data
+ * 0 means no timeout (potentially waiting forever)
+ *
+ * \return The callback must return the number of bytes received,
+ * or a non-zero error code:
+ * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT if the operation timed out,
+ * \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ if interrupted by a signal.
+ *
+ * \note The callback may receive fewer bytes than the length of the
+ * buffer. It must always return the number of bytes actually
+ * received and written to the buffer.
+ */
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t(void *ctx,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len,
+ uint32_t timeout);
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: set a pair of timers/delays to watch
+ *
+ * \param ctx Context pointer
+ * \param int_ms Intermediate delay in milliseconds
+ * \param fin_ms Final delay in milliseconds
+ * 0 cancels the current timer.
+ *
+ * \note This callback must at least store the necessary information
+ * for the associated \c mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t callback to
+ * return correct information.
+ *
+ * \note If using an event-driven style of programming, an event must
+ * be generated when the final delay is passed. The event must
+ * cause a call to \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() with the proper
+ * SSL context to be scheduled. Care must be taken to ensure
+ * that at most one such call happens at a time.
+ *
+ * \note Only one timer at a time must be running. Calling this
+ * function while a timer is running must cancel it. Cancelled
+ * timers must not generate any event.
+ */
+typedef void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t(void *ctx,
+ uint32_t int_ms,
+ uint32_t fin_ms);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: get status of timers/delays
+ *
+ * \param ctx Context pointer
+ *
+ * \return This callback must return:
+ * -1 if cancelled (fin_ms == 0),
+ * 0 if none of the delays have passed,
+ * 1 if only the intermediate delay has passed,
+ * 2 if the final delay has passed.
+ */
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t(void *ctx);
+
+/* Defined below */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session;
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context;
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_config mbedtls_ssl_config;
+
+/* Defined in library/ssl_misc.h */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform;
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params;
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_RESUMPTION \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK /* 1U << 0 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_EPHEMERAL_RESUMPTION \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL /* 1U << 2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA (1U << 3)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK \
+ (MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_RESUMPTION | \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_EPHEMERAL_RESUMPTION | \
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: server-side session cache getter
+ *
+ * The session cache is logically a key value store, with
+ * keys being session IDs and values being instances of
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session.
+ *
+ * This callback retrieves an entry in this key-value store.
+ *
+ * \param data The address of the session cache structure to query.
+ * \param session_id The buffer holding the session ID to query.
+ * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in Bytes.
+ * \param session The address of the session structure to populate.
+ * It is initialized with mbdtls_ssl_session_init(),
+ * and the callback must always leave it in a state
+ * where it can safely be freed via
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session_free() independent of the
+ * return code of this function.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success
+ * \return A non-zero return value on failure.
+ *
+ */
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t(void *data,
+ unsigned char const *session_id,
+ size_t session_id_len,
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: server-side session cache setter
+ *
+ * The session cache is logically a key value store, with
+ * keys being session IDs and values being instances of
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session.
+ *
+ * This callback sets an entry in this key-value store.
+ *
+ * \param data The address of the session cache structure to modify.
+ * \param session_id The buffer holding the session ID to query.
+ * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in Bytes.
+ * \param session The address of the session to be stored in the
+ * session cache.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success
+ * \return A non-zero return value on failure.
+ */
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t(void *data,
+ unsigned char const *session_id,
+ size_t session_id_len,
+ const mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: start external signature operation.
+ *
+ * This callback is called during an SSL handshake to start
+ * a signature decryption operation using an
+ * external processor. The parameter \p cert contains
+ * the public key; it is up to the callback function to
+ * determine how to access the associated private key.
+ *
+ * This function typically sends or enqueues a request, and
+ * does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows
+ * the handshake step to be non-blocking.
+ *
+ * The parameters \p ssl and \p cert are guaranteed to remain
+ * valid throughout the handshake. On the other hand, this
+ * function must save the contents of \p hash if the value
+ * is needed for later processing, because the \p hash buffer
+ * is no longer valid after this function returns.
+ *
+ * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data()
+ * to store an operation context for later retrieval
+ * by the resume or cancel callback.
+ *
+ * \note For RSA signatures, this function must produce output
+ * that is consistent with PKCS#1 v1.5 in the same way as
+ * mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(). Before the private key operation,
+ * apply the padding steps described in RFC 8017, section 9.2
+ * "EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5" as follows.
+ * - If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, apply the PKCS#1 v1.5
+ * encoding, treating \p hash as the DigestInfo to be
+ * padded. In other words, apply EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 starting
+ * from step 3, with `T = hash` and `tLen = hash_len`.
+ * - If `md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE`, apply the PKCS#1 v1.5
+ * encoding, treating \p hash as the hash to be encoded and
+ * padded. In other words, apply EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 starting
+ * from step 2, with `digestAlgorithm` obtained by calling
+ * mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md() on \p md_alg.
+ *
+ * \note For ECDSA signatures, the output format is the DER encoding
+ * `Ecdsa-Sig-Value` defined in
+ * [RFC 4492 section 5.4](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.4).
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be
+ * modified other than via
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data().
+ * \param cert Certificate containing the public key.
+ * In simple cases, this is one of the pointers passed to
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() when configuring the SSL
+ * connection. However, if other callbacks are used, this
+ * property may not hold. For example, if an SNI callback
+ * is registered with mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(), then
+ * this callback determines what certificate is used.
+ * \param md_alg Hash algorithm.
+ * \param hash Buffer containing the hash. This buffer is
+ * no longer valid when the function returns.
+ * \param hash_len Size of the \c hash buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if the operation was started successfully and the SSL
+ * stack should call the resume callback immediately.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation
+ * was started successfully and the SSL stack should return
+ * immediately without calling the resume callback yet.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH if the external
+ * processor does not support this key. The SSL stack will
+ * use the private key object instead.
+ * \return Any other error indicates a fatal failure and is
+ * propagated up the call chain. The callback should
+ * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and <b>must not</b>
+ * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as
+ * directed in the documentation of this callback.
+ */
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ size_t hash_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: start external decryption operation.
+ *
+ * This callback is called during an SSL handshake to start
+ * an RSA decryption operation using an
+ * external processor. The parameter \p cert contains
+ * the public key; it is up to the callback function to
+ * determine how to access the associated private key.
+ *
+ * This function typically sends or enqueues a request, and
+ * does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows
+ * the handshake step to be non-blocking.
+ *
+ * The parameters \p ssl and \p cert are guaranteed to remain
+ * valid throughout the handshake. On the other hand, this
+ * function must save the contents of \p input if the value
+ * is needed for later processing, because the \p input buffer
+ * is no longer valid after this function returns.
+ *
+ * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data()
+ * to store an operation context for later retrieval
+ * by the resume or cancel callback.
+ *
+ * \warning RSA decryption as used in TLS is subject to a potential
+ * timing side channel attack first discovered by Bleichenbacher
+ * in 1998. This attack can be remotely exploitable
+ * in practice. To avoid this attack, you must ensure that
+ * if the callback performs an RSA decryption, the time it
+ * takes to execute and return the result does not depend
+ * on whether the RSA decryption succeeded or reported
+ * invalid padding.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be
+ * modified other than via
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data().
+ * \param cert Certificate containing the public key.
+ * In simple cases, this is one of the pointers passed to
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() when configuring the SSL
+ * connection. However, if other callbacks are used, this
+ * property may not hold. For example, if an SNI callback
+ * is registered with mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(), then
+ * this callback determines what certificate is used.
+ * \param input Buffer containing the input ciphertext. This buffer
+ * is no longer valid when the function returns.
+ * \param input_len Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if the operation was started successfully and the SSL
+ * stack should call the resume callback immediately.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation
+ * was started successfully and the SSL stack should return
+ * immediately without calling the resume callback yet.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH if the external
+ * processor does not support this key. The SSL stack will
+ * use the private key object instead.
+ * \return Any other error indicates a fatal failure and is
+ * propagated up the call chain. The callback should
+ * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and <b>must not</b>
+ * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as
+ * directed in the documentation of this callback.
+ */
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t input_len);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: resume external operation.
+ *
+ * This callback is called during an SSL handshake to resume
+ * an external operation started by the
+ * ::mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t or
+ * ::mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t callback.
+ *
+ * This function typically checks the status of a pending
+ * request or causes the request queue to make progress, and
+ * does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows
+ * the handshake step to be non-blocking.
+ *
+ * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data()
+ * to retrieve an operation context set by the start callback.
+ * It may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() to modify
+ * this context.
+ *
+ * Note that when this function returns a status other than
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, it must free any
+ * resources associated with the operation.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be
+ * modified other than via
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data().
+ * \param output Buffer containing the output (signature or decrypted
+ * data) on success.
+ * \param output_len On success, number of bytes written to \p output.
+ * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if output of the operation is available in the
+ * \p output buffer.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation
+ * is still in progress. Subsequent requests for progress
+ * on the SSL connection will call the resume callback
+ * again.
+ * \return Any other error means that the operation is aborted.
+ * The SSL handshake is aborted. The callback should
+ * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and <b>must not</b>
+ * use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as
+ * directed in the documentation of this callback.
+ */
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t *output_len,
+ size_t output_size);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: cancel external operation.
+ *
+ * This callback is called if an SSL connection is closed
+ * while an asynchronous operation is in progress. Note that
+ * this callback is not called if the
+ * ::mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t callback has run and has
+ * returned a value other than
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, since in that case
+ * the asynchronous operation has already completed.
+ *
+ * This function may call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data()
+ * to retrieve an operation context set by the start callback.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be
+ * modified.
+ */
+typedef void mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN 48
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 32
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 48
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 20
+#else
+/* This is already checked in check_config.h, but be sure. */
+#error "Bad configuration - need SHA-1, SHA-256 or SHA-512 enabled to compute digest of peer CRT."
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED &&
+ !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned char client_application_traffic_secret_N[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char server_application_traffic_secret_N[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char exporter_master_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char resumption_master_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH 255
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH 4
+/*
+ * For code readability use a typedef for DTLS-SRTP profiles
+ *
+ * Use_srtp extension protection profiles values as defined in
+ * http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml
+ *
+ * Reminder: if this list is expanded mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value
+ * must be updated too.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 ((uint16_t) 0x0001)
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 ((uint16_t) 0x0002)
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80 ((uint16_t) 0x0005)
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32 ((uint16_t) 0x0006)
+/* This one is not iana defined, but for code readability. */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ((uint16_t) 0x0000)
+
+typedef uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile;
+
+typedef struct mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info_t {
+ /*! The SRTP profile that was negotiated. */
+ mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chosen_dtls_srtp_profile);
+ /*! The length of mki_value. */
+ uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mki_len);
+ /*! The mki_value used, with max size of 256 bytes. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mki_value)[MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH];
+}
+mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info;
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
+
+/** Human-friendly representation of the (D)TLS protocol version. */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN, /*!< Context not in use or version not yet negotiated. */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 = 0x0303, /*!< (D)TLS 1.2 */
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 = 0x0304, /*!< (D)TLS 1.3 */
+} mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version;
+
+/*
+ * This structure is used for storing current session data.
+ *
+ * Note: when changing this definition, we need to check and update:
+ * - in tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function:
+ * ssl_populate_session() and ssl_serialize_session_save_load()
+ * - in library/ssl_tls.c:
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session_init() and mbedtls_ssl_session_free()
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session_save() and ssl_session_load()
+ * ssl_session_copy()
+ */
+struct mbedtls_ssl_session {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mfl_code); /*!< MaxFragmentLength negotiated by peer */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
+
+/*!< RecordSizeLimit received from the peer */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)
+ uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(record_size_limit);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */
+
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(exported);
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint); /*!< 0: client, 1: server */
+
+ /** TLS version negotiated in the session. Used if and when renegotiating
+ * or resuming a session instead of the configured minor TLS version.
+ */
+ mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+ mbedtls_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(start); /*!< start time of current session */
+#endif
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite); /*!< chosen ciphersuite */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id_len); /*!< session id length */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id)[32]; /*!< session identifier */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(master)[48]; /*!< the master secret */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert); /*!< peer X.509 cert chain */
+#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+ /*! The digest of the peer's end-CRT. This must be kept to detect CRT
+ * changes during renegotiation, mitigating the triple handshake attack. */
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest);
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest_len);
+ mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest_type);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(verify_result); /*!< verification result */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket); /*!< RFC 5077 session ticket */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_len); /*!< session ticket length */
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_lifetime); /*!< ticket lifetime hint */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+ /*! When a ticket is created by a TLS server as part of an established TLS
+ * session, the ticket creation time may need to be saved for the ticket
+ * module to be able to check the ticket age when the ticket is used.
+ * That's the purpose of this field.
+ * Before creating a new ticket, an Mbed TLS server set this field with
+ * its current time in milliseconds. This time may then be saved in the
+ * session ticket data by the session ticket writing function and
+ * recovered by the ticket parsing function later when the ticket is used.
+ * The ticket module may then use this time to compute the ticket age and
+ * determine if it has expired or not.
+ * The Mbed TLS implementations of the session ticket writing and parsing
+ * functions save and retrieve the ticket creation time as part of the
+ * session ticket data. The session ticket parsing function relies on
+ * the mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ticket_creation_time() API to get the
+ * ticket creation time from the session ticket data.
+ */
+ mbedtls_ms_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_creation_time);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_age_add); /*!< Randomly generated value used to obscure the age of the ticket */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_flags); /*!< Ticket flags */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(resumption_key_len); /*!< resumption_key length */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(resumption_key)[MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN];
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+ char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hostname); /*!< host name binded with tickets */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ char *ticket_alpn; /*!< ALPN negotiated in the session
+ during which the ticket was generated. */
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+ /*! Time in milliseconds when the last ticket was received. */
+ mbedtls_ms_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_reception_time);
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_early_data_size); /*!< maximum amount of early data in tickets */
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(encrypt_then_mac); /*!< flag for EtM activation */
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+ mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(app_secrets);
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * Identifiers for PRFs used in various versions of TLS.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA384,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA256
+}
+mbedtls_tls_prf_types;
+
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET = 0,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
+} mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: Export key alongside random values for
+ * session identification, and PRF for
+ * implementation of TLS key exporters.
+ *
+ * \param p_expkey Context for the callback.
+ * \param type The type of the key that is being exported.
+ * \param secret The address of the buffer holding the secret
+ * that's being exporterd.
+ * \param secret_len The length of \p secret in bytes.
+ * \param client_random The client random bytes.
+ * \param server_random The server random bytes.
+ * \param tls_prf_type The identifier for the PRF used in the handshake
+ * to which the key belongs.
+ */
+typedef void mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t(void *p_expkey,
+ mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type type,
+ const unsigned char *secret,
+ size_t secret_len,
+ const unsigned char client_random[32],
+ const unsigned char server_random[32],
+ mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: generic handshake callback
+ *
+ * \note Callbacks may use user_data funcs to set/get app user data.
+ * See \c mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_p()
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n()
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_p()
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n()
+ *
+ * \param ssl \c mbedtls_ssl_context on which the callback is run
+ *
+ * \return The return value of the callback is 0 if successful,
+ * or a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code, which will cause
+ * the handshake to be aborted.
+ */
+typedef int (*mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+#endif
+
+/* A type for storing user data in a library structure.
+ *
+ * The representation of type may change in future versions of the library.
+ * Only the behaviors guaranteed by documented accessor functions are
+ * guaranteed to remain stable.
+ */
+typedef union {
+ uintptr_t n; /* typically a handle to an associated object */
+ void *p; /* typically a pointer to extra data */
+} mbedtls_ssl_user_data_t;
+
+/**
+ * SSL/TLS configuration to be shared between mbedtls_ssl_context structures.
+ */
+struct mbedtls_ssl_config {
+ /* Group items mostly by size. This helps to reduce memory wasted to
+ * padding. It also helps to keep smaller fields early in the structure,
+ * so that elements tend to be in the 128-element direct access window
+ * on Arm Thumb, which reduces the code size. */
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_tls_version); /*!< max. TLS version used */
+ mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min_tls_version); /*!< min. TLS version used */
+
+ /*
+ * Flags (could be bit-fields to save RAM, but separate bytes make
+ * the code smaller on architectures with an instruction for direct
+ * byte access).
+ */
+
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint); /*!< 0: client, 1: server */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transport); /*!< 0: stream (TLS), 1: datagram (DTLS) */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(authmode); /*!< MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_XXX */
+ /* needed even with renego disabled for LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(allow_legacy_renegotiation); /*!< MBEDTLS_LEGACY_XXX */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mfl_code); /*!< desired fragment length indicator
+ (MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_XXX) */
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(encrypt_then_mac); /*!< negotiate encrypt-then-mac? */
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(extended_ms); /*!< negotiate extended master secret? */
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(anti_replay); /*!< detect and prevent replay? */
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(disable_renegotiation); /*!< disable renegotiation? */
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+ /** Encodes two booleans, one stating whether TLS 1.2 session tickets are
+ * enabled or not, the other one whether the handling of TLS 1.3
+ * NewSessionTicket messages is enabled or not. They are respectively set
+ * by mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets() and
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets().
+ */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_tickets); /*!< use session tickets? */
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+ uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(new_session_tickets_count); /*!< number of NewSessionTicket */
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cert_req_ca_list); /*!< enable sending CA list in
+ Certificate Request messages? */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(respect_cli_pref); /*!< pick the ciphersuite according to
+ the client's preferences rather
+ than ours? */
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ignore_unexpected_cid); /*!< Should DTLS record with
+ * unexpected CID
+ * lead to failure? */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_mki_support); /* support having mki_value
+ in the use_srtp extension? */
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Pointers
+ */
+
+ /** Allowed ciphersuites for (D)TLS 1.2 (0-terminated) */
+ const int *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite_list);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+ /** Allowed TLS 1.3 key exchange modes. */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls13_kex_modes);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
+
+ /** Callback for printing debug output */
+ void(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_dbg))(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *);
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_dbg); /*!< context for the debug function */
+
+ /** Callback for getting (pseudo-)random numbers */
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_rng))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t);
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_rng); /*!< context for the RNG function */
+
+ /** Callback to retrieve a session from the cache */
+ mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_get_cache);
+ /** Callback to store a session into the cache */
+ mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_set_cache);
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_cache); /*!< context for cache callbacks */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+ /** Callback for setting cert according to SNI extension */
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_sni))(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_sni); /*!< context for SNI callback */
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+ /** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_vrfy))(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *);
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_vrfy); /*!< context for X.509 verify calllback */
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ /** Callback to retrieve PSK key from identity */
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_psk))(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_psk); /*!< context for PSK callback */
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ /** Callback to create & write a cookie for ClientHello verification */
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cookie_write))(void *, unsigned char **, unsigned char *,
+ const unsigned char *, size_t);
+ /** Callback to verify validity of a ClientHello cookie */
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cookie_check))(void *, const unsigned char *, size_t,
+ const unsigned char *, size_t);
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_cookie); /*!< context for the cookie callbacks */
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ /** Callback to create & write a session ticket */
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ticket_write))(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *,
+ unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, size_t *,
+ uint32_t *);
+ /** Callback to parse a session ticket into a session structure */
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ticket_parse))(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *, unsigned char *, size_t);
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_ticket); /*!< context for the ticket callbacks */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cid_len); /*!< The length of CIDs for incoming DTLS records. */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cert_profile); /*!< verification profile */
+ mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_cert); /*!< own certificate/key pair(s) */
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_chain); /*!< trusted CAs */
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_crl); /*!< trusted CAs CRLs */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ca_cb);
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_ca_cb);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+ mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_sign_start); /*!< start asynchronous signature operation */
+ mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_decrypt_start); /*!< start asynchronous decryption operation */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+ mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_resume); /*!< resume asynchronous operation */
+ mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_cancel); /*!< cancel asynchronous operation */
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_async_config_data); /*!< Configuration data set by mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ const int *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_hashes); /*!< allowed signature hashes */
+#endif
+ const uint16_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_algs); /*!< allowed signature algorithms */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(curve_list); /*!< allowed curves */
+#endif
+
+ const uint16_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(group_list); /*!< allowed IANA NamedGroups */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_P); /*!< prime modulus for DHM */
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_G); /*!< generator for DHM */
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_opaque); /*!< PSA key slot holding opaque PSK. This field
+ * should only be set via
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
+ * If either no PSK or a raw PSK have been
+ * configured, this has value \c 0.
+ */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk); /*!< The raw pre-shared key. This field should
+ * only be set via mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
+ * If either no PSK or an opaque PSK
+ * have been configured, this has value NULL. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_len); /*!< The length of the raw pre-shared key.
+ * This field should only be set via
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
+ * Its value is non-zero if and only if
+ * \c psk is not \c NULL. */
+
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_identity); /*!< The PSK identity for PSK negotiation.
+ * This field should only be set via
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
+ * This is set if and only if either
+ * \c psk or \c psk_opaque are set. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_identity_len);/*!< The length of PSK identity.
+ * This field should only be set via
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
+ * Its value is non-zero if and only if
+ * \c psk is not \c NULL or \c psk_opaque
+ * is not \c 0. */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_enabled); /*!< Early data enablement:
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED,
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ /* The maximum amount of 0-RTT data. RFC 8446 section 4.6.1 */
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_early_data_size);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+ const char **MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alpn_list); /*!< ordered list of protocols */
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+ /*! ordered list of supported srtp profile */
+ const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_profile_list);
+ /*! number of supported profiles */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_profile_list_len);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
+
+ /*
+ * Numerical settings (int)
+ */
+
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(read_timeout); /*!< timeout for mbedtls_ssl_read (ms) */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hs_timeout_min); /*!< initial value of the handshake
+ retransmission timeout (ms) */
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hs_timeout_max); /*!< maximum value of the handshake
+ retransmission timeout (ms) */
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_max_records); /*!< grace period for renegotiation */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_period)[8]; /*!< value of the record counters
+ that triggers renegotiation */
+#endif
+
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_limit); /*!< limit of records with a bad MAC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_min_bitlen); /*!< min. bit length of the DHM prime */
+#endif
+
+ /** User data pointer or handle.
+ *
+ * The library sets this to \p 0 when creating a context and does not
+ * access it afterwards.
+ */
+ mbedtls_ssl_user_data_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cert_cb); /*!< certificate selection callback */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dn_hints);/*!< acceptable client cert issuers */
+#endif
+};
+
+struct mbedtls_ssl_context {
+ const mbedtls_ssl_config *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(conf); /*!< configuration information */
+
+ /*
+ * Miscellaneous
+ */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); /*!< SSL handshake: current state */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_status); /*!< Initial, in progress, pending? */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_records_seen); /*!< Records since renego request, or with DTLS,
+ number of retransmissions of request if
+ renego_max_records is < 0 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+
+ /**
+ * Maximum TLS version to be negotiated, then negotiated TLS version.
+ *
+ * It is initialized as the configured maximum TLS version to be
+ * negotiated by mbedtls_ssl_setup().
+ *
+ * When renegotiating or resuming a session, it is overwritten in the
+ * ClientHello writing preparation stage with the previously negotiated
+ * TLS version.
+ *
+ * On client side, it is updated to the TLS version selected by the server
+ * for the handshake when the ServerHello is received.
+ *
+ * On server side, it is updated to the TLS version the server selects for
+ * the handshake when the ClientHello is received.
+ */
+ mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+ /**
+ * State of the negotiation and transfer of early data. Reset to
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE when the context is reset.
+ */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_state);
+#endif
+
+ /** Multipurpose field.
+ *
+ * - DTLS: records with a bad MAC received.
+ * - TLS: accumulated length of handshake fragments (up to \c in_hslen).
+ *
+ * This field is multipurpose in order to preserve the ABI in the
+ * Mbed TLS 3.6 LTS branch. Until 3.6.2, it was only used in DTLS
+ * and called `badmac_seen`.
+ */
+ unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_seen_or_in_hsfraglen);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+ /** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_vrfy))(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *);
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_vrfy); /*!< context for X.509 verify callback */
+#endif
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_send); /*!< Callback for network send */
+ mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_recv); /*!< Callback for network receive */
+ mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_recv_timeout);
+ /*!< Callback for network receive with timeout */
+
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_bio); /*!< context for I/O operations */
+
+ /*
+ * Session layer
+ */
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_in); /*!< current session data (in) */
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_out); /*!< current session data (out) */
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session); /*!< negotiated session data */
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_negotiate); /*!< session data in negotiation */
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(handshake); /*!< params required only during
+ the handshake process */
+
+ /*
+ * Record layer transformations
+ */
+ mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_in); /*!< current transform params (in)
+ * This is always a reference,
+ * never an owning pointer. */
+ mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_out); /*!< current transform params (out)
+ * This is always a reference,
+ * never an owning pointer. */
+ mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform); /*!< negotiated transform params
+ * This pointer owns the transform
+ * it references. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+ mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_negotiate); /*!< transform params in negotiation
+ * This pointer owns the transform
+ * it references. */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+ /*! The application data transform in TLS 1.3.
+ * This pointer owns the transform it references. */
+ mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_application);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
+
+ /*
+ * Timers
+ */
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_timer); /*!< context for the timer callbacks */
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_set_timer); /*!< set timer callback */
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_get_timer); /*!< get timer callback */
+
+ /*
+ * Record layer (incoming data)
+ */
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_buf); /*!< input buffer */
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_ctr); /*!< 64-bit incoming message counter
+ TLS: maintained by us
+ DTLS: read from peer */
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_hdr); /*!< start of record header */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_cid); /*!< The start of the CID;
+ * (the end is marked by in_len). */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_len); /*!< two-bytes message length field */
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_iv); /*!< ivlen-byte IV */
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msg); /*!< message contents (in_iv+ivlen) */
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_offt); /*!< read offset in application data */
+
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msgtype); /*!< record header: message type */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msglen); /*!< record header: message length */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_left); /*!< amount of data read so far */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_buf_len); /*!< length of input buffer */
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_epoch); /*!< DTLS epoch for incoming records */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_record_offset); /*!< offset of the next record in datagram
+ (equal to in_left if none) */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
+ uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_window_top); /*!< last validated record seq_num */
+ uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_window); /*!< bitmask for replay detection */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
+
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_hslen); /*!< current handshake message length,
+ including the handshake header */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nb_zero); /*!< # of 0-length encrypted messages */
+
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keep_current_message); /*!< drop or reuse current message
+ on next call to record layer? */
+
+ /* The following three variables indicate if and, if yes,
+ * what kind of alert is pending to be sent.
+ */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(send_alert); /*!< Determines if a fatal alert
+ should be sent. Values:
+ - \c 0 , no alert is to be sent.
+ - \c 1 , alert is to be sent. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alert_type); /*!< Type of alert if send_alert
+ != 0 */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alert_reason); /*!< The error code to be returned
+ to the user once the fatal alert
+ has been sent. */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(disable_datagram_packing); /*!< Disable packing multiple records
+ * within a single datagram. */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ /*
+ * One of:
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD
+ */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(discard_early_data_record);
+#endif
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total_early_data_size); /*!< Number of received/written early data bytes */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+
+ /*
+ * Record layer (outgoing data)
+ */
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_buf); /*!< output buffer */
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_ctr); /*!< 64-bit outgoing message counter */
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_hdr); /*!< start of record header */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_cid); /*!< The start of the CID;
+ * (the end is marked by in_len). */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_len); /*!< two-bytes message length field */
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_iv); /*!< ivlen-byte IV */
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msg); /*!< message contents (out_iv+ivlen) */
+
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msgtype); /*!< record header: message type */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msglen); /*!< record header: message length */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_left); /*!< amount of data not yet written */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_buf_len); /*!< length of output buffer */
+#endif
+
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cur_out_ctr)[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /*!< Outgoing record sequence number. */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+ uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mtu); /*!< path mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+ /*
+ * User settings
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+ /** Expected peer CN for verification.
+ *
+ * Also used on clients for SNI,
+ * and for TLS 1.3 session resumption using tickets.
+ *
+ * The value of this field can be:
+ * - \p NULL in a newly initialized or reset context.
+ * - A heap-allocated copy of the last value passed to
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(), if the last call had a non-null
+ * \p hostname argument.
+ * - A special value to indicate that mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname()
+ * was called with \p NULL (as opposed to never having been called).
+ * See `mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname_pointer()` in `ssl_tls.c`.
+ *
+ * If this field contains the value \p NULL and the configuration option
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
+ * is unset, on a TLS client, attempting to verify a server certificate
+ * results in the error
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME.
+ *
+ * If this field contains the special value described above, or if
+ * the value is \p NULL and the configuration option
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
+ * is set, then the peer name verification is skipped, which may be
+ * insecure, especially on a client. Furthermore, on a client, the
+ * server_name extension is not sent, and the server name is ignored
+ * in TLS 1.3 session resumption using tickets.
+ */
+ char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hostname);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+ const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alpn_chosen); /*!< negotiated protocol */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+ /*
+ * use_srtp extension
+ */
+ mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_info);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
+
+ /*
+ * Information for DTLS hello verify
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cli_id); /*!< transport-level ID of the client */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cli_id_len); /*!< length of cli_id */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+ /*
+ * Secure renegotiation
+ */
+ /* needed to know when to send extension on server */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(secure_renegotiation); /*!< does peer support legacy or
+ secure renegotiation */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(verify_data_len); /*!< length of verify data stored */
+ char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_verify_data)[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */
+ char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_verify_data)[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+ /* CID configuration to use in subsequent handshakes. */
+
+ /*! The next incoming CID, chosen by the user and applying to
+ * all subsequent handshakes. This may be different from the
+ * CID currently used in case the user has re-configured the CID
+ * after an initial handshake. */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_cid)[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX];
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_cid_len); /*!< The length of \c own_cid. */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(negotiate_cid); /*!< This indicates whether the CID extension should
+ * be negotiated in the next handshake or not.
+ * Possible values are #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED
+ * and #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+ /** Callback to export key block and master secret */
+ mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_export_keys);
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export_keys); /*!< context for key export callback */
+
+ /** User data pointer or handle.
+ *
+ * The library sets this to \p 0 when creating a context and does not
+ * access it afterwards.
+ *
+ * \warning Serializing and restoring an SSL context with
+ * mbedtls_ssl_context_save() and mbedtls_ssl_context_load()
+ * does not currently restore the user data.
+ */
+ mbedtls_ssl_user_data_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return the name of the ciphersuite associated with the
+ * given ID
+ *
+ * \param ciphersuite_id SSL ciphersuite ID
+ *
+ * \return a string containing the ciphersuite name
+ */
+const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(const int ciphersuite_id);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return the ID of the ciphersuite associated with the
+ * given name
+ *
+ * \param ciphersuite_name SSL ciphersuite name
+ *
+ * \return the ID with the ciphersuite or 0 if not found
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id(const char *ciphersuite_name);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize an SSL context
+ * Just makes the context ready for mbedtls_ssl_setup() or
+ * mbedtls_ssl_free()
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set up an SSL context for use
+ *
+ * \note No copy of the configuration context is made, it can be
+ * shared by many mbedtls_ssl_context structures.
+ *
+ * \warning The conf structure will be accessed during the session.
+ * It must not be modified or freed as long as the session
+ * is active.
+ *
+ * \warning This function must be called exactly once per context.
+ * Calling mbedtls_ssl_setup again is not supported, even
+ * if no session is active.
+ *
+ * \warning After setting up a client context, if certificate-based
+ * authentication is enabled, you should call
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() to specifiy the expected
+ * name of the server. Without this, in most scenarios,
+ * the TLS connection is insecure. See
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
+ * for more information.
+ *
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param conf SSL configuration to use
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if
+ * memory allocation failed
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_setup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Reset an already initialized SSL context for re-use
+ * while retaining application-set variables, function
+ * pointers and data.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED or
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the current endpoint type
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param endpoint must be MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the current endpoint type
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ *
+ * \return Endpoint type, either MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT
+ * or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_endpoint(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf)
+{
+ return conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the transport type (TLS or DTLS).
+ * Default: TLS
+ *
+ * \note For DTLS, you must either provide a recv callback that
+ * doesn't block, or one that handles timeouts, see
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). You also need to provide timer
+ * callbacks with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb().
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param transport transport type:
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM for TLS,
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM for DTLS.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the certificate verification mode
+ * Default: NONE on server, REQUIRED on client
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param authmode can be:
+ *
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE: peer certificate is not checked
+ * (default on server)
+ * (insecure on client)
+ *
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL: peer certificate is checked, however the
+ * handshake continues even if verification failed;
+ * mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() can be called after the
+ * handshake is complete.
+ *
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED: peer *must* present a valid certificate,
+ * handshake is aborted if verification failed.
+ * (default on client)
+ *
+ * \note On client, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED is the recommended mode.
+ * With MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL, the user needs to call mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() at
+ * the right time(s), which may not be obvious, while REQUIRED always perform
+ * the verification as soon as possible. For example, REQUIRED was protecting
+ * against the "triple handshake" attack even before it was found.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the early data mode
+ * Default: disabled on server and client
+ *
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to use.
+ * \param early_data_enabled can be:
+ *
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED:
+ * Early data functionality is disabled. This is the default on client and
+ * server.
+ *
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED:
+ * Early data functionality is enabled and may be negotiated in the handshake.
+ * Application using early data functionality needs to be aware that the
+ * security properties for early data (also refered to as 0-RTT data) are
+ * weaker than those for other kinds of TLS data. See the documentation of
+ * mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() and mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() for more
+ * information.
+ * When early data functionality is enabled on server and only in that case,
+ * the call to one of the APIs that trigger or resume an handshake sequence,
+ * namely mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(),
+ * mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() may return with the error code
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA indicating that some early data have
+ * been received. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()
+ * before calling the original function again.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ int early_data_enabled);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the maximum amount of 0-RTT data in bytes
+ * Default: #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE
+ *
+ * This function sets the value of the max_early_data_size
+ * field of the early data indication extension included in
+ * the NewSessionTicket messages that the server may send.
+ *
+ * The value defines the maximum amount of 0-RTT data
+ * in bytes that a client will be allowed to send when using
+ * one of the tickets defined by the NewSessionTicket messages.
+ *
+ * \note When resuming a session using a ticket, if the server receives more
+ * early data than allowed for the ticket, it terminates the connection.
+ * The maximum amount of 0-RTT data should thus be large enough
+ * to allow a minimum of early data to be exchanged.
+ *
+ * \param[in] conf The SSL configuration to use.
+ * \param[in] max_early_data_size The maximum amount of 0-RTT data.
+ *
+ * \warning This interface DOES NOT influence/limit the amount of early data
+ * that can be received through previously created and issued tickets,
+ * which clients may have stored.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_early_data_size(
+ mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t max_early_data_size);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the verification callback (Optional).
+ *
+ * If set, the provided verify callback is called for each
+ * certificate in the peer's CRT chain, including the trusted
+ * root. For more information, please see the documentation of
+ * \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify().
+ *
+ * \note For per context callbacks and contexts, please use
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() instead.
+ *
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to use.
+ * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use during CRT verification.
+ * \param p_vrfy The opaque context to be passed to the callback.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
+ void *p_vrfy);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the random number generator callback
+ *
+ * \note The callback with its parameter must remain valid as
+ * long as there is an SSL context that uses the
+ * SSL configuration.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param f_rng RNG function (mandatory)
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the debug callback
+ *
+ * The callback has the following argument:
+ * void * opaque context for the callback
+ * int debug level
+ * const char * file name
+ * int line number
+ * const char * message
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param f_dbg debug function
+ * \param p_dbg debug parameter
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *),
+ void *p_dbg);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return the SSL configuration structure associated
+ * with the given SSL context.
+ *
+ * \note The pointer returned by this function is guaranteed to
+ * remain valid until the context is freed.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to query.
+ * \return Pointer to the SSL configuration associated with \p ssl.
+ */
+static inline const mbedtls_ssl_config *mbedtls_ssl_context_get_config(
+ const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(conf);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the underlying BIO callbacks for write, read and
+ * read-with-timeout.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param p_bio parameter (context) shared by BIO callbacks
+ * \param f_send write callback
+ * \param f_recv read callback
+ * \param f_recv_timeout blocking read callback with timeout.
+ *
+ * \note One of f_recv or f_recv_timeout can be NULL, in which case
+ * the other is used. If both are non-NULL, f_recv_timeout is
+ * used and f_recv is ignored (as if it were NULL).
+ *
+ * \note The two most common use cases are:
+ * - non-blocking I/O, f_recv != NULL, f_recv_timeout == NULL
+ * - blocking I/O, f_recv == NULL, f_recv_timeout != NULL
+ *
+ * \note For DTLS, you need to provide either a non-NULL
+ * f_recv_timeout callback, or a f_recv that doesn't block.
+ *
+ * \note See the documentations of \c mbedtls_ssl_send_t,
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_recv_t and \c mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t for
+ * the conventions those callbacks must follow.
+ *
+ * \note On some platforms, net_sockets.c provides
+ * \c mbedtls_net_send(), \c mbedtls_net_recv() and
+ * \c mbedtls_net_recv_timeout() that are suitable to be used
+ * here.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ void *p_bio,
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send,
+ mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv,
+ mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+
+
+/**
+ * \brief Configure the use of the Connection ID (CID)
+ * extension in the next handshake.
+ *
+ * Reference: RFC 9146 (or draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
+ * for legacy version)
+ *
+ * The DTLS CID extension allows the reliable association of
+ * DTLS records to DTLS connections across changes in the
+ * underlying transport (changed IP and Port metadata) by
+ * adding explicit connection identifiers (CIDs) to the
+ * headers of encrypted DTLS records. The desired CIDs are
+ * configured by the application layer and are exchanged in
+ * new `ClientHello` / `ServerHello` extensions during the
+ * handshake, where each side indicates the CID it wants the
+ * peer to use when writing encrypted messages. The CIDs are
+ * put to use once records get encrypted: the stack discards
+ * any incoming records that don't include the configured CID
+ * in their header, and adds the peer's requested CID to the
+ * headers of outgoing messages.
+ *
+ * This API enables or disables the use of the CID extension
+ * in the next handshake and sets the value of the CID to
+ * be used for incoming messages.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to configure. This must be initialized.
+ * \param enable This value determines whether the CID extension should
+ * be used or not. Possible values are:
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED to enable the use of the CID.
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED (default) to disable the use
+ * of the CID.
+ * \param own_cid The address of the readable buffer holding the CID we want
+ * the peer to use when sending encrypted messages to us.
+ * This may be \c NULL if \p own_cid_len is \c 0.
+ * This parameter is unused if \p enable is set to
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED.
+ * \param own_cid_len The length of \p own_cid.
+ * This parameter is unused if \p enable is set to
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED.
+ *
+ * \note The value of \p own_cid_len must match the value of the
+ * \c len parameter passed to mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid()
+ * when configuring the ::mbedtls_ssl_config that \p ssl
+ * is bound to.
+ *
+ * \note This CID configuration applies to subsequent handshakes
+ * performed on the SSL context \p ssl, but does not trigger
+ * one. You still have to call `mbedtls_ssl_handshake()`
+ * (for the initial handshake) or `mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate()`
+ * (for a renegotiation handshake) explicitly after a
+ * successful call to this function to run the handshake.
+ *
+ * \note This call cannot guarantee that the use of the CID
+ * will be successfully negotiated in the next handshake,
+ * because the peer might not support it. Specifically:
+ * - On the Client, enabling the use of the CID through
+ * this call implies that the `ClientHello` in the next
+ * handshake will include the CID extension, thereby
+ * offering the use of the CID to the server. Only if
+ * the `ServerHello` contains the CID extension, too,
+ * the CID extension will actually be put to use.
+ * - On the Server, enabling the use of the CID through
+ * this call implies that the server will look for
+ * the CID extension in a `ClientHello` from the client,
+ * and, if present, reply with a CID extension in its
+ * `ServerHello`.
+ *
+ * \note To check whether the use of the CID was negotiated
+ * after the subsequent handshake has completed, please
+ * use the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid().
+ *
+ * \warning If the use of the CID extension is enabled in this call
+ * and the subsequent handshake negotiates its use, Mbed TLS
+ * will silently drop every packet whose CID does not match
+ * the CID configured in \p own_cid. It is the responsibility
+ * of the user to adapt the underlying transport to take care
+ * of CID-based demultiplexing before handing datagrams to
+ * Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, the CID configuration
+ * applies to the next handshake.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ int enable,
+ unsigned char const *own_cid,
+ size_t own_cid_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get information about our request for usage of the CID
+ * extension in the current connection.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to query.
+ * \param enabled The address at which to store whether the CID extension
+ * is requested to be used or not. If the CID is
+ * requested, `*enabled` is set to
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; otherwise, it is set to
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED.
+ * \param own_cid The address of the buffer in which to store our own
+ * CID (if the CID extension is requested). This may be
+ * \c NULL in case the value of our CID isn't needed. If
+ * it is not \c NULL, \p own_cid_len must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param own_cid_len The address at which to store the size of our own CID
+ * (if the CID extension is requested). This is also the
+ * number of Bytes in \p own_cid that have been written.
+ * This may be \c NULL in case the length of our own CID
+ * isn't needed. If it is \c NULL, \p own_cid must be
+ * \c NULL, too.
+ *
+ *\note If we are requesting an empty CID this function sets
+ * `*enabled` to #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED (the rationale
+ * for this is that the resulting outcome is the
+ * same as if the CID extensions wasn't requested).
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_own_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ int *enabled,
+ unsigned char own_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX],
+ size_t *own_cid_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get information about the use of the CID extension
+ * in the current connection.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to query.
+ * \param enabled The address at which to store whether the CID extension
+ * is currently in use or not. If the CID is in use,
+ * `*enabled` is set to MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED;
+ * otherwise, it is set to MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED.
+ * \param peer_cid The address of the buffer in which to store the CID
+ * chosen by the peer (if the CID extension is used).
+ * This may be \c NULL in case the value of peer CID
+ * isn't needed. If it is not \c NULL, \p peer_cid_len
+ * must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param peer_cid_len The address at which to store the size of the CID
+ * chosen by the peer (if the CID extension is used).
+ * This is also the number of Bytes in \p peer_cid that
+ * have been written.
+ * This may be \c NULL in case the length of the peer CID
+ * isn't needed. If it is \c NULL, \p peer_cid must be
+ * \c NULL, too.
+ *
+ * \note This applies to the state of the CID negotiated in
+ * the last complete handshake. If a handshake is in
+ * progress, this function will attempt to complete
+ * the handshake first.
+ *
+ * \note If CID extensions have been exchanged but both client
+ * and server chose to use an empty CID, this function
+ * sets `*enabled` to #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED
+ * (the rationale for this is that the resulting
+ * communication is the same as if the CID extensions
+ * hadn't been used).
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ int *enabled,
+ unsigned char peer_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX],
+ size_t *peer_cid_len);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the Maximum Transport Unit (MTU).
+ * Special value: 0 means unset (no limit).
+ * This represents the maximum size of a datagram payload
+ * handled by the transport layer (usually UDP) as determined
+ * by the network link and stack. In practice, this controls
+ * the maximum size datagram the DTLS layer will pass to the
+ * \c f_send() callback set using \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio().
+ *
+ * \note The limit on datagram size is converted to a limit on
+ * record payload by subtracting the current overhead of
+ * encapsulation and encryption/authentication if any.
+ *
+ * \note This can be called at any point during the connection, for
+ * example when a Path Maximum Transfer Unit (PMTU)
+ * estimate becomes available from other sources,
+ * such as lower (or higher) protocol layers.
+ *
+ * \note This setting only controls the size of the packets we send,
+ * and does not restrict the size of the datagrams we're
+ * willing to receive. Client-side, you can request the
+ * server to use smaller records with \c
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len().
+ *
+ * \note If both a MTU and a maximum fragment length have been
+ * configured (or negotiated with the peer), the resulting
+ * lower limit on record payload (see first note) is used.
+ *
+ * \note This can only be used to decrease the maximum size
+ * of datagrams (hence records, see first note) sent. It
+ * cannot be used to increase the maximum size of records over
+ * the limit set by #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN.
+ *
+ * \note Values lower than the current record layer expansion will
+ * result in an error when trying to send data.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param mtu Value of the path MTU in bytes
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Set a connection-specific verification callback (optional).
+ *
+ * If set, the provided verify callback is called for each
+ * certificate in the peer's CRT chain, including the trusted
+ * root. For more information, please see the documentation of
+ * \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify().
+ *
+ * \note This call is analogous to mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() but
+ * binds the verification callback and context to an SSL context
+ * as opposed to an SSL configuration.
+ * If mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() and mbedtls_ssl_set_verify()
+ * are both used, mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() takes precedence.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to use.
+ * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use during CRT verification.
+ * \param p_vrfy The opaque context to be passed to the callback.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
+ void *p_vrfy);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the timeout period for mbedtls_ssl_read()
+ * (Default: no timeout.)
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration context
+ * \param timeout Timeout value in milliseconds.
+ * Use 0 for no timeout (default).
+ *
+ * \note With blocking I/O, this will only work if a non-NULL
+ * \c f_recv_timeout was set with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio().
+ * With non-blocking I/O, this will only work if timer
+ * callbacks were set with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb().
+ *
+ * \note With non-blocking I/O, you may also skip this function
+ * altogether and handle timeouts at the application layer.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Check whether a buffer contains a valid and authentic record
+ * that has not been seen before. (DTLS only).
+ *
+ * This function does not change the user-visible state
+ * of the SSL context. Its sole purpose is to provide
+ * an indication of the legitimacy of an incoming record.
+ *
+ * This can be useful e.g. in distributed server environments
+ * using the DTLS Connection ID feature, in which connections
+ * might need to be passed between service instances on a change
+ * of peer address, but where such disruptive operations should
+ * only happen after the validity of incoming records has been
+ * confirmed.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to use.
+ * \param buf The address of the buffer holding the record to be checked.
+ * This must be a read/write buffer of length \p buflen Bytes.
+ * \param buflen The length of \p buf in Bytes.
+ *
+ * \note This routine only checks whether the provided buffer begins
+ * with a valid and authentic record that has not been seen
+ * before, but does not check potential data following the
+ * initial record. In particular, it is possible to pass DTLS
+ * datagrams containing multiple records, in which case only
+ * the first record is checked.
+ *
+ * \note This function modifies the input buffer \p buf. If you need
+ * to preserve the original record, you have to maintain a copy.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the record is valid and authentic and has not been
+ * seen before.
+ * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC if the check completed
+ * successfully but the record was found to be not authentic.
+ * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD if the check completed
+ * successfully but the record was found to be invalid for
+ * a reason different from authenticity checking.
+ * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD if the check completed
+ * successfully but the record was found to be unexpected
+ * in the state of the SSL context, including replayed records.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
+ * In this case, the SSL context becomes unusable and needs
+ * to be freed or reset before reuse.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_check_record(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the timer callbacks (Mandatory for DTLS.)
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param p_timer parameter (context) shared by timer callbacks
+ * \param f_set_timer set timer callback
+ * \param f_get_timer get timer callback. Must return:
+ *
+ * \note See the documentation of \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t and
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t for the conventions this pair of
+ * callbacks must follow.
+ *
+ * \note On some platforms, timing.c provides
+ * \c mbedtls_timing_set_delay() and
+ * \c mbedtls_timing_get_delay() that are suitable for using
+ * here, except if using an event-driven style.
+ *
+ * \note See also the "DTLS tutorial" article in our knowledge base.
+ * https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/how-to/dtls-tutorial
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ void *p_timer,
+ mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer,
+ mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the certificate selection callback (server-side only).
+ *
+ * If set, the callback is always called for each handshake,
+ * after `ClientHello` processing has finished.
+ *
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with.
+ * \param f_cert_cb The callback for selecting server certificate after
+ * `ClientHello` processing has finished.
+ */
+static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t f_cert_cb)
+{
+ conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cert_cb) = f_cert_cb;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: generate and write session ticket
+ *
+ * \note This describes what a callback implementation should do.
+ * This callback should generate an encrypted and
+ * authenticated ticket for the session and write it to the
+ * output buffer. Here, ticket means the opaque ticket part
+ * of the NewSessionTicket structure of RFC 5077.
+ *
+ * \param p_ticket Context for the callback
+ * \param session SSL session to be written in the ticket
+ * \param start Start of the output buffer
+ * \param end End of the output buffer
+ * \param tlen On exit, holds the length written
+ * \param lifetime On exit, holds the lifetime of the ticket in seconds
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or
+ * a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code.
+ */
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t(void *p_ticket,
+ const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
+ unsigned char *start,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *tlen,
+ uint32_t *lifetime);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: parse and load session ticket
+ *
+ * \note This describes what a callback implementation should do.
+ * This callback should parse a session ticket as generated
+ * by the corresponding mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t function,
+ * and, if the ticket is authentic and valid, load the
+ * session.
+ *
+ * \note The implementation is allowed to modify the first len
+ * bytes of the input buffer, eg to use it as a temporary
+ * area for the decrypted ticket contents.
+ *
+ * \param p_ticket Context for the callback
+ * \param session SSL session to be loaded
+ * \param buf Start of the buffer containing the ticket
+ * \param len Length of the ticket.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC if not authentic, or
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED if expired, or
+ * any other non-zero code for other failures.
+ */
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t(void *p_ticket,
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Configure SSL session ticket callbacks (server only).
+ * (Default: none.)
+ *
+ * \note On server, session tickets are enabled by providing
+ * non-NULL callbacks.
+ *
+ * \note On client, use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets().
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration context
+ * \param f_ticket_write Callback for writing a ticket
+ * \param f_ticket_parse Callback for parsing a ticket
+ * \param p_ticket Context shared by the two callbacks
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t *f_ticket_write,
+ mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t *f_ticket_parse,
+ void *p_ticket);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+/**
+ * \brief Get the creation time of a session ticket.
+ *
+ * \note See the documentation of \c ticket_creation_time for information about
+ * the intended usage of this function.
+ *
+ * \param session SSL session
+ * \param ticket_creation_time On exit, holds the ticket creation time in
+ * milliseconds.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if an input is not valid.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ticket_creation_time(
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *session, mbedtls_ms_time_t *ticket_creation_time)
+{
+ if (session == NULL || ticket_creation_time == NULL ||
+ session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint) != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ *ticket_creation_time = session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_creation_time);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the session-id buffer.
+ *
+ * \param session SSL session.
+ *
+ * \return The address of the session-id buffer.
+ */
+static inline unsigned const char (*mbedtls_ssl_session_get_id(const mbedtls_ssl_session *
+ session))[32]
+{
+ return &session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the size of the session-id.
+ *
+ * \param session SSL session.
+ *
+ * \return size_t size of session-id buffer.
+ */
+static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_session_get_id_len(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session)
+{
+ return session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id_len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the ciphersuite-id.
+ *
+ * \param session SSL session.
+ *
+ * \return int represetation for ciphersuite.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ciphersuite_id(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session)
+{
+ return session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Configure a key export callback.
+ * (Default: none.)
+ *
+ * This API can be used for two purposes:
+ * - Debugging: Use this API to e.g. generate an NSSKeylog
+ * file and use it to inspect encrypted traffic in tools
+ * such as Wireshark.
+ * - Application-specific export: Use this API to implement
+ * key exporters, e.g. for EAP-TLS or DTLS-SRTP.
+ *
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to which the export
+ * callback should be attached.
+ * \param f_export_keys The callback for the key export.
+ * \param p_export_keys The opaque context pointer to be passed to the
+ * callback \p f_export_keys.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_export_keys_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys,
+ void *p_export_keys);
+
+/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL configuration to a pointer.
+ *
+ * You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_p().
+ *
+ * \note The library stores \c p without accessing it. It is the responsibility
+ * of the caller to ensure that the pointer remains valid.
+ *
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify.
+ * \param p The new value of the user data.
+ */
+static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p(
+ mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ void *p)
+{
+ conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p = p;
+}
+
+/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL configuration to an integer.
+ *
+ * You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n().
+ *
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify.
+ * \param n The new value of the user data.
+ */
+static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n(
+ mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ uintptr_t n)
+{
+ conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n = n;
+}
+
+/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL configuration as a pointer.
+ *
+ * This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p(), or
+ * \c NULL if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p() has not previously been
+ * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n() has
+ * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p().
+ *
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify.
+ * \return The current value of the user data.
+ */
+static inline void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_p(
+ mbedtls_ssl_config *conf)
+{
+ return conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p;
+}
+
+/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL configuration as an integer.
+ *
+ * This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n(), or
+ * \c 0 if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n() has not previously been
+ * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p() has
+ * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n().
+ *
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify.
+ * \return The current value of the user data.
+ */
+static inline uintptr_t mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n(
+ mbedtls_ssl_config *conf)
+{
+ return conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n;
+}
+
+/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL context to a pointer.
+ *
+ * You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_p().
+ *
+ * \note The library stores \c p without accessing it. It is the responsibility
+ * of the caller to ensure that the pointer remains valid.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to modify.
+ * \param p The new value of the user data.
+ */
+static inline void mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p(
+ mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ void *p)
+{
+ ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p = p;
+}
+
+/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL context to an integer.
+ *
+ * You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n().
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to modify.
+ * \param n The new value of the user data.
+ */
+static inline void mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n(
+ mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ uintptr_t n)
+{
+ ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n = n;
+}
+
+/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL context as a pointer.
+ *
+ * This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p(), or
+ * \c NULL if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p() has not previously been
+ * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n() has
+ * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p().
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to modify.
+ * \return The current value of the user data.
+ */
+static inline void *mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_p(
+ mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p;
+}
+
+/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL context as an integer.
+ *
+ * This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n(), or
+ * \c 0 if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n() has not previously been
+ * called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p() has
+ * been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n().
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to modify.
+ * \return The current value of the user data.
+ */
+static inline uintptr_t mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n(
+ mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
+/**
+ * \brief Configure asynchronous private key operation callbacks.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration context
+ * \param f_async_sign Callback to start a signature operation. See
+ * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t
+ * for more information. This may be \c NULL if the
+ * external processor does not support any signature
+ * operation; in this case the private key object
+ * associated with the certificate will be used.
+ * \param f_async_decrypt Callback to start a decryption operation. See
+ * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t
+ * for more information. This may be \c NULL if the
+ * external processor does not support any decryption
+ * operation; in this case the private key object
+ * associated with the certificate will be used.
+ * \param f_async_resume Callback to resume an asynchronous operation. See
+ * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t
+ * for more information. This may not be \c NULL unless
+ * \p f_async_sign and \p f_async_decrypt are both
+ * \c NULL.
+ * \param f_async_cancel Callback to cancel an asynchronous operation. See
+ * the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t
+ * for more information. This may be \c NULL if
+ * no cleanup is needed.
+ * \param config_data A pointer to configuration data which can be
+ * retrieved with
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data(). The
+ * library stores this value without dereferencing it.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign,
+ mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt,
+ mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume,
+ mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel,
+ void *config_data);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Retrieve the configuration data set by
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb().
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration context
+ * \return The configuration data set by
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb().
+ */
+void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Retrieve the asynchronous operation user context.
+ *
+ * \note This function may only be called while a handshake
+ * is in progress.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to access.
+ *
+ * \return The asynchronous operation user context that was last
+ * set during the current handshake. If
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() has not yet been
+ * called during the current handshake, this function returns
+ * \c NULL.
+ */
+void *mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Retrieve the asynchronous operation user context.
+ *
+ * \note This function may only be called while a handshake
+ * is in progress.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to access.
+ * \param ctx The new value of the asynchronous operation user context.
+ * Call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data() later during the
+ * same handshake to retrieve this value.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ void *ctx);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: generate a cookie
+ *
+ * \param ctx Context for the callback
+ * \param p Buffer to write to,
+ * must be updated to point right after the cookie
+ * \param end Pointer to one past the end of the output buffer
+ * \param info Client ID info that was passed to
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id()
+ * \param ilen Length of info in bytes
+ *
+ * \return The callback must return 0 on success,
+ * or a negative error code.
+ */
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t(void *ctx,
+ unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
+ const unsigned char *info, size_t ilen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Callback type: verify a cookie
+ *
+ * \param ctx Context for the callback
+ * \param cookie Cookie to verify
+ * \param clen Length of cookie
+ * \param info Client ID info that was passed to
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id()
+ * \param ilen Length of info in bytes
+ *
+ * \return The callback must return 0 if cookie is valid,
+ * or a negative error code.
+ */
+typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t(void *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *cookie, size_t clen,
+ const unsigned char *info, size_t ilen);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Register callbacks for DTLS cookies
+ * (Server only. DTLS only.)
+ *
+ * Default: dummy callbacks that fail, in order to force you to
+ * register working callbacks (and initialize their context).
+ *
+ * To disable HelloVerifyRequest, register NULL callbacks.
+ *
+ * \warning Disabling hello verification allows your server to be used
+ * for amplification in DoS attacks against other hosts.
+ * Only disable if you known this can't happen in your
+ * particular environment.
+ *
+ * \note See comments on \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() about handling
+ * the MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED that is expected
+ * on the first handshake attempt when this is enabled.
+ *
+ * \note This is also necessary to handle client reconnection from
+ * the same port as described in RFC 6347 section 4.2.8 (only
+ * the variant with cookies is supported currently). See
+ * comments on \c mbedtls_ssl_read() for details.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param f_cookie_write Cookie write callback
+ * \param f_cookie_check Cookie check callback
+ * \param p_cookie Context for both callbacks
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write,
+ mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check,
+ void *p_cookie);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set client's transport-level identification info.
+ * (Server only. DTLS only.)
+ *
+ * This is usually the IP address (and port), but could be
+ * anything identify the client depending on the underlying
+ * network stack. Used for HelloVerifyRequest with DTLS.
+ * This is *not* used to route the actual packets.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param info Transport-level info identifying the client (eg IP + port)
+ * \param ilen Length of info in bytes
+ *
+ * \note An internal copy is made, so the info buffer can be reused.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used on client,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if out of memory.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *info,
+ size_t ilen);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
+/**
+ * \brief Enable or disable anti-replay protection for DTLS.
+ * (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.)
+ * Default: enabled.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param mode MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED.
+ *
+ * \warning Disabling this is a security risk unless the application
+ * protocol handles duplicated packets in a safe way. You
+ * should not disable this without careful consideration.
+ * However, if your application already detects duplicated
+ * packets and needs information about them to adjust its
+ * transmission strategy, then you'll want to disable this.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set a limit on the number of records with a bad MAC
+ * before terminating the connection.
+ * (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.)
+ * Default: 0 (disabled).
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param limit Limit, or 0 to disable.
+ *
+ * \note If the limit is N, then the connection is terminated when
+ * the Nth non-authentic record is seen.
+ *
+ * \note Records with an invalid header are not counted, only the
+ * ones going through the authentication-decryption phase.
+ *
+ * \note This is a security trade-off related to the fact that it's
+ * often relatively easy for an active attacker to inject UDP
+ * datagrams. On one hand, setting a low limit here makes it
+ * easier for such an attacker to forcibly terminated a
+ * connection. On the other hand, a high limit or no limit
+ * might make us waste resources checking authentication on
+ * many bogus packets.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Allow or disallow packing of multiple handshake records
+ * within a single datagram.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to configure.
+ * \param allow_packing This determines whether datagram packing may
+ * be used or not. A value of \c 0 means that every
+ * record will be sent in a separate datagram; a
+ * value of \c 1 means that, if space permits,
+ * multiple handshake messages (including CCS) belonging to
+ * a single flight may be packed within a single datagram.
+ *
+ * \note This is enabled by default and should only be disabled
+ * for test purposes, or if datagram packing causes
+ * interoperability issues with peers that don't support it.
+ *
+ * \note Allowing datagram packing reduces the network load since
+ * there's less overhead if multiple messages share the same
+ * datagram. Also, it increases the handshake efficiency
+ * since messages belonging to a single datagram will not
+ * be reordered in transit, and so future message buffering
+ * or flight retransmission (if no buffering is used) as
+ * means to deal with reordering are needed less frequently.
+ *
+ * \note Application records are not affected by this option and
+ * are currently always sent in separate datagrams.
+ *
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned allow_packing);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set retransmit timeout values for the DTLS handshake.
+ * (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.)
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param min Initial timeout value in milliseconds.
+ * Default: 1000 (1 second).
+ * \param max Maximum timeout value in milliseconds.
+ * Default: 60000 (60 seconds).
+ *
+ * \note Default values are from RFC 6347 section 4.2.4.1.
+ *
+ * \note The 'min' value should typically be slightly above the
+ * expected round-trip time to your peer, plus whatever time
+ * it takes for the peer to process the message. For example,
+ * if your RTT is about 600ms and you peer needs up to 1s to
+ * do the cryptographic operations in the handshake, then you
+ * should set 'min' slightly above 1600. Lower values of 'min'
+ * might cause spurious resends which waste network resources,
+ * while larger value of 'min' will increase overall latency
+ * on unreliable network links.
+ *
+ * \note The more unreliable your network connection is, the larger
+ * your max / min ratio needs to be in order to achieve
+ * reliable handshakes.
+ *
+ * \note Messages are retransmitted up to log2(ceil(max/min)) times.
+ * For example, if min = 1s and max = 5s, the retransmit plan
+ * goes: send ... 1s -> resend ... 2s -> resend ... 4s ->
+ * resend ... 5s -> give up and return a timeout error.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t min, uint32_t max);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the session cache callbacks (server-side only)
+ * If not set, no session resuming is done (except if session
+ * tickets are enabled too).
+ *
+ * The session cache has the responsibility to check for stale
+ * entries based on timeout. See RFC 5246 for recommendations.
+ *
+ * Warning: session.peer_cert is cleared by the SSL/TLS layer on
+ * connection shutdown, so do not cache the pointer! Either set
+ * it to NULL or make a full copy of the certificate.
+ *
+ * The get callback is called once during the initial handshake
+ * to enable session resuming. The get function has the
+ * following parameters: (void *parameter, mbedtls_ssl_session *session)
+ * If a valid entry is found, it should fill the master of
+ * the session object with the cached values and return 0,
+ * return 1 otherwise. Optionally peer_cert can be set as well
+ * if it is properly present in cache entry.
+ *
+ * The set callback is called once during the initial handshake
+ * to enable session resuming after the entire handshake has
+ * been finished. The set function has the following parameters:
+ * (void *parameter, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session). The function
+ * should create a cache entry for future retrieval based on
+ * the data in the session structure and should keep in mind
+ * that the mbedtls_ssl_session object presented (and all its referenced
+ * data) is cleared by the SSL/TLS layer when the connection is
+ * terminated. It is recommended to add metadata to determine if
+ * an entry is still valid in the future. Return 0 if
+ * successfully cached, return 1 otherwise.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param p_cache parameter (context) for both callbacks
+ * \param f_get_cache session get callback
+ * \param f_set_cache session set callback
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ void *p_cache,
+ mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *f_get_cache,
+ mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *f_set_cache);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Load a session for session resumption.
+ *
+ * Sessions loaded through this call will be considered
+ * for session resumption in the next handshake.
+ *
+ * \note Even if this call succeeds, it is not guaranteed that
+ * the next handshake will indeed be shortened through the
+ * use of session resumption: The server is always free
+ * to reject any attempt for resumption and fall back to
+ * a full handshake.
+ *
+ * \note This function can handle a variety of mechanisms for session
+ * resumption: For TLS 1.2, both session ID-based resumption
+ * and ticket-based resumption will be considered. For TLS 1.3,
+ * sessions equate to tickets, and loading one session by
+ * calling this function will lead to its corresponding ticket
+ * being advertised as resumption PSK by the client. This
+ * depends on session tickets being enabled (see
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS configuration option) though.
+ * If session tickets are disabled, a call to this function
+ * with a TLS 1.3 session, will not have any effect on the next
+ * handshake for the SSL context \p ssl.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context representing the connection which should
+ * be attempted to be setup using session resumption. This
+ * must be initialized via mbedtls_ssl_init() and bound to
+ * an SSL configuration via mbedtls_ssl_setup(), but
+ * the handshake must not yet have been started.
+ * \param session The session to be considered for session resumption.
+ * This must be a session previously exported via
+ * mbedtls_ssl_get_session(), and potentially serialized and
+ * deserialized through mbedtls_ssl_session_save() and
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session_load() in the meantime.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the session
+ * could not be loaded because one session has already been
+ * loaded. This error is non-fatal, and has no observable
+ * effect on the SSL context or the session that was attempted
+ * to be loaded.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ *
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_session()
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_session_load()
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_session(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Load serialized session data into a session structure.
+ * On client, this can be used for loading saved sessions
+ * before resuming them with mbedtls_ssl_set_session().
+ * On server, this can be used for alternative implementations
+ * of session cache or session tickets.
+ *
+ * \warning If a peer certificate chain is associated with the session,
+ * the serialized state will only contain the peer's
+ * end-entity certificate and the result of the chain
+ * verification (unless verification was disabled), but not
+ * the rest of the chain.
+ *
+ * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_save()
+ * \see mbedtls_ssl_set_session()
+ *
+ * \param session The session structure to be populated. It must have been
+ * initialised with mbedtls_ssl_session_init() but not
+ * populated yet.
+ * \param buf The buffer holding the serialized session data. It must be a
+ * readable buffer of at least \p len bytes.
+ * \param len The size of the serialized data in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH if the serialized data
+ * was generated in a different version or configuration of
+ * Mbed TLS.
+ * \return Another negative value for other kinds of errors (for
+ * example, unsupported features in the embedded certificate).
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Save session structure as serialized data in a buffer.
+ * On client, this can be used for saving session data,
+ * potentially in non-volatile storage, for resuming later.
+ * On server, this can be used for alternative implementations
+ * of session cache or session tickets.
+ *
+ * \see mbedtls_ssl_session_load()
+ *
+ * \param session The session structure to be saved.
+ * \param buf The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a
+ * writeable buffer of at least \p buf_len bytes, or may be \c
+ * NULL if \p buf_len is \c 0.
+ * \param buf_len The number of bytes available for writing in \p buf.
+ * \param olen The size in bytes of the data that has been or would have
+ * been written. It must point to a valid \c size_t.
+ *
+ * \note \p olen is updated to the correct value regardless of
+ * whether \p buf_len was large enough. This makes it possible
+ * to determine the necessary size by calling this function
+ * with \p buf set to \c NULL and \p buf_len to \c 0.
+ *
+ * \note For TLS 1.3 sessions, this feature is supported only if the
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS configuration option is enabled,
+ * as in TLS 1.3 session resumption is possible only with
+ * tickets.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf is too small.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS configuration option is disabled
+ * and the session is a TLS 1.3 session.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buf_len,
+ size_t *olen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the preference
+ * order. First in the list has the highest preference.
+ *
+ * For TLS 1.2, the notion of ciphersuite determines both
+ * the key exchange mechanism and the suite of symmetric
+ * algorithms to be used during and after the handshake.
+ *
+ * For TLS 1.3 (in development), the notion of ciphersuite
+ * only determines the suite of symmetric algorithms to be
+ * used during and after the handshake, while key exchange
+ * mechanisms are configured separately.
+ *
+ * In Mbed TLS, ciphersuites for both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3
+ * are configured via this function. For users of TLS 1.3,
+ * there will be separate API for the configuration of key
+ * exchange mechanisms.
+ *
+ * The list of ciphersuites passed to this function may
+ * contain a mixture of TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 ciphersuite
+ * identifiers. This is useful if negotiation of TLS 1.3
+ * should be attempted, but a fallback to TLS 1.2 would
+ * be tolerated.
+ *
+ * \note By default, the server chooses its preferred
+ * ciphersuite among those that the client supports. If
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order() is called to prefer
+ * the client's preferences, the server instead chooses
+ * the client's preferred ciphersuite among those that
+ * the server supports.
+ *
+ * \warning The ciphersuites array \p ciphersuites is not copied.
+ * It must remain valid for the lifetime of the SSL
+ * configuration \p conf.
+ *
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to modify.
+ * \param ciphersuites A 0-terminated list of IANA identifiers of supported
+ * ciphersuites, accessible through \c MBEDTLS_TLS_XXX
+ * and \c MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_XXX macros defined in
+ * ssl_ciphersuites.h.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ const int *ciphersuites);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the supported key exchange modes for TLS 1.3 connections.
+ *
+ * In contrast to TLS 1.2, the ciphersuite concept in TLS 1.3 does not
+ * include the choice of key exchange mechanism. It is therefore not
+ * covered by the API mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(). See the
+ * documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() for more
+ * information on the ciphersuite concept in TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.
+ *
+ * The present function is specific to TLS 1.3 and allows users to
+ * configure the set of supported key exchange mechanisms in TLS 1.3.
+ *
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration the change should apply to.
+ * \param kex_modes A bitwise combination of one or more of the following:
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK
+ * This flag enables pure-PSK key exchanges.
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL
+ * This flag enables combined PSK-ephemeral key exchanges.
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL
+ * This flag enables pure-ephemeral key exchanges.
+ * For convenience, the following pre-defined macros are
+ * available for combinations of the above:
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL
+ * Includes all of pure-PSK, PSK-ephemeral and pure-ephemeral.
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL
+ * Includes both pure-PSK and combined PSK-ephemeral
+ * key exchanges, but excludes pure-ephemeral key exchanges.
+ * - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL
+ * Includes both pure-ephemeral and combined PSK-ephemeral
+ * key exchanges.
+ *
+ * \note If a PSK-based key exchange mode shall be supported, applications
+ * must also use the APIs mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()
+ * to configure the PSKs to be used.
+ *
+ * \note If a pure-ephemeral key exchange mode shall be supported,
+ * server-side applications must also provide a certificate via
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert().
+ *
+ */
+
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ const int kex_modes);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE 0
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL 1
+/**
+ * \brief Specify the length of Connection IDs for incoming
+ * encrypted DTLS records, as well as the behaviour
+ * on unexpected CIDs.
+ *
+ * By default, the CID length is set to \c 0,
+ * and unexpected CIDs are silently ignored.
+ *
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to modify.
+ * \param len The length in Bytes of the CID fields in encrypted
+ * DTLS records using the CID mechanism. This must
+ * not be larger than #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX.
+ * \param ignore_other_cids This determines the stack's behaviour when
+ * receiving a record with an unexpected CID.
+ * Possible values are:
+ * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE
+ * In this case, the record is silently ignored.
+ * - #MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL
+ * In this case, the stack fails with the specific
+ * error code #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID.
+ *
+ * \note The CID specification allows implementations to either
+ * use a common length for all incoming connection IDs or
+ * allow variable-length incoming IDs. Mbed TLS currently
+ * requires a common length for all connections sharing the
+ * same SSL configuration; this allows simpler parsing of
+ * record headers.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p len
+ * is too large.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, size_t len,
+ int ignore_other_cids);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the X.509 security profile used for verification
+ *
+ * \note The restrictions are enforced for all certificates in the
+ * chain. However, signatures in the handshake are not covered
+ * by this setting but by \b mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes().
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param profile Profile to use
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the data required to verify peer certificate
+ *
+ * \note See \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for notes regarding the
+ * parameters ca_chain (maps to trust_ca for that function)
+ * and ca_crl.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param ca_chain trusted CA chain (meaning all fully trusted top-level CAs)
+ * \param ca_crl trusted CA CRLs
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain,
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+/**
+ * \brief Set DN hints sent to client in CertificateRequest message
+ *
+ * \note If not set, subject distinguished names (DNs) are taken
+ * from \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain()
+ * or \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain())
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param crt crt chain whose subject DNs are issuer DNs of client certs
+ * from which the client should select client peer certificate.
+ */
+static inline
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt)
+{
+ conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dn_hints) = crt;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the trusted certificate callback.
+ *
+ * This API allows to register the set of trusted certificates
+ * through a callback, instead of a linked list as configured
+ * by mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain().
+ *
+ * This is useful for example in contexts where a large number
+ * of CAs are used, and the inefficiency of maintaining them
+ * in a linked list cannot be tolerated. It is also useful when
+ * the set of trusted CAs needs to be modified frequently.
+ *
+ * See the documentation of `mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t` for
+ * more information.
+ *
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with.
+ * \param f_ca_cb The trusted certificate callback to use when verifying
+ * certificate chains.
+ * \param p_ca_cb The context to be passed to \p f_ca_cb (for example,
+ * a reference to a trusted CA database).
+ *
+ * \note This API is incompatible with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain():
+ * Any call to this function overwrites the values set through
+ * earlier calls to mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() or
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb().
+ *
+ * \note This API is incompatible with CA indication in
+ * CertificateRequest messages: A server-side SSL context which
+ * is bound to an SSL configuration that uses a CA callback
+ * configured via mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(), and which requires
+ * client authentication, will send an empty CA list in the
+ * corresponding CertificateRequest message.
+ *
+ * \note This API is incompatible with mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain():
+ * If an SSL context is bound to an SSL configuration which uses
+ * CA callbacks configured via mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(), then
+ * calls to mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() have no effect.
+ *
+ * \note The use of this API disables the use of restartable ECC
+ * during X.509 CRT signature verification (but doesn't affect
+ * other uses).
+ *
+ * \warning This API is incompatible with the use of CRLs. Any call to
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() unsets CRLs configured through
+ * earlier calls to mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain().
+ *
+ * \warning In multi-threaded environments, the callback \p f_ca_cb
+ * must be thread-safe, and it is the user's responsibility
+ * to guarantee this (for example through a mutex
+ * contained in the callback context pointed to by \p p_ca_cb).
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,
+ void *p_ca_cb);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set own certificate chain and private key
+ *
+ * \note own_cert should contain in order from the bottom up your
+ * certificate chain. The top certificate (self-signed)
+ * can be omitted.
+ *
+ * \note On server, this function can be called multiple times to
+ * provision more than one cert/key pair (eg one ECDSA, one
+ * RSA with SHA-256, one RSA with SHA-1). An adequate
+ * certificate will be selected according to the client's
+ * advertised capabilities. In case multiple certificates are
+ * adequate, preference is given to the one set by the first
+ * call to this function, then second, etc.
+ *
+ * \note On client, only the first call has any effect. That is,
+ * only one client certificate can be provisioned. The
+ * server's preferences in its CertificateRequest message will
+ * be ignored and our only cert will be sent regardless of
+ * whether it matches those preferences - the server can then
+ * decide what it wants to do with it.
+ *
+ * \note The provided \p pk_key needs to match the public key in the
+ * first certificate in \p own_cert, or all handshakes using
+ * that certificate will fail. It is your responsibility
+ * to ensure that; this function will not perform any check.
+ * You may use mbedtls_pk_check_pair() in order to perform
+ * this check yourself, but be aware that this function can
+ * be computationally expensive on some key types.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param own_cert own public certificate chain
+ * \param pk_key own private key
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED)
+/**
+ * \brief Configure pre-shared keys (PSKs) and their
+ * identities to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
+ *
+ * Only one PSK can be registered, through either
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
+ * If you attempt to register more than one PSK, this function
+ * fails, though this may change in future versions, which
+ * may add support for multiple PSKs.
+ *
+ * \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually
+ * want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead.
+ *
+ * \note A PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback
+ * takes precedence over a PSK configured by this function.
+ *
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with.
+ * \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key to use.
+ * \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes.
+ * \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity.
+ * \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity
+ * in bytes.
+ *
+ * \note The PSK and its identity are copied internally and
+ * hence need not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime
+ * of the SSL configuration.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no more PSKs
+ * can be configured. In this case, the old PSK(s) remain intact.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len,
+ const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+/**
+ * \brief Configure one or more opaque pre-shared keys (PSKs) and
+ * their identities to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
+ *
+ * Only one PSK can be registered, through either
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
+ * If you attempt to register more than one PSK, this function
+ * fails, though this may change in future versions, which
+ * may add support for multiple PSKs.
+ *
+ * \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually
+ * want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead.
+ *
+ * \note An opaque PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in
+ * the PSK callback takes precedence over an opaque PSK
+ * configured by this function.
+ *
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with.
+ * \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK.
+ * Until \p conf is destroyed or this function is successfully
+ * called again, the key slot \p psk must be populated with a
+ * key of type PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy
+ * allows its use for the key derivation algorithm applied
+ * in the handshake.
+ * \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity.
+ * \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity
+ * in bytes.
+ *
+ * \note The PSK identity hint is copied internally and hence need
+ * not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime of the
+ * SSL configuration.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no more PSKs
+ * can be configured. In this case, the old PSK(s) remain intact.
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk,
+ const unsigned char *psk_identity,
+ size_t psk_identity_len);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake.
+ *
+ * \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback,
+ * i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb().
+ *
+ * \note A PSK set by this function takes precedence over a PSK
+ * configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for.
+ * \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key.
+ * \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+/**
+ * \brief Set an opaque pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake.
+ *
+ * \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback,
+ * i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb().
+ *
+ * \note An opaque PSK set by this function takes precedence over an
+ * opaque PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for.
+ * \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK.
+ * For the duration of the current handshake, the key slot
+ * must be populated with a key of type
+ * PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy allows its
+ * use for the key derivation algorithm
+ * applied in the handshake.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the PSK callback (server-side only).
+ *
+ * If set, the PSK callback is called for each
+ * handshake where a PSK-based ciphersuite was negotiated.
+ * The caller provides the identity received and wants to
+ * receive the actual PSK data and length.
+ *
+ * The callback has the following parameters:
+ * - \c void*: The opaque pointer \p p_psk.
+ * - \c mbedtls_ssl_context*: The SSL context to which
+ * the operation applies.
+ * - \c const unsigned char*: The PSK identity
+ * selected by the client.
+ * - \c size_t: The length of the PSK identity
+ * selected by the client.
+ *
+ * If a valid PSK identity is found, the callback should use
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() or
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque()
+ * on the SSL context to set the correct PSK and return \c 0.
+ * Any other return value will result in a denied PSK identity.
+ *
+ * \note A dynamic PSK (i.e. set by the PSK callback) takes
+ * precedence over a static PSK (i.e. set by
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()).
+ * This means that if you set a PSK callback using this
+ * function, you don't need to set a PSK using
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()).
+ *
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with.
+ * \param f_psk The callback for selecting and setting the PSK based
+ * in the PSK identity chosen by the client.
+ * \param p_psk A pointer to an opaque structure to be passed to
+ * the callback, for example a PSK store.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_psk);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values
+ * from big-endian binary presentations.
+ * (Default values: MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_[PG]_BIN)
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param dhm_P Diffie-Hellman-Merkle modulus in big-endian binary form
+ * \param P_len Length of DHM modulus
+ * \param dhm_G Diffie-Hellman-Merkle generator in big-endian binary form
+ * \param G_len Length of DHM generator
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len,
+ const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values,
+ * read from existing context (server-side only)
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param dhm_ctx Diffie-Hellman-Merkle context
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the minimum length for Diffie-Hellman parameters.
+ * (Client-side only.)
+ * (Default: 1024 bits.)
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param bitlen Minimum bit length of the DHM prime
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ unsigned int bitlen);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the allowed curves in order of preference.
+ *
+ * On server: this only affects selection of the ECDHE curve;
+ * the curves used for ECDH and ECDSA are determined by the
+ * list of available certificates instead.
+ *
+ * On client: this affects the list of curves offered for any
+ * use. The server can override our preference order.
+ *
+ * Both sides: limits the set of curves accepted for use in
+ * ECDHE and in the peer's end-entity certificate.
+ *
+ * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups().
+ *
+ * \note This has no influence on which curves are allowed inside the
+ * certificate chains, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile()
+ * for that. For the end-entity certificate however, the key
+ * will be accepted only if it is allowed both by this list
+ * and by the cert profile.
+ *
+ * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference
+ * (preferred curve first).
+ *
+ * \note The default list is the same set of curves that
+ * #mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default allows, plus
+ * ECDHE-only curves selected according to the same criteria.
+ * The order favors curves with the lowest resource usage.
+ *
+ * \note New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this list,
+ * for example if new curves are added to the library.
+ * New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items
+ * from this list unless serious security concerns require it.
+ * New minor versions of Mbed TLS may change the order in
+ * keeping with the general principle of favoring the lowest
+ * resource usage.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param curves Ordered list of allowed curves,
+ * terminated by MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE.
+ */
+void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curves);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the allowed groups in order of preference.
+ *
+ * On server: This only affects the choice of key agreement mechanism
+ *
+ * On client: this affects the list of groups offered for any
+ * use. The server can override our preference order.
+ *
+ * Both sides: limits the set of groups accepted for use in
+ * key sharing.
+ *
+ * \note This function replaces the deprecated mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(),
+ * which only allows ECP curves to be configured.
+ *
+ * \note The most recent invocation of either mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves()
+ * or mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups() nullifies all previous invocations
+ * of both.
+ *
+ * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference
+ * (preferred group first).
+ *
+ * \note When this function is not called, a default list is used,
+ * consisting of all supported curves at 255 bits and above,
+ * and all supported finite fields at 2048 bits and above.
+ * The order favors groups with the lowest resource usage.
+ *
+ * \note New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items
+ * from the default list unless serious security concerns require it.
+ * New minor versions of Mbed TLS may change the order in
+ * keeping with the general principle of favoring the lowest
+ * resource usage.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param groups List of allowed groups ordered by preference, terminated by 0.
+ * Must contain valid IANA NamedGroup IDs (provided via either an integer
+ * or using MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_NAMED_GROUP_XXX macros).
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ const uint16_t *groups);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the allowed hashes for signatures during the handshake.
+ *
+ * \note This only affects which hashes are offered and can be used
+ * for signatures during the handshake. Hashes for message
+ * authentication and the TLS PRF are controlled by the
+ * ciphersuite, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(). Hashes
+ * used for certificate signature are controlled by the
+ * verification profile, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile().
+ *
+ * \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs().
+ *
+ * \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference
+ * (preferred hash first).
+ *
+ * \note By default, all supported hashes whose length is at least
+ * 256 bits are allowed. This is the same set as the default
+ * for certificate verification
+ * (#mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default).
+ * The preference order is currently unspecified and may
+ * change in future versions.
+ *
+ * \note New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this list,
+ * for example if new curves are added to the library.
+ * New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items
+ * from this list unless serious security concerns require it.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param hashes Ordered list of allowed signature hashes,
+ * terminated by \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE.
+ */
+void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ const int *hashes);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Configure allowed signature algorithms for use in TLS
+ *
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to use.
+ * \param sig_algs List of allowed IANA values for TLS 1.3 signature algorithms,
+ * terminated by #MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE. The list must remain
+ * available throughout the lifetime of the conf object.
+ * - For TLS 1.3, values of \c MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_XXXX should be
+ * used.
+ * - For TLS 1.2, values should be given as
+ * "(HashAlgorithm << 8) | SignatureAlgorithm".
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ const uint16_t *sig_algs);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Set or reset the hostname to check against the received
+ * peer certificate. On a client, this also sets the
+ * ServerName TLS extension, if that extension is enabled.
+ * On a TLS 1.3 client, this also sets the server name in
+ * the session resumption ticket, if that feature is enabled.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param hostname The server hostname. This may be \c NULL to clear
+ * the hostname.
+ *
+ * \note Maximum hostname length #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN.
+ *
+ * \note If the hostname is \c NULL on a client, then the server
+ * is not authenticated: it only needs to have a valid
+ * certificate, not a certificate matching its name.
+ * Therefore you should always call this function on a client,
+ * unless the connection is set up to only allow
+ * pre-shared keys, or in scenarios where server
+ * impersonation is not a concern. See the documentation of
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED on
+ * allocation failure, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
+ * too long input hostname.
+ *
+ * Hostname set to the one provided on success (cleared
+ * when NULL). On allocation failure hostname is cleared.
+ * On too long input failure, old hostname is unchanged.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the hostname that checked against the received
+ * server certificate. It is used to set the ServerName
+ * TLS extension, too, if that extension is enabled.
+ * (client-side only)
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ *
+ * \return const pointer to the hostname value
+ */
+static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hostname);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
+/**
+ * \brief Retrieve SNI extension value for the current handshake.
+ * Available in \c f_cert_cb of \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb(),
+ * this is the same value passed to \c f_sni callback of
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni() and may be used instead of
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni().
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param name_len pointer into which to store length of returned value.
+ * 0 if SNI extension is not present or not yet processed.
+ *
+ * \return const pointer to SNI extension value.
+ * - value is valid only when called in \c f_cert_cb
+ * registered with \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb().
+ * - value is NULL if SNI extension is not present.
+ * - value is not '\0'-terminated. Use \c name_len for len.
+ * - value must not be freed.
+ */
+const unsigned char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hs_sni(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ size_t *name_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set own certificate and key for the current handshake
+ *
+ * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() but for use within
+ * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback.
+ *
+ * \note Passing null \c own_cert clears the certificate list for
+ * the current handshake.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param own_cert own public certificate chain
+ * \param pk_key own private key
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the data required to verify peer certificate for the
+ * current handshake
+ *
+ * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() but for use within
+ * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param ca_chain trusted CA chain (meaning all fully trusted top-level CAs)
+ * \param ca_crl trusted CA CRLs
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain,
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
+/**
+ * \brief Set DN hints sent to client in CertificateRequest message
+ *
+ * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints() but for use within
+ * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param crt crt chain whose subject DNs are issuer DNs of client certs
+ * from which the client should select client peer certificate.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set authmode for the current handshake.
+ *
+ * \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode() but for use within
+ * the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param authmode MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL or
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ int authmode);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set server side ServerName TLS extension callback
+ * (optional, server-side only).
+ *
+ * If set, the ServerName callback is called whenever the
+ * server receives a ServerName TLS extension from the client
+ * during a handshake. The ServerName callback has the
+ * following parameters: (void *parameter, mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ * const unsigned char *hostname, size_t len). If a suitable
+ * certificate is found, the callback must set the
+ * certificate(s) and key(s) to use with \c
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert() (can be called repeatedly),
+ * and may optionally adjust the CA and associated CRL with \c
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() as well as the client
+ * authentication mode with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(),
+ * then must return 0. If no matching name is found, the
+ * callback may return non-zero to abort the handshake.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param f_sni verification function
+ * \param p_sni verification parameter
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_sni);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the EC J-PAKE password for current handshake.
+ *
+ * \note An internal copy is made, and destroyed as soon as the
+ * handshake is completed, or when the SSL context is reset or
+ * freed.
+ *
+ * \note The SSL context needs to be already set up. The right place
+ * to call this function is between \c mbedtls_ssl_setup() or
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_reset() and \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake().
+ * Password cannot be empty (see RFC 8236).
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param pw EC J-PAKE password (pre-shared secret). It cannot be empty
+ * \param pw_len length of pw in bytes
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success, or a negative error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *pw,
+ size_t pw_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the EC J-PAKE opaque password for current handshake.
+ *
+ * \note The key must remain valid until the handshake is over.
+ *
+ * \note The SSL context needs to be already set up. The right place
+ * to call this function is between \c mbedtls_ssl_setup() or
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_reset() and \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake().
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param pwd EC J-PAKE opaque password
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success, or a negative error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t pwd);
+#endif /*MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the supported Application Layer Protocols.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param protos Pointer to a NULL-terminated list of supported protocols,
+ * in decreasing preference order. The pointer to the list is
+ * recorded by the library for later reference as required, so
+ * the lifetime of the table must be at least as long as the
+ * lifetime of the SSL configuration structure.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **protos);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the name of the negotiated Application Layer Protocol.
+ * This function should be called after the handshake is
+ * completed.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ *
+ * \return Protocol name, or NULL if no protocol was negotiated.
+ */
+const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile profile)
+{
+ switch (profile) {
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80:
+ return "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80";
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32:
+ return "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32";
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80:
+ return "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80";
+ case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32:
+ return "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32";
+ default: break;
+ }
+ return "";
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
+/**
+ * \brief Manage support for mki(master key id) value
+ * in use_srtp extension.
+ * MKI is an optional part of SRTP used for key management
+ * and re-keying. See RFC3711 section 3.1 for details.
+ * The default value is
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED.
+ *
+ * \param conf The SSL configuration to manage mki support.
+ * \param support_mki_value Enable or disable mki usage. Values are
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED
+ * or #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ int support_mki_value);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the supported DTLS-SRTP protection profiles.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param profiles Pointer to a List of MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET terminated
+ * supported protection profiles
+ * in decreasing preference order.
+ * The pointer to the list is recorded by the library
+ * for later reference as required, so the lifetime
+ * of the table must be at least as long as the lifetime
+ * of the SSL configuration structure.
+ * The list must not hold more than
+ * MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH elements
+ * (excluding the terminating MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET).
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the list of
+ * protection profiles is incorrect.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles
+ (mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *profiles);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the mki_value for the current DTLS-SRTP session.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context to use.
+ * \param mki_value The MKI value to set.
+ * \param mki_len The length of the MKI value.
+ *
+ * \note This function is relevant on client side only.
+ * The server discovers the mki value during handshake.
+ * A mki value set on server side using this function
+ * is ignored.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *mki_value,
+ uint16_t mki_len);
+/**
+ * \brief Get the negotiated DTLS-SRTP information:
+ * Protection profile and MKI value.
+ *
+ * \warning This function must be called after the handshake is
+ * completed. The value returned by this function must
+ * not be trusted or acted upon before the handshake completes.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to query.
+ * \param dtls_srtp_info The negotiated DTLS-SRTP information:
+ * - Protection profile in use.
+ * A direct mapping of the iana defined value for protection
+ * profile on an uint16_t.
+ http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml
+ * #MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET if the use of SRTP was not negotiated
+ * or peer's Hello packet was not parsed yet.
+ * - mki size and value( if size is > 0 ).
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the maximum supported version sent from the client side
+ * and/or accepted at the server side.
+ *
+ * See also the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version().
+ *
+ * \note This ignores ciphersuites from higher versions.
+ *
+ * \note This function is deprecated and has been replaced by
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version().
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param major Major version number (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3)
+ * \param minor Minor version number
+ * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for (D)TLS 1.2,
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 for TLS 1.3)
+ */
+void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major,
+ int minor);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the maximum supported version sent from the client side
+ * and/or accepted at the server side.
+ *
+ * \note After the handshake, you can call
+ * mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number() to see what version was
+ * negotiated.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param tls_version TLS protocol version number (\c mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version)
+ * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN is not valid)
+ */
+static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version)
+{
+ conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_tls_version) = tls_version;
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the minimum accepted SSL/TLS protocol version
+ *
+ * \note By default, all supported versions are accepted.
+ * Future versions of the library may disable older
+ * protocol versions by default if they become deprecated.
+ *
+ * \note The following versions are supported (if enabled at
+ * compile time):
+ * - (D)TLS 1.2: \p major = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
+ * \p minor = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
+ * - TLS 1.3: \p major = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
+ * \p minor = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4
+ *
+ * Note that the numbers in the constant names are the
+ * TLS internal protocol numbers, and the minor versions
+ * differ by one from the human-readable versions!
+ *
+ * \note Input outside of the SSL_MAX_XXXXX_VERSION and
+ * SSL_MIN_XXXXX_VERSION range is ignored.
+ *
+ * \note After the handshake, you can call
+ * mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number() to see what version was
+ * negotiated.
+ *
+ * \note This function is deprecated and has been replaced by
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_tls_version().
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param major Major version number (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3)
+ * \param minor Minor version number
+ * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for (D)TLS 1.2,
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 for TLS 1.3)
+ */
+void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major,
+ int minor);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the minimum supported version sent from the client side
+ * and/or accepted at the server side.
+ *
+ * \note After the handshake, you can call
+ * mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number() to see what version was
+ * negotiated.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param tls_version TLS protocol version number (\c mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version)
+ * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN is not valid)
+ */
+static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_tls_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version)
+{
+ conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min_tls_version) = tls_version;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+/**
+ * \brief Enable or disable Encrypt-then-MAC
+ * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED)
+ *
+ * \note This should always be enabled, it is a security
+ * improvement, and should not cause any interoperability
+ * issue (used only if the peer supports it too).
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param etm MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+/**
+ * \brief Enable or disable Extended Master Secret negotiation.
+ * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED)
+ *
+ * \note This should always be enabled, it is a security fix to the
+ * protocol, and should not cause any interoperability issue
+ * (used only if the peer supports it too).
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param ems MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Whether to send a list of acceptable CAs in
+ * CertificateRequest messages.
+ * (Default: do send)
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param cert_req_ca_list MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED or
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ char cert_req_ca_list);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the maximum fragment length to emit and/or negotiate.
+ * (Typical: the smaller of #MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, usually `2^14` bytes)
+ * (Server: set maximum fragment length to emit,
+ * usually negotiated by the client during handshake)
+ * (Client: set maximum fragment length to emit *and*
+ * negotiate with the server during handshake)
+ * (Default: #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE)
+ *
+ * \note On the client side, the maximum fragment length extension
+ * *will not* be used, unless the maximum fragment length has
+ * been set via this function to a value different than
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE.
+ *
+ * \note With TLS, this currently only affects ApplicationData (sent
+ * with \c mbedtls_ssl_read()), not handshake messages.
+ * With DTLS, this affects both ApplicationData and handshake.
+ *
+ * \note Defragmentation of TLS handshake messages is supported
+ * with some limitations. See the documentation of
+ * mbedtls_ssl_handshake() for details.
+ *
+ * \note This sets the maximum length for a record's payload,
+ * excluding record overhead that will be added to it, see
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion().
+ *
+ * \note For DTLS, it is also possible to set a limit for the total
+ * size of datagrams passed to the transport layer, including
+ * record overhead, see \c mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu().
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param mfl_code Code for maximum fragment length (allowed values:
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024,
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096)
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Pick the ciphersuites order according to the second parameter
+ * in the SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C).
+ * (Default, if never called: MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER)
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param order Server or client (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER
+ * or MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT)
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int order);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Enable / Disable TLS 1.2 session tickets (client only,
+ * TLS 1.2 only). Enabled by default.
+ *
+ * \note On server, use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb().
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param use_tickets Enable or disable (#MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED or
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED)
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+/**
+ * \brief Enable / Disable handling of TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket messages
+ * (client only, TLS 1.3 only).
+ *
+ * The handling of TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket messages is disabled by
+ * default.
+ *
+ * In TLS 1.3, servers may send a NewSessionTicket message at any time,
+ * and may send multiple NewSessionTicket messages. By default, TLS 1.3
+ * clients ignore NewSessionTicket messages.
+ *
+ * To support session tickets in TLS 1.3 clients, call this function
+ * with #MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED. When
+ * this is enabled, when a client receives a NewSessionTicket message,
+ * the next call to a message processing functions (notably
+ * mbedtls_ssl_handshake() and mbedtls_ssl_read()) will return
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET. The client should then
+ * call mbedtls_ssl_get_session() to retrieve the session ticket before
+ * calling the same message processing function again.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param signal_new_session_tickets Enable or disable
+ * (#MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED or
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED)
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets(
+ mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int signal_new_session_tickets);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+/**
+ * \brief Number of NewSessionTicket messages for the server to send
+ * after handshake completion.
+ *
+ * \note The default value is
+ * \c MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS.
+ *
+ * \note In case of a session resumption, this setting only partially apply.
+ * At most one ticket is sent in that case to just renew the pool of
+ * tickets of the client. The rationale is to avoid the number of
+ * tickets on the server to become rapidly out of control when the
+ * server has the same configuration for all its connection instances.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param num_tickets Number of NewSessionTicket.
+ *
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_new_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ uint16_t num_tickets);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS &&
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C &&
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3*/
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+/**
+ * \brief Enable / Disable renegotiation support for connection when
+ * initiated by peer
+ * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED)
+ *
+ * \warning It is recommended to always disable renegotiation unless you
+ * know you need it and you know what you're doing. In the
+ * past, there have been several issues associated with
+ * renegotiation or a poor understanding of its properties.
+ *
+ * \note Server-side, enabling renegotiation also makes the server
+ * susceptible to a resource DoS by a malicious client.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param renegotiation Enable or disable (MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED or
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED)
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int renegotiation);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Prevent or allow legacy renegotiation.
+ * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
+ *
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION allows connections to
+ * be established even if the peer does not support
+ * secure renegotiation, but does not allow renegotiation
+ * to take place if not secure.
+ * (Interoperable and secure option)
+ *
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION allows renegotiations
+ * with non-upgraded peers. Allowing legacy renegotiation
+ * makes the connection vulnerable to specific man in the
+ * middle attacks. (See RFC 5746)
+ * (Most interoperable and least secure option)
+ *
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE breaks off connections
+ * if peer does not support secure renegotiation. Results
+ * in interoperability issues with non-upgraded peers
+ * that do not support renegotiation altogether.
+ * (Most secure option, interoperability issues)
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param allow_legacy Prevent or allow (SSL_NO_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION,
+ * SSL_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION or
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE)
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int allow_legacy);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+/**
+ * \brief Enforce renegotiation requests.
+ * (Default: enforced, max_records = 16)
+ *
+ * When we request a renegotiation, the peer can comply or
+ * ignore the request. This function allows us to decide
+ * whether to enforce our renegotiation requests by closing
+ * the connection if the peer doesn't comply.
+ *
+ * However, records could already be in transit from the peer
+ * when the request is emitted. In order to increase
+ * reliability, we can accept a number of records before the
+ * expected handshake records.
+ *
+ * The optimal value is highly dependent on the specific usage
+ * scenario.
+ *
+ * \note With DTLS and server-initiated renegotiation, the
+ * HelloRequest is retransmitted every time mbedtls_ssl_read() times
+ * out or receives Application Data, until:
+ * - max_records records have beens seen, if it is >= 0, or
+ * - the number of retransmits that would happen during an
+ * actual handshake has been reached.
+ * Please remember the request might be lost a few times
+ * if you consider setting max_records to a really low value.
+ *
+ * \warning On client, the grace period can only happen during
+ * mbedtls_ssl_read(), as opposed to mbedtls_ssl_write() and mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate()
+ * which always behave as if max_record was 0. The reason is,
+ * if we receive application data from the server, we need a
+ * place to write it, which only happens during mbedtls_ssl_read().
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param max_records Use MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED if you don't want to
+ * enforce renegotiation, or a non-negative value to enforce
+ * it but allow for a grace period of max_records records.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int max_records);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set record counter threshold for periodic renegotiation.
+ * (Default: 2^48 - 1)
+ *
+ * Renegotiation is automatically triggered when a record
+ * counter (outgoing or incoming) crosses the defined
+ * threshold. The default value is meant to prevent the
+ * connection from being closed when the counter is about to
+ * reached its maximal value (it is not allowed to wrap).
+ *
+ * Lower values can be used to enforce policies such as "keys
+ * must be refreshed every N packets with cipher X".
+ *
+ * The renegotiation period can be disabled by setting
+ * conf->disable_renegotiation to
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED.
+ *
+ * \note When the configured transport is
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM the maximum renegotiation
+ * period is 2^48 - 1, and for MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
+ * the maximum renegotiation period is 2^64 - 1.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration
+ * \param period The threshold value: a big-endian 64-bit number.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ const unsigned char period[8]);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Check if there is data already read from the
+ * underlying transport but not yet processed.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ *
+ * \return 0 if nothing's pending, 1 otherwise.
+ *
+ * \note This is different in purpose and behaviour from
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail in that it considers
+ * any kind of unprocessed data, not only unread
+ * application data. If \c mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes
+ * returns a non-zero value, this function will
+ * also signal pending data, but the converse does
+ * not hold. For example, in DTLS there might be
+ * further records waiting to be processed from
+ * the current underlying transport's datagram.
+ *
+ * \note If this function returns 1 (data pending), this
+ * does not imply that a subsequent call to
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_read will provide any data;
+ * e.g., the unprocessed data might turn out
+ * to be an alert or a handshake message.
+ *
+ * \note This function is useful in the following situation:
+ * If the SSL/TLS module successfully returns from an
+ * operation - e.g. a handshake or an application record
+ * read - and you're awaiting incoming data next, you
+ * must not immediately idle on the underlying transport
+ * to have data ready, but you need to check the value
+ * of this function first. The reason is that the desired
+ * data might already be read but not yet processed.
+ * If, in contrast, a previous call to the SSL/TLS module
+ * returned MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, it is not necessary
+ * to call this function, as the latter error code entails
+ * that all internal data has been processed.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_check_pending(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return the number of application data bytes
+ * remaining to be read from the current record.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ *
+ * \return How many bytes are available in the application
+ * data record read buffer.
+ *
+ * \note When working over a datagram transport, this is
+ * useful to detect the current datagram's boundary
+ * in case \c mbedtls_ssl_read has written the maximal
+ * amount of data fitting into the input buffer.
+ *
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return the result of the certificate verification
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to use.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the certificate verification was successful.
+ * \return \c -1u if the result is not available. This may happen
+ * e.g. if the handshake aborts early, or a verification
+ * callback returned a fatal error.
+ * \return A bitwise combination of \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX
+ * and \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX failure flags; see x509.h.
+ */
+uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return the id of the current ciphersuite
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ *
+ * \return a ciphersuite id
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id_from_ssl(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return the name of the current ciphersuite
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ *
+ * \return a string containing the ciphersuite name
+ */
+const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return the (D)TLS protocol version negotiated in the
+ * given connection.
+ *
+ * \note If you call this function too early during the initial
+ * handshake, before the two sides have agreed on a version,
+ * this function returns #MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to query.
+ * \return The negotiated protocol version.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number(
+ const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return the current TLS version
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ *
+ * \return a string containing the TLS version
+ */
+const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return the (maximum) number of bytes added by the record
+ * layer: header + encryption/MAC overhead (inc. padding)
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ *
+ * \return Current maximum record expansion in bytes
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return the current maximum outgoing record payload in bytes.
+ *
+ * \note The logic to determine the maximum outgoing record payload is
+ * version-specific. It takes into account various factors, such as
+ * the mbedtls_config.h setting \c MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, extensions
+ * such as the max fragment length or record size limit extension if
+ * used, and for DTLS the path MTU as configured and current
+ * record expansion.
+ *
+ * \note With DTLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will return an error if
+ * called with a larger length value.
+ * With TLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will fragment the input if
+ * necessary and return the number of bytes written; it is up
+ * to the caller to call \c mbedtls_ssl_write() again in
+ * order to send the remaining bytes if any.
+ *
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload()
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion()
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ *
+ * \return Current maximum payload for an outgoing record,
+ * or a negative error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return the current maximum incoming record payload in bytes.
+ *
+ * \note The logic to determine the maximum incoming record payload is
+ * version-specific. It takes into account various factors, such as
+ * the mbedtls_config.h setting \c MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN, extensions
+ * such as the max fragment length extension or record size limit
+ * extension if used, and the current record expansion.
+ *
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu()
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload()
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion()
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ *
+ * \return Current maximum payload for an incoming record,
+ * or a negative error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Return the peer certificate from the current connection.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to use. This must be initialized and setup.
+ *
+ * \return The current peer certificate, if available.
+ * The returned certificate is owned by the SSL context and
+ * is valid only until the next call to the SSL API.
+ * \return \c NULL if no peer certificate is available. This might
+ * be because the chosen ciphersuite doesn't use CRTs
+ * (PSK-based ciphersuites, for example), or because
+ * #MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE has been disabled,
+ * allowing the stack to free the peer's CRT to save memory.
+ *
+ * \note For one-time inspection of the peer's certificate during
+ * the handshake, consider registering an X.509 CRT verification
+ * callback through mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() instead of calling
+ * this function. Using mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() also comes at
+ * the benefit of allowing you to influence the verification
+ * process, for example by masking expected and tolerated
+ * verification failures.
+ *
+ * \warning You must not use the pointer returned by this function
+ * after any further call to the SSL API, including
+ * mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write(); this is
+ * because the pointer might change during renegotiation,
+ * which happens transparently to the user.
+ * If you want to use the certificate across API calls,
+ * you must make a copy.
+ */
+const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Export a session in order to resume it later.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context representing the connection for which to
+ * to export a session structure for later resumption.
+ * \param session The target structure in which to store the exported session.
+ * This must have been initialized with mbedtls_ssl_session_init()
+ * but otherwise be unused.
+ *
+ * \note This function can handle a variety of mechanisms for session
+ * resumption: For TLS 1.2, both session ID-based resumption and
+ * ticket-based resumption will be considered. For TLS 1.3,
+ * sessions equate to tickets, and if session tickets are
+ * enabled (see #MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS configuration
+ * option), this function exports the last received ticket and
+ * the exported session may be used to resume the TLS 1.3
+ * session. If session tickets are disabled, exported sessions
+ * cannot be used to resume a TLS 1.3 session.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful. In this case, \p session can be used for
+ * session resumption by passing it to mbedtls_ssl_set_session(),
+ * and serialized for storage via mbedtls_ssl_session_save().
+ * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
+ *
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_session()
+ * \sa mbedtls_ssl_session_save()
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform the SSL handshake
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE
+ * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to
+ * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying
+ * transport - in this case you must call this function again
+ * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous
+ * operation is in progress (see
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you
+ * must call this function again when the operation is ready.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic
+ * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) -
+ * in this case you must call this function again to complete
+ * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED if DTLS is in use
+ * and the client did not demonstrate reachability yet - in
+ * this case you must stop using the context (see below).
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET if a TLS 1.3
+ * NewSessionTicket message has been received. See the
+ * documentation of mbedtls_ssl_read() for more information
+ * about this error code.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as
+ * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been
+ * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific
+ * and may occur only if the early data feature has been
+ * enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data()
+ * documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()
+ * to read the early data before resuming the handshake.
+ * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using
+ * the context (see below).
+ *
+ * \warning If this function returns something other than
+ * \c 0,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET or
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA,
+ * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
+ * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
+ * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current
+ * connection must be closed.
+ *
+ * \note If DTLS is in use, then you may choose to handle
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED specially for logging
+ * purposes, as it is an expected return value rather than an
+ * actual error, but you still need to reset/free the context.
+ *
+ * \note Remarks regarding event-driven DTLS:
+ * If the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram
+ * from the underlying transport layer is currently being processed,
+ * and it is safe to idle until the timer or the underlying transport
+ * signal a new event. This is not true for a successful handshake,
+ * in which case the datagram of the underlying transport that is
+ * currently being processed might or might not contain further
+ * DTLS records.
+ *
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
+ * Otherwise, the handshake may call psa_crypto_init()
+ * if a negotiation involving TLS 1.3 takes place (this may
+ * be the case even if TLS 1.3 is offered but eventually
+ * not selected).
+ *
+ * \note In TLS, reception of fragmented handshake messages is
+ * supported with some limitations (those limitations do
+ * not apply to DTLS, where defragmentation is fully
+ * supported):
+ * - On an Mbed TLS server that only accepts TLS 1.2,
+ * the initial ClientHello message must not be fragmented.
+ * A TLS 1.2 ClientHello may be fragmented if the server
+ * also accepts TLS 1.3 connections (meaning
+ * that #MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 enabled, and the
+ * accepted versions have not been restricted with
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version() or the like).
+ * - The first fragment of a handshake message must be
+ * at least 4 bytes long.
+ * - Non-handshake records must not be interleaved between
+ * the fragments of a handshake message. (This is permitted
+ * in TLS 1.2 but not in TLS 1.3, but Mbed TLS rejects it
+ * even in TLS 1.2.)
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
+/**
+ * \brief After calling mbedtls_ssl_handshake() to start the SSL
+ * handshake you can call this function to check whether the
+ * handshake is over for a given SSL context. This function
+ * should be also used to determine when to stop calling
+ * mbedtls_handshake_step() for that context.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ *
+ * \return \c 1 if handshake is over, \c 0 if it is still ongoing.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
+{
+ return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state) >= MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a single step of the SSL handshake
+ *
+ * \note The state of the context (ssl->state) will be at
+ * the next state after this function returns \c 0. Do not
+ * call this function if mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over()
+ * returns \c 1.
+ *
+ * \warning Whilst in the past you may have used direct access to the
+ * context state (ssl->state) in order to ascertain when to
+ * stop calling this function and although you can still do
+ * so with something like ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state) or by
+ * defining MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS, this is now
+ * considered deprecated and could be broken in any future
+ * release. If you still find you have good reason for such
+ * direct access, then please do contact the team to explain
+ * this (raise an issue or post to the mailing list), so that
+ * we can add a solution to your problem that will be
+ * guaranteed to work in the future.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ *
+ * \return See mbedtls_ssl_handshake().
+ *
+ * \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET or
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA, you must stop using
+ * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it
+ * or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before
+ * re-using it for a new connection; the current connection
+ * must be closed.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
+/**
+ * \brief Initiate an SSL renegotiation on the running connection.
+ * Client: perform the renegotiation right now.
+ * Server: request renegotiation, which will be performed
+ * during the next call to mbedtls_ssl_read() if honored by
+ * client.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or any mbedtls_ssl_handshake() return
+ * value except #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT that can't
+ * happen during a renegotiation.
+ *
+ * \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, you must stop using
+ * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it
+ * or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before
+ * re-using it for a new connection; the current connection
+ * must be closed.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Read at most 'len' application data bytes
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param buf buffer that will hold the data
+ * \param len maximum number of bytes to read
+ *
+ * \return The (positive) number of bytes read if successful.
+ * \return \c 0 if the read end of the underlying transport was closed
+ * without sending a CloseNotify beforehand, which might happen
+ * because of various reasons (internal error of an underlying
+ * stack, non-conformant peer not sending a CloseNotify and
+ * such) - in this case you must stop using the context
+ * (see below).
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY if the underlying
+ * transport is still functional, but the peer has
+ * acknowledged to not send anything anymore.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE
+ * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to
+ * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying
+ * transport - in this case you must call this function again
+ * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous
+ * operation is in progress (see
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you
+ * must call this function again when the operation is ready.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic
+ * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) -
+ * in this case you must call this function again to complete
+ * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT if we're at the server
+ * side of a DTLS connection and the client is initiating a
+ * new connection using the same source port. See below.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET if a TLS 1.3
+ * NewSessionTicket message has been received.
+ * This error code is only returned on the client side. It is
+ * only returned if handling of TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket
+ * messages has been enabled through
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets().
+ * This error code indicates that a TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket
+ * message has been received and parsed successfully by the
+ * client. The ticket data can be retrieved from the SSL
+ * context by calling mbedtls_ssl_get_session(). It remains
+ * available until the next call to mbedtls_ssl_read().
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as
+ * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been
+ * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific
+ * and may occur only if the early data feature has been
+ * enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data()
+ * documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()
+ * to read the early data before resuming the handshake.
+ * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using
+ * the context (see below).
+ *
+ * \warning If this function returns something other than
+ * a positive value,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT or
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET or
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA,
+ * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
+ * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
+ * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current
+ * connection must be closed.
+ *
+ * \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT
+ * (which can only happen server-side), it means that a client
+ * is initiating a new connection using the same source port.
+ * You can either treat that as a connection close and wait
+ * for the client to resend a ClientHello, or directly
+ * continue with \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() with the same
+ * context (as it has been reset internally). Either way, you
+ * must make sure this is seen by the application as a new
+ * connection: application state, if any, should be reset, and
+ * most importantly the identity of the client must be checked
+ * again. WARNING: not validating the identity of the client
+ * again, or not transmitting the new identity to the
+ * application layer, would allow authentication bypass!
+ *
+ * \note Remarks regarding event-driven DTLS:
+ * - If the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram
+ * from the underlying transport layer is currently being processed,
+ * and it is safe to idle until the timer or the underlying transport
+ * signal a new event.
+ * - This function may return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ even if data was
+ * initially available on the underlying transport, as this data may have
+ * been only e.g. duplicated messages or a renegotiation request.
+ * Therefore, you must be prepared to receive MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ even
+ * when reacting to an incoming-data event from the underlying transport.
+ * - On success, the datagram of the underlying transport that is currently
+ * being processed may contain further DTLS records. You should call
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_check_pending to check for remaining records.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Try to write exactly 'len' application data bytes
+ *
+ * \warning This function will do partial writes in some cases. If the
+ * return value is non-negative but less than length, the
+ * function must be called again with updated arguments:
+ * buf + ret, len - ret (if ret is the return value) until
+ * it returns a value equal to the last 'len' argument.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param buf buffer holding the data
+ * \param len how many bytes must be written
+ *
+ * \return The (non-negative) number of bytes actually written if
+ * successful (may be less than \p len).
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE
+ * if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to
+ * be available for reading from or writing to the underlying
+ * transport - in this case you must call this function again
+ * when the underlying transport is ready for the operation.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous
+ * operation is in progress (see
+ * mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you
+ * must call this function again when the operation is ready.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic
+ * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) -
+ * in this case you must call this function again to complete
+ * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET if a TLS 1.3
+ * NewSessionTicket message has been received. See the
+ * documentation of mbedtls_ssl_read() for more information
+ * about this error code.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as
+ * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been
+ * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific
+ * and may occur only if the early data feature has been
+ * enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data()
+ * documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()
+ * to read the early data before resuming the handshake.
+ * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using
+ * the context (see below).
+ *
+ * \warning If this function returns something other than
+ * a non-negative value,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET or
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA,
+ * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
+ * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
+ * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current
+ * connection must be closed.
+ *
+ * \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE/READ,
+ * it must be called later with the *same* arguments,
+ * until it returns a value greater than or equal to 0. When
+ * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE there may be
+ * some partial data in the output buffer, however this is not
+ * yet sent.
+ *
+ * \note If the requested length is greater than the maximum
+ * fragment length (either the built-in limit or the one set
+ * or negotiated with the peer), then:
+ * - with TLS, less bytes than requested are written.
+ * - with DTLS, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA is returned.
+ * \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload() may be used to
+ * query the active maximum fragment length.
+ *
+ * \note Attempting to write 0 bytes will result in an empty TLS
+ * application record being sent.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_write(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Send an alert message
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param level The alert level of the message
+ * (MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING or MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL)
+ * \param message The alert message (SSL_ALERT_MSG_*)
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific SSL error code.
+ *
+ * \note If this function returns something other than 0 or
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using
+ * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or
+ * call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it
+ * for a new connection; the current connection must be closed.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char level,
+ unsigned char message);
+/**
+ * \brief Notify the peer that the connection is being closed
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific SSL error code.
+ *
+ * \note If this function returns something other than 0 or
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using
+ * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or
+ * call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it
+ * for a new connection; the current connection must be closed.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Read at most 'len' bytes of early data
+ *
+ * \note This API is server specific.
+ *
+ * \warning Early data is defined in the TLS 1.3 specification, RFC 8446.
+ * IMPORTANT NOTE from section 2.3 of the specification:
+ *
+ * The security properties for 0-RTT data are weaker than
+ * those for other kinds of TLS data. Specifically:
+ * - This data is not forward secret, as it is encrypted
+ * solely under keys derived using the offered PSK.
+ * - There are no guarantees of non-replay between connections.
+ * Protection against replay for ordinary TLS 1.3 1-RTT data
+ * is provided via the server's Random value, but 0-RTT data
+ * does not depend on the ServerHello and therefore has
+ * weaker guarantees. This is especially relevant if the
+ * data is authenticated either with TLS client
+ * authentication or inside the application protocol. The
+ * same warnings apply to any use of the
+ * early_exporter_master_secret.
+ *
+ * \warning Mbed TLS does not implement any of the anti-replay defenses
+ * defined in section 8 of the TLS 1.3 specification:
+ * single-use of tickets or ClientHello recording within a
+ * given time window.
+ *
+ * \note This function is used in conjunction with
+ * mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(),
+ * mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write() to read early
+ * data when these functions return
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context, it must have been initialized and set up.
+ * \param buf buffer that will hold the data
+ * \param len maximum number of bytes to read
+ *
+ * \return The (positive) number of bytes read if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA if it is not
+ * possible to read early data for the SSL context \p ssl. Note
+ * that this function is intended to be called for an SSL
+ * context \p ssl only after a call to mbedtls_ssl_handshake(),
+ * mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or
+ * mbedtls_ssl_write() for \p ssl that has returned
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Try to write exactly 'len' application data bytes while
+ * performing the handshake (early data).
+ *
+ * \warning Early data is defined in the TLS 1.3 specification, RFC 8446.
+ * IMPORTANT NOTE from section 2.3 of the specification:
+ *
+ * The security properties for 0-RTT data are weaker than
+ * those for other kinds of TLS data. Specifically:
+ * - This data is not forward secret, as it is encrypted
+ * solely under keys derived using the offered PSK.
+ * - There are no guarantees of non-replay between connections.
+ * Protection against replay for ordinary TLS 1.3 1-RTT data
+ * is provided via the server's Random value, but 0-RTT data
+ * does not depend on the ServerHello and therefore has
+ * weaker guarantees. This is especially relevant if the
+ * data is authenticated either with TLS client
+ * authentication or inside the application protocol. The
+ * same warnings apply to any use of the
+ * early_exporter_master_secret.
+ *
+ * \note This function behaves mainly as mbedtls_ssl_write(). The
+ * specification of mbedtls_ssl_write() relevant to TLS 1.3
+ * (thus not the parts specific to (D)TLS1.2) applies to this
+ * function and the present documentation is mainly restricted
+ * to the differences with mbedtls_ssl_write(). One noticeable
+ * difference though is that mbedtls_ssl_write() aims to
+ * complete the handshake before to write application data
+ * while mbedtls_ssl_write_early() aims to drive the handshake
+ * just past the point where it is not possible to send early
+ * data anymore.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param buf buffer holding the data
+ * \param len how many bytes must be written
+ *
+ * \return The (non-negative) number of bytes actually written if
+ * successful (may be less than \p len).
+ *
+ * \return One additional specific error code compared to
+ * mbedtls_ssl_write():
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA.
+ *
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA is returned when it
+ * is not possible to write early data for the SSL context
+ * \p ssl.
+ *
+ * It may have been possible and it is not possible
+ * anymore because the client received the server Finished
+ * message, the server rejected early data or the maximum
+ * number of allowed early data for the PSK in use has been
+ * reached.
+ *
+ * It may never have been possible and will never be possible
+ * for the SSL context \p ssl because the use of early data
+ * is disabled for that context or more generally the context
+ * is not suitably configured to enable early data or the first
+ * call to the function was done while the handshake was
+ * already completed.
+ *
+ * It is not possible to write early data for the SSL context
+ * \p ssl and any subsequent call to this API will return this
+ * error code. But this does not preclude for using it with
+ * mbedtls_ssl_write(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or
+ * mbedtls_ssl_handshake() and the handshake can be
+ * completed by calling one of these APIs.
+ *
+ * \note This function may write early data only if the SSL context
+ * has been configured for the handshake with a PSK for which
+ * early data is allowed.
+ *
+ * \note To maximize the number of early data that can be written in
+ * the course of the handshake, it is expected that this
+ * function starts the handshake for the SSL context \p ssl.
+ * But this is not mandatory.
+ *
+ * \note This function does not provide any information on whether
+ * the server has accepted or will accept early data or not.
+ * When it returns a positive value, it just means that it
+ * has written early data to the server. To know whether the
+ * server has accepted early data or not, you should call
+ * mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status() with the handshake
+ * completed.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the status of the negotiation of the use of early data.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to query
+ *
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if this function is called
+ * from the server-side.
+ *
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if this function is called
+ * prior to completion of the handshake.
+ *
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED if the client
+ * has not indicated the use of early data to the server.
+ *
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED if the client has
+ * indicated the use of early data and the server has accepted
+ * it.
+ *
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED if the client has
+ * indicated the use of early data but the server has rejected
+ * it. In this situation, the client may want to re-send the
+ * early data it may have tried to send by calling
+ * mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() as ordinary post-handshake
+ * application data by calling mbedtls_ssl_write().
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL context and clear memory
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
+/**
+ * \brief Save an active connection as serialized data in a buffer.
+ * This allows the freeing or re-using of the SSL context
+ * while still picking up the connection later in a way that
+ * it entirely transparent to the peer.
+ *
+ * \see mbedtls_ssl_context_load()
+ *
+ * \note The serialized data only contains the data that is
+ * necessary to resume the connection: negotiated protocol
+ * options, session identifier, keys, etc.
+ * Loading a saved SSL context does not restore settings and
+ * state related to how the application accesses the context,
+ * such as configured callback functions, user data, pending
+ * incoming or outgoing data, etc.
+ *
+ * \note This feature is currently only available under certain
+ * conditions, see the documentation of the return value
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA for details.
+ *
+ * \note When this function succeeds, it calls
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on \p ssl which as a result is
+ * no longer associated with the connection that has been
+ * serialized. This avoids creating copies of the connection
+ * state. You're then free to either re-use the context
+ * structure for a different connection, or call
+ * mbedtls_ssl_free() on it. See the documentation of
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() for more details.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context to save. On success, it is no longer
+ * associated with the connection that has been serialized.
+ * \param buf The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a
+ * writeable buffer of at least \p buf_len bytes, or may be \c
+ * NULL if \p buf_len is \c 0.
+ * \param buf_len The number of bytes available for writing in \p buf.
+ * \param olen The size in bytes of the data that has been or would have
+ * been written. It must point to a valid \c size_t.
+ *
+ * \note \p olen is updated to the correct value regardless of
+ * whether \p buf_len was large enough. This makes it possible
+ * to determine the necessary size by calling this function
+ * with \p buf set to \c NULL and \p buf_len to \c 0. However,
+ * the value of \p olen is only guaranteed to be correct when
+ * the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or
+ * \c 0. If the return value is different, then the value of
+ * \p olen is undefined.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf is too small.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed
+ * while resetting the context.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a handshake is in
+ * progress, or there is pending data for reading or sending,
+ * or the connection does not use DTLS 1.2 with an AEAD
+ * ciphersuite, or renegotiation is enabled.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_context_save(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buf_len,
+ size_t *olen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Load serialized connection data to an SSL context.
+ *
+ * \see mbedtls_ssl_context_save()
+ *
+ * \warning The same serialized data must never be loaded into more
+ * that one context. In order to ensure that, after
+ * successfully loading serialized data to an SSL context, you
+ * should immediately destroy or invalidate all copies of the
+ * serialized data that was loaded. Loading the same data in
+ * more than one context would cause severe security failures
+ * including but not limited to loss of confidentiality.
+ *
+ * \note Before calling this function, the SSL context must be
+ * prepared in one of the two following ways. The first way is
+ * to take a context freshly initialised with
+ * mbedtls_ssl_init() and call mbedtls_ssl_setup() on it with
+ * the same ::mbedtls_ssl_config structure that was used in
+ * the original connection. The second way is to
+ * call mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on a context that was
+ * previously prepared as above but used in the meantime.
+ * Either way, you must not use the context to perform a
+ * handshake between calling mbedtls_ssl_setup() or
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() and calling this function. You
+ * may however call other setter functions in that time frame
+ * as indicated in the note below.
+ *
+ * \note Before or after calling this function successfully, you
+ * also need to configure some connection-specific callbacks
+ * and settings before you can use the connection again
+ * (unless they were already set before calling
+ * mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() and the values are suitable for
+ * the present connection). Specifically, you want to call
+ * at least mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(),
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(), and
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n() or
+ * mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p() if they were set originally.
+ * All other SSL setter functions
+ * are not necessary to call, either because they're only used
+ * in handshakes, or because the setting is already saved. You
+ * might choose to call them anyway, for example in order to
+ * share code between the cases of establishing a new
+ * connection and the case of loading an already-established
+ * connection.
+ *
+ * \note If you have new information about the path MTU, you want to
+ * call mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu() after calling this function, as
+ * otherwise this function would overwrite your
+ * newly-configured value with the value that was active when
+ * the context was saved.
+ *
+ * \note When this function returns an error code, it calls
+ * mbedtls_ssl_free() on \p ssl. In this case, you need to
+ * prepare the context with the usual sequence starting with a
+ * call to mbedtls_ssl_init() if you want to use it again.
+ *
+ * \param ssl The SSL context structure to be populated. It must have
+ * been prepared as described in the note above.
+ * \param buf The buffer holding the serialized connection data. It must
+ * be a readable buffer of at least \p len bytes.
+ * \param len The size of the serialized data in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH if the serialized data
+ * comes from a different Mbed TLS version or build.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_context_load(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize an SSL configuration context
+ * Just makes the context ready for
+ * mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() or mbedtls_ssl_config_free().
+ *
+ * \note You need to call mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() unless you
+ * manually set all of the relevant fields yourself.
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_config_init(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Load reasonable default SSL configuration values.
+ * (You need to call mbedtls_ssl_config_init() first.)
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration context
+ * \param endpoint MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER
+ * \param transport MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM for TLS, or
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM for DTLS
+ * \param preset a MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_XXX value
+ *
+ * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport() for notes on DTLS.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_ALLOC_FAILED on memory allocation error.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
+ int endpoint, int transport, int preset);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free an SSL configuration context
+ *
+ * \param conf SSL configuration context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_config_free(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize SSL session structure
+ *
+ * \param session SSL session
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_session_init(mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free referenced items in an SSL session including the
+ * peer certificate and clear memory
+ *
+ * \note A session object can be freed even if the SSL context
+ * that was used to retrieve the session is still in use.
+ *
+ * \param session SSL session
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_session_free(mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
+
+/**
+ * \brief TLS-PRF function for key derivation.
+ *
+ * \param prf The tls_prf type function type to be used.
+ * \param secret Secret for the key derivation function.
+ * \param slen Length of the secret.
+ * \param label String label for the key derivation function,
+ * terminated with null character.
+ * \param random Random bytes.
+ * \param rlen Length of the random bytes buffer.
+ * \param dstbuf The buffer holding the derived key.
+ * \param dlen Length of the output buffer.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success. An SSL specific error on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf(const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf,
+ const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
+ const char *label,
+ const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen,
+ unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEYING_MATERIAL_EXPORT)
+/* Maximum value for key_len in mbedtls_ssl_export_keying material. Depending on the TLS
+ * version and the negotiated ciphersuite, larger keys could in principle be exported,
+ * but for simplicity, we define one limit that works in all cases. TLS 1.3 with SHA256
+ * has the strictest limit: 255 blocks of SHA256 output, or 8160 bytes. */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_MAX_KEY_LEN 8160
+
+/**
+ * \brief TLS-Exporter to derive shared symmetric keys between server and client.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context from which to export keys. Must have finished the handshake.
+ * \param out Output buffer of length at least key_len bytes.
+ * \param key_len Length of the key to generate in bytes, must be at most
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_MAX_KEY_LEN (8160).
+ * \param label Label for which to generate the key of length label_len.
+ * \param label_len Length of label in bytes. Must be at most 249 in TLS 1.3.
+ * \param context Context of the key. Can be NULL if context_len or use_context is 0.
+ * \param context_len Length of context. Must be < 2^16 in TLS 1.2.
+ * \param use_context Indicates if a context should be used in deriving the key.
+ *
+ * \note TLS 1.2 makes a distinction between a 0-length context and no context.
+ * This is why the use_context argument exists. TLS 1.3 does not make
+ * this distinction. If use_context is 0 and TLS 1.3 is used, context and
+ * context_len are ignored and a 0-length context is used.
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success.
+ * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the handshake is not yet completed.
+ * \return An SSL-specific error on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_export_keying_material(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ uint8_t *out, const size_t key_len,
+ const char *label, const size_t label_len,
+ const unsigned char *context, const size_t context_len,
+ const int use_context);
+#endif
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ssl.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1307b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cache.h
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+/**
+ * \file ssl_cache.h
+ *
+ * \brief SSL session cache implementation
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: Module settings
+ *
+ * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section.
+ * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line.
+ * \{
+ */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT 86400 /*!< 1 day */
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES 50 /*!< Maximum entries in cache */
+#endif
+
+/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_context mbedtls_ssl_cache_context;
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry;
+
+/**
+ * \brief This structure is used for storing cache entries
+ */
+struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+ mbedtls_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timestamp); /*!< entry timestamp */
+#endif
+
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_id)[32]; /*!< session ID */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_id_len);
+
+ unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session); /*!< serialized session */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_len);
+
+ mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next); /*!< chain pointer */
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Cache context
+ */
+struct mbedtls_ssl_cache_context {
+ mbedtls_ssl_cache_entry *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chain); /*!< start of the chain */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timeout); /*!< cache entry timeout */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_entries); /*!< maximum entries */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex); /*!< mutex */
+#endif
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize an SSL cache context
+ *
+ * \param cache SSL cache context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_cache_init(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Cache get callback implementation
+ * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled)
+ *
+ * \param data The SSL cache context to use.
+ * \param session_id The pointer to the buffer holding the session ID
+ * for the session to load.
+ * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in bytes.
+ * \param session The address at which to store the session
+ * associated with \p session_id, if present.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND if there is
+ * no cache entry with specified session ID found, or
+ * any other negative error code for other failures.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get(void *data,
+ unsigned char const *session_id,
+ size_t session_id_len,
+ mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Cache set callback implementation
+ * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled)
+ *
+ * \param data The SSL cache context to use.
+ * \param session_id The pointer to the buffer holding the session ID
+ * associated to \p session.
+ * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in bytes.
+ * \param session The session to store.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set(void *data,
+ unsigned char const *session_id,
+ size_t session_id_len,
+ const mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Remove the cache entry by the session ID
+ * (Thread-safe if MBEDTLS_THREADING_C is enabled)
+ *
+ * \param data The SSL cache context to use.
+ * \param session_id The pointer to the buffer holding the session ID
+ * associated to session.
+ * \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success. This indicates the cache entry for
+ * the session with provided ID is removed or does not
+ * exist.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_cache_remove(void *data,
+ unsigned char const *session_id,
+ size_t session_id_len);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the cache timeout
+ * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT (1 day))
+ *
+ * A timeout of 0 indicates no timeout.
+ *
+ * \param cache SSL cache context
+ * \param timeout cache entry timeout in seconds
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int timeout);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the cache timeout
+ *
+ * A timeout of 0 indicates no timeout.
+ *
+ * \param cache SSL cache context
+ *
+ * \return cache entry timeout in seconds
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache)
+{
+ return cache->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timeout);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the maximum number of cache entries
+ * (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_DEFAULT_MAX_ENTRIES (50))
+ *
+ * \param cache SSL cache context
+ * \param max cache entry maximum
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_max_entries(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache, int max);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free referenced items in a cache context and clear memory
+ *
+ * \param cache SSL cache context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_cache_free(mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ssl_cache.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..12d4462
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h
@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
+/**
+ * \file ssl_ciphersuites.h
+ *
+ * \brief SSL Ciphersuites for Mbed TLS
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Supported ciphersuites (Official IANA names)
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5 0x01 /**< Weak! */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x02 /**< Weak! */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2C /**< Weak! */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2D /**< Weak! */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0x2E /**< Weak! */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x2F
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x33
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x35
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x39
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0x3B /**< Weak! */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x3C /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x3D /**< TLS 1.2 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x41
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA 0x45
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0x67 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 0x6B /**< TLS 1.2 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x84
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA 0x88
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x8C
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x8D
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x90
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x91
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0x94
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0x95
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x9C /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x9D /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x9E /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x9F /**< TLS 1.2 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xA8 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xA9 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xAA /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xAB /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xAC /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xAD /**< TLS 1.2 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xAE
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xAF
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xB0 /**< Weak! */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xB1 /**< Weak! */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xB2
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xB3
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xB4 /**< Weak! */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xB5 /**< Weak! */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xB6
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xB7
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xB8 /**< Weak! */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xB9 /**< Weak! */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xBA /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xBE /**< TLS 1.2 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0xC0 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256 0xC4 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC001 /**< Weak! */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC004
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC005
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC006 /**< Weak! */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC009
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00A
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC00B /**< Weak! */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC00E
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC00F
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC010 /**< Weak! */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC013
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC014
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC023 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC024 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC025 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC026 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC027 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC028 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC029 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC02A /**< TLS 1.2 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02B /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02C /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02D /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC02E /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC02F /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC030 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC031 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC032 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 0xC035
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 0xC036
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC037
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC038
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA 0xC039
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256 0xC03A
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384 0xC03B
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC03C /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC03D /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC044 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC045 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC048 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC049 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC04A /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC04B /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC04C /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC04D /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC04E /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC04F /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC050 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC051 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC052 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC053 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC05C /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC05D /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC05E /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC05F /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC060 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC061 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC062 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC063 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC064 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC065 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC066 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC067 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC068 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC069 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC06A /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC06B /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC06C /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC06D /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC06E /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC06F /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC070 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC071 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC072
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC073
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC074
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC075
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC076
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC077
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC078
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC079
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC07A /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC07B /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC07C /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC07D /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC086 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC087 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC088 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC089 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC08A /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC08B /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC08C /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC08D /**< TLS 1.2 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC08E /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC08F /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC090 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC091 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 0xC092 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 0xC093 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC094
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC095
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC096
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC097
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC098
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC099
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 0xC09A
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 0xC09B
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC09C /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC09D /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC09E /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC09F /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0A0 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0A1 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0A2 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0A3 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC0A4 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC0A5 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC0A6 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC0A7 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0A8 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0A9 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0AA /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0AB /**< TLS 1.2 */
+/* The last two are named with PSK_DHE in the RFC, which looks like a typo */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM 0xC0AC /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM 0xC0AD /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0AE /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8 0xC0AF /**< TLS 1.2 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECJPAKE_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8 0xC0FF /**< experimental */
+
+/* RFC 7905 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCA8 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCA9 /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAA /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAB /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAC /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAD /**< TLS 1.2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0xCCAE /**< TLS 1.2 */
+
+/* RFC 8446, Appendix B.4 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 0x1301 /**< TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 0x1302 /**< TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 0x1303 /**< TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 0x1304 /**< TLS 1.3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 0x1305 /**< TLS 1.3 */
+
+/* Reminder: update mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret when adding a new key exchange.
+ * Reminder: update MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__xxx below
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_NONE = 0,
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA,
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA,
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA,
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA,
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK,
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK,
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK,
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK,
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA,
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA,
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE,
+} mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t;
+
+/* Key exchanges using a certificate */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* Key exchanges in either TLS 1.2 or 1.3 which are using an ECDSA
+ * signature */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_ECDSA_ANY_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* Key exchanges allowing client certificate requests.
+ *
+ * Note: that's almost the same as MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED
+ * above, except RSA-PSK uses a server certificate but no client cert.
+ *
+ * Note: this difference is specific to TLS 1.2, as with TLS 1.3, things are
+ * more symmetrical: client certs and server certs are either both allowed
+ * (Ephemeral mode) or both disallowed (PSK and PKS-Ephemeral modes).
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* Helper to state that certificate-based client authentication through ECDSA
+ * is supported in TLS 1.2 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY)
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* ECDSA required for certificates in either TLS 1.2 or 1.3 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* Key exchanges involving server signature in ServerKeyExchange */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* Key exchanges using ECDH */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* Key exchanges that don't involve ephemeral keys */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* Key exchanges that involve ephemeral keys */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* Key exchanges using a PSK */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* Key exchanges using DHE */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* Key exchanges using ECDHE */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* TLS 1.2 key exchanges using ECDH or ECDHE*/
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* TLS 1.3 PSK key exchanges */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* TLS 1.2 or 1.3 key exchanges with PSK */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* TLS 1.3 ephemeral key exchanges */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* TLS 1.3 key exchanges using ECDHE */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH)
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* TLS 1.2 or 1.3 key exchanges using ECDH or ECDHE */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* TLS 1.2 XXDH key exchanges: ECDH or ECDHE or FFDH */
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED))
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_1_2_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/* The handshake params structure has a set of fields called xxdh_psa which are used:
+ * - by TLS 1.2 with `USE_PSA` to do ECDH or ECDHE;
+ * - by TLS 1.3 to do ECDHE or FFDHE.
+ * The following macros can be used to guard their declaration and use.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_1_2_ENABLED) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_1_2_ENABLED
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_1_2_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
+#define MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_WEAK 0x01 /**< Weak ciphersuite flag */
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_SHORT_TAG 0x02 /**< Short authentication tag,
+ eg for CCM_8 */
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS 0x04 /**< Can't be used with DTLS */
+
+/**
+ * \brief This structure is used for storing ciphersuite information
+ *
+ * \note members are defined using integral types instead of enums
+ * in order to pack structure and reduce memory usage by internal
+ * \c ciphersuite_definitions[]
+ */
+struct mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t {
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
+ const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name);
+
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher); /* mbedtls_cipher_type_t */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mac); /* mbedtls_md_type_t */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange); /* mbedtls_key_exchange_type_t */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags);
+
+ uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min_tls_version); /* mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version */
+ uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_tls_version); /* mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version */
+};
+
+const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(void);
+
+const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string(const char *ciphersuite_name);
+const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(int ciphersuite_id);
+
+static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_name(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info)
+{
+ return info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name);
+}
+
+static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_id(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info)
+{
+ return info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
+}
+
+size_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_cipher_key_bitlen(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ssl_ciphersuites.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f211e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_cookie.h
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/**
+ * \file ssl_cookie.h
+ *
+ * \brief DTLS cookie callbacks implementation
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
+#endif
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: Module settings
+ *
+ * The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section.
+ * Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line.
+ * \{
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT 60 /**< Default expiration delay of DTLS cookies, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies issued */
+#endif
+
+/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for the default cookie functions.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_hmac_key); /*!< key id for the HMAC portion */
+ psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psa_hmac_alg); /*!< key algorithm for the HMAC portion */
+#else
+ mbedtls_md_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hmac_ctx); /*!< context for the HMAC portion */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+ unsigned long MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial); /*!< serial number for expiration */
+#endif
+ unsigned long MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timeout); /*!< timeout delay, in seconds if HAVE_TIME,
+ or in number of tickets issued */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex);
+#endif
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+} mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize cookie context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_init(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Setup cookie context (generate keys)
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_setup(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set expiration delay for cookies
+ * (Default MBEDTLS_SSL_COOKIE_TIMEOUT)
+ *
+ * \param ctx Cookie context
+ * \param delay Delay, in seconds if HAVE_TIME, or in number of cookies
+ * issued in the meantime.
+ * 0 to disable expiration (NOT recommended)
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_set_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx, unsigned long delay);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free cookie context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_cookie_free(mbedtls_ssl_cookie_ctx *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Generate cookie, see \c mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t
+ */
+mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Verify cookie, see \c mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t
+ */
+mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check;
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ssl_cookie.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f7e440
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/ssl_ticket.h
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+/**
+ * \file ssl_ticket.h
+ *
+ * \brief TLS server ticket callbacks implementation
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_H
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+/*
+ * This implementation of the session ticket callbacks includes key
+ * management, rotating the keys periodically in order to preserve forward
+ * secrecy, when MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME is defined.
+ */
+
+#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_MAX_KEY_BYTES 32 /*!< Max supported key length in bytes */
+#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES 4 /*!< key name length in bytes */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Information for session ticket protection
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key {
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name)[MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_KEY_NAME_BYTES];
+ /*!< random key identifier */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+ mbedtls_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(generation_time); /*!< key generation timestamp (seconds) */
+#endif
+ /*! Lifetime of the key in seconds. This is also the lifetime of the
+ * tickets created under that key.
+ */
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime);
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); /*!< context for auth enc/decryption */
+#else
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key); /*!< key used for auth enc/decryption */
+ psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); /*!< algorithm of auth enc/decryption */
+ psa_key_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_type); /*!< key type */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_bits); /*!< key length in bits */
+#endif
+}
+mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for session ticket handling functions
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context {
+ mbedtls_ssl_ticket_key MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keys)[2]; /*!< ticket protection keys */
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(active); /*!< index of the currently active key */
+
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_lifetime); /*!< lifetime of tickets in seconds */
+
+ /** Callback for getting (pseudo-)random numbers */
+ int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_rng))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t);
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_rng); /*!< context for the RNG function */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex);
+#endif
+}
+mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a ticket context.
+ * (Just make it ready for mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup()
+ * or mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free().)
+ *
+ * \param ctx Context to be initialized
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Prepare context to be actually used
+ *
+ * \param ctx Context to be set up
+ * \param f_rng RNG callback function (mandatory)
+ * \param p_rng RNG callback context.
+ * Note that the RNG callback must remain valid
+ * until the ticket context is freed.
+ * \param cipher AEAD cipher to use for ticket protection.
+ * Recommended value: MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM.
+ * \param lifetime Tickets lifetime in seconds
+ * Recommended value: 86400 (one day).
+ *
+ * \note It is highly recommended to select a cipher that is at
+ * least as strong as the strongest ciphersuite
+ * supported. Usually that means a 256-bit key.
+ *
+ * \note It is recommended to pick a reasonable lifetime so as not
+ * to negate the benefits of forward secrecy.
+ *
+ * \note The TLS 1.3 specification states that ticket lifetime must
+ * be smaller than seven days. If ticket lifetime has been
+ * set to a value greater than seven days in this module then
+ * if the TLS 1.3 is configured to send tickets after the
+ * handshake it will fail the connection when trying to send
+ * the first ticket.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful,
+ * or a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng, void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher,
+ uint32_t lifetime);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Rotate session ticket encryption key to new specified key.
+ * Provides for external control of session ticket encryption
+ * key rotation, e.g. for synchronization between different
+ * machines. If this function is not used, or if not called
+ * before ticket lifetime expires, then a new session ticket
+ * encryption key is generated internally in order to avoid
+ * unbounded session ticket encryption key lifetimes.
+ *
+ * \param ctx Context to be set up
+ * \param name Session ticket encryption key name
+ * \param nlength Session ticket encryption key name length in bytes
+ * \param k Session ticket encryption key
+ * \param klength Session ticket encryption key length in bytes
+ * \param lifetime Tickets lifetime in seconds
+ * Recommended value: 86400 (one day).
+ *
+ * \note \c name and \c k are recommended to be cryptographically
+ * random data.
+ *
+ * \note \c nlength must match sizeof( ctx->name )
+ *
+ * \note \c klength must be sufficient for use by cipher specified
+ * to \c mbedtls_ssl_ticket_setup
+ *
+ * \note It is recommended to pick a reasonable lifetime so as not
+ * to negate the benefits of forward secrecy.
+ *
+ * \note The TLS 1.3 specification states that ticket lifetime must
+ * be smaller than seven days. If ticket lifetime has been
+ * set to a value greater than seven days in this module then
+ * if the TLS 1.3 is configured to send tickets after the
+ * handshake it will fail the connection when trying to send
+ * the first ticket.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful,
+ * or a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_rotate(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *name, size_t nlength,
+ const unsigned char *k, size_t klength,
+ uint32_t lifetime);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Implementation of the ticket write callback
+ *
+ * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t for description
+ */
+mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Implementation of the ticket parse callback
+ *
+ * \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t for description
+ */
+mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free a context's content and zeroize it.
+ *
+ * \param ctx Context to be cleaned up
+ */
+void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_free(mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ssl_ticket.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/threading.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/threading.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b4df0e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/threading.h
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+/**
+ * \file threading.h
+ *
+ * \brief Threading abstraction layer
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_THREADING_H
+#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** Bad input parameters to function. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x001C
+/** Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR -0x001E
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD)
+#include <pthread.h>
+typedef struct mbedtls_threading_mutex_t {
+ pthread_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mutex);
+
+ /* WARNING - state should only be accessed when holding the mutex lock in
+ * framework/tests/src/threading_helpers.c, otherwise corruption can occur.
+ * state will be 0 after a failed init or a free, and nonzero after a
+ * successful init. This field is for testing only and thus not considered
+ * part of the public API of Mbed TLS and may change without notice.*/
+ char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state);
+
+} mbedtls_threading_mutex_t;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT)
+/* You should define the mbedtls_threading_mutex_t type in your header */
+#include "threading_alt.h"
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set your alternate threading implementation function
+ * pointers and initialize global mutexes. If used, this
+ * function must be called once in the main thread before any
+ * other Mbed TLS function is called, and
+ * mbedtls_threading_free_alt() must be called once in the main
+ * thread after all other Mbed TLS functions.
+ *
+ * \note mutex_init() and mutex_free() don't return a status code.
+ * If mutex_init() fails, it should leave its argument (the
+ * mutex) in a state such that mutex_lock() will fail when
+ * called with this argument.
+ *
+ * \param mutex_init the init function implementation
+ * \param mutex_free the free function implementation
+ * \param mutex_lock the lock function implementation
+ * \param mutex_unlock the unlock function implementation
+ */
+void mbedtls_threading_set_alt(void (*mutex_init)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *),
+ void (*mutex_free)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *),
+ int (*mutex_lock)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *),
+ int (*mutex_unlock)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *));
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free global mutexes.
+ */
+void mbedtls_threading_free_alt(void);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+/*
+ * The function pointers for mutex_init, mutex_free, mutex_ and mutex_unlock
+ *
+ * All these functions are expected to work or the result will be undefined.
+ */
+extern void (*mbedtls_mutex_init)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex);
+extern void (*mbedtls_mutex_free)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex);
+extern int (*mbedtls_mutex_lock)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex);
+extern int (*mbedtls_mutex_unlock)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex);
+
+/*
+ * Global mutexes
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT)
+/* This mutex may or may not be used in the default definition of
+ * mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(), but in order to determine that,
+ * we need to check POSIX features, hence modify _POSIX_C_SOURCE.
+ * With the current approach, this declaration is orphaned, lacking
+ * an accompanying definition, in case mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r()
+ * doesn't need it, but that's not a problem. */
+extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+/*
+ * A mutex used to make the PSA subsystem thread safe.
+ *
+ * key_slot_mutex protects the registered_readers and
+ * state variable for all key slots in &global_data.key_slots.
+ *
+ * This mutex must be held when any read from or write to a state or
+ * registered_readers field is performed, i.e. when calling functions:
+ * psa_key_slot_state_transition(), psa_register_read(), psa_unregister_read(),
+ * psa_key_slot_has_readers() and psa_wipe_key_slot(). */
+extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex;
+
+/*
+ * A mutex used to make the non-rng PSA global_data struct members thread safe.
+ *
+ * This mutex must be held when reading or writing to any of the PSA global_data
+ * structure members, other than the rng_state or rng struct. */
+extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_psa_globaldata_mutex;
+
+/*
+ * A mutex used to make the PSA global_data rng data thread safe.
+ *
+ * This mutex must be held when reading or writing to the PSA
+ * global_data rng_state or rng struct members. */
+extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_psa_rngdata_mutex;
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* threading.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/timing.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/timing.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..62ae102
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/timing.h
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/**
+ * \file timing.h
+ *
+ * \brief Portable interface to timeouts and to the CPU cycle counter
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_TIMING_H
+#define MBEDTLS_TIMING_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT)
+// Regular implementation
+//
+
+/**
+ * \brief timer structure
+ */
+struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time {
+ uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(opaque)[4];
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for mbedtls_timing_set/get_delay()
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_timing_delay_context {
+ struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(timer);
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(int_ms);
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(fin_ms);
+} mbedtls_timing_delay_context;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */
+#include "timing_alt.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TIMING_ALT */
+
+/* Internal use */
+unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer(struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int reset);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set a pair of delays to watch
+ * (See \c mbedtls_timing_get_delay().)
+ *
+ * \param data Pointer to timing data.
+ * Must point to a valid \c mbedtls_timing_delay_context struct.
+ * \param int_ms First (intermediate) delay in milliseconds.
+ * The effect if int_ms > fin_ms is unspecified.
+ * \param fin_ms Second (final) delay in milliseconds.
+ * Pass 0 to cancel the current delay.
+ *
+ * \note To set a single delay, either use \c mbedtls_timing_set_timer
+ * directly or use this function with int_ms == fin_ms.
+ */
+void mbedtls_timing_set_delay(void *data, uint32_t int_ms, uint32_t fin_ms);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the status of delays
+ * (Memory helper: number of delays passed.)
+ *
+ * \param data Pointer to timing data
+ * Must point to a valid \c mbedtls_timing_delay_context struct.
+ *
+ * \return -1 if cancelled (fin_ms = 0),
+ * 0 if none of the delays are passed,
+ * 1 if only the intermediate delay is passed,
+ * 2 if the final delay is passed.
+ */
+int mbedtls_timing_get_delay(void *data);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the final timing delay
+ *
+ * \param data Pointer to timing data
+ * Must point to a valid \c mbedtls_timing_delay_context struct.
+ *
+ * \return Final timing delay in milliseconds.
+ */
+uint32_t mbedtls_timing_get_final_delay(
+ const mbedtls_timing_delay_context *data);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* timing.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..637f9d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/version.h
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/**
+ * \file version.h
+ *
+ * \brief Run-time version information
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+/*
+ * This set of run-time variables can be used to determine the version number of
+ * the Mbed TLS library used. Compile-time version defines for the same can be
+ * found in build_info.h
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_VERSION_H
+#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_VERSION_C)
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Get the version number.
+ *
+ * \return The constructed version number in the format
+ * MMNNPP00 (Major, Minor, Patch).
+ */
+unsigned int mbedtls_version_get_number(void);
+
+/**
+ * Get the version string ("x.y.z").
+ *
+ * \param string The string that will receive the value.
+ * (Should be at least 9 bytes in size)
+ */
+void mbedtls_version_get_string(char *string);
+
+/**
+ * Get the full version string ("Mbed TLS x.y.z").
+ *
+ * \param string The string that will receive the value. The Mbed TLS version
+ * string will use 18 bytes AT MOST including a terminating
+ * null byte.
+ * (So the buffer should be at least 18 bytes to receive this
+ * version string).
+ */
+void mbedtls_version_get_string_full(char *string);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Check if support for a feature was compiled into this
+ * Mbed TLS binary. This allows you to see at runtime if the
+ * library was for instance compiled with or without
+ * Multi-threading support.
+ *
+ * \note only checks against defines in the sections "System
+ * support", "Mbed TLS modules" and "Mbed TLS feature
+ * support" in mbedtls_config.h
+ *
+ * \param feature The string for the define to check (e.g. "MBEDTLS_AES_C")
+ *
+ * \return 0 if the feature is present,
+ * -1 if the feature is not present and
+ * -2 if support for feature checking as a whole was not
+ * compiled in.
+ */
+int mbedtls_version_check_feature(const char *feature);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_VERSION_C */
+
+#endif /* version.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b10461
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509.h
@@ -0,0 +1,500 @@
+/**
+ * \file x509.h
+ *
+ * \brief X.509 generic defines and structures
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_H
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \addtogroup x509_module
+ * \{
+ */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA)
+/**
+ * Maximum number of intermediate CAs in a verification chain.
+ * That is, maximum length of the chain, excluding the end-entity certificate
+ * and the trusted root certificate.
+ *
+ * Set this to a low value to prevent an adversary from making you waste
+ * resources verifying an overlong certificate chain.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA 8
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \name X509 Error codes
+ * \{
+ */
+/** Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA hashing/encryption combination. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x2080
+/** Requested OID is unknown. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID -0x2100
+/** The CRT/CRL/CSR format is invalid, e.g. different type expected. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT -0x2180
+/** The CRT/CRL/CSR version element is invalid. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION -0x2200
+/** The serial tag or value is invalid. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL -0x2280
+/** The algorithm tag or value is invalid. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG -0x2300
+/** The name tag or value is invalid. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME -0x2380
+/** The date tag or value is invalid. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE -0x2400
+/** The signature tag or value invalid. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE -0x2480
+/** The extension tag or value is invalid. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS -0x2500
+/** CRT/CRL/CSR has an unsupported version number. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION -0x2580
+/** Signature algorithm (oid) is unsupported. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG -0x2600
+/** Signature algorithms do not match. (see \c ::mbedtls_x509_crt sig_oid) */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH -0x2680
+/** Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED -0x2700
+/** Format not recognized as DER or PEM. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT -0x2780
+/** Input invalid. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x2800
+/** Allocation of memory failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED -0x2880
+/** Read/write of file failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR -0x2900
+/** Destination buffer is too small. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x2980
+/** A fatal error occurred, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR -0x3000
+/** \} name X509 Error codes */
+
+/**
+ * \name X509 Verify codes
+ * \{
+ */
+/* Reminder: update x509_crt_verify_strings[] in library/x509_crt.c */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED 0x01 /**< The certificate validity has expired. */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED 0x02 /**< The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL). */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH 0x04 /**< The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CN. */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED 0x08 /**< The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA. */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED 0x10 /**< The CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CA. */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED 0x20 /**< The CRL is expired. */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING 0x40 /**< Certificate was missing. */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY 0x80 /**< Certificate verification was skipped. */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER 0x0100 /**< Other reason (can be used by verify callback) */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE 0x0200 /**< The certificate validity starts in the future. */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE 0x0400 /**< The CRL is from the future */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE 0x0800 /**< Usage does not match the keyUsage extension. */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE 0x1000 /**< Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension. */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE 0x2000 /**< Usage does not match the nsCertType extension. */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD 0x4000 /**< The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash. */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK 0x8000 /**< The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA). */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY 0x010000 /**< The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short). */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD 0x020000 /**< The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash. */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK 0x040000 /**< The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA). */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY 0x080000 /**< The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short). */
+
+/** \} name X509 Verify codes */
+/** \} addtogroup x509_module */
+
+/*
+ * X.509 v3 Subject Alternative Name types.
+ * otherName [0] OtherName,
+ * rfc822Name [1] IA5String,
+ * dNSName [2] IA5String,
+ * x400Address [3] ORAddress,
+ * directoryName [4] Name,
+ * ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName,
+ * uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,
+ * iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING,
+ * registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_OTHER_NAME 0
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_RFC822_NAME 1
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DNS_NAME 2
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_X400_ADDRESS_NAME 3
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_DIRECTORY_NAME 4
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_EDI_PARTY_NAME 5
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_UNIFORM_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER 6
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_IP_ADDRESS 7
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_REGISTERED_ID 8
+
+/*
+ * X.509 v3 Key Usage Extension flags
+ * Reminder: update mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage() when adding new flags.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE (0x80) /* bit 0 */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_NON_REPUDIATION (0x40) /* bit 1 */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT (0x20) /* bit 2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT (0x10) /* bit 3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT (0x08) /* bit 4 */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN (0x04) /* bit 5 */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN (0x02) /* bit 6 */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY (0x01) /* bit 7 */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY (0x8000) /* bit 8 */
+
+/*
+ * Netscape certificate types
+ * (http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/pki/nss/tech-notes/tn3.html)
+ */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT (0x80) /* bit 0 */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_SERVER (0x40) /* bit 1 */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL (0x20) /* bit 2 */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING (0x10) /* bit 3 */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_RESERVED (0x08) /* bit 4 */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA (0x04) /* bit 5 */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA (0x02) /* bit 6 */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_OBJECT_SIGNING_CA (0x01) /* bit 7 */
+
+/*
+ * X.509 extension types
+ *
+ * Comments refer to the status for using certificates. Status can be
+ * different for writing certificates or reading CRLs or CSRs.
+ *
+ * Those are defined in oid.h as oid.c needs them in a data structure. Since
+ * these were previously defined here, let's have aliases for compatibility.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_MAPPINGS
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME /* Supported (DNS) */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_ISSUER_ALT_NAME
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_DIRECTORY_ATTRS
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS /* Supported */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_INIHIBIT_ANYPOLICY
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_FRESHEST_CRL
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE
+
+/*
+ * Storage format identifiers
+ * Recognized formats: PEM and DER
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_DER 1
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_FORMAT_PEM 2
+
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE 256 /**< Maximum value size of a DN entry */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \addtogroup x509_module
+ * \{ */
+
+/**
+ * \name Structures for parsing X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRs
+ * \{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Type-length-value structure that allows for ASN1 using DER.
+ */
+typedef mbedtls_asn1_buf mbedtls_x509_buf;
+
+/**
+ * Container for ASN1 bit strings.
+ */
+typedef mbedtls_asn1_bitstring mbedtls_x509_bitstring;
+
+/**
+ * Container for ASN1 named information objects.
+ * It allows for Relative Distinguished Names (e.g. cn=localhost,ou=code,etc.).
+ */
+typedef mbedtls_asn1_named_data mbedtls_x509_name;
+
+/**
+ * Container for a sequence of ASN.1 items
+ */
+typedef mbedtls_asn1_sequence mbedtls_x509_sequence;
+
+/*
+ * Container for the fields of the Authority Key Identifier object
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509_authority {
+ mbedtls_x509_buf keyIdentifier;
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence authorityCertIssuer;
+ mbedtls_x509_buf authorityCertSerialNumber;
+ mbedtls_x509_buf raw;
+}
+mbedtls_x509_authority;
+
+/** Container for date and time (precision in seconds). */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509_time {
+ int year, mon, day; /**< Date. */
+ int hour, min, sec; /**< Time. */
+}
+mbedtls_x509_time;
+
+/**
+ * From RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6:
+ * OtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * type-id OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ * value [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY type-id }
+ *
+ * Future versions of the library may add new fields to this structure or
+ * to its embedded union and structure.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_other_name {
+ /**
+ * The type_id is an OID as defined in RFC 5280.
+ * To check the value of the type id, you should use
+ * \p MBEDTLS_OID_CMP with a known OID mbedtls_x509_buf.
+ */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf type_id; /**< The type id. */
+ union {
+ /**
+ * From RFC 4108 section 5:
+ * HardwareModuleName ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * hwType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ * hwSerialNum OCTET STRING }
+ */
+ struct {
+ mbedtls_x509_buf oid; /**< The object identifier. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf val; /**< The named value. */
+ }
+ hardware_module_name;
+ }
+ value;
+}
+mbedtls_x509_san_other_name;
+
+/**
+ * A structure for holding the parsed Subject Alternative Name,
+ * according to type.
+ *
+ * Future versions of the library may add new fields to this structure or
+ * to its embedded union and structure.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name {
+ int type; /**< The SAN type, value of MBEDTLS_X509_SAN_XXX. */
+ union {
+ mbedtls_x509_san_other_name other_name;
+ mbedtls_x509_name directory_name;
+ mbedtls_x509_buf unstructured_name; /**< The buffer for the unstructured types. rfc822Name, dnsName and uniformResourceIdentifier are currently supported. */
+ }
+ san; /**< A union of the supported SAN types */
+}
+mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name;
+
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_list {
+ mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name node;
+ struct mbedtls_x509_san_list *next;
+}
+mbedtls_x509_san_list;
+
+/** \} name Structures for parsing X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRs */
+/** \} addtogroup x509_module */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Store the certificate DN in printable form into buf;
+ * no more than size characters will be written.
+ *
+ * \param buf Buffer to write to
+ * \param size Maximum size of buffer
+ * \param dn The X509 name to represent
+ *
+ * \return The length of the string written (not including the
+ * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Convert the certificate DN string \p name into
+ * a linked list of mbedtls_x509_name (equivalent to
+ * mbedtls_asn1_named_data).
+ *
+ * \note This function allocates a linked list, and places the head
+ * pointer in \p head. This list must later be freed by a
+ * call to mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list().
+ *
+ * \param[out] head Address in which to store the pointer to the head of the
+ * allocated list of mbedtls_x509_name. Must point to NULL on
+ * entry.
+ * \param[in] name The string representation of a DN to convert
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success, or a negative error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Return the next relative DN in an X509 name.
+ *
+ * \note Intended use is to compare function result to dn->next
+ * in order to detect boundaries of multi-valued RDNs.
+ *
+ * \param dn Current node in the X509 name
+ *
+ * \return Pointer to the first attribute-value pair of the
+ * next RDN in sequence, or NULL if end is reached.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_x509_name *mbedtls_x509_dn_get_next(
+ mbedtls_x509_name *dn)
+{
+ while (dn->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_merged) && dn->next != NULL) {
+ dn = dn->next;
+ }
+ return dn->next;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Store the certificate serial in printable form into buf;
+ * no more than size characters will be written.
+ *
+ * \param buf Buffer to write to
+ * \param size Maximum size of buffer
+ * \param serial The X509 serial to represent
+ *
+ * \return The length of the string written (not including the
+ * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *serial);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Compare pair of mbedtls_x509_time.
+ *
+ * \param t1 mbedtls_x509_time to compare
+ * \param t2 mbedtls_x509_time to compare
+ *
+ * \return < 0 if t1 is before t2
+ * 0 if t1 equals t2
+ * > 0 if t1 is after t2
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_time *t1, const mbedtls_x509_time *t2);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
+/**
+ * \brief Fill mbedtls_x509_time with provided mbedtls_time_t.
+ *
+ * \param tt mbedtls_time_t to convert
+ * \param now mbedtls_x509_time to fill with converted mbedtls_time_t
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success
+ * \return A non-zero return value on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time_t tt, mbedtls_x509_time *now);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Check a given mbedtls_x509_time against the system time
+ * and tell if it's in the past.
+ *
+ * \note Intended usage is "if( is_past( valid_to ) ) ERROR".
+ * Hence the return value of 1 if on internal errors.
+ *
+ * \param to mbedtls_x509_time to check
+ *
+ * \return 1 if the given time is in the past or an error occurred,
+ * 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(const mbedtls_x509_time *to);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Check a given mbedtls_x509_time against the system time
+ * and tell if it's in the future.
+ *
+ * \note Intended usage is "if( is_future( valid_from ) ) ERROR".
+ * Hence the return value of 1 if on internal errors.
+ *
+ * \param from mbedtls_x509_time to check
+ *
+ * \return 1 if the given time is in the future or an error occurred,
+ * 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(const mbedtls_x509_time *from);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function parses an item in the SubjectAlternativeNames
+ * extension. Please note that this function might allocate
+ * additional memory for a subject alternative name, thus
+ * mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name has to be called
+ * to dispose of this additional memory afterwards.
+ *
+ * \param san_buf The buffer holding the raw data item of the subject
+ * alternative name.
+ * \param san The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation
+ * of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_buf.
+ *
+ * \note Supported GeneralName types, as defined in RFC 5280:
+ * "rfc822Name", "dnsName", "directoryName",
+ * "uniformResourceIdentifier" and "hardware_module_name"
+ * of type "otherName", as defined in RFC 4108.
+ *
+ * \note This function should be called on a single raw data of
+ * subject alternative name. For example, after successful
+ * certificate parsing, one must iterate on every item in the
+ * \c crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to
+ * this function.
+ *
+ * \warning The target structure contains pointers to the raw data of the
+ * parsed certificate, and its lifetime is restricted by the
+ * lifetime of the certificate.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for an unsupported
+ * SAN type.
+ * \return Another negative value for any other failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf,
+ mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san);
+/**
+ * \brief Unallocate all data related to subject alternative name
+ *
+ * \param san SAN structure - extra memory owned by this structure will be freed
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function parses a CN string as an IP address.
+ *
+ * \param cn The CN string to parse. CN string MUST be null-terminated.
+ * \param dst The target buffer to populate with the binary IP address.
+ * The buffer MUST be 16 bytes to save IPv6, and should be
+ * 4-byte aligned if the result will be used as struct in_addr.
+ * e.g. uint32_t dst[4]
+ *
+ * \note \p cn is parsed as an IPv6 address if string contains ':',
+ * else \p cn is parsed as an IPv4 address.
+ *
+ * \return Length of binary IP address; num bytes written to target.
+ * \return \c 0 on failure to parse CN string as an IP address.
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_cn_inet_pton(const char *cn, void *dst);
+
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_SAFE_SNPRINTF \
+ do { \
+ if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= n) \
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; \
+ \
+ n -= (size_t) ret; \
+ p += (size_t) ret; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6625a44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+/**
+ * \file x509_crl.h
+ *
+ * \brief X.509 certificate revocation list parsing
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \addtogroup x509_module
+ * \{ */
+
+/**
+ * \name Structures and functions for parsing CRLs
+ * \{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Certificate revocation list entry.
+ * Contains the CA-specific serial numbers and revocation dates.
+ *
+ * Some fields of this structure are publicly readable. Do not modify
+ * them except via Mbed TLS library functions: the effect of modifying
+ * those fields or the data that those fields points to is unspecified.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry {
+ /** Direct access to the whole entry inside the containing buffer. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf raw;
+ /** The serial number of the revoked certificate. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf serial;
+ /** The revocation date of this entry. */
+ mbedtls_x509_time revocation_date;
+ /** Direct access to the list of CRL entry extensions
+ * (an ASN.1 constructed sequence).
+ *
+ * If there are no extensions, `entry_ext.len == 0` and
+ * `entry_ext.p == NULL`. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf entry_ext;
+
+ /** Next element in the linked list of entries.
+ * \p NULL indicates the end of the list.
+ * Do not modify this field directly. */
+ struct mbedtls_x509_crl_entry *next;
+}
+mbedtls_x509_crl_entry;
+
+/**
+ * Certificate revocation list structure.
+ * Every CRL may have multiple entries.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crl {
+ mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf tbs; /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */
+
+ int version; /**< CRL version (1=v1, 2=v2) */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; /**< CRL signature type identifier */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_raw; /**< The raw issuer data (DER). */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_name issuer; /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_time this_update;
+ mbedtls_x509_time next_update;
+
+ mbedtls_x509_crl_entry entry; /**< The CRL entries containing the certificate revocation times for this CA. */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_buf crl_ext;
+
+ mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_oid2);
+ mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig);
+ mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_md); /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk); /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_opts); /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */
+
+ /** Next element in the linked list of CRL.
+ * \p NULL indicates the end of the list.
+ * Do not modify this field directly. */
+ struct mbedtls_x509_crl *next;
+}
+mbedtls_x509_crl;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Parse a DER-encoded CRL and append it to the chained list
+ *
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * \param chain points to the start of the chain
+ * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data in DER format
+ * \param buflen size of the buffer
+ * (including the terminating null byte for PEM data)
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen);
+/**
+ * \brief Parse one or more CRLs and append them to the chained list
+ *
+ * \note Multiple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format
+ *
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * \param chain points to the start of the chain
+ * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data in PEM or DER format
+ * \param buflen size of the buffer
+ * (including the terminating null byte for PEM data)
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+/**
+ * \brief Load one or more CRLs and append them to the chained list
+ *
+ * \note Multiple CRLs are accepted only if using PEM format
+ *
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * \param chain points to the start of the chain
+ * \param path filename to read the CRLs from (in PEM or DER encoding)
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crl_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crl *chain, const char *path);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
+/**
+ * \brief Returns an informational string about the CRL.
+ *
+ * \param buf Buffer to write to
+ * \param size Maximum size of buffer
+ * \param prefix A line prefix
+ * \param crl The X509 CRL to represent
+ *
+ * \return The length of the string written (not including the
+ * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crl_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a CRL (chain)
+ *
+ * \param crl CRL chain to initialize
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509_crl_init(mbedtls_x509_crl *crl);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Unallocate all CRL data
+ *
+ * \param crl CRL chain to free
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509_crl_free(mbedtls_x509_crl *crl);
+
+/** \} name Structures and functions for parsing CRLs */
+/** \} addtogroup x509_module */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* mbedtls_x509_crl.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b96039
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_crt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1208 @@
+/**
+ * \file x509_crt.h
+ *
+ * \brief X.509 certificate parsing and writing
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
+#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h"
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+
+/**
+ * \addtogroup x509_module
+ * \{
+ */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \name Structures and functions for parsing and writing X.509 certificates
+ * \{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Container for an X.509 certificate. The certificate may be chained.
+ *
+ * Some fields of this structure are publicly readable. Do not modify
+ * them except via Mbed TLS library functions: the effect of modifying
+ * those fields or the data that those fields points to is unspecified.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt {
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_buffer); /**< Indicates if \c raw is owned
+ * by the structure or not. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw certificate data (DER). */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf tbs; /**< The raw certificate body (DER). The part that is To Be Signed. */
+
+ int version; /**< The X.509 version. (1=v1, 2=v2, 3=v3) */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf serial; /**< Unique id for certificate issued by a specific CA. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid; /**< Signature algorithm, e.g. sha1RSA */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_raw; /**< The raw issuer data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf subject_raw; /**< The raw subject data (DER). Used for quick comparison. */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_name issuer; /**< The parsed issuer data (named information object). */
+ mbedtls_x509_name subject; /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_time valid_from; /**< Start time of certificate validity. */
+ mbedtls_x509_time valid_to; /**< End time of certificate validity. */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_buf pk_raw;
+ mbedtls_pk_context pk; /**< Container for the public key context. */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_buf issuer_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 issuer unique identifier. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf subject_id; /**< Optional X.509 v2/v3 subject unique identifier. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf v3_ext; /**< Optional X.509 v3 extensions. */
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names; /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension. These can be later parsed by mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name. */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf subject_key_id; /**< Optional X.509 v3 extension subject key identifier. */
+ mbedtls_x509_authority authority_key_id; /**< Optional X.509 v3 extension authority key identifier. */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence certificate_policies; /**< Optional list of certificate policies (Only anyPolicy is printed and enforced, however the rest of the policies are still listed). */
+
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ext_types); /**< Bit string containing detected and parsed extensions */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_istrue); /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: 1 if this certificate belongs to a CA, 0 otherwise. */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_pathlen); /**< Optional Basic Constraint extension value: The maximum path length to the root certificate. Path length is 1 higher than RFC 5280 'meaning', so 1+ */
+
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_usage); /**< Optional key usage extension value: See the values in x509.h */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence ext_key_usage; /**< Optional list of extended key usage OIDs. */
+
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ns_cert_type); /**< Optional Netscape certificate type extension value: See the values in x509.h */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig); /**< Signature: hash of the tbs part signed with the private key. */
+ mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_md); /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk); /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_opts); /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */
+
+ /** Next certificate in the linked list that constitutes the CA chain.
+ * \p NULL indicates the end of the list.
+ * Do not modify this field directly. */
+ struct mbedtls_x509_crt *next;
+}
+mbedtls_x509_crt;
+
+/**
+ * Build flag from an algorithm/curve identifier (pk, md, ecp)
+ * Since 0 is always XXX_NONE, ignore it.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG(id) (1 << ((id) - 1))
+
+/**
+ * Security profile for certificate verification.
+ *
+ * All lists are bitfields, built by ORing flags from MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG().
+ *
+ * The fields of this structure are part of the public API and can be
+ * manipulated directly by applications. Future versions of the library may
+ * add extra fields or reorder existing fields.
+ *
+ * You can create custom profiles by starting from a copy of
+ * an existing profile, such as mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default or
+ * mbedtls_x509_ctr_profile_none and then tune it to your needs.
+ *
+ * For example to allow SHA-224 in addition to the default:
+ *
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_profile my_profile = mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default;
+ * my_profile.allowed_mds |= MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 );
+ *
+ * Or to allow only RSA-3072+ with SHA-256:
+ *
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_profile my_profile = mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_none;
+ * my_profile.allowed_mds = MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 );
+ * my_profile.allowed_pks = MBEDTLS_X509_ID_FLAG( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA );
+ * my_profile.rsa_min_bitlen = 3072;
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509_crt_profile {
+ uint32_t allowed_mds; /**< MDs for signatures */
+ uint32_t allowed_pks; /**< PK algs for public keys;
+ * this applies to all certificates
+ * in the provided chain. */
+ uint32_t allowed_curves; /**< Elliptic curves for ECDSA */
+ uint32_t rsa_min_bitlen; /**< Minimum size for RSA keys */
+}
+mbedtls_x509_crt_profile;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1 0
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 1
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3 2
+
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN 20
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN 15
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN)
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_FILE_PATH_LEN 512
+#endif
+
+/* This macro unfolds to the concatenation of macro invocations
+ * X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO( error code,
+ * error code as string,
+ * human readable description )
+ * where X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO is defined by the user.
+ * See x509_crt.c for an example of how to use this. */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO_LIST \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXPIRED", \
+ "The certificate validity has expired") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_REVOKED", \
+ "The certificate has been revoked (is on a CRL)") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH", \
+ "The certificate Common Name (CN) does not match with the expected CN") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED", \
+ "The certificate is not correctly signed by the trusted CA") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED", \
+ "The CRL is not correctly signed by the trusted CA") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_EXPIRED", \
+ "The CRL is expired") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING", \
+ "Certificate was missing") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY", \
+ "Certificate verification was skipped") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_OTHER", \
+ "Other reason (can be used by verify callback)") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_FUTURE", \
+ "The certificate validity starts in the future") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_FUTURE", \
+ "The CRL is from the future") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_KEY_USAGE", \
+ "Usage does not match the keyUsage extension") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_EXT_KEY_USAGE", \
+ "Usage does not match the extendedKeyUsage extension") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NS_CERT_TYPE", \
+ "Usage does not match the nsCertType extension") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_MD", \
+ "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable hash.") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK", \
+ "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA).") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY", \
+ "The certificate is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short).") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_MD", \
+ "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable hash.") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_PK", \
+ "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable PK alg (eg RSA vs ECDSA).") \
+ X509_CRT_ERROR_INFO(MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY, \
+ "MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_BAD_KEY", \
+ "The CRL is signed with an unacceptable key (eg bad curve, RSA too short).")
+
+/**
+ * Container for writing a certificate (CRT)
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_cert {
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(version);
+ unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial)[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN];
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(serial_len);
+ mbedtls_pk_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject_key);
+ mbedtls_pk_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer_key);
+ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject);
+ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(issuer);
+ mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_alg);
+ char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(not_before)[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1];
+ char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(not_after)[MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_UTC_TIME_LEN + 1];
+ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(extensions);
+}
+mbedtls_x509write_cert;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set Subject Alternative Name
+ *
+ * \param ctx Certificate context to use
+ * \param san_list List of SAN values
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ *
+ * \note "dnsName", "uniformResourceIdentifier", "IP address",
+ * "otherName", and "DirectoryName", as defined in RFC 5280,
+ * are supported.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_alternative_name(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list);
+
+/**
+ * Item in a verification chain: cert and flags for it
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(crt);
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags);
+} mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item;
+
+/**
+ * Max size of verification chain: end-entity + intermediates + trusted root
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE (MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA + 2)
+
+/**
+ * Verification chain as built by \c mbedtls_crt_verify_chain()
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(items)[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE];
+ unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
+ /* This stores the list of potential trusted signers obtained from
+ * the CA callback used for the CRT verification, if configured.
+ * We must track it somewhere because the callback passes its
+ * ownership to the caller. */
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(trust_ca_cb_result);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
+} mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Context for resuming X.509 verify operations
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /* for check_signature() */
+ mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk);
+
+ /* for find_parent_in() */
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(parent); /* non-null iff parent_in in progress */
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(fallback_parent);
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(fallback_signature_is_good);
+
+ /* for find_parent() */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(parent_is_trusted); /* -1 if find_parent is not in progress */
+
+ /* for verify_chain() */
+ enum {
+ x509_crt_rs_none,
+ x509_crt_rs_find_parent,
+ } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_progress); /* none if no operation is in progress */
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(self_cnt);
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ver_chain);
+
+} mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+/* Now we can declare functions that take a pointer to that */
+typedef void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx;
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
+/**
+ * Default security profile. Should provide a good balance between security
+ * and compatibility with current deployments.
+ *
+ * This profile permits:
+ * - SHA2 hashes with at least 256 bits: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512.
+ * - Elliptic curves with 255 bits and above except secp256k1.
+ * - RSA with 2048 bits and above.
+ *
+ * New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this profile, for example if
+ * new algorithms are added to the library. New minor versions of Mbed TLS will
+ * not reduce this profile unless serious security concerns require it.
+ */
+extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default;
+
+/**
+ * Expected next default profile. Recommended for new deployments.
+ * Currently targets a 128-bit security level, except for allowing RSA-2048.
+ * This profile may change at any time.
+ */
+extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_next;
+
+/**
+ * NSA Suite B profile.
+ */
+extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_suiteb;
+
+/**
+ * Empty profile that allows nothing. Useful as a basis for constructing
+ * custom profiles.
+ */
+extern const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_none;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it
+ * to the end of the provided chained list.
+ *
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to.
+ * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point
+ * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_init().
+ * \param buf The buffer holding the DER encoded certificate.
+ * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf.
+ *
+ * \note This function makes an internal copy of the CRT buffer
+ * \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed or reused
+ * after this call returns. To avoid duplicating the CRT
+ * buffer (at the cost of stricter lifetime constraints),
+ * use mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy() instead.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief The type of certificate extension callbacks.
+ *
+ * Callbacks of this type are passed to and used by the
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() routine when
+ * it encounters either an unsupported extension or a
+ * "certificate policies" extension containing any
+ * unsupported certificate policies.
+ * Future versions of the library may invoke the callback
+ * in other cases, if and when the need arises.
+ *
+ * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback.
+ * \param crt The certificate being parsed.
+ * \param oid The OID of the extension.
+ * \param critical Whether the extension is critical.
+ * \param p Pointer to the start of the extension value
+ * (the content of the OCTET STRING).
+ * \param end End of extension value.
+ *
+ * \note The callback must fail and return a negative error code
+ * if it can not parse or does not support the extension.
+ * When the callback fails to parse a critical extension
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() also fails.
+ * When the callback fails to parse a non critical extension
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() simply skips
+ * the extension and continues parsing.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t)(void *p_ctx,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt const *crt,
+ mbedtls_x509_buf const *oid,
+ int critical,
+ const unsigned char *p,
+ const unsigned char *end);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it
+ * to the end of the provided chained list.
+ *
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to.
+ * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point
+ * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_init().
+ * \param buf The buffer holding the DER encoded certificate.
+ * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf.
+ * \param make_copy When not zero this function makes an internal copy of the
+ * CRT buffer \p buf. In particular, \p buf may be destroyed
+ * or reused after this call returns.
+ * When zero this function avoids duplicating the CRT buffer
+ * by taking temporary ownership thereof until the CRT
+ * is destroyed (like mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy())
+ * \param cb A callback invoked for every unsupported certificate
+ * extension.
+ * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback.
+ *
+ * \note This call is functionally equivalent to
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(), and/or
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy()
+ * but it calls the callback with every unsupported
+ * certificate extension and additionally the
+ * "certificate policies" extension if it contains any
+ * unsupported certificate policies.
+ * The callback must return a negative error code if it
+ * does not know how to handle such an extension.
+ * When the callback fails to parse a critical extension
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() also fails.
+ * When the callback fails to parse a non critical extension
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb() simply skips
+ * the extension and continues parsing.
+ * Future versions of the library may invoke the callback
+ * in other cases, if and when the need arises.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_with_ext_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen,
+ int make_copy,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_ext_cb_t cb,
+ void *p_ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Parse a single DER formatted certificate and add it
+ * to the end of the provided chained list. This is a
+ * variant of mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der() which takes
+ * temporary ownership of the CRT buffer until the CRT
+ * is destroyed.
+ *
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * \param chain The pointer to the start of the CRT chain to attach to.
+ * When parsing the first CRT in a chain, this should point
+ * to an instance of ::mbedtls_x509_crt initialized through
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_init().
+ * \param buf The address of the readable buffer holding the DER encoded
+ * certificate to use. On success, this buffer must be
+ * retained and not be changed for the lifetime of the
+ * CRT chain \p chain, that is, until \p chain is destroyed
+ * through a call to mbedtls_x509_crt_free().
+ * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buf.
+ *
+ * \note This call is functionally equivalent to
+ * mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(), but it avoids creating a
+ * copy of the input buffer at the cost of stronger lifetime
+ * constraints. This is useful in constrained environments
+ * where duplication of the CRT cannot be tolerated.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der_nocopy(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Parse one DER-encoded or one or more concatenated PEM-encoded
+ * certificates and add them to the chained list.
+ *
+ * For CRTs in PEM encoding, the function parses permissively:
+ * if at least one certificate can be parsed, the function
+ * returns the number of certificates for which parsing failed
+ * (hence \c 0 if all certificates were parsed successfully).
+ * If no certificate could be parsed, the function returns
+ * the first (negative) error encountered during parsing.
+ *
+ * PEM encoded certificates may be interleaved by other data
+ * such as human readable descriptions of their content, as
+ * long as the certificates are enclosed in the PEM specific
+ * '-----{BEGIN/END} CERTIFICATE-----' delimiters.
+ *
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * \param chain The chain to which to add the parsed certificates.
+ * \param buf The buffer holding the certificate data in PEM or DER format.
+ * For certificates in PEM encoding, this may be a concatenation
+ * of multiple certificates; for DER encoding, the buffer must
+ * comprise exactly one certificate.
+ * \param buflen The size of \p buf, including the terminating \c NULL byte
+ * in case of PEM encoded data.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if all certificates were parsed successfully.
+ * \return The (positive) number of certificates that couldn't
+ * be parsed if parsing was partly successful (see above).
+ * \return A negative X509 or PEM error code otherwise.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+/**
+ * \brief Load one or more certificates and add them
+ * to the chained list. Parses permissively. If some
+ * certificates can be parsed, the result is the number
+ * of failed certificates it encountered. If none complete
+ * correctly, the first error is returned.
+ *
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * \param chain points to the start of the chain
+ * \param path filename to read the certificates from
+ *
+ * \return 0 if all certificates parsed successfully, a positive number
+ * if partly successful or a specific X509 or PEM error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Load one or more certificate files from a path and add them
+ * to the chained list. Parses permissively. If some
+ * certificates can be parsed, the result is the number
+ * of failed certificates it encountered. If none complete
+ * correctly, the first error is returned.
+ *
+ * \param chain points to the start of the chain
+ * \param path directory / folder to read the certificate files from
+ *
+ * \return 0 if all certificates parsed successfully, a positive number
+ * if partly successful or a specific X509 or PEM error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_path(mbedtls_x509_crt *chain, const char *path);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
+/**
+ * \brief Returns an informational string about the
+ * certificate.
+ *
+ * \param buf Buffer to write to
+ * \param size Maximum size of buffer
+ * \param prefix A line prefix
+ * \param crt The X509 certificate to represent
+ *
+ * \return The length of the string written (not including the
+ * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Returns an informational string about the
+ * verification status of a certificate.
+ *
+ * \param buf Buffer to write to
+ * \param size Maximum size of buffer
+ * \param prefix A line prefix
+ * \param flags Verification flags created by mbedtls_x509_crt_verify()
+ *
+ * \return The length of the string written (not including the
+ * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
+ uint32_t flags);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Verify a chain of certificates.
+ *
+ * The verify callback is a user-supplied callback that
+ * can clear / modify / add flags for a certificate. If set,
+ * the verification callback is called for each
+ * certificate in the chain (from the trust-ca down to the
+ * presented crt). The parameters for the callback are:
+ * (void *parameter, mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, int certificate_depth,
+ * int *flags). With the flags representing current flags for
+ * that specific certificate and the certificate depth from
+ * the bottom (Peer cert depth = 0).
+ *
+ * All flags left after returning from the callback
+ * are also returned to the application. The function should
+ * return 0 for anything (including invalid certificates)
+ * other than fatal error, as a non-zero return code
+ * immediately aborts the verification process. For fatal
+ * errors, a specific error code should be used (different
+ * from MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED which should not
+ * be returned at this point), or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR
+ * can be used if no better code is available.
+ *
+ * \note In case verification failed, the results can be displayed
+ * using \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_info()
+ *
+ * \note Same as \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile() with the
+ * default security profile.
+ *
+ * \note It is your responsibility to provide up-to-date CRLs for
+ * all trusted CAs. If no CRL is provided for the CA that was
+ * used to sign the certificate, CRL verification is skipped
+ * silently, that is *without* setting any flag.
+ *
+ * \note The \c trust_ca list can contain two types of certificates:
+ * (1) those of trusted root CAs, so that certificates
+ * chaining up to those CAs will be trusted, and (2)
+ * self-signed end-entity certificates to be trusted (for
+ * specific peers you know) - in that case, the self-signed
+ * certificate doesn't need to have the CA bit set.
+ *
+ * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified.
+ * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs.
+ * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs.
+ * \param cn The expected Common Name. This will be checked to be
+ * present in the certificate's subjectAltNames extension or,
+ * if this extension is absent, as a CN component in its
+ * Subject name. DNS names and IP addresses are fully
+ * supported, while the URI subtype is partially supported:
+ * only exact matching, without any normalization procedures
+ * described in 7.4 of RFC5280, will result in a positive
+ * URI verification.
+ * This may be \c NULL if the CN need not be verified.
+ * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification.
+ * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is
+ * set to (uint32_t) -1.
+ * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation
+ * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information.
+ * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the chain is valid with respect to the
+ * passed CN, CAs, CRLs and security profile.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED in case the
+ * certificate chain verification failed. In this case,
+ * \c *flags will have one or more
+ * \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX
+ * flags set.
+ * \return Another negative error code in case of a fatal error
+ * encountered during the verification process.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
+ const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
+ void *p_vrfy);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Verify a chain of certificates with respect to
+ * a configurable security profile.
+ *
+ * \note Same as \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(), but with explicit
+ * security profile.
+ *
+ * \note The restrictions on keys (RSA minimum size, allowed curves
+ * for ECDSA) apply to all certificates: trusted root,
+ * intermediate CAs if any, and end entity certificate.
+ *
+ * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified.
+ * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs.
+ * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs.
+ * \param profile The security profile to use for the verification.
+ * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the
+ * CN need not be verified.
+ * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification.
+ * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is
+ * set to (uint32_t) -1.
+ * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation
+ * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information.
+ * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if the chain is valid with respect to the
+ * passed CN, CAs, CRLs and security profile.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED in case the
+ * certificate chain verification failed. In this case,
+ * \c *flags will have one or more
+ * \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX or \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX
+ * flags set.
+ * \return Another negative error code in case of a fatal error
+ * encountered during the verification process.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
+ const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
+ void *p_vrfy);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Restartable version of \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile()
+ *
+ * \note Performs the same job as \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile()
+ * but can return early and restart according to the limit
+ * set with \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops() to reduce blocking.
+ *
+ * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified.
+ * \param trust_ca The list of trusted CAs.
+ * \param ca_crl The list of CRLs for trusted CAs.
+ * \param profile The security profile to use for the verification.
+ * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the
+ * CN need not be verified.
+ * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification.
+ * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is
+ * set to (uint32_t) -1.
+ * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation
+ * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information.
+ * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy.
+ * \param rs_ctx The restart context to use. This may be set to \c NULL
+ * to disable restartable ECC.
+ *
+ * \return See \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile(), or
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS if maximum number of
+ * operations was reached: see \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops().
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
+ mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
+ const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
+ void *p_vrfy,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief The type of trusted certificate callbacks.
+ *
+ * Callbacks of this type are passed to and used by the CRT
+ * verification routine mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb()
+ * when looking for trusted signers of a given certificate.
+ *
+ * On success, the callback returns a list of trusted
+ * certificates to be considered as potential signers
+ * for the input certificate.
+ *
+ * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback.
+ * \param child The certificate for which to search a potential signer.
+ * This will point to a readable certificate.
+ * \param candidate_cas The address at which to store the address of the first
+ * entry in the generated linked list of candidate signers.
+ * This will not be \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \note The callback must only return a non-zero value on a
+ * fatal error. If, in contrast, the search for a potential
+ * signer completes without a single candidate, the
+ * callback must return \c 0 and set \c *candidate_cas
+ * to \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, \c *candidate_cas points
+ * to a heap-allocated linked list of instances of
+ * ::mbedtls_x509_crt, and ownership of this list is passed
+ * to the caller.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t)(void *p_ctx,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt const *child,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt **candidate_cas);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
+/**
+ * \brief Version of \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile() which
+ * uses a callback to acquire the list of trusted CA
+ * certificates.
+ *
+ * \param crt The certificate chain to be verified.
+ * \param f_ca_cb The callback to be used to query for potential signers
+ * of a given child certificate. See the documentation of
+ * ::mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t for more information.
+ * \param p_ca_cb The opaque context to be passed to \p f_ca_cb.
+ * \param profile The security profile for the verification.
+ * \param cn The expected Common Name. This may be \c NULL if the
+ * CN need not be verified.
+ * \param flags The address at which to store the result of the verification.
+ * If the verification couldn't be completed, the flag value is
+ * set to (uint32_t) -1.
+ * \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use. See the documentation
+ * of mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for more information.
+ * \param p_vrfy The context to be passed to \p f_vrfy.
+ *
+ * \return See \c mbedtls_crt_verify_with_profile().
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_ca_cb(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,
+ void *p_ca_cb,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
+ const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
+ int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
+ void *p_vrfy);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Check usage of certificate against keyUsage extension.
+ *
+ * \param crt Leaf certificate used.
+ * \param usage Intended usage(s) (eg MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT
+ * before using the certificate to perform an RSA key
+ * exchange).
+ *
+ * \note Except for decipherOnly and encipherOnly, a bit set in the
+ * usage argument means this bit MUST be set in the
+ * certificate. For decipherOnly and encipherOnly, it means
+ * that bit MAY be set.
+ *
+ * \return 0 is these uses of the certificate are allowed,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the keyUsage extension
+ * is present but does not match the usage argument.
+ *
+ * \note You should only call this function on leaf certificates, on
+ * (intermediate) CAs the keyUsage extension is automatically
+ * checked by \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify().
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+ unsigned int usage);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Check usage of certificate against extendedKeyUsage.
+ *
+ * \param crt Leaf certificate used.
+ * \param usage_oid Intended usage (eg MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH or
+ * MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH).
+ * \param usage_len Length of usage_oid (eg given by MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE()).
+ *
+ * \return 0 if this use of the certificate is allowed,
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA if not.
+ *
+ * \note Usually only makes sense on leaf certificates.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_check_extended_key_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
+ const char *usage_oid,
+ size_t usage_len);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Verify the certificate revocation status
+ *
+ * \param crt a certificate to be verified
+ * \param crl the CRL to verify against
+ *
+ * \return 1 if the certificate is revoked, 0 otherwise
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_is_revoked(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, const mbedtls_x509_crl *crl);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a certificate (chain)
+ *
+ * \param crt Certificate chain to initialize
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509_crt_init(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Unallocate all certificate data
+ *
+ * \param crt Certificate chain to free
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509_crt_free(mbedtls_x509_crt *crt);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a restart context
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init(mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free the components of a restart context
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free(mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Query certificate for given extension type
+ *
+ * \param[in] ctx Certificate context to be queried, must not be \c NULL
+ * \param ext_type Extension type being queried for, must be a valid
+ * extension type. Must be one of the MBEDTLS_X509_EXT_XXX
+ * values
+ *
+ * \return 0 if the given extension type is not present,
+ * non-zero otherwise
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_x509_crt_has_ext_type(const mbedtls_x509_crt *ctx,
+ int ext_type)
+{
+ return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ext_types) & ext_type;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Access the ca_istrue field
+ *
+ * \param[in] crt Certificate to be queried, must not be \c NULL
+ *
+ * \return \c 1 if this a CA certificate \c 0 otherwise.
+ * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS if the certificate does not contain
+ * the Optional Basic Constraint extension.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_crt_get_ca_istrue(const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt);
+
+/** \} name Structures and functions for parsing and writing X.509 certificates */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a CRT writing context
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to initialize
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the version for a Certificate
+ * Default: MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param version version to set (MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_1, MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_2 or
+ * MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_VERSION_3)
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_version(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, int version);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the serial number for a Certificate.
+ *
+ * \deprecated This function is deprecated and will be removed in a
+ * future version of the library. Please use
+ * mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw() instead.
+ *
+ * \note Even though the MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C guard looks redundant since
+ * X509 depends on PK and PK depends on BIGNUM, this emphasizes
+ * a direct dependency between X509 and BIGNUM which is going
+ * to be deprecated in the future.
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param serial serial number to set
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ */
+int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial(
+ mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const mbedtls_mpi *serial);
+#endif // MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the serial number for a Certificate.
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param serial A raw array of bytes containing the serial number in big
+ * endian format
+ * \param serial_len Length of valid bytes (expressed in bytes) in \p serial
+ * input buffer
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the provided input buffer
+ * is too big (longer than MBEDTLS_X509_RFC5280_MAX_SERIAL_LEN)
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_serial_raw(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
+ unsigned char *serial, size_t serial_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the validity period for a Certificate
+ * Timestamps should be in string format for UTC timezone
+ * i.e. "YYYYMMDDhhmmss"
+ * e.g. "20131231235959" for December 31st 2013
+ * at 23:59:59
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param not_before not_before timestamp
+ * \param not_after not_after timestamp
+ *
+ * \return 0 if timestamp was parsed successfully, or
+ * a specific error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_validity(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, const char *not_before,
+ const char *not_after);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the issuer name for a Certificate
+ * Issuer names should contain a comma-separated list
+ * of OID types and values:
+ * e.g. "C=UK,O=ARM,CN=Mbed TLS CA"
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param issuer_name issuer name to set
+ *
+ * \return 0 if issuer name was parsed successfully, or
+ * a specific error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_name(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
+ const char *issuer_name);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the subject name for a Certificate
+ * Subject names should contain a comma-separated list
+ * of OID types and values:
+ * e.g. "C=UK,O=ARM,CN=Mbed TLS Server 1"
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param subject_name subject name to set
+ *
+ * \return 0 if subject name was parsed successfully, or
+ * a specific error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_name(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
+ const char *subject_name);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the subject public key for the certificate
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param key public key to include
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the issuer key used for signing the certificate
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param key private key to sign with
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the MD algorithm to use for the signature
+ * (e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1)
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param md_alg MD algorithm to use
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_md_alg(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Generic function to add to or replace an extension in the
+ * CRT
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param oid OID of the extension
+ * \param oid_len length of the OID
+ * \param critical if the extension is critical (per the RFC's definition)
+ * \param val value of the extension OCTET STRING
+ * \param val_len length of the value data
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_extension(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
+ const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
+ int critical,
+ const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the basicConstraints extension for a CRT
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param is_ca is this a CA certificate
+ * \param max_pathlen maximum length of certificate chains below this
+ * certificate (only for CA certificates, -1 is
+ * unlimited)
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_basic_constraints(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
+ int is_ca, int max_pathlen);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
+/**
+ * \brief Set the subjectKeyIdentifier extension for a CRT
+ * Requires that mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key() has been
+ * called before
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_subject_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the authorityKeyIdentifier extension for a CRT
+ * Requires that mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_issuer_key() has been
+ * called before
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_authority_key_identifier(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the Key Usage Extension flags
+ * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param key_usage key usage flags to set
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
+ unsigned int key_usage);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the Extended Key Usage Extension
+ * (e.g. MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH)
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param exts extended key usage extensions to set, a sequence of
+ * MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID objects
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ext_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_asn1_sequence *exts);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the Netscape Cert Type flags
+ * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT | MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL)
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to use
+ * \param ns_cert_type Netscape Cert Type flags to set
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_set_ns_cert_type(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx,
+ unsigned char ns_cert_type);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free the contents of a CRT write context
+ *
+ * \param ctx CRT context to free
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509write_crt_free(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write a built up certificate to a X509 DER structure
+ * Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the
+ * return value to determine where you should start
+ * using the buffer
+ *
+ * \param ctx certificate to write away
+ * \param buf buffer to write to
+ * \param size size of the buffer
+ * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
+ *
+ * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific
+ * error code
+ *
+ * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_der(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Write a built up certificate to a X509 PEM string
+ *
+ * \param ctx certificate to write away
+ * \param buf buffer to write to
+ * \param size size of the buffer
+ * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code
+ *
+ * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_crt_pem(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C */
+
+/** \} addtogroup x509_module */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* mbedtls_x509_crt.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4bd7f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/mbedtls/x509_csr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
+/**
+ * \file x509_csr.h
+ *
+ * \brief X.509 certificate signing request parsing and writing
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H
+#define MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \addtogroup x509_module
+ * \{ */
+
+/**
+ * \name Structures and functions for X.509 Certificate Signing Requests (CSR)
+ * \{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Certificate Signing Request (CSR) structure.
+ *
+ * Some fields of this structure are publicly readable. Do not modify
+ * them except via Mbed TLS library functions: the effect of modifying
+ * those fields or the data that those fields point to is unspecified.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509_csr {
+ mbedtls_x509_buf raw; /**< The raw CSR data (DER). */
+ mbedtls_x509_buf cri; /**< The raw CertificateRequestInfo body (DER). */
+
+ int version; /**< CSR version (1=v1). */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_buf subject_raw; /**< The raw subject data (DER). */
+ mbedtls_x509_name subject; /**< The parsed subject data (named information object). */
+
+ mbedtls_pk_context pk; /**< Container for the public key context. */
+
+ unsigned int key_usage; /**< Optional key usage extension value: See the values in x509.h */
+ unsigned char ns_cert_type; /**< Optional Netscape certificate type extension value: See the values in x509.h */
+ mbedtls_x509_sequence subject_alt_names; /**< Optional list of raw entries of Subject Alternative Names extension. These can be later parsed by mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name. */
+
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ext_types); /**< Bit string containing detected and parsed extensions */
+
+ mbedtls_x509_buf sig_oid;
+ mbedtls_x509_buf MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig);
+ mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_md); /**< Internal representation of the MD algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 */
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_pk); /**< Internal representation of the Public Key algorithm of the signature algorithm, e.g. MBEDTLS_PK_RSA */
+ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_opts); /**< Signature options to be passed to mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(), e.g. for RSASSA-PSS */
+}
+mbedtls_x509_csr;
+
+/**
+ * Container for writing a CSR
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_x509write_csr {
+ mbedtls_pk_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key);
+ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(subject);
+ mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_alg);
+ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(extensions);
+}
+mbedtls_x509write_csr;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in DER format
+ *
+ * \note Any unsupported requested extensions are silently
+ * ignored, unless the critical flag is set, in which case
+ * the CSR is rejected.
+ *
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * \param csr CSR context to fill
+ * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data
+ * \param buflen size of the buffer
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief The type of certificate extension callbacks.
+ *
+ * Callbacks of this type are passed to and used by the
+ * mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_with_ext_cb() routine when
+ * it encounters either an unsupported extension.
+ * Future versions of the library may invoke the callback
+ * in other cases, if and when the need arises.
+ *
+ * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback.
+ * \param csr The CSR being parsed.
+ * \param oid The OID of the extension.
+ * \param critical Whether the extension is critical.
+ * \param p Pointer to the start of the extension value
+ * (the content of the OCTET STRING).
+ * \param end End of extension value.
+ *
+ * \note The callback must fail and return a negative error code
+ * if it can not parse or does not support the extension.
+ * When the callback fails to parse a critical extension
+ * mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_with_ext_cb() also fails.
+ * When the callback fails to parse a non critical extension
+ * mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_with_ext_cb() simply skips
+ * the extension and continues parsing.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative error code on failure.
+ */
+typedef int (*mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t)(void *p_ctx,
+ mbedtls_x509_csr const *csr,
+ mbedtls_x509_buf const *oid,
+ int critical,
+ const unsigned char *p,
+ const unsigned char *end);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR) in DER format
+ *
+ * \note Any unsupported requested extensions are silently
+ * ignored, unless the critical flag is set, in which case
+ * the result of the callback function decides whether
+ * CSR is rejected.
+ *
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * \param csr CSR context to fill
+ * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data
+ * \param buflen size of the buffer
+ * \param cb A callback invoked for every unsupported certificate
+ * extension.
+ * \param p_ctx An opaque context passed to the callback.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der_with_ext_cb(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen,
+ mbedtls_x509_csr_ext_cb_t cb,
+ void *p_ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR), DER or PEM format
+ *
+ * \note See notes for \c mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_der()
+ *
+ * \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
+ * subsystem must have been initialized by calling
+ * psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * \param csr CSR context to fill
+ * \param buf buffer holding the CRL data
+ * \param buflen size of the buffer
+ * (including the terminating null byte for PEM data)
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+/**
+ * \brief Load a Certificate Signing Request (CSR)
+ *
+ * \note See notes for \c mbedtls_x509_csr_parse()
+ *
+ * \param csr CSR context to fill
+ * \param path filename to read the CSR from
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific X509 or PEM error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_csr_parse_file(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr, const char *path);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
+/**
+ * \brief Returns an informational string about the
+ * CSR.
+ *
+ * \param buf Buffer to write to
+ * \param size Maximum size of buffer
+ * \param prefix A line prefix
+ * \param csr The X509 CSR to represent
+ *
+ * \return The length of the string written (not including the
+ * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509_csr_info(char *buf, size_t size, const char *prefix,
+ const mbedtls_x509_csr *csr);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a CSR
+ *
+ * \param csr CSR to initialize
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509_csr_init(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Unallocate all CSR data
+ *
+ * \param csr CSR to free
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509_csr_free(mbedtls_x509_csr *csr);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C */
+
+/** \} name Structures and functions for X.509 Certificate Signing Requests (CSR) */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a CSR context
+ *
+ * \param ctx CSR context to initialize
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509write_csr_init(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the subject name for a CSR
+ * Subject names should contain a comma-separated list
+ * of OID types and values:
+ * e.g. "C=UK,O=ARM,CN=Mbed TLS Server 1"
+ *
+ * \param ctx CSR context to use
+ * \param subject_name subject name to set
+ *
+ * \return 0 if subject name was parsed successfully, or
+ * a specific error code
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_name(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx,
+ const char *subject_name);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the key for a CSR (public key will be included,
+ * private key used to sign the CSR when writing it)
+ *
+ * \param ctx CSR context to use
+ * \param key Asymmetric key to include
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_pk_context *key);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the MD algorithm to use for the signature
+ * (e.g. MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1)
+ *
+ * \param ctx CSR context to use
+ * \param md_alg MD algorithm to use
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_md_alg(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the Key Usage Extension flags
+ * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | MBEDTLS_X509_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)
+ *
+ * \param ctx CSR context to use
+ * \param key_usage key usage flags to set
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ *
+ * \note The <code>decipherOnly</code> flag from the Key Usage
+ * extension is represented by bit 8 (i.e.
+ * <code>0x8000</code>), which cannot typically be represented
+ * in an unsigned char. Therefore, the flag
+ * <code>decipherOnly</code> (i.e.
+ * #MBEDTLS_X509_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY) cannot be set using this
+ * function.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_key_usage(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char key_usage);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set Subject Alternative Name
+ *
+ * \param ctx CSR context to use
+ * \param san_list List of SAN values
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ *
+ * \note Only "dnsName", "uniformResourceIdentifier" and "otherName",
+ * as defined in RFC 5280, are supported.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_subject_alternative_name(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the Netscape Cert Type flags
+ * (e.g. MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CLIENT | MBEDTLS_X509_NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL)
+ *
+ * \param ctx CSR context to use
+ * \param ns_cert_type Netscape Cert Type flags to set
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_ns_cert_type(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx,
+ unsigned char ns_cert_type);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Generic function to add to or replace an extension in the
+ * CSR
+ *
+ * \param ctx CSR context to use
+ * \param oid OID of the extension
+ * \param oid_len length of the OID
+ * \param critical Set to 1 to mark the extension as critical, 0 otherwise.
+ * \param val value of the extension OCTET STRING
+ * \param val_len length of the value data
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_csr_set_extension(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx,
+ const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
+ int critical,
+ const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free the contents of a CSR context
+ *
+ * \param ctx CSR context to free
+ */
+void mbedtls_x509write_csr_free(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Write a CSR (Certificate Signing Request) to a
+ * DER structure
+ * Note: data is written at the end of the buffer! Use the
+ * return value to determine where you should start
+ * using the buffer
+ *
+ * \param ctx CSR to write away
+ * \param buf buffer to write to
+ * \param size size of the buffer
+ * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
+ *
+ * \return length of data written if successful, or a specific
+ * error code
+ *
+ * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_csr_der(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Write a CSR (Certificate Signing Request) to a
+ * PEM string
+ *
+ * \param ctx CSR to write away
+ * \param buf buffer to write to
+ * \param size size of the buffer
+ * \param f_rng RNG function. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng RNG parameter
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or a specific error code
+ *
+ * \note \p f_rng is used for the signature operation.
+ */
+int mbedtls_x509write_csr_pem(mbedtls_x509write_csr *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t size,
+ mbedtls_f_rng_t *f_rng,
+ void *p_rng);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */
+
+/** \} addtogroup x509_module */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* mbedtls_x509_csr.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/build_info.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/build_info.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ee6cd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/build_info.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa/build_info.h
+ *
+ * \brief Build-time PSA configuration info
+ *
+ * Include this file if you need to depend on the
+ * configuration options defined in mbedtls_config.h or MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
+ * in PSA cryptography core specific files.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILD_INFO_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILD_INFO_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILD_INFO_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2fe9f35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto.h
@@ -0,0 +1,4977 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa/crypto.h
+ * \brief Platform Security Architecture cryptography module
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_H
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE)
+#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE
+#else
+#include "crypto_platform.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#ifdef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__
+/* This __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ block contains mock definitions for things that
+ * must be defined in the crypto_platform.h header. These mock definitions
+ * are present in this file as a convenience to generate pretty-printed
+ * documentation that includes those definitions. */
+
+/** \defgroup platform Implementation-specific definitions
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/**@}*/
+#endif /* __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* The file "crypto_types.h" declares types that encode errors,
+ * algorithms, key types, policies, etc. */
+#include "crypto_types.h"
+
+/** \defgroup version API version
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * The major version of this implementation of the PSA Crypto API
+ */
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MAJOR 1
+
+/**
+ * The minor version of this implementation of the PSA Crypto API
+ */
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_API_VERSION_MINOR 0
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/* The file "crypto_values.h" declares macros to build and analyze values
+ * of integral types defined in "crypto_types.h". */
+#include "crypto_values.h"
+
+/* The file "crypto_sizes.h" contains definitions for size calculation
+ * macros whose definitions are implementation-specific. */
+#include "crypto_sizes.h"
+
+/* The file "crypto_struct.h" contains definitions for
+ * implementation-specific structs that are declared above. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_FILE)
+#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_FILE
+#else
+#include "crypto_struct.h"
+#endif
+
+/** \defgroup initialization Library initialization
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Library initialization.
+ *
+ * Applications must call this function before calling any other
+ * function in this module.
+ *
+ * Applications may call this function more than once. Once a call
+ * succeeds, subsequent calls are guaranteed to succeed.
+ *
+ * If the application calls other functions before calling psa_crypto_init(),
+ * the behavior is undefined. Implementations are encouraged to either perform
+ * the operation as if the library had been initialized or to return
+ * #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE or some other applicable error. In particular,
+ * implementations should not return a success status if the lack of
+ * initialization may have security implications, for example due to improper
+ * seeding of the random number generator.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_crypto_init(void);
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \addtogroup attributes
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** \def PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT
+ *
+ * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key attribute structure
+ * of type #psa_key_attributes_t.
+ */
+
+/** Return an initial value for a key attributes structure.
+ */
+static psa_key_attributes_t psa_key_attributes_init(void);
+
+/** Declare a key as persistent and set its key identifier.
+ *
+ * If the attribute structure currently declares the key as volatile (which
+ * is the default content of an attribute structure), this function sets
+ * the lifetime attribute to #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT.
+ *
+ * This function does not access storage, it merely stores the given
+ * value in the structure.
+ * The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute
+ * structure is passed to a key creation function such as
+ * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), psa_generate_key_custom(),
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_key(), psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom()
+ * or psa_copy_key().
+ *
+ * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
+ * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
+ * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once.
+ *
+ * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to.
+ * \param key The persistent identifier for the key.
+ * This can be any value in the range from
+ * #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN to #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX
+ * inclusive.
+ */
+static void psa_set_key_id(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key);
+
+#ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+/** Set the owner identifier of a key.
+ *
+ * When key identifiers encode key owner identifiers, psa_set_key_id() does
+ * not allow to define in key attributes the owner of volatile keys as
+ * psa_set_key_id() enforces the key to be persistent.
+ *
+ * This function allows to set in key attributes the owner identifier of a
+ * key. It is intended to be used for volatile keys. For persistent keys,
+ * it is recommended to use the PSA Cryptography API psa_set_key_id() to define
+ * the owner of a key.
+ *
+ * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to.
+ * \param owner The key owner identifier.
+ */
+static void mbedtls_set_key_owner_id(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner);
+#endif
+
+/** Set the location of a persistent key.
+ *
+ * To make a key persistent, you must give it a persistent key identifier
+ * with psa_set_key_id(). By default, a key that has a persistent identifier
+ * is stored in the default storage area identifier by
+ * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT. Call this function to choose a storage
+ * area, or to explicitly declare the key as volatile.
+ *
+ * This function does not access storage, it merely stores the given
+ * value in the structure.
+ * The persistent key will be written to storage when the attribute
+ * structure is passed to a key creation function such as
+ * psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(), psa_generate_key_custom(),
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_key(), psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom()
+ * or psa_copy_key().
+ *
+ * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
+ * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
+ * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once.
+ *
+ * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to.
+ * \param lifetime The lifetime for the key.
+ * If this is #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE, the
+ * key will be volatile, and the key identifier
+ * attribute is reset to 0.
+ */
+static void psa_set_key_lifetime(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime);
+
+/** Retrieve the key identifier from key attributes.
+ *
+ * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
+ * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
+ * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query.
+ *
+ * \return The persistent identifier stored in the attribute structure.
+ * This value is unspecified if the attribute structure declares
+ * the key as volatile.
+ */
+static mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_get_key_id(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
+
+/** Retrieve the lifetime from key attributes.
+ *
+ * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
+ * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
+ * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query.
+ *
+ * \return The lifetime value stored in the attribute structure.
+ */
+static psa_key_lifetime_t psa_get_key_lifetime(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
+
+/** Declare usage flags for a key.
+ *
+ * Usage flags are part of a key's usage policy. They encode what
+ * kind of operations are permitted on the key. For more details,
+ * refer to the documentation of the type #psa_key_usage_t.
+ *
+ * This function overwrites any usage flags
+ * previously set in \p attributes.
+ *
+ * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
+ * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
+ * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once.
+ *
+ * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to.
+ * \param usage_flags The usage flags to write.
+ */
+static void psa_set_key_usage_flags(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ psa_key_usage_t usage_flags);
+
+/** Retrieve the usage flags from key attributes.
+ *
+ * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
+ * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
+ * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query.
+ *
+ * \return The usage flags stored in the attribute structure.
+ */
+static psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
+
+/** Declare the permitted algorithm policy for a key.
+ *
+ * The permitted algorithm policy of a key encodes which algorithm or
+ * algorithms are permitted to be used with this key. The following
+ * algorithm policies are supported:
+ * - 0 does not allow any cryptographic operation with the key. The key
+ * may be used for non-cryptographic actions such as exporting (if
+ * permitted by the usage flags).
+ * - An algorithm value permits this particular algorithm.
+ * - An algorithm wildcard built from #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH allows the specified
+ * signature scheme with any hash algorithm.
+ * - An algorithm built from #PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC allows
+ * any MAC algorithm from the same base class (e.g. CMAC) which
+ * generates/verifies a MAC length greater than or equal to the length
+ * encoded in the wildcard algorithm.
+ * - An algorithm built from #PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG
+ * allows any AEAD algorithm from the same base class (e.g. CCM) which
+ * generates/verifies a tag length greater than or equal to the length
+ * encoded in the wildcard algorithm.
+ *
+ * This function overwrites any algorithm policy
+ * previously set in \p attributes.
+ *
+ * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
+ * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
+ * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once.
+ *
+ * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to.
+ * \param alg The permitted algorithm policy to write.
+ */
+static void psa_set_key_algorithm(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg);
+
+
+/** Retrieve the algorithm policy from key attributes.
+ *
+ * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
+ * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
+ * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query.
+ *
+ * \return The algorithm stored in the attribute structure.
+ */
+static psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
+
+/** Declare the type of a key.
+ *
+ * This function overwrites any key type
+ * previously set in \p attributes.
+ *
+ * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
+ * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
+ * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once.
+ *
+ * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to.
+ * \param type The key type to write.
+ * If this is 0, the key type in \p attributes
+ * becomes unspecified.
+ */
+static void psa_set_key_type(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ psa_key_type_t type);
+
+
+/** Declare the size of a key.
+ *
+ * This function overwrites any key size previously set in \p attributes.
+ *
+ * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
+ * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
+ * but in this case it must evaluate each of its arguments exactly once.
+ *
+ * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to.
+ * \param bits The key size in bits.
+ * If this is 0, the key size in \p attributes
+ * becomes unspecified. Keys of size 0 are
+ * not supported.
+ */
+static void psa_set_key_bits(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ size_t bits);
+
+/** Retrieve the key type from key attributes.
+ *
+ * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
+ * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
+ * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query.
+ *
+ * \return The key type stored in the attribute structure.
+ */
+static psa_key_type_t psa_get_key_type(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
+
+/** Retrieve the key size from key attributes.
+ *
+ * This function may be declared as `static` (i.e. without external
+ * linkage). This function may be provided as a function-like macro,
+ * but in this case it must evaluate its argument exactly once.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query.
+ *
+ * \return The key size stored in the attribute structure, in bits.
+ */
+static size_t psa_get_key_bits(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
+
+/** Retrieve the attributes of a key.
+ *
+ * This function first resets the attribute structure as with
+ * psa_reset_key_attributes(). It then copies the attributes of
+ * the given key into the given attribute structure.
+ *
+ * \note This function may allocate memory or other resources.
+ * Once you have called this function on an attribute structure,
+ * you must call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free these resources.
+ *
+ * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to query.
+ * \param[in,out] attributes On success, the attributes of the key.
+ * On failure, equivalent to a
+ * freshly-initialized structure.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
+
+/** Reset a key attribute structure to a freshly initialized state.
+ *
+ * You must initialize the attribute structure as described in the
+ * documentation of the type #psa_key_attributes_t before calling this
+ * function. Once the structure has been initialized, you may call this
+ * function at any time.
+ *
+ * This function frees any auxiliary resources that the structure
+ * may contain.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] attributes The attribute structure to reset.
+ */
+void psa_reset_key_attributes(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup key_management Key management
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** Remove non-essential copies of key material from memory.
+ *
+ * If the key identifier designates a volatile key, this functions does not do
+ * anything and returns successfully.
+ *
+ * If the key identifier designates a persistent key, then this function will
+ * free all resources associated with the key in volatile memory. The key
+ * data in persistent storage is not affected and the key can still be used.
+ *
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to purge.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The key material will have been removed from memory if it is not
+ * currently required.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p key is not a valid key identifier.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key);
+
+/** Make a copy of a key.
+ *
+ * Copy key material from one location to another.
+ *
+ * This function is primarily useful to copy a key from one location
+ * to another, since it populates a key using the material from
+ * another key which may have a different lifetime.
+ *
+ * This function may be used to share a key with a different party,
+ * subject to implementation-defined restrictions on key sharing.
+ *
+ * The policy on the source key must have the usage flag
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY set.
+ * This flag is sufficient to permit the copy if the key has the lifetime
+ * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT.
+ * Some secure elements do not provide a way to copy a key without
+ * making it extractable from the secure element. If a key is located
+ * in such a secure element, then the key must have both usage flags
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY and #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT in order to make
+ * a copy of the key outside the secure element.
+ *
+ * The resulting key may only be used in a way that conforms to
+ * both the policy of the original key and the policy specified in
+ * the \p attributes parameter:
+ * - The usage flags on the resulting key are the bitwise-and of the
+ * usage flags on the source policy and the usage flags in \p attributes.
+ * - If both allow the same algorithm or wildcard-based
+ * algorithm policy, the resulting key has the same algorithm policy.
+ * - If either of the policies allows an algorithm and the other policy
+ * allows a wildcard-based algorithm policy that includes this algorithm,
+ * the resulting key allows the same algorithm.
+ * - If the policies do not allow any algorithm in common, this function
+ * fails with the status #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+ *
+ * The effect of this function on implementation-defined attributes is
+ * implementation-defined.
+ *
+ * \param source_key The key to copy. It must allow the usage
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY. If a private or secret key is
+ * being copied outside of a secure element it must
+ * also allow #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT.
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key.
+ * They are used as follows:
+ * - The key type and size may be 0. If either is
+ * nonzero, it must match the corresponding
+ * attribute of the source key.
+ * - The key location (the lifetime and, for
+ * persistent keys, the key identifier) is
+ * used directly.
+ * - The policy constraints (usage flags and
+ * algorithm policy) are combined from
+ * the source key and \p attributes so that
+ * both sets of restrictions apply, as
+ * described in the documentation of this function.
+ * \param[out] target_key On success, an identifier for the newly created
+ * key. For persistent keys, this is the key
+ * identifier defined in \p attributes.
+ * \c 0 on failure.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \p source_key is invalid.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
+ * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is
+ * already a persistent key with the given identifier.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The lifetime or identifier in \p attributes are invalid, or
+ * the policy constraints on the source and specified in
+ * \p attributes are incompatible, or
+ * \p attributes specifies a key type or key size
+ * which does not match the attributes of the source key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The source key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY usage flag, or
+ * the source key is not exportable and its lifetime does not
+ * allow copying it to the target's lifetime.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_copy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *target_key);
+
+
+/**
+ * \brief Destroy a key.
+ *
+ * This function destroys a key from both volatile
+ * memory and, if applicable, non-volatile storage. Implementations shall
+ * make a best effort to ensure that the key material cannot be recovered.
+ *
+ * This function also erases any metadata such as policies and frees
+ * resources associated with the key.
+ *
+ * If a key is currently in use in a multipart operation, then destroying the
+ * key will cause the multipart operation to fail.
+ *
+ * \warning We can only guarantee that the the key material will
+ * eventually be wiped from memory. With threading enabled
+ * and during concurrent execution, copies of the key material may
+ * still exist until all threads have finished using the key.
+ *
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to erase. If this is \c 0, do nothing and
+ * return #PSA_SUCCESS.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \p key was a valid identifier and the key material that it
+ * referred to has been erased. Alternatively, \p key is \c 0.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The key cannot be erased because it is
+ * read-only, either due to a policy or due to physical restrictions.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \p key is not a valid identifier nor \c 0.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * There was a failure in communication with the cryptoprocessor.
+ * The key material may still be present in the cryptoprocessor.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
+ * This error is typically a result of either storage corruption on a
+ * cleartext storage backend, or an attempt to read data that was
+ * written by an incompatible version of the library.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * The storage is corrupted. Implementations shall make a best effort
+ * to erase key material even in this stage, however applications
+ * should be aware that it may be impossible to guarantee that the
+ * key material is not recoverable in such cases.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED
+ * An unexpected condition which is not a storage corruption or
+ * a communication failure occurred. The cryptoprocessor may have
+ * been compromised.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key);
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup import_export Key import and export
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Import a key in binary format.
+ *
+ * This function supports any output from psa_export_key(). Refer to the
+ * documentation of psa_export_public_key() for the format of public keys
+ * and to the documentation of psa_export_key() for the format for
+ * other key types.
+ *
+ * The key data determines the key size. The attributes may optionally
+ * specify a key size; in this case it must match the size determined
+ * from the key data. A key size of 0 in \p attributes indicates that
+ * the key size is solely determined by the key data.
+ *
+ * Implementations must reject an attempt to import a key of size 0.
+ *
+ * This specification supports a single format for each key type.
+ * Implementations may support other formats as long as the standard
+ * format is supported. Implementations that support other formats
+ * should ensure that the formats are clearly unambiguous so as to
+ * minimize the risk that an invalid input is accidentally interpreted
+ * according to a different format.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key.
+ * The key size is always determined from the
+ * \p data buffer.
+ * If the key size in \p attributes is nonzero,
+ * it must be equal to the size from \p data.
+ * \param[out] key On success, an identifier to the newly created key.
+ * For persistent keys, this is the key identifier
+ * defined in \p attributes.
+ * \c 0 on failure.
+ * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data. The content of this
+ * buffer is interpreted according to the type declared
+ * in \p attributes.
+ * All implementations must support at least the format
+ * described in the documentation
+ * of psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() for
+ * the chosen type. Implementations may allow other
+ * formats, but should be conservative: implementations
+ * should err on the side of rejecting content if it
+ * may be erroneous (e.g. wrong type or truncated data).
+ * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata
+ * have been saved to persistent storage.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
+ * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is
+ * already a persistent key with the given identifier.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * The key type or key size is not supported, either by the
+ * implementation in general or in this particular persistent location.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The key attributes, as a whole, are invalid, or
+ * the key data is not correctly formatted, or
+ * the size in \p attributes is nonzero and does not match the size
+ * of the key data.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_import_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *data,
+ size_t data_length,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key);
+
+
+
+/**
+ * \brief Export a key in binary format.
+ *
+ * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to
+ * create an equivalent object.
+ *
+ * If the implementation of psa_import_key() supports other formats
+ * beyond the format specified here, the output from psa_export_key()
+ * must use the representation specified here, not the original
+ * representation.
+ *
+ * For standard key types, the output format is as follows:
+ *
+ * - For symmetric keys (including MAC keys), the format is the
+ * raw bytes of the key.
+ * - For DES, the key data consists of 8 bytes. The parity bits must be
+ * correct.
+ * - For Triple-DES, the format is the concatenation of the
+ * two or three DES keys.
+ * - For RSA key pairs (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR), the format
+ * is the non-encrypted DER encoding of the representation defined by
+ * PKCS\#1 (RFC 8017) as `RSAPrivateKey`, version 0.
+ * ```
+ * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version INTEGER, -- must be 0
+ * modulus INTEGER, -- n
+ * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e
+ * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d
+ * prime1 INTEGER, -- p
+ * prime2 INTEGER, -- q
+ * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1)
+ * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1)
+ * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p
+ * }
+ * ```
+ * - For elliptic curve key pairs (key types for which
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR is true), the format is
+ * a representation of the private value as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string
+ * where `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size
+ * of the order of the curve's coordinate field. This byte string is
+ * in little-endian order for Montgomery curves (curve types
+ * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`), and in big-endian order for Weierstrass
+ * curves (curve types `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`, `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX`
+ * and `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`).
+ * For Weierstrass curves, this is the content of the `privateKey` field of
+ * the `ECPrivateKey` format defined by RFC 5915. For Montgomery curves,
+ * the format is defined by RFC 7748, and output is masked according to §5.
+ * For twisted Edwards curves, the private key is as defined by RFC 8032
+ * (a 32-byte string for Edwards25519, a 57-byte string for Edwards448).
+ * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange key pairs (key types for which
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR is true), the
+ * format is the representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte
+ * string. The length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes
+ * (leading zeroes are not stripped).
+ * - For public keys (key types for which #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY is
+ * true), the format is the same as for psa_export_public_key().
+ *
+ * The policy on the key must have the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT set.
+ *
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to export. It must allow the
+ * usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT, unless it is a public
+ * key.
+ * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written.
+ * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the key data.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT flag.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p data buffer is too small. You can determine a
+ * sufficient buffer size by calling
+ * #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c type, \c bits)
+ * where \c type is the key type
+ * and \c bits is the key size in bits.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_export_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ uint8_t *data,
+ size_t data_size,
+ size_t *data_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Export a public key or the public part of a key pair in binary format.
+ *
+ * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to
+ * create an object that is equivalent to the public key.
+ *
+ * This specification supports a single format for each key type.
+ * Implementations may support other formats as long as the standard
+ * format is supported. Implementations that support other formats
+ * should ensure that the formats are clearly unambiguous so as to
+ * minimize the risk that an invalid input is accidentally interpreted
+ * according to a different format.
+ *
+ * For standard key types, the output format is as follows:
+ * - For RSA public keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY), the DER encoding of
+ * the representation defined by RFC 3279 §2.3.1 as `RSAPublicKey`.
+ * ```
+ * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * modulus INTEGER, -- n
+ * publicExponent INTEGER } -- e
+ * ```
+ * - For elliptic curve keys on a twisted Edwards curve (key types for which
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY is true and #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY
+ * returns #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS), the public key is as defined
+ * by RFC 8032
+ * (a 32-byte string for Edwards25519, a 57-byte string for Edwards448).
+ * - For other elliptic curve public keys (key types for which
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY is true), the format is the uncompressed
+ * representation defined by SEC1 §2.3.3 as the content of an ECPoint.
+ * Let `m` be the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of
+ * `q` for a curve over `F_q`. The representation consists of:
+ * - The byte 0x04;
+ * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian;
+ * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian.
+ * - For Diffie-Hellman key exchange public keys (key types for which
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY is true),
+ * the format is the representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a
+ * big-endian byte string. The length of the byte string is the length of the
+ * base prime `p` in bytes.
+ *
+ * Exporting a public key object or the public part of a key pair is
+ * always permitted, regardless of the key's usage flags.
+ *
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to export.
+ * \param[out] data Buffer where the key data is to be written.
+ * \param data_size Size of the \p data buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] data_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the key data.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The key is neither a public key nor a key pair.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p data buffer is too small. You can determine a
+ * sufficient buffer size by calling
+ * #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(#PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(\c type), \c bits)
+ * where \c type is the key type
+ * and \c bits is the key size in bits.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ uint8_t *data,
+ size_t data_size,
+ size_t *data_length);
+
+
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup hash Message digests
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message.
+ *
+ * \note To verify the hash of a message against an
+ * expected value, use psa_hash_compare() instead.
+ *
+ * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash.
+ * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written.
+ * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the hash value. This is always
+ * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\p alg).
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * \p hash_size is too small
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_hash_compute(psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *hash,
+ size_t hash_size,
+ size_t *hash_length);
+
+/** Calculate the hash (digest) of a message and compare it with a
+ * reference value.
+ *
+ * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to hash.
+ * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] hash Buffer containing the expected hash value.
+ * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the input.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it
+ * differs from the expected hash.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not supported or is not a hash algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p input_length or \p hash_length do not match the hash size for \p alg
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_hash_compare(psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t *hash,
+ size_t hash_length);
+
+/** The type of the state data structure for multipart hash operations.
+ *
+ * Before calling any function on a hash operation object, the application must
+ * initialize it by any of the following means:
+ * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_hash_operation_t operation;
+ * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_hash_operation_t operation = {0};
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT,
+ * for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_hash_operation_t operation = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+ * \endcode
+ * - Assign the result of the function psa_hash_operation_init()
+ * to the structure, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_hash_operation_t operation;
+ * operation = psa_hash_operation_init();
+ * \endcode
+ *
+ * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
+ * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
+ * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */
+typedef struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_t;
+
+/** \def PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT
+ *
+ * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a hash operation object
+ * of type #psa_hash_operation_t.
+ */
+
+/** Return an initial value for a hash operation object.
+ */
+static psa_hash_operation_t psa_hash_operation_init(void);
+
+/** Set up a multipart hash operation.
+ *
+ * The sequence of operations to calculate a hash (message digest)
+ * is as follows:
+ * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
+ * listed here.
+ * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
+ * documentation for #psa_hash_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT.
+ * -# Call psa_hash_setup() to specify the algorithm.
+ * -# Call psa_hash_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
+ * of the message each time. The hash that is calculated is the hash
+ * of the concatenation of these messages in order.
+ * -# To calculate the hash, call psa_hash_finish().
+ * To compare the hash with an expected value, call psa_hash_verify().
+ *
+ * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_hash_setup(), the
+ * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_hash_abort(). The
+ * application may call psa_hash_abort() at any time after the operation
+ * has been initialized.
+ *
+ * After a successful call to psa_hash_setup(), the application must
+ * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
+ * operation:
+ * - A successful call to psa_hash_finish() or psa_hash_verify().
+ * - A call to psa_hash_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have
+ * been initialized as per the documentation for
+ * #psa_hash_operation_t and not yet in use.
+ * \param alg The hash algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not a supported hash algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p alg is not a hash algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_hash_setup(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg);
+
+/** Add a message fragment to a multipart hash operation.
+ *
+ * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation.
+ * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to hash.
+ * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_hash_update(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length);
+
+/** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message.
+ *
+ * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function.
+ * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating
+ * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update().
+ *
+ * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort().
+ *
+ * \warning Applications should not call this function if they expect
+ * a specific value for the hash. Call psa_hash_verify() instead.
+ * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as
+ * hash values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky
+ * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information
+ * about the hashed data which could allow an attacker to guess
+ * a valid hash and thereby bypass security controls.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation.
+ * \param[out] hash Buffer where the hash is to be written.
+ * \param hash_size Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] hash_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the hash value. This is always
+ * #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where \c alg is the
+ * hash algorithm that is calculated.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p hash buffer is too small. You can determine a
+ * sufficient buffer size by calling #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg)
+ * where \c alg is the hash algorithm that is calculated.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_hash_finish(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *hash,
+ size_t hash_size,
+ size_t *hash_length);
+
+/** Finish the calculation of the hash of a message and compare it with
+ * an expected value.
+ *
+ * The application must call psa_hash_setup() before calling this function.
+ * This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating
+ * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_hash_update(). It then
+ * compares the calculated hash with the expected hash passed as a
+ * parameter to this function.
+ *
+ * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_hash_abort().
+ *
+ * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the
+ * comparison between the actual hash and the expected hash is performed
+ * in constant time.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active hash operation.
+ * \param[in] hash Buffer containing the expected hash value.
+ * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The expected hash is identical to the actual hash of the message.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The hash of the message was calculated successfully, but it
+ * differs from the expected hash.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_hash_verify(psa_hash_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *hash,
+ size_t hash_length);
+
+/** Abort a hash operation.
+ *
+ * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the
+ * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object
+ * can be reused for another operation by calling
+ * psa_hash_setup() again.
+ *
+ * You may call this function any time after the operation object has
+ * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_hash_operation_t.
+ *
+ * In particular, calling psa_hash_abort() after the operation has been
+ * terminated by a call to psa_hash_abort(), psa_hash_finish() or
+ * psa_hash_verify() is safe and has no effect.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Initialized hash operation.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_hash_abort(psa_hash_operation_t *operation);
+
+/** Clone a hash operation.
+ *
+ * This function copies the state of an ongoing hash operation to
+ * a new operation object. In other words, this function is equivalent
+ * to calling psa_hash_setup() on \p target_operation with the same
+ * algorithm that \p source_operation was set up for, then
+ * psa_hash_update() on \p target_operation with the same input that
+ * that was passed to \p source_operation. After this function returns, the
+ * two objects are independent, i.e. subsequent calls involving one of
+ * the objects do not affect the other object.
+ *
+ * \param[in] source_operation The active hash operation to clone.
+ * \param[in,out] target_operation The operation object to set up.
+ * It must be initialized but not active.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The \p source_operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
+ * the \p target_operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_hash_clone(const psa_hash_operation_t *source_operation,
+ psa_hash_operation_t *target_operation);
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup MAC Message authentication codes
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** Calculate the MAC (message authentication code) of a message.
+ *
+ * \note To verify the MAC of a message against an
+ * expected value, use psa_mac_verify() instead.
+ * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as
+ * MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky
+ * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information
+ * about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess
+ * a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls.
+ *
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It
+ * must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE.
+ * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message.
+ * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written.
+ * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the MAC value.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * \p mac_size is too small
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * The key could not be retrieved from storage.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_compute(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length);
+
+/** Calculate the MAC of a message and compare it with a reference value.
+ *
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It
+ * must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE.
+ * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input message.
+ * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value.
+ * \param mac_length Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the input.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it
+ * differs from the expected value.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * The key could not be retrieved from storage.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_verify(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_length);
+
+/** The type of the state data structure for multipart MAC operations.
+ *
+ * Before calling any function on a MAC operation object, the application must
+ * initialize it by any of the following means:
+ * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_mac_operation_t operation;
+ * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_mac_operation_t operation = {0};
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT,
+ * for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_mac_operation_t operation = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
+ * \endcode
+ * - Assign the result of the function psa_mac_operation_init()
+ * to the structure, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_mac_operation_t operation;
+ * operation = psa_mac_operation_init();
+ * \endcode
+ *
+ *
+ * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
+ * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
+ * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */
+typedef struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_t;
+
+/** \def PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT
+ *
+ * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a MAC operation object of type
+ * #psa_mac_operation_t.
+ */
+
+/** Return an initial value for a MAC operation object.
+ */
+static psa_mac_operation_t psa_mac_operation_init(void);
+
+/** Set up a multipart MAC calculation operation.
+ *
+ * This function sets up the calculation of the MAC
+ * (message authentication code) of a byte string.
+ * To verify the MAC of a message against an
+ * expected value, use psa_mac_verify_setup() instead.
+ *
+ * The sequence of operations to calculate a MAC is as follows:
+ * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
+ * listed here.
+ * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
+ * documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT.
+ * -# Call psa_mac_sign_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
+ * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
+ * of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC
+ * of the concatenation of these messages in order.
+ * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_sign_finish() to finish
+ * calculating the MAC value and retrieve it.
+ *
+ * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the
+ * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_mac_abort(). The
+ * application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation
+ * has been initialized.
+ *
+ * After a successful call to psa_mac_sign_setup(), the application must
+ * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods:
+ * - A successful call to psa_mac_sign_finish().
+ * - A call to psa_mac_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have
+ * been initialized as per the documentation for
+ * #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use.
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It
+ * must remain valid until the operation terminates.
+ * It must allow the usage PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE.
+ * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * The key could not be retrieved from storage.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg);
+
+/** Set up a multipart MAC verification operation.
+ *
+ * This function sets up the verification of the MAC
+ * (message authentication code) of a byte string against an expected value.
+ *
+ * The sequence of operations to verify a MAC is as follows:
+ * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
+ * listed here.
+ * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
+ * documentation for #psa_mac_operation_t, e.g. #PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT.
+ * -# Call psa_mac_verify_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
+ * -# Call psa_mac_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
+ * of the message each time. The MAC that is calculated is the MAC
+ * of the concatenation of these messages in order.
+ * -# At the end of the message, call psa_mac_verify_finish() to finish
+ * calculating the actual MAC of the message and verify it against
+ * the expected value.
+ *
+ * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the
+ * operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_mac_abort(). The
+ * application may call psa_mac_abort() at any time after the operation
+ * has been initialized.
+ *
+ * After a successful call to psa_mac_verify_setup(), the application must
+ * eventually terminate the operation through one of the following methods:
+ * - A successful call to psa_mac_verify_finish().
+ * - A call to psa_mac_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have
+ * been initialized as per the documentation for
+ * #psa_mac_operation_t and not yet in use.
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It
+ * must remain valid until the operation terminates.
+ * It must allow the usage
+ * PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE.
+ * \param alg The MAC algorithm to compute (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value
+ * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \c key is not compatible with \c alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \c alg is not supported or is not a MAC algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * The key could not be retrieved from storage.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_setup(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg);
+
+/** Add a message fragment to a multipart MAC operation.
+ *
+ * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup()
+ * before calling this function.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation.
+ * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to add to
+ * the MAC calculation.
+ * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_update(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length);
+
+/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message.
+ *
+ * The application must call psa_mac_sign_setup() before calling this function.
+ * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating
+ * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update().
+ *
+ * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort().
+ *
+ * \warning Applications should not call this function if they expect
+ * a specific value for the MAC. Call psa_mac_verify_finish() instead.
+ * Beware that comparing integrity or authenticity data such as
+ * MAC values with a function such as \c memcmp is risky
+ * because the time taken by the comparison may leak information
+ * about the MAC value which could allow an attacker to guess
+ * a valid MAC and thereby bypass security controls.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation.
+ * \param[out] mac Buffer where the MAC value is to be written.
+ * \param mac_size Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] mac_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the MAC value. This is always
+ * #PSA_MAC_LENGTH(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg)
+ * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and
+ * bit-size respectively of the key and \c alg is the
+ * MAC algorithm that is calculated.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p mac buffer is too small. You can determine a
+ * sufficient buffer size by calling PSA_MAC_LENGTH().
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac sign
+ * operation), or the library has not been previously initialized
+ * by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_sign_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *mac_length);
+
+/** Finish the calculation of the MAC of a message and compare it with
+ * an expected value.
+ *
+ * The application must call psa_mac_verify_setup() before calling this function.
+ * This function calculates the MAC of the message formed by concatenating
+ * the inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_mac_update(). It then
+ * compares the calculated MAC with the expected MAC passed as a
+ * parameter to this function.
+ *
+ * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_mac_abort().
+ *
+ * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the
+ * comparison between the actual MAC and the expected MAC is performed
+ * in constant time.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active MAC operation.
+ * \param[in] mac Buffer containing the expected MAC value.
+ * \param mac_length Size of the \p mac buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The expected MAC is identical to the actual MAC of the message.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The MAC of the message was calculated successfully, but it
+ * differs from the expected MAC.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active mac verify
+ * operation), or the library has not been previously initialized
+ * by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_verify_finish(psa_mac_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *mac,
+ size_t mac_length);
+
+/** Abort a MAC operation.
+ *
+ * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the
+ * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object
+ * can be reused for another operation by calling
+ * psa_mac_sign_setup() or psa_mac_verify_setup() again.
+ *
+ * You may call this function any time after the operation object has
+ * been initialized by one of the methods described in #psa_mac_operation_t.
+ *
+ * In particular, calling psa_mac_abort() after the operation has been
+ * terminated by a call to psa_mac_abort(), psa_mac_sign_finish() or
+ * psa_mac_verify_finish() is safe and has no effect.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Initialized MAC operation.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_mac_abort(psa_mac_operation_t *operation);
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup cipher Symmetric ciphers
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** Encrypt a message using a symmetric cipher.
+ *
+ * This function encrypts a message with a random IV (initialization
+ * vector). Use the multipart operation interface with a
+ * #psa_cipher_operation_t object to provide other forms of IV.
+ *
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
+ * It must allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT.
+ * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to encrypt.
+ * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written.
+ * The output contains the IV followed by
+ * the ciphertext proper.
+ * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the output.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *output,
+ size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_length);
+
+/** Decrypt a message using a symmetric cipher.
+ *
+ * This function decrypts a message encrypted with a symmetric cipher.
+ *
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
+ * It must remain valid until the operation
+ * terminates. It must allow the usage
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT.
+ * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message to decrypt.
+ * This consists of the IV followed by the
+ * ciphertext proper.
+ * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output Buffer where the plaintext is to be written.
+ * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the output.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *output,
+ size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_length);
+
+/** The type of the state data structure for multipart cipher operations.
+ *
+ * Before calling any function on a cipher operation object, the application
+ * must initialize it by any of the following means:
+ * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_cipher_operation_t operation;
+ * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_cipher_operation_t operation = {0};
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT,
+ * for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_cipher_operation_t operation = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT;
+ * \endcode
+ * - Assign the result of the function psa_cipher_operation_init()
+ * to the structure, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_cipher_operation_t operation;
+ * operation = psa_cipher_operation_init();
+ * \endcode
+ *
+ * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
+ * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
+ * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */
+typedef struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_t;
+
+/** \def PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT
+ *
+ * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a cipher operation object of
+ * type #psa_cipher_operation_t.
+ */
+
+/** Return an initial value for a cipher operation object.
+ */
+static psa_cipher_operation_t psa_cipher_operation_init(void);
+
+/** Set the key for a multipart symmetric encryption operation.
+ *
+ * The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with a symmetric cipher
+ * is as follows:
+ * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
+ * listed here.
+ * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
+ * documentation for #psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g.
+ * #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT.
+ * -# Call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
+ * -# Call either psa_cipher_generate_iv() or psa_cipher_set_iv() to
+ * generate or set the IV (initialization vector). You should use
+ * psa_cipher_generate_iv() unless the protocol you are implementing
+ * requires a specific IV value.
+ * -# Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
+ * of the message each time.
+ * -# Call psa_cipher_finish().
+ *
+ * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(),
+ * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_cipher_abort(). The
+ * application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation
+ * has been initialized.
+ *
+ * After a successful call to psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(), the application must
+ * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
+ * operation:
+ * - A successful call to psa_cipher_finish().
+ * - A call to psa_cipher_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have
+ * been initialized as per the documentation for
+ * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use.
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
+ * It must remain valid until the operation
+ * terminates. It must allow the usage
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT.
+ * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg);
+
+/** Set the key for a multipart symmetric decryption operation.
+ *
+ * The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with a symmetric cipher
+ * is as follows:
+ * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
+ * listed here.
+ * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
+ * documentation for #psa_cipher_operation_t, e.g.
+ * #PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT.
+ * -# Call psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
+ * -# Call psa_cipher_set_iv() with the IV (initialization vector) for the
+ * decryption. If the IV is prepended to the ciphertext, you can call
+ * psa_cipher_update() on a buffer containing the IV followed by the
+ * beginning of the message.
+ * -# Call psa_cipher_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
+ * of the message each time.
+ * -# Call psa_cipher_finish().
+ *
+ * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(),
+ * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_cipher_abort(). The
+ * application may call psa_cipher_abort() at any time after the operation
+ * has been initialized.
+ *
+ * After a successful call to psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(), the application must
+ * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
+ * operation:
+ * - A successful call to psa_cipher_finish().
+ * - A call to psa_cipher_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have
+ * been initialized as per the documentation for
+ * #psa_cipher_operation_t and not yet in use.
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
+ * It must remain valid until the operation
+ * terminates. It must allow the usage
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT.
+ * \param alg The cipher algorithm to compute
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not supported or is not a cipher algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg);
+
+/** Generate an IV for a symmetric encryption operation.
+ *
+ * This function generates a random IV (initialization vector), nonce
+ * or initial counter value for the encryption operation as appropriate
+ * for the chosen algorithm, key type and key size.
+ *
+ * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before
+ * calling this function.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation.
+ * \param[out] iv Buffer where the generated IV is to be written.
+ * \param iv_size Size of the \p iv buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] iv_length On success, the number of bytes of the
+ * generated IV.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p iv buffer is too small.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with no IV set),
+ * or the library has not been previously initialized
+ * by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_cipher_generate_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *iv,
+ size_t iv_size,
+ size_t *iv_length);
+
+/** Set the IV for a symmetric encryption or decryption operation.
+ *
+ * This function sets the IV (initialization vector), nonce
+ * or initial counter value for the encryption or decryption operation.
+ *
+ * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() before
+ * calling this function.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort().
+ *
+ * \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_cipher_generate_iv()
+ * instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires
+ * a non-random IV.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation.
+ * \param[in] iv Buffer containing the IV to use.
+ * \param iv_length Size of the IV in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The size of \p iv is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm,
+ * or the chosen algorithm does not use an IV.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active cipher
+ * encrypt operation, with no IV set), or the library has not been
+ * previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_cipher_set_iv(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *iv,
+ size_t iv_length);
+
+/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active cipher operation.
+ *
+ * Before calling this function, you must:
+ * 1. Call either psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup().
+ * The choice of setup function determines whether this function
+ * encrypts or decrypts its input.
+ * 2. If the algorithm requires an IV, call psa_cipher_generate_iv()
+ * (recommended when encrypting) or psa_cipher_set_iv().
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation.
+ * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to
+ * encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written.
+ * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the returned output.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with an IV set
+ * if required for the algorithm), or the library has not been
+ * previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_cipher_update(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *output,
+ size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_length);
+
+/** Finish encrypting or decrypting a message in a cipher operation.
+ *
+ * The application must call psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or
+ * psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() before calling this function. The choice
+ * of setup function determines whether this function encrypts or
+ * decrypts its input.
+ *
+ * This function finishes the encryption or decryption of the message
+ * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to
+ * psa_cipher_update().
+ *
+ * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_cipher_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active cipher operation.
+ * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written.
+ * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the returned output.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The total input size passed to this operation is not valid for
+ * this particular algorithm. For example, the algorithm is a based
+ * on block cipher and requires a whole number of blocks, but the
+ * total input size is not a multiple of the block size.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING
+ * This is a decryption operation for an algorithm that includes
+ * padding, and the ciphertext does not contain valid padding.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with an IV set
+ * if required for the algorithm), or the library has not been
+ * previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_cipher_finish(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *output,
+ size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_length);
+
+/** Abort a cipher operation.
+ *
+ * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the
+ * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object
+ * can be reused for another operation by calling
+ * psa_cipher_encrypt_setup() or psa_cipher_decrypt_setup() again.
+ *
+ * You may call this function any time after the operation object has
+ * been initialized as described in #psa_cipher_operation_t.
+ *
+ * In particular, calling psa_cipher_abort() after the operation has been
+ * terminated by a call to psa_cipher_abort() or psa_cipher_finish()
+ * is safe and has no effect.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Initialized cipher operation.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_cipher_abort(psa_cipher_operation_t *operation);
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup aead Authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** Process an authenticated encryption operation.
+ *
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the
+ * operation. It must allow the usage
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT.
+ * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use.
+ * \param nonce_length Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that will be authenticated
+ * but not encrypted.
+ * \param additional_data_length Size of \p additional_data in bytes.
+ * \param[in] plaintext Data that will be authenticated and
+ * encrypted.
+ * \param plaintext_length Size of \p plaintext in bytes.
+ * \param[out] ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and
+ * encrypted data. The additional data is not
+ * part of this output. For algorithms where the
+ * encrypted data and the authentication tag
+ * are defined as separate outputs, the
+ * authentication tag is appended to the
+ * encrypted data.
+ * \param ciphertext_size Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes.
+ * This must be appropriate for the selected
+ * algorithm and key:
+ * - A sufficient output size is
+ * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type,
+ * \p alg, \p plaintext_length) where
+ * \c key_type is the type of \p key.
+ * - #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p
+ * plaintext_length) evaluates to the maximum
+ * ciphertext size of any supported AEAD
+ * encryption.
+ * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output
+ * in the \p ciphertext buffer.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * \p ciphertext_size is too small.
+ * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \p alg,
+ * \p plaintext_length) or
+ * #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p plaintext_length) can be used to
+ * determine the required buffer size.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *nonce,
+ size_t nonce_length,
+ const uint8_t *additional_data,
+ size_t additional_data_length,
+ const uint8_t *plaintext,
+ size_t plaintext_length,
+ uint8_t *ciphertext,
+ size_t ciphertext_size,
+ size_t *ciphertext_length);
+
+/** Process an authenticated decryption operation.
+ *
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the
+ * operation. It must allow the usage
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT.
+ * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param[in] nonce Nonce or IV to use.
+ * \param nonce_length Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] additional_data Additional data that has been authenticated
+ * but not encrypted.
+ * \param additional_data_length Size of \p additional_data in bytes.
+ * \param[in] ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and
+ * encrypted. For algorithms where the
+ * encrypted data and the authentication tag
+ * are defined as separate inputs, the buffer
+ * must contain the encrypted data followed
+ * by the authentication tag.
+ * \param ciphertext_length Size of \p ciphertext in bytes.
+ * \param[out] plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data.
+ * \param plaintext_size Size of the \p plaintext buffer in bytes.
+ * This must be appropriate for the selected
+ * algorithm and key:
+ * - A sufficient output size is
+ * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type,
+ * \p alg, \p ciphertext_length) where
+ * \c key_type is the type of \p key.
+ * - #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p
+ * ciphertext_length) evaluates to the maximum
+ * plaintext size of any supported AEAD
+ * decryption.
+ * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the size of the output
+ * in the \p plaintext buffer.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The ciphertext is not authentic.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * \p plaintext_size is too small.
+ * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \p alg,
+ * \p ciphertext_length) or
+ * #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p ciphertext_length) can be used
+ * to determine the required buffer size.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *nonce,
+ size_t nonce_length,
+ const uint8_t *additional_data,
+ size_t additional_data_length,
+ const uint8_t *ciphertext,
+ size_t ciphertext_length,
+ uint8_t *plaintext,
+ size_t plaintext_size,
+ size_t *plaintext_length);
+
+/** The type of the state data structure for multipart AEAD operations.
+ *
+ * Before calling any function on an AEAD operation object, the application
+ * must initialize it by any of the following means:
+ * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_aead_operation_t operation;
+ * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_aead_operation_t operation = {0};
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT,
+ * for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_aead_operation_t operation = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
+ * \endcode
+ * - Assign the result of the function psa_aead_operation_init()
+ * to the structure, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_aead_operation_t operation;
+ * operation = psa_aead_operation_init();
+ * \endcode
+ *
+ * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
+ * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
+ * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */
+typedef struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_t;
+
+/** \def PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT
+ *
+ * This macro returns a suitable initializer for an AEAD operation object of
+ * type #psa_aead_operation_t.
+ */
+
+/** Return an initial value for an AEAD operation object.
+ */
+static psa_aead_operation_t psa_aead_operation_init(void);
+
+/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated encryption operation.
+ *
+ * The sequence of operations to encrypt a message with authentication
+ * is as follows:
+ * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
+ * listed here.
+ * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
+ * documentation for #psa_aead_operation_t, e.g.
+ * #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
+ * -# If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the
+ * inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and
+ * psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths()
+ * for details.
+ * -# Call either psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce() to
+ * generate or set the nonce. You should use
+ * psa_aead_generate_nonce() unless the protocol you are implementing
+ * requires a specific nonce value.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
+ * of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
+ * of the message to encrypt each time.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_finish().
+ *
+ * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup(),
+ * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_aead_abort(). The
+ * application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation
+ * has been initialized.
+ *
+ * After a successful call to psa_aead_encrypt_setup(), the application must
+ * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
+ * operation:
+ * - A successful call to psa_aead_finish().
+ * - A call to psa_aead_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have
+ * been initialized as per the documentation for
+ * #psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use.
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
+ * It must remain valid until the operation
+ * terminates. It must allow the usage
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT.
+ * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg);
+
+/** Set the key for a multipart authenticated decryption operation.
+ *
+ * The sequence of operations to decrypt a message with authentication
+ * is as follows:
+ * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
+ * listed here.
+ * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
+ * documentation for #psa_aead_operation_t, e.g.
+ * #PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_decrypt_setup() to specify the algorithm and key.
+ * -# If needed, call psa_aead_set_lengths() to specify the length of the
+ * inputs to the subsequent calls to psa_aead_update_ad() and
+ * psa_aead_update(). See the documentation of psa_aead_set_lengths()
+ * for details.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_set_nonce() with the nonce for the decryption.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_update_ad() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
+ * of the non-encrypted additional authenticated data each time.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_update() zero, one or more times, passing a fragment
+ * of the ciphertext to decrypt each time.
+ * -# Call psa_aead_verify().
+ *
+ * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_aead_decrypt_setup(),
+ * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_aead_abort(). The
+ * application may call psa_aead_abort() at any time after the operation
+ * has been initialized.
+ *
+ * After a successful call to psa_aead_decrypt_setup(), the application must
+ * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
+ * operation:
+ * - A successful call to psa_aead_verify().
+ * - A call to psa_aead_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have
+ * been initialized as per the documentation for
+ * #psa_aead_operation_t and not yet in use.
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
+ * It must remain valid until the operation
+ * terminates. It must allow the usage
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT.
+ * \param alg The AEAD algorithm to compute
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p key is not compatible with \p alg.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not supported or is not an AEAD algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or the
+ * library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg);
+
+/** Generate a random nonce for an authenticated encryption operation.
+ *
+ * This function generates a random nonce for the authenticated encryption
+ * operation with an appropriate size for the chosen algorithm, key type
+ * and key size.
+ *
+ * The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() before
+ * calling this function.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param[out] nonce Buffer where the generated nonce is to be
+ * written.
+ * \param nonce_size Size of the \p nonce buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] nonce_length On success, the number of bytes of the
+ * generated nonce.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p nonce buffer is too small.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active aead encrypt
+ * operation, with no nonce set), or the library has not been
+ * previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_generate_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *nonce,
+ size_t nonce_size,
+ size_t *nonce_length);
+
+/** Set the nonce for an authenticated encryption or decryption operation.
+ *
+ * This function sets the nonce for the authenticated
+ * encryption or decryption operation.
+ *
+ * The application must call psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or
+ * psa_aead_decrypt_setup() before calling this function.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().
+ *
+ * \note When encrypting, applications should use psa_aead_generate_nonce()
+ * instead of this function, unless implementing a protocol that requires
+ * a non-random IV.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param[in] nonce Buffer containing the nonce to use.
+ * \param nonce_length Size of the nonce in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The size of \p nonce is not acceptable for the chosen algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, with no nonce
+ * set), or the library has not been previously initialized
+ * by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_set_nonce(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *nonce,
+ size_t nonce_length);
+
+/** Declare the lengths of the message and additional data for AEAD.
+ *
+ * The application must call this function before calling
+ * psa_aead_update_ad() or psa_aead_update() if the algorithm for
+ * the operation requires it. If the algorithm does not require it,
+ * calling this function is optional, but if this function is called
+ * then the implementation must enforce the lengths.
+ *
+ * You may call this function before or after setting the nonce with
+ * psa_aead_set_nonce() or psa_aead_generate_nonce().
+ *
+ * - For #PSA_ALG_CCM, calling this function is required.
+ * - For the other AEAD algorithms defined in this specification, calling
+ * this function is not required.
+ * - For vendor-defined algorithm, refer to the vendor documentation.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param ad_length Size of the non-encrypted additional
+ * authenticated data in bytes.
+ * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext to encrypt in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * At least one of the lengths is not acceptable for the chosen
+ * algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and
+ * psa_aead_update_ad() and psa_aead_update() must not have been
+ * called yet), or the library has not been previously initialized
+ * by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_set_lengths(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+ size_t ad_length,
+ size_t plaintext_length);
+
+/** Pass additional data to an active AEAD operation.
+ *
+ * Additional data is authenticated, but not encrypted.
+ *
+ * You may call this function multiple times to pass successive fragments
+ * of the additional data. You may not call this function after passing
+ * data to encrypt or decrypt with psa_aead_update().
+ *
+ * Before calling this function, you must:
+ * 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup().
+ * 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce().
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().
+ *
+ * \warning When decrypting, until psa_aead_verify() has returned #PSA_SUCCESS,
+ * there is no guarantee that the input is valid. Therefore, until
+ * you have called psa_aead_verify() and it has returned #PSA_SUCCESS,
+ * treat the input as untrusted and prepare to undo any action that
+ * depends on the input if psa_aead_verify() returns an error status.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param[in] input Buffer containing the fragment of
+ * additional data.
+ * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The total input length overflows the additional data length that
+ * was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, have a nonce
+ * set, have lengths set if required by the algorithm, and
+ * psa_aead_update() must not have been called yet), or the library
+ * has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_update_ad(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length);
+
+/** Encrypt or decrypt a message fragment in an active AEAD operation.
+ *
+ * Before calling this function, you must:
+ * 1. Call either psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup().
+ * The choice of setup function determines whether this function
+ * encrypts or decrypts its input.
+ * 2. Set the nonce with psa_aead_generate_nonce() or psa_aead_set_nonce().
+ * 3. Call psa_aead_update_ad() to pass all the additional data.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().
+ *
+ * \warning When decrypting, until psa_aead_verify() has returned #PSA_SUCCESS,
+ * there is no guarantee that the input is valid. Therefore, until
+ * you have called psa_aead_verify() and it has returned #PSA_SUCCESS:
+ * - Do not use the output in any way other than storing it in a
+ * confidential location. If you take any action that depends
+ * on the tentative decrypted data, this action will need to be
+ * undone if the input turns out not to be valid. Furthermore,
+ * if an adversary can observe that this action took place
+ * (for example through timing), they may be able to use this
+ * fact as an oracle to decrypt any message encrypted with the
+ * same key.
+ * - In particular, do not copy the output anywhere but to a
+ * memory or storage space that you have exclusive access to.
+ *
+ * This function does not require the input to be aligned to any
+ * particular block boundary. If the implementation can only process
+ * a whole block at a time, it must consume all the input provided, but
+ * it may delay the end of the corresponding output until a subsequent
+ * call to psa_aead_update(), psa_aead_finish() or psa_aead_verify()
+ * provides sufficient input. The amount of data that can be delayed
+ * in this way is bounded by #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param[in] input Buffer containing the message fragment to
+ * encrypt or decrypt.
+ * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written.
+ * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
+ * This must be appropriate for the selected
+ * algorithm and key:
+ * - A sufficient output size is
+ * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type,
+ * \c alg, \p input_length) where
+ * \c key_type is the type of key and \c alg is
+ * the algorithm that were used to set up the
+ * operation.
+ * - #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p
+ * input_length) evaluates to the maximum
+ * output size of any supported AEAD
+ * algorithm.
+ * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the returned output.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
+ * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg, \p input_length) or
+ * #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length) can be used to
+ * determine the required buffer size.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is
+ * less than the additional data length that was previously
+ * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or
+ * the total input length overflows the plaintext length that
+ * was previously specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, have a nonce
+ * set, and have lengths set if required by the algorithm), or the
+ * library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_update(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *output,
+ size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_length);
+
+/** Finish encrypting a message in an AEAD operation.
+ *
+ * The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_encrypt_setup().
+ *
+ * This function finishes the authentication of the additional data
+ * formed by concatenating the inputs passed to preceding calls to
+ * psa_aead_update_ad() with the plaintext formed by concatenating the
+ * inputs passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update().
+ *
+ * This function has two output buffers:
+ * - \p ciphertext contains trailing ciphertext that was buffered from
+ * preceding calls to psa_aead_update().
+ * - \p tag contains the authentication tag.
+ *
+ * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param[out] ciphertext Buffer where the last part of the ciphertext
+ * is to be written.
+ * \param ciphertext_size Size of the \p ciphertext buffer in bytes.
+ * This must be appropriate for the selected
+ * algorithm and key:
+ * - A sufficient output size is
+ * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type,
+ * \c alg) where \c key_type is the type of key
+ * and \c alg is the algorithm that were used to
+ * set up the operation.
+ * - #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to
+ * the maximum output size of any supported AEAD
+ * algorithm.
+ * \param[out] ciphertext_length On success, the number of bytes of
+ * returned ciphertext.
+ * \param[out] tag Buffer where the authentication tag is
+ * to be written.
+ * \param tag_size Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes.
+ * This must be appropriate for the selected
+ * algorithm and key:
+ * - The exact tag size is #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c
+ * key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg) where
+ * \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and
+ * bit-size of the key, and \c alg is the
+ * algorithm that were used in the call to
+ * psa_aead_encrypt_setup().
+ * - #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the
+ * maximum tag size of any supported AEAD
+ * algorithm.
+ * \param[out] tag_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the returned tag.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p ciphertext or \p tag buffer is too small.
+ * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg) or
+ * #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the
+ * required \p ciphertext buffer size. #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\c key_type,
+ * \c key_bits, \c alg) or #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE can be used to
+ * determine the required \p tag buffer size.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is
+ * less than the additional data length that was previously
+ * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or
+ * the total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is
+ * less than the plaintext length that was previously
+ * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active encryption
+ * operation with a nonce set), or the library has not been previously
+ * initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_finish(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *ciphertext,
+ size_t ciphertext_size,
+ size_t *ciphertext_length,
+ uint8_t *tag,
+ size_t tag_size,
+ size_t *tag_length);
+
+/** Finish authenticating and decrypting a message in an AEAD operation.
+ *
+ * The operation must have been set up with psa_aead_decrypt_setup().
+ *
+ * This function finishes the authenticated decryption of the message
+ * components:
+ *
+ * - The additional data consisting of the concatenation of the inputs
+ * passed to preceding calls to psa_aead_update_ad().
+ * - The ciphertext consisting of the concatenation of the inputs passed to
+ * preceding calls to psa_aead_update().
+ * - The tag passed to this function call.
+ *
+ * If the authentication tag is correct, this function outputs any remaining
+ * plaintext and reports success. If the authentication tag is not correct,
+ * this function returns #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE.
+ *
+ * When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_aead_abort().
+ *
+ * \note Implementations shall make the best effort to ensure that the
+ * comparison between the actual tag and the expected tag is performed
+ * in constant time.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active AEAD operation.
+ * \param[out] plaintext Buffer where the last part of the plaintext
+ * is to be written. This is the remaining data
+ * from previous calls to psa_aead_update()
+ * that could not be processed until the end
+ * of the input.
+ * \param plaintext_size Size of the \p plaintext buffer in bytes.
+ * This must be appropriate for the selected algorithm and key:
+ * - A sufficient output size is
+ * #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type,
+ * \c alg) where \c key_type is the type of key
+ * and \c alg is the algorithm that were used to
+ * set up the operation.
+ * - #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE evaluates to
+ * the maximum output size of any supported AEAD
+ * algorithm.
+ * \param[out] plaintext_length On success, the number of bytes of
+ * returned plaintext.
+ * \param[in] tag Buffer containing the authentication tag.
+ * \param tag_length Size of the \p tag buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The calculations were successful, but the authentication tag is
+ * not correct.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p plaintext buffer is too small.
+ * #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c alg) or
+ * #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE can be used to determine the
+ * required buffer size.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The total length of input to psa_aead_update_ad() so far is
+ * less than the additional data length that was previously
+ * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths(), or
+ * the total length of input to psa_aead_update() so far is
+ * less than the plaintext length that was previously
+ * specified with psa_aead_set_lengths().
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be an active decryption
+ * operation with a nonce set), or the library has not been previously
+ * initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_verify(psa_aead_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *plaintext,
+ size_t plaintext_size,
+ size_t *plaintext_length,
+ const uint8_t *tag,
+ size_t tag_length);
+
+/** Abort an AEAD operation.
+ *
+ * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the
+ * \p operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object
+ * can be reused for another operation by calling
+ * psa_aead_encrypt_setup() or psa_aead_decrypt_setup() again.
+ *
+ * You may call this function any time after the operation object has
+ * been initialized as described in #psa_aead_operation_t.
+ *
+ * In particular, calling psa_aead_abort() after the operation has been
+ * terminated by a call to psa_aead_abort(), psa_aead_finish() or
+ * psa_aead_verify() is safe and has no effect.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Initialized AEAD operation.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_aead_abort(psa_aead_operation_t *operation);
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup asymmetric Asymmetric cryptography
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Sign a message with a private key. For hash-and-sign algorithms,
+ * this includes the hashing step.
+ *
+ * \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature algorithm, first use
+ * a multi-part hash operation and then pass the resulting hash to
+ * psa_sign_hash(). PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the
+ * hash algorithm to use.
+ *
+ * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
+ * It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must
+ * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE.
+ * \param[in] alg An asymmetric signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX
+ * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(\p alg)
+ * is true), that is compatible with the type of
+ * \p key.
+ * \param[in] input The input message to sign.
+ * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written.
+ * \param[in] signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. This
+ * must be appropriate for the selected
+ * algorithm and key:
+ * - The required signature size is
+ * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
+ * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and
+ * bit-size respectively of key.
+ * - #PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the
+ * maximum signature size of any supported
+ * signature algorithm.
+ * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up
+ * the returned signature value.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag,
+ * or it does not permit the requested algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
+ * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
+ * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
+ * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
+ * respectively of \p key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_sign_message(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_size,
+ size_t *signature_length);
+
+/** \brief Verify the signature of a message with a public key, using
+ * a hash-and-sign verification algorithm.
+ *
+ * \note To perform a multi-part hash-and-sign signature verification
+ * algorithm, first use a multi-part hash operation to hash the message
+ * and then pass the resulting hash to psa_verify_hash().
+ * PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(\p alg) can be used to determine the hash algorithm
+ * to use.
+ *
+ * \param[in] key Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
+ * It must be a public key or an asymmetric key
+ * pair. The key must allow the usage
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE.
+ * \param[in] alg An asymmetric signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX
+ * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(\p alg)
+ * is true), that is compatible with the type of
+ * \p key.
+ * \param[in] input The message whose signature is to be verified.
+ * \param[in] input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify.
+ * \param[in] signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE flag,
+ * or it does not permit the requested algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed signature
+ * is not a valid signature.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_verify_message(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Sign a hash or short message with a private key.
+ *
+ * Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must
+ * first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update()
+ * and psa_hash_finish(), or alternatively by calling psa_hash_compute().
+ * Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash
+ * parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg)
+ * to determine the hash algorithm to use.
+ *
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
+ * It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must
+ * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH.
+ * \param alg A signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX
+ * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg)
+ * is true), that is compatible with
+ * the type of \p key.
+ * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign.
+ * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written.
+ * \param signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the returned signature value.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
+ * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
+ * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
+ * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
+ * respectively of \p key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_sign_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *hash,
+ size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_size,
+ size_t *signature_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Verify the signature of a hash or short message using a public key.
+ *
+ * Note that to perform a hash-and-sign signature algorithm, you must
+ * first calculate the hash by calling psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update()
+ * and psa_hash_finish(), or alternatively by calling psa_hash_compute().
+ * Then pass the resulting hash as the \p hash
+ * parameter to this function. You can use #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(\p alg)
+ * to determine the hash algorithm to use.
+ *
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation. It
+ * must be a public key or an asymmetric key pair. The
+ * key must allow the usage
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH.
+ * \param alg A signature algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX
+ * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg)
+ * is true), that is compatible with
+ * the type of \p key.
+ * \param[in] hash The hash or message whose signature is to be
+ * verified.
+ * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify.
+ * \param signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The signature is valid.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed
+ * signature is not a valid signature.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_verify_hash(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *hash,
+ size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature,
+ size_t signature_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encrypt a short message with a public key.
+ *
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
+ * It must be a public key or an asymmetric key
+ * pair. It must allow the usage
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT.
+ * \param alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is
+ * compatible with the type of \p key.
+ * \param[in] input The message to encrypt.
+ * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the
+ * encryption algorithm.
+ * If the algorithm does not support a
+ * salt, pass \c NULL.
+ * If the algorithm supports an optional
+ * salt and you do not want to pass a salt,
+ * pass \c NULL.
+ *
+ * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is
+ * supported.
+ * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes.
+ * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0.
+ * \param[out] output Buffer where the encrypted message is to
+ * be written.
+ * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the returned output.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can
+ * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
+ * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
+ * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
+ * respectively of \p key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t *salt,
+ size_t salt_length,
+ uint8_t *output,
+ size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Decrypt a short message with a private key.
+ *
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
+ * It must be an asymmetric key pair. It must
+ * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT.
+ * \param alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is
+ * compatible with the type of \p key.
+ * \param[in] input The message to decrypt.
+ * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] salt A salt or label, if supported by the
+ * encryption algorithm.
+ * If the algorithm does not support a
+ * salt, pass \c NULL.
+ * If the algorithm supports an optional
+ * salt and you do not want to pass a salt,
+ * pass \c NULL.
+ *
+ * - For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is
+ * supported.
+ * \param salt_length Size of the \p salt buffer in bytes.
+ * If \p salt is \c NULL, pass 0.
+ * \param[out] output Buffer where the decrypted message is to
+ * be written.
+ * \param output_size Size of the \c output buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the returned output.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p output buffer is too small. You can
+ * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
+ * #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \p alg)
+ * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
+ * respectively of \p key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t *salt,
+ size_t salt_length,
+ uint8_t *output,
+ size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_length);
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup key_derivation Key derivation and pseudorandom generation
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** The type of the state data structure for key derivation operations.
+ *
+ * Before calling any function on a key derivation operation object, the
+ * application must initialize it by any of the following means:
+ * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation;
+ * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = {0};
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT,
+ * for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
+ * \endcode
+ * - Assign the result of the function psa_key_derivation_operation_init()
+ * to the structure, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation;
+ * operation = psa_key_derivation_operation_init();
+ * \endcode
+ *
+ * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
+ * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
+ * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice.
+ */
+typedef struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_t;
+
+/** \def PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT
+ *
+ * This macro returns a suitable initializer for a key derivation operation
+ * object of type #psa_key_derivation_operation_t.
+ */
+
+/** Return an initial value for a key derivation operation object.
+ */
+static psa_key_derivation_operation_t psa_key_derivation_operation_init(void);
+
+/** Set up a key derivation operation.
+ *
+ * A key derivation algorithm takes some inputs and uses them to generate
+ * a byte stream in a deterministic way.
+ * This byte stream can be used to produce keys and other
+ * cryptographic material.
+ *
+ * To derive a key:
+ * -# Start with an initialized object of type #psa_key_derivation_operation_t.
+ * -# Call psa_key_derivation_setup() to select the algorithm.
+ * -# Provide the inputs for the key derivation by calling
+ * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_input_key()
+ * as appropriate. Which inputs are needed, in what order, and whether
+ * they may be keys and if so of what type depends on the algorithm.
+ * -# Optionally set the operation's maximum capacity with
+ * psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(). You may do this before, in the middle
+ * of or after providing inputs. For some algorithms, this step is mandatory
+ * because the output depends on the maximum capacity.
+ * -# To derive a key, call psa_key_derivation_output_key() or
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom().
+ * To derive a byte string for a different purpose, call
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes().
+ * Successive calls to these functions use successive output bytes
+ * calculated by the key derivation algorithm.
+ * -# Clean up the key derivation operation object with
+ * psa_key_derivation_abort().
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error, the key derivation operation object is
+ * not changed.
+ *
+ * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_key_derivation_setup(),
+ * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_key_derivation_abort().
+ *
+ * Implementations must reject an attempt to derive a key of size 0.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object
+ * to set up. It must
+ * have been initialized but not set up yet.
+ * \param alg The key derivation algorithm to compute
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \c alg is not a key derivation algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be inactive), or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup(
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg);
+
+/** Retrieve the current capacity of a key derivation operation.
+ *
+ * The capacity of a key derivation is the maximum number of bytes that it can
+ * return. When you get *N* bytes of output from a key derivation operation,
+ * this reduces its capacity by *N*.
+ *
+ * \param[in] operation The operation to query.
+ * \param[out] capacity On success, the capacity of the operation.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_get_capacity(
+ const psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
+ size_t *capacity);
+
+/** Set the maximum capacity of a key derivation operation.
+ *
+ * The capacity of a key derivation operation is the maximum number of bytes
+ * that the key derivation operation can return from this point onwards.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to modify.
+ * \param capacity The new capacity of the operation.
+ * It must be less or equal to the operation's
+ * current capacity.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p capacity is larger than the operation's current capacity.
+ * In this case, the operation object remains valid and its capacity
+ * remains unchanged.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active), or the
+ * library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_capacity(
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
+ size_t capacity);
+
+/** Use the maximum possible capacity for a key derivation operation.
+ *
+ * Use this value as the capacity argument when setting up a key derivation
+ * to indicate that the operation should have the maximum possible capacity.
+ * The value of the maximum possible capacity depends on the key derivation
+ * algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_UNLIMITED_CAPACITY ((size_t) (-1))
+
+/** Provide an input for key derivation or key agreement.
+ *
+ * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm.
+ * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement
+ * algorithm for information.
+ *
+ * This function passes direct inputs, which is usually correct for
+ * non-secret inputs. To pass a secret input, which should be in a key
+ * object, call psa_key_derivation_input_key() instead of this function.
+ * Refer to the documentation of individual step types
+ * (`PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx` values of type ::psa_key_derivation_step_t)
+ * for more information.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use.
+ * It must have been set up with
+ * psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not
+ * have produced any output yet.
+ * \param step Which step the input data is for.
+ * \param[in] data Input data to use.
+ * \param data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or
+ * \c step does not allow direct inputs.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid for this input \p step, or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
+ psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
+ const uint8_t *data,
+ size_t data_length);
+
+/** Provide a numeric input for key derivation or key agreement.
+ *
+ * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm.
+ * However, when an algorithm requires a particular order, numeric inputs
+ * usually come first as they tend to be configuration parameters.
+ * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement
+ * algorithm for information.
+ *
+ * This function is used for inputs which are fixed-size non-negative
+ * integers.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use.
+ * It must have been set up with
+ * psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not
+ * have produced any output yet.
+ * \param step Which step the input data is for.
+ * \param[in] value The value of the numeric input.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or
+ * \c step does not allow numeric inputs.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid for this input \p step, or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_integer(
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
+ psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
+ uint64_t value);
+
+/** Provide an input for key derivation in the form of a key.
+ *
+ * Which inputs are required and in what order depends on the algorithm.
+ * Refer to the documentation of each key derivation or key agreement
+ * algorithm for information.
+ *
+ * This function obtains input from a key object, which is usually correct for
+ * secret inputs or for non-secret personalization strings kept in the key
+ * store. To pass a non-secret parameter which is not in the key store,
+ * call psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() instead of this function.
+ * Refer to the documentation of individual step types
+ * (`PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx` values of type ::psa_key_derivation_step_t)
+ * for more information.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use.
+ * It must have been set up with
+ * psa_key_derivation_setup() and must not
+ * have produced any output yet.
+ * \param step Which step the input data is for.
+ * \param key Identifier of the key. It must have an
+ * appropriate type for step and must allow the
+ * usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE or
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION (see note)
+ * and the algorithm used by the operation.
+ *
+ * \note Once all inputs steps are completed, the operations will allow:
+ * - psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() if each input was either a direct input
+ * or a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE set;
+ * - psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom()
+ * if the input for step
+ * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD
+ * was from a key slot with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE and each other input was
+ * either a direct input or a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE set;
+ * - psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() if each input was either a direct input
+ * or a key with #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION set;
+ * - psa_key_derivation_verify_key() under the same conditions as
+ * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes().
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The key allows neither #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE nor
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION, or it doesn't allow this
+ * algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \c step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm, or
+ * \c step does not allow key inputs of the given type
+ * or does not allow key inputs at all.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid for this input \p step, or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key(
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
+ psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key);
+
+/** Perform a key agreement and use the shared secret as input to a key
+ * derivation.
+ *
+ * A key agreement algorithm takes two inputs: a private key \p private_key
+ * a public key \p peer_key.
+ * The result of this function is passed as input to a key derivation.
+ * The output of this key derivation can be extracted by reading from the
+ * resulting operation to produce keys and other cryptographic material.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to use.
+ * It must have been set up with
+ * psa_key_derivation_setup() with a
+ * key agreement and derivation algorithm
+ * \c alg (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\c alg) is true
+ * and #PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(\c alg)
+ * is false).
+ * The operation must be ready for an
+ * input of the type given by \p step.
+ * \param step Which step the input data is for.
+ * \param private_key Identifier of the private key to use. It must
+ * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
+ * \param[in] peer_key Public key of the peer. The peer key must be in the
+ * same format that psa_import_key() accepts for the
+ * public key type corresponding to the type of
+ * private_key. That is, this function performs the
+ * equivalent of
+ * #psa_import_key(...,
+ * `peer_key`, `peer_key_length`) where
+ * with key attributes indicating the public key
+ * type corresponding to the type of `private_key`.
+ * For example, for EC keys, this means that peer_key
+ * is interpreted as a point on the curve that the
+ * private key is on. The standard formats for public
+ * keys are documented in the documentation of
+ * psa_export_public_key().
+ * \param peer_key_length Size of \p peer_key in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \c private_key is not compatible with \c alg,
+ * or \p peer_key is not valid for \c alg or not compatible with
+ * \c private_key, or \c step does not allow an input resulting
+ * from a key agreement.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \c alg is not supported or is not a key derivation algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid for this key agreement \p step,
+ * or the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
+ psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key,
+ const uint8_t *peer_key,
+ size_t peer_key_length);
+
+/** Read some data from a key derivation operation.
+ *
+ * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and
+ * return those bytes.
+ * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this
+ * function destructively reads the requested number of bytes from the
+ * stream.
+ * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status other than
+ * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from.
+ * \param[out] output Buffer where the output will be written.
+ * \param output_length Number of bytes to output.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * One of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA
+ * The operation's capacity was less than
+ * \p output_length bytes. Note that in this case,
+ * no output is written to the output buffer.
+ * The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus
+ * subsequent calls to this function will not
+ * succeed, even with a smaller output buffer.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed
+ * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously
+ * initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *output,
+ size_t output_length);
+
+/** Derive a key from an ongoing key derivation operation.
+ *
+ * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm
+ * and uses those bytes to generate a key deterministically.
+ * The key's location, usage policy, type and size are taken from
+ * \p attributes.
+ *
+ * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this
+ * function destructively reads as many bytes as required from the
+ * stream.
+ * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status other than
+ * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_key_derivation_abort().
+ *
+ * How much output is produced and consumed from the operation, and how
+ * the key is derived, depends on the key type and on the key size
+ * (denoted \c bits below):
+ *
+ * - For key types for which the key is an arbitrary sequence of bytes
+ * of a given size, this function is functionally equivalent to
+ * calling #psa_key_derivation_output_bytes
+ * and passing the resulting output to #psa_import_key.
+ * However, this function has a security benefit:
+ * if the implementation provides an isolation boundary then
+ * the key material is not exposed outside the isolation boundary.
+ * As a consequence, for these key types, this function always consumes
+ * exactly (\c bits / 8) bytes from the operation.
+ * The following key types defined in this specification follow this scheme:
+ *
+ * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES;
+ * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA;
+ * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA;
+ * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE;
+ * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC;
+ * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH.
+ *
+ * - For ECC keys on a Montgomery elliptic curve
+ * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(\c curve) where \c curve designates a
+ * Montgomery curve), this function always draws a byte string whose
+ * length is determined by the curve, and sets the mandatory bits
+ * accordingly. That is:
+ *
+ * - Curve25519 (#PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 255 bits): draw a 32-byte
+ * string and process it as specified in RFC 7748 §5.
+ * - Curve448 (#PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY, 448 bits): draw a 56-byte
+ * string and process it as specified in RFC 7748 §5.
+ *
+ * - For key types for which the key is represented by a single sequence of
+ * \c bits bits with constraints as to which bit sequences are acceptable,
+ * this function draws a byte string of length (\c bits / 8) bytes rounded
+ * up to the nearest whole number of bytes. If the resulting byte string
+ * is acceptable, it becomes the key, otherwise the drawn bytes are discarded.
+ * This process is repeated until an acceptable byte string is drawn.
+ * The byte string drawn from the operation is interpreted as specified
+ * for the output produced by psa_export_key().
+ * The following key types defined in this specification follow this scheme:
+ *
+ * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES.
+ * Force-set the parity bits, but discard forbidden weak keys.
+ * For 2-key and 3-key triple-DES, the three keys are generated
+ * successively (for example, for 3-key triple-DES,
+ * if the first 8 bytes specify a weak key and the next 8 bytes do not,
+ * discard the first 8 bytes, use the next 8 bytes as the first key,
+ * and continue reading output from the operation to derive the other
+ * two keys).
+ * - Finite-field Diffie-Hellman keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(\c group)
+ * where \c group designates any Diffie-Hellman group) and
+ * ECC keys on a Weierstrass elliptic curve
+ * (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(\c curve) where \c curve designates a
+ * Weierstrass curve).
+ * For these key types, interpret the byte string as integer
+ * in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range
+ * [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain
+ * (the prime *p* for Diffie-Hellman, the subprime *q* for DSA,
+ * or the order of the curve's base point for ECC).
+ * Add 1 to the resulting integer and use this as the private key *x*.
+ * This method allows compliance to NIST standards, specifically
+ * the methods titled "key-pair generation by testing candidates"
+ * in NIST SP 800-56A §5.6.1.1.4 for Diffie-Hellman,
+ * in FIPS 186-4 §B.1.2 for DSA, and
+ * in NIST SP 800-56A §5.6.1.2.2 or
+ * FIPS 186-4 §B.4.2 for elliptic curve keys.
+ *
+ * - For other key types, including #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR,
+ * the way in which the operation output is consumed is
+ * implementation-defined.
+ *
+ * In all cases, the data that is read is discarded from the operation.
+ * The operation's capacity is decreased by the number of bytes read.
+ *
+ * For algorithms that take an input step #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET,
+ * the input to that step must be provided with psa_key_derivation_input_key().
+ * Future versions of this specification may include additional restrictions
+ * on the derived key based on the attributes and strength of the secret key.
+ *
+ * \note This function is equivalent to calling
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom()
+ * with the custom production parameters #PSA_CUSTOM_KEY_PARAMETERS_INIT
+ * and `custom_data_length == 0` (i.e. `custom_data` is empty).
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key.
+ * If the key type to be created is
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH then the algorithm in
+ * the policy must be the same as in the current
+ * operation.
+ * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from.
+ * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created
+ * key. For persistent keys, this is the key
+ * identifier defined in \p attributes.
+ * \c 0 on failure.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata
+ * have been saved to persistent storage.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
+ * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is
+ * already a persistent key with the given identifier.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA
+ * There was not enough data to create the desired key.
+ * Note that in this case, no output is written to the output buffer.
+ * The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus subsequent calls to
+ * this function will not succeed, even with a smaller output buffer.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * The key type or key size is not supported, either by the
+ * implementation in general or in this particular location.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The provided key attributes are not valid for the operation.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or
+ * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input was not provided through a
+ * key; or one of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed
+ * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously
+ * initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key);
+
+/** Derive a key from an ongoing key derivation operation with custom
+ * production parameters.
+ *
+ * See the description of psa_key_derivation_out_key() for the operation of
+ * this function with the default production parameters.
+ * Mbed TLS currently does not currently support any non-default production
+ * parameters.
+ *
+ * \note This function is experimental and may change in future minor
+ * versions of Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key.
+ * If the key type to be created is
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH then the algorithm in
+ * the policy must be the same as in the current
+ * operation.
+ * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from.
+ * \param[in] custom Customization parameters for the key generation.
+ * When this is #PSA_CUSTOM_KEY_PARAMETERS_INIT
+ * with \p custom_data_length = 0,
+ * this function is equivalent to
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_key().
+ * \param[in] custom_data Variable-length data associated with \c custom.
+ * \param custom_data_length
+ * Length of `custom_data` in bytes.
+ * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created
+ * key. For persistent keys, this is the key
+ * identifier defined in \p attributes.
+ * \c 0 on failure.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata
+ * have been saved to persistent storage.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
+ * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is
+ * already a persistent key with the given identifier.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA
+ * There was not enough data to create the desired key.
+ * Note that in this case, no output is written to the output buffer.
+ * The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus subsequent calls to
+ * this function will not succeed, even with a smaller output buffer.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * The key type or key size is not supported, either by the
+ * implementation in general or in this particular location.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The provided key attributes are not valid for the operation.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or
+ * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input was not provided through a
+ * key; or one of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed
+ * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously
+ * initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_custom_key_parameters_t *custom,
+ const uint8_t *custom_data,
+ size_t custom_data_length,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key);
+
+#ifndef __cplusplus
+/* Omitted when compiling in C++, because one of the parameters is a
+ * pointer to a struct with a flexible array member, and that is not
+ * standard C++.
+ * https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/9020
+ */
+/** Derive a key from an ongoing key derivation operation with custom
+ * production parameters.
+ *
+ * \note
+ * This is a deprecated variant of psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom().
+ * It is equivalent except that the associated variable-length data
+ * is passed in `params->data` instead of a separate parameter.
+ * This function will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key.
+ * If the key type to be created is
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH then the algorithm in
+ * the policy must be the same as in the current
+ * operation.
+ * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from.
+ * \param[in] params Customization parameters for the key derivation.
+ * When this is #PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT
+ * with \p params_data_length = 0,
+ * this function is equivalent to
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_key().
+ * Mbed TLS currently only supports the default
+ * production parameters, i.e.
+ * #PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT,
+ * for all key types.
+ * \param params_data_length
+ * Length of `params->data` in bytes.
+ * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created
+ * key. For persistent keys, this is the key
+ * identifier defined in \p attributes.
+ * \c 0 on failure.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata
+ * have been saved to persistent storage.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
+ * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is
+ * already a persistent key with the given identifier.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA
+ * There was not enough data to create the desired key.
+ * Note that in this case, no output is written to the output buffer.
+ * The operation's capacity is set to 0, thus subsequent calls to
+ * this function will not succeed, even with a smaller output buffer.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * The key type or key size is not supported, either by the
+ * implementation in general or in this particular location.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The provided key attributes are not valid for the operation.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or
+ * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input was not provided through a
+ * key; or one of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed
+ * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously
+ * initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params,
+ size_t params_data_length,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key);
+#endif /* !__cplusplus */
+
+/** Compare output data from a key derivation operation to an expected value.
+ *
+ * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and
+ * compares those bytes to an expected value in constant time.
+ * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this
+ * function destructively reads the expected number of bytes from the
+ * stream before comparing them.
+ * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read.
+ *
+ * This is functionally equivalent to the following code:
+ * \code
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(operation, tmp, output_length);
+ * if (memcmp(output, tmp, output_length) != 0)
+ * return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE;
+ * \endcode
+ * except (1) it works even if the key's policy does not allow outputting the
+ * bytes, and (2) the comparison will be done in constant time.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status other than
+ * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE,
+ * the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling
+ * psa_key_derivation_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from.
+ * \param[in] expected Buffer containing the expected derivation output.
+ * \param expected_length Length of the expected output; this is also the
+ * number of bytes that will be read.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The output was read successfully, but it differs from the expected
+ * output.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * One of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't allow
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA
+ * The operation's capacity was less than
+ * \p output_length bytes. Note that in this case,
+ * the operation's capacity is set to 0, thus
+ * subsequent calls to this function will not
+ * succeed, even with a smaller expected output.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed
+ * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously
+ * initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *expected,
+ size_t expected_length);
+
+/** Compare output data from a key derivation operation to an expected value
+ * stored in a key object.
+ *
+ * This function calculates output bytes from a key derivation algorithm and
+ * compares those bytes to an expected value, provided as key of type
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH.
+ * If you view the key derivation's output as a stream of bytes, this
+ * function destructively reads the number of bytes corresponding to the
+ * length of the expected value from the stream before comparing them.
+ * The operation's capacity decreases by the number of bytes read.
+ *
+ * This is functionally equivalent to exporting the key and calling
+ * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() on the result, except that it
+ * works even if the key cannot be exported.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status other than
+ * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE,
+ * the operation enters an error state and must be aborted by calling
+ * psa_key_derivation_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The key derivation operation object to read from.
+ * \param[in] expected A key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH
+ * containing the expected output. Its policy must
+ * include the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION flag
+ * and the permitted algorithm must match the
+ * operation. The value of this key was likely
+ * computed by a previous call to
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom().
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The output was read successfully, but if differs from the expected
+ * output.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * The key passed as the expected value does not exist.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The key passed as the expected value has an invalid type.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The key passed as the expected value does not allow this usage or
+ * this algorithm; or one of the inputs was a key whose policy didn't
+ * allow #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA
+ * The operation's capacity was less than
+ * the length of the expected value. In this case,
+ * the operation's capacity is set to 0, thus
+ * subsequent calls to this function will not
+ * succeed, even with a smaller expected output.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active and completed
+ * all required input steps), or the library has not been previously
+ * initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_verify_key(
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
+ psa_key_id_t expected);
+
+/** Abort a key derivation operation.
+ *
+ * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the \c
+ * operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused
+ * for another operation by calling psa_key_derivation_setup() again.
+ *
+ * This function may be called at any time after the operation
+ * object has been initialized as described in #psa_key_derivation_operation_t.
+ *
+ * In particular, it is valid to call psa_key_derivation_abort() twice, or to
+ * call psa_key_derivation_abort() on an operation that has not been set up.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation to abort.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort(
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation);
+
+/** Perform a key agreement and return the raw shared secret.
+ *
+ * \warning The raw result of a key agreement algorithm such as finite-field
+ * Diffie-Hellman or elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman has biases and should
+ * not be used directly as key material. It should instead be passed as
+ * input to a key derivation algorithm. To chain a key agreement with
+ * a key derivation, use psa_key_derivation_key_agreement() and other
+ * functions from the key derivation interface.
+ *
+ * \param alg The key agreement algorithm to compute
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p alg)
+ * is true).
+ * \param private_key Identifier of the private key to use. It must
+ * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
+ * \param[in] peer_key Public key of the peer. It must be
+ * in the same format that psa_import_key()
+ * accepts. The standard formats for public
+ * keys are documented in the documentation
+ * of psa_export_public_key().
+ * \param peer_key_length Size of \p peer_key in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output Buffer where the decrypted message is to
+ * be written.
+ * \param output_size Size of the \c output buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the returned output.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p alg is not a key agreement algorithm, or
+ * \p private_key is not compatible with \p alg,
+ * or \p peer_key is not valid for \p alg or not compatible with
+ * \p private_key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * \p output_size is too small
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p alg is not a supported key agreement algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_raw_key_agreement(psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t private_key,
+ const uint8_t *peer_key,
+ size_t peer_key_length,
+ uint8_t *output,
+ size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_length);
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup random Random generation
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Generate random bytes.
+ *
+ * \warning This function **can** fail! Callers MUST check the return status
+ * and MUST NOT use the content of the output buffer if the return
+ * status is not #PSA_SUCCESS.
+ *
+ * \note To generate a key, use psa_generate_key() instead.
+ *
+ * \param[out] output Output buffer for the generated data.
+ * \param output_size Number of bytes to generate and output.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_generate_random(uint8_t *output,
+ size_t output_size);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Generate a key or key pair.
+ *
+ * The key is generated randomly.
+ * Its location, usage policy, type and size are taken from \p attributes.
+ *
+ * Implementations must reject an attempt to generate a key of size 0.
+ *
+ * The following type-specific considerations apply:
+ * - For RSA keys (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR),
+ * the public exponent is 65537.
+ * The modulus is a product of two probabilistic primes
+ * between 2^{n-1} and 2^n where n is the bit size specified in the
+ * attributes.
+ *
+ * \note This function is equivalent to calling psa_generate_key_custom()
+ * with the custom production parameters #PSA_CUSTOM_KEY_PARAMETERS_INIT
+ * and `custom_data_length == 0` (i.e. `custom_data` is empty).
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key.
+ * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created
+ * key. For persistent keys, this is the key
+ * identifier defined in \p attributes.
+ * \c 0 on failure.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata
+ * have been saved to persistent storage.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
+ * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is
+ * already a persistent key with the given identifier.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_generate_key(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Generate a key or key pair using custom production parameters.
+ *
+ * See the description of psa_generate_key() for the operation of this
+ * function with the default production parameters. In addition, this function
+ * supports the following production customizations, described in more detail
+ * in the documentation of ::psa_custom_key_parameters_t:
+ *
+ * - RSA keys: generation with a custom public exponent.
+ *
+ * \note This function is experimental and may change in future minor
+ * versions of Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key.
+ * \param[in] custom Customization parameters for the key generation.
+ * When this is #PSA_CUSTOM_KEY_PARAMETERS_INIT
+ * with \p custom_data_length = 0,
+ * this function is equivalent to
+ * psa_generate_key().
+ * \param[in] custom_data Variable-length data associated with \c custom.
+ * \param custom_data_length
+ * Length of `custom_data` in bytes.
+ * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created
+ * key. For persistent keys, this is the key
+ * identifier defined in \p attributes.
+ * \c 0 on failure.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata
+ * have been saved to persistent storage.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
+ * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is
+ * already a persistent key with the given identifier.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_generate_key_custom(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const psa_custom_key_parameters_t *custom,
+ const uint8_t *custom_data,
+ size_t custom_data_length,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key);
+
+#ifndef __cplusplus
+/* Omitted when compiling in C++, because one of the parameters is a
+ * pointer to a struct with a flexible array member, and that is not
+ * standard C++.
+ * https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/9020
+ */
+/**
+ * \brief Generate a key or key pair using custom production parameters.
+ *
+ * \note
+ * This is a deprecated variant of psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom().
+ * It is equivalent except that the associated variable-length data
+ * is passed in `params->data` instead of a separate parameter.
+ * This function will be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes for the new key.
+ * \param[in] params Customization parameters for the key generation.
+ * When this is #PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT
+ * with \p params_data_length = 0,
+ * this function is equivalent to
+ * psa_generate_key().
+ * \param params_data_length
+ * Length of `params->data` in bytes.
+ * \param[out] key On success, an identifier for the newly created
+ * key. For persistent keys, this is the key
+ * identifier defined in \p attributes.
+ * \c 0 on failure.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * If the key is persistent, the key material and the key's metadata
+ * have been saved to persistent storage.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
+ * This is an attempt to create a persistent key, and there is
+ * already a persistent key with the given identifier.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_generate_key_ext(const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const psa_key_production_parameters_t *params,
+ size_t params_data_length,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key);
+#endif /* !__cplusplus */
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup interruptible_hash Interruptible sign/verify hash
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** The type of the state data structure for interruptible hash
+ * signing operations.
+ *
+ * Before calling any function on a sign hash operation object, the
+ * application must initialize it by any of the following means:
+ * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation;
+ * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation = {0};
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to the initializer
+ * #PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation =
+ * PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT;
+ * \endcode
+ * - Assign the result of the function
+ * psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_init() to the structure, for
+ * example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation;
+ * operation = psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_init();
+ * \endcode
+ *
+ * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
+ * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
+ * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */
+typedef struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t;
+
+/** The type of the state data structure for interruptible hash
+ * verification operations.
+ *
+ * Before calling any function on a sign hash operation object, the
+ * application must initialize it by any of the following means:
+ * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation;
+ * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation = {0};
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to the initializer
+ * #PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation =
+ * PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT;
+ * \endcode
+ * - Assign the result of the function
+ * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_init() to the structure, for
+ * example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t operation;
+ * operation = psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_init();
+ * \endcode
+ *
+ * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
+ * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
+ * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */
+typedef struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the maximum number of ops allowed to be
+ * executed by an interruptible function in a
+ * single call.
+ *
+ * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
+ * at any point. It is not bound by the usual
+ * interface stability promises.
+ *
+ * \note The time taken to execute a single op is
+ * implementation specific and depends on
+ * software, hardware, the algorithm, key type and
+ * curve chosen. Even within a single operation,
+ * successive ops can take differing amounts of
+ * time. The only guarantee is that lower values
+ * for \p max_ops means functions will block for a
+ * lesser maximum amount of time. The functions
+ * \c psa_sign_interruptible_get_num_ops() and
+ * \c psa_verify_interruptible_get_num_ops() are
+ * provided to help with tuning this value.
+ *
+ * \note This value defaults to
+ * #PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED, which
+ * means the whole operation will be done in one
+ * go, regardless of the number of ops required.
+ *
+ * \note If more ops are needed to complete a
+ * computation, #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE will be
+ * returned by the function performing the
+ * computation. It is then the caller's
+ * responsibility to either call again with the
+ * same operation context until it returns 0 or an
+ * error code; or to call the relevant abort
+ * function if the answer is no longer required.
+ *
+ * \note The interpretation of \p max_ops is also
+ * implementation defined. On a hard real time
+ * system, this can indicate a hard deadline, as a
+ * real-time system needs a guarantee of not
+ * spending more than X time, however care must be
+ * taken in such an implementation to avoid the
+ * situation whereby calls just return, not being
+ * able to do any actual work within the allotted
+ * time. On a non-real-time system, the
+ * implementation can be more relaxed, but again
+ * whether this number should be interpreted as as
+ * hard or soft limit or even whether a less than
+ * or equals as regards to ops executed in a
+ * single call is implementation defined.
+ *
+ * \note For keys in local storage when no accelerator
+ * driver applies, please see also the
+ * documentation for \c mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(),
+ * which is the internal implementation in these
+ * cases.
+ *
+ * \warning With implementations that interpret this number
+ * as a hard limit, setting this number too small
+ * may result in an infinite loop, whereby each
+ * call results in immediate return with no ops
+ * done (as there is not enough time to execute
+ * any), and thus no result will ever be achieved.
+ *
+ * \note This only applies to functions whose
+ * documentation mentions they may return
+ * #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE.
+ *
+ * \param max_ops The maximum number of ops to be executed in a
+ * single call. This can be a number from 0 to
+ * #PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED, where 0
+ * is the least amount of work done per call.
+ */
+void psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(uint32_t max_ops);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the maximum number of ops allowed to be
+ * executed by an interruptible function in a
+ * single call. This will return the last
+ * value set by
+ * \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() or
+ * #PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED if
+ * that function has never been called.
+ *
+ * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
+ * at any point. It is not bound by the usual
+ * interface stability promises.
+ *
+ * \return Maximum number of ops allowed to be
+ * executed by an interruptible function in a
+ * single call.
+ */
+uint32_t psa_interruptible_get_max_ops(void);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the number of ops that a hash signing
+ * operation has taken so far. If the operation
+ * has completed, then this will represent the
+ * number of ops required for the entire
+ * operation. After initialization or calling
+ * \c psa_sign_hash_interruptible_abort() on
+ * the operation, a value of 0 will be returned.
+ *
+ * \note This interface is guaranteed re-entrant and
+ * thus may be called from driver code.
+ *
+ * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
+ * at any point. It is not bound by the usual
+ * interface stability promises.
+ *
+ * This is a helper provided to help you tune the
+ * value passed to \c
+ * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops().
+ *
+ * \param operation The \c psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t
+ * to use. This must be initialized first.
+ *
+ * \return Number of ops that the operation has taken so
+ * far.
+ */
+uint32_t psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops(
+ const psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the number of ops that a hash verification
+ * operation has taken so far. If the operation
+ * has completed, then this will represent the
+ * number of ops required for the entire
+ * operation. After initialization or calling \c
+ * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_abort() on the
+ * operation, a value of 0 will be returned.
+ *
+ * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
+ * at any point. It is not bound by the usual
+ * interface stability promises.
+ *
+ * This is a helper provided to help you tune the
+ * value passed to \c
+ * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops().
+ *
+ * \param operation The \c
+ * psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t to
+ * use. This must be initialized first.
+ *
+ * \return Number of ops that the operation has taken so
+ * far.
+ */
+uint32_t psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops(
+ const psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Start signing a hash or short message with a
+ * private key, in an interruptible manner.
+ *
+ * \see \c psa_sign_hash_complete()
+ *
+ * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
+ * at any point. It is not bound by the usual
+ * interface stability promises.
+ *
+ * \note This function combined with \c
+ * psa_sign_hash_complete() is equivalent to
+ * \c psa_sign_hash() but
+ * \c psa_sign_hash_complete() can return early and
+ * resume according to the limit set with \c
+ * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to reduce the
+ * maximum time spent in a function call.
+ *
+ * \note Users should call \c psa_sign_hash_complete()
+ * repeatedly on the same context after a
+ * successful call to this function until \c
+ * psa_sign_hash_complete() either returns 0 or an
+ * error. \c psa_sign_hash_complete() will return
+ * #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE if there is more work
+ * to do. Alternatively users can call
+ * \c psa_sign_hash_abort() at any point if they no
+ * longer want the result.
+ *
+ * \note If this function returns an error status, the
+ * operation enters an error state and must be
+ * aborted by calling \c psa_sign_hash_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in, out] operation The \c psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t
+ * to use. This must be initialized first.
+ *
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
+ * It must be an asymmetric key pair. The key must
+ * allow the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH.
+ * \param alg A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX
+ * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg)
+ * is true), that is compatible with
+ * the type of \p key.
+ * \param[in] hash The hash or message to sign.
+ * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The operation started successfully - call \c psa_sign_hash_complete()
+ * with the same context to complete the operation
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH flag, or it does
+ * not permit the requested algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * An operation has previously been started on this context, and is
+ * still in progress.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_start(
+ psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Continue and eventually complete the action of
+ * signing a hash or short message with a private
+ * key, in an interruptible manner.
+ *
+ * \see \c psa_sign_hash_start()
+ *
+ * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
+ * at any point. It is not bound by the usual
+ * interface stability promises.
+ *
+ * \note This function combined with \c
+ * psa_sign_hash_start() is equivalent to
+ * \c psa_sign_hash() but this function can return
+ * early and resume according to the limit set with
+ * \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to reduce the
+ * maximum time spent in a function call.
+ *
+ * \note Users should call this function on the same
+ * operation object repeatedly until it either
+ * returns 0 or an error. This function will return
+ * #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE if there is more work
+ * to do. Alternatively users can call
+ * \c psa_sign_hash_abort() at any point if they no
+ * longer want the result.
+ *
+ * \note When this function returns successfully, the
+ * operation becomes inactive. If this function
+ * returns an error status, the operation enters an
+ * error state and must be aborted by calling
+ * \c psa_sign_hash_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in, out] operation The \c psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t
+ * to use. This must be initialized first, and have
+ * had \c psa_sign_hash_start() called with it
+ * first.
+ *
+ * \param[out] signature Buffer where the signature is to be written.
+ * \param signature_size Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes. This
+ * must be appropriate for the selected
+ * algorithm and key:
+ * - The required signature size is
+ * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c
+ * key_bits, \c alg) where \c key_type and \c
+ * key_bits are the type and bit-size
+ * respectively of key.
+ * - #PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE evaluates to the
+ * maximum signature size of any supported
+ * signature algorithm.
+ * \param[out] signature_length On success, the number of bytes that make up
+ * the returned signature value.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Operation completed successfully
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE
+ * Operation was interrupted due to the setting of \c
+ * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(). There is still work to be done.
+ * Call this function again with the same operation object.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p signature buffer is too small. You can
+ * determine a sufficient buffer size by calling
+ * #PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c key_type, \c key_bits, \c alg)
+ * where \c key_type and \c key_bits are the type and bit-size
+ * respectively of \c key.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * An operation was not previously started on this context via
+ * \c psa_sign_hash_start().
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has either not been previously initialized by
+ * psa_crypto_init() or you did not previously call
+ * psa_sign_hash_start() with this operation object. It is
+ * implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize results in
+ * this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_complete(
+ psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation,
+ uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_size,
+ size_t *signature_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Abort a sign hash operation.
+ *
+ * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
+ * at any point. It is not bound by the usual
+ * interface stability promises.
+ *
+ * \note This function is the only function that clears
+ * the number of ops completed as part of the
+ * operation. Please ensure you copy this value via
+ * \c psa_sign_hash_get_num_ops() if required
+ * before calling.
+ *
+ * \note Aborting an operation frees all associated
+ * resources except for the \p operation structure
+ * itself. Once aborted, the operation object can
+ * be reused for another operation by calling \c
+ * psa_sign_hash_start() again.
+ *
+ * \note You may call this function any time after the
+ * operation object has been initialized. In
+ * particular, calling \c psa_sign_hash_abort()
+ * after the operation has already been terminated
+ * by a call to \c psa_sign_hash_abort() or
+ * psa_sign_hash_complete() is safe.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Initialized sign hash operation.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The operation was aborted successfully.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_abort(
+ psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Start reading and verifying a hash or short
+ * message, in an interruptible manner.
+ *
+ * \see \c psa_verify_hash_complete()
+ *
+ * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
+ * at any point. It is not bound by the usual
+ * interface stability promises.
+ *
+ * \note This function combined with \c
+ * psa_verify_hash_complete() is equivalent to
+ * \c psa_verify_hash() but \c
+ * psa_verify_hash_complete() can return early and
+ * resume according to the limit set with \c
+ * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to reduce the
+ * maximum time spent in a function.
+ *
+ * \note Users should call \c psa_verify_hash_complete()
+ * repeatedly on the same operation object after a
+ * successful call to this function until \c
+ * psa_verify_hash_complete() either returns 0 or
+ * an error. \c psa_verify_hash_complete() will
+ * return #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE if there is
+ * more work to do. Alternatively users can call
+ * \c psa_verify_hash_abort() at any point if they
+ * no longer want the result.
+ *
+ * \note If this function returns an error status, the
+ * operation enters an error state and must be
+ * aborted by calling \c psa_verify_hash_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in, out] operation The \c psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t
+ * to use. This must be initialized first.
+ *
+ * \param key Identifier of the key to use for the operation.
+ * The key must allow the usage
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH.
+ * \param alg A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX
+ * value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(\p alg)
+ * is true), that is compatible with
+ * the type of \p key.
+ * \param[in] hash The hash whose signature is to be verified.
+ * \param hash_length Size of the \p hash buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[in] signature Buffer containing the signature to verify.
+ * \param signature_length Size of the \p signature buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The operation started successfully - please call \c
+ * psa_verify_hash_complete() with the same context to complete the
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * Another operation has already been started on this context, and is
+ * still in progress.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH flag, or it does
+ * not permit the requested algorithm.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_start(
+ psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *hash, size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *signature, size_t signature_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Continue and eventually complete the action of
+ * reading and verifying a hash or short message
+ * signed with a private key, in an interruptible
+ * manner.
+ *
+ * \see \c psa_verify_hash_start()
+ *
+ * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change
+ * at any point. It is not bound by the usual
+ * interface stability promises.
+ *
+ * \note This function combined with \c
+ * psa_verify_hash_start() is equivalent to
+ * \c psa_verify_hash() but this function can
+ * return early and resume according to the limit
+ * set with \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to
+ * reduce the maximum time spent in a function
+ * call.
+ *
+ * \note Users should call this function on the same
+ * operation object repeatedly until it either
+ * returns 0 or an error. This function will return
+ * #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE if there is more work
+ * to do. Alternatively users can call
+ * \c psa_verify_hash_abort() at any point if they
+ * no longer want the result.
+ *
+ * \note When this function returns successfully, the
+ * operation becomes inactive. If this function
+ * returns an error status, the operation enters an
+ * error state and must be aborted by calling
+ * \c psa_verify_hash_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in, out] operation The \c psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t
+ * to use. This must be initialized first, and have
+ * had \c psa_verify_hash_start() called with it
+ * first.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Operation completed successfully, and the passed signature is valid.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE
+ * Operation was interrupted due to the setting of \c
+ * psa_interruptible_set_max_ops(). There is still work to be done.
+ * Call this function again with the same operation object.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The calculation was performed successfully, but the passed
+ * signature is not a valid signature.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * An operation was not previously started on this context via
+ * \c psa_verify_hash_start().
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has either not been previously initialized by
+ * psa_crypto_init() or you did not previously call
+ * psa_verify_hash_start() on this object. It is
+ * implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize results in
+ * this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_complete(
+ psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Abort a verify hash operation.
+ *
+ * \warning This is a beta API, and thus subject to change at
+ * any point. It is not bound by the usual interface
+ * stability promises.
+ *
+ * \note This function is the only function that clears the
+ * number of ops completed as part of the operation.
+ * Please ensure you copy this value via
+ * \c psa_verify_hash_get_num_ops() if required
+ * before calling.
+ *
+ * \note Aborting an operation frees all associated
+ * resources except for the operation structure
+ * itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be
+ * reused for another operation by calling \c
+ * psa_verify_hash_start() again.
+ *
+ * \note You may call this function any time after the
+ * operation object has been initialized.
+ * In particular, calling \c psa_verify_hash_abort()
+ * after the operation has already been terminated by
+ * a call to \c psa_verify_hash_abort() or
+ * psa_verify_hash_complete() is safe.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Initialized verify hash operation.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The operation was aborted successfully.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_abort(
+ psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t *operation);
+
+
+/**@}*/
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+/* The file "crypto_extra.h" contains vendor-specific definitions. This
+ * can include vendor-defined algorithms, extra functions, etc. */
+#include "crypto_extra.h"
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a2af15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa/crypto_adjust_auto_enabled.h
+ * \brief Adjust PSA configuration: enable always-on features
+ *
+ * This is an internal header. Do not include it directly.
+ *
+ * Always enable certain features which require a negligible amount of code
+ * to implement, to avoid some edge cases in the configuration combinatorics.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_AUTO_ENABLED_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_AUTO_ENABLED_H
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILES_READ)
+#error "Do not include psa/crypto_adjust_*.h manually! This can lead to problems, " \
+ "up to and including runtime errors such as buffer overflows. " \
+ "If you're trying to fix a complaint from check_config.h, just remove " \
+ "it from your configuration file: since Mbed TLS 3.0, it is included " \
+ "automatically at the right point."
+#endif /* */
+
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_AUTO_ENABLED_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_dependencies.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_dependencies.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..92e9c4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_dependencies.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa/crypto_adjust_config_dependencies.h
+ * \brief Adjust PSA configuration by resolving some dependencies.
+ *
+ * This is an internal header. Do not include it directly.
+ *
+ * See docs/proposed/psa-conditional-inclusion-c.md.
+ * If the Mbed TLS implementation of a cryptographic mechanism A depends on a
+ * cryptographic mechanism B then if the cryptographic mechanism A is enabled
+ * and not accelerated enable B. Note that if A is enabled and accelerated, it
+ * is not necessary to enable B for A support.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_CONFIG_DEPENDENCIES_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_CONFIG_DEPENDENCIES_H
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILES_READ)
+#error "Do not include psa/crypto_adjust_*.h manually! This can lead to problems, " \
+ "up to and including runtime errors such as buffer overflows. " \
+ "If you're trying to fix a complaint from check_config.h, just remove " \
+ "it from your configuration file: since Mbed TLS 3.0, it is included " \
+ "automatically at the right point."
+#endif /* */
+
+#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PRF)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND)) || \
+ (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC))
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC 1
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128))
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1
+#endif
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_CONFIG_DEPENDENCIES_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cec39e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa/crypto_adjust_config_key_pair_types.h
+ * \brief Adjust PSA configuration for key pair types.
+ *
+ * This is an internal header. Do not include it directly.
+ *
+ * See docs/proposed/psa-conditional-inclusion-c.md.
+ * - Support non-basic operations in a keypair type implicitly enables basic
+ * support for that keypair type.
+ * - Support for a keypair type implicitly enables the corresponding public
+ * key type.
+ * - Basic support for a keypair type implicilty enables import/export support
+ * for that keypair type. Warning: this is implementation-specific (mainly
+ * for the benefit of testing) and may change in the future!
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_KEYPAIR_TYPES_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_KEYPAIR_TYPES_H
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILES_READ)
+#error "Do not include psa/crypto_adjust_*.h manually! This can lead to problems, " \
+ "up to and including runtime errors such as buffer overflows. " \
+ "If you're trying to fix a complaint from check_config.h, just remove " \
+ "it from your configuration file: since Mbed TLS 3.0, it is included " \
+ "automatically at the right point."
+#endif /* */
+
+/*****************************************************************
+ * ANYTHING -> BASIC
+ ****************************************************************/
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
+#endif
+
+/*****************************************************************
+ * BASIC -> corresponding PUBLIC
+ ****************************************************************/
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1
+#endif
+
+/*****************************************************************
+ * BASIC -> IMPORT+EXPORT
+ *
+ * (Implementation-specific, may change in the future.)
+ ****************************************************************/
+
+/* Even though KEY_PAIR symbols' feature several level of support (BASIC, IMPORT,
+ * EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE) we're not planning to have support only for BASIC
+ * without IMPORT/EXPORT since these last 2 features are strongly used in tests.
+ * In general it is allowed to include more feature than what is strictly
+ * requested.
+ * As a consequence IMPORT and EXPORT features will be automatically enabled
+ * as soon as the BASIC one is. */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
+#endif
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_KEYPAIR_TYPES_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..54b116f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa/crypto_adjust_config_synonyms.h
+ * \brief Adjust PSA configuration: enable quasi-synonyms
+ *
+ * This is an internal header. Do not include it directly.
+ *
+ * When two features require almost the same code, we automatically enable
+ * both when either one is requested, to reduce the combinatorics of
+ * possible configurations.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_CONFIG_SYNONYMS_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_CONFIG_SYNONYMS_H
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILES_READ)
+#error "Do not include psa/crypto_adjust_*.h manually! This can lead to problems, " \
+ "up to and including runtime errors such as buffer overflows. " \
+ "If you're trying to fix a complaint from check_config.h, just remove " \
+ "it from your configuration file: since Mbed TLS 3.0, it is included " \
+ "automatically at the right point."
+#endif /* */
+
+/****************************************************************/
+/* De facto synonyms */
+/****************************************************************/
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY
+#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW
+#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT
+#elif !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS)
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS
+#endif
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_ADJUST_CONFIG_SYNONYMS_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c14f5dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+/*
+ * Context structure declaration of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers
+ * called through the PSA Crypto driver dispatch layer.
+ * This file contains the context structures of those algorithms which need to
+ * rely on other algorithms, i.e. are 'composite' algorithms.
+ *
+ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
+ * include psa/crypto.h.
+ *
+ * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and
+ * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the
+ * multi-part state objects of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers. The
+ * definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the
+ * implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include <psa/crypto_driver_common.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM)
+#include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM)
+#include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
+#endif
+#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
+
+/*
+ * MAC multi-part operation definitions.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+typedef struct {
+ /** The HMAC algorithm in use */
+ psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg);
+ /** The hash context. */
+ struct psa_hash_operation_s hash_ctx;
+ /** The HMAC part of the context. */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(opad)[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+} mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0, PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT, { 0 } }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
+
+typedef struct {
+ psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg);
+ union {
+ unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy); /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hmac);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HMAC */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC) || defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cmac);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CMAC */
+ } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
+} mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 } }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD 1
+#endif
+
+/* Context structure for the Mbed TLS AEAD implementation. */
+typedef struct {
+ psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg);
+ psa_key_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_type);
+
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is_encrypt) : 1;
+
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tag_length);
+
+ union {
+ unsigned dummy; /* Enable easier initializing of the union. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM)
+ mbedtls_ccm_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ccm);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM)
+ mbedtls_gcm_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(gcm);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_GCM */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
+ mbedtls_chachapoly_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chachapoly);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 */
+
+ } ctx;
+
+} mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } }
+
+#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
+
+/* Context structure for the Mbed TLS interruptible sign hash implementation. */
+typedef struct {
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(restart_ctx);
+
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(num_ops);
+
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(coordinate_bytes);
+ psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg);
+ mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_alg);
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hash)[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)];
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hash_length);
+
+#else
+ /* Make the struct non-empty if algs not supported. */
+ unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy);
+
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) ||
+ * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) &&
+ * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */
+} mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t;
+
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { { 0 }, { 0 }, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
+#endif
+
+/* Context structure for the Mbed TLS interruptible verify hash
+ * implementation.*/
+typedef struct {
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_context *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(restart_ctx);
+
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(num_ops);
+
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hash)[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)];
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hash_length);
+
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(r);
+ mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(s);
+
+#else
+ /* Make the struct non-empty if algs not supported. */
+ unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy);
+
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) ||
+ * defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) &&
+ * defined( MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE ) */
+
+} mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t;
+
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+#define MBEDTLS_VERIFY_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { { 0 }, { 0 }, 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 }, \
+ { 0 } }
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_VERIFY_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
+#endif
+
+
+/* EC-JPAKE operation definitions */
+
+#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE 1
+#endif
+
+/* Note: the format for mbedtls_ecjpake_read/write function has an extra
+ * length byte for each step, plus an extra 3 bytes for ECParameters in the
+ * server's 2nd round. */
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_JPAKE_BUFFER_SIZE ((3 + 1 + 65 + 1 + 65 + 1 + 32) * 2)
+
+typedef struct {
+ psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg);
+
+ uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password);
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password_len);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_role MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(role);
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer[MBEDTLS_PSA_JPAKE_BUFFER_SIZE]);
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer_length);
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer_offset);
+#endif
+ /* Context structure for the Mbed TLS EC-JPAKE implementation. */
+ union {
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_JPAKE)
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_context MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(jpake);
+#endif
+ } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
+
+} mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT { { 0 } }
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_COMPOSITES_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b91ae7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/*
+ * Context structure declaration of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers
+ * called through the PSA Crypto driver dispatch layer.
+ * This file contains the context structures of key derivation algorithms
+ * which need to rely on other algorithms.
+ *
+ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
+ * include psa/crypto.h.
+ *
+ * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and
+ * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the
+ * multi-part state objects of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers. The
+ * definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the
+ * implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEY_DERIVATION_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEY_DERIVATION_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include <psa/crypto_driver_common.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND)
+typedef struct {
+ uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(info);
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(info_length);
+#if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff
+#error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t"
+#endif
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(offset_in_block);
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_number);
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state) : 2;
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(info_set) : 1;
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(output_block)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(prk)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
+ struct psa_mac_operation_s MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hmac);
+} psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF ||
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT ||
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS)
+typedef struct {
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(data)[PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE];
+} psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_t;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
+typedef enum {
+ PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_INIT, /* no input provided */
+ PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET, /* seed has been set */
+ PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OTHER_KEY_SET, /* other key has been set - optional */
+ PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET, /* key has been set */
+ PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_LABEL_SET, /* label has been set */
+ PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_OUTPUT /* output has been started */
+} psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_state_t;
+
+typedef struct psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_s {
+#if PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE > 0xff
+#error "PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE does not fit in uint8_t"
+#endif
+
+ /* Indicates how many bytes in the current HMAC block have
+ * not yet been read by the user. */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(left_in_block);
+
+ /* The 1-based number of the block. */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_number);
+
+ psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_state_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state);
+
+ uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(secret);
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(secret_length);
+ uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(seed);
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(seed_length);
+ uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(label);
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(label_length);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
+ uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(other_secret);
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(other_secret_length);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */
+
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Ai)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
+
+ /* `HMAC_hash( prk, A( i ) + seed )` in the notation of RFC 5246, Sect. 5. */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(output_block)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
+} psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) ||
+ * MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */
+#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2)
+typedef enum {
+ PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_INIT, /* no input provided */
+ PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_INPUT_COST_SET, /* input cost has been set */
+ PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_SALT_SET, /* salt has been set */
+ PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_PASSWORD_SET, /* password has been set */
+ PSA_PBKDF2_STATE_OUTPUT /* output has been started */
+} psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_state_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+ psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_state_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state);
+ uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(input_cost);
+ uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(salt);
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(salt_length);
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password)[PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password_length);
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(output_block)[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bytes_used);
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_number);
+} psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t;
+#endif /* PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2 */
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEY_DERIVATION_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..98ab4d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/*
+ * Context structure declaration of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers
+ * called through the PSA Crypto driver dispatch layer.
+ * This file contains the context structures of those algorithms which do not
+ * rely on other algorithms, i.e. are 'primitive' algorithms.
+ *
+ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
+ * include psa/crypto.h.
+ *
+ * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and
+ * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the
+ * multi-part state objects of the Mbed TLS software-based PSA drivers. The
+ * definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h to define the
+ * implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include <psa/crypto_driver_common.h>
+
+/*
+ * Hash multi-part operation definitions.
+ */
+
+#include "mbedtls/md5.h"
+#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h"
+#include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
+#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
+#include "mbedtls/sha512.h"
+#include "mbedtls/sha3.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH
+#endif
+
+typedef struct {
+ psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg);
+ union {
+ unsigned dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with no supported algorithms. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_MD5)
+ mbedtls_md5_context md5;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RIPEMD160)
+ mbedtls_ripemd160_context ripemd160;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_1)
+ mbedtls_sha1_context sha1;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_256) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_224)
+ mbedtls_sha256_context sha256;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_512) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA_384)
+ mbedtls_sha512_context sha512;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_224) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_256) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_384) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_SHA3_512)
+ mbedtls_sha3_context sha3;
+#endif
+ } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
+} mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 } }
+
+/*
+ * Cipher multi-part operation definitions.
+ */
+
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CTR) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CFB) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_OFB) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER 1
+#endif
+
+typedef struct {
+ /* Context structure for the Mbed TLS cipher implementation. */
+ psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg);
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_length);
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(block_length);
+ union {
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy);
+ mbedtls_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher);
+ } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
+} mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, { 0 } }
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_PRIMITIVES_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_compat.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_compat.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a226c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_compat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa/crypto_compat.h
+ *
+ * \brief PSA cryptography module: Backward compatibility aliases
+ *
+ * This header declares alternative names for macro and functions.
+ * New application code should not use these names.
+ * These names may be removed in a future version of Mbed TLS.
+ *
+ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
+ * include psa/crypto.h.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * To support both openless APIs and psa_open_key() temporarily, define
+ * psa_key_handle_t to be equal to mbedtls_svc_key_id_t. Do not mark the
+ * type and its utility macros and functions deprecated yet. This will be done
+ * in a subsequent phase.
+ */
+typedef mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_handle_t;
+
+#define PSA_KEY_HANDLE_INIT MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT
+
+/** Check whether a handle is null.
+ *
+ * \param handle Handle
+ *
+ * \return Non-zero if the handle is null, zero otherwise.
+ */
+static inline int psa_key_handle_is_null(psa_key_handle_t handle)
+{
+ return mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(handle);
+}
+
+/** Open a handle to an existing persistent key.
+ *
+ * Open a handle to a persistent key. A key is persistent if it was created
+ * with a lifetime other than #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. A persistent key
+ * always has a nonzero key identifier, set with psa_set_key_id() when
+ * creating the key. Implementations may provide additional pre-provisioned
+ * keys that can be opened with psa_open_key(). Such keys have an application
+ * key identifier in the vendor range, as documented in the description of
+ * #psa_key_id_t.
+ *
+ * The application must eventually close the handle with psa_close_key() or
+ * psa_destroy_key() to release associated resources. If the application dies
+ * without calling one of these functions, the implementation should perform
+ * the equivalent of a call to psa_close_key().
+ *
+ * Some implementations permit an application to open the same key multiple
+ * times. If this is successful, each call to psa_open_key() will return a
+ * different key handle.
+ *
+ * \note This API is not part of the PSA Cryptography API Release 1.0.0
+ * specification. It was defined in the 1.0 Beta 3 version of the
+ * specification but was removed in the 1.0.0 released version. This API is
+ * kept for the time being to not break applications relying on it. It is not
+ * deprecated yet but will be in the near future.
+ *
+ * \note Applications that rely on opening a key multiple times will not be
+ * portable to implementations that only permit a single key handle to be
+ * opened. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`.
+ *
+ *
+ * \param key The persistent identifier of the key.
+ * \param[out] handle On success, a handle to the key.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success. The application can now use the value of `*handle`
+ * to access the key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * The implementation does not have sufficient resources to open the
+ * key. This can be due to reaching an implementation limit on the
+ * number of open keys, the number of open key handles, or available
+ * memory.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
+ * There is no persistent key with key identifier \p key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p key is not a valid persistent key identifier.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The specified key exists, but the application does not have the
+ * permission to access it. Note that this specification does not
+ * define any way to create such a key, but it may be possible
+ * through implementation-specific means.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_open_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
+ psa_key_handle_t *handle);
+
+/** Close a key handle.
+ *
+ * If the handle designates a volatile key, this will destroy the key material
+ * and free all associated resources, just like psa_destroy_key().
+ *
+ * If this is the last open handle to a persistent key, then closing the handle
+ * will free all resources associated with the key in volatile memory. The key
+ * data in persistent storage is not affected and can be opened again later
+ * with a call to psa_open_key().
+ *
+ * Closing the key handle makes the handle invalid, and the key handle
+ * must not be used again by the application.
+ *
+ * \note This API is not part of the PSA Cryptography API Release 1.0.0
+ * specification. It was defined in the 1.0 Beta 3 version of the
+ * specification but was removed in the 1.0.0 released version. This API is
+ * kept for the time being to not break applications relying on it. It is not
+ * deprecated yet but will be in the near future.
+ *
+ * \note If the key handle was used to set up an active
+ * :ref:\`multipart operation <multipart-operations>\`, then closing the
+ * key handle can cause the multipart operation to fail. Applications should
+ * maintain the key handle until after the multipart operation has finished.
+ *
+ * \param handle The key handle to close.
+ * If this is \c 0, do nothing and return \c PSA_SUCCESS.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * \p handle was a valid handle or \c 0. It is now closed.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \p handle is not a valid handle nor \c 0.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle);
+
+/** \addtogroup attributes
+ * @{
+ */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+/** Custom Diffie-Hellman group.
+ *
+ * Mbed TLS does not support custom DH groups.
+ *
+ * \deprecated This value is not useful, so this macro will be removed in
+ * a future version of the library.
+ */
+#define PSA_DH_FAMILY_CUSTOM \
+ ((psa_dh_family_t) MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(0x7e))
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set domain parameters for a key.
+ *
+ * \deprecated Mbed TLS no longer supports any domain parameters.
+ * This function only does the equivalent of
+ * psa_set_key_type() and will be removed in a future version
+ * of the library.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] attributes Attribute structure where \p type will be set.
+ * \param type Key type (a \c PSA_KEY_TYPE_XXX value).
+ * \param[in] data Ignored.
+ * \param data_length Must be 0.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ */
+static inline psa_status_t MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED psa_set_key_domain_parameters(
+ psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ psa_key_type_t type, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length)
+{
+ (void) data;
+ if (data_length != 0) {
+ return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ }
+ psa_set_key_type(attributes, type);
+ return PSA_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get domain parameters for a key.
+ *
+ * \deprecated Mbed TLS no longer supports any domain parameters.
+ * This function alwaya has an empty output and will be
+ * removed in a future version of the library.
+
+ * \param[in] attributes Ignored.
+ * \param[out] data Ignored.
+ * \param data_size Ignored.
+ * \param[out] data_length Set to 0.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ */
+static inline psa_status_t MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED psa_get_key_domain_parameters(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length)
+{
+ (void) attributes;
+ (void) data;
+ (void) data_size;
+ *data_length = 0;
+ return PSA_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/** Safe output buffer size for psa_get_key_domain_parameters().
+ *
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \
+ MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_NUMERIC_CONSTANT(1u)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+/**@}*/
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_COMPAT_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_config.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_config.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e0a8d60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_config.h
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa/crypto_config.h
+ * \brief PSA crypto configuration options (set of defines)
+ *
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG)
+/**
+ * When #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is enabled in mbedtls_config.h,
+ * this file determines which cryptographic mechanisms are enabled
+ * through the PSA Cryptography API (\c psa_xxx() functions).
+ *
+ * To enable a cryptographic mechanism, uncomment the definition of
+ * the corresponding \c PSA_WANT_xxx preprocessor symbol.
+ * To disable a cryptographic mechanism, comment out the definition of
+ * the corresponding \c PSA_WANT_xxx preprocessor symbol.
+ * The names of cryptographic mechanisms correspond to values
+ * defined in psa/crypto_values.h, with the prefix \c PSA_WANT_ instead
+ * of \c PSA_.
+ *
+ * Note that many cryptographic mechanisms involve two symbols: one for
+ * the key type (\c PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx) and one for the algorithm
+ * (\c PSA_WANT_ALG_xxx). Mechanisms with additional parameters may involve
+ * additional symbols.
+ */
+#else
+/**
+ * When \c MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG is disabled in mbedtls_config.h,
+ * this file is not used, and cryptographic mechanisms are supported
+ * through the PSA API if and only if they are supported through the
+ * mbedtls_xxx API.
+ */
+#endif
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H
+
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CFB 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_HMAC 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_OFB 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS 1
+
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 1
+/* For secp256r1, consider enabling #MBEDTLS_PSA_P256M_DRIVER_ENABLED
+ * (see the description in mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h for details). */
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1
+#define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1
+
+#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 1
+#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 1
+#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 1
+#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 1
+#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 1
+
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_HMAC 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES 1
+//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR 1 /* Deprecated */
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA 1
+//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR 1 /* Deprecated */
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1
+
+/*
+ * The following symbols extend and deprecate the legacy
+ * PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR ones. They include the usage of that key in
+ * the name's suffix. "_USE" is the most generic and it can be used to describe
+ * a generic suport, whereas other ones add more features on top of that and
+ * they are more specific.
+ */
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1
+
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
+//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 /* Not supported */
+
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
+//#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 /* Not supported */
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc11d3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa/crypto_driver_common.h
+ * \brief Definitions for all PSA crypto drivers
+ *
+ * This file contains common definitions shared by all PSA crypto drivers.
+ * Do not include it directly: instead, include the header file(s) for
+ * the type(s) of driver that you are implementing. For example, if
+ * you are writing a dynamically registered driver for a secure element,
+ * include `psa/crypto_se_driver.h`.
+ *
+ * This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver Model, containing functions for
+ * driver developers to implement to enable hardware to be called in a
+ * standardized way by a PSA Cryptographic API implementation. The functions
+ * comprising the driver model, which driver authors implement, are not
+ * intended to be called by application developers.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/* Include type definitions (psa_status_t, psa_algorithm_t,
+ * psa_key_type_t, etc.) and macros to build and analyze values
+ * of these types. */
+#include "crypto_types.h"
+#include "crypto_values.h"
+/* Include size definitions which are used to size some arrays in operation
+ * structures. */
+#include <psa/crypto_sizes.h>
+
+/** For encrypt-decrypt functions, whether the operation is an encryption
+ * or a decryption. */
+typedef enum {
+ PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_DECRYPT,
+ PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_ENCRYPT
+} psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t;
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d717c51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+/*
+ * Declaration of context structures for use with the PSA driver wrapper
+ * interface. This file contains the context structures for 'composite'
+ * operations, i.e. those operations which need to make use of other operations
+ * from the primitives (crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h)
+ *
+ * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future.
+ *
+ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
+ * include psa/crypto.h.
+ *
+ * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and
+ * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the
+ * multi-part state objects of the PSA drivers included in the cryptographic
+ * library. The definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h
+ * to define the implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects.
+ */
+/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H
+
+#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h"
+
+/* Include the context structure definitions for the Mbed TLS software drivers */
+#include "psa/crypto_builtin_composites.h"
+
+/* Include the context structure definitions for those drivers that were
+ * declared during the autogeneration process. */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1)
+#include <libtestdriver1/include/psa/crypto.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \
+ defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC)
+typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t;
+typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT \
+ LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT
+#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT \
+ LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT
+
+#else
+typedef mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t;
+typedef mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT \
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT
+#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_MAC_OPERATION_INIT \
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 && LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_MAC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \
+ defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD)
+typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT \
+ LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT
+#else
+typedef mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT \
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 && LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_AEAD */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \
+ defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE)
+
+typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_pake_operation_t;
+typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_pake_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT \
+ LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT
+#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT \
+ LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT
+
+#else
+typedef mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_pake_operation_t;
+typedef mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_pake_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT \
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT
+#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT \
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 && LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE */
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+
+/* Define the context to be used for an operation that is executed through the
+ * PSA Driver wrapper layer as the union of all possible driver's contexts.
+ *
+ * The union members are the driver's context structures, and the member names
+ * are formatted as `'drivername'_ctx`. This allows for procedural generation
+ * of both this file and the content of psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h */
+
+typedef union {
+ unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */
+ mbedtls_psa_mac_operation_t mbedtls_ctx;
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_mac_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx;
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_mac_operation_t opaque_test_driver_ctx;
+#endif
+} psa_driver_mac_context_t;
+
+typedef union {
+ unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */
+ mbedtls_psa_aead_operation_t mbedtls_ctx;
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_aead_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx;
+#endif
+} psa_driver_aead_context_t;
+
+typedef union {
+ unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */
+ mbedtls_psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_t mbedtls_ctx;
+} psa_driver_sign_hash_interruptible_context_t;
+
+typedef union {
+ unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */
+ mbedtls_psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_t mbedtls_ctx;
+} psa_driver_verify_hash_interruptible_context_t;
+
+typedef union {
+ unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */
+ mbedtls_psa_pake_operation_t mbedtls_ctx;
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_pake_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx;
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_pake_operation_t opaque_test_driver_ctx;
+#endif
+} psa_driver_pake_context_t;
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_COMPOSITES_H */
+/* End of automatically generated file. */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2119051
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/*
+ * Declaration of context structures for use with the PSA driver wrapper
+ * interface. This file contains the context structures for key derivation
+ * operations.
+ *
+ * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future.
+ *
+ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
+ * include psa/crypto.h.
+ *
+ * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and
+ * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the
+ * multi-part state objects of the PSA drivers included in the cryptographic
+ * library. The definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h
+ * to define the implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects.
+ */
+/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_KEY_DERIVATION_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_KEY_DERIVATION_H
+
+#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h"
+
+/* Include the context structure definitions for the Mbed TLS software drivers */
+#include "psa/crypto_builtin_key_derivation.h"
+
+/* Include the context structure definitions for those drivers that were
+ * declared during the autogeneration process. */
+
+typedef union {
+ unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND)
+ psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hkdf);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
+ psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls12_prf);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS)
+ psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls12_ecjpake_to_pms);
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_HAVE_SOFT_PBKDF2)
+ psa_pbkdf2_key_derivation_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pbkdf2);
+#endif
+} psa_driver_key_derivation_context_t;
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_KEY_DERIVATION_H */
+/* End of automatically generated file. */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c90a5fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+/*
+ * Declaration of context structures for use with the PSA driver wrapper
+ * interface. This file contains the context structures for 'primitive'
+ * operations, i.e. those operations which do not rely on other contexts.
+ *
+ * Warning: This file will be auto-generated in the future.
+ *
+ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
+ * include psa/crypto.h.
+ *
+ * \note This header and its content are not part of the Mbed TLS API and
+ * applications must not depend on it. Its main purpose is to define the
+ * multi-part state objects of the PSA drivers included in the cryptographic
+ * library. The definitions of these objects are then used by crypto_struct.h
+ * to define the implementation-defined types of PSA multi-part state objects.
+ */
+/* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H
+
+#include "psa/crypto_driver_common.h"
+
+/* Include the context structure definitions for the Mbed TLS software drivers */
+#include "psa/crypto_builtin_primitives.h"
+
+/* Include the context structure definitions for those drivers that were
+ * declared during the autogeneration process. */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1)
+#include <libtestdriver1/include/psa/crypto.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \
+ defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER)
+typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT \
+ LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT
+#else
+typedef mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT \
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 &&
+ LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_CIPHER */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \
+ defined(LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH)
+typedef libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_HASH_OPERATION_INIT \
+ LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT
+#else
+typedef mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_HASH_OPERATION_INIT \
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1 &&
+ LIBTESTDRIVER1_MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_HASH */
+
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned int initialised : 1;
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t ctx;
+} mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_OPAQUE_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT \
+ { 0, MBEDTLS_TRANSPARENT_TEST_DRIVER_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT }
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST */
+
+/* Define the context to be used for an operation that is executed through the
+ * PSA Driver wrapper layer as the union of all possible driver's contexts.
+ *
+ * The union members are the driver's context structures, and the member names
+ * are formatted as `'drivername'_ctx`. This allows for procedural generation
+ * of both this file and the content of psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h */
+
+typedef union {
+ unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */
+ mbedtls_psa_hash_operation_t mbedtls_ctx;
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_hash_operation_t test_driver_ctx;
+#endif
+} psa_driver_hash_context_t;
+
+typedef union {
+ unsigned dummy; /* Make sure this union is always non-empty */
+ mbedtls_psa_cipher_operation_t mbedtls_ctx;
+#if defined(PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST)
+ mbedtls_transparent_test_driver_cipher_operation_t transparent_test_driver_ctx;
+ mbedtls_opaque_test_driver_cipher_operation_t opaque_test_driver_ctx;
+#endif
+} psa_driver_cipher_context_t;
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CONTEXTS_PRIMITIVES_H */
+/* End of automatically generated file. */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_extra.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7074090
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_extra.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1936 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa/crypto_extra.h
+ *
+ * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS vendor extensions
+ *
+ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
+ * include psa/crypto.h.
+ *
+ * This file is reserved for vendor-specific definitions.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "crypto_types.h"
+#include "crypto_compat.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* UID for secure storage seed */
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID 0xFFFFFF52
+
+/* See mbedtls_config.h for definition */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32
+#endif
+
+/* If the size of static key slots is not explicitly defined by the user, then
+ * set it to the maximum between PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_OR_PUBLIC_MAX_SIZE and
+ * PSA_CIPHER_MAX_KEY_LENGTH.
+ * See mbedtls_config.h for the definition. */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_STATIC_KEY_SLOT_BUFFER_SIZE)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_STATIC_KEY_SLOT_BUFFER_SIZE \
+ ((PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_OR_PUBLIC_MAX_SIZE > PSA_CIPHER_MAX_KEY_LENGTH) ? \
+ PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_OR_PUBLIC_MAX_SIZE : PSA_CIPHER_MAX_KEY_LENGTH)
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_STATIC_KEY_SLOT_BUFFER_SIZE*/
+
+/** \addtogroup attributes
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** \brief Declare the enrollment algorithm for a key.
+ *
+ * An operation on a key may indifferently use the algorithm set with
+ * psa_set_key_algorithm() or with this function.
+ *
+ * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to.
+ * \param alg2 A second algorithm that the key may be used
+ * for, in addition to the algorithm set with
+ * psa_set_key_algorithm().
+ *
+ * \warning Setting an enrollment algorithm is not recommended, because
+ * using the same key with different algorithms can allow some
+ * attacks based on arithmetic relations between different
+ * computations made with the same key, or can escalate harmless
+ * side channels into exploitable ones. Use this function only
+ * if it is necessary to support a protocol for which it has been
+ * verified that the usage of the key with multiple algorithms
+ * is safe.
+ */
+static inline void psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm(
+ psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg2)
+{
+ attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg2) = alg2;
+}
+
+/** Retrieve the enrollment algorithm policy from key attributes.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query.
+ *
+ * \return The enrollment algorithm stored in the attribute structure.
+ */
+static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
+{
+ return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg2);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
+
+/** Retrieve the slot number where a key is stored.
+ *
+ * A slot number is only defined for keys that are stored in a secure
+ * element.
+ *
+ * This information is only useful if the secure element is not entirely
+ * managed through the PSA Cryptography API. It is up to the secure
+ * element driver to decide how PSA slot numbers map to any other interface
+ * that the secure element may have.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The key attribute structure to query.
+ * \param[out] slot_number On success, the slot number containing the key.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The key is located in a secure element, and \p *slot_number
+ * indicates the slot number that contains it.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The caller is not permitted to query the slot number.
+ * Mbed TLS currently does not return this error.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The key is not located in a secure element.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_get_key_slot_number(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number);
+
+/** Choose the slot number where a key is stored.
+ *
+ * This function declares a slot number in the specified attribute
+ * structure.
+ *
+ * A slot number is only meaningful for keys that are stored in a secure
+ * element. It is up to the secure element driver to decide how PSA slot
+ * numbers map to any other interface that the secure element may have.
+ *
+ * \note Setting a slot number in key attributes for a key creation can
+ * cause the following errors when creating the key:
+ * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED if the selected secure element does
+ * not support choosing a specific slot number.
+ * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED if the caller is not permitted to
+ * choose slot numbers in general or to choose this specific slot.
+ * - #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT if the chosen slot number is not
+ * valid in general or not valid for this specific key.
+ * - #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS if there is already a key in the
+ * selected slot.
+ *
+ * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to.
+ * \param slot_number The slot number to set.
+ */
+static inline void psa_set_key_slot_number(
+ psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number)
+{
+ attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(has_slot_number) = 1;
+ attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(slot_number) = slot_number;
+}
+
+/** Remove the slot number attribute from a key attribute structure.
+ *
+ * This function undoes the action of psa_set_key_slot_number().
+ *
+ * \param[out] attributes The attribute structure to write to.
+ */
+static inline void psa_clear_key_slot_number(
+ psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
+{
+ attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(has_slot_number) = 0;
+}
+
+/** Register a key that is already present in a secure element.
+ *
+ * The key must be located in a secure element designated by the
+ * lifetime field in \p attributes, in the slot set with
+ * psa_set_key_slot_number() in the attribute structure.
+ * This function makes the key available through the key identifier
+ * specified in \p attributes.
+ *
+ * \param[in] attributes The attributes of the existing key.
+ * - The lifetime must be a persistent lifetime
+ * in a secure element. Volatile lifetimes are
+ * not currently supported.
+ * - The key identifier must be in the valid
+ * range for persistent keys.
+ * - The key type and size must be specified and
+ * must be consistent with the key material
+ * in the secure element.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The key was successfully registered.
+ * Note that depending on the design of the driver, this may or may
+ * not guarantee that a key actually exists in the designated slot
+ * and is compatible with the specified attributes.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
+ * There is already a key with the identifier specified in
+ * \p attributes.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * The secure element driver for the specified lifetime does not
+ * support registering a key.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The identifier in \p attributes is invalid, namely the identifier is
+ * not in the user range, or
+ * \p attributes specifies a lifetime which is not located
+ * in a secure element, or no slot number is specified in \p attributes,
+ * or the specified slot number is not valid.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The caller is not authorized to register the specified key slot.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/**
+ * \brief Library deinitialization.
+ *
+ * This function clears all data associated with the PSA layer,
+ * including the whole key store.
+ * This function is not thread safe, it wipes every key slot regardless of
+ * state and reader count. It should only be called when no slot is in use.
+ *
+ * This is an Mbed TLS extension.
+ */
+void mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(void);
+
+/** \brief Statistics about
+ * resource consumption related to the PSA keystore.
+ *
+ * \note The content of this structure is not part of the stable API and ABI
+ * of Mbed TLS and may change arbitrarily from version to version.
+ */
+typedef struct mbedtls_psa_stats_s {
+ /** Number of slots containing key material for a volatile key. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(volatile_slots);
+ /** Number of slots containing key material for a key which is in
+ * internal persistent storage. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_slots);
+ /** Number of slots containing a reference to a key in a
+ * secure element. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(external_slots);
+ /** Number of slots which are occupied, but do not contain
+ * key material yet. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(half_filled_slots);
+ /** Number of slots that contain cache data. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cache_slots);
+ /** Number of slots that are not used for anything. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(empty_slots);
+ /** Number of slots that are locked. */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(locked_slots);
+ /** Largest key id value among open keys in internal persistent storage. */
+ psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_open_internal_key_id);
+ /** Largest key id value among open keys in secure elements. */
+ psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_open_external_key_id);
+} mbedtls_psa_stats_t;
+
+/** \brief Get statistics about
+ * resource consumption related to the PSA keystore.
+ *
+ * \note When Mbed TLS is built as part of a service, with isolation
+ * between the application and the keystore, the service may or
+ * may not expose this function.
+ */
+void mbedtls_psa_get_stats(mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Inject an initial entropy seed for the random generator into
+ * secure storage.
+ *
+ * This function injects data to be used as a seed for the random generator
+ * used by the PSA Crypto implementation. On devices that lack a trusted
+ * entropy source (preferably a hardware random number generator),
+ * the Mbed PSA Crypto implementation uses this value to seed its
+ * random generator.
+ *
+ * On devices without a trusted entropy source, this function must be
+ * called exactly once in the lifetime of the device. On devices with
+ * a trusted entropy source, calling this function is optional.
+ * In all cases, this function may only be called before calling any
+ * other function in the PSA Crypto API, including psa_crypto_init().
+ *
+ * When this function returns successfully, it populates a file in
+ * persistent storage. Once the file has been created, this function
+ * can no longer succeed.
+ *
+ * If any error occurs, this function does not change the system state.
+ * You can call this function again after correcting the reason for the
+ * error if possible.
+ *
+ * \warning This function **can** fail! Callers MUST check the return status.
+ *
+ * \warning If you use this function, you should use it as part of a
+ * factory provisioning process. The value of the injected seed
+ * is critical to the security of the device. It must be
+ * *secret*, *unpredictable* and (statistically) *unique per device*.
+ * You should be generate it randomly using a cryptographically
+ * secure random generator seeded from trusted entropy sources.
+ * You should transmit it securely to the device and ensure
+ * that its value is not leaked or stored anywhere beyond the
+ * needs of transmitting it from the point of generation to
+ * the call of this function, and erase all copies of the value
+ * once this function returns.
+ *
+ * This is an Mbed TLS extension.
+ *
+ * \note This function is only available on the following platforms:
+ * * If the compile-time option MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY is enabled.
+ * Note that you must provide compatible implementations of
+ * mbedtls_nv_seed_read and mbedtls_nv_seed_write.
+ * * In a client-server integration of PSA Cryptography, on the client side,
+ * if the server supports this feature.
+ * \param[in] seed Buffer containing the seed value to inject.
+ * \param[in] seed_size Size of the \p seed buffer.
+ * The size of the seed in bytes must be greater
+ * or equal to both #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE
+ * and the value of \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM
+ * in `library/entropy_poll.h` in the Mbed TLS source
+ * code.
+ * It must be less or equal to
+ * #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The seed value was injected successfully. The random generator
+ * of the PSA Crypto implementation is now ready for use.
+ * You may now call psa_crypto_init() and use the PSA Crypto
+ * implementation.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p seed_size is out of range.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * There was a failure reading or writing from storage.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The library has already been initialized. It is no longer
+ * possible to call this function.
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed,
+ size_t seed_size);
+
+/** \addtogroup crypto_types
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** DSA public key.
+ *
+ * The import and export format is the
+ * representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a big-endian byte
+ * string. The length of the byte string is the length of the base prime `p`
+ * in bytes.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4002)
+
+/** DSA key pair (private and public key).
+ *
+ * The import and export format is the
+ * representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte string. The
+ * length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes (leading zeroes
+ * are not stripped).
+ *
+ * Deterministic DSA key derivation with psa_generate_derived_key follows
+ * FIPS 186-4 §B.1.2: interpret the byte string as integer
+ * in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range
+ * [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain
+ * (the prime *p* for Diffie-Hellman, the subprime *q* for DSA,
+ * or the order of the curve's base point for ECC).
+ * Add 1 to the resulting integer and use this as the private key *x*.
+ *
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7002)
+
+/** Whether a key type is a DSA key (pair or public-only). */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA(type) \
+ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000400)
+/** DSA signature with hashing.
+ *
+ * This is the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4,
+ * with a random per-message secret number (*k*).
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
+ * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding DSA signature algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_DSA(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000500)
+#define PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG
+/** Deterministic DSA signature with hashing.
+ *
+ * This is the deterministic variant defined by RFC 6979 of
+ * the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
+ * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding DSA signature algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \
+ PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE)
+#define PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \
+ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0)
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg))
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg))
+
+
+/* We need to expand the sample definition of this macro from
+ * the API definition. */
+#undef PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \
+ PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg)
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \addtogroup attributes
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** PAKE operation stages. */
+#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_SETUP 0
+#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS 1
+#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION 2
+
+/**@}*/
+
+
+/** \defgroup psa_external_rng External random generator
+ * @{
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG)
+/** External random generator function, implemented by the platform.
+ *
+ * When the compile-time option #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG is enabled,
+ * this function replaces Mbed TLS's entropy and DRBG modules for all
+ * random generation triggered via PSA crypto interfaces.
+ *
+ * \note This random generator must deliver random numbers with cryptographic
+ * quality and high performance. It must supply unpredictable numbers
+ * with a uniform distribution. The implementation of this function
+ * is responsible for ensuring that the random generator is seeded
+ * with sufficient entropy. If you have a hardware TRNG which is slow
+ * or delivers non-uniform output, declare it as an entropy source
+ * with mbedtls_entropy_add_source() instead of enabling this option.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] context Pointer to the random generator context.
+ * This is all-bits-zero on the first call
+ * and preserved between successive calls.
+ * \param[out] output Output buffer. On success, this buffer
+ * contains random data with a uniform
+ * distribution.
+ * \param output_size The size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] output_length On success, set this value to \p output_size.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success. The output buffer contains \p output_size bytes of
+ * cryptographic-quality random data, and \c *output_length is
+ * set to \p output_size.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
+ * The random generator requires extra entropy and there is no
+ * way to obtain entropy under current environment conditions.
+ * This error should not happen under normal circumstances since
+ * this function is responsible for obtaining as much entropy as
+ * it needs. However implementations of this function may return
+ * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY if there is no way to obtain
+ * entropy without blocking indefinitely.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
+ * A failure of the random generator hardware that isn't covered
+ * by #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY.
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(
+ mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context,
+ uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup psa_builtin_keys Built-in keys
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** The minimum value for a key identifier that is built into the
+ * implementation.
+ *
+ * The range of key identifiers from #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN
+ * to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX within the range from
+ * #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN and #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX and must not intersect
+ * with any other set of implementation-chosen key identifiers.
+ *
+ * This value is part of the library's API since changing it would invalidate
+ * the values of built-in key identifiers in applications.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN ((psa_key_id_t) 0x7fff0000)
+
+/** The maximum value for a key identifier that is built into the
+ * implementation.
+ *
+ * See #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN for more information.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX ((psa_key_id_t) 0x7fffefff)
+
+/** A slot number identifying a key in a driver.
+ *
+ * Values of this type are used to identify built-in keys.
+ */
+typedef uint64_t psa_drv_slot_number_t;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS)
+/** Test whether a key identifier belongs to the builtin key range.
+ *
+ * \param key_id Key identifier to test.
+ *
+ * \retval 1
+ * The key identifier is a builtin key identifier.
+ * \retval 0
+ * The key identifier is not a builtin key identifier.
+ */
+static inline int psa_key_id_is_builtin(psa_key_id_t key_id)
+{
+ return (key_id >= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN) &&
+ (key_id <= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX);
+}
+
+/** Platform function to obtain the location and slot number of a built-in key.
+ *
+ * An application-specific implementation of this function must be provided if
+ * #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS is enabled. This would typically be provided
+ * as part of a platform's system image.
+ *
+ * #MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(\p key_id) needs to be in the range from
+ * #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX.
+ *
+ * In a multi-application configuration
+ * (\c MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER is defined),
+ * this function should check that #MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(\p key_id)
+ * is allowed to use the given key.
+ *
+ * \param key_id The key ID for which to retrieve the
+ * location and slot attributes.
+ * \param[out] lifetime On success, the lifetime associated with the key
+ * corresponding to \p key_id. Lifetime is a
+ * combination of which driver contains the key,
+ * and with what persistence level the key is
+ * intended to be used. If the platform
+ * implementation does not contain specific
+ * information about the intended key persistence
+ * level, the persistence level may be reported as
+ * #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT.
+ * \param[out] slot_number On success, the slot number known to the driver
+ * registered at the lifetime location reported
+ * through \p lifetime which corresponds to the
+ * requested built-in key.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The requested key identifier designates a built-in key.
+ * In a multi-application configuration, the requested owner
+ * is allowed to access it.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
+ * The requested key identifier is not a built-in key which is known
+ * to this function. If a key exists in the key storage with this
+ * identifier, the data from the storage will be used.
+ * \return (any other error)
+ * Any other error is propagated to the function that requested the key.
+ * Common errors include:
+ * - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED: the key exists but the requested owner
+ * is not allowed to access it.
+ */
+psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key(
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id,
+ psa_key_lifetime_t *lifetime,
+ psa_drv_slot_number_t *slot_number);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */
+
+/** @} */
+
+/** \defgroup psa_crypto_client Functions defined by a client provider
+ *
+ * The functions in this group are meant to be implemented by providers of
+ * the PSA Crypto client interface. They are provided by the library when
+ * #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is enabled.
+ *
+ * \note All functions in this group are experimental, as using
+ * alternative client interface providers is experimental.
+ *
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** Check if PSA is capable of handling the specified hash algorithm.
+ *
+ * This means that PSA core was built with the corresponding PSA_WANT_ALG_xxx
+ * set and that psa_crypto_init has already been called.
+ *
+ * \note When using Mbed TLS version of PSA core (i.e. MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is
+ * set) for now this function only checks the state of the driver
+ * subsystem, not the algorithm. This might be improved in the future.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm.
+ *
+ * \return 1 if the PSA can handle \p hash_alg, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int psa_can_do_hash(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg);
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \addtogroup crypto_types
+ * @{
+ */
+
+#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000000)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a password-authenticated key exchange.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE)
+ * algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
+ * algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(alg) \
+ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE)
+
+/** The Password-authenticated key exchange by juggling (J-PAKE) algorithm.
+ *
+ * This is J-PAKE as defined by RFC 8236, instantiated with the following
+ * parameters:
+ *
+ * - The group can be either an elliptic curve or defined over a finite field.
+ * - Schnorr NIZK proof as defined by RFC 8235 and using the same group as the
+ * J-PAKE algorithm.
+ * - A cryptographic hash function.
+ *
+ * To select these parameters and set up the cipher suite, call these functions
+ * in any order:
+ *
+ * \code
+ * psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_JPAKE);
+ * psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(cipher_suite,
+ * PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(type, family, bits));
+ * psa_pake_cs_set_hash(cipher_suite, hash);
+ * \endcode
+ *
+ * For more information on how to set a specific curve or field, refer to the
+ * documentation of the individual \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants.
+ *
+ * After initializing a J-PAKE operation, call
+ *
+ * \code
+ * psa_pake_setup(operation, cipher_suite);
+ * psa_pake_set_user(operation, ...);
+ * psa_pake_set_peer(operation, ...);
+ * psa_pake_set_password_key(operation, ...);
+ * \endcode
+ *
+ * The password is provided as a key. This can be the password text itself,
+ * in an agreed character encoding, or some value derived from the password
+ * as required by a higher level protocol.
+ *
+ * (The implementation converts the key material to a number as described in
+ * Section 2.3.8 of _SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography_
+ * (https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf), before reducing it modulo \c q. Here
+ * \c q is order of the group defined by the primitive set in the cipher suite.
+ * The \c psa_pake_set_password_key() function returns an error if the result
+ * of the reduction is 0.)
+ *
+ * The key exchange flow for J-PAKE is as follows:
+ * -# To get the first round data that needs to be sent to the peer, call
+ * \code
+ * // Get g1
+ * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
+ * // Get the ZKP public key for x1
+ * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
+ * // Get the ZKP proof for x1
+ * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
+ * // Get g2
+ * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
+ * // Get the ZKP public key for x2
+ * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
+ * // Get the ZKP proof for x2
+ * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
+ * \endcode
+ * -# To provide the first round data received from the peer to the operation,
+ * call
+ * \code
+ * // Set g3
+ * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
+ * // Set the ZKP public key for x3
+ * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
+ * // Set the ZKP proof for x3
+ * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
+ * // Set g4
+ * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
+ * // Set the ZKP public key for x4
+ * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
+ * // Set the ZKP proof for x4
+ * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
+ * \endcode
+ * -# To get the second round data that needs to be sent to the peer, call
+ * \code
+ * // Get A
+ * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
+ * // Get ZKP public key for x2*s
+ * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
+ * // Get ZKP proof for x2*s
+ * psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
+ * \endcode
+ * -# To provide the second round data received from the peer to the operation,
+ * call
+ * \code
+ * // Set B
+ * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
+ * // Set ZKP public key for x4*s
+ * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
+ * // Set ZKP proof for x4*s
+ * psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
+ * \endcode
+ * -# To access the shared secret call
+ * \code
+ * // Get Ka=Kb=K
+ * psa_pake_get_implicit_key()
+ * \endcode
+ *
+ * For more information consult the documentation of the individual
+ * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants.
+ *
+ * At this point there is a cryptographic guarantee that only the authenticated
+ * party who used the same password is able to compute the key. But there is no
+ * guarantee that the peer is the party it claims to be and was able to do so.
+ *
+ * That is, the authentication is only implicit (the peer is not authenticated
+ * at this point, and no action should be taken that assume that they are - like
+ * for example accessing restricted files).
+ *
+ * To make the authentication explicit there are various methods, see Section 5
+ * of RFC 8236 for two examples.
+ *
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_JPAKE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000100)
+
+/** @} */
+
+/** \defgroup pake Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE)
+ *
+ * This is a proposed PAKE interface for the PSA Crypto API. It is not part of
+ * the official PSA Crypto API yet.
+ *
+ * \note The content of this section is not part of the stable API and ABI
+ * of Mbed TLS and may change arbitrarily from version to version.
+ * Same holds for the corresponding macros #PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE and
+ * #PSA_ALG_JPAKE.
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** \brief Encoding of the application role of PAKE
+ *
+ * Encodes the application's role in the algorithm is being executed. For more
+ * information see the documentation of individual \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_XXX
+ * constants.
+ */
+typedef uint8_t psa_pake_role_t;
+
+/** Encoding of input and output indicators for PAKE.
+ *
+ * Some PAKE algorithms need to exchange more data than just a single key share.
+ * This type is for encoding additional input and output data for such
+ * algorithms.
+ */
+typedef uint8_t psa_pake_step_t;
+
+/** Encoding of the type of the PAKE's primitive.
+ *
+ * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff.
+ * Vendors who define additional types must use an encoding in this range.
+ *
+ * For more information see the documentation of individual
+ * \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants.
+ */
+typedef uint8_t psa_pake_primitive_type_t;
+
+/** \brief Encoding of the family of the primitive associated with the PAKE.
+ *
+ * For more information see the documentation of individual
+ * \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants.
+ */
+typedef uint8_t psa_pake_family_t;
+
+/** \brief Encoding of the primitive associated with the PAKE.
+ *
+ * For more information see the documentation of the #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE macro.
+ */
+typedef uint32_t psa_pake_primitive_t;
+
+/** A value to indicate no role in a PAKE algorithm.
+ * This value can be used in a call to psa_pake_set_role() for symmetric PAKE
+ * algorithms which do not assign roles.
+ */
+#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x00)
+
+/** The first peer in a balanced PAKE.
+ *
+ * Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them needs an
+ * ordering of peers for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not
+ * need this, both #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST and #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND are
+ * accepted.
+ */
+#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x01)
+
+/** The second peer in a balanced PAKE.
+ *
+ * Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them needs an
+ * ordering of peers for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not
+ * need this, either #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST or #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND are
+ * accepted.
+ */
+#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x02)
+
+/** The client in an augmented PAKE.
+ *
+ * Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server.
+ */
+#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x11)
+
+/** The server in an augmented PAKE.
+ *
+ * Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server.
+ */
+#define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x12)
+
+/** The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of elliptic curves.
+ *
+ * The values of the \c family and \c bits fields of the cipher suite identify a
+ * specific elliptic curve, using the same mapping that is used for ECC
+ * (::psa_ecc_family_t) keys.
+ *
+ * (Here \c family means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_family() and
+ * \c bits means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_bits().)
+ *
+ * Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar
+ * values:
+ * -# The format for group elements is the same as for public keys on the
+ * specific curve would be. For more information, consult the documentation of
+ * psa_export_public_key().
+ * -# The format for scalars is the same as for private keys on the specific
+ * curve would be. For more information, consult the documentation of
+ * psa_export_key().
+ */
+#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t) 0x01)
+
+/** The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of Diffie-Hellman groups.
+ *
+ * The values of the \c family and \c bits fields of the cipher suite identify
+ * a specific Diffie-Hellman group, using the same mapping that is used for
+ * Diffie-Hellman (::psa_dh_family_t) keys.
+ *
+ * (Here \c family means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_family() and
+ * \c bits means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_bits().)
+ *
+ * Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar
+ * values:
+ * -# The format for group elements is the same as for public keys on the
+ * specific group would be. For more information, consult the documentation of
+ * psa_export_public_key().
+ * -# The format for scalars is the same as for private keys on the specific
+ * group would be. For more information, consult the documentation of
+ * psa_export_key().
+ */
+#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t) 0x02)
+
+/** Construct a PAKE primitive from type, family and bit-size.
+ *
+ * \param pake_type The type of the primitive
+ * (value of type ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t).
+ * \param pake_family The family of the primitive
+ * (the type and interpretation of this parameter depends
+ * on \p pake_type, for more information consult the
+ * documentation of individual ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t
+ * constants).
+ * \param pake_bits The bit-size of the primitive
+ * (Value of type \c size_t. The interpretation
+ * of this parameter depends on \p pake_family, for more
+ * information consult the documentation of individual
+ * ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t constants).
+ *
+ * \return The constructed primitive value of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t.
+ * Return 0 if the requested primitive can't be encoded as
+ * ::psa_pake_primitive_t.
+ */
+#define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(pake_type, pake_family, pake_bits) \
+ ((pake_bits & 0xFFFF) != pake_bits) ? 0 : \
+ ((psa_pake_primitive_t) (((pake_type) << 24 | \
+ (pake_family) << 16) | (pake_bits)))
+
+/** The key share being sent to or received from the peer.
+ *
+ * The format for both input and output at this step is the same as for public
+ * keys on the group determined by the primitive (::psa_pake_primitive_t) would
+ * be.
+ *
+ * For more information on the format, consult the documentation of
+ * psa_export_public_key().
+ *
+ * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the
+ * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE.
+ */
+#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x01)
+
+/** A Schnorr NIZKP public key.
+ *
+ * This is the ephemeral public key in the Schnorr Non-Interactive
+ * Zero-Knowledge Proof (the value denoted by the letter 'V' in RFC 8235).
+ *
+ * The format for both input and output at this step is the same as for public
+ * keys on the group determined by the primitive (::psa_pake_primitive_t) would
+ * be.
+ *
+ * For more information on the format, consult the documentation of
+ * psa_export_public_key().
+ *
+ * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the
+ * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE.
+ */
+#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x02)
+
+/** A Schnorr NIZKP proof.
+ *
+ * This is the proof in the Schnorr Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof (the
+ * value denoted by the letter 'r' in RFC 8235).
+ *
+ * Both for input and output, the value at this step is an integer less than
+ * the order of the group selected in the cipher suite. The format depends on
+ * the group as well:
+ *
+ * - For Montgomery curves, the encoding is little endian.
+ * - For everything else the encoding is big endian (see Section 2.3.8 of
+ * _SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography_ at https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf).
+ *
+ * In both cases leading zeroes are allowed as long as the length in bytes does
+ * not exceed the byte length of the group order.
+ *
+ * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the
+ * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE.
+ */
+#define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x03)
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_pake_output().
+ *
+ * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_pake_output() will not fail due to an insufficient output buffer
+ * size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE
+ *
+ * \param alg A PAKE algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param primitive A primitive of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t that is
+ * compatible with algorithm \p alg.
+ * \param output_step A value of type ::psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the
+ * algorithm \p alg.
+ * \return A sufficient output buffer size for the specified
+ * PAKE algorithm, primitive, and output step. If the
+ * PAKE algorithm, primitive, or output step is not
+ * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
+ * return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, output_step) \
+ (alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE && \
+ primitive == PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, \
+ PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256) ? \
+ ( \
+ output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ? 65 : \
+ output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ? 65 : \
+ 32 \
+ ) : \
+ 0)
+
+/** A sufficient input buffer size for psa_pake_input().
+ *
+ * The value returned by this macro is guaranteed to be large enough for any
+ * valid input to psa_pake_input() in an operation with the specified
+ * parameters.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE
+ *
+ * \param alg A PAKE algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param primitive A primitive of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t that is
+ * compatible with algorithm \p alg.
+ * \param input_step A value of type ::psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the
+ * algorithm \p alg.
+ * \return A sufficient input buffer size for the specified
+ * input, cipher suite and algorithm. If the cipher suite,
+ * the input type or PAKE algorithm is not recognized, or
+ * the parameters are incompatible, return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, input_step) \
+ (alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE && \
+ primitive == PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, \
+ PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256) ? \
+ ( \
+ input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ? 65 : \
+ input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ? 65 : \
+ 32 \
+ ) : \
+ 0)
+
+/** Output buffer size for psa_pake_output() for any of the supported PAKE
+ * algorithm and primitive suites and output step.
+ *
+ * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer.
+ *
+ * The value of this macro must be at least as large as the largest value
+ * returned by PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE()
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p output_step).
+ */
+#define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE 65
+
+/** Input buffer size for psa_pake_input() for any of the supported PAKE
+ * algorithm and primitive suites and input step.
+ *
+ * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer.
+ *
+ * The value of this macro must be at least as large as the largest value
+ * returned by PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE()
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p output_step).
+ */
+#define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE 65
+
+/** Returns a suitable initializer for a PAKE cipher suite object of type
+ * psa_pake_cipher_suite_t.
+ */
+#define PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT { PSA_ALG_NONE, 0, 0, 0, PSA_ALG_NONE }
+
+/** Returns a suitable initializer for a PAKE operation object of type
+ * psa_pake_operation_t.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
+#else
+#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT { 0, PSA_ALG_NONE, 0, PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_SETUP, \
+ { 0 }, { { 0 } } }
+#endif
+
+struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s {
+ psa_algorithm_t algorithm;
+ psa_pake_primitive_type_t type;
+ psa_pake_family_t family;
+ uint16_t bits;
+ psa_algorithm_t hash;
+};
+
+struct psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_s {
+ uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password);
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password_len);
+ uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user);
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_len);
+ uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer);
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_len);
+ psa_key_attributes_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(attributes);
+ struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_suite);
+};
+
+typedef enum psa_crypto_driver_pake_step {
+ PSA_JPAKE_STEP_INVALID = 0, /* Invalid step */
+ PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 1, /* Round 1: input/output key share (for ephemeral private key X1).*/
+ PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 2, /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X1 key */
+ PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 3, /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X1 key */
+ PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 4, /* Round 1: input/output key share (for ephemeral private key X2).*/
+ PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 5, /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X2 key */
+ PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 6, /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X2 key */
+ PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 7, /* Round 2: output X2S key (our key) */
+ PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 8, /* Round 2: output Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X2S key (our key) */
+ PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 9, /* Round 2: output Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X2S key (our key) */
+ PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_KEY_SHARE = 10, /* Round 2: input X4S key (from peer) */
+ PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC = 11, /* Round 2: input Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X4S key (from peer) */
+ PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PROOF = 12 /* Round 2: input Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X4S key (from peer) */
+} psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t;
+
+typedef enum psa_jpake_round {
+ PSA_JPAKE_FIRST = 0,
+ PSA_JPAKE_SECOND = 1,
+ PSA_JPAKE_FINISHED = 2
+} psa_jpake_round_t;
+
+typedef enum psa_jpake_io_mode {
+ PSA_JPAKE_INPUT = 0,
+ PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT = 1
+} psa_jpake_io_mode_t;
+
+struct psa_jpake_computation_stage_s {
+ /* The J-PAKE round we are currently on */
+ psa_jpake_round_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(round);
+ /* The 'mode' we are currently in (inputting or outputting) */
+ psa_jpake_io_mode_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(io_mode);
+ /* The number of completed inputs so far this round */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(inputs);
+ /* The number of completed outputs so far this round */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(outputs);
+ /* The next expected step (KEY_SHARE, ZK_PUBLIC or ZK_PROOF) */
+ psa_pake_step_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(step);
+};
+
+#define PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_INPUTS(round) ((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FINISHED ? 0 : \
+ ((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FIRST ? 2 : 1))
+#define PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_OUTPUTS(round) ((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FINISHED ? 0 : \
+ ((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FIRST ? 2 : 1))
+
+struct psa_pake_operation_s {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+ mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle;
+#else
+ /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
+ * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping
+ * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported.
+ * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
+ * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to
+ * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
+ /* Algorithm of the PAKE operation */
+ psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg);
+ /* A primitive of type compatible with algorithm */
+ psa_pake_primitive_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(primitive);
+ /* Stage of the PAKE operation: waiting for the setup, collecting inputs
+ * or computing. */
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(stage);
+ /* Holds computation stage of the PAKE algorithms. */
+ union {
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy);
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE)
+ struct psa_jpake_computation_stage_s MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(jpake);
+#endif
+ } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(computation_stage);
+ union {
+ psa_driver_pake_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
+ struct psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_s MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(inputs);
+ } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(data);
+#endif
+};
+
+/** \addtogroup pake
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** The type of the data structure for PAKE cipher suites.
+ *
+ * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
+ * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
+ * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice.
+ */
+typedef struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s psa_pake_cipher_suite_t;
+
+/** Return an initial value for a PAKE cipher suite object.
+ */
+static psa_pake_cipher_suite_t psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(void);
+
+/** Retrieve the PAKE algorithm from a PAKE cipher suite.
+ *
+ * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query.
+ *
+ * \return The PAKE algorithm stored in the cipher suite structure.
+ */
+static psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm(
+ const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite);
+
+/** Declare the PAKE algorithm for the cipher suite.
+ *
+ * This function overwrites any PAKE algorithm
+ * previously set in \p cipher_suite.
+ *
+ * \param[out] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to write to.
+ * \param algorithm The PAKE algorithm to write.
+ * (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type ::psa_algorithm_t
+ * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true.)
+ * If this is 0, the PAKE algorithm in
+ * \p cipher_suite becomes unspecified.
+ */
+static void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
+ psa_algorithm_t algorithm);
+
+/** Retrieve the primitive from a PAKE cipher suite.
+ *
+ * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query.
+ *
+ * \return The primitive stored in the cipher suite structure.
+ */
+static psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_get_primitive(
+ const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite);
+
+/** Declare the primitive for a PAKE cipher suite.
+ *
+ * This function overwrites any primitive previously set in \p cipher_suite.
+ *
+ * \param[out] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to write to.
+ * \param primitive The primitive to write. If this is 0, the
+ * primitive type in \p cipher_suite becomes
+ * unspecified.
+ */
+static void psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
+ psa_pake_primitive_t primitive);
+
+/** Retrieve the PAKE family from a PAKE cipher suite.
+ *
+ * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query.
+ *
+ * \return The PAKE family stored in the cipher suite structure.
+ */
+static psa_pake_family_t psa_pake_cs_get_family(
+ const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite);
+
+/** Retrieve the PAKE primitive bit-size from a PAKE cipher suite.
+ *
+ * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query.
+ *
+ * \return The PAKE primitive bit-size stored in the cipher suite structure.
+ */
+static uint16_t psa_pake_cs_get_bits(
+ const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite);
+
+/** Retrieve the hash algorithm from a PAKE cipher suite.
+ *
+ * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to query.
+ *
+ * \return The hash algorithm stored in the cipher suite structure. The return
+ * value is 0 if the PAKE is not parametrised by a hash algorithm or if
+ * the hash algorithm is not set.
+ */
+static psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_hash(
+ const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite);
+
+/** Declare the hash algorithm for a PAKE cipher suite.
+ *
+ * This function overwrites any hash algorithm
+ * previously set in \p cipher_suite.
+ *
+ * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
+ * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
+ * for more information.
+ *
+ * \param[out] cipher_suite The cipher suite structure to write to.
+ * \param hash The hash involved in the cipher suite.
+ * (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type ::psa_algorithm_t
+ * such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\c alg) is true.)
+ * If this is 0, the hash algorithm in
+ * \p cipher_suite becomes unspecified.
+ */
+static void psa_pake_cs_set_hash(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
+ psa_algorithm_t hash);
+
+/** The type of the state data structure for PAKE operations.
+ *
+ * Before calling any function on a PAKE operation object, the application
+ * must initialize it by any of the following means:
+ * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_pake_operation_t operation;
+ * memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_pake_operation_t operation = {0};
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT,
+ * for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_pake_operation_t operation = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT;
+ * \endcode
+ * - Assign the result of the function psa_pake_operation_init()
+ * to the structure, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_pake_operation_t operation;
+ * operation = psa_pake_operation_init();
+ * \endcode
+ *
+ * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
+ * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
+ * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */
+typedef struct psa_pake_operation_s psa_pake_operation_t;
+
+/** The type of input values for PAKE operations. */
+typedef struct psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_s psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t;
+
+/** The type of computation stage for J-PAKE operations. */
+typedef struct psa_jpake_computation_stage_s psa_jpake_computation_stage_t;
+
+/** Return an initial value for a PAKE operation object.
+ */
+static psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_operation_init(void);
+
+/** Get the length of the password in bytes from given inputs.
+ *
+ * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs.
+ * \param[out] password_len Password length.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * Password hasn't been set yet.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password_len(
+ const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs,
+ size_t *password_len);
+
+/** Get the password from given inputs.
+ *
+ * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs.
+ * \param[out] buffer Return buffer for password.
+ * \param buffer_size Size of the return buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] buffer_length Actual size of the password in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * Password hasn't been set yet.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password(
+ const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs,
+ uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_size, size_t *buffer_length);
+
+/** Get the length of the user id in bytes from given inputs.
+ *
+ * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs.
+ * \param[out] user_len User id length.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * User id hasn't been set yet.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user_len(
+ const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs,
+ size_t *user_len);
+
+/** Get the length of the peer id in bytes from given inputs.
+ *
+ * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs.
+ * \param[out] peer_len Peer id length.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * Peer id hasn't been set yet.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer_len(
+ const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs,
+ size_t *peer_len);
+
+/** Get the user id from given inputs.
+ *
+ * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs.
+ * \param[out] user_id User id.
+ * \param user_id_size Size of \p user_id in bytes.
+ * \param[out] user_id_len Size of the user id in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * User id hasn't been set yet.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p user_id is too small.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user(
+ const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs,
+ uint8_t *user_id, size_t user_id_size, size_t *user_id_len);
+
+/** Get the peer id from given inputs.
+ *
+ * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs.
+ * \param[out] peer_id Peer id.
+ * \param peer_id_size Size of \p peer_id in bytes.
+ * \param[out] peer_id_length Size of the peer id in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * Peer id hasn't been set yet.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p peer_id is too small.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer(
+ const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs,
+ uint8_t *peer_id, size_t peer_id_size, size_t *peer_id_length);
+
+/** Get the cipher suite from given inputs.
+ *
+ * \param[in] inputs Operation inputs.
+ * \param[out] cipher_suite Return buffer for role.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * Cipher_suite hasn't been set yet.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_cipher_suite(
+ const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs,
+ psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite);
+
+/** Set the session information for a password-authenticated key exchange.
+ *
+ * The sequence of operations to set up a password-authenticated key exchange
+ * is as follows:
+ * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
+ * listed here.
+ * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
+ * documentation for #psa_pake_operation_t, e.g.
+ * #PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT.
+ * -# Call psa_pake_setup() to specify the cipher suite.
+ * -# Call \c psa_pake_set_xxx() functions on the operation to complete the
+ * setup. The exact sequence of \c psa_pake_set_xxx() functions that needs
+ * to be called depends on the algorithm in use.
+ *
+ * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
+ * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
+ * for more information.
+ *
+ * A typical sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key
+ * exchange:
+ * -# Call psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to get the
+ * key share that needs to be sent to the peer.
+ * -# Call psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to provide
+ * the key share that was received from the peer.
+ * -# Depending on the algorithm additional calls to psa_pake_output() and
+ * psa_pake_input() might be necessary.
+ * -# Call psa_pake_get_implicit_key() for accessing the shared secret.
+ *
+ * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
+ * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
+ * for more information.
+ *
+ * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_pake_setup(),
+ * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_pake_abort(). The
+ * application may call psa_pake_abort() at any time after the operation
+ * has been initialized.
+ *
+ * After a successful call to psa_pake_setup(), the application must
+ * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
+ * operation:
+ * - A call to psa_pake_abort().
+ * - A successful call to psa_pake_get_implicit_key().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set up. It must have
+ * been initialized but not set up yet.
+ * \param[in] cipher_suite The cipher suite to use. (A cipher suite fully
+ * characterizes a PAKE algorithm and determines
+ * the algorithm as well.)
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The algorithm in \p cipher_suite is not a PAKE algorithm, or the
+ * PAKE primitive in \p cipher_suite is not compatible with the
+ * PAKE algorithm, or the hash algorithm in \p cipher_suite is invalid
+ * or not compatible with the PAKE algorithm and primitive.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * The algorithm in \p cipher_suite is not a supported PAKE algorithm,
+ * or the PAKE primitive in \p cipher_suite is not supported or not
+ * compatible with the PAKE algorithm, or the hash algorithm in
+ * \p cipher_suite is not supported or not compatible with the PAKE
+ * algorithm and primitive.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid, or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_pake_setup(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
+ const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite);
+
+/** Set the password for a password-authenticated key exchange from key ID.
+ *
+ * Call this function when the password, or a value derived from the password,
+ * is already present in the key store.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the password for. It
+ * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and
+ * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor
+ * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must
+ * be on operation for which the password hasn't
+ * been set yet (psa_pake_set_password_key()
+ * hasn't been called yet).
+ * \param password Identifier of the key holding the password or a
+ * value derived from the password (eg. by a
+ * memory-hard function). It must remain valid
+ * until the operation terminates. It must be of
+ * type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD or
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH. It has to allow
+ * the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * \p password is not a valid key identifier.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE flag, or it does not
+ * permit the \p operation's algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The key type for \p password is not #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD or
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH, or \p password is not compatible with
+ * the \p operation's cipher suite.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * The key type or key size of \p password is not supported with the
+ * \p operation's cipher suite.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must have been set up.), or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t password);
+
+/** Set the user ID for a password-authenticated key exchange.
+ *
+ * Call this function to set the user ID. For PAKE algorithms that associate a
+ * user identifier with each side of the session you need to call
+ * psa_pake_set_peer() as well. For PAKE algorithms that associate a single
+ * user identifier with the session, call psa_pake_set_user() only.
+ *
+ * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
+ * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
+ * for more information.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the user ID for. It
+ * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and
+ * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor
+ * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must
+ * be on operation for which the user ID hasn't
+ * been set (psa_pake_set_user() hasn't been
+ * called yet).
+ * \param[in] user_id The user ID to authenticate with.
+ * \param user_id_len Size of the \p user_id buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p user_id is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm and cipher
+ * suite.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * The value of \p user_id is not supported by the implementation.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid, or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_pake_set_user(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *user_id,
+ size_t user_id_len);
+
+/** Set the peer ID for a password-authenticated key exchange.
+ *
+ * Call this function in addition to psa_pake_set_user() for PAKE algorithms
+ * that associate a user identifier with each side of the session. For PAKE
+ * algorithms that associate a single user identifier with the session, call
+ * psa_pake_set_user() only.
+ *
+ * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
+ * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
+ * for more information.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to set the peer ID for. It
+ * must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and
+ * not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor
+ * psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must
+ * be on operation for which the peer ID hasn't
+ * been set (psa_pake_set_peer() hasn't been
+ * called yet).
+ * \param[in] peer_id The peer's ID to authenticate.
+ * \param peer_id_len Size of the \p peer_id buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p peer_id is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm and cipher
+ * suite.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * The algorithm doesn't associate a second identity with the session.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * Calling psa_pake_set_peer() is invalid with the \p operation's
+ * algorithm, the operation state is not valid, or the library has not
+ * been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_pake_set_peer(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
+ const uint8_t *peer_id,
+ size_t peer_id_len);
+
+/** Set the application role for a password-authenticated key exchange.
+ *
+ * Not all PAKE algorithms need to differentiate the communicating entities.
+ * It is optional to call this function for PAKEs that don't require a role
+ * to be specified. For such PAKEs the application role parameter is ignored,
+ * or #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE can be passed as \c role.
+ *
+ * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
+ * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
+ * for more information.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation object to specify the
+ * application's role for. It must have been set up
+ * by psa_pake_setup() and not yet in use (neither
+ * psa_pake_output() nor psa_pake_input() has been
+ * called yet). It must be on operation for which
+ * the application's role hasn't been specified
+ * (psa_pake_set_role() hasn't been called yet).
+ * \param role A value of type ::psa_pake_role_t indicating the
+ * application's role in the PAKE the algorithm
+ * that is being set up. For more information see
+ * the documentation of \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_XXX
+ * constants.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The \p role is not a valid PAKE role in the \p operation’s algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * The \p role for this algorithm is not supported or is not valid.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid, or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_pake_set_role(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
+ psa_pake_role_t role);
+
+/** Get output for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange.
+ *
+ * Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this
+ * function several times or you might not need to call this at all.
+ *
+ * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key
+ * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of
+ * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type
+ * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more
+ * information.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation.
+ * \param step The step of the algorithm for which the output is
+ * requested.
+ * \param[out] output Buffer where the output is to be written in the
+ * format appropriate for this \p step. Refer to
+ * the documentation of the individual
+ * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants for more
+ * information.
+ * \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. This must
+ * be at least #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c alg, \c
+ * primitive, \p output_step) where \c alg and
+ * \p primitive are the PAKE algorithm and primitive
+ * in the operation's cipher suite, and \p step is
+ * the output step.
+ *
+ * \param[out] output_length On success, the number of bytes of the returned
+ * output.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+ * The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p step is not supported with the operation's algorithm.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and fully set
+ * up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements
+ * for ordering of input and output steps), or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_pake_output(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
+ psa_pake_step_t step,
+ uint8_t *output,
+ size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_length);
+
+/** Provide input for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange.
+ *
+ * Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this
+ * function several times or you might not need to call this at all.
+ *
+ * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key
+ * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of
+ * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type
+ * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more
+ * information.
+ *
+ * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
+ * state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort().
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation.
+ * \param step The step for which the input is provided.
+ * \param[in] input Buffer containing the input in the format
+ * appropriate for this \p step. Refer to the
+ * documentation of the individual
+ * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants for more
+ * information.
+ * \param input_length Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The verification fails for a #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF input step.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p input_length is not compatible with the \p operation’s algorithm,
+ * or the \p input is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm,
+ * cipher suite or \p step.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * \p step p is not supported with the \p operation's algorithm, or the
+ * \p input is not supported for the \p operation's algorithm, cipher
+ * suite or \p step.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and fully set
+ * up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements
+ * for ordering of input and output steps), or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_pake_input(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
+ psa_pake_step_t step,
+ const uint8_t *input,
+ size_t input_length);
+
+/** Get implicitly confirmed shared secret from a PAKE.
+ *
+ * At this point there is a cryptographic guarantee that only the authenticated
+ * party who used the same password is able to compute the key. But there is no
+ * guarantee that the peer is the party it claims to be and was able to do so.
+ *
+ * That is, the authentication is only implicit. Since the peer is not
+ * authenticated yet, no action should be taken yet that assumes that the peer
+ * is who it claims to be. For example, do not access restricted files on the
+ * peer's behalf until an explicit authentication has succeeded.
+ *
+ * This function can be called after the key exchange phase of the operation
+ * has completed. It imports the shared secret output of the PAKE into the
+ * provided derivation operation. The input step
+ * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is used when placing the shared key
+ * material in the key derivation operation.
+ *
+ * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key
+ * exchange depends on the algorithm in use. Refer to the documentation of
+ * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type
+ * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more
+ * information.
+ *
+ * When this function returns successfully, \p operation becomes inactive.
+ * If this function returns an error status, both \p operation
+ * and \c key_derivation operations enter an error state and must be aborted by
+ * calling psa_pake_abort() and psa_key_derivation_abort() respectively.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation Active PAKE operation.
+ * \param[out] output A key derivation operation that is ready
+ * for an input step of type
+ * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is not compatible with the
+ * algorithm in the \p output key derivation operation.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * Input from a PAKE is not supported by the algorithm in the \p output
+ * key derivation operation.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The PAKE operation state is not valid (it must be active, but beyond
+ * that validity is specific to the algorithm), or
+ * the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(),
+ * or the state of \p output is not valid for
+ * the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET step. This can happen if the
+ * step is out of order or the application has done this step already
+ * and it may not be repeated.
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_pake_get_implicit_key(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
+ psa_key_derivation_operation_t *output);
+
+/** Abort a PAKE operation.
+ *
+ * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the \c
+ * operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused
+ * for another operation by calling psa_pake_setup() again.
+ *
+ * This function may be called at any time after the operation
+ * object has been initialized as described in #psa_pake_operation_t.
+ *
+ * In particular, calling psa_pake_abort() after the operation has been
+ * terminated by a call to psa_pake_abort() or psa_pake_get_implicit_key()
+ * is safe and has no effect.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] operation The operation to abort.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
+ * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
+ * results in this error code.
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_pake_abort(psa_pake_operation_t *operation);
+
+/**@}*/
+
+static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm(
+ const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite)
+{
+ return cipher_suite->algorithm;
+}
+
+static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(
+ psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
+ psa_algorithm_t algorithm)
+{
+ if (!PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(algorithm)) {
+ cipher_suite->algorithm = 0;
+ } else {
+ cipher_suite->algorithm = algorithm;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_get_primitive(
+ const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite)
+{
+ return PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(cipher_suite->type, cipher_suite->family,
+ cipher_suite->bits);
+}
+
+static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(
+ psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
+ psa_pake_primitive_t primitive)
+{
+ cipher_suite->type = (psa_pake_primitive_type_t) (primitive >> 24);
+ cipher_suite->family = (psa_pake_family_t) (0xFF & (primitive >> 16));
+ cipher_suite->bits = (uint16_t) (0xFFFF & primitive);
+}
+
+static inline psa_pake_family_t psa_pake_cs_get_family(
+ const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite)
+{
+ return cipher_suite->family;
+}
+
+static inline uint16_t psa_pake_cs_get_bits(
+ const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite)
+{
+ return cipher_suite->bits;
+}
+
+static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_hash(
+ const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite)
+{
+ return cipher_suite->hash;
+}
+
+static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_hash(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
+ psa_algorithm_t hash)
+{
+ if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash)) {
+ cipher_suite->hash = 0;
+ } else {
+ cipher_suite->hash = hash;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(void)
+{
+ const struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s v = PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT;
+ return v;
+}
+
+static inline struct psa_pake_operation_s psa_pake_operation_init(void)
+{
+ const struct psa_pake_operation_s v = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT;
+ return v;
+}
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_legacy.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_legacy.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7df3614
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_legacy.h
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa/crypto_legacy.h
+ *
+ * \brief Add temporary suppport for deprecated symbols before they are
+ * removed from the library.
+ *
+ * PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR and MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR
+ * symbols are deprecated.
+ * New symols add a suffix to that base name in order to clearly state what is
+ * the expected use for the key (use, import, export, generate, derive).
+ * Here we define some backward compatibility support for uses stil using
+ * the legacy symbols.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_LEGACY_H
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_LEGACY_H
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) //no-check-names
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
+#endif
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
+#endif
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
+#endif
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
+#endif
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) //no-check-names
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1
+#endif
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1
+#endif
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1
+#endif
+#if !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
+#define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR) //no-check-names
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) //no-check-names
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_LEGACY_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_platform.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_platform.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a871ee1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_platform.h
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa/crypto_platform.h
+ *
+ * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS platform definitions
+ *
+ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
+ * include psa/crypto.h.
+ *
+ * This file contains platform-dependent type definitions.
+ *
+ * In implementations with isolation between the application and the
+ * cryptography module, implementers should take care to ensure that
+ * the definitions that are exposed to applications match what the
+ * module implements.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+/*
+ * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not
+ * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which
+ * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the
+ * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and
+ * configuration.
+ */
+#include "psa/build_info.h"
+
+/* PSA requires several types which C99 provides in stdint.h. */
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER)
+
+/* Building for the PSA Crypto service on a PSA platform, a key owner is a PSA
+ * partition identifier.
+ *
+ * The function psa_its_identifier_of_slot() in psa_crypto_storage.c that
+ * translates a key identifier to a key storage file name assumes that
+ * mbedtls_key_owner_id_t is a 32-bit integer. This function thus needs
+ * reworking if mbedtls_key_owner_id_t is not defined as a 32-bit integer
+ * here anymore.
+ */
+typedef int32_t mbedtls_key_owner_id_t;
+
+/** Compare two key owner identifiers.
+ *
+ * \param id1 First key owner identifier.
+ * \param id2 Second key owner identifier.
+ *
+ * \return Non-zero if the two key owner identifiers are equal, zero otherwise.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal(mbedtls_key_owner_id_t id1,
+ mbedtls_key_owner_id_t id2)
+{
+ return id1 == id2;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */
+
+/*
+ * When MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM is defined, the code is being built for SPM
+ * (Secure Partition Manager) integration which separates the code into two
+ * parts: NSPE (Non-Secure Processing Environment) and SPE (Secure Processing
+ * Environment). When building for the SPE, an additional header file should be
+ * included.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM)
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_SECURE 1
+#include "crypto_spe.h"
+#endif // MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SPM
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG)
+/** The type of the context passed to mbedtls_psa_external_get_random().
+ *
+ * Mbed TLS initializes the context to all-bits-zero before calling
+ * mbedtls_psa_external_get_random() for the first time.
+ *
+ * The definition of this type in the Mbed TLS source code is for
+ * demonstration purposes. Implementers of mbedtls_psa_external_get_random()
+ * are expected to replace it with a custom definition.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ uintptr_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(opaque)[2];
+} mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+/** The type of the client handle used in context structures
+ *
+ * When a client view of the multipart context structures is required,
+ * this handle is used to keep a mapping with the service side of the
+ * context which contains the actual data.
+ */
+typedef uint32_t mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t;
+#endif
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ce14bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_se_driver.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1383 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa/crypto_se_driver.h
+ * \brief PSA external cryptoprocessor driver module
+ *
+ * This header declares types and function signatures for cryptography
+ * drivers that access key material via opaque references.
+ * This is meant for cryptoprocessors that have a separate key storage from the
+ * space in which the PSA Crypto implementation runs, typically secure
+ * elements (SEs).
+ *
+ * This file is part of the PSA Crypto Driver HAL (hardware abstraction layer),
+ * containing functions for driver developers to implement to enable hardware
+ * to be called in a standardized way by a PSA Cryptography API
+ * implementation. The functions comprising the driver HAL, which driver
+ * authors implement, are not intended to be called by application developers.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#include "crypto_driver_common.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** \defgroup se_init Secure element driver initialization
+ */
+/**@{*/
+
+/** \brief Driver context structure
+ *
+ * Driver functions receive a pointer to this structure.
+ * Each registered driver has one instance of this structure.
+ *
+ * Implementations must include the fields specified here and
+ * may include other fields.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** A read-only pointer to the driver's persistent data.
+ *
+ * Drivers typically use this persistent data to keep track of
+ * which slot numbers are available. This is only a guideline:
+ * drivers may use the persistent data for any purpose, keeping
+ * in mind the restrictions on when the persistent data is saved
+ * to storage: the persistent data is only saved after calling
+ * certain functions that receive a writable pointer to the
+ * persistent data.
+ *
+ * The core allocates a memory buffer for the persistent data.
+ * The pointer is guaranteed to be suitably aligned for any data type,
+ * like a pointer returned by `malloc` (but the core can use any
+ * method to allocate the buffer, not necessarily `malloc`).
+ *
+ * The size of this buffer is in the \c persistent_data_size field of
+ * this structure.
+ *
+ * Before the driver is initialized for the first time, the content of
+ * the persistent data is all-bits-zero. After a driver upgrade, if the
+ * size of the persistent data has increased, the original data is padded
+ * on the right with zeros; if the size has decreased, the original data
+ * is truncated to the new size.
+ *
+ * This pointer is to read-only data. Only a few driver functions are
+ * allowed to modify the persistent data. These functions receive a
+ * writable pointer. These functions are:
+ * - psa_drv_se_t::p_init
+ * - psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate
+ * - psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy
+ *
+ * The PSA Cryptography core saves the persistent data from one
+ * session to the next. It does this before returning from API functions
+ * that call a driver method that is allowed to modify the persistent
+ * data, specifically:
+ * - psa_crypto_init() causes a call to psa_drv_se_t::p_init, and may call
+ * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy to complete an action
+ * that was interrupted by a power failure.
+ * - Key creation functions cause a call to
+ * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate, and may cause a call to
+ * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy in case an error occurs.
+ * - psa_destroy_key() causes a call to
+ * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy.
+ */
+ const void *const MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_data);
+
+ /** The size of \c persistent_data in bytes.
+ *
+ * This is always equal to the value of the `persistent_data_size` field
+ * of the ::psa_drv_se_t structure when the driver is registered.
+ */
+ const size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_data_size);
+
+ /** Driver transient data.
+ *
+ * The core initializes this value to 0 and does not read or modify it
+ * afterwards. The driver may store whatever it wants in this field.
+ */
+ uintptr_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transient_data);
+} psa_drv_se_context_t;
+
+/** \brief A driver initialization function.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data
+ * that allows writing.
+ * \param location The location value for which this driver
+ * is registered. The driver will be invoked
+ * for all keys whose lifetime is in this
+ * location.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The driver is operational.
+ * The core will update the persistent data in storage.
+ * \return
+ * Any other return value prevents the driver from being used in
+ * this session.
+ * The core will NOT update the persistent data in storage.
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_init_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ void *persistent_data,
+ psa_key_location_t location);
+
+#if defined(__DOXYGEN_ONLY__) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
+/* Mbed TLS with secure element support enabled defines this type in
+ * crypto_types.h because it is also visible to applications through an
+ * implementation-specific extension.
+ * For the PSA Cryptography specification, this type is only visible
+ * via crypto_se_driver.h. */
+/** An internal designation of a key slot between the core part of the
+ * PSA Crypto implementation and the driver. The meaning of this value
+ * is driver-dependent. */
+typedef uint64_t psa_key_slot_number_t;
+#endif /* __DOXYGEN_ONLY__ || !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup se_mac Secure Element Message Authentication Codes
+ * Generation and authentication of Message Authentication Codes (MACs) using
+ * a secure element can be done either as a single function call (via the
+ * `psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t` or `psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t` functions), or in
+ * parts using the following sequence:
+ * - `psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t`
+ * - `psa_drv_se_mac_update_t`
+ * - `psa_drv_se_mac_update_t`
+ * - ...
+ * - `psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t` or `psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t`
+ *
+ * If a previously started secure element MAC operation needs to be terminated,
+ * it should be done so by the `psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t`. Failure to do so may
+ * result in allocated resources not being freed or in other undefined
+ * behavior.
+ */
+/**@{*/
+/** \brief A function that starts a secure element MAC operation for a PSA
+ * Crypto Driver implementation
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that will contain the
+ * hardware-specific MAC context
+ * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the
+ * operation
+ * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used to underly the MAC
+ * operation
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ void *op_context,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot,
+ psa_algorithm_t algorithm);
+
+/** \brief A function that continues a previously started secure element MAC
+ * operation
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the
+ * previously-established MAC operation to be
+ * updated
+ * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be appended
+ * to the MAC operation
+ * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of the input message buffer
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_update_t)(void *op_context,
+ const uint8_t *p_input,
+ size_t input_length);
+
+/** \brief a function that completes a previously started secure element MAC
+ * operation by returning the resulting MAC.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the
+ * previously started MAC operation to be
+ * finished
+ * \param[out] p_mac A buffer where the generated MAC will be
+ * placed
+ * \param[in] mac_size The size in bytes of the buffer that has been
+ * allocated for the `output` buffer
+ * \param[out] p_mac_length After completion, will contain the number of
+ * bytes placed in the `p_mac` buffer
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t)(void *op_context,
+ uint8_t *p_mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *p_mac_length);
+
+/** \brief A function that completes a previously started secure element MAC
+ * operation by comparing the resulting MAC against a provided value
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the previously
+ * started MAC operation to be finished
+ * \param[in] p_mac The MAC value against which the resulting MAC
+ * will be compared against
+ * \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of the value stored in `p_mac`
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The operation completed successfully and the MACs matched each
+ * other
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The operation completed successfully, but the calculated MAC did
+ * not match the provided MAC
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t)(void *op_context,
+ const uint8_t *p_mac,
+ size_t mac_length);
+
+/** \brief A function that aborts a previous started secure element MAC
+ * operation
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the previously
+ * started MAC operation to be aborted
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t)(void *op_context);
+
+/** \brief A function that performs a secure element MAC operation in one
+ * command and returns the calculated MAC
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be MACed
+ * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of `p_input`
+ * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used
+ * \param[in] alg The algorithm to be used to underlie the MAC
+ * operation
+ * \param[out] p_mac A buffer where the generated MAC will be
+ * placed
+ * \param[in] mac_size The size in bytes of the `p_mac` buffer
+ * \param[out] p_mac_length After completion, will contain the number of
+ * bytes placed in the `output` buffer
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ const uint8_t *p_input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ uint8_t *p_mac,
+ size_t mac_size,
+ size_t *p_mac_length);
+
+/** \brief A function that performs a secure element MAC operation in one
+ * command and compares the resulting MAC against a provided value
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the message to be MACed
+ * \param[in] input_length The size in bytes of `input`
+ * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used
+ * \param[in] alg The algorithm to be used to underlie the MAC
+ * operation
+ * \param[in] p_mac The MAC value against which the resulting MAC will
+ * be compared against
+ * \param[in] mac_length The size in bytes of `mac`
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The operation completed successfully and the MACs matched each
+ * other
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
+ * The operation completed successfully, but the calculated MAC did
+ * not match the provided MAC
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ const uint8_t *p_input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *p_mac,
+ size_t mac_length);
+
+/** \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to
+ * perform secure element MAC operations
+ *
+ * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate the table as appropriate
+ * upon startup.
+ *
+ * If one of the functions is not implemented (such as
+ * `psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t`), it should be set to NULL.
+ *
+ * Driver implementers should ensure that they implement all of the functions
+ * that make sense for their hardware, and that they provide a full solution
+ * (for example, if they support `p_setup`, they should also support
+ * `p_update` and at least one of `p_finish` or `p_finish_verify`).
+ *
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /**The size in bytes of the hardware-specific secure element MAC context
+ * structure
+ */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(context_size);
+ /** Function that performs a MAC setup operation
+ */
+ psa_drv_se_mac_setup_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_setup);
+ /** Function that performs a MAC update operation
+ */
+ psa_drv_se_mac_update_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_update);
+ /** Function that completes a MAC operation
+ */
+ psa_drv_se_mac_finish_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_finish);
+ /** Function that completes a MAC operation with a verify check
+ */
+ psa_drv_se_mac_finish_verify_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_finish_verify);
+ /** Function that aborts a previously started MAC operation
+ */
+ psa_drv_se_mac_abort_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_abort);
+ /** Function that performs a MAC operation in one call
+ */
+ psa_drv_se_mac_generate_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_mac);
+ /** Function that performs a MAC and verify operation in one call
+ */
+ psa_drv_se_mac_verify_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_mac_verify);
+} psa_drv_se_mac_t;
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup se_cipher Secure Element Symmetric Ciphers
+ *
+ * Encryption and Decryption using secure element keys in block modes other
+ * than ECB must be done in multiple parts, using the following flow:
+ * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t`
+ * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t` (optional depending upon block mode)
+ * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t`
+ * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t`
+ * - ...
+ * - `psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t`
+ *
+ * If a previously started secure element Cipher operation needs to be
+ * terminated, it should be done so by the `psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t`. Failure
+ * to do so may result in allocated resources not being freed or in other
+ * undefined behavior.
+ *
+ * In situations where a PSA Cryptographic API implementation is using a block
+ * mode not-supported by the underlying hardware or driver, it can construct
+ * the block mode itself, while calling the `psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t` function
+ * for the cipher operations.
+ */
+/**@{*/
+
+/** \brief A function that provides the cipher setup function for a
+ * secure element driver
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that will contain the
+ * hardware-specific cipher context.
+ * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the
+ * operation
+ * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used in the cipher
+ * operation
+ * \param[in] direction Indicates whether the operation is an encrypt
+ * or decrypt
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ void *op_context,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot,
+ psa_algorithm_t algorithm,
+ psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t direction);
+
+/** \brief A function that sets the initialization vector (if
+ * necessary) for a secure element cipher operation
+ *
+ * Rationale: The `psa_se_cipher_*` operation in the PSA Cryptographic API has
+ * two IV functions: one to set the IV, and one to generate it internally. The
+ * generate function is not necessary for the drivers to implement as the PSA
+ * Crypto implementation can do the generation using its RNG features.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] op_context A structure that contains the previously set up
+ * hardware-specific cipher context
+ * \param[in] p_iv A buffer containing the initialization vector
+ * \param[in] iv_length The size (in bytes) of the `p_iv` buffer
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t)(void *op_context,
+ const uint8_t *p_iv,
+ size_t iv_length);
+
+/** \brief A function that continues a previously started secure element cipher
+ * operation
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the
+ * previously started cipher operation
+ * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be
+ * encrypted/decrypted
+ * \param[in] input_size The size in bytes of the buffer pointed to
+ * by `p_input`
+ * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the
+ * output will be placed
+ * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the
+ * `p_output` buffer
+ * \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number
+ * of bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t)(void *op_context,
+ const uint8_t *p_input,
+ size_t input_size,
+ uint8_t *p_output,
+ size_t output_size,
+ size_t *p_output_length);
+
+/** \brief A function that completes a previously started secure element cipher
+ * operation
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the
+ * previously started cipher operation
+ * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the output
+ * will be placed
+ * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the `p_output`
+ * buffer
+ * \param[out] p_output_length After completion, will contain the number of
+ * bytes placed in the `p_output` buffer
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t)(void *op_context,
+ uint8_t *p_output,
+ size_t output_size,
+ size_t *p_output_length);
+
+/** \brief A function that aborts a previously started secure element cipher
+ * operation
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure for the
+ * previously started cipher operation
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t)(void *op_context);
+
+/** \brief A function that performs the ECB block mode for secure element
+ * cipher operations
+ *
+ * Note: this function should only be used with implementations that do not
+ * provide a needed higher-level operation.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param[in] key_slot The slot of the key to be used for the operation
+ * \param[in] algorithm The algorithm to be used in the cipher operation
+ * \param[in] direction Indicates whether the operation is an encrypt or
+ * decrypt
+ * \param[in] p_input A buffer containing the data to be
+ * encrypted/decrypted
+ * \param[in] input_size The size in bytes of the buffer pointed to by
+ * `p_input`
+ * \param[out] p_output The caller-allocated buffer where the output
+ * will be placed
+ * \param[in] output_size The allocated size in bytes of the `p_output`
+ * buffer
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot,
+ psa_algorithm_t algorithm,
+ psa_encrypt_or_decrypt_t direction,
+ const uint8_t *p_input,
+ size_t input_size,
+ uint8_t *p_output,
+ size_t output_size);
+
+/**
+ * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement
+ * cipher operations using secure elements.
+ *
+ * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as
+ * appropriate upon startup or at build time.
+ *
+ * If one of the functions is not implemented (such as
+ * `psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t`), it should be set to NULL.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** The size in bytes of the hardware-specific secure element cipher
+ * context structure
+ */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(context_size);
+ /** Function that performs a cipher setup operation */
+ psa_drv_se_cipher_setup_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_setup);
+ /** Function that sets a cipher IV (if necessary) */
+ psa_drv_se_cipher_set_iv_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_set_iv);
+ /** Function that performs a cipher update operation */
+ psa_drv_se_cipher_update_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_update);
+ /** Function that completes a cipher operation */
+ psa_drv_se_cipher_finish_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_finish);
+ /** Function that aborts a cipher operation */
+ psa_drv_se_cipher_abort_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_abort);
+ /** Function that performs ECB mode for a cipher operation
+ * (Danger: ECB mode should not be used directly by clients of the PSA
+ * Crypto Client API)
+ */
+ psa_drv_se_cipher_ecb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_ecb);
+} psa_drv_se_cipher_t;
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup se_asymmetric Secure Element Asymmetric Cryptography
+ *
+ * Since the amount of data that can (or should) be encrypted or signed using
+ * asymmetric keys is limited by the key size, asymmetric key operations using
+ * keys in a secure element must be done in single function calls.
+ */
+/**@{*/
+
+/**
+ * \brief A function that signs a hash or short message with a private key in
+ * a secure element
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of an asymmetric key pair
+ * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible
+ * with the type of `key`
+ * \param[in] p_hash The hash to sign
+ * \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes
+ * \param[out] p_signature Buffer where the signature is to be written
+ * \param[in] signature_size Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes
+ * \param[out] p_signature_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the returned signature value
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_sign_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *p_hash,
+ size_t hash_length,
+ uint8_t *p_signature,
+ size_t signature_size,
+ size_t *p_signature_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief A function that verifies the signature a hash or short message using
+ * an asymmetric public key in a secure element
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of a public key or an asymmetric key
+ * pair
+ * \param[in] alg A signature algorithm that is compatible with
+ * the type of `key`
+ * \param[in] p_hash The hash whose signature is to be verified
+ * \param[in] hash_length Size of the `p_hash` buffer in bytes
+ * \param[in] p_signature Buffer containing the signature to verify
+ * \param[in] signature_length Size of the `p_signature` buffer in bytes
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The signature is valid.
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_verify_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *p_hash,
+ size_t hash_length,
+ const uint8_t *p_signature,
+ size_t signature_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief A function that encrypts a short message with an asymmetric public
+ * key in a secure element
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of a public key or an asymmetric key
+ * pair
+ * \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is
+ * compatible with the type of `key`
+ * \param[in] p_input The message to encrypt
+ * \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes
+ * \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the
+ * encryption algorithm
+ * If the algorithm does not support a
+ * salt, pass `NULL`.
+ * If the algorithm supports an optional
+ * salt and you do not want to pass a salt,
+ * pass `NULL`.
+ * For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is
+ * supported.
+ * \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes
+ * If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0.
+ * \param[out] p_output Buffer where the encrypted message is to
+ * be written
+ * \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes
+ * \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes that make up
+ * the returned output
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_encrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *p_input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t *p_salt,
+ size_t salt_length,
+ uint8_t *p_output,
+ size_t output_size,
+ size_t *p_output_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief A function that decrypts a short message with an asymmetric private
+ * key in a secure element.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param[in] key_slot Key slot of an asymmetric key pair
+ * \param[in] alg An asymmetric encryption algorithm that is
+ * compatible with the type of `key`
+ * \param[in] p_input The message to decrypt
+ * \param[in] input_length Size of the `p_input` buffer in bytes
+ * \param[in] p_salt A salt or label, if supported by the
+ * encryption algorithm
+ * If the algorithm does not support a
+ * salt, pass `NULL`.
+ * If the algorithm supports an optional
+ * salt and you do not want to pass a salt,
+ * pass `NULL`.
+ * For #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, no salt is
+ * supported.
+ * \param[in] salt_length Size of the `p_salt` buffer in bytes
+ * If `p_salt` is `NULL`, pass 0.
+ * \param[out] p_output Buffer where the decrypted message is to
+ * be written
+ * \param[in] output_size Size of the `p_output` buffer in bytes
+ * \param[out] p_output_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the returned output
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_asymmetric_decrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *p_input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ const uint8_t *p_salt,
+ size_t salt_length,
+ uint8_t *p_output,
+ size_t output_size,
+ size_t *p_output_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement
+ * asymmetric cryptographic operations using secure elements.
+ *
+ * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as
+ * appropriate upon startup or at build time.
+ *
+ * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** Function that performs an asymmetric sign operation */
+ psa_drv_se_asymmetric_sign_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_sign);
+ /** Function that performs an asymmetric verify operation */
+ psa_drv_se_asymmetric_verify_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_verify);
+ /** Function that performs an asymmetric encrypt operation */
+ psa_drv_se_asymmetric_encrypt_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_encrypt);
+ /** Function that performs an asymmetric decrypt operation */
+ psa_drv_se_asymmetric_decrypt_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_decrypt);
+} psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t;
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup se_aead Secure Element Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data
+ * Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD) operations with secure
+ * elements must be done in one function call. While this creates a burden for
+ * implementers as there must be sufficient space in memory for the entire
+ * message, it prevents decrypted data from being made available before the
+ * authentication operation is complete and the data is known to be authentic.
+ */
+/**@{*/
+
+/** \brief A function that performs a secure element authenticated encryption
+ * operation
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param[in] key_slot Slot containing the key to use.
+ * \param[in] algorithm The AEAD algorithm to compute
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true)
+ * \param[in] p_nonce Nonce or IV to use
+ * \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `p_nonce` buffer in bytes
+ * \param[in] p_additional_data Additional data that will be
+ * authenticated but not encrypted
+ * \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `p_additional_data` in bytes
+ * \param[in] p_plaintext Data that will be authenticated and
+ * encrypted
+ * \param[in] plaintext_length Size of `p_plaintext` in bytes
+ * \param[out] p_ciphertext Output buffer for the authenticated and
+ * encrypted data. The additional data is
+ * not part of this output. For algorithms
+ * where the encrypted data and the
+ * authentication tag are defined as
+ * separate outputs, the authentication
+ * tag is appended to the encrypted data.
+ * \param[in] ciphertext_size Size of the `p_ciphertext` buffer in
+ * bytes
+ * \param[out] p_ciphertext_length On success, the size of the output in
+ * the `p_ciphertext` buffer
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_aead_encrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot,
+ psa_algorithm_t algorithm,
+ const uint8_t *p_nonce,
+ size_t nonce_length,
+ const uint8_t *p_additional_data,
+ size_t additional_data_length,
+ const uint8_t *p_plaintext,
+ size_t plaintext_length,
+ uint8_t *p_ciphertext,
+ size_t ciphertext_size,
+ size_t *p_ciphertext_length);
+
+/** A function that performs a secure element authenticated decryption operation
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param[in] key_slot Slot containing the key to use
+ * \param[in] algorithm The AEAD algorithm to compute
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(`alg`) is true)
+ * \param[in] p_nonce Nonce or IV to use
+ * \param[in] nonce_length Size of the `p_nonce` buffer in bytes
+ * \param[in] p_additional_data Additional data that has been
+ * authenticated but not encrypted
+ * \param[in] additional_data_length Size of `p_additional_data` in bytes
+ * \param[in] p_ciphertext Data that has been authenticated and
+ * encrypted.
+ * For algorithms where the encrypted data
+ * and the authentication tag are defined
+ * as separate inputs, the buffer must
+ * contain the encrypted data followed by
+ * the authentication tag.
+ * \param[in] ciphertext_length Size of `p_ciphertext` in bytes
+ * \param[out] p_plaintext Output buffer for the decrypted data
+ * \param[in] plaintext_size Size of the `p_plaintext` buffer in
+ * bytes
+ * \param[out] p_plaintext_length On success, the size of the output in
+ * the `p_plaintext` buffer
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_aead_decrypt_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot,
+ psa_algorithm_t algorithm,
+ const uint8_t *p_nonce,
+ size_t nonce_length,
+ const uint8_t *p_additional_data,
+ size_t additional_data_length,
+ const uint8_t *p_ciphertext,
+ size_t ciphertext_length,
+ uint8_t *p_plaintext,
+ size_t plaintext_size,
+ size_t *p_plaintext_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to implement
+ * secure element Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data operations
+ *
+ * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as
+ * appropriate upon startup.
+ *
+ * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** Function that performs the AEAD encrypt operation */
+ psa_drv_se_aead_encrypt_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_encrypt);
+ /** Function that performs the AEAD decrypt operation */
+ psa_drv_se_aead_decrypt_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_decrypt);
+} psa_drv_se_aead_t;
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup se_key_management Secure Element Key Management
+ * Currently, key management is limited to importing keys in the clear,
+ * destroying keys, and exporting keys in the clear.
+ * Whether a key may be exported is determined by the key policies in place
+ * on the key slot.
+ */
+/**@{*/
+
+/** An enumeration indicating how a key is created.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT, /**< During psa_import_key() */
+ PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE, /**< During psa_generate_key() */
+ PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE, /**< During psa_key_derivation_output_key() */
+ PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY, /**< During psa_copy_key() */
+
+#ifndef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__
+ /** A key is being registered with mbedtls_psa_register_se_key().
+ *
+ * The core only passes this value to
+ * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_validate_slot_number, not to
+ * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate. The call to
+ * `p_validate_slot_number` is not followed by any other call to the
+ * driver: the key is considered successfully registered if the call to
+ * `p_validate_slot_number` succeeds, or if `p_validate_slot_number` is
+ * null.
+ *
+ * With this creation method, the driver must return #PSA_SUCCESS if
+ * the given attributes are compatible with the existing key in the slot,
+ * and #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST if the driver can determine that there
+ * is no key with the specified slot number.
+ *
+ * This is an Mbed TLS extension.
+ */
+ PSA_KEY_CREATION_REGISTER,
+#endif
+} psa_key_creation_method_t;
+
+/** \brief A function that allocates a slot for a key.
+ *
+ * To create a key in a specific slot in a secure element, the core
+ * first calls this function to determine a valid slot number,
+ * then calls a function to create the key material in that slot.
+ * In nominal conditions (that is, if no error occurs),
+ * the effect of a call to a key creation function in the PSA Cryptography
+ * API with a lifetime that places the key in a secure element is the
+ * following:
+ * -# The core calls psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_allocate
+ * (or in some implementations
+ * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_validate_slot_number). The driver
+ * selects (or validates) a suitable slot number given the key attributes
+ * and the state of the secure element.
+ * -# The core calls a key creation function in the driver.
+ *
+ * The key creation functions in the PSA Cryptography API are:
+ * - psa_import_key(), which causes
+ * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_IMPORT
+ * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_import.
+ * - psa_generate_key(), which causes
+ * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_GENERATE
+ * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_import.
+ * - psa_key_derivation_output_key(), which causes
+ * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_DERIVE
+ * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t::p_derive.
+ * - psa_copy_key(), which causes
+ * a call to `p_allocate` with \p method = #PSA_KEY_CREATION_COPY
+ * then a call to psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_export.
+ *
+ * In case of errors, other behaviors are possible.
+ * - If the PSA Cryptography subsystem dies after the first step,
+ * for example because the device has lost power abruptly,
+ * the second step may never happen, or may happen after a reset
+ * and re-initialization. Alternatively, after a reset and
+ * re-initialization, the core may call
+ * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy on the slot number that
+ * was allocated (or validated) instead of calling a key creation function.
+ * - If an error occurs, the core may call
+ * psa_drv_se_key_management_t::p_destroy on the slot number that
+ * was allocated (or validated) instead of calling a key creation function.
+ *
+ * Errors and system resets also have an impact on the driver's persistent
+ * data. If a reset happens before the overall key creation process is
+ * completed (before or after the second step above), it is unspecified
+ * whether the persistent data after the reset is identical to what it
+ * was before or after the call to `p_allocate` (or `p_validate_slot_number`).
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data
+ * that allows writing.
+ * \param[in] attributes Attributes of the key.
+ * \param method The way in which the key is being created.
+ * \param[out] key_slot Slot where the key will be stored.
+ * This must be a valid slot for a key of the
+ * chosen type. It must be unoccupied.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ * The core will record \c *key_slot as the key slot where the key
+ * is stored and will update the persistent data in storage.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t)(
+ psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ void *persistent_data,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ psa_key_creation_method_t method,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t *key_slot);
+
+/** \brief A function that determines whether a slot number is valid
+ * for a key.
+ *
+ * To create a key in a specific slot in a secure element, the core
+ * first calls this function to validate the choice of slot number,
+ * then calls a function to create the key material in that slot.
+ * See the documentation of #psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t for more details.
+ *
+ * As of the PSA Cryptography API specification version 1.0, there is no way
+ * for applications to trigger a call to this function. However some
+ * implementations offer the capability to create or declare a key in
+ * a specific slot via implementation-specific means, generally for the
+ * sake of initial device provisioning or onboarding. Such a mechanism may
+ * be added to a future version of the PSA Cryptography API specification.
+ *
+ * This function may update the driver's persistent data through
+ * \p persistent_data. The core will save the updated persistent data at the
+ * end of the key creation process. See the description of
+ * ::psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t for more information.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data
+ * that allows writing.
+ * \param[in] attributes Attributes of the key.
+ * \param method The way in which the key is being created.
+ * \param[in] key_slot Slot where the key is to be stored.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The given slot number is valid for a key with the given
+ * attributes.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * The given slot number is not valid for a key with the
+ * given attributes. This includes the case where the slot
+ * number is not valid at all.
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
+ * There is already a key with the specified slot number.
+ * Drivers may choose to return this error from the key
+ * creation function instead.
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t)(
+ psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ void *persistent_data,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ psa_key_creation_method_t method,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot);
+
+/** \brief A function that imports a key into a secure element in binary format
+ *
+ * This function can support any output from psa_export_key(). Refer to the
+ * documentation of psa_export_key() for the format for each key type.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param key_slot Slot where the key will be stored.
+ * This must be a valid slot for a key of the
+ * chosen type. It must be unoccupied.
+ * \param[in] attributes The key attributes, including the lifetime,
+ * the key type and the usage policy.
+ * Drivers should not access the key size stored
+ * in the attributes: it may not match the
+ * data passed in \p data.
+ * Drivers can call psa_get_key_lifetime(),
+ * psa_get_key_type(),
+ * psa_get_key_usage_flags() and
+ * psa_get_key_algorithm() to access this
+ * information.
+ * \param[in] data Buffer containing the key data.
+ * \param[in] data_length Size of the \p data buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] bits On success, the key size in bits. The driver
+ * must determine this value after parsing the
+ * key according to the key type.
+ * This value is not used if the function fails.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * Success.
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_import_key_t)(
+ psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ const uint8_t *data,
+ size_t data_length,
+ size_t *bits);
+
+/**
+ * \brief A function that destroys a secure element key and restore the slot to
+ * its default state
+ *
+ * This function destroys the content of the key from a secure element.
+ * Implementations shall make a best effort to ensure that any previous content
+ * of the slot is unrecoverable.
+ *
+ * This function returns the specified slot to its default state.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param[in,out] persistent_data A pointer to the persistent data
+ * that allows writing.
+ * \param key_slot The key slot to erase.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The slot's content, if any, has been erased.
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_destroy_key_t)(
+ psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ void *persistent_data,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot);
+
+/**
+ * \brief A function that exports a secure element key in binary format
+ *
+ * The output of this function can be passed to psa_import_key() to
+ * create an equivalent object.
+ *
+ * If a key is created with `psa_import_key()` and then exported with
+ * this function, it is not guaranteed that the resulting data is
+ * identical: the implementation may choose a different representation
+ * of the same key if the format permits it.
+ *
+ * This function should generate output in the same format that
+ * `psa_export_key()` does. Refer to the
+ * documentation of `psa_export_key()` for the format for each key type.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param[in] key Slot whose content is to be exported. This must
+ * be an occupied key slot.
+ * \param[out] p_data Buffer where the key data is to be written.
+ * \param[in] data_size Size of the `p_data` buffer in bytes.
+ * \param[out] p_data_length On success, the number of bytes
+ * that make up the key data.
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE \emptydescription
+ * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_export_key_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t key,
+ uint8_t *p_data,
+ size_t data_size,
+ size_t *p_data_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief A function that generates a symmetric or asymmetric key on a secure
+ * element
+ *
+ * If the key type \c type recorded in \p attributes
+ * is asymmetric (#PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(\c type) = 1),
+ * the driver may export the public key at the time of generation,
+ * in the format documented for psa_export_public_key() by writing it
+ * to the \p pubkey buffer.
+ * This is optional, intended for secure elements that output the
+ * public key at generation time and that cannot export the public key
+ * later. Drivers that do not need this feature should leave
+ * \p *pubkey_length set to 0 and should
+ * implement the psa_drv_key_management_t::p_export_public function.
+ * Some implementations do not support this feature, in which case
+ * \p pubkey is \c NULL and \p pubkey_size is 0.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param key_slot Slot where the key will be stored.
+ * This must be a valid slot for a key of the
+ * chosen type. It must be unoccupied.
+ * \param[in] attributes The key attributes, including the lifetime,
+ * the key type and size, and the usage policy.
+ * Drivers can call psa_get_key_lifetime(),
+ * psa_get_key_type(), psa_get_key_bits(),
+ * psa_get_key_usage_flags() and
+ * psa_get_key_algorithm() to access this
+ * information.
+ * \param[out] pubkey A buffer where the driver can write the
+ * public key, when generating an asymmetric
+ * key pair.
+ * This is \c NULL when generating a symmetric
+ * key or if the core does not support
+ * exporting the public key at generation time.
+ * \param pubkey_size The size of the `pubkey` buffer in bytes.
+ * This is 0 when generating a symmetric
+ * key or if the core does not support
+ * exporting the public key at generation time.
+ * \param[out] pubkey_length On entry, this is always 0.
+ * On success, the number of bytes written to
+ * \p pubkey. If this is 0 or unchanged on return,
+ * the core will not read the \p pubkey buffer,
+ * and will instead call the driver's
+ * psa_drv_key_management_t::p_export_public
+ * function to export the public key when needed.
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_generate_key_t)(
+ psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t key_slot,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ uint8_t *pubkey, size_t pubkey_size, size_t *pubkey_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to for secure
+ * element key management
+ *
+ * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as
+ * appropriate upon startup or at build time.
+ *
+ * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** Function that allocates a slot for a key. */
+ psa_drv_se_allocate_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_allocate);
+ /** Function that checks the validity of a slot for a key. */
+ psa_drv_se_validate_slot_number_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_validate_slot_number);
+ /** Function that performs a key import operation */
+ psa_drv_se_import_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_import);
+ /** Function that performs a generation */
+ psa_drv_se_generate_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_generate);
+ /** Function that performs a key destroy operation */
+ psa_drv_se_destroy_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_destroy);
+ /** Function that performs a key export operation */
+ psa_drv_se_export_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export);
+ /** Function that performs a public key export operation */
+ psa_drv_se_export_key_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export_public);
+} psa_drv_se_key_management_t;
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup driver_derivation Secure Element Key Derivation and Agreement
+ * Key derivation is the process of generating new key material using an
+ * existing key and additional parameters, iterating through a basic
+ * cryptographic function, such as a hash.
+ * Key agreement is a part of cryptographic protocols that allows two parties
+ * to agree on the same key value, but starting from different original key
+ * material.
+ * The flows are similar, and the PSA Crypto Driver Model uses the same functions
+ * for both of the flows.
+ *
+ * There are two different final functions for the flows,
+ * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive` and `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export`.
+ * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive` is used when the key material should be
+ * placed in a slot on the hardware and not exposed to the caller.
+ * `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export` is used when the key material should be
+ * returned to the PSA Cryptographic API implementation.
+ *
+ * Different key derivation algorithms require a different number of inputs.
+ * Instead of having an API that takes as input variable length arrays, which
+ * can be problematic to manage on embedded platforms, the inputs are passed
+ * to the driver via a function, `psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral`, that
+ * is called multiple times with different `collateral_id`s. Thus, for a key
+ * derivation algorithm that required 3 parameter inputs, the flow would look
+ * something like:
+ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
+ * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup(kdf_algorithm, source_key, dest_key_size_bytes);
+ * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_0,
+ * p_collateral_0,
+ * collateral_0_size);
+ * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_1,
+ * p_collateral_1,
+ * collateral_1_size);
+ * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(kdf_algorithm_collateral_id_2,
+ * p_collateral_2,
+ * collateral_2_size);
+ * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive();
+ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ *
+ * key agreement example:
+ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~{.c}
+ * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup(alg, source_key. dest_key_size_bytes);
+ * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral(DHE_PUBKEY, p_pubkey, pubkey_size);
+ * psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export(p_session_key,
+ * session_key_size,
+ * &session_key_length);
+ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ */
+/**@{*/
+
+/** \brief A function that Sets up a secure element key derivation operation by
+ * specifying the algorithm and the source key sot
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] drv_context The driver context structure.
+ * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any
+ * context information for the implementation
+ * \param[in] kdf_alg The algorithm to be used for the key derivation
+ * \param[in] source_key The key to be used as the source material for
+ * the key derivation
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup_t)(psa_drv_se_context_t *drv_context,
+ void *op_context,
+ psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t source_key);
+
+/** \brief A function that provides collateral (parameters) needed for a secure
+ * element key derivation or key agreement operation
+ *
+ * Since many key derivation algorithms require multiple parameters, it is
+ * expected that this function may be called multiple times for the same
+ * operation, each with a different algorithm-specific `collateral_id`
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any
+ * context information for the implementation
+ * \param[in] collateral_id An ID for the collateral being provided
+ * \param[in] p_collateral A buffer containing the collateral data
+ * \param[in] collateral_size The size in bytes of the collateral
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral_t)(void *op_context,
+ uint32_t collateral_id,
+ const uint8_t *p_collateral,
+ size_t collateral_size);
+
+/** \brief A function that performs the final secure element key derivation
+ * step and place the generated key material in a slot
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] op_context A hardware-specific structure containing any
+ * context information for the implementation
+ * \param[in] dest_key The slot where the generated key material
+ * should be placed
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive_t)(void *op_context,
+ psa_key_slot_number_t dest_key);
+
+/** \brief A function that performs the final step of a secure element key
+ * agreement and place the generated key material in a buffer
+ *
+ * \param[out] p_output Buffer in which to place the generated key
+ * material
+ * \param[in] output_size The size in bytes of `p_output`
+ * \param[out] p_output_length Upon success, contains the number of bytes of
+ * key material placed in `p_output`
+ *
+ * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription
+ */
+typedef psa_status_t (*psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export_t)(void *op_context,
+ uint8_t *p_output,
+ size_t output_size,
+ size_t *p_output_length);
+
+/**
+ * \brief A struct containing all of the function pointers needed to for secure
+ * element key derivation and agreement
+ *
+ * PSA Crypto API implementations should populate instances of the table as
+ * appropriate upon startup.
+ *
+ * If one of the functions is not implemented, it should be set to NULL.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** The driver-specific size of the key derivation context */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(context_size);
+ /** Function that performs a key derivation setup */
+ psa_drv_se_key_derivation_setup_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_setup);
+ /** Function that sets key derivation collateral */
+ psa_drv_se_key_derivation_collateral_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_collateral);
+ /** Function that performs a final key derivation step */
+ psa_drv_se_key_derivation_derive_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_derive);
+ /** Function that performs a final key derivation or agreement and
+ * exports the key */
+ psa_drv_se_key_derivation_export_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export);
+} psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t;
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup se_registration Secure element driver registration
+ */
+/**@{*/
+
+/** A structure containing pointers to all the entry points of a
+ * secure element driver.
+ *
+ * Future versions of this specification may add extra substructures at
+ * the end of this structure.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /** The version of the driver HAL that this driver implements.
+ * This is a protection against loading driver binaries built against
+ * a different version of this specification.
+ * Use #PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION.
+ */
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hal_version);
+
+ /** The size of the driver's persistent data in bytes.
+ *
+ * This can be 0 if the driver does not need persistent data.
+ *
+ * See the documentation of psa_drv_se_context_t::persistent_data
+ * for more information about why and how a driver can use
+ * persistent data.
+ */
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_data_size);
+
+ /** The driver initialization function.
+ *
+ * This function is called once during the initialization of the
+ * PSA Cryptography subsystem, before any other function of the
+ * driver is called. If this function returns a failure status,
+ * the driver will be unusable, at least until the next system reset.
+ *
+ * If this field is \c NULL, it is equivalent to a function that does
+ * nothing and returns #PSA_SUCCESS.
+ */
+ psa_drv_se_init_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_init);
+
+ const psa_drv_se_key_management_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_management);
+ const psa_drv_se_mac_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mac);
+ const psa_drv_se_cipher_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher);
+ const psa_drv_se_aead_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(aead);
+ const psa_drv_se_asymmetric_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(asymmetric);
+ const psa_drv_se_key_derivation_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(derivation);
+} psa_drv_se_t;
+
+/** The current version of the secure element driver HAL.
+ */
+/* 0.0.0 patchlevel 5 */
+#define PSA_DRV_SE_HAL_VERSION 0x00000005
+
+/** Register an external cryptoprocessor (secure element) driver.
+ *
+ * This function is only intended to be used by driver code, not by
+ * application code. In implementations with separation between the
+ * PSA cryptography module and applications, this function should
+ * only be available to callers that run in the same memory space as
+ * the cryptography module, and should not be exposed to applications
+ * running in a different memory space.
+ *
+ * This function may be called before psa_crypto_init(). It is
+ * implementation-defined whether this function may be called
+ * after psa_crypto_init().
+ *
+ * \note Implementations store metadata about keys including the lifetime
+ * value, which contains the driver's location indicator. Therefore,
+ * from one instantiation of the PSA Cryptography
+ * library to the next one, if there is a key in storage with a certain
+ * lifetime value, you must always register the same driver (or an
+ * updated version that communicates with the same secure element)
+ * with the same location value.
+ *
+ * \param location The location value through which this driver will
+ * be exposed to applications.
+ * This driver will be used for all keys such that
+ * `location == #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION( lifetime )`.
+ * The value #PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE is reserved
+ * and may not be used for drivers. Implementations
+ * may reserve other values.
+ * \param[in] methods The method table of the driver. This structure must
+ * remain valid for as long as the cryptography
+ * module keeps running. It is typically a global
+ * constant.
+ *
+ * \return #PSA_SUCCESS
+ * The driver was successfully registered. Applications can now
+ * use \p location to access keys through the methods passed to
+ * this function.
+ * \return #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
+ * This function was called after the initialization of the
+ * cryptography module, and this implementation does not support
+ * driver registration at this stage.
+ * \return #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
+ * There is already a registered driver for this value of \p location.
+ * \return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ * \p location is a reserved value.
+ * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
+ * `methods->hal_version` is not supported by this implementation.
+ * \return #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY
+ * \return #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
+ * \return #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * \return #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
+ */
+psa_status_t psa_register_se_driver(
+ psa_key_location_t location,
+ const psa_drv_se_t *methods);
+
+/**@}*/
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SE_DRIVER_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..87b8c39
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1317 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa/crypto_sizes.h
+ *
+ * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS buffer size macros
+ *
+ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
+ * include psa/crypto.h.
+ *
+ * This file contains the definitions of macros that are useful to
+ * compute buffer sizes. The signatures and semantics of these macros
+ * are standardized, but the definitions are not, because they depend on
+ * the available algorithms and, in some cases, on permitted tolerances
+ * on buffer sizes.
+ *
+ * In implementations with isolation between the application and the
+ * cryptography module, implementers should take care to ensure that
+ * the definitions that are exposed to applications match what the
+ * module implements.
+ *
+ * Macros that compute sizes whose values do not depend on the
+ * implementation are in crypto.h.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H
+
+/*
+ * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not
+ * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which
+ * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the
+ * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and
+ * configuration.
+ */
+#include "psa/build_info.h"
+
+#define PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) (((bits) + 7u) / 8u)
+#define PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(bytes) ((bytes) * 8u)
+#define PSA_MAX_OF_THREE(a, b, c) ((a) <= (b) ? (b) <= (c) ? \
+ (c) : (b) : (a) <= (c) ? (c) : (a))
+
+#define PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(block_size, length) \
+ (((length) + (block_size) - 1) / (block_size) * (block_size))
+
+/** The size of the output of psa_hash_finish(), in bytes.
+ *
+ * This is also the hash size that psa_hash_verify() expects.
+ *
+ * \param alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true), or an HMAC algorithm
+ * (#PSA_ALG_HMAC(\c hash_alg) where \c hash_alg is a
+ * hash algorithm).
+ *
+ * \return The hash size for the specified hash algorithm.
+ * If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_HASH_LENGTH(alg) \
+ ( \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 16u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 20u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 20u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 28u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 32u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 48u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 64u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 28u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 32u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 28u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 32u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 48u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 64u : \
+ 0u)
+
+/** The input block size of a hash algorithm, in bytes.
+ *
+ * Hash algorithms process their input data in blocks. Hash operations will
+ * retain any partial blocks until they have enough input to fill the block or
+ * until the operation is finished.
+ * This affects the output from psa_hash_suspend().
+ *
+ * \param alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The block size in bytes for the specified hash algorithm.
+ * If the hash algorithm is not recognized, return 0.
+ * An implementation can return either 0 or the correct size for a
+ * hash algorithm that it recognizes, but does not support.
+ */
+#define PSA_HASH_BLOCK_LENGTH(alg) \
+ ( \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_MD5 ? 64u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ? 64u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ? 64u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ? 64u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ? 64u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ? 128u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ? 128u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ? 128u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ? 128u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ? 144u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ? 136u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ? 104u : \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ? 72u : \
+ 0u)
+
+/** \def PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE
+ *
+ * Maximum size of a hash.
+ *
+ * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value
+ * is the maximum size of a hash in bytes.
+ */
+/* Note: for HMAC-SHA-3, the block size is 144 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-224,
+ * 136 bytes for HMAC-SHA3-256, 104 bytes for SHA3-384, 72 bytes for
+ * HMAC-SHA3-512. */
+/* Note: PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE should be kept in sync with MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE,
+ * see the note on MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE for details. */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224)
+#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 144u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256)
+#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 136u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512)
+#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384)
+#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384)
+#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 104u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512)
+#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 72u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256)
+#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224)
+#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64u
+#else /* SHA-1 or smaller */
+#define PSA_HMAC_MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 64u
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512)
+#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 64u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384)
+#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 48u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256)
+#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 32u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224)
+#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 28u
+#else /* SHA-1 or smaller */
+#define PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE 20u
+#endif
+
+/** \def PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE
+ *
+ * Maximum size of a MAC.
+ *
+ * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value
+ * is the maximum size of a MAC in bytes.
+ */
+/* All non-HMAC MACs have a maximum size that's smaller than the
+ * minimum possible value of PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE in this implementation. */
+/* Note that the encoding of truncated MAC algorithms limits this value
+ * to 64 bytes.
+ */
+#define PSA_MAC_MAX_SIZE PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE
+
+/** The length of a tag for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes.
+ *
+ * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to store the
+ * tag output from psa_aead_finish().
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE.
+ *
+ * \param key_type The type of the AEAD key.
+ * \param key_bits The size of the AEAD key in bits.
+ * \param alg An AEAD algorithm
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The tag length for the specified algorithm and key.
+ * If the AEAD algorithm does not have an identified
+ * tag that can be distinguished from the rest of
+ * the ciphertext, return 0.
+ * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not
+ * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
+ * return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
+ (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ? \
+ PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \
+ ((void) (key_bits), 0u))
+
+/** The maximum tag size for all supported AEAD algorithms, in bytes.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg).
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE 16u
+
+/* The maximum size of an RSA key on this implementation, in bits.
+ * This is a vendor-specific macro.
+ *
+ * Mbed TLS does not set a hard limit on the size of RSA keys: any key
+ * whose parameters fit in a bignum is accepted. However large keys can
+ * induce a large memory usage and long computation times. Unlike other
+ * auxiliary macros in this file and in crypto.h, which reflect how the
+ * library is configured, this macro defines how the library is
+ * configured. This implementation refuses to import or generate an
+ * RSA key whose size is larger than the value defined here.
+ *
+ * Note that an implementation may set different size limits for different
+ * operations, and does not need to accept all key sizes up to the limit. */
+#define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 4096u
+
+/* The minimum size of an RSA key on this implementation, in bits.
+ * This is a vendor-specific macro.
+ *
+ * Limits RSA key generation to a minimum due to avoid accidental misuse.
+ * This value cannot be less than 128 bits.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS
+#else
+#define PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS 1024
+#endif
+
+/* The maximum size of an DH key on this implementation, in bits.
+ * This is a vendor-specific macro.*/
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 8192u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 6144u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 4096u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 3072u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 2048u
+#else
+#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 0u
+#endif
+
+/* The maximum size of an ECC key on this implementation, in bits.
+ * This is a vendor-specific macro. */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 521u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 512u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 448u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 384u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 256u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 255u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 224u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192)
+#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 192u
+#else
+#define PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS 0u
+#endif
+
+/** This macro returns the maximum supported length of the PSK for the
+ * TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS key derivation
+ * (#PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(\c hash_alg)).
+ *
+ * The maximum supported length does not depend on the chosen hash algorithm.
+ *
+ * Quoting RFC 4279, Sect 5.3:
+ * TLS implementations supporting these ciphersuites MUST support
+ * arbitrary PSK identities up to 128 octets in length, and arbitrary
+ * PSKs up to 64 octets in length. Supporting longer identities and
+ * keys is RECOMMENDED.
+ *
+ * Therefore, no implementation should define a value smaller than 64
+ * for #PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE.
+ */
+#define PSA_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_PSK_MAX_SIZE 128u
+
+/* The expected size of input passed to psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_input,
+ * which is expected to work with P-256 curve only. */
+#define PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_INPUT_SIZE 65u
+
+/* The size of a serialized K.X coordinate to be used in
+ * psa_tls12_ecjpake_to_pms_input. This function only accepts the P-256
+ * curve. */
+#define PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE 32u
+
+/* The maximum number of iterations for PBKDF2 on this implementation, in bits.
+ * This is a vendor-specific macro. This can be configured if necessary */
+#define PSA_VENDOR_PBKDF2_MAX_ITERATIONS 0xffffffffU
+
+/** The maximum size of a block cipher. */
+#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE 16u
+
+/** The size of the output of psa_mac_sign_finish(), in bytes.
+ *
+ * This is also the MAC size that psa_mac_verify_finish() expects.
+ *
+ * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
+ * \param key_type The type of the MAC key.
+ * \param key_bits The size of the MAC key in bits.
+ * \param alg A MAC algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The MAC size for the specified algorithm with
+ * the specified key parameters.
+ * \return 0 if the MAC algorithm is not recognized.
+ * \return Either 0 or the correct size for a MAC algorithm that
+ * the implementation recognizes, but does not support.
+ * \return Unspecified if the key parameters are not consistent
+ * with the algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_MAC_LENGTH(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
+ ((alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ? PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(alg) : \
+ PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) ? PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(alg)) : \
+ PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \
+ ((void) (key_type), (void) (key_bits), 0u))
+
+/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_encrypt(), in bytes.
+ *
+ * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is
+ * guaranteed that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an
+ * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of
+ * the ciphertext may be smaller.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p plaintext_length).
+ *
+ * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
+ * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is
+ * compatible with algorithm \p alg.
+ * \param alg An AEAD algorithm
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified
+ * algorithm.
+ * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not
+ * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
+ * return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, plaintext_length) \
+ (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ? \
+ (plaintext_length) + PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \
+ 0u)
+
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_encrypt(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
+ *
+ * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_aead_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ *
+ * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are
+ * compile-time constants.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg,
+ * \p plaintext_length).
+ *
+ * \param plaintext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return A sufficient output buffer size for any of the
+ * supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
+ *
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(plaintext_length) \
+ ((plaintext_length) + PSA_AEAD_TAG_MAX_SIZE)
+
+
+/** The maximum size of the output of psa_aead_decrypt(), in bytes.
+ *
+ * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is
+ * guaranteed that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an
+ * insufficient buffer size. Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of
+ * the plaintext may be smaller.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p ciphertext_length).
+ *
+ * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
+ * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is
+ * compatible with algorithm \p alg.
+ * \param alg An AEAD algorithm
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param ciphertext_length Size of the plaintext in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return The AEAD ciphertext size for the specified
+ * algorithm.
+ * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not
+ * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
+ * return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, ciphertext_length) \
+ (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \
+ (ciphertext_length) > PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) ? \
+ (ciphertext_length) - PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(alg) : \
+ 0u)
+
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_decrypt(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
+ *
+ * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_aead_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ *
+ * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are
+ * compile-time constants.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg,
+ * \p ciphertext_length).
+ *
+ * \param ciphertext_length Size of the ciphertext in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return A sufficient output buffer size for any of the
+ * supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
+ *
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(ciphertext_length) \
+ (ciphertext_length)
+
+/** The default nonce size for an AEAD algorithm, in bytes.
+ *
+ * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to
+ * store the nonce output from #psa_aead_generate_nonce().
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE.
+ *
+ * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to
+ * #psa_aead_set_nonce(), #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(),
+ * just the default size that is generated by #psa_aead_generate_nonce().
+ *
+ * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
+ * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with
+ * algorithm \p alg.
+ *
+ * \param alg An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The default nonce size for the specified key type and algorithm.
+ * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not recognized,
+ * or the parameters are incompatible, return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \
+ (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) == 16 ? \
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) ? 13u : \
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) ? 12u : \
+ 0u : \
+ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) ? 12u : \
+ 0u)
+
+/** The maximum default nonce size among all supported pairs of key types and
+ * AEAD algorithms, in bytes.
+ *
+ * This is equal to or greater than any value that #PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH()
+ * may return.
+ *
+ * \note This is not the maximum size of nonce supported as input to
+ * #psa_aead_set_nonce(), #psa_aead_encrypt() or #psa_aead_decrypt(),
+ * just the largest size that may be generated by
+ * #psa_aead_generate_nonce().
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_NONCE_MAX_SIZE 13u
+
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update().
+ *
+ * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is
+ * guaranteed that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an
+ * insufficient buffer size. The actual size of the output may be smaller
+ * in any given call.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length).
+ *
+ * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
+ * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is
+ * compatible with algorithm \p alg.
+ * \param alg An AEAD algorithm
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return A sufficient output buffer size for the specified
+ * algorithm.
+ * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not
+ * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
+ * return 0.
+ */
+/* For all the AEAD modes defined in this specification, it is possible
+ * to emit output without delay. However, hardware may not always be
+ * capable of this. So for modes based on a block cipher, allow the
+ * implementation to delay the output until it has a full block. */
+#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \
+ (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 ? \
+ PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \
+ PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), (input_length)) : \
+ (input_length) : \
+ 0u)
+
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_aead_update(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
+ *
+ * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_aead_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length).
+ *
+ * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes.
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \
+ (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, (input_length)))
+
+/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish().
+ *
+ * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is
+ * guaranteed that psa_aead_finish() will not fail due to an
+ * insufficient ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output may
+ * be smaller in any given call.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.
+ *
+ * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is
+ compatible with algorithm \p alg.
+ * \param alg An AEAD algorithm
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for the
+ * specified algorithm.
+ * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not
+ * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
+ * return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \
+ (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \
+ PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \
+ PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \
+ 0u)
+
+/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_aead_finish(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg).
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE)
+
+/** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify().
+ *
+ * If the size of the plaintext buffer is at least this large, it is
+ * guaranteed that psa_aead_verify() will not fail due to an
+ * insufficient plaintext buffer size. The actual size of the output may
+ * be smaller in any given call.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.
+ *
+ * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is
+ * compatible with algorithm \p alg.
+ * \param alg An AEAD algorithm
+ * (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return A sufficient plaintext buffer size for the
+ * specified algorithm.
+ * If the key type or AEAD algorithm is not
+ * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
+ * return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \
+ (PSA_AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH(key_type, alg) != 0 && \
+ PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) ? \
+ PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \
+ 0u)
+
+/** A sufficient plaintext buffer size for psa_aead_verify(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and AEAD algorithms.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg).
+ */
+#define PSA_AEAD_VERIFY_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE)
+
+#define PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \
+ 2u * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg)) + 1u : \
+ 11u /*PKCS#1v1.5*/)
+
+/**
+ * \brief ECDSA signature size for a given curve bit size
+ *
+ * \param curve_bits Curve size in bits.
+ * \return Signature size in bytes.
+ *
+ * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one.
+ */
+#define PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(curve_bits) \
+ (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits) * 2u)
+
+/** Sufficient signature buffer size for psa_sign_hash().
+ *
+ * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a signature using a key
+ * of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm.
+ * Note that the actual size of the signature may be smaller
+ * (some algorithms produce a variable-size signature).
+ *
+ * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
+ * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a
+ * key pair type or a public key type).
+ * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits.
+ * \param alg The signature algorithm.
+ *
+ * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return
+ * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
+ * psa_sign_hash() will not fail with
+ * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
+ * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported,
+ * return either a sensible size or 0.
+ * If the parameters are not valid, the
+ * return value is unspecified.
+ */
+#define PSA_SIGN_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
+ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? ((void) alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(key_type) ? PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(key_bits) : \
+ ((void) alg, 0u))
+
+#define PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE \
+ PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)
+
+/** \def PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
+ *
+ * Maximum size of an asymmetric signature.
+ *
+ * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value
+ * is the maximum size of a signature in bytes.
+ */
+#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE 1
+
+#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) && \
+ (PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE > PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE)
+#undef PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
+#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
+#endif
+#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS)) && \
+ (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE)
+#undef PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
+#define PSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)
+#endif
+
+/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt().
+ *
+ * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a ciphertext produced using
+ * a key of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm.
+ * Note that the actual size of the ciphertext may be smaller, depending
+ * on the algorithm.
+ *
+ * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
+ * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a
+ * key pair type or a public key type).
+ * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits.
+ * \param alg The asymmetric encryption algorithm.
+ *
+ * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return
+ * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
+ * psa_asymmetric_encrypt() will not fail with
+ * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
+ * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported,
+ * return either a sensible size or 0.
+ * If the parameters are not valid, the
+ * return value is unspecified.
+ */
+#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
+ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? \
+ ((void) alg, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits)) : \
+ 0u)
+
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_encrypt(), for any
+ * supported asymmetric encryption.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg).
+ */
+/* This macro assumes that RSA is the only supported asymmetric encryption. */
+#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \
+ (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS))
+
+/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt().
+ *
+ * This macro returns a sufficient buffer size for a plaintext produced using
+ * a key of the specified type and size, with the specified algorithm.
+ * Note that the actual size of the plaintext may be smaller, depending
+ * on the algorithm.
+ *
+ * \warning This function may call its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
+ * \param key_type An asymmetric key type (this may indifferently be a
+ * key pair type or a public key type).
+ * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits.
+ * \param alg The asymmetric encryption algorithm.
+ *
+ * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return
+ * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
+ * psa_asymmetric_decrypt() will not fail with
+ * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
+ * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported,
+ * return either a sensible size or 0.
+ * If the parameters are not valid, the
+ * return value is unspecified.
+ */
+#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits, alg) \
+ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? \
+ PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) - PSA_RSA_MINIMUM_PADDING_SIZE(alg) : \
+ 0u)
+
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_asymmetric_decrypt(), for any
+ * supported asymmetric decryption.
+ *
+ * This macro assumes that RSA is the only supported asymmetric encryption.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits, \p alg).
+ */
+#define PSA_ASYMMETRIC_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \
+ (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS))
+
+/* Maximum size of the ASN.1 encoding of an INTEGER with the specified
+ * number of bits.
+ *
+ * This definition assumes that bits <= 2^19 - 9 so that the length field
+ * is at most 3 bytes. The length of the encoding is the length of the
+ * bit string padded to a whole number of bytes plus:
+ * - 1 type byte;
+ * - 1 to 3 length bytes;
+ * - 0 to 1 bytes of leading 0 due to the sign bit.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(bits) \
+ ((bits) / 8u + 5u)
+
+/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA public key.
+ * Assumes that the public exponent is less than 2^32.
+ *
+ * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * modulus INTEGER, -- n
+ * publicExponent INTEGER } -- e
+ *
+ * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead;
+ * - n : INTEGER;
+ * - 7 bytes for the public exponent.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \
+ (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) + 11u)
+
+/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an RSA key pair.
+ * Assumes that the public exponent is less than 2^32 and that the size
+ * difference between the two primes is at most 1 bit.
+ *
+ * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version Version, -- 0
+ * modulus INTEGER, -- N-bit
+ * publicExponent INTEGER, -- 32-bit
+ * privateExponent INTEGER, -- N-bit
+ * prime1 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit
+ * prime2 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit
+ * exponent1 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit
+ * exponent2 INTEGER, -- N/2-bit
+ * coefficient INTEGER, -- N/2-bit
+ * }
+ *
+ * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead;
+ * - 3 bytes of version;
+ * - 7 half-size INTEGERs plus 2 full-size INTEGERs,
+ * overapproximated as 9 half-size INTEGERS;
+ * - 7 bytes for the public exponent.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \
+ (9u * PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE((key_bits) / 2u + 1u) + 14u)
+
+/* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA public key.
+ *
+ * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } -- contains DSAPublicKey
+ * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ * parameters Dss-Params } -- SEQUENCE of 3 INTEGERs
+ * DSAPublicKey ::= INTEGER -- public key, Y
+ *
+ * - 3 * 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead;
+ * - 1 + 1 + 7 bytes of algorithm (DSA OID);
+ * - 4 bytes of BIT STRING overhead;
+ * - 3 full-size INTEGERs (p, g, y);
+ * - 1 + 1 + 32 bytes for 1 sub-size INTEGER (q <= 256 bits).
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \
+ (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3u + 59u)
+
+/* Maximum size of the export encoding of a DSA key pair.
+ *
+ * DSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version Version, -- 0
+ * prime INTEGER, -- p
+ * subprime INTEGER, -- q
+ * generator INTEGER, -- g
+ * public INTEGER, -- y
+ * private INTEGER, -- x
+ * }
+ *
+ * - 4 bytes of SEQUENCE overhead;
+ * - 3 bytes of version;
+ * - 3 full-size INTEGERs (p, g, y);
+ * - 2 * (1 + 1 + 32) bytes for 2 sub-size INTEGERs (q, x <= 256 bits).
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \
+ (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ASN1_INTEGER_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) * 3u + 75u)
+
+/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC public key.
+ *
+ * The representation of an ECC public key is:
+ * - The byte 0x04;
+ * - `x_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian;
+ * - `y_P` as a `ceiling(m/8)`-byte string, big-endian;
+ * - where m is the bit size associated with the curve.
+ *
+ * - 1 byte + 2 * point size.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \
+ (2u * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) + 1u)
+
+/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an ECC key pair.
+ *
+ * An ECC key pair is represented by the secret value.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \
+ (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits))
+
+/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an DH key pair.
+ *
+ * An DH key pair is represented by the secret value.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \
+ (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits))
+
+/* Maximum size of the export encoding of an DH public key.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) \
+ (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits))
+
+/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_key() or
+ * psa_export_public_key().
+ *
+ * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are
+ * compile-time constants.
+ *
+ * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
+ * The following code illustrates how to allocate enough memory to export
+ * a key by querying the key type and size at runtime.
+ * \code{c}
+ * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ * psa_status_t status;
+ * status = psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes);
+ * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...);
+ * psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
+ * size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes);
+ * size_t buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits);
+ * psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
+ * uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size);
+ * if (buffer == NULL) handle_error(...);
+ * size_t buffer_length;
+ * status = psa_export_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length);
+ * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...);
+ * \endcode
+ *
+ * \param key_type A supported key type.
+ * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits.
+ *
+ * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return
+ * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
+ * psa_export_key() or psa_export_public_key() will not fail with
+ * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
+ * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not supported,
+ * return either a sensible size or 0.
+ * If the parameters are not valid, the return value is unspecified.
+ */
+#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \
+ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \
+ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
+ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
+ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
+ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
+ 0u)
+
+/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_export_public_key().
+ *
+ * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are
+ * compile-time constants.
+ *
+ * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
+ * The following code illustrates how to allocate enough memory to export
+ * a public key by querying the key type and size at runtime.
+ * \code{c}
+ * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ * psa_status_t status;
+ * status = psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes);
+ * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...);
+ * psa_key_type_t key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
+ * size_t key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes);
+ * size_t buffer_size = PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits);
+ * psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
+ * uint8_t *buffer = malloc(buffer_size);
+ * if (buffer == NULL) handle_error(...);
+ * size_t buffer_length;
+ * status = psa_export_public_key(key, buffer, buffer_size, &buffer_length);
+ * if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) handle_error(...);
+ * \endcode
+ *
+ * \param key_type A public key or key pair key type.
+ * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits.
+ *
+ * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return
+ * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
+ * psa_export_public_key() will not fail with
+ * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
+ * If the parameters are a valid combination that is not
+ * supported, return either a sensible size or 0.
+ * If the parameters are not valid,
+ * the return value is unspecified.
+ *
+ * If the parameters are valid and supported,
+ * return the same result as
+ * #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(
+ * \p #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(\p key_type),
+ * \p key_bits).
+ */
+#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \
+ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(key_type) ? PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(key_bits) : \
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(key_type) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : \
+ 0u)
+
+/** Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric key pair.
+ *
+ * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is
+ * a sufficient buffer size when calling psa_export_key() to export any
+ * asymmetric key pair, regardless of the exact key type and key size.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_EXPORT_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits).
+ */
+#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE 1
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \
+ (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) > \
+ PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE)
+#undef PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE
+#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE \
+ PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \
+ (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \
+ PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE)
+#undef PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE
+#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE \
+ PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \
+ (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \
+ PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE)
+#undef PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE
+#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE \
+ PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS)
+#endif
+
+/** Sufficient buffer size for exporting any asymmetric public key.
+ *
+ * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is
+ * a sufficient buffer size when calling psa_export_key() or
+ * psa_export_public_key() to export any asymmetric public key,
+ * regardless of the exact key type and key size.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits).
+ */
+#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE 1
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \
+ (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) > \
+ PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE)
+#undef PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE
+#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE \
+ PSA_KEY_EXPORT_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) && \
+ (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \
+ PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE)
+#undef PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE
+#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE \
+ PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) && \
+ (PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) > \
+ PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE)
+#undef PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE
+#define PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE \
+ PSA_KEY_EXPORT_FFDH_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS)
+#endif
+
+#define PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_OR_PUBLIC_MAX_SIZE \
+ ((PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE > PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE) ? \
+ PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE : PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE)
+
+/** Sufficient output buffer size for psa_raw_key_agreement().
+ *
+ * This macro returns a compile-time constant if its arguments are
+ * compile-time constants.
+ *
+ * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE.
+ *
+ * \param key_type A supported key type.
+ * \param key_bits The size of the key in bits.
+ *
+ * \return If the parameters are valid and supported, return
+ * a buffer size in bytes that guarantees that
+ * psa_raw_key_agreement() will not fail with
+ * #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL.
+ * If the parameters are a valid combination that
+ * is not supported, return either a sensible size or 0.
+ * If the parameters are not valid,
+ * the return value is unspecified.
+ */
+#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, key_bits) \
+ ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) || \
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(key_type)) ? PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bits) : 0u)
+
+/** Maximum size of the output from psa_raw_key_agreement().
+ *
+ * This macro expands to a compile-time constant integer. This value is the
+ * maximum size of the output any raw key agreement algorithm, in bytes.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p key_bits).
+ */
+#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE 1
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) && \
+ (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS) > PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE)
+#undef PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE
+#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)
+#endif
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) && \
+ (PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS) > PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE)
+#undef PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE
+#define PSA_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS)
+#endif
+
+/** Maximum key length for ciphers.
+ *
+ * Since there is no additional PSA_WANT_xxx symbol to specifiy the size of
+ * the key once a cipher is enabled (as it happens for asymmetric keys for
+ * example), the maximum key length is taken into account for each cipher.
+ * The resulting value will be the maximum cipher's key length given depending
+ * on which ciphers are enabled.
+ *
+ * Note: max value for AES used below would be doubled if XTS were enabled, but
+ * this mode is currently not supported in Mbed TLS implementation of PSA
+ * APIs.
+ */
+#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20))
+#define PSA_CIPHER_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32u
+#elif defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES)
+#define PSA_CIPHER_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 24u
+#else
+#define PSA_CIPHER_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 0u
+#endif
+
+/** The default IV size for a cipher algorithm, in bytes.
+ *
+ * The IV that is generated as part of a call to #psa_cipher_encrypt() is always
+ * the default IV length for the algorithm.
+ *
+ * This macro can be used to allocate a buffer of sufficient size to
+ * store the IV output from #psa_cipher_generate_iv() when using
+ * a multi-part cipher operation.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE.
+ *
+ * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
+ * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm \p alg.
+ *
+ * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The default IV size for the specified key type and algorithm.
+ * If the algorithm does not use an IV, return 0.
+ * If the key type or cipher algorithm is not recognized,
+ * or the parameters are incompatible, return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH(key_type, alg) \
+ (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) > 1 && \
+ ((alg) == PSA_ALG_CTR || \
+ (alg) == PSA_ALG_CFB || \
+ (alg) == PSA_ALG_OFB || \
+ (alg) == PSA_ALG_XTS || \
+ (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || \
+ (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7) ? PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \
+ (key_type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 && \
+ (alg) == PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ? 12u : \
+ (alg) == PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG ? 13u : \
+ 0u)
+
+/** The maximum IV size for all supported cipher algorithms, in bytes.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH().
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE 16u
+
+/** The maximum size of the output of psa_cipher_encrypt(), in bytes.
+ *
+ * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_cipher_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ * Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the output might be smaller.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length).
+ *
+ * \warning This macro may evaluate its arguments multiple times or
+ * zero times, so you should not pass arguments that contain
+ * side effects.
+ *
+ * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm
+ * alg.
+ * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and
+ * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not
+ * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
+ * return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \
+ (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ? \
+ (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) != 0 ? \
+ PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \
+ (input_length) + 1u) + \
+ PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) : 0u) : \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \
+ (input_length) + PSA_CIPHER_IV_LENGTH((key_type), (alg)) : \
+ 0u))
+
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_encrypt(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and cipher algorithms.
+ *
+ * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_cipher_encrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length).
+ *
+ * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes.
+ *
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \
+ (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, \
+ (input_length) + 1u) + \
+ PSA_CIPHER_IV_MAX_SIZE)
+
+/** The maximum size of the output of psa_cipher_decrypt(), in bytes.
+ *
+ * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_cipher_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ * Depending on the algorithm, the actual size of the output might be smaller.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length).
+ *
+ * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm
+ * alg.
+ * \param alg A cipher algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and
+ * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not
+ * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
+ * return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) && \
+ ((key_type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \
+ (input_length) : \
+ 0u)
+
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_decrypt(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and cipher algorithms.
+ *
+ * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_cipher_decrypt() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length).
+ *
+ * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes.
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_DECRYPT_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \
+ (input_length)
+
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_update().
+ *
+ * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_cipher_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ * The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(\p input_length).
+ *
+ * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm
+ * alg.
+ * \param alg A cipher algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
+ * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and
+ * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not
+ * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg, input_length) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \
+ (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) != 0 ? \
+ (((alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 || \
+ (alg) == PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING || \
+ (alg) == PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING) ? \
+ PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type), \
+ input_length) : \
+ (input_length)) : 0u) : \
+ 0u)
+
+/** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_cipher_update(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and cipher algorithms.
+ *
+ * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
+ * that psa_cipher_update() will not fail due to an insufficient buffer size.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg, \p input_length).
+ *
+ * \param input_length Size of the input in bytes.
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_UPDATE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE(input_length) \
+ (PSA_ROUND_UP_TO_MULTIPLE(PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE, input_length))
+
+/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_cipher_finish().
+ *
+ * If the size of the ciphertext buffer is at least this large, it is
+ * guaranteed that psa_cipher_finish() will not fail due to an insufficient
+ * ciphertext buffer size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in
+ * any given call.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE().
+ *
+ * \param key_type A symmetric key type that is compatible with algorithm
+ * alg.
+ * \param alg A cipher algorithm (PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(\p alg) is true).
+ * \return A sufficient output size for the specified key type and
+ * algorithm. If the key type or cipher algorithm is not
+ * recognized, or the parameters are incompatible, return 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(key_type, alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) ? \
+ (alg == PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ? \
+ PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(key_type) : \
+ 0u) : \
+ 0u)
+
+/** A sufficient ciphertext buffer size for psa_cipher_finish(), for any of the
+ * supported key types and cipher algorithms.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p key_type, \p alg).
+ */
+#define PSA_CIPHER_FINISH_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE \
+ (PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE)
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_SIZES_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..362e921
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_struct.h
@@ -0,0 +1,527 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa/crypto_struct.h
+ *
+ * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS structured type implementations
+ *
+ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
+ * include psa/crypto.h.
+ *
+ * This file contains the definitions of some data structures with
+ * implementation-specific definitions.
+ *
+ * In implementations with isolation between the application and the
+ * cryptography module, it is expected that the front-end and the back-end
+ * would have different versions of this file.
+ *
+ * <h3>Design notes about multipart operation structures</h3>
+ *
+ * For multipart operations without driver delegation support, each multipart
+ * operation structure contains a `psa_algorithm_t alg` field which indicates
+ * which specific algorithm the structure is for. When the structure is not in
+ * use, `alg` is 0. Most of the structure consists of a union which is
+ * discriminated by `alg`.
+ *
+ * For multipart operations with driver delegation support, each multipart
+ * operation structure contains an `unsigned int id` field indicating which
+ * driver got assigned to do the operation. When the structure is not in use,
+ * 'id' is 0. The structure contains also a driver context which is the union
+ * of the contexts of all drivers able to handle the type of multipart
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * Note that when `alg` or `id` is 0, the content of other fields is undefined.
+ * In particular, it is not guaranteed that a freshly-initialized structure
+ * is all-zero: we initialize structures to something like `{0, 0}`, which
+ * is only guaranteed to initializes the first member of the union;
+ * GCC and Clang initialize the whole structure to 0 (at the time of writing),
+ * but MSVC and CompCert don't.
+ *
+ * In Mbed TLS, multipart operation structures live independently from
+ * the key. This allows Mbed TLS to free the key objects when destroying
+ * a key slot. If a multipart operation needs to remember the key after
+ * the setup function returns, the operation structure needs to contain a
+ * copy of the key.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not
+ * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which
+ * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the
+ * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and
+ * configuration.
+ */
+#include "psa/build_info.h"
+
+/* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the primitive
+ * algorithms. */
+#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h"
+
+struct psa_hash_operation_s {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+ mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle;
+#else
+ /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
+ * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping
+ * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported.
+ * ID values are auto-generated in psa_driver_wrappers.h.
+ * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to
+ * any driver (i.e. the driver context is not active, in use). */
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
+ psa_driver_hash_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
+#endif
+};
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+#define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
+#else
+#define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 } }
+#endif
+static inline struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_init(void)
+{
+ const struct psa_hash_operation_s v = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+ return v;
+}
+
+struct psa_cipher_operation_s {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+ mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle;
+#else
+ /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
+ * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping
+ * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported.
+ * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
+ * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to
+ * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
+
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_required) : 1;
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(iv_set) : 1;
+
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(default_iv_length);
+
+ psa_driver_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
+#endif
+};
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+#define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
+#else
+#define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } }
+#endif
+static inline struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_init(void)
+{
+ const struct psa_cipher_operation_s v = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT;
+ return v;
+}
+
+/* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the composite
+ * algorithms. */
+#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h"
+
+struct psa_mac_operation_s {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+ mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle;
+#else
+ /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
+ * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping
+ * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported.
+ * ID values are auto-generated in psa_driver_wrappers.h
+ * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to
+ * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
+ uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mac_size);
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is_sign) : 1;
+ psa_driver_mac_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
+#endif
+};
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
+#else
+#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, { 0 } }
+#endif
+static inline struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_init(void)
+{
+ const struct psa_mac_operation_s v = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
+ return v;
+}
+
+struct psa_aead_operation_s {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+ mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle;
+#else
+ /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
+ * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping
+ * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported.
+ * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
+ * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to
+ * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
+
+ psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg);
+ psa_key_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_type);
+
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ad_remaining);
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(body_remaining);
+
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nonce_set) : 1;
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lengths_set) : 1;
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ad_started) : 1;
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(body_started) : 1;
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is_encrypt) : 1;
+
+ psa_driver_aead_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
+#endif
+};
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
+#else
+#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } }
+#endif
+static inline struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_init(void)
+{
+ const struct psa_aead_operation_s v = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT;
+ return v;
+}
+
+/* Include the context definition for the compiled-in drivers for the key
+ * derivation algorithms. */
+#include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h"
+
+struct psa_key_derivation_s {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+ mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle;
+#else
+ psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg);
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(can_output_key) : 1;
+ size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(capacity);
+ psa_driver_key_derivation_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
+#endif
+};
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
+#else
+/* This only zeroes out the first byte in the union, the rest is unspecified. */
+#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, { 0 } }
+#endif
+static inline struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_init(
+ void)
+{
+ const struct psa_key_derivation_s v = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT;
+ return v;
+}
+
+struct psa_custom_key_parameters_s {
+ /* Future versions may add other fields in this structure. */
+ uint32_t flags;
+};
+
+/** The default production parameters for key generation or key derivation.
+ *
+ * Calling psa_generate_key_custom() or psa_key_derivation_output_key_custom()
+ * with `custom=PSA_CUSTOM_KEY_PARAMETERS_INIT` and `custom_data_length=0` is
+ * equivalent to calling psa_generate_key() or psa_key_derivation_output_key()
+ * respectively.
+ */
+#define PSA_CUSTOM_KEY_PARAMETERS_INIT { 0 }
+
+#ifndef __cplusplus
+/* Omitted when compiling in C++, because one of the parameters is a
+ * pointer to a struct with a flexible array member, and that is not
+ * standard C++.
+ * https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/9020
+ */
+/* This is a deprecated variant of `struct psa_custom_key_parameters_s`.
+ * It has exactly the same layout, plus an extra field which is a flexible
+ * array member. Thus a `const struct psa_key_production_parameters_s *`
+ * can be passed to any function that reads a
+ * `const struct psa_custom_key_parameters_s *`.
+ */
+struct psa_key_production_parameters_s {
+ uint32_t flags;
+ uint8_t data[];
+};
+
+/** The default production parameters for key generation or key derivation.
+ *
+ * Calling psa_generate_key_ext() or psa_key_derivation_output_key_ext()
+ * with `params=PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT` and
+ * `params_data_length == 0` is equivalent to
+ * calling psa_generate_key() or psa_key_derivation_output_key()
+ * respectively.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_PRODUCTION_PARAMETERS_INIT { 0 }
+#endif /* !__cplusplus */
+
+struct psa_key_policy_s {
+ psa_key_usage_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(usage);
+ psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg);
+ psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg2);
+};
+typedef struct psa_key_policy_s psa_key_policy_t;
+
+#define PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT { 0, 0, 0 }
+static inline struct psa_key_policy_s psa_key_policy_init(void)
+{
+ const struct psa_key_policy_s v = PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT;
+ return v;
+}
+
+/* The type used internally for key sizes.
+ * Public interfaces use size_t, but internally we use a smaller type. */
+typedef uint16_t psa_key_bits_t;
+/* The maximum value of the type used to represent bit-sizes.
+ * This is used to mark an invalid key size. */
+#define PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE ((psa_key_bits_t) -1)
+/* The maximum size of a key in bits.
+ * Currently defined as the maximum that can be represented, rounded down
+ * to a whole number of bytes.
+ * This is an uncast value so that it can be used in preprocessor
+ * conditionals. */
+#define PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS 0xfff8
+
+struct psa_key_attributes_s {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
+ psa_key_slot_number_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(slot_number);
+ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(has_slot_number);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
+ psa_key_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type);
+ psa_key_bits_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits);
+ psa_key_lifetime_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime);
+ psa_key_policy_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy);
+ /* This type has a different layout in the client view wrt the
+ * service view of the key id, i.e. in service view usually is
+ * expected to have MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER defined
+ * thus adding an owner field to the standard psa_key_id_t. For
+ * implementations with client/service separation, this means the
+ * object will be marshalled through a transport channel and
+ * interpreted differently at each side of the transport. Placing
+ * it at the end of structures allows to interpret the structure
+ * at the client without reorganizing the memory layout of the
+ * struct
+ */
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
+};
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
+#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_MAYBE_SLOT_NUMBER 0, 0,
+#else
+#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_MAYBE_SLOT_NUMBER
+#endif
+#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_MAYBE_SLOT_NUMBER \
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, 0, \
+ PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE, \
+ PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT, \
+ MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT }
+
+static inline struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_init(void)
+{
+ const struct psa_key_attributes_s v = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ return v;
+}
+
+static inline void psa_set_key_id(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key)
+{
+ psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime);
+
+ attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id) = key;
+
+ if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime)) {
+ attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime) =
+ PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(
+ PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT,
+ PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime));
+ }
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_get_key_id(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
+{
+ return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
+}
+
+#ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+static inline void mbedtls_set_key_owner_id(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner)
+{
+ attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner) = owner;
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline void psa_set_key_lifetime(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime)
+{
+ attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime) = lifetime;
+ if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime)) {
+#ifdef MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+ attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) = 0;
+#else
+ attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id) = 0;
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
+static inline psa_key_lifetime_t psa_get_key_lifetime(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
+{
+ return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime);
+}
+
+static inline void psa_extend_key_usage_flags(psa_key_usage_t *usage_flags)
+{
+ if (*usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) {
+ *usage_flags |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE;
+ }
+
+ if (*usage_flags & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH) {
+ *usage_flags |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline void psa_set_key_usage_flags(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ psa_key_usage_t usage_flags)
+{
+ psa_extend_key_usage_flags(&usage_flags);
+ attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(usage) = usage_flags;
+}
+
+static inline psa_key_usage_t psa_get_key_usage_flags(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
+{
+ return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(usage);
+}
+
+static inline void psa_set_key_algorithm(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ psa_algorithm_t alg)
+{
+ attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg) = alg;
+}
+
+static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_algorithm(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
+{
+ return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg);
+}
+
+static inline void psa_set_key_type(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ psa_key_type_t type)
+{
+ attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type) = type;
+}
+
+static inline psa_key_type_t psa_get_key_type(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
+{
+ return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type);
+}
+
+static inline void psa_set_key_bits(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ size_t bits)
+{
+ if (bits > PSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) {
+ attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits) = PSA_KEY_BITS_TOO_LARGE;
+ } else {
+ attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits) = (psa_key_bits_t) bits;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline size_t psa_get_key_bits(
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
+{
+ return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief The context for PSA interruptible hash signing.
+ */
+struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+ mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle;
+#else
+ /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
+ * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping
+ * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported.
+ * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
+ * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to
+ * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
+
+ psa_driver_sign_hash_interruptible_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
+
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(error_occurred) : 1;
+
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(num_ops);
+#endif
+};
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+#define PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
+#else
+#define PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 }, 0, 0 }
+#endif
+
+static inline struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s
+psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_init(void)
+{
+ const struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s v =
+ PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT;
+
+ return v;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief The context for PSA interruptible hash verification.
+ */
+struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+ mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle;
+#else
+ /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
+ * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping
+ * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported.
+ * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
+ * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to
+ * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
+
+ psa_driver_verify_hash_interruptible_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
+
+ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(error_occurred) : 1;
+
+ uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(num_ops);
+#endif
+};
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+#define PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
+#else
+#define PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 }, 0, 0 }
+#endif
+
+static inline struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s
+psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_init(void)
+{
+ const struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s v =
+ PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT;
+
+ return v;
+}
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_STRUCT_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f831486
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_types.h
@@ -0,0 +1,508 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa/crypto_types.h
+ *
+ * \brief PSA cryptography module: type aliases.
+ *
+ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
+ * include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver
+ * header file.
+ *
+ * This file contains portable definitions of integral types for properties
+ * of cryptographic keys, designations of cryptographic algorithms, and
+ * error codes returned by the library.
+ *
+ * This header file does not declare any function.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H
+
+/*
+ * Include the build-time configuration information header. Here, we do not
+ * include `"mbedtls/build_info.h"` directly but `"psa/build_info.h"`, which
+ * is basically just an alias to it. This is to ease the maintenance of the
+ * TF-PSA-Crypto repository which has a different build system and
+ * configuration.
+ */
+#include "psa/build_info.h"
+
+/* Define the MBEDTLS_PRIVATE macro. */
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE)
+#include MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_FILE
+#else
+#include "crypto_platform.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/** \defgroup error Error codes
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Function return status.
+ *
+ * This is either #PSA_SUCCESS (which is zero), indicating success,
+ * or a small negative value indicating that an error occurred. Errors are
+ * encoded as one of the \c PSA_ERROR_xxx values defined here. */
+/* If #PSA_SUCCESS is already defined, it means that #psa_status_t
+ * is also defined in an external header, so prevent its multiple
+ * definition.
+ */
+#ifndef PSA_SUCCESS
+typedef int32_t psa_status_t;
+#endif
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** \brief Encoding of a key type.
+ *
+ * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
+ * `PSA_KEY_TYPE_xxx`.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
+ */
+typedef uint16_t psa_key_type_t;
+
+/** The type of PSA elliptic curve family identifiers.
+ *
+ * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
+ * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`.
+ *
+ * The curve identifier is required to create an ECC key using the
+ * PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY()
+ * macros.
+ *
+ * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff.
+ * Vendors who define additional families must use an encoding in this range.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
+ */
+typedef uint8_t psa_ecc_family_t;
+
+/** The type of PSA Diffie-Hellman group family identifiers.
+ *
+ * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
+ * `PSA_DH_FAMILY_xxx`.
+ *
+ * The group identifier is required to create a Diffie-Hellman key using the
+ * PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR() or PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY()
+ * macros.
+ *
+ * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff.
+ * Vendors who define additional families must use an encoding in this range.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
+ */
+typedef uint8_t psa_dh_family_t;
+
+/** \brief Encoding of a cryptographic algorithm.
+ *
+ * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
+ * `PSA_ALG_xxx`.
+ *
+ * For algorithms that can be applied to multiple key types, this type
+ * does not encode the key type. For example, for symmetric ciphers
+ * based on a block cipher, #psa_algorithm_t encodes the block cipher
+ * mode and the padding mode while the block cipher itself is encoded
+ * via #psa_key_type_t.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
+ */
+typedef uint32_t psa_algorithm_t;
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** Encoding of key lifetimes.
+ *
+ * The lifetime of a key indicates where it is stored and what system actions
+ * may create and destroy it.
+ *
+ * Lifetime values have the following structure:
+ * - Bits 0-7 (#PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(\c lifetime)):
+ * persistence level. This value indicates what device management
+ * actions can cause it to be destroyed. In particular, it indicates
+ * whether the key is _volatile_ or _persistent_.
+ * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
+ * - Bits 8-31 (#PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(\c lifetime)):
+ * location indicator. This value indicates which part of the system
+ * has access to the key material and can perform operations using the key.
+ * See ::psa_key_location_t for more information.
+ *
+ * Volatile keys are automatically destroyed when the application instance
+ * terminates or on a power reset of the device. Persistent keys are
+ * preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an
+ * integration-specific device management event occurs (for example,
+ * a factory reset).
+ *
+ * Persistent keys have a key identifier of type #mbedtls_svc_key_id_t.
+ * This identifier remains valid throughout the lifetime of the key,
+ * even if the application instance that created the key terminates.
+ * The application can call psa_open_key() to open a persistent key that
+ * it created previously.
+ *
+ * The default lifetime of a key is #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE. The lifetime
+ * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT is supported if persistent storage is
+ * available. Other lifetime values may be supported depending on the
+ * library configuration.
+ *
+ * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
+ * `PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_xxx`.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
+ */
+typedef uint32_t psa_key_lifetime_t;
+
+/** Encoding of key persistence levels.
+ *
+ * What distinguishes different persistence levels is what device management
+ * events may cause keys to be destroyed. _Volatile_ keys are destroyed
+ * by a power reset. Persistent keys may be destroyed by events such as
+ * a transfer of ownership or a factory reset. What management events
+ * actually affect persistent keys at different levels is outside the
+ * scope of the PSA Cryptography specification.
+ *
+ * The PSA Cryptography specification defines the following values of
+ * persistence levels:
+ * - \c 0 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE: volatile key.
+ * A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when
+ * the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key
+ * is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device.
+ * - \c 1 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT:
+ * persistent key with a default lifetime.
+ * - \c 2-254: currently not supported by Mbed TLS.
+ * - \c 255 = #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY:
+ * read-only or write-once key.
+ * A key with this persistence level cannot be destroyed.
+ * Mbed TLS does not currently offer a way to create such keys, but
+ * integrations of Mbed TLS can use it for built-in keys that the
+ * application cannot modify (for example, a hardware unique key (HUK)).
+ *
+ * \note Key persistence levels are 8-bit values. Key management
+ * interfaces operate on lifetimes (type ::psa_key_lifetime_t) which
+ * encode the persistence as the lower 8 bits of a 32-bit value.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
+ */
+typedef uint8_t psa_key_persistence_t;
+
+/** Encoding of key location indicators.
+ *
+ * If an integration of Mbed TLS can make calls to external
+ * cryptoprocessors such as secure elements, the location of a key
+ * indicates which secure element performs the operations on the key.
+ * Depending on the design of the secure element, the key
+ * material may be stored either in the secure element, or
+ * in wrapped (encrypted) form alongside the key metadata in the
+ * primary local storage.
+ *
+ * The PSA Cryptography API specification defines the following values of
+ * location indicators:
+ * - \c 0: primary local storage.
+ * This location is always available.
+ * The primary local storage is typically the same storage area that
+ * contains the key metadata.
+ * - \c 1: primary secure element.
+ * Integrations of Mbed TLS should support this value if there is a secure
+ * element attached to the operating environment.
+ * As a guideline, secure elements may provide higher resistance against
+ * side channel and physical attacks than the primary local storage, but may
+ * have restrictions on supported key types, sizes, policies and operations
+ * and may have different performance characteristics.
+ * - \c 2-0x7fffff: other locations defined by a PSA specification.
+ * The PSA Cryptography API does not currently assign any meaning to these
+ * locations, but future versions of that specification or other PSA
+ * specifications may do so.
+ * - \c 0x800000-0xffffff: vendor-defined locations.
+ * No PSA specification will assign a meaning to locations in this range.
+ *
+ * \note Key location indicators are 24-bit values. Key management
+ * interfaces operate on lifetimes (type ::psa_key_lifetime_t) which
+ * encode the location as the upper 24 bits of a 32-bit value.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
+ */
+typedef uint32_t psa_key_location_t;
+
+/** Encoding of identifiers of persistent keys.
+ *
+ * - Applications may freely choose key identifiers in the range
+ * #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN to #PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX.
+ * - The implementation may define additional key identifiers in the range
+ * #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN to #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX.
+ * - 0 is reserved as an invalid key identifier.
+ * - Key identifiers outside these ranges are reserved for future use.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to how values are allocated must require careful
+ * consideration to allow backward compatibility.
+ */
+typedef uint32_t psa_key_id_t;
+
+/** Encoding of key identifiers as seen inside the PSA Crypto implementation.
+ *
+ * When PSA Crypto is built as a library inside an application, this type
+ * is identical to #psa_key_id_t. When PSA Crypto is built as a service
+ * that can store keys on behalf of multiple clients, this type
+ * encodes the #psa_key_id_t value seen by each client application as
+ * well as extra information that identifies the client that owns
+ * the key.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER)
+typedef psa_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_t;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */
+/* Implementation-specific: The Mbed TLS library can be built as
+ * part of a multi-client service that exposes the PSA Cryptography API in each
+ * client and encodes the client identity in the key identifier argument of
+ * functions such as psa_open_key().
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id);
+ mbedtls_key_owner_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner);
+} mbedtls_svc_key_id_t;
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup policy Key policies
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** \brief Encoding of permitted usage on a key.
+ *
+ * Values of this type are generally constructed as bitwise-ors of macros
+ * called `PSA_KEY_USAGE_xxx`.
+ *
+ * \note Values of this type are encoded in the persistent key store.
+ * Any changes to existing values will require bumping the storage
+ * format version and providing a translation when reading the old
+ * format.
+ */
+typedef uint32_t psa_key_usage_t;
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup attributes Key attributes
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** The type of a structure containing key attributes.
+ *
+ * This is an opaque structure that can represent the metadata of a key
+ * object. Metadata that can be stored in attributes includes:
+ * - The location of the key in storage, indicated by its key identifier
+ * and its lifetime.
+ * - The key's policy, comprising usage flags and a specification of
+ * the permitted algorithm(s).
+ * - Information about the key itself: the key type and its size.
+ * - Additional implementation-defined attributes.
+ *
+ * The actual key material is not considered an attribute of a key.
+ * Key attributes do not contain information that is generally considered
+ * highly confidential.
+ *
+ * An attribute structure works like a simple data structure where each function
+ * `psa_set_key_xxx` sets a field and the corresponding function
+ * `psa_get_key_xxx` retrieves the value of the corresponding field.
+ * However, a future version of the library may report values that are
+ * equivalent to the original one, but have a different encoding. Invalid
+ * values may be mapped to different, also invalid values.
+ *
+ * An attribute structure may contain references to auxiliary resources,
+ * for example pointers to allocated memory or indirect references to
+ * pre-calculated values. In order to free such resources, the application
+ * must call psa_reset_key_attributes(). As an exception, calling
+ * psa_reset_key_attributes() on an attribute structure is optional if
+ * the structure has only been modified by the following functions
+ * since it was initialized or last reset with psa_reset_key_attributes():
+ * - psa_set_key_id()
+ * - psa_set_key_lifetime()
+ * - psa_set_key_type()
+ * - psa_set_key_bits()
+ * - psa_set_key_usage_flags()
+ * - psa_set_key_algorithm()
+ *
+ * Before calling any function on a key attribute structure, the application
+ * must initialize it by any of the following means:
+ * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
+ * memset(&attributes, 0, sizeof(attributes));
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {0};
+ * \endcode
+ * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT,
+ * for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ * \endcode
+ * - Assign the result of the function psa_key_attributes_init()
+ * to the structure, for example:
+ * \code
+ * psa_key_attributes_t attributes;
+ * attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
+ * \endcode
+ *
+ * A freshly initialized attribute structure contains the following
+ * values:
+ *
+ * - lifetime: #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE.
+ * - key identifier: 0 (which is not a valid key identifier).
+ * - type: \c 0 (meaning that the type is unspecified).
+ * - key size: \c 0 (meaning that the size is unspecified).
+ * - usage flags: \c 0 (which allows no usage except exporting a public key).
+ * - algorithm: \c 0 (which allows no cryptographic usage, but allows
+ * exporting).
+ *
+ * A typical sequence to create a key is as follows:
+ * -# Create and initialize an attribute structure.
+ * -# If the key is persistent, call psa_set_key_id().
+ * Also call psa_set_key_lifetime() to place the key in a non-default
+ * location.
+ * -# Set the key policy with psa_set_key_usage_flags() and
+ * psa_set_key_algorithm().
+ * -# Set the key type with psa_set_key_type().
+ * Skip this step if copying an existing key with psa_copy_key().
+ * -# When generating a random key with psa_generate_key() or deriving a key
+ * with psa_key_derivation_output_key(), set the desired key size with
+ * psa_set_key_bits().
+ * -# Call a key creation function: psa_import_key(), psa_generate_key(),
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_key() or psa_copy_key(). This function reads
+ * the attribute structure, creates a key with these attributes, and
+ * outputs a key identifier to the newly created key.
+ * -# The attribute structure is now no longer necessary.
+ * You may call psa_reset_key_attributes(), although this is optional
+ * with the workflow presented here because the attributes currently
+ * defined in this specification do not require any additional resources
+ * beyond the structure itself.
+ *
+ * A typical sequence to query a key's attributes is as follows:
+ * -# Call psa_get_key_attributes().
+ * -# Call `psa_get_key_xxx` functions to retrieve the attribute(s) that
+ * you are interested in.
+ * -# Call psa_reset_key_attributes() to free any resources that may be
+ * used by the attribute structure.
+ *
+ * Once a key has been created, it is impossible to change its attributes.
+ */
+typedef struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_t;
+
+
+#ifndef __DOXYGEN_ONLY__
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
+/* Mbed TLS defines this type in crypto_types.h because it is also
+ * visible to applications through an implementation-specific extension.
+ * For the PSA Cryptography specification, this type is only visible
+ * via crypto_se_driver.h. */
+typedef uint64_t psa_key_slot_number_t;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
+#endif /* !__DOXYGEN_ONLY__ */
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup derivation Key derivation
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** \brief Encoding of the step of a key derivation.
+ *
+ * Values of this type are generally constructed by macros called
+ * `PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx`.
+ */
+typedef uint16_t psa_key_derivation_step_t;
+
+/** \brief Custom parameters for key generation or key derivation.
+ *
+ * This is a structure type with at least the following field:
+ *
+ * - \c flags: an unsigned integer type. 0 for the default production parameters.
+ *
+ * Functions that take such a structure as input also take an associated
+ * input buffer \c custom_data of length \c custom_data_length.
+ *
+ * The interpretation of this structure and the associated \c custom_data
+ * parameter depend on the type of the created key.
+ *
+ * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:
+ * - \c flags: must be 0.
+ * - \c custom_data: the public exponent, in little-endian order.
+ * This must be an odd integer and must not be 1.
+ * Implementations must support 65537, should support 3 and may
+ * support other values.
+ * When not using a driver, Mbed TLS supports values up to \c INT_MAX.
+ * If this is empty, the default value 65537 is used.
+ * - Other key types: reserved for future use. \c flags must be 0.
+ */
+typedef struct psa_custom_key_parameters_s psa_custom_key_parameters_t;
+
+/** \brief Custom parameters for key generation or key derivation.
+ *
+ * This is a structure type with at least the following fields:
+ *
+ * - \c flags: an unsigned integer type. 0 for the default production parameters.
+ * - \c data: a flexible array of bytes.
+ *
+ * The interpretation of this structure depend on the type of the
+ * created key.
+ *
+ * - #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:
+ * - \c flags: must be 0.
+ * - \c data: the public exponent, in little-endian order.
+ * This must be an odd integer and must not be 1.
+ * Implementations must support 65537, should support 3 and may
+ * support other values.
+ * When not using a driver, Mbed TLS supports values up to \c INT_MAX.
+ * If this is empty or if the custom production parameters are omitted
+ * altogether, the default value 65537 is used.
+ * - Other key types: reserved for future use. \c flags must be 0.
+ *
+ */
+typedef struct psa_key_production_parameters_s psa_key_production_parameters_t;
+
+/**@}*/
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_TYPES_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_values.h b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_values.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d678db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/include/psa/crypto_values.h
@@ -0,0 +1,2783 @@
+/**
+ * \file psa/crypto_values.h
+ *
+ * \brief PSA cryptography module: macros to build and analyze integer values.
+ *
+ * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
+ * include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver
+ * header file.
+ *
+ * This file contains portable definitions of macros to build and analyze
+ * values of integral types that encode properties of cryptographic keys,
+ * designations of cryptographic algorithms, and error codes returned by
+ * the library.
+ *
+ * Note that many of the constants defined in this file are embedded in
+ * the persistent key store, as part of key metadata (including usage
+ * policies). As a consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage
+ * format version changes).
+ *
+ * This header file only defines preprocessor macros.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H
+#define PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H
+#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
+
+/** \defgroup error Error codes
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/* PSA error codes */
+
+/* Error codes are standardized across PSA domains (framework, crypto, storage,
+ * etc.). Do not change the values in this section or even the expansions
+ * of each macro: it must be possible to `#include` both this header
+ * and some other PSA component's headers in the same C source,
+ * which will lead to duplicate definitions of the `PSA_SUCCESS` and
+ * `PSA_ERROR_xxx` macros, which is ok if and only if the macros expand
+ * to the same sequence of tokens.
+ *
+ * If you must add a new
+ * value, check with the Arm PSA framework group to pick one that other
+ * domains aren't already using. */
+
+/* Tell uncrustify not to touch the constant definitions, otherwise
+ * it might change the spacing to something that is not PSA-compliant
+ * (e.g. adding a space after casts).
+ *
+ * *INDENT-OFF*
+ */
+
+/** The action was completed successfully. */
+#define PSA_SUCCESS ((psa_status_t)0)
+
+/** An error occurred that does not correspond to any defined
+ * failure cause.
+ *
+ * Implementations may use this error code if none of the other standard
+ * error codes are applicable. */
+#define PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR ((psa_status_t)-132)
+
+/** The requested operation or a parameter is not supported
+ * by this implementation.
+ *
+ * Implementations should return this error code when an enumeration
+ * parameter such as a key type, algorithm, etc. is not recognized.
+ * If a combination of parameters is recognized and identified as
+ * not valid, return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT instead. */
+#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED ((psa_status_t)-134)
+
+/** The requested action is denied by a policy.
+ *
+ * Implementations should return this error code when the parameters
+ * are recognized as valid and supported, and a policy explicitly
+ * denies the requested operation.
+ *
+ * If a subset of the parameters of a function call identify a
+ * forbidden operation, and another subset of the parameters are
+ * not valid or not supported, it is unspecified whether the function
+ * returns #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or
+ * #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. */
+#define PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ((psa_status_t)-133)
+
+/** An output buffer is too small.
+ *
+ * Applications can call the \c PSA_xxx_SIZE macro listed in the function
+ * description to determine a sufficient buffer size.
+ *
+ * Implementations should preferably return this error code only
+ * in cases when performing the operation with a larger output
+ * buffer would succeed. However implementations may return this
+ * error if a function has invalid or unsupported parameters in addition
+ * to the parameters that determine the necessary output buffer size. */
+#define PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL ((psa_status_t)-138)
+
+/** Asking for an item that already exists
+ *
+ * Implementations should return this error, when attempting
+ * to write an item (like a key) that already exists. */
+#define PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS ((psa_status_t)-139)
+
+/** Asking for an item that doesn't exist
+ *
+ * Implementations should return this error, if a requested item (like
+ * a key) does not exist. */
+#define PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST ((psa_status_t)-140)
+
+/** The requested action cannot be performed in the current state.
+ *
+ * Multipart operations return this error when one of the
+ * functions is called out of sequence. Refer to the function
+ * descriptions for permitted sequencing of functions.
+ *
+ * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate
+ * that a key either exists or not,
+ * but shall instead return #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS or #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
+ * as applicable.
+ *
+ * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a
+ * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * instead. */
+#define PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ((psa_status_t)-137)
+
+/** The parameters passed to the function are invalid.
+ *
+ * Implementations may return this error any time a parameter or
+ * combination of parameters are recognized as invalid.
+ *
+ * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a
+ * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+ * instead.
+ */
+#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ((psa_status_t)-135)
+
+/** There is not enough runtime memory.
+ *
+ * If the action is carried out across multiple security realms, this
+ * error can refer to available memory in any of the security realms. */
+#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ((psa_status_t)-141)
+
+/** There is not enough persistent storage.
+ *
+ * Functions that modify the key storage return this error code if
+ * there is insufficient storage space on the host media. In addition,
+ * many functions that do not otherwise access storage may return this
+ * error code if the implementation requires a mandatory log entry for
+ * the requested action and the log storage space is full. */
+#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE ((psa_status_t)-142)
+
+/** There was a communication failure inside the implementation.
+ *
+ * This can indicate a communication failure between the application
+ * and an external cryptoprocessor or between the cryptoprocessor and
+ * an external volatile or persistent memory. A communication failure
+ * may be transient or permanent depending on the cause.
+ *
+ * \warning If a function returns this error, it is undetermined
+ * whether the requested action has completed or not. Implementations
+ * should return #PSA_SUCCESS on successful completion whenever
+ * possible, however functions may return #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
+ * if the requested action was completed successfully in an external
+ * cryptoprocessor but there was a breakdown of communication before
+ * the cryptoprocessor could report the status to the application.
+ */
+#define PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-145)
+
+/** There was a storage failure that may have led to data loss.
+ *
+ * This error indicates that some persistent storage is corrupted.
+ * It should not be used for a corruption of volatile memory
+ * (use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED), for a communication error
+ * between the cryptoprocessor and its external storage (use
+ * #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE), or when the storage is
+ * in a valid state but is full (use #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE).
+ *
+ * Note that a storage failure does not indicate that any data that was
+ * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data may no
+ * longer be readable from storage.
+ *
+ * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure
+ * the global integrity of the keystore. Depending on the global
+ * integrity guarantees offered by the implementation, access to other
+ * data may or may not fail even if the data is still readable but
+ * its integrity cannot be guaranteed.
+ *
+ * Implementations should only use this error code to report a
+ * permanent storage corruption. However application writers should
+ * keep in mind that transient errors while reading the storage may be
+ * reported using this error code. */
+#define PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-146)
+
+/** A hardware failure was detected.
+ *
+ * A hardware failure may be transient or permanent depending on the
+ * cause. */
+#define PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-147)
+
+/** A tampering attempt was detected.
+ *
+ * If an application receives this error code, there is no guarantee
+ * that previously accessed or computed data was correct and remains
+ * confidential. Applications should not perform any security function
+ * and should enter a safe failure state.
+ *
+ * Implementations may return this error code if they detect an invalid
+ * state that cannot happen during normal operation and that indicates
+ * that the implementation's security guarantees no longer hold. Depending
+ * on the implementation architecture and on its security and safety goals,
+ * the implementation may forcibly terminate the application.
+ *
+ * This error code is intended as a last resort when a security breach
+ * is detected and it is unsure whether the keystore data is still
+ * protected. Implementations shall only return this error code
+ * to report an alarm from a tampering detector, to indicate that
+ * the confidentiality of stored data can no longer be guaranteed,
+ * or to indicate that the integrity of previously returned data is now
+ * considered compromised. Implementations shall not use this error code
+ * to indicate a hardware failure that merely makes it impossible to
+ * perform the requested operation (use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE,
+ * #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE, #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE,
+ * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY or other applicable error code
+ * instead).
+ *
+ * This error indicates an attack against the application. Implementations
+ * shall not return this error code as a consequence of the behavior of
+ * the application itself. */
+#define PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED ((psa_status_t)-151)
+
+/** There is not enough entropy to generate random data needed
+ * for the requested action.
+ *
+ * This error indicates a failure of a hardware random generator.
+ * Application writers should note that this error can be returned not
+ * only by functions whose purpose is to generate random data, such
+ * as key, IV or nonce generation, but also by functions that execute
+ * an algorithm with a randomized result, as well as functions that
+ * use randomization of intermediate computations as a countermeasure
+ * to certain attacks.
+ *
+ * Implementations should avoid returning this error after psa_crypto_init()
+ * has succeeded. Implementations should generate sufficient
+ * entropy during initialization and subsequently use a cryptographically
+ * secure pseudorandom generator (PRNG). However implementations may return
+ * this error at any time if a policy requires the PRNG to be reseeded
+ * during normal operation. */
+#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY ((psa_status_t)-148)
+
+/** The signature, MAC or hash is incorrect.
+ *
+ * Verification functions return this error if the verification
+ * calculations completed successfully, and the value to be verified
+ * was determined to be incorrect.
+ *
+ * If the value to verify has an invalid size, implementations may return
+ * either #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE. */
+#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE ((psa_status_t)-149)
+
+/** The decrypted padding is incorrect.
+ *
+ * \warning In some protocols, when decrypting data, it is essential that
+ * the behavior of the application does not depend on whether the padding
+ * is correct, down to precise timing. Applications should prefer
+ * protocols that use authenticated encryption rather than plain
+ * encryption. If the application must perform a decryption of
+ * unauthenticated data, the application writer should take care not
+ * to reveal whether the padding is invalid.
+ *
+ * Implementations should strive to make valid and invalid padding
+ * as close as possible to indistinguishable to an external observer.
+ * In particular, the timing of a decryption operation should not
+ * depend on the validity of the padding. */
+#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING ((psa_status_t)-150)
+
+/** Return this error when there's insufficient data when attempting
+ * to read from a resource. */
+#define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ((psa_status_t)-143)
+
+/** This can be returned if a function can no longer operate correctly.
+ * For example, if an essential initialization operation failed or
+ * a mutex operation failed. */
+#define PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-144)
+
+/** The key identifier is not valid. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`.
+ */
+#define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ((psa_status_t)-136)
+
+/** Stored data has been corrupted.
+ *
+ * This error indicates that some persistent storage has suffered corruption.
+ * It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific error
+ * codes:
+ *
+ * - A corruption of volatile memory - use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED.
+ * - A communication error between the cryptoprocessor and its external
+ * storage - use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE.
+ * - When the storage is in a valid state but is full - use
+ * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE.
+ * - When the storage fails for other reasons - use
+ * #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE.
+ * - When the stored data is not valid - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID.
+ *
+ * \note A storage corruption does not indicate that any data that was
+ * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data might no
+ * longer be readable from storage.
+ *
+ * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure the
+ * global integrity of the keystore.
+ */
+#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT ((psa_status_t)-152)
+
+/** Data read from storage is not valid for the implementation.
+ *
+ * This error indicates that some data read from storage does not have a valid
+ * format. It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific
+ * error codes:
+ *
+ * - When the storage or stored data is corrupted - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
+ * - When the storage fails for other reasons - use #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
+ * - An invalid argument to the API - use #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
+ *
+ * This error is typically a result of either storage corruption on a
+ * cleartext storage backend, or an attempt to read data that was
+ * written by an incompatible version of the library.
+ */
+#define PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID ((psa_status_t)-153)
+
+/** The function that returns this status is defined as interruptible and
+ * still has work to do, thus the user should call the function again with the
+ * same operation context until it either returns #PSA_SUCCESS or any other
+ * error. This is not an error per se, more a notification of status.
+ */
+#define PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE ((psa_status_t)-248)
+
+/* *INDENT-ON* */
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/* Note that key type values, including ECC family and DH group values, are
+ * embedded in the persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a
+ * consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage format version
+ * changes).
+ */
+
+/** An invalid key type value.
+ *
+ * Zero is not the encoding of any key type.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x0000)
+
+/** Vendor-defined key type flag.
+ *
+ * Key types defined by this standard will never have the
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set. Vendors who define additional key types
+ * must use an encoding with the #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should
+ * respect the bitwise structure used by standard encodings whenever practical.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_type_t) 0x8000)
+
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7000)
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1000)
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2000)
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4000)
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7000)
+
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t) 0x3000)
+
+/** Whether a key type is vendor-defined.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(type) \
+ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0)
+
+/** Whether a key type is an unstructured array of bytes.
+ *
+ * This encompasses both symmetric keys and non-key data.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(type) \
+ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW || \
+ ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC)
+
+/** Whether a key type is asymmetric: either a key pair or a public key. */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type) \
+ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK \
+ & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) == \
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY)
+/** Whether a key type is the public part of a key pair. */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
+ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY)
+/** Whether a key type is a key pair containing a private part and a public
+ * part. */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type) \
+ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR)
+/** The key pair type corresponding to a public key type.
+ *
+ * You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged.
+ *
+ * \param type A public key type or key pair type.
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding key pair type.
+ * If \p type is not a public key or a key pair,
+ * the return value is undefined.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
+ ((type) | PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR)
+/** The public key type corresponding to a key pair type.
+ *
+ * You may also pass a public key type as \p type, it will be left unchanged.
+ *
+ * \param type A public key type or key pair type.
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding public key type.
+ * If \p type is not a public key or a key pair,
+ * the return value is undefined.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) \
+ ((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR)
+
+/** Raw data.
+ *
+ * A "key" of this type cannot be used for any cryptographic operation.
+ * Applications may use this type to store arbitrary data in the keystore. */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1001)
+
+/** HMAC key.
+ *
+ * The key policy determines which underlying hash algorithm the key can be
+ * used for.
+ *
+ * HMAC keys should generally have the same size as the underlying hash.
+ * This size can be calculated with #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where
+ * \c alg is the HMAC algorithm or the underlying hash algorithm. */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1100)
+
+/** A secret for key derivation.
+ *
+ * This key type is for high-entropy secrets only. For low-entropy secrets,
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD should be used instead.
+ *
+ * These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or
+ * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of key derivation algorithms.
+ *
+ * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key
+ * can be used for.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1200)
+
+/** A low-entropy secret for password hashing or key derivation.
+ *
+ * This key type is suitable for passwords and passphrases which are typically
+ * intended to be memorizable by humans, and have a low entropy relative to
+ * their size. It can be used for randomly generated or derived keys with
+ * maximum or near-maximum entropy, but #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE is more suitable
+ * for such keys. It is not suitable for passwords with extremely low entropy,
+ * such as numerical PINs.
+ *
+ * These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of
+ * key derivation algorithms. Algorithms that accept such an input were
+ * designed to accept low-entropy secret and are known as password hashing or
+ * key stretching algorithms.
+ *
+ * These keys cannot be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET input of
+ * key derivation algorithms, as the algorithms that take such an input expect
+ * it to be high-entropy.
+ *
+ * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key can be
+ * used for, among the permissible subset defined above.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1203)
+
+/** A secret value that can be used to verify a password hash.
+ *
+ * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key
+ * can be used for, among the same permissible subset as for
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1205)
+
+/** A secret value that can be used in when computing a password hash.
+ *
+ * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key
+ * can be used for, among the subset of algorithms that can use pepper.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1206)
+
+/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the AES block cipher.
+ *
+ * The size of the key can be 16 bytes (AES-128), 24 bytes (AES-192) or
+ * 32 bytes (AES-256).
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2400)
+
+/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the
+ * ARIA block cipher. */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2406)
+
+/** Key for a cipher or MAC algorithm based on DES or 3DES (Triple-DES).
+ *
+ * The size of the key can be 64 bits (single DES), 128 bits (2-key 3DES) or
+ * 192 bits (3-key 3DES).
+ *
+ * Note that single DES and 2-key 3DES are weak and strongly
+ * deprecated and should only be used to decrypt legacy data. 3-key 3DES
+ * is weak and deprecated and should only be used in legacy protocols.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2301)
+
+/** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the
+ * Camellia block cipher. */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2403)
+
+/** Key for the ChaCha20 stream cipher or the Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm.
+ *
+ * ChaCha20 and the ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction are defined in RFC 7539.
+ *
+ * \note For ChaCha20 and ChaCha20_Poly1305, Mbed TLS only supports
+ * 12-byte nonces.
+ *
+ * \note For ChaCha20, the initial counter value is 0. To encrypt or decrypt
+ * with the initial counter value 1, you can process and discard a
+ * 64-byte block before the real data.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20 ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2004)
+
+/** RSA public key.
+ *
+ * The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4001)
+/** RSA key pair (private and public key).
+ *
+ * The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7001)
+/** Whether a key type is an RSA key (pair or public-only). */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type) \
+ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
+
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4100)
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7100)
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK ((psa_key_type_t) 0x00ff)
+/** Elliptic curve key pair.
+ *
+ * The size of an elliptic curve key is the bit size associated with the curve,
+ * i.e. the bit size of *q* for a curve over a field *F<sub>q</sub>*.
+ * See the documentation of `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families for details.
+ *
+ * \param curve A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that
+ * identifies the ECC curve to be used.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve) \
+ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (curve))
+/** Elliptic curve public key.
+ *
+ * The size of an elliptic curve public key is the same as the corresponding
+ * private key (see #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR and the documentation of
+ * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families).
+ *
+ * \param curve A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that
+ * identifies the ECC curve to be used.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve) \
+ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (curve))
+
+/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key (pair or public-only). */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) \
+ ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \
+ ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
+/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key pair. */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type) \
+ (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE)
+/** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve public key. */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
+ (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == \
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
+
+/** Extract the curve from an elliptic curve key type. */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type) \
+ ((psa_ecc_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) ? \
+ ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) : \
+ 0))
+
+/** Check if the curve of given family is Weierstrass elliptic curve. */
+#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_IS_WEIERSTRASS(family) ((family & 0xc0) == 0)
+
+/** SEC Koblitz curves over prime fields.
+ *
+ * This family comprises the following curves:
+ * secp192k1, secp224k1, secp256k1.
+ * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
+ * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
+ * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
+ *
+ * \note For secp224k1, the bit-size is 225 (size of a private value).
+ *
+ * \note Mbed TLS only supports secp192k1 and secp256k1.
+ */
+#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x17)
+
+/** SEC random curves over prime fields.
+ *
+ * This family comprises the following curves:
+ * secp192r1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1.
+ * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
+ * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
+ * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
+ */
+#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x12)
+/* SECP160R2 (SEC2 v1, obsolete, not supported in Mbed TLS) */
+#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x1b)
+
+/** SEC Koblitz curves over binary fields.
+ *
+ * This family comprises the following curves:
+ * sect163k1, sect233k1, sect239k1, sect283k1, sect409k1, sect571k1.
+ * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
+ * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
+ * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
+ *
+ * \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family.
+ */
+#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x27)
+
+/** SEC random curves over binary fields.
+ *
+ * This family comprises the following curves:
+ * sect163r1, sect233r1, sect283r1, sect409r1, sect571r1.
+ * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
+ * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
+ * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
+ *
+ * \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family.
+ */
+#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x22)
+
+/** SEC additional random curves over binary fields.
+ *
+ * This family comprises the following curve:
+ * sect163r2.
+ * It is defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
+ * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
+ * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
+ *
+ * \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family.
+ */
+#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x2b)
+
+/** Brainpool P random curves.
+ *
+ * This family comprises the following curves:
+ * brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP256r1,
+ * brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1.
+ * It is defined in RFC 5639.
+ *
+ * \note Mbed TLS only supports the 256-bit, 384-bit and 512-bit curves
+ * in this family.
+ */
+#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1 ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x30)
+
+/** Curve25519 and Curve448.
+ *
+ * This family comprises the following Montgomery curves:
+ * - 255-bit: Bernstein et al.,
+ * _Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records_, LNCS 3958, 2006.
+ * The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X25519 when used with this curve.
+ * - 448-bit: Hamburg,
+ * _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015.
+ * The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X448 when used with this curve.
+ */
+#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x41)
+
+/** The twisted Edwards curves Ed25519 and Ed448.
+ *
+ * These curves are suitable for EdDSA (#PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA for both curves,
+ * #PSA_ALG_ED25519PH for the 255-bit curve,
+ * #PSA_ALG_ED448PH for the 448-bit curve).
+ *
+ * This family comprises the following twisted Edwards curves:
+ * - 255-bit: Edwards25519, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent
+ * to Curve25519.
+ * Bernstein et al., _Twisted Edwards curves_, Africacrypt 2008.
+ * - 448-bit: Edwards448, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent
+ * to Curve448.
+ * Hamburg, _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015.
+ *
+ * \note Mbed TLS does not support Edwards curves yet.
+ */
+#define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x42)
+
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4200)
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7200)
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK ((psa_key_type_t) 0x00ff)
+/** Diffie-Hellman key pair.
+ *
+ * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the
+ * Diffie-Hellman group to be used.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(group) \
+ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (group))
+/** Diffie-Hellman public key.
+ *
+ * \param group A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the
+ * Diffie-Hellman group to be used.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(group) \
+ (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (group))
+
+/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key (pair or public-only). */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) \
+ ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) & \
+ ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
+/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key pair. */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(type) \
+ (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE)
+/** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman public key. */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(type) \
+ (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == \
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
+
+/** Extract the group from a Diffie-Hellman key type. */
+#define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY(type) \
+ ((psa_dh_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) ? \
+ ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) : \
+ 0))
+
+/** Diffie-Hellman groups defined in RFC 7919 Appendix A.
+ *
+ * This family includes groups with the following key sizes (in bits):
+ * 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192. A given implementation may support
+ * all of these sizes or only a subset.
+ */
+#define PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x03)
+
+#define PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) \
+ (((type) >> 8) & 7)
+/** The block size of a block cipher.
+ *
+ * \param type A cipher key type (value of type #psa_key_type_t).
+ *
+ * \return The block size for a block cipher, or 1 for a stream cipher.
+ * The return value is undefined if \p type is not a supported
+ * cipher key type.
+ *
+ * \note It is possible to build stream cipher algorithms on top of a block
+ * cipher, for example CTR mode (#PSA_ALG_CTR).
+ * This macro only takes the key type into account, so it cannot be
+ * used to determine the size of the data that #psa_cipher_update()
+ * might buffer for future processing in general.
+ *
+ * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one.
+ *
+ * \warning This macro may evaluate its argument multiple times.
+ */
+#define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(type) \
+ (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \
+ 1u << PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) : \
+ 0u)
+
+/* Note that algorithm values are embedded in the persistent key store,
+ * as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they must not be changed
+ * (unless the storage format version changes).
+ */
+
+/** Vendor-defined algorithm flag.
+ *
+ * Algorithms defined by this standard will never have the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG
+ * bit set. Vendors who define additional algorithms must use an encoding with
+ * the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should respect the bitwise structure
+ * used by standard encodings whenever practical.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x80000000)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x7f000000)
+#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000000)
+#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03000000)
+#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04000000)
+#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05000000)
+#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000000)
+#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000000)
+#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000000)
+#define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09000000)
+
+/** Whether an algorithm is vendor-defined.
+ *
+ * See also #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(alg) \
+ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
+ * algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg) \
+ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
+ * algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) \
+ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a symmetric cipher algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is a symmetric cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
+ * algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg) \
+ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is an authenticated encryption
+ * with associated data (AEAD) algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
+ * algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) \
+ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric signature algorithm,
+ * also known as public-key signature algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric signature algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
+ * algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(alg) \
+ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm,
+ * also known as public-key encryption algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
+ * algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg) \
+ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key agreement algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is a key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
+ * algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \
+ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key derivation algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is a key derivation algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
+ * algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) \
+ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a key stretching / password hashing
+ * algorithm.
+ *
+ * A key stretching / password hashing algorithm is a key derivation algorithm
+ * that is suitable for use with a low-entropy secret such as a password.
+ * Equivalently, it's a key derivation algorithm that uses a
+ * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input step.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is a key stretching / password hashing algorithm, 0
+ * otherwise. This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a
+ * supported algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) && \
+ (alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG)
+
+/** An invalid algorithm identifier value. */
+/* *INDENT-OFF* (https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-arch-tests/issues/337) */
+#define PSA_ALG_NONE ((psa_algorithm_t)0)
+/* *INDENT-ON* */
+
+#define PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x000000ff)
+/** MD5 */
+#define PSA_ALG_MD5 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000003)
+/** PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 */
+#define PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000004)
+/** SHA1 */
+#define PSA_ALG_SHA_1 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000005)
+/** SHA2-224 */
+#define PSA_ALG_SHA_224 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000008)
+/** SHA2-256 */
+#define PSA_ALG_SHA_256 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000009)
+/** SHA2-384 */
+#define PSA_ALG_SHA_384 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000a)
+/** SHA2-512 */
+#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000b)
+/** SHA2-512/224 */
+#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000c)
+/** SHA2-512/256 */
+#define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000d)
+/** SHA3-224 */
+#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000010)
+/** SHA3-256 */
+#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000011)
+/** SHA3-384 */
+#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000012)
+/** SHA3-512 */
+#define PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000013)
+/** The first 512 bits (64 bytes) of the SHAKE256 output.
+ *
+ * This is the prehashing for Ed448ph (see #PSA_ALG_ED448PH). For other
+ * scenarios where a hash function based on SHA3/SHAKE is desired, SHA3-512
+ * has the same output size and a (theoretically) higher security strength.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000015)
+
+/** In a hash-and-sign algorithm policy, allow any hash algorithm.
+ *
+ * This value may be used to form the algorithm usage field of a policy
+ * for a signature algorithm that is parametrized by a hash. The key
+ * may then be used to perform operations using the same signature
+ * algorithm parametrized with any supported hash.
+ *
+ * That is, suppose that `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` is one of the following macros:
+ * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT,
+ * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA, #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA.
+ * Then you may create and use a key as follows:
+ * - Set the key usage field using #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH, for example:
+ * ```
+ * psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); // or VERIFY
+ * psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH));
+ * ```
+ * - Import or generate key material.
+ * - Call psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), passing
+ * an algorithm built from `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` and a specific hash. Each
+ * call to sign or verify a message may use a different hash.
+ * ```
+ * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), ...);
+ * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), ...);
+ * psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA3_256), ...);
+ * ```
+ *
+ * This value may not be used to build other algorithms that are
+ * parametrized over a hash. For any valid use of this macro to build
+ * an algorithm \c alg, #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(\c alg) is true.
+ *
+ * This value may not be used to build an algorithm specification to
+ * perform an operation. It is only valid to build policies.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x020000ff)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00c00000)
+#define PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03800000)
+/** Macro to build an HMAC algorithm.
+ *
+ * For example, #PSA_ALG_HMAC(#PSA_ALG_SHA_256) is HMAC-SHA-256.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding HMAC algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+
+#define PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(hmac_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hmac_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HMAC algorithm.
+ *
+ * HMAC is a family of MAC algorithms that are based on a hash function.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is an HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
+ * algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg) \
+ (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \
+ PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE)
+
+/* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bits corresponding to
+ * PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK encode the length to which the MAC is
+ * truncated. As an exception, the value 0 means the untruncated algorithm,
+ * whatever its length is. The length is encoded in 6 bits, so it can
+ * reach up to 63; the largest MAC is 64 bytes so its trivial truncation
+ * to full length is correctly encoded as 0 and any non-trivial truncation
+ * is correctly encoded as a value between 1 and 63. */
+#define PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x003f0000)
+#define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET 16
+
+/* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bit corresponding to
+ * #PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm
+ * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted
+ * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the
+ * same base class and having a (potentially truncated) MAC length greater or
+ * equal than the one encoded in #PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK. */
+#define PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00008000)
+
+/** Macro to build a truncated MAC algorithm.
+ *
+ * A truncated MAC algorithm is identical to the corresponding MAC
+ * algorithm except that the MAC value for the truncated algorithm
+ * consists of only the first \p mac_length bytes of the MAC value
+ * for the untruncated algorithm.
+ *
+ * \note This macro may allow constructing algorithm identifiers that
+ * are not valid, either because the specified length is larger
+ * than the untruncated MAC or because the specified length is
+ * smaller than permitted by the implementation.
+ *
+ * \note It is implementation-defined whether a truncated MAC that
+ * is truncated to the same length as the MAC of the untruncated
+ * algorithm is considered identical to the untruncated algorithm
+ * for policy comparison purposes.
+ *
+ * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
+ * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg)
+ * is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated
+ * MAC algorithm.
+ * \param mac_length Desired length of the truncated MAC in bytes.
+ * This must be at most the full length of the MAC
+ * and must be at least an implementation-specified
+ * minimum. The implementation-specified minimum
+ * shall not be zero.
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding MAC algorithm with the specified
+ * length.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported
+ * MAC algorithm or if \p mac_length is too small or
+ * too large for the specified MAC algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, mac_length) \
+ (((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK | \
+ PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) | \
+ ((mac_length) << PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK))
+
+/** Macro to build the base MAC algorithm corresponding to a truncated
+ * MAC algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
+ * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg)
+ * is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated
+ * MAC algorithm.
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding base MAC algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported
+ * MAC algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg) \
+ ((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK | \
+ PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG))
+
+/** Length to which a MAC algorithm is truncated.
+ *
+ * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
+ * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg)
+ * is true).
+ *
+ * \return Length of the truncated MAC in bytes.
+ * \return 0 if \p mac_alg is a non-truncated MAC algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported
+ * MAC algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(mac_alg) \
+ (((mac_alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK) >> PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET)
+
+/** Macro to build a MAC minimum-MAC-length wildcard algorithm.
+ *
+ * A minimum-MAC-length MAC wildcard algorithm permits all MAC algorithms
+ * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the (potentially truncated) MAC
+ * length of the specific algorithm is equal to or larger then the wildcard
+ * algorithm's minimum MAC length.
+ *
+ * \note When setting the minimum required MAC length to less than the
+ * smallest MAC length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively
+ * becomes an 'any-MAC-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param mac_alg A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
+ * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg)
+ * is true).
+ * \param min_mac_length Desired minimum length of the message authentication
+ * code in bytes. This must be at most the untruncated
+ * length of the MAC and must be at least 1.
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding MAC wildcard algorithm with the
+ * specified minimum length.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported MAC
+ * algorithm or if \p min_mac_length is less than 1 or
+ * too large for the specified MAC algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) \
+ (PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) | \
+ PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00000)
+/** The CBC-MAC construction over a block cipher
+ *
+ * \warning CBC-MAC is insecure in many cases.
+ * A more secure mode, such as #PSA_ALG_CMAC, is recommended.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00100)
+/** The CMAC construction over a block cipher */
+#define PSA_ALG_CMAC ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00200)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
+ * algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg) \
+ (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \
+ PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00800000)
+#define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00400000)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a stream cipher.
+ *
+ * A stream cipher is a symmetric cipher that encrypts or decrypts messages
+ * by applying a bitwise-xor with a stream of bytes that is generated
+ * from a key.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is a stream cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
+ * algorithm identifier or if it is not a symmetric cipher algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(alg) \
+ (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG)) == \
+ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG))
+
+/** The stream cipher mode of a stream cipher algorithm.
+ *
+ * The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type.
+ * - To use ChaCha20, use a key type of #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04800100)
+
+/** The CTR stream cipher mode.
+ *
+ * CTR is a stream cipher which is built from a block cipher.
+ * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
+ * For example, to use AES-128-CTR, use this algorithm with
+ * a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES and a length of 128 bits (16 bytes).
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_CTR ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01000)
+
+/** The CFB stream cipher mode.
+ *
+ * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_CFB ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01100)
+
+/** The OFB stream cipher mode.
+ *
+ * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_OFB ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01200)
+
+/** The XTS cipher mode.
+ *
+ * XTS is a cipher mode which is built from a block cipher. It requires at
+ * least one full block of input, but beyond this minimum the input
+ * does not need to be a whole number of blocks.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_XTS ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0440ff00)
+
+/** The Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode of a block cipher, with no padding.
+ *
+ * \warning ECB mode does not protect the confidentiality of the encrypted data
+ * except in extremely narrow circumstances. It is recommended that applications
+ * only use ECB if they need to construct an operating mode that the
+ * implementation does not provide. Implementations are encouraged to provide
+ * the modes that applications need in preference to supporting direct access
+ * to ECB.
+ *
+ * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
+ *
+ * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths are a
+ * multiple of the block size of the chosen block cipher.
+ *
+ * ECB mode does not accept an initialization vector (IV). When using a
+ * multi-part cipher operation with this algorithm, psa_cipher_generate_iv()
+ * and psa_cipher_set_iv() must not be called.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404400)
+
+/** The CBC block cipher chaining mode, with no padding.
+ *
+ * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
+ *
+ * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths
+ * are whole number of blocks for the chosen block cipher.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404000)
+
+/** The CBC block cipher chaining mode with PKCS#7 padding.
+ *
+ * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
+ *
+ * This is the padding method defined by PKCS#7 (RFC 2315) §10.3.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404100)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00400000)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is an AEAD mode on a block cipher.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm which is an AEAD mode based on
+ * a block cipher, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
+ * algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg) \
+ (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG)) == \
+ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG))
+
+/** The CCM authenticated encryption algorithm.
+ *
+ * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_CCM ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05500100)
+
+/** The CCM* cipher mode without authentication.
+ *
+ * This is CCM* as specified in IEEE 802.15.4 §7, with a tag length of 0.
+ * For CCM* with a nonzero tag length, use the AEAD algorithm #PSA_ALG_CCM.
+ *
+ * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
+ *
+ * Currently only 13-byte long IV's are supported.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01300)
+
+/** The GCM authenticated encryption algorithm.
+ *
+ * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_GCM ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05500200)
+
+/** The Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm.
+ *
+ * The ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction is defined in RFC 7539.
+ *
+ * Implementations must support 12-byte nonces, may support 8-byte nonces,
+ * and should reject other sizes.
+ *
+ * Implementations must support 16-byte tags and should reject other sizes.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05100500)
+
+/* In the encoding of an AEAD algorithm, the bits corresponding to
+ * PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK encode the length of the AEAD tag.
+ * The constants for default lengths follow this encoding.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x003f0000)
+#define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET 16
+
+/* In the encoding of an AEAD algorithm, the bit corresponding to
+ * #PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm
+ * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted
+ * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the
+ * same base class and having a tag length greater than or equal to the one
+ * encoded in #PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK. */
+#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00008000)
+
+/** Macro to build a shortened AEAD algorithm.
+ *
+ * A shortened AEAD algorithm is similar to the corresponding AEAD
+ * algorithm, but has an authentication tag that consists of fewer bytes.
+ * Depending on the algorithm, the tag length may affect the calculation
+ * of the ciphertext.
+ *
+ * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type
+ * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg)
+ * is true).
+ * \param tag_length Desired length of the authentication tag in bytes.
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the specified
+ * length.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported
+ * AEAD algorithm or if \p tag_length is not valid
+ * for the specified AEAD algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, tag_length) \
+ (((aead_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK | \
+ PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) | \
+ ((tag_length) << PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET & \
+ PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK))
+
+/** Retrieve the tag length of a specified AEAD algorithm
+ *
+ * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type
+ * #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg)
+ * is true).
+ *
+ * \return The tag length specified by the input algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported
+ * AEAD algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg) \
+ (((aead_alg) & PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK) >> \
+ PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET)
+
+/** Calculate the corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default tag length.
+ *
+ * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default
+ * tag length for that algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg) \
+ ( \
+ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) \
+ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) \
+ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) \
+ 0)
+#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, ref) \
+ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, 0) == \
+ PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(ref, 0) ? \
+ ref :
+
+/** Macro to build an AEAD minimum-tag-length wildcard algorithm.
+ *
+ * A minimum-tag-length AEAD wildcard algorithm permits all AEAD algorithms
+ * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the tag length of the specific
+ * algorithm is equal to or larger then the minimum tag length specified by the
+ * wildcard algorithm.
+ *
+ * \note When setting the minimum required tag length to less than the
+ * smallest tag length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively
+ * becomes an 'any-tag-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param aead_alg An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type
+ * #psa_algorithm_t such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true).
+ * \param min_tag_length Desired minimum length of the authentication tag in
+ * bytes. This must be at least 1 and at most the largest
+ * allowed tag length of the algorithm.
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding AEAD wildcard algorithm with the
+ * specified minimum length.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported
+ * AEAD algorithm or if \p min_tag_length is less than 1
+ * or too large for the specified AEAD algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) \
+ (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) | \
+ PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000200)
+/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature with hashing.
+ *
+ * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017
+ * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
+ * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
+ * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+/** Raw PKCS#1 v1.5 signature.
+ *
+ * The input to this algorithm is the DigestInfo structure used by
+ * RFC 8017 (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications), §9.2
+ * steps 3–6.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000300)
+#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06001300)
+/** RSA PSS signature with hashing.
+ *
+ * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017
+ * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
+ * RSASSA-PSS, with the message generation function MGF1, and with
+ * a salt length equal to the length of the hash, or the largest
+ * possible salt length for the algorithm and key size if that is
+ * smaller than the hash length. The specified hash algorithm is
+ * used to hash the input message, to create the salted hash, and
+ * for the mask generation.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
+ * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+
+/** RSA PSS signature with hashing with relaxed verification.
+ *
+ * This algorithm has the same behavior as #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS when signing,
+ * but allows an arbitrary salt length (including \c 0) when verifying a
+ * signature.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
+ * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with standard salt.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard.
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is of the form
+ * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg),
+ * where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or
+ * #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not
+ * a supported algorithm identifier or policy.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with any salt.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard.
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is of the form
+ * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg),
+ * where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or
+ * #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not
+ * a supported algorithm identifier or policy.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS.
+ *
+ * This includes any of the RSA PSS algorithm variants, regardless of the
+ * constraints on salt length.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard.
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is of the form
+ * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg) or
+ * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg),
+ * where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or
+ * #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not
+ * a supported algorithm identifier or policy.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) || \
+ PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg))
+
+#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000600)
+/** ECDSA signature with hashing.
+ *
+ * This is the ECDSA signature scheme defined by ANSI X9.62,
+ * with a random per-message secret number (*k*).
+ *
+ * The representation of the signature as a byte string consists of
+ * the concatenation of the signature values *r* and *s*. Each of
+ * *r* and *s* is encoded as an *N*-octet string, where *N* is the length
+ * of the base point of the curve in octets. Each value is represented
+ * in big-endian order (most significant octet first).
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
+ * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding ECDSA signature algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+/** ECDSA signature without hashing.
+ *
+ * This is the same signature scheme as #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(), but
+ * without specifying a hash algorithm. This algorithm may only be
+ * used to sign or verify a sequence of bytes that should be an
+ * already-calculated hash. Note that the input is padded with
+ * zeros on the left or truncated on the left as required to fit
+ * the curve size.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE
+#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000700)
+/** Deterministic ECDSA signature with hashing.
+ *
+ * This is the deterministic ECDSA signature scheme defined by RFC 6979.
+ *
+ * The representation of a signature is the same as with #PSA_ALG_ECDSA().
+ *
+ * Note that when this algorithm is used for verification, signatures
+ * made with randomized ECDSA (#PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg)) with the
+ * same private key are accepted. In other words,
+ * #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) differs from
+ * #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) only for signature, not for verification.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ * This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
+ * when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding deterministic ECDSA signature
+ * algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00000100)
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) == \
+ PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE)
+#define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg) \
+ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0)
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg))
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg))
+
+/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm without prehashing (PureEdDSA),
+ * using standard parameters.
+ *
+ * Contexts are not supported in the current version of this specification
+ * because there is no suitable signature interface that can take the
+ * context as a parameter. A future version of this specification may add
+ * suitable functions and extend this algorithm to support contexts.
+ *
+ * PureEdDSA requires an elliptic curve key on a twisted Edwards curve.
+ * In this specification, the following curves are supported:
+ * - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 255-bit: Ed25519 as specified
+ * in RFC 8032.
+ * The curve is Edwards25519.
+ * The hash function used internally is SHA-512.
+ * - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 448-bit: Ed448 as specified
+ * in RFC 8032.
+ * The curve is Edwards448.
+ * The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the
+ * SHAKE256 output.
+ *
+ * This algorithm can be used with psa_sign_message() and
+ * psa_verify_message(). Since there is no prehashing, it cannot be used
+ * with psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash().
+ *
+ * The signature format is the concatenation of R and S as defined by
+ * RFC 8032 §5.1.6 and §5.2.6 (a 64-byte string for Ed25519, a 114-byte
+ * string for Ed448).
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000800)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000900)
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE)
+
+/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA),
+ * using SHA-512 and the Edwards25519 curve.
+ *
+ * See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format.
+ *
+ * This algorithm is Ed25519 as specified in RFC 8032.
+ * The curve is Edwards25519.
+ * The prehash is SHA-512.
+ * The hash function used internally is SHA-512.
+ *
+ * This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature,
+ * you can either:
+ * - call psa_sign_message() on the message;
+ * - or calculate the SHA-512 hash of the message
+ * with psa_hash_compute()
+ * or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(),
+ * using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHA_512,
+ * then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash().
+ * Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or
+ * psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_ED25519PH \
+ (PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHA_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+
+/** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA),
+ * using SHAKE256 and the Edwards448 curve.
+ *
+ * See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format.
+ *
+ * This algorithm is Ed448 as specified in RFC 8032.
+ * The curve is Edwards448.
+ * The prehash is the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output.
+ * The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the
+ * SHAKE256 output.
+ *
+ * This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature,
+ * you can either:
+ * - call psa_sign_message() on the message;
+ * - or calculate the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output of the message
+ * with psa_hash_compute()
+ * or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(),
+ * using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512,
+ * then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash().
+ * Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or
+ * psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_ED448PH \
+ (PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+
+/* Default definition, to be overridden if the library is extended with
+ * more hash-and-sign algorithms that we want to keep out of this header
+ * file. */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) 0
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used
+ * with psa_sign_hash() and psa_verify_hash().
+ *
+ * This encompasses all strict hash-and-sign algorithms categorized by
+ * PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(), as well as algorithms that follow the
+ * paradigm more loosely:
+ * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW (expects its input to be an encoded hash)
+ * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY (doesn't specify what kind of hash the input is)
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a
+ * hash. 0 if alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used
+ * to sign a message. 0 if alg is not a signature algorithm.
+ * This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a
+ * supported algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) || \
+ PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) || \
+ PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg))
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used
+ * with psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message().
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a
+ * message. 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used
+ * to sign an already-calculated hash. 0 if \p alg is not a signature
+ * algorithm. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a
+ * supported algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) || (alg) == PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash-and-sign algorithm.
+ *
+ * Hash-and-sign algorithms are asymmetric (public-key) signature algorithms
+ * structured in two parts: first the calculation of a hash in a way that
+ * does not depend on the key, then the calculation of a signature from the
+ * hash value and the key. Hash-and-sign algorithms encode the hash
+ * used for the hashing step, and you can call #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH
+ * to extract this algorithm.
+ *
+ * Thus, for a hash-and-sign algorithm,
+ * `psa_sign_message(key, alg, input, ...)` is equivalent to
+ * ```
+ * psa_hash_compute(PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg), input, ..., hash, ...);
+ * psa_sign_hash(key, alg, hash, ..., signature, ...);
+ * ```
+ * Most usefully, separating the hash from the signature allows the hash
+ * to be calculated in multiple steps with psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update()
+ * and psa_hash_finish(). Likewise psa_verify_message() is equivalent to
+ * calculating the hash and then calling psa_verify_hash().
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash-and-sign algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
+ * algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) && \
+ ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) != 0)
+
+/** Get the hash used by a hash-and-sign signature algorithm.
+ *
+ * A hash-and-sign algorithm is a signature algorithm which is
+ * composed of two phases: first a hashing phase which does not use
+ * the key and produces a hash of the input message, then a signing
+ * phase which only uses the hash and the key and not the message
+ * itself.
+ *
+ * \param alg A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(\p alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The underlying hash algorithm if \p alg is a hash-and-sign
+ * algorithm.
+ * \return 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that does not
+ * follow the hash-and-sign structure.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p alg is not a signature algorithm or
+ * if it is not supported by the implementation.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \
+ ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \
+ 0)
+
+/** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption.
+ *
+ * \warning Calling psa_asymmetric_decrypt() with this algorithm as a
+ * parameter is considered an inherently dangerous function
+ * (CWE-242). Unless it is used in a side channel free and safe
+ * way (eg. implementing the TLS protocol as per 7.4.7.1 of
+ * RFC 5246), the calling code is vulnerable.
+ *
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000200)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000300)
+/** RSA OAEP encryption.
+ *
+ * This is the encryption scheme defined by RFC 8017
+ * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
+ * RSAES-OAEP, with the message generation function MGF1.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg The hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true) to use
+ * for MGF1.
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding RSA OAEP encryption algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE)
+#define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ? \
+ ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH : \
+ 0)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000100)
+/** Macro to build an HKDF algorithm.
+ *
+ * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is HKDF using HMAC-SHA-256.
+ *
+ * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
+ * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt used in the "extract" step.
+ * It is optional; if omitted, the derivation uses an empty salt.
+ * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key used in the "extract" step.
+ * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string used in the "expand" step.
+ * You must pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT before #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET.
+ * You may pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO at any time after steup and before
+ * starting to generate output.
+ *
+ * \warning HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alg
+ * if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then
+ * pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible
+ * for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure
+ * unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding HKDF algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_HKDF(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF algorithm.
+ *
+ * HKDF is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based on a hash
+ * function and the HMAC construction.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
+ * key derivation algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE)
+#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+
+#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000400)
+/** Macro to build an HKDF-Extract algorithm.
+ *
+ * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is
+ * HKDF-Extract using HMAC-SHA-256.
+ *
+ * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
+ * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt.
+ * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the input keying material used in the
+ * "extract" step.
+ * The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above.
+ * Each input may only be passed once.
+ *
+ * \warning HKDF-Extract is not meant to be used on its own. PSA_ALG_HKDF
+ * should be used instead if possible. PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT is provided
+ * as a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a
+ * building block. It may also be a slight performance optimization
+ * in applications that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many
+ * different info strings.
+ *
+ * \warning HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alg
+ * if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then
+ * pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible
+ * for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure
+ * unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding HKDF-Extract algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Extract algorithm.
+ *
+ * HKDF-Extract is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based
+ * on a hash function and the HMAC construction.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF-Extract algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
+ * key derivation algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000500)
+/** Macro to build an HKDF-Expand algorithm.
+ *
+ * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is
+ * HKDF-Expand using HMAC-SHA-256.
+ *
+ * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
+ * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the pseudorandom key (PRK).
+ * - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string.
+ *
+ * The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above.
+ * Each input may only be passed once.
+ *
+ * \warning HKDF-Expand is not meant to be used on its own. `PSA_ALG_HKDF`
+ * should be used instead if possible. `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND` is provided as
+ * a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a building
+ * block. It may also be a slight performance optimization in applications
+ * that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many different info strings.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding HKDF-Expand algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Expand algorithm.
+ *
+ * HKDF-Expand is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based
+ * on a hash function and the HMAC construction.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF-Expand algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
+ * key derivation algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF or HKDF-Extract or
+ * HKDF-Expand algorithm.
+ *
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \c alg is any HKDF type algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
+ * key derivation algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE || \
+ ((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE || \
+ ((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000200)
+/** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.
+ *
+ * TLS 1.2 uses a custom pseudorandom function (PRF) for key schedule,
+ * specified in Section 5 of RFC 5246. It is based on HMAC and can be
+ * used with either SHA-256 or SHA-384.
+ *
+ * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be
+ * passed in the order given here:
+ * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed.
+ * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key.
+ * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label.
+ *
+ * For the application to TLS-1.2 key expansion, the seed is the
+ * concatenation of ServerHello.Random + ClientHello.Random,
+ * and the label is "key expansion".
+ *
+ * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` represents the
+ * TLS 1.2 PRF using HMAC-SHA-256.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
+ * key derivation algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE)
+#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+
+#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000300)
+/** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MasterSecret algorithm.
+ *
+ * In a pure-PSK handshake in TLS 1.2, the master secret is derived
+ * from the PreSharedKey (PSK) through the application of padding
+ * (RFC 4279, Section 2) and the TLS-1.2 PRF (RFC 5246, Section 5).
+ * The latter is based on HMAC and can be used with either SHA-256
+ * or SHA-384.
+ *
+ * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be
+ * passed in the order given here:
+ * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed.
+ * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET is the other secret for the
+ * computation of the premaster secret. This input is optional;
+ * if omitted, it defaults to a string of null bytes with the same length
+ * as the secret (PSK) input.
+ * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key.
+ * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label.
+ *
+ * For the application to TLS-1.2, the seed (which is
+ * forwarded to the TLS-1.2 PRF) is the concatenation of the
+ * ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random,
+ * the label is "master secret" or "extended master secret" and
+ * the other secret depends on the key exchange specified in the cipher suite:
+ * - for a plain PSK cipher suite (RFC 4279, Section 2), omit
+ * PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET
+ * - for a DHE-PSK (RFC 4279, Section 3) or ECDHE-PSK cipher suite
+ * (RFC 5489, Section 2), the other secret should be the output of the
+ * PSA_ALG_FFDH or PSA_ALG_ECDH key agreement performed with the peer.
+ * The recommended way to pass this input is to use a key derivation
+ * algorithm constructed as
+ * PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg))
+ * and to call psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(). Alternatively,
+ * this input may be an output of `psa_raw_key_agreement()` passed with
+ * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(), or an equivalent input passed with
+ * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_input_key().
+ * - for a RSA-PSK cipher suite (RFC 4279, Section 4), the other secret
+ * should be the 48-byte client challenge (the PreMasterSecret of
+ * (RFC 5246, Section 7.4.7.1)) concatenation of the TLS version and
+ * a 46-byte random string chosen by the client. On the server, this is
+ * typically an output of psa_asymmetric_decrypt() using
+ * PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, passed to the key derivation operation
+ * with `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`.
+ *
+ * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` represents the
+ * TLS-1.2 PSK to MasterSecret derivation PRF using HMAC-SHA-256.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
+ * key derivation algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE)
+#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+
+/* The TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS KDF. It takes the shared secret K (an EC point
+ * in case of EC J-PAKE) and calculates SHA256(K.X) that the rest of TLS 1.2
+ * will use to derive the session secret, as defined by step 2 of
+ * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01#section-8.7.
+ * Uses PSA_ALG_SHA_256.
+ * This function takes a single input:
+ * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the shared secret K from EC J-PAKE.
+ * The only supported curve is secp256r1 (the 256-bit curve in
+ * #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1), so the input must be exactly 65 bytes.
+ * The output has to be read as a single chunk of 32 bytes, defined as
+ * PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000609)
+
+/* This flag indicates whether the key derivation algorithm is suitable for
+ * use on low-entropy secrets such as password - these algorithms are also
+ * known as key stretching or password hashing schemes. These are also the
+ * algorithms that accepts inputs of type #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD.
+ *
+ * Those algorithms cannot be combined with a key agreement algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00800000)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08800100)
+/** Macro to build a PBKDF2-HMAC password hashing / key stretching algorithm.
+ *
+ * PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2).
+ * This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using a PRF based on
+ * HMAC with the specified hash.
+ * For example, `PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` specifies PBKDF2
+ * using the PRF HMAC-SHA-256.
+ *
+ * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be
+ * provided in the following order:
+ * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST is the iteration count.
+ * This input step must be used exactly once.
+ * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt.
+ * This input step must be used one or more times; if used several times, the
+ * inputs will be concatenated. This can be used to build the final salt
+ * from multiple sources, both public and secret (also known as pepper).
+ * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD is the password to be hashed.
+ * This input step must be used exactly once.
+ *
+ * \param hash_alg A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
+ * #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding PBKDF2-HMAC-XXX algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
+ * hash algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(hash_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \c alg is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
+ * key derivation algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(alg) \
+ (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE)
+#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_GET_HASH(pbkdf2_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((pbkdf2_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
+/** The PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128 password hashing / key stretching algorithm.
+ *
+ * PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2).
+ * This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using the
+ * AES-CMAC-PRF-128 PRF specified by RFC 4615.
+ *
+ * This key derivation algorithm uses the same inputs as
+ * #PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC() with the same constraints.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08800200)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg) || \
+ ((kdf_alg) == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128))
+
+#define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0xfe00ffff)
+#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK ((psa_algorithm_t) 0xffff0000)
+
+/** Macro to build a combined algorithm that chains a key agreement with
+ * a key derivation.
+ *
+ * \param ka_alg A key agreement algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such
+ * that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p ka_alg) is true).
+ * \param kdf_alg A key derivation algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such
+ * that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p kdf_alg) is true).
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding key agreement and derivation
+ * algorithm.
+ * \return Unspecified if \p ka_alg is not a supported
+ * key agreement algorithm or \p kdf_alg is not a
+ * supported key derivation algorithm.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, kdf_alg) \
+ ((ka_alg) | (kdf_alg))
+
+#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) \
+ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) \
+ (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a raw key agreement algorithm.
+ *
+ * A raw key agreement algorithm is one that does not specify
+ * a key derivation function.
+ * Usually, raw key agreement algorithms are constructed directly with
+ * a \c PSA_ALG_xxx macro while non-raw key agreement algorithms are
+ * constructed with #PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT().
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \p alg is a raw key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
+ * algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) && \
+ PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
+
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_OR_AGREEMENT(alg) \
+ ((PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)))
+
+/** The finite-field Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement algorithm.
+ *
+ * The shared secret produced by key agreement is
+ * `g^{ab}` in big-endian format.
+ * It is `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where `m` is the size of the prime `p`
+ * in bits.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_FFDH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09010000)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm.
+ *
+ * This includes the raw finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as
+ * finite-field Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation
+ * algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \c alg is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm, 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
+ * key agreement algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_FFDH(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_FFDH)
+
+/** The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm.
+ *
+ * The shared secret produced by key agreement is the x-coordinate of
+ * the shared secret point. It is always `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where
+ * `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of the
+ * order of the curve's coordinate field. When `m` is not a multiple of 8,
+ * the byte containing the most significant bit of the shared secret
+ * is padded with zero bits. The byte order is either little-endian
+ * or big-endian depending on the curve type.
+ *
+ * - For Montgomery curves (curve types `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`),
+ * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A`
+ * in little-endian byte order.
+ * The bit size is 448 for Curve448 and 255 for Curve25519.
+ * - For Weierstrass curves over prime fields (curve types
+ * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX` and `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`),
+ * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A`
+ * in big-endian byte order.
+ * The bit size is `m = ceiling(log_2(p))` for the field `F_p`.
+ * - For Weierstrass curves over binary fields (curve types
+ * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`),
+ * the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A`
+ * in big-endian byte order.
+ * The bit size is `m` for the field `F_{2^m}`.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_ECDH ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09020000)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman
+ * algorithm.
+ *
+ * This includes the raw elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as
+ * elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation
+ * algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \c alg is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm,
+ * 0 otherwise.
+ * This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
+ * key agreement algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_ECDH)
+
+/** Whether the specified algorithm encoding is a wildcard.
+ *
+ * Wildcard values may only be used to set the usage algorithm field in
+ * a policy, not to perform an operation.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return 1 if \c alg is a wildcard algorithm encoding.
+ * \return 0 if \c alg is a non-wildcard algorithm encoding (suitable for
+ * an operation).
+ * \return This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
+ * algorithm identifier.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg) \
+ (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ? \
+ PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH : \
+ PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) ? \
+ (alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \
+ PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) ? \
+ (alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 : \
+ (alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
+
+/** Get the hash used by a composite algorithm.
+ *
+ * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
+ *
+ * \return The underlying hash algorithm if alg is a composite algorithm that
+ * uses a hash algorithm.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if alg is not a composite algorithm that uses a hash.
+ */
+#define PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) \
+ (((alg) & 0x000000ff) == 0 ? ((psa_algorithm_t) 0) : 0x02000000 | ((alg) & 0x000000ff))
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/* Note that location and persistence level values are embedded in the
+ * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they
+ * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes).
+ */
+
+/** The default lifetime for volatile keys.
+ *
+ * A volatile key only exists as long as the identifier to it is not destroyed.
+ * The key material is guaranteed to be erased on a power reset.
+ *
+ * A key with this lifetime is typically stored in the RAM area of the
+ * PSA Crypto subsystem. However this is an implementation choice.
+ * If an implementation stores data about the key in a non-volatile memory,
+ * it must release all the resources associated with the key and erase the
+ * key material if the calling application terminates.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE ((psa_key_lifetime_t) 0x00000000)
+
+/** The default lifetime for persistent keys.
+ *
+ * A persistent key remains in storage until it is explicitly destroyed or
+ * until the corresponding storage area is wiped. This specification does
+ * not define any mechanism to wipe a storage area, but integrations may
+ * provide their own mechanism (for example to perform a factory reset,
+ * to prepare for device refurbishment, or to uninstall an application).
+ *
+ * This lifetime value is the default storage area for the calling
+ * application. Integrations of Mbed TLS may support other persistent lifetimes.
+ * See ::psa_key_lifetime_t for more information.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT ((psa_key_lifetime_t) 0x00000001)
+
+/** The persistence level of volatile keys.
+ *
+ * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0x00)
+
+/** The default persistence level for persistent keys.
+ *
+ * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0x01)
+
+/** A persistence level indicating that a key is never destroyed.
+ *
+ * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0xff)
+
+#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) \
+ ((psa_key_persistence_t) ((lifetime) & 0x000000ff))
+
+#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime) \
+ ((psa_key_location_t) ((lifetime) >> 8))
+
+/** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is volatile.
+ *
+ * A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when
+ * the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key
+ * is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device.
+ *
+ * A key that is not volatile is persistent. Persistent keys are
+ * preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an
+ * implementation-specific device management event occurs (for example,
+ * a factory reset).
+ *
+ * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query (value of type
+ * ::psa_key_lifetime_t).
+ *
+ * \return \c 1 if the key is volatile, otherwise \c 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime) \
+ (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \
+ PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE)
+
+/** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is read-only.
+ *
+ * Read-only keys cannot be created or destroyed through the PSA Crypto API.
+ * They must be created through platform-specific means that bypass the API.
+ *
+ * Some platforms may offer ways to destroy read-only keys. For example,
+ * consider a platform with multiple levels of privilege, where a
+ * low-privilege application can use a key but is not allowed to destroy
+ * it, and the platform exposes the key to the application with a read-only
+ * lifetime. High-privilege code can destroy the key even though the
+ * application sees the key as read-only.
+ *
+ * \param lifetime The lifetime value to query (value of type
+ * ::psa_key_lifetime_t).
+ *
+ * \return \c 1 if the key is read-only, otherwise \c 0.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(lifetime) \
+ (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \
+ PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY)
+
+/** Construct a lifetime from a persistence level and a location.
+ *
+ * \param persistence The persistence level
+ * (value of type ::psa_key_persistence_t).
+ * \param location The location indicator
+ * (value of type ::psa_key_location_t).
+ *
+ * \return The constructed lifetime value.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(persistence, location) \
+ ((location) << 8 | (persistence))
+
+/** The local storage area for persistent keys.
+ *
+ * This storage area is available on all systems that can store persistent
+ * keys without delegating the storage to a third-party cryptoprocessor.
+ *
+ * See ::psa_key_location_t for more information.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE ((psa_key_location_t) 0x000000)
+
+#define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_VENDOR_FLAG ((psa_key_location_t) 0x800000)
+
+/* Note that key identifier values are embedded in the
+ * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they
+ * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes).
+ */
+
+/** The null key identifier.
+ */
+/* *INDENT-OFF* (https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-arch-tests/issues/337) */
+#define PSA_KEY_ID_NULL ((psa_key_id_t)0)
+/* *INDENT-ON* */
+/** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the application.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN ((psa_key_id_t) 0x00000001)
+/** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the application.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX ((psa_key_id_t) 0x3fffffff)
+/** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN ((psa_key_id_t) 0x40000000)
+/** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX ((psa_key_id_t) 0x7fffffff)
+
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ((psa_key_id_t) 0)
+#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(id) (id)
+#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(id) (0)
+
+/** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime.
+ *
+ * \param unused Unused parameter.
+ * \param key_id Identifier of the key.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make(
+ unsigned int unused, psa_key_id_t key_id)
+{
+ (void) unused;
+
+ return key_id;
+}
+
+/** Compare two key identifiers.
+ *
+ * \param id1 First key identifier.
+ * \param id2 Second key identifier.
+ *
+ * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2)
+{
+ return id1 == id2;
+}
+
+/** Check whether a key identifier is null.
+ *
+ * \param key Key identifier.
+ *
+ * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key)
+{
+ return key == 0;
+}
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ((mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ 0, 0 })
+#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(id) ((id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id))
+#define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(id) ((id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner))
+
+/** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime.
+ *
+ * \param owner_id Identifier of the key owner.
+ * \param key_id Identifier of the key.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make(
+ mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner_id, psa_key_id_t key_id)
+{
+ return (mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ .MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) = key_id,
+ .MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner) = owner_id };
+}
+
+/** Compare two key identifiers.
+ *
+ * \param id1 First key identifier.
+ * \param id2 Second key identifier.
+ *
+ * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2)
+{
+ return (id1.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) == id2.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id)) &&
+ mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal(id1.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner), id2.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner));
+}
+
+/** Check whether a key identifier is null.
+ *
+ * \param key Key identifier.
+ *
+ * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key)
+{
+ return key.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) == 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup policy Key policies
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/* Note that key usage flags are embedded in the
+ * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they
+ * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes).
+ */
+
+/** Whether the key may be exported.
+ *
+ * A public key or the public part of a key pair may always be exported
+ * regardless of the value of this permission flag.
+ *
+ * If a key does not have export permission, implementations shall not
+ * allow the key to be exported in plain form from the cryptoprocessor,
+ * whether through psa_export_key() or through a proprietary interface.
+ * The key may however be exportable in a wrapped form, i.e. in a form
+ * where it is encrypted by another key.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000001)
+
+/** Whether the key may be copied.
+ *
+ * This flag allows the use of psa_copy_key() to make a copy of the key
+ * with the same policy or a more restrictive policy.
+ *
+ * For lifetimes for which the key is located in a secure element which
+ * enforce the non-exportability of keys, copying a key outside the secure
+ * element also requires the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT.
+ * Copying the key inside the secure element is permitted with just
+ * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY if the secure element supports it.
+ * For keys with the lifetime #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or
+ * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY
+ * is sufficient to permit the copy.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000002)
+
+/** Whether the key may be used to encrypt a message.
+ *
+ * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric encryption operation,
+ * for an AEAD encryption-and-authentication operation,
+ * or for an asymmetric encryption operation,
+ * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
+ *
+ * For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000100)
+
+/** Whether the key may be used to decrypt a message.
+ *
+ * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric decryption operation,
+ * for an AEAD decryption-and-verification operation,
+ * or for an asymmetric decryption operation,
+ * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
+ *
+ * For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000200)
+
+/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message.
+ *
+ * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation or for
+ * an asymmetric message signature operation, if otherwise permitted by the
+ * key’s type and policy.
+ *
+ * For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000400)
+
+/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message.
+ *
+ * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation or for
+ * an asymmetric message signature verification operation, if otherwise
+ * permitted by the key’s type and policy.
+ *
+ * For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000800)
+
+/** Whether the key may be used to sign a message.
+ *
+ * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation
+ * or for an asymmetric signature operation,
+ * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
+ *
+ * For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00001000)
+
+/** Whether the key may be used to verify a message signature.
+ *
+ * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation
+ * or for an asymmetric signature verification operation,
+ * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
+ *
+ * For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00002000)
+
+/** Whether the key may be used to derive other keys or produce a password
+ * hash.
+ *
+ * This flag allows the key to be used for a key derivation operation or for
+ * a key agreement operation, if otherwise permitted by the key's type and
+ * policy.
+ *
+ * If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to
+ * psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key derivation operation, then it
+ * permits calling psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() or
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_key() at the end of the operation.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00004000)
+
+/** Whether the key may be used to verify the result of a key derivation,
+ * including password hashing.
+ *
+ * This flag allows the key to be used:
+ *
+ * This flag allows the key to be used in a key derivation operation, if
+ * otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
+ *
+ * If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to
+ * psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key derivation operation, then it
+ * permits calling psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() or
+ * psa_key_derivation_verify_key() at the end of the operation.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00008000)
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup derivation Key derivation
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/* Key input steps are not embedded in the persistent storage, so you can
+ * change them if needed: it's only an ABI change. */
+
+/** A secret input for key derivation.
+ *
+ * This should be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE
+ * (passed to psa_key_derivation_input_key())
+ * or the shared secret resulting from a key agreement
+ * (obtained via psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()).
+ *
+ * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to
+ * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation
+ * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(),
+ * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), or
+ * psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), but not
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_key().
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0101)
+
+/** A low-entropy secret input for password hashing / key stretching.
+ *
+ * This is usually a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD (passed to
+ * psa_key_derivation_input_key()) or a direct input (passed to
+ * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()) that is a password or passphrase. It can
+ * also be high-entropy secret such as a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE or
+ * the shared secret resulting from a key agreement.
+ *
+ * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to
+ * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation
+ * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(),
+ * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), or
+ * psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), but not
+ * psa_key_derivation_output_key().
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0102)
+
+/** A high-entropy additional secret input for key derivation.
+ *
+ * This is typically the shared secret resulting from a key agreement obtained
+ * via `psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()`. It may alternatively be a key of
+ * type `PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE` passed to `psa_key_derivation_input_key()`, or
+ * a direct input passed to `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET \
+ ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0103)
+
+/** A label for key derivation.
+ *
+ * This should be a direct input.
+ * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0201)
+
+/** A salt for key derivation.
+ *
+ * This should be a direct input.
+ * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA or
+ * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0202)
+
+/** An information string for key derivation.
+ *
+ * This should be a direct input.
+ * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0203)
+
+/** A seed for key derivation.
+ *
+ * This should be a direct input.
+ * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0204)
+
+/** A cost parameter for password hashing / key stretching.
+ *
+ * This must be a direct input, passed to psa_key_derivation_input_integer().
+ */
+#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0205)
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup helper_macros Helper macros
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/* Helper macros */
+
+/** Check if two AEAD algorithm identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm
+ * regardless of the tag length they encode.
+ *
+ * \param aead_alg_1 An AEAD algorithm identifier.
+ * \param aead_alg_2 An AEAD algorithm identifier.
+ *
+ * \return 1 if both identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm,
+ * 0 otherwise.
+ * Unspecified if neither \p aead_alg_1 nor \p aead_alg_2 are
+ * a supported AEAD algorithm.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(aead_alg_1, aead_alg_2) \
+ (!(((aead_alg_1) ^ (aead_alg_2)) & \
+ ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)))
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/**@}*/
+
+/** \defgroup interruptible Interruptible operations
+ * @{
+ */
+
+/** Maximum value for use with \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to determine
+ * the maximum number of ops allowed to be executed by an interruptible
+ * function in a single call.
+ */
+#define PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED UINT32_MAX
+
+/**@}*/
+
+#endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/.gitignore b/third_party/mbedtls/library/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3351e8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+libmbed*
+*.sln
+*.vcxproj
+
+####START_COMMENTED_GENERATED_FILES###
+#/error.c
+#/version_features.c
+#/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c
+#/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
+#/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c
+####END_COMMENTED_GENERATED_FILES###
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/CMakeLists.txt b/third_party/mbedtls/library/CMakeLists.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2c21fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,359 @@
+option(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY "Build Mbed TLS static library." ON)
+option(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY "Build Mbed TLS shared library." OFF)
+option(LINK_WITH_PTHREAD "Explicitly link Mbed TLS library to pthread." OFF)
+option(LINK_WITH_TRUSTED_STORAGE "Explicitly link Mbed TLS library to trusted_storage." OFF)
+
+# Set the project root directory if it's not already defined, as may happen if
+# the library folder is included directly by a parent project, without
+# including the top level CMakeLists.txt.
+if(NOT DEFINED MBEDTLS_DIR)
+ set(MBEDTLS_DIR ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR})
+endif()
+
+set(src_crypto
+ aes.c
+ aesni.c
+ aesce.c
+ aria.c
+ asn1parse.c
+ asn1write.c
+ base64.c
+ bignum.c
+ bignum_core.c
+ bignum_mod.c
+ bignum_mod_raw.c
+ block_cipher.c
+ camellia.c
+ ccm.c
+ chacha20.c
+ chachapoly.c
+ cipher.c
+ cipher_wrap.c
+ constant_time.c
+ cmac.c
+ ctr_drbg.c
+ des.c
+ dhm.c
+ ecdh.c
+ ecdsa.c
+ ecjpake.c
+ ecp.c
+ ecp_curves.c
+ ecp_curves_new.c
+ entropy.c
+ entropy_poll.c
+ error.c
+ gcm.c
+ hkdf.c
+ hmac_drbg.c
+ lmots.c
+ lms.c
+ md.c
+ md5.c
+ memory_buffer_alloc.c
+ nist_kw.c
+ oid.c
+ padlock.c
+ pem.c
+ pk.c
+ pk_ecc.c
+ pk_wrap.c
+ pkcs12.c
+ pkcs5.c
+ pkparse.c
+ pkwrite.c
+ platform.c
+ platform_util.c
+ poly1305.c
+ psa_crypto.c
+ psa_crypto_aead.c
+ psa_crypto_cipher.c
+ psa_crypto_client.c
+ psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c
+ psa_crypto_ecp.c
+ psa_crypto_ffdh.c
+ psa_crypto_hash.c
+ psa_crypto_mac.c
+ psa_crypto_pake.c
+ psa_crypto_rsa.c
+ psa_crypto_se.c
+ psa_crypto_slot_management.c
+ psa_crypto_storage.c
+ psa_its_file.c
+ psa_util.c
+ ripemd160.c
+ rsa.c
+ rsa_alt_helpers.c
+ sha1.c
+ sha256.c
+ sha512.c
+ sha3.c
+ threading.c
+ timing.c
+ version.c
+ version_features.c
+)
+
+set(src_x509
+ pkcs7.c
+ x509.c
+ x509_create.c
+ x509_crl.c
+ x509_crt.c
+ x509_csr.c
+ x509write.c
+ x509write_crt.c
+ x509write_csr.c
+)
+
+set(src_tls
+ debug.c
+ mps_reader.c
+ mps_trace.c
+ net_sockets.c
+ ssl_cache.c
+ ssl_ciphersuites.c
+ ssl_client.c
+ ssl_cookie.c
+ ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c
+ ssl_msg.c
+ ssl_ticket.c
+ ssl_tls.c
+ ssl_tls12_client.c
+ ssl_tls12_server.c
+ ssl_tls13_keys.c
+ ssl_tls13_server.c
+ ssl_tls13_client.c
+ ssl_tls13_generic.c
+)
+
+if(GEN_FILES)
+ find_package(Perl REQUIRED)
+
+ file(GLOB error_headers ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/mbedtls/*.h)
+ add_custom_command(
+ OUTPUT
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/error.c
+ COMMAND
+ ${PERL_EXECUTABLE}
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_errors.pl
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/mbedtls
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/data_files
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/error.c
+ DEPENDS
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_errors.pl
+ ${error_headers}
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/data_files/error.fmt
+ )
+
+ add_custom_command(
+ OUTPUT
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/version_features.c
+ COMMAND
+ ${PERL_EXECUTABLE}
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_features.pl
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/mbedtls
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/data_files
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/version_features.c
+ DEPENDS
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_features.pl
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/data_files/version_features.fmt
+ )
+
+ add_custom_command(
+ OUTPUT
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c
+ COMMAND
+ ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE}
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../framework/scripts/generate_ssl_debug_helpers.py
+ --mbedtls-root ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/..
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}
+ DEPENDS
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../framework/scripts/generate_ssl_debug_helpers.py
+ ${error_headers}
+ )
+
+ add_custom_command(
+ OUTPUT
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c
+ COMMAND
+ ${MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE}
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_driver_wrappers.py
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}
+ DEPENDS
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/generate_driver_wrappers.py
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c.jinja
+ )
+
+
+else()
+ link_to_source(error.c)
+ link_to_source(version_features.c)
+ link_to_source(ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c)
+ link_to_source(psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c)
+endif()
+
+if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCC)
+ set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wmissing-declarations")
+endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_GNUCC)
+
+if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG)
+ set(CMAKE_C_FLAGS "${CMAKE_C_FLAGS} -Wmissing-declarations -Wdocumentation -Wno-documentation-deprecated-sync -Wunreachable-code")
+endif(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_CLANG)
+
+if(CMAKE_COMPILER_IS_MSVC)
+ option(MSVC_STATIC_RUNTIME "Build the libraries with /MT compiler flag" OFF)
+ if(MSVC_STATIC_RUNTIME)
+ foreach(flag_var
+ CMAKE_C_FLAGS CMAKE_C_FLAGS_DEBUG CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELEASE
+ CMAKE_C_FLAGS_MINSIZEREL CMAKE_C_FLAGS_RELWITHDEBINFO
+ CMAKE_C_FLAGS_CHECK)
+ string(REGEX REPLACE "/MD" "/MT" ${flag_var} "${${flag_var}}")
+ endforeach(flag_var)
+ endif()
+endif()
+
+if(WIN32)
+ set(libs ${libs} ws2_32 bcrypt)
+endif(WIN32)
+
+if(CMAKE_C_COMPILER_ID MATCHES "AppleClang")
+ set(CMAKE_C_ARCHIVE_CREATE "<CMAKE_AR> Scr <TARGET> <LINK_FLAGS> <OBJECTS>")
+ set(CMAKE_C_ARCHIVE_FINISH "<CMAKE_RANLIB> -no_warning_for_no_symbols -c <TARGET>")
+endif()
+if(CMAKE_CXX_COMPILER_ID MATCHES "AppleClang")
+ set(CMAKE_CXX_ARCHIVE_CREATE "<CMAKE_AR> Scr <TARGET> <LINK_FLAGS> <OBJECTS>")
+ set(CMAKE_CXX_ARCHIVE_FINISH "<CMAKE_RANLIB> -no_warning_for_no_symbols -c <TARGET>")
+endif()
+
+if(HAIKU)
+ set(libs ${libs} network)
+endif(HAIKU)
+
+if(LINK_WITH_PTHREAD)
+ set(libs ${libs} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT})
+endif()
+
+if(LINK_WITH_TRUSTED_STORAGE)
+ set(libs ${libs} trusted_storage)
+endif()
+
+if (NOT USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND NOT USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
+ message(FATAL_ERROR "Need to choose static or shared mbedtls build!")
+endif(NOT USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND NOT USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
+
+set(mbedtls_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}mbedtls")
+set(mbedx509_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}mbedx509")
+set(mbedcrypto_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}mbedcrypto")
+
+set(mbedtls_target ${mbedtls_target} PARENT_SCOPE)
+set(mbedx509_target ${mbedx509_target} PARENT_SCOPE)
+set(mbedcrypto_target ${mbedcrypto_target} PARENT_SCOPE)
+
+if (USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
+ set(mbedtls_static_target ${mbedtls_target})
+ set(mbedx509_static_target ${mbedx509_target})
+ set(mbedcrypto_static_target ${mbedcrypto_target})
+endif()
+
+set(target_libraries ${mbedcrypto_target} ${mbedx509_target} ${mbedtls_target})
+
+if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
+ string(APPEND mbedtls_static_target "_static")
+ string(APPEND mbedx509_static_target "_static")
+ string(APPEND mbedcrypto_static_target "_static")
+
+ list(APPEND target_libraries
+ ${mbedcrypto_static_target}
+ ${mbedx509_static_target}
+ ${mbedtls_static_target})
+endif()
+
+set(p256m_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}p256m")
+set(everest_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}everest")
+
+if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
+ add_library(${mbedcrypto_static_target} STATIC ${src_crypto})
+ set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedcrypto)
+ target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC ${libs})
+
+ if(TARGET ${everest_target})
+ target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC ${everest_target})
+ endif()
+
+ if(TARGET ${p256m_target})
+ target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_static_target} PUBLIC ${p256m_target})
+ endif()
+
+ add_library(${mbedx509_static_target} STATIC ${src_x509})
+ set_target_properties(${mbedx509_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedx509)
+ target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_static_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_static_target})
+
+ add_library(${mbedtls_static_target} STATIC ${src_tls})
+ set_target_properties(${mbedtls_static_target} PROPERTIES OUTPUT_NAME mbedtls)
+ target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_static_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_static_target})
+endif(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
+
+if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
+ set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR})
+ add_library(${mbedcrypto_target} SHARED ${src_crypto})
+ set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.4 SOVERSION 16)
+ target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${libs})
+
+ if(TARGET ${everest_target})
+ target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${everest_target})
+ endif()
+
+ if(TARGET ${p256m_target})
+ target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${p256m_target})
+ endif()
+
+ add_library(${mbedx509_target} SHARED ${src_x509})
+ set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.4 SOVERSION 7)
+ target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_target})
+
+ add_library(${mbedtls_target} SHARED ${src_tls})
+ set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.6.4 SOVERSION 21)
+ target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_target})
+endif(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
+
+foreach(target IN LISTS target_libraries)
+ add_library(MbedTLS::${target} ALIAS ${target}) # add_subdirectory support
+ # Include public header files from /include and other directories
+ # declared by /3rdparty/**/CMakeLists.txt. Include private header files
+ # from /library and others declared by /3rdparty/**/CMakeLists.txt.
+ # /library needs to be listed explicitly when building .c files outside
+ # of /library (which currently means: under /3rdparty).
+ target_include_directories(${target}
+ PUBLIC $<BUILD_INTERFACE:${MBEDTLS_DIR}/include/>
+ $<INSTALL_INTERFACE:include/>
+ PRIVATE ${MBEDTLS_DIR}/library/
+ # Needed to include psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR})
+ # Pass-through MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE and MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE
+ if(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
+ target_compile_definitions(${target}
+ PUBLIC MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE="${MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE}")
+ endif()
+ if(MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE)
+ target_compile_definitions(${target}
+ PUBLIC MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE="${MBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE}")
+ endif()
+ install(
+ TARGETS ${target}
+ EXPORT MbedTLSTargets
+ ARCHIVE DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR}
+ LIBRARY DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR}
+ RUNTIME DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_BINDIR}
+ PERMISSIONS OWNER_READ OWNER_WRITE GROUP_READ WORLD_READ)
+endforeach(target)
+
+set(lib_target "${MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX}lib")
+
+add_custom_target(${lib_target} DEPENDS ${mbedcrypto_target} ${mbedx509_target} ${mbedtls_target})
+if(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
+ add_dependencies(${lib_target} ${mbedcrypto_static_target} ${mbedx509_static_target} ${mbedtls_static_target})
+endif()
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/Makefile b/third_party/mbedtls/library/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3543dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+ifndef MBEDTLS_PATH
+MBEDTLS_PATH := ..
+endif
+
+GENERATED_FILES := \
+ error.c version_features.c \
+ ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c \
+ psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h \
+ psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c
+
+ifneq ($(GENERATED_FILES),$(wildcard $(GENERATED_FILES)))
+ ifeq (,$(wildcard $(MBEDTLS_PATH)/framework/exported.make))
+ # Use the define keyword to get a multi-line message.
+ # GNU make appends ". Stop.", so tweak the ending of our message accordingly.
+ define error_message
+$(MBEDTLS_PATH)/framework/exported.make not found.
+Run `git submodule update --init` to fetch the submodule contents.
+This is a fatal error
+ endef
+ $(error $(error_message))
+ endif
+ include $(MBEDTLS_PATH)/framework/exported.make
+endif
+
+# Also see "include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h"
+
+CFLAGS ?= -O2
+WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral
+LDFLAGS ?=
+
+# Include ../include for public headers and . for private headers.
+# Note that . needs to be included explicitly for the sake of library
+# files that are not in the /library directory (which currently means
+# under /3rdparty).
+LOCAL_CFLAGS = $(WARNING_CFLAGS) -I. -I../include -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64
+LOCAL_LDFLAGS =
+
+ifdef DEBUG
+LOCAL_CFLAGS += -g3
+endif
+
+# MicroBlaze specific options:
+# CFLAGS += -mno-xl-soft-mul -mxl-barrel-shift
+
+# To compile on Plan9:
+# CFLAGS += -D_BSD_EXTENSION
+
+PERL ?= perl
+
+ifdef WINDOWS
+PYTHON ?= python
+else
+PYTHON ?= $(shell if type python3 >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then echo python3; else echo python; fi)
+endif
+
+# if were running on Windows build for Windows
+ifdef WINDOWS
+WINDOWS_BUILD=1
+else ifeq ($(shell uname -s),Darwin)
+ifeq ($(AR),ar)
+APPLE_BUILD ?= 1
+endif
+endif
+
+ifdef WINDOWS_BUILD
+LOCAL_LDFLAGS += -lbcrypt
+endif
+
+# To compile as a shared library:
+ifdef SHARED
+# all code is position-indep with mingw, avoid warning about useless flag
+ifndef WINDOWS_BUILD
+LOCAL_CFLAGS += -fPIC -fpic
+endif
+endif
+
+SOEXT_TLS?=so.21
+SOEXT_X509?=so.7
+SOEXT_CRYPTO?=so.16
+
+# Set AR_DASH= (empty string) to use an ar implementation that does not accept
+# the - prefix for command line options (e.g. llvm-ar)
+AR_DASH ?= -
+
+ARFLAGS = $(AR_DASH)src
+ifdef APPLE_BUILD
+ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0)
+ARFLAGS = $(AR_DASH)Src
+RLFLAGS = -no_warning_for_no_symbols -c
+RL ?= ranlib
+endif
+endif
+
+DLEXT ?= so
+ifdef WINDOWS_BUILD
+# Windows shared library extension:
+DLEXT = dll
+else ifdef APPLE_BUILD
+ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0)
+# Mac OS X shared library extension:
+DLEXT = dylib
+endif
+endif
+
+OBJS_CRYPTO= \
+ aes.o \
+ aesni.o \
+ aesce.o \
+ aria.o \
+ asn1parse.o \
+ asn1write.o \
+ base64.o \
+ bignum.o \
+ bignum_core.o \
+ bignum_mod.o \
+ bignum_mod_raw.o \
+ block_cipher.o \
+ camellia.o \
+ ccm.o \
+ chacha20.o \
+ chachapoly.o \
+ cipher.o \
+ cipher_wrap.o \
+ cmac.o \
+ constant_time.o \
+ ctr_drbg.o \
+ des.o \
+ dhm.o \
+ ecdh.o \
+ ecdsa.o \
+ ecjpake.o \
+ ecp.o \
+ ecp_curves.o \
+ ecp_curves_new.o \
+ entropy.o \
+ entropy_poll.o \
+ error.o \
+ gcm.o \
+ hkdf.o \
+ hmac_drbg.o \
+ lmots.o \
+ lms.o \
+ md.o \
+ md5.o \
+ memory_buffer_alloc.o \
+ nist_kw.o \
+ oid.o \
+ padlock.o \
+ pem.o \
+ pk.o \
+ pk_ecc.o \
+ pk_wrap.o \
+ pkcs12.o \
+ pkcs5.o \
+ pkparse.o \
+ pkwrite.o \
+ platform.o \
+ platform_util.o \
+ poly1305.o \
+ psa_crypto.o \
+ psa_crypto_aead.o \
+ psa_crypto_cipher.o \
+ psa_crypto_client.o \
+ psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.o \
+ psa_crypto_ecp.o \
+ psa_crypto_ffdh.o \
+ psa_crypto_hash.o \
+ psa_crypto_mac.o \
+ psa_crypto_pake.o \
+ psa_crypto_rsa.o \
+ psa_crypto_se.o \
+ psa_crypto_slot_management.o \
+ psa_crypto_storage.o \
+ psa_its_file.o \
+ psa_util.o \
+ ripemd160.o \
+ rsa.o \
+ rsa_alt_helpers.o \
+ sha1.o \
+ sha256.o \
+ sha512.o \
+ sha3.o \
+ threading.o \
+ timing.o \
+ version.o \
+ version_features.o \
+ # This line is intentionally left blank
+
+include ../3rdparty/Makefile.inc
+LOCAL_CFLAGS+=$(THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES)
+OBJS_CRYPTO+=$(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS)
+
+OBJS_X509= \
+ x509.o \
+ x509_create.o \
+ x509_crl.o \
+ x509_crt.o \
+ x509_csr.o \
+ x509write.o \
+ x509write_crt.o \
+ x509write_csr.o \
+ pkcs7.o \
+ # This line is intentionally left blank
+
+OBJS_TLS= \
+ debug.o \
+ mps_reader.o \
+ mps_trace.o \
+ net_sockets.o \
+ ssl_cache.o \
+ ssl_ciphersuites.o \
+ ssl_client.o \
+ ssl_cookie.o \
+ ssl_debug_helpers_generated.o \
+ ssl_msg.o \
+ ssl_ticket.o \
+ ssl_tls.o \
+ ssl_tls12_client.o \
+ ssl_tls12_server.o \
+ ssl_tls13_keys.o \
+ ssl_tls13_client.o \
+ ssl_tls13_server.o \
+ ssl_tls13_generic.o \
+ # This line is intentionally left blank
+
+.SILENT:
+
+.PHONY: all static shared clean
+
+ifndef SHARED
+all: static
+else
+all: shared static
+endif
+
+static: libmbedcrypto.a libmbedx509.a libmbedtls.a
+ cd ../tests && echo "This is a seedfile that contains 64 bytes (65 on Windows)......" > seedfile
+
+shared: libmbedcrypto.$(DLEXT) libmbedx509.$(DLEXT) libmbedtls.$(DLEXT)
+
+# Windows builds under Mingw can fail if make tries to create archives in the same
+# directory at the same time - see https://bugs.launchpad.net/gcc-arm-embedded/+bug/1848002.
+# This forces builds of the .a files to be serialised.
+ifdef WINDOWS
+libmbedtls.a: | libmbedx509.a
+libmbedx509.a: | libmbedcrypto.a
+endif
+
+# tls
+libmbedtls.a: $(OBJS_TLS)
+ echo " AR $@"
+ $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $@ $(OBJS_TLS)
+ifdef APPLE_BUILD
+ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0)
+ echo " RL $@"
+ $(RL) $(RLFLAGS) $@
+endif
+endif
+
+libmbedtls.$(SOEXT_TLS): $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.so
+ echo " LD $@"
+ $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) -L. -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
+
+ifneq ($(SOEXT_TLS),so)
+libmbedtls.so: libmbedtls.$(SOEXT_TLS)
+ echo " LN $@ -> $<"
+ ln -sf $< $@
+endif
+
+libmbedtls.dylib: $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.dylib
+ echo " LD $@"
+ $(CC) -dynamiclib -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) -L. -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
+
+libmbedtls.dll: $(OBJS_TLS) libmbedx509.dll
+ echo " LD $@"
+ $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_TLS) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -L. -lmbedx509 -lmbedcrypto -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
+
+# x509
+libmbedx509.a: $(OBJS_X509)
+ echo " AR $@"
+ $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $@ $(OBJS_X509)
+ifdef APPLE_BUILD
+ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0)
+ echo " RL $@"
+ $(RL) $(RLFLAGS) $@
+endif
+endif
+
+libmbedx509.$(SOEXT_X509): $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.so
+ echo " LD $@"
+ $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) -L. -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
+
+ifneq ($(SOEXT_X509),so)
+libmbedx509.so: libmbedx509.$(SOEXT_X509)
+ echo " LN $@ -> $<"
+ ln -sf $< $@
+endif
+
+libmbedx509.dylib: $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.dylib
+ echo " LD $@"
+ $(CC) -dynamiclib -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) -L. -lmbedcrypto $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
+
+libmbedx509.dll: $(OBJS_X509) libmbedcrypto.dll
+ echo " LD $@"
+ $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_X509) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -L. -lmbedcrypto -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
+
+# crypto
+libmbedcrypto.a: $(OBJS_CRYPTO)
+ echo " AR $@"
+ $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO)
+ifdef APPLE_BUILD
+ifneq ($(APPLE_BUILD),0)
+ echo " RL $@"
+ $(RL) $(RLFLAGS) $@
+endif
+endif
+
+libmbedcrypto.$(SOEXT_CRYPTO): $(OBJS_CRYPTO)
+ echo " LD $@"
+ $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
+
+ifneq ($(SOEXT_CRYPTO),so)
+libmbedcrypto.so: libmbedcrypto.$(SOEXT_CRYPTO)
+ echo " LN $@ -> $<"
+ ln -sf $< $@
+endif
+
+libmbedcrypto.dylib: $(OBJS_CRYPTO)
+ echo " LD $@"
+ $(CC) -dynamiclib -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
+
+libmbedcrypto.dll: $(OBJS_CRYPTO)
+ echo " LD $@"
+ $(CC) -shared -Wl,-soname,$@ -Wl,--out-implib,$@.a -o $@ $(OBJS_CRYPTO) -lws2_32 -lwinmm -lgdi32 -static-libgcc $(LOCAL_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS)
+
+.c.o:
+ echo " CC $<"
+ $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ -c $<
+
+.c.s:
+ echo " CC $<"
+ $(CC) $(LOCAL_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -S -o $@ -c $<
+
+.PHONY: generated_files
+generated_files: $(GENERATED_FILES)
+
+# See root Makefile
+GEN_FILES ?=
+ifdef GEN_FILES
+gen_file_dep =
+else
+gen_file_dep = |
+endif
+
+error.c: $(gen_file_dep) ../scripts/generate_errors.pl
+error.c: $(gen_file_dep) ../scripts/data_files/error.fmt
+error.c: $(gen_file_dep) $(filter-out %config%,$(wildcard ../include/mbedtls/*.h))
+error.c:
+ echo " Gen $@"
+ $(PERL) ../scripts/generate_errors.pl
+
+## patched: use shipped generated file
+ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c: $(gen_file_dep) $(filter-out %config%,$(wildcard ../include/mbedtls/*.h))
+ssl_debug_helpers_generated.c:
+ echo " Gen $@"
+ $(PYTHON) ../framework/scripts/generate_ssl_debug_helpers.py --mbedtls-root .. .
+
+version_features.c: $(gen_file_dep) ../scripts/generate_features.pl
+version_features.c: $(gen_file_dep) ../scripts/data_files/version_features.fmt
+## The generated file only depends on the options that are present in mbedtls_config.h,
+## not on which options are set. To avoid regenerating this file all the time
+## when switching between configurations, don't declare mbedtls_config.h as a
+## dependency. Remove this file from your working tree if you've just added or
+## removed an option in mbedtls_config.h.
+#version_features.c: ../include/mbedtls/mbedtls_config.h
+version_features.c:
+ echo " Gen $@"
+ $(PERL) ../scripts/generate_features.pl
+
+GENERATED_WRAPPER_FILES = \
+ psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h \
+ psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c
+$(GENERATED_WRAPPER_FILES): ../scripts/generate_driver_wrappers.py
+$(GENERATED_WRAPPER_FILES): ../scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja
+$(GENERATED_WRAPPER_FILES): ../scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c.jinja
+$(GENERATED_WRAPPER_FILES):
+ echo " Gen $(GENERATED_WRAPPER_FILES)"
+ $(PYTHON) ../scripts/generate_driver_wrappers.py
+
+psa_crypto.o:psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
+
+clean:
+ifndef WINDOWS
+ rm -f *.o *.s libmbed*
+ rm -f $(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS) $(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS:.o=.s)
+else
+ if exist *.o del /Q /F *.o
+ if exist *.s del /Q /F *.s
+ if exist libmbed* del /Q /F libmbed*
+ del /Q /F del_errors_out_if_the_file_list_is_empty_but_not_if_a_file_does_not_exist $(subst /,\,$(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS) $(THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS:.o=.s))
+endif
+
+neat: clean
+ifndef WINDOWS
+ rm -f $(GENERATED_FILES)
+else
+ for %f in ($(subst /,\,$(GENERATED_FILES))) if exist %f del /Q /F %f
+endif
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/aes.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/aes.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1a5c3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/aes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2294 @@
+/*
+ * FIPS-197 compliant AES implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+/*
+ * The AES block cipher was designed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen.
+ *
+ * https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/projects/cryptographic-standards-and-guidelines/documents/aes-development/rijndael-ammended.pdf
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
+#if !((defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C)) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) && defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) && defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)))
+#error "MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM)
+#error "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
+#error "MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY cannot be defined when " \
+ "MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C is set"
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C)
+#include "padlock.h"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)
+#include "aesni.h"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C)
+#include "aesce.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#include "ctr.h"
+
+/*
+ * This is a convenience shorthand macro to check if we need reverse S-box and
+ * reverse tables. It's private and only defined in this file.
+ */
+#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) || \
+ (!defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY))) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+#define MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE)
+static int aes_padlock_ace = -1;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES)
+/*
+ * Forward S-box
+ */
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const unsigned char FSb[256] =
+{
+ 0x63, 0x7C, 0x77, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC5,
+ 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xAB, 0x76,
+ 0xCA, 0x82, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x47, 0xF0,
+ 0xAD, 0xD4, 0xA2, 0xAF, 0x9C, 0xA4, 0x72, 0xC0,
+ 0xB7, 0xFD, 0x93, 0x26, 0x36, 0x3F, 0xF7, 0xCC,
+ 0x34, 0xA5, 0xE5, 0xF1, 0x71, 0xD8, 0x31, 0x15,
+ 0x04, 0xC7, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9A,
+ 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xE2, 0xEB, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x75,
+ 0x09, 0x83, 0x2C, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xA0,
+ 0x52, 0x3B, 0xD6, 0xB3, 0x29, 0xE3, 0x2F, 0x84,
+ 0x53, 0xD1, 0x00, 0xED, 0x20, 0xFC, 0xB1, 0x5B,
+ 0x6A, 0xCB, 0xBE, 0x39, 0x4A, 0x4C, 0x58, 0xCF,
+ 0xD0, 0xEF, 0xAA, 0xFB, 0x43, 0x4D, 0x33, 0x85,
+ 0x45, 0xF9, 0x02, 0x7F, 0x50, 0x3C, 0x9F, 0xA8,
+ 0x51, 0xA3, 0x40, 0x8F, 0x92, 0x9D, 0x38, 0xF5,
+ 0xBC, 0xB6, 0xDA, 0x21, 0x10, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0xD2,
+ 0xCD, 0x0C, 0x13, 0xEC, 0x5F, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17,
+ 0xC4, 0xA7, 0x7E, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x5D, 0x19, 0x73,
+ 0x60, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x22, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x88,
+ 0x46, 0xEE, 0xB8, 0x14, 0xDE, 0x5E, 0x0B, 0xDB,
+ 0xE0, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x0A, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5C,
+ 0xC2, 0xD3, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xE4, 0x79,
+ 0xE7, 0xC8, 0x37, 0x6D, 0x8D, 0xD5, 0x4E, 0xA9,
+ 0x6C, 0x56, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0x65, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0x08,
+ 0xBA, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2E, 0x1C, 0xA6, 0xB4, 0xC6,
+ 0xE8, 0xDD, 0x74, 0x1F, 0x4B, 0xBD, 0x8B, 0x8A,
+ 0x70, 0x3E, 0xB5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xF6, 0x0E,
+ 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x86, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0x9E,
+ 0xE1, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x11, 0x69, 0xD9, 0x8E, 0x94,
+ 0x9B, 0x1E, 0x87, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0x55, 0x28, 0xDF,
+ 0x8C, 0xA1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x42, 0x68,
+ 0x41, 0x99, 0x2D, 0x0F, 0xB0, 0x54, 0xBB, 0x16
+};
+
+/*
+ * Forward tables
+ */
+#define FT \
+\
+ V(A5, 63, 63, C6), V(84, 7C, 7C, F8), V(99, 77, 77, EE), V(8D, 7B, 7B, F6), \
+ V(0D, F2, F2, FF), V(BD, 6B, 6B, D6), V(B1, 6F, 6F, DE), V(54, C5, C5, 91), \
+ V(50, 30, 30, 60), V(03, 01, 01, 02), V(A9, 67, 67, CE), V(7D, 2B, 2B, 56), \
+ V(19, FE, FE, E7), V(62, D7, D7, B5), V(E6, AB, AB, 4D), V(9A, 76, 76, EC), \
+ V(45, CA, CA, 8F), V(9D, 82, 82, 1F), V(40, C9, C9, 89), V(87, 7D, 7D, FA), \
+ V(15, FA, FA, EF), V(EB, 59, 59, B2), V(C9, 47, 47, 8E), V(0B, F0, F0, FB), \
+ V(EC, AD, AD, 41), V(67, D4, D4, B3), V(FD, A2, A2, 5F), V(EA, AF, AF, 45), \
+ V(BF, 9C, 9C, 23), V(F7, A4, A4, 53), V(96, 72, 72, E4), V(5B, C0, C0, 9B), \
+ V(C2, B7, B7, 75), V(1C, FD, FD, E1), V(AE, 93, 93, 3D), V(6A, 26, 26, 4C), \
+ V(5A, 36, 36, 6C), V(41, 3F, 3F, 7E), V(02, F7, F7, F5), V(4F, CC, CC, 83), \
+ V(5C, 34, 34, 68), V(F4, A5, A5, 51), V(34, E5, E5, D1), V(08, F1, F1, F9), \
+ V(93, 71, 71, E2), V(73, D8, D8, AB), V(53, 31, 31, 62), V(3F, 15, 15, 2A), \
+ V(0C, 04, 04, 08), V(52, C7, C7, 95), V(65, 23, 23, 46), V(5E, C3, C3, 9D), \
+ V(28, 18, 18, 30), V(A1, 96, 96, 37), V(0F, 05, 05, 0A), V(B5, 9A, 9A, 2F), \
+ V(09, 07, 07, 0E), V(36, 12, 12, 24), V(9B, 80, 80, 1B), V(3D, E2, E2, DF), \
+ V(26, EB, EB, CD), V(69, 27, 27, 4E), V(CD, B2, B2, 7F), V(9F, 75, 75, EA), \
+ V(1B, 09, 09, 12), V(9E, 83, 83, 1D), V(74, 2C, 2C, 58), V(2E, 1A, 1A, 34), \
+ V(2D, 1B, 1B, 36), V(B2, 6E, 6E, DC), V(EE, 5A, 5A, B4), V(FB, A0, A0, 5B), \
+ V(F6, 52, 52, A4), V(4D, 3B, 3B, 76), V(61, D6, D6, B7), V(CE, B3, B3, 7D), \
+ V(7B, 29, 29, 52), V(3E, E3, E3, DD), V(71, 2F, 2F, 5E), V(97, 84, 84, 13), \
+ V(F5, 53, 53, A6), V(68, D1, D1, B9), V(00, 00, 00, 00), V(2C, ED, ED, C1), \
+ V(60, 20, 20, 40), V(1F, FC, FC, E3), V(C8, B1, B1, 79), V(ED, 5B, 5B, B6), \
+ V(BE, 6A, 6A, D4), V(46, CB, CB, 8D), V(D9, BE, BE, 67), V(4B, 39, 39, 72), \
+ V(DE, 4A, 4A, 94), V(D4, 4C, 4C, 98), V(E8, 58, 58, B0), V(4A, CF, CF, 85), \
+ V(6B, D0, D0, BB), V(2A, EF, EF, C5), V(E5, AA, AA, 4F), V(16, FB, FB, ED), \
+ V(C5, 43, 43, 86), V(D7, 4D, 4D, 9A), V(55, 33, 33, 66), V(94, 85, 85, 11), \
+ V(CF, 45, 45, 8A), V(10, F9, F9, E9), V(06, 02, 02, 04), V(81, 7F, 7F, FE), \
+ V(F0, 50, 50, A0), V(44, 3C, 3C, 78), V(BA, 9F, 9F, 25), V(E3, A8, A8, 4B), \
+ V(F3, 51, 51, A2), V(FE, A3, A3, 5D), V(C0, 40, 40, 80), V(8A, 8F, 8F, 05), \
+ V(AD, 92, 92, 3F), V(BC, 9D, 9D, 21), V(48, 38, 38, 70), V(04, F5, F5, F1), \
+ V(DF, BC, BC, 63), V(C1, B6, B6, 77), V(75, DA, DA, AF), V(63, 21, 21, 42), \
+ V(30, 10, 10, 20), V(1A, FF, FF, E5), V(0E, F3, F3, FD), V(6D, D2, D2, BF), \
+ V(4C, CD, CD, 81), V(14, 0C, 0C, 18), V(35, 13, 13, 26), V(2F, EC, EC, C3), \
+ V(E1, 5F, 5F, BE), V(A2, 97, 97, 35), V(CC, 44, 44, 88), V(39, 17, 17, 2E), \
+ V(57, C4, C4, 93), V(F2, A7, A7, 55), V(82, 7E, 7E, FC), V(47, 3D, 3D, 7A), \
+ V(AC, 64, 64, C8), V(E7, 5D, 5D, BA), V(2B, 19, 19, 32), V(95, 73, 73, E6), \
+ V(A0, 60, 60, C0), V(98, 81, 81, 19), V(D1, 4F, 4F, 9E), V(7F, DC, DC, A3), \
+ V(66, 22, 22, 44), V(7E, 2A, 2A, 54), V(AB, 90, 90, 3B), V(83, 88, 88, 0B), \
+ V(CA, 46, 46, 8C), V(29, EE, EE, C7), V(D3, B8, B8, 6B), V(3C, 14, 14, 28), \
+ V(79, DE, DE, A7), V(E2, 5E, 5E, BC), V(1D, 0B, 0B, 16), V(76, DB, DB, AD), \
+ V(3B, E0, E0, DB), V(56, 32, 32, 64), V(4E, 3A, 3A, 74), V(1E, 0A, 0A, 14), \
+ V(DB, 49, 49, 92), V(0A, 06, 06, 0C), V(6C, 24, 24, 48), V(E4, 5C, 5C, B8), \
+ V(5D, C2, C2, 9F), V(6E, D3, D3, BD), V(EF, AC, AC, 43), V(A6, 62, 62, C4), \
+ V(A8, 91, 91, 39), V(A4, 95, 95, 31), V(37, E4, E4, D3), V(8B, 79, 79, F2), \
+ V(32, E7, E7, D5), V(43, C8, C8, 8B), V(59, 37, 37, 6E), V(B7, 6D, 6D, DA), \
+ V(8C, 8D, 8D, 01), V(64, D5, D5, B1), V(D2, 4E, 4E, 9C), V(E0, A9, A9, 49), \
+ V(B4, 6C, 6C, D8), V(FA, 56, 56, AC), V(07, F4, F4, F3), V(25, EA, EA, CF), \
+ V(AF, 65, 65, CA), V(8E, 7A, 7A, F4), V(E9, AE, AE, 47), V(18, 08, 08, 10), \
+ V(D5, BA, BA, 6F), V(88, 78, 78, F0), V(6F, 25, 25, 4A), V(72, 2E, 2E, 5C), \
+ V(24, 1C, 1C, 38), V(F1, A6, A6, 57), V(C7, B4, B4, 73), V(51, C6, C6, 97), \
+ V(23, E8, E8, CB), V(7C, DD, DD, A1), V(9C, 74, 74, E8), V(21, 1F, 1F, 3E), \
+ V(DD, 4B, 4B, 96), V(DC, BD, BD, 61), V(86, 8B, 8B, 0D), V(85, 8A, 8A, 0F), \
+ V(90, 70, 70, E0), V(42, 3E, 3E, 7C), V(C4, B5, B5, 71), V(AA, 66, 66, CC), \
+ V(D8, 48, 48, 90), V(05, 03, 03, 06), V(01, F6, F6, F7), V(12, 0E, 0E, 1C), \
+ V(A3, 61, 61, C2), V(5F, 35, 35, 6A), V(F9, 57, 57, AE), V(D0, B9, B9, 69), \
+ V(91, 86, 86, 17), V(58, C1, C1, 99), V(27, 1D, 1D, 3A), V(B9, 9E, 9E, 27), \
+ V(38, E1, E1, D9), V(13, F8, F8, EB), V(B3, 98, 98, 2B), V(33, 11, 11, 22), \
+ V(BB, 69, 69, D2), V(70, D9, D9, A9), V(89, 8E, 8E, 07), V(A7, 94, 94, 33), \
+ V(B6, 9B, 9B, 2D), V(22, 1E, 1E, 3C), V(92, 87, 87, 15), V(20, E9, E9, C9), \
+ V(49, CE, CE, 87), V(FF, 55, 55, AA), V(78, 28, 28, 50), V(7A, DF, DF, A5), \
+ V(8F, 8C, 8C, 03), V(F8, A1, A1, 59), V(80, 89, 89, 09), V(17, 0D, 0D, 1A), \
+ V(DA, BF, BF, 65), V(31, E6, E6, D7), V(C6, 42, 42, 84), V(B8, 68, 68, D0), \
+ V(C3, 41, 41, 82), V(B0, 99, 99, 29), V(77, 2D, 2D, 5A), V(11, 0F, 0F, 1E), \
+ V(CB, B0, B0, 7B), V(FC, 54, 54, A8), V(D6, BB, BB, 6D), V(3A, 16, 16, 2C)
+
+#define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##a##b##c##d
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t FT0[256] = { FT };
+#undef V
+
+#define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##b##c##d##a
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t FT1[256] = { FT };
+#undef V
+
+#define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##c##d##a##b
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t FT2[256] = { FT };
+#undef V
+
+#define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##d##a##b##c
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t FT3[256] = { FT };
+#undef V
+
+#undef FT
+
+/*
+ * Reverse S-box
+ */
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const unsigned char RSb[256] =
+{
+ 0x52, 0x09, 0x6A, 0xD5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xA5, 0x38,
+ 0xBF, 0x40, 0xA3, 0x9E, 0x81, 0xF3, 0xD7, 0xFB,
+ 0x7C, 0xE3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9B, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x87,
+ 0x34, 0x8E, 0x43, 0x44, 0xC4, 0xDE, 0xE9, 0xCB,
+ 0x54, 0x7B, 0x94, 0x32, 0xA6, 0xC2, 0x23, 0x3D,
+ 0xEE, 0x4C, 0x95, 0x0B, 0x42, 0xFA, 0xC3, 0x4E,
+ 0x08, 0x2E, 0xA1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x24, 0xB2,
+ 0x76, 0x5B, 0xA2, 0x49, 0x6D, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x25,
+ 0x72, 0xF8, 0xF6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16,
+ 0xD4, 0xA4, 0x5C, 0xCC, 0x5D, 0x65, 0xB6, 0x92,
+ 0x6C, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50, 0xFD, 0xED, 0xB9, 0xDA,
+ 0x5E, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0x84,
+ 0x90, 0xD8, 0xAB, 0x00, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0xD3, 0x0A,
+ 0xF7, 0xE4, 0x58, 0x05, 0xB8, 0xB3, 0x45, 0x06,
+ 0xD0, 0x2C, 0x1E, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x3F, 0x0F, 0x02,
+ 0xC1, 0xAF, 0xBD, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8A, 0x6B,
+ 0x3A, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41, 0x4F, 0x67, 0xDC, 0xEA,
+ 0x97, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0xCE, 0xF0, 0xB4, 0xE6, 0x73,
+ 0x96, 0xAC, 0x74, 0x22, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x35, 0x85,
+ 0xE2, 0xF9, 0x37, 0xE8, 0x1C, 0x75, 0xDF, 0x6E,
+ 0x47, 0xF1, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x1D, 0x29, 0xC5, 0x89,
+ 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x62, 0x0E, 0xAA, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x1B,
+ 0xFC, 0x56, 0x3E, 0x4B, 0xC6, 0xD2, 0x79, 0x20,
+ 0x9A, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xCD, 0x5A, 0xF4,
+ 0x1F, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xC7, 0x31,
+ 0xB1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59, 0x27, 0x80, 0xEC, 0x5F,
+ 0x60, 0x51, 0x7F, 0xA9, 0x19, 0xB5, 0x4A, 0x0D,
+ 0x2D, 0xE5, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0x93, 0xC9, 0x9C, 0xEF,
+ 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0xAE, 0x2A, 0xF5, 0xB0,
+ 0xC8, 0xEB, 0xBB, 0x3C, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61,
+ 0x17, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x7E, 0xBA, 0x77, 0xD6, 0x26,
+ 0xE1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63, 0x55, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x7D
+};
+
+/*
+ * Reverse tables
+ */
+#define RT \
+\
+ V(50, A7, F4, 51), V(53, 65, 41, 7E), V(C3, A4, 17, 1A), V(96, 5E, 27, 3A), \
+ V(CB, 6B, AB, 3B), V(F1, 45, 9D, 1F), V(AB, 58, FA, AC), V(93, 03, E3, 4B), \
+ V(55, FA, 30, 20), V(F6, 6D, 76, AD), V(91, 76, CC, 88), V(25, 4C, 02, F5), \
+ V(FC, D7, E5, 4F), V(D7, CB, 2A, C5), V(80, 44, 35, 26), V(8F, A3, 62, B5), \
+ V(49, 5A, B1, DE), V(67, 1B, BA, 25), V(98, 0E, EA, 45), V(E1, C0, FE, 5D), \
+ V(02, 75, 2F, C3), V(12, F0, 4C, 81), V(A3, 97, 46, 8D), V(C6, F9, D3, 6B), \
+ V(E7, 5F, 8F, 03), V(95, 9C, 92, 15), V(EB, 7A, 6D, BF), V(DA, 59, 52, 95), \
+ V(2D, 83, BE, D4), V(D3, 21, 74, 58), V(29, 69, E0, 49), V(44, C8, C9, 8E), \
+ V(6A, 89, C2, 75), V(78, 79, 8E, F4), V(6B, 3E, 58, 99), V(DD, 71, B9, 27), \
+ V(B6, 4F, E1, BE), V(17, AD, 88, F0), V(66, AC, 20, C9), V(B4, 3A, CE, 7D), \
+ V(18, 4A, DF, 63), V(82, 31, 1A, E5), V(60, 33, 51, 97), V(45, 7F, 53, 62), \
+ V(E0, 77, 64, B1), V(84, AE, 6B, BB), V(1C, A0, 81, FE), V(94, 2B, 08, F9), \
+ V(58, 68, 48, 70), V(19, FD, 45, 8F), V(87, 6C, DE, 94), V(B7, F8, 7B, 52), \
+ V(23, D3, 73, AB), V(E2, 02, 4B, 72), V(57, 8F, 1F, E3), V(2A, AB, 55, 66), \
+ V(07, 28, EB, B2), V(03, C2, B5, 2F), V(9A, 7B, C5, 86), V(A5, 08, 37, D3), \
+ V(F2, 87, 28, 30), V(B2, A5, BF, 23), V(BA, 6A, 03, 02), V(5C, 82, 16, ED), \
+ V(2B, 1C, CF, 8A), V(92, B4, 79, A7), V(F0, F2, 07, F3), V(A1, E2, 69, 4E), \
+ V(CD, F4, DA, 65), V(D5, BE, 05, 06), V(1F, 62, 34, D1), V(8A, FE, A6, C4), \
+ V(9D, 53, 2E, 34), V(A0, 55, F3, A2), V(32, E1, 8A, 05), V(75, EB, F6, A4), \
+ V(39, EC, 83, 0B), V(AA, EF, 60, 40), V(06, 9F, 71, 5E), V(51, 10, 6E, BD), \
+ V(F9, 8A, 21, 3E), V(3D, 06, DD, 96), V(AE, 05, 3E, DD), V(46, BD, E6, 4D), \
+ V(B5, 8D, 54, 91), V(05, 5D, C4, 71), V(6F, D4, 06, 04), V(FF, 15, 50, 60), \
+ V(24, FB, 98, 19), V(97, E9, BD, D6), V(CC, 43, 40, 89), V(77, 9E, D9, 67), \
+ V(BD, 42, E8, B0), V(88, 8B, 89, 07), V(38, 5B, 19, E7), V(DB, EE, C8, 79), \
+ V(47, 0A, 7C, A1), V(E9, 0F, 42, 7C), V(C9, 1E, 84, F8), V(00, 00, 00, 00), \
+ V(83, 86, 80, 09), V(48, ED, 2B, 32), V(AC, 70, 11, 1E), V(4E, 72, 5A, 6C), \
+ V(FB, FF, 0E, FD), V(56, 38, 85, 0F), V(1E, D5, AE, 3D), V(27, 39, 2D, 36), \
+ V(64, D9, 0F, 0A), V(21, A6, 5C, 68), V(D1, 54, 5B, 9B), V(3A, 2E, 36, 24), \
+ V(B1, 67, 0A, 0C), V(0F, E7, 57, 93), V(D2, 96, EE, B4), V(9E, 91, 9B, 1B), \
+ V(4F, C5, C0, 80), V(A2, 20, DC, 61), V(69, 4B, 77, 5A), V(16, 1A, 12, 1C), \
+ V(0A, BA, 93, E2), V(E5, 2A, A0, C0), V(43, E0, 22, 3C), V(1D, 17, 1B, 12), \
+ V(0B, 0D, 09, 0E), V(AD, C7, 8B, F2), V(B9, A8, B6, 2D), V(C8, A9, 1E, 14), \
+ V(85, 19, F1, 57), V(4C, 07, 75, AF), V(BB, DD, 99, EE), V(FD, 60, 7F, A3), \
+ V(9F, 26, 01, F7), V(BC, F5, 72, 5C), V(C5, 3B, 66, 44), V(34, 7E, FB, 5B), \
+ V(76, 29, 43, 8B), V(DC, C6, 23, CB), V(68, FC, ED, B6), V(63, F1, E4, B8), \
+ V(CA, DC, 31, D7), V(10, 85, 63, 42), V(40, 22, 97, 13), V(20, 11, C6, 84), \
+ V(7D, 24, 4A, 85), V(F8, 3D, BB, D2), V(11, 32, F9, AE), V(6D, A1, 29, C7), \
+ V(4B, 2F, 9E, 1D), V(F3, 30, B2, DC), V(EC, 52, 86, 0D), V(D0, E3, C1, 77), \
+ V(6C, 16, B3, 2B), V(99, B9, 70, A9), V(FA, 48, 94, 11), V(22, 64, E9, 47), \
+ V(C4, 8C, FC, A8), V(1A, 3F, F0, A0), V(D8, 2C, 7D, 56), V(EF, 90, 33, 22), \
+ V(C7, 4E, 49, 87), V(C1, D1, 38, D9), V(FE, A2, CA, 8C), V(36, 0B, D4, 98), \
+ V(CF, 81, F5, A6), V(28, DE, 7A, A5), V(26, 8E, B7, DA), V(A4, BF, AD, 3F), \
+ V(E4, 9D, 3A, 2C), V(0D, 92, 78, 50), V(9B, CC, 5F, 6A), V(62, 46, 7E, 54), \
+ V(C2, 13, 8D, F6), V(E8, B8, D8, 90), V(5E, F7, 39, 2E), V(F5, AF, C3, 82), \
+ V(BE, 80, 5D, 9F), V(7C, 93, D0, 69), V(A9, 2D, D5, 6F), V(B3, 12, 25, CF), \
+ V(3B, 99, AC, C8), V(A7, 7D, 18, 10), V(6E, 63, 9C, E8), V(7B, BB, 3B, DB), \
+ V(09, 78, 26, CD), V(F4, 18, 59, 6E), V(01, B7, 9A, EC), V(A8, 9A, 4F, 83), \
+ V(65, 6E, 95, E6), V(7E, E6, FF, AA), V(08, CF, BC, 21), V(E6, E8, 15, EF), \
+ V(D9, 9B, E7, BA), V(CE, 36, 6F, 4A), V(D4, 09, 9F, EA), V(D6, 7C, B0, 29), \
+ V(AF, B2, A4, 31), V(31, 23, 3F, 2A), V(30, 94, A5, C6), V(C0, 66, A2, 35), \
+ V(37, BC, 4E, 74), V(A6, CA, 82, FC), V(B0, D0, 90, E0), V(15, D8, A7, 33), \
+ V(4A, 98, 04, F1), V(F7, DA, EC, 41), V(0E, 50, CD, 7F), V(2F, F6, 91, 17), \
+ V(8D, D6, 4D, 76), V(4D, B0, EF, 43), V(54, 4D, AA, CC), V(DF, 04, 96, E4), \
+ V(E3, B5, D1, 9E), V(1B, 88, 6A, 4C), V(B8, 1F, 2C, C1), V(7F, 51, 65, 46), \
+ V(04, EA, 5E, 9D), V(5D, 35, 8C, 01), V(73, 74, 87, FA), V(2E, 41, 0B, FB), \
+ V(5A, 1D, 67, B3), V(52, D2, DB, 92), V(33, 56, 10, E9), V(13, 47, D6, 6D), \
+ V(8C, 61, D7, 9A), V(7A, 0C, A1, 37), V(8E, 14, F8, 59), V(89, 3C, 13, EB), \
+ V(EE, 27, A9, CE), V(35, C9, 61, B7), V(ED, E5, 1C, E1), V(3C, B1, 47, 7A), \
+ V(59, DF, D2, 9C), V(3F, 73, F2, 55), V(79, CE, 14, 18), V(BF, 37, C7, 73), \
+ V(EA, CD, F7, 53), V(5B, AA, FD, 5F), V(14, 6F, 3D, DF), V(86, DB, 44, 78), \
+ V(81, F3, AF, CA), V(3E, C4, 68, B9), V(2C, 34, 24, 38), V(5F, 40, A3, C2), \
+ V(72, C3, 1D, 16), V(0C, 25, E2, BC), V(8B, 49, 3C, 28), V(41, 95, 0D, FF), \
+ V(71, 01, A8, 39), V(DE, B3, 0C, 08), V(9C, E4, B4, D8), V(90, C1, 56, 64), \
+ V(61, 84, CB, 7B), V(70, B6, 32, D5), V(74, 5C, 6C, 48), V(42, 57, B8, D0)
+
+
+#define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##a##b##c##d
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RT0[256] = { RT };
+#undef V
+
+#define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##b##c##d##a
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RT1[256] = { RT };
+#undef V
+
+#define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##c##d##a##b
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RT2[256] = { RT };
+#undef V
+
+#define V(a, b, c, d) 0x##d##a##b##c
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t RT3[256] = { RT };
+#undef V
+
+#undef RT
+
+/*
+ * Round constants
+ */
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static const uint32_t round_constants[10] =
+{
+ 0x00000001, 0x00000002, 0x00000004, 0x00000008,
+ 0x00000010, 0x00000020, 0x00000040, 0x00000080,
+ 0x0000001B, 0x00000036
+};
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */
+
+/*
+ * Forward S-box & tables
+ */
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static unsigned char FSb[256];
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t FT0[256];
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t FT1[256];
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t FT2[256];
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t FT3[256];
+
+/*
+ * Reverse S-box & tables
+ */
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static unsigned char RSb[256];
+
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RT0[256];
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RT1[256];
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RT2[256];
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t RT3[256];
+
+/*
+ * Round constants
+ */
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static uint32_t round_constants[10];
+
+/*
+ * Tables generation code
+ */
+#define ROTL8(x) (((x) << 8) & 0xFFFFFFFF) | ((x) >> 24)
+#define XTIME(x) (((x) << 1) ^ (((x) & 0x80) ? 0x1B : 0x00))
+#define MUL(x, y) (((x) && (y)) ? pow[(log[(x)]+log[(y)]) % 255] : 0)
+
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static int aes_init_done = 0;
+
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static void aes_gen_tables(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ uint8_t x, y, z;
+ uint8_t pow[256];
+ uint8_t log[256];
+
+ /*
+ * compute pow and log tables over GF(2^8)
+ */
+ for (i = 0, x = 1; i < 256; i++) {
+ pow[i] = x;
+ log[x] = (uint8_t) i;
+ x ^= XTIME(x);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * calculate the round constants
+ */
+ for (i = 0, x = 1; i < 10; i++) {
+ round_constants[i] = x;
+ x = XTIME(x);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * generate the forward and reverse S-boxes
+ */
+ FSb[0x00] = 0x63;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES)
+ RSb[0x63] = 0x00;
+#endif
+
+ for (i = 1; i < 256; i++) {
+ x = pow[255 - log[i]];
+
+ y = x; y = (y << 1) | (y >> 7);
+ x ^= y; y = (y << 1) | (y >> 7);
+ x ^= y; y = (y << 1) | (y >> 7);
+ x ^= y; y = (y << 1) | (y >> 7);
+ x ^= y ^ 0x63;
+
+ FSb[i] = x;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES)
+ RSb[x] = (unsigned char) i;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * generate the forward and reverse tables
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
+ x = FSb[i];
+ y = XTIME(x);
+ z = y ^ x;
+
+ FT0[i] = ((uint32_t) y) ^
+ ((uint32_t) x << 8) ^
+ ((uint32_t) x << 16) ^
+ ((uint32_t) z << 24);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES)
+ FT1[i] = ROTL8(FT0[i]);
+ FT2[i] = ROTL8(FT1[i]);
+ FT3[i] = ROTL8(FT2[i]);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES)
+ x = RSb[i];
+
+ RT0[i] = ((uint32_t) MUL(0x0E, x)) ^
+ ((uint32_t) MUL(0x09, x) << 8) ^
+ ((uint32_t) MUL(0x0D, x) << 16) ^
+ ((uint32_t) MUL(0x0B, x) << 24);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES)
+ RT1[i] = ROTL8(RT0[i]);
+ RT2[i] = ROTL8(RT1[i]);
+ RT3[i] = ROTL8(RT2[i]);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_NEED_REVERSE_TABLES */
+ }
+}
+
+#undef ROTL8
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES)
+
+#define ROTL8(x) ((uint32_t) ((x) << 8) + (uint32_t) ((x) >> 24))
+#define ROTL16(x) ((uint32_t) ((x) << 16) + (uint32_t) ((x) >> 16))
+#define ROTL24(x) ((uint32_t) ((x) << 24) + (uint32_t) ((x) >> 8))
+
+#define AES_RT0(idx) RT0[idx]
+#define AES_RT1(idx) ROTL8(RT0[idx])
+#define AES_RT2(idx) ROTL16(RT0[idx])
+#define AES_RT3(idx) ROTL24(RT0[idx])
+
+#define AES_FT0(idx) FT0[idx]
+#define AES_FT1(idx) ROTL8(FT0[idx])
+#define AES_FT2(idx) ROTL16(FT0[idx])
+#define AES_FT3(idx) ROTL24(FT0[idx])
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */
+
+#define AES_RT0(idx) RT0[idx]
+#define AES_RT1(idx) RT1[idx]
+#define AES_RT2(idx) RT2[idx]
+#define AES_RT3(idx) RT3[idx]
+
+#define AES_FT0(idx) FT0[idx]
+#define AES_FT1(idx) FT1[idx]
+#define AES_FT2(idx) FT2[idx]
+#define AES_FT3(idx) FT3[idx]
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_FEWER_TABLES */
+
+void mbedtls_aes_init(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_aes_context));
+}
+
+void mbedtls_aes_free(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_aes_context));
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+void mbedtls_aes_xts_init(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->crypt);
+ mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->tweak);
+}
+
+void mbedtls_aes_xts_free(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx->crypt);
+ mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx->tweak);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */
+
+/* Some implementations need the round keys to be aligned.
+ * Return an offset to be added to buf, such that (buf + offset) is
+ * correctly aligned.
+ * Note that the offset is in units of elements of buf, i.e. 32-bit words,
+ * i.e. an offset of 1 means 4 bytes and so on.
+ */
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE)) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2)
+#define MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN
+#endif
+
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static unsigned mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(uint32_t *buf)
+{
+#if defined(MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN)
+ int align_16_bytes = 0;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE)
+ if (aes_padlock_ace == -1) {
+ aes_padlock_ace = mbedtls_padlock_has_support(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE);
+ }
+ if (aes_padlock_ace) {
+ align_16_bytes = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2
+ if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) {
+ align_16_bytes = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (align_16_bytes) {
+ /* These implementations needs 16-byte alignment
+ * for the round key array. */
+ unsigned delta = ((uintptr_t) buf & 0x0000000fU) / 4;
+ if (delta == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ return 4 - delta; // 16 bytes = 4 uint32_t
+ }
+ }
+#else /* MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN */
+ (void) buf;
+#endif /* MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN */
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * AES key schedule (encryption)
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT)
+int mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits)
+{
+ uint32_t *RK;
+
+ switch (keybits) {
+ case 128: ctx->nr = 10; break;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ case 192: ctx->nr = 12; break;
+ case 256: ctx->nr = 14; break;
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */
+ default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ROM_TABLES)
+ if (aes_init_done == 0) {
+ aes_gen_tables();
+ aes_init_done = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ ctx->rk_offset = mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf);
+ RK = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
+ if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) {
+ return mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc((unsigned char *) RK, key, keybits);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE)
+ if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) {
+ return mbedtls_aesce_setkey_enc((unsigned char *) RK, key, keybits);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < (keybits >> 5); i++) {
+ RK[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, i << 2);
+ }
+
+ switch (ctx->nr) {
+ case 10:
+
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 10; i++, RK += 4) {
+ RK[4] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[3])]) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[3])] << 8) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(RK[3])] << 16) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(RK[3])] << 24);
+
+ RK[5] = RK[1] ^ RK[4];
+ RK[6] = RK[2] ^ RK[5];
+ RK[7] = RK[3] ^ RK[6];
+ }
+ break;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ case 12:
+
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 8; i++, RK += 6) {
+ RK[6] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[5])]) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[5])] << 8) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(RK[5])] << 16) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(RK[5])] << 24);
+
+ RK[7] = RK[1] ^ RK[6];
+ RK[8] = RK[2] ^ RK[7];
+ RK[9] = RK[3] ^ RK[8];
+ RK[10] = RK[4] ^ RK[9];
+ RK[11] = RK[5] ^ RK[10];
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case 14:
+
+ for (unsigned int i = 0; i < 7; i++, RK += 8) {
+ RK[8] = RK[0] ^ round_constants[i] ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[7])]) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[7])] << 8) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(RK[7])] << 16) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(RK[7])] << 24);
+
+ RK[9] = RK[1] ^ RK[8];
+ RK[10] = RK[2] ^ RK[9];
+ RK[11] = RK[3] ^ RK[10];
+
+ RK[12] = RK[4] ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(RK[11])]) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(RK[11])] << 8) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(RK[11])] << 16) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(RK[11])] << 24);
+
+ RK[13] = RK[5] ^ RK[12];
+ RK[14] = RK[6] ^ RK[13];
+ RK[15] = RK[7] ^ RK[14];
+ }
+ break;
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_ENC_ALT */
+
+/*
+ * AES key schedule (decryption)
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+int mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits)
+{
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
+ uint32_t *SK;
+#endif
+ int ret;
+ mbedtls_aes_context cty;
+ uint32_t *RK;
+
+
+ mbedtls_aes_init(&cty);
+
+ ctx->rk_offset = mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf);
+ RK = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset;
+
+ /* Also checks keybits */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&cty, key, keybits)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ctx->nr = cty.nr;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
+ if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) {
+ mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key((unsigned char *) RK,
+ (const unsigned char *) (cty.buf + cty.rk_offset), ctx->nr);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE)
+ if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) {
+ mbedtls_aesce_inverse_key(
+ (unsigned char *) RK,
+ (const unsigned char *) (cty.buf + cty.rk_offset),
+ ctx->nr);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
+ SK = cty.buf + cty.rk_offset + cty.nr * 4;
+
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+ SK -= 8;
+ for (int i = ctx->nr - 1; i > 0; i--, SK -= 8) {
+ for (int j = 0; j < 4; j++, SK++) {
+ *RK++ = AES_RT0(FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(*SK)]) ^
+ AES_RT1(FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*SK)]) ^
+ AES_RT2(FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(*SK)]) ^
+ AES_RT3(FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(*SK)]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */
+exit:
+ mbedtls_aes_free(&cty);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_SETKEY_DEC_ALT && !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+static int mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys(const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits,
+ const unsigned char **key1,
+ unsigned int *key1bits,
+ const unsigned char **key2,
+ unsigned int *key2bits)
+{
+ const unsigned int half_keybits = keybits / 2;
+ const unsigned int half_keybytes = half_keybits / 8;
+
+ switch (keybits) {
+ case 256: break;
+ case 512: break;
+ default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ *key1bits = half_keybits;
+ *key2bits = half_keybits;
+ *key1 = &key[0];
+ *key2 = &key[half_keybytes];
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const unsigned char *key1, *key2;
+ unsigned int key1bits, key2bits;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys(key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits,
+ &key2, &key2bits);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the tweak key. Always set tweak key for the encryption mode. */
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->tweak, key2, key2bits);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Set crypt key for encryption. */
+ return mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->crypt, key1, key1bits);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const unsigned char *key1, *key2;
+ unsigned int key1bits, key2bits;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_decode_keys(key, keybits, &key1, &key1bits,
+ &key2, &key2bits);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the tweak key. Always set tweak key for encryption. */
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->tweak, key2, key2bits);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Set crypt key for decryption. */
+ return mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx->crypt, key1, key1bits);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */
+
+#define AES_FROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ (X0) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(Y0)) ^ \
+ AES_FT1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(Y1)) ^ \
+ AES_FT2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(Y2)) ^ \
+ AES_FT3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(Y3)); \
+ \
+ (X1) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(Y1)) ^ \
+ AES_FT1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(Y2)) ^ \
+ AES_FT2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(Y3)) ^ \
+ AES_FT3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(Y0)); \
+ \
+ (X2) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(Y2)) ^ \
+ AES_FT1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(Y3)) ^ \
+ AES_FT2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(Y0)) ^ \
+ AES_FT3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(Y1)); \
+ \
+ (X3) = *RK++ ^ AES_FT0(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(Y3)) ^ \
+ AES_FT1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(Y0)) ^ \
+ AES_FT2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(Y1)) ^ \
+ AES_FT3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(Y2)); \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define AES_RROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, Y0, Y1, Y2, Y3) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ (X0) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(Y0)) ^ \
+ AES_RT1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(Y3)) ^ \
+ AES_RT2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(Y2)) ^ \
+ AES_RT3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(Y1)); \
+ \
+ (X1) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(Y1)) ^ \
+ AES_RT1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(Y0)) ^ \
+ AES_RT2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(Y3)) ^ \
+ AES_RT3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(Y2)); \
+ \
+ (X2) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(Y2)) ^ \
+ AES_RT1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(Y1)) ^ \
+ AES_RT2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(Y0)) ^ \
+ AES_RT3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(Y3)); \
+ \
+ (X3) = *RK++ ^ AES_RT0(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(Y3)) ^ \
+ AES_RT1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(Y2)) ^ \
+ AES_RT2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(Y1)) ^ \
+ AES_RT3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(Y0)); \
+ } while (0)
+
+/*
+ * AES-ECB block encryption
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT)
+int mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16])
+{
+ int i;
+ uint32_t *RK = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset;
+ struct {
+ uint32_t X[4];
+ uint32_t Y[4];
+ } t;
+
+ t.X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 0); t.X[0] ^= *RK++;
+ t.X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 4); t.X[1] ^= *RK++;
+ t.X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 8); t.X[2] ^= *RK++;
+ t.X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 12); t.X[3] ^= *RK++;
+
+ for (i = (ctx->nr >> 1) - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+ AES_FROUND(t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3]);
+ AES_FROUND(t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3], t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3]);
+ }
+
+ AES_FROUND(t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3]);
+
+ t.X[0] = *RK++ ^ \
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(t.Y[0])]) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(t.Y[1])] << 8) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(t.Y[2])] << 16) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(t.Y[3])] << 24);
+
+ t.X[1] = *RK++ ^ \
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(t.Y[1])]) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(t.Y[2])] << 8) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(t.Y[3])] << 16) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(t.Y[0])] << 24);
+
+ t.X[2] = *RK++ ^ \
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(t.Y[2])]) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(t.Y[3])] << 8) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(t.Y[0])] << 16) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(t.Y[1])] << 24);
+
+ t.X[3] = *RK++ ^ \
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(t.Y[3])]) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(t.Y[0])] << 8) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(t.Y[1])] << 16) ^
+ ((uint32_t) FSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(t.Y[2])] << 24);
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(t.X[0], output, 0);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(t.X[1], output, 4);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(t.X[2], output, 8);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(t.X[3], output, 12);
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&t, sizeof(t));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT_ALT */
+
+/*
+ * AES-ECB block decryption
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+int mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16])
+{
+ int i;
+ uint32_t *RK = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset;
+ struct {
+ uint32_t X[4];
+ uint32_t Y[4];
+ } t;
+
+ t.X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 0); t.X[0] ^= *RK++;
+ t.X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 4); t.X[1] ^= *RK++;
+ t.X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 8); t.X[2] ^= *RK++;
+ t.X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 12); t.X[3] ^= *RK++;
+
+ for (i = (ctx->nr >> 1) - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+ AES_RROUND(t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3]);
+ AES_RROUND(t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3], t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3]);
+ }
+
+ AES_RROUND(t.Y[0], t.Y[1], t.Y[2], t.Y[3], t.X[0], t.X[1], t.X[2], t.X[3]);
+
+ t.X[0] = *RK++ ^ \
+ ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(t.Y[0])]) ^
+ ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(t.Y[3])] << 8) ^
+ ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(t.Y[2])] << 16) ^
+ ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(t.Y[1])] << 24);
+
+ t.X[1] = *RK++ ^ \
+ ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(t.Y[1])]) ^
+ ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(t.Y[0])] << 8) ^
+ ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(t.Y[3])] << 16) ^
+ ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(t.Y[2])] << 24);
+
+ t.X[2] = *RK++ ^ \
+ ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(t.Y[2])]) ^
+ ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(t.Y[1])] << 8) ^
+ ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(t.Y[0])] << 16) ^
+ ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(t.Y[3])] << 24);
+
+ t.X[3] = *RK++ ^ \
+ ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(t.Y[3])]) ^
+ ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(t.Y[2])] << 8) ^
+ ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(t.Y[1])] << 16) ^
+ ((uint32_t) RSb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(t.Y[0])] << 24);
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(t.X[0], output, 0);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(t.X[1], output, 4);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(t.X[2], output, 8);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(t.X[3], output, 12);
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&t, sizeof(t));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT_ALT && !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */
+
+/* VIA Padlock and our intrinsics-based implementation of AESNI require
+ * the round keys to be aligned on a 16-byte boundary. We take care of this
+ * before creating them, but the AES context may have moved (this can happen
+ * if the library is called from a language with managed memory), and in later
+ * calls it might have a different alignment with respect to 16-byte memory.
+ * So we may need to realign.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED static void aes_maybe_realign(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx)
+{
+ unsigned new_offset = mbedtls_aes_rk_offset(ctx->buf);
+ if (new_offset != ctx->rk_offset) {
+ memmove(ctx->buf + new_offset, // new address
+ ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset, // current address
+ (ctx->nr + 1) * 16); // number of round keys * bytes per rk
+ ctx->rk_offset = new_offset;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * AES-ECB block encryption/decryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16])
+{
+ if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MAY_NEED_TO_ALIGN)
+ aes_maybe_realign(ctx);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
+ if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) {
+ return mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE)
+ if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) {
+ return mbedtls_aesce_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE)
+ if (aes_padlock_ace > 0) {
+ return mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb(ctx, mode, input, output);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ return mbedtls_internal_aes_decrypt(ctx, input, output);
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ return mbedtls_internal_aes_encrypt(ctx, input, output);
+ }
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+
+/*
+ * AES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ unsigned char iv[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char temp[16];
+
+ if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* Nothing to do if length is zero. */
+ if (length == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (length % 16) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE)
+ if (aes_padlock_ace > 0) {
+ if (mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc(ctx, mode, length, iv, input, output) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ // If padlock data misaligned, we just fall back to
+ // unaccelerated mode
+ //
+ }
+#endif
+
+ const unsigned char *ivp = iv;
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ while (length > 0) {
+ memcpy(temp, input, 16);
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ /* Avoid using the NEON implementation of mbedtls_xor. Because of the dependency on
+ * the result for the next block in CBC, and the cost of transferring that data from
+ * NEON registers, NEON is slower on aarch64. */
+ mbedtls_xor_no_simd(output, output, iv, 16);
+
+ memcpy(iv, temp, 16);
+
+ input += 16;
+ output += 16;
+ length -= 16;
+ }
+ } else {
+ while (length > 0) {
+ mbedtls_xor_no_simd(output, input, ivp, 16);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, output, output);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ ivp = output;
+
+ input += 16;
+ output += 16;
+ length -= 16;
+ }
+ memcpy(iv, ivp, 16);
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+
+typedef unsigned char mbedtls_be128[16];
+
+/*
+ * GF(2^128) multiplication function
+ *
+ * This function multiplies a field element by x in the polynomial field
+ * representation. It uses 64-bit word operations to gain speed but compensates
+ * for machine endianness and hence works correctly on both big and little
+ * endian machines.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)
+MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE
+#endif
+static inline void mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble(unsigned char r[16],
+ const unsigned char x[16])
+{
+ uint64_t a, b, ra, rb;
+
+ a = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE(x, 0);
+ b = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE(x, 8);
+
+ ra = (a << 1) ^ 0x0087 >> (8 - ((b >> 63) << 3));
+ rb = (a >> 63) | (b << 1);
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(ra, r, 0);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(rb, r, 8);
+}
+
+/*
+ * AES-XTS buffer encryption/decryption
+ *
+ * Use of MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE here and for mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble()
+ * is a 3x performance improvement for gcc -Os, if we have hardware AES support.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)
+MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE
+#endif
+int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ const unsigned char data_unit[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t blocks = length / 16;
+ size_t leftover = length % 16;
+ unsigned char tweak[16];
+ unsigned char prev_tweak[16];
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+
+ if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* Data units must be at least 16 bytes long. */
+ if (length < 16) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ /* NIST SP 800-38E disallows data units larger than 2**20 blocks. */
+ if (length > (1 << 20) * 16) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the tweak. */
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->tweak, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
+ data_unit, tweak);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ while (blocks--) {
+ if (MBEDTLS_UNLIKELY(leftover && (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) && blocks == 0)) {
+ /* We are on the last block in a decrypt operation that has
+ * leftover bytes, so we need to use the next tweak for this block,
+ * and this tweak for the leftover bytes. Save the current tweak for
+ * the leftovers and then update the current tweak for use on this,
+ * the last full block. */
+ memcpy(prev_tweak, tweak, sizeof(tweak));
+ mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble(tweak, tweak);
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_xor(tmp, input, tweak, 16);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_xor(output, tmp, tweak, 16);
+
+ /* Update the tweak for the next block. */
+ mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble(tweak, tweak);
+
+ output += 16;
+ input += 16;
+ }
+
+ if (leftover) {
+ /* If we are on the leftover bytes in a decrypt operation, we need to
+ * use the previous tweak for these bytes (as saved in prev_tweak). */
+ unsigned char *t = mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT ? prev_tweak : tweak;
+
+ /* We are now on the final part of the data unit, which doesn't divide
+ * evenly by 16. It's time for ciphertext stealing. */
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned char *prev_output = output - 16;
+
+ /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block to our output for each
+ * byte of ciphertext we won't steal. */
+ for (i = 0; i < leftover; i++) {
+ output[i] = prev_output[i];
+ }
+
+ /* Copy the remainder of the input for this final round. */
+ mbedtls_xor(tmp, input, t, leftover);
+
+ /* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block for input in this
+ * round. */
+ mbedtls_xor(tmp + i, prev_output + i, t + i, 16 - i);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->crypt, mode, tmp, tmp);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Write the result back to the previous block, overriding the previous
+ * output we copied. */
+ mbedtls_xor(prev_output, tmp, t, 16);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+/*
+ * AES-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ size_t *iv_off,
+ unsigned char iv[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int c;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t n;
+
+ if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ n = *iv_off;
+
+ if (n > 15) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ while (length--) {
+ if (n == 0) {
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ c = *input++;
+ *output++ = (unsigned char) (c ^ iv[n]);
+ iv[n] = (unsigned char) c;
+
+ n = (n + 1) & 0x0F;
+ }
+ } else {
+ while (length--) {
+ if (n == 0) {
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char) (iv[n] ^ *input++);
+
+ n = (n + 1) & 0x0F;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *iv_off = n;
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * AES-CFB8 buffer encryption/decryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb8(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ unsigned char iv[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char c;
+ unsigned char ov[17];
+
+ if (mode != MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ while (length--) {
+ memcpy(ov, iv, 16);
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ ov[16] = *input;
+ }
+
+ c = *output++ = (unsigned char) (iv[0] ^ *input++);
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT) {
+ ov[16] = c;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(iv, ov + 1, 16);
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+/*
+ * AES-OFB (Output Feedback Mode) buffer encryption/decryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ size_t length,
+ size_t *iv_off,
+ unsigned char iv[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t n;
+
+ n = *iv_off;
+
+ if (n > 15) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ while (length--) {
+ if (n == 0) {
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, iv, iv);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+ *output++ = *input++ ^ iv[n];
+
+ n = (n + 1) & 0x0F;
+ }
+
+ *iv_off = n;
+
+exit:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+/*
+ * AES-CTR buffer encryption/decryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ size_t length,
+ size_t *nc_off,
+ unsigned char nonce_counter[16],
+ unsigned char stream_block[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ size_t offset = *nc_off;
+
+ if (offset > 0x0F) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < length;) {
+ size_t n = 16;
+ if (offset == 0) {
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, stream_block);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(nonce_counter);
+ } else {
+ n -= offset;
+ }
+
+ if (n > (length - i)) {
+ n = (length - i);
+ }
+ mbedtls_xor(&output[i], &input[i], &stream_block[offset], n);
+ // offset might be non-zero for the last block, but in that case, we don't use it again
+ offset = 0;
+ i += n;
+ }
+
+ // capture offset for future resumption
+ *nc_off = (*nc_off + length) % 16;
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/*
+ * AES test vectors from:
+ *
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/archive/aes/rijndael/rijndael-vals.zip
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_dec[][16] =
+{
+ { 0x44, 0x41, 0x6A, 0xC2, 0xD1, 0xF5, 0x3C, 0x58,
+ 0x33, 0x03, 0x91, 0x7E, 0x6B, 0xE9, 0xEB, 0xE0 },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { 0x48, 0xE3, 0x1E, 0x9E, 0x25, 0x67, 0x18, 0xF2,
+ 0x92, 0x29, 0x31, 0x9C, 0x19, 0xF1, 0x5B, 0xA4 },
+ { 0x05, 0x8C, 0xCF, 0xFD, 0xBB, 0xCB, 0x38, 0x2D,
+ 0x1F, 0x6F, 0x56, 0x58, 0x5D, 0x8A, 0x4A, 0xDE }
+#endif
+};
+#endif
+
+static const unsigned char aes_test_ecb_enc[][16] =
+{
+ { 0xC3, 0x4C, 0x05, 0x2C, 0xC0, 0xDA, 0x8D, 0x73,
+ 0x45, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0x5F, 0x03, 0xBE, 0x29, 0x7F },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { 0xF3, 0xF6, 0x75, 0x2A, 0xE8, 0xD7, 0x83, 0x11,
+ 0x38, 0xF0, 0x41, 0x56, 0x06, 0x31, 0xB1, 0x14 },
+ { 0x8B, 0x79, 0xEE, 0xCC, 0x93, 0xA0, 0xEE, 0x5D,
+ 0xFF, 0x30, 0xB4, 0xEA, 0x21, 0x63, 0x6D, 0xA4 }
+#endif
+};
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_dec[][16] =
+{
+ { 0xFA, 0xCA, 0x37, 0xE0, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0x53, 0x73,
+ 0xDF, 0x70, 0x6E, 0x73, 0xF7, 0xC9, 0xAF, 0x86 },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { 0x5D, 0xF6, 0x78, 0xDD, 0x17, 0xBA, 0x4E, 0x75,
+ 0xB6, 0x17, 0x68, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0xEF, 0x7C, 0x7B },
+ { 0x48, 0x04, 0xE1, 0x81, 0x8F, 0xE6, 0x29, 0x75,
+ 0x19, 0xA3, 0xE8, 0x8C, 0x57, 0x31, 0x04, 0x13 }
+#endif
+};
+
+static const unsigned char aes_test_cbc_enc[][16] =
+{
+ { 0x8A, 0x05, 0xFC, 0x5E, 0x09, 0x5A, 0xF4, 0x84,
+ 0x8A, 0x08, 0xD3, 0x28, 0xD3, 0x68, 0x8E, 0x3D },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { 0x7B, 0xD9, 0x66, 0xD5, 0x3A, 0xD8, 0xC1, 0xBB,
+ 0x85, 0xD2, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE8, 0x7B, 0xB1, 0x04 },
+ { 0xFE, 0x3C, 0x53, 0x65, 0x3E, 0x2F, 0x45, 0xB5,
+ 0x6F, 0xCD, 0x88, 0xB2, 0xCC, 0x89, 0x8F, 0xF0 }
+#endif
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+/*
+ * AES-CFB128 test vectors from:
+ *
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
+ */
+static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_key[][32] =
+{
+ { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6,
+ 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52,
+ 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5,
+ 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B },
+ { 0x60, 0x3D, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x15, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xBE,
+ 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81,
+ 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7,
+ 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 }
+#endif
+};
+
+static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_iv[16] =
+{
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F
+};
+
+static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_pt[64] =
+{
+ 0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96,
+ 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A,
+ 0xAE, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x1E, 0x03, 0xAC, 0x9C,
+ 0x9E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xAC, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x8E, 0x51,
+ 0x30, 0xC8, 0x1C, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x5C, 0xE4, 0x11,
+ 0xE5, 0xFB, 0xC1, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x52, 0xEF,
+ 0xF6, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x4F, 0x9B, 0x17,
+ 0xAD, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0x6C, 0x37, 0x10
+};
+
+static const unsigned char aes_test_cfb128_ct[][64] =
+{
+ { 0x3B, 0x3F, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x20,
+ 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xF8, 0xE8, 0x3C, 0xFB, 0x4A,
+ 0xC8, 0xA6, 0x45, 0x37, 0xA0, 0xB3, 0xA9, 0x3F,
+ 0xCD, 0xE3, 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x9F, 0x1C, 0xE5, 0x8B,
+ 0x26, 0x75, 0x1F, 0x67, 0xA3, 0xCB, 0xB1, 0x40,
+ 0xB1, 0x80, 0x8C, 0xF1, 0x87, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0xDF,
+ 0xC0, 0x4B, 0x05, 0x35, 0x7C, 0x5D, 0x1C, 0x0E,
+ 0xEA, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0xF7, 0xF2, 0xE6 },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { 0xCD, 0xC8, 0x0D, 0x6F, 0xDD, 0xF1, 0x8C, 0xAB,
+ 0x34, 0xC2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xC9, 0x9A, 0x41, 0x74,
+ 0x67, 0xCE, 0x7F, 0x7F, 0x81, 0x17, 0x36, 0x21,
+ 0x96, 0x1A, 0x2B, 0x70, 0x17, 0x1D, 0x3D, 0x7A,
+ 0x2E, 0x1E, 0x8A, 0x1D, 0xD5, 0x9B, 0x88, 0xB1,
+ 0xC8, 0xE6, 0x0F, 0xED, 0x1E, 0xFA, 0xC4, 0xC9,
+ 0xC0, 0x5F, 0x9F, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0x83, 0x4F, 0xA0,
+ 0x42, 0xAE, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0x58, 0x4B, 0x09, 0xFF },
+ { 0xDC, 0x7E, 0x84, 0xBF, 0xDA, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4B,
+ 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5D, 0x38, 0x60,
+ 0x39, 0xFF, 0xED, 0x14, 0x3B, 0x28, 0xB1, 0xC8,
+ 0x32, 0x11, 0x3C, 0x63, 0x31, 0xE5, 0x40, 0x7B,
+ 0xDF, 0x10, 0x13, 0x24, 0x15, 0xE5, 0x4B, 0x92,
+ 0xA1, 0x3E, 0xD0, 0xA8, 0x26, 0x7A, 0xE2, 0xF9,
+ 0x75, 0xA3, 0x85, 0x74, 0x1A, 0xB9, 0xCE, 0xF8,
+ 0x20, 0x31, 0x62, 0x3D, 0x55, 0xB1, 0xE4, 0x71 }
+#endif
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+/*
+ * AES-OFB test vectors from:
+ *
+ * https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38a/final
+ */
+static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_key[][32] =
+{
+ { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6,
+ 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52,
+ 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5,
+ 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B },
+ { 0x60, 0x3D, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x15, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xBE,
+ 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81,
+ 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7,
+ 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 }
+#endif
+};
+
+static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_iv[16] =
+{
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F
+};
+
+static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_pt[64] =
+{
+ 0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96,
+ 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A,
+ 0xAE, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x1E, 0x03, 0xAC, 0x9C,
+ 0x9E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xAC, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x8E, 0x51,
+ 0x30, 0xC8, 0x1C, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x5C, 0xE4, 0x11,
+ 0xE5, 0xFB, 0xC1, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x52, 0xEF,
+ 0xF6, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x4F, 0x9B, 0x17,
+ 0xAD, 0x2B, 0x41, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0x6C, 0x37, 0x10
+};
+
+static const unsigned char aes_test_ofb_ct[][64] =
+{
+ { 0x3B, 0x3F, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0x20,
+ 0x33, 0x34, 0x49, 0xF8, 0xE8, 0x3C, 0xFB, 0x4A,
+ 0x77, 0x89, 0x50, 0x8d, 0x16, 0x91, 0x8f, 0x03,
+ 0xf5, 0x3c, 0x52, 0xda, 0xc5, 0x4e, 0xd8, 0x25,
+ 0x97, 0x40, 0x05, 0x1e, 0x9c, 0x5f, 0xec, 0xf6,
+ 0x43, 0x44, 0xf7, 0xa8, 0x22, 0x60, 0xed, 0xcc,
+ 0x30, 0x4c, 0x65, 0x28, 0xf6, 0x59, 0xc7, 0x78,
+ 0x66, 0xa5, 0x10, 0xd9, 0xc1, 0xd6, 0xae, 0x5e },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { 0xCD, 0xC8, 0x0D, 0x6F, 0xDD, 0xF1, 0x8C, 0xAB,
+ 0x34, 0xC2, 0x59, 0x09, 0xC9, 0x9A, 0x41, 0x74,
+ 0xfc, 0xc2, 0x8b, 0x8d, 0x4c, 0x63, 0x83, 0x7c,
+ 0x09, 0xe8, 0x17, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x10, 0x04, 0x01,
+ 0x8d, 0x9a, 0x9a, 0xea, 0xc0, 0xf6, 0x59, 0x6f,
+ 0x55, 0x9c, 0x6d, 0x4d, 0xaf, 0x59, 0xa5, 0xf2,
+ 0x6d, 0x9f, 0x20, 0x08, 0x57, 0xca, 0x6c, 0x3e,
+ 0x9c, 0xac, 0x52, 0x4b, 0xd9, 0xac, 0xc9, 0x2a },
+ { 0xDC, 0x7E, 0x84, 0xBF, 0xDA, 0x79, 0x16, 0x4B,
+ 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x84, 0x86, 0x98, 0x5D, 0x38, 0x60,
+ 0x4f, 0xeb, 0xdc, 0x67, 0x40, 0xd2, 0x0b, 0x3a,
+ 0xc8, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0xd8, 0x2a, 0x4f, 0xb0, 0x8d,
+ 0x71, 0xab, 0x47, 0xa0, 0x86, 0xe8, 0x6e, 0xed,
+ 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x1c, 0x5b, 0xba, 0x97, 0xc4, 0x08,
+ 0x01, 0x26, 0x14, 0x1d, 0x67, 0xf3, 0x7b, 0xe8,
+ 0x53, 0x8f, 0x5a, 0x8b, 0xe7, 0x40, 0xe4, 0x84 }
+#endif
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+/*
+ * AES-CTR test vectors from:
+ *
+ * http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc3686.html
+ */
+
+static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_key[][16] =
+{
+ { 0xAE, 0x68, 0x52, 0xF8, 0x12, 0x10, 0x67, 0xCC,
+ 0x4B, 0xF7, 0xA5, 0x76, 0x55, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x9E },
+ { 0x7E, 0x24, 0x06, 0x78, 0x17, 0xFA, 0xE0, 0xD7,
+ 0x43, 0xD6, 0xCE, 0x1F, 0x32, 0x53, 0x91, 0x63 },
+ { 0x76, 0x91, 0xBE, 0x03, 0x5E, 0x50, 0x20, 0xA8,
+ 0xAC, 0x6E, 0x61, 0x85, 0x29, 0xF9, 0xA0, 0xDC }
+};
+
+static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[][16] =
+{
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 },
+ { 0x00, 0x6C, 0xB6, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0x54, 0x3B, 0x59,
+ 0xDA, 0x48, 0xD9, 0x0B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 },
+ { 0x00, 0xE0, 0x01, 0x7B, 0x27, 0x77, 0x7F, 0x3F,
+ 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }
+};
+
+static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_pt[][48] =
+{
+ { 0x53, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x20, 0x62,
+ 0x6C, 0x6F, 0x63, 0x6B, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x73, 0x67 },
+ { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F,
+ 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
+ 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F },
+
+ { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F,
+ 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
+ 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F,
+ 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23 }
+};
+
+static const unsigned char aes_test_ctr_ct[][48] =
+{
+ { 0xE4, 0x09, 0x5D, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xA7, 0xB3, 0x79,
+ 0x2D, 0x61, 0x75, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x13, 0x11, 0xB8 },
+ { 0x51, 0x04, 0xA1, 0x06, 0x16, 0x8A, 0x72, 0xD9,
+ 0x79, 0x0D, 0x41, 0xEE, 0x8E, 0xDA, 0xD3, 0x88,
+ 0xEB, 0x2E, 0x1E, 0xFC, 0x46, 0xDA, 0x57, 0xC8,
+ 0xFC, 0xE6, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x91, 0x41, 0xBE, 0x28 },
+ { 0xC1, 0xCF, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x9F, 0x2F, 0xFD, 0xD9,
+ 0xCF, 0x46, 0x52, 0xE9, 0xEF, 0xDB, 0x72, 0xD7,
+ 0x45, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x2B, 0xDE, 0x6D, 0x78, 0x36,
+ 0xD5, 0x9A, 0x5C, 0xEA, 0xAE, 0xF3, 0x10, 0x53,
+ 0x25, 0xB2, 0x07, 0x2F }
+};
+
+static const int aes_test_ctr_len[3] =
+{ 16, 32, 36 };
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+/*
+ * AES-XTS test vectors from:
+ *
+ * IEEE P1619/D16 Annex B
+ * https://web.archive.org/web/20150629024421/http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/pdf00086.pdf
+ * (Archived from original at http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/pdf00086.pdf)
+ */
+static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_key[][32] =
+{
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
+ { 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11,
+ 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11,
+ 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22,
+ 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22 },
+ { 0xff, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0xfc, 0xfb, 0xfa, 0xf9, 0xf8,
+ 0xf7, 0xf6, 0xf5, 0xf4, 0xf3, 0xf2, 0xf1, 0xf0,
+ 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22,
+ 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22 },
+};
+
+static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_pt32[][32] =
+{
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
+ { 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44,
+ 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44,
+ 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44,
+ 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44 },
+ { 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44,
+ 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44,
+ 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44,
+ 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44, 0x44 },
+};
+
+static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_ct32[][32] =
+{
+ { 0x91, 0x7c, 0xf6, 0x9e, 0xbd, 0x68, 0xb2, 0xec,
+ 0x9b, 0x9f, 0xe9, 0xa3, 0xea, 0xdd, 0xa6, 0x92,
+ 0xcd, 0x43, 0xd2, 0xf5, 0x95, 0x98, 0xed, 0x85,
+ 0x8c, 0x02, 0xc2, 0x65, 0x2f, 0xbf, 0x92, 0x2e },
+ { 0xc4, 0x54, 0x18, 0x5e, 0x6a, 0x16, 0x93, 0x6e,
+ 0x39, 0x33, 0x40, 0x38, 0xac, 0xef, 0x83, 0x8b,
+ 0xfb, 0x18, 0x6f, 0xff, 0x74, 0x80, 0xad, 0xc4,
+ 0x28, 0x93, 0x82, 0xec, 0xd6, 0xd3, 0x94, 0xf0 },
+ { 0xaf, 0x85, 0x33, 0x6b, 0x59, 0x7a, 0xfc, 0x1a,
+ 0x90, 0x0b, 0x2e, 0xb2, 0x1e, 0xc9, 0x49, 0xd2,
+ 0x92, 0xdf, 0x4c, 0x04, 0x7e, 0x0b, 0x21, 0x53,
+ 0x21, 0x86, 0xa5, 0x97, 0x1a, 0x22, 0x7a, 0x89 },
+};
+
+static const unsigned char aes_test_xts_data_unit[][16] =
+{
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
+ { 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
+ { 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
+};
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */
+
+/*
+ * Checkup routine
+ */
+int mbedtls_aes_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ int ret = 0, i, j, u, mode;
+ unsigned int keybits;
+ unsigned char key[32];
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+ const unsigned char *aes_tests;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ unsigned char iv[16];
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ unsigned char prv[16];
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ size_t offset;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ int len;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ unsigned char nonce_counter[16];
+ unsigned char stream_block[16];
+#endif
+ mbedtls_aes_context ctx;
+
+ memset(key, 0, 32);
+ mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ALT)
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES note: alternative implementation.\n");
+#else /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
+#if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 1
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES note: AESNI code present (assembly implementation).\n");
+#elif MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES note: AESNI code present (intrinsics implementation).\n");
+#else
+#error "Unrecognised value for MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE"
+#endif
+ if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES)) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using AESNI.\n");
+ } else
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE)
+ if (mbedtls_padlock_has_support(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE)) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using VIA Padlock.\n");
+ } else
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE)
+ if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES note: using AESCE.\n");
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES note: built-in implementation.\n");
+#endif
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * ECB mode
+ */
+ {
+ static const int num_tests =
+ sizeof(aes_test_ecb_enc) / sizeof(*aes_test_ecb_enc);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) {
+ u = i >> 1;
+ keybits = 128 + u * 64;
+ mode = i & 1;
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES-ECB-%3u (%s): ", keybits,
+ (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc");
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("skipped\n");
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ memset(buf, 0, 16);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, keybits);
+ aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_dec[u];
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits);
+ aes_tests = aes_test_ecb_enc[u];
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when
+ * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when
+ * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined.
+ */
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) {
+ mbedtls_printf("skipped\n");
+ continue;
+ } else if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < 10000; j++) {
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx, mode, buf, buf);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 16) != 0) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ /*
+ * CBC mode
+ */
+ {
+ static const int num_tests =
+ sizeof(aes_test_cbc_dec) / sizeof(*aes_test_cbc_dec);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) {
+ u = i >> 1;
+ keybits = 128 + u * 64;
+ mode = i & 1;
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES-CBC-%3u (%s): ", keybits,
+ (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc");
+ }
+
+ memset(iv, 0, 16);
+ memset(prv, 0, 16);
+ memset(buf, 0, 16);
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, keybits);
+ aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_dec[u];
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits);
+ aes_tests = aes_test_cbc_enc[u];
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when
+ * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when
+ * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined.
+ */
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) {
+ mbedtls_printf("skipped\n");
+ continue;
+ } else if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < 10000; j++) {
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT) {
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+
+ memcpy(tmp, prv, 16);
+ memcpy(prv, buf, 16);
+ memcpy(buf, tmp, 16);
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&ctx, mode, 16, iv, buf, buf);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 16) != 0) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ /*
+ * CFB128 mode
+ */
+ {
+ static const int num_tests =
+ sizeof(aes_test_cfb128_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_cfb128_key);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) {
+ u = i >> 1;
+ keybits = 128 + u * 64;
+ mode = i & 1;
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES-CFB128-%3u (%s): ", keybits,
+ (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc");
+ }
+
+ memcpy(iv, aes_test_cfb128_iv, 16);
+ memcpy(key, aes_test_cfb128_key[u], keybits / 8);
+
+ offset = 0;
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits);
+ /*
+ * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when
+ * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when
+ * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined.
+ */
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) {
+ mbedtls_printf("skipped\n");
+ continue;
+ } else if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ memcpy(buf, aes_test_cfb128_ct[u], 64);
+ aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_pt;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buf, aes_test_cfb128_pt, 64);
+ aes_tests = aes_test_cfb128_ct[u];
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128(&ctx, mode, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 64) != 0) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ /*
+ * OFB mode
+ */
+ {
+ static const int num_tests =
+ sizeof(aes_test_ofb_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_ofb_key);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) {
+ u = i >> 1;
+ keybits = 128 + u * 64;
+ mode = i & 1;
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES-OFB-%3u (%s): ", keybits,
+ (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc");
+ }
+
+ memcpy(iv, aes_test_ofb_iv, 16);
+ memcpy(key, aes_test_ofb_key[u], keybits / 8);
+
+ offset = 0;
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, keybits);
+ /*
+ * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when
+ * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when
+ * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined.
+ */
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192) {
+ mbedtls_printf("skipped\n");
+ continue;
+ } else if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ memcpy(buf, aes_test_ofb_ct[u], 64);
+ aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_pt;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buf, aes_test_ofb_pt, 64);
+ aes_tests = aes_test_ofb_ct[u];
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb(&ctx, 64, &offset, iv, buf, buf);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, 64) != 0) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ /*
+ * CTR mode
+ */
+ {
+ static const int num_tests =
+ sizeof(aes_test_ctr_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_ctr_key);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) {
+ u = i >> 1;
+ mode = i & 1;
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES-CTR-128 (%s): ",
+ (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc");
+ }
+
+ memcpy(nonce_counter, aes_test_ctr_nonce_counter[u], 16);
+ memcpy(key, aes_test_ctr_key[u], 16);
+
+ offset = 0;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, 128)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ len = aes_test_ctr_len[u];
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ memcpy(buf, aes_test_ctr_ct[u], len);
+ aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_pt[u];
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buf, aes_test_ctr_pt[u], len);
+ aes_tests = aes_test_ctr_ct[u];
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(&ctx, len, &offset, nonce_counter,
+ stream_block, buf, buf);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, len) != 0) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ /*
+ * XTS mode
+ */
+ {
+ static const int num_tests =
+ sizeof(aes_test_xts_key) / sizeof(*aes_test_xts_key);
+ mbedtls_aes_xts_context ctx_xts;
+
+ mbedtls_aes_xts_init(&ctx_xts);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_tests << 1; i++) {
+ const unsigned char *data_unit;
+ u = i >> 1;
+ mode = i & 1;
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES-XTS-128 (%s): ",
+ (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc");
+ }
+
+ memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ memcpy(key, aes_test_xts_key[u], 32);
+ data_unit = aes_test_xts_data_unit[u];
+
+ len = sizeof(*aes_test_xts_ct32);
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec(&ctx_xts, key, 256);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ memcpy(buf, aes_test_xts_ct32[u], len);
+ aes_tests = aes_test_xts_pt32[u];
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc(&ctx_xts, key, 256);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ memcpy(buf, aes_test_xts_pt32[u], len);
+ aes_tests = aes_test_xts_ct32[u];
+ }
+
+
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(&ctx_xts, mode, len, data_unit,
+ buf, buf);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(buf, aes_tests, len) != 0) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_aes_xts_free(&ctx_xts);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ if (ret != 0 && verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/aesce.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/aesce.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6a9e0a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/aesce.c
@@ -0,0 +1,618 @@
+/*
+ * Armv8-A Cryptographic Extension support functions for Aarch64
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#if defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 4)
+
+/* Ideally, we would simply use MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A in the following #if,
+ * but that is defined by build_info.h, and we need this block to happen first. */
+#if defined(__ARM_ARCH)
+#if __ARM_ARCH >= 8
+#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && !defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO)
+/* TODO: Re-consider above after https://reviews.llvm.org/D131064 merged.
+ *
+ * The intrinsic declaration are guarded by predefined ACLE macros in clang:
+ * these are normally only enabled by the -march option on the command line.
+ * By defining the macros ourselves we gain access to those declarations without
+ * requiring -march on the command line.
+ *
+ * `arm_neon.h` is included by common.h, so we put these defines
+ * at the top of this file, before any includes.
+ */
+#define __ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO 1
+/* See: https://arm-software.github.io/acle/main/acle.html#cryptographic-extensions
+ *
+ * `__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO` is deprecated, but we need to continue to specify it
+ * for older compilers.
+ */
+#define __ARM_FEATURE_AES 1
+#define MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG
+#endif
+
+#endif /* defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 4) */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C)
+
+#include "aesce.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE)
+
+/* Compiler version checks. */
+#if defined(__clang__)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) && (__clang_major__ < 11)
+# error "Minimum version of Clang for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C on 32-bit Arm or Thumb is 11.0."
+# elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) && (__clang_major__ < 4)
+# error "Minimum version of Clang for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C on aarch64 is 4.0."
+# endif
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+# if __GNUC__ < 6
+# error "Minimum version of GCC for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C is 6.0."
+# endif
+#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+/* TODO: We haven't verified MSVC from 1920 to 1928. If someone verified that,
+ * please update this and document of `MBEDTLS_AESCE_C` in
+ * `mbedtls_config.h`. */
+# if _MSC_VER < 1929
+# error "Minimum version of MSVC for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C is 2019 version 16.11.2."
+# endif
+#elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION)
+# if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) && (__ARMCC_VERSION < 6200002)
+/* TODO: We haven't verified armclang for 32-bit Arm/Thumb prior to 6.20.
+ * If someone verified that, please update this and document of
+ * `MBEDTLS_AESCE_C` in `mbedtls_config.h`. */
+# error "Minimum version of armclang for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C on 32-bit Arm is 6.20."
+# elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) && (__ARMCC_VERSION < 6060000)
+# error "Minimum version of armclang for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C on aarch64 is 6.6."
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if !(defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO) || defined(__ARM_FEATURE_AES)) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG)
+# if defined(__ARMCOMPILER_VERSION)
+# if __ARMCOMPILER_VERSION <= 6090000
+# error "Must use minimum -march=armv8-a+crypto for MBEDTLS_AESCE_C"
+# else
+# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("aes"))), apply_to=function)
+# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA
+# endif
+# elif defined(__clang__)
+# pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("aes"))), apply_to=function)
+# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA
+# elif defined(__GNUC__)
+# pragma GCC push_options
+# pragma GCC target ("+crypto")
+# define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA
+# elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+# error "Required feature(__ARM_FEATURE_AES) is not enabled."
+# endif
+#endif /* !(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO || __ARM_FEATURE_AES) ||
+ MBEDTLS_ENABLE_ARM_CRYPTO_EXTENSIONS_COMPILER_FLAG */
+
+#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
+
+#include <sys/auxv.h>
+#if !defined(HWCAP_NEON)
+#define HWCAP_NEON (1 << 12)
+#endif
+#if !defined(HWCAP2_AES)
+#define HWCAP2_AES (1 << 0)
+#endif
+#if !defined(HWCAP_AES)
+#define HWCAP_AES (1 << 3)
+#endif
+#if !defined(HWCAP_ASIMD)
+#define HWCAP_ASIMD (1 << 1)
+#endif
+
+signed char mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = -1;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
+/*
+ * AES instruction support detection routine
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesce_has_support_impl(void)
+{
+ /* To avoid many calls to getauxval, cache the result. This is
+ * thread-safe, because we store the result in a char so cannot
+ * be vulnerable to non-atomic updates.
+ * It is possible that we could end up setting result more than
+ * once, but that is harmless.
+ */
+ if (mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result == -1) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32)
+ unsigned long auxval = getauxval(AT_HWCAP);
+ unsigned long auxval2 = getauxval(AT_HWCAP2);
+ if (((auxval & HWCAP_NEON) == HWCAP_NEON) &&
+ ((auxval2 & HWCAP2_AES) == HWCAP2_AES)) {
+ mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = 1;
+ } else {
+ mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = 0;
+ }
+#else
+ unsigned long auxval = getauxval(AT_HWCAP);
+ if ((auxval & (HWCAP_ASIMD | HWCAP_AES)) ==
+ (HWCAP_ASIMD | HWCAP_AES)) {
+ mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = 1;
+ } else {
+ mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ return mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) */
+
+/* Single round of AESCE encryption */
+#define AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND \
+ block = vaeseq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); \
+ block = vaesmcq_u8(block); \
+ keys += 16
+/* Two rounds of AESCE encryption */
+#define AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2 AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND; AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND
+
+MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE
+static uint8x16_t aesce_encrypt_block(uint8x16_t block,
+ unsigned char *keys,
+ int rounds)
+{
+ /* 10, 12 or 14 rounds. Unroll loop. */
+ if (rounds == 10) {
+ goto rounds_10;
+ }
+ if (rounds == 12) {
+ goto rounds_12;
+ }
+ AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2;
+rounds_12:
+ AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2;
+rounds_10:
+ AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2;
+ AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2;
+ AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2;
+ AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND_X2;
+ AESCE_ENCRYPT_ROUND;
+
+ /* AES AddRoundKey for the previous round.
+ * SubBytes, ShiftRows for the final round. */
+ block = vaeseq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys));
+ keys += 16;
+
+ /* Final round: no MixColumns */
+
+ /* Final AddRoundKey */
+ block = veorq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys));
+
+ return block;
+}
+
+/* Single round of AESCE decryption
+ *
+ * AES AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows
+ *
+ * block = vaesdq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys));
+ *
+ * AES inverse MixColumns for the next round.
+ *
+ * This means that we switch the order of the inverse AddRoundKey and
+ * inverse MixColumns operations. We have to do this as AddRoundKey is
+ * done in an atomic instruction together with the inverses of SubBytes
+ * and ShiftRows.
+ *
+ * It works because MixColumns is a linear operation over GF(2^8) and
+ * AddRoundKey is an exclusive or, which is equivalent to addition over
+ * GF(2^8). (The inverse of MixColumns needs to be applied to the
+ * affected round keys separately which has been done when the
+ * decryption round keys were calculated.)
+ *
+ * block = vaesimcq_u8(block);
+ */
+#define AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND \
+ block = vaesdq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys)); \
+ block = vaesimcq_u8(block); \
+ keys += 16
+/* Two rounds of AESCE decryption */
+#define AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2 AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND; AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+static uint8x16_t aesce_decrypt_block(uint8x16_t block,
+ unsigned char *keys,
+ int rounds)
+{
+ /* 10, 12 or 14 rounds. Unroll loop. */
+ if (rounds == 10) {
+ goto rounds_10;
+ }
+ if (rounds == 12) {
+ goto rounds_12;
+ }
+ AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2;
+rounds_12:
+ AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2;
+rounds_10:
+ AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2;
+ AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2;
+ AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2;
+ AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND_X2;
+ AESCE_DECRYPT_ROUND;
+
+ /* The inverses of AES AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows finishing up the
+ * last full round. */
+ block = vaesdq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys));
+ keys += 16;
+
+ /* Inverse AddRoundKey for inverting the initial round key addition. */
+ block = veorq_u8(block, vld1q_u8(keys));
+
+ return block;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * AES-ECB block en(de)cryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesce_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16])
+{
+ uint8x16_t block = vld1q_u8(&input[0]);
+ unsigned char *keys = (unsigned char *) (ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ block = aesce_decrypt_block(block, keys, ctx->nr);
+ } else
+#else
+ (void) mode;
+#endif
+ {
+ block = aesce_encrypt_block(block, keys, ctx->nr);
+ }
+ vst1q_u8(&output[0], block);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute decryption round keys from encryption round keys
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+void mbedtls_aesce_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey,
+ const unsigned char *fwdkey,
+ int nr)
+{
+ int i, j;
+ j = nr;
+ vst1q_u8(invkey, vld1q_u8(fwdkey + j * 16));
+ for (i = 1, j--; j > 0; i++, j--) {
+ vst1q_u8(invkey + i * 16,
+ vaesimcq_u8(vld1q_u8(fwdkey + j * 16)));
+ }
+ vst1q_u8(invkey + i * 16, vld1q_u8(fwdkey + j * 16));
+
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline uint32_t aes_rot_word(uint32_t word)
+{
+ return (word << (32 - 8)) | (word >> 8);
+}
+
+static inline uint32_t aes_sub_word(uint32_t in)
+{
+ uint8x16_t v = vreinterpretq_u8_u32(vdupq_n_u32(in));
+ uint8x16_t zero = vdupq_n_u8(0);
+
+ /* vaeseq_u8 does both SubBytes and ShiftRows. Taking the first row yields
+ * the correct result as ShiftRows doesn't change the first row. */
+ v = vaeseq_u8(zero, v);
+ return vgetq_lane_u32(vreinterpretq_u32_u8(v), 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key expansion function
+ */
+static void aesce_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ const size_t key_bit_length)
+{
+ static uint8_t const rcon[] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, 0x10,
+ 0x20, 0x40, 0x80, 0x1b, 0x36 };
+ /* See https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.197.pdf
+ * - Section 5, Nr = Nk + 6
+ * - Section 5.2, the length of round keys is Nb*(Nr+1)
+ */
+ const size_t key_len_in_words = key_bit_length / 32; /* Nk */
+ const size_t round_key_len_in_words = 4; /* Nb */
+ const size_t rounds_needed = key_len_in_words + 6; /* Nr */
+ const size_t round_keys_len_in_words =
+ round_key_len_in_words * (rounds_needed + 1); /* Nb*(Nr+1) */
+ const uint32_t *rko_end = (uint32_t *) rk + round_keys_len_in_words;
+
+ memcpy(rk, key, key_len_in_words * 4);
+
+ for (uint32_t *rki = (uint32_t *) rk;
+ rki + key_len_in_words < rko_end;
+ rki += key_len_in_words) {
+
+ size_t iteration = (size_t) (rki - (uint32_t *) rk) / key_len_in_words;
+ uint32_t *rko;
+ rko = rki + key_len_in_words;
+ rko[0] = aes_rot_word(aes_sub_word(rki[key_len_in_words - 1]));
+ rko[0] ^= rcon[iteration] ^ rki[0];
+ rko[1] = rko[0] ^ rki[1];
+ rko[2] = rko[1] ^ rki[2];
+ rko[3] = rko[2] ^ rki[3];
+ if (rko + key_len_in_words > rko_end) {
+ /* Do not write overflow words.*/
+ continue;
+ }
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ switch (key_bit_length) {
+ case 128:
+ break;
+ case 192:
+ rko[4] = rko[3] ^ rki[4];
+ rko[5] = rko[4] ^ rki[5];
+ break;
+ case 256:
+ rko[4] = aes_sub_word(rko[3]) ^ rki[4];
+ rko[5] = rko[4] ^ rki[5];
+ rko[6] = rko[5] ^ rki[6];
+ rko[7] = rko[6] ^ rki[7];
+ break;
+ }
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key expansion, wrapper
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesce_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ size_t bits)
+{
+ switch (bits) {
+ case 128:
+ case 192:
+ case 256:
+ aesce_setkey_enc(rk, key, bits);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32)
+
+#if defined(__clang__)
+/* On clang for A32/T32, work around some missing intrinsics and types which are listed in
+ * [ACLE](https://arm-software.github.io/acle/neon_intrinsics/advsimd.html#polynomial-1)
+ * These are only required for GCM.
+ */
+#define vreinterpretq_u64_p64(a) ((uint64x2_t) a)
+
+typedef uint8x16_t poly128_t;
+
+static inline poly128_t vmull_p64(poly64_t a, poly64_t b)
+{
+ poly128_t r;
+ asm ("vmull.p64 %[r], %[a], %[b]" : [r] "=w" (r) : [a] "w" (a), [b] "w" (b) :);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* This is set to cause some more missing intrinsics to be defined below */
+#define COMMON_MISSING_INTRINSICS
+
+static inline poly128_t vmull_high_p64(poly64x2_t a, poly64x2_t b)
+{
+ return vmull_p64((poly64_t) (vget_high_u64((uint64x2_t) a)),
+ (poly64_t) (vget_high_u64((uint64x2_t) b)));
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(__clang__) */
+
+static inline uint8x16_t vrbitq_u8(uint8x16_t x)
+{
+ /* There is no vrbitq_u8 instruction in A32/T32, so provide
+ * an equivalent non-Neon implementation. Reverse bit order in each
+ * byte with 4x rbit, rev. */
+ asm ("ldm %[p], { r2-r5 } \n\t"
+ "rbit r2, r2 \n\t"
+ "rev r2, r2 \n\t"
+ "rbit r3, r3 \n\t"
+ "rev r3, r3 \n\t"
+ "rbit r4, r4 \n\t"
+ "rev r4, r4 \n\t"
+ "rbit r5, r5 \n\t"
+ "rev r5, r5 \n\t"
+ "stm %[p], { r2-r5 } \n\t"
+ :
+ /* Output: 16 bytes of memory pointed to by &x */
+ "+m" (*(uint8_t(*)[16]) &x)
+ :
+ [p] "r" (&x)
+ :
+ "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5"
+ );
+ return x;
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && __GNUC__ == 5
+/* Some intrinsics are not available for GCC 5.X. */
+#define COMMON_MISSING_INTRINSICS
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC && __GNUC__ == 5 */
+
+
+#if defined(COMMON_MISSING_INTRINSICS)
+
+/* Missing intrinsics common to both GCC 5, and Clang on 32-bit */
+
+#define vreinterpretq_p64_u8(a) ((poly64x2_t) a)
+#define vreinterpretq_u8_p128(a) ((uint8x16_t) a)
+
+static inline poly64x1_t vget_low_p64(poly64x2_t a)
+{
+ uint64x1_t r = vget_low_u64(vreinterpretq_u64_p64(a));
+ return (poly64x1_t) r;
+
+}
+
+#endif /* COMMON_MISSING_INTRINSICS */
+
+/* vmull_p64/vmull_high_p64 wrappers.
+ *
+ * Older compilers miss some intrinsic functions for `poly*_t`. We use
+ * uint8x16_t and uint8x16x3_t as input/output parameters.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC)
+/* GCC reports incompatible type error without cast. GCC think poly64_t and
+ * poly64x1_t are different, that is different with MSVC and Clang. */
+#define MBEDTLS_VMULL_P64(a, b) vmull_p64((poly64_t) a, (poly64_t) b)
+#else
+/* MSVC reports `error C2440: 'type cast'` with cast. Clang does not report
+ * error with/without cast. And I think poly64_t and poly64x1_t are same, no
+ * cast for clang also. */
+#define MBEDTLS_VMULL_P64(a, b) vmull_p64(a, b)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC */
+
+static inline uint8x16_t pmull_low(uint8x16_t a, uint8x16_t b)
+{
+
+ return vreinterpretq_u8_p128(
+ MBEDTLS_VMULL_P64(
+ (poly64_t) vget_low_p64(vreinterpretq_p64_u8(a)),
+ (poly64_t) vget_low_p64(vreinterpretq_p64_u8(b))
+ ));
+}
+
+static inline uint8x16_t pmull_high(uint8x16_t a, uint8x16_t b)
+{
+ return vreinterpretq_u8_p128(
+ vmull_high_p64(vreinterpretq_p64_u8(a),
+ vreinterpretq_p64_u8(b)));
+}
+
+/* GHASH does 128b polynomial multiplication on block in GF(2^128) defined by
+ * `x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1`.
+ *
+ * Arm64 only has 64b->128b polynomial multipliers, we need to do 4 64b
+ * multiplies to generate a 128b.
+ *
+ * `poly_mult_128` executes polynomial multiplication and outputs 256b that
+ * represented by 3 128b due to code size optimization.
+ *
+ * Output layout:
+ * | | | |
+ * |------------|-------------|-------------|
+ * | ret.val[0] | h3:h2:00:00 | high 128b |
+ * | ret.val[1] | :m2:m1:00 | middle 128b |
+ * | ret.val[2] | : :l1:l0 | low 128b |
+ */
+static inline uint8x16x3_t poly_mult_128(uint8x16_t a, uint8x16_t b)
+{
+ uint8x16x3_t ret;
+ uint8x16_t h, m, l; /* retval high/middle/low */
+ uint8x16_t c, d, e;
+
+ h = pmull_high(a, b); /* h3:h2:00:00 = a1*b1 */
+ l = pmull_low(a, b); /* : :l1:l0 = a0*b0 */
+ c = vextq_u8(b, b, 8); /* :c1:c0 = b0:b1 */
+ d = pmull_high(a, c); /* :d2:d1:00 = a1*b0 */
+ e = pmull_low(a, c); /* :e2:e1:00 = a0*b1 */
+ m = veorq_u8(d, e); /* :m2:m1:00 = d + e */
+
+ ret.val[0] = h;
+ ret.val[1] = m;
+ ret.val[2] = l;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Modulo reduction.
+ *
+ * See: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285612706_Implementing_GCM_on_ARMv8
+ *
+ * Section 4.3
+ *
+ * Modular reduction is slightly more complex. Write the GCM modulus as f(z) =
+ * z^128 +r(z), where r(z) = z^7+z^2+z+ 1. The well known approach is to
+ * consider that z^128 ≡r(z) (mod z^128 +r(z)), allowing us to write the 256-bit
+ * operand to be reduced as a(z) = h(z)z^128 +l(z)≡h(z)r(z) + l(z). That is, we
+ * simply multiply the higher part of the operand by r(z) and add it to l(z). If
+ * the result is still larger than 128 bits, we reduce again.
+ */
+static inline uint8x16_t poly_mult_reduce(uint8x16x3_t input)
+{
+ uint8x16_t const ZERO = vdupq_n_u8(0);
+
+ uint64x2_t r = vreinterpretq_u64_u8(vdupq_n_u8(0x87));
+#if defined(__GNUC__)
+ /* use 'asm' as an optimisation barrier to prevent loading MODULO from
+ * memory. It is for GNUC compatible compilers.
+ */
+ asm volatile ("" : "+w" (r));
+#endif
+ uint8x16_t const MODULO = vreinterpretq_u8_u64(vshrq_n_u64(r, 64 - 8));
+ uint8x16_t h, m, l; /* input high/middle/low 128b */
+ uint8x16_t c, d, e, f, g, n, o;
+ h = input.val[0]; /* h3:h2:00:00 */
+ m = input.val[1]; /* :m2:m1:00 */
+ l = input.val[2]; /* : :l1:l0 */
+ c = pmull_high(h, MODULO); /* :c2:c1:00 = reduction of h3 */
+ d = pmull_low(h, MODULO); /* : :d1:d0 = reduction of h2 */
+ e = veorq_u8(c, m); /* :e2:e1:00 = m2:m1:00 + c2:c1:00 */
+ f = pmull_high(e, MODULO); /* : :f1:f0 = reduction of e2 */
+ g = vextq_u8(ZERO, e, 8); /* : :g1:00 = e1:00 */
+ n = veorq_u8(d, l); /* : :n1:n0 = d1:d0 + l1:l0 */
+ o = veorq_u8(n, f); /* o1:o0 = f1:f0 + n1:n0 */
+ return veorq_u8(o, g); /* = o1:o0 + g1:00 */
+}
+
+/*
+ * GCM multiplication: c = a times b in GF(2^128)
+ */
+void mbedtls_aesce_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16],
+ const unsigned char a[16],
+ const unsigned char b[16])
+{
+ uint8x16_t va, vb, vc;
+ va = vrbitq_u8(vld1q_u8(&a[0]));
+ vb = vrbitq_u8(vld1q_u8(&b[0]));
+ vc = vrbitq_u8(poly_mult_reduce(poly_mult_128(va, vb)));
+ vst1q_u8(&c[0], vc);
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA)
+#if defined(__clang__)
+#pragma clang attribute pop
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+#pragma GCC pop_options
+#endif
+#undef MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/aesce.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/aesce.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a14d085
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/aesce.h
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+/**
+ * \file aesce.h
+ *
+ * \brief Support hardware AES acceleration on Armv8-A processors with
+ * the Armv8-A Cryptographic Extension.
+ *
+ * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library
+ * functions; you must not call them directly.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_AESCE_H
+#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+#include "common.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) \
+ && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS) \
+ && (defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) || defined(__clang__) || defined(MSC_VER))
+
+/* MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE is defined if we have a suitable target platform, and a
+ * potentially suitable compiler (compiler version & flags are not checked when defining
+ * this). */
+#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
+
+extern signed char mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal function to detect the crypto extension in CPUs.
+ *
+ * \return 1 if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesce_has_support_impl(void);
+
+#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT() (mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result == -1 ? \
+ mbedtls_aesce_has_support_impl() : \
+ mbedtls_aesce_has_support_result)
+
+#else /* defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) */
+
+/* If we are not on Linux, we can't detect support so assume that it's supported.
+ * Similarly, assume support if MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY is set.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT() 1
+
+#endif /* defined(__linux__) && !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal AES-ECB block encryption and decryption
+ *
+ * \warning This assumes that the context specifies either 10, 12 or 14
+ * rounds and will behave incorrectly if this is not the case.
+ *
+ * \param ctx AES context
+ * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT
+ * \param input 16-byte input block
+ * \param output 16-byte output block
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success (cannot fail)
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesce_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal GCM multiplication: c = a * b in GF(2^128)
+ *
+ * \note This function is only for internal use by other library
+ * functions; you must not call it directly.
+ *
+ * \param c Result
+ * \param a First operand
+ * \param b Second operand
+ *
+ * \note Both operands and result are bit strings interpreted as
+ * elements of GF(2^128) as per the GCM spec.
+ */
+void mbedtls_aesce_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16],
+ const unsigned char a[16],
+ const unsigned char b[16]);
+
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+/**
+ * \brief Internal round key inversion. This function computes
+ * decryption round keys from the encryption round keys.
+ *
+ * \param invkey Round keys for the equivalent inverse cipher
+ * \param fwdkey Original round keys (for encryption)
+ * \param nr Number of rounds (that is, number of round keys minus one)
+ */
+void mbedtls_aesce_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey,
+ const unsigned char *fwdkey,
+ int nr);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal key expansion for encryption
+ *
+ * \param rk Destination buffer where the round keys are written
+ * \param key Encryption key
+ * \param bits Key size in bits (must be 128, 192 or 256)
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesce_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ size_t bits);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#else
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A)
+#error "AES hardware acceleration not supported on this platform / compiler"
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_C && MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARMV8_A && MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS &&
+ (MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC || __clang__ || MSC_VER) */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESCE_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/aesni.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/aesni.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2857068
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/aesni.c
@@ -0,0 +1,846 @@
+/*
+ * AES-NI support functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/*
+ * [AES-WP] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/tool/intel-advanced-encryption-standard-aes-instructions-set.html
+ * [CLMUL-WP] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/download/intel-carry-less-multiplication-instruction-and-its-usage-for-computing-the-gcm-mode.html
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)
+
+#include "aesni.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
+
+#if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2
+#if defined(__GNUC__)
+#include <cpuid.h>
+#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+#include <intrin.h>
+#else
+#error "`__cpuid` required by MBEDTLS_AESNI_C is not supported by the compiler"
+#endif
+#include <immintrin.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC)
+#pragma GCC push_options
+#pragma GCC target ("pclmul,sse2,aes")
+#define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA
+#elif defined(__clang__) && (__clang_major__ >= 5)
+#pragma clang attribute push (__attribute__((target("pclmul,sse2,aes"))), apply_to=function)
+#define MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
+/*
+ * AES-NI support detection routine
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesni_has_support(unsigned int what)
+{
+ /* To avoid a race condition, tell the compiler that the assignment
+ * `done = 1` and the assignment to `c` may not be reordered.
+ * https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/9840
+ *
+ * Note that we may also be worried about memory access reordering,
+ * but fortunately the x86 memory model is not too wild: stores
+ * from the same thread are observed consistently by other threads.
+ * (See example 8-1 in Sewell et al., "x86-TSO: A Rigorous and Usable
+ * Programmer’s Model for x86 Multiprocessors", CACM, 2010,
+ * https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~pes20/weakmemory/cacm.pdf)
+ */
+ static volatile int done = 0;
+ static volatile unsigned int c = 0;
+
+ if (!done) {
+#if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2
+ static int info[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+ __cpuid(info, 1);
+#else
+ __cpuid(1, info[0], info[1], info[2], info[3]);
+#endif
+ c = info[2];
+#else /* AESNI using asm */
+ asm ("movl $1, %%eax \n\t"
+ "cpuid \n\t"
+ : "=c" (c)
+ :
+ : "eax", "ebx", "edx");
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */
+ done = 1;
+ }
+
+ return (c & what) != 0;
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY */
+
+#if MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 2
+
+/*
+ * AES-NI AES-ECB block en(de)cryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16])
+{
+ const __m128i *rk = (const __m128i *) (ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset);
+ unsigned nr = ctx->nr; // Number of remaining rounds
+
+ // Load round key 0
+ __m128i state;
+ memcpy(&state, input, 16);
+ state = _mm_xor_si128(state, rk[0]); // state ^= *rk;
+ ++rk;
+ --nr;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT) {
+ while (nr != 0) {
+ state = _mm_aesdec_si128(state, *rk);
+ ++rk;
+ --nr;
+ }
+ state = _mm_aesdeclast_si128(state, *rk);
+ } else
+#else
+ (void) mode;
+#endif
+ {
+ while (nr != 0) {
+ state = _mm_aesenc_si128(state, *rk);
+ ++rk;
+ --nr;
+ }
+ state = _mm_aesenclast_si128(state, *rk);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(output, &state, 16);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * GCM multiplication: c = a times b in GF(2^128)
+ * Based on [CLMUL-WP] algorithms 1 (with equation 27) and 5.
+ */
+
+static void gcm_clmul(const __m128i aa, const __m128i bb,
+ __m128i *cc, __m128i *dd)
+{
+ /*
+ * Caryless multiplication dd:cc = aa * bb
+ * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 1 (p. 12).
+ */
+ *cc = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(aa, bb, 0x00); // a0*b0 = c1:c0
+ *dd = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(aa, bb, 0x11); // a1*b1 = d1:d0
+ __m128i ee = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(aa, bb, 0x10); // a0*b1 = e1:e0
+ __m128i ff = _mm_clmulepi64_si128(aa, bb, 0x01); // a1*b0 = f1:f0
+ ff = _mm_xor_si128(ff, ee); // e1+f1:e0+f0
+ ee = ff; // e1+f1:e0+f0
+ ff = _mm_srli_si128(ff, 8); // 0:e1+f1
+ ee = _mm_slli_si128(ee, 8); // e0+f0:0
+ *dd = _mm_xor_si128(*dd, ff); // d1:d0+e1+f1
+ *cc = _mm_xor_si128(*cc, ee); // c1+e0+f0:c0
+}
+
+static void gcm_shift(__m128i *cc, __m128i *dd)
+{
+ /* [CMUCL-WP] Algorithm 5 Step 1: shift cc:dd one bit to the left,
+ * taking advantage of [CLMUL-WP] eq 27 (p. 18). */
+ // // *cc = r1:r0
+ // // *dd = r3:r2
+ __m128i cc_lo = _mm_slli_epi64(*cc, 1); // r1<<1:r0<<1
+ __m128i dd_lo = _mm_slli_epi64(*dd, 1); // r3<<1:r2<<1
+ __m128i cc_hi = _mm_srli_epi64(*cc, 63); // r1>>63:r0>>63
+ __m128i dd_hi = _mm_srli_epi64(*dd, 63); // r3>>63:r2>>63
+ __m128i xmm5 = _mm_srli_si128(cc_hi, 8); // 0:r1>>63
+ cc_hi = _mm_slli_si128(cc_hi, 8); // r0>>63:0
+ dd_hi = _mm_slli_si128(dd_hi, 8); // 0:r1>>63
+
+ *cc = _mm_or_si128(cc_lo, cc_hi); // r1<<1|r0>>63:r0<<1
+ *dd = _mm_or_si128(_mm_or_si128(dd_lo, dd_hi), xmm5); // r3<<1|r2>>62:r2<<1|r1>>63
+}
+
+static __m128i gcm_reduce(__m128i xx)
+{
+ // // xx = x1:x0
+ /* [CLMUL-WP] Algorithm 5 Step 2 */
+ __m128i aa = _mm_slli_epi64(xx, 63); // x1<<63:x0<<63 = stuff:a
+ __m128i bb = _mm_slli_epi64(xx, 62); // x1<<62:x0<<62 = stuff:b
+ __m128i cc = _mm_slli_epi64(xx, 57); // x1<<57:x0<<57 = stuff:c
+ __m128i dd = _mm_slli_si128(_mm_xor_si128(_mm_xor_si128(aa, bb), cc), 8); // a+b+c:0
+ return _mm_xor_si128(dd, xx); // x1+a+b+c:x0 = d:x0
+}
+
+static __m128i gcm_mix(__m128i dx)
+{
+ /* [CLMUL-WP] Algorithm 5 Steps 3 and 4 */
+ __m128i ee = _mm_srli_epi64(dx, 1); // e1:x0>>1 = e1:e0'
+ __m128i ff = _mm_srli_epi64(dx, 2); // f1:x0>>2 = f1:f0'
+ __m128i gg = _mm_srli_epi64(dx, 7); // g1:x0>>7 = g1:g0'
+
+ // e0'+f0'+g0' is almost e0+f0+g0, except for some missing
+ // bits carried from d. Now get those bits back in.
+ __m128i eh = _mm_slli_epi64(dx, 63); // d<<63:stuff
+ __m128i fh = _mm_slli_epi64(dx, 62); // d<<62:stuff
+ __m128i gh = _mm_slli_epi64(dx, 57); // d<<57:stuff
+ __m128i hh = _mm_srli_si128(_mm_xor_si128(_mm_xor_si128(eh, fh), gh), 8); // 0:missing bits of d
+
+ return _mm_xor_si128(_mm_xor_si128(_mm_xor_si128(_mm_xor_si128(ee, ff), gg), hh), dx);
+}
+
+void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16],
+ const unsigned char a[16],
+ const unsigned char b[16])
+{
+ __m128i aa = { 0 }, bb = { 0 }, cc, dd;
+
+ /* The inputs are in big-endian order, so byte-reverse them */
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ ((uint8_t *) &aa)[i] = a[15 - i];
+ ((uint8_t *) &bb)[i] = b[15 - i];
+ }
+
+ gcm_clmul(aa, bb, &cc, &dd);
+ gcm_shift(&cc, &dd);
+ /*
+ * Now reduce modulo the GCM polynomial x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1
+ * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 5 (p. 18).
+ * Currently dd:cc holds x3:x2:x1:x0 (already shifted).
+ */
+ __m128i dx = gcm_reduce(cc);
+ __m128i xh = gcm_mix(dx);
+ cc = _mm_xor_si128(xh, dd); // x3+h1:x2+h0
+
+ /* Now byte-reverse the outputs */
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ c[i] = ((uint8_t *) &cc)[15 - i];
+ }
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute decryption round keys from encryption round keys
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey,
+ const unsigned char *fwdkey, int nr)
+{
+ __m128i *ik = (__m128i *) invkey;
+ const __m128i *fk = (const __m128i *) fwdkey + nr;
+
+ *ik = *fk;
+ for (--fk, ++ik; fk > (const __m128i *) fwdkey; --fk, ++ik) {
+ *ik = _mm_aesimc_si128(*fk);
+ }
+ *ik = *fk;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Key expansion, 128-bit case
+ */
+static __m128i aesni_set_rk_128(__m128i state, __m128i xword)
+{
+ /*
+ * Finish generating the next round key.
+ *
+ * On entry state is r3:r2:r1:r0 and xword is X:stuff:stuff:stuff
+ * with X = rot( sub( r3 ) ) ^ RCON (obtained with AESKEYGENASSIST).
+ *
+ * On exit, xword is r7:r6:r5:r4
+ * with r4 = X + r0, r5 = r4 + r1, r6 = r5 + r2, r7 = r6 + r3
+ * and this is returned, to be written to the round key buffer.
+ */
+ xword = _mm_shuffle_epi32(xword, 0xff); // X:X:X:X
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state); // X+r3:X+r2:X+r1:r4
+ state = _mm_slli_si128(state, 4); // r2:r1:r0:0
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state); // X+r3+r2:X+r2+r1:r5:r4
+ state = _mm_slli_si128(state, 4); // r1:r0:0:0
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state); // X+r3+r2+r1:r6:r5:r4
+ state = _mm_slli_si128(state, 4); // r0:0:0:0
+ state = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state); // r7:r6:r5:r4
+ return state;
+}
+
+static void aesni_setkey_enc_128(unsigned char *rk_bytes,
+ const unsigned char *key)
+{
+ __m128i *rk = (__m128i *) rk_bytes;
+
+ memcpy(&rk[0], key, 16);
+ rk[1] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[0], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[0], 0x01));
+ rk[2] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[1], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[1], 0x02));
+ rk[3] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[2], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[2], 0x04));
+ rk[4] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[3], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[3], 0x08));
+ rk[5] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[4], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[4], 0x10));
+ rk[6] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[5], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[5], 0x20));
+ rk[7] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[6], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[6], 0x40));
+ rk[8] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[7], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[7], 0x80));
+ rk[9] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[8], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[8], 0x1B));
+ rk[10] = aesni_set_rk_128(rk[9], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[9], 0x36));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key expansion, 192-bit case
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+static void aesni_set_rk_192(__m128i *state0, __m128i *state1, __m128i xword,
+ unsigned char *rk)
+{
+ /*
+ * Finish generating the next 6 quarter-keys.
+ *
+ * On entry state0 is r3:r2:r1:r0, state1 is stuff:stuff:r5:r4
+ * and xword is stuff:stuff:X:stuff with X = rot( sub( r3 ) ) ^ RCON
+ * (obtained with AESKEYGENASSIST).
+ *
+ * On exit, state0 is r9:r8:r7:r6 and state1 is stuff:stuff:r11:r10
+ * and those are written to the round key buffer.
+ */
+ xword = _mm_shuffle_epi32(xword, 0x55); // X:X:X:X
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state0); // X+r3:X+r2:X+r1:X+r0
+ *state0 = _mm_slli_si128(*state0, 4); // r2:r1:r0:0
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state0); // X+r3+r2:X+r2+r1:X+r1+r0:X+r0
+ *state0 = _mm_slli_si128(*state0, 4); // r1:r0:0:0
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state0); // X+r3+r2+r1:X+r2+r1+r0:X+r1+r0:X+r0
+ *state0 = _mm_slli_si128(*state0, 4); // r0:0:0:0
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state0); // X+r3+r2+r1+r0:X+r2+r1+r0:X+r1+r0:X+r0
+ *state0 = xword; // = r9:r8:r7:r6
+
+ xword = _mm_shuffle_epi32(xword, 0xff); // r9:r9:r9:r9
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state1); // stuff:stuff:r9+r5:r9+r4
+ *state1 = _mm_slli_si128(*state1, 4); // stuff:stuff:r4:0
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, *state1); // stuff:stuff:r9+r5+r4:r9+r4
+ *state1 = xword; // = stuff:stuff:r11:r10
+
+ /* Store state0 and the low half of state1 into rk, which is conceptually
+ * an array of 24-byte elements. Since 24 is not a multiple of 16,
+ * rk is not necessarily aligned so just `*rk = *state0` doesn't work. */
+ memcpy(rk, state0, 16);
+ memcpy(rk + 16, state1, 8);
+}
+
+static void aesni_setkey_enc_192(unsigned char *rk,
+ const unsigned char *key)
+{
+ /* First round: use original key */
+ memcpy(rk, key, 24);
+ /* aes.c guarantees that rk is aligned on a 16-byte boundary. */
+ __m128i state0 = ((__m128i *) rk)[0];
+ __m128i state1 = _mm_loadl_epi64(((__m128i *) rk) + 1);
+
+ aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x01), rk + 24 * 1);
+ aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x02), rk + 24 * 2);
+ aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x04), rk + 24 * 3);
+ aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x08), rk + 24 * 4);
+ aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x10), rk + 24 * 5);
+ aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x20), rk + 24 * 6);
+ aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x40), rk + 24 * 7);
+ aesni_set_rk_192(&state0, &state1, _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state1, 0x80), rk + 24 * 8);
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */
+
+/*
+ * Key expansion, 256-bit case
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+static void aesni_set_rk_256(__m128i state0, __m128i state1, __m128i xword,
+ __m128i *rk0, __m128i *rk1)
+{
+ /*
+ * Finish generating the next two round keys.
+ *
+ * On entry state0 is r3:r2:r1:r0, state1 is r7:r6:r5:r4 and
+ * xword is X:stuff:stuff:stuff with X = rot( sub( r7 )) ^ RCON
+ * (obtained with AESKEYGENASSIST).
+ *
+ * On exit, *rk0 is r11:r10:r9:r8 and *rk1 is r15:r14:r13:r12
+ */
+ xword = _mm_shuffle_epi32(xword, 0xff);
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state0);
+ state0 = _mm_slli_si128(state0, 4);
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state0);
+ state0 = _mm_slli_si128(state0, 4);
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state0);
+ state0 = _mm_slli_si128(state0, 4);
+ state0 = _mm_xor_si128(state0, xword);
+ *rk0 = state0;
+
+ /* Set xword to stuff:Y:stuff:stuff with Y = subword( r11 )
+ * and proceed to generate next round key from there */
+ xword = _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(state0, 0x00);
+ xword = _mm_shuffle_epi32(xword, 0xaa);
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state1);
+ state1 = _mm_slli_si128(state1, 4);
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state1);
+ state1 = _mm_slli_si128(state1, 4);
+ xword = _mm_xor_si128(xword, state1);
+ state1 = _mm_slli_si128(state1, 4);
+ state1 = _mm_xor_si128(state1, xword);
+ *rk1 = state1;
+}
+
+static void aesni_setkey_enc_256(unsigned char *rk_bytes,
+ const unsigned char *key)
+{
+ __m128i *rk = (__m128i *) rk_bytes;
+
+ memcpy(&rk[0], key, 16);
+ memcpy(&rk[1], key + 16, 16);
+
+ /*
+ * Main "loop" - Generating one more key than necessary,
+ * see definition of mbedtls_aes_context.buf
+ */
+ aesni_set_rk_256(rk[0], rk[1], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[1], 0x01), &rk[2], &rk[3]);
+ aesni_set_rk_256(rk[2], rk[3], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[3], 0x02), &rk[4], &rk[5]);
+ aesni_set_rk_256(rk[4], rk[5], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[5], 0x04), &rk[6], &rk[7]);
+ aesni_set_rk_256(rk[6], rk[7], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[7], 0x08), &rk[8], &rk[9]);
+ aesni_set_rk_256(rk[8], rk[9], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[9], 0x10), &rk[10], &rk[11]);
+ aesni_set_rk_256(rk[10], rk[11], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[11], 0x20), &rk[12], &rk[13]);
+ aesni_set_rk_256(rk[12], rk[13], _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(rk[13], 0x40), &rk[14], &rk[15]);
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA)
+#if defined(__clang__)
+#pragma clang attribute pop
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+#pragma GCC pop_options
+#endif
+#undef MBEDTLS_POP_TARGET_PRAGMA
+#endif
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE == 1 */
+
+#if defined(__has_feature)
+#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer)
+#warning \
+ "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C is known to cause spurious error reports with some memory sanitizers as they do not understand the assembly code."
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Binutils needs to be at least 2.19 to support AES-NI instructions.
+ * Unfortunately, a lot of users have a lower version now (2014-04).
+ * Emit bytecode directly in order to support "old" version of gas.
+ *
+ * Opcodes from the Intel architecture reference manual, vol. 3.
+ * We always use registers, so we don't need prefixes for memory operands.
+ * Operand macros are in gas order (src, dst) as opposed to Intel order
+ * (dst, src) in order to blend better into the surrounding assembly code.
+ */
+#define AESDEC(regs) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDE," regs "\n\t"
+#define AESDECLAST(regs) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDF," regs "\n\t"
+#define AESENC(regs) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDC," regs "\n\t"
+#define AESENCLAST(regs) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDD," regs "\n\t"
+#define AESIMC(regs) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x38,0xDB," regs "\n\t"
+#define AESKEYGENA(regs, imm) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x3A,0xDF," regs "," imm "\n\t"
+#define PCLMULQDQ(regs, imm) ".byte 0x66,0x0F,0x3A,0x44," regs "," imm "\n\t"
+
+#define xmm0_xmm0 "0xC0"
+#define xmm0_xmm1 "0xC8"
+#define xmm0_xmm2 "0xD0"
+#define xmm0_xmm3 "0xD8"
+#define xmm0_xmm4 "0xE0"
+#define xmm1_xmm0 "0xC1"
+#define xmm1_xmm2 "0xD1"
+
+/*
+ * AES-NI AES-ECB block en(de)cryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16])
+{
+ asm ("movdqu (%3), %%xmm0 \n\t" // load input
+ "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key 0
+ "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // round 0
+ "add $16, %1 \n\t" // point to next round key
+ "subl $1, %0 \n\t" // normal rounds = nr - 1
+ "test %2, %2 \n\t" // mode?
+ "jz 2f \n\t" // 0 = decrypt
+
+ "1: \n\t" // encryption loop
+ "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key
+ AESENC(xmm1_xmm0) // do round
+ "add $16, %1 \n\t" // point to next round key
+ "subl $1, %0 \n\t" // loop
+ "jnz 1b \n\t"
+ "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key
+ AESENCLAST(xmm1_xmm0) // last round
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ "jmp 3f \n\t"
+
+ "2: \n\t" // decryption loop
+ "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t"
+ AESDEC(xmm1_xmm0) // do round
+ "add $16, %1 \n\t"
+ "subl $1, %0 \n\t"
+ "jnz 2b \n\t"
+ "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // load round key
+ AESDECLAST(xmm1_xmm0) // last round
+#endif
+
+ "3: \n\t"
+ "movdqu %%xmm0, (%4) \n\t" // export output
+ :
+ : "r" (ctx->nr), "r" (ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset), "r" (mode), "r" (input), "r" (output)
+ : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1", "0", "1");
+
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * GCM multiplication: c = a times b in GF(2^128)
+ * Based on [CLMUL-WP] algorithms 1 (with equation 27) and 5.
+ */
+void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16],
+ const unsigned char a[16],
+ const unsigned char b[16])
+{
+ unsigned char aa[16], bb[16], cc[16];
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* The inputs are in big-endian order, so byte-reverse them */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ aa[i] = a[15 - i];
+ bb[i] = b[15 - i];
+ }
+
+ asm ("movdqu (%0), %%xmm0 \n\t" // a1:a0
+ "movdqu (%1), %%xmm1 \n\t" // b1:b0
+
+ /*
+ * Caryless multiplication xmm2:xmm1 = xmm0 * xmm1
+ * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 1 (p. 12).
+ */
+ "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" // copy of b1:b0
+ "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm3 \n\t" // same
+ "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm4 \n\t" // same
+ PCLMULQDQ(xmm0_xmm1, "0x00") // a0*b0 = c1:c0
+ PCLMULQDQ(xmm0_xmm2, "0x11") // a1*b1 = d1:d0
+ PCLMULQDQ(xmm0_xmm3, "0x10") // a0*b1 = e1:e0
+ PCLMULQDQ(xmm0_xmm4, "0x01") // a1*b0 = f1:f0
+ "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm4 \n\t" // e1+f1:e0+f0
+ "movdqa %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // same
+ "psrldq $8, %%xmm4 \n\t" // 0:e1+f1
+ "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // e0+f0:0
+ "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm2 \n\t" // d1:d0+e1+f1
+ "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // c1+e0+f1:c0
+
+ /*
+ * Now shift the result one bit to the left,
+ * taking advantage of [CLMUL-WP] eq 27 (p. 18)
+ */
+ "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r1:r0
+ "movdqa %%xmm2, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r3:r2
+ "psllq $1, %%xmm1 \n\t" // r1<<1:r0<<1
+ "psllq $1, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1:r2<<1
+ "psrlq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r1>>63:r0>>63
+ "psrlq $63, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r3>>63:r2>>63
+ "movdqa %%xmm3, %%xmm5 \n\t" // r1>>63:r0>>63
+ "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // r0>>63:0
+ "pslldq $8, %%xmm4 \n\t" // r2>>63:0
+ "psrldq $8, %%xmm5 \n\t" // 0:r1>>63
+ "por %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // r1<<1|r0>>63:r0<<1
+ "por %%xmm4, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1|r2>>62:r2<<1
+ "por %%xmm5, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r3<<1|r2>>62:r2<<1|r1>>63
+
+ /*
+ * Now reduce modulo the GCM polynomial x^128 + x^7 + x^2 + x + 1
+ * using [CLMUL-WP] algorithm 5 (p. 18).
+ * Currently xmm2:xmm1 holds x3:x2:x1:x0 (already shifted).
+ */
+ /* Step 2 (1) */
+ "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm3 \n\t" // x1:x0
+ "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm4 \n\t" // same
+ "movdqa %%xmm1, %%xmm5 \n\t" // same
+ "psllq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // x1<<63:x0<<63 = stuff:a
+ "psllq $62, %%xmm4 \n\t" // x1<<62:x0<<62 = stuff:b
+ "psllq $57, %%xmm5 \n\t" // x1<<57:x0<<57 = stuff:c
+
+ /* Step 2 (2) */
+ "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // stuff:a+b
+ "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm3 \n\t" // stuff:a+b+c
+ "pslldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // a+b+c:0
+ "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm1 \n\t" // x1+a+b+c:x0 = d:x0
+
+ /* Steps 3 and 4 */
+ "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm0 \n\t" // d:x0
+ "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm4 \n\t" // same
+ "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm5 \n\t" // same
+ "psrlq $1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1:x0>>1 = e1:e0'
+ "psrlq $2, %%xmm4 \n\t" // f1:x0>>2 = f1:f0'
+ "psrlq $7, %%xmm5 \n\t" // g1:x0>>7 = g1:g0'
+ "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1:e0'+f0'
+ "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1+g1:e0'+f0'+g0'
+ // e0'+f0'+g0' is almost e0+f0+g0, ex\tcept for some missing
+ // bits carried from d. Now get those\t bits back in.
+ "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm3 \n\t" // d:x0
+ "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm4 \n\t" // same
+ "movdqa %%xmm1,%%xmm5 \n\t" // same
+ "psllq $63, %%xmm3 \n\t" // d<<63:stuff
+ "psllq $62, %%xmm4 \n\t" // d<<62:stuff
+ "psllq $57, %%xmm5 \n\t" // d<<57:stuff
+ "pxor %%xmm4, %%xmm3 \n\t" // d<<63+d<<62:stuff
+ "pxor %%xmm5, %%xmm3 \n\t" // missing bits of d:stuff
+ "psrldq $8, %%xmm3 \n\t" // 0:missing bits of d
+ "pxor %%xmm3, %%xmm0 \n\t" // e1+f1+g1:e0+f0+g0
+ "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // h1:h0
+ "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm0 \n\t" // x3+h1:x2+h0
+
+ "movdqu %%xmm0, (%2) \n\t" // done
+ :
+ : "r" (aa), "r" (bb), "r" (cc)
+ : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1", "xmm2", "xmm3", "xmm4", "xmm5");
+
+ /* Now byte-reverse the outputs */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ c[i] = cc[15 - i];
+ }
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute decryption round keys from encryption round keys
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey,
+ const unsigned char *fwdkey, int nr)
+{
+ unsigned char *ik = invkey;
+ const unsigned char *fk = fwdkey + 16 * nr;
+
+ memcpy(ik, fk, 16);
+
+ for (fk -= 16, ik += 16; fk > fwdkey; fk -= 16, ik += 16) {
+ asm ("movdqu (%0), %%xmm0 \n\t"
+ AESIMC(xmm0_xmm0)
+ "movdqu %%xmm0, (%1) \n\t"
+ :
+ : "r" (fk), "r" (ik)
+ : "memory", "xmm0");
+ }
+
+ memcpy(ik, fk, 16);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Key expansion, 128-bit case
+ */
+static void aesni_setkey_enc_128(unsigned char *rk,
+ const unsigned char *key)
+{
+ asm ("movdqu (%1), %%xmm0 \n\t" // copy the original key
+ "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" // as round key 0
+ "jmp 2f \n\t" // skip auxiliary routine
+
+ /*
+ * Finish generating the next round key.
+ *
+ * On entry xmm0 is r3:r2:r1:r0 and xmm1 is X:stuff:stuff:stuff
+ * with X = rot( sub( r3 ) ) ^ RCON.
+ *
+ * On exit, xmm0 is r7:r6:r5:r4
+ * with r4 = X + r0, r5 = r4 + r1, r6 = r5 + r2, r7 = r6 + r3
+ * and those are written to the round key buffer.
+ */
+ "1: \n\t"
+ "pshufd $0xff, %%xmm1, %%xmm1 \n\t" // X:X:X:X
+ "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm1 \n\t" // X+r3:X+r2:X+r1:r4
+ "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // r2:r1:r0:0
+ "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm1 \n\t" // X+r3+r2:X+r2+r1:r5:r4
+ "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // etc
+ "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm1 \n\t"
+ "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t"
+ "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm0 \n\t" // update xmm0 for next time!
+ "add $16, %0 \n\t" // point to next round key
+ "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t" // write it
+ "ret \n\t"
+
+ /* Main "loop" */
+ "2: \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x01") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x02") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x04") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x08") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x10") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x20") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x40") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x80") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x1B") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm1, "0x36") "call 1b \n\t"
+ :
+ : "r" (rk), "r" (key)
+ : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1", "0");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key expansion, 192-bit case
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+static void aesni_setkey_enc_192(unsigned char *rk,
+ const unsigned char *key)
+{
+ asm ("movdqu (%1), %%xmm0 \n\t" // copy original round key
+ "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t"
+ "add $16, %0 \n\t"
+ "movq 16(%1), %%xmm1 \n\t"
+ "movq %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t"
+ "add $8, %0 \n\t"
+ "jmp 2f \n\t" // skip auxiliary routine
+
+ /*
+ * Finish generating the next 6 quarter-keys.
+ *
+ * On entry xmm0 is r3:r2:r1:r0, xmm1 is stuff:stuff:r5:r4
+ * and xmm2 is stuff:stuff:X:stuff with X = rot( sub( r3 ) ) ^ RCON.
+ *
+ * On exit, xmm0 is r9:r8:r7:r6 and xmm1 is stuff:stuff:r11:r10
+ * and those are written to the round key buffer.
+ */
+ "1: \n\t"
+ "pshufd $0x55, %%xmm2, %%xmm2 \n\t" // X:X:X:X
+ "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" // X+r3:X+r2:X+r1:r4
+ "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t" // etc
+ "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t"
+ "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t"
+ "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t"
+ "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t"
+ "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm0 \n\t" // update xmm0 = r9:r8:r7:r6
+ "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t"
+ "add $16, %0 \n\t"
+ "pshufd $0xff, %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t" // r9:r9:r9:r9
+ "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t" // stuff:stuff:r9+r5:r10
+ "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t" // r2:r1:r0:0
+ "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm1 \n\t" // xmm1 = stuff:stuff:r11:r10
+ "movq %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t"
+ "add $8, %0 \n\t"
+ "ret \n\t"
+
+ "2: \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x01") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x02") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x04") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x08") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x10") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x20") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x40") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x80") "call 1b \n\t"
+
+ :
+ : "r" (rk), "r" (key)
+ : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1", "xmm2", "0");
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */
+
+/*
+ * Key expansion, 256-bit case
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+static void aesni_setkey_enc_256(unsigned char *rk,
+ const unsigned char *key)
+{
+ asm ("movdqu (%1), %%xmm0 \n\t"
+ "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t"
+ "add $16, %0 \n\t"
+ "movdqu 16(%1), %%xmm1 \n\t"
+ "movdqu %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t"
+ "jmp 2f \n\t" // skip auxiliary routine
+
+ /*
+ * Finish generating the next two round keys.
+ *
+ * On entry xmm0 is r3:r2:r1:r0, xmm1 is r7:r6:r5:r4 and
+ * xmm2 is X:stuff:stuff:stuff with X = rot( sub( r7 )) ^ RCON
+ *
+ * On exit, xmm0 is r11:r10:r9:r8 and xmm1 is r15:r14:r13:r12
+ * and those have been written to the output buffer.
+ */
+ "1: \n\t"
+ "pshufd $0xff, %%xmm2, %%xmm2 \n\t"
+ "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t"
+ "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t"
+ "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t"
+ "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t"
+ "pxor %%xmm0, %%xmm2 \n\t"
+ "pslldq $4, %%xmm0 \n\t"
+ "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm0 \n\t"
+ "add $16, %0 \n\t"
+ "movdqu %%xmm0, (%0) \n\t"
+
+ /* Set xmm2 to stuff:Y:stuff:stuff with Y = subword( r11 )
+ * and proceed to generate next round key from there */
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm0_xmm2, "0x00")
+ "pshufd $0xaa, %%xmm2, %%xmm2 \n\t"
+ "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t"
+ "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t"
+ "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t"
+ "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t"
+ "pxor %%xmm1, %%xmm2 \n\t"
+ "pslldq $4, %%xmm1 \n\t"
+ "pxor %%xmm2, %%xmm1 \n\t"
+ "add $16, %0 \n\t"
+ "movdqu %%xmm1, (%0) \n\t"
+ "ret \n\t"
+
+ /*
+ * Main "loop" - Generating one more key than necessary,
+ * see definition of mbedtls_aes_context.buf
+ */
+ "2: \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x01") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x02") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x04") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x08") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x10") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x20") "call 1b \n\t"
+ AESKEYGENA(xmm1_xmm2, "0x40") "call 1b \n\t"
+ :
+ : "r" (rk), "r" (key)
+ : "memory", "cc", "xmm0", "xmm1", "xmm2", "0");
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */
+
+/*
+ * Key expansion, wrapper
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ size_t bits)
+{
+ switch (bits) {
+ case 128: aesni_setkey_enc_128(rk, key); break;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ case 192: aesni_setkey_enc_192(rk, key); break;
+ case 256: aesni_setkey_enc_256(rk, key); break;
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */
+ default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/aesni.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/aesni.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59e27af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/aesni.h
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/**
+ * \file aesni.h
+ *
+ * \brief AES-NI for hardware AES acceleration on some Intel processors
+ *
+ * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library
+ * functions; you must not call them directly.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_AESNI_H
+#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
+
+#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES 0x02000000u
+#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL 0x00000002u
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C) && \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86))
+
+/* Can we do AESNI with intrinsics?
+ * (Only implemented with certain compilers, only for certain targets.)
+ */
+#undef MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__clang__)
+/* Visual Studio supports AESNI intrinsics since VS 2008 SP1. We only support
+ * VS 2013 and up for other reasons anyway, so no need to check the version. */
+#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS
+#endif
+/* GCC-like compilers: currently, we only support intrinsics if the requisite
+ * target flag is enabled when building the library (e.g. `gcc -mpclmul -msse2`
+ * or `clang -maes -mpclmul`). */
+#if (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) && defined(__AES__) && defined(__PCLMUL__)
+#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS
+#endif
+/* For 32-bit, we only support intrinsics */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) && (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__))
+#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS
+#endif
+
+/* Choose the implementation of AESNI, if one is available.
+ *
+ * Favor the intrinsics-based implementation if it's available, for better
+ * maintainability.
+ * Performance is about the same (see #7380).
+ * In the long run, we will likely remove the assembly implementation. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_INTRINSICS)
+#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE 2 // via intrinsics
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
+ (defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__)) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64)
+/* Can we do AESNI with inline assembly?
+ * (Only implemented with gas syntax, only for 64-bit.)
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE 1 // via assembly
+#else
+#error "MBEDTLS_AESNI_C defined, but neither intrinsics nor assembly available"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal function to detect the AES-NI feature in CPUs.
+ *
+ * \note This function is only for internal use by other library
+ * functions; you must not call it directly.
+ *
+ * \param what The feature to detect
+ * (MBEDTLS_AESNI_AES or MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL)
+ *
+ * \return 1 if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_USE_HARDWARE_ONLY)
+int mbedtls_aesni_has_support(unsigned int what);
+#else
+#define mbedtls_aesni_has_support(what) 1
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal AES-NI AES-ECB block encryption and decryption
+ *
+ * \note This function is only for internal use by other library
+ * functions; you must not call it directly.
+ *
+ * \param ctx AES context
+ * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT
+ * \param input 16-byte input block
+ * \param output 16-byte output block
+ *
+ * \return 0 on success (cannot fail)
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesni_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal GCM multiplication: c = a * b in GF(2^128)
+ *
+ * \note This function is only for internal use by other library
+ * functions; you must not call it directly.
+ *
+ * \param c Result
+ * \param a First operand
+ * \param b Second operand
+ *
+ * \note Both operands and result are bit strings interpreted as
+ * elements of GF(2^128) as per the GCM spec.
+ */
+void mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(unsigned char c[16],
+ const unsigned char a[16],
+ const unsigned char b[16]);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+/**
+ * \brief Internal round key inversion. This function computes
+ * decryption round keys from the encryption round keys.
+ *
+ * \note This function is only for internal use by other library
+ * functions; you must not call it directly.
+ *
+ * \param invkey Round keys for the equivalent inverse cipher
+ * \param fwdkey Original round keys (for encryption)
+ * \param nr Number of rounds (that is, number of round keys minus one)
+ */
+void mbedtls_aesni_inverse_key(unsigned char *invkey,
+ const unsigned char *fwdkey,
+ int nr);
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal key expansion for encryption
+ *
+ * \note This function is only for internal use by other library
+ * functions; you must not call it directly.
+ *
+ * \param rk Destination buffer where the round keys are written
+ * \param key Encryption key
+ * \param bits Key size in bits (must be 128, 192 or 256)
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH
+ */
+int mbedtls_aesni_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ size_t bits);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_C && (MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64 || MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AESNI_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/alignment.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/alignment.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a17001d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/alignment.h
@@ -0,0 +1,684 @@
+/**
+ * \file alignment.h
+ *
+ * \brief Utility code for dealing with unaligned memory accesses
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_ALIGNMENT_H
+#define MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_ALIGNMENT_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/*
+ * Define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS for architectures where unaligned memory
+ * accesses are known to be efficient.
+ *
+ * All functions defined here will behave correctly regardless, but might be less
+ * efficient when this is not defined.
+ */
+#if defined(__ARM_FEATURE_UNALIGNED) \
+ || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) \
+ || defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64)
+/*
+ * __ARM_FEATURE_UNALIGNED is defined where appropriate by armcc, gcc 7, clang 9
+ * (and later versions) for Arm v7 and later; all x86 platforms should have
+ * efficient unaligned access.
+ *
+ * https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/build/arm64-windows-abi-conventions?view=msvc-170#alignment
+ * specifies that on Windows-on-Arm64, unaligned access is safe (except for uncached
+ * device memory).
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) && \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) \
+ || defined(__ICCRX__) || defined(__ICCRL78__) || defined(__ICCRISCV__))
+#pragma language=save
+#pragma language=extended
+#define MBEDTLS_POP_IAR_LANGUAGE_PRAGMA
+/* IAR recommend this technique for accessing unaligned data in
+ * https://www.iar.com/knowledge/support/technical-notes/compiler/accessing-unaligned-data
+ * This results in a single load / store instruction (if unaligned access is supported).
+ * According to that document, this is only supported on certain architectures.
+ */
+ #define UINT_UNALIGNED
+typedef uint16_t __packed mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t;
+typedef uint32_t __packed mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t;
+typedef uint64_t __packed mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t;
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 40504) && \
+ ((MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION < 60300) || (!defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)))
+/*
+ * gcc may generate a branch to memcpy for calls like `memcpy(dest, src, 4)` rather than
+ * generating some LDR or LDRB instructions (similar for stores).
+ *
+ * This is architecture dependent: x86-64 seems fine even with old gcc; 32-bit Arm
+ * is affected. To keep it simple, we enable for all architectures.
+ *
+ * For versions of gcc < 5.4.0 this issue always happens.
+ * For gcc < 6.3.0, this issue happens at -O0
+ * For all versions, this issue happens iff unaligned access is not supported.
+ *
+ * For gcc 4.x, this implementation will generate byte-by-byte loads even if unaligned access is
+ * supported, which is correct but not optimal.
+ *
+ * For performance (and code size, in some cases), we want to avoid the branch and just generate
+ * some inline load/store instructions since the access is small and constant-size.
+ *
+ * The manual states:
+ * "The packed attribute specifies that a variable or structure field should have the smallest
+ * possible alignment—one byte for a variable"
+ * https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.5.4/gcc/Variable-Attributes.html
+ *
+ * Previous implementations used __attribute__((__aligned__(1)), but had issues with a gcc bug:
+ * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=94662
+ *
+ * Tested with several versions of GCC from 4.5.0 up to 13.2.0
+ * We don't enable for older than 4.5.0 as this has not been tested.
+ */
+ #define UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT
+typedef struct {
+ uint16_t x;
+} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t;
+typedef struct {
+ uint32_t x;
+} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t;
+typedef struct {
+ uint64_t x;
+} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t;
+ #endif
+
+/*
+ * We try to force mbedtls_(get|put)_unaligned_uintXX to be always inline, because this results
+ * in code that is both smaller and faster. IAR and gcc both benefit from this when optimising
+ * for size.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Read the unsigned 16 bits integer from the given address, which need not
+ * be aligned.
+ *
+ * \param p pointer to 2 bytes of data
+ * \return Data at the given address
+ */
+#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
+#pragma inline = forced
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+__attribute__((always_inline))
+#endif
+static inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p)
+{
+ uint16_t r;
+#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
+ mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p;
+ r = *p16;
+#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT)
+ mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p;
+ r = p16->x;
+#else
+ memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r));
+#endif
+ return r;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Write the unsigned 16 bits integer to the given address, which need not
+ * be aligned.
+ *
+ * \param p pointer to 2 bytes of data
+ * \param x data to write
+ */
+#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
+#pragma inline = forced
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+__attribute__((always_inline))
+#endif
+static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x)
+{
+#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
+ mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p;
+ *p16 = x;
+#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT)
+ mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p;
+ p16->x = x;
+#else
+ memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x));
+#endif
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the unsigned 32 bits integer from the given address, which need not
+ * be aligned.
+ *
+ * \param p pointer to 4 bytes of data
+ * \return Data at the given address
+ */
+#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
+#pragma inline = forced
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+__attribute__((always_inline))
+#endif
+static inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
+ mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p;
+ r = *p32;
+#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT)
+ mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p;
+ r = p32->x;
+#else
+ memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r));
+#endif
+ return r;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Write the unsigned 32 bits integer to the given address, which need not
+ * be aligned.
+ *
+ * \param p pointer to 4 bytes of data
+ * \param x data to write
+ */
+#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
+#pragma inline = forced
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+__attribute__((always_inline))
+#endif
+static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x)
+{
+#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
+ mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p;
+ *p32 = x;
+#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT)
+ mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p;
+ p32->x = x;
+#else
+ memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x));
+#endif
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read the unsigned 64 bits integer from the given address, which need not
+ * be aligned.
+ *
+ * \param p pointer to 8 bytes of data
+ * \return Data at the given address
+ */
+#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
+#pragma inline = forced
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+__attribute__((always_inline))
+#endif
+static inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p)
+{
+ uint64_t r;
+#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
+ mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p;
+ r = *p64;
+#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT)
+ mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p;
+ r = p64->x;
+#else
+ memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r));
+#endif
+ return r;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Write the unsigned 64 bits integer to the given address, which need not
+ * be aligned.
+ *
+ * \param p pointer to 8 bytes of data
+ * \param x data to write
+ */
+#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
+#pragma inline = forced
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+__attribute__((always_inline))
+#endif
+static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(void *p, uint64_t x)
+{
+#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED)
+ mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p;
+ *p64 = x;
+#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT)
+ mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p;
+ p64->x = x;
+#else
+ memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x));
+#endif
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_IAR_LANGUAGE_PRAGMA)
+#pragma language=restore
+#endif
+
+/** Byte Reading Macros
+ *
+ * Given a multi-byte integer \p x, MBEDTLS_BYTE_n retrieves the n-th
+ * byte from x, where byte 0 is the least significant byte.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x) ((uint8_t) ((x) & 0xff))
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 8) & 0xff))
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 16) & 0xff))
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 24) & 0xff))
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_4(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 32) & 0xff))
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_5(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 40) & 0xff))
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_6(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 48) & 0xff))
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTE_7(x) ((uint8_t) (((x) >> 56) & 0xff))
+
+/*
+ * Detect GCC built-in byteswap routines
+ */
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ)
+#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4, 8)
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 __builtin_bswap16
+#endif /* __GNUC_PREREQ(4,8) */
+#if __GNUC_PREREQ(4, 3)
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __builtin_bswap32
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 __builtin_bswap64
+#endif /* __GNUC_PREREQ(4,3) */
+#endif /* defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__GNUC_PREREQ) */
+
+/*
+ * Detect Clang built-in byteswap routines
+ */
+#if defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin)
+#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap16) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16)
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 __builtin_bswap16
+#endif /* __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap16) */
+#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32)
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __builtin_bswap32
+#endif /* __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap32) */
+#if __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64)
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 __builtin_bswap64
+#endif /* __has_builtin(__builtin_bswap64) */
+#endif /* defined(__clang__) && defined(__has_builtin) */
+
+/*
+ * Detect MSVC built-in byteswap routines
+ */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16)
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 _byteswap_ushort
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32)
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 _byteswap_ulong
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64)
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 _byteswap_uint64
+#endif
+#endif /* defined(_MSC_VER) */
+
+/* Detect armcc built-in byteswap routine */
+#if defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && (__ARMCC_VERSION >= 410000) && !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32)
+#if defined(__ARM_ACLE) /* ARM Compiler 6 - earlier versions don't need a header */
+#include <arm_acle.h>
+#endif
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __rev
+#endif
+
+/* Detect IAR built-in byteswap routine */
+#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
+#if defined(__ARM_ACLE)
+#include <arm_acle.h>
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16(x) ((uint16_t) __rev16((uint32_t) (x)))
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 __rev
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 __revll
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Where compiler built-ins are not present, fall back to C code that the
+ * compiler may be able to detect and transform into the relevant bswap or
+ * similar instruction.
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16)
+static inline uint16_t mbedtls_bswap16(uint16_t x)
+{
+ return
+ (x & 0x00ff) << 8 |
+ (x & 0xff00) >> 8;
+}
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP16 mbedtls_bswap16
+#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP16) */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32)
+static inline uint32_t mbedtls_bswap32(uint32_t x)
+{
+ return
+ (x & 0x000000ff) << 24 |
+ (x & 0x0000ff00) << 8 |
+ (x & 0x00ff0000) >> 8 |
+ (x & 0xff000000) >> 24;
+}
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP32 mbedtls_bswap32
+#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP32) */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64)
+static inline uint64_t mbedtls_bswap64(uint64_t x)
+{
+ return
+ (x & 0x00000000000000ffULL) << 56 |
+ (x & 0x000000000000ff00ULL) << 40 |
+ (x & 0x0000000000ff0000ULL) << 24 |
+ (x & 0x00000000ff000000ULL) << 8 |
+ (x & 0x000000ff00000000ULL) >> 8 |
+ (x & 0x0000ff0000000000ULL) >> 24 |
+ (x & 0x00ff000000000000ULL) >> 40 |
+ (x & 0xff00000000000000ULL) >> 56;
+}
+#define MBEDTLS_BSWAP64 mbedtls_bswap64
+#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_BSWAP64) */
+
+#if !defined(__BYTE_ORDER__)
+
+#if defined(__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
+/* IAR defines __xxx_ENDIAN__, but not __BYTE_ORDER__ */
+#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 0
+#elif defined(__BIG_ENDIAN__)
+#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 1
+#else
+static const uint16_t mbedtls_byte_order_detector = { 0x100 };
+#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN (*((unsigned char *) (&mbedtls_byte_order_detector)) == 0x01)
+#endif
+
+#else
+
+#if (__BYTE_ORDER__) == (__ORDER_BIG_ENDIAN__)
+#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 1
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN 0
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !defined(__BYTE_ORDER__) */
+
+/**
+ * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in
+ * big-endian order (MSB first).
+ *
+ * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from.
+ * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and most significant
+ * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned
+ * integer from.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(data, offset) \
+ ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \
+ ? mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset)) \
+ : MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset))) \
+ )
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32
+ * bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the most significant
+ * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(n, data, offset) \
+ { \
+ if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \
+ { \
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), (uint32_t) (n)); \
+ } \
+ else \
+ { \
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP32((uint32_t) (n))); \
+ } \
+ }
+
+/**
+ * Get the unsigned 32 bits integer corresponding to four bytes in
+ * little-endian order (LSB first).
+ *
+ * \param data Base address of the memory to get the four bytes from.
+ * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and least significant
+ * byte of the four bytes to build the 32 bits unsigned
+ * integer from.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, offset) \
+ ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \
+ ? MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset))) \
+ : mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset)) \
+ )
+
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 32 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param n 32 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 32
+ * bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the least significant
+ * byte of the 32 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(n, data, offset) \
+ { \
+ if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \
+ { \
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP32((uint32_t) (n))); \
+ } \
+ else \
+ { \
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((data) + (offset), ((uint32_t) (n))); \
+ } \
+ }
+
+/**
+ * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in
+ * little-endian order (LSB first).
+ *
+ * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from.
+ * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and least significant
+ * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned
+ * integer from.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE(data, offset) \
+ ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \
+ ? MBEDTLS_BSWAP16(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset))) \
+ : mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset)) \
+ )
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16
+ * bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the least significant
+ * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_LE(n, data, offset) \
+ { \
+ if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \
+ { \
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP16((uint16_t) (n))); \
+ } \
+ else \
+ { \
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), (uint16_t) (n)); \
+ } \
+ }
+
+/**
+ * Get the unsigned 16 bits integer corresponding to two bytes in
+ * big-endian order (MSB first).
+ *
+ * \param data Base address of the memory to get the two bytes from.
+ * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and most significant
+ * byte of the two bytes to build the 16 bits unsigned
+ * integer from.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(data, offset) \
+ ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \
+ ? mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset)) \
+ : MBEDTLS_BSWAP16(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset))) \
+ )
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 16 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param n 16 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 16
+ * bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the most significant
+ * byte of the 16 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(n, data, offset) \
+ { \
+ if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \
+ { \
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), (uint16_t) (n)); \
+ } \
+ else \
+ { \
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP16((uint16_t) (n))); \
+ } \
+ }
+
+/**
+ * Get the unsigned 24 bits integer corresponding to three bytes in
+ * big-endian order (MSB first).
+ *
+ * \param data Base address of the memory to get the three bytes from.
+ * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and most significant
+ * byte of the three bytes to build the 24 bits unsigned
+ * integer from.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_BE(data, offset) \
+ ( \
+ ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset)] << 16) \
+ | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 8) \
+ | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 2]) \
+ )
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 24 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param n 24 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 24
+ * bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the most significant
+ * byte of the 24 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_BE(n, data, offset) \
+ { \
+ (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); \
+ (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \
+ (data)[(offset) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \
+ }
+
+/**
+ * Get the unsigned 24 bits integer corresponding to three bytes in
+ * little-endian order (LSB first).
+ *
+ * \param data Base address of the memory to get the three bytes from.
+ * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and least significant
+ * byte of the three bytes to build the 24 bits unsigned
+ * integer from.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT24_LE(data, offset) \
+ ( \
+ ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset)]) \
+ | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 1] << 8) \
+ | ((uint32_t) (data)[(offset) + 2] << 16) \
+ )
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 24 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param n 24 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 24
+ * bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the least significant
+ * byte of the 24 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT24_LE(n, data, offset) \
+ { \
+ (data)[(offset)] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \
+ (data)[(offset) + 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \
+ (data)[(offset) + 2] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(n); \
+ }
+
+/**
+ * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in
+ * big-endian order (MSB first).
+ *
+ * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from.
+ * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and most significant
+ * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned
+ * integer from.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(data, offset) \
+ ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \
+ ? mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset)) \
+ : MBEDTLS_BSWAP64(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset))) \
+ )
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in big-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64
+ * bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the most significant
+ * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(n, data, offset) \
+ { \
+ if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \
+ { \
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), (uint64_t) (n)); \
+ } \
+ else \
+ { \
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP64((uint64_t) (n))); \
+ } \
+ }
+
+/**
+ * Get the unsigned 64 bits integer corresponding to eight bytes in
+ * little-endian order (LSB first).
+ *
+ * \param data Base address of the memory to get the eight bytes from.
+ * \param offset Offset from \p data of the first and least significant
+ * byte of the eight bytes to build the 64 bits unsigned
+ * integer from.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_LE(data, offset) \
+ ((MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \
+ ? MBEDTLS_BSWAP64(mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset))) \
+ : mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset)) \
+ )
+
+/**
+ * Put in memory a 64 bits unsigned integer in little-endian order.
+ *
+ * \param n 64 bits unsigned integer to put in memory.
+ * \param data Base address of the memory where to put the 64
+ * bits unsigned integer in.
+ * \param offset Offset from \p data where to put the least significant
+ * byte of the 64 bits unsigned integer \p n.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(n, data, offset) \
+ { \
+ if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) \
+ { \
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), MBEDTLS_BSWAP64((uint64_t) (n))); \
+ } \
+ else \
+ { \
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64((data) + (offset), (uint64_t) (n)); \
+ } \
+ }
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_ALIGNMENT_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/aria.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/aria.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d9f84cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/aria.c
@@ -0,0 +1,969 @@
+/*
+ * ARIA implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This implementation is based on the following standards:
+ * [1] http://210.104.33.10/ARIA/doc/ARIA-specification-e.pdf
+ * [2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5794
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/aria.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT)
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+/*
+ * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( B A D C ), i.e. swap pairs of bytes
+ *
+ * This is submatrix P1 in [1] Appendix B.1
+ *
+ * Common compilers fail to translate this to minimal number of instructions,
+ * so let's provide asm versions for common platforms with C fallback.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM)
+#if defined(__arm__) /* rev16 available from v6 up */
+/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && \
+ (!defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000) && \
+ __ARM_ARCH >= 6
+static inline uint32_t aria_p1(uint32_t x)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+ __asm("rev16 %0, %1" : "=l" (r) : "l" (x));
+ return r;
+}
+#define ARIA_P1 aria_p1
+#elif defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && __ARMCC_VERSION < 6000000 && \
+ (__TARGET_ARCH_ARM >= 6 || __TARGET_ARCH_THUMB >= 3)
+static inline uint32_t aria_p1(uint32_t x)
+{
+ uint32_t r;
+ __asm("rev16 r, x");
+ return r;
+}
+#define ARIA_P1 aria_p1
+#endif
+#endif /* arm */
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && \
+ defined(__i386__) || defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__)
+/* I couldn't find an Intel equivalent of rev16, so two instructions */
+#define ARIA_P1(x) ARIA_P2(ARIA_P3(x))
+#endif /* x86 gnuc */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM && GNUC */
+#if !defined(ARIA_P1)
+#define ARIA_P1(x) ((((x) >> 8) & 0x00FF00FF) ^ (((x) & 0x00FF00FF) << 8))
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( C D A B ), i.e. rotate by 16 bits
+ *
+ * This is submatrix P2 in [1] Appendix B.1
+ *
+ * Common compilers will translate this to a single instruction.
+ */
+#define ARIA_P2(x) (((x) >> 16) ^ ((x) << 16))
+
+/*
+ * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( D C B A ), i.e. change endianness
+ *
+ * This is submatrix P3 in [1] Appendix B.1
+ */
+#define ARIA_P3(x) MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(x)
+
+/*
+ * ARIA Affine Transform
+ * (a, b, c, d) = state in/out
+ *
+ * If we denote the first byte of input by 0, ..., the last byte by f,
+ * then inputs are: a = 0123, b = 4567, c = 89ab, d = cdef.
+ *
+ * Reading [1] 2.4 or [2] 2.4.3 in columns and performing simple
+ * rearrangements on adjacent pairs, output is:
+ *
+ * a = 3210 + 4545 + 6767 + 88aa + 99bb + dccd + effe
+ * = 3210 + 4567 + 6745 + 89ab + 98ba + dcfe + efcd
+ * b = 0101 + 2323 + 5476 + 8998 + baab + eecc + ffdd
+ * = 0123 + 2301 + 5476 + 89ab + ba98 + efcd + fedc
+ * c = 0022 + 1133 + 4554 + 7667 + ab89 + dcdc + fefe
+ * = 0123 + 1032 + 4567 + 7654 + ab89 + dcfe + fedc
+ * d = 1001 + 2332 + 6644 + 7755 + 9898 + baba + cdef
+ * = 1032 + 2301 + 6745 + 7654 + 98ba + ba98 + cdef
+ *
+ * Note: another presentation of the A transform can be found as the first
+ * half of App. B.1 in [1] in terms of 4-byte operators P1, P2, P3 and P4.
+ * The implementation below uses only P1 and P2 as they are sufficient.
+ */
+static inline void aria_a(uint32_t *a, uint32_t *b,
+ uint32_t *c, uint32_t *d)
+{
+ uint32_t ta, tb, tc;
+ ta = *b; // 4567
+ *b = *a; // 0123
+ *a = ARIA_P2(ta); // 6745
+ tb = ARIA_P2(*d); // efcd
+ *d = ARIA_P1(*c); // 98ba
+ *c = ARIA_P1(tb); // fedc
+ ta ^= *d; // 4567+98ba
+ tc = ARIA_P2(*b); // 2301
+ ta = ARIA_P1(ta) ^ tc ^ *c; // 2301+5476+89ab+fedc
+ tb ^= ARIA_P2(*d); // ba98+efcd
+ tc ^= ARIA_P1(*a); // 2301+7654
+ *b ^= ta ^ tb; // 0123+2301+5476+89ab+ba98+efcd+fedc OUT
+ tb = ARIA_P2(tb) ^ ta; // 2301+5476+89ab+98ba+cdef+fedc
+ *a ^= ARIA_P1(tb); // 3210+4567+6745+89ab+98ba+dcfe+efcd OUT
+ ta = ARIA_P2(ta); // 0123+7654+ab89+dcfe
+ *d ^= ARIA_P1(ta) ^ tc; // 1032+2301+6745+7654+98ba+ba98+cdef OUT
+ tc = ARIA_P2(tc); // 0123+5476
+ *c ^= ARIA_P1(tc) ^ ta; // 0123+1032+4567+7654+ab89+dcfe+fedc OUT
+}
+
+/*
+ * ARIA Substitution Layer SL1 / SL2
+ * (a, b, c, d) = state in/out
+ * (sa, sb, sc, sd) = 256 8-bit S-Boxes (see below)
+ *
+ * By passing sb1, sb2, is1, is2 as S-Boxes you get SL1
+ * By passing is1, is2, sb1, sb2 as S-Boxes you get SL2
+ */
+static inline void aria_sl(uint32_t *a, uint32_t *b,
+ uint32_t *c, uint32_t *d,
+ const uint8_t sa[256], const uint8_t sb[256],
+ const uint8_t sc[256], const uint8_t sd[256])
+{
+ *a = ((uint32_t) sa[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(*a)]) ^
+ (((uint32_t) sb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*a)]) << 8) ^
+ (((uint32_t) sc[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(*a)]) << 16) ^
+ (((uint32_t) sd[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(*a)]) << 24);
+ *b = ((uint32_t) sa[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(*b)]) ^
+ (((uint32_t) sb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*b)]) << 8) ^
+ (((uint32_t) sc[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(*b)]) << 16) ^
+ (((uint32_t) sd[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(*b)]) << 24);
+ *c = ((uint32_t) sa[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(*c)]) ^
+ (((uint32_t) sb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*c)]) << 8) ^
+ (((uint32_t) sc[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(*c)]) << 16) ^
+ (((uint32_t) sd[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(*c)]) << 24);
+ *d = ((uint32_t) sa[MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(*d)]) ^
+ (((uint32_t) sb[MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(*d)]) << 8) ^
+ (((uint32_t) sc[MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(*d)]) << 16) ^
+ (((uint32_t) sd[MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(*d)]) << 24);
+}
+
+/*
+ * S-Boxes
+ */
+static const uint8_t aria_sb1[256] =
+{
+ 0x63, 0x7C, 0x77, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC5, 0x30, 0x01, 0x67, 0x2B,
+ 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xAB, 0x76, 0xCA, 0x82, 0xC9, 0x7D, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x47, 0xF0,
+ 0xAD, 0xD4, 0xA2, 0xAF, 0x9C, 0xA4, 0x72, 0xC0, 0xB7, 0xFD, 0x93, 0x26,
+ 0x36, 0x3F, 0xF7, 0xCC, 0x34, 0xA5, 0xE5, 0xF1, 0x71, 0xD8, 0x31, 0x15,
+ 0x04, 0xC7, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x18, 0x96, 0x05, 0x9A, 0x07, 0x12, 0x80, 0xE2,
+ 0xEB, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x75, 0x09, 0x83, 0x2C, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xA0,
+ 0x52, 0x3B, 0xD6, 0xB3, 0x29, 0xE3, 0x2F, 0x84, 0x53, 0xD1, 0x00, 0xED,
+ 0x20, 0xFC, 0xB1, 0x5B, 0x6A, 0xCB, 0xBE, 0x39, 0x4A, 0x4C, 0x58, 0xCF,
+ 0xD0, 0xEF, 0xAA, 0xFB, 0x43, 0x4D, 0x33, 0x85, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x02, 0x7F,
+ 0x50, 0x3C, 0x9F, 0xA8, 0x51, 0xA3, 0x40, 0x8F, 0x92, 0x9D, 0x38, 0xF5,
+ 0xBC, 0xB6, 0xDA, 0x21, 0x10, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0xD2, 0xCD, 0x0C, 0x13, 0xEC,
+ 0x5F, 0x97, 0x44, 0x17, 0xC4, 0xA7, 0x7E, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x5D, 0x19, 0x73,
+ 0x60, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x22, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x88, 0x46, 0xEE, 0xB8, 0x14,
+ 0xDE, 0x5E, 0x0B, 0xDB, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x0A, 0x49, 0x06, 0x24, 0x5C,
+ 0xC2, 0xD3, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x91, 0x95, 0xE4, 0x79, 0xE7, 0xC8, 0x37, 0x6D,
+ 0x8D, 0xD5, 0x4E, 0xA9, 0x6C, 0x56, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0x65, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0x08,
+ 0xBA, 0x78, 0x25, 0x2E, 0x1C, 0xA6, 0xB4, 0xC6, 0xE8, 0xDD, 0x74, 0x1F,
+ 0x4B, 0xBD, 0x8B, 0x8A, 0x70, 0x3E, 0xB5, 0x66, 0x48, 0x03, 0xF6, 0x0E,
+ 0x61, 0x35, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x86, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0x9E, 0xE1, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x11,
+ 0x69, 0xD9, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x9B, 0x1E, 0x87, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0x55, 0x28, 0xDF,
+ 0x8C, 0xA1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x42, 0x68, 0x41, 0x99, 0x2D, 0x0F,
+ 0xB0, 0x54, 0xBB, 0x16
+};
+
+static const uint8_t aria_sb2[256] =
+{
+ 0xE2, 0x4E, 0x54, 0xFC, 0x94, 0xC2, 0x4A, 0xCC, 0x62, 0x0D, 0x6A, 0x46,
+ 0x3C, 0x4D, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x5E, 0xFA, 0x64, 0xCB, 0xB4, 0x97, 0xBE, 0x2B,
+ 0xBC, 0x77, 0x2E, 0x03, 0xD3, 0x19, 0x59, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0x06, 0x41, 0x6B,
+ 0x55, 0xF0, 0x99, 0x69, 0xEA, 0x9C, 0x18, 0xAE, 0x63, 0xDF, 0xE7, 0xBB,
+ 0x00, 0x73, 0x66, 0xFB, 0x96, 0x4C, 0x85, 0xE4, 0x3A, 0x09, 0x45, 0xAA,
+ 0x0F, 0xEE, 0x10, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x7F, 0xF4, 0x29, 0xAC, 0xCF, 0xAD, 0x91,
+ 0x8D, 0x78, 0xC8, 0x95, 0xF9, 0x2F, 0xCE, 0xCD, 0x08, 0x7A, 0x88, 0x38,
+ 0x5C, 0x83, 0x2A, 0x28, 0x47, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0xC7, 0x93, 0xA4, 0x12, 0x53,
+ 0xFF, 0x87, 0x0E, 0x31, 0x36, 0x21, 0x58, 0x48, 0x01, 0x8E, 0x37, 0x74,
+ 0x32, 0xCA, 0xE9, 0xB1, 0xB7, 0xAB, 0x0C, 0xD7, 0xC4, 0x56, 0x42, 0x26,
+ 0x07, 0x98, 0x60, 0xD9, 0xB6, 0xB9, 0x11, 0x40, 0xEC, 0x20, 0x8C, 0xBD,
+ 0xA0, 0xC9, 0x84, 0x04, 0x49, 0x23, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0x50, 0x1F, 0x13, 0xDC,
+ 0xD8, 0xC0, 0x9E, 0x57, 0xE3, 0xC3, 0x7B, 0x65, 0x3B, 0x02, 0x8F, 0x3E,
+ 0xE8, 0x25, 0x92, 0xE5, 0x15, 0xDD, 0xFD, 0x17, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xD4, 0x9A,
+ 0x7E, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x67, 0xFE, 0x76, 0x9D, 0x43, 0xA7, 0xE1, 0xD0, 0xF5,
+ 0x68, 0xF2, 0x1B, 0x34, 0x70, 0x05, 0xA3, 0x8A, 0xD5, 0x79, 0x86, 0xA8,
+ 0x30, 0xC6, 0x51, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0xA6, 0x27, 0xF6, 0x35, 0xD2, 0x6E, 0x24,
+ 0x16, 0x82, 0x5F, 0xDA, 0xE6, 0x75, 0xA2, 0xEF, 0x2C, 0xB2, 0x1C, 0x9F,
+ 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x80, 0x0A, 0x72, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x6C, 0x90, 0x0B, 0x5B, 0x33,
+ 0x7D, 0x5A, 0x52, 0xF3, 0x61, 0xA1, 0xF7, 0xB0, 0xD6, 0x3F, 0x7C, 0x6D,
+ 0xED, 0x14, 0xE0, 0xA5, 0x3D, 0x22, 0xB3, 0xF8, 0x89, 0xDE, 0x71, 0x1A,
+ 0xAF, 0xBA, 0xB5, 0x81
+};
+
+static const uint8_t aria_is1[256] =
+{
+ 0x52, 0x09, 0x6A, 0xD5, 0x30, 0x36, 0xA5, 0x38, 0xBF, 0x40, 0xA3, 0x9E,
+ 0x81, 0xF3, 0xD7, 0xFB, 0x7C, 0xE3, 0x39, 0x82, 0x9B, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x87,
+ 0x34, 0x8E, 0x43, 0x44, 0xC4, 0xDE, 0xE9, 0xCB, 0x54, 0x7B, 0x94, 0x32,
+ 0xA6, 0xC2, 0x23, 0x3D, 0xEE, 0x4C, 0x95, 0x0B, 0x42, 0xFA, 0xC3, 0x4E,
+ 0x08, 0x2E, 0xA1, 0x66, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x24, 0xB2, 0x76, 0x5B, 0xA2, 0x49,
+ 0x6D, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x25, 0x72, 0xF8, 0xF6, 0x64, 0x86, 0x68, 0x98, 0x16,
+ 0xD4, 0xA4, 0x5C, 0xCC, 0x5D, 0x65, 0xB6, 0x92, 0x6C, 0x70, 0x48, 0x50,
+ 0xFD, 0xED, 0xB9, 0xDA, 0x5E, 0x15, 0x46, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x9D, 0x84,
+ 0x90, 0xD8, 0xAB, 0x00, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0xD3, 0x0A, 0xF7, 0xE4, 0x58, 0x05,
+ 0xB8, 0xB3, 0x45, 0x06, 0xD0, 0x2C, 0x1E, 0x8F, 0xCA, 0x3F, 0x0F, 0x02,
+ 0xC1, 0xAF, 0xBD, 0x03, 0x01, 0x13, 0x8A, 0x6B, 0x3A, 0x91, 0x11, 0x41,
+ 0x4F, 0x67, 0xDC, 0xEA, 0x97, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0xCE, 0xF0, 0xB4, 0xE6, 0x73,
+ 0x96, 0xAC, 0x74, 0x22, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x35, 0x85, 0xE2, 0xF9, 0x37, 0xE8,
+ 0x1C, 0x75, 0xDF, 0x6E, 0x47, 0xF1, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x1D, 0x29, 0xC5, 0x89,
+ 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x62, 0x0E, 0xAA, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x1B, 0xFC, 0x56, 0x3E, 0x4B,
+ 0xC6, 0xD2, 0x79, 0x20, 0x9A, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xCD, 0x5A, 0xF4,
+ 0x1F, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x33, 0x88, 0x07, 0xC7, 0x31, 0xB1, 0x12, 0x10, 0x59,
+ 0x27, 0x80, 0xEC, 0x5F, 0x60, 0x51, 0x7F, 0xA9, 0x19, 0xB5, 0x4A, 0x0D,
+ 0x2D, 0xE5, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0x93, 0xC9, 0x9C, 0xEF, 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x3B, 0x4D,
+ 0xAE, 0x2A, 0xF5, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0xEB, 0xBB, 0x3C, 0x83, 0x53, 0x99, 0x61,
+ 0x17, 0x2B, 0x04, 0x7E, 0xBA, 0x77, 0xD6, 0x26, 0xE1, 0x69, 0x14, 0x63,
+ 0x55, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x7D
+};
+
+static const uint8_t aria_is2[256] =
+{
+ 0x30, 0x68, 0x99, 0x1B, 0x87, 0xB9, 0x21, 0x78, 0x50, 0x39, 0xDB, 0xE1,
+ 0x72, 0x09, 0x62, 0x3C, 0x3E, 0x7E, 0x5E, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0xA0, 0xCC, 0xA3,
+ 0x2A, 0x1D, 0xFB, 0xB6, 0xD6, 0x20, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0x81, 0x65, 0xF5, 0x89,
+ 0xCB, 0x9D, 0x77, 0xC6, 0x57, 0x43, 0x56, 0x17, 0xD4, 0x40, 0x1A, 0x4D,
+ 0xC0, 0x63, 0x6C, 0xE3, 0xB7, 0xC8, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x53, 0xAA, 0x38, 0x98,
+ 0x0C, 0xF4, 0x9B, 0xED, 0x7F, 0x22, 0x76, 0xAF, 0xDD, 0x3A, 0x0B, 0x58,
+ 0x67, 0x88, 0x06, 0xC3, 0x35, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x8B, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0xE6, 0x5F,
+ 0x02, 0x24, 0x75, 0x93, 0x66, 0x1E, 0xE5, 0xE2, 0x54, 0xD8, 0x10, 0xCE,
+ 0x7A, 0xE8, 0x08, 0x2C, 0x12, 0x97, 0x32, 0xAB, 0xB4, 0x27, 0x0A, 0x23,
+ 0xDF, 0xEF, 0xCA, 0xD9, 0xB8, 0xFA, 0xDC, 0x31, 0x6B, 0xD1, 0xAD, 0x19,
+ 0x49, 0xBD, 0x51, 0x96, 0xEE, 0xE4, 0xA8, 0x41, 0xDA, 0xFF, 0xCD, 0x55,
+ 0x86, 0x36, 0xBE, 0x61, 0x52, 0xF8, 0xBB, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x48, 0x69, 0x9A,
+ 0xE0, 0x47, 0x9E, 0x5C, 0x04, 0x4B, 0x34, 0x15, 0x79, 0x26, 0xA7, 0xDE,
+ 0x29, 0xAE, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x84, 0xE9, 0xD2, 0xBA, 0x5D, 0xF3, 0xC5, 0xB0,
+ 0xBF, 0xA4, 0x3B, 0x71, 0x44, 0x46, 0x2B, 0xFC, 0xEB, 0x6F, 0xD5, 0xF6,
+ 0x14, 0xFE, 0x7C, 0x70, 0x5A, 0x7D, 0xFD, 0x2F, 0x18, 0x83, 0x16, 0xA5,
+ 0x91, 0x1F, 0x05, 0x95, 0x74, 0xA9, 0xC1, 0x5B, 0x4A, 0x85, 0x6D, 0x13,
+ 0x07, 0x4F, 0x4E, 0x45, 0xB2, 0x0F, 0xC9, 0x1C, 0xA6, 0xBC, 0xEC, 0x73,
+ 0x90, 0x7B, 0xCF, 0x59, 0x8F, 0xA1, 0xF9, 0x2D, 0xF2, 0xB1, 0x00, 0x94,
+ 0x37, 0x9F, 0xD0, 0x2E, 0x9C, 0x6E, 0x28, 0x3F, 0x80, 0xF0, 0x3D, 0xD3,
+ 0x25, 0x8A, 0xB5, 0xE7, 0x42, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0xEA, 0xF7, 0x4C, 0x11, 0x33,
+ 0x03, 0xA2, 0xAC, 0x60
+};
+
+/*
+ * Helper for key schedule: r = FO( p, k ) ^ x
+ */
+static void aria_fo_xor(uint32_t r[4], const uint32_t p[4],
+ const uint32_t k[4], const uint32_t x[4])
+{
+ uint32_t a, b, c, d;
+
+ a = p[0] ^ k[0];
+ b = p[1] ^ k[1];
+ c = p[2] ^ k[2];
+ d = p[3] ^ k[3];
+
+ aria_sl(&a, &b, &c, &d, aria_sb1, aria_sb2, aria_is1, aria_is2);
+ aria_a(&a, &b, &c, &d);
+
+ r[0] = a ^ x[0];
+ r[1] = b ^ x[1];
+ r[2] = c ^ x[2];
+ r[3] = d ^ x[3];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper for key schedule: r = FE( p, k ) ^ x
+ */
+static void aria_fe_xor(uint32_t r[4], const uint32_t p[4],
+ const uint32_t k[4], const uint32_t x[4])
+{
+ uint32_t a, b, c, d;
+
+ a = p[0] ^ k[0];
+ b = p[1] ^ k[1];
+ c = p[2] ^ k[2];
+ d = p[3] ^ k[3];
+
+ aria_sl(&a, &b, &c, &d, aria_is1, aria_is2, aria_sb1, aria_sb2);
+ aria_a(&a, &b, &c, &d);
+
+ r[0] = a ^ x[0];
+ r[1] = b ^ x[1];
+ r[2] = c ^ x[2];
+ r[3] = d ^ x[3];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Big endian 128-bit rotation: r = a ^ (b <<< n), used only in key setup.
+ *
+ * We chose to store bytes into 32-bit words in little-endian format (see
+ * MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE / MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE ) so we need to reverse
+ * bytes here.
+ */
+static void aria_rot128(uint32_t r[4], const uint32_t a[4],
+ const uint32_t b[4], uint8_t n)
+{
+ uint8_t i, j;
+ uint32_t t, u;
+
+ const uint8_t n1 = n % 32; // bit offset
+ const uint8_t n2 = n1 ? 32 - n1 : 0; // reverse bit offset
+
+ j = (n / 32) % 4; // initial word offset
+ t = ARIA_P3(b[j]); // big endian
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+ j = (j + 1) % 4; // get next word, big endian
+ u = ARIA_P3(b[j]);
+ t <<= n1; // rotate
+ t |= u >> n2;
+ t = ARIA_P3(t); // back to little endian
+ r[i] = a[i] ^ t; // store
+ t = u; // move to next word
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set encryption key
+ */
+int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits)
+{
+ /* round constant masks */
+ const uint32_t rc[3][4] =
+ {
+ { 0xB7C17C51, 0x940A2227, 0xE8AB13FE, 0xE06E9AFA },
+ { 0xCC4AB16D, 0x20C8219E, 0xD5B128FF, 0xB0E25DEF },
+ { 0x1D3792DB, 0x70E92621, 0x75972403, 0x0EC9E804 }
+ };
+
+ int i;
+ uint32_t w[4][4], *w2;
+
+ if (keybits != 128 && keybits != 192 && keybits != 256) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy key to W0 (and potential remainder to W1) */
+ w[0][0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 0);
+ w[0][1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 4);
+ w[0][2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 8);
+ w[0][3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 12);
+
+ memset(w[1], 0, 16);
+ if (keybits >= 192) {
+ w[1][0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 16); // 192 bit key
+ w[1][1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 20);
+ }
+ if (keybits == 256) {
+ w[1][2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 24); // 256 bit key
+ w[1][3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 28);
+ }
+
+ i = (keybits - 128) >> 6; // index: 0, 1, 2
+ ctx->nr = 12 + 2 * i; // no. rounds: 12, 14, 16
+
+ aria_fo_xor(w[1], w[0], rc[i], w[1]); // W1 = FO(W0, CK1) ^ KR
+ i = i < 2 ? i + 1 : 0;
+ aria_fe_xor(w[2], w[1], rc[i], w[0]); // W2 = FE(W1, CK2) ^ W0
+ i = i < 2 ? i + 1 : 0;
+ aria_fo_xor(w[3], w[2], rc[i], w[1]); // W3 = FO(W2, CK3) ^ W1
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) { // create round keys
+ w2 = w[(i + 1) & 3];
+ aria_rot128(ctx->rk[i], w[i], w2, 128 - 19);
+ aria_rot128(ctx->rk[i + 4], w[i], w2, 128 - 31);
+ aria_rot128(ctx->rk[i + 8], w[i], w2, 61);
+ aria_rot128(ctx->rk[i + 12], w[i], w2, 31);
+ }
+ aria_rot128(ctx->rk[16], w[0], w[1], 19);
+
+ /* w holds enough info to reconstruct the round keys */
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(w, sizeof(w));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set decryption key
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits)
+{
+ int i, j, k, ret;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(ctx, key, keybits);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* flip the order of round keys */
+ for (i = 0, j = ctx->nr; i < j; i++, j--) {
+ for (k = 0; k < 4; k++) {
+ uint32_t t = ctx->rk[i][k];
+ ctx->rk[i][k] = ctx->rk[j][k];
+ ctx->rk[j][k] = t;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* apply affine transform to middle keys */
+ for (i = 1; i < ctx->nr; i++) {
+ aria_a(&ctx->rk[i][0], &ctx->rk[i][1],
+ &ctx->rk[i][2], &ctx->rk[i][3]);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt a block
+ */
+int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char input[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE],
+ unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ uint32_t a, b, c, d;
+
+ a = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 0);
+ b = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 4);
+ c = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 8);
+ d = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 12);
+
+ i = 0;
+ while (1) {
+ a ^= ctx->rk[i][0];
+ b ^= ctx->rk[i][1];
+ c ^= ctx->rk[i][2];
+ d ^= ctx->rk[i][3];
+ i++;
+
+ aria_sl(&a, &b, &c, &d, aria_sb1, aria_sb2, aria_is1, aria_is2);
+ aria_a(&a, &b, &c, &d);
+
+ a ^= ctx->rk[i][0];
+ b ^= ctx->rk[i][1];
+ c ^= ctx->rk[i][2];
+ d ^= ctx->rk[i][3];
+ i++;
+
+ aria_sl(&a, &b, &c, &d, aria_is1, aria_is2, aria_sb1, aria_sb2);
+ if (i >= ctx->nr) {
+ break;
+ }
+ aria_a(&a, &b, &c, &d);
+ }
+
+ /* final key mixing */
+ a ^= ctx->rk[i][0];
+ b ^= ctx->rk[i][1];
+ c ^= ctx->rk[i][2];
+ d ^= ctx->rk[i][3];
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(a, output, 0);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(b, output, 4);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(c, output, 8);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(d, output, 12);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Initialize context */
+void mbedtls_aria_init(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_aria_context));
+}
+
+/* Clear context */
+void mbedtls_aria_free(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_aria_context));
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+/*
+ * ARIA-CBC buffer encryption/decryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ unsigned char temp[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE];
+
+ if ((mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT) && (mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (length % MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT) {
+ while (length > 0) {
+ memcpy(temp, input, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE);
+ mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(ctx, input, output);
+
+ mbedtls_xor(output, output, iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE);
+
+ memcpy(iv, temp, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE);
+
+ input += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE;
+ output += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE;
+ length -= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ while (length > 0) {
+ mbedtls_xor(output, input, iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE);
+
+ mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(ctx, output, output);
+ memcpy(iv, output, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE);
+
+ input += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE;
+ output += MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE;
+ length -= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+/*
+ * ARIA-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ size_t *iv_off,
+ unsigned char iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ size_t n;
+
+ if ((mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT) && (mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ n = *iv_off;
+
+ /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited
+ * buffer overflow. */
+ if (n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT) {
+ while (length--) {
+ if (n == 0) {
+ mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(ctx, iv, iv);
+ }
+
+ c = *input++;
+ *output++ = c ^ iv[n];
+ iv[n] = c;
+
+ n = (n + 1) & 0x0F;
+ }
+ } else {
+ while (length--) {
+ if (n == 0) {
+ mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(ctx, iv, iv);
+ }
+
+ iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char) (iv[n] ^ *input++);
+
+ n = (n + 1) & 0x0F;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *iv_off = n;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+/*
+ * ARIA-CTR buffer encryption/decryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx,
+ size_t length,
+ size_t *nc_off,
+ unsigned char nonce_counter[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE],
+ unsigned char stream_block[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int c, i;
+ size_t n;
+
+ n = *nc_off;
+ /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited
+ * buffer overflow. */
+ if (n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ while (length--) {
+ if (n == 0) {
+ mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(ctx, nonce_counter,
+ stream_block);
+
+ for (i = MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i--) {
+ if (++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ c = *input++;
+ *output++ = (unsigned char) (c ^ stream_block[n]);
+
+ n = (n + 1) & 0x0F;
+ }
+
+ *nc_off = n;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ARIA_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+/*
+ * Basic ARIA ECB test vectors from RFC 5794
+ */
+static const uint8_t aria_test1_ecb_key[32] = // test key
+{
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, // 128 bit
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F,
+ 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, // 192 bit
+ 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F // 256 bit
+};
+
+static const uint8_t aria_test1_ecb_pt[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] = // plaintext
+{
+ 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, // same for all
+ 0x88, 0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF // key sizes
+};
+
+static const uint8_t aria_test1_ecb_ct[3][MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] = // ciphertext
+{
+ { 0xD7, 0x18, 0xFB, 0xD6, 0xAB, 0x64, 0x4C, 0x73, // 128 bit
+ 0x9D, 0xA9, 0x5F, 0x3B, 0xE6, 0x45, 0x17, 0x78 },
+ { 0x26, 0x44, 0x9C, 0x18, 0x05, 0xDB, 0xE7, 0xAA, // 192 bit
+ 0x25, 0xA4, 0x68, 0xCE, 0x26, 0x3A, 0x9E, 0x79 },
+ { 0xF9, 0x2B, 0xD7, 0xC7, 0x9F, 0xB7, 0x2E, 0x2F, // 256 bit
+ 0x2B, 0x8F, 0x80, 0xC1, 0x97, 0x2D, 0x24, 0xFC }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Mode tests from "Test Vectors for ARIA" Version 1.0
+ * http://210.104.33.10/ARIA/doc/ARIA-testvector-e.pdf
+ */
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR))
+static const uint8_t aria_test2_key[32] =
+{
+ 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, // 128 bit
+ 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff,
+ 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, // 192 bit
+ 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff // 256 bit
+};
+
+static const uint8_t aria_test2_pt[48] =
+{
+ 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, // same for all
+ 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb,
+ 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc,
+ 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
+ 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+ 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0xbb,
+};
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB))
+static const uint8_t aria_test2_iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE] =
+{
+ 0x0f, 0x1e, 0x2d, 0x3c, 0x4b, 0x5a, 0x69, 0x78, // same for CBC, CFB
+ 0x87, 0x96, 0xa5, 0xb4, 0xc3, 0xd2, 0xe1, 0xf0 // CTR has zero IV
+};
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+static const uint8_t aria_test2_cbc_ct[3][48] = // CBC ciphertext
+{
+ { 0x49, 0xd6, 0x18, 0x60, 0xb1, 0x49, 0x09, 0x10, // 128-bit key
+ 0x9c, 0xef, 0x0d, 0x22, 0xa9, 0x26, 0x81, 0x34,
+ 0xfa, 0xdf, 0x9f, 0xb2, 0x31, 0x51, 0xe9, 0x64,
+ 0x5f, 0xba, 0x75, 0x01, 0x8b, 0xdb, 0x15, 0x38,
+ 0xb5, 0x33, 0x34, 0x63, 0x4b, 0xbf, 0x7d, 0x4c,
+ 0xd4, 0xb5, 0x37, 0x70, 0x33, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x15 },
+ { 0xaf, 0xe6, 0xcf, 0x23, 0x97, 0x4b, 0x53, 0x3c, // 192-bit key
+ 0x67, 0x2a, 0x82, 0x62, 0x64, 0xea, 0x78, 0x5f,
+ 0x4e, 0x4f, 0x7f, 0x78, 0x0d, 0xc7, 0xf3, 0xf1,
+ 0xe0, 0x96, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x23, 0x86, 0xd5,
+ 0x14, 0xe9, 0xc3, 0xe7, 0x72, 0x59, 0xde, 0x92,
+ 0xdd, 0x11, 0x02, 0xff, 0xab, 0x08, 0x6c, 0x1e },
+ { 0x52, 0x3a, 0x8a, 0x80, 0x6a, 0xe6, 0x21, 0xf1, // 256-bit key
+ 0x55, 0xfd, 0xd2, 0x8d, 0xbc, 0x34, 0xe1, 0xab,
+ 0x7b, 0x9b, 0x42, 0x43, 0x2a, 0xd8, 0xb2, 0xef,
+ 0xb9, 0x6e, 0x23, 0xb1, 0x3f, 0x0a, 0x6e, 0x52,
+ 0xf3, 0x61, 0x85, 0xd5, 0x0a, 0xd0, 0x02, 0xc5,
+ 0xf6, 0x01, 0xbe, 0xe5, 0x49, 0x3f, 0x11, 0x8b }
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+static const uint8_t aria_test2_cfb_ct[3][48] = // CFB ciphertext
+{
+ { 0x37, 0x20, 0xe5, 0x3b, 0xa7, 0xd6, 0x15, 0x38, // 128-bit key
+ 0x34, 0x06, 0xb0, 0x9f, 0x0a, 0x05, 0xa2, 0x00,
+ 0xc0, 0x7c, 0x21, 0xe6, 0x37, 0x0f, 0x41, 0x3a,
+ 0x5d, 0x13, 0x25, 0x00, 0xa6, 0x82, 0x85, 0x01,
+ 0x7c, 0x61, 0xb4, 0x34, 0xc7, 0xb7, 0xca, 0x96,
+ 0x85, 0xa5, 0x10, 0x71, 0x86, 0x1e, 0x4d, 0x4b },
+ { 0x41, 0x71, 0xf7, 0x19, 0x2b, 0xf4, 0x49, 0x54, // 192-bit key
+ 0x94, 0xd2, 0x73, 0x61, 0x29, 0x64, 0x0f, 0x5c,
+ 0x4d, 0x87, 0xa9, 0xa2, 0x13, 0x66, 0x4c, 0x94,
+ 0x48, 0x47, 0x7c, 0x6e, 0xcc, 0x20, 0x13, 0x59,
+ 0x8d, 0x97, 0x66, 0x95, 0x2d, 0xd8, 0xc3, 0x86,
+ 0x8f, 0x17, 0xe3, 0x6e, 0xf6, 0x6f, 0xd8, 0x4b },
+ { 0x26, 0x83, 0x47, 0x05, 0xb0, 0xf2, 0xc0, 0xe2, // 256-bit key
+ 0x58, 0x8d, 0x4a, 0x7f, 0x09, 0x00, 0x96, 0x35,
+ 0xf2, 0x8b, 0xb9, 0x3d, 0x8c, 0x31, 0xf8, 0x70,
+ 0xec, 0x1e, 0x0b, 0xdb, 0x08, 0x2b, 0x66, 0xfa,
+ 0x40, 0x2d, 0xd9, 0xc2, 0x02, 0xbe, 0x30, 0x0c,
+ 0x45, 0x17, 0xd1, 0x96, 0xb1, 0x4d, 0x4c, 0xe1 }
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+static const uint8_t aria_test2_ctr_ct[3][48] = // CTR ciphertext
+{
+ { 0xac, 0x5d, 0x7d, 0xe8, 0x05, 0xa0, 0xbf, 0x1c, // 128-bit key
+ 0x57, 0xc8, 0x54, 0x50, 0x1a, 0xf6, 0x0f, 0xa1,
+ 0x14, 0x97, 0xe2, 0xa3, 0x45, 0x19, 0xde, 0xa1,
+ 0x56, 0x9e, 0x91, 0xe5, 0xb5, 0xcc, 0xae, 0x2f,
+ 0xf3, 0xbf, 0xa1, 0xbf, 0x97, 0x5f, 0x45, 0x71,
+ 0xf4, 0x8b, 0xe1, 0x91, 0x61, 0x35, 0x46, 0xc3 },
+ { 0x08, 0x62, 0x5c, 0xa8, 0xfe, 0x56, 0x9c, 0x19, // 192-bit key
+ 0xba, 0x7a, 0xf3, 0x76, 0x0a, 0x6e, 0xd1, 0xce,
+ 0xf4, 0xd1, 0x99, 0x26, 0x3e, 0x99, 0x9d, 0xde,
+ 0x14, 0x08, 0x2d, 0xbb, 0xa7, 0x56, 0x0b, 0x79,
+ 0xa4, 0xc6, 0xb4, 0x56, 0xb8, 0x70, 0x7d, 0xce,
+ 0x75, 0x1f, 0x98, 0x54, 0xf1, 0x88, 0x93, 0xdf },
+ { 0x30, 0x02, 0x6c, 0x32, 0x96, 0x66, 0x14, 0x17, // 256-bit key
+ 0x21, 0x17, 0x8b, 0x99, 0xc0, 0xa1, 0xf1, 0xb2,
+ 0xf0, 0x69, 0x40, 0x25, 0x3f, 0x7b, 0x30, 0x89,
+ 0xe2, 0xa3, 0x0e, 0xa8, 0x6a, 0xa3, 0xc8, 0x8f,
+ 0x59, 0x40, 0xf0, 0x5a, 0xd7, 0xee, 0x41, 0xd7,
+ 0x13, 0x47, 0xbb, 0x72, 0x61, 0xe3, 0x48, 0xf1 }
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#define ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT(cond) \
+ do { \
+ if (cond) { \
+ if (verbose) \
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); \
+ goto exit; \
+ } else { \
+ if (verbose) \
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n"); \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Checkup routine
+ */
+int mbedtls_aria_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ int i;
+ uint8_t blk[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE];
+ mbedtls_aria_context ctx;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR))
+ size_t j;
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR))
+ uint8_t buf[48], iv[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE];
+#endif
+
+ mbedtls_aria_init(&ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * Test set 1
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ /* test ECB encryption */
+ if (verbose) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-ECB-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i);
+ }
+ mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(&ctx, aria_test1_ecb_key, 128 + 64 * i);
+ mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(&ctx, aria_test1_ecb_pt, blk);
+ ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT(
+ memcmp(blk, aria_test1_ecb_ct[i], MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE)
+ != 0);
+
+ /* test ECB decryption */
+ if (verbose) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-ECB-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ mbedtls_printf("skipped\n");
+#endif
+ }
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec(&ctx, aria_test1_ecb_key, 128 + 64 * i);
+ mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(&ctx, aria_test1_ecb_ct[i], blk);
+ ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT(
+ memcmp(blk, aria_test1_ecb_pt, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE)
+ != 0);
+#endif
+ }
+ if (verbose) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Test set 2
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ /* Test CBC encryption */
+ if (verbose) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-CBC-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i);
+ }
+ mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(&ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i);
+ memcpy(iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE);
+ memset(buf, 0x55, sizeof(buf));
+ mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc(&ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, 48, iv,
+ aria_test2_pt, buf);
+ ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, aria_test2_cbc_ct[i], 48)
+ != 0);
+
+ /* Test CBC decryption */
+ if (verbose) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-CBC-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i);
+ }
+ mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec(&ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i);
+ memcpy(iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE);
+ memset(buf, 0xAA, sizeof(buf));
+ mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc(&ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT, 48, iv,
+ aria_test2_cbc_ct[i], buf);
+ ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, aria_test2_pt, 48) != 0);
+ }
+ if (verbose) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ /* Test CFB encryption */
+ if (verbose) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-CFB-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i);
+ }
+ mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(&ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i);
+ memcpy(iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE);
+ memset(buf, 0x55, sizeof(buf));
+ j = 0;
+ mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128(&ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT, 48, &j, iv,
+ aria_test2_pt, buf);
+ ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, aria_test2_cfb_ct[i], 48) != 0);
+
+ /* Test CFB decryption */
+ if (verbose) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-CFB-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i);
+ }
+ mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(&ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i);
+ memcpy(iv, aria_test2_iv, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE);
+ memset(buf, 0xAA, sizeof(buf));
+ j = 0;
+ mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128(&ctx, MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT, 48, &j,
+ iv, aria_test2_cfb_ct[i], buf);
+ ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, aria_test2_pt, 48) != 0);
+ }
+ if (verbose) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+ /* Test CTR encryption */
+ if (verbose) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-CTR-%d (enc): ", 128 + 64 * i);
+ }
+ mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(&ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i);
+ memset(iv, 0, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); // IV = 0
+ memset(buf, 0x55, sizeof(buf));
+ j = 0;
+ mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr(&ctx, 48, &j, iv, blk,
+ aria_test2_pt, buf);
+ ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, aria_test2_ctr_ct[i], 48) != 0);
+
+ /* Test CTR decryption */
+ if (verbose) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ARIA-CTR-%d (dec): ", 128 + 64 * i);
+ }
+ mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(&ctx, aria_test2_key, 128 + 64 * i);
+ memset(iv, 0, MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE); // IV = 0
+ memset(buf, 0xAA, sizeof(buf));
+ j = 0;
+ mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr(&ctx, 48, &j, iv, blk,
+ aria_test2_ctr_ct[i], buf);
+ ARIA_SELF_TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, aria_test2_pt, 48) != 0);
+ }
+ if (verbose) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_aria_free(&ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e33fdf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/asn1parse.c
@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
+/*
+ * Generic ASN.1 parsing
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA)
+
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+/*
+ * ASN.1 DER decoding routines
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_len(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *len)
+{
+ if ((end - *p) < 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if ((**p & 0x80) == 0) {
+ *len = *(*p)++;
+ } else {
+ int n = (**p) & 0x7F;
+ if (n == 0 || n > 4) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH;
+ }
+ if ((end - *p) <= n) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA;
+ }
+ *len = 0;
+ (*p)++;
+ while (n--) {
+ *len = (*len << 8) | **p;
+ (*p)++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (*len > (size_t) (end - *p)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *len, int tag)
+{
+ if ((end - *p) < 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (**p != tag) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG;
+ }
+
+ (*p)++;
+
+ return mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, len);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ int *val)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (len != 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ *val = (**p != 0) ? 1 : 0;
+ (*p)++;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int asn1_get_tagged_int(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ int tag, int *val)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, tag)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * len==0 is malformed (0 must be represented as 020100 for INTEGER,
+ * or 0A0100 for ENUMERATED tags
+ */
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH;
+ }
+ /* This is a cryptography library. Reject negative integers. */
+ if ((**p & 0x80) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ /* Skip leading zeros. */
+ while (len > 0 && **p == 0) {
+ ++(*p);
+ --len;
+ }
+
+ /* Reject integers that don't fit in an int. This code assumes that
+ * the int type has no padding bit. */
+ if (len > sizeof(int)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH;
+ }
+ if (len == sizeof(int) && (**p & 0x80) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ *val = 0;
+ while (len-- > 0) {
+ *val = (*val << 8) | **p;
+ (*p)++;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_int(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ int *val)
+{
+ return asn1_get_tagged_int(p, end, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER, val);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_enum(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ int *val)
+{
+ return asn1_get_tagged_int(p, end, MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED, val);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_mpi *X)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(X, *p, len);
+
+ *p += len;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_asn1_bitstring *bs)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ /* Certificate type is a single byte bitstring */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &bs->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Check length, subtract one for actual bit string length */
+ if (bs->len < 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA;
+ }
+ bs->len -= 1;
+
+ /* Get number of unused bits, ensure unused bits <= 7 */
+ bs->unused_bits = **p;
+ if (bs->unused_bits > 7) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH;
+ }
+ (*p)++;
+
+ /* Get actual bitstring */
+ bs->p = *p;
+ *p += bs->len;
+
+ if (*p != end) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Traverse an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF <tag>"
+ * and call a callback for each entry found.
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(
+ unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ unsigned char tag_must_mask, unsigned char tag_must_val,
+ unsigned char tag_may_mask, unsigned char tag_may_val,
+ int (*cb)(void *ctx, int tag,
+ unsigned char *start, size_t len),
+ void *ctx)
+{
+ int ret;
+ size_t len;
+
+ /* Get main sequence tag */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (*p + len != end) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ while (*p < end) {
+ unsigned char const tag = *(*p)++;
+
+ if ((tag & tag_must_mask) != tag_must_val) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, &len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((tag & tag_may_mask) == tag_may_val) {
+ if (cb != NULL) {
+ ret = cb(ctx, tag, *p, len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ *p += len;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get a bit string without unused bits
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (*len == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+ --(*len);
+
+ if (**p != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+ ++(*p);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_asn1_sequence_free(mbedtls_asn1_sequence *seq)
+{
+ while (seq != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_asn1_sequence *next = seq->next;
+ mbedtls_free(seq);
+ seq = next;
+ }
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+ int tag;
+ mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur;
+} asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t;
+
+static int asn1_get_sequence_of_cb(void *ctx,
+ int tag,
+ unsigned char *start,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t *cb_ctx =
+ (asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t *) ctx;
+ mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur =
+ cb_ctx->cur;
+
+ if (cur->buf.p != NULL) {
+ cur->next =
+ mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_sequence));
+
+ if (cur->next == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+
+ cur->buf.p = start;
+ cur->buf.len = len;
+ cur->buf.tag = tag;
+
+ cb_ctx->cur = cur;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parses and splits an ASN.1 "SEQUENCE OF <tag>"
+ */
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_sequence_of(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_asn1_sequence *cur,
+ int tag)
+{
+ asn1_get_sequence_of_cb_ctx_t cb_ctx = { tag, cur };
+ memset(cur, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_sequence));
+ return mbedtls_asn1_traverse_sequence_of(
+ p, end, 0xFF, tag, 0, 0,
+ asn1_get_sequence_of_cb, &cb_ctx);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((end - *p) < 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA;
+ }
+
+ alg->tag = **p;
+ end = *p + len;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &alg->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ alg->p = *p;
+ *p += alg->len;
+
+ if (*p == end) {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(params, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ params->tag = **p;
+ (*p)++;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, ¶ms->len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ params->p = *p;
+ *p += params->len;
+
+ if (*p != end) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf *alg)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf params;
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf));
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(p, end, alg, ¶ms)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((params.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL && params.tag != 0) || params.len != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur)
+{
+ if (cur == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_free(cur->oid.p);
+ mbedtls_free(cur->val.p);
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cur, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_named_data));
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head)
+{
+ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur;
+
+ while ((cur = *head) != NULL) {
+ *head = cur->next;
+ mbedtls_free(cur->oid.p);
+ mbedtls_free(cur->val.p);
+ mbedtls_free(cur);
+ }
+}
+
+void mbedtls_asn1_free_named_data_list_shallow(mbedtls_asn1_named_data *name)
+{
+ for (mbedtls_asn1_named_data *next; name != NULL; name = next) {
+ next = name->next;
+ mbedtls_free(name);
+ }
+}
+
+const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(const mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list,
+ const char *oid, size_t len)
+{
+ while (list != NULL) {
+ if (list->oid.len == len &&
+ memcmp(list->oid.p, oid, len) == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ list = list->next;
+ }
+
+ return list;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97f9db0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/asn1write.c
@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@
+/*
+ * ASN.1 buffer writing functionality
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA)
+
+#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#endif
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_len(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, size_t len)
+{
+#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFF
+ if (len > 0xFFFFFFFF) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ int required = 1;
+
+ if (len >= 0x80) {
+ for (size_t l = len; l != 0; l >>= 8) {
+ required++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (required > (*p - start)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ do {
+ *--(*p) = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len);
+ len >>= 8;
+ } while (len);
+
+ if (required > 1) {
+ *--(*p) = (unsigned char) (0x80 + required - 1);
+ }
+
+ return required;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, unsigned char tag)
+{
+ if (*p - start < 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ *--(*p) = tag;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C)
+static int mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *start,
+ size_t len,
+ unsigned char tag)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len));
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, tag));
+
+ return (int) len;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ if (*p < start || (size_t) (*p - start) < size) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ len = size;
+ (*p) -= len;
+ if (len != 0) {
+ memcpy(*p, buf, len);
+ }
+
+ return (int) len;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_mpi *X)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ // Write the MPI
+ //
+ len = mbedtls_mpi_size(X);
+
+ /* DER represents 0 with a sign bit (0=nonnegative) and 7 value bits, not
+ * as 0 digits. We need to end up with 020100, not with 0200. */
+ if (len == 0) {
+ len = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (*p < start || (size_t) (*p - start) < len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ (*p) -= len;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(X, *p, len));
+
+ // DER format assumes 2s complement for numbers, so the leftmost bit
+ // should be 0 for positive numbers and 1 for negative numbers.
+ //
+ if (X->s == 1 && **p & 0x80) {
+ if (*p - start < 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ *--(*p) = 0x00;
+ len += 1;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER);
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start)
+{
+ // Write NULL
+ //
+ return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, 0, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ const char *oid, size_t oid_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(p, start,
+ (const unsigned char *) oid, oid_len));
+ return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
+ size_t par_len)
+{
+ return mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(p, start, oid, oid_len, par_len, 1);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_algorithm_identifier_ext(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
+ size_t par_len, int has_par)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ if (has_par) {
+ if (par_len == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_null(p, start));
+ } else {
+ len += par_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid(p, start, oid, oid_len));
+
+ return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_bool(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int boolean)
+{
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ if (*p - start < 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ *--(*p) = (boolean) ? 255 : 0;
+ len++;
+
+ return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BOOLEAN);
+}
+
+static int asn1_write_tagged_int(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val, int tag)
+{
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ do {
+ if (*p - start < 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ len += 1;
+ *--(*p) = val & 0xff;
+ val >>= 8;
+ } while (val > 0);
+
+ if (**p & 0x80) {
+ if (*p - start < 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ *--(*p) = 0x00;
+ len += 1;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, tag);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_int(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val)
+{
+ return asn1_write_tagged_int(p, start, val, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_enum(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int val)
+{
+ return asn1_write_tagged_int(p, start, val, MBEDTLS_ASN1_ENUMERATED);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, int tag,
+ const char *text, size_t text_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(p, start,
+ (const unsigned char *) text,
+ text_len));
+
+ return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, tag);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ const char *text, size_t text_len)
+{
+ return mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING, text, text_len);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ const char *text, size_t text_len)
+{
+ return mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING, text,
+ text_len);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ const char *text, size_t text_len)
+{
+ return mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING, text, text_len);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_named_bitstring(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *start,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t bits)
+{
+ size_t unused_bits, byte_len;
+ const unsigned char *cur_byte;
+ unsigned char cur_byte_shifted;
+ unsigned char bit;
+
+ byte_len = (bits + 7) / 8;
+ unused_bits = (byte_len * 8) - bits;
+
+ /*
+ * Named bitstrings require that trailing 0s are excluded in the encoding
+ * of the bitstring. Trailing 0s are considered part of the 'unused' bits
+ * when encoding this value in the first content octet
+ */
+ if (bits != 0) {
+ cur_byte = buf + byte_len - 1;
+ cur_byte_shifted = *cur_byte >> unused_bits;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ bit = cur_byte_shifted & 0x1;
+ cur_byte_shifted >>= 1;
+
+ if (bit != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ bits--;
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (bits % 8 == 0) {
+ cur_byte_shifted = *--cur_byte;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(p, start, buf, bits);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t bits)
+{
+ size_t len = 0;
+ size_t unused_bits, byte_len;
+
+ byte_len = (bits + 7) / 8;
+ unused_bits = (byte_len * 8) - bits;
+
+ if (*p < start || (size_t) (*p - start) < byte_len + 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ len = byte_len + 1;
+
+ /* Write the bitstring. Ensure the unused bits are zeroed */
+ if (byte_len > 0) {
+ byte_len--;
+ *--(*p) = buf[byte_len] & ~((0x1 << unused_bits) - 1);
+ (*p) -= byte_len;
+ memcpy(*p, buf, byte_len);
+ }
+
+ /* Write unused bits */
+ *--(*p) = (unsigned char) unused_bits;
+
+ return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_asn1_write_octet_string(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer(p, start, buf, size));
+
+ return mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(p, start, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+}
+
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+/* This is a copy of the ASN.1 parsing function mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(),
+ * which is replicated to avoid a dependency ASN1_WRITE_C on ASN1_PARSE_C. */
+static mbedtls_asn1_named_data *asn1_find_named_data(
+ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *list,
+ const char *oid, size_t len)
+{
+ while (list != NULL) {
+ if (list->oid.len == len &&
+ memcmp(list->oid.p, oid, len) == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ list = list->next;
+ }
+
+ return list;
+}
+#else
+#define asn1_find_named_data(list, oid, len) \
+ ((mbedtls_asn1_named_data *) mbedtls_asn1_find_named_data(list, oid, len))
+#endif
+
+mbedtls_asn1_named_data *mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data(
+ mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head,
+ const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
+ const unsigned char *val,
+ size_t val_len)
+{
+ mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur;
+
+ if ((cur = asn1_find_named_data(*head, oid, oid_len)) == NULL) {
+ // Add new entry if not present yet based on OID
+ //
+ cur = (mbedtls_asn1_named_data *) mbedtls_calloc(1,
+ sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_named_data));
+ if (cur == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ cur->oid.len = oid_len;
+ cur->oid.p = mbedtls_calloc(1, oid_len);
+ if (cur->oid.p == NULL) {
+ mbedtls_free(cur);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(cur->oid.p, oid, oid_len);
+
+ cur->val.len = val_len;
+ if (val_len != 0) {
+ cur->val.p = mbedtls_calloc(1, val_len);
+ if (cur->val.p == NULL) {
+ mbedtls_free(cur->oid.p);
+ mbedtls_free(cur);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ cur->next = *head;
+ *head = cur;
+ } else if (val_len == 0) {
+ mbedtls_free(cur->val.p);
+ cur->val.p = NULL;
+ cur->val.len = 0;
+ } else if (cur->val.len != val_len) {
+ /*
+ * Enlarge existing value buffer if needed
+ * Preserve old data until the allocation succeeded, to leave list in
+ * a consistent state in case allocation fails.
+ */
+ void *p = mbedtls_calloc(1, val_len);
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_free(cur->val.p);
+ cur->val.p = p;
+ cur->val.len = val_len;
+ }
+
+ if (val != NULL && val_len != 0) {
+ memcpy(cur->val.p, val, val_len);
+ }
+
+ return cur;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/base64.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/base64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..388fa9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/base64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+/*
+ * RFC 1521 base64 encoding/decoding
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/base64.h"
+#include "base64_internal.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+#include <string.h>
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char(unsigned char value)
+{
+ unsigned char digit = 0;
+ /* For each range of values, if value is in that range, mask digit with
+ * the corresponding value. Since value can only be in a single range,
+ * only at most one masking will change digit. */
+ digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(0, 25, value, 'A' + value);
+ digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(26, 51, value, 'a' + value - 26);
+ digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(52, 61, value, '0' + value - 52);
+ digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(62, 62, value, '+');
+ digit |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(63, 63, value, '/');
+ return digit;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value(unsigned char c)
+{
+ unsigned char val = 0;
+ /* For each range of digits, if c is in that range, mask val with
+ * the corresponding value. Since c can only be in a single range,
+ * only at most one masking will change val. Set val to one plus
+ * the desired value so that it stays 0 if c is in none of the ranges. */
+ val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('A', 'Z', c, c - 'A' + 0 + 1);
+ val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('a', 'z', c, c - 'a' + 26 + 1);
+ val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('0', '9', c, c - '0' + 52 + 1);
+ val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('+', '+', c, c - '+' + 62 + 1);
+ val |= mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if('/', '/', c, c - '/' + 63 + 1);
+ /* At this point, val is 0 if c is an invalid digit and v+1 if c is
+ * a digit with the value v. */
+ return val - 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode a buffer into base64 format
+ */
+int mbedtls_base64_encode(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen,
+ const unsigned char *src, size_t slen)
+{
+ size_t i, n;
+ int C1, C2, C3;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ if (slen == 0) {
+ *olen = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ n = slen / 3 + (slen % 3 != 0);
+
+ if (n > (SIZE_MAX - 1) / 4) {
+ *olen = SIZE_MAX;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ n *= 4;
+
+ if ((dlen < n + 1) || (NULL == dst)) {
+ *olen = n + 1;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ n = (slen / 3) * 3;
+
+ for (i = 0, p = dst; i < n; i += 3) {
+ C1 = *src++;
+ C2 = *src++;
+ C3 = *src++;
+
+ *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char((C1 >> 2) & 0x3F);
+ *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char((((C1 & 3) << 4) + (C2 >> 4))
+ & 0x3F);
+ *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char((((C2 & 15) << 2) + (C3 >> 6))
+ & 0x3F);
+ *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char(C3 & 0x3F);
+ }
+
+ if (i < slen) {
+ C1 = *src++;
+ C2 = ((i + 1) < slen) ? *src++ : 0;
+
+ *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char((C1 >> 2) & 0x3F);
+ *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char((((C1 & 3) << 4) + (C2 >> 4))
+ & 0x3F);
+
+ if ((i + 1) < slen) {
+ *p++ = mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char(((C2 & 15) << 2) & 0x3F);
+ } else {
+ *p++ = '=';
+ }
+
+ *p++ = '=';
+ }
+
+ *olen = (size_t) (p - dst);
+ *p = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode a base64-formatted buffer
+ */
+int mbedtls_base64_decode(unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, size_t *olen,
+ const unsigned char *src, size_t slen)
+{
+ size_t i; /* index in source */
+ size_t n; /* number of digits or trailing = in source */
+ uint32_t x; /* value accumulator */
+ unsigned accumulated_digits = 0;
+ unsigned equals = 0;
+ int spaces_present = 0;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ /* First pass: check for validity and get output length */
+ for (i = n = 0; i < slen; i++) {
+ /* Skip spaces before checking for EOL */
+ spaces_present = 0;
+ while (i < slen && src[i] == ' ') {
+ ++i;
+ spaces_present = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Spaces at end of buffer are OK */
+ if (i == slen) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if ((slen - i) >= 2 &&
+ src[i] == '\r' && src[i + 1] == '\n') {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (src[i] == '\n') {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Space inside a line is an error */
+ if (spaces_present) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER;
+ }
+
+ if (src[i] > 127) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER;
+ }
+
+ if (src[i] == '=') {
+ if (++equals > 2) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (equals != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER;
+ }
+ if (mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value(src[i]) < 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER;
+ }
+ }
+ n++;
+ }
+
+ /* In valid base64, the number of digits (n-equals) is always of the form
+ * 4*k, 4*k+2 or *4k+3. Also, the number n of digits plus the number of
+ * equal signs at the end is always a multiple of 4. */
+ if ((n - equals) % 4 == 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER;
+ }
+ if (n % 4 != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER;
+ }
+
+ /* We've determined that the input is valid, and that it contains
+ * exactly k blocks of digits-or-equals, with n = 4 * k,
+ * and equals only present at the end of the last block if at all.
+ * Now we can calculate the length of the output.
+ *
+ * Each block of 4 digits in the input map to 3 bytes of output.
+ * For the last block:
+ * - abcd (where abcd are digits) is a full 3-byte block;
+ * - abc= means 1 byte less than a full 3-byte block of output;
+ * - ab== means 2 bytes less than a full 3-byte block of output;
+ * - a==== and ==== is rejected above.
+ */
+ *olen = (n / 4) * 3 - equals;
+
+ /* If the output buffer is too small, signal this and stop here.
+ * Also, as documented, stop here if `dst` is null, independently of
+ * `dlen`.
+ *
+ * There is an edge case when the output is empty: in this case,
+ * `dlen == 0` with `dst == NULL` is valid (on some platforms,
+ * `malloc(0)` returns `NULL`). Since the call is valid, we return
+ * 0 in this case.
+ */
+ if ((*olen != 0 && dst == NULL) || dlen < *olen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ for (x = 0, p = dst; i > 0; i--, src++) {
+ if (*src == '\r' || *src == '\n' || *src == ' ') {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (*src == '=') {
+ /* We already know from the first loop that equal signs are
+ * only at the end. */
+ break;
+ }
+ x = x << 6;
+ x |= mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value(*src);
+
+ if (++accumulated_digits == 4) {
+ accumulated_digits = 0;
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(x);
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(x);
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(x);
+ }
+ }
+ if (accumulated_digits == 3) {
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(x << 6);
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(x << 6);
+ } else if (accumulated_digits == 2) {
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(x << 12);
+ }
+
+ if (*olen != (size_t) (p - dst)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+static const unsigned char base64_test_dec[64] =
+{
+ 0x24, 0x48, 0x6E, 0x56, 0x87, 0x62, 0x5A, 0xBD,
+ 0xBF, 0x17, 0xD9, 0xA2, 0xC4, 0x17, 0x1A, 0x01,
+ 0x94, 0xED, 0x8F, 0x1E, 0x11, 0xB3, 0xD7, 0x09,
+ 0x0C, 0xB6, 0xE9, 0x10, 0x6F, 0x22, 0xEE, 0x13,
+ 0xCA, 0xB3, 0x07, 0x05, 0x76, 0xC9, 0xFA, 0x31,
+ 0x6C, 0x08, 0x34, 0xFF, 0x8D, 0xC2, 0x6C, 0x38,
+ 0x00, 0x43, 0xE9, 0x54, 0x97, 0xAF, 0x50, 0x4B,
+ 0xD1, 0x41, 0xBA, 0x95, 0x31, 0x5A, 0x0B, 0x97
+};
+
+static const unsigned char base64_test_enc[] =
+ "JEhuVodiWr2/F9mixBcaAZTtjx4Rs9cJDLbpEG8i7hPK"
+ "swcFdsn6MWwINP+Nwmw4AEPpVJevUEvRQbqVMVoLlw==";
+
+/*
+ * Checkup routine
+ */
+int mbedtls_base64_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ const unsigned char *src;
+ unsigned char buffer[128];
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" Base64 encoding test: ");
+ }
+
+ src = base64_test_dec;
+
+ if (mbedtls_base64_encode(buffer, sizeof(buffer), &len, src, 64) != 0 ||
+ memcmp(base64_test_enc, buffer, 88) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n Base64 decoding test: ");
+ }
+
+ src = base64_test_enc;
+
+ if (mbedtls_base64_decode(buffer, sizeof(buffer), &len, src, 88) != 0 ||
+ memcmp(base64_test_dec, buffer, 64) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n\n");
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/base64_internal.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/base64_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a09bd23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/base64_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/**
+ * \file base64_internal.h
+ *
+ * \brief RFC 1521 base64 encoding/decoding: interfaces for invasive testing
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_BASE64_INTERNAL
+#define MBEDTLS_BASE64_INTERNAL
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+
+/** Given a value in the range 0..63, return the corresponding Base64 digit.
+ *
+ * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII
+ * but not EBCDIC).
+ *
+ * \param value A value in the range 0..63.
+ *
+ * \return A base64 digit converted from \p value.
+ */
+unsigned char mbedtls_ct_base64_enc_char(unsigned char value);
+
+/** Given a Base64 digit, return its value.
+ *
+ * If c is not a Base64 digit ('A'..'Z', 'a'..'z', '0'..'9', '+' or '/'),
+ * return -1.
+ *
+ * The implementation assumes that letters are consecutive (e.g. ASCII
+ * but not EBCDIC).
+ *
+ * \param c A base64 digit.
+ *
+ * \return The value of the base64 digit \p c.
+ */
+signed char mbedtls_ct_base64_dec_value(unsigned char c);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_INTERNAL */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4244909
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2487 @@
+/*
+ * Multi-precision integer library
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The following sources were referenced in the design of this Multi-precision
+ * Integer library:
+ *
+ * [1] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997
+ * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone
+ *
+ * [2] Multi-Precision Math
+ * Tom St Denis
+ * https://github.com/libtom/libtommath/blob/develop/tommath.pdf
+ *
+ * [3] GNU Multi-Precision Arithmetic Library
+ * https://gmplib.org/manual/index.html
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#include "bignum_core.h"
+#include "bignum_internal.h"
+#include "bn_mul.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+
+
+/*
+ * Conditionally select an MPI sign in constant time.
+ * (MPI sign is the field s in mbedtls_mpi. It is unsigned short and only 1 and -1 are valid
+ * values.)
+ */
+static inline signed short mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t cond,
+ signed short sign1, signed short sign2)
+{
+ return (signed short) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(cond, sign1 + 1, sign2 + 1) - 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare signed values in constant time
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(const mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *Y,
+ unsigned *ret)
+{
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t different_sign, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative, result;
+
+ if (X->n != Y->n) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Set N_is_negative to MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if N >= 0, MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if N < 0.
+ * We know that N->s == 1 if N >= 0 and N->s == -1 if N < 0.
+ */
+ X_is_negative = mbedtls_ct_bool((X->s & 2) >> 1);
+ Y_is_negative = mbedtls_ct_bool((Y->s & 2) >> 1);
+
+ /*
+ * If the signs are different, then the positive operand is the bigger.
+ * That is if X is negative (X_is_negative == 1), then X < Y is true and it
+ * is false if X is positive (X_is_negative == 0).
+ */
+ different_sign = mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(X_is_negative, Y_is_negative); // true if different sign
+ result = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(different_sign, X_is_negative);
+
+ /*
+ * Assuming signs are the same, compare X and Y. We switch the comparison
+ * order if they are negative so that we get the right result, regardles of
+ * sign.
+ */
+
+ /* This array is used to conditionally swap the pointers in const time */
+ void * const p[2] = { X->p, Y->p };
+ size_t i = mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(X_is_negative, 1);
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t lt = mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(p[i], p[i ^ 1], X->n);
+
+ /*
+ * Store in result iff the signs are the same (i.e., iff different_sign == false). If
+ * the signs differ, result has already been set, so we don't change it.
+ */
+ result = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(result,
+ mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_bool_not(different_sign), lt));
+
+ *ret = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(result, 1);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Conditionally assign X = Y, without leaking information
+ * about whether the assignment was made or not.
+ * (Leaking information about the respective sizes of X and Y is ok however.)
+ */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64) && \
+ (_MSC_FULL_VER < 193131103)
+/*
+ * MSVC miscompiles this function if it's inlined prior to Visual Studio 2022 version 17.1. See:
+ * https://developercommunity.visualstudio.com/t/c-compiler-miscompiles-part-of-mbedtls-library-on/1646989
+ */
+__declspec(noinline)
+#endif
+int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *Y,
+ unsigned char assign)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n));
+
+ {
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool(assign);
+
+ X->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(do_assign, Y->s, X->s);
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X->p, Y->p, Y->n, do_assign);
+
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_not_assign = mbedtls_ct_bool_not(do_assign);
+ for (size_t i = Y->n; i < X->n; i++) {
+ X->p[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(do_not_assign, X->p[i]);
+ }
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information
+ * about whether the swap was made or not.
+ * Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which would lead to
+ * different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ mbedtls_mpi *Y,
+ unsigned char swap)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int s;
+
+ if (X == Y) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_swap = mbedtls_ct_bool(swap);
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(Y, X->n));
+
+ s = X->s;
+ X->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(do_swap, Y->s, X->s);
+ Y->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(do_swap, s, Y->s);
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(X->p, Y->p, X->n, do_swap);
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */
+#define mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(v, n) mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(v, ciL * (n))
+
+/*
+ * Initialize one MPI
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_init(mbedtls_mpi *X)
+{
+ X->s = 1;
+ X->n = 0;
+ X->p = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unallocate one MPI
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_free(mbedtls_mpi *X)
+{
+ if (X == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (X->p != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(X->p, X->n);
+ }
+
+ X->s = 1;
+ X->n = 0;
+ X->p = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Enlarge to the specified number of limbs
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_grow(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *p;
+
+ if (nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (X->n < nblimbs) {
+ if ((p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mbedtls_calloc(nblimbs, ciL)) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (X->p != NULL) {
+ memcpy(p, X->p, X->n * ciL);
+ mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(X->p, X->n);
+ }
+
+ /* nblimbs fits in n because we ensure that MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS
+ * fits, and we've checked that nblimbs <= MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS. */
+ X->n = (unsigned short) nblimbs;
+ X->p = p;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Resize down as much as possible,
+ * while keeping at least the specified number of limbs
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_shrink(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *p;
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Actually resize up if there are currently fewer than nblimbs limbs. */
+ if (X->n <= nblimbs) {
+ return mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, nblimbs);
+ }
+ /* After this point, then X->n > nblimbs and in particular X->n > 0. */
+
+ for (i = X->n - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+ if (X->p[i] != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ i++;
+
+ if (i < nblimbs) {
+ i = nblimbs;
+ }
+
+ if ((p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mbedtls_calloc(i, ciL)) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (X->p != NULL) {
+ memcpy(p, X->p, i * ciL);
+ mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(X->p, X->n);
+ }
+
+ /* i fits in n because we ensure that MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS
+ * fits, and we've checked that i <= nblimbs <= MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS. */
+ X->n = (unsigned short) i;
+ X->p = p;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Resize X to have exactly n limbs and set it to 0. */
+static int mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t limbs)
+{
+ if (limbs == 0) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(X);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (X->n == limbs) {
+ memset(X->p, 0, limbs * ciL);
+ X->s = 1;
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(X);
+ return mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, limbs);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the contents of Y into X.
+ *
+ * This function is not constant-time. Leading zeros in Y may be removed.
+ *
+ * Ensure that X does not shrink. This is not guaranteed by the public API,
+ * but some code in the bignum module might still rely on this property.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_copy(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (X == Y) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (Y->n == 0) {
+ if (X->n != 0) {
+ X->s = 1;
+ memset(X->p, 0, X->n * ciL);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (i = Y->n - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+ if (Y->p[i] != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ i++;
+
+ X->s = Y->s;
+
+ if (X->n < i) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, i));
+ } else {
+ memset(X->p + i, 0, (X->n - i) * ciL);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(X->p, Y->p, i * ciL);
+
+cleanup:
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Swap the contents of X and Y
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi T;
+
+ memcpy(&T, X, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi));
+ memcpy(X, Y, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi));
+ memcpy(Y, &T, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi));
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sint_abs(mbedtls_mpi_sint z)
+{
+ if (z >= 0) {
+ return z;
+ }
+ /* Take care to handle the most negative value (-2^(biL-1)) correctly.
+ * A naive -z would have undefined behavior.
+ * Write this in a way that makes popular compilers happy (GCC, Clang,
+ * MSVC). */
+ return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0 - (mbedtls_mpi_uint) z;
+}
+
+/* Convert x to a sign, i.e. to 1, if x is positive, or -1, if x is negative.
+ * This looks awkward but generates smaller code than (x < 0 ? -1 : 1) */
+#define TO_SIGN(x) ((mbedtls_mpi_sint) (((mbedtls_mpi_uint) x) >> (biL - 1)) * -2 + 1)
+
+/*
+ * Set value from integer
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_lset(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, 1));
+ memset(X->p, 0, X->n * ciL);
+
+ X->p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(z);
+ X->s = TO_SIGN(z);
+
+cleanup:
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get a specific bit
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos)
+{
+ if (X->n * biL <= pos) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return (X->p[pos / biL] >> (pos % biL)) & 0x01;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set a bit to a specific value of 0 or 1
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t off = pos / biL;
+ size_t idx = pos % biL;
+
+ if (val != 0 && val != 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (X->n * biL <= pos) {
+ if (val == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, off + 1));
+ }
+
+ X->p[off] &= ~((mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0x01 << idx);
+ X->p[off] |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) val << idx;
+
+cleanup:
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the number of less significant zero-bits
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_lsb(const mbedtls_mpi *X)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+#if defined(__has_builtin)
+#if (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == UINT_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_ctz)
+ #define mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz __builtin_ctz
+#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_ctzl)
+ #define mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz __builtin_ctzl
+#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULLONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_ctzll)
+ #define mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz __builtin_ctzll
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz)
+ for (i = 0; i < X->n; i++) {
+ if (X->p[i] != 0) {
+ return i * biL + mbedtls_mpi_uint_ctz(X->p[i]);
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ size_t count = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < X->n; i++) {
+ for (size_t j = 0; j < biL; j++, count++) {
+ if (((X->p[i] >> j) & 1) != 0) {
+ return count;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the number of bits
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(const mbedtls_mpi *X)
+{
+ return mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(X->p, X->n);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the total size in bytes
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_size(const mbedtls_mpi *X)
+{
+ return (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(X) + 7) >> 3;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert an ASCII character to digit value
+ */
+static int mpi_get_digit(mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, int radix, char c)
+{
+ *d = 255;
+
+ if (c >= 0x30 && c <= 0x39) {
+ *d = c - 0x30;
+ }
+ if (c >= 0x41 && c <= 0x46) {
+ *d = c - 0x37;
+ }
+ if (c >= 0x61 && c <= 0x66) {
+ *d = c - 0x57;
+ }
+
+ if (*d >= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) radix) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Import from an ASCII string
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_read_string(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t i, j, slen, n;
+ int sign = 1;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint d;
+ mbedtls_mpi T;
+
+ if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
+
+ if (s[0] == 0) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(X);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s[0] == '-') {
+ ++s;
+ sign = -1;
+ }
+
+ slen = strlen(s);
+
+ if (radix == 16) {
+ if (slen > SIZE_MAX >> 2) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ n = BITS_TO_LIMBS(slen << 2);
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, n));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 0));
+
+ for (i = slen, j = 0; i > 0; i--, j++) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_get_digit(&d, radix, s[i - 1]));
+ X->p[j / (2 * ciL)] |= d << ((j % (2 * ciL)) << 2);
+ }
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 0));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < slen; i++) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_get_digit(&d, radix, s[i]));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(&T, X, radix));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(X, &T, d));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sign < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(X) != 0) {
+ X->s = -1;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper to write the digits high-order first.
+ */
+static int mpi_write_hlp(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix,
+ char **p, const size_t buflen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint r;
+ size_t length = 0;
+ char *p_end = *p + buflen;
+
+ do {
+ if (length >= buflen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(&r, X, radix));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_int(X, NULL, X, radix));
+ /*
+ * Write the residue in the current position, as an ASCII character.
+ */
+ if (r < 0xA) {
+ *(--p_end) = (char) ('0' + r);
+ } else {
+ *(--p_end) = (char) ('A' + (r - 0xA));
+ }
+
+ length++;
+ } while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, 0) != 0);
+
+ memmove(*p, p_end, length);
+ *p += length;
+
+cleanup:
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Export into an ASCII string
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_write_string(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix,
+ char *buf, size_t buflen, size_t *olen)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t n;
+ char *p;
+ mbedtls_mpi T;
+
+ if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ n = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(X); /* Number of bits necessary to present `n`. */
+ if (radix >= 4) {
+ n >>= 1; /* Number of 4-adic digits necessary to present
+ * `n`. If radix > 4, this might be a strict
+ * overapproximation of the number of
+ * radix-adic digits needed to present `n`. */
+ }
+ if (radix >= 16) {
+ n >>= 1; /* Number of hexadecimal digits necessary to
+ * present `n`. */
+
+ }
+ n += 1; /* Terminating null byte */
+ n += 1; /* Compensate for the divisions above, which round down `n`
+ * in case it's not even. */
+ n += 1; /* Potential '-'-sign. */
+ n += (n & 1); /* Make n even to have enough space for hexadecimal writing,
+ * which always uses an even number of hex-digits. */
+
+ if (buflen < n) {
+ *olen = n;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ p = buf;
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
+
+ if (X->s == -1) {
+ *p++ = '-';
+ buflen--;
+ }
+
+ if (radix == 16) {
+ int c;
+ size_t i, j, k;
+
+ for (i = X->n, k = 0; i > 0; i--) {
+ for (j = ciL; j > 0; j--) {
+ c = (X->p[i - 1] >> ((j - 1) << 3)) & 0xFF;
+
+ if (c == 0 && k == 0 && (i + j) != 2) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ *(p++) = "0123456789ABCDEF" [c / 16];
+ *(p++) = "0123456789ABCDEF" [c % 16];
+ k = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&T, X));
+
+ if (T.s == -1) {
+ T.s = 1;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mpi_write_hlp(&T, radix, &p, buflen));
+ }
+
+ *p++ = '\0';
+ *olen = (size_t) (p - buf);
+
+cleanup:
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+/*
+ * Read X from an opened file
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_read_file(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint d;
+ size_t slen;
+ char *p;
+ /*
+ * Buffer should have space for (short) label and decimal formatted MPI,
+ * newline characters and '\0'
+ */
+ char s[MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE];
+
+ if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ memset(s, 0, sizeof(s));
+ if (fgets(s, sizeof(s) - 1, fin) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ slen = strlen(s);
+ if (slen == sizeof(s) - 2) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ if (slen > 0 && s[slen - 1] == '\n') {
+ slen--; s[slen] = '\0';
+ }
+ if (slen > 0 && s[slen - 1] == '\r') {
+ slen--; s[slen] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ p = s + slen;
+ while (p-- > s) {
+ if (mpi_get_digit(&d, radix, *p) != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_mpi_read_string(X, radix, p + 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write X into an opened file (or stdout if fout == NULL)
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_write_file(const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fout)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t n, slen, plen;
+ /*
+ * Buffer should have space for (short) label and decimal formatted MPI,
+ * newline characters and '\0'
+ */
+ char s[MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE];
+
+ if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ memset(s, 0, sizeof(s));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_string(X, radix, s, sizeof(s) - 2, &n));
+
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ p = "";
+ }
+
+ plen = strlen(p);
+ slen = strlen(s);
+ s[slen++] = '\r';
+ s[slen++] = '\n';
+
+ if (fout != NULL) {
+ if (fwrite(p, 1, plen, fout) != plen ||
+ fwrite(s, 1, slen, fout) != slen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ }
+ } else {
+ mbedtls_printf("%s%s", p, s);
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+
+/*
+ * Import X from unsigned binary data, little endian
+ *
+ * This function is guaranteed to return an MPI with exactly the necessary
+ * number of limbs (in particular, it does not skip 0s in the input).
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le(mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(buflen);
+
+ /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, limbs));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_read_le(X->p, X->n, buf, buflen));
+
+cleanup:
+
+ /*
+ * This function is also used to import keys. However, wiping the buffers
+ * upon failure is not necessary because failure only can happen before any
+ * input is copied.
+ */
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Import X from unsigned binary data, big endian
+ *
+ * This function is guaranteed to return an MPI with exactly the necessary
+ * number of limbs (in particular, it does not skip 0s in the input).
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(buflen);
+
+ /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, limbs));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_read_be(X->p, X->n, buf, buflen));
+
+cleanup:
+
+ /*
+ * This function is also used to import keys. However, wiping the buffers
+ * upon failure is not necessary because failure only can happen before any
+ * input is copied.
+ */
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Export X into unsigned binary data, little endian
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(const mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_mpi_core_write_le(X->p, X->n, buf, buflen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Export X into unsigned binary data, big endian
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(const mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_mpi_core_write_be(X->p, X->n, buf, buflen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Left-shift: X <<= count
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t i;
+
+ i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(X) + count;
+
+ if (X->n * biL < i) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, BITS_TO_LIMBS(i)));
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_l(X->p, X->n, count);
+cleanup:
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Right-shift: X >>= count
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count)
+{
+ if (X->n != 0) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(X->p, X->n, count);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare unsigned values
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y)
+{
+ size_t i, j;
+
+ for (i = X->n; i > 0; i--) {
+ if (X->p[i - 1] != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (j = Y->n; j > 0; j--) {
+ if (Y->p[j - 1] != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If i == j == 0, i.e. abs(X) == abs(Y),
+ * we end up returning 0 at the end of the function. */
+
+ if (i > j) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (j > i) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (; i > 0; i--) {
+ if (X->p[i - 1] > Y->p[i - 1]) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1]) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare signed values
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y)
+{
+ size_t i, j;
+
+ for (i = X->n; i > 0; i--) {
+ if (X->p[i - 1] != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (j = Y->n; j > 0; j--) {
+ if (Y->p[j - 1] != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (i == 0 && j == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (i > j) {
+ return X->s;
+ }
+ if (j > i) {
+ return -Y->s;
+ }
+
+ if (X->s > 0 && Y->s < 0) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (Y->s > 0 && X->s < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (; i > 0; i--) {
+ if (X->p[i - 1] > Y->p[i - 1]) {
+ return X->s;
+ }
+ if (X->p[i - 1] < Y->p[i - 1]) {
+ return -X->s;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare signed values
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi Y;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1];
+
+ *p = mpi_sint_abs(z);
+ Y.s = TO_SIGN(z);
+ Y.n = 1;
+ Y.p = p;
+
+ return mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(X, &Y);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unsigned addition: X = |A| + |B| (HAC 14.7)
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t j;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *p;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint c;
+
+ if (X == B) {
+ const mbedtls_mpi *T = A; A = X; B = T;
+ }
+
+ if (X != A) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, A));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * X must always be positive as a result of unsigned additions.
+ */
+ X->s = 1;
+
+ for (j = B->n; j > 0; j--) {
+ if (B->p[j - 1] != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Exit early to avoid undefined behavior on NULL+0 when X->n == 0
+ * and B is 0 (of any size). */
+ if (j == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, j));
+
+ /* j is the number of non-zero limbs of B. Add those to X. */
+
+ p = X->p;
+
+ c = mbedtls_mpi_core_add(p, p, B->p, j);
+
+ p += j;
+
+ /* Now propagate any carry */
+
+ while (c != 0) {
+ if (j >= X->n) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, j + 1));
+ p = X->p + j;
+ }
+
+ *p += c; c = (*p < c); j++; p++;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unsigned subtraction: X = |A| - |B| (HAC 14.9, 14.10)
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t n;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint carry;
+
+ for (n = B->n; n > 0; n--) {
+ if (B->p[n - 1] != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (n > A->n) {
+ /* B >= (2^ciL)^n > A */
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, A->n));
+
+ /* Set the high limbs of X to match A. Don't touch the lower limbs
+ * because X might be aliased to B, and we must not overwrite the
+ * significant digits of B. */
+ if (A->n > n && A != X) {
+ memcpy(X->p + n, A->p + n, (A->n - n) * ciL);
+ }
+ if (X->n > A->n) {
+ memset(X->p + A->n, 0, (X->n - A->n) * ciL);
+ }
+
+ carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X->p, A->p, B->p, n);
+ if (carry != 0) {
+ /* Propagate the carry through the rest of X. */
+ carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int(X->p + n, X->p + n, carry, X->n - n);
+
+ /* If we have further carry/borrow, the result is negative. */
+ if (carry != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* X should always be positive as a result of unsigned subtractions. */
+ X->s = 1;
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Common function for signed addition and subtraction.
+ * Calculate A + B * flip_B where flip_B is 1 or -1.
+ */
+static int add_sub_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B,
+ int flip_B)
+{
+ int ret, s;
+
+ s = A->s;
+ if (A->s * B->s * flip_B < 0) {
+ int cmp = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs(A, B);
+ if (cmp >= 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(X, A, B));
+ /* If |A| = |B|, the result is 0 and we must set the sign bit
+ * to +1 regardless of which of A or B was negative. Otherwise,
+ * since |A| > |B|, the sign is the sign of A. */
+ X->s = cmp == 0 ? 1 : s;
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(X, B, A));
+ /* Since |A| < |B|, the sign is the opposite of A. */
+ X->s = -s;
+ }
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(X, A, B));
+ X->s = s;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signed addition: X = A + B
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B)
+{
+ return add_sub_mpi(X, A, B, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signed subtraction: X = A - B
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B)
+{
+ return add_sub_mpi(X, A, B, -1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signed addition: X = A + b
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_add_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi B;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1];
+
+ p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b);
+ B.s = TO_SIGN(b);
+ B.n = 1;
+ B.p = p;
+
+ return mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(X, A, &B);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signed subtraction: X = A - b
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi B;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1];
+
+ p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b);
+ B.s = TO_SIGN(b);
+ B.n = 1;
+ B.p = p;
+
+ return mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(X, A, &B);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Baseline multiplication: X = A * B (HAC 14.12)
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t i, j;
+ mbedtls_mpi TA, TB;
+ int result_is_zero = 0;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&TA);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&TB);
+
+ if (X == A) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TA, A)); A = &TA;
+ }
+ if (X == B) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TB, B)); B = &TB;
+ }
+
+ for (i = A->n; i > 0; i--) {
+ if (A->p[i - 1] != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (i == 0) {
+ result_is_zero = 1;
+ }
+
+ for (j = B->n; j > 0; j--) {
+ if (B->p[j - 1] != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (j == 0) {
+ result_is_zero = 1;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, i + j));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 0));
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(X->p, A->p, i, B->p, j);
+
+ /* If the result is 0, we don't shortcut the operation, which reduces
+ * but does not eliminate side channels leaking the zero-ness. We do
+ * need to take care to set the sign bit properly since the library does
+ * not fully support an MPI object with a value of 0 and s == -1. */
+ if (result_is_zero) {
+ X->s = 1;
+ } else {
+ X->s = A->s * B->s;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&TB); mbedtls_mpi_free(&TA);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Baseline multiplication: X = A * b
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_uint b)
+{
+ size_t n = A->n;
+ while (n > 0 && A->p[n - 1] == 0) {
+ --n;
+ }
+
+ /* The general method below doesn't work if b==0. */
+ if (b == 0 || n == 0) {
+ return mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate A*b as A + A*(b-1) to take advantage of mbedtls_mpi_core_mla */
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ /* In general, A * b requires 1 limb more than b. If
+ * A->p[n - 1] * b / b == A->p[n - 1], then A * b fits in the same
+ * number of limbs as A and the call to grow() is not required since
+ * copy() will take care of the growth if needed. However, experimentally,
+ * making the call to grow() unconditional causes slightly fewer
+ * calls to calloc() in ECP code, presumably because it reuses the
+ * same mpi for a while and this way the mpi is more likely to directly
+ * grow to its final size.
+ *
+ * Note that calculating A*b as 0 + A*b doesn't work as-is because
+ * A,X can be the same. */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, n + 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, A));
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(X->p, X->n, A->p, n, b - 1);
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unsigned integer divide - double mbedtls_mpi_uint dividend, u1/u0, and
+ * mbedtls_mpi_uint divisor, d
+ */
+static mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_int_div_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint u1,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint u0,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint d,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *r)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL)
+ mbedtls_t_udbl dividend, quotient;
+#else
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint radix = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << biH;
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint uint_halfword_mask = ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << biH) - 1;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint d0, d1, q0, q1, rAX, r0, quotient;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint u0_msw, u0_lsw;
+ size_t s;
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Check for overflow
+ */
+ if (0 == d || u1 >= d) {
+ if (r != NULL) {
+ *r = ~(mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0u;
+ }
+
+ return ~(mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0u;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL)
+ dividend = (mbedtls_t_udbl) u1 << biL;
+ dividend |= (mbedtls_t_udbl) u0;
+ quotient = dividend / d;
+ if (quotient > ((mbedtls_t_udbl) 1 << biL) - 1) {
+ quotient = ((mbedtls_t_udbl) 1 << biL) - 1;
+ }
+
+ if (r != NULL) {
+ *r = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (dividend - (quotient * d));
+ }
+
+ return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) quotient;
+#else
+
+ /*
+ * Algorithm D, Section 4.3.1 - The Art of Computer Programming
+ * Vol. 2 - Seminumerical Algorithms, Knuth
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Normalize the divisor, d, and dividend, u0, u1
+ */
+ s = mbedtls_mpi_core_clz(d);
+ d = d << s;
+
+ u1 = u1 << s;
+ u1 |= (u0 >> (biL - s)) & (-(mbedtls_mpi_sint) s >> (biL - 1));
+ u0 = u0 << s;
+
+ d1 = d >> biH;
+ d0 = d & uint_halfword_mask;
+
+ u0_msw = u0 >> biH;
+ u0_lsw = u0 & uint_halfword_mask;
+
+ /*
+ * Find the first quotient and remainder
+ */
+ q1 = u1 / d1;
+ r0 = u1 - d1 * q1;
+
+ while (q1 >= radix || (q1 * d0 > radix * r0 + u0_msw)) {
+ q1 -= 1;
+ r0 += d1;
+
+ if (r0 >= radix) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rAX = (u1 * radix) + (u0_msw - q1 * d);
+ q0 = rAX / d1;
+ r0 = rAX - q0 * d1;
+
+ while (q0 >= radix || (q0 * d0 > radix * r0 + u0_lsw)) {
+ q0 -= 1;
+ r0 += d1;
+
+ if (r0 >= radix) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (r != NULL) {
+ *r = (rAX * radix + u0_lsw - q0 * d) >> s;
+ }
+
+ quotient = q1 * radix + q0;
+
+ return quotient;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Division by mbedtls_mpi: A = Q * B + R (HAC 14.20)
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *B)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t i, n, t, k;
+ mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, T1, T2;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint TP2[3];
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(B, 0) == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); mbedtls_mpi_init(&Y); mbedtls_mpi_init(&Z);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&T1);
+ /*
+ * Avoid dynamic memory allocations for constant-size T2.
+ *
+ * T2 is used for comparison only and the 3 limbs are assigned explicitly,
+ * so nobody increase the size of the MPI and we're safe to use an on-stack
+ * buffer.
+ */
+ T2.s = 1;
+ T2.n = sizeof(TP2) / sizeof(*TP2);
+ T2.p = TP2;
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs(A, B) < 0) {
+ if (Q != NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(Q, 0));
+ }
+ if (R != NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(R, A));
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&X, A));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&Y, B));
+ X.s = Y.s = 1;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&Z, A->n + 2));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&Z, 0));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&T1, A->n + 2));
+
+ k = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&Y) % biL;
+ if (k < biL - 1) {
+ k = biL - 1 - k;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&X, k));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&Y, k));
+ } else {
+ k = 0;
+ }
+
+ n = X.n - 1;
+ t = Y.n - 1;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&Y, biL * (n - t)));
+
+ while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&X, &Y) >= 0) {
+ Z.p[n - t]++;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&X, &X, &Y));
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&Y, biL * (n - t)));
+
+ for (i = n; i > t; i--) {
+ if (X.p[i] >= Y.p[t]) {
+ Z.p[i - t - 1] = ~(mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0u;
+ } else {
+ Z.p[i - t - 1] = mbedtls_int_div_int(X.p[i], X.p[i - 1],
+ Y.p[t], NULL);
+ }
+
+ T2.p[0] = (i < 2) ? 0 : X.p[i - 2];
+ T2.p[1] = (i < 1) ? 0 : X.p[i - 1];
+ T2.p[2] = X.p[i];
+
+ Z.p[i - t - 1]++;
+ do {
+ Z.p[i - t - 1]--;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&T1, 0));
+ T1.p[0] = (t < 1) ? 0 : Y.p[t - 1];
+ T1.p[1] = Y.p[t];
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(&T1, &T1, Z.p[i - t - 1]));
+ } while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&T1, &T2) > 0);
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(&T1, &Y, Z.p[i - t - 1]));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&T1, biL * (i - t - 1)));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&X, &X, &T1));
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&X, 0) < 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&T1, &Y));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&T1, biL * (i - t - 1)));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&X, &X, &T1));
+ Z.p[i - t - 1]--;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (Q != NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(Q, &Z));
+ Q->s = A->s * B->s;
+ }
+
+ if (R != NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&X, k));
+ X.s = A->s;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(R, &X));
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(R, 0) == 0) {
+ R->s = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); mbedtls_mpi_free(&Y); mbedtls_mpi_free(&Z);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&T1);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(TP2, sizeof(TP2));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Division by int: A = Q * b + R
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_div_int(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ mbedtls_mpi_sint b)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi B;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1];
+
+ p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b);
+ B.s = TO_SIGN(b);
+ B.n = 1;
+ B.p = p;
+
+ return mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(Q, R, A, &B);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Modulo: R = A mod B
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(B, 0) < 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(NULL, R, A, B));
+
+ while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(R, 0) < 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(R, R, B));
+ }
+
+ while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(R, B) >= 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(R, R, B));
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Modulo: r = A mod b
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint x, y, z;
+
+ if (b == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO;
+ }
+
+ if (b < 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * handle trivial cases
+ */
+ if (b == 1 || A->n == 0) {
+ *r = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (b == 2) {
+ *r = A->p[0] & 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * general case
+ */
+ for (i = A->n, y = 0; i > 0; i--) {
+ x = A->p[i - 1];
+ y = (y << biH) | (x >> biH);
+ z = y / b;
+ y -= z * b;
+
+ x <<= biH;
+ y = (y << biH) | (x >> biH);
+ z = y / b;
+ y -= z * b;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If A is negative, then the current y represents a negative value.
+ * Flipping it to the positive side.
+ */
+ if (A->s < 0 && y != 0) {
+ y = b - y;
+ }
+
+ *r = y;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Warning! If the parameter E_public has MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC as its value,
+ * this function is not constant time with respect to the exponent (parameter E).
+ */
+static int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_optionally_safe(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *E, int E_public,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 0) <= 0 || (N->p[0] & 1) == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(E, 0) < 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(E) > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(N) > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that the exponent that we are passing to the core is not NULL.
+ */
+ if (E->n == 0) {
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 1);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate working memory for mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()
+ */
+ size_t T_limbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(N->n, E->n);
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mbedtls_calloc(T_limbs, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
+ if (T == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi RR;
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR);
+
+ /*
+ * If 1st call, pre-compute R^2 mod N
+ */
+ if (prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, N));
+
+ if (prec_RR != NULL) {
+ *prec_RR = RR;
+ }
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(prec_RR, N->n));
+ RR = *prec_RR;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * To preserve constness we need to make a copy of A. Using X for this to
+ * save memory.
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, A));
+
+ /*
+ * Compensate for negative A (and correct at the end).
+ */
+ X->s = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure that X is in a form that is safe for consumption by
+ * the core functions.
+ *
+ * - The core functions will not touch the limbs of X above N->n. The
+ * result will be correct if those limbs are 0, which the mod call
+ * ensures.
+ * - Also, X must have at least as many limbs as N for the calls to the
+ * core functions.
+ */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(X, N) >= 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(X, X, N));
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, N->n));
+
+ /*
+ * Convert to and from Montgomery around mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod().
+ */
+ {
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p);
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, mm, RR.p, T);
+ if (E_public == MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_unsafe(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, E->p, E->n, RR.p, T);
+ } else {
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, E->p, E->n, RR.p, T);
+ }
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(X->p, X->p, N->p, N->n, mm, T);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Correct for negative A.
+ */
+ if (A->s == -1 && (E->p[0] & 1) != 0) {
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t is_x_non_zero = mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(X->p, X->n);
+ X->s = mbedtls_ct_mpi_sign_if(is_x_non_zero, -1, 1);
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(X, N, X));
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_zeroize_and_free(T, T_limbs);
+
+ if (prec_RR == NULL || prec_RR->p == NULL) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&RR);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N,
+ mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR)
+{
+ return mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_optionally_safe(X, A, E, MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET, N, prec_RR);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N,
+ mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR)
+{
+ return mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_optionally_safe(X, A, E, MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC, N, prec_RR);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Greatest common divisor: G = gcd(A, B) (HAC 14.54)
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_gcd(mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t lz, lzt;
+ mbedtls_mpi TA, TB;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&TA); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TB);
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TA, A));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TB, B));
+
+ lz = mbedtls_mpi_lsb(&TA);
+ lzt = mbedtls_mpi_lsb(&TB);
+
+ /* The loop below gives the correct result when A==0 but not when B==0.
+ * So have a special case for B==0. Leverage the fact that we just
+ * calculated the lsb and lsb(B)==0 iff B is odd or 0 to make the test
+ * slightly more efficient than cmp_int(). */
+ if (lzt == 0 && mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&TB, 0) == 0) {
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(G, A);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (lzt < lz) {
+ lz = lzt;
+ }
+
+ TA.s = TB.s = 1;
+
+ /* We mostly follow the procedure described in HAC 14.54, but with some
+ * minor differences:
+ * - Sequences of multiplications or divisions by 2 are grouped into a
+ * single shift operation.
+ * - The procedure in HAC assumes that 0 < TB <= TA.
+ * - The condition TB <= TA is not actually necessary for correctness.
+ * TA and TB have symmetric roles except for the loop termination
+ * condition, and the shifts at the beginning of the loop body
+ * remove any significance from the ordering of TA vs TB before
+ * the shifts.
+ * - If TA = 0, the loop goes through 0 iterations and the result is
+ * correctly TB.
+ * - The case TB = 0 was short-circuited above.
+ *
+ * For the correctness proof below, decompose the original values of
+ * A and B as
+ * A = sa * 2^a * A' with A'=0 or A' odd, and sa = +-1
+ * B = sb * 2^b * B' with B'=0 or B' odd, and sb = +-1
+ * Then gcd(A, B) = 2^{min(a,b)} * gcd(A',B'),
+ * and gcd(A',B') is odd or 0.
+ *
+ * At the beginning, we have TA = |A| and TB = |B| so gcd(A,B) = gcd(TA,TB).
+ * The code maintains the following invariant:
+ * gcd(A,B) = 2^k * gcd(TA,TB) for some k (I)
+ */
+
+ /* Proof that the loop terminates:
+ * At each iteration, either the right-shift by 1 is made on a nonzero
+ * value and the nonnegative integer bitlen(TA) + bitlen(TB) decreases
+ * by at least 1, or the right-shift by 1 is made on zero and then
+ * TA becomes 0 which ends the loop (TB cannot be 0 if it is right-shifted
+ * since in that case TB is calculated from TB-TA with the condition TB>TA).
+ */
+ while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&TA, 0) != 0) {
+ /* Divisions by 2 preserve the invariant (I). */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&TA, mbedtls_mpi_lsb(&TA)));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&TB, mbedtls_mpi_lsb(&TB)));
+
+ /* Set either TA or TB to |TA-TB|/2. Since TA and TB are both odd,
+ * TA-TB is even so the division by 2 has an integer result.
+ * Invariant (I) is preserved since any odd divisor of both TA and TB
+ * also divides |TA-TB|/2, and any odd divisor of both TA and |TA-TB|/2
+ * also divides TB, and any odd divisor of both TB and |TA-TB|/2 also
+ * divides TA.
+ */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&TA, &TB) >= 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(&TA, &TA, &TB));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&TA, 1));
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(&TB, &TB, &TA));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&TB, 1));
+ }
+ /* Note that one of TA or TB is still odd. */
+ }
+
+ /* By invariant (I), gcd(A,B) = 2^k * gcd(TA,TB) for some k.
+ * At the loop exit, TA = 0, so gcd(TA,TB) = TB.
+ * - If there was at least one loop iteration, then one of TA or TB is odd,
+ * and TA = 0, so TB is odd and gcd(TA,TB) = gcd(A',B'). In this case,
+ * lz = min(a,b) so gcd(A,B) = 2^lz * TB.
+ * - If there was no loop iteration, then A was 0, and gcd(A,B) = B.
+ * In this case, lz = 0 and B = TB so gcd(A,B) = B = 2^lz * TB as well.
+ */
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&TB, lz));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(G, &TB));
+
+cleanup:
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&TA); mbedtls_mpi_free(&TB);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fill X with size bytes of random.
+ * The bytes returned from the RNG are used in a specific order which
+ * is suitable for deterministic ECDSA (see the specification of
+ * mbedtls_mpi_random() and the implementation in mbedtls_mpi_fill_random()).
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(size);
+
+ /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, limbs));
+ if (size == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_fill_random(X->p, X->n, size, f_rng, p_rng);
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_random(mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ mbedtls_mpi_sint min,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *N,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ if (min < 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, min) <= 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the same number of limbs
+ * as the upper bound, even if the upper bound has leading zeros.
+ * This is necessary for mbedtls_mpi_core_random. */
+ int ret = mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, N->n);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_mpi_core_random(X->p, min, N->p, X->n, f_rng, p_rng);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Modular inverse: X = A^-1 mod N (HAC 14.61 / 14.64)
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi G, TA, TU, U1, U2, TB, TV, V1, V2;
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 1) <= 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&TA); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TU); mbedtls_mpi_init(&U1); mbedtls_mpi_init(&U2);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&G); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TB); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TV);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&V1); mbedtls_mpi_init(&V2);
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&G, A, N));
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&G, 1) != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&TA, A, N));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TU, &TA));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TB, N));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TV, N));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&U1, 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&U2, 0));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&V1, 0));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&V2, 1));
+
+ do {
+ while ((TU.p[0] & 1) == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&TU, 1));
+
+ if ((U1.p[0] & 1) != 0 || (U2.p[0] & 1) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&U1, &U1, &TB));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&U2, &U2, &TA));
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&U1, 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&U2, 1));
+ }
+
+ while ((TV.p[0] & 1) == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&TV, 1));
+
+ if ((V1.p[0] & 1) != 0 || (V2.p[0] & 1) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&V1, &V1, &TB));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&V2, &V2, &TA));
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&V1, 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&V2, 1));
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&TU, &TV) >= 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&TU, &TU, &TV));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&U1, &U1, &V1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&U2, &U2, &V2));
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&TV, &TV, &TU));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&V1, &V1, &U1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&V2, &V2, &U2));
+ }
+ } while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&TU, 0) != 0);
+
+ while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&V1, 0) < 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&V1, &V1, N));
+ }
+
+ while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&V1, N) >= 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&V1, &V1, N));
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, &V1));
+
+cleanup:
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&TA); mbedtls_mpi_free(&TU); mbedtls_mpi_free(&U1); mbedtls_mpi_free(&U2);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&G); mbedtls_mpi_free(&TB); mbedtls_mpi_free(&TV);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&V1); mbedtls_mpi_free(&V2);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
+
+/* Gaps between primes, starting at 3. https://oeis.org/A001223 */
+static const unsigned char small_prime_gaps[] = {
+ 2, 2, 4, 2, 4, 2, 4, 6,
+ 2, 6, 4, 2, 4, 6, 6, 2,
+ 6, 4, 2, 6, 4, 6, 8, 4,
+ 2, 4, 2, 4, 14, 4, 6, 2,
+ 10, 2, 6, 6, 4, 6, 6, 2,
+ 10, 2, 4, 2, 12, 12, 4, 2,
+ 4, 6, 2, 10, 6, 6, 6, 2,
+ 6, 4, 2, 10, 14, 4, 2, 4,
+ 14, 6, 10, 2, 4, 6, 8, 6,
+ 6, 4, 6, 8, 4, 8, 10, 2,
+ 10, 2, 6, 4, 6, 8, 4, 2,
+ 4, 12, 8, 4, 8, 4, 6, 12,
+ 2, 18, 6, 10, 6, 6, 2, 6,
+ 10, 6, 6, 2, 6, 6, 4, 2,
+ 12, 10, 2, 4, 6, 6, 2, 12,
+ 4, 6, 8, 10, 8, 10, 8, 6,
+ 6, 4, 8, 6, 4, 8, 4, 14,
+ 10, 12, 2, 10, 2, 4, 2, 10,
+ 14, 4, 2, 4, 14, 4, 2, 4,
+ 20, 4, 8, 10, 8, 4, 6, 6,
+ 14, 4, 6, 6, 8, 6, /*reaches 997*/
+ 0 /* the last entry is effectively unused */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Small divisors test (X must be positive)
+ *
+ * Return values:
+ * 0: no small factor (possible prime, more tests needed)
+ * 1: certain prime
+ * MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE: certain non-prime
+ * other negative: error
+ */
+static int mpi_check_small_factors(const mbedtls_mpi *X)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t i;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint r;
+ unsigned p = 3; /* The first odd prime */
+
+ if ((X->p[0] & 1) == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(small_prime_gaps); p += small_prime_gaps[i], i++) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(&r, X, p));
+ if (r == 0) {
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, p) == 0) {
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Miller-Rabin pseudo-primality test (HAC 4.24)
+ */
+static int mpi_miller_rabin(const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t rounds,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret, count;
+ size_t i, j, k, s;
+ mbedtls_mpi W, R, T, A, RR;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&W); mbedtls_mpi_init(&R);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); mbedtls_mpi_init(&A);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR);
+
+ /*
+ * W = |X| - 1
+ * R = W >> lsb( W )
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&W, X, 1));
+ s = mbedtls_mpi_lsb(&W);
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&R, &W));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&R, s));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
+ /*
+ * pick a random A, 1 < A < |X| - 1
+ */
+ count = 0;
+ do {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&A, X->n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng));
+
+ j = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&A);
+ k = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&W);
+ if (j > k) {
+ A.p[A.n - 1] &= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << (k - (A.n - 1) * biL - 1)) - 1;
+ }
+
+ if (count++ > 30) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ } while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&A, &W) >= 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&A, 1) <= 0);
+
+ /*
+ * A = A^R mod |X|
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&A, &A, &R, X, &RR));
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&A, &W) == 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&A, 1) == 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ j = 1;
+ while (j < s && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&A, &W) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * A = A * A mod |X|
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &A, &A));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&A, &T, X));
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&A, 1) == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ j++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * not prime if A != |X| - 1 or A == 1
+ */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&A, &W) != 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&A, 1) == 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&W); mbedtls_mpi_free(&R);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); mbedtls_mpi_free(&A);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&RR);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pseudo-primality test: small factors, then Miller-Rabin
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi XX;
+
+ XX.s = 1;
+ XX.n = X->n;
+ XX.p = X->p;
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&XX, 0) == 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&XX, 1) == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE;
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&XX, 2) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mpi_check_small_factors(&XX)) != 0) {
+ if (ret == 1) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return mpi_miller_rabin(&XX, rounds, f_rng, p_rng);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prime number generation
+ *
+ * To generate an RSA key in a way recommended by FIPS 186-4, both primes must
+ * be either 1024 bits or 1536 bits long, and flags must contain
+ * MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+#ifdef MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64
+// ceil(2^63.5)
+#define CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2 0xb504f333f9de6485ULL
+#else
+// ceil(2^31.5)
+#define CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2 0xb504f334U
+#endif
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE;
+ size_t k, n;
+ int rounds;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint r;
+ mbedtls_mpi Y;
+
+ if (nbits < 3 || nbits > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&Y);
+
+ n = BITS_TO_LIMBS(nbits);
+
+ if ((flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR) == 0) {
+ /*
+ * 2^-80 error probability, number of rounds chosen per HAC, table 4.4
+ */
+ rounds = ((nbits >= 1300) ? 2 : (nbits >= 850) ? 3 :
+ (nbits >= 650) ? 4 : (nbits >= 350) ? 8 :
+ (nbits >= 250) ? 12 : (nbits >= 150) ? 18 : 27);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * 2^-100 error probability, number of rounds computed based on HAC,
+ * fact 4.48
+ */
+ rounds = ((nbits >= 1450) ? 4 : (nbits >= 1150) ? 5 :
+ (nbits >= 1000) ? 6 : (nbits >= 850) ? 7 :
+ (nbits >= 750) ? 8 : (nbits >= 500) ? 13 :
+ (nbits >= 250) ? 28 : (nbits >= 150) ? 40 : 51);
+ }
+
+ while (1) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(X, n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng));
+ /* make sure generated number is at least (nbits-1)+0.5 bits (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.3 steps 4.4, 5.5) */
+ if (X->p[n-1] < CEIL_MAXUINT_DIV_SQRT2) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ k = n * biL;
+ if (k > nbits) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(X, k - nbits));
+ }
+ X->p[0] |= 1;
+
+ if ((flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH) == 0) {
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng);
+
+ if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * A necessary condition for Y and X = 2Y + 1 to be prime
+ * is X = 2 mod 3 (which is equivalent to Y = 2 mod 3).
+ * Make sure it is satisfied, while keeping X = 3 mod 4
+ */
+
+ X->p[0] |= 2;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(&r, X, 3));
+ if (r == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(X, X, 8));
+ } else if (r == 1) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(X, X, 4));
+ }
+
+ /* Set Y = (X-1) / 2, which is X / 2 because X is odd */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&Y, X));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&Y, 1));
+
+ while (1) {
+ /*
+ * First, check small factors for X and Y
+ * before doing Miller-Rabin on any of them
+ */
+ if ((ret = mpi_check_small_factors(X)) == 0 &&
+ (ret = mpi_check_small_factors(&Y)) == 0 &&
+ (ret = mpi_miller_rabin(X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng))
+ == 0 &&
+ (ret = mpi_miller_rabin(&Y, rounds, f_rng, p_rng))
+ == 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Next candidates. We want to preserve Y = (X-1) / 2 and
+ * Y = 1 mod 2 and Y = 2 mod 3 (eq X = 3 mod 4 and X = 2 mod 3)
+ * so up Y by 6 and X by 12.
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(X, X, 12));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&Y, &Y, 6));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&Y);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+#define GCD_PAIR_COUNT 3
+
+static const int gcd_pairs[GCD_PAIR_COUNT][3] =
+{
+ { 693, 609, 21 },
+ { 1764, 868, 28 },
+ { 768454923, 542167814, 1 }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Checkup routine
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ int ret, i;
+ mbedtls_mpi A, E, N, X, Y, U, V;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&A); mbedtls_mpi_init(&E); mbedtls_mpi_init(&N); mbedtls_mpi_init(&X);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&Y); mbedtls_mpi_init(&U); mbedtls_mpi_init(&V);
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&A, 16,
+ "EFE021C2645FD1DC586E69184AF4A31E" \
+ "D5F53E93B5F123FA41680867BA110131" \
+ "944FE7952E2517337780CB0DB80E61AA" \
+ "E7C8DDC6C5C6AADEB34EB38A2F40D5E6"));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&E, 16,
+ "B2E7EFD37075B9F03FF989C7C5051C20" \
+ "34D2A323810251127E7BF8625A4F49A5" \
+ "F3E27F4DA8BD59C47D6DAABA4C8127BD" \
+ "5B5C25763222FEFCCFC38B832366C29E"));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&N, 16,
+ "0066A198186C18C10B2F5ED9B522752A" \
+ "9830B69916E535C8F047518A889A43A5" \
+ "94B6BED27A168D31D4A52F88925AA8F5"));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&X, &A, &N));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&U, 16,
+ "602AB7ECA597A3D6B56FF9829A5E8B85" \
+ "9E857EA95A03512E2BAE7391688D264A" \
+ "A5663B0341DB9CCFD2C4C5F421FEC814" \
+ "8001B72E848A38CAE1C65F78E56ABDEF" \
+ "E12D3C039B8A02D6BE593F0BBBDA56F1" \
+ "ECF677152EF804370C1A305CAF3B5BF1" \
+ "30879B56C61DE584A0F53A2447A51E"));
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" MPI test #1 (mul_mpi): ");
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&X, &U) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(&X, &Y, &A, &N));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&U, 16,
+ "256567336059E52CAE22925474705F39A94"));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&V, 16,
+ "6613F26162223DF488E9CD48CC132C7A" \
+ "0AC93C701B001B092E4E5B9F73BCD27B" \
+ "9EE50D0657C77F374E903CDFA4C642"));
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" MPI test #2 (div_mpi): ");
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&X, &U) != 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&Y, &V) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&X, &A, &E, &N, NULL));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&U, 16,
+ "36E139AEA55215609D2816998ED020BB" \
+ "BD96C37890F65171D948E9BC7CBAA4D9" \
+ "325D24D6A3C12710F10A09FA08AB87"));
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" MPI test #3 (exp_mod): ");
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&X, &U) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&X, &A, &N));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&U, 16,
+ "003A0AAEDD7E784FC07D8F9EC6E3BFD5" \
+ "C3DBA76456363A10869622EAC2DD84EC" \
+ "C5B8A74DAC4D09E03B5E0BE779F2DF61"));
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" MPI test #4 (inv_mod): ");
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&X, &U) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" MPI test #5 (simple gcd): ");
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < GCD_PAIR_COUNT; i++) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&X, gcd_pairs[i][0]));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&Y, gcd_pairs[i][1]));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_gcd(&A, &X, &Y));
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&A, gcd_pairs[i][2]) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed at %d\n", i);
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+
+ if (ret != 0 && verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", (unsigned int) ret);
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&A); mbedtls_mpi_free(&E); mbedtls_mpi_free(&N); mbedtls_mpi_free(&X);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&Y); mbedtls_mpi_free(&U); mbedtls_mpi_free(&V);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88582c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1022 @@
+/*
+ * Core bignum functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include "bignum_core.h"
+#include "bn_mul.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_clz(mbedtls_mpi_uint a)
+{
+#if defined(__has_builtin)
+#if (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == UINT_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_clz)
+ #define core_clz __builtin_clz
+#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_clzl)
+ #define core_clz __builtin_clzl
+#elif (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == ULLONG_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_clzll)
+ #define core_clz __builtin_clzll
+#endif
+#endif
+#if defined(core_clz)
+ return (size_t) core_clz(a);
+#else
+ size_t j;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << (biL - 1);
+
+ for (j = 0; j < biL; j++) {
+ if (a & mask) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ mask >>= 1;
+ }
+
+ return j;
+#endif
+}
+
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs)
+{
+ int i;
+ size_t j;
+
+ for (i = ((int) A_limbs) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ if (A[i] != 0) {
+ j = biL - mbedtls_mpi_core_clz(A[i]);
+ return (i * biL) + j;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_bigendian_to_host(mbedtls_mpi_uint a)
+{
+ if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) {
+ /* Nothing to do on bigendian systems. */
+ return a;
+ } else {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32)
+ return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) MBEDTLS_BSWAP32(a);
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64)
+ return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) MBEDTLS_BSWAP64(a);
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host(mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ size_t A_limbs)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_left;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *cur_limb_right;
+ if (A_limbs == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Traverse limbs and
+ * - adapt byte-order in each limb
+ * - swap the limbs themselves.
+ * For that, simultaneously traverse the limbs from left to right
+ * and from right to left, as long as the left index is not bigger
+ * than the right index (it's not a problem if limbs is odd and the
+ * indices coincide in the last iteration).
+ */
+ for (cur_limb_left = A, cur_limb_right = A + (A_limbs - 1);
+ cur_limb_left <= cur_limb_right;
+ cur_limb_left++, cur_limb_right--) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp;
+ /* Note that if cur_limb_left == cur_limb_right,
+ * this code effectively swaps the bytes only once. */
+ tmp = mpi_bigendian_to_host(*cur_limb_left);
+ *cur_limb_left = mpi_bigendian_to_host(*cur_limb_right);
+ *cur_limb_right = tmp;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Whether min <= A, in constant time.
+ * A_limbs must be at least 1. */
+mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_uint_le_mpi(mbedtls_mpi_uint min,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ size_t A_limbs)
+{
+ /* min <= least significant limb? */
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t min_le_lsl = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(A[0], min);
+
+ /* limbs other than the least significant one are all zero? */
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t msll_mask = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE;
+ for (size_t i = 1; i < A_limbs; i++) {
+ msll_mask = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(msll_mask, mbedtls_ct_bool(A[i]));
+ }
+
+ /* min <= A iff the lowest limb of A is >= min or the other limbs
+ * are not all zero. */
+ return mbedtls_ct_bool_or(msll_mask, min_le_lsl);
+}
+
+mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
+ size_t limbs)
+{
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t ret = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE, cond = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE, done = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE;
+
+ for (size_t i = limbs; i > 0; i--) {
+ /*
+ * If B[i - 1] < A[i - 1] then A < B is false and the result must
+ * remain 0.
+ *
+ * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and
+ * the fact that we are done and continue looping.
+ */
+ cond = mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(B[i - 1], A[i - 1]);
+ done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(done, cond);
+
+ /*
+ * If A[i - 1] < B[i - 1] then A < B is true.
+ *
+ * Again even if we can make a decision, we just mark the result and
+ * the fact that we are done and continue looping.
+ */
+ cond = mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(A[i - 1], B[i - 1]);
+ ret = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(ret, mbedtls_ct_bool_and(cond, mbedtls_ct_bool_not(done)));
+ done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(done, cond);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If all the limbs were equal, then the numbers are equal, A < B is false
+ * and leaving the result 0 is correct.
+ */
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ size_t limbs,
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t assign)
+{
+ if (X == A) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* This function is very performance-sensitive for RSA. For this reason
+ * we have the loop below, instead of calling mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if
+ * (this is more optimal since here we don't have to handle the case where
+ * we copy awkwardly sized data).
+ */
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) {
+ X[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(assign, A[i], X[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y,
+ size_t limbs,
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t swap)
+{
+ if (X == Y) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp = X[i];
+ X[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(swap, Y[i], X[i]);
+ Y[i] = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(swap, tmp, Y[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_core_read_le(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ size_t X_limbs,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t input_length)
+{
+ const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(input_length);
+
+ if (X_limbs < limbs) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ if (X != NULL) {
+ memset(X, 0, X_limbs * ciL);
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < input_length; i++) {
+ size_t offset = ((i % ciL) << 3);
+ X[i / ciL] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) input[i]) << offset;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_core_read_be(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ size_t X_limbs,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t input_length)
+{
+ const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(input_length);
+
+ if (X_limbs < limbs) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ /* If X_limbs is 0, input_length must also be 0 (from previous test).
+ * Nothing to do. */
+ if (X_limbs == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memset(X, 0, X_limbs * ciL);
+
+ /* memcpy() with (NULL, 0) is undefined behaviour */
+ if (input_length != 0) {
+ size_t overhead = (X_limbs * ciL) - input_length;
+ unsigned char *Xp = (unsigned char *) X;
+ memcpy(Xp + overhead, input, input_length);
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host(X, X_limbs);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_core_write_le(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ size_t A_limbs,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_length)
+{
+ size_t stored_bytes = A_limbs * ciL;
+ size_t bytes_to_copy;
+
+ if (stored_bytes < output_length) {
+ bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes;
+ } else {
+ bytes_to_copy = output_length;
+
+ /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of A.
+ * However A may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */
+ for (size_t i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++) {
+ if (GET_BYTE(A, i) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++) {
+ output[i] = GET_BYTE(A, i);
+ }
+
+ if (stored_bytes < output_length) {
+ /* Write trailing 0 bytes */
+ memset(output + stored_bytes, 0, output_length - stored_bytes);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_core_write_be(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ size_t X_limbs,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_length)
+{
+ size_t stored_bytes;
+ size_t bytes_to_copy;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ stored_bytes = X_limbs * ciL;
+
+ if (stored_bytes < output_length) {
+ /* There is enough space in the output buffer. Write initial
+ * null bytes and record the position at which to start
+ * writing the significant bytes. In this case, the execution
+ * trace of this function does not depend on the value of the
+ * number. */
+ bytes_to_copy = stored_bytes;
+ p = output + output_length - stored_bytes;
+ memset(output, 0, output_length - stored_bytes);
+ } else {
+ /* The output buffer is smaller than the allocated size of X.
+ * However X may fit if its leading bytes are zero. */
+ bytes_to_copy = output_length;
+ p = output;
+ for (size_t i = bytes_to_copy; i < stored_bytes; i++) {
+ if (GET_BYTE(X, i) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < bytes_to_copy; i++) {
+ p[bytes_to_copy - i - 1] = GET_BYTE(X, i);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t limbs,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ size_t i, v0, v1;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1;
+
+ v0 = count / biL;
+ v1 = count & (biL - 1);
+
+ if (v0 > limbs || (v0 == limbs && v1 > 0)) {
+ memset(X, 0, limbs * ciL);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * shift by count / limb_size
+ */
+ if (v0 > 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < limbs - v0; i++) {
+ X[i] = X[i + v0];
+ }
+
+ for (; i < limbs; i++) {
+ X[i] = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * shift by count % limb_size
+ */
+ if (v1 > 0) {
+ for (i = limbs; i > 0; i--) {
+ r1 = X[i - 1] << (biL - v1);
+ X[i - 1] >>= v1;
+ X[i - 1] |= r0;
+ r0 = r1;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t limbs,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ size_t i, v0, v1;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint r0 = 0, r1;
+
+ v0 = count / (biL);
+ v1 = count & (biL - 1);
+
+ /*
+ * shift by count / limb_size
+ */
+ if (v0 > 0) {
+ for (i = limbs; i > v0; i--) {
+ X[i - 1] = X[i - v0 - 1];
+ }
+
+ for (; i > 0; i--) {
+ X[i - 1] = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * shift by count % limb_size
+ */
+ if (v1 > 0) {
+ for (i = v0; i < limbs; i++) {
+ r1 = X[i] >> (biL - v1);
+ X[i] <<= v1;
+ X[i] |= r0;
+ r0 = r1;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_add(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
+ size_t limbs)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0;
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint t = c + A[i];
+ c = (t < A[i]);
+ t += B[i];
+ c += (t < B[i]);
+ X[i] = t;
+ }
+
+ return c;
+}
+
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ size_t limbs,
+ unsigned cond)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0;
+
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t do_add = mbedtls_ct_bool(cond);
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint add = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(do_add, A[i]);
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint t = c + X[i];
+ c = (t < X[i]);
+ t += add;
+ c += (t < add);
+ X[i] = t;
+ }
+
+ return c;
+}
+
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
+ size_t limbs)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0;
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint z = (A[i] < c);
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint t = A[i] - c;
+ c = (t < B[i]) + z;
+ X[i] = t - B[i];
+ }
+
+ return c;
+}
+
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(mbedtls_mpi_uint *d, size_t d_len,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *s, size_t s_len,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint b)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0; /* carry */
+ /*
+ * It is a documented precondition of this function that d_len >= s_len.
+ * If that's not the case, we swap these round: this turns what would be
+ * a buffer overflow into an incorrect result.
+ */
+ if (d_len < s_len) {
+ s_len = d_len;
+ }
+ size_t excess_len = d_len - s_len;
+ size_t steps_x8 = s_len / 8;
+ size_t steps_x1 = s_len & 7;
+
+ while (steps_x8--) {
+ MULADDC_X8_INIT
+ MULADDC_X8_CORE
+ MULADDC_X8_STOP
+ }
+
+ while (steps_x1--) {
+ MULADDC_X1_INIT
+ MULADDC_X1_CORE
+ MULADDC_X1_STOP
+ }
+
+ while (excess_len--) {
+ *d += c;
+ c = (*d < c);
+ d++;
+ }
+
+ return c;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, size_t B_limbs)
+{
+ memset(X, 0, (A_limbs + B_limbs) * ciL);
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < B_limbs; i++) {
+ (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(X + i, A_limbs + 1, A, A_limbs, B[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fast Montgomery initialization (thanks to Tom St Denis).
+ */
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint x = N[0];
+
+ x += ((N[0] + 2) & 4) << 1;
+
+ for (unsigned int i = biL; i >= 8; i /= 2) {
+ x *= (2 - (N[0] * x));
+ }
+
+ return ~x + 1;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
+ size_t B_limbs,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
+ size_t AN_limbs,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint mm,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T)
+{
+ memset(T, 0, (2 * AN_limbs + 1) * ciL);
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < AN_limbs; i++) {
+ /* T = (T + u0*B + u1*N) / 2^biL */
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint u0 = A[i];
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint u1 = (T[0] + u0 * B[0]) * mm;
+
+ (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(T, AN_limbs + 2, B, B_limbs, u0);
+ (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(T, AN_limbs + 2, N, AN_limbs, u1);
+
+ T++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The result we want is (T >= N) ? T - N : T.
+ *
+ * For better constant-time properties in this function, we always do the
+ * subtraction, with the result in X.
+ *
+ * We also look to see if there was any carry in the final additions in the
+ * loop above.
+ */
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint carry = T[AN_limbs];
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint borrow = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, T, N, AN_limbs);
+
+ /*
+ * Using R as the Montgomery radix (auxiliary modulus) i.e. 2^(biL*AN_limbs):
+ *
+ * T can be in one of 3 ranges:
+ *
+ * 1) T < N : (carry, borrow) = (0, 1): we want T
+ * 2) N <= T < R : (carry, borrow) = (0, 0): we want X
+ * 3) T >= R : (carry, borrow) = (1, 1): we want X
+ *
+ * and (carry, borrow) = (1, 0) can't happen.
+ *
+ * So the correct return value is already in X if (carry ^ borrow) = 0,
+ * but is in (the lower AN_limbs limbs of) T if (carry ^ borrow) = 1.
+ */
+ mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_bool(carry ^ borrow),
+ (unsigned char *) X,
+ (unsigned char *) T,
+ NULL,
+ AN_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(X, N->n * 2 * biL));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(X, X, N));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shrink(X, N->n));
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *table,
+ size_t limbs,
+ size_t count,
+ size_t index)
+{
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < count; i++, table += limbs) {
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t assign = mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(i, index);
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(dest, table, limbs, assign);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Fill X with n_bytes random bytes.
+ * X must already have room for those bytes.
+ * The ordering of the bytes returned from the RNG is suitable for
+ * deterministic ECDSA (see RFC 6979 §3.3 and the specification of
+ * mbedtls_mpi_core_random()).
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_core_fill_random(
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs,
+ size_t n_bytes,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(n_bytes);
+ const size_t overhead = (limbs * ciL) - n_bytes;
+
+ if (X_limbs < limbs) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ memset(X, 0, overhead);
+ memset((unsigned char *) X + limbs * ciL, 0, (X_limbs - limbs) * ciL);
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(f_rng(p_rng, (unsigned char *) X + overhead, n_bytes));
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host(X, limbs);
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_core_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint min,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
+ size_t limbs,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t ge_lower = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, lt_upper = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE;
+ size_t n_bits = mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(N, limbs);
+ size_t n_bytes = (n_bits + 7) / 8;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ /*
+ * When min == 0, each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing
+ * (the msb has a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will
+ * be < N), so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30).
+ *
+ * When N is just below a power of 2, as is the case when generating
+ * a random scalar on most elliptic curves, 1 try is enough with
+ * overwhelming probability. When N is just above a power of 2,
+ * as when generating a random scalar on secp224k1, each try has
+ * a probability of failing that is almost 1/2.
+ *
+ * The probabilities are almost the same if min is nonzero but negligible
+ * compared to N. This is always the case when N is crypto-sized, but
+ * it's convenient to support small N for testing purposes. When N
+ * is small, use a higher repeat count, otherwise the probability of
+ * failure is macroscopic.
+ */
+ int count = (n_bytes > 4 ? 30 : 250);
+
+ /*
+ * Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA)
+ * when f_rng is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG:
+ * - use the same byte ordering;
+ * - keep the leftmost n_bits bits of the generated octet string;
+ * - try until result is in the desired range.
+ * This also avoids any bias, which is especially important for ECDSA.
+ */
+ do {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_fill_random(X, limbs,
+ n_bytes,
+ f_rng, p_rng));
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(X, limbs, 8 * n_bytes - n_bits);
+
+ if (--count == 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ge_lower = mbedtls_mpi_core_uint_le_mpi(min, X, limbs);
+ lt_upper = mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(X, N, limbs);
+ } while (mbedtls_ct_bool_and(ge_lower, lt_upper) == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE);
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static size_t exp_mod_get_window_size(size_t Ebits)
+{
+#if MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE >= 6
+ return (Ebits > 671) ? 6 : (Ebits > 239) ? 5 : (Ebits > 79) ? 4 : 1;
+#elif MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE == 5
+ return (Ebits > 239) ? 5 : (Ebits > 79) ? 4 : 1;
+#elif MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE > 1
+ return (Ebits > 79) ? MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE : 1;
+#else
+ (void) Ebits;
+ return 1;
+#endif
+}
+
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs, size_t E_limbs)
+{
+ const size_t wsize = exp_mod_get_window_size(E_limbs * biL);
+ const size_t welem = ((size_t) 1) << wsize;
+
+ /* How big does each part of the working memory pool need to be? */
+ const size_t table_limbs = welem * AN_limbs;
+ const size_t select_limbs = AN_limbs;
+ const size_t temp_limbs = 2 * AN_limbs + 1;
+
+ return table_limbs + select_limbs + temp_limbs;
+}
+
+static void exp_mod_precompute_window(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
+ size_t AN_limbs,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint mm,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
+ size_t welem,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wtable,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *temp)
+{
+ /* W[0] = 1 (in Montgomery presentation) */
+ memset(Wtable, 0, AN_limbs * ciL);
+ Wtable[0] = 1;
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(Wtable, Wtable, RR, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, temp);
+
+ /* W[1] = A (already in Montgomery presentation) */
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *W1 = Wtable + AN_limbs;
+ memcpy(W1, A, AN_limbs * ciL);
+
+ /* W[i+1] = W[i] * W[1], i >= 2 */
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wprev = W1;
+ for (size_t i = 2; i < welem; i++) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wcur = Wprev + AN_limbs;
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(Wcur, Wprev, W1, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, temp);
+ Wprev = Wcur;
+ }
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+void (*mbedtls_safe_codepath_hook)(void) = NULL;
+void (*mbedtls_unsafe_codepath_hook)(void) = NULL;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * This function calculates the indices of the exponent where the exponentiation algorithm should
+ * start processing.
+ *
+ * Warning! If the parameter E_public has MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC as its value,
+ * this function is not constant time with respect to the exponent (parameter E).
+ */
+static inline void exp_mod_calc_first_bit_optionally_safe(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E,
+ size_t E_limbs,
+ int E_public,
+ size_t *E_limb_index,
+ size_t *E_bit_index)
+{
+ if (E_public == MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC) {
+ /*
+ * Skip leading zero bits.
+ */
+ size_t E_bits = mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(E, E_limbs);
+ if (E_bits == 0) {
+ /*
+ * If E is 0 mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen() returns 0. Even if that is the case, we will want
+ * to represent it as a single 0 bit and as such the bitlength will be 1.
+ */
+ E_bits = 1;
+ }
+
+ *E_limb_index = E_bits / biL;
+ *E_bit_index = E_bits % biL;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if (mbedtls_unsafe_codepath_hook != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_unsafe_codepath_hook();
+ }
+#endif
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Here we need to be constant time with respect to E and can't do anything better than
+ * start at the first allocated bit.
+ */
+ *E_limb_index = E_limbs;
+ *E_bit_index = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if (mbedtls_safe_codepath_hook != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_safe_codepath_hook();
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Warning! If the parameter window_public has MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC as its value, this function is
+ * not constant time with respect to the window parameter and consequently the exponent of the
+ * exponentiation (parameter E of mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_optionally_safe).
+ */
+static inline void exp_mod_table_lookup_optionally_safe(mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wselect,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *Wtable,
+ size_t AN_limbs, size_t welem,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint window,
+ int window_public)
+{
+ if (window_public == MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC) {
+ memcpy(Wselect, Wtable + window * AN_limbs, AN_limbs * ciL);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if (mbedtls_unsafe_codepath_hook != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_unsafe_codepath_hook();
+ }
+#endif
+ } else {
+ /* Select Wtable[window] without leaking window through
+ * memory access patterns. */
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup(Wselect, Wtable,
+ AN_limbs, welem, window);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if (mbedtls_safe_codepath_hook != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_safe_codepath_hook();
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
+/* Exponentiation: X := A^E mod N.
+ *
+ * Warning! If the parameter E_public has MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC as its value,
+ * this function is not constant time with respect to the exponent (parameter E).
+ *
+ * A must already be in Montgomery form.
+ *
+ * As in other bignum functions, assume that AN_limbs and E_limbs are nonzero.
+ *
+ * RR must contain 2^{2*biL} mod N.
+ *
+ * The algorithm is a variant of Left-to-right k-ary exponentiation: HAC 14.82
+ * (The difference is that the body in our loop processes a single bit instead
+ * of a full window.)
+ */
+static void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_optionally_safe(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
+ size_t AN_limbs,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E,
+ size_t E_limbs,
+ int E_public,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T)
+{
+ /* We'll process the bits of E from most significant
+ * (limb_index=E_limbs-1, E_bit_index=biL-1) to least significant
+ * (limb_index=0, E_bit_index=0). */
+ size_t E_limb_index = E_limbs;
+ size_t E_bit_index = 0;
+ exp_mod_calc_first_bit_optionally_safe(E, E_limbs, E_public,
+ &E_limb_index, &E_bit_index);
+
+ const size_t wsize = exp_mod_get_window_size(E_limb_index * biL);
+ const size_t welem = ((size_t) 1) << wsize;
+
+ /* This is how we will use the temporary storage T, which must have space
+ * for table_limbs, select_limbs and (2 * AN_limbs + 1) for montmul. */
+ const size_t table_limbs = welem * AN_limbs;
+ const size_t select_limbs = AN_limbs;
+
+ /* Pointers to specific parts of the temporary working memory pool */
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *const Wtable = T;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *const Wselect = Wtable + table_limbs;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *const temp = Wselect + select_limbs;
+
+ /*
+ * Window precomputation
+ */
+
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N);
+
+ /* Set Wtable[i] = A^i (in Montgomery representation) */
+ exp_mod_precompute_window(A, N, AN_limbs,
+ mm, RR,
+ welem, Wtable, temp);
+
+ /*
+ * Fixed window exponentiation
+ */
+
+ /* X = 1 (in Montgomery presentation) initially */
+ memcpy(X, Wtable, AN_limbs * ciL);
+
+ /* At any given time, window contains window_bits bits from E.
+ * window_bits can go up to wsize. */
+ size_t window_bits = 0;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint window = 0;
+
+ do {
+ /* Square */
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, X, X, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, temp);
+
+ /* Move to the next bit of the exponent */
+ if (E_bit_index == 0) {
+ --E_limb_index;
+ E_bit_index = biL - 1;
+ } else {
+ --E_bit_index;
+ }
+ /* Insert next exponent bit into window */
+ ++window_bits;
+ window <<= 1;
+ window |= (E[E_limb_index] >> E_bit_index) & 1;
+
+ /* Clear window if it's full. Also clear the window at the end,
+ * when we've finished processing the exponent. */
+ if (window_bits == wsize ||
+ (E_bit_index == 0 && E_limb_index == 0)) {
+
+ exp_mod_table_lookup_optionally_safe(Wselect, Wtable, AN_limbs, welem,
+ window, E_public);
+ /* Multiply X by the selected element. */
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, X, Wselect, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm,
+ temp);
+ window = 0;
+ window_bits = 0;
+ }
+ } while (!(E_bit_index == 0 && E_limb_index == 0));
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, size_t AN_limbs,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E, size_t E_limbs,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_optionally_safe(X,
+ A,
+ N,
+ AN_limbs,
+ E,
+ E_limbs,
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET,
+ RR,
+ T);
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, size_t AN_limbs,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E, size_t E_limbs,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_optionally_safe(X,
+ A,
+ N,
+ AN_limbs,
+ E,
+ E_limbs,
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC,
+ RR,
+ T);
+}
+
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint c, /* doubles as carry */
+ size_t limbs)
+{
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint s = A[i];
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint t = s - c;
+ c = (t > s);
+ X[i] = t;
+ }
+
+ return c;
+}
+
+mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ size_t limbs)
+{
+ volatile const mbedtls_mpi_uint *force_read_A = A;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint bits = 0;
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < limbs; i++) {
+ bits |= force_read_A[i];
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_ct_bool(bits);
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
+ size_t AN_limbs,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint mm,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *rr,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, A, rr, AN_limbs, N, AN_limbs, mm, T);
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
+ size_t AN_limbs,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint mm,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T)
+{
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rinv = 1; /* 1/R in Mont. rep => 1 */
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, A, &Rinv, 1, N, AN_limbs, mm, T);
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..264ee63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_core.h
@@ -0,0 +1,825 @@
+/**
+ * Core bignum functions
+ *
+ * This interface should only be used by the legacy bignum module (bignum.h)
+ * and the modular bignum modules (bignum_mod.c, bignum_mod_raw.c). All other
+ * modules should use the high-level modular bignum interface (bignum_mod.h)
+ * or the legacy bignum interface (bignum.h).
+ *
+ * This module is about processing non-negative integers with a fixed upper
+ * bound that's of the form 2^n-1 where n is a multiple of #biL.
+ * These can be thought of integers written in base 2^#biL with a fixed
+ * number of digits. Digits in this base are called *limbs*.
+ * Many operations treat these numbers as the principal representation of
+ * a number modulo 2^n or a smaller bound.
+ *
+ * The functions in this module obey the following conventions unless
+ * explicitly indicated otherwise:
+ *
+ * - **Overflow**: some functions indicate overflow from the range
+ * [0, 2^n-1] by returning carry parameters, while others operate
+ * modulo and so cannot overflow. This should be clear from the function
+ * documentation.
+ * - **Bignum parameters**: Bignums are passed as pointers to an array of
+ * limbs. A limb has the type #mbedtls_mpi_uint. Unless otherwise specified:
+ * - Bignum parameters called \p A, \p B, ... are inputs, and are
+ * not modified by the function.
+ * - For operations modulo some number, the modulus is called \p N
+ * and is input-only.
+ * - Bignum parameters called \p X, \p Y are outputs or input-output.
+ * The initial content of output-only parameters is ignored.
+ * - Some functions use different names that reflect traditional
+ * naming of operands of certain operations (e.g.
+ * divisor/dividend/quotient/remainder).
+ * - \p T is a temporary storage area. The initial content of such
+ * parameter is ignored and the final content is unspecified.
+ * - **Bignum sizes**: bignum sizes are always expressed in limbs.
+ * Most functions work on bignums of a given size and take a single
+ * \p limbs parameter that applies to all parameters that are limb arrays.
+ * All bignum sizes must be at least 1 and must be significantly less than
+ * #SIZE_MAX. The behavior if a size is 0 is undefined. The behavior if the
+ * total size of all parameters overflows #SIZE_MAX is undefined.
+ * - **Parameter ordering**: for bignum parameters, outputs come before inputs.
+ * Temporaries come last.
+ * - **Aliasing**: in general, output bignums may be aliased to one or more
+ * inputs. As an exception, parameters that are documented as a modulus value
+ * may not be aliased to an output. Outputs may not be aliased to one another.
+ * Temporaries may not be aliased to any other parameter.
+ * - **Overlap**: apart from aliasing of limb array pointers (where two
+ * arguments are equal pointers), overlap is not supported and may result
+ * in undefined behavior.
+ * - **Error handling**: This is a low-level module. Functions generally do not
+ * try to protect against invalid arguments such as nonsensical sizes or
+ * null pointers. Note that some functions that operate on bignums of
+ * different sizes have constraints about their size, and violating those
+ * constraints may lead to buffer overflows.
+ * - **Modular representatives**: functions that operate modulo \p N expect
+ * all modular inputs to be in the range [0, \p N - 1] and guarantee outputs
+ * in the range [0, \p N - 1]. If an input is out of range, outputs are
+ * fully unspecified, though bignum values out of range should not cause
+ * buffer overflows (beware that this is not extensively tested).
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_H
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_H
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+
+#define ciL (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) /** chars in limb */
+#define biL (ciL << 3) /** bits in limb */
+#define biH (ciL << 2) /** half limb size */
+
+/*
+ * Convert between bits/chars and number of limbs
+ * Divide first in order to avoid potential overflows
+ */
+#define BITS_TO_LIMBS(i) ((i) / biL + ((i) % biL != 0))
+#define CHARS_TO_LIMBS(i) ((i) / ciL + ((i) % ciL != 0))
+/* Get a specific byte, without range checks. */
+#define GET_BYTE(X, i) \
+ (((X)[(i) / ciL] >> (((i) % ciL) * 8)) & 0xff)
+
+/* Constants to identify whether a value is public or secret. If a parameter is marked as secret by
+ * this constant, the function must be constant time with respect to the parameter.
+ *
+ * This is only needed for functions with the _optionally_safe postfix. All other functions have
+ * fixed behavior that can't be changed at runtime and are constant time with respect to their
+ * parameters as prescribed by their documentation or by conventions in their module's documentation.
+ *
+ * Parameters should be named X_public where X is the name of the
+ * corresponding input parameter.
+ *
+ * Implementation should always check using
+ * if (X_public == MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC) {
+ * // unsafe path
+ * } else {
+ * // safe path
+ * }
+ * not the other way round, in order to prevent misuse. (That is, if a value
+ * other than the two below is passed, default to the safe path.)
+ *
+ * The value of MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC is chosen in a way that is unlikely to happen by accident, but
+ * which can be used as an immediate value in a Thumb2 comparison (for code size). */
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC 0x2a2a2a2a
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET 0
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+// Default value for testing that is neither MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_PUBLIC nor MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_SECRET
+#define MBEDTLS_MPI_IS_TEST 1
+#endif
+
+/** Count leading zero bits in a given integer.
+ *
+ * \warning The result is undefined if \p a == 0
+ *
+ * \param a Integer to count leading zero bits.
+ *
+ * \return The number of leading zero bits in \p a, if \p a != 0.
+ * If \p a == 0, the result is undefined.
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_clz(mbedtls_mpi_uint a);
+
+/** Return the minimum number of bits required to represent the value held
+ * in the MPI.
+ *
+ * \note This function returns 0 if all the limbs of \p A are 0.
+ *
+ * \param[in] A The address of the MPI.
+ * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A.
+ *
+ * \return The number of bits in \p A.
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs);
+
+/** Convert a big-endian byte array aligned to the size of mbedtls_mpi_uint
+ * into the storage form used by mbedtls_mpi.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] A The address of the MPI.
+ * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host(mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ size_t A_limbs);
+
+/** \brief Compare a machine integer with an MPI.
+ *
+ * This function operates in constant time with respect
+ * to the values of \p min and \p A.
+ *
+ * \param min A machine integer.
+ * \param[in] A An MPI.
+ * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A.
+ * This must be at least 1.
+ *
+ * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p min is less than or equal to \p A, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
+ */
+mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_uint_le_mpi(mbedtls_mpi_uint min,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ size_t A_limbs);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Check if one unsigned MPI is less than another in constant
+ * time.
+ *
+ * \param A The left-hand MPI. This must point to an array of limbs
+ * with the same allocated length as \p B.
+ * \param B The right-hand MPI. This must point to an array of limbs
+ * with the same allocated length as \p A.
+ * \param limbs The number of limbs in \p A and \p B.
+ * This must not be 0.
+ *
+ * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p A is less than \p B.
+ * MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if \p A is greater than or equal to \p B.
+ */
+mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
+ size_t limbs);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a safe conditional copy of an MPI which doesn't reveal
+ * whether assignment was done or not.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The address of the destination MPI.
+ * This must be initialized. Must have enough limbs to
+ * store the full value of \p A.
+ * \param[in] A The address of the source MPI. This must be initialized.
+ * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p A.
+ * \param assign The condition deciding whether to perform the
+ * assignment or not. Callers will need to use
+ * the constant time interface (e.g. `mbedtls_ct_bool()`)
+ * to construct this argument.
+ *
+ * \note This function avoids leaking any information about whether
+ * the assignment was done or not.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ size_t limbs,
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t assign);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a safe conditional swap of two MPIs which doesn't reveal
+ * whether the swap was done or not.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The address of the first MPI.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param[in,out] Y The address of the second MPI.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p X and \p Y.
+ * \param swap The condition deciding whether to perform
+ * the swap or not.
+ *
+ * \note This function avoids leaking any information about whether
+ * the swap was done or not.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y,
+ size_t limbs,
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t swap);
+
+/** Import X from unsigned binary data, little-endian.
+ *
+ * The MPI needs to have enough limbs to store the full value (including any
+ * most significant zero bytes in the input).
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The address of the MPI.
+ * \param X_limbs The number of limbs of \p X.
+ * \param[in] input The input buffer to import from.
+ * \param input_length The length bytes of \p input.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p X isn't
+ * large enough to hold the value in \p input.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_core_read_le(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ size_t X_limbs,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t input_length);
+
+/** Import X from unsigned binary data, big-endian.
+ *
+ * The MPI needs to have enough limbs to store the full value (including any
+ * most significant zero bytes in the input).
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The address of the MPI.
+ * May only be #NULL if \p X_limbs is 0 and \p input_length
+ * is 0.
+ * \param X_limbs The number of limbs of \p X.
+ * \param[in] input The input buffer to import from.
+ * May only be #NULL if \p input_length is 0.
+ * \param input_length The length in bytes of \p input.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p X isn't
+ * large enough to hold the value in \p input.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_core_read_be(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ size_t X_limbs,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t input_length);
+
+/** Export A into unsigned binary data, little-endian.
+ *
+ * \note If \p output is shorter than \p A the export is still successful if the
+ * value held in \p A fits in the buffer (that is, if enough of the most
+ * significant bytes of \p A are 0).
+ *
+ * \param[in] A The address of the MPI.
+ * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A.
+ * \param[out] output The output buffer to export to.
+ * \param output_length The length in bytes of \p output.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p output isn't
+ * large enough to hold the value of \p A.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_core_write_le(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ size_t A_limbs,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_length);
+
+/** Export A into unsigned binary data, big-endian.
+ *
+ * \note If \p output is shorter than \p A the export is still successful if the
+ * value held in \p A fits in the buffer (that is, if enough of the most
+ * significant bytes of \p A are 0).
+ *
+ * \param[in] A The address of the MPI.
+ * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A.
+ * \param[out] output The output buffer to export to.
+ * \param output_length The length in bytes of \p output.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p output isn't
+ * large enough to hold the value of \p A.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_core_write_be(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ size_t A_limbs,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_length);
+
+/** \brief Shift an MPI in-place right by a number of bits.
+ *
+ * Shifting by more bits than there are bit positions
+ * in \p X is valid and results in setting \p X to 0.
+ *
+ * This function's execution time depends on the value
+ * of \p count (and of course \p limbs).
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The number to shift.
+ * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p X. This must be at least 1.
+ * \param count The number of bits to shift by.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t limbs,
+ size_t count);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Shift an MPI in-place left by a number of bits.
+ *
+ * Shifting by more bits than there are bit positions
+ * in \p X will produce an unspecified result.
+ *
+ * This function's execution time depends on the value
+ * of \p count (and of course \p limbs).
+ * \param[in,out] X The number to shift.
+ * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p X. This must be at least 1.
+ * \param count The number of bits to shift by.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t limbs,
+ size_t count);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Add two fixed-size large unsigned integers, returning the carry.
+ *
+ * Calculates `A + B` where `A` and `B` have the same size.
+ *
+ * This function operates modulo `2^(biL*limbs)` and returns the carry
+ * (1 if there was a wraparound, and 0 otherwise).
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The result of the addition.
+ * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of the left operand.
+ * \param[in] B Little-endian presentation of the right operand.
+ * \param limbs Number of limbs of \p X, \p A and \p B.
+ *
+ * \return 1 if `A + B >= 2^(biL*limbs)`, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_add(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
+ size_t limbs);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Conditional addition of two fixed-size large unsigned integers,
+ * returning the carry.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to
+ *
+ * ```
+ * if( cond )
+ * X += A;
+ * return carry;
+ * ```
+ *
+ * This function operates modulo `2^(biL*limbs)`.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The pointer to the (little-endian) array
+ * representing the bignum to accumulate onto.
+ * \param[in] A The pointer to the (little-endian) array
+ * representing the bignum to conditionally add
+ * to \p X. This may be aliased to \p X but may not
+ * overlap otherwise.
+ * \param limbs Number of limbs of \p X and \p A.
+ * \param cond Condition bit dictating whether addition should
+ * happen or not. This must be \c 0 or \c 1.
+ *
+ * \warning If \p cond is neither 0 nor 1, the result of this function
+ * is unspecified, and the resulting value in \p X might be
+ * neither its original value nor \p X + \p A.
+ *
+ * \return 1 if `X + cond * A >= 2^(biL*limbs)`, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ size_t limbs,
+ unsigned cond);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Subtract two fixed-size large unsigned integers, returning the borrow.
+ *
+ * Calculate `A - B` where \p A and \p B have the same size.
+ * This function operates modulo `2^(biL*limbs)` and returns the carry
+ * (1 if there was a wraparound, i.e. if `A < B`, and 0 otherwise).
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap
+ * either otherwise.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The result of the subtraction.
+ * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of left operand.
+ * \param[in] B Little-endian presentation of right operand.
+ * \param limbs Number of limbs of \p X, \p A and \p B.
+ *
+ * \return 1 if `A < B`.
+ * 0 if `A >= B`.
+ */
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
+ size_t limbs);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a fixed-size multiply accumulate operation: X += b * A
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A (when \p X_limbs == \p A_limbs), but may not
+ * otherwise overlap.
+ *
+ * This function operates modulo `2^(biL*X_limbs)`.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The pointer to the (little-endian) array
+ * representing the bignum to accumulate onto.
+ * \param X_limbs The number of limbs of \p X. This must be
+ * at least \p A_limbs.
+ * \param[in] A The pointer to the (little-endian) array
+ * representing the bignum to multiply with.
+ * This may be aliased to \p X but may not overlap
+ * otherwise.
+ * \param A_limbs The number of limbs of \p A.
+ * \param b X scalar to multiply with.
+ *
+ * \return The carry at the end of the operation.
+ */
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint b);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a known-size multiplication
+ *
+ * \p X may not be aliased to any of the inputs for this function.
+ * \p A may be aliased to \p B.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The pointer to the (little-endian) array to receive
+ * the product of \p A_limbs and \p B_limbs.
+ * This must be of length \p A_limbs + \p B_limbs.
+ * \param[in] A The pointer to the (little-endian) array
+ * representing the first factor.
+ * \param A_limbs The number of limbs in \p A.
+ * \param[in] B The pointer to the (little-endian) array
+ * representing the second factor.
+ * \param B_limbs The number of limbs in \p B.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A, size_t A_limbs,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, size_t B_limbs);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Calculate initialisation value for fast Montgomery modular
+ * multiplication
+ *
+ * \param[in] N Little-endian presentation of the modulus. This must have
+ * at least one limb.
+ *
+ * \return The initialisation value for fast Montgomery modular multiplication
+ */
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Montgomery multiplication: X = A * B * R^-1 mod N (HAC 14.36)
+ *
+ * \p A and \p B must be in canonical form. That is, < \p N.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p N, or even \p B (if \p AN_limbs ==
+ * \p B_limbs) but may not overlap any parameters otherwise.
+ *
+ * \p A and \p B may alias each other, if \p AN_limbs == \p B_limbs. They may
+ * not alias \p N (since they must be in canonical form, they cannot == \p N).
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The destination MPI, as a little-endian array of
+ * length \p AN_limbs.
+ * On successful completion, X contains the result of
+ * the multiplication `A * B * R^-1` mod N where
+ * `R = 2^(biL*AN_limbs)`.
+ * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of first operand.
+ * Must have the same number of limbs as \p N.
+ * \param[in] B Little-endian presentation of second operand.
+ * \param[in] B_limbs The number of limbs in \p B.
+ * Must be <= \p AN_limbs.
+ * \param[in] N Little-endian presentation of the modulus.
+ * This must be odd, and have exactly the same number
+ * of limbs as \p A.
+ * It may alias \p X, but must not alias or otherwise
+ * overlap any of the other parameters.
+ * \param[in] AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p X, \p A and \p N.
+ * \param mm The Montgomery constant for \p N: -N^-1 mod 2^biL.
+ * This can be calculated by `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init()`.
+ * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of size at least 2*AN_limbs+1 limbs.
+ * Its initial content is unused and
+ * its final content is indeterminate.
+ * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the
+ * other parameters.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B, size_t B_limbs,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, size_t AN_limbs,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint mm, mbedtls_mpi_uint *T);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Calculate the square of the Montgomery constant. (Needed
+ * for conversion and operations in Montgomery form.)
+ *
+ * \param[out] X A pointer to the result of the calculation of
+ * the square of the Montgomery constant:
+ * 2^{2*n*biL} mod N.
+ * \param[in] N Little-endian presentation of the modulus, which must be odd.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if there is not enough space
+ * to store the value of Montgomery constant squared.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO if \p N modulus is zero.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE if \p N modulus is negative.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *N);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+/**
+ * Copy an MPI from a table without leaking the index.
+ *
+ * \param dest The destination buffer. This must point to a writable
+ * buffer of at least \p limbs limbs.
+ * \param table The address of the table. This must point to a readable
+ * array of \p count elements of \p limbs limbs each.
+ * \param limbs The number of limbs in each table entry.
+ * \param count The number of entries in \p table.
+ * \param index The (secret) table index to look up. This must be in the
+ * range `0 .. count-1`.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_ct_uint_table_lookup(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dest,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *table,
+ size_t limbs,
+ size_t count,
+ size_t index);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Fill an integer with a number of random bytes.
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI.
+ * \param X_limbs The number of limbs of \p X.
+ * \param bytes The number of random bytes to generate.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be
+ * \c NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context argument.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have
+ * enough room for \p bytes bytes.
+ * \return A negative error code on RNG failure.
+ *
+ * \note The bytes obtained from the RNG are interpreted
+ * as a big-endian representation of an MPI; this can
+ * be relevant in applications like deterministic ECDSA.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_core_fill_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs,
+ size_t bytes,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/** Generate a random number uniformly in a range.
+ *
+ * This function generates a random number between \p min inclusive and
+ * \p N exclusive.
+ *
+ * The procedure complies with RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA)
+ * when the RNG is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG
+ * and \p min is \c 1.
+ *
+ * \note There are `N - min` possible outputs. The lower bound
+ * \p min can be reached, but the upper bound \p N cannot.
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI, with \p limbs limbs.
+ * It must not be aliased with \p N or otherwise overlap it.
+ * \param min The minimum value to return.
+ * \param N The upper bound of the range, exclusive, with \p limbs limbs.
+ * In other words, this is one plus the maximum value to return.
+ * \p N must be strictly larger than \p min.
+ * \param limbs The number of limbs of \p N and \p X.
+ * This must not be 0.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if the implementation was
+ * unable to find a suitable value within a limited number
+ * of attempts. This has a negligible probability if \p N
+ * is significantly larger than \p min, which is the case
+ * for all usual cryptographic applications.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_core_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint min,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
+ size_t limbs,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Returns the number of limbs of working memory required for
+ * a call to `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`.
+ *
+ * \note This will always be at least
+ * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(AN_limbs)`,
+ * i.e. sufficient for a call to `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()`.
+ *
+ * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in the input `A` and the modulus `N`
+ * (they must be the same size) that will be given to
+ * `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`.
+ * \param E_limbs The number of limbs in the exponent `E` that will be given
+ * to `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`.
+ *
+ * \return The number of limbs of working memory required by
+ * `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod()`.
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs, size_t E_limbs);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a modular exponentiation with public or secret exponent:
+ * X = A^E mod N, where \p A is already in Montgomery form.
+ *
+ * \warning This function is not constant time with respect to \p E (the exponent).
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but not to \p RR or \p E, even if \p E_limbs ==
+ * \p AN_limbs.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The destination MPI, as a little endian array of length
+ * \p AN_limbs.
+ * \param[in] A The base MPI, as a little endian array of length \p AN_limbs.
+ * Must be in Montgomery form.
+ * \param[in] N The modulus, as a little endian array of length \p AN_limbs.
+ * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p X, \p A, \p N, \p RR.
+ * \param[in] E The exponent, as a little endian array of length \p E_limbs.
+ * \param E_limbs The number of limbs in \p E.
+ * \param[in] RR The precomputed residue of 2^{2*biL} modulo N, as a little
+ * endian array of length \p AN_limbs.
+ * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of at least the number of limbs returned
+ * by `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs()`.
+ * Its initial content is unused and its final content is
+ * indeterminate.
+ * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the other
+ * parameters.
+ * It is up to the caller to zeroize \p T when it is no
+ * longer needed, and before freeing it if it was dynamically
+ * allocated.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, size_t AN_limbs,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E, size_t E_limbs,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a modular exponentiation with secret exponent:
+ * X = A^E mod N, where \p A is already in Montgomery form.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but not to \p RR or \p E, even if \p E_limbs ==
+ * \p AN_limbs.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The destination MPI, as a little endian array of length
+ * \p AN_limbs.
+ * \param[in] A The base MPI, as a little endian array of length \p AN_limbs.
+ * Must be in Montgomery form.
+ * \param[in] N The modulus, as a little endian array of length \p AN_limbs.
+ * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p X, \p A, \p N, \p RR.
+ * \param[in] E The exponent, as a little endian array of length \p E_limbs.
+ * \param E_limbs The number of limbs in \p E.
+ * \param[in] RR The precomputed residue of 2^{2*biL} modulo N, as a little
+ * endian array of length \p AN_limbs.
+ * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of at least the number of limbs returned
+ * by `mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs()`.
+ * Its initial content is unused and its final content is
+ * indeterminate.
+ * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the other
+ * parameters.
+ * It is up to the caller to zeroize \p T when it is no
+ * longer needed, and before freeing it if it was dynamically
+ * allocated.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N, size_t AN_limbs,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *E, size_t E_limbs,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Subtract unsigned integer from known-size large unsigned integers.
+ * Return the borrow.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The result of the subtraction.
+ * \param[in] A The left operand.
+ * \param b The unsigned scalar to subtract.
+ * \param limbs Number of limbs of \p X and \p A.
+ *
+ * \return 1 if `A < b`.
+ * 0 if `A >= b`.
+ */
+mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint b,
+ size_t limbs);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Determine if a given MPI has the value \c 0 in constant time with
+ * respect to the value (but not with respect to the number of limbs).
+ *
+ * \param[in] A The MPI to test.
+ * \param limbs Number of limbs in \p A.
+ *
+ * \return MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if `A == 0`
+ * MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if `A != 0`.
+ */
+mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ size_t limbs);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Returns the number of limbs of working memory required for
+ * a call to `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()`.
+ *
+ * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in the input `A` and the modulus `N`
+ * (they must be the same size) that will be given to
+ * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()` or one of the other functions
+ * that specifies this as the amount of working memory needed.
+ *
+ * \return The number of limbs of working memory required by
+ * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()` (or other similar function).
+ */
+static inline size_t mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs)
+{
+ return 2 * AN_limbs + 1;
+}
+
+/** Convert an MPI into Montgomery form.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but may not otherwise overlap it.
+ *
+ * \p X may not alias \p N (it is in canonical form, so must be strictly less
+ * than \p N). Nor may it alias or overlap \p rr (this is unlikely to be
+ * required in practice.)
+ *
+ * This function is a thin wrapper around `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()` that is
+ * an alternative to calling `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep()` when we
+ * don't want to allocate memory.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The result of the conversion.
+ * Must have the same number of limbs as \p A.
+ * \param[in] A The MPI to convert into Montgomery form.
+ * Must have the same number of limbs as the modulus.
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus, which gives the size of
+ * the base `R` = 2^(biL*N->limbs).
+ * \param[in] AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p X, \p A, \p N and \p rr.
+ * \param mm The Montgomery constant for \p N: -N^-1 mod 2^biL.
+ * This can be determined by calling
+ * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init()`.
+ * \param[in] rr The residue for `2^{2*n*biL} mod N`.
+ * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of size at least
+ * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(AN_limbs)`
+ * limbs.
+ * Its initial content is unused and
+ * its final content is indeterminate.
+ * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the
+ * other parameters.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
+ size_t AN_limbs,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint mm,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *rr,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T);
+
+/** Convert an MPI from Montgomery form.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but may not otherwise overlap it.
+ *
+ * \p X may not alias \p N (it is in canonical form, so must be strictly less
+ * than \p N).
+ *
+ * This function is a thin wrapper around `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()` that is
+ * an alternative to calling `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep()` when we
+ * don't want to allocate memory.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The result of the conversion.
+ * Must have the same number of limbs as \p A.
+ * \param[in] A The MPI to convert from Montgomery form.
+ * Must have the same number of limbs as the modulus.
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus, which gives the size of
+ * the base `R` = 2^(biL*N->limbs).
+ * \param[in] AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p X, \p A and \p N.
+ * \param mm The Montgomery constant for \p N: -N^-1 mod 2^biL.
+ * This can be determined by calling
+ * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init()`.
+ * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of size at least
+ * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(AN_limbs)`
+ * limbs.
+ * Its initial content is unused and
+ * its final content is indeterminate.
+ * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the
+ * other parameters.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
+ size_t AN_limbs,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint mm,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_core_invasive.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_core_invasive.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..167099d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_core_invasive.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/**
+ * \file bignum_core_invasive.h
+ *
+ * \brief Function declarations for invasive functions of bignum core.
+ */
+/**
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_INVASIVE_H
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_INVASIVE_H
+
+#include "bignum_core.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+
+extern void (*mbedtls_safe_codepath_hook)(void);
+extern void (*mbedtls_unsafe_codepath_hook)(void);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && !MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_CORE_INVASIVE_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_internal.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aceaf55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/**
+ * \file bignum_internal.h
+ *
+ * \brief Internal-only bignum public-key cryptosystem API.
+ *
+ * This file declares bignum-related functions that are to be used
+ * only from within the Mbed TLS library itself.
+ *
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_INTERNAL_H
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_INTERNAL_H
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a modular exponentiation: X = A^E mod N
+ *
+ * \warning This function is not constant time with respect to \p E (the exponent).
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * This must not alias E or N.
+ * \param A The base of the exponentiation.
+ * This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param E The exponent MPI. This must point to an initialized MPI.
+ * \param N The base for the modular reduction. This must point to an
+ * initialized MPI.
+ * \param prec_RR A helper MPI depending solely on \p N which can be used to
+ * speed-up multiple modular exponentiations for the same value
+ * of \p N. This may be \c NULL. If it is not \c NULL, it must
+ * point to an initialized MPI. If it hasn't been used after
+ * the call to mbedtls_mpi_init(), this function will compute
+ * the helper value and store it in \p prec_RR for reuse on
+ * subsequent calls to this function. Otherwise, the function
+ * will assume that \p prec_RR holds the helper value set by a
+ * previous call to mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(), and reuse it.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if a memory allocation failed.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \c N is negative or
+ * even, or if \c E is negative.
+ * \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failures.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod_unsafe(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *E, const mbedtls_mpi *N,
+ mbedtls_mpi *prec_RR);
+
+#endif /* bignum_internal.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dfd332a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.c
@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+/**
+ * Modular bignum functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT)
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include "bignum_core.h"
+#include "bignum_mod.h"
+#include "bignum_mod_raw.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *p,
+ size_t p_limbs)
+{
+ if (p_limbs != N->limbs || !mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(p, N->p, N->limbs)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ r->limbs = N->limbs;
+ r->p = p;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_release(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r)
+{
+ if (r == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ r->limbs = 0;
+ r->p = NULL;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N)
+{
+ if (N == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ N->p = NULL;
+ N->limbs = 0;
+ N->bits = 0;
+ N->int_rep = MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N)
+{
+ if (N == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ switch (N->int_rep) {
+ case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY:
+ if (N->rep.mont.rr != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free((mbedtls_mpi_uint *) N->rep.mont.rr,
+ N->limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
+ N->rep.mont.rr = NULL;
+ }
+ N->rep.mont.mm = 0;
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED:
+ N->rep.ored.modp = NULL;
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ N->p = NULL;
+ N->limbs = 0;
+ N->bits = 0;
+ N->int_rep = MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID;
+}
+
+static int set_mont_const_square(const mbedtls_mpi_uint **X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ size_t limbs)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi N;
+ mbedtls_mpi RR;
+ *X = NULL;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&N);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR);
+
+ if (A == NULL || limbs == 0 || limbs >= (MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS / 2) - 2) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_grow(&N, limbs)) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(N.p, A, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * limbs);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, &N);
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ *X = RR.p;
+ RR.p = NULL;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&N);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&RR);
+ ret = (ret != 0) ? MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED : 0;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static inline void standard_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p,
+ size_t p_limbs,
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector int_rep)
+{
+ N->p = p;
+ N->limbs = p_limbs;
+ N->bits = mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen(p, p_limbs);
+ N->int_rep = int_rep;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p,
+ size_t p_limbs)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ standard_modulus_setup(N, p, p_limbs, MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY);
+ N->rep.mont.mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p);
+ ret = set_mont_const_square(&N->rep.mont.rr, N->p, N->limbs);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(N);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_optred_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p,
+ size_t p_limbs,
+ mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn modp)
+{
+ standard_modulus_setup(N, p, p_limbs, MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED);
+ N->rep.ored.modp = modp;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mul(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N)
+{
+ if (N->limbs == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (X->limbs != N->limbs || A->limbs != N->limbs || B->limbs != N->limbs) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T = mbedtls_calloc(N->limbs * 2 + 1, ciL);
+ if (T == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_mul(X->p, A->p, B->p, N, T);
+
+ mbedtls_free(T);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N)
+{
+ if (X->limbs != N->limbs || A->limbs != N->limbs || B->limbs != N->limbs) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub(X->p, A->p, B->p, N);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv_mont(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *working_memory)
+{
+ /* Input already in Montgomery form, so there's little to do */
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime(X->p, A->p,
+ N->p, N->limbs,
+ N->rep.mont.rr,
+ working_memory);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv_non_mont(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *working_memory)
+{
+ /* Need to convert input into Montgomery form */
+
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus Nmont;
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init(&Nmont);
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(&Nmont, N->p, N->limbs));
+
+ /* We'll use X->p to hold the Montgomery form of the input A->p */
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(X->p, A->p, Nmont.p, Nmont.limbs,
+ Nmont.rep.mont.mm, Nmont.rep.mont.rr,
+ working_memory);
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime(X->p, X->p,
+ Nmont.p, Nmont.limbs,
+ Nmont.rep.mont.rr,
+ working_memory);
+
+ /* And convert back from Montgomery form */
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(X->p, X->p, Nmont.p, Nmont.limbs,
+ Nmont.rep.mont.mm, working_memory);
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(&Nmont);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N)
+{
+ if (X->limbs != N->limbs || A->limbs != N->limbs) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* Zero has the same value regardless of Montgomery form or not */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_core_check_zero_ct(A->p, A->limbs) == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ size_t working_limbs =
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs(N->limbs);
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *working_memory = mbedtls_calloc(working_limbs,
+ sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
+ if (working_memory == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ switch (N->int_rep) {
+ case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY:
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv_mont(X, A, N, working_memory);
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED:
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv_non_mont(X, A, N, working_memory);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(working_memory,
+ working_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_add(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N)
+{
+ if (X->limbs != N->limbs || A->limbs != N->limbs || B->limbs != N->limbs) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add(X->p, A->p, B->p, N);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_random(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint min,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ if (X->limbs != N->limbs) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ return mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_random(X->p, min, N, f_rng, p_rng);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_read(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen,
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+
+ /* Do our best to check if r and m have been set up */
+ if (r->limbs == 0 || N->limbs == 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (r->limbs != N->limbs) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_read(r->p, N, buf, buflen, ext_rep);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ r->limbs = N->limbs;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_canonical_to_modulus_rep(r->p, N);
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_write(const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen,
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep)
+{
+ /* Do our best to check if r and m have been set up */
+ if (r->limbs == 0 || N->limbs == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ if (r->limbs != N->limbs) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *working_memory = r->p;
+ size_t working_memory_len = sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * r->limbs;
+
+ if (N->int_rep == MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY) {
+
+ working_memory = mbedtls_calloc(r->limbs, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
+
+ if (working_memory == NULL) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(working_memory, r->p, working_memory_len);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep(working_memory, N);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_write(working_memory, N, buf, buflen, ext_rep);
+
+cleanup:
+
+ if (N->int_rep == MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY &&
+ working_memory != NULL) {
+
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(working_memory, working_memory_len);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..963d888
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod.h
@@ -0,0 +1,452 @@
+/**
+ * Modular bignum functions
+ *
+ * This module implements operations on integers modulo some fixed modulus.
+ *
+ * The functions in this module obey the following conventions unless
+ * explicitly indicated otherwise:
+ *
+ * - **Modulus parameters**: the modulus is passed as a pointer to a structure
+ * of type #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus. The structure must be set up with an
+ * array of limbs storing the bignum value of the modulus. The modulus must
+ * be odd and is assumed to have no leading zeroes. The modulus is usually
+ * named \c N and is usually input-only. Functions which take a parameter
+ * of type \c const #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus* must not modify its value.
+ * - **Bignum parameters**: Bignums are passed as pointers to an array of
+ * limbs or to a #mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue structure. A limb has the type
+ * #mbedtls_mpi_uint. Residues must be initialized before use, and must be
+ * associated with the modulus \c N. Unless otherwise specified:
+ * - Bignum parameters called \c A, \c B, ... are inputs and are not
+ * modified by the function. Functions which take a parameter of
+ * type \c const #mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue* must not modify its value.
+ * - Bignum parameters called \c X, \c Y, ... are outputs or input-output.
+ * The initial bignum value of output-only parameters is ignored, but
+ * they must be set up and associated with the modulus \c N. Some
+ * functions (typically constant-flow) require that the limbs in an
+ * output residue are initialized.
+ * - Bignum parameters called \c p are inputs used to set up a modulus or
+ * residue. These must be pointers to an array of limbs.
+ * - \c T is a temporary storage area. The initial content of such a
+ * parameter is ignored and the final content is unspecified.
+ * - Some functions use different names, such as \c r for the residue.
+ * - **Bignum sizes**: bignum sizes are always expressed in limbs. Both
+ * #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus and #mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue have a \c limbs
+ * member storing its size. All bignum parameters must have the same
+ * number of limbs as the modulus. All bignum sizes must be at least 1 and
+ * must be significantly less than #SIZE_MAX. The behavior if a size is 0 is
+ * undefined.
+ * - **Bignum representation**: the representation of inputs and outputs is
+ * specified by the \c int_rep field of the modulus.
+ * - **Parameter ordering**: for bignum parameters, outputs come before inputs.
+ * The modulus is passed after residues. Temporaries come last.
+ * - **Aliasing**: in general, output bignums may be aliased to one or more
+ * inputs. Modulus values may not be aliased to any other parameter. Outputs
+ * may not be aliased to one another. Temporaries may not be aliased to any
+ * other parameter.
+ * - **Overlap**: apart from aliasing of residue pointers (where two residue
+ * arguments are equal pointers), overlap is not supported and may result
+ * in undefined behavior.
+ * - **Error handling**: functions generally check compatibility of input
+ * sizes. Most functions will not check that input values are in canonical
+ * form (i.e. that \c A < \c N), this is only checked during setup of a
+ * residue structure.
+ * - **Modular representatives**: all functions expect inputs to be in the
+ * range [0, \c N - 1] and guarantee outputs in the range [0, \c N - 1].
+ * Residues are set up with an associated modulus, and operations are only
+ * guaranteed to work if the modulus is associated with all residue
+ * parameters. If a residue is passed with a modulus other than the one it
+ * is associated with, then it may be out of range. If an input is out of
+ * range, outputs are fully unspecified, though bignum values out of range
+ * should not cause buffer overflows (beware that this is not extensively
+ * tested).
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_H
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_H
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#endif
+
+/** How residues associated with a modulus are represented.
+ *
+ * This also determines which fields of the modulus structure are valid and
+ * what their contents are (see #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus).
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ /** Representation not chosen (makes the modulus structure invalid). */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_INVALID = 0,
+ /* Skip 1 as it is slightly easier to accidentally pass to functions. */
+ /** Montgomery representation. */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY = 2,
+ /* Optimised reduction available. This indicates a coordinate modulus (P)
+ * and one or more of the following have been configured:
+ * - A nist curve (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECPXXXR1_ENABLED) & MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM.
+ * - A Kobliz Curve.
+ * - A Fast Reduction Curve CURVE25519 or CURVE448. */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED,
+} mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector;
+
+/* Make mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector and mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep disjoint to
+ * make it easier to catch when they are accidentally swapped. */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_INVALID = 0,
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE = 8,
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE
+} mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep;
+
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *p;
+ size_t limbs;
+} mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue;
+
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint const *rr; /* The residue for 2^{2*n*biL} mod N */
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint mm; /* Montgomery const for -N^{-1} mod 2^{ciL} */
+} mbedtls_mpi_mont_struct;
+
+typedef int (*mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn)(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn modp; /* The optimised reduction function pointer */
+} mbedtls_mpi_opt_red_struct;
+
+typedef struct {
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p;
+ size_t limbs; // number of limbs
+ size_t bits; // bitlen of p
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_rep_selector int_rep; // selector to signal the active member of the union
+ union rep {
+ /* if int_rep == #MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY */
+ mbedtls_mpi_mont_struct mont;
+ /* if int_rep == #MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED */
+ mbedtls_mpi_opt_red_struct ored;
+ } rep;
+} mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus;
+
+/** Setup a residue structure.
+ *
+ * The residue will be set up with the buffer \p p and modulus \p N.
+ *
+ * The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by the resulting residue structure.
+ * The value at the pointed-to memory will be the initial value of \p r and must
+ * hold a value that is less than the modulus. This value will be used as-is
+ * and interpreted according to the value of the `N->int_rep` field.
+ *
+ * The modulus \p N will be the modulus associated with \p r. The residue \p r
+ * should only be used in operations where the modulus is \p N.
+ *
+ * \param[out] r The address of the residue to setup.
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p r.
+ * \param[in] p The address of the limb array containing the value of \p r.
+ * The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by \p r and must
+ * not be modified in any way until after
+ * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_release() is called. The data
+ * pointed to by \p p must be less than the modulus (the value
+ * pointed to by `N->p`) and already in the representation
+ * indicated by `N->int_rep`.
+ * \param p_limbs The number of limbs of \p p. Must be the same as the number
+ * of limbs in the modulus \p N.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p p_limbs is less than the
+ * limbs in \p N or if \p p is not less than \p N.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *p,
+ size_t p_limbs);
+
+/** Unbind elements of a residue structure.
+ *
+ * This function removes the reference to the limb array that was passed to
+ * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup() to make it safe to free or use again.
+ *
+ * This function invalidates \p r and it must not be used until after
+ * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup() is called on it again.
+ *
+ * \param[out] r The address of residue to release.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_release(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r);
+
+/** Initialize a modulus structure.
+ *
+ * \param[out] N The address of the modulus structure to initialize.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_init(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N);
+
+/** Setup a modulus structure.
+ *
+ * \param[out] N The address of the modulus structure to populate.
+ * \param[in] p The address of the limb array storing the value of \p N.
+ * The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by \p N and must
+ * not be modified in any way until after
+ * mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free() is called.
+ * \param p_limbs The number of limbs of \p p.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p,
+ size_t p_limbs);
+
+/** Setup an optimised-reduction compatible modulus structure.
+ *
+ * \param[out] N The address of the modulus structure to populate.
+ * \param[in] p The address of the limb array storing the value of \p N.
+ * The memory pointed to by \p p will be used by \p N and must
+ * not be modified in any way until after
+ * mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free() is called.
+ * \param p_limbs The number of limbs of \p p.
+ * \param modp A pointer to the optimised reduction function to use. \p p.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_optred_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p,
+ size_t p_limbs,
+ mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn modp);
+
+/** Free elements of a modulus structure.
+ *
+ * This function frees any memory allocated by mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup().
+ *
+ * \warning This function does not free the limb array passed to
+ * mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup() only removes the reference to it,
+ * making it safe to free or to use it again.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] N The address of the modulus structure to free.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N);
+
+/** \brief Multiply two residues, returning the residue modulo the specified
+ * modulus.
+ *
+ * \note Currently handles the case when `N->int_rep` is
+ * MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY.
+ *
+ * The size of the operation is determined by \p N. \p A, \p B and \p X must
+ * all be associated with the modulus \p N and must all have the same number
+ * of limbs as \p N.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap
+ * either otherwise. They may not alias \p N (since they must be in canonical
+ * form, they cannot == \p N).
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The address of the result MPI. Must have the same
+ * number of limbs as \p N.
+ * On successful completion, \p X contains the result of
+ * the multiplication `A * B * R^-1` mod N where
+ * `R = 2^(biL * N->limbs)`.
+ * \param[in] A The address of the first MPI.
+ * \param[in] B The address of the second MPI.
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo
+ * operation on the result of the multiplication.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if all the parameters do not
+ * have the same number of limbs or \p N is invalid.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mul(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a fixed-size modular subtraction.
+ *
+ * Calculate `A - B modulo N`.
+ *
+ * \p A, \p B and \p X must all have the same number of limbs as \p N.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap
+ * either otherwise.
+ *
+ * \note This function does not check that \p A or \p B are in canonical
+ * form (that is, are < \p N) - that will have been done by
+ * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup().
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The address of the result MPI. Must be initialized.
+ * Must have the same number of limbs as the modulus \p N.
+ * \param[in] A The address of the first MPI.
+ * \param[in] B The address of the second MPI.
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo
+ * operation on the result of the subtraction.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the given MPIs do not
+ * have the correct number of limbs.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_sub(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform modular inversion of an MPI with respect to a modulus \p N.
+ *
+ * \p A and \p X must be associated with the modulus \p N and will therefore
+ * have the same number of limbs as \p N.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A.
+ *
+ * \warning Currently only supports prime moduli, but does not check for them.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The modular inverse of \p A with respect to \p N.
+ * \param[in] A The number to calculate the modular inverse of.
+ * Must not be 0.
+ * \param[in] N The modulus to use.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p A and \p N do not
+ * have the same number of limbs.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p A is zero.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if couldn't allocate enough
+ * memory (needed for conversion to and from Mongtomery form
+ * when not in Montgomery form already, and for temporary use
+ * by the inversion calculation itself).
+ */
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_inv(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N);
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a fixed-size modular addition.
+ *
+ * Calculate `A + B modulo N`.
+ *
+ * \p A, \p B and \p X must all be associated with the modulus \p N and must
+ * all have the same number of limbs as \p N.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap
+ * either otherwise.
+ *
+ * \note This function does not check that \p A or \p B are in canonical
+ * form (that is, are < \p N) - that will have been done by
+ * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup().
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The address of the result residue. Must be initialized.
+ * Must have the same number of limbs as the modulus \p N.
+ * \param[in] A The address of the first input residue.
+ * \param[in] B The address of the second input residue.
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo
+ * operation on the result of the addition.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the given MPIs do not
+ * have the correct number of limbs.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_add(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *B,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N);
+
+/** Generate a random number uniformly in a range.
+ *
+ * This function generates a random number between \p min inclusive and
+ * \p N exclusive.
+ *
+ * The procedure complies with RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA)
+ * when the RNG is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG
+ * and \p min is \c 1.
+ *
+ * \note There are `N - min` possible outputs. The lower bound
+ * \p min can be reached, but the upper bound \p N cannot.
+ *
+ * \param X The destination residue.
+ * \param min The minimum value to return. It must be strictly smaller
+ * than \b N.
+ * \param N The modulus.
+ * This is the upper bound of the output range, exclusive.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if the implementation was
+ * unable to find a suitable value within a limited number
+ * of attempts. This has a negligible probability if \p N
+ * is significantly larger than \p min, which is the case
+ * for all usual cryptographic applications.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_random(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *X,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint min,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/** Read a residue from a byte buffer.
+ *
+ * The residue will be automatically converted to the internal representation
+ * based on the value of the `N->int_rep` field.
+ *
+ * The modulus \p N will be the modulus associated with \p r. The residue \p r
+ * should only be used in operations where the modulus is \p N or a modulus
+ * equivalent to \p N (in the sense that all their fields or memory pointed by
+ * their fields hold the same value).
+ *
+ * \param[out] r The address of the residue. It must have exactly the same
+ * number of limbs as the modulus \p N.
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus.
+ * \param[in] buf The input buffer to import from.
+ * \param buflen The length in bytes of \p buf.
+ * \param ext_rep The endianness of the number in the input buffer.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p r isn't
+ * large enough to hold the value in \p buf.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p ext_rep
+ * is invalid or the value in the buffer is not less than \p N.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_read(mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen,
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep);
+
+/** Write a residue into a byte buffer.
+ *
+ * The modulus \p N must be the modulus associated with \p r (see
+ * mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue_setup() and mbedtls_mpi_mod_read()).
+ *
+ * The residue will be automatically converted from the internal representation
+ * based on the value of `N->int_rep` field.
+ *
+ * \warning If the buffer is smaller than `N->bits`, the number of
+ * leading zeroes is leaked through timing. If \p r is
+ * secret, the caller must ensure that \p buflen is at least
+ * (`N->bits`+7)/8.
+ *
+ * \param[in] r The address of the residue. It must have the same number of
+ * limbs as the modulus \p N. (\p r is an input parameter, but
+ * its value will be modified during execution and restored
+ * before the function returns.)
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus associated with \p r.
+ * \param[out] buf The output buffer to export to.
+ * \param buflen The length in bytes of \p buf.
+ * \param ext_rep The endianness in which the number should be written into
+ * the output buffer.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf isn't
+ * large enough to hold the value of \p r (without leading
+ * zeroes).
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p ext_rep is invalid.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED if couldn't allocate enough
+ * memory for conversion. Can occur only for moduli with
+ * MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_write(const mbedtls_mpi_mod_residue *r,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buflen,
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5343bc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.c
@@ -0,0 +1,276 @@
+/*
+ * Low-level modular bignum functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT)
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include "bignum_core.h"
+#include "bignum_mod_raw.h"
+#include "bignum_mod.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+
+#include "bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h"
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ unsigned char assign)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign(X, A, N->limbs, mbedtls_ct_bool(assign));
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ unsigned char swap)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_swap(X, Y, N->limbs, mbedtls_ct_bool(swap));
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_read(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ switch (ext_rep) {
+ case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE:
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_read_le(X, N->limbs,
+ input, input_length);
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE:
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_read_be(X, N->limbs,
+ input, input_length);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (!mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct(X, N->p, N->limbs)) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_write(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_length,
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep)
+{
+ switch (ext_rep) {
+ case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_LE:
+ return mbedtls_mpi_core_write_le(A, N->limbs,
+ output, output_length);
+ case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_EXT_REP_BE:
+ return mbedtls_mpi_core_write_be(A, N->limbs,
+ output, output_length);
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint c = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, A, B, N->limbs);
+
+ (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) c);
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint c = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, X, N->p, N->limbs);
+
+ (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) c);
+}
+
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_mul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T)
+{
+ /* Standard (A * B) multiplication stored into pre-allocated T
+ * buffer of fixed limb size of (2N + 1).
+ *
+ * The space may not not fully filled by when
+ * MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED is used. */
+ const size_t T_limbs = BITS_TO_LIMBS(N->bits) * 2;
+ switch (N->int_rep) {
+ case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY:
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(X, A, B, N->limbs, N->p, N->limbs,
+ N->rep.mont.mm, T);
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED:
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(T, A, N->limbs, B, N->limbs);
+
+ /* Optimised Reduction */
+ (*N->rep.ored.modp)(T, T_limbs);
+
+ /* Convert back to canonical representation */
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(T, N);
+ memcpy(X, T, N->limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+}
+
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs)
+{
+ /* mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime() needs a temporary for the exponent,
+ * which will be the same size as the modulus and input (AN_limbs),
+ * and additional space to pass to mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(). */
+ return AN_limbs +
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod_working_limbs(AN_limbs, AN_limbs);
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
+ size_t AN_limbs,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T)
+{
+ /* Inversion by power: g^|G| = 1 => g^(-1) = g^(|G|-1), and
+ * |G| = N - 1, so we want
+ * g^(|G|-1) = g^(N - 2)
+ */
+
+ /* Use the first AN_limbs of T to hold N - 2 */
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *Nminus2 = T;
+ (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_sub_int(Nminus2, N, 2, AN_limbs);
+
+ /* Rest of T is given to exp_mod for its working space */
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_exp_mod(X,
+ A, N, AN_limbs, Nminus2, AN_limbs,
+ RR, T + AN_limbs);
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint carry, borrow;
+ carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, A, B, N->limbs);
+ borrow = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, X, N->p, N->limbs);
+ (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) (carry ^ borrow));
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_canonical_to_modulus_rep(
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N)
+{
+ switch (N->int_rep) {
+ case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY:
+ return mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep(X, N);
+ case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED:
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_modulus_to_canonical_rep(
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N)
+{
+ switch (N->int_rep) {
+ case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY:
+ return mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep(X, N);
+ case MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_OPT_RED:
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint min,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = mbedtls_mpi_core_random(X, min, N->p, N->limbs, f_rng, p_rng);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_canonical_to_modulus_rep(X, N);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T;
+ const size_t t_limbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(N->limbs);
+
+ if ((T = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mbedtls_calloc(t_limbs, ciL)) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(X, X, N->p, N->limbs,
+ N->rep.mont.mm, N->rep.mont.rr, T);
+
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(T, t_limbs * ciL);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N)
+{
+ const size_t t_limbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(N->limbs);
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T;
+
+ if ((T = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mbedtls_calloc(t_limbs, ciL)) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_from_mont_rep(X, X, N->p, N->limbs, N->rep.mont.mm, T);
+
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(T, t_limbs * ciL);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_neg(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, N->p, A, N->limbs);
+
+ /* If A=0 initially, then X=N now. Detect this by
+ * subtracting N and catching the carry. */
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint borrow = mbedtls_mpi_core_sub(X, X, N->p, N->limbs);
+ (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add_if(X, N->p, N->limbs, (unsigned) borrow);
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7bb4ca3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw.h
@@ -0,0 +1,416 @@
+/**
+ * Low-level modular bignum functions
+ *
+ * This interface should only be used by the higher-level modular bignum
+ * module (bignum_mod.c) and the ECP module (ecp.c, ecp_curves.c). All other
+ * modules should use the high-level modular bignum interface (bignum_mod.h)
+ * or the legacy bignum interface (bignum.h).
+ *
+ * This is a low-level interface to operations on integers modulo which
+ * has no protection against passing invalid arguments such as arrays of
+ * the wrong size. The functions in bignum_mod.h provide a higher-level
+ * interface that includes protections against accidental misuse, at the
+ * expense of code size and sometimes more cumbersome memory management.
+ *
+ * The functions in this module obey the following conventions unless
+ * explicitly indicated otherwise:
+ * - **Modulus parameters**: the modulus is passed as a pointer to a structure
+ * of type #mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus. The structure must be set up with an
+ * array of limbs storing the bignum value of the modulus. The modulus must
+ * be odd and is assumed to have no leading zeroes. The modulus is usually
+ * named \c N and is usually input-only.
+ * - **Bignum parameters**: Bignums are passed as pointers to an array of
+ * limbs. A limb has the type #mbedtls_mpi_uint. Unless otherwise specified:
+ * - Bignum parameters called \c A, \c B, ... are inputs, and are not
+ * modified by the function.
+ * - Bignum parameters called \c X, \c Y are outputs or input-output.
+ * The initial content of output-only parameters is ignored.
+ * - \c T is a temporary storage area. The initial content of such a
+ * parameter is ignored and the final content is unspecified.
+ * - **Bignum sizes**: bignum sizes are usually expressed by the \c limbs
+ * member of the modulus argument. All bignum parameters must have the same
+ * number of limbs as the modulus. All bignum sizes must be at least 1 and
+ * must be significantly less than #SIZE_MAX. The behavior if a size is 0 is
+ * undefined.
+ * - **Bignum representation**: the representation of inputs and outputs is
+ * specified by the \c int_rep field of the modulus for arithmetic
+ * functions. Utility functions may allow for different representation.
+ * - **Parameter ordering**: for bignum parameters, outputs come before inputs.
+ * The modulus is passed after other bignum input parameters. Temporaries
+ * come last.
+ * - **Aliasing**: in general, output bignums may be aliased to one or more
+ * inputs. Modulus values may not be aliased to any other parameter. Outputs
+ * may not be aliased to one another. Temporaries may not be aliased to any
+ * other parameter.
+ * - **Overlap**: apart from aliasing of limb array pointers (where two
+ * arguments are equal pointers), overlap is not supported and may result
+ * in undefined behavior.
+ * - **Error handling**: This is a low-level module. Functions generally do not
+ * try to protect against invalid arguments such as nonsensical sizes or
+ * null pointers. Note that passing bignums with a different size than the
+ * modulus may lead to buffer overflows. Some functions which allocate
+ * memory or handle reading/writing of bignums will return an error if
+ * memory allocation fails or if buffer sizes are invalid.
+ * - **Modular representatives**: all functions expect inputs to be in the
+ * range [0, \c N - 1] and guarantee outputs in the range [0, \c N - 1]. If
+ * an input is out of range, outputs are fully unspecified, though bignum
+ * values out of range should not cause buffer overflows (beware that this is
+ * not extensively tested).
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_H
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_H
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "bignum_mod.h"
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a safe conditional copy of an MPI which doesn't reveal
+ * whether the assignment was done or not.
+ *
+ * The size to copy is determined by \p N.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The address of the destination MPI.
+ * This must be initialized. Must have enough limbs to
+ * store the full value of \p A.
+ * \param[in] A The address of the source MPI. This must be initialized.
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p X and \p A.
+ * \param assign The condition deciding whether to perform the
+ * assignment or not. Must be either 0 or 1:
+ * * \c 1: Perform the assignment `X = A`.
+ * * \c 0: Keep the original value of \p X.
+ *
+ * \note This function avoids leaking any information about whether
+ * the assignment was done or not.
+ *
+ * \warning If \p assign is neither 0 nor 1, the result of this function
+ * is indeterminate, and the resulting value in \p X might be
+ * neither its original value nor the value in \p A.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ unsigned char assign);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a safe conditional swap of two MPIs which doesn't reveal
+ * whether the swap was done or not.
+ *
+ * The size to swap is determined by \p N.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The address of the first MPI. This must be initialized.
+ * \param[in,out] Y The address of the second MPI. This must be initialized.
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p X and \p Y.
+ * \param swap The condition deciding whether to perform
+ * the swap or not. Must be either 0 or 1:
+ * * \c 1: Swap the values of \p X and \p Y.
+ * * \c 0: Keep the original values of \p X and \p Y.
+ *
+ * \note This function avoids leaking any information about whether
+ * the swap was done or not.
+ *
+ * \warning If \p swap is neither 0 nor 1, the result of this function
+ * is indeterminate, and both \p X and \p Y might end up with
+ * values different to either of the original ones.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *Y,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ unsigned char swap);
+
+/** Import X from unsigned binary data.
+ *
+ * The MPI needs to have enough limbs to store the full value (including any
+ * most significant zero bytes in the input).
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The address of the MPI. The size is determined by \p N.
+ * (In particular, it must have at least as many limbs as
+ * the modulus \p N.)
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p X.
+ * \param[in] input The input buffer to import from.
+ * \param input_length The length in bytes of \p input.
+ * \param ext_rep The endianness of the number in the input buffer.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p X isn't
+ * large enough to hold the value in \p input.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the external representation
+ * of \p N is invalid or \p X is not less than \p N.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_read(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t input_length,
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep);
+
+/** Export A into unsigned binary data.
+ *
+ * \param[in] A The address of the MPI. The size is determined by \p N.
+ * (In particular, it must have at least as many limbs as
+ * the modulus \p N.)
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus related to \p A.
+ * \param[out] output The output buffer to export to.
+ * \param output_length The length in bytes of \p output.
+ * \param ext_rep The endianness in which the number should be written into the output buffer.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p output isn't
+ * large enough to hold the value of \p A.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the external representation
+ * of \p N is invalid.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_write(const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_length,
+ mbedtls_mpi_mod_ext_rep ext_rep);
+
+/** \brief Subtract two MPIs, returning the residue modulo the specified
+ * modulus.
+ *
+ * The size of the operation is determined by \p N. \p A and \p B must have
+ * the same number of limbs as \p N.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap
+ * either otherwise.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The address of the result MPI.
+ * This must be initialized. Must have enough limbs to
+ * store the full value of the result.
+ * \param[in] A The address of the first MPI. This must be initialized.
+ * \param[in] B The address of the second MPI. This must be initialized.
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo
+ * operation on the result of the subtraction.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_sub(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N);
+
+/** \brief Multiply two MPIs, returning the residue modulo the specified
+ * modulus.
+ *
+ * \note Currently handles the case when `N->int_rep` is
+ * MBEDTLS_MPI_MOD_REP_MONTGOMERY.
+ *
+ * The size of the operation is determined by \p N. \p A, \p B and \p X must
+ * all be associated with the modulus \p N and must all have the same number
+ * of limbs as \p N.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap
+ * either otherwise. They may not alias \p N (since they must be in canonical
+ * form, they cannot == \p N).
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The address of the result MPI. Must have the same
+ * number of limbs as \p N.
+ * On successful completion, \p X contains the result of
+ * the multiplication `A * B * R^-1` mod N where
+ * `R = 2^(biL * N->limbs)`.
+ * \param[in] A The address of the first MPI.
+ * \param[in] B The address of the second MPI.
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus. Used to perform a modulo
+ * operation on the result of the multiplication.
+ * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of size at least 2 * N->limbs + 1
+ * limbs. Its initial content is unused and
+ * its final content is indeterminate.
+ * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the
+ * other parameters.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_mul(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Returns the number of limbs of working memory required for
+ * a call to `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime()`.
+ *
+ * \note This will always be at least
+ * `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(AN_limbs)`,
+ * i.e. sufficient for a call to `mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul()`.
+ *
+ * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in the input `A` and the modulus `N`
+ * (they must be the same size) that will be given to
+ * `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime()`.
+ *
+ * \return The number of limbs of working memory required by
+ * `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime()`.
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs(size_t AN_limbs);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform fixed-width modular inversion of a Montgomery-form MPI with
+ * respect to a modulus \p N that must be prime.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A, but not to \p N or \p RR.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The modular inverse of \p A with respect to \p N.
+ * Will be in Montgomery form.
+ * \param[in] A The number to calculate the modular inverse of.
+ * Must be in Montgomery form. Must not be 0.
+ * \param[in] N The modulus, as a little-endian array of length \p AN_limbs.
+ * Must be prime.
+ * \param AN_limbs The number of limbs in \p A, \p N and \p RR.
+ * \param[in] RR The precomputed residue of 2^{2*biL} modulo N, as a little-
+ * endian array of length \p AN_limbs.
+ * \param[in,out] T Temporary storage of at least the number of limbs returned
+ * by `mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime_working_limbs()`.
+ * Its initial content is unused and its final content is
+ * indeterminate.
+ * It must not alias or otherwise overlap any of the other
+ * parameters.
+ * It is up to the caller to zeroize \p T when it is no
+ * longer needed, and before freeing it if it was dynamically
+ * allocated.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_inv_prime(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
+ size_t AN_limbs,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *RR,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *T);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform a known-size modular addition.
+ *
+ * Calculate `A + B modulo N`.
+ *
+ * The number of limbs in each operand, and the result, is given by the
+ * modulus \p N.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A or \p B, or even both, but may not overlap
+ * either otherwise.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The result of the modular addition.
+ * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of the left operand. This
+ * must be smaller than \p N.
+ * \param[in] B Little-endian presentation of the right operand. This
+ * must be smaller than \p N.
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_add(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *B,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N);
+
+/** Convert an MPI from canonical representation (little-endian limb array)
+ * to the representation associated with the modulus.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The limb array to convert.
+ * It must have as many limbs as \p N.
+ * It is converted in place.
+ * If this function returns an error, the content of \p X
+ * is unspecified.
+ * \param[in] N The modulus structure.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * Otherwise an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_canonical_to_modulus_rep(
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N);
+
+/** Convert an MPI from the representation associated with the modulus
+ * to canonical representation (little-endian limb array).
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The limb array to convert.
+ * It must have as many limbs as \p N.
+ * It is converted in place.
+ * If this function returns an error, the content of \p X
+ * is unspecified.
+ * \param[in] N The modulus structure.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * Otherwise an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx error code.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_modulus_to_canonical_rep(
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N);
+
+/** Generate a random number uniformly in a range.
+ *
+ * This function generates a random number between \p min inclusive and
+ * \p N exclusive.
+ *
+ * The procedure complies with RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA)
+ * when the RNG is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG
+ * and \p min is \c 1.
+ *
+ * \note There are `N - min` possible outputs. The lower bound
+ * \p min can be reached, but the upper bound \p N cannot.
+ *
+ * \param X The destination MPI, in canonical representation modulo \p N.
+ * It must not be aliased with \p N or otherwise overlap it.
+ * \param min The minimum value to return. It must be strictly smaller
+ * than \b N.
+ * \param N The modulus.
+ * This is the upper bound of the output range, exclusive.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to use. This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG parameter to be passed to \p f_rng.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE if the implementation was
+ * unable to find a suitable value within a limited number
+ * of attempts. This has a negligible probability if \p N
+ * is significantly larger than \p min, which is the case
+ * for all usual cryptographic applications.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_random(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint min,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng);
+
+/** Convert an MPI into Montgomery form.
+ *
+ * \param X The address of the MPI.
+ * Must have the same number of limbs as \p N.
+ * \param N The address of the modulus, which gives the size of
+ * the base `R` = 2^(biL*N->limbs).
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_to_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N);
+
+/** Convert an MPI back from Montgomery representation.
+ *
+ * \param X The address of the MPI.
+ * Must have the same number of limbs as \p N.
+ * \param N The address of the modulus, which gives the size of
+ * the base `R`= 2^(biL*N->limbs).
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_from_mont_rep(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N);
+
+/** \brief Perform fixed width modular negation.
+ *
+ * The size of the operation is determined by \p N. \p A must have
+ * the same number of limbs as \p N.
+ *
+ * \p X may be aliased to \p A.
+ *
+ * \param[out] X The result of the modular negation.
+ * This must be initialized.
+ * \param[in] A Little-endian presentation of the input operand. This
+ * must be less than or equal to \p N.
+ * \param[in] N The modulus to use.
+ */
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_neg(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94a0d06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/**
+ * \file bignum_mod_raw_invasive.h
+ *
+ * \brief Function declarations for invasive functions of Low-level
+ * modular bignum.
+ */
+/**
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_INVASIVE_H
+#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_INVASIVE_H
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#include "bignum_mod.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+
+/** Convert the result of a quasi-reduction to its canonical representative.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted. Must have the
+ * same number of limbs as \p N. The input value must
+ * be in range 0 <= X < 2N.
+ * \param[in] N The address of the modulus.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+void mbedtls_mpi_mod_raw_fix_quasi_reduction(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_MOD_RAW_INVASIVE_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/block_cipher.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/block_cipher.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..51cdcdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/block_cipher.c
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+/**
+ * \file block_cipher.c
+ *
+ * \brief Lightweight abstraction layer for block ciphers with 128 bit blocks,
+ * for use by the GCM and CCM modules.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
+#include "psa_util_internal.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "block_cipher_internal.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
+static psa_key_type_t psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t cipher_id)
+{
+ switch (cipher_id) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_AES_VIA_PSA)
+ case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES:
+ return PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ARIA_VIA_PSA)
+ case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA:
+ return PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_VIA_PSA)
+ case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:
+ return PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA;
+#endif
+ default:
+ return PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE;
+ }
+}
+
+static int mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status)
+{
+ return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, psa_to_cipher_errors,
+ psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */
+
+void mbedtls_block_cipher_free(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
+ if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) {
+ psa_destroy_key(ctx->psa_key_id);
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+ switch (ctx->id) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES:
+ mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx->ctx.aes);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA:
+ mbedtls_aria_free(&ctx->ctx.aria);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:
+ mbedtls_camellia_free(&ctx->ctx.camellia);
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ ctx->id = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id)
+{
+ ctx->id = (cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES :
+ (cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA :
+ (cipher_id == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA) ? MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA :
+ MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
+ psa_key_type_t psa_key_type = psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(ctx->id);
+ if (psa_key_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE &&
+ psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING)) {
+ ctx->engine = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->engine = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_LEGACY;
+#endif
+
+ switch (ctx->id) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES:
+ mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->ctx.aes);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA:
+ mbedtls_aria_init(&ctx->ctx.aria);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:
+ mbedtls_camellia_init(&ctx->ctx.camellia);
+ return 0;
+#endif
+ default:
+ ctx->id = MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_NONE;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+}
+
+int mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned key_bitlen)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
+ if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) {
+ psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, psa_key_type_from_block_cipher_id(ctx->id));
+ psa_set_key_bits(&key_attr, key_bitlen);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attr, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING);
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT);
+
+ status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, key, PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(key_bitlen), &ctx->psa_key_id);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(status);
+ }
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */
+
+ switch (ctx->id) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES:
+ return mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->ctx.aes, key, key_bitlen);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA:
+ return mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(&ctx->ctx.aria, key, key_bitlen);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:
+ return mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(&ctx->ctx.camellia, key, key_bitlen);
+#endif
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT;
+ }
+}
+
+int mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16])
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA)
+ if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ENGINE_PSA) {
+ psa_status_t status;
+ size_t olen;
+
+ status = psa_cipher_encrypt(ctx->psa_key_id, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING,
+ input, 16, output, 16, &olen);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return mbedtls_cipher_error_from_psa(status);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA */
+
+ switch (ctx->id) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_AES:
+ return mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->ctx.aes, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
+ input, output);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_ARIA:
+ return mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(&ctx->ctx.aria, input, output);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA:
+ return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(&ctx->ctx.camellia,
+ MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT,
+ input, output);
+#endif
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT;
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/block_cipher_internal.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/block_cipher_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c57338b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/block_cipher_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/**
+ * \file block_cipher_internal.h
+ *
+ * \brief Lightweight abstraction layer for block ciphers with 128 bit blocks,
+ * for use by the GCM and CCM modules.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_INTERNAL_H
+#define MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/block_cipher.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize the context.
+ * This must be the first API call before using the context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to initialize.
+ */
+static inline void mbedtls_block_cipher_init(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the block cipher to use with this context.
+ * This must be called after mbedtls_block_cipher_init().
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to set up.
+ * \param cipher_id The identifier of the cipher to use.
+ * This must be either AES, ARIA or Camellia.
+ * Warning: this is a ::mbedtls_cipher_id_t,
+ * not a ::mbedtls_block_cipher_id_t!
+ *
+ * \retval \c 0 on success.
+ * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p cipher_id was
+ * invalid.
+ */
+int mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the key into the context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to configure.
+ * \param key The buffer holding the key material.
+ * \param key_bitlen The size of the key in bits.
+ *
+ * \retval \c 0 on success.
+ * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT if the context was not
+ * properly set up before calling this function.
+ * \retval One of #MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+ * #MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p key_bitlen is
+ * invalid.
+ */
+int mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned key_bitlen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encrypt one block (16 bytes) with the configured key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context holding the key.
+ * \param input The buffer holding the input block. Must be 16 bytes.
+ * \param output The buffer to which the output block will be written.
+ * Must be writable and 16 bytes long.
+ * This must either not overlap with \p input, or be equal.
+ *
+ * \retval \c 0 on success.
+ * \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT if the context was not
+ * properly set up before calling this function.
+ * \retval Another negative value if encryption failed.
+ */
+int mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16]);
+/**
+ * \brief Clear the context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The context to clear.
+ */
+void mbedtls_block_cipher_free(mbedtls_block_cipher_context_t *ctx);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/bn_mul.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bn_mul.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0738469
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/bn_mul.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1094 @@
+/**
+ * \file bn_mul.h
+ *
+ * \brief Multi-precision integer library
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+/*
+ * Multiply source vector [s] with b, add result
+ * to destination vector [d] and set carry c.
+ *
+ * Currently supports:
+ *
+ * . IA-32 (386+) . AMD64 / EM64T
+ * . IA-32 (SSE2) . Motorola 68000
+ * . PowerPC, 32-bit . MicroBlaze
+ * . PowerPC, 64-bit . TriCore
+ * . SPARC v8 . ARM v3+
+ * . Alpha . MIPS32
+ * . C, longlong . C, generic
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H
+#define MBEDTLS_BN_MUL_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+
+
+/*
+ * Conversion macros for embedded constants:
+ * build lists of mbedtls_mpi_uint's from lists of unsigned char's grouped by 8, 4 or 2
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(a, b, c, d) \
+ ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (a) << 0) | \
+ ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (b) << 8) | \
+ ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (c) << 16) | \
+ ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (d) << 24)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(a, b) \
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(a, b, 0, 0)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) \
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(a, b, c, d), \
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(e, f, g, h)
+
+#else /* 64-bits */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) \
+ ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (a) << 0) | \
+ ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (b) << 8) | \
+ ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (c) << 16) | \
+ ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (d) << 24) | \
+ ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (e) << 32) | \
+ ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (f) << 40) | \
+ ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (g) << 48) | \
+ ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) (h) << 56)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(a, b, c, d) \
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(a, b, c, d, 0, 0, 0, 0)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(a, b) \
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(a, b, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
+
+#endif /* bits in mbedtls_mpi_uint */
+
+/* *INDENT-OFF* */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM)
+
+/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && \
+ ( !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000 )
+
+/*
+ * GCC < 5.0 treated the x86 ebx (which is used for the GOT) as a
+ * fixed reserved register when building as PIC, leading to errors
+ * like: bn_mul.h:46:13: error: PIC register clobbered by 'ebx' in 'asm'
+ *
+ * This is fixed by an improved register allocator in GCC 5+. From the
+ * release notes:
+ * Register allocation improvements: Reuse of the PIC hard register,
+ * instead of using a fixed register, was implemented on x86/x86-64
+ * targets. This improves generated PIC code performance as more hard
+ * registers can be used.
+ */
+#if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__ < 5 && defined(__PIC__)
+#define MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_EBX
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Disable use of the i386 assembly code below if option -O0, to disable all
+ * compiler optimisations, is passed, detected with __OPTIMIZE__
+ * This is done as the number of registers used in the assembly code doesn't
+ * work with the -O0 option.
+ */
+#if defined(__i386__) && defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && !defined(MULADDC_CANNOT_USE_EBX)
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ { mbedtls_mpi_uint t; \
+ asm( \
+ "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t" \
+ "movl %5, %%esi \n\t" \
+ "movl %6, %%edi \n\t" \
+ "movl %7, %%ecx \n\t" \
+ "movl %8, %%ebx \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ "lodsl \n\t" \
+ "mull %%ebx \n\t" \
+ "addl %%ecx, %%eax \n\t" \
+ "adcl $0, %%edx \n\t" \
+ "addl (%%edi), %%eax \n\t" \
+ "adcl $0, %%edx \n\t" \
+ "movl %%edx, %%ecx \n\t" \
+ "stosl \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \
+ "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \
+ "movl %%edi, %2 \n\t" \
+ "movl %%esi, %3 \n\t" \
+ : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \
+ : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \
+ : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \
+ ); }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2)
+
+#define MULADDC_X8_INIT MULADDC_X1_INIT
+
+#define MULADDC_X8_CORE \
+ "movd %%ecx, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "movd %%ebx, %%mm0 \n\t" \
+ "movd (%%edi), %%mm3 \n\t" \
+ "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "movd (%%esi), %%mm2 \n\t" \
+ "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm2 \n\t" \
+ "movd 4(%%esi), %%mm4 \n\t" \
+ "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm4 \n\t" \
+ "movd 8(%%esi), %%mm6 \n\t" \
+ "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm6 \n\t" \
+ "movd 12(%%esi), %%mm7 \n\t" \
+ "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm7 \n\t" \
+ "paddq %%mm2, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "movd 4(%%edi), %%mm3 \n\t" \
+ "paddq %%mm4, %%mm3 \n\t" \
+ "movd 8(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \
+ "paddq %%mm6, %%mm5 \n\t" \
+ "movd 12(%%edi), %%mm4 \n\t" \
+ "paddq %%mm4, %%mm7 \n\t" \
+ "movd %%mm1, (%%edi) \n\t" \
+ "movd 16(%%esi), %%mm2 \n\t" \
+ "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm2 \n\t" \
+ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "movd 20(%%esi), %%mm4 \n\t" \
+ "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm4 \n\t" \
+ "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "movd 24(%%esi), %%mm6 \n\t" \
+ "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm6 \n\t" \
+ "movd %%mm1, 4(%%edi) \n\t" \
+ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "movd 28(%%esi), %%mm3 \n\t" \
+ "pmuludq %%mm0, %%mm3 \n\t" \
+ "paddq %%mm5, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "movd 16(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \
+ "paddq %%mm5, %%mm2 \n\t" \
+ "movd %%mm1, 8(%%edi) \n\t" \
+ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "paddq %%mm7, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "movd 20(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \
+ "paddq %%mm5, %%mm4 \n\t" \
+ "movd %%mm1, 12(%%edi) \n\t" \
+ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "paddq %%mm2, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "movd 24(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \
+ "paddq %%mm5, %%mm6 \n\t" \
+ "movd %%mm1, 16(%%edi) \n\t" \
+ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "paddq %%mm4, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "movd 28(%%edi), %%mm5 \n\t" \
+ "paddq %%mm5, %%mm3 \n\t" \
+ "movd %%mm1, 20(%%edi) \n\t" \
+ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "paddq %%mm6, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "movd %%mm1, 24(%%edi) \n\t" \
+ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "paddq %%mm3, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "movd %%mm1, 28(%%edi) \n\t" \
+ "addl $32, %%edi \n\t" \
+ "addl $32, %%esi \n\t" \
+ "psrlq $32, %%mm1 \n\t" \
+ "movd %%mm1, %%ecx \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X8_STOP \
+ "emms \n\t" \
+ "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t" \
+ "movl %%ecx, %1 \n\t" \
+ "movl %%edi, %2 \n\t" \
+ "movl %%esi, %3 \n\t" \
+ : "=m" (t), "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \
+ : "m" (t), "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \
+ : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi" \
+ ); } \
+
+#endif /* SSE2 */
+
+#endif /* i386 */
+
+#if defined(__amd64__) || defined (__x86_64__)
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ asm( \
+ "xorq %%r8, %%r8\n"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ "movq (%%rsi), %%rax\n" \
+ "mulq %%rbx\n" \
+ "addq $8, %%rsi\n" \
+ "addq %%rcx, %%rax\n" \
+ "movq %%r8, %%rcx\n" \
+ "adcq $0, %%rdx\n" \
+ "nop \n" \
+ "addq %%rax, (%%rdi)\n" \
+ "adcq %%rdx, %%rcx\n" \
+ "addq $8, %%rdi\n"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ : "+c" (c), "+D" (d), "+S" (s), "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d) \
+ : "b" (b), "m" (*(const uint64_t (*)[16]) s) \
+ : "rax", "rdx", "r8" \
+ );
+
+#endif /* AMD64 */
+
+// The following assembly code assumes that a pointer will fit in a 64-bit register
+// (including ILP32 __aarch64__ ABIs such as on watchOS, hence the 2^32 - 1)
+#if defined(__aarch64__) && (UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffful || UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffffffffffful)
+
+/*
+ * There are some issues around different compilers requiring different constraint
+ * syntax for updating pointers from assembly code (see notes for
+ * MBEDTLS_ASM_AARCH64_PTR_CONSTRAINT in common.h), especially on aarch64_32 (aka ILP32).
+ *
+ * For this reason we cast the pointers to/from uintptr_t here.
+ */
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ do { uintptr_t muladdc_d = (uintptr_t) d, muladdc_s = (uintptr_t) s; asm(
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ "ldr x4, [%x2], #8 \n\t" \
+ "ldr x5, [%x1] \n\t" \
+ "mul x6, x4, %4 \n\t" \
+ "umulh x7, x4, %4 \n\t" \
+ "adds x5, x5, x6 \n\t" \
+ "adc x7, x7, xzr \n\t" \
+ "adds x5, x5, %0 \n\t" \
+ "adc %0, x7, xzr \n\t" \
+ "str x5, [%x1], #8 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ : "+r" (c), \
+ "+r" (muladdc_d), \
+ "+r" (muladdc_s), \
+ "+m" (*(uint64_t (*)[16]) d) \
+ : "r" (b), "m" (*(const uint64_t (*)[16]) s) \
+ : "x4", "x5", "x6", "x7", "cc" \
+ ); d = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)muladdc_d; s = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *)muladdc_s; } while (0);
+
+#endif /* Aarch64 */
+
+#if defined(__mc68020__) || defined(__mcpu32__)
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ asm( \
+ "movl %3, %%a2 \n\t" \
+ "movl %4, %%a3 \n\t" \
+ "movl %5, %%d3 \n\t" \
+ "movl %6, %%d2 \n\t" \
+ "moveq #0, %%d0 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \
+ "moveq #0, %%d3 \n\t" \
+ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d4, %%d3 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ "movl %%d3, %0 \n\t" \
+ "movl %%a3, %1 \n\t" \
+ "movl %%a2, %2 \n\t" \
+ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \
+ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \
+ : "d0", "d1", "d2", "d3", "d4", "a2", "a3" \
+ );
+
+#define MULADDC_X8_INIT MULADDC_X1_INIT
+
+#define MULADDC_X8_CORE \
+ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \
+ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \
+ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \
+ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \
+ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \
+ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \
+ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \
+ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \
+ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \
+ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \
+ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \
+ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \
+ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "mulul %%d2, %%d4:%%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d3, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d0, %%d4 \n\t" \
+ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \
+ "movel %%a2@+, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "mulul %%d2, %%d3:%%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d4, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t" \
+ "addl %%d1, %%a3@+ \n\t" \
+ "addxl %%d0, %%d3 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X8_STOP MULADDC_X1_STOP
+
+#endif /* MC68000 */
+
+#if defined(__powerpc64__) || defined(__ppc64__)
+
+#if defined(__MACH__) && defined(__APPLE__)
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ asm( \
+ "ld r3, %3 \n\t" \
+ "ld r4, %4 \n\t" \
+ "ld r5, %5 \n\t" \
+ "ld r6, %6 \n\t" \
+ "addi r3, r3, -8 \n\t" \
+ "addi r4, r4, -8 \n\t" \
+ "addic r5, r5, 0 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ "ldu r7, 8(r3) \n\t" \
+ "mulld r8, r7, r6 \n\t" \
+ "mulhdu r9, r7, r6 \n\t" \
+ "adde r8, r8, r5 \n\t" \
+ "ld r7, 8(r4) \n\t" \
+ "addze r5, r9 \n\t" \
+ "addc r8, r8, r7 \n\t" \
+ "stdu r8, 8(r4) \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ "addze r5, r5 \n\t" \
+ "addi r4, r4, 8 \n\t" \
+ "addi r3, r3, 8 \n\t" \
+ "std r5, %0 \n\t" \
+ "std r4, %1 \n\t" \
+ "std r3, %2 \n\t" \
+ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \
+ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \
+ : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \
+ );
+
+
+#else /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ asm( \
+ "ld %%r3, %3 \n\t" \
+ "ld %%r4, %4 \n\t" \
+ "ld %%r5, %5 \n\t" \
+ "ld %%r6, %6 \n\t" \
+ "addi %%r3, %%r3, -8 \n\t" \
+ "addi %%r4, %%r4, -8 \n\t" \
+ "addic %%r5, %%r5, 0 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ "ldu %%r7, 8(%%r3) \n\t" \
+ "mulld %%r8, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \
+ "mulhdu %%r9, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \
+ "adde %%r8, %%r8, %%r5 \n\t" \
+ "ld %%r7, 8(%%r4) \n\t" \
+ "addze %%r5, %%r9 \n\t" \
+ "addc %%r8, %%r8, %%r7 \n\t" \
+ "stdu %%r8, 8(%%r4) \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ "addze %%r5, %%r5 \n\t" \
+ "addi %%r4, %%r4, 8 \n\t" \
+ "addi %%r3, %%r3, 8 \n\t" \
+ "std %%r5, %0 \n\t" \
+ "std %%r4, %1 \n\t" \
+ "std %%r3, %2 \n\t" \
+ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \
+ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \
+ : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \
+ );
+
+#endif /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */
+
+#elif defined(__powerpc__) || defined(__ppc__) /* end PPC64/begin PPC32 */
+
+#if defined(__MACH__) && defined(__APPLE__)
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ asm( \
+ "lwz r3, %3 \n\t" \
+ "lwz r4, %4 \n\t" \
+ "lwz r5, %5 \n\t" \
+ "lwz r6, %6 \n\t" \
+ "addi r3, r3, -4 \n\t" \
+ "addi r4, r4, -4 \n\t" \
+ "addic r5, r5, 0 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ "lwzu r7, 4(r3) \n\t" \
+ "mullw r8, r7, r6 \n\t" \
+ "mulhwu r9, r7, r6 \n\t" \
+ "adde r8, r8, r5 \n\t" \
+ "lwz r7, 4(r4) \n\t" \
+ "addze r5, r9 \n\t" \
+ "addc r8, r8, r7 \n\t" \
+ "stwu r8, 4(r4) \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ "addze r5, r5 \n\t" \
+ "addi r4, r4, 4 \n\t" \
+ "addi r3, r3, 4 \n\t" \
+ "stw r5, %0 \n\t" \
+ "stw r4, %1 \n\t" \
+ "stw r3, %2 \n\t" \
+ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \
+ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \
+ : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \
+ );
+
+#else /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ asm( \
+ "lwz %%r3, %3 \n\t" \
+ "lwz %%r4, %4 \n\t" \
+ "lwz %%r5, %5 \n\t" \
+ "lwz %%r6, %6 \n\t" \
+ "addi %%r3, %%r3, -4 \n\t" \
+ "addi %%r4, %%r4, -4 \n\t" \
+ "addic %%r5, %%r5, 0 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ "lwzu %%r7, 4(%%r3) \n\t" \
+ "mullw %%r8, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \
+ "mulhwu %%r9, %%r7, %%r6 \n\t" \
+ "adde %%r8, %%r8, %%r5 \n\t" \
+ "lwz %%r7, 4(%%r4) \n\t" \
+ "addze %%r5, %%r9 \n\t" \
+ "addc %%r8, %%r8, %%r7 \n\t" \
+ "stwu %%r8, 4(%%r4) \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ "addze %%r5, %%r5 \n\t" \
+ "addi %%r4, %%r4, 4 \n\t" \
+ "addi %%r3, %%r3, 4 \n\t" \
+ "stw %%r5, %0 \n\t" \
+ "stw %%r4, %1 \n\t" \
+ "stw %%r3, %2 \n\t" \
+ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \
+ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \
+ : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", "r9" \
+ );
+
+#endif /* __MACH__ && __APPLE__ */
+
+#endif /* PPC32 */
+
+/*
+ * The Sparc(64) assembly is reported to be broken.
+ * Disable it for now, until we're able to fix it.
+ */
+#if 0 && defined(__sparc__)
+#if defined(__sparc64__)
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ asm( \
+ "ldx %3, %%o0 \n\t" \
+ "ldx %4, %%o1 \n\t" \
+ "ld %5, %%o2 \n\t" \
+ "ld %6, %%o3 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ "ld [%%o0], %%o4 \n\t" \
+ "inc 4, %%o0 \n\t" \
+ "ld [%%o1], %%o5 \n\t" \
+ "umul %%o3, %%o4, %%o4 \n\t" \
+ "addcc %%o4, %%o2, %%o4 \n\t" \
+ "rd %%y, %%g1 \n\t" \
+ "addx %%g1, 0, %%g1 \n\t" \
+ "addcc %%o4, %%o5, %%o4 \n\t" \
+ "st %%o4, [%%o1] \n\t" \
+ "addx %%g1, 0, %%o2 \n\t" \
+ "inc 4, %%o1 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ "st %%o2, %0 \n\t" \
+ "stx %%o1, %1 \n\t" \
+ "stx %%o0, %2 \n\t" \
+ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \
+ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \
+ : "g1", "o0", "o1", "o2", "o3", "o4", \
+ "o5" \
+ );
+
+#else /* __sparc64__ */
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ asm( \
+ "ld %3, %%o0 \n\t" \
+ "ld %4, %%o1 \n\t" \
+ "ld %5, %%o2 \n\t" \
+ "ld %6, %%o3 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ "ld [%%o0], %%o4 \n\t" \
+ "inc 4, %%o0 \n\t" \
+ "ld [%%o1], %%o5 \n\t" \
+ "umul %%o3, %%o4, %%o4 \n\t" \
+ "addcc %%o4, %%o2, %%o4 \n\t" \
+ "rd %%y, %%g1 \n\t" \
+ "addx %%g1, 0, %%g1 \n\t" \
+ "addcc %%o4, %%o5, %%o4 \n\t" \
+ "st %%o4, [%%o1] \n\t" \
+ "addx %%g1, 0, %%o2 \n\t" \
+ "inc 4, %%o1 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ "st %%o2, %0 \n\t" \
+ "st %%o1, %1 \n\t" \
+ "st %%o0, %2 \n\t" \
+ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \
+ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \
+ : "g1", "o0", "o1", "o2", "o3", "o4", \
+ "o5" \
+ );
+
+#endif /* __sparc64__ */
+#endif /* __sparc__ */
+
+#if defined(__microblaze__) || defined(microblaze)
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ asm( \
+ "lwi r3, %3 \n\t" \
+ "lwi r4, %4 \n\t" \
+ "lwi r5, %5 \n\t" \
+ "lwi r6, %6 \n\t" \
+ "andi r7, r6, 0xffff \n\t" \
+ "bsrli r6, r6, 16 \n\t"
+
+#if(__BYTE_ORDER__ == __ORDER_LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
+#define MULADDC_LHUI \
+ "lhui r9, r3, 0 \n\t" \
+ "addi r3, r3, 2 \n\t" \
+ "lhui r8, r3, 0 \n\t"
+#else
+#define MULADDC_LHUI \
+ "lhui r8, r3, 0 \n\t" \
+ "addi r3, r3, 2 \n\t" \
+ "lhui r9, r3, 0 \n\t"
+#endif
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ MULADDC_LHUI \
+ "addi r3, r3, 2 \n\t" \
+ "mul r10, r9, r6 \n\t" \
+ "mul r11, r8, r7 \n\t" \
+ "mul r12, r9, r7 \n\t" \
+ "mul r13, r8, r6 \n\t" \
+ "bsrli r8, r10, 16 \n\t" \
+ "bsrli r9, r11, 16 \n\t" \
+ "add r13, r13, r8 \n\t" \
+ "add r13, r13, r9 \n\t" \
+ "bslli r10, r10, 16 \n\t" \
+ "bslli r11, r11, 16 \n\t" \
+ "add r12, r12, r10 \n\t" \
+ "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \
+ "add r12, r12, r11 \n\t" \
+ "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \
+ "lwi r10, r4, 0 \n\t" \
+ "add r12, r12, r10 \n\t" \
+ "addc r13, r13, r0 \n\t" \
+ "add r12, r12, r5 \n\t" \
+ "addc r5, r13, r0 \n\t" \
+ "swi r12, r4, 0 \n\t" \
+ "addi r4, r4, 4 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ "swi r5, %0 \n\t" \
+ "swi r4, %1 \n\t" \
+ "swi r3, %2 \n\t" \
+ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \
+ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \
+ : "r3", "r4", "r5", "r6", "r7", "r8", \
+ "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13" \
+ );
+
+#endif /* MicroBlaze */
+
+#if defined(__tricore__)
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ asm( \
+ "ld.a %%a2, %3 \n\t" \
+ "ld.a %%a3, %4 \n\t" \
+ "ld.w %%d4, %5 \n\t" \
+ "ld.w %%d1, %6 \n\t" \
+ "xor %%d5, %%d5 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ "ld.w %%d0, [%%a2+] \n\t" \
+ "madd.u %%e2, %%e4, %%d0, %%d1 \n\t" \
+ "ld.w %%d0, [%%a3] \n\t" \
+ "addx %%d2, %%d2, %%d0 \n\t" \
+ "addc %%d3, %%d3, 0 \n\t" \
+ "mov %%d4, %%d3 \n\t" \
+ "st.w [%%a3+], %%d2 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ "st.w %0, %%d4 \n\t" \
+ "st.a %1, %%a3 \n\t" \
+ "st.a %2, %%a2 \n\t" \
+ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \
+ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \
+ : "d0", "d1", "e2", "d4", "a2", "a3" \
+ );
+
+#endif /* TriCore */
+
+#if defined(__arm__)
+
+#if defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC)
+/*
+ * Thumb 1 ISA. This code path has only been tested successfully on gcc;
+ * it does not compile on clang or armclang.
+ */
+
+#if !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(__GNUC__)
+/*
+ * Note, gcc -O0 by default uses r7 for the frame pointer, so it complains about
+ * our use of r7 below, unless -fomit-frame-pointer is passed.
+ *
+ * On the other hand, -fomit-frame-pointer is implied by any -Ox options with
+ * x !=0, which we can detect using __OPTIMIZE__ (which is also defined by
+ * clang and armcc5 under the same conditions).
+ *
+ * If gcc needs to use r7, we use r1 as a scratch register and have a few extra
+ * instructions to preserve/restore it; otherwise, we can use r7 and avoid
+ * the preserve/restore overhead.
+ */
+#define MULADDC_SCRATCH "RS .req r1 \n\t"
+#define MULADDC_PRESERVE_SCRATCH "mov r10, r1 \n\t"
+#define MULADDC_RESTORE_SCRATCH "mov r1, r10 \n\t"
+#define MULADDC_SCRATCH_CLOBBER "r10"
+#else /* !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(__GNUC__) */
+#define MULADDC_SCRATCH "RS .req r7 \n\t"
+#define MULADDC_PRESERVE_SCRATCH ""
+#define MULADDC_RESTORE_SCRATCH ""
+#define MULADDC_SCRATCH_CLOBBER "r7"
+#endif /* !defined(__OPTIMIZE__) && defined(__GNUC__) */
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ asm( \
+ MULADDC_SCRATCH \
+ "ldr r0, %3 \n\t" \
+ "ldr r1, %4 \n\t" \
+ "ldr r2, %5 \n\t" \
+ "ldr r3, %6 \n\t" \
+ "lsr r4, r3, #16 \n\t" \
+ "mov r9, r4 \n\t" \
+ "lsl r4, r3, #16 \n\t" \
+ "lsr r4, r4, #16 \n\t" \
+ "mov r8, r4 \n\t" \
+
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ MULADDC_PRESERVE_SCRATCH \
+ "ldmia r0!, {r6} \n\t" \
+ "lsr RS, r6, #16 \n\t" \
+ "lsl r6, r6, #16 \n\t" \
+ "lsr r6, r6, #16 \n\t" \
+ "mov r4, r8 \n\t" \
+ "mul r4, r6 \n\t" \
+ "mov r3, r9 \n\t" \
+ "mul r6, r3 \n\t" \
+ "mov r5, r9 \n\t" \
+ "mul r5, RS \n\t" \
+ "mov r3, r8 \n\t" \
+ "mul RS, r3 \n\t" \
+ "lsr r3, r6, #16 \n\t" \
+ "add r5, r5, r3 \n\t" \
+ "lsr r3, RS, #16 \n\t" \
+ "add r5, r5, r3 \n\t" \
+ "add r4, r4, r2 \n\t" \
+ "mov r2, #0 \n\t" \
+ "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \
+ "lsl r3, r6, #16 \n\t" \
+ "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \
+ "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \
+ "lsl r3, RS, #16 \n\t" \
+ "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \
+ "adc r5, r2 \n\t" \
+ MULADDC_RESTORE_SCRATCH \
+ "ldr r3, [r1] \n\t" \
+ "add r4, r4, r3 \n\t" \
+ "adc r2, r5 \n\t" \
+ "stmia r1!, {r4} \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ "str r2, %0 \n\t" \
+ "str r1, %1 \n\t" \
+ "str r0, %2 \n\t" \
+ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \
+ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \
+ : "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5", \
+ "r6", MULADDC_SCRATCH_CLOBBER, "r8", "r9", "cc" \
+ );
+#endif /* !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && !defined(__clang__) */
+
+#elif (__ARM_ARCH >= 6) && \
+ defined (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP) && (__ARM_FEATURE_DSP == 1)
+/* Armv6-M (or later) with DSP Instruction Set Extensions.
+ * Requires support for either Thumb 2 or Arm ISA.
+ */
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ { \
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp_a, tmp_b; \
+ asm volatile (
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ ".p2align 2 \n\t" \
+ "ldr %[a], [%[in]], #4 \n\t" \
+ "ldr %[b], [%[acc]] \n\t" \
+ "umaal %[b], %[carry], %[scalar], %[a] \n\t" \
+ "str %[b], [%[acc]], #4 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ : [a] "=&r" (tmp_a), \
+ [b] "=&r" (tmp_b), \
+ [in] "+r" (s), \
+ [acc] "+r" (d), \
+ [carry] "+l" (c) \
+ : [scalar] "r" (b) \
+ : "memory" \
+ ); \
+ }
+
+#define MULADDC_X2_INIT \
+ { \
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp_a0, tmp_b0; \
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint tmp_a1, tmp_b1; \
+ asm volatile (
+
+ /* - Make sure loop is 4-byte aligned to avoid stalls
+ * upon repeated non-word aligned instructions in
+ * some microarchitectures.
+ * - Don't use ldm with post-increment or back-to-back
+ * loads with post-increment and same address register
+ * to avoid stalls on some microarchitectures.
+ * - Bunch loads and stores to reduce latency on some
+ * microarchitectures. E.g., on Cortex-M4, the first
+ * in a series of load/store operations has latency
+ * 2 cycles, while subsequent loads/stores are single-cycle. */
+#define MULADDC_X2_CORE \
+ ".p2align 2 \n\t" \
+ "ldr %[a0], [%[in]], #+8 \n\t" \
+ "ldr %[b0], [%[acc]], #+8 \n\t" \
+ "ldr %[a1], [%[in], #-4] \n\t" \
+ "ldr %[b1], [%[acc], #-4] \n\t" \
+ "umaal %[b0], %[carry], %[scalar], %[a0] \n\t" \
+ "umaal %[b1], %[carry], %[scalar], %[a1] \n\t" \
+ "str %[b0], [%[acc], #-8] \n\t" \
+ "str %[b1], [%[acc], #-4] \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X2_STOP \
+ : [a0] "=&r" (tmp_a0), \
+ [b0] "=&r" (tmp_b0), \
+ [a1] "=&r" (tmp_a1), \
+ [b1] "=&r" (tmp_b1), \
+ [in] "+r" (s), \
+ [acc] "+r" (d), \
+ [carry] "+l" (c) \
+ : [scalar] "r" (b) \
+ : "memory" \
+ ); \
+ }
+
+#else /* Thumb 2 or Arm ISA, without DSP extensions */
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ asm( \
+ "ldr r0, %3 \n\t" \
+ "ldr r1, %4 \n\t" \
+ "ldr r2, %5 \n\t" \
+ "ldr r3, %6 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ "ldr r4, [r0], #4 \n\t" \
+ "mov r5, #0 \n\t" \
+ "ldr r6, [r1] \n\t" \
+ "umlal r2, r5, r3, r4 \n\t" \
+ "adds r4, r6, r2 \n\t" \
+ "adc r2, r5, #0 \n\t" \
+ "str r4, [r1], #4 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ "str r2, %0 \n\t" \
+ "str r1, %1 \n\t" \
+ "str r0, %2 \n\t" \
+ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \
+ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \
+ : "r0", "r1", "r2", "r3", "r4", "r5", \
+ "r6", "cc" \
+ );
+
+#endif /* ISA codepath selection */
+
+#endif /* defined(__arm__) */
+
+#if defined(__alpha__)
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ asm( \
+ "ldq $1, %3 \n\t" \
+ "ldq $2, %4 \n\t" \
+ "ldq $3, %5 \n\t" \
+ "ldq $4, %6 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ "ldq $6, 0($1) \n\t" \
+ "addq $1, 8, $1 \n\t" \
+ "mulq $6, $4, $7 \n\t" \
+ "umulh $6, $4, $6 \n\t" \
+ "addq $7, $3, $7 \n\t" \
+ "cmpult $7, $3, $3 \n\t" \
+ "ldq $5, 0($2) \n\t" \
+ "addq $7, $5, $7 \n\t" \
+ "cmpult $7, $5, $5 \n\t" \
+ "stq $7, 0($2) \n\t" \
+ "addq $2, 8, $2 \n\t" \
+ "addq $6, $3, $3 \n\t" \
+ "addq $5, $3, $3 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ "stq $3, %0 \n\t" \
+ "stq $2, %1 \n\t" \
+ "stq $1, %2 \n\t" \
+ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \
+ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \
+ : "$1", "$2", "$3", "$4", "$5", "$6", "$7" \
+ );
+#endif /* Alpha */
+
+#if defined(__mips__) && !defined(__mips64)
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ asm( \
+ "lw $10, %3 \n\t" \
+ "lw $11, %4 \n\t" \
+ "lw $12, %5 \n\t" \
+ "lw $13, %6 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ "lw $14, 0($10) \n\t" \
+ "multu $13, $14 \n\t" \
+ "addi $10, $10, 4 \n\t" \
+ "mflo $14 \n\t" \
+ "mfhi $9 \n\t" \
+ "addu $14, $12, $14 \n\t" \
+ "lw $15, 0($11) \n\t" \
+ "sltu $12, $14, $12 \n\t" \
+ "addu $15, $14, $15 \n\t" \
+ "sltu $14, $15, $14 \n\t" \
+ "addu $12, $12, $9 \n\t" \
+ "sw $15, 0($11) \n\t" \
+ "addu $12, $12, $14 \n\t" \
+ "addi $11, $11, 4 \n\t"
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ "sw $12, %0 \n\t" \
+ "sw $11, %1 \n\t" \
+ "sw $10, %2 \n\t" \
+ : "=m" (c), "=m" (d), "=m" (s) \
+ : "m" (s), "m" (d), "m" (c), "m" (b) \
+ : "$9", "$10", "$11", "$12", "$13", "$14", "$15", "lo", "hi" \
+ );
+
+#endif /* MIPS */
+#endif /* GNUC */
+
+#if (defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86)) || defined(__WATCOMC__)
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+ __asm mov esi, s \
+ __asm mov edi, d \
+ __asm mov ecx, c \
+ __asm mov ebx, b
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ __asm lodsd \
+ __asm mul ebx \
+ __asm add eax, ecx \
+ __asm adc edx, 0 \
+ __asm add eax, [edi] \
+ __asm adc edx, 0 \
+ __asm mov ecx, edx \
+ __asm stosd
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+ __asm mov c, ecx \
+ __asm mov d, edi \
+ __asm mov s, esi
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_SSE2)
+
+#define EMIT __asm _emit
+
+#define MULADDC_X8_INIT MULADDC_X1_INIT
+
+#define MULADDC_X8_CORE \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0xC9 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0xC3 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x1F \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x16 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD0 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x66 EMIT 0x04 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xE0 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x76 EMIT 0x08 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF0 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x0C \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF8 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCA \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x5F EMIT 0x04 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xDC \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x08 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xEE \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x67 EMIT 0x0C \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xFC \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x0F \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x56 EMIT 0x10 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD0 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x66 EMIT 0x14 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xE0 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x76 EMIT 0x18 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xF0 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x04 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x5E EMIT 0x1C \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xF4 EMIT 0xD8 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCD \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x10 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xD5 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x08 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCF \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x14 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xE5 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x0C \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCA \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x18 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xF5 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x10 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCC \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x6E EMIT 0x6F EMIT 0x1C \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xDD \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x14 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCE \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x18 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0xD4 EMIT 0xCB \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0x4F EMIT 0x1C \
+ EMIT 0x83 EMIT 0xC7 EMIT 0x20 \
+ EMIT 0x83 EMIT 0xC6 EMIT 0x20 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x73 EMIT 0xD1 EMIT 0x20 \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x7E EMIT 0xC9
+
+#define MULADDC_X8_STOP \
+ EMIT 0x0F EMIT 0x77 \
+ __asm mov c, ecx \
+ __asm mov d, edi \
+ __asm mov s, esi
+
+#endif /* SSE2 */
+#endif /* MSVC */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM */
+
+#if !defined(MULADDC_X1_CORE)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL)
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+{ \
+ mbedtls_t_udbl r; \
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint r0, r1;
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ r = *(s++) * (mbedtls_t_udbl) b; \
+ r0 = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) r; \
+ r1 = (mbedtls_mpi_uint)( r >> biL ); \
+ r0 += c; r1 += (r0 < c); \
+ r0 += *d; r1 += (r0 < *d); \
+ c = r1; *(d++) = r0;
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+}
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_UDBL */
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_INIT \
+{ \
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint s0, s1, b0, b1; \
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint r0, r1, rx, ry; \
+ b0 = ( b << biH ) >> biH; \
+ b1 = ( b >> biH );
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_CORE \
+ s0 = ( *s << biH ) >> biH; \
+ s1 = ( *s >> biH ); s++; \
+ rx = s0 * b1; r0 = s0 * b0; \
+ ry = s1 * b0; r1 = s1 * b1; \
+ r1 += ( rx >> biH ); \
+ r1 += ( ry >> biH ); \
+ rx <<= biH; ry <<= biH; \
+ r0 += rx; r1 += (r0 < rx); \
+ r0 += ry; r1 += (r0 < ry); \
+ r0 += c; r1 += (r0 < c); \
+ r0 += *d; r1 += (r0 < *d); \
+ c = r1; *(d++) = r0;
+
+#define MULADDC_X1_STOP \
+}
+
+#endif /* C (longlong) */
+#endif /* C (generic) */
+
+#if !defined(MULADDC_X2_CORE)
+#define MULADDC_X2_INIT MULADDC_X1_INIT
+#define MULADDC_X2_STOP MULADDC_X1_STOP
+#define MULADDC_X2_CORE MULADDC_X1_CORE MULADDC_X1_CORE
+#endif /* MULADDC_X2_CORE */
+
+#if !defined(MULADDC_X4_CORE)
+#define MULADDC_X4_INIT MULADDC_X2_INIT
+#define MULADDC_X4_STOP MULADDC_X2_STOP
+#define MULADDC_X4_CORE MULADDC_X2_CORE MULADDC_X2_CORE
+#endif /* MULADDC_X4_CORE */
+
+#if !defined(MULADDC_X8_CORE)
+#define MULADDC_X8_INIT MULADDC_X4_INIT
+#define MULADDC_X8_STOP MULADDC_X4_STOP
+#define MULADDC_X8_CORE MULADDC_X4_CORE MULADDC_X4_CORE
+#endif /* MULADDC_X8_CORE */
+
+/* *INDENT-ON* */
+#endif /* bn_mul.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/camellia.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/camellia.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1c0a08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/camellia.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1058 @@
+/*
+ * Camellia implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+/*
+ * The Camellia block cipher was designed by NTT and Mitsubishi Electric
+ * Corporation.
+ *
+ * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/dl/01espec.pdf
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/camellia.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT)
+
+static const unsigned char SIGMA_CHARS[6][8] =
+{
+ { 0xa0, 0x9e, 0x66, 0x7f, 0x3b, 0xcc, 0x90, 0x8b },
+ { 0xb6, 0x7a, 0xe8, 0x58, 0x4c, 0xaa, 0x73, 0xb2 },
+ { 0xc6, 0xef, 0x37, 0x2f, 0xe9, 0x4f, 0x82, 0xbe },
+ { 0x54, 0xff, 0x53, 0xa5, 0xf1, 0xd3, 0x6f, 0x1c },
+ { 0x10, 0xe5, 0x27, 0xfa, 0xde, 0x68, 0x2d, 0x1d },
+ { 0xb0, 0x56, 0x88, 0xc2, 0xb3, 0xe6, 0xc1, 0xfd }
+};
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY)
+
+static const unsigned char FSb[256] =
+{
+ 112, 130, 44, 236, 179, 39, 192, 229, 228, 133, 87, 53, 234, 12, 174, 65,
+ 35, 239, 107, 147, 69, 25, 165, 33, 237, 14, 79, 78, 29, 101, 146, 189,
+ 134, 184, 175, 143, 124, 235, 31, 206, 62, 48, 220, 95, 94, 197, 11, 26,
+ 166, 225, 57, 202, 213, 71, 93, 61, 217, 1, 90, 214, 81, 86, 108, 77,
+ 139, 13, 154, 102, 251, 204, 176, 45, 116, 18, 43, 32, 240, 177, 132, 153,
+ 223, 76, 203, 194, 52, 126, 118, 5, 109, 183, 169, 49, 209, 23, 4, 215,
+ 20, 88, 58, 97, 222, 27, 17, 28, 50, 15, 156, 22, 83, 24, 242, 34,
+ 254, 68, 207, 178, 195, 181, 122, 145, 36, 8, 232, 168, 96, 252, 105, 80,
+ 170, 208, 160, 125, 161, 137, 98, 151, 84, 91, 30, 149, 224, 255, 100, 210,
+ 16, 196, 0, 72, 163, 247, 117, 219, 138, 3, 230, 218, 9, 63, 221, 148,
+ 135, 92, 131, 2, 205, 74, 144, 51, 115, 103, 246, 243, 157, 127, 191, 226,
+ 82, 155, 216, 38, 200, 55, 198, 59, 129, 150, 111, 75, 19, 190, 99, 46,
+ 233, 121, 167, 140, 159, 110, 188, 142, 41, 245, 249, 182, 47, 253, 180, 89,
+ 120, 152, 6, 106, 231, 70, 113, 186, 212, 37, 171, 66, 136, 162, 141, 250,
+ 114, 7, 185, 85, 248, 238, 172, 10, 54, 73, 42, 104, 60, 56, 241, 164,
+ 64, 40, 211, 123, 187, 201, 67, 193, 21, 227, 173, 244, 119, 199, 128, 158
+};
+
+#define SBOX1(n) FSb[(n)]
+#define SBOX2(n) (unsigned char) ((FSb[(n)] >> 7 ^ FSb[(n)] << 1) & 0xff)
+#define SBOX3(n) (unsigned char) ((FSb[(n)] >> 1 ^ FSb[(n)] << 7) & 0xff)
+#define SBOX4(n) FSb[((n) << 1 ^ (n) >> 7) &0xff]
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY */
+
+static const unsigned char FSb[256] =
+{
+ 112, 130, 44, 236, 179, 39, 192, 229, 228, 133, 87, 53, 234, 12, 174, 65,
+ 35, 239, 107, 147, 69, 25, 165, 33, 237, 14, 79, 78, 29, 101, 146, 189,
+ 134, 184, 175, 143, 124, 235, 31, 206, 62, 48, 220, 95, 94, 197, 11, 26,
+ 166, 225, 57, 202, 213, 71, 93, 61, 217, 1, 90, 214, 81, 86, 108, 77,
+ 139, 13, 154, 102, 251, 204, 176, 45, 116, 18, 43, 32, 240, 177, 132, 153,
+ 223, 76, 203, 194, 52, 126, 118, 5, 109, 183, 169, 49, 209, 23, 4, 215,
+ 20, 88, 58, 97, 222, 27, 17, 28, 50, 15, 156, 22, 83, 24, 242, 34,
+ 254, 68, 207, 178, 195, 181, 122, 145, 36, 8, 232, 168, 96, 252, 105, 80,
+ 170, 208, 160, 125, 161, 137, 98, 151, 84, 91, 30, 149, 224, 255, 100, 210,
+ 16, 196, 0, 72, 163, 247, 117, 219, 138, 3, 230, 218, 9, 63, 221, 148,
+ 135, 92, 131, 2, 205, 74, 144, 51, 115, 103, 246, 243, 157, 127, 191, 226,
+ 82, 155, 216, 38, 200, 55, 198, 59, 129, 150, 111, 75, 19, 190, 99, 46,
+ 233, 121, 167, 140, 159, 110, 188, 142, 41, 245, 249, 182, 47, 253, 180, 89,
+ 120, 152, 6, 106, 231, 70, 113, 186, 212, 37, 171, 66, 136, 162, 141, 250,
+ 114, 7, 185, 85, 248, 238, 172, 10, 54, 73, 42, 104, 60, 56, 241, 164,
+ 64, 40, 211, 123, 187, 201, 67, 193, 21, 227, 173, 244, 119, 199, 128, 158
+};
+
+static const unsigned char FSb2[256] =
+{
+ 224, 5, 88, 217, 103, 78, 129, 203, 201, 11, 174, 106, 213, 24, 93, 130,
+ 70, 223, 214, 39, 138, 50, 75, 66, 219, 28, 158, 156, 58, 202, 37, 123,
+ 13, 113, 95, 31, 248, 215, 62, 157, 124, 96, 185, 190, 188, 139, 22, 52,
+ 77, 195, 114, 149, 171, 142, 186, 122, 179, 2, 180, 173, 162, 172, 216, 154,
+ 23, 26, 53, 204, 247, 153, 97, 90, 232, 36, 86, 64, 225, 99, 9, 51,
+ 191, 152, 151, 133, 104, 252, 236, 10, 218, 111, 83, 98, 163, 46, 8, 175,
+ 40, 176, 116, 194, 189, 54, 34, 56, 100, 30, 57, 44, 166, 48, 229, 68,
+ 253, 136, 159, 101, 135, 107, 244, 35, 72, 16, 209, 81, 192, 249, 210, 160,
+ 85, 161, 65, 250, 67, 19, 196, 47, 168, 182, 60, 43, 193, 255, 200, 165,
+ 32, 137, 0, 144, 71, 239, 234, 183, 21, 6, 205, 181, 18, 126, 187, 41,
+ 15, 184, 7, 4, 155, 148, 33, 102, 230, 206, 237, 231, 59, 254, 127, 197,
+ 164, 55, 177, 76, 145, 110, 141, 118, 3, 45, 222, 150, 38, 125, 198, 92,
+ 211, 242, 79, 25, 63, 220, 121, 29, 82, 235, 243, 109, 94, 251, 105, 178,
+ 240, 49, 12, 212, 207, 140, 226, 117, 169, 74, 87, 132, 17, 69, 27, 245,
+ 228, 14, 115, 170, 241, 221, 89, 20, 108, 146, 84, 208, 120, 112, 227, 73,
+ 128, 80, 167, 246, 119, 147, 134, 131, 42, 199, 91, 233, 238, 143, 1, 61
+};
+
+static const unsigned char FSb3[256] =
+{
+ 56, 65, 22, 118, 217, 147, 96, 242, 114, 194, 171, 154, 117, 6, 87, 160,
+ 145, 247, 181, 201, 162, 140, 210, 144, 246, 7, 167, 39, 142, 178, 73, 222,
+ 67, 92, 215, 199, 62, 245, 143, 103, 31, 24, 110, 175, 47, 226, 133, 13,
+ 83, 240, 156, 101, 234, 163, 174, 158, 236, 128, 45, 107, 168, 43, 54, 166,
+ 197, 134, 77, 51, 253, 102, 88, 150, 58, 9, 149, 16, 120, 216, 66, 204,
+ 239, 38, 229, 97, 26, 63, 59, 130, 182, 219, 212, 152, 232, 139, 2, 235,
+ 10, 44, 29, 176, 111, 141, 136, 14, 25, 135, 78, 11, 169, 12, 121, 17,
+ 127, 34, 231, 89, 225, 218, 61, 200, 18, 4, 116, 84, 48, 126, 180, 40,
+ 85, 104, 80, 190, 208, 196, 49, 203, 42, 173, 15, 202, 112, 255, 50, 105,
+ 8, 98, 0, 36, 209, 251, 186, 237, 69, 129, 115, 109, 132, 159, 238, 74,
+ 195, 46, 193, 1, 230, 37, 72, 153, 185, 179, 123, 249, 206, 191, 223, 113,
+ 41, 205, 108, 19, 100, 155, 99, 157, 192, 75, 183, 165, 137, 95, 177, 23,
+ 244, 188, 211, 70, 207, 55, 94, 71, 148, 250, 252, 91, 151, 254, 90, 172,
+ 60, 76, 3, 53, 243, 35, 184, 93, 106, 146, 213, 33, 68, 81, 198, 125,
+ 57, 131, 220, 170, 124, 119, 86, 5, 27, 164, 21, 52, 30, 28, 248, 82,
+ 32, 20, 233, 189, 221, 228, 161, 224, 138, 241, 214, 122, 187, 227, 64, 79
+};
+
+static const unsigned char FSb4[256] =
+{
+ 112, 44, 179, 192, 228, 87, 234, 174, 35, 107, 69, 165, 237, 79, 29, 146,
+ 134, 175, 124, 31, 62, 220, 94, 11, 166, 57, 213, 93, 217, 90, 81, 108,
+ 139, 154, 251, 176, 116, 43, 240, 132, 223, 203, 52, 118, 109, 169, 209, 4,
+ 20, 58, 222, 17, 50, 156, 83, 242, 254, 207, 195, 122, 36, 232, 96, 105,
+ 170, 160, 161, 98, 84, 30, 224, 100, 16, 0, 163, 117, 138, 230, 9, 221,
+ 135, 131, 205, 144, 115, 246, 157, 191, 82, 216, 200, 198, 129, 111, 19, 99,
+ 233, 167, 159, 188, 41, 249, 47, 180, 120, 6, 231, 113, 212, 171, 136, 141,
+ 114, 185, 248, 172, 54, 42, 60, 241, 64, 211, 187, 67, 21, 173, 119, 128,
+ 130, 236, 39, 229, 133, 53, 12, 65, 239, 147, 25, 33, 14, 78, 101, 189,
+ 184, 143, 235, 206, 48, 95, 197, 26, 225, 202, 71, 61, 1, 214, 86, 77,
+ 13, 102, 204, 45, 18, 32, 177, 153, 76, 194, 126, 5, 183, 49, 23, 215,
+ 88, 97, 27, 28, 15, 22, 24, 34, 68, 178, 181, 145, 8, 168, 252, 80,
+ 208, 125, 137, 151, 91, 149, 255, 210, 196, 72, 247, 219, 3, 218, 63, 148,
+ 92, 2, 74, 51, 103, 243, 127, 226, 155, 38, 55, 59, 150, 75, 190, 46,
+ 121, 140, 110, 142, 245, 182, 253, 89, 152, 106, 70, 186, 37, 66, 162, 250,
+ 7, 85, 238, 10, 73, 104, 56, 164, 40, 123, 201, 193, 227, 244, 199, 158
+};
+
+#define SBOX1(n) FSb[(n)]
+#define SBOX2(n) FSb2[(n)]
+#define SBOX3(n) FSb3[(n)]
+#define SBOX4(n) FSb4[(n)]
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_SMALL_MEMORY */
+
+static const unsigned char shifts[2][4][4] =
+{
+ {
+ { 1, 1, 1, 1 }, /* KL */
+ { 0, 0, 0, 0 }, /* KR */
+ { 1, 1, 1, 1 }, /* KA */
+ { 0, 0, 0, 0 } /* KB */
+ },
+ {
+ { 1, 0, 1, 1 }, /* KL */
+ { 1, 1, 0, 1 }, /* KR */
+ { 1, 1, 1, 0 }, /* KA */
+ { 1, 1, 0, 1 } /* KB */
+ }
+};
+
+static const signed char indexes[2][4][20] =
+{
+ {
+ { 0, 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 38, 39,
+ 36, 37, 23, 20, 21, 22, 27, -1, -1, 26 }, /* KL -> RK */
+ { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,
+ -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 }, /* KR -> RK */
+ { 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
+ 18, 19, -1, 24, 25, -1, 31, 28, 29, 30 }, /* KA -> RK */
+ { -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,
+ -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1 } /* KB -> RK */
+ },
+ {
+ { 0, 1, 2, 3, 61, 62, 63, 60, -1, -1,
+ -1, -1, 27, 24, 25, 26, 35, 32, 33, 34 }, /* KL -> RK */
+ { -1, -1, -1, -1, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17,
+ 18, 19, -1, -1, -1, -1, 39, 36, 37, 38 }, /* KR -> RK */
+ { -1, -1, -1, -1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 58, 59,
+ 56, 57, 31, 28, 29, 30, -1, -1, -1, -1 }, /* KA -> RK */
+ { 4, 5, 6, 7, 65, 66, 67, 64, 20, 21,
+ 22, 23, -1, -1, -1, -1, 43, 40, 41, 42 } /* KB -> RK */
+ }
+};
+
+static const signed char transposes[2][20] =
+{
+ {
+ 21, 22, 23, 20,
+ -1, -1, -1, -1,
+ 18, 19, 16, 17,
+ 11, 8, 9, 10,
+ 15, 12, 13, 14
+ },
+ {
+ 25, 26, 27, 24,
+ 29, 30, 31, 28,
+ 18, 19, 16, 17,
+ -1, -1, -1, -1,
+ -1, -1, -1, -1
+ }
+};
+
+/* Shift macro for 128 bit strings with rotation smaller than 32 bits (!) */
+#define ROTL(DEST, SRC, SHIFT) \
+ { \
+ (DEST)[0] = (SRC)[0] << (SHIFT) ^ (SRC)[1] >> (32 - (SHIFT)); \
+ (DEST)[1] = (SRC)[1] << (SHIFT) ^ (SRC)[2] >> (32 - (SHIFT)); \
+ (DEST)[2] = (SRC)[2] << (SHIFT) ^ (SRC)[3] >> (32 - (SHIFT)); \
+ (DEST)[3] = (SRC)[3] << (SHIFT) ^ (SRC)[0] >> (32 - (SHIFT)); \
+ }
+
+#define FL(XL, XR, KL, KR) \
+ { \
+ (XR) = ((((XL) &(KL)) << 1) | (((XL) &(KL)) >> 31)) ^ (XR); \
+ (XL) = ((XR) | (KR)) ^ (XL); \
+ }
+
+#define FLInv(YL, YR, KL, KR) \
+ { \
+ (YL) = ((YR) | (KR)) ^ (YL); \
+ (YR) = ((((YL) &(KL)) << 1) | (((YL) &(KL)) >> 31)) ^ (YR); \
+ }
+
+#define SHIFT_AND_PLACE(INDEX, OFFSET) \
+ { \
+ TK[0] = KC[(OFFSET) * 4 + 0]; \
+ TK[1] = KC[(OFFSET) * 4 + 1]; \
+ TK[2] = KC[(OFFSET) * 4 + 2]; \
+ TK[3] = KC[(OFFSET) * 4 + 3]; \
+ \
+ for (i = 1; i <= 4; i++) \
+ if (shifts[(INDEX)][(OFFSET)][i -1]) \
+ ROTL(TK + i * 4, TK, (15 * i) % 32); \
+ \
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) \
+ if (indexes[(INDEX)][(OFFSET)][i] != -1) { \
+ RK[indexes[(INDEX)][(OFFSET)][i]] = TK[i]; \
+ } \
+ }
+
+static void camellia_feistel(const uint32_t x[2], const uint32_t k[2],
+ uint32_t z[2])
+{
+ uint32_t I0, I1;
+ I0 = x[0] ^ k[0];
+ I1 = x[1] ^ k[1];
+
+ I0 = ((uint32_t) SBOX1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(I0)) << 24) |
+ ((uint32_t) SBOX2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(I0)) << 16) |
+ ((uint32_t) SBOX3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(I0)) << 8) |
+ ((uint32_t) SBOX4(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(I0)));
+ I1 = ((uint32_t) SBOX2(MBEDTLS_BYTE_3(I1)) << 24) |
+ ((uint32_t) SBOX3(MBEDTLS_BYTE_2(I1)) << 16) |
+ ((uint32_t) SBOX4(MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(I1)) << 8) |
+ ((uint32_t) SBOX1(MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(I1)));
+
+ I0 ^= (I1 << 8) | (I1 >> 24);
+ I1 ^= (I0 << 16) | (I0 >> 16);
+ I0 ^= (I1 >> 8) | (I1 << 24);
+ I1 ^= (I0 >> 8) | (I0 << 24);
+
+ z[0] ^= I1;
+ z[1] ^= I0;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_camellia_init(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_camellia_context));
+}
+
+void mbedtls_camellia_free(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_camellia_context));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Camellia key schedule (encryption)
+ */
+int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits)
+{
+ int idx;
+ size_t i;
+ uint32_t *RK;
+ unsigned char t[64];
+ uint32_t SIGMA[6][2];
+ uint32_t KC[16];
+ uint32_t TK[20];
+
+ RK = ctx->rk;
+
+ memset(t, 0, 64);
+ memset(RK, 0, sizeof(ctx->rk));
+
+ switch (keybits) {
+ case 128: ctx->nr = 3; idx = 0; break;
+ case 192:
+ case 256: ctx->nr = 4; idx = 1; break;
+ default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < keybits / 8; ++i) {
+ t[i] = key[i];
+ }
+
+ if (keybits == 192) {
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ t[24 + i] = ~t[16 + i];
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Prepare SIGMA values
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+ SIGMA[i][0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(SIGMA_CHARS[i], 0);
+ SIGMA[i][1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(SIGMA_CHARS[i], 4);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Key storage in KC
+ * Order: KL, KR, KA, KB
+ */
+ memset(KC, 0, sizeof(KC));
+
+ /* Store KL, KR */
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ KC[i] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(t, i * 4);
+ }
+
+ /* Generate KA */
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+ KC[8 + i] = KC[i] ^ KC[4 + i];
+ }
+
+ camellia_feistel(KC + 8, SIGMA[0], KC + 10);
+ camellia_feistel(KC + 10, SIGMA[1], KC + 8);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+ KC[8 + i] ^= KC[i];
+ }
+
+ camellia_feistel(KC + 8, SIGMA[2], KC + 10);
+ camellia_feistel(KC + 10, SIGMA[3], KC + 8);
+
+ if (keybits > 128) {
+ /* Generate KB */
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+ KC[12 + i] = KC[4 + i] ^ KC[8 + i];
+ }
+
+ camellia_feistel(KC + 12, SIGMA[4], KC + 14);
+ camellia_feistel(KC + 14, SIGMA[5], KC + 12);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Generating subkeys
+ */
+
+ /* Manipulating KL */
+ SHIFT_AND_PLACE(idx, 0);
+
+ /* Manipulating KR */
+ if (keybits > 128) {
+ SHIFT_AND_PLACE(idx, 1);
+ }
+
+ /* Manipulating KA */
+ SHIFT_AND_PLACE(idx, 2);
+
+ /* Manipulating KB */
+ if (keybits > 128) {
+ SHIFT_AND_PLACE(idx, 3);
+ }
+
+ /* Do transpositions */
+ for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
+ if (transposes[idx][i] != -1) {
+ RK[32 + 12 * idx + i] = RK[transposes[idx][i]];
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Camellia key schedule (decryption)
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+int mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits)
+{
+ int idx, ret;
+ size_t i;
+ mbedtls_camellia_context cty;
+ uint32_t *RK;
+ uint32_t *SK;
+
+ mbedtls_camellia_init(&cty);
+
+ /* Also checks keybits */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(&cty, key, keybits)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ctx->nr = cty.nr;
+ idx = (ctx->nr == 4);
+
+ RK = ctx->rk;
+ SK = cty.rk + 24 * 2 + 8 * idx * 2;
+
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+
+ for (i = 22 + 8 * idx, SK -= 6; i > 0; i--, SK -= 4) {
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+ }
+
+ SK -= 2;
+
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+ *RK++ = *SK++;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_camellia_free(&cty);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */
+
+/*
+ * Camellia-ECB block encryption/decryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16])
+{
+ int NR;
+ uint32_t *RK, X[4];
+ if (mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ((void) mode);
+
+ NR = ctx->nr;
+ RK = ctx->rk;
+
+ X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 0);
+ X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 4);
+ X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 8);
+ X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 12);
+
+ X[0] ^= *RK++;
+ X[1] ^= *RK++;
+ X[2] ^= *RK++;
+ X[3] ^= *RK++;
+
+ while (NR) {
+ --NR;
+ camellia_feistel(X, RK, X + 2);
+ RK += 2;
+ camellia_feistel(X + 2, RK, X);
+ RK += 2;
+ camellia_feistel(X, RK, X + 2);
+ RK += 2;
+ camellia_feistel(X + 2, RK, X);
+ RK += 2;
+ camellia_feistel(X, RK, X + 2);
+ RK += 2;
+ camellia_feistel(X + 2, RK, X);
+ RK += 2;
+
+ if (NR) {
+ FL(X[0], X[1], RK[0], RK[1]);
+ RK += 2;
+ FLInv(X[2], X[3], RK[0], RK[1]);
+ RK += 2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ X[2] ^= *RK++;
+ X[3] ^= *RK++;
+ X[0] ^= *RK++;
+ X[1] ^= *RK++;
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(X[2], output, 0);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(X[3], output, 4);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(X[0], output, 8);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(X[1], output, 12);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+/*
+ * Camellia-CBC buffer encryption/decryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ unsigned char iv[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ unsigned char temp[16];
+ if (mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (length % 16) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) {
+ while (length > 0) {
+ memcpy(temp, input, 16);
+ mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, input, output);
+
+ mbedtls_xor(output, output, iv, 16);
+
+ memcpy(iv, temp, 16);
+
+ input += 16;
+ output += 16;
+ length -= 16;
+ }
+ } else {
+ while (length > 0) {
+ mbedtls_xor(output, input, iv, 16);
+
+ mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(ctx, mode, output, output);
+ memcpy(iv, output, 16);
+
+ input += 16;
+ output += 16;
+ length -= 16;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+/*
+ * Camellia-CFB128 buffer encryption/decryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ size_t *iv_off,
+ unsigned char iv[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int c;
+ size_t n;
+ if (mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT && mode != MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ n = *iv_off;
+ if (n >= 16) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) {
+ while (length--) {
+ if (n == 0) {
+ mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, iv, iv);
+ }
+
+ c = *input++;
+ *output++ = (unsigned char) (c ^ iv[n]);
+ iv[n] = (unsigned char) c;
+
+ n = (n + 1) & 0x0F;
+ }
+ } else {
+ while (length--) {
+ if (n == 0) {
+ mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, iv, iv);
+ }
+
+ iv[n] = *output++ = (unsigned char) (iv[n] ^ *input++);
+
+ n = (n + 1) & 0x0F;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *iv_off = n;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+/*
+ * Camellia-CTR buffer encryption/decryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx,
+ size_t length,
+ size_t *nc_off,
+ unsigned char nonce_counter[16],
+ unsigned char stream_block[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int c, i;
+ size_t n;
+
+ n = *nc_off;
+ if (n >= 16) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ while (length--) {
+ if (n == 0) {
+ mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter,
+ stream_block);
+
+ for (i = 16; i > 0; i--) {
+ if (++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ c = *input++;
+ *output++ = (unsigned char) (c ^ stream_block[n]);
+
+ n = (n + 1) & 0x0F;
+ }
+
+ *nc_off = n;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+/*
+ * Camellia test vectors from:
+ *
+ * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/technology.html:
+ * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/dl/cryptrec/intermediate.txt
+ * http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/camellia/dl/cryptrec/t_camellia.txt
+ * (For each bitlength: Key 0, Nr 39)
+ */
+#define CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB 2
+
+static const unsigned char camellia_test_ecb_key[3][CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB][32] =
+{
+ {
+ { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef,
+ 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 },
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef,
+ 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10,
+ 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77 },
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef,
+ 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10,
+ 0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77,
+ 0x88, 0x99, 0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee, 0xff },
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }
+ },
+};
+
+static const unsigned char camellia_test_ecb_plain[CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB][16] =
+{
+ { 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef,
+ 0xfe, 0xdc, 0xba, 0x98, 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 },
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }
+};
+
+static const unsigned char camellia_test_ecb_cipher[3][CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB][16] =
+{
+ {
+ { 0x67, 0x67, 0x31, 0x38, 0x54, 0x96, 0x69, 0x73,
+ 0x08, 0x57, 0x06, 0x56, 0x48, 0xea, 0xbe, 0x43 },
+ { 0x38, 0x3C, 0x6C, 0x2A, 0xAB, 0xEF, 0x7F, 0xDE,
+ 0x25, 0xCD, 0x47, 0x0B, 0xF7, 0x74, 0xA3, 0x31 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0xb4, 0x99, 0x34, 0x01, 0xb3, 0xe9, 0x96, 0xf8,
+ 0x4e, 0xe5, 0xce, 0xe7, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0x09, 0xb9 },
+ { 0xD1, 0x76, 0x3F, 0xC0, 0x19, 0xD7, 0x7C, 0xC9,
+ 0x30, 0xBF, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x6F, 0x7C, 0x93, 0x64 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x9a, 0xcc, 0x23, 0x7d, 0xff, 0x16, 0xd7, 0x6c,
+ 0x20, 0xef, 0x7c, 0x91, 0x9e, 0x3a, 0x75, 0x09 },
+ { 0x05, 0x03, 0xFB, 0x10, 0xAB, 0x24, 0x1E, 0x7C,
+ 0xF4, 0x5D, 0x8C, 0xDE, 0xEE, 0x47, 0x43, 0x35 }
+ }
+};
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+#define CAMELLIA_TESTS_CBC 3
+
+static const unsigned char camellia_test_cbc_key[3][32] =
+{
+ { 0x2B, 0x7E, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0xA6,
+ 0xAB, 0xF7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xCF, 0x4F, 0x3C }
+ ,
+ { 0x8E, 0x73, 0xB0, 0xF7, 0xDA, 0x0E, 0x64, 0x52,
+ 0xC8, 0x10, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xE5,
+ 0x62, 0xF8, 0xEA, 0xD2, 0x52, 0x2C, 0x6B, 0x7B }
+ ,
+ { 0x60, 0x3D, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x15, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xBE,
+ 0x2B, 0x73, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x77, 0x81,
+ 0x1F, 0x35, 0x2C, 0x07, 0x3B, 0x61, 0x08, 0xD7,
+ 0x2D, 0x98, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xF4 }
+};
+
+static const unsigned char camellia_test_cbc_iv[16] =
+
+{ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F }
+;
+
+static const unsigned char camellia_test_cbc_plain[CAMELLIA_TESTS_CBC][16] =
+{
+ { 0x6B, 0xC1, 0xBE, 0xE2, 0x2E, 0x40, 0x9F, 0x96,
+ 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x7E, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2A },
+ { 0xAE, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x1E, 0x03, 0xAC, 0x9C,
+ 0x9E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xAC, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x8E, 0x51 },
+ { 0x30, 0xC8, 0x1C, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x5C, 0xE4, 0x11,
+ 0xE5, 0xFB, 0xC1, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x0A, 0x52, 0xEF }
+
+};
+
+static const unsigned char camellia_test_cbc_cipher[3][CAMELLIA_TESTS_CBC][16] =
+{
+ {
+ { 0x16, 0x07, 0xCF, 0x49, 0x4B, 0x36, 0xBB, 0xF0,
+ 0x0D, 0xAE, 0xB0, 0xB5, 0x03, 0xC8, 0x31, 0xAB },
+ { 0xA2, 0xF2, 0xCF, 0x67, 0x16, 0x29, 0xEF, 0x78,
+ 0x40, 0xC5, 0xA5, 0xDF, 0xB5, 0x07, 0x48, 0x87 },
+ { 0x0F, 0x06, 0x16, 0x50, 0x08, 0xCF, 0x8B, 0x8B,
+ 0x5A, 0x63, 0x58, 0x63, 0x62, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x54 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0x2A, 0x48, 0x30, 0xAB, 0x5A, 0xC4, 0xA1, 0xA2,
+ 0x40, 0x59, 0x55, 0xFD, 0x21, 0x95, 0xCF, 0x93 },
+ { 0x5D, 0x5A, 0x86, 0x9B, 0xD1, 0x4C, 0xE5, 0x42,
+ 0x64, 0xF8, 0x92, 0xA6, 0xDD, 0x2E, 0xC3, 0xD5 },
+ { 0x37, 0xD3, 0x59, 0xC3, 0x34, 0x98, 0x36, 0xD8,
+ 0x84, 0xE3, 0x10, 0xAD, 0xDF, 0x68, 0xC4, 0x49 }
+ },
+ {
+ { 0xE6, 0xCF, 0xA3, 0x5F, 0xC0, 0x2B, 0x13, 0x4A,
+ 0x4D, 0x2C, 0x0B, 0x67, 0x37, 0xAC, 0x3E, 0xDA },
+ { 0x36, 0xCB, 0xEB, 0x73, 0xBD, 0x50, 0x4B, 0x40,
+ 0x70, 0xB1, 0xB7, 0xDE, 0x2B, 0x21, 0xEB, 0x50 },
+ { 0xE3, 0x1A, 0x60, 0x55, 0x29, 0x7D, 0x96, 0xCA,
+ 0x33, 0x30, 0xCD, 0xF1, 0xB1, 0x86, 0x0A, 0x83 }
+ }
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+/*
+ * Camellia-CTR test vectors from:
+ *
+ * http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc5528.html
+ */
+
+static const unsigned char camellia_test_ctr_key[3][16] =
+{
+ { 0xAE, 0x68, 0x52, 0xF8, 0x12, 0x10, 0x67, 0xCC,
+ 0x4B, 0xF7, 0xA5, 0x76, 0x55, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x9E },
+ { 0x7E, 0x24, 0x06, 0x78, 0x17, 0xFA, 0xE0, 0xD7,
+ 0x43, 0xD6, 0xCE, 0x1F, 0x32, 0x53, 0x91, 0x63 },
+ { 0x76, 0x91, 0xBE, 0x03, 0x5E, 0x50, 0x20, 0xA8,
+ 0xAC, 0x6E, 0x61, 0x85, 0x29, 0xF9, 0xA0, 0xDC }
+};
+
+static const unsigned char camellia_test_ctr_nonce_counter[3][16] =
+{
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 },
+ { 0x00, 0x6C, 0xB6, 0xDB, 0xC0, 0x54, 0x3B, 0x59,
+ 0xDA, 0x48, 0xD9, 0x0B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 },
+ { 0x00, 0xE0, 0x01, 0x7B, 0x27, 0x77, 0x7F, 0x3F,
+ 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 }
+};
+
+static const unsigned char camellia_test_ctr_pt[3][48] =
+{
+ { 0x53, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x20, 0x62,
+ 0x6C, 0x6F, 0x63, 0x6B, 0x20, 0x6D, 0x73, 0x67 },
+
+ { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F,
+ 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
+ 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F },
+
+ { 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F,
+ 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
+ 0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E, 0x1F,
+ 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23 }
+};
+
+static const unsigned char camellia_test_ctr_ct[3][48] =
+{
+ { 0xD0, 0x9D, 0xC2, 0x9A, 0x82, 0x14, 0x61, 0x9A,
+ 0x20, 0x87, 0x7C, 0x76, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x0B, 0x3F },
+ { 0xDB, 0xF3, 0xC7, 0x8D, 0xC0, 0x83, 0x96, 0xD4,
+ 0xDA, 0x7C, 0x90, 0x77, 0x65, 0xBB, 0xCB, 0x44,
+ 0x2B, 0x8E, 0x8E, 0x0F, 0x31, 0xF0, 0xDC, 0xA7,
+ 0x2C, 0x74, 0x17, 0xE3, 0x53, 0x60, 0xE0, 0x48 },
+ { 0xB1, 0x9D, 0x1F, 0xCD, 0xCB, 0x75, 0xEB, 0x88,
+ 0x2F, 0x84, 0x9C, 0xE2, 0x4D, 0x85, 0xCF, 0x73,
+ 0x9C, 0xE6, 0x4B, 0x2B, 0x5C, 0x9D, 0x73, 0xF1,
+ 0x4F, 0x2D, 0x5D, 0x9D, 0xCE, 0x98, 0x89, 0xCD,
+ 0xDF, 0x50, 0x86, 0x96 }
+};
+
+static const int camellia_test_ctr_len[3] =
+{ 16, 32, 36 };
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+
+/*
+ * Checkup routine
+ */
+int mbedtls_camellia_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ int i, j, u, v;
+ unsigned char key[32];
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+ unsigned char src[16];
+ unsigned char dst[16];
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ unsigned char iv[16];
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ size_t offset, len;
+ unsigned char nonce_counter[16];
+ unsigned char stream_block[16];
+#endif
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ mbedtls_camellia_context ctx;
+
+ mbedtls_camellia_init(&ctx);
+ memset(key, 0, 32);
+
+ for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) {
+ u = j >> 1;
+ v = j & 1;
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" CAMELLIA-ECB-%3d (%s): ", 128 + u * 64,
+ (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc");
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ if (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("skipped\n");
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CAMELLIA_TESTS_ECB; i++) {
+ memcpy(key, camellia_test_ecb_key[u][i], 16 + 8 * u);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ if (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) {
+ mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, 128 + u * 64);
+ memcpy(src, camellia_test_ecb_cipher[u][i], 16);
+ memcpy(dst, camellia_test_ecb_plain[i], 16);
+ } else
+#endif
+ { /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT */
+ mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, 128 + u * 64);
+ memcpy(src, camellia_test_ecb_plain[i], 16);
+ memcpy(dst, camellia_test_ecb_cipher[u][i], 16);
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb(&ctx, v, src, buf);
+
+ if (memcmp(buf, dst, 16) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ /*
+ * CBC mode
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) {
+ u = j >> 1;
+ v = j & 1;
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" CAMELLIA-CBC-%3d (%s): ", 128 + u * 64,
+ (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc");
+ }
+
+ memcpy(src, camellia_test_cbc_iv, 16);
+ memcpy(dst, camellia_test_cbc_iv, 16);
+ memcpy(key, camellia_test_cbc_key[u], 16 + 8 * u);
+
+ if (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) {
+ mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec(&ctx, key, 128 + u * 64);
+ } else {
+ mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, 128 + u * 64);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CAMELLIA_TESTS_CBC; i++) {
+
+ if (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) {
+ memcpy(iv, src, 16);
+ memcpy(src, camellia_test_cbc_cipher[u][i], 16);
+ memcpy(dst, camellia_test_cbc_plain[i], 16);
+ } else { /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT */
+ memcpy(iv, dst, 16);
+ memcpy(src, camellia_test_cbc_plain[i], 16);
+ memcpy(dst, camellia_test_cbc_cipher[u][i], 16);
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc(&ctx, v, 16, iv, src, buf);
+
+ if (memcmp(buf, dst, 16) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ /*
+ * CTR mode
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+ u = i >> 1;
+ v = i & 1;
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" CAMELLIA-CTR-128 (%s): ",
+ (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc");
+ }
+
+ memcpy(nonce_counter, camellia_test_ctr_nonce_counter[u], 16);
+ memcpy(key, camellia_test_ctr_key[u], 16);
+
+ offset = 0;
+ mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, 128);
+
+ if (v == MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_DECRYPT) {
+ len = camellia_test_ctr_len[u];
+ memcpy(buf, camellia_test_ctr_ct[u], len);
+
+ mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr(&ctx, len, &offset, nonce_counter, stream_block,
+ buf, buf);
+
+ if (memcmp(buf, camellia_test_ctr_pt[u], len) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ } else {
+ len = camellia_test_ctr_len[u];
+ memcpy(buf, camellia_test_ctr_pt[u], len);
+
+ mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr(&ctx, len, &offset, nonce_counter, stream_block,
+ buf, buf);
+
+ if (memcmp(buf, camellia_test_ctr_ct[u], len) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_camellia_free(&ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/ccm.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ccm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..969c6c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ccm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,764 @@
+/*
+ * NIST SP800-38C compliant CCM implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Definition of CCM:
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38C/SP800-38C_updated-July20_2007.pdf
+ * RFC 3610 "Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)"
+ *
+ * Related:
+ * RFC 5116 "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption"
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+#include "block_cipher_internal.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#else
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+#include <stdio.h>
+#define mbedtls_printf printf
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT)
+
+
+/*
+ * Initialize context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ccm_init(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ccm_context));
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_setkey(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, cipher)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, key, keybits)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+#else
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
+
+ cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher, keybits,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB);
+ if (cipher_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(cipher_info) != 16) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&ctx->cipher_ctx, key, keybits,
+ MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ccm_free(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx);
+#else
+ mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
+#endif
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_ccm_context));
+}
+
+#define CCM_STATE__CLEAR 0
+#define CCM_STATE__STARTED (1 << 0)
+#define CCM_STATE__LENGTHS_SET (1 << 1)
+#define CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED (1 << 2)
+#define CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED (1 << 3)
+#define CCM_STATE__ERROR (1 << 4)
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt or decrypt a partial block with CTR
+ */
+static int mbedtls_ccm_crypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ size_t offset, size_t use_len,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char tmp_buf[16] = { 0 };
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->ctr, tmp_buf);
+#else
+ size_t olen = 0;
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->ctr, 16, tmp_buf, &olen);
+#endif
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf));
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_xor(output, input, tmp_buf + offset, use_len);
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_buf, sizeof(tmp_buf));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void mbedtls_ccm_clear_state(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->state = CCM_STATE__CLEAR;
+ memset(ctx->y, 0, 16);
+ memset(ctx->ctr, 0, 16);
+}
+
+static int ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char i;
+ size_t len_left;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ size_t olen;
+#endif
+
+ /* length calculation can be done only after both
+ * mbedtls_ccm_starts() and mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths() have been executed
+ */
+ if (!(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__STARTED) || !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__LENGTHS_SET)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* CCM expects non-empty tag.
+ * CCM* allows empty tag. For CCM* without tag, the tag calculation is skipped.
+ */
+ if (ctx->tag_len == 0) {
+ if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT || ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT) {
+ ctx->plaintext_len = 0;
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * First block:
+ * 0 .. 0 flags
+ * 1 .. iv_len nonce (aka iv) - set by: mbedtls_ccm_starts()
+ * iv_len+1 .. 15 length
+ *
+ * With flags as (bits):
+ * 7 0
+ * 6 add present?
+ * 5 .. 3 (t - 2) / 2
+ * 2 .. 0 q - 1
+ */
+ ctx->y[0] |= (ctx->add_len > 0) << 6;
+ ctx->y[0] |= ((ctx->tag_len - 2) / 2) << 3;
+ ctx->y[0] |= ctx->q - 1;
+
+ for (i = 0, len_left = ctx->plaintext_len; i < ctx->q; i++, len_left >>= 8) {
+ ctx->y[15-i] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len_left);
+ }
+
+ if (len_left > 0) {
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ /* Start CBC-MAC with first block*/
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y);
+#else
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
+#endif
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_starts(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const unsigned char *iv,
+ size_t iv_len)
+{
+ /* Also implies q is within bounds */
+ if (iv_len < 7 || iv_len > 13) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ ctx->mode = mode;
+ ctx->q = 16 - 1 - (unsigned char) iv_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Prepare counter block for encryption:
+ * 0 .. 0 flags
+ * 1 .. iv_len nonce (aka iv)
+ * iv_len+1 .. 15 counter (initially 1)
+ *
+ * With flags as (bits):
+ * 7 .. 3 0
+ * 2 .. 0 q - 1
+ */
+ memset(ctx->ctr, 0, 16);
+ ctx->ctr[0] = ctx->q - 1;
+ memcpy(ctx->ctr + 1, iv, iv_len);
+ memset(ctx->ctr + 1 + iv_len, 0, ctx->q);
+ ctx->ctr[15] = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * See ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready() for block layout description
+ */
+ memcpy(ctx->y + 1, iv, iv_len);
+
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__STARTED;
+ return ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(ctx);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ size_t total_ad_len,
+ size_t plaintext_len,
+ size_t tag_len)
+{
+ /*
+ * Check length requirements: SP800-38C A.1
+ * Additional requirement: a < 2^16 - 2^8 to simplify the code.
+ * 'length' checked later (when writing it to the first block)
+ *
+ * Also, loosen the requirements to enable support for CCM* (IEEE 802.15.4).
+ */
+ if (tag_len == 2 || tag_len > 16 || tag_len % 2 != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ if (total_ad_len >= 0xFF00) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ ctx->plaintext_len = plaintext_len;
+ ctx->add_len = total_ad_len;
+ ctx->tag_len = tag_len;
+ ctx->processed = 0;
+
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__LENGTHS_SET;
+ return ccm_calculate_first_block_if_ready(ctx);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *add,
+ size_t add_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t use_len, offset;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ size_t olen;
+#endif
+
+ if (ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ if (add_len > 0) {
+ if (ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ if (!(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED)) {
+ if (add_len > ctx->add_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ ctx->y[0] ^= (unsigned char) ((ctx->add_len >> 8) & 0xFF);
+ ctx->y[1] ^= (unsigned char) ((ctx->add_len) & 0xFF);
+
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_STARTED;
+ } else if (ctx->processed + add_len > ctx->add_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ while (add_len > 0) {
+ offset = (ctx->processed + 2) % 16; /* account for y[0] and y[1]
+ * holding total auth data length */
+ use_len = 16 - offset;
+
+ if (use_len > add_len) {
+ use_len = add_len;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_xor(ctx->y + offset, ctx->y + offset, add, use_len);
+
+ ctx->processed += use_len;
+ add_len -= use_len;
+ add += use_len;
+
+ if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->add_len) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y);
+#else
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
+#endif
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->processed == ctx->add_len) {
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED;
+ ctx->processed = 0; // prepare for mbedtls_ccm_update()
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_update(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char i;
+ size_t use_len, offset;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ size_t olen;
+#endif
+
+ unsigned char local_output[16];
+
+ if (ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ /* Check against plaintext length only if performing operation with
+ * authentication
+ */
+ if (ctx->tag_len != 0 && ctx->processed + input_len > ctx->plaintext_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ if (output_size < input_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+ *output_len = input_len;
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+ while (input_len > 0) {
+ offset = ctx->processed % 16;
+
+ use_len = 16 - offset;
+
+ if (use_len > input_len) {
+ use_len = input_len;
+ }
+
+ ctx->processed += use_len;
+
+ if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT || \
+ ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT) {
+ mbedtls_xor(ctx->y + offset, ctx->y + offset, input, use_len);
+
+ if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y);
+#else
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
+#endif
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt(ctx, offset, use_len, input, output);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT || \
+ ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT) {
+ /* Since output may be in shared memory, we cannot be sure that
+ * it will contain what we wrote to it. Therefore, we should avoid using
+ * it as input to any operations.
+ * Write decrypted data to local_output to avoid using output variable as
+ * input in the XOR operation for Y.
+ */
+ ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt(ctx, offset, use_len, input, local_output);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_xor(ctx->y + offset, ctx->y + offset, local_output, use_len);
+
+ memcpy(output, local_output, use_len);
+
+ if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y);
+#else
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->y, &olen);
+#endif
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ ctx->state |= CCM_STATE__ERROR;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (use_len + offset == 16 || ctx->processed == ctx->plaintext_len) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->q; i++) {
+ if (++(ctx->ctr)[15-i] != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ input_len -= use_len;
+ input += use_len;
+ output += use_len;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(local_output, 16);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_finish(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char i;
+
+ if (ctx->state & CCM_STATE__ERROR) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->add_len > 0 && !(ctx->state & CCM_STATE__AUTH_DATA_FINISHED)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->plaintext_len > 0 && ctx->processed != ctx->plaintext_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Authentication: reset counter and crypt/mask internal tag
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->q; i++) {
+ ctx->ctr[15-i] = 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ccm_crypt(ctx, 0, 16, ctx->y, ctx->y);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if (tag != NULL) {
+ memcpy(tag, ctx->y, tag_len);
+ }
+ mbedtls_ccm_clear_state(ctx);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authenticated encryption or decryption
+ */
+static int ccm_auth_crypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t olen;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_starts(ctx, mode, iv, iv_len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(ctx, add_len, length, tag_len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_update_ad(ctx, add, add_len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_update(ctx, input, length,
+ output, length, &olen)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_finish(ctx, tag, tag_len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authenticated encryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_ccm_star_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len)
+{
+ return ccm_auth_crypt(ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len,
+ add, add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len)
+{
+ return ccm_auth_crypt(ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_ENCRYPT, length, iv, iv_len,
+ add, add_len, input, output, tag, tag_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authenticated decryption
+ */
+static int mbedtls_ccm_compare_tags(const unsigned char *tag1,
+ const unsigned char *tag2,
+ size_t tag_len)
+{
+ /* Check tag in "constant-time" */
+ int diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag1, tag2, tag_len);
+
+ if (diff != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ccm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, int mode, size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+ const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char check_tag[16];
+
+ if ((ret = ccm_auth_crypt(ctx, mode, length,
+ iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
+ input, output, check_tag, tag_len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ccm_compare_tags(tag, check_tag, tag_len)) != 0) {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(output, length);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_star_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+ const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len)
+{
+ return ccm_auth_decrypt(ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT, length,
+ iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
+ input, output, tag, tag_len);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_ccm_context *ctx, size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output,
+ const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len)
+{
+ return ccm_auth_decrypt(ctx, MBEDTLS_CCM_DECRYPT, length,
+ iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
+ input, output, tag, tag_len);
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CCM_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES)
+/*
+ * Examples 1 to 3 from SP800-38C Appendix C
+ */
+
+#define NB_TESTS 3
+#define CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN 24
+#define CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN 32
+/*
+ * The data is the same for all tests, only the used length changes
+ */
+static const unsigned char key_test_data[] = {
+ 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47,
+ 0x48, 0x49, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f
+};
+
+static const unsigned char iv_test_data[] = {
+ 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
+ 0x18, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ad_test_data[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
+ 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13
+};
+
+static const unsigned char msg_test_data[CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN] = {
+ 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x26, 0x27,
+ 0x28, 0x29, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x2c, 0x2d, 0x2e, 0x2f,
+ 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37,
+};
+
+static const size_t iv_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 7, 8, 12 };
+static const size_t add_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 8, 16, 20 };
+static const size_t msg_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 16, 24 };
+static const size_t tag_len_test_data[NB_TESTS] = { 4, 6, 8 };
+
+static const unsigned char res_test_data[NB_TESTS][CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN] = {
+ { 0x71, 0x62, 0x01, 0x5b, 0x4d, 0xac, 0x25, 0x5d },
+ { 0xd2, 0xa1, 0xf0, 0xe0, 0x51, 0xea, 0x5f, 0x62,
+ 0x08, 0x1a, 0x77, 0x92, 0x07, 0x3d, 0x59, 0x3d,
+ 0x1f, 0xc6, 0x4f, 0xbf, 0xac, 0xcd },
+ { 0xe3, 0xb2, 0x01, 0xa9, 0xf5, 0xb7, 0x1a, 0x7a,
+ 0x9b, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xec, 0xcd, 0x97, 0xe7, 0x0b,
+ 0x61, 0x76, 0xaa, 0xd9, 0xa4, 0x42, 0x8a, 0xa5,
+ 0x48, 0x43, 0x92, 0xfb, 0xc1, 0xb0, 0x99, 0x51 }
+};
+
+int mbedtls_ccm_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ mbedtls_ccm_context ctx;
+ /*
+ * Some hardware accelerators require the input and output buffers
+ * would be in RAM, because the flash is not accessible.
+ * Use buffers on the stack to hold the test vectors data.
+ */
+ unsigned char plaintext[CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN];
+ unsigned char ciphertext[CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN];
+ size_t i;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ mbedtls_ccm_init(&ctx);
+
+ if (mbedtls_ccm_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key_test_data,
+ 8 * sizeof(key_test_data)) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" CCM: setup failed");
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NB_TESTS; i++) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" CCM-AES #%u: ", (unsigned int) i + 1);
+ }
+
+ memset(plaintext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN);
+ memset(ciphertext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_CT_MAX_LEN);
+ memcpy(plaintext, msg_test_data, msg_len_test_data[i]);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(&ctx, msg_len_test_data[i],
+ iv_test_data, iv_len_test_data[i],
+ ad_test_data, add_len_test_data[i],
+ plaintext, ciphertext,
+ ciphertext + msg_len_test_data[i],
+ tag_len_test_data[i]);
+
+ if (ret != 0 ||
+ memcmp(ciphertext, res_test_data[i],
+ msg_len_test_data[i] + tag_len_test_data[i]) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+ memset(plaintext, 0, CCM_SELFTEST_PT_MAX_LEN);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(&ctx, msg_len_test_data[i],
+ iv_test_data, iv_len_test_data[i],
+ ad_test_data, add_len_test_data[i],
+ ciphertext, plaintext,
+ ciphertext + msg_len_test_data[i],
+ tag_len_test_data[i]);
+
+ if (ret != 0 ||
+ memcmp(plaintext, msg_test_data, msg_len_test_data[i]) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_ccm_free(&ctx);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..acaae5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/chacha20.c
@@ -0,0 +1,497 @@
+/**
+ * \file chacha20.c
+ *
+ * \brief ChaCha20 cipher.
+ *
+ * \author Daniel King <damaki.gh@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT)
+
+#define ROTL32(value, amount) \
+ ((uint32_t) ((value) << (amount)) | ((value) >> (32 - (amount))))
+
+#define CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX (12U)
+
+#define CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES (4U * 16U)
+
+/**
+ * \brief ChaCha20 quarter round operation.
+ *
+ * The quarter round is defined as follows (from RFC 7539):
+ * 1. a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 16;
+ * 2. c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 12;
+ * 3. a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 8;
+ * 4. c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 7;
+ *
+ * \param state ChaCha20 state to modify.
+ * \param a The index of 'a' in the state.
+ * \param b The index of 'b' in the state.
+ * \param c The index of 'c' in the state.
+ * \param d The index of 'd' in the state.
+ */
+static inline void chacha20_quarter_round(uint32_t state[16],
+ size_t a,
+ size_t b,
+ size_t c,
+ size_t d)
+{
+ /* a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 16; */
+ state[a] += state[b];
+ state[d] ^= state[a];
+ state[d] = ROTL32(state[d], 16);
+
+ /* c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 12 */
+ state[c] += state[d];
+ state[b] ^= state[c];
+ state[b] = ROTL32(state[b], 12);
+
+ /* a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 8; */
+ state[a] += state[b];
+ state[d] ^= state[a];
+ state[d] = ROTL32(state[d], 8);
+
+ /* c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 7; */
+ state[c] += state[d];
+ state[b] ^= state[c];
+ state[b] = ROTL32(state[b], 7);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Perform the ChaCha20 inner block operation.
+ *
+ * This function performs two rounds: the column round and the
+ * diagonal round.
+ *
+ * \param state The ChaCha20 state to update.
+ */
+static void chacha20_inner_block(uint32_t state[16])
+{
+ chacha20_quarter_round(state, 0, 4, 8, 12);
+ chacha20_quarter_round(state, 1, 5, 9, 13);
+ chacha20_quarter_round(state, 2, 6, 10, 14);
+ chacha20_quarter_round(state, 3, 7, 11, 15);
+
+ chacha20_quarter_round(state, 0, 5, 10, 15);
+ chacha20_quarter_round(state, 1, 6, 11, 12);
+ chacha20_quarter_round(state, 2, 7, 8, 13);
+ chacha20_quarter_round(state, 3, 4, 9, 14);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Generates a keystream block.
+ *
+ * \param initial_state The initial ChaCha20 state (key, nonce, counter).
+ * \param keystream Generated keystream bytes are written to this buffer.
+ */
+static void chacha20_block(const uint32_t initial_state[16],
+ unsigned char keystream[64])
+{
+ uint32_t working_state[16];
+ size_t i;
+
+ memcpy(working_state,
+ initial_state,
+ CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES);
+
+ for (i = 0U; i < 10U; i++) {
+ chacha20_inner_block(working_state);
+ }
+
+ working_state[0] += initial_state[0];
+ working_state[1] += initial_state[1];
+ working_state[2] += initial_state[2];
+ working_state[3] += initial_state[3];
+ working_state[4] += initial_state[4];
+ working_state[5] += initial_state[5];
+ working_state[6] += initial_state[6];
+ working_state[7] += initial_state[7];
+ working_state[8] += initial_state[8];
+ working_state[9] += initial_state[9];
+ working_state[10] += initial_state[10];
+ working_state[11] += initial_state[11];
+ working_state[12] += initial_state[12];
+ working_state[13] += initial_state[13];
+ working_state[14] += initial_state[14];
+ working_state[15] += initial_state[15];
+
+ for (i = 0U; i < 16; i++) {
+ size_t offset = i * 4U;
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(working_state[i], keystream, offset);
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(working_state, sizeof(working_state));
+}
+
+void mbedtls_chacha20_init(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->state, sizeof(ctx->state));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->keystream8, sizeof(ctx->keystream8));
+
+ /* Initially, there's no keystream bytes available */
+ ctx->keystream_bytes_used = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_chacha20_free(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_chacha20_context));
+ }
+}
+
+int mbedtls_chacha20_setkey(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char key[32])
+{
+ /* ChaCha20 constants - the string "expand 32-byte k" */
+ ctx->state[0] = 0x61707865;
+ ctx->state[1] = 0x3320646e;
+ ctx->state[2] = 0x79622d32;
+ ctx->state[3] = 0x6b206574;
+
+ /* Set key */
+ ctx->state[4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 0);
+ ctx->state[5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 4);
+ ctx->state[6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 8);
+ ctx->state[7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 12);
+ ctx->state[8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 16);
+ ctx->state[9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 20);
+ ctx->state[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 24);
+ ctx->state[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(key, 28);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_chacha20_starts(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char nonce[12],
+ uint32_t counter)
+{
+ /* Counter */
+ ctx->state[12] = counter;
+
+ /* Nonce */
+ ctx->state[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(nonce, 0);
+ ctx->state[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(nonce, 4);
+ ctx->state[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(nonce, 8);
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->keystream8, sizeof(ctx->keystream8));
+
+ /* Initially, there's no keystream bytes available */
+ ctx->keystream_bytes_used = CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_chacha20_update(mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx,
+ size_t size,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ size_t offset = 0U;
+
+ /* Use leftover keystream bytes, if available */
+ while (size > 0U && ctx->keystream_bytes_used < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES) {
+ output[offset] = input[offset]
+ ^ ctx->keystream8[ctx->keystream_bytes_used];
+
+ ctx->keystream_bytes_used++;
+ offset++;
+ size--;
+ }
+
+ /* Process full blocks */
+ while (size >= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES) {
+ /* Generate new keystream block and increment counter */
+ chacha20_block(ctx->state, ctx->keystream8);
+ ctx->state[CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX]++;
+
+ mbedtls_xor(output + offset, input + offset, ctx->keystream8, 64U);
+
+ offset += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES;
+ size -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE_BYTES;
+ }
+
+ /* Last (partial) block */
+ if (size > 0U) {
+ /* Generate new keystream block and increment counter */
+ chacha20_block(ctx->state, ctx->keystream8);
+ ctx->state[CHACHA20_CTR_INDEX]++;
+
+ mbedtls_xor(output + offset, input + offset, ctx->keystream8, size);
+
+ ctx->keystream_bytes_used = size;
+
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_chacha20_crypt(const unsigned char key[32],
+ const unsigned char nonce[12],
+ uint32_t counter,
+ size_t data_len,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ mbedtls_chacha20_context ctx;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ mbedtls_chacha20_init(&ctx);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_chacha20_setkey(&ctx, key);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_chacha20_starts(&ctx, nonce, counter);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update(&ctx, data_len, input, output);
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_chacha20_free(&ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+static const unsigned char test_keys[2][32] =
+{
+ {
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
+ },
+ {
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01
+ }
+};
+
+static const unsigned char test_nonces[2][12] =
+{
+ {
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
+ },
+ {
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02
+ }
+};
+
+static const uint32_t test_counters[2] =
+{
+ 0U,
+ 1U
+};
+
+static const unsigned char test_input[2][375] =
+{
+ {
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00
+ },
+ {
+ 0x41, 0x6e, 0x79, 0x20, 0x73, 0x75, 0x62, 0x6d,
+ 0x69, 0x73, 0x73, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74,
+ 0x6f, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x49, 0x45,
+ 0x54, 0x46, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6e,
+ 0x64, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x62, 0x79, 0x20, 0x74,
+ 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x72,
+ 0x69, 0x62, 0x75, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x66,
+ 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x70, 0x75, 0x62, 0x6c, 0x69,
+ 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x61,
+ 0x73, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x72,
+ 0x20, 0x70, 0x61, 0x72, 0x74, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66,
+ 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x49, 0x45, 0x54, 0x46,
+ 0x20, 0x49, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6e, 0x65,
+ 0x74, 0x2d, 0x44, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x74, 0x20,
+ 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x52, 0x46, 0x43, 0x20, 0x61,
+ 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x79, 0x20, 0x73,
+ 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74,
+ 0x20, 0x6d, 0x61, 0x64, 0x65, 0x20, 0x77, 0x69,
+ 0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65,
+ 0x20, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x65, 0x78, 0x74,
+ 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x49,
+ 0x45, 0x54, 0x46, 0x20, 0x61, 0x63, 0x74, 0x69,
+ 0x76, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20,
+ 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x72,
+ 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x22, 0x49,
+ 0x45, 0x54, 0x46, 0x20, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x74,
+ 0x72, 0x69, 0x62, 0x75, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e,
+ 0x22, 0x2e, 0x20, 0x53, 0x75, 0x63, 0x68, 0x20,
+ 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e,
+ 0x74, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x75,
+ 0x64, 0x65, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x20,
+ 0x73, 0x74, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e,
+ 0x74, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x49, 0x45,
+ 0x54, 0x46, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73, 0x69,
+ 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x61, 0x73, 0x20,
+ 0x77, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x61, 0x73, 0x20,
+ 0x77, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74, 0x74, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x20,
+ 0x61, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x63,
+ 0x74, 0x72, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x63, 0x20, 0x63,
+ 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61,
+ 0x74, 0x69, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x73, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x61,
+ 0x64, 0x65, 0x20, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e,
+ 0x79, 0x20, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x20, 0x6f,
+ 0x72, 0x20, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x63, 0x65, 0x2c,
+ 0x20, 0x77, 0x68, 0x69, 0x63, 0x68, 0x20, 0x61,
+ 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x61, 0x64, 0x64, 0x72, 0x65,
+ 0x73, 0x73, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6f
+ }
+};
+
+static const unsigned char test_output[2][375] =
+{
+ {
+ 0x76, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xad, 0xa0, 0xf1, 0x3d, 0x90,
+ 0x40, 0x5d, 0x6a, 0xe5, 0x53, 0x86, 0xbd, 0x28,
+ 0xbd, 0xd2, 0x19, 0xb8, 0xa0, 0x8d, 0xed, 0x1a,
+ 0xa8, 0x36, 0xef, 0xcc, 0x8b, 0x77, 0x0d, 0xc7,
+ 0xda, 0x41, 0x59, 0x7c, 0x51, 0x57, 0x48, 0x8d,
+ 0x77, 0x24, 0xe0, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0xd8, 0x4a, 0x37,
+ 0x6a, 0x43, 0xb8, 0xf4, 0x15, 0x18, 0xa1, 0x1c,
+ 0xc3, 0x87, 0xb6, 0x69, 0xb2, 0xee, 0x65, 0x86
+ },
+ {
+ 0xa3, 0xfb, 0xf0, 0x7d, 0xf3, 0xfa, 0x2f, 0xde,
+ 0x4f, 0x37, 0x6c, 0xa2, 0x3e, 0x82, 0x73, 0x70,
+ 0x41, 0x60, 0x5d, 0x9f, 0x4f, 0x4f, 0x57, 0xbd,
+ 0x8c, 0xff, 0x2c, 0x1d, 0x4b, 0x79, 0x55, 0xec,
+ 0x2a, 0x97, 0x94, 0x8b, 0xd3, 0x72, 0x29, 0x15,
+ 0xc8, 0xf3, 0xd3, 0x37, 0xf7, 0xd3, 0x70, 0x05,
+ 0x0e, 0x9e, 0x96, 0xd6, 0x47, 0xb7, 0xc3, 0x9f,
+ 0x56, 0xe0, 0x31, 0xca, 0x5e, 0xb6, 0x25, 0x0d,
+ 0x40, 0x42, 0xe0, 0x27, 0x85, 0xec, 0xec, 0xfa,
+ 0x4b, 0x4b, 0xb5, 0xe8, 0xea, 0xd0, 0x44, 0x0e,
+ 0x20, 0xb6, 0xe8, 0xdb, 0x09, 0xd8, 0x81, 0xa7,
+ 0xc6, 0x13, 0x2f, 0x42, 0x0e, 0x52, 0x79, 0x50,
+ 0x42, 0xbd, 0xfa, 0x77, 0x73, 0xd8, 0xa9, 0x05,
+ 0x14, 0x47, 0xb3, 0x29, 0x1c, 0xe1, 0x41, 0x1c,
+ 0x68, 0x04, 0x65, 0x55, 0x2a, 0xa6, 0xc4, 0x05,
+ 0xb7, 0x76, 0x4d, 0x5e, 0x87, 0xbe, 0xa8, 0x5a,
+ 0xd0, 0x0f, 0x84, 0x49, 0xed, 0x8f, 0x72, 0xd0,
+ 0xd6, 0x62, 0xab, 0x05, 0x26, 0x91, 0xca, 0x66,
+ 0x42, 0x4b, 0xc8, 0x6d, 0x2d, 0xf8, 0x0e, 0xa4,
+ 0x1f, 0x43, 0xab, 0xf9, 0x37, 0xd3, 0x25, 0x9d,
+ 0xc4, 0xb2, 0xd0, 0xdf, 0xb4, 0x8a, 0x6c, 0x91,
+ 0x39, 0xdd, 0xd7, 0xf7, 0x69, 0x66, 0xe9, 0x28,
+ 0xe6, 0x35, 0x55, 0x3b, 0xa7, 0x6c, 0x5c, 0x87,
+ 0x9d, 0x7b, 0x35, 0xd4, 0x9e, 0xb2, 0xe6, 0x2b,
+ 0x08, 0x71, 0xcd, 0xac, 0x63, 0x89, 0x39, 0xe2,
+ 0x5e, 0x8a, 0x1e, 0x0e, 0xf9, 0xd5, 0x28, 0x0f,
+ 0xa8, 0xca, 0x32, 0x8b, 0x35, 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x76,
+ 0x59, 0x89, 0xcb, 0xcf, 0x3d, 0xaa, 0x8b, 0x6c,
+ 0xcc, 0x3a, 0xaf, 0x9f, 0x39, 0x79, 0xc9, 0x2b,
+ 0x37, 0x20, 0xfc, 0x88, 0xdc, 0x95, 0xed, 0x84,
+ 0xa1, 0xbe, 0x05, 0x9c, 0x64, 0x99, 0xb9, 0xfd,
+ 0xa2, 0x36, 0xe7, 0xe8, 0x18, 0xb0, 0x4b, 0x0b,
+ 0xc3, 0x9c, 0x1e, 0x87, 0x6b, 0x19, 0x3b, 0xfe,
+ 0x55, 0x69, 0x75, 0x3f, 0x88, 0x12, 0x8c, 0xc0,
+ 0x8a, 0xaa, 0x9b, 0x63, 0xd1, 0xa1, 0x6f, 0x80,
+ 0xef, 0x25, 0x54, 0xd7, 0x18, 0x9c, 0x41, 0x1f,
+ 0x58, 0x69, 0xca, 0x52, 0xc5, 0xb8, 0x3f, 0xa3,
+ 0x6f, 0xf2, 0x16, 0xb9, 0xc1, 0xd3, 0x00, 0x62,
+ 0xbe, 0xbc, 0xfd, 0x2d, 0xc5, 0xbc, 0xe0, 0x91,
+ 0x19, 0x34, 0xfd, 0xa7, 0x9a, 0x86, 0xf6, 0xe6,
+ 0x98, 0xce, 0xd7, 0x59, 0xc3, 0xff, 0x9b, 0x64,
+ 0x77, 0x33, 0x8f, 0x3d, 0xa4, 0xf9, 0xcd, 0x85,
+ 0x14, 0xea, 0x99, 0x82, 0xcc, 0xaf, 0xb3, 0x41,
+ 0xb2, 0x38, 0x4d, 0xd9, 0x02, 0xf3, 0xd1, 0xab,
+ 0x7a, 0xc6, 0x1d, 0xd2, 0x9c, 0x6f, 0x21, 0xba,
+ 0x5b, 0x86, 0x2f, 0x37, 0x30, 0xe3, 0x7c, 0xfd,
+ 0xc4, 0xfd, 0x80, 0x6c, 0x22, 0xf2, 0x21
+ }
+};
+
+static const size_t test_lengths[2] =
+{
+ 64U,
+ 375U
+};
+
+/* Make sure no other definition is already present. */
+#undef ASSERT
+
+#define ASSERT(cond, args) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ if (!(cond)) \
+ { \
+ if (verbose != 0) \
+ mbedtls_printf args; \
+ \
+ return -1; \
+ } \
+ } \
+ while (0)
+
+int mbedtls_chacha20_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ unsigned char output[381];
+ unsigned i;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ for (i = 0U; i < 2U; i++) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ChaCha20 test %u ", i);
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_chacha20_crypt(test_keys[i],
+ test_nonces[i],
+ test_counters[i],
+ test_lengths[i],
+ test_input[i],
+ output);
+
+ ASSERT(0 == ret, ("error code: %i\n", ret));
+
+ ASSERT(0 == memcmp(output, test_output[i], test_lengths[i]),
+ ("failed (output)\n"));
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a1314ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/chachapoly.c
@@ -0,0 +1,478 @@
+/**
+ * \file chachapoly.c
+ *
+ * \brief ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD construction based on RFC 7539.
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT)
+
+#define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT (0)
+#define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD (1)
+#define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT (2) /* Encrypting or decrypting */
+#define CHACHAPOLY_STATE_FINISHED (3)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Adds nul bytes to pad the AAD for Poly1305.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context.
+ */
+static int chachapoly_pad_aad(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx)
+{
+ uint32_t partial_block_len = (uint32_t) (ctx->aad_len % 16U);
+ unsigned char zeroes[15];
+
+ if (partial_block_len == 0U) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memset(zeroes, 0, sizeof(zeroes));
+
+ return mbedtls_poly1305_update(&ctx->poly1305_ctx,
+ zeroes,
+ 16U - partial_block_len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Adds nul bytes to pad the ciphertext for Poly1305.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The ChaCha20-Poly1305 context.
+ */
+static int chachapoly_pad_ciphertext(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx)
+{
+ uint32_t partial_block_len = (uint32_t) (ctx->ciphertext_len % 16U);
+ unsigned char zeroes[15];
+
+ if (partial_block_len == 0U) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memset(zeroes, 0, sizeof(zeroes));
+ return mbedtls_poly1305_update(&ctx->poly1305_ctx,
+ zeroes,
+ 16U - partial_block_len);
+}
+
+void mbedtls_chachapoly_init(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_chacha20_init(&ctx->chacha20_ctx);
+ mbedtls_poly1305_init(&ctx->poly1305_ctx);
+ ctx->aad_len = 0U;
+ ctx->ciphertext_len = 0U;
+ ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT;
+ ctx->mode = MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_chachapoly_free(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_chacha20_free(&ctx->chacha20_ctx);
+ mbedtls_poly1305_free(&ctx->poly1305_ctx);
+ ctx->aad_len = 0U;
+ ctx->ciphertext_len = 0U;
+ ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT;
+ ctx->mode = MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char key[32])
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_chacha20_setkey(&ctx->chacha20_ctx, key);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_chachapoly_starts(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char nonce[12],
+ mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char poly1305_key[64];
+
+ /* Set counter = 0, will be update to 1 when generating Poly1305 key */
+ ret = mbedtls_chacha20_starts(&ctx->chacha20_ctx, nonce, 0U);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate the Poly1305 key by getting the ChaCha20 keystream output with
+ * counter = 0. This is the same as encrypting a buffer of zeroes.
+ * Only the first 256-bits (32 bytes) of the key is used for Poly1305.
+ * The other 256 bits are discarded.
+ */
+ memset(poly1305_key, 0, sizeof(poly1305_key));
+ ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update(&ctx->chacha20_ctx, sizeof(poly1305_key),
+ poly1305_key, poly1305_key);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_poly1305_starts(&ctx->poly1305_ctx, poly1305_key);
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ ctx->aad_len = 0U;
+ ctx->ciphertext_len = 0U;
+ ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD;
+ ctx->mode = mode;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(poly1305_key, 64U);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *aad,
+ size_t aad_len)
+{
+ if (ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE;
+ }
+
+ ctx->aad_len += aad_len;
+
+ return mbedtls_poly1305_update(&ctx->poly1305_ctx, aad, aad_len);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_chachapoly_update(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx,
+ size_t len,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if ((ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD) &&
+ (ctx->state != CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD) {
+ ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT;
+
+ ret = chachapoly_pad_aad(ctx);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ctx->ciphertext_len += len;
+
+ if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT) {
+ ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update(&ctx->chacha20_ctx, len, input, output);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_poly1305_update(&ctx->poly1305_ctx, output, len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ } else { /* DECRYPT */
+ ret = mbedtls_poly1305_update(&ctx->poly1305_ctx, input, len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update(&ctx->chacha20_ctx, len, input, output);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char mac[16])
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char len_block[16];
+
+ if (ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_INIT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_AAD) {
+ ret = chachapoly_pad_aad(ctx);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ } else if (ctx->state == CHACHAPOLY_STATE_CIPHERTEXT) {
+ ret = chachapoly_pad_ciphertext(ctx);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ctx->state = CHACHAPOLY_STATE_FINISHED;
+
+ /* The lengths of the AAD and ciphertext are processed by
+ * Poly1305 as the final 128-bit block, encoded as little-endian integers.
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(ctx->aad_len, len_block, 0);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_LE(ctx->ciphertext_len, len_block, 8);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_poly1305_update(&ctx->poly1305_ctx, len_block, 16U);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_poly1305_finish(&ctx->poly1305_ctx, mac);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int chachapoly_crypt_and_tag(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode,
+ size_t length,
+ const unsigned char nonce[12],
+ const unsigned char *aad,
+ size_t aad_len,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned char tag[16])
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_starts(ctx, nonce, mode);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad(ctx, aad, aad_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_update(ctx, length, input, output);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(ctx, tag);
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx,
+ size_t length,
+ const unsigned char nonce[12],
+ const unsigned char *aad,
+ size_t aad_len,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ unsigned char tag[16])
+{
+ return chachapoly_crypt_and_tag(ctx, MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT,
+ length, nonce, aad, aad_len,
+ input, output, tag);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx,
+ size_t length,
+ const unsigned char nonce[12],
+ const unsigned char *aad,
+ size_t aad_len,
+ const unsigned char tag[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char check_tag[16];
+ int diff;
+
+ if ((ret = chachapoly_crypt_and_tag(ctx,
+ MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT, length, nonce,
+ aad, aad_len, input, output, check_tag)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Check tag in "constant-time" */
+ diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, sizeof(check_tag));
+
+ if (diff != 0) {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(output, length);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+static const unsigned char test_key[1][32] =
+{
+ {
+ 0x80, 0x81, 0x82, 0x83, 0x84, 0x85, 0x86, 0x87,
+ 0x88, 0x89, 0x8a, 0x8b, 0x8c, 0x8d, 0x8e, 0x8f,
+ 0x90, 0x91, 0x92, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, 0x97,
+ 0x98, 0x99, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0x9e, 0x9f
+ }
+};
+
+static const unsigned char test_nonce[1][12] =
+{
+ {
+ 0x07, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* 32-bit common part */
+ 0x40, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47 /* 64-bit IV */
+ }
+};
+
+static const unsigned char test_aad[1][12] =
+{
+ {
+ 0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0xc0, 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3,
+ 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7
+ }
+};
+
+static const size_t test_aad_len[1] =
+{
+ 12U
+};
+
+static const unsigned char test_input[1][114] =
+{
+ {
+ 0x4c, 0x61, 0x64, 0x69, 0x65, 0x73, 0x20, 0x61,
+ 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x47, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x6c,
+ 0x65, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x20,
+ 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x61, 0x73,
+ 0x73, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x20, 0x27, 0x39, 0x39,
+ 0x3a, 0x20, 0x49, 0x66, 0x20, 0x49, 0x20, 0x63,
+ 0x6f, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x64, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x66, 0x66,
+ 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x79, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x20, 0x6f,
+ 0x6e, 0x6c, 0x79, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x20,
+ 0x74, 0x69, 0x70, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20,
+ 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x66, 0x75, 0x74, 0x75,
+ 0x72, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x73, 0x75, 0x6e, 0x73,
+ 0x63, 0x72, 0x65, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x77, 0x6f,
+ 0x75, 0x6c, 0x64, 0x20, 0x62, 0x65, 0x20, 0x69,
+ 0x74, 0x2e
+ }
+};
+
+static const unsigned char test_output[1][114] =
+{
+ {
+ 0xd3, 0x1a, 0x8d, 0x34, 0x64, 0x8e, 0x60, 0xdb,
+ 0x7b, 0x86, 0xaf, 0xbc, 0x53, 0xef, 0x7e, 0xc2,
+ 0xa4, 0xad, 0xed, 0x51, 0x29, 0x6e, 0x08, 0xfe,
+ 0xa9, 0xe2, 0xb5, 0xa7, 0x36, 0xee, 0x62, 0xd6,
+ 0x3d, 0xbe, 0xa4, 0x5e, 0x8c, 0xa9, 0x67, 0x12,
+ 0x82, 0xfa, 0xfb, 0x69, 0xda, 0x92, 0x72, 0x8b,
+ 0x1a, 0x71, 0xde, 0x0a, 0x9e, 0x06, 0x0b, 0x29,
+ 0x05, 0xd6, 0xa5, 0xb6, 0x7e, 0xcd, 0x3b, 0x36,
+ 0x92, 0xdd, 0xbd, 0x7f, 0x2d, 0x77, 0x8b, 0x8c,
+ 0x98, 0x03, 0xae, 0xe3, 0x28, 0x09, 0x1b, 0x58,
+ 0xfa, 0xb3, 0x24, 0xe4, 0xfa, 0xd6, 0x75, 0x94,
+ 0x55, 0x85, 0x80, 0x8b, 0x48, 0x31, 0xd7, 0xbc,
+ 0x3f, 0xf4, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x8e, 0x4b, 0x7a, 0x9d,
+ 0xe5, 0x76, 0xd2, 0x65, 0x86, 0xce, 0xc6, 0x4b,
+ 0x61, 0x16
+ }
+};
+
+static const size_t test_input_len[1] =
+{
+ 114U
+};
+
+static const unsigned char test_mac[1][16] =
+{
+ {
+ 0x1a, 0xe1, 0x0b, 0x59, 0x4f, 0x09, 0xe2, 0x6a,
+ 0x7e, 0x90, 0x2e, 0xcb, 0xd0, 0x60, 0x06, 0x91
+ }
+};
+
+/* Make sure no other definition is already present. */
+#undef ASSERT
+
+#define ASSERT(cond, args) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ if (!(cond)) \
+ { \
+ if (verbose != 0) \
+ mbedtls_printf args; \
+ \
+ return -1; \
+ } \
+ } \
+ while (0)
+
+int mbedtls_chachapoly_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ mbedtls_chachapoly_context ctx;
+ unsigned i;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char output[200];
+ unsigned char mac[16];
+
+ for (i = 0U; i < 1U; i++) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ChaCha20-Poly1305 test %u ", i);
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_chachapoly_init(&ctx);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey(&ctx, test_key[i]);
+ ASSERT(0 == ret, ("setkey() error code: %i\n", ret));
+
+ ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag(&ctx,
+ test_input_len[i],
+ test_nonce[i],
+ test_aad[i],
+ test_aad_len[i],
+ test_input[i],
+ output,
+ mac);
+
+ ASSERT(0 == ret, ("crypt_and_tag() error code: %i\n", ret));
+
+ ASSERT(0 == memcmp(output, test_output[i], test_input_len[i]),
+ ("failure (wrong output)\n"));
+
+ ASSERT(0 == memcmp(mac, test_mac[i], 16U),
+ ("failure (wrong MAC)\n"));
+
+ mbedtls_chachapoly_free(&ctx);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6469e9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/check_crypto_config.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/**
+ * \file check_crypto_config.h
+ *
+ * \brief Consistency checks for PSA configuration options
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/*
+ * It is recommended to include this file from your crypto_config.h
+ * in order to catch dependency issues early.
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) && \
+ !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA))
+#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC) && \
+ !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DES))
+#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && \
+ !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY))
+#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) && \
+ !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY))
+#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) && \
+ !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA))
+#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) && \
+ !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY))
+#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN) && \
+ !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY))
+#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP) && \
+ !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY))
+#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS) && \
+ !(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY))
+#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)) && \
+ !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
+#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_xxx defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) && \
+ !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
+#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_xxx defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) && \
+ !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY)
+#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_xxx defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR is deprecated and will be removed in a \
+ future version of Mbed TLS. Please switch to new PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_xxx \
+ symbols, where xxx can be: USE, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE"
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
+#warning "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR is deprecated and will be removed in a \
+ future version of Mbed TLS. Please switch to new PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_xxx \
+ symbols, where xxx can be: USE, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR is deprecated and will be removed in a \
+ future version of Mbed TLS. Please switch to new PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_xxx \
+ symbols, where xxx can be: USE, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE"
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING)
+#warning "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR is deprecated and will be removed in a \
+ future version of Mbed TLS. Please switch to new PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_xxx \
+ symbols, where xxx can be: USE, IMPORT, EXPORT, GENERATE, DERIVE"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING */
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR */
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)
+#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE defined, but feature is not supported"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)
+#error "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE defined, but feature is not supported"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
+ !(defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512))
+#error "MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) && \
+ !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256)
+#error "PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS defined, but not all prerequisites"
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHECK_CRYPTO_CONFIG_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/cipher.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/cipher.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ae01dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/cipher.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1689 @@
+/**
+ * \file cipher.c
+ *
+ * \brief Generic cipher wrapper for Mbed TLS
+ *
+ * \author Adriaan de Jong <dejong@fox-it.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
+#include "cipher_invasive.h"
+#include "cipher_wrap.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C)
+#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
+#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
+#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+static int supported_init = 0;
+
+static inline const mbedtls_cipher_base_t *mbedtls_cipher_get_base(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info)
+{
+ return mbedtls_cipher_base_lookup_table[info->base_idx];
+}
+
+const int *mbedtls_cipher_list(void)
+{
+ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def;
+ int *type;
+
+ if (!supported_init) {
+ def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions;
+ type = mbedtls_cipher_supported;
+
+ while (def->type != 0) {
+ *type++ = (*def++).type;
+ }
+
+ *type = 0;
+
+ supported_init = 1;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_cipher_supported;
+}
+
+const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type)
+{
+ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def;
+
+ for (def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions; def->info != NULL; def++) {
+ if (def->type == cipher_type) {
+ return def->info;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_string(
+ const char *cipher_name)
+{
+ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def;
+
+ if (NULL == cipher_name) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions; def->info != NULL; def++) {
+ if (!strcmp(def->info->name, cipher_name)) {
+ return def->info;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(
+ const mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher_id,
+ int key_bitlen,
+ const mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode)
+{
+ const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t *def;
+
+ for (def = mbedtls_cipher_definitions; def->info != NULL; def++) {
+ if (mbedtls_cipher_get_base(def->info)->cipher == cipher_id &&
+ mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(def->info) == (unsigned) key_bitlen &&
+ def->info->mode == mode) {
+ return def->info;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+static inline psa_key_type_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type(
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher)
+{
+ switch (cipher) {
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:
+ return PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES;
+
+ /* ARIA not yet supported in PSA. */
+ /* case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC:
+ return( PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA ); */
+
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode(
+ mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mode, size_t taglen)
+{
+ switch (mode) {
+ case MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB:
+ return PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING;
+ case MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM:
+ return PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_GCM, taglen);
+ case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM:
+ return PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(PSA_ALG_CCM, taglen);
+ case MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG:
+ return PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG;
+ case MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC:
+ if (taglen == 0) {
+ return PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+void mbedtls_cipher_init(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t));
+}
+
+void mbedtls_cipher_free(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) {
+ if (ctx->cipher_ctx != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa =
+ (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx;
+
+ if (cipher_psa->slot_state == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED) {
+ /* xxx_free() doesn't allow to return failures. */
+ (void) psa_destroy_key(cipher_psa->slot);
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(cipher_psa, sizeof(*cipher_psa));
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t));
+ return;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
+ if (ctx->cmac_ctx) {
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ctx->cmac_ctx,
+ sizeof(mbedtls_cmac_context_t));
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (ctx->cipher_ctx) {
+ mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->ctx_free_func(ctx->cipher_ctx);
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t));
+}
+
+int mbedtls_cipher_setup(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info)
+{
+ if (cipher_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t));
+
+ if (mbedtls_cipher_get_base(cipher_info)->ctx_alloc_func != NULL) {
+ ctx->cipher_ctx = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(cipher_info)->ctx_alloc_func();
+ if (ctx->cipher_ctx == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ctx->cipher_info = cipher_info;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+int mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info,
+ size_t taglen)
+{
+ psa_algorithm_t alg;
+ mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *cipher_psa;
+
+ if (NULL == cipher_info || NULL == ctx) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the underlying cipher mode and cipher type are
+ * supported by the underlying PSA Crypto implementation. */
+ alg = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_mode(((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) cipher_info->mode), taglen);
+ if (alg == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+ if (mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type(((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) cipher_info->type)) == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_t));
+
+ cipher_psa = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_context_psa));
+ if (cipher_psa == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+ cipher_psa->alg = alg;
+ ctx->cipher_ctx = cipher_psa;
+ ctx->cipher_info = cipher_info;
+ ctx->psa_enabled = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+int mbedtls_cipher_setkey(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ int key_bitlen,
+ const mbedtls_operation_t operation)
+{
+ if (operation != MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT && operation != MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ if (MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) &&
+ MBEDTLS_DECRYPT == operation) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) {
+ mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa =
+ (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx;
+
+ size_t const key_bytelen = ((size_t) key_bitlen + 7) / 8;
+
+ psa_status_t status;
+ psa_key_type_t key_type;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+
+ /* PSA Crypto API only accepts byte-aligned keys. */
+ if (key_bitlen % 8 != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* Don't allow keys to be set multiple times. */
+ if (cipher_psa->slot_state != MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_UNSET) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ key_type = mbedtls_psa_translate_cipher_type(
+ ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type));
+ if (key_type == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+ psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key_type);
+
+ /* Mbed TLS' cipher layer doesn't enforce the mode of operation
+ * (encrypt vs. decrypt): it is possible to setup a key for encryption
+ * and use it for AEAD decryption. Until tests relying on this
+ * are changed, allow any usage in PSA. */
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes,
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, cipher_psa->alg);
+
+ status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_bytelen,
+ &cipher_psa->slot);
+ switch (status) {
+ case PSA_SUCCESS:
+ break;
+ case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
+ }
+ /* Indicate that we own the key slot and need to
+ * destroy it in mbedtls_cipher_free(). */
+ cipher_psa->slot_state = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED;
+
+ ctx->key_bitlen = key_bitlen;
+ ctx->operation = operation;
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+ if ((ctx->cipher_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_KEY_LEN) == 0 &&
+ (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(ctx->cipher_info) != key_bitlen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ctx->key_bitlen = key_bitlen;
+ ctx->operation = operation;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ /*
+ * For OFB, CFB and CTR mode always use the encryption key schedule
+ */
+ if (MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT == operation ||
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) ||
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) ||
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) {
+ return mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->setkey_enc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, key,
+ ctx->key_bitlen);
+ }
+
+ if (MBEDTLS_DECRYPT == operation) {
+ return mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->setkey_dec_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, key,
+ ctx->key_bitlen);
+ }
+#else
+ if (operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT || operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) {
+ return mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->setkey_enc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx, key,
+ ctx->key_bitlen);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *iv,
+ size_t iv_len)
+{
+ size_t actual_iv_size;
+
+ if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) {
+ /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
+ * operations, we currently don't make it
+ * accessible through the cipher layer. */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+ /* avoid buffer overflow in ctx->iv */
+ if (iv_len > MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx->cipher_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN) != 0) {
+ actual_iv_size = iv_len;
+ } else {
+ actual_iv_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(ctx->cipher_info);
+
+ /* avoid reading past the end of input buffer */
+ if (actual_iv_size > iv_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C)
+ if (((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type) == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20) {
+ /* Even though the actual_iv_size is overwritten with a correct value
+ * of 12 from the cipher info, return an error to indicate that
+ * the input iv_len is wrong. */
+ if (iv_len != 12) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (0 != mbedtls_chacha20_starts((mbedtls_chacha20_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ iv,
+ 0U)) { /* Initial counter value */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+ if (((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type) == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 &&
+ iv_len != 12) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+ if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) {
+ return mbedtls_gcm_starts((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ ctx->operation,
+ iv, iv_len);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
+ if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) {
+ int set_lengths_result;
+ int ccm_star_mode;
+
+ set_lengths_result = mbedtls_ccm_set_lengths(
+ (mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ 0, 0, 0);
+ if (set_lengths_result != 0) {
+ return set_lengths_result;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) {
+ ccm_star_mode = MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_DECRYPT;
+ } else if (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT) {
+ ccm_star_mode = MBEDTLS_CCM_STAR_ENCRYPT;
+ } else {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_ccm_starts((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ ccm_star_mode,
+ iv, iv_len);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (actual_iv_size != 0) {
+ memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, actual_iv_size);
+ ctx->iv_size = actual_iv_size;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_cipher_reset(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) {
+ /* We don't support resetting PSA-based
+ * cipher contexts, yet. */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+ ctx->unprocessed_len = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+int mbedtls_cipher_update_ad(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len)
+{
+ if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) {
+ /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
+ * operations, we currently don't make it
+ * accessible through the cipher layer. */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+ if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) {
+ return mbedtls_gcm_update_ad((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ ad, ad_len);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+ if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) {
+ int result;
+ mbedtls_chachapoly_mode_t mode;
+
+ mode = (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)
+ ? MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_ENCRYPT
+ : MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_DECRYPT;
+
+ result = mbedtls_chachapoly_starts((mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ ctx->iv,
+ mode);
+ if (result != 0) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_chachapoly_update_aad((mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ ad, ad_len);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
+
+int mbedtls_cipher_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen, unsigned char *output, size_t *olen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t block_size;
+
+ if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) {
+ /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
+ * operations, we currently don't make it
+ * accessible through the cipher layer. */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+ *olen = 0;
+ block_size = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(ctx);
+ if (0 == block_size) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT;
+ }
+
+ if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB) {
+ if (ilen != block_size) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED;
+ }
+
+ *olen = ilen;
+
+ if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->ecb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ ctx->operation, input,
+ output))) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+ if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM) {
+ return mbedtls_gcm_update((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ input, ilen,
+ output, ilen, olen);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
+ if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) {
+ return mbedtls_ccm_update((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ input, ilen,
+ output, ilen, olen);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+ if (((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type) == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305) {
+ *olen = ilen;
+ return mbedtls_chachapoly_update((mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ ilen, input, output);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (input == output &&
+ (ctx->unprocessed_len != 0 || ilen % block_size)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC) {
+ size_t copy_len = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If there is not enough data for a full block, cache it.
+ */
+ if ((ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT && NULL != ctx->add_padding &&
+ ilen <= block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len) ||
+ (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT && NULL == ctx->add_padding &&
+ ilen < block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len) ||
+ (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT &&
+ ilen < block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len)) {
+ memcpy(&(ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len]), input,
+ ilen);
+
+ ctx->unprocessed_len += ilen;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Process cached data first
+ */
+ if (0 != ctx->unprocessed_len) {
+ copy_len = block_size - ctx->unprocessed_len;
+
+ memcpy(&(ctx->unprocessed_data[ctx->unprocessed_len]), input,
+ copy_len);
+
+ if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ ctx->operation,
+ block_size, ctx->iv,
+ ctx->
+ unprocessed_data,
+ output))) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *olen += block_size;
+ output += block_size;
+ ctx->unprocessed_len = 0;
+
+ input += copy_len;
+ ilen -= copy_len;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Cache final, incomplete block
+ */
+ if (0 != ilen) {
+ /* Encryption: only cache partial blocks
+ * Decryption w/ padding: always keep at least one whole block
+ * Decryption w/o padding: only cache partial blocks
+ */
+ copy_len = ilen % block_size;
+ if (copy_len == 0 &&
+ ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT &&
+ NULL != ctx->add_padding) {
+ copy_len = block_size;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(ctx->unprocessed_data, &(input[ilen - copy_len]),
+ copy_len);
+
+ ctx->unprocessed_len += copy_len;
+ ilen -= copy_len;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Process remaining full blocks
+ */
+ if (ilen) {
+ if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ ctx->operation,
+ ilen, ctx->iv,
+ input,
+ output))) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *olen += ilen;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB) {
+ if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->cfb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ ctx->operation, ilen,
+ &ctx->unprocessed_len,
+ ctx->iv,
+ input, output))) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *olen = ilen;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB) {
+ if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->ofb_func(ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ ilen,
+ &ctx->unprocessed_len,
+ ctx->iv,
+ input, output))) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *olen = ilen;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR) {
+ if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->ctr_func(ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ ilen,
+ &ctx->unprocessed_len,
+ ctx->iv,
+ ctx->unprocessed_data,
+ input, output))) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *olen = ilen;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS) {
+ if (ctx->unprocessed_len > 0) {
+ /* We can only process an entire data unit at a time. */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->xts_func(ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ ctx->operation,
+ ilen,
+ ctx->iv,
+ input,
+ output);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *olen = ilen;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) == MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM) {
+ if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->stream_func(ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ ilen, input,
+ output))) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *olen = ilen;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM */
+
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+/*
+ * PKCS7 (and PKCS5) padding: fill with ll bytes, with ll = padding_len
+ */
+static void add_pkcs_padding(unsigned char *output, size_t output_len,
+ size_t data_len)
+{
+ size_t padding_len = output_len - data_len;
+ unsigned char i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < padding_len; i++) {
+ output[data_len + i] = (unsigned char) padding_len;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the length of the PKCS7 padding.
+ *
+ * Note: input_len must be the block size of the cipher.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_get_pkcs_padding(unsigned char *input,
+ size_t input_len,
+ size_t *data_len)
+{
+ size_t i, pad_idx;
+ unsigned char padding_len;
+
+ if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ padding_len = input[input_len - 1];
+
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padding_len, input_len);
+ bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(padding_len, 0));
+
+ /* The number of bytes checked must be independent of padding_len,
+ * so pick input_len, which is usually 8 or 16 (one block) */
+ pad_idx = input_len - padding_len;
+ for (i = 0; i < input_len; i++) {
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t in_padding = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, pad_idx);
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t different = mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i], padding_len);
+ bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, different));
+ }
+
+ /* If the padding is invalid, set the output length to 0 */
+ *data_len = mbedtls_ct_if(bad, 0, input_len - padding_len);
+
+ return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS)
+/*
+ * One and zeros padding: fill with 80 00 ... 00
+ */
+static void add_one_and_zeros_padding(unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_len, size_t data_len)
+{
+ size_t padding_len = output_len - data_len;
+ unsigned char i = 0;
+
+ output[data_len] = 0x80;
+ for (i = 1; i < padding_len; i++) {
+ output[data_len + i] = 0x00;
+ }
+}
+
+static int get_one_and_zeros_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
+ size_t *data_len)
+{
+ if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t in_padding = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE;
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad = MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE;
+
+ *data_len = 0;
+
+ for (ptrdiff_t i = (ptrdiff_t) (input_len) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t is_nonzero = mbedtls_ct_bool(input[i]);
+
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t hit_first_nonzero = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(is_nonzero, in_padding);
+
+ *data_len = mbedtls_ct_size_if(hit_first_nonzero, i, *data_len);
+
+ bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_if(hit_first_nonzero, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i], 0x80), bad);
+
+ in_padding = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(in_padding, mbedtls_ct_bool_not(is_nonzero));
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN)
+/*
+ * Zeros and len padding: fill with 00 ... 00 ll, where ll is padding length
+ */
+static void add_zeros_and_len_padding(unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_len, size_t data_len)
+{
+ size_t padding_len = output_len - data_len;
+ unsigned char i = 0;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < padding_len; i++) {
+ output[data_len + i - 1] = 0x00;
+ }
+ output[output_len - 1] = (unsigned char) padding_len;
+}
+
+static int get_zeros_and_len_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
+ size_t *data_len)
+{
+ size_t i, pad_idx;
+ unsigned char padding_len;
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t bad;
+
+ if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ padding_len = input[input_len - 1];
+ *data_len = input_len - padding_len;
+
+ /* Avoid logical || since it results in a branch */
+ bad = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padding_len, input_len);
+ bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(padding_len, 0));
+
+ /* The number of bytes checked must be independent of padding_len */
+ pad_idx = input_len - padding_len;
+ for (i = 0; i < input_len - 1; i++) {
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t is_padding = mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, pad_idx);
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t nonzero_pad_byte;
+ nonzero_pad_byte = mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(is_padding, mbedtls_ct_bool(input[i]));
+ bad = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(bad, nonzero_pad_byte);
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(bad, MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS)
+/*
+ * Zero padding: fill with 00 ... 00
+ */
+static void add_zeros_padding(unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_len, size_t data_len)
+{
+ memset(output + data_len, 0, output_len - data_len);
+}
+
+static int get_zeros_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
+ size_t *data_len)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t done = MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE, prev_done;
+
+ if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ *data_len = 0;
+ for (i = input_len; i > 0; i--) {
+ prev_done = done;
+ done = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(done, mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(input[i-1], 0));
+ *data_len = mbedtls_ct_size_if(mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(done, prev_done), i, *data_len);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS */
+
+/*
+ * No padding: don't pad :)
+ *
+ * There is no add_padding function (check for NULL in mbedtls_cipher_finish)
+ * but a trivial get_padding function
+ */
+static int get_no_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len,
+ size_t *data_len)
+{
+ if (NULL == input || NULL == data_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ *data_len = input_len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */
+
+int mbedtls_cipher_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen)
+{
+ if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) {
+ /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
+ * operations, we currently don't make it
+ * accessible through the cipher layer. */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+ *olen = 0;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING)
+ /* CBC mode requires padding so we make sure a call to
+ * mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode has been done successfully. */
+ if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) {
+ if (ctx->get_padding == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) ||
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) ||
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) ||
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) ||
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) ||
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) ||
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) ||
+ (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type))) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) {
+ if (ctx->unprocessed_len != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) {
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT == ctx->operation) {
+ /* check for 'no padding' mode */
+ if (NULL == ctx->add_padding) {
+ if (0 != ctx->unprocessed_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ctx->add_padding(ctx->unprocessed_data, mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size(ctx),
+ ctx->unprocessed_len);
+ } else if (mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(ctx) != ctx->unprocessed_len) {
+ /*
+ * For decrypt operations, expect a full block,
+ * or an empty block if no padding
+ */
+ if (NULL == ctx->add_padding && 0 == ctx->unprocessed_len) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED;
+ }
+
+ /* cipher block */
+ if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_cipher_get_base(ctx->cipher_info)->cbc_func(ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ ctx->operation,
+ mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(
+ ctx),
+ ctx->iv,
+ ctx->unprocessed_data,
+ output))) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Set output size for decryption */
+ if (MBEDTLS_DECRYPT == ctx->operation) {
+ return ctx->get_padding(output, mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(ctx),
+ olen);
+ }
+
+ /* Set output size for encryption */
+ *olen = mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size(ctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+#else
+ ((void) output);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING)
+int mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ mbedtls_cipher_padding_t mode)
+{
+ if (NULL == ctx->cipher_info ||
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC != ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) {
+ /* While PSA Crypto knows about CBC padding
+ * schemes, we currently don't make them
+ * accessible through the cipher layer. */
+ if (mode != MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+ switch (mode) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+ case MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7:
+ ctx->add_padding = add_pkcs_padding;
+ ctx->get_padding = mbedtls_get_pkcs_padding;
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS)
+ case MBEDTLS_PADDING_ONE_AND_ZEROS:
+ ctx->add_padding = add_one_and_zeros_padding;
+ ctx->get_padding = get_one_and_zeros_padding;
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN)
+ case MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS_AND_LEN:
+ ctx->add_padding = add_zeros_and_len_padding;
+ ctx->get_padding = get_zeros_and_len_padding;
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_ZEROS)
+ case MBEDTLS_PADDING_ZEROS:
+ ctx->add_padding = add_zeros_padding;
+ ctx->get_padding = get_zeros_padding;
+ break;
+#endif
+ case MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE:
+ ctx->add_padding = NULL;
+ ctx->get_padding = get_no_padding;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+int mbedtls_cipher_write_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len)
+{
+ if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT != ctx->operation) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) {
+ /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
+ * operations, we currently don't make it
+ * accessible through the cipher layer. */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+ if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) {
+ size_t output_length;
+ /* The code here doesn't yet support alternative implementations
+ * that can delay up to a block of output. */
+ return mbedtls_gcm_finish((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ NULL, 0, &output_length,
+ tag, tag_len);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+ if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) {
+ /* Don't allow truncated MAC for Poly1305 */
+ if (tag_len != 16U) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(
+ (mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, tag);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_cipher_check_tag(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len)
+{
+ unsigned char check_tag[16];
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (ctx->cipher_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (MBEDTLS_DECRYPT != ctx->operation) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) {
+ /* While PSA Crypto has an API for multipart
+ * operations, we currently don't make it
+ * accessible through the cipher layer. */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+ /* Status to return on a non-authenticated algorithm. */
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+ if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) {
+ size_t output_length;
+ /* The code here doesn't yet support alternative implementations
+ * that can delay up to a block of output. */
+
+ if (tag_len > sizeof(check_tag)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (0 != (ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(
+ (mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ NULL, 0, &output_length,
+ check_tag, tag_len))) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Check the tag in "constant-time" */
+ if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, tag_len) != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+ if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) {
+ /* Don't allow truncated MAC for Poly1305 */
+ if (tag_len != sizeof(check_tag)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_finish(
+ (mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx->cipher_ctx, check_tag);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Check the tag in "constant-time" */
+ if (mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, tag_len) != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(check_tag, tag_len);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C || MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
+
+/*
+ * Packet-oriented wrapper for non-AEAD modes
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_crypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t finish_olen;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) {
+ /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that
+ * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will
+ * still be in its default state of 0, which is
+ * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call
+ * below will gracefully fail. */
+ mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa =
+ (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx;
+
+ psa_status_t status;
+ psa_cipher_operation_t cipher_op = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT;
+ size_t part_len;
+
+ if (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) {
+ status = psa_cipher_decrypt_setup(&cipher_op,
+ cipher_psa->slot,
+ cipher_psa->alg);
+ } else if (ctx->operation == MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT) {
+ status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(&cipher_op,
+ cipher_psa->slot,
+ cipher_psa->alg);
+ } else {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* In the following, we can immediately return on an error,
+ * because the PSA Crypto API guarantees that cipher operations
+ * are terminated by unsuccessful calls to psa_cipher_update(),
+ * and by any call to psa_cipher_finish(). */
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) != MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB) {
+ status = psa_cipher_set_iv(&cipher_op, iv, iv_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ status = psa_cipher_update(&cipher_op,
+ input, ilen,
+ output, ilen, olen);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_cipher_finish(&cipher_op,
+ output + *olen, ilen - *olen,
+ &part_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ *olen += part_len;
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_iv(ctx, iv, iv_len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_reset(ctx)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, input, ilen,
+ output, olen)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_finish(ctx, output + *olen,
+ &finish_olen)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *olen += finish_olen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD)
+/*
+ * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function used by
+ * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext().
+ */
+static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
+ unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) {
+ /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that
+ * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will
+ * still be in its default state of 0, which is
+ * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call
+ * below will gracefully fail. */
+ mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa =
+ (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx;
+
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ /* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag
+ * at the end of the encrypted message. */
+ if (output == NULL || tag != output + ilen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_aead_encrypt(cipher_psa->slot,
+ cipher_psa->alg,
+ iv, iv_len,
+ ad, ad_len,
+ input, ilen,
+ output, ilen + tag_len, olen);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ *olen -= tag_len;
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+ if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) {
+ *olen = ilen;
+ return mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(ctx->cipher_ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT,
+ ilen, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len,
+ input, output, tag_len, tag);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
+ if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) {
+ *olen = ilen;
+ return mbedtls_ccm_encrypt_and_tag(ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen,
+ iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len, input, output,
+ tag, tag_len);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+ if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) {
+ /* ChachaPoly has fixed length nonce and MAC (tag) */
+ if ((iv_len != mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(ctx->cipher_info)) ||
+ (tag_len != 16U)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ *olen = ilen;
+ return mbedtls_chachapoly_encrypt_and_tag(ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ ilen, iv, ad, ad_len, input, output, tag);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
+
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD modes: internal function used by
+ * mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext().
+ */
+static int mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
+ const unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ if (ctx->psa_enabled == 1) {
+ /* As in the non-PSA case, we don't check that
+ * a key has been set. If not, the key slot will
+ * still be in its default state of 0, which is
+ * guaranteed to be invalid, hence the PSA-call
+ * below will gracefully fail. */
+ mbedtls_cipher_context_psa * const cipher_psa =
+ (mbedtls_cipher_context_psa *) ctx->cipher_ctx;
+
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ /* PSA Crypto API always writes the authentication tag
+ * at the end of the encrypted message. */
+ if (input == NULL || tag != input + ilen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_aead_decrypt(cipher_psa->slot,
+ cipher_psa->alg,
+ iv, iv_len,
+ ad, ad_len,
+ input, ilen + tag_len,
+ output, ilen, olen);
+ if (status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED;
+ } else if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+ if (MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) {
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ *olen = ilen;
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen,
+ iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len,
+ tag, tag_len, input, output);
+
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
+ if (MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) {
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ *olen = ilen;
+ ret = mbedtls_ccm_auth_decrypt(ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen,
+ iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len,
+ input, output, tag, tag_len);
+
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+ if (MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305 == ((mbedtls_cipher_type_t) ctx->cipher_info->type)) {
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ /* ChachaPoly has fixed length nonce and MAC (tag) */
+ if ((iv_len != mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(ctx->cipher_info)) ||
+ (tag_len != 16U)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ *olen = ilen;
+ ret = mbedtls_chachapoly_auth_decrypt(ctx->cipher_ctx, ilen,
+ iv, ad, ad_len, tag, input, output);
+
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
+
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD) || defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
+/*
+ * Packet-oriented encryption for AEAD/NIST_KW: public function.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_auth_encrypt_ext(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_len,
+ size_t *olen, size_t tag_len)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
+ if (
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ ctx->psa_enabled == 0 &&
+#endif
+ (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) ||
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode))) {
+ mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode =
+ (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) ?
+ MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP;
+
+ /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP,
+ * so these length should be 0 as documented. */
+ if (iv_len != 0 || tag_len != 0 || ad_len != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ (void) iv;
+ (void) ad;
+
+ return mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap(ctx->cipher_ctx, mode, input, ilen,
+ output, olen, output_len);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD)
+ /* AEAD case: check length before passing on to shared function */
+ if (output_len < ilen + tag_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ int ret = mbedtls_cipher_aead_encrypt(ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len,
+ input, ilen, output, olen,
+ output + ilen, tag_len);
+ *olen += tag_len;
+ return ret;
+#else
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Packet-oriented decryption for AEAD/NIST_KW: public function.
+ */
+int mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt_ext(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *ad, size_t ad_len,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_len,
+ size_t *olen, size_t tag_len)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
+ if (
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+ ctx->psa_enabled == 0 &&
+#endif
+ (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode) ||
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode))) {
+ mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode =
+ (MBEDTLS_MODE_KW == ((mbedtls_cipher_mode_t) ctx->cipher_info->mode)) ?
+ MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW : MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP;
+
+ /* There is no iv, tag or ad associated with KW and KWP,
+ * so these length should be 0 as documented. */
+ if (iv_len != 0 || tag_len != 0 || ad_len != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ (void) iv;
+ (void) ad;
+
+ return mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(ctx->cipher_ctx, mode, input, ilen,
+ output, olen, output_len);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD)
+ /* AEAD case: check length before passing on to shared function */
+ if (ilen < tag_len || output_len < ilen - tag_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_cipher_aead_decrypt(ctx, iv, iv_len, ad, ad_len,
+ input, ilen - tag_len, output, olen,
+ input + ilen - tag_len, tag_len);
+#else
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD */
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_AEAD || MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/cipher_invasive.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/cipher_invasive.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..702f8f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/cipher_invasive.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/**
+ * \file cipher_invasive.h
+ *
+ * \brief Cipher module: interfaces for invasive testing only.
+ *
+ * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only.
+ * They SHOULD NOT be made available in library integrations except when
+ * building the library for testing.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_INVASIVE_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_INVASIVE_H
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_get_pkcs_padding(unsigned char *input,
+ size_t input_len,
+ size_t *data_len);
+
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_INVASIVE_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b4c21ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2482 @@
+/**
+ * \file cipher_wrap.c
+ *
+ * \brief Generic cipher wrapper for Mbed TLS
+ *
+ * \author Adriaan de Jong <dejong@fox-it.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+
+#include "cipher_wrap.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+#include "mbedtls/camellia.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+#include "mbedtls/aria.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+#include "mbedtls/des.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C)
+#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
+#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
+#include <string.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+enum mbedtls_cipher_base_index {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA)
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C)
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHA20_BASE,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHAPOLY_BASE,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE3,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA)
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_NULL_BASE,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_XTS_AES,
+#endif
+ /* Prevent compile failure due to empty enum */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_PREVENT_EMPTY_ENUM
+};
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C))
+/* shared by all GCM ciphers */
+static void *gcm_ctx_alloc(void)
+{
+ void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_gcm_context));
+
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_gcm_init((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void gcm_ctx_free(void *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_gcm_free(ctx);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C))
+/* shared by all CCM ciphers */
+static void *ccm_ctx_alloc(void)
+{
+ void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ccm_context));
+
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_ccm_init((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void ccm_ctx_free(void *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_ccm_free(ctx);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+
+static int aes_crypt_ecb_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ return mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, operation, input, output);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+static int aes_crypt_cbc_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, size_t length,
+ unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ return mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, input,
+ output);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+static int aes_crypt_cfb128_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation,
+ size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ return mbedtls_aes_crypt_cfb128((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv_off, iv,
+ input, output);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+static int aes_crypt_ofb_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *iv_off,
+ unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ return mbedtls_aes_crypt_ofb((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, length, iv_off,
+ iv, input, output);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+static int aes_crypt_ctr_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off,
+ unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ return mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, length, nc_off, nonce_counter,
+ stream_block, input, output);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+static int aes_crypt_xts_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation,
+ size_t length,
+ const unsigned char data_unit[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = ctx;
+ int mode;
+
+ switch (operation) {
+ case MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT:
+ mode = MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT;
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_DECRYPT:
+ mode = MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts(xts_ctx, mode, length,
+ data_unit, input, output);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+static int aes_setkey_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int aes_setkey_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen);
+}
+
+static void *aes_ctx_alloc(void)
+{
+ mbedtls_aes_context *aes = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_aes_context));
+
+ if (aes == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_aes_init(aes);
+
+ return aes;
+}
+
+static void aes_ctx_free(void *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_aes_free((mbedtls_aes_context *) ctx);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t aes_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES,
+ aes_crypt_ecb_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ aes_crypt_cbc_wrap,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ aes_crypt_cfb128_wrap,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ aes_crypt_ofb_wrap,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ aes_crypt_ctr_wrap,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ aes_setkey_enc_wrap,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ aes_setkey_dec_wrap,
+#endif
+ aes_ctx_alloc,
+ aes_ctx_free
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ecb_info = {
+ "AES-128-ECB",
+ 16,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES
+};
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ecb_info = {
+ "AES-192-ECB",
+ 16,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ecb_info = {
+ "AES-256-ECB",
+ 16,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES
+};
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_cbc_info = {
+ "AES-128-CBC",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES
+};
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_cbc_info = {
+ "AES-192-CBC",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_cbc_info = {
+ "AES-256-CBC",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES
+};
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_cfb128_info = {
+ "AES-128-CFB128",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES
+};
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_cfb128_info = {
+ "AES-192-CFB128",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_cfb128_info = {
+ "AES-256-CFB128",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES
+};
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ofb_info = {
+ "AES-128-OFB",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES
+};
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ofb_info = {
+ "AES-192-OFB",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ofb_info = {
+ "AES-256-OFB",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_OFB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES
+};
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ctr_info = {
+ "AES-128-CTR",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES
+};
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ctr_info = {
+ "AES-192-CTR",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ctr_info = {
+ "AES-256-CTR",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES
+};
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+static int xts_aes_setkey_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = ctx;
+ return mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_enc(xts_ctx, key, key_bitlen);
+}
+
+static int xts_aes_setkey_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = ctx;
+ return mbedtls_aes_xts_setkey_dec(xts_ctx, key, key_bitlen);
+}
+
+static void *xts_aes_ctx_alloc(void)
+{
+ mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(*xts_ctx));
+
+ if (xts_ctx != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_aes_xts_init(xts_ctx);
+ }
+
+ return xts_ctx;
+}
+
+static void xts_aes_ctx_free(void *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_aes_xts_context *xts_ctx = ctx;
+
+ if (xts_ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_aes_xts_free(xts_ctx);
+ mbedtls_free(xts_ctx);
+}
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t xts_aes_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES,
+ NULL,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ aes_crypt_xts_wrap,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ xts_aes_setkey_enc_wrap,
+ xts_aes_setkey_dec_wrap,
+ xts_aes_ctx_alloc,
+ xts_aes_ctx_free
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_xts_info = {
+ "AES-128-XTS",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_XTS_AES
+};
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_xts_info = {
+ "AES-256-XTS",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 512 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_XTS,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_XTS_AES
+};
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES)
+static int gcm_aes_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_gcm_setkey((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES,
+ key, key_bitlen);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C && MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_aes_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES,
+ NULL,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+ gcm_aes_setkey_wrap,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ gcm_aes_setkey_wrap,
+#endif
+ gcm_ctx_alloc,
+ gcm_ctx_free,
+#else
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_gcm_info = {
+ "AES-128-GCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES
+};
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_gcm_info = {
+ "AES-192-GCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_gcm_info = {
+ "AES-256-GCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES
+};
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES)
+static int ccm_aes_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ccm_setkey((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES,
+ key, key_bitlen);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C && MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_aes_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES,
+ NULL,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
+ ccm_aes_setkey_wrap,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ ccm_aes_setkey_wrap,
+#endif
+ ccm_ctx_alloc,
+ ccm_ctx_free,
+#else
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+#endif
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ccm_info = {
+ "AES-128-CCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES
+};
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ccm_info = {
+ "AES-192-CCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ccm_info = {
+ "AES-256-CCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES
+};
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+ "AES-128-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES
+};
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+ "AES-192-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+ "AES-256-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES
+};
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA */
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+
+static int camellia_crypt_ecb_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ecb((mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, operation, input,
+ output);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+static int camellia_crypt_cbc_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation,
+ size_t length, unsigned char *iv,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cbc((mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv,
+ input, output);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+static int camellia_crypt_cfb128_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation,
+ size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_cfb128((mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, operation, length,
+ iv_off, iv, input, output);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+static int camellia_crypt_ctr_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off,
+ unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ return mbedtls_camellia_crypt_ctr((mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, length, nc_off,
+ nonce_counter, stream_block, input, output);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+static int camellia_setkey_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_camellia_setkey_dec((mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int camellia_setkey_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_camellia_setkey_enc((mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen);
+}
+
+static void *camellia_ctx_alloc(void)
+{
+ mbedtls_camellia_context *ctx;
+ ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_camellia_context));
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_camellia_init(ctx);
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void camellia_ctx_free(void *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_camellia_free((mbedtls_camellia_context *) ctx);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t camellia_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA,
+ camellia_crypt_ecb_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ camellia_crypt_cbc_wrap,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ camellia_crypt_cfb128_wrap,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ camellia_crypt_ctr_wrap,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ camellia_setkey_enc_wrap,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ camellia_setkey_dec_wrap,
+#endif
+ camellia_ctx_alloc,
+ camellia_ctx_free
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ecb_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-128-ECB",
+ 16,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ecb_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-192-ECB",
+ 16,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ecb_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-256-ECB",
+ 16,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA
+};
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_cbc_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-128-CBC",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_cbc_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-192-CBC",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_cbc_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-256-CBC",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_cfb128_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-128-CFB128",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_cfb128_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-192-CFB128",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_cfb128_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-256-CFB128",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ctr_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-128-CTR",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ctr_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-192-CTR",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ctr_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-256-CTR",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+static int gcm_camellia_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_gcm_setkey((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA,
+ key, key_bitlen);
+}
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_camellia_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA,
+ NULL,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ gcm_camellia_setkey_wrap,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ gcm_camellia_setkey_wrap,
+#endif
+ gcm_ctx_alloc,
+ gcm_ctx_free,
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_gcm_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-128-GCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_gcm_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-192-GCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_gcm_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-256-GCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
+static int ccm_camellia_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ccm_setkey((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA,
+ key, key_bitlen);
+}
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_camellia_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CAMELLIA,
+ NULL,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ ccm_camellia_setkey_wrap,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ ccm_camellia_setkey_wrap,
+#endif
+ ccm_ctx_alloc,
+ ccm_ctx_free,
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ccm_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-128-CCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ccm_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-192-CCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ccm_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-256-CCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t camellia_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+ "CAMELLIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+
+static int aria_crypt_ecb_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ (void) operation;
+ return mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb((mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, input,
+ output);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+static int aria_crypt_cbc_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation,
+ size_t length, unsigned char *iv,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ return mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc((mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv,
+ input, output);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+static int aria_crypt_cfb128_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation,
+ size_t length, size_t *iv_off, unsigned char *iv,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ return mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128((mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, operation, length,
+ iv_off, iv, input, output);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+static int aria_crypt_ctr_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off,
+ unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ return mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr((mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, length, nc_off,
+ nonce_counter, stream_block, input, output);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+static int aria_setkey_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec((mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int aria_setkey_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc((mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx, key, key_bitlen);
+}
+
+static void *aria_ctx_alloc(void)
+{
+ mbedtls_aria_context *ctx;
+ ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_aria_context));
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_aria_init(ctx);
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void aria_ctx_free(void *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_aria_free((mbedtls_aria_context *) ctx);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t aria_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA,
+ aria_crypt_ecb_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ aria_crypt_cbc_wrap,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ aria_crypt_cfb128_wrap,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ aria_crypt_ctr_wrap,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ aria_setkey_enc_wrap,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ aria_setkey_dec_wrap,
+#endif
+ aria_ctx_alloc,
+ aria_ctx_free
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ecb_info = {
+ "ARIA-128-ECB",
+ 16,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ecb_info = {
+ "ARIA-192-ECB",
+ 16,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ecb_info = {
+ "ARIA-256-ECB",
+ 16,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA
+};
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_cbc_info = {
+ "ARIA-128-CBC",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_cbc_info = {
+ "ARIA-192-CBC",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_cbc_info = {
+ "ARIA-256-CBC",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_cfb128_info = {
+ "ARIA-128-CFB128",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CFB128,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_cfb128_info = {
+ "ARIA-192-CFB128",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CFB128,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_cfb128_info = {
+ "ARIA-256-CFB128",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CFB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CFB128,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ctr_info = {
+ "ARIA-128-CTR",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CTR,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ctr_info = {
+ "ARIA-192-CTR",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CTR,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ctr_info = {
+ "ARIA-256-CTR",
+ 16,
+ 16 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CTR,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CTR,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+static int gcm_aria_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_gcm_setkey((mbedtls_gcm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA,
+ key, key_bitlen);
+}
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t gcm_aria_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA,
+ NULL,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ gcm_aria_setkey_wrap,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ gcm_aria_setkey_wrap,
+#endif
+ gcm_ctx_alloc,
+ gcm_ctx_free,
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_gcm_info = {
+ "ARIA-128-GCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_gcm_info = {
+ "ARIA-192-GCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_gcm_info = {
+ "ARIA-256-GCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
+static int ccm_aria_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ccm_setkey((mbedtls_ccm_context *) ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA,
+ key, key_bitlen);
+}
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t ccm_aria_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_ARIA,
+ NULL,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ ccm_aria_setkey_wrap,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ ccm_aria_setkey_wrap,
+#endif
+ ccm_ctx_alloc,
+ ccm_ctx_free,
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ccm_info = {
+ "ARIA-128-CCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ccm_info = {
+ "ARIA-192-CCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ccm_info = {
+ "ARIA-256-CCM",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+ "ARIA-128-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+ "ARIA-192-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aria_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info = {
+ "ARIA-256-CCM*-NO-TAG",
+ 16,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_VARIABLE_IV_LEN,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+
+static int des_crypt_ecb_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ ((void) operation);
+ return mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb((mbedtls_des_context *) ctx, input, output);
+}
+
+static int des3_crypt_ecb_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ ((void) operation);
+ return mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb((mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, input, output);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+static int des_crypt_cbc_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, size_t length,
+ unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ return mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc((mbedtls_des_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, input,
+ output);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+static int des3_crypt_cbc_wrap(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t operation, size_t length,
+ unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ return mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc((mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, operation, length, iv, input,
+ output);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+static int des_setkey_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ ((void) key_bitlen);
+
+ return mbedtls_des_setkey_dec((mbedtls_des_context *) ctx, key);
+}
+
+static int des_setkey_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ ((void) key_bitlen);
+
+ return mbedtls_des_setkey_enc((mbedtls_des_context *) ctx, key);
+}
+
+static int des3_set2key_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ ((void) key_bitlen);
+
+ return mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec((mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, key);
+}
+
+static int des3_set2key_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ ((void) key_bitlen);
+
+ return mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc((mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, key);
+}
+
+static int des3_set3key_dec_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ ((void) key_bitlen);
+
+ return mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec((mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, key);
+}
+
+static int des3_set3key_enc_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ ((void) key_bitlen);
+
+ return mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc((mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx, key);
+}
+
+static void *des_ctx_alloc(void)
+{
+ mbedtls_des_context *des = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_des_context));
+
+ if (des == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_des_init(des);
+
+ return des;
+}
+
+static void des_ctx_free(void *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_des_free((mbedtls_des_context *) ctx);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static void *des3_ctx_alloc(void)
+{
+ mbedtls_des3_context *des3;
+ des3 = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_des3_context));
+
+ if (des3 == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_des3_init(des3);
+
+ return des3;
+}
+
+static void des3_ctx_free(void *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_des3_free((mbedtls_des3_context *) ctx);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES,
+ des_crypt_ecb_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ des_crypt_cbc_wrap,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ des_setkey_enc_wrap,
+ des_setkey_dec_wrap,
+ des_ctx_alloc,
+ des_ctx_free
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ecb_info = {
+ "DES-ECB",
+ 8,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES
+};
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_cbc_info = {
+ "DES-CBC",
+ 8,
+ 8 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_ede_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_DES,
+ des3_crypt_ecb_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ des3_crypt_cbc_wrap,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ des3_set2key_enc_wrap,
+ des3_set2key_dec_wrap,
+ des3_ctx_alloc,
+ des3_ctx_free
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede_ecb_info = {
+ "DES-EDE-ECB",
+ 8,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE
+};
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede_cbc_info = {
+ "DES-EDE-CBC",
+ 8,
+ 8 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t des_ede3_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_3DES,
+ des3_crypt_ecb_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ des3_crypt_cbc_wrap,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ des3_set3key_enc_wrap,
+ des3_set3key_dec_wrap,
+ des3_ctx_alloc,
+ des3_ctx_free
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede3_ecb_info = {
+ "DES-EDE3-ECB",
+ 8,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE3
+};
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t des_ede3_cbc_info = {
+ "DES-EDE3-CBC",
+ 8,
+ 8 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_DES_EDE3 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE3
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C)
+
+static int chacha20_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ if (key_bitlen != 256U) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (0 != mbedtls_chacha20_setkey((mbedtls_chacha20_context *) ctx, key)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int chacha20_stream_wrap(void *ctx, size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_chacha20_update(ctx, length, input, output);
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void *chacha20_ctx_alloc(void)
+{
+ mbedtls_chacha20_context *ctx;
+ ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_chacha20_context));
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_chacha20_init(ctx);
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void chacha20_ctx_free(void *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_chacha20_free((mbedtls_chacha20_context *) ctx);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t chacha20_base_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20,
+ NULL,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ chacha20_stream_wrap,
+#endif
+ chacha20_setkey_wrap,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ chacha20_setkey_wrap,
+#endif
+ chacha20_ctx_alloc,
+ chacha20_ctx_free
+};
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t chacha20_info = {
+ "CHACHA20",
+ 1,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHA20_BASE
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+
+static int chachapoly_setkey_wrap(void *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ if (key_bitlen != 256U) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (0 != mbedtls_chachapoly_setkey((mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx, key)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void *chachapoly_ctx_alloc(void)
+{
+ mbedtls_chachapoly_context *ctx;
+ ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_chachapoly_context));
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_chachapoly_init(ctx);
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void chachapoly_ctx_free(void *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_chachapoly_free((mbedtls_chachapoly_context *) ctx);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t chachapoly_base_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_CHACHA20,
+ NULL,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ chachapoly_setkey_wrap,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ chachapoly_setkey_wrap,
+#endif
+ chachapoly_ctx_alloc,
+ chachapoly_ctx_free
+};
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t chachapoly_info = {
+ "CHACHA20-POLY1305",
+ 1,
+ 12 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_CHACHAPOLY,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHAPOLY_BASE
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
+static int null_crypt_stream(void *ctx, size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ ((void) ctx);
+ memmove(output, input, length);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int null_setkey(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ ((void) ctx);
+ ((void) key);
+ ((void) key_bitlen);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void *null_ctx_alloc(void)
+{
+ return (void *) 1;
+}
+
+static void null_ctx_free(void *ctx)
+{
+ ((void) ctx);
+}
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t null_base_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_NULL,
+ NULL,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ null_crypt_stream,
+#endif
+ null_setkey,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ null_setkey,
+#endif
+ null_ctx_alloc,
+ null_ctx_free
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t null_cipher_info = {
+ "NULL",
+ 1,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_STREAM,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_NULL_BASE
+};
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER) */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
+static void *kw_ctx_alloc(void)
+{
+ void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_nist_kw_context));
+
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_nist_kw_init((mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void kw_ctx_free(void *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_nist_kw_free(ctx);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static int kw_aes_setkey_wrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey((mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, key_bitlen, 1);
+}
+
+static int kw_aes_setkey_unwrap(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey((mbedtls_nist_kw_context *) ctx,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, key, key_bitlen, 0);
+}
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_base_t kw_aes_info = {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES,
+ NULL,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ NULL,
+#endif
+ kw_aes_setkey_wrap,
+ kw_aes_setkey_unwrap,
+ kw_ctx_alloc,
+ kw_ctx_free,
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_nist_kw_info = {
+ "AES-128-KW",
+ 16,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_KW,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES
+};
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_nist_kw_info = {
+ "AES-192-KW",
+ 16,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_KW,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_nist_kw_info = {
+ "AES-256-KW",
+ 16,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_KW,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES
+};
+#endif
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_nist_kwp_info = {
+ "AES-128-KWP",
+ 16,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 128 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES
+};
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_nist_kwp_info = {
+ "AES-192-KWP",
+ 16,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 192 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES
+};
+
+static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_nist_kwp_info = {
+ "AES-256-KWP",
+ 16,
+ 0 >> MBEDTLS_IV_SIZE_SHIFT,
+ 256 >> MBEDTLS_KEY_BITLEN_SHIFT,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_KWP,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP,
+ 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES
+};
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */
+
+const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[] =
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB, &aes_128_ecb_info },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB, &aes_192_ecb_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB, &aes_256_ecb_info },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, &aes_128_cbc_info },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, &aes_192_cbc_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, &aes_256_cbc_info },
+#endif
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CFB128, &aes_128_cfb128_info },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CFB128, &aes_192_cfb128_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CFB128, &aes_256_cfb128_info },
+#endif
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_OFB, &aes_128_ofb_info },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_OFB, &aes_192_ofb_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_OFB, &aes_256_ofb_info },
+#endif
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CTR, &aes_128_ctr_info },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CTR, &aes_192_ctr_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CTR, &aes_256_ctr_info },
+#endif
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_XTS, &aes_128_xts_info },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_XTS, &aes_256_xts_info },
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_GCM, &aes_128_gcm_info },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM, &aes_192_gcm_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_GCM, &aes_256_gcm_info },
+#endif
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM, &aes_128_ccm_info },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM, &aes_192_ccm_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM, &aes_256_ccm_info },
+#endif
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aes_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aes_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aes_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_ECB, &camellia_128_ecb_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_ECB, &camellia_192_ecb_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_ECB, &camellia_256_ecb_info },
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, &camellia_128_cbc_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CBC, &camellia_192_cbc_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, &camellia_256_cbc_info },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CFB128, &camellia_128_cfb128_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CFB128, &camellia_192_cfb128_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CFB128, &camellia_256_cfb128_info },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CTR, &camellia_128_ctr_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CTR, &camellia_192_ctr_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CTR, &camellia_256_ctr_info },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_GCM, &camellia_128_gcm_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_GCM, &camellia_192_gcm_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_GCM, &camellia_256_gcm_info },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM, &camellia_128_ccm_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM, &camellia_192_ccm_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM, &camellia_256_ccm_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &camellia_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &camellia_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CAMELLIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &camellia_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_ECB, &aria_128_ecb_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_ECB, &aria_192_ecb_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_ECB, &aria_256_ecb_info },
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CBC, &aria_128_cbc_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CBC, &aria_192_cbc_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CBC, &aria_256_cbc_info },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CFB128, &aria_128_cfb128_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CFB128, &aria_192_cfb128_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CFB128, &aria_256_cfb128_info },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CTR, &aria_128_ctr_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CTR, &aria_192_ctr_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CTR, &aria_256_ctr_info },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_GCM, &aria_128_gcm_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_GCM, &aria_192_gcm_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_GCM, &aria_256_gcm_info },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM, &aria_128_ccm_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM, &aria_192_ccm_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM, &aria_256_ccm_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_128_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aria_128_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_192_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aria_192_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARIA_256_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG, &aria_256_ccm_star_no_tag_info },
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_ECB, &des_ecb_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_ECB, &des_ede_ecb_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB, &des_ede3_ecb_info },
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC, &des_cbc_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC, &des_ede_cbc_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, &des_ede3_cbc_info },
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20, &chacha20_info },
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, &chachapoly_info },
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KW, &aes_128_nist_kw_info },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KW, &aes_192_nist_kw_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KW, &aes_256_nist_kw_info },
+#endif
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_KWP, &aes_128_nist_kwp_info },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_KWP, &aes_192_nist_kwp_info },
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_KWP, &aes_256_nist_kwp_info },
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, &null_cipher_info },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER */
+
+ { MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, NULL }
+};
+
+#define NUM_CIPHERS (sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions) / \
+ sizeof(mbedtls_cipher_definitions[0]))
+int mbedtls_cipher_supported[NUM_CIPHERS];
+
+const mbedtls_cipher_base_t * const mbedtls_cipher_base_lookup_table[] = {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+ [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_AES] = &aes_info,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+ [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_ARIA] = &aria_info,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+ [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CAMELLIA] = &camellia_info,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA)
+ [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_AES] = &ccm_aes_info,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+ [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_ARIA] = &ccm_aria_info,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+ [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CCM_CAMELLIA] = &ccm_camellia_info,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C)
+ [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHA20_BASE] = &chacha20_base_info,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+ [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_CHACHAPOLY_BASE] = &chachapoly_base_info,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+ [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE3] = &des_ede3_info,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+ [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES_EDE] = &des_ede_info,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+ [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_DES] = &des_info,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA)
+ [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_AES] = &gcm_aes_info,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+ [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_ARIA] = &gcm_aria_info,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+ [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_GCM_CAMELLIA] = &gcm_camellia_info,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
+ [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_KW_AES] = &kw_aes_info,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL_CIPHER)
+ [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_NULL_BASE] = &null_base_info,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+ [MBEDTLS_CIPHER_BASE_INDEX_XTS_AES] = &xts_aes_info
+#endif
+};
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9564c5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/cipher_wrap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+/**
+ * \file cipher_wrap.h
+ *
+ * \brief Cipher wrappers.
+ *
+ * \author Adriaan de Jong <dejong@fox-it.com>
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Support for GCM either through Mbed TLS SW implementation or PSA */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM))
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_GCM) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES))
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM))
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES))
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG))
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA
+#endif
+
+#if (defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG) && \
+ defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES))
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_AES_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305))
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_GCM_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_CHACHAPOLY_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA)
+#define MBEDTLS_CIPHER_HAVE_SOME_AEAD_VIA_LEGACY_OR_USE_PSA
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Base cipher information. The non-mode specific functions and values.
+ */
+struct mbedtls_cipher_base_t {
+ /** Base Cipher type (e.g. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES) */
+ mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher;
+
+ /** Encrypt using ECB */
+ int (*ecb_func)(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ /** Encrypt using CBC */
+ int (*cbc_func)(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, size_t length,
+ unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB)
+ /** Encrypt using CFB (Full length) */
+ int (*cfb_func)(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, size_t length, size_t *iv_off,
+ unsigned char *iv, const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_OFB)
+ /** Encrypt using OFB (Full length) */
+ int (*ofb_func)(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *iv_off,
+ unsigned char *iv,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR)
+ /** Encrypt using CTR */
+ int (*ctr_func)(void *ctx, size_t length, size_t *nc_off,
+ unsigned char *nonce_counter, unsigned char *stream_block,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+ /** Encrypt or decrypt using XTS. */
+ int (*xts_func)(void *ctx, mbedtls_operation_t mode, size_t length,
+ const unsigned char data_unit[16],
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_STREAM)
+ /** Encrypt using STREAM */
+ int (*stream_func)(void *ctx, size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output);
+#endif
+
+ /** Set key for encryption purposes */
+ int (*setkey_enc_func)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT)
+ /** Set key for decryption purposes */
+ int (*setkey_dec_func)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int key_bitlen);
+#endif
+
+ /** Allocate a new context */
+ void * (*ctx_alloc_func)(void);
+
+ /** Free the given context */
+ void (*ctx_free_func)(void *ctx);
+
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t type;
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *info;
+} mbedtls_cipher_definition_t;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_UNSET = 0,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_OWNED, /* Used for PSA-based cipher contexts which */
+ /* use raw key material internally imported */
+ /* as a volatile key, and which hence need */
+ /* to destroy that key when the context is */
+ /* freed. */
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PSA_KEY_NOT_OWNED, /* Used for PSA-based cipher contexts */
+ /* which use a key provided by the */
+ /* user, and which hence will not be */
+ /* destroyed when the context is freed. */
+} mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership;
+
+typedef struct {
+ psa_algorithm_t alg;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t slot;
+ mbedtls_cipher_psa_key_ownership slot_state;
+} mbedtls_cipher_context_psa;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+extern const mbedtls_cipher_definition_t mbedtls_cipher_definitions[];
+
+extern int mbedtls_cipher_supported[];
+
+extern const mbedtls_cipher_base_t * const mbedtls_cipher_base_lookup_table[];
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_WRAP_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/cmac.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/cmac.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eda10d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/cmac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1067 @@
+/**
+ * \file cmac.c
+ *
+ * \brief NIST SP800-38B compliant CMAC implementation for AES and 3DES
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/*
+ * References:
+ *
+ * - NIST SP 800-38B Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The
+ * CMAC Mode for Authentication
+ * http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38b.pdf
+ *
+ * - RFC 4493 - The AES-CMAC Algorithm
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4493
+ *
+ * - RFC 4615 - The Advanced Encryption Standard-Cipher-based Message
+ * Authentication Code-Pseudo-Random Function-128 (AES-CMAC-PRF-128)
+ * Algorithm for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE)
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4615
+ *
+ * Additional test vectors: ISO/IEC 9797-1
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/cmac.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+/*
+ * Multiplication by u in the Galois field of GF(2^n)
+ *
+ * As explained in NIST SP 800-38B, this can be computed:
+ *
+ * If MSB(p) = 0, then p = (p << 1)
+ * If MSB(p) = 1, then p = (p << 1) ^ R_n
+ * with R_64 = 0x1B and R_128 = 0x87
+ *
+ * Input and output MUST NOT point to the same buffer
+ * Block size must be 8 bytes or 16 bytes - the block sizes for DES and AES.
+ */
+static int cmac_multiply_by_u(unsigned char *output,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t blocksize)
+{
+ const unsigned char R_128 = 0x87;
+ unsigned char R_n;
+ uint32_t overflow = 0x00;
+ int i;
+
+ if (blocksize == MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ R_n = R_128;
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+ else if (blocksize == MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ const unsigned char R_64 = 0x1B;
+ R_n = R_64;
+ }
+#endif
+ else {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ for (i = (int) blocksize - 4; i >= 0; i -= 4) {
+ uint32_t i32 = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(&input[i], 0);
+ uint32_t new_overflow = i32 >> 31;
+ i32 = (i32 << 1) | overflow;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(i32, &output[i], 0);
+ overflow = new_overflow;
+ }
+
+ R_n = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_bool(input[0] >> 7), R_n);
+ output[blocksize - 1] ^= R_n;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate subkeys
+ *
+ * - as specified by RFC 4493, section 2.3 Subkey Generation Algorithm
+ */
+static int cmac_generate_subkeys(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ unsigned char *K1, unsigned char *K2)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char L[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ size_t olen, block_size;
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(L, sizeof(L));
+
+ block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(ctx->cipher_info);
+
+ /* Calculate Ek(0) */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, L, block_size, L, &olen)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Generate K1 and K2
+ */
+ if ((ret = cmac_multiply_by_u(K1, L, block_size)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = cmac_multiply_by_u(K2, K1, block_size)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(L, sizeof(L));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT) || defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT)
+
+/*
+ * Create padded last block from (partial) last block.
+ *
+ * We can't use the padding option from the cipher layer, as it only works for
+ * CBC and we use ECB mode, and anyway we need to XOR K1 or K2 in addition.
+ */
+static void cmac_pad(unsigned char padded_block[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE],
+ size_t padded_block_len,
+ const unsigned char *last_block,
+ size_t last_block_len)
+{
+ size_t j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < padded_block_len; j++) {
+ if (j < last_block_len) {
+ padded_block[j] = last_block[j];
+ } else if (j == last_block_len) {
+ padded_block[j] = 0x80;
+ } else {
+ padded_block[j] = 0x00;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t keybits)
+{
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t type;
+ mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx;
+ int retval;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || key == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if ((retval = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(ctx, key, (int) keybits,
+ MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) {
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ type = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_type(ctx->cipher_info);
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB:
+ case MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocated and initialise in the cipher context memory for the CMAC
+ * context */
+ cmac_ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_cmac_context_t));
+ if (cmac_ctx == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ ctx->cmac_ctx = cmac_ctx;
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cmac_ctx->state, sizeof(cmac_ctx->state));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen)
+{
+ mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx;
+ unsigned char *state;
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t n, j, olen, block_size;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || input == NULL ||
+ ctx->cmac_ctx == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ cmac_ctx = ctx->cmac_ctx;
+ block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(ctx->cipher_info);
+ state = ctx->cmac_ctx->state;
+
+ /* Without the MBEDTLS_ASSUME below, gcc -O3 will generate a warning of the form
+ * error: writing 16 bytes into a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overflow=] */
+ MBEDTLS_ASSUME(block_size <= MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ /* Is there data still to process from the last call, that's greater in
+ * size than a block? */
+ if (cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len > 0 &&
+ ilen > block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len) {
+ memcpy(&cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block[cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len],
+ input,
+ block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len);
+
+ mbedtls_xor_no_simd(state, cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block, state, block_size);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, state, block_size, state,
+ &olen)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ input += block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len;
+ ilen -= block_size - cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len;
+ cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* n is the number of blocks including any final partial block */
+ n = (ilen + block_size - 1) / block_size;
+
+ /* Iterate across the input data in block sized chunks, excluding any
+ * final partial or complete block */
+ for (j = 1; j < n; j++) {
+ mbedtls_xor_no_simd(state, input, state, block_size);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, state, block_size, state,
+ &olen)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ilen -= block_size;
+ input += block_size;
+ }
+
+ /* If there is data left over that wasn't aligned to a block */
+ if (ilen > 0) {
+ memcpy(&cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block[cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len],
+ input,
+ ilen);
+ cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len += ilen;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx;
+ unsigned char *state, *last_block;
+ unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char M_last[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t olen, block_size;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || ctx->cmac_ctx == NULL ||
+ output == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ cmac_ctx = ctx->cmac_ctx;
+ block_size = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(ctx->cipher_info);
+ MBEDTLS_ASSUME(block_size <= MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE); // silence GCC warning
+ state = cmac_ctx->state;
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(K1, sizeof(K1));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(K2, sizeof(K2));
+ cmac_generate_subkeys(ctx, K1, K2);
+
+ last_block = cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block;
+
+ /* Calculate last block */
+ if (cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len < block_size) {
+ cmac_pad(M_last, block_size, last_block, cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len);
+ mbedtls_xor(M_last, M_last, K2, block_size);
+ } else {
+ /* Last block is complete block */
+ mbedtls_xor(M_last, last_block, K1, block_size);
+ }
+
+
+ mbedtls_xor(state, M_last, state, block_size);
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(ctx, state, block_size, state,
+ &olen)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(output, state, block_size);
+
+exit:
+ /* Wipe the generated keys on the stack, and any other transients to avoid
+ * side channel leakage */
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(K1, sizeof(K1));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(K2, sizeof(K2));
+
+ cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len = 0;
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block,
+ sizeof(cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block));
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(state, MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_cipher_cmac_reset(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_cmac_context_t *cmac_ctx;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->cipher_info == NULL || ctx->cmac_ctx == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ cmac_ctx = ctx->cmac_ctx;
+
+ /* Reset the internal state */
+ cmac_ctx->unprocessed_len = 0;
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block,
+ sizeof(cmac_ctx->unprocessed_block));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(cmac_ctx->state,
+ sizeof(cmac_ctx->state));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_cipher_cmac(const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (cipher_info == NULL || key == NULL || input == NULL || output == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_cipher_init(&ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_starts(&ctx, key, keylen);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_update(&ctx, input, ilen);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac_finish(&ctx, output);
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+/*
+ * Implementation of AES-CMAC-PRF-128 defined in RFC 4615
+ */
+int mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128(const unsigned char *key, size_t key_length,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len,
+ unsigned char output[16])
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
+ unsigned char zero_key[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char int_key[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ if (key == NULL || input == NULL || output == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB);
+ if (cipher_info == NULL) {
+ /* Failing at this point must be due to a build issue */
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (key_length == MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ /* Use key as is */
+ memcpy(int_key, key, MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ } else {
+ memset(zero_key, 0, MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(cipher_info, zero_key, 128, key,
+ key_length, int_key);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(cipher_info, int_key, 128, input, in_len,
+ output);
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(int_key, sizeof(int_key));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_CMAC_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/*
+ * CMAC test data for SP800-38B
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/AES_CMAC.pdf
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/Examples/TDES_CMAC.pdf
+ *
+ * AES-CMAC-PRF-128 test data from RFC 4615
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4615#page-4
+ */
+
+#define NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY 4
+#define NB_PRF_TESTS 3
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+/* All CMAC test inputs are truncated from the same 64 byte buffer. */
+static const unsigned char test_message[] = {
+ /* PT */
+ 0x6b, 0xc1, 0xbe, 0xe2, 0x2e, 0x40, 0x9f, 0x96,
+ 0xe9, 0x3d, 0x7e, 0x11, 0x73, 0x93, 0x17, 0x2a,
+ 0xae, 0x2d, 0x8a, 0x57, 0x1e, 0x03, 0xac, 0x9c,
+ 0x9e, 0xb7, 0x6f, 0xac, 0x45, 0xaf, 0x8e, 0x51,
+ 0x30, 0xc8, 0x1c, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x5c, 0xe4, 0x11,
+ 0xe5, 0xfb, 0xc1, 0x19, 0x1a, 0x0a, 0x52, 0xef,
+ 0xf6, 0x9f, 0x24, 0x45, 0xdf, 0x4f, 0x9b, 0x17,
+ 0xad, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x7b, 0xe6, 0x6c, 0x37, 0x10
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+/* Truncation point of message for AES CMAC tests */
+static const unsigned int aes_message_lengths[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY] = {
+ /* Mlen */
+ 0,
+ 16,
+ 20,
+ 64
+};
+
+/* CMAC-AES128 Test Data */
+static const unsigned char aes_128_key[16] = {
+ 0x2b, 0x7e, 0x15, 0x16, 0x28, 0xae, 0xd2, 0xa6,
+ 0xab, 0xf7, 0x15, 0x88, 0x09, 0xcf, 0x4f, 0x3c
+};
+static const unsigned char aes_128_subkeys[2][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {
+ {
+ /* K1 */
+ 0xfb, 0xee, 0xd6, 0x18, 0x35, 0x71, 0x33, 0x66,
+ 0x7c, 0x85, 0xe0, 0x8f, 0x72, 0x36, 0xa8, 0xde
+ },
+ {
+ /* K2 */
+ 0xf7, 0xdd, 0xac, 0x30, 0x6a, 0xe2, 0x66, 0xcc,
+ 0xf9, 0x0b, 0xc1, 0x1e, 0xe4, 0x6d, 0x51, 0x3b
+ }
+};
+static const unsigned char aes_128_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] =
+{
+ {
+ /* Example #1 */
+ 0xbb, 0x1d, 0x69, 0x29, 0xe9, 0x59, 0x37, 0x28,
+ 0x7f, 0xa3, 0x7d, 0x12, 0x9b, 0x75, 0x67, 0x46
+ },
+ {
+ /* Example #2 */
+ 0x07, 0x0a, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x6b, 0x4d, 0x41, 0x44,
+ 0xf7, 0x9b, 0xdd, 0x9d, 0xd0, 0x4a, 0x28, 0x7c
+ },
+ {
+ /* Example #3 */
+ 0x7d, 0x85, 0x44, 0x9e, 0xa6, 0xea, 0x19, 0xc8,
+ 0x23, 0xa7, 0xbf, 0x78, 0x83, 0x7d, 0xfa, 0xde
+ },
+ {
+ /* Example #4 */
+ 0x51, 0xf0, 0xbe, 0xbf, 0x7e, 0x3b, 0x9d, 0x92,
+ 0xfc, 0x49, 0x74, 0x17, 0x79, 0x36, 0x3c, 0xfe
+ }
+};
+
+/* CMAC-AES192 Test Data */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+static const unsigned char aes_192_key[24] = {
+ 0x8e, 0x73, 0xb0, 0xf7, 0xda, 0x0e, 0x64, 0x52,
+ 0xc8, 0x10, 0xf3, 0x2b, 0x80, 0x90, 0x79, 0xe5,
+ 0x62, 0xf8, 0xea, 0xd2, 0x52, 0x2c, 0x6b, 0x7b
+};
+static const unsigned char aes_192_subkeys[2][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {
+ {
+ /* K1 */
+ 0x44, 0x8a, 0x5b, 0x1c, 0x93, 0x51, 0x4b, 0x27,
+ 0x3e, 0xe6, 0x43, 0x9d, 0xd4, 0xda, 0xa2, 0x96
+ },
+ {
+ /* K2 */
+ 0x89, 0x14, 0xb6, 0x39, 0x26, 0xa2, 0x96, 0x4e,
+ 0x7d, 0xcc, 0x87, 0x3b, 0xa9, 0xb5, 0x45, 0x2c
+ }
+};
+static const unsigned char aes_192_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] =
+{
+ {
+ /* Example #1 */
+ 0xd1, 0x7d, 0xdf, 0x46, 0xad, 0xaa, 0xcd, 0xe5,
+ 0x31, 0xca, 0xc4, 0x83, 0xde, 0x7a, 0x93, 0x67
+ },
+ {
+ /* Example #2 */
+ 0x9e, 0x99, 0xa7, 0xbf, 0x31, 0xe7, 0x10, 0x90,
+ 0x06, 0x62, 0xf6, 0x5e, 0x61, 0x7c, 0x51, 0x84
+ },
+ {
+ /* Example #3 */
+ 0x3d, 0x75, 0xc1, 0x94, 0xed, 0x96, 0x07, 0x04,
+ 0x44, 0xa9, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0xc7, 0x40, 0xec, 0xf8
+ },
+ {
+ /* Example #4 */
+ 0xa1, 0xd5, 0xdf, 0x0e, 0xed, 0x79, 0x0f, 0x79,
+ 0x4d, 0x77, 0x58, 0x96, 0x59, 0xf3, 0x9a, 0x11
+ }
+};
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */
+
+/* CMAC-AES256 Test Data */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+static const unsigned char aes_256_key[32] = {
+ 0x60, 0x3d, 0xeb, 0x10, 0x15, 0xca, 0x71, 0xbe,
+ 0x2b, 0x73, 0xae, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x7d, 0x77, 0x81,
+ 0x1f, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x07, 0x3b, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd7,
+ 0x2d, 0x98, 0x10, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x14, 0xdf, 0xf4
+};
+static const unsigned char aes_256_subkeys[2][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {
+ {
+ /* K1 */
+ 0xca, 0xd1, 0xed, 0x03, 0x29, 0x9e, 0xed, 0xac,
+ 0x2e, 0x9a, 0x99, 0x80, 0x86, 0x21, 0x50, 0x2f
+ },
+ {
+ /* K2 */
+ 0x95, 0xa3, 0xda, 0x06, 0x53, 0x3d, 0xdb, 0x58,
+ 0x5d, 0x35, 0x33, 0x01, 0x0c, 0x42, 0xa0, 0xd9
+ }
+};
+static const unsigned char aes_256_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE] =
+{
+ {
+ /* Example #1 */
+ 0x02, 0x89, 0x62, 0xf6, 0x1b, 0x7b, 0xf8, 0x9e,
+ 0xfc, 0x6b, 0x55, 0x1f, 0x46, 0x67, 0xd9, 0x83
+ },
+ {
+ /* Example #2 */
+ 0x28, 0xa7, 0x02, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x2e, 0x8f, 0x82,
+ 0xbd, 0x4b, 0xf2, 0x8d, 0x8c, 0x37, 0xc3, 0x5c
+ },
+ {
+ /* Example #3 */
+ 0x15, 0x67, 0x27, 0xdc, 0x08, 0x78, 0x94, 0x4a,
+ 0x02, 0x3c, 0x1f, 0xe0, 0x3b, 0xad, 0x6d, 0x93
+ },
+ {
+ /* Example #4 */
+ 0xe1, 0x99, 0x21, 0x90, 0x54, 0x9f, 0x6e, 0xd5,
+ 0x69, 0x6a, 0x2c, 0x05, 0x6c, 0x31, 0x54, 0x10
+ }
+};
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+/* Truncation point of message for 3DES CMAC tests */
+static const unsigned int des3_message_lengths[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY] = {
+ 0,
+ 16,
+ 20,
+ 32
+};
+
+/* CMAC-TDES (Generation) - 2 Key Test Data */
+static const unsigned char des3_2key_key[24] = {
+ /* Key1 */
+ 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef,
+ /* Key2 */
+ 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xEF, 0x01,
+ /* Key3 */
+ 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef
+};
+static const unsigned char des3_2key_subkeys[2][8] = {
+ {
+ /* K1 */
+ 0x0d, 0xd2, 0xcb, 0x7a, 0x3d, 0x88, 0x88, 0xd9
+ },
+ {
+ /* K2 */
+ 0x1b, 0xa5, 0x96, 0xf4, 0x7b, 0x11, 0x11, 0xb2
+ }
+};
+static const unsigned char des3_2key_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE]
+ = {
+ {
+ /* Sample #1 */
+ 0x79, 0xce, 0x52, 0xa7, 0xf7, 0x86, 0xa9, 0x60
+ },
+ {
+ /* Sample #2 */
+ 0xcc, 0x18, 0xa0, 0xb7, 0x9a, 0xf2, 0x41, 0x3b
+ },
+ {
+ /* Sample #3 */
+ 0xc0, 0x6d, 0x37, 0x7e, 0xcd, 0x10, 0x19, 0x69
+ },
+ {
+ /* Sample #4 */
+ 0x9c, 0xd3, 0x35, 0x80, 0xf9, 0xb6, 0x4d, 0xfb
+ }
+ };
+
+/* CMAC-TDES (Generation) - 3 Key Test Data */
+static const unsigned char des3_3key_key[24] = {
+ /* Key1 */
+ 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xaa, 0xcd, 0xef,
+ /* Key2 */
+ 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, 0x01,
+ /* Key3 */
+ 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef, 0x01, 0x23
+};
+static const unsigned char des3_3key_subkeys[2][8] = {
+ {
+ /* K1 */
+ 0x9d, 0x74, 0xe7, 0x39, 0x33, 0x17, 0x96, 0xc0
+ },
+ {
+ /* K2 */
+ 0x3a, 0xe9, 0xce, 0x72, 0x66, 0x2f, 0x2d, 0x9b
+ }
+};
+static const unsigned char des3_3key_expected_result[NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY][MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE]
+ = {
+ {
+ /* Sample #1 */
+ 0x7d, 0xb0, 0xd3, 0x7d, 0xf9, 0x36, 0xc5, 0x50
+ },
+ {
+ /* Sample #2 */
+ 0x30, 0x23, 0x9c, 0xf1, 0xf5, 0x2e, 0x66, 0x09
+ },
+ {
+ /* Sample #3 */
+ 0x6c, 0x9f, 0x3e, 0xe4, 0x92, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0xe2
+ },
+ {
+ /* Sample #4 */
+ 0x99, 0x42, 0x9b, 0xd0, 0xbF, 0x79, 0x04, 0xe5
+ }
+ };
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+/* AES AES-CMAC-PRF-128 Test Data */
+static const unsigned char PRFK[] = {
+ /* Key */
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
+ 0xed, 0xcb
+};
+
+/* Sizes in bytes */
+static const size_t PRFKlen[NB_PRF_TESTS] = {
+ 18,
+ 16,
+ 10
+};
+
+/* Message */
+static const unsigned char PRFM[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07,
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f,
+ 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13
+};
+
+static const unsigned char PRFT[NB_PRF_TESTS][16] = {
+ {
+ 0x84, 0xa3, 0x48, 0xa4, 0xa4, 0x5d, 0x23, 0x5b,
+ 0xab, 0xff, 0xfc, 0x0d, 0x2b, 0x4d, 0xa0, 0x9a
+ },
+ {
+ 0x98, 0x0a, 0xe8, 0x7b, 0x5f, 0x4c, 0x9c, 0x52,
+ 0x14, 0xf5, 0xb6, 0xa8, 0x45, 0x5e, 0x4c, 0x2d
+ },
+ {
+ 0x29, 0x0d, 0x9e, 0x11, 0x2e, 0xdb, 0x09, 0xee,
+ 0x14, 0x1f, 0xcf, 0x64, 0xc0, 0xb7, 0x2f, 0x3d
+ }
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+static int cmac_test_subkeys(int verbose,
+ const char *testname,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ int keybits,
+ const unsigned char *subkeys,
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type,
+ int block_size,
+ int num_tests)
+{
+ int i, ret = 0;
+ mbedtls_cipher_context_t ctx;
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
+ unsigned char K1[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ unsigned char K2[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_type);
+ if (cipher_info == NULL) {
+ /* Failing at this point must be due to a build issue */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_tests; i++) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" %s CMAC subkey #%d: ", testname, i + 1);
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_cipher_init(&ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("test execution failed\n");
+ }
+
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&ctx, key, keybits,
+ MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) {
+ /* When CMAC is implemented by an alternative implementation, or
+ * the underlying primitive itself is implemented alternatively,
+ * AES-192 may be unavailable. This should not cause the selftest
+ * function to fail. */
+ if ((ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED ||
+ ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) &&
+ cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("skipped\n");
+ }
+ goto next_test;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("test execution failed\n");
+ }
+
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = cmac_generate_subkeys(&ctx, K1, K2);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = memcmp(K1, subkeys, block_size)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = memcmp(K2, &subkeys[block_size], block_size)) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+next_test:
+ mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx);
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ goto exit;
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx);
+
+exit:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int cmac_test_wth_cipher(int verbose,
+ const char *testname,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ int keybits,
+ const unsigned char *messages,
+ const unsigned int message_lengths[4],
+ const unsigned char *expected_result,
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type,
+ int block_size,
+ int num_tests)
+{
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
+ int i, ret = 0;
+ unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_CMAC_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_type);
+ if (cipher_info == NULL) {
+ /* Failing at this point must be due to a build issue */
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_tests; i++) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" %s CMAC #%d: ", testname, i + 1);
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_cmac(cipher_info, key, keybits, messages,
+ message_lengths[i], output)) != 0) {
+ /* When CMAC is implemented by an alternative implementation, or
+ * the underlying primitive itself is implemented alternatively,
+ * AES-192 and/or 3DES may be unavailable. This should not cause
+ * the selftest function to fail. */
+ if ((ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED ||
+ ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) &&
+ (cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB ||
+ cipher_type == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB)) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("skipped\n");
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = memcmp(output, &expected_result[i * block_size], block_size)) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+static int test_aes128_cmac_prf(int verbose)
+{
+ int i;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char output[MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NB_PRF_TESTS; i++) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES CMAC 128 PRF #%d: ", i);
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_cmac_prf_128(PRFK, PRFKlen[i], PRFM, 20, output);
+ if (ret != 0 ||
+ memcmp(output, PRFT[i], MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) != 0) {
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+ } else if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+int mbedtls_cmac_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+ /* AES-128 */
+ if ((ret = cmac_test_subkeys(verbose,
+ "AES 128",
+ aes_128_key,
+ 128,
+ (const unsigned char *) aes_128_subkeys,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher(verbose,
+ "AES 128",
+ aes_128_key,
+ 128,
+ test_message,
+ aes_message_lengths,
+ (const unsigned char *) aes_128_expected_result,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* AES-192 */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ if ((ret = cmac_test_subkeys(verbose,
+ "AES 192",
+ aes_192_key,
+ 192,
+ (const unsigned char *) aes_192_subkeys,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher(verbose,
+ "AES 192",
+ aes_192_key,
+ 192,
+ test_message,
+ aes_message_lengths,
+ (const unsigned char *) aes_192_expected_result,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */
+
+ /* AES-256 */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ if ((ret = cmac_test_subkeys(verbose,
+ "AES 256",
+ aes_256_key,
+ 256,
+ (const unsigned char *) aes_256_subkeys,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher(verbose,
+ "AES 256",
+ aes_256_key,
+ 256,
+ test_message,
+ aes_message_lengths,
+ (const unsigned char *) aes_256_expected_result,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+ /* 3DES 2 key */
+ if ((ret = cmac_test_subkeys(verbose,
+ "3DES 2 key",
+ des3_2key_key,
+ 192,
+ (const unsigned char *) des3_2key_subkeys,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher(verbose,
+ "3DES 2 key",
+ des3_2key_key,
+ 192,
+ test_message,
+ des3_message_lengths,
+ (const unsigned char *) des3_2key_expected_result,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* 3DES 3 key */
+ if ((ret = cmac_test_subkeys(verbose,
+ "3DES 3 key",
+ des3_3key_key,
+ 192,
+ (const unsigned char *) des3_3key_subkeys,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = cmac_test_wth_cipher(verbose,
+ "3DES 3 key",
+ des3_3key_key,
+ 192,
+ test_message,
+ des3_message_lengths,
+ (const unsigned char *) des3_3key_expected_result,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_ECB,
+ MBEDTLS_DES3_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ NB_CMAC_TESTS_PER_KEY)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+ if ((ret = test_aes128_cmac_prf(verbose)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CMAC_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/common.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/common.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..50f2a29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
+/**
+ * \file common.h
+ *
+ * \brief Utility macros for internal use in the library
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H
+#define MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+#include "alignment.h"
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#if defined(__ARM_NEON)
+#include <arm_neon.h>
+#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_IS_WINDOWS_ON_ARM64)
+#include <arm64_neon.h>
+#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS
+#endif
+
+/** Helper to define a function as static except when building invasive tests.
+ *
+ * If a function is only used inside its own source file and should be
+ * declared `static` to allow the compiler to optimize for code size,
+ * but that function has unit tests, define it with
+ * ```
+ * MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_foo(...) { ... }
+ * ```
+ * and declare it in a header in the `library/` directory with
+ * ```
+ * #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+ * int mbedtls_foo(...);
+ * #endif
+ * ```
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE static
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+extern void (*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail)(const char *test, int line, const char *file);
+#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(TEST) \
+ do { \
+ if ((!(TEST)) && ((*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail) != NULL)) \
+ { \
+ (*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail)( #TEST, __LINE__, __FILE__); \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(TEST)
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) */
+
+/** \def ARRAY_LENGTH
+ * Return the number of elements of a static or stack array.
+ *
+ * \param array A value of array (not pointer) type.
+ *
+ * \return The number of elements of the array.
+ */
+/* A correct implementation of ARRAY_LENGTH, but which silently gives
+ * a nonsensical result if called with a pointer rather than an array. */
+#define ARRAY_LENGTH_UNSAFE(array) \
+ (sizeof(array) / sizeof(*(array)))
+
+#if defined(__GNUC__)
+/* Test if arg and &(arg)[0] have the same type. This is true if arg is
+ * an array but not if it's a pointer. */
+#define IS_ARRAY_NOT_POINTER(arg) \
+ (!__builtin_types_compatible_p(__typeof__(arg), \
+ __typeof__(&(arg)[0])))
+/* A compile-time constant with the value 0. If `const_expr` is not a
+ * compile-time constant with a nonzero value, cause a compile-time error. */
+#define STATIC_ASSERT_EXPR(const_expr) \
+ (0 && sizeof(struct { unsigned int STATIC_ASSERT : 1 - 2 * !(const_expr); }))
+
+/* Return the scalar value `value` (possibly promoted). This is a compile-time
+ * constant if `value` is. `condition` must be a compile-time constant.
+ * If `condition` is false, arrange to cause a compile-time error. */
+#define STATIC_ASSERT_THEN_RETURN(condition, value) \
+ (STATIC_ASSERT_EXPR(condition) ? 0 : (value))
+
+#define ARRAY_LENGTH(array) \
+ (STATIC_ASSERT_THEN_RETURN(IS_ARRAY_NOT_POINTER(array), \
+ ARRAY_LENGTH_UNSAFE(array)))
+
+#else
+/* If we aren't sure the compiler supports our non-standard tricks,
+ * fall back to the unsafe implementation. */
+#define ARRAY_LENGTH(array) ARRAY_LENGTH_UNSAFE(array)
+#endif
+/** Allow library to access its structs' private members.
+ *
+ * Although structs defined in header files are publicly available,
+ * their members are private and should not be accessed by the user.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS
+
+/**
+ * \brief Securely zeroize a buffer then free it.
+ *
+ * Similar to making consecutive calls to
+ * \c mbedtls_platform_zeroize() and \c mbedtls_free(), but has
+ * code size savings, and potential for optimisation in the future.
+ *
+ * Guaranteed to be a no-op if \p buf is \c NULL and \p len is 0.
+ *
+ * \param buf Buffer to be zeroized then freed.
+ * \param len Length of the buffer in bytes
+ */
+void mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(void *buf, size_t len);
+
+/** Return an offset into a buffer.
+ *
+ * This is just the addition of an offset to a pointer, except that this
+ * function also accepts an offset of 0 into a buffer whose pointer is null.
+ * (`p + n` has undefined behavior when `p` is null, even when `n == 0`.
+ * A null pointer is a valid buffer pointer when the size is 0, for example
+ * as the result of `malloc(0)` on some platforms.)
+ *
+ * \param p Pointer to a buffer of at least n bytes.
+ * This may be \p NULL if \p n is zero.
+ * \param n An offset in bytes.
+ * \return Pointer to offset \p n in the buffer \p p.
+ * Note that this is only a valid pointer if the size of the
+ * buffer is at least \p n + 1.
+ */
+static inline unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset(
+ unsigned char *p, size_t n)
+{
+ return p == NULL ? NULL : p + n;
+}
+
+/** Return an offset into a read-only buffer.
+ *
+ * Similar to mbedtls_buffer_offset(), but for const pointers.
+ *
+ * \param p Pointer to a buffer of at least n bytes.
+ * This may be \p NULL if \p n is zero.
+ * \param n An offset in bytes.
+ * \return Pointer to offset \p n in the buffer \p p.
+ * Note that this is only a valid pointer if the size of the
+ * buffer is at least \p n + 1.
+ */
+static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset_const(
+ const unsigned char *p, size_t n)
+{
+ return p == NULL ? NULL : p + n;
+}
+
+/* Always inline mbedtls_xor() for similar reasons as mbedtls_xor_no_simd(). */
+#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
+#pragma inline = forced
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+__attribute__((always_inline))
+#endif
+/**
+ * Perform a fast block XOR operation, such that
+ * r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i] where 0 <= i < n
+ *
+ * \param r Pointer to result (buffer of at least \p n bytes). \p r
+ * may be equal to either \p a or \p b, but behaviour when
+ * it overlaps in other ways is undefined.
+ * \param a Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes)
+ * \param b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes)
+ * \param n Number of bytes to process.
+ *
+ * \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor() or
+ * mbedtls_xor_no_simd() (these are functionally equivalent).
+ * If the result is used immediately after the xor operation in non-SIMD code (e.g, in
+ * AES-CBC), there may be additional latency to transfer the data from SIMD to scalar
+ * registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd() may be faster. In other cases where
+ * the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor() may be faster.
+ * For targets without SIMD support, they will behave the same.
+ */
+static inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r,
+ const unsigned char *a,
+ const unsigned char *b,
+ size_t n)
+{
+ size_t i = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS) && \
+ (!(defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION < 70300))
+ /* Old GCC versions generate a warning here, so disable the NEON path for these compilers */
+ for (; (i + 16) <= n; i += 16) {
+ uint8x16_t v1 = vld1q_u8(a + i);
+ uint8x16_t v2 = vld1q_u8(b + i);
+ uint8x16_t x = veorq_u8(v1, v2);
+ vst1q_u8(r + i, x);
+ }
+#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
+ /* This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case
+ * where n is a constant multiple of 16.
+ * For other compilers (e.g. recent gcc and clang) it makes no difference if n is a compile-time
+ * constant, and is a very small perf regression if n is not a compile-time constant. */
+ if (n % 16 == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64)
+ /* This codepath probably only makes sense on architectures with 64-bit registers */
+ for (; (i + 8) <= n; i += 8) {
+ uint64_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(b + i);
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(r + i, x);
+ }
+#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
+ if (n % 8 == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+#else
+ for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) {
+ uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(b + i);
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(r + i, x);
+ }
+#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
+ if (n % 4 == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+ for (; i < n; i++) {
+ r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i];
+ }
+}
+
+/* Always inline mbedtls_xor_no_simd() as we see significant perf regressions when it does not get
+ * inlined (e.g., observed about 3x perf difference in gcm_mult_largetable with gcc 7 - 12) */
+#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
+#pragma inline = forced
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+__attribute__((always_inline))
+#endif
+/**
+ * Perform a fast block XOR operation, such that
+ * r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i] where 0 <= i < n
+ *
+ * In some situations, this can perform better than mbedtls_xor() (e.g., it's about 5%
+ * better in AES-CBC).
+ *
+ * \param r Pointer to result (buffer of at least \p n bytes). \p r
+ * may be equal to either \p a or \p b, but behaviour when
+ * it overlaps in other ways is undefined.
+ * \param a Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes)
+ * \param b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes)
+ * \param n Number of bytes to process.
+ *
+ * \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor() or
+ * mbedtls_xor_no_simd() (these are functionally equivalent).
+ * If the result is used immediately after the xor operation in non-SIMD code (e.g, in
+ * AES-CBC), there may be additional latency to transfer the data from SIMD to scalar
+ * registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd() may be faster. In other cases where
+ * the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor() may be faster.
+ * For targets without SIMD support, they will behave the same.
+ */
+static inline void mbedtls_xor_no_simd(unsigned char *r,
+ const unsigned char *a,
+ const unsigned char *b,
+ size_t n)
+{
+ size_t i = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64)
+ /* This codepath probably only makes sense on architectures with 64-bit registers */
+ for (; (i + 8) <= n; i += 8) {
+ uint64_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(b + i);
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(r + i, x);
+ }
+#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
+ /* This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case
+ * where n is a constant multiple of 8.
+ * For other compilers (e.g. recent gcc and clang) it makes no difference if n is a compile-time
+ * constant, and is a very small perf regression if n is not a compile-time constant. */
+ if (n % 8 == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+#else
+ for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) {
+ uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(b + i);
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(r + i, x);
+ }
+#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
+ if (n % 4 == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+ for (; i < n; i++) {
+ r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i];
+ }
+}
+
+/* Fix MSVC C99 compatible issue
+ * MSVC support __func__ from visual studio 2015( 1900 )
+ * Use MSVC predefine macro to avoid name check fail.
+ */
+#if (defined(_MSC_VER) && (_MSC_VER <= 1900))
+#define /*no-check-names*/ __func__ __FUNCTION__
+#endif
+
+/* Define `asm` for compilers which don't define it. */
+/* *INDENT-OFF* */
+#ifndef asm
+#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__)
+#define asm __asm
+#else
+#define asm __asm__
+#endif
+#endif
+/* *INDENT-ON* */
+
+/*
+ * Define the constraint used for read-only pointer operands to aarch64 asm.
+ *
+ * This is normally the usual "r", but for aarch64_32 (aka ILP32,
+ * as found in watchos), "p" is required to avoid warnings from clang.
+ *
+ * Note that clang does not recognise '+p' or '=p', and armclang
+ * does not recognise 'p' at all. Therefore, to update a pointer from
+ * aarch64 assembly, it is necessary to use something like:
+ *
+ * uintptr_t uptr = (uintptr_t) ptr;
+ * asm( "ldr x4, [%x0], #8" ... : "+r" (uptr) : : )
+ * ptr = (void*) uptr;
+ *
+ * Note that the "x" in "%x0" is neccessary; writing "%0" will cause warnings.
+ */
+#if defined(__aarch64__) && defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM)
+#if UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffful
+/* ILP32: Specify the pointer operand slightly differently, as per #7787. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ASM_AARCH64_PTR_CONSTRAINT "p"
+#elif UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffffffffffful
+/* Normal case (64-bit pointers): use "r" as the constraint for pointer operands to asm */
+#define MBEDTLS_ASM_AARCH64_PTR_CONSTRAINT "r"
+#else
+#error "Unrecognised pointer size for aarch64"
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/* Always provide a static assert macro, so it can be used unconditionally.
+ * It does nothing on systems where we don't know how to define a static assert.
+ */
+/* Can't use the C11-style `defined(static_assert)` on FreeBSD, since it
+ * defines static_assert even with -std=c99, but then complains about it.
+ */
+#if defined(static_assert) && !defined(__FreeBSD__)
+#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(expr, msg) static_assert(expr, msg)
+#else
+/* Make sure `MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(expr, msg);` is valid both inside and
+ * outside a function. We choose a struct declaration, which can be repeated
+ * any number of times and does not need a matching definition. */
+#define MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(expr, msg) \
+ struct ISO_C_does_not_allow_extra_semicolon_outside_of_a_function
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__has_builtin)
+#define MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(x) __has_builtin(x)
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(x) 0
+#endif
+
+/* Define compiler branch hints */
+#if MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(__builtin_expect)
+#define MBEDTLS_LIKELY(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 1)
+#define MBEDTLS_UNLIKELY(x) __builtin_expect(!!(x), 0)
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_LIKELY(x) x
+#define MBEDTLS_UNLIKELY(x) x
+#endif
+
+/* MBEDTLS_ASSUME may be used to provide additional information to the compiler
+ * which can result in smaller code-size. */
+#if MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(__builtin_assume)
+/* clang provides __builtin_assume */
+#define MBEDTLS_ASSUME(x) __builtin_assume(x)
+#elif MBEDTLS_HAS_BUILTIN(__builtin_unreachable)
+/* gcc and IAR can use __builtin_unreachable */
+#define MBEDTLS_ASSUME(x) do { if (!(x)) __builtin_unreachable(); } while (0)
+#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+/* Supported by MSVC since VS 2005 */
+#define MBEDTLS_ASSUME(x) __assume(x)
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_ASSUME(x) do { } while (0)
+#endif
+
+/* For gcc -Os, override with -O2 for a given function.
+ *
+ * This will not affect behaviour for other optimisation settings, e.g. -O0.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && defined(__OPTIMIZE_SIZE__)
+#define MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE __attribute__((optimize("-O2")))
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE
+#endif
+
+/* Suppress compiler warnings for unused functions and variables. */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) && defined(__has_attribute)
+# if __has_attribute(unused)
+# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED __attribute__((unused))
+# endif
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) && defined(__GNUC__)
+# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED __attribute__((unused))
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) && defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) && defined(__VER__)
+/* IAR does support __attribute__((unused)), but only if the -e flag (extended language support)
+ * is given; the pragma always works.
+ * Unfortunately the pragma affects the rest of the file where it is used, but this is harmless.
+ * Check for version 5.2 or later - this pragma may be supported by earlier versions, but I wasn't
+ * able to find documentation).
+ */
+# if (__VER__ >= 5020000)
+# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED _Pragma("diag_suppress=Pe177")
+# endif
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED) && defined(_MSC_VER)
+# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED __pragma(warning(suppress:4189))
+#endif
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED)
+# define MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED
+#endif
+
+/* GCC >= 15 has a warning 'unterminated-string-initialization' which complains if you initialize
+ * a string into an array without space for a terminating NULL character. In some places in the
+ * codebase this behaviour is intended, so we add the macro MBEDTLS_ATTRIBUTE_UNTERMINATED_STRING
+ * to suppress the warning in these places.
+ */
+#if defined(__has_attribute)
+#if __has_attribute(nonstring)
+#define MBEDTLS_HAS_ATTRIBUTE_NONSTRING
+#endif /* __has_attribute(nonstring) */
+#endif /* __has_attribute */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_ATTRIBUTE_NONSTRING)
+#define MBEDTLS_ATTRIBUTE_UNTERMINATED_STRING __attribute__((nonstring))
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_ATTRIBUTE_UNTERMINATED_STRING
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAS_ATTRIBUTE_NONSTRING */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_LIBRARY_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d212ddf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/constant_time.c
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+/**
+ * Constant-time functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The following functions are implemented without using comparison operators, as those
+ * might be translated to branches by some compilers on some platforms.
+ */
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ASM)
+/*
+ * Define an object with the value zero, such that the compiler cannot prove that it
+ * has the value zero (because it is volatile, it "may be modified in ways unknown to
+ * the implementation").
+ */
+volatile mbedtls_ct_uint_t mbedtls_ct_zero = 0;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_VOLATILE_ACCESS where assembly is present to
+ * perform fast unaligned access to volatile data.
+ *
+ * This is needed because mbedtls_get_unaligned_uintXX etc don't support volatile
+ * memory accesses.
+ *
+ * Some of these definitions could be moved into alignment.h but for now they are
+ * only used here.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) && \
+ ((defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) && (UINTPTR_MAX == 0xfffffffful)) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM))
+/* We check pointer sizes to avoid issues with them not matching register size requirements */
+#define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_VOLATILE_ACCESS
+
+static inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32(volatile const unsigned char *p)
+{
+ /* This is UB, even where it's safe:
+ * return *((volatile uint32_t*)p);
+ * so instead the same thing is expressed in assembly below.
+ */
+ uint32_t r;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM)
+ asm volatile ("ldr %0, [%1]" : "=r" (r) : "r" (p) :);
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM)
+ asm volatile ("ldr %w0, [%1]" : "=r" (r) : MBEDTLS_ASM_AARCH64_PTR_CONSTRAINT(p) :);
+#else
+#error "No assembly defined for mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32"
+#endif
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) &&
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM)) */
+
+int mbedtls_ct_memcmp(const void *a,
+ const void *b,
+ size_t n)
+{
+ size_t i = 0;
+ /*
+ * `A` and `B` are cast to volatile to ensure that the compiler
+ * generates code that always fully reads both buffers.
+ * Otherwise it could generate a test to exit early if `diff` has all
+ * bits set early in the loop.
+ */
+ volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
+ volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
+ uint32_t diff = 0;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_VOLATILE_ACCESS)
+ for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) {
+ uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32(A + i);
+ uint32_t y = mbedtls_get_unaligned_volatile_uint32(B + i);
+ diff |= x ^ y;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ for (; i < n; i++) {
+ /* Read volatile data in order before computing diff.
+ * This avoids IAR compiler warning:
+ * 'the order of volatile accesses is undefined ..' */
+ unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i];
+ diff |= x ^ y;
+ }
+
+
+#if (INT_MAX < INT32_MAX)
+ /* We don't support int smaller than 32-bits, but if someone tried to build
+ * with this configuration, there is a risk that, for differing data, the
+ * only bits set in diff are in the top 16-bits, and would be lost by a
+ * simple cast from uint32 to int.
+ * This would have significant security implications, so protect against it. */
+#error "mbedtls_ct_memcmp() requires minimum 32-bit ints"
+#else
+ /* The bit-twiddling ensures that when we cast uint32_t to int, we are casting
+ * a value that is in the range 0..INT_MAX - a value larger than this would
+ * result in implementation defined behaviour.
+ *
+ * This ensures that the value returned by the function is non-zero iff
+ * diff is non-zero.
+ */
+ return (int) ((diff & 0xffff) | (diff >> 16));
+#endif
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
+
+int mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial(const void *a,
+ const void *b,
+ size_t n,
+ size_t skip_head,
+ size_t skip_tail)
+{
+ unsigned int diff = 0;
+
+ volatile const unsigned char *A = (volatile const unsigned char *) a;
+ volatile const unsigned char *B = (volatile const unsigned char *) b;
+
+ size_t valid_end = n - skip_tail;
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ unsigned char x = A[i], y = B[i];
+ unsigned int d = x ^ y;
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t valid = mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(i, skip_head),
+ mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(i, valid_end));
+ diff |= mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(valid, d);
+ }
+
+ /* Since we go byte-by-byte, the only bits set will be in the bottom 8 bits, so the
+ * cast from uint to int is safe. */
+ return (int) diff;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+
+void mbedtls_ct_memmove_left(void *start, size_t total, size_t offset)
+{
+ volatile unsigned char *buf = start;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < total; i++) {
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t no_op = mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(total - offset, i);
+ /* The first `total - offset` passes are a no-op. The last
+ * `offset` passes shift the data one byte to the left and
+ * zero out the last byte. */
+ for (size_t n = 0; n < total - 1; n++) {
+ unsigned char current = buf[n];
+ unsigned char next = buf[n+1];
+ buf[n] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(no_op, current, next);
+ }
+ buf[total-1] = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(no_op, buf[total-1]);
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 && MBEDTLS_RSA_C && ! MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */
+
+void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+ unsigned char *dest,
+ const unsigned char *src1,
+ const unsigned char *src2,
+ size_t len)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)
+ const uint64_t mask = (uint64_t) condition;
+ const uint64_t not_mask = (uint64_t) ~mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(condition);
+#else
+ const uint32_t mask = (uint32_t) condition;
+ const uint32_t not_mask = (uint32_t) ~mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(condition);
+#endif
+
+ /* If src2 is NULL, setup src2 so that we read from the destination address.
+ *
+ * This means that if src2 == NULL && condition is false, the result will be a
+ * no-op because we read from dest and write the same data back into dest.
+ */
+ if (src2 == NULL) {
+ src2 = dest;
+ }
+
+ /* dest[i] = c1 == c2 ? src[i] : dest[i] */
+ size_t i = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64)
+ for (; (i + 8) <= len; i += 8) {
+ uint64_t a = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(src1 + i) & mask;
+ uint64_t b = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(src2 + i) & not_mask;
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(dest + i, a | b);
+ }
+#else
+ for (; (i + 4) <= len; i += 4) {
+ uint32_t a = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(src1 + i) & mask;
+ uint32_t b = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(src2 + i) & not_mask;
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(dest + i, a | b);
+ }
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64) */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS */
+ for (; i < len; i++) {
+ dest[i] = (src1[i] & mask) | (src2[i] & not_mask);
+ }
+}
+
+void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset(unsigned char *dest,
+ const unsigned char *src,
+ size_t offset,
+ size_t offset_min,
+ size_t offset_max,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ size_t offsetval;
+
+ for (offsetval = offset_min; offsetval <= offset_max; offsetval++) {
+ mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(offsetval, offset), dest, src + offsetval, NULL,
+ len);
+ }
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+
+void mbedtls_ct_zeroize_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ uint32_t mask = (uint32_t) ~condition;
+ uint8_t *p = (uint8_t *) buf;
+ size_t i = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)
+ for (; (i + 4) <= len; i += 4) {
+ mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32((void *) (p + i),
+ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32((void *) (p + i)) & mask);
+ }
+#endif
+ for (; i < len; i++) {
+ p[i] = p[i] & mask;
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/constant_time_impl.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/constant_time_impl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aeaeecb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/constant_time_impl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,541 @@
+/**
+ * Constant-time functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_IMPL_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_IMPL_H
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * To improve readability of constant_time_internal.h, the static inline
+ * definitions are here, and constant_time_internal.h has only the declarations.
+ *
+ * This results in duplicate declarations of the form:
+ * static inline void f(); // from constant_time_internal.h
+ * static inline void f() { ... } // from constant_time_impl.h
+ * when constant_time_internal.h is included.
+ *
+ * This appears to behave as if the declaration-without-definition was not present
+ * (except for warnings if gcc -Wredundant-decls or similar is used).
+ *
+ * Disable -Wredundant-decls so that gcc does not warn about this. This is re-enabled
+ * at the bottom of this file.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (__GNUC__ > 4)
+ #pragma GCC diagnostic push
+ #pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wredundant-decls"
+#endif
+
+/* armcc5 --gnu defines __GNUC__ but doesn't support GNU's extended asm */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && defined(__GNUC__) && (!defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) || \
+ __ARMCC_VERSION >= 6000000)
+#define MBEDTLS_CT_ASM
+#if (defined(__arm__) || defined(__thumb__) || defined(__thumb2__))
+#define MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM
+#elif defined(__aarch64__)
+#define MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM
+#elif defined(__amd64__) || defined(__x86_64__)
+#define MBEDTLS_CT_X86_64_ASM
+#elif defined(__i386__)
+#define MBEDTLS_CT_X86_ASM
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#define MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE (sizeof(mbedtls_ct_uint_t) * 8)
+
+
+/* ============================================================================
+ * Core const-time primitives
+ */
+
+/* Ensure that the compiler cannot know the value of x (i.e., cannot optimise
+ * based on its value) after this function is called.
+ *
+ * If we are not using assembly, this will be fairly inefficient, so its use
+ * should be minimised.
+ */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ASM)
+extern volatile mbedtls_ct_uint_t mbedtls_ct_zero;
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Ensure that a value cannot be known at compile time.
+ *
+ * \param x The value to hide from the compiler.
+ * \return The same value that was passed in, such that the compiler
+ * cannot prove its value (even for calls of the form
+ * x = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(1), x will be unknown).
+ *
+ * \note This is mainly used in constructing mbedtls_ct_condition_t
+ * values and performing operations over them, to ensure that
+ * there is no way for the compiler to ever know anything about
+ * the value of an mbedtls_ct_condition_t.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ct_uint_t mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ASM)
+ asm volatile ("" : [x] "+r" (x) :);
+ return x;
+#else
+ return x ^ mbedtls_ct_zero;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Selecting unified syntax is needed for gcc, and harmless on clang.
+ *
+ * This is needed because on Thumb 1, condition flags are always set, so
+ * e.g. "negs" is supported but "neg" is not (on Thumb 2, both exist).
+ *
+ * Under Thumb 1 unified syntax, only the "negs" form is accepted, and
+ * under divided syntax, only the "neg" form is accepted. clang only
+ * supports unified syntax.
+ *
+ * On Thumb 2 and Arm, both compilers are happy with the "s" suffix,
+ * although we don't actually care about setting the flags.
+ *
+ * For old versions of gcc (see #8516 for details), restore divided
+ * syntax afterwards - otherwise old versions of gcc seem to apply
+ * unified syntax globally, which breaks other asm code.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__) && \
+ (__GNUC__ < 11) && !defined(__ARM_ARCH_2__)
+#define RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX ".syntax divided \n\t"
+#else
+#define RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX
+#endif
+
+/* Convert a number into a condition in constant time. */
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x)
+{
+ /*
+ * Define mask-generation code that, as far as possible, will not use branches or conditional instructions.
+ *
+ * For some platforms / type sizes, we define assembly to assure this.
+ *
+ * Otherwise, we define a plain C fallback which (in May 2023) does not get optimised into
+ * conditional instructions or branches by trunk clang, gcc, or MSVC v19.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64))
+ mbedtls_ct_uint_t s;
+ asm volatile ("neg %x[s], %x[x] \n\t"
+ "orr %x[x], %x[s], %x[x] \n\t"
+ "asr %x[x], %x[x], 63 \n\t"
+ :
+ [s] "=&r" (s),
+ [x] "+&r" (x)
+ :
+ :
+ );
+ return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x;
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32)
+ uint32_t s;
+ asm volatile (".syntax unified \n\t"
+ "negs %[s], %[x] \n\t"
+ "orrs %[x], %[x], %[s] \n\t"
+ "asrs %[x], %[x], #31 \n\t"
+ RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX
+ :
+ [s] "=&l" (s),
+ [x] "+&l" (x)
+ :
+ :
+ "cc" /* clobbers flag bits */
+ );
+ return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x;
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64))
+ uint64_t s;
+ asm volatile ("mov %[x], %[s] \n\t"
+ "neg %[s] \n\t"
+ "or %[x], %[s] \n\t"
+ "sar $63, %[s] \n\t"
+ :
+ [s] "=&a" (s)
+ :
+ [x] "D" (x)
+ :
+ );
+ return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) s;
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32)
+ uint32_t s;
+ asm volatile ("mov %[x], %[s] \n\t"
+ "neg %[s] \n\t"
+ "or %[s], %[x] \n\t"
+ "sar $31, %[x] \n\t"
+ :
+ [s] "=&c" (s),
+ [x] "+&a" (x)
+ :
+ :
+ );
+ return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x;
+#else
+ const mbedtls_ct_uint_t xo = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(x);
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+ /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is
+ * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */
+#pragma warning( push )
+#pragma warning( disable : 4146 )
+#endif
+ // y is negative (i.e., top bit set) iff x is non-zero
+ mbedtls_ct_int_t y = (-xo) | -(xo >> 1);
+
+ // extract only the sign bit of y so that y == 1 (if x is non-zero) or 0 (if x is zero)
+ y = (((mbedtls_ct_uint_t) y) >> (MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE - 1));
+
+ // -y has all bits set (if x is non-zero), or all bits clear (if x is zero)
+ return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (-y);
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#pragma warning( pop )
+#endif
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_ct_uint_t mbedtls_ct_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+ mbedtls_ct_uint_t if1,
+ mbedtls_ct_uint_t if0)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64))
+ asm volatile ("and %x[if1], %x[if1], %x[condition] \n\t"
+ "mvn %x[condition], %x[condition] \n\t"
+ "and %x[condition], %x[condition], %x[if0] \n\t"
+ "orr %x[condition], %x[if1], %x[condition]"
+ :
+ [condition] "+&r" (condition),
+ [if1] "+&r" (if1)
+ :
+ [if0] "r" (if0)
+ :
+ );
+ return (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) condition;
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32)
+ asm volatile (".syntax unified \n\t"
+ "ands %[if1], %[if1], %[condition] \n\t"
+ "mvns %[condition], %[condition] \n\t"
+ "ands %[condition], %[condition], %[if0] \n\t"
+ "orrs %[condition], %[if1], %[condition] \n\t"
+ RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX
+ :
+ [condition] "+&l" (condition),
+ [if1] "+&l" (if1)
+ :
+ [if0] "l" (if0)
+ :
+ "cc"
+ );
+ return (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) condition;
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64))
+ asm volatile ("and %[condition], %[if1] \n\t"
+ "not %[condition] \n\t"
+ "and %[condition], %[if0] \n\t"
+ "or %[if1], %[if0] \n\t"
+ :
+ [condition] "+&D" (condition),
+ [if1] "+&S" (if1),
+ [if0] "+&a" (if0)
+ :
+ :
+ );
+ return if0;
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32)
+ asm volatile ("and %[condition], %[if1] \n\t"
+ "not %[condition] \n\t"
+ "and %[if0], %[condition] \n\t"
+ "or %[condition], %[if1] \n\t"
+ :
+ [condition] "+&c" (condition),
+ [if1] "+&a" (if1)
+ :
+ [if0] "b" (if0)
+ :
+ );
+ return if1;
+#else
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t not_cond =
+ (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (~mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(condition));
+ return (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) ((condition & if1) | (not_cond & if0));
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, mbedtls_ct_uint_t y)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CT_AARCH64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64))
+ uint64_t s1;
+ asm volatile ("eor %x[s1], %x[y], %x[x] \n\t"
+ "sub %x[x], %x[x], %x[y] \n\t"
+ "bic %x[x], %x[x], %x[s1] \n\t"
+ "and %x[s1], %x[s1], %x[y] \n\t"
+ "orr %x[s1], %x[x], %x[s1] \n\t"
+ "asr %x[x], %x[s1], 63"
+ :
+ [s1] "=&r" (s1),
+ [x] "+&r" (x)
+ :
+ [y] "r" (y)
+ :
+ );
+ return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x;
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_ARM_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32)
+ uint32_t s1;
+ asm volatile (
+ ".syntax unified \n\t"
+#if defined(__thumb__) && !defined(__thumb2__)
+ "movs %[s1], %[x] \n\t"
+ "eors %[s1], %[s1], %[y] \n\t"
+#else
+ "eors %[s1], %[x], %[y] \n\t"
+#endif
+ "subs %[x], %[x], %[y] \n\t"
+ "bics %[x], %[x], %[s1] \n\t"
+ "ands %[y], %[s1], %[y] \n\t"
+ "orrs %[x], %[x], %[y] \n\t"
+ "asrs %[x], %[x], #31 \n\t"
+ RESTORE_ASM_SYNTAX
+ :
+ [s1] "=&l" (s1),
+ [x] "+&l" (x),
+ [y] "+&l" (y)
+ :
+ :
+ "cc"
+ );
+ return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x;
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_64_ASM) && (defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32) || defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64))
+ uint64_t s;
+ asm volatile ("mov %[x], %[s] \n\t"
+ "xor %[y], %[s] \n\t"
+ "sub %[y], %[x] \n\t"
+ "and %[s], %[y] \n\t"
+ "not %[s] \n\t"
+ "and %[s], %[x] \n\t"
+ "or %[y], %[x] \n\t"
+ "sar $63, %[x] \n\t"
+ :
+ [s] "=&a" (s),
+ [x] "+&D" (x),
+ [y] "+&S" (y)
+ :
+ :
+ );
+ return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x;
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_CT_X86_ASM) && defined(MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32)
+ uint32_t s;
+ asm volatile ("mov %[x], %[s] \n\t"
+ "xor %[y], %[s] \n\t"
+ "sub %[y], %[x] \n\t"
+ "and %[s], %[y] \n\t"
+ "not %[s] \n\t"
+ "and %[s], %[x] \n\t"
+ "or %[y], %[x] \n\t"
+ "sar $31, %[x] \n\t"
+ :
+ [s] "=&b" (s),
+ [x] "+&a" (x),
+ [y] "+&c" (y)
+ :
+ :
+ );
+ return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) x;
+#else
+ /* Ensure that the compiler cannot optimise the following operations over x and y,
+ * even if it knows the value of x and y.
+ */
+ const mbedtls_ct_uint_t xo = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(x);
+ const mbedtls_ct_uint_t yo = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(y);
+ /*
+ * Check if the most significant bits (MSB) of the operands are different.
+ * cond is true iff the MSBs differ.
+ */
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t cond = mbedtls_ct_bool((xo ^ yo) >> (MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE - 1));
+
+ /*
+ * If the MSB are the same then the difference x-y will be negative (and
+ * have its MSB set to 1 during conversion to unsigned) if and only if x<y.
+ *
+ * If the MSB are different, then the operand with the MSB of 1 is the
+ * bigger. (That is if y has MSB of 1, then x<y is true and it is false if
+ * the MSB of y is 0.)
+ */
+
+ // Select either y, or x - y
+ mbedtls_ct_uint_t ret = mbedtls_ct_if(cond, yo, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) (xo - yo));
+
+ // Extract only the MSB of ret
+ ret = ret >> (MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE - 1);
+
+ // Convert to a condition (i.e., all bits set iff non-zero)
+ return mbedtls_ct_bool(ret);
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, mbedtls_ct_uint_t y)
+{
+ /* diff = 0 if x == y, non-zero otherwise */
+ const mbedtls_ct_uint_t diff = mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(x) ^ mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(y);
+
+ /* all ones if x != y, 0 otherwise */
+ return mbedtls_ct_bool(diff);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(unsigned char low,
+ unsigned char high,
+ unsigned char c,
+ unsigned char t)
+{
+ const unsigned char co = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(c);
+ const unsigned char to = (unsigned char) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(t);
+
+ /* low_mask is: 0 if low <= c, 0x...ff if low > c */
+ unsigned low_mask = ((unsigned) co - low) >> 8;
+ /* high_mask is: 0 if c <= high, 0x...ff if c > high */
+ unsigned high_mask = ((unsigned) high - co) >> 8;
+
+ return (unsigned char) (~(low_mask | high_mask)) & to;
+}
+
+/* ============================================================================
+ * Everything below here is trivial wrapper functions
+ */
+
+static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+ size_t if1,
+ size_t if0)
+{
+ return (size_t) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+ unsigned if1,
+ unsigned if0)
+{
+ return (unsigned) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0);
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1,
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t if0)
+{
+ return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1,
+ (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint if1,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint if0)
+{
+ return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) mbedtls_ct_if(condition,
+ (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if1,
+ (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) if0);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, size_t if1)
+{
+ return (size_t) (condition & if1);
+}
+
+static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, unsigned if1)
+{
+ return (unsigned) (condition & if1);
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1)
+{
+ return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (condition & if1);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint if1)
+{
+ return (mbedtls_mpi_uint) (condition & if1);
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1, int if0)
+{
+ /* Coverting int -> uint -> int here is safe, because we require if1 and if0 to be
+ * in the range -32767..0, and we require 32-bit int and uint types.
+ *
+ * This means that (0 <= -if0 < INT_MAX), so negating if0 is safe, and similarly for
+ * converting back to int.
+ */
+ return -((int) mbedtls_ct_if(condition, (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) (-if1),
+ (mbedtls_ct_uint_t) (-if0)));
+}
+
+static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1)
+{
+ return -((int) (condition & (-if1)));
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x,
+ mbedtls_ct_uint_t y)
+{
+ return ~mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(x, y);
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x,
+ mbedtls_ct_uint_t y)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(y, x);
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x,
+ mbedtls_ct_uint_t y)
+{
+ return ~mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(x, y);
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_le(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x,
+ mbedtls_ct_uint_t y)
+{
+ return ~mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(x, y);
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x,
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t y)
+{
+ return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (x ^ y);
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x,
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t y)
+{
+ return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (x & y);
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_or(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x,
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t y)
+{
+ return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (x | y);
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_not(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x)
+{
+ return (mbedtls_ct_condition_t) (~x);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (__GNUC__ > 4)
+/* Restore warnings for -Wredundant-decls on gcc */
+ #pragma GCC diagnostic pop
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_IMPL_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61a5c6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/constant_time_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,579 @@
+/**
+ * Constant-time functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#endif
+
+/* The constant-time interface provides various operations that are likely
+ * to result in constant-time code that does not branch or use conditional
+ * instructions for secret data (for secret pointers, this also applies to
+ * the data pointed to).
+ *
+ * It has three main parts:
+ *
+ * - boolean operations
+ * These are all named mbedtls_ct_<type>_<operation>.
+ * They operate over <type> and return mbedtls_ct_condition_t.
+ * All arguments are considered secret.
+ * example: bool x = y | z => x = mbedtls_ct_bool_or(y, z)
+ * example: bool x = y == z => x = mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(y, z)
+ *
+ * - conditional data selection
+ * These are all named mbedtls_ct_<type>_if and mbedtls_ct_<type>_if_else_0
+ * All arguments are considered secret.
+ * example: size_t a = x ? b : c => a = mbedtls_ct_size_if(x, b, c)
+ * example: unsigned a = x ? b : 0 => a = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(x, b)
+ *
+ * - block memory operations
+ * Only some arguments are considered secret, as documented for each
+ * function.
+ * example: if (x) memcpy(...) => mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(x, ...)
+ *
+ * mbedtls_ct_condition_t must be treated as opaque and only created and
+ * manipulated via the functions in this header. The compiler should never
+ * be able to prove anything about its value at compile-time.
+ *
+ * mbedtls_ct_uint_t is an unsigned integer type over which constant time
+ * operations may be performed via the functions in this header. It is as big
+ * as the larger of size_t and mbedtls_mpi_uint, i.e. it is safe to cast
+ * to/from "unsigned int", "size_t", and "mbedtls_mpi_uint" (and any other
+ * not-larger integer types).
+ *
+ * For Arm (32-bit, 64-bit and Thumb), x86 and x86-64, assembly implementations
+ * are used to ensure that the generated code is constant time. For other
+ * architectures, it uses a plain C fallback designed to yield constant-time code
+ * (this has been observed to be constant-time on latest gcc, clang and MSVC
+ * as of May 2023).
+ *
+ * For readability, the static inline definitions are separated out into
+ * constant_time_impl.h.
+ */
+
+#if (SIZE_MAX > 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
+/* Pointer size > 64-bit */
+typedef size_t mbedtls_ct_condition_t;
+typedef size_t mbedtls_ct_uint_t;
+typedef ptrdiff_t mbedtls_ct_int_t;
+#define MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE ((mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(SIZE_MAX))
+#elif (SIZE_MAX > 0xffffffff) || defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64)
+/* 32-bit < pointer size <= 64-bit, or 64-bit MPI */
+typedef uint64_t mbedtls_ct_condition_t;
+typedef uint64_t mbedtls_ct_uint_t;
+typedef int64_t mbedtls_ct_int_t;
+#define MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_64
+#define MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE ((mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(UINT64_MAX))
+#else
+/* Pointer size <= 32-bit, and no 64-bit MPIs */
+typedef uint32_t mbedtls_ct_condition_t;
+typedef uint32_t mbedtls_ct_uint_t;
+typedef int32_t mbedtls_ct_int_t;
+#define MBEDTLS_CT_SIZE_32
+#define MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE ((mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(UINT32_MAX))
+#endif
+#define MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE ((mbedtls_ct_condition_t) mbedtls_ct_compiler_opaque(0))
+
+/* ============================================================================
+ * Boolean operations
+ */
+
+/** Convert a number into a mbedtls_ct_condition_t.
+ *
+ * \param x Number to convert.
+ *
+ * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x != 0, or MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if \p x == 0
+ *
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x);
+
+/** Boolean "not equal" operation.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * \p x != \p y
+ *
+ * \param x The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x != \p y, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_ne(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, mbedtls_ct_uint_t y);
+
+/** Boolean "equals" operation.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * \p x == \p y
+ *
+ * \param x The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x == \p y, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_eq(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x,
+ mbedtls_ct_uint_t y);
+
+/** Boolean "less than" operation.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * \p x < \p y
+ *
+ * \param x The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x < \p y, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_lt(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x, mbedtls_ct_uint_t y);
+
+/** Boolean "greater than" operation.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * \p x > \p y
+ *
+ * \param x The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x > \p y, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x,
+ mbedtls_ct_uint_t y);
+
+/** Boolean "greater or equal" operation.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * \p x >= \p y
+ *
+ * \param x The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x >= \p y,
+ * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_ge(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x,
+ mbedtls_ct_uint_t y);
+
+/** Boolean "less than or equal" operation.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * \p x <= \p y
+ *
+ * \param x The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x <= \p y,
+ * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_uint_le(mbedtls_ct_uint_t x,
+ mbedtls_ct_uint_t y);
+
+/** Boolean not-equals operation.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * \p x != \p y
+ *
+ * \param x The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \note This is more efficient than mbedtls_ct_uint_ne if both arguments are
+ * mbedtls_ct_condition_t.
+ *
+ * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x != \p y,
+ * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_ne(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x,
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t y);
+
+/** Boolean "and" operation.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * \p x && \p y
+ *
+ * \param x The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x && \p y,
+ * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_and(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x,
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t y);
+
+/** Boolean "or" operation.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * \p x || \p y
+ *
+ * \param x The first value to analyze.
+ * \param y The second value to analyze.
+ *
+ * \return MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE if \p x || \p y,
+ * otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_or(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x,
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t y);
+
+/** Boolean "not" operation.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * ! \p x
+ *
+ * \param x The value to invert
+ *
+ * \return MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE if \p x, otherwise MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_not(mbedtls_ct_condition_t x);
+
+
+/* ============================================================================
+ * Data selection operations
+ */
+
+/** Choose between two size_t values.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * condition ? if1 : if0.
+ *
+ * \param condition Condition to test.
+ * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
+ * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
+ *
+ * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0.
+ */
+static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+ size_t if1,
+ size_t if0);
+
+/** Choose between two unsigned values.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * condition ? if1 : if0.
+ *
+ * \param condition Condition to test.
+ * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
+ * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
+ *
+ * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0.
+ */
+static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+ unsigned if1,
+ unsigned if0);
+
+/** Choose between two mbedtls_ct_condition_t values.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * condition ? if1 : if0.
+ *
+ * \param condition Condition to test.
+ * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
+ * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
+ *
+ * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1,
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t if0);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+/** Choose between two mbedtls_mpi_uint values.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * condition ? if1 : if0.
+ *
+ * \param condition Condition to test.
+ * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
+ * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
+ *
+ * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, \
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint if1, \
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint if0);
+
+#endif
+
+/** Choose between an unsigned value and 0.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * condition ? if1 : 0.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_uint_if(condition, if1, 0) but
+ * results in smaller code size.
+ *
+ * \param condition Condition to test.
+ * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
+ *
+ * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0.
+ */
+static inline unsigned mbedtls_ct_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, unsigned if1);
+
+/** Choose between an mbedtls_ct_condition_t and 0.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * condition ? if1 : 0.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_bool_if(condition, if1, 0) but
+ * results in smaller code size.
+ *
+ * \param condition Condition to test.
+ * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
+ *
+ * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_ct_condition_t mbedtls_ct_bool_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+ mbedtls_ct_condition_t if1);
+
+/** Choose between a size_t value and 0.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * condition ? if1 : 0.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_size_if(condition, if1, 0) but
+ * results in smaller code size.
+ *
+ * \param condition Condition to test.
+ * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
+ *
+ * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0.
+ */
+static inline size_t mbedtls_ct_size_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, size_t if1);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+
+/** Choose between an mbedtls_mpi_uint value and 0.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * condition ? if1 : 0.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if(condition, if1, 0) but
+ * results in smaller code size.
+ *
+ * \param condition Condition to test.
+ * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
+ *
+ * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0.
+ */
+static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint if1);
+
+#endif
+
+/** Constant-flow char selection
+ *
+ * \param low Secret. Bottom of range
+ * \param high Secret. Top of range
+ * \param c Secret. Value to compare to range
+ * \param t Secret. Value to return, if in range
+ *
+ * \return \p t if \p low <= \p c <= \p high, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline unsigned char mbedtls_ct_uchar_in_range_if(unsigned char low,
+ unsigned char high,
+ unsigned char c,
+ unsigned char t);
+
+/** Choose between two error values. The values must be in the range [-32767..0].
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * condition ? if1 : if0.
+ *
+ * \param condition Condition to test.
+ * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
+ * \param if0 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE.
+ *
+ * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise \c if0.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1, int if0);
+
+/** Choose between an error value and 0. The error value must be in the range [-32767..0].
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * condition ? if1 : 0.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to mbedtls_ct_error_if(condition, if1, 0) but
+ * results in smaller code size.
+ *
+ * \param condition Condition to test.
+ * \param if1 Value to use if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE.
+ *
+ * \return \c if1 if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE, otherwise 0.
+ */
+static inline int mbedtls_ct_error_if_else_0(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, int if1);
+
+/* ============================================================================
+ * Block memory operations
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+
+/** Conditionally set a block of memory to zero.
+ *
+ * Regardless of the condition, every byte will be read once and written to
+ * once.
+ *
+ * \param condition Secret. Condition to test.
+ * \param buf Secret. Pointer to the start of the buffer.
+ * \param len Number of bytes to set to zero.
+ *
+ * \warning Unlike mbedtls_platform_zeroize, this does not have the same guarantees
+ * about not being optimised away if the memory is never read again.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ct_zeroize_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition, void *buf, size_t len);
+
+/** Shift some data towards the left inside a buffer.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * memmove(start, start + offset, total - offset);
+ * memset(start + (total - offset), 0, offset);
+ *
+ * Timing independence comes at the expense of performance.
+ *
+ * \param start Secret. Pointer to the start of the buffer.
+ * \param total Total size of the buffer.
+ * \param offset Secret. Offset from which to copy \p total - \p offset bytes.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ct_memmove_left(void *start,
+ size_t total,
+ size_t offset);
+
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) */
+
+/** Conditional memcpy.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * if (condition) {
+ * memcpy(dest, src1, len);
+ * } else {
+ * if (src2 != NULL)
+ * memcpy(dest, src2, len);
+ * }
+ *
+ * It will always read len bytes from src1.
+ * If src2 != NULL, it will always read len bytes from src2.
+ * If src2 == NULL, it will instead read len bytes from dest (as if src2 == dest).
+ *
+ * \param condition The condition
+ * \param dest Secret. Destination pointer.
+ * \param src1 Secret. Pointer to copy from (if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_TRUE).
+ * This may be equal to \p dest, but may not overlap in other ways.
+ * \param src2 Secret (contents only - may branch to determine if this parameter is NULL).
+ * Pointer to copy from (if \p condition == MBEDTLS_CT_FALSE and \p src2 is not NULL). May be NULL.
+ * This may be equal to \p dest, but may not overlap it in other ways. It may overlap with \p src1.
+ * \param len Number of bytes to copy.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_if(mbedtls_ct_condition_t condition,
+ unsigned char *dest,
+ const unsigned char *src1,
+ const unsigned char *src2,
+ size_t len
+ );
+
+/** Copy data from a secret position.
+ *
+ * Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * memcpy(dst, src + offset, len)
+ *
+ * This function copies \p len bytes from \p src + \p offset to
+ * \p dst, with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not depend on
+ * \p offset, but only on \p offset_min, \p offset_max and \p len.
+ *
+ * \note This function reads from \p dest, but the value that
+ * is read does not influence the result and this
+ * function's behavior is well-defined regardless of the
+ * contents of the buffers. This may result in false
+ * positives from static or dynamic analyzers, especially
+ * if \p dest is not initialized.
+ *
+ * \param dest Secret. The destination buffer. This must point to a writable
+ * buffer of at least \p len bytes.
+ * \param src Secret. The base of the source buffer. This must point to a
+ * readable buffer of at least \p offset_max + \p len
+ * bytes. Shouldn't overlap with \p dest
+ * \param offset Secret. The offset in the source buffer from which to copy.
+ * This must be no less than \p offset_min and no greater
+ * than \p offset_max.
+ * \param offset_min The minimal value of \p offset.
+ * \param offset_max The maximal value of \p offset.
+ * \param len The number of bytes to copy.
+ */
+void mbedtls_ct_memcpy_offset(unsigned char *dest,
+ const unsigned char *src,
+ size_t offset,
+ size_t offset_min,
+ size_t offset_max,
+ size_t len);
+
+/* Documented in include/mbedtls/constant_time.h. a and b are secret.
+
+ int mbedtls_ct_memcmp(const void *a,
+ const void *b,
+ size_t n);
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
+
+/** Constant-time buffer comparison without branches.
+ *
+ * Similar to mbedtls_ct_memcmp, except that the result only depends on part of
+ * the input data - differences in the head or tail are ignored. Functionally equivalent to:
+ *
+ * memcmp(a + skip_head, b + skip_head, size - skip_head - skip_tail)
+ *
+ * Time taken depends on \p n, but not on \p skip_head or \p skip_tail .
+ *
+ * Behaviour is undefined if ( \p skip_head + \p skip_tail) > \p n.
+ *
+ * \param a Secret. Pointer to the first buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL.
+ * \param b Secret. Pointer to the second buffer, containing at least \p n bytes. May not be NULL.
+ * \param n The number of bytes to examine (total size of the buffers).
+ * \param skip_head Secret. The number of bytes to treat as non-significant at the start of the buffer.
+ * These bytes will still be read.
+ * \param skip_tail Secret. The number of bytes to treat as non-significant at the end of the buffer.
+ * These bytes will still be read.
+ *
+ * \return Zero if the contents of the two buffers are the same, otherwise non-zero.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial(const void *a,
+ const void *b,
+ size_t n,
+ size_t skip_head,
+ size_t skip_tail);
+
+#endif
+
+/* Include the implementation of static inline functions above. */
+#include "constant_time_impl.h"
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CONSTANT_TIME_INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/ctr.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ctr.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aa48fb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ctr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/**
+ * \file ctr.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file contains common functionality for counter algorithms.
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_CTR_H
+#define MBEDTLS_CTR_H
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+/**
+ * \brief Increment a big-endian 16-byte value.
+ * This is quite performance-sensitive for AES-CTR and CTR-DRBG.
+ *
+ * \param n A 16-byte value to be incremented.
+ */
+static inline void mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(uint8_t n[16])
+{
+ // The 32-bit version seems to perform about the same as a 64-bit version
+ // on 64-bit architectures, so no need to define a 64-bit version.
+ for (int i = 3;; i--) {
+ uint32_t x = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(n, i << 2);
+ x += 1;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(x, n, i << 2);
+ if (x != 0 || i == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b82044e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ctr_drbg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1016 @@
+/*
+ * CTR_DRBG implementation based on AES-256 (NIST SP 800-90)
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+/*
+ * The NIST SP 800-90 DRBGs are described in the following publication.
+ *
+ * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-90r.pdf
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
+
+#include "ctr.h"
+#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+#include <stdio.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Using error translation functions from PSA to MbedTLS */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#include "psa_util_internal.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+static psa_status_t ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context *psa_ctx,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+ psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&key_attr, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING);
+ psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES);
+ status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, key, key_len, &psa_ctx->key_id);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_cipher_encrypt_setup(&psa_ctx->operation, psa_ctx->key_id, PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static void ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context *psa_ctx)
+{
+ psa_cipher_abort(&psa_ctx->operation);
+ psa_destroy_key(psa_ctx->key_id);
+
+ psa_ctx->operation = psa_cipher_operation_init();
+ psa_ctx->key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * CTR_DRBG context initialization
+ */
+void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context));
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ ctx->psa_ctx.key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ ctx->psa_ctx.operation = psa_cipher_operation_init();
+#else
+ mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx->aes_ctx);
+#endif
+ /* Indicate that the entropy nonce length is not set explicitly.
+ * See mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(). */
+ ctx->reseed_counter = -1;
+
+ ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function resets CTR_DRBG context to the state immediately
+ * after initial call of mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init().
+ */
+void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ /* The mutex is initialized iff f_entropy is set. */
+ if (ctx->f_entropy != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex);
+ }
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&ctx->psa_ctx);
+#else
+ mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx->aes_ctx);
+#endif
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context));
+ ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
+ ctx->reseed_counter = -1;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ int resistance)
+{
+ ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->entropy_len = len;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ /* If mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() has already been called, it's
+ * too late. Return the error code that's closest to making sense. */
+ if (ctx->f_entropy != NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG;
+ }
+
+ /* This shouldn't be an issue because
+ * MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT < INT_MAX in any sensible
+ * configuration, but make sure anyway. */
+ if (len > INT_MAX) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG;
+ }
+
+ /* For backward compatibility with Mbed TLS <= 2.19, store the
+ * entropy nonce length in a field that already exists, but isn't
+ * used until after the initial seeding. */
+ /* Due to the capping of len above, the value fits in an int. */
+ ctx->reseed_counter = (int) len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_reseed_interval(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ int interval)
+{
+ ctx->reseed_interval = interval;
+}
+
+static int block_cipher_df(unsigned char *output,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len)
+{
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT +
+ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16];
+ unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN];
+ unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE];
+ unsigned char chain[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE];
+ unsigned char *p, *iv;
+ int ret = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_status_t status;
+ size_t tmp_len;
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_psa_context psa_ctx;
+
+ psa_ctx.key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_ctx.operation = psa_cipher_operation_init();
+#else
+ mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx;
+#endif
+
+ int i, j;
+ size_t buf_len, use_len;
+
+ if (data_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG;
+ }
+
+ memset(buf, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT +
+ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 16);
+
+ /*
+ * Construct IV (16 bytes) and S in buffer
+ * IV = Counter (in 32-bits) padded to 16 with zeroes
+ * S = Length input string (in 32-bits) || Length of output (in 32-bits) ||
+ * data || 0x80
+ * (Total is padded to a multiple of 16-bytes with zeroes)
+ */
+ p = buf + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(data_len, p, 0);
+ p += 4 + 3;
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN;
+ memcpy(p, data, data_len);
+ p[data_len] = 0x80;
+
+ buf_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE + 8 + data_len + 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE; i++) {
+ key[i] = i;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&psa_ctx, key, sizeof(key));
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#else
+ mbedtls_aes_init(&aes_ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes_ctx, key,
+ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Reduce data to MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN bytes of data
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ p = buf;
+ memset(chain, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE);
+ use_len = buf_len;
+
+ while (use_len > 0) {
+ mbedtls_xor(chain, chain, p, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE);
+ p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE;
+ use_len -= (use_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) ?
+ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : use_len;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ status = psa_cipher_update(&psa_ctx.operation, chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE,
+ chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#else
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
+ chain, chain)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ memcpy(tmp + j, chain, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * Update IV
+ */
+ buf[3]++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Do final encryption with reduced data
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&psa_ctx);
+
+ status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&psa_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#else
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes_ctx, tmp,
+ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#endif
+ iv = tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE;
+ p = output;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ status = psa_cipher_update(&psa_ctx.operation, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE,
+ iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#else
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
+ iv, iv)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#endif
+ memcpy(p, iv, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE);
+ p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE;
+ }
+exit:
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&psa_ctx);
+#else
+ mbedtls_aes_free(&aes_ctx);
+#endif
+ /*
+ * tidy up the stack
+ */
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key, sizeof(key));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(chain, sizeof(chain));
+ if (0 != ret) {
+ /*
+ * wipe partial seed from memory
+ */
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(output, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* CTR_DRBG_Update (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.2)
+ * ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, provided_data)
+ * implements
+ * CTR_DRBG_Update(provided_data, Key, V)
+ * with inputs and outputs
+ * ctx->aes_ctx = Key
+ * ctx->counter = V
+ */
+static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char data[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN])
+{
+ unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN];
+ unsigned char *p = tmp;
+ int j;
+ int ret = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_status_t status;
+ size_t tmp_len;
+#endif
+
+ memset(tmp, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN);
+
+ for (j = 0; j < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; j += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE) {
+ /*
+ * Increase counter
+ */
+ mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(ctx->counter);
+
+ /*
+ * Crypt counter block
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ status = psa_cipher_update(&ctx->psa_ctx.operation, ctx->counter, sizeof(ctx->counter),
+ p, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#else
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
+ ctx->counter, p)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_xor(tmp, tmp, data, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN);
+
+ /*
+ * Update key and counter
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ ctr_drbg_destroy_psa_contex(&ctx->psa_ctx);
+
+ status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&ctx->psa_ctx, tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#else
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->aes_ctx, tmp,
+ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#endif
+ memcpy(ctx->counter, tmp + MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE,
+ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE);
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2)
+ * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(ctx, additional, add_len)
+ * implements
+ * CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string,
+ * security_strength) -> initial_working_state
+ * with inputs
+ * ctx->counter = all-bits-0
+ * ctx->aes_ctx = context from all-bits-0 key
+ * additional[:add_len] = entropy_input || nonce || personalization_string
+ * and with outputs
+ * ctx = initial_working_state
+ */
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *additional,
+ size_t add_len)
+{
+ unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN];
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (add_len == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = block_cipher_df(add_input, additional, add_len)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, add_input)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(add_input, sizeof(add_input));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* CTR_DRBG_Reseed with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.4.2)
+ * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, len, nonce_len)
+ * implements
+ * CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional_input)
+ * -> new_working_state
+ * with inputs
+ * ctx contains working_state
+ * additional[:len] = additional_input
+ * and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy
+ * for (ctx->entropy_len + nonce_len) bytes
+ * and with output
+ * ctx contains new_working_state
+ */
+static int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *additional,
+ size_t len,
+ size_t nonce_len)
+{
+ unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT];
+ size_t seedlen = 0;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (ctx->entropy_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG;
+ }
+ if (nonce_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG;
+ }
+ if (len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT - ctx->entropy_len - nonce_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG;
+ }
+
+ memset(seed, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT);
+
+ /* Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy to seed state. */
+ if (0 != ctx->f_entropy(ctx->p_entropy, seed, ctx->entropy_len)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED;
+ }
+ seedlen += ctx->entropy_len;
+
+ /* Gather entropy for a nonce if requested. */
+ if (nonce_len != 0) {
+ if (0 != ctx->f_entropy(ctx->p_entropy, seed + seedlen, nonce_len)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED;
+ }
+ seedlen += nonce_len;
+ }
+
+ /* Add additional data if provided. */
+ if (additional != NULL && len != 0) {
+ memcpy(seed + seedlen, additional, len);
+ seedlen += len;
+ }
+
+ /* Reduce to 384 bits. */
+ if ((ret = block_cipher_df(seed, seed, seedlen)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Update state. */
+ if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, seed)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ ctx->reseed_counter = 1;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seed, sizeof(seed));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *additional, size_t len)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal(ctx, additional, len, 0);
+}
+
+/* Return a "good" nonce length for CTR_DRBG. The chosen nonce length
+ * is sufficient to achieve the maximum security strength given the key
+ * size and entropy length. If there is enough entropy in the initial
+ * call to the entropy function to serve as both the entropy input and
+ * the nonce, don't make a second call to get a nonce. */
+static size_t good_nonce_len(size_t entropy_len)
+{
+ if (entropy_len >= MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE * 3 / 2) {
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ return (entropy_len + 1) / 2;
+ }
+}
+
+/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.3.2)
+ * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(ctx, f_entropy, p_entropy, custom, len)
+ * implements
+ * CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string,
+ * security_strength) -> initial_working_state
+ * with inputs
+ * custom[:len] = nonce || personalization_string
+ * where entropy_input comes from f_entropy for ctx->entropy_len bytes
+ * and with outputs
+ * ctx = initial_working_state
+ */
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_entropy,
+ const unsigned char *custom,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE];
+ size_t nonce_len;
+
+ memset(key, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE);
+
+ /* The mutex is initialized iff f_entropy is set. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex);
+#endif
+
+ ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy;
+ ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy;
+
+ if (ctx->entropy_len == 0) {
+ ctx->entropy_len = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN;
+ }
+ /* ctx->reseed_counter contains the desired amount of entropy to
+ * grab for a nonce (see mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len()).
+ * If it's -1, indicating that the entropy nonce length was not set
+ * explicitly, use a sufficiently large nonce for security. */
+ nonce_len = (ctx->reseed_counter >= 0 ?
+ (size_t) ctx->reseed_counter :
+ good_nonce_len(ctx->entropy_len));
+
+ /* Initialize with an empty key. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ status = ctr_drbg_setup_psa_context(&ctx->psa_ctx, key, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
+ return status;
+ }
+#else
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx->aes_ctx, key,
+ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYBITS)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Do the initial seeding. */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed_internal(ctx, custom, len,
+ nonce_len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* CTR_DRBG_Generate with derivation function (SP 800-90A §10.2.1.5.2)
+ * mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(ctx, output, output_len, additional, add_len)
+ * implements
+ * CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional[:add_len])
+ * -> working_state_after_reseed
+ * if required, then
+ * CTR_DRBG_Generate(working_state_after_reseed,
+ * requested_number_of_bits, additional_input)
+ * -> status, returned_bits, new_working_state
+ * with inputs
+ * ctx contains working_state
+ * requested_number_of_bits = 8 * output_len
+ * additional[:add_len] = additional_input
+ * and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy
+ * and with outputs
+ * status = SUCCESS (this function does the reseed internally)
+ * returned_bits = output[:output_len]
+ * ctx contains new_working_state
+ */
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_len,
+ const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng;
+ unsigned char *p = output;
+ struct {
+ unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN];
+ unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE];
+ } locals;
+ size_t use_len;
+
+ if (output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG;
+ }
+
+ if (add_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG;
+ }
+
+ memset(locals.add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN);
+
+ if (ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval ||
+ ctx->prediction_resistance) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, add_len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ add_len = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (add_len > 0) {
+ if ((ret = block_cipher_df(locals.add_input, additional, add_len)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, locals.add_input)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ while (output_len > 0) {
+ /*
+ * Increase counter (treat it as a 128-bit big-endian integer).
+ */
+ mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(ctx->counter);
+
+ /*
+ * Crypt counter block
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ psa_status_t status;
+ size_t tmp_len;
+
+ status = psa_cipher_update(&ctx->psa_ctx.operation, ctx->counter, sizeof(ctx->counter),
+ locals.tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#else
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT,
+ ctx->counter, locals.tmp)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ use_len = (output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE)
+ ? MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE : output_len;
+ /*
+ * Copy random block to destination
+ */
+ memcpy(p, locals.tmp, use_len);
+ p += use_len;
+ output_len -= use_len;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, locals.add_input)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ctx->reseed_counter++;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&locals, sizeof(locals));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(void *p_rng, unsigned char *output,
+ size_t output_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(ctx, output, output_len, NULL, 0);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const char *path)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ FILE *f;
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT];
+
+ if ((f = fopen(path, "wb")) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */
+ mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(ctx, buf,
+ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (fwrite(buf, 1, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT, f) !=
+ MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ } else {
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ fclose(f);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update_seed_file(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const char *path)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ size_t n;
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_INPUT];
+ unsigned char c;
+
+ if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */
+ mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL);
+
+ n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f);
+ if (fread(&c, 1, 1, f) != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if (n == 0 || ferror(f)) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ f = NULL;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(ctx, buf, n);
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (f != NULL) {
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return mbedtls_ctr_drbg_write_seed_file(ctx, path);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+/* The CTR_DRBG NIST test vectors used here are available at
+ * https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/documents/drbg/drbgtestvectors.zip
+ *
+ * The parameters used to derive the test data are:
+ *
+ * [AES-128 use df]
+ * [PredictionResistance = True/False]
+ * [EntropyInputLen = 128]
+ * [NonceLen = 64]
+ * [PersonalizationStringLen = 128]
+ * [AdditionalInputLen = 0]
+ * [ReturnedBitsLen = 512]
+ *
+ * [AES-256 use df]
+ * [PredictionResistance = True/False]
+ * [EntropyInputLen = 256]
+ * [NonceLen = 128]
+ * [PersonalizationStringLen = 256]
+ * [AdditionalInputLen = 0]
+ * [ReturnedBitsLen = 512]
+ *
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY)
+static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[] =
+{ 0x04, 0xd9, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xdc, 0xe8, 0x6e, 0xbb,
+ 0xf1, 0x08, 0x77, 0x2b, 0x9e, 0x08, 0xca, 0x92,
+ 0x65, 0x16, 0xda, 0x99, 0xa2, 0x59, 0xf3, 0xe8,
+ 0x38, 0x7e, 0x3f, 0x6b, 0x51, 0x70, 0x7b, 0x20,
+ 0xec, 0x53, 0xd0, 0x66, 0xc3, 0x0f, 0xe3, 0xb0,
+ 0xe0, 0x86, 0xa6, 0xaa, 0x5f, 0x72, 0x2f, 0xad,
+ 0xf7, 0xef, 0x06, 0xb8, 0xd6, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0xe8 };
+
+static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[] =
+{ 0x07, 0x0d, 0x59, 0x63, 0x98, 0x73, 0xa5, 0x45,
+ 0x27, 0x38, 0x22, 0x7b, 0x76, 0x85, 0xd1, 0xa9,
+ 0x74, 0x18, 0x1f, 0x3c, 0x22, 0xf6, 0x49, 0x20,
+ 0x4a, 0x47, 0xc2, 0xf3, 0x85, 0x16, 0xb4, 0x6f,
+ 0x00, 0x2e, 0x71, 0xda, 0xed, 0x16, 0x9b, 0x5c };
+
+static const unsigned char pers_pr[] =
+{ 0xbf, 0xa4, 0x9a, 0x8f, 0x7b, 0xd8, 0xb1, 0x7a,
+ 0x9d, 0xfa, 0x45, 0xed, 0x21, 0x52, 0xb3, 0xad };
+
+static const unsigned char pers_nopr[] =
+{ 0x4e, 0x61, 0x79, 0xd4, 0xc2, 0x72, 0xa1, 0x4c,
+ 0xf1, 0x3d, 0xf6, 0x5e, 0xa3, 0xa6, 0xe5, 0x0f };
+
+static const unsigned char result_pr[] =
+{ 0xc9, 0x0a, 0xaf, 0x85, 0x89, 0x71, 0x44, 0x66,
+ 0x4f, 0x25, 0x0b, 0x2b, 0xde, 0xd8, 0xfa, 0xff,
+ 0x52, 0x5a, 0x1b, 0x32, 0x5e, 0x41, 0x7a, 0x10,
+ 0x1f, 0xef, 0x1e, 0x62, 0x23, 0xe9, 0x20, 0x30,
+ 0xc9, 0x0d, 0xad, 0x69, 0xb4, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0xf4,
+ 0x87, 0x42, 0xd5, 0xae, 0x5e, 0x5e, 0x43, 0xcc,
+ 0xd9, 0xfd, 0x0b, 0x93, 0x4a, 0xe3, 0xd4, 0x06,
+ 0x37, 0x36, 0x0f, 0x3f, 0x72, 0x82, 0x0c, 0xcf };
+
+static const unsigned char result_nopr[] =
+{ 0x31, 0xc9, 0x91, 0x09, 0xf8, 0xc5, 0x10, 0x13,
+ 0x3c, 0xd3, 0x96, 0xf9, 0xbc, 0x2c, 0x12, 0xc0,
+ 0x7c, 0xc1, 0x61, 0x5f, 0xa3, 0x09, 0x99, 0xaf,
+ 0xd7, 0xf2, 0x36, 0xfd, 0x40, 0x1a, 0x8b, 0xf2,
+ 0x33, 0x38, 0xee, 0x1d, 0x03, 0x5f, 0x83, 0xb7,
+ 0xa2, 0x53, 0xdc, 0xee, 0x18, 0xfc, 0xa7, 0xf2,
+ 0xee, 0x96, 0xc6, 0xc2, 0xcd, 0x0c, 0xff, 0x02,
+ 0x76, 0x70, 0x69, 0xaa, 0x69, 0xd1, 0x3b, 0xe8 };
+#else /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */
+
+static const unsigned char entropy_source_pr[] =
+{ 0xca, 0x58, 0xfd, 0xf2, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xcb, 0x49,
+ 0xd4, 0xe0, 0x5b, 0xe2, 0x39, 0x50, 0xd9, 0x8a,
+ 0x6a, 0xb3, 0xc5, 0x2f, 0xdf, 0x74, 0xd5, 0x85,
+ 0x8f, 0xd1, 0xba, 0x64, 0x54, 0x7b, 0xdb, 0x1e,
+ 0xc5, 0xea, 0x24, 0xc0, 0xfa, 0x0c, 0x90, 0x15,
+ 0x09, 0x20, 0x92, 0x42, 0x32, 0x36, 0x45, 0x45,
+ 0x7d, 0x20, 0x76, 0x6b, 0xcf, 0xa2, 0x15, 0xc8,
+ 0x2f, 0x9f, 0xbc, 0x88, 0x3f, 0x80, 0xd1, 0x2c,
+ 0xb7, 0x16, 0xd1, 0x80, 0x9e, 0xe1, 0xc9, 0xb3,
+ 0x88, 0x1b, 0x21, 0x45, 0xef, 0xa1, 0x7f, 0xce,
+ 0xc8, 0x92, 0x35, 0x55, 0x2a, 0xd9, 0x1d, 0x8e,
+ 0x12, 0x38, 0xac, 0x01, 0x4e, 0x38, 0x18, 0x76,
+ 0x9c, 0xf2, 0xb6, 0xd4, 0x13, 0xb6, 0x2c, 0x77,
+ 0xc0, 0xe7, 0xe6, 0x0c, 0x47, 0x44, 0x95, 0xbe };
+
+static const unsigned char entropy_source_nopr[] =
+{ 0x4c, 0xfb, 0x21, 0x86, 0x73, 0x34, 0x6d, 0x9d,
+ 0x50, 0xc9, 0x22, 0xe4, 0x9b, 0x0d, 0xfc, 0xd0,
+ 0x90, 0xad, 0xf0, 0x4f, 0x5c, 0x3b, 0xa4, 0x73,
+ 0x27, 0xdf, 0xcd, 0x6f, 0xa6, 0x3a, 0x78, 0x5c,
+ 0x01, 0x69, 0x62, 0xa7, 0xfd, 0x27, 0x87, 0xa2,
+ 0x4b, 0xf6, 0xbe, 0x47, 0xef, 0x37, 0x83, 0xf1,
+ 0xb7, 0xec, 0x46, 0x07, 0x23, 0x63, 0x83, 0x4a,
+ 0x1b, 0x01, 0x33, 0xf2, 0xc2, 0x38, 0x91, 0xdb,
+ 0x4f, 0x11, 0xa6, 0x86, 0x51, 0xf2, 0x3e, 0x3a,
+ 0x8b, 0x1f, 0xdc, 0x03, 0xb1, 0x92, 0xc7, 0xe7 };
+
+static const unsigned char pers_pr[] =
+{ 0x5a, 0x70, 0x95, 0xe9, 0x81, 0x40, 0x52, 0x33,
+ 0x91, 0x53, 0x7e, 0x75, 0xd6, 0x19, 0x9d, 0x1e,
+ 0xad, 0x0d, 0xc6, 0xa7, 0xde, 0x6c, 0x1f, 0xe0,
+ 0xea, 0x18, 0x33, 0xa8, 0x7e, 0x06, 0x20, 0xe9 };
+
+static const unsigned char pers_nopr[] =
+{ 0x88, 0xee, 0xb8, 0xe0, 0xe8, 0x3b, 0xf3, 0x29,
+ 0x4b, 0xda, 0xcd, 0x60, 0x99, 0xeb, 0xe4, 0xbf,
+ 0x55, 0xec, 0xd9, 0x11, 0x3f, 0x71, 0xe5, 0xeb,
+ 0xcb, 0x45, 0x75, 0xf3, 0xd6, 0xa6, 0x8a, 0x6b };
+
+static const unsigned char result_pr[] =
+{ 0xce, 0x2f, 0xdb, 0xb6, 0xd9, 0xb7, 0x39, 0x85,
+ 0x04, 0xc5, 0xc0, 0x42, 0xc2, 0x31, 0xc6, 0x1d,
+ 0x9b, 0x5a, 0x59, 0xf8, 0x7e, 0x0d, 0xcc, 0x62,
+ 0x7b, 0x65, 0x11, 0x55, 0x10, 0xeb, 0x9e, 0x3d,
+ 0xa4, 0xfb, 0x1c, 0x6a, 0x18, 0xc0, 0x74, 0xdb,
+ 0xdd, 0xe7, 0x02, 0x23, 0x63, 0x21, 0xd0, 0x39,
+ 0xf9, 0xa7, 0xc4, 0x52, 0x84, 0x3b, 0x49, 0x40,
+ 0x72, 0x2b, 0xb0, 0x6c, 0x9c, 0xdb, 0xc3, 0x43 };
+
+static const unsigned char result_nopr[] =
+{ 0xa5, 0x51, 0x80, 0xa1, 0x90, 0xbe, 0xf3, 0xad,
+ 0xaf, 0x28, 0xf6, 0xb7, 0x95, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0xf3,
+ 0xd6, 0xdf, 0xa1, 0xb2, 0x7d, 0xd0, 0x46, 0x7b,
+ 0x0c, 0x75, 0xf5, 0xfa, 0x93, 0x1e, 0x97, 0x14,
+ 0x75, 0xb2, 0x7c, 0xae, 0x03, 0xa2, 0x96, 0x54,
+ 0xe2, 0xf4, 0x09, 0x66, 0xea, 0x33, 0x64, 0x30,
+ 0x40, 0xd1, 0x40, 0x0f, 0xe6, 0x77, 0x87, 0x3a,
+ 0xf8, 0x09, 0x7c, 0x1f, 0xe9, 0xf0, 0x02, 0x98 };
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_USE_128_BIT_KEY */
+
+static size_t test_offset;
+static int ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy(void *data, unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p = data;
+ memcpy(buf, p + test_offset, len);
+ test_offset += len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define CHK(c) if ((c) != 0) \
+ { \
+ if (verbose != 0) \
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); \
+ return 1; \
+ }
+
+#define SELF_TEST_OUTPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH 64
+
+/*
+ * Checkup routine
+ */
+int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctx;
+ unsigned char buf[sizeof(result_pr)];
+
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * Based on a NIST CTR_DRBG test vector (PR = True)
+ */
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" CTR_DRBG (PR = TRUE) : ");
+ }
+
+ test_offset = 0;
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE);
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE / 2);
+ CHK(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(&ctx,
+ ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy,
+ (void *) entropy_source_pr,
+ pers_pr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE));
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_prediction_resistance(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_PR_ON);
+ CHK(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, SELF_TEST_OUTPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH));
+ CHK(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, sizeof(result_pr)));
+ CHK(memcmp(buf, result_pr, sizeof(result_pr)));
+
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(&ctx);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Based on a NIST CTR_DRBG test vector (PR = FALSE)
+ */
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" CTR_DRBG (PR = FALSE): ");
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&ctx);
+
+ test_offset = 0;
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE);
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_nonce_len(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE / 2);
+ CHK(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(&ctx,
+ ctr_drbg_self_test_entropy,
+ (void *) entropy_source_nopr,
+ pers_nopr, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_KEYSIZE));
+ CHK(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(&ctx, NULL, 0));
+ CHK(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, SELF_TEST_OUTPUT_DISCARD_LENGTH));
+ CHK(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, sizeof(result_nopr)));
+ CHK(memcmp(buf, result_nopr, sizeof(result_nopr)));
+
+ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(&ctx);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/debug.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/debug.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c36ed3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/debug.c
@@ -0,0 +1,465 @@
+/*
+ * Debugging routines
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include "debug_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* DEBUG_BUF_SIZE must be at least 2 */
+#define DEBUG_BUF_SIZE 512
+
+static int debug_threshold = 0;
+
+void mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(int threshold)
+{
+ debug_threshold = threshold;
+}
+
+/*
+ * All calls to f_dbg must be made via this function
+ */
+static inline void debug_send_line(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line,
+ const char *str)
+{
+ /*
+ * If in a threaded environment, we need a thread identifier.
+ * Since there is no portable way to get one, use the address of the ssl
+ * context instead, as it shouldn't be shared between threads.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ char idstr[20 + DEBUG_BUF_SIZE]; /* 0x + 16 nibbles + ': ' */
+ mbedtls_snprintf(idstr, sizeof(idstr), "%p: %s", (void *) ssl, str);
+ ssl->conf->f_dbg(ssl->conf->p_dbg, level, file, line, idstr);
+#else
+ ssl->conf->f_dbg(ssl->conf->p_dbg, level, file, line, str);
+#endif
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6)
+void mbedtls_debug_print_msg(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line,
+ const char *format, ...)
+{
+ va_list argp;
+ char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE];
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(DEBUG_BUF_SIZE >= 2, "DEBUG_BUF_SIZE too small");
+
+ if (NULL == ssl ||
+ NULL == ssl->conf ||
+ NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg ||
+ level > debug_threshold) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ va_start(argp, format);
+ ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf(str, DEBUG_BUF_SIZE, format, argp);
+ va_end(argp);
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (ret >= DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1) {
+ ret = DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 2;
+ }
+ }
+ str[ret] = '\n';
+ str[ret + 1] = '\0';
+
+ debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str);
+}
+
+void mbedtls_debug_print_ret(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line,
+ const char *text, int ret)
+{
+ char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE];
+
+ if (NULL == ssl ||
+ NULL == ssl->conf ||
+ NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg ||
+ level > debug_threshold) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * With non-blocking I/O and examples that just retry immediately,
+ * the logs would be quickly flooded with WANT_READ, so ignore that.
+ * Don't ignore WANT_WRITE however, since it is usually rare.
+ */
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s() returned %d (-0x%04x)\n",
+ text, ret, (unsigned int) -ret);
+
+ debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str);
+}
+
+void mbedtls_debug_print_buf(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line, const char *text,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE];
+ char txt[17];
+ size_t i, idx = 0;
+
+ if (NULL == ssl ||
+ NULL == ssl->conf ||
+ NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg ||
+ level > debug_threshold) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "dumping '%s' (%u bytes)\n",
+ text, (unsigned int) len);
+
+ debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str);
+
+ memset(txt, 0, sizeof(txt));
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ if (i >= 4096) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i % 16 == 0) {
+ if (i > 0) {
+ mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " %s\n", txt);
+ debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str);
+
+ idx = 0;
+ memset(txt, 0, sizeof(txt));
+ }
+
+ idx += mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "%04x: ",
+ (unsigned int) i);
+
+ }
+
+ idx += mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " %02x",
+ (unsigned int) buf[i]);
+ txt[i % 16] = (buf[i] > 31 && buf[i] < 127) ? buf[i] : '.';
+ }
+
+ if (len > 0) {
+ for (/* i = i */; i % 16 != 0; i++) {
+ idx += mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " ");
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " %s\n", txt);
+ debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str);
+ }
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
+void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line,
+ const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X)
+{
+ char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE];
+
+ if (NULL == ssl ||
+ NULL == ssl->conf ||
+ NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg ||
+ level > debug_threshold) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s(X)", text);
+ mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(ssl, level, file, line, str, &X->X);
+
+ mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s(Y)", text);
+ mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(ssl, level, file, line, str, &X->Y);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+static void mbedtls_debug_print_ec_coord(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line, const char *text,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE];
+ size_t i, idx = 0;
+
+ mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "value of '%s' (%u bits) is:\n",
+ text, (unsigned int) len * 8);
+
+ debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ if (i >= 4096) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i % 16 == 0) {
+ if (i > 0) {
+ mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "\n");
+ debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str);
+
+ idx = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ idx += mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " %02x",
+ (unsigned int) buf[i]);
+ }
+
+ if (len > 0) {
+ for (/* i = i */; i % 16 != 0; i++) {
+ idx += mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " ");
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "\n");
+ debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str);
+ }
+}
+
+void mbedtls_debug_print_psa_ec(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line,
+ const char *text, const mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
+{
+ char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE];
+ const uint8_t *coord_start;
+ size_t coord_len;
+
+ if (NULL == ssl ||
+ NULL == ssl->conf ||
+ NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg ||
+ level > debug_threshold) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* For the description of pk->pk_raw content please refer to the description
+ * psa_export_public_key() function. */
+ coord_len = (pk->pub_raw_len - 1)/2;
+
+ /* X coordinate */
+ coord_start = pk->pub_raw + 1;
+ mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s(X)", text);
+ mbedtls_debug_print_ec_coord(ssl, level, file, line, str, coord_start, coord_len);
+
+ /* Y coordinate */
+ coord_start = coord_start + coord_len;
+ mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s(Y)", text);
+ mbedtls_debug_print_ec_coord(ssl, level, file, line, str, coord_start, coord_len);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line,
+ const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X)
+{
+ char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE];
+ size_t bitlen;
+ size_t idx = 0;
+
+ if (NULL == ssl ||
+ NULL == ssl->conf ||
+ NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg ||
+ NULL == X ||
+ level > debug_threshold) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ bitlen = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(X);
+
+ mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "value of '%s' (%u bits) is:\n",
+ text, (unsigned) bitlen);
+ debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str);
+
+ if (bitlen == 0) {
+ str[0] = ' '; str[1] = '0'; str[2] = '0';
+ idx = 3;
+ } else {
+ int n;
+ for (n = (int) ((bitlen - 1) / 8); n >= 0; n--) {
+ size_t limb_offset = n / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint);
+ size_t offset_in_limb = n % sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint);
+ unsigned char octet =
+ (X->p[limb_offset] >> (offset_in_limb * 8)) & 0xff;
+ mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, " %02x", octet);
+ idx += 3;
+ /* Wrap lines after 16 octets that each take 3 columns */
+ if (idx >= 3 * 16) {
+ mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "\n");
+ debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str);
+ idx = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (idx != 0) {
+ mbedtls_snprintf(str + idx, sizeof(str) - idx, "\n");
+ debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str);
+ }
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
+static void debug_print_pk(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line,
+ const char *text, const mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ mbedtls_pk_debug_item items[MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS];
+ char name[16];
+
+ memset(items, 0, sizeof(items));
+
+ if (mbedtls_pk_debug(pk, items) != 0) {
+ debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line,
+ "invalid PK context\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MAX_ITEMS; i++) {
+ if (items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_NONE) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s%s", text, items[i].name);
+ name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0';
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ if (items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI) {
+ mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(ssl, level, file, line, name, items[i].value);
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
+ if (items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP) {
+ mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(ssl, level, file, line, name, items[i].value);
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ if (items[i].type == MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_PSA_EC) {
+ mbedtls_debug_print_psa_ec(ssl, level, file, line, name, items[i].value);
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ { debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line,
+ "should not happen\n"); }
+ }
+}
+
+static void debug_print_line_by_line(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line, const char *text)
+{
+ char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE];
+ const char *start, *cur;
+
+ start = text;
+ for (cur = text; *cur != '\0'; cur++) {
+ if (*cur == '\n') {
+ size_t len = (size_t) (cur - start) + 1;
+ if (len > DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1) {
+ len = DEBUG_BUF_SIZE - 1;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(str, start, len);
+ str[len] = '\0';
+
+ debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str);
+
+ start = cur + 1;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void mbedtls_debug_print_crt(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line,
+ const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt)
+{
+ char str[DEBUG_BUF_SIZE];
+ int i = 0;
+
+ if (NULL == ssl ||
+ NULL == ssl->conf ||
+ NULL == ssl->conf->f_dbg ||
+ NULL == crt ||
+ level > debug_threshold) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ while (crt != NULL) {
+ char buf[1024];
+
+ mbedtls_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%s #%d:\n", text, ++i);
+ debug_send_line(ssl, level, file, line, str);
+
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_info(buf, sizeof(buf) - 1, "", crt);
+ debug_print_line_by_line(ssl, level, file, line, buf);
+
+ debug_print_pk(ssl, level, file, line, "crt->", &crt->pk);
+
+ crt = crt->next;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
+static void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh_internal(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
+ int level, const char *file,
+ int line,
+ const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh,
+ mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+ const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx = ecdh;
+#else
+ const mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx = &ecdh->ctx.mbed_ecdh;
+#endif
+
+ switch (attr) {
+ case MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q:
+ mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(ssl, level, file, line, "ECDH: Q",
+ &ctx->Q);
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP:
+ mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(ssl, level, file, line, "ECDH: Qp",
+ &ctx->Qp);
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z:
+ mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(ssl, level, file, line, "ECDH: z",
+ &ctx->z);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line,
+ const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh,
+ mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+ mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh_internal(ssl, level, file, line, ecdh, attr);
+#else
+ switch (ecdh->var) {
+ default:
+ mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh_internal(ssl, level, file, line, ecdh,
+ attr);
+ }
+#endif
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED &&
+ MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/debug_internal.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/debug_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4523b46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/debug_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+/**
+ * \file debug_internal.h
+ *
+ * \brief Internal part of the public "debug.h".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H
+#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
+
+/**
+ * \brief Print a message to the debug output. This function is always used
+ * through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG() macro, which supplies the ssl
+ * context, file and line number parameters.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param level error level of the debug message
+ * \param file file the message has occurred in
+ * \param line line number the message has occurred at
+ * \param format format specifier, in printf format
+ * \param ... variables used by the format specifier
+ *
+ * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
+ * library only.
+ */
+void mbedtls_debug_print_msg(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line,
+ const char *format, ...) MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Print the return value of a function to the debug output. This
+ * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET() macro,
+ * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param level error level of the debug message
+ * \param file file the error has occurred in
+ * \param line line number the error has occurred in
+ * \param text the name of the function that returned the error
+ * \param ret the return code value
+ *
+ * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
+ * library only.
+ */
+void mbedtls_debug_print_ret(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line,
+ const char *text, int ret);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Output a buffer of size len bytes to the debug output. This function
+ * is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF() macro,
+ * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param level error level of the debug message
+ * \param file file the error has occurred in
+ * \param line line number the error has occurred in
+ * \param text a name or label for the buffer being dumped. Normally the
+ * variable or buffer name
+ * \param buf the buffer to be outputted
+ * \param len length of the buffer
+ *
+ * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
+ * library only.
+ */
+void mbedtls_debug_print_buf(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line, const char *text,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+/**
+ * \brief Print a MPI variable to the debug output. This function is always
+ * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI() macro, which supplies the
+ * ssl context, file and line number parameters.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param level error level of the debug message
+ * \param file file the error has occurred in
+ * \param line line number the error has occurred in
+ * \param text a name or label for the MPI being output. Normally the
+ * variable name
+ * \param X the MPI variable
+ *
+ * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
+ * library only.
+ */
+void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line,
+ const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
+/**
+ * \brief Print an ECP point to the debug output. This function is always
+ * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP() macro, which supplies the
+ * ssl context, file and line number parameters.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param level error level of the debug message
+ * \param file file the error has occurred in
+ * \param line line number the error has occurred in
+ * \param text a name or label for the ECP point being output. Normally the
+ * variable name
+ * \param X the ECP point
+ *
+ * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
+ * library only.
+ */
+void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line,
+ const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
+/**
+ * \brief Print a X.509 certificate structure to the debug output. This
+ * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT() macro,
+ * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param level error level of the debug message
+ * \param file file the error has occurred in
+ * \param line line number the error has occurred in
+ * \param text a name or label for the certificate being output
+ * \param crt X.509 certificate structure
+ *
+ * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
+ * library only.
+ */
+void mbedtls_debug_print_crt(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line,
+ const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt);
+#endif
+
+/* Note: the MBEDTLS_ECDH_C guard here is mandatory because this debug function
+ only works for the built-in implementation. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q,
+ MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP,
+ MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z,
+} mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Print a field of the ECDH structure in the SSL context to the debug
+ * output. This function is always used through the
+ * MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH() macro, which supplies the ssl context, file
+ * and line number parameters.
+ *
+ * \param ssl SSL context
+ * \param level error level of the debug message
+ * \param file file the error has occurred in
+ * \param line line number the error has occurred in
+ * \param ecdh the ECDH context
+ * \param attr the identifier of the attribute being output
+ *
+ * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the
+ * library only.
+ */
+void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level,
+ const char *file, int line,
+ const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh,
+ mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED &&
+ MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/des.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/des.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f0032b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/des.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1042 @@
+/*
+ * FIPS-46-3 compliant Triple-DES implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+/*
+ * DES, on which TDES is based, was originally designed by Horst Feistel
+ * at IBM in 1974, and was adopted as a standard by NIST (formerly NBS).
+ *
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips46-3/fips46-3.pdf
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/des.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_ALT)
+
+/*
+ * Expanded DES S-boxes
+ */
+static const uint32_t SB1[64] =
+{
+ 0x01010400, 0x00000000, 0x00010000, 0x01010404,
+ 0x01010004, 0x00010404, 0x00000004, 0x00010000,
+ 0x00000400, 0x01010400, 0x01010404, 0x00000400,
+ 0x01000404, 0x01010004, 0x01000000, 0x00000004,
+ 0x00000404, 0x01000400, 0x01000400, 0x00010400,
+ 0x00010400, 0x01010000, 0x01010000, 0x01000404,
+ 0x00010004, 0x01000004, 0x01000004, 0x00010004,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00000404, 0x00010404, 0x01000000,
+ 0x00010000, 0x01010404, 0x00000004, 0x01010000,
+ 0x01010400, 0x01000000, 0x01000000, 0x00000400,
+ 0x01010004, 0x00010000, 0x00010400, 0x01000004,
+ 0x00000400, 0x00000004, 0x01000404, 0x00010404,
+ 0x01010404, 0x00010004, 0x01010000, 0x01000404,
+ 0x01000004, 0x00000404, 0x00010404, 0x01010400,
+ 0x00000404, 0x01000400, 0x01000400, 0x00000000,
+ 0x00010004, 0x00010400, 0x00000000, 0x01010004
+};
+
+static const uint32_t SB2[64] =
+{
+ 0x80108020, 0x80008000, 0x00008000, 0x00108020,
+ 0x00100000, 0x00000020, 0x80100020, 0x80008020,
+ 0x80000020, 0x80108020, 0x80108000, 0x80000000,
+ 0x80008000, 0x00100000, 0x00000020, 0x80100020,
+ 0x00108000, 0x00100020, 0x80008020, 0x00000000,
+ 0x80000000, 0x00008000, 0x00108020, 0x80100000,
+ 0x00100020, 0x80000020, 0x00000000, 0x00108000,
+ 0x00008020, 0x80108000, 0x80100000, 0x00008020,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00108020, 0x80100020, 0x00100000,
+ 0x80008020, 0x80100000, 0x80108000, 0x00008000,
+ 0x80100000, 0x80008000, 0x00000020, 0x80108020,
+ 0x00108020, 0x00000020, 0x00008000, 0x80000000,
+ 0x00008020, 0x80108000, 0x00100000, 0x80000020,
+ 0x00100020, 0x80008020, 0x80000020, 0x00100020,
+ 0x00108000, 0x00000000, 0x80008000, 0x00008020,
+ 0x80000000, 0x80100020, 0x80108020, 0x00108000
+};
+
+static const uint32_t SB3[64] =
+{
+ 0x00000208, 0x08020200, 0x00000000, 0x08020008,
+ 0x08000200, 0x00000000, 0x00020208, 0x08000200,
+ 0x00020008, 0x08000008, 0x08000008, 0x00020000,
+ 0x08020208, 0x00020008, 0x08020000, 0x00000208,
+ 0x08000000, 0x00000008, 0x08020200, 0x00000200,
+ 0x00020200, 0x08020000, 0x08020008, 0x00020208,
+ 0x08000208, 0x00020200, 0x00020000, 0x08000208,
+ 0x00000008, 0x08020208, 0x00000200, 0x08000000,
+ 0x08020200, 0x08000000, 0x00020008, 0x00000208,
+ 0x00020000, 0x08020200, 0x08000200, 0x00000000,
+ 0x00000200, 0x00020008, 0x08020208, 0x08000200,
+ 0x08000008, 0x00000200, 0x00000000, 0x08020008,
+ 0x08000208, 0x00020000, 0x08000000, 0x08020208,
+ 0x00000008, 0x00020208, 0x00020200, 0x08000008,
+ 0x08020000, 0x08000208, 0x00000208, 0x08020000,
+ 0x00020208, 0x00000008, 0x08020008, 0x00020200
+};
+
+static const uint32_t SB4[64] =
+{
+ 0x00802001, 0x00002081, 0x00002081, 0x00000080,
+ 0x00802080, 0x00800081, 0x00800001, 0x00002001,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00802000, 0x00802000, 0x00802081,
+ 0x00000081, 0x00000000, 0x00800080, 0x00800001,
+ 0x00000001, 0x00002000, 0x00800000, 0x00802001,
+ 0x00000080, 0x00800000, 0x00002001, 0x00002080,
+ 0x00800081, 0x00000001, 0x00002080, 0x00800080,
+ 0x00002000, 0x00802080, 0x00802081, 0x00000081,
+ 0x00800080, 0x00800001, 0x00802000, 0x00802081,
+ 0x00000081, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x00802000,
+ 0x00002080, 0x00800080, 0x00800081, 0x00000001,
+ 0x00802001, 0x00002081, 0x00002081, 0x00000080,
+ 0x00802081, 0x00000081, 0x00000001, 0x00002000,
+ 0x00800001, 0x00002001, 0x00802080, 0x00800081,
+ 0x00002001, 0x00002080, 0x00800000, 0x00802001,
+ 0x00000080, 0x00800000, 0x00002000, 0x00802080
+};
+
+static const uint32_t SB5[64] =
+{
+ 0x00000100, 0x02080100, 0x02080000, 0x42000100,
+ 0x00080000, 0x00000100, 0x40000000, 0x02080000,
+ 0x40080100, 0x00080000, 0x02000100, 0x40080100,
+ 0x42000100, 0x42080000, 0x00080100, 0x40000000,
+ 0x02000000, 0x40080000, 0x40080000, 0x00000000,
+ 0x40000100, 0x42080100, 0x42080100, 0x02000100,
+ 0x42080000, 0x40000100, 0x00000000, 0x42000000,
+ 0x02080100, 0x02000000, 0x42000000, 0x00080100,
+ 0x00080000, 0x42000100, 0x00000100, 0x02000000,
+ 0x40000000, 0x02080000, 0x42000100, 0x40080100,
+ 0x02000100, 0x40000000, 0x42080000, 0x02080100,
+ 0x40080100, 0x00000100, 0x02000000, 0x42080000,
+ 0x42080100, 0x00080100, 0x42000000, 0x42080100,
+ 0x02080000, 0x00000000, 0x40080000, 0x42000000,
+ 0x00080100, 0x02000100, 0x40000100, 0x00080000,
+ 0x00000000, 0x40080000, 0x02080100, 0x40000100
+};
+
+static const uint32_t SB6[64] =
+{
+ 0x20000010, 0x20400000, 0x00004000, 0x20404010,
+ 0x20400000, 0x00000010, 0x20404010, 0x00400000,
+ 0x20004000, 0x00404010, 0x00400000, 0x20000010,
+ 0x00400010, 0x20004000, 0x20000000, 0x00004010,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010, 0x00004000,
+ 0x00404000, 0x20004010, 0x00000010, 0x20400010,
+ 0x20400010, 0x00000000, 0x00404010, 0x20404000,
+ 0x00004010, 0x00404000, 0x20404000, 0x20000000,
+ 0x20004000, 0x00000010, 0x20400010, 0x00404000,
+ 0x20404010, 0x00400000, 0x00004010, 0x20000010,
+ 0x00400000, 0x20004000, 0x20000000, 0x00004010,
+ 0x20000010, 0x20404010, 0x00404000, 0x20400000,
+ 0x00404010, 0x20404000, 0x00000000, 0x20400010,
+ 0x00000010, 0x00004000, 0x20400000, 0x00404010,
+ 0x00004000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010, 0x00000000,
+ 0x20404000, 0x20000000, 0x00400010, 0x20004010
+};
+
+static const uint32_t SB7[64] =
+{
+ 0x00200000, 0x04200002, 0x04000802, 0x00000000,
+ 0x00000800, 0x04000802, 0x00200802, 0x04200800,
+ 0x04200802, 0x00200000, 0x00000000, 0x04000002,
+ 0x00000002, 0x04000000, 0x04200002, 0x00000802,
+ 0x04000800, 0x00200802, 0x00200002, 0x04000800,
+ 0x04000002, 0x04200000, 0x04200800, 0x00200002,
+ 0x04200000, 0x00000800, 0x00000802, 0x04200802,
+ 0x00200800, 0x00000002, 0x04000000, 0x00200800,
+ 0x04000000, 0x00200800, 0x00200000, 0x04000802,
+ 0x04000802, 0x04200002, 0x04200002, 0x00000002,
+ 0x00200002, 0x04000000, 0x04000800, 0x00200000,
+ 0x04200800, 0x00000802, 0x00200802, 0x04200800,
+ 0x00000802, 0x04000002, 0x04200802, 0x04200000,
+ 0x00200800, 0x00000000, 0x00000002, 0x04200802,
+ 0x00000000, 0x00200802, 0x04200000, 0x00000800,
+ 0x04000002, 0x04000800, 0x00000800, 0x00200002
+};
+
+static const uint32_t SB8[64] =
+{
+ 0x10001040, 0x00001000, 0x00040000, 0x10041040,
+ 0x10000000, 0x10001040, 0x00000040, 0x10000000,
+ 0x00040040, 0x10040000, 0x10041040, 0x00041000,
+ 0x10041000, 0x00041040, 0x00001000, 0x00000040,
+ 0x10040000, 0x10000040, 0x10001000, 0x00001040,
+ 0x00041000, 0x00040040, 0x10040040, 0x10041000,
+ 0x00001040, 0x00000000, 0x00000000, 0x10040040,
+ 0x10000040, 0x10001000, 0x00041040, 0x00040000,
+ 0x00041040, 0x00040000, 0x10041000, 0x00001000,
+ 0x00000040, 0x10040040, 0x00001000, 0x00041040,
+ 0x10001000, 0x00000040, 0x10000040, 0x10040000,
+ 0x10040040, 0x10000000, 0x00040000, 0x10001040,
+ 0x00000000, 0x10041040, 0x00040040, 0x10000040,
+ 0x10040000, 0x10001000, 0x10001040, 0x00000000,
+ 0x10041040, 0x00041000, 0x00041000, 0x00001040,
+ 0x00001040, 0x00040040, 0x10000000, 0x10041000
+};
+
+/*
+ * PC1: left and right halves bit-swap
+ */
+static const uint32_t LHs[16] =
+{
+ 0x00000000, 0x00000001, 0x00000100, 0x00000101,
+ 0x00010000, 0x00010001, 0x00010100, 0x00010101,
+ 0x01000000, 0x01000001, 0x01000100, 0x01000101,
+ 0x01010000, 0x01010001, 0x01010100, 0x01010101
+};
+
+static const uint32_t RHs[16] =
+{
+ 0x00000000, 0x01000000, 0x00010000, 0x01010000,
+ 0x00000100, 0x01000100, 0x00010100, 0x01010100,
+ 0x00000001, 0x01000001, 0x00010001, 0x01010001,
+ 0x00000101, 0x01000101, 0x00010101, 0x01010101,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initial Permutation macro
+ */
+#define DES_IP(X, Y) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ T = (((X) >> 4) ^ (Y)) & 0x0F0F0F0F; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 4); \
+ T = (((X) >> 16) ^ (Y)) & 0x0000FFFF; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 16); \
+ T = (((Y) >> 2) ^ (X)) & 0x33333333; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 2); \
+ T = (((Y) >> 8) ^ (X)) & 0x00FF00FF; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 8); \
+ (Y) = (((Y) << 1) | ((Y) >> 31)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \
+ T = ((X) ^ (Y)) & 0xAAAAAAAA; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= T; \
+ (X) = (((X) << 1) | ((X) >> 31)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \
+ } while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Final Permutation macro
+ */
+#define DES_FP(X, Y) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ (X) = (((X) << 31) | ((X) >> 1)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \
+ T = ((X) ^ (Y)) & 0xAAAAAAAA; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= T; \
+ (Y) = (((Y) << 31) | ((Y) >> 1)) & 0xFFFFFFFF; \
+ T = (((Y) >> 8) ^ (X)) & 0x00FF00FF; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 8); \
+ T = (((Y) >> 2) ^ (X)) & 0x33333333; (X) ^= T; (Y) ^= (T << 2); \
+ T = (((X) >> 16) ^ (Y)) & 0x0000FFFF; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 16); \
+ T = (((X) >> 4) ^ (Y)) & 0x0F0F0F0F; (Y) ^= T; (X) ^= (T << 4); \
+ } while (0)
+
+/*
+ * DES round macro
+ */
+#define DES_ROUND(X, Y) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ T = *SK++ ^ (X); \
+ (Y) ^= SB8[(T) & 0x3F] ^ \
+ SB6[(T >> 8) & 0x3F] ^ \
+ SB4[(T >> 16) & 0x3F] ^ \
+ SB2[(T >> 24) & 0x3F]; \
+ \
+ T = *SK++ ^ (((X) << 28) | ((X) >> 4)); \
+ (Y) ^= SB7[(T) & 0x3F] ^ \
+ SB5[(T >> 8) & 0x3F] ^ \
+ SB3[(T >> 16) & 0x3F] ^ \
+ SB1[(T >> 24) & 0x3F]; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define SWAP(a, b) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ uint32_t t = (a); (a) = (b); (b) = t; t = 0; \
+ } while (0)
+
+void mbedtls_des_init(mbedtls_des_context *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_des_context));
+}
+
+void mbedtls_des_free(mbedtls_des_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_des_context));
+}
+
+void mbedtls_des3_init(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_des3_context));
+}
+
+void mbedtls_des3_free(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_des3_context));
+}
+
+static const unsigned char odd_parity_table[128] = { 1, 2, 4, 7, 8,
+ 11, 13, 14, 16, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 31, 32,
+ 35, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44,
+ 47, 49, 50, 52, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62, 64, 67, 69,
+ 70, 73, 74, 76, 79, 81,
+ 82, 84, 87, 88, 91, 93, 94, 97, 98, 100, 103,
+ 104, 107, 109, 110, 112,
+ 115, 117, 118, 121, 122, 124, 127, 128, 131,
+ 133, 134, 137, 138, 140,
+ 143, 145, 146, 148, 151, 152, 155, 157, 158,
+ 161, 162, 164, 167, 168,
+ 171, 173, 174, 176, 179, 181, 182, 185, 186,
+ 188, 191, 193, 194, 196,
+ 199, 200, 203, 205, 206, 208, 211, 213, 214,
+ 217, 218, 220, 223, 224,
+ 227, 229, 230, 233, 234, 236, 239, 241, 242,
+ 244, 247, 248, 251, 253,
+ 254 };
+
+void mbedtls_des_key_set_parity(unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE; i++) {
+ key[i] = odd_parity_table[key[i] / 2];
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the given key's parity, returns 1 on failure, 0 on SUCCESS
+ */
+int mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity(const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE; i++) {
+ if (key[i] != odd_parity_table[key[i] / 2]) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Table of weak and semi-weak keys
+ *
+ * Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weak_key
+ *
+ * Weak:
+ * Alternating ones + zeros (0x0101010101010101)
+ * Alternating 'F' + 'E' (0xFEFEFEFEFEFEFEFE)
+ * '0xE0E0E0E0F1F1F1F1'
+ * '0x1F1F1F1F0E0E0E0E'
+ *
+ * Semi-weak:
+ * 0x011F011F010E010E and 0x1F011F010E010E01
+ * 0x01E001E001F101F1 and 0xE001E001F101F101
+ * 0x01FE01FE01FE01FE and 0xFE01FE01FE01FE01
+ * 0x1FE01FE00EF10EF1 and 0xE01FE01FF10EF10E
+ * 0x1FFE1FFE0EFE0EFE and 0xFE1FFE1FFE0EFE0E
+ * 0xE0FEE0FEF1FEF1FE and 0xFEE0FEE0FEF1FEF1
+ *
+ */
+
+#define WEAK_KEY_COUNT 16
+
+static const unsigned char weak_key_table[WEAK_KEY_COUNT][MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE] =
+{
+ { 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01 },
+ { 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE, 0xFE },
+ { 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x1F, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E, 0x0E },
+ { 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xE0, 0xF1, 0xF1, 0xF1, 0xF1 },
+
+ { 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x0E },
+ { 0x1F, 0x01, 0x1F, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01, 0x0E, 0x01 },
+ { 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01, 0xF1 },
+ { 0xE0, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01, 0xF1, 0x01 },
+ { 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE },
+ { 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01, 0xFE, 0x01 },
+ { 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xF1 },
+ { 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xE0, 0x1F, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x0E },
+ { 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE },
+ { 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0xFE, 0x0E },
+ { 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE },
+ { 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xE0, 0xFE, 0xF1, 0xFE, 0xF1 }
+};
+
+int mbedtls_des_key_check_weak(const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < WEAK_KEY_COUNT; i++) {
+ if (memcmp(weak_key_table[i], key, MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE) == 0) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT)
+void mbedtls_des_setkey(uint32_t SK[32], const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE])
+{
+ int i;
+ uint32_t X, Y, T;
+
+ X = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, 0);
+ Y = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, 4);
+
+ /*
+ * Permuted Choice 1
+ */
+ T = ((Y >> 4) ^ X) & 0x0F0F0F0F; X ^= T; Y ^= (T << 4);
+ T = ((Y) ^ X) & 0x10101010; X ^= T; Y ^= (T);
+
+ X = (LHs[(X) & 0xF] << 3) | (LHs[(X >> 8) & 0xF] << 2)
+ | (LHs[(X >> 16) & 0xF] << 1) | (LHs[(X >> 24) & 0xF])
+ | (LHs[(X >> 5) & 0xF] << 7) | (LHs[(X >> 13) & 0xF] << 6)
+ | (LHs[(X >> 21) & 0xF] << 5) | (LHs[(X >> 29) & 0xF] << 4);
+
+ Y = (RHs[(Y >> 1) & 0xF] << 3) | (RHs[(Y >> 9) & 0xF] << 2)
+ | (RHs[(Y >> 17) & 0xF] << 1) | (RHs[(Y >> 25) & 0xF])
+ | (RHs[(Y >> 4) & 0xF] << 7) | (RHs[(Y >> 12) & 0xF] << 6)
+ | (RHs[(Y >> 20) & 0xF] << 5) | (RHs[(Y >> 28) & 0xF] << 4);
+
+ X &= 0x0FFFFFFF;
+ Y &= 0x0FFFFFFF;
+
+ /*
+ * calculate subkeys
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ if (i < 2 || i == 8 || i == 15) {
+ X = ((X << 1) | (X >> 27)) & 0x0FFFFFFF;
+ Y = ((Y << 1) | (Y >> 27)) & 0x0FFFFFFF;
+ } else {
+ X = ((X << 2) | (X >> 26)) & 0x0FFFFFFF;
+ Y = ((Y << 2) | (Y >> 26)) & 0x0FFFFFFF;
+ }
+
+ *SK++ = ((X << 4) & 0x24000000) | ((X << 28) & 0x10000000)
+ | ((X << 14) & 0x08000000) | ((X << 18) & 0x02080000)
+ | ((X << 6) & 0x01000000) | ((X << 9) & 0x00200000)
+ | ((X >> 1) & 0x00100000) | ((X << 10) & 0x00040000)
+ | ((X << 2) & 0x00020000) | ((X >> 10) & 0x00010000)
+ | ((Y >> 13) & 0x00002000) | ((Y >> 4) & 0x00001000)
+ | ((Y << 6) & 0x00000800) | ((Y >> 1) & 0x00000400)
+ | ((Y >> 14) & 0x00000200) | ((Y) & 0x00000100)
+ | ((Y >> 5) & 0x00000020) | ((Y >> 10) & 0x00000010)
+ | ((Y >> 3) & 0x00000008) | ((Y >> 18) & 0x00000004)
+ | ((Y >> 26) & 0x00000002) | ((Y >> 24) & 0x00000001);
+
+ *SK++ = ((X << 15) & 0x20000000) | ((X << 17) & 0x10000000)
+ | ((X << 10) & 0x08000000) | ((X << 22) & 0x04000000)
+ | ((X >> 2) & 0x02000000) | ((X << 1) & 0x01000000)
+ | ((X << 16) & 0x00200000) | ((X << 11) & 0x00100000)
+ | ((X << 3) & 0x00080000) | ((X >> 6) & 0x00040000)
+ | ((X << 15) & 0x00020000) | ((X >> 4) & 0x00010000)
+ | ((Y >> 2) & 0x00002000) | ((Y << 8) & 0x00001000)
+ | ((Y >> 14) & 0x00000808) | ((Y >> 9) & 0x00000400)
+ | ((Y) & 0x00000200) | ((Y << 7) & 0x00000100)
+ | ((Y >> 7) & 0x00000020) | ((Y >> 3) & 0x00000011)
+ | ((Y << 2) & 0x00000004) | ((Y >> 21) & 0x00000002);
+ }
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DES_SETKEY_ALT */
+
+/*
+ * DES key schedule (56-bit, encryption)
+ */
+int mbedtls_des_setkey_enc(mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE])
+{
+ mbedtls_des_setkey(ctx->sk, key);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * DES key schedule (56-bit, decryption)
+ */
+int mbedtls_des_setkey_dec(mbedtls_des_context *ctx, const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ mbedtls_des_setkey(ctx->sk, key);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i += 2) {
+ SWAP(ctx->sk[i], ctx->sk[30 - i]);
+ SWAP(ctx->sk[i + 1], ctx->sk[31 - i]);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void des3_set2key(uint32_t esk[96],
+ uint32_t dsk[96],
+ const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE*2])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ mbedtls_des_setkey(esk, key);
+ mbedtls_des_setkey(dsk + 32, key + 8);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i += 2) {
+ dsk[i] = esk[30 - i];
+ dsk[i + 1] = esk[31 - i];
+
+ esk[i + 32] = dsk[62 - i];
+ esk[i + 33] = dsk[63 - i];
+
+ esk[i + 64] = esk[i];
+ esk[i + 65] = esk[i + 1];
+
+ dsk[i + 64] = dsk[i];
+ dsk[i + 65] = dsk[i + 1];
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Triple-DES key schedule (112-bit, encryption)
+ */
+int mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2])
+{
+ uint32_t sk[96];
+
+ des3_set2key(ctx->sk, sk, key);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sk, sizeof(sk));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Triple-DES key schedule (112-bit, decryption)
+ */
+int mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 2])
+{
+ uint32_t sk[96];
+
+ des3_set2key(sk, ctx->sk, key);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sk, sizeof(sk));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void des3_set3key(uint32_t esk[96],
+ uint32_t dsk[96],
+ const unsigned char key[24])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ mbedtls_des_setkey(esk, key);
+ mbedtls_des_setkey(dsk + 32, key + 8);
+ mbedtls_des_setkey(esk + 64, key + 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i += 2) {
+ dsk[i] = esk[94 - i];
+ dsk[i + 1] = esk[95 - i];
+
+ esk[i + 32] = dsk[62 - i];
+ esk[i + 33] = dsk[63 - i];
+
+ dsk[i + 64] = esk[30 - i];
+ dsk[i + 65] = esk[31 - i];
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Triple-DES key schedule (168-bit, encryption)
+ */
+int mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3])
+{
+ uint32_t sk[96];
+
+ des3_set3key(ctx->sk, sk, key);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sk, sizeof(sk));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Triple-DES key schedule (168-bit, decryption)
+ */
+int mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE * 3])
+{
+ uint32_t sk[96];
+
+ des3_set3key(sk, ctx->sk, key);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sk, sizeof(sk));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * DES-ECB block encryption/decryption
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT)
+int mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_des_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char input[8],
+ unsigned char output[8])
+{
+ int i;
+ uint32_t X, Y, T, *SK;
+
+ SK = ctx->sk;
+
+ X = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 0);
+ Y = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 4);
+
+ DES_IP(X, Y);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ DES_ROUND(Y, X);
+ DES_ROUND(X, Y);
+ }
+
+ DES_FP(Y, X);
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(Y, output, 0);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(X, output, 4);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DES_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+/*
+ * DES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ unsigned char iv[8],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char temp[8];
+
+ if (length % 8) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT) {
+ while (length > 0) {
+ mbedtls_xor(output, input, iv, 8);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb(ctx, output, output);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ memcpy(iv, output, 8);
+
+ input += 8;
+ output += 8;
+ length -= 8;
+ }
+ } else { /* MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT */
+ while (length > 0) {
+ memcpy(temp, input, 8);
+ ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb(ctx, input, output);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_xor(output, output, iv, 8);
+
+ memcpy(iv, temp, 8);
+
+ input += 8;
+ output += 8;
+ length -= 8;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+/*
+ * 3DES-ECB block encryption/decryption
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT)
+int mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char input[8],
+ unsigned char output[8])
+{
+ int i;
+ uint32_t X, Y, T, *SK;
+
+ SK = ctx->sk;
+
+ X = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 0);
+ Y = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(input, 4);
+
+ DES_IP(X, Y);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ DES_ROUND(Y, X);
+ DES_ROUND(X, Y);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ DES_ROUND(X, Y);
+ DES_ROUND(Y, X);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ DES_ROUND(Y, X);
+ DES_ROUND(X, Y);
+ }
+
+ DES_FP(Y, X);
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(Y, output, 0);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(X, output, 4);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DES3_CRYPT_ECB_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+/*
+ * 3DES-CBC buffer encryption/decryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_des3_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ unsigned char iv[8],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char temp[8];
+
+ if (length % 8) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_DES_ENCRYPT) {
+ while (length > 0) {
+ mbedtls_xor(output, input, iv, 8);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb(ctx, output, output);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ memcpy(iv, output, 8);
+
+ input += 8;
+ output += 8;
+ length -= 8;
+ }
+ } else { /* MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT */
+ while (length > 0) {
+ memcpy(temp, input, 8);
+ ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb(ctx, input, output);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_xor(output, output, iv, 8);
+
+ memcpy(iv, temp, 8);
+
+ input += 8;
+ output += 8;
+ length -= 8;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DES_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/*
+ * DES and 3DES test vectors from:
+ *
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/des/tripledes-vectors.zip
+ */
+static const unsigned char des3_test_keys[24] =
+{
+ 0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF,
+ 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0x01,
+ 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0x01, 0x23
+};
+
+static const unsigned char des3_test_buf[8] =
+{
+ 0x4E, 0x6F, 0x77, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74
+};
+
+static const unsigned char des3_test_ecb_dec[3][8] =
+{
+ { 0x37, 0x2B, 0x98, 0xBF, 0x52, 0x65, 0xB0, 0x59 },
+ { 0xC2, 0x10, 0x19, 0x9C, 0x38, 0x5A, 0x65, 0xA1 },
+ { 0xA2, 0x70, 0x56, 0x68, 0x69, 0xE5, 0x15, 0x1D }
+};
+
+static const unsigned char des3_test_ecb_enc[3][8] =
+{
+ { 0x1C, 0xD5, 0x97, 0xEA, 0x84, 0x26, 0x73, 0xFB },
+ { 0xB3, 0x92, 0x4D, 0xF3, 0xC5, 0xB5, 0x42, 0x93 },
+ { 0xDA, 0x37, 0x64, 0x41, 0xBA, 0x6F, 0x62, 0x6F }
+};
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+static const unsigned char des3_test_iv[8] =
+{
+ 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x90, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF,
+};
+
+static const unsigned char des3_test_cbc_dec[3][8] =
+{
+ { 0x58, 0xD9, 0x48, 0xEF, 0x85, 0x14, 0x65, 0x9A },
+ { 0x5F, 0xC8, 0x78, 0xD4, 0xD7, 0x92, 0xD9, 0x54 },
+ { 0x25, 0xF9, 0x75, 0x85, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x48, 0xBF }
+};
+
+static const unsigned char des3_test_cbc_enc[3][8] =
+{
+ { 0x91, 0x1C, 0x6D, 0xCF, 0x48, 0xA7, 0xC3, 0x4D },
+ { 0x60, 0x1A, 0x76, 0x8F, 0xA1, 0xF9, 0x66, 0xF1 },
+ { 0xA1, 0x50, 0x0F, 0x99, 0xB2, 0xCD, 0x64, 0x76 }
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+/*
+ * Checkup routine
+ */
+int mbedtls_des_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ int i, j, u, v, ret = 0;
+ mbedtls_des_context ctx;
+ mbedtls_des3_context ctx3;
+ unsigned char buf[8];
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ unsigned char prv[8];
+ unsigned char iv[8];
+#endif
+
+ mbedtls_des_init(&ctx);
+ mbedtls_des3_init(&ctx3);
+ /*
+ * ECB mode
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+ u = i >> 1;
+ v = i & 1;
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" DES%c-ECB-%3d (%s): ",
+ (u == 0) ? ' ' : '3', 56 + u * 56,
+ (v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc");
+ }
+
+ memcpy(buf, des3_test_buf, 8);
+
+ switch (i) {
+ case 0:
+ ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_dec(&ctx, des3_test_keys);
+ break;
+
+ case 1:
+ ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_enc(&ctx, des3_test_keys);
+ break;
+
+ case 2:
+ ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec(&ctx3, des3_test_keys);
+ break;
+
+ case 3:
+ ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc(&ctx3, des3_test_keys);
+ break;
+
+ case 4:
+ ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec(&ctx3, des3_test_keys);
+ break;
+
+ case 5:
+ ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc(&ctx3, des3_test_keys);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < 100; j++) {
+ if (u == 0) {
+ ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_ecb(&ctx, buf, buf);
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_ecb(&ctx3, buf, buf);
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT &&
+ memcmp(buf, des3_test_ecb_dec[u], 8) != 0) ||
+ (v != MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT &&
+ memcmp(buf, des3_test_ecb_enc[u], 8) != 0)) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+ /*
+ * CBC mode
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+ u = i >> 1;
+ v = i & 1;
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" DES%c-CBC-%3d (%s): ",
+ (u == 0) ? ' ' : '3', 56 + u * 56,
+ (v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT) ? "dec" : "enc");
+ }
+
+ memcpy(iv, des3_test_iv, 8);
+ memcpy(prv, des3_test_iv, 8);
+ memcpy(buf, des3_test_buf, 8);
+
+ switch (i) {
+ case 0:
+ ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_dec(&ctx, des3_test_keys);
+ break;
+
+ case 1:
+ ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_enc(&ctx, des3_test_keys);
+ break;
+
+ case 2:
+ ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_dec(&ctx3, des3_test_keys);
+ break;
+
+ case 3:
+ ret = mbedtls_des3_set2key_enc(&ctx3, des3_test_keys);
+ break;
+
+ case 4:
+ ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec(&ctx3, des3_test_keys);
+ break;
+
+ case 5:
+ ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_enc(&ctx3, des3_test_keys);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT) {
+ for (j = 0; j < 100; j++) {
+ if (u == 0) {
+ ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc(&ctx, v, 8, iv, buf, buf);
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc(&ctx3, v, 8, iv, buf, buf);
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ for (j = 0; j < 100; j++) {
+ unsigned char tmp[8];
+
+ if (u == 0) {
+ ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc(&ctx, v, 8, iv, buf, buf);
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc(&ctx3, v, 8, iv, buf, buf);
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(tmp, prv, 8);
+ memcpy(prv, buf, 8);
+ memcpy(buf, tmp, 8);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(buf, prv, 8);
+ }
+
+ if ((v == MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT &&
+ memcmp(buf, des3_test_cbc_dec[u], 8) != 0) ||
+ (v != MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT &&
+ memcmp(buf, des3_test_cbc_enc[u], 8) != 0)) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_des_free(&ctx);
+ mbedtls_des3_free(&ctx3);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/dhm.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/dhm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bcc07f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/dhm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,712 @@
+/*
+ * Diffie-Hellman-Merkle key exchange
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+/*
+ * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation
+ * of the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle algorithm:
+ *
+ * [1] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 12
+ * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/dhm.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
+#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT)
+
+/*
+ * helper to validate the mbedtls_mpi size and import it
+ */
+static int dhm_read_bignum(mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end)
+{
+ int ret, n;
+
+ if (end - *p < 2) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ n = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*p, 0);
+ (*p) += 2;
+
+ if ((size_t) (end - *p) < (size_t) n) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(X, *p, n)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED, ret);
+ }
+
+ (*p) += n;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify sanity of parameter with regards to P
+ *
+ * Parameter should be: 2 <= public_param <= P - 2
+ *
+ * This means that we need to return an error if
+ * public_param < 2 or public_param > P-2
+ *
+ * For more information on the attack, see:
+ * http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/psandqs.pdf
+ * http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2005-2643
+ */
+static int dhm_check_range(const mbedtls_mpi *param, const mbedtls_mpi *P)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi U;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&U);
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&U, P, 2));
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(param, 2) < 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(param, &U) > 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&U);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_dhm_init(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_dhm_context));
+}
+
+size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx)
+{
+ return mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->P);
+}
+
+size_t mbedtls_dhm_get_len(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx)
+{
+ return mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->P);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_dhm_get_value(const mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_dhm_parameter param,
+ mbedtls_mpi *dest)
+{
+ const mbedtls_mpi *src = NULL;
+ switch (param) {
+ case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_P:
+ src = &ctx->P;
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_G:
+ src = &ctx->G;
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_X:
+ src = &ctx->X;
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GX:
+ src = &ctx->GX;
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_GY:
+ src = &ctx->GY;
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_DHM_PARAM_K:
+ src = &ctx->K;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ return mbedtls_mpi_copy(dest, src);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse the ServerKeyExchange parameters
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_read_params(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if ((ret = dhm_read_bignum(&ctx->P, p, end)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = dhm_read_bignum(&ctx->G, p, end)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = dhm_read_bignum(&ctx->GY, p, end)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = dhm_check_range(&ctx->GY, &ctx->P)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pick a random R in the range [2, M-2] for blinding or key generation.
+ */
+static int dhm_random_below(mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *M,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_random(R, 3, M, f_rng, p_rng));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(R, R, 1));
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int dhm_make_common(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->P, 0) == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ if (x_size < 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if ((unsigned) x_size < mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->P)) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&ctx->X, x_size, f_rng, p_rng));
+ } else {
+ /* Generate X as large as possible ( <= P - 2 ) */
+ ret = dhm_random_below(&ctx->X, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng);
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED;
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate GX = G^X mod P
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->GX, &ctx->G, &ctx->X,
+ &ctx->P, &ctx->RP));
+
+ if ((ret = dhm_check_range(&ctx->GX, &ctx->P)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_make_params(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret;
+ size_t n1, n2, n3;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ ret = dhm_make_common(ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Export P, G, GX. RFC 5246 §4.4 states that "leading zero octets are
+ * not required". We omit leading zeros for compactness.
+ */
+#define DHM_MPI_EXPORT(X, n) \
+ do { \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary((X), \
+ p + 2, \
+ (n))); \
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(n); \
+ *p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(n); \
+ p += (n); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ n1 = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->P);
+ n2 = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->G);
+ n3 = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->GX);
+
+ p = output;
+ DHM_MPI_EXPORT(&ctx->P, n1);
+ DHM_MPI_EXPORT(&ctx->G, n2);
+ DHM_MPI_EXPORT(&ctx->GX, n3);
+
+ *olen = (size_t) (p - output);
+
+cleanup:
+ if (ret != 0 && ret > -128) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED, ret);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set prime modulus and generator
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_set_group(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *P,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *G)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->P, P)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->G, G)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED, ret);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Import the peer's public value G^Y
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_read_public(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (ilen < 1 || ilen > mbedtls_dhm_get_len(ctx)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->GY, input, ilen)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create own private value X and export G^X
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_make_public(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx, int x_size,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t olen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (olen < 1 || olen > mbedtls_dhm_get_len(ctx)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ret = dhm_make_common(ctx, x_size, f_rng, p_rng);
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED;
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->GX, output, olen));
+
+cleanup:
+ if (ret != 0 && ret > -128) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED, ret);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Use the blinding method and optimisation suggested in section 10 of:
+ * KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA,
+ * DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer
+ * Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113.
+ */
+static int dhm_update_blinding(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret;
+ mbedtls_mpi R;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&R);
+
+ /*
+ * Don't use any blinding the first time a particular X is used,
+ * but remember it to use blinding next time.
+ */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&ctx->X, &ctx->pX) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->pX, &ctx->X));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&ctx->Vi, 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&ctx->Vf, 1));
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ok, we need blinding. Can we re-use existing values?
+ * If yes, just update them by squaring them.
+ */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&ctx->Vi, 1) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->Vi, &ctx->P));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P));
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We need to generate blinding values from scratch
+ */
+
+ /* Vi = random( 2, P-2 ) */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(dhm_random_below(&ctx->Vi, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng));
+
+ /* Vf = Vi^-X mod P
+ * First compute Vi^-1 = R * (R Vi)^-1, (avoiding leaks from inv_mod),
+ * then elevate to the Xth power. */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(dhm_random_below(&R, &ctx->P, f_rng, p_rng));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vi, &R));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &R));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->P));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->Vf, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->X, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP));
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&R);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Derive and export the shared secret (G^Y)^X mod P
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_size, size_t *olen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi GYb;
+
+ if (f_rng == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (output_size < mbedtls_dhm_get_len(ctx)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = dhm_check_range(&ctx->GY, &ctx->P)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&GYb);
+
+ /* Blind peer's value */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(dhm_update_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&GYb, &ctx->GY, &ctx->Vi));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&GYb, &GYb, &ctx->P));
+
+ /* Do modular exponentiation */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&ctx->K, &GYb, &ctx->X,
+ &ctx->P, &ctx->RP));
+
+ /* Unblind secret value */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->Vf));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&ctx->K, &ctx->K, &ctx->P));
+
+ /* Output the secret without any leading zero byte. This is mandatory
+ * for TLS per RFC 5246 §8.1.2. */
+ *olen = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->K);
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->K, output, *olen));
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&GYb);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED, ret);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free the components of a DHM key
+ */
+void mbedtls_dhm_free(mbedtls_dhm_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->pX);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vf);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->Vi);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->RP);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->K);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->GY);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->GX);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->X);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->G);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->P);
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_dhm_context));
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+/*
+ * Parse DHM parameters
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm(mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const unsigned char *dhmin,
+ size_t dhminlen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len;
+ unsigned char *p, *end;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
+ mbedtls_pem_context pem;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
+ mbedtls_pem_init(&pem);
+
+ /* Avoid calling mbedtls_pem_read_buffer() on non-null-terminated string */
+ if (dhminlen == 0 || dhmin[dhminlen - 1] != '\0') {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT;
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(&pem,
+ "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----",
+ "-----END DH PARAMETERS-----",
+ dhmin, NULL, 0, &dhminlen);
+ }
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Was PEM encoded
+ */
+ dhminlen = pem.buflen;
+ } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ p = (ret == 0) ? pem.buf : (unsigned char *) dhmin;
+#else
+ p = (unsigned char *) dhmin;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
+ end = p + dhminlen;
+
+ /*
+ * DHParams ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * prime INTEGER, -- P
+ * generator INTEGER, -- g
+ * privateValueLength INTEGER OPTIONAL
+ * }
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ end = p + len;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end, &dhm->P)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end, &dhm->G)) != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (p != end) {
+ /* This might be the optional privateValueLength.
+ * If so, we can cleanly discard it */
+ mbedtls_mpi rec;
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&rec);
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end, &rec);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&rec);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if (p != end) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
+ mbedtls_pem_free(&pem);
+#endif
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_dhm_free(dhm);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+/*
+ * Load all data from a file into a given buffer.
+ *
+ * The file is expected to contain either PEM or DER encoded data.
+ * A terminating null byte is always appended. It is included in the announced
+ * length only if the data looks like it is PEM encoded.
+ */
+static int load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n)
+{
+ FILE *f;
+ long size;
+
+ if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ }
+ /* The data loaded here is public, so don't bother disabling buffering. */
+
+ fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END);
+ if ((size = ftell(f)) == -1) {
+ fclose(f);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ }
+ fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET);
+
+ *n = (size_t) size;
+
+ if (*n + 1 == 0 ||
+ (*buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, *n + 1)) == NULL) {
+ fclose(f);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (fread(*buf, 1, *n, f) != *n) {
+ fclose(f);
+
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(*buf, *n + 1);
+
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ fclose(f);
+
+ (*buf)[*n] = '\0';
+
+ if (strstr((const char *) *buf, "-----BEGIN ") != NULL) {
+ ++*n;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load and parse DHM parameters
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhmfile(mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm, const char *path)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t n;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ if ((ret = load_file(path, &buf, &n)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm(dhm, buf, n);
+
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, n);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
+static const char mbedtls_test_dhm_params[] =
+ "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n"
+ "MIGHAoGBAJ419DBEOgmQTzo5qXl5fQcN9TN455wkOL7052HzxxRVMyhYmwQcgJvh\r\n"
+ "1sa18fyfR9OiVEMYglOpkqVoGLN7qd5aQNNi5W7/C+VBdHTBJcGZJyyP5B3qcz32\r\n"
+ "9mLJKudlVudV0Qxk5qUJaPZ/xupz0NyoVpviuiBOI1gNi8ovSXWzAgEC\r\n"
+ "-----END DH PARAMETERS-----\r\n";
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
+static const char mbedtls_test_dhm_params[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x81, 0x87, 0x02, 0x81, 0x81, 0x00, 0x9e, 0x35, 0xf4, 0x30, 0x44,
+ 0x3a, 0x09, 0x90, 0x4f, 0x3a, 0x39, 0xa9, 0x79, 0x79, 0x7d, 0x07, 0x0d,
+ 0xf5, 0x33, 0x78, 0xe7, 0x9c, 0x24, 0x38, 0xbe, 0xf4, 0xe7, 0x61, 0xf3,
+ 0xc7, 0x14, 0x55, 0x33, 0x28, 0x58, 0x9b, 0x04, 0x1c, 0x80, 0x9b, 0xe1,
+ 0xd6, 0xc6, 0xb5, 0xf1, 0xfc, 0x9f, 0x47, 0xd3, 0xa2, 0x54, 0x43, 0x18,
+ 0x82, 0x53, 0xa9, 0x92, 0xa5, 0x68, 0x18, 0xb3, 0x7b, 0xa9, 0xde, 0x5a,
+ 0x40, 0xd3, 0x62, 0xe5, 0x6e, 0xff, 0x0b, 0xe5, 0x41, 0x74, 0x74, 0xc1,
+ 0x25, 0xc1, 0x99, 0x27, 0x2c, 0x8f, 0xe4, 0x1d, 0xea, 0x73, 0x3d, 0xf6,
+ 0xf6, 0x62, 0xc9, 0x2a, 0xe7, 0x65, 0x56, 0xe7, 0x55, 0xd1, 0x0c, 0x64,
+ 0xe6, 0xa5, 0x09, 0x68, 0xf6, 0x7f, 0xc6, 0xea, 0x73, 0xd0, 0xdc, 0xa8,
+ 0x56, 0x9b, 0xe2, 0xba, 0x20, 0x4e, 0x23, 0x58, 0x0d, 0x8b, 0xca, 0x2f,
+ 0x49, 0x75, 0xb3, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
+
+static const size_t mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len = sizeof(mbedtls_test_dhm_params);
+
+/*
+ * Checkup routine
+ */
+int mbedtls_dhm_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_dhm_context dhm;
+
+ mbedtls_dhm_init(&dhm);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" DHM parameter load: ");
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_dhm_parse_dhm(&dhm,
+ (const unsigned char *) mbedtls_test_dhm_params,
+ mbedtls_test_dhm_params_len)) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n\n");
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_dhm_free(&dhm);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b276c6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecdh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,694 @@
+/*
+ * Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/*
+ * References:
+ *
+ * SEC1 https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf
+ * RFC 4492
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+typedef mbedtls_ecdh_context mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed;
+#endif
+
+static mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id(
+ const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+ return ctx->grp.id;
+#else
+ return ctx->grp_id;
+#endif
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ecdh_can_do(mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid)
+{
+ /* At this time, all groups support ECDH. */
+ (void) gid;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT)
+/*
+ * Generate public key (restartable version)
+ *
+ * Note: this internal function relies on its caller preserving the value of
+ * the output parameter 'd' across continuation calls. This would not be
+ * acceptable for a public function but is OK here as we control call sites.
+ */
+static int ecdh_gen_public_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ int restarting = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ restarting = (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL);
+#endif
+ /* If multiplication is in progress, we already generated a privkey */
+ if (!restarting) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(grp, d, f_rng, p_rng));
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(grp, Q, d, &grp->G,
+ f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx));
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate public key
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ return ecdh_gen_public_restartable(grp, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT)
+/*
+ * Compute shared secret (SEC1 3.3.1)
+ */
+static int ecdh_compute_shared_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *z,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point P;
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&P);
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(grp, &P, d, Q,
+ f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx));
+
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(&P)) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(z, &P.X));
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&P);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute shared secret (SEC1 3.3.1)
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ return ecdh_compute_shared_restartable(grp, z, Q, d,
+ f_rng, p_rng, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */
+
+static void ecdh_init_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&ctx->grp);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->d);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Q);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Qp);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->z);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_init(&ctx->rs);
+#endif
+}
+
+mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecdh_get_grp_id(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+ return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp).id;
+#else
+ return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp_id);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecdh_init(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+ ecdh_init_internal(ctx);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Vi);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Vf);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->_d);
+#else
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_ecdh_context));
+
+ ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_NONE;
+#endif
+ ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ ctx->restart_enabled = 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int ecdh_setup_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx,
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, grp_id);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Setup context
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_setup(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+ return ecdh_setup_internal(ctx, grp_id);
+#else
+ switch (grp_id) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:
+ ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED;
+ ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST;
+ ctx->grp_id = grp_id;
+ return mbedtls_everest_setup(&ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, grp_id);
+#endif
+ default:
+ ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;
+ ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0;
+ ctx->grp_id = grp_id;
+ ecdh_init_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh);
+ return ecdh_setup_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, grp_id);
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+static void ecdh_free_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&ctx->grp);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->d);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Q);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Qp);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->z);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_free(&ctx->rs);
+#endif
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+/*
+ * Enable restartable operations for context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->restart_enabled = 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Free context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecdh_free(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Vi);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Vf);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->_d);
+ ecdh_free_internal(ctx);
+#else
+ switch (ctx->var) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST:
+ mbedtls_everest_free(&ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh);
+ break;
+#endif
+ case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0:
+ ecdh_free_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;
+ ctx->var = MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_NONE;
+ ctx->grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int ecdh_make_params_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx,
+ size_t *olen, int point_format,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *,
+ unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ int restart_enabled)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t grp_len, pt_len;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (ctx->grp.pbits == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (restart_enabled) {
+ rs_ctx = &ctx->rs;
+ }
+#else
+ (void) restart_enabled;
+#endif
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if ((ret = ecdh_gen_public_restartable(&ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q,
+ f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#else
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(&ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q,
+ f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group(&ctx->grp, &grp_len, buf,
+ blen)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ buf += grp_len;
+ blen -= grp_len;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, point_format,
+ &pt_len, buf, blen)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *olen = grp_len + pt_len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Setup and write the ServerKeyExchange parameters (RFC 4492)
+ * struct {
+ * ECParameters curve_params;
+ * ECPoint public;
+ * } ServerECDHParams;
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int restart_enabled = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled;
+#else
+ (void) restart_enabled;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+ return ecdh_make_params_internal(ctx, olen, ctx->point_format, buf, blen,
+ f_rng, p_rng, restart_enabled);
+#else
+ switch (ctx->var) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST:
+ return mbedtls_everest_make_params(&ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen,
+ buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng);
+#endif
+ case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0:
+ return ecdh_make_params_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen,
+ ctx->point_format, buf, blen,
+ f_rng, p_rng,
+ restart_enabled);
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+static int ecdh_read_params_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx,
+ const unsigned char **buf,
+ const unsigned char *end)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Qp, buf,
+ (size_t) (end - *buf));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the ServerKeyExchange parameters (RFC 4492)
+ * struct {
+ * ECParameters curve_params;
+ * ECPoint public;
+ * } ServerECDHParams;
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_read_params(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char **buf,
+ const unsigned char *end)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(&grp_id, buf, (size_t) (end - *buf)))
+ != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(ctx, grp_id)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+ return ecdh_read_params_internal(ctx, buf, end);
+#else
+ switch (ctx->var) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST:
+ return mbedtls_everest_read_params(&ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh,
+ buf, end);
+#endif
+ case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0:
+ return ecdh_read_params_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh,
+ buf, end);
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+static int ecdh_get_params_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
+ mbedtls_ecdh_side side)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ /* If it's not our key, just import the public part as Qp */
+ if (side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS) {
+ return mbedtls_ecp_copy(&ctx->Qp, &key->Q);
+ }
+
+ /* Our key: import public (as Q) and private parts */
+ if (side != MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy(&ctx->Q, &key->Q)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->d, &key->d)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get parameters from a keypair
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_get_params(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
+ mbedtls_ecdh_side side)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ if (side != MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS && side != MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id(ctx) == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
+ /* This is the first call to get_params(). Set up the context
+ * for use with the group. */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_setup(ctx, key->grp.id)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* This is not the first call to get_params(). Check that the
+ * current key's group is the same as the context's, which was set
+ * from the first key's group. */
+ if (mbedtls_ecdh_grp_id(ctx) != key->grp.id) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+ return ecdh_get_params_internal(ctx, key, side);
+#else
+ switch (ctx->var) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST:
+ {
+ mbedtls_everest_ecdh_side s = side == MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ?
+ MBEDTLS_EVEREST_ECDH_OURS :
+ MBEDTLS_EVEREST_ECDH_THEIRS;
+ return mbedtls_everest_get_params(&ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh,
+ key, s);
+ }
+#endif
+ case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0:
+ return ecdh_get_params_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh,
+ key, side);
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+static int ecdh_make_public_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx,
+ size_t *olen, int point_format,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *,
+ unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ int restart_enabled)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (ctx->grp.pbits == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (restart_enabled) {
+ rs_ctx = &ctx->rs;
+ }
+#else
+ (void) restart_enabled;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if ((ret = ecdh_gen_public_restartable(&ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q,
+ f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#else
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(&ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q,
+ f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+ return mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, point_format, olen,
+ buf, blen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Setup and export the client public value
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int restart_enabled = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+ return ecdh_make_public_internal(ctx, olen, ctx->point_format, buf, blen,
+ f_rng, p_rng, restart_enabled);
+#else
+ switch (ctx->var) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST:
+ return mbedtls_everest_make_public(&ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen,
+ buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng);
+#endif
+ case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0:
+ return ecdh_make_public_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen,
+ ctx->point_format, buf, blen,
+ f_rng, p_rng,
+ restart_enabled);
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+static int ecdh_read_public_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const unsigned char *p = buf;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Qp, &p,
+ blen)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((size_t) (p - buf) != blen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse and import the client's public value
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_read_public(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+ return ecdh_read_public_internal(ctx, buf, blen);
+#else
+ switch (ctx->var) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST:
+ return mbedtls_everest_read_public(&ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh,
+ buf, blen);
+#endif
+ case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0:
+ return ecdh_read_public_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh,
+ buf, blen);
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+static int ecdh_calc_secret_internal(mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed *ctx,
+ size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t blen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *,
+ unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ int restart_enabled)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->grp.pbits == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (restart_enabled) {
+ rs_ctx = &ctx->rs;
+ }
+#else
+ (void) restart_enabled;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if ((ret = ecdh_compute_shared_restartable(&ctx->grp, &ctx->z, &ctx->Qp,
+ &ctx->d, f_rng, p_rng,
+ rs_ctx)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#else
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared(&ctx->grp, &ctx->z, &ctx->Qp,
+ &ctx->d, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_size(&ctx->z) > blen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ *olen = ctx->grp.pbits / 8 + ((ctx->grp.pbits % 8) != 0);
+
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&ctx->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) {
+ return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(&ctx->z, buf, *olen);
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->z, buf, *olen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Derive and export the shared secret
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret(mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int restart_enabled = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ restart_enabled = ctx->restart_enabled;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
+ return ecdh_calc_secret_internal(ctx, olen, buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng,
+ restart_enabled);
+#else
+ switch (ctx->var) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST:
+ return mbedtls_everest_calc_secret(&ctx->ctx.everest_ecdh, olen,
+ buf, blen, f_rng, p_rng);
+#endif
+ case MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_MBEDTLS_2_0:
+ return ecdh_calc_secret_internal(&ctx->ctx.mbed_ecdh, olen, buf,
+ blen, f_rng, p_rng,
+ restart_enabled);
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f7a996
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecdsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,867 @@
+/*
+ * Elliptic curve DSA
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/*
+ * References:
+ *
+ * SEC1 https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
+#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+
+/*
+ * Sub-context for ecdsa_verify()
+ */
+struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver {
+ mbedtls_mpi u1, u2; /* intermediate values */
+ enum { /* what to do next? */
+ ecdsa_ver_init = 0, /* getting started */
+ ecdsa_ver_muladd, /* muladd step */
+ } state;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Init verify restart sub-context
+ */
+static void ecdsa_restart_ver_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->u1);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->u2);
+ ctx->state = ecdsa_ver_init;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free the components of a verify restart sub-context
+ */
+static void ecdsa_restart_ver_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->u1);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->u2);
+
+ ecdsa_restart_ver_init(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sub-context for ecdsa_sign()
+ */
+struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig {
+ int sign_tries;
+ int key_tries;
+ mbedtls_mpi k; /* per-signature random */
+ mbedtls_mpi r; /* r value */
+ enum { /* what to do next? */
+ ecdsa_sig_init = 0, /* getting started */
+ ecdsa_sig_mul, /* doing ecp_mul() */
+ ecdsa_sig_modn, /* mod N computations */
+ } state;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Init verify sign sub-context
+ */
+static void ecdsa_restart_sig_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->sign_tries = 0;
+ ctx->key_tries = 0;
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->k);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->r);
+ ctx->state = ecdsa_sig_init;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free the components of a sign restart sub-context
+ */
+static void ecdsa_restart_sig_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->k);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->r);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+/*
+ * Sub-context for ecdsa_sign_det()
+ */
+struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det {
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx; /* DRBG state */
+ enum { /* what to do next? */
+ ecdsa_det_init = 0, /* getting started */
+ ecdsa_det_sign, /* make signature */
+ } state;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Init verify sign_det sub-context
+ */
+static void ecdsa_restart_det_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(&ctx->rng_ctx);
+ ctx->state = ecdsa_det_init;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free the components of a sign_det restart sub-context
+ */
+static void ecdsa_restart_det_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&ctx->rng_ctx);
+
+ ecdsa_restart_det_init(ctx);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
+
+#define ECDSA_RS_ECP (rs_ctx == NULL ? NULL : &rs_ctx->ecp)
+
+/* Utility macro for checking and updating ops budget */
+#define ECDSA_BUDGET(ops) \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_budget(grp, ECDSA_RS_ECP, ops));
+
+/* Call this when entering a function that needs its own sub-context */
+#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER(SUB) do { \
+ /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ \
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ecp.depth++ == 0) \
+ rs_ctx->ecp.ops_done = 0; \
+ \
+ /* set up our own sub-context if needed */ \
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && \
+ rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB == NULL) \
+ { \
+ rs_ctx->SUB = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(*rs_ctx->SUB)); \
+ if (rs_ctx->SUB == NULL) \
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; \
+ \
+ ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_init(rs_ctx->SUB); \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+/* Call this when leaving a function that needs its own sub-context */
+#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE(SUB) do { \
+ /* clear our sub-context when not in progress (done or error) */ \
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB != NULL && \
+ ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) \
+ { \
+ ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_free(rs_ctx->SUB); \
+ mbedtls_free(rs_ctx->SUB); \
+ rs_ctx->SUB = NULL; \
+ } \
+ \
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL) \
+ rs_ctx->ecp.depth--; \
+} while (0)
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+#define ECDSA_RS_ECP NULL
+
+#define ECDSA_BUDGET(ops) /* no-op; for compatibility */
+
+#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER(SUB) (void) rs_ctx
+#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE(SUB) (void) rs_ctx
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT)
+/*
+ * Derive a suitable integer for group grp from a buffer of length len
+ * SEC1 4.1.3 step 5 aka SEC1 4.1.4 step 3
+ */
+static int derive_mpi(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *x,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t n_size = (grp->nbits + 7) / 8;
+ size_t use_size = blen > n_size ? n_size : blen;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(x, buf, use_size));
+ if (use_size * 8 > grp->nbits) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(x, use_size * 8 - grp->nbits));
+ }
+
+ /* While at it, reduce modulo N */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(x, &grp->N) >= 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(x, x, &grp->N));
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC || !ECDSA_SIGN_ALT || !ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */
+
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid)
+{
+ switch (gid) {
+#ifdef MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519: return 0;
+#endif
+#ifdef MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448: return 0;
+#endif
+ default: return 1;
+ }
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
+/*
+ * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3)
+ * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message)
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+ int ret, key_tries, sign_tries;
+ int *p_sign_tries = &sign_tries, *p_key_tries = &key_tries;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point R;
+ mbedtls_mpi k, e, t;
+ mbedtls_mpi *pk = &k, *pr = r;
+
+ /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
+ if (!mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(grp->id) || grp->N.p == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure d is in range 1..n-1 */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(d, 1) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(d, &grp->N) >= 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&R);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&k); mbedtls_mpi_init(&e); mbedtls_mpi_init(&t);
+
+ ECDSA_RS_ENTER(sig);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL) {
+ /* redirect to our context */
+ p_sign_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->sign_tries;
+ p_key_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->key_tries;
+ pk = &rs_ctx->sig->k;
+ pr = &rs_ctx->sig->r;
+
+ /* jump to current step */
+ if (rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_mul) {
+ goto mul;
+ }
+ if (rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_modn) {
+ goto modn;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+ *p_sign_tries = 0;
+ do {
+ if ((*p_sign_tries)++ > 10) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Steps 1-3: generate a suitable ephemeral keypair
+ * and set r = xR mod n
+ */
+ *p_key_tries = 0;
+ do {
+ if ((*p_key_tries)++ > 10) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(grp, pk, f_rng, p_rng));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL) {
+ rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_mul;
+ }
+
+mul:
+#endif
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(grp, &R, pk, &grp->G,
+ f_rng_blind,
+ p_rng_blind,
+ ECDSA_RS_ECP));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(pr, &R.X, &grp->N));
+ } while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(pr, 0) == 0);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL) {
+ rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_modn;
+ }
+
+modn:
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Accounting for everything up to the end of the loop
+ * (step 6, but checking now avoids saving e and t)
+ */
+ ECDSA_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 4);
+
+ /*
+ * Step 5: derive MPI from hashed message
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(derive_mpi(grp, &e, buf, blen));
+
+ /*
+ * Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step,
+ * avoiding a potential timing leak.
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(grp, &t, f_rng_blind,
+ p_rng_blind));
+
+ /*
+ * Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(s, pr, d));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&e, &e, s));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&e, &e, &t));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(pk, pk, &t));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(pk, pk, &grp->N));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(s, pk, &grp->N));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(s, s, &e));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(s, s, &grp->N));
+ } while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(s, 0) == 0);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(r, pr));
+ }
+#endif
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&R);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&k); mbedtls_mpi_free(&e); mbedtls_mpi_free(&t);
+
+ ECDSA_RS_LEAVE(sig);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */
+ return mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+ f_rng, p_rng, f_rng, p_rng, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+/*
+ * Deterministic signature wrapper
+ *
+ * note: The f_rng_blind parameter must not be NULL.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng = &rng_ctx;
+ unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
+ size_t grp_len = (grp->nbits + 7) / 8;
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
+ mbedtls_mpi h;
+
+ if ((md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg)) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&h);
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(&rng_ctx);
+
+ ECDSA_RS_ENTER(det);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL) {
+ /* redirect to our context */
+ p_rng = &rs_ctx->det->rng_ctx;
+
+ /* jump to current step */
+ if (rs_ctx->det->state == ecdsa_det_sign) {
+ goto sign;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+ /* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(d, data, grp_len));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(derive_mpi(grp, &h, buf, blen));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&h, data + grp_len, grp_len));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf(p_rng, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL) {
+ rs_ctx->det->state = ecdsa_det_sign;
+ }
+
+sign:
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
+ (void) f_rng_blind;
+ (void) p_rng_blind;
+ ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng);
+#else
+ ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng,
+ f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, rs_ctx);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&rng_ctx);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&h);
+
+ ECDSA_RS_LEAVE(det);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Deterministic signature wrapper
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_ext(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ mbedtls_mpi *s, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ int (*f_rng_blind)(void *, unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng_blind)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg,
+ f_rng_blind, p_rng_blind, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT)
+/*
+ * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message (SEC1 4.1.4)
+ * Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 2 (hash message)
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *s,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point R;
+ mbedtls_mpi *pu1 = &u1, *pu2 = &u2;
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&R);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&e); mbedtls_mpi_init(&s_inv);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&u1); mbedtls_mpi_init(&u2);
+
+ /* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
+ if (!mbedtls_ecdsa_can_do(grp->id) || grp->N.p == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ECDSA_RS_ENTER(ver);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL) {
+ /* redirect to our context */
+ pu1 = &rs_ctx->ver->u1;
+ pu2 = &rs_ctx->ver->u2;
+
+ /* jump to current step */
+ if (rs_ctx->ver->state == ecdsa_ver_muladd) {
+ goto muladd;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+ /*
+ * Step 1: make sure r and s are in range 1..n-1
+ */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(r, 1) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(r, &grp->N) >= 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(s, 1) < 0 || mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(s, &grp->N) >= 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Step 3: derive MPI from hashed message
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(derive_mpi(grp, &e, buf, blen));
+
+ /*
+ * Step 4: u1 = e / s mod n, u2 = r / s mod n
+ */
+ ECDSA_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK + MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 2);
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(&s_inv, s, &grp->N));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(pu1, &e, &s_inv));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(pu1, pu1, &grp->N));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(pu2, r, &s_inv));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(pu2, pu2, &grp->N));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL) {
+ rs_ctx->ver->state = ecdsa_ver_muladd;
+ }
+
+muladd:
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Step 5: R = u1 G + u2 Q
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable(grp,
+ &R, pu1, &grp->G, pu2, Q, ECDSA_RS_ECP));
+
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(&R)) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Step 6: convert xR to an integer (no-op)
+ * Step 7: reduce xR mod n (gives v)
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&R.X, &R.X, &grp->N));
+
+ /*
+ * Step 8: check if v (that is, R.X) is equal to r
+ */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&R.X, r) != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&R);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&e); mbedtls_mpi_free(&s_inv);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&u1); mbedtls_mpi_free(&u2);
+
+ ECDSA_RS_LEAVE(ver);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *r,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *s)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(grp, buf, blen, Q, r, s, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */
+
+/*
+ * Convert a signature (given by context) to ASN.1
+ */
+static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1(const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size,
+ size_t *slen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_LEN] = { 0 };
+ unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf);
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&p, buf, s));
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(&p, buf, r));
+
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, buf, len));
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, buf,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE));
+
+ if (len > sig_size) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(sig, p, len);
+ *slen = len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute and write signature
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi r, s;
+ if (f_rng == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&r);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&s);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
+ hash, hlen, md_alg, f_rng,
+ p_rng, rs_ctx));
+#else
+ (void) md_alg;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
+ (void) rs_ctx;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
+ hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng));
+#else
+ /* Use the same RNG for both blinding and ephemeral key generation */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_restartable(&ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
+ hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, f_rng,
+ p_rng, rs_ctx));
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_signature_to_asn1(&r, &s, sig, sig_size, slen));
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&r);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&s);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute and write signature
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *slen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(
+ ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, sig_size, slen,
+ f_rng, p_rng, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read and check signature
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable(
+ ctx, hash, hlen, sig, slen, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restartable read and check signature
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen,
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) sig;
+ const unsigned char *end = sig + slen;
+ size_t len;
+ mbedtls_mpi r, s;
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&r);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&s);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+ ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (p + len != end) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end, &r)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end, &s)) != 0) {
+ ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT)
+ (void) rs_ctx;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(&ctx->grp, hash, hlen,
+ &ctx->Q, &r, &s)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+#else
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify_restartable(&ctx->grp, hash, hlen,
+ &ctx->Q, &r, &s, rs_ctx)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */
+
+ /* At this point we know that the buffer starts with a valid signature.
+ * Return 0 if the buffer just contains the signature, and a specific
+ * error code if the valid signature is followed by more data. */
+ if (p != end) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&r);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&s);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT)
+/*
+ * Generate key pair
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, gid);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(&ctx->grp, &ctx->d,
+ &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng);
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */
+
+/*
+ * Set context from an mbedtls_ecp_keypair
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(&ctx->grp, &key->grp)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&ctx->d, &key->d)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy(&ctx->Q, &key->Q)) != 0) {
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_free(ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecdsa_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecdsa_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(ctx);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+/*
+ * Initialize a restart context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_init(&ctx->ecp);
+
+ ctx->ver = NULL;
+ ctx->sig = NULL;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+ ctx->det = NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free the components of a restart context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_free(&ctx->ecp);
+
+ ecdsa_restart_ver_free(ctx->ver);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx->ver);
+ ctx->ver = NULL;
+
+ ecdsa_restart_sig_free(ctx->sig);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx->sig);
+ ctx->sig = NULL;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+ ecdsa_restart_det_free(ctx->det);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx->det);
+ ctx->det = NULL;
+#endif
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cdf5d7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecjpake.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1216 @@
+/*
+ * Elliptic curve J-PAKE
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/*
+ * References in the code are to the Thread v1.0 Specification,
+ * available to members of the Thread Group http://threadgroup.org/
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/ecjpake.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT)
+
+/*
+ * Convert a mbedtls_ecjpake_role to identifier string
+ */
+static const char * const ecjpake_id[] = {
+ "client",
+ "server"
+};
+
+#define ID_MINE (ecjpake_id[ctx->role])
+#define ID_PEER (ecjpake_id[1 - ctx->role])
+
+/**
+ * Helper to Compute a hash from md_type
+ */
+static int mbedtls_ecjpake_compute_hash(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ return mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type),
+ input, ilen, output);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecjpake_init(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&ctx->grp);
+ ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Xm1);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Xm2);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Xp1);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Xp2);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->Xp);
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->xm1);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->xm2);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&ctx->s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecjpake_free(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ctx->md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&ctx->grp);
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Xm1);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Xm2);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Xp1);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Xp2);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->Xp);
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->xm1);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->xm2);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&ctx->s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Setup context
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_role role,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t hash,
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id curve,
+ const unsigned char *secret,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (role != MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT && role != MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ctx->role = role;
+
+ if ((mbedtls_md_info_from_type(hash)) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ ctx->md_type = hash;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ctx->grp, curve));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->s, secret, len));
+
+cleanup:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_free(ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ int point_format)
+{
+ switch (point_format) {
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED:
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED:
+ ctx->point_format = point_format;
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if context is ready for use
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_check(const mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->md_type == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ||
+ ctx->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ||
+ ctx->s.p == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a point plus its length to a buffer
+ */
+static int ecjpake_write_len_point(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const int pf,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *P)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len;
+
+ /* Need at least 4 for length plus 1 for point */
+ if (end < *p || end - *p < 5) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(grp, P, pf,
+ &len, *p + 4, (size_t) (end - (*p + 4)));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(len, *p, 0);
+
+ *p += 4 + len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Size of the temporary buffer for ecjpake_hash:
+ * 3 EC points plus their length, plus ID and its length (4 + 6 bytes)
+ */
+#define ECJPAKE_HASH_BUF_LEN (3 * (4 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN) + 4 + 6)
+
+/*
+ * Compute hash for ZKP (7.4.2.2.2.1)
+ */
+static int ecjpake_hash(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const int pf,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *G,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *V,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *X,
+ const char *id,
+ mbedtls_mpi *h)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char buf[ECJPAKE_HASH_BUF_LEN];
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ const unsigned char *end = buf + sizeof(buf);
+ const size_t id_len = strlen(id);
+ unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+
+ /* Write things to temporary buffer */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_write_len_point(&p, end, grp, pf, G));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_write_len_point(&p, end, grp, pf, V));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_write_len_point(&p, end, grp, pf, X));
+
+ if (end - p < 4) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(id_len, p, 0);
+ p += 4;
+
+ if (end < p || (size_t) (end - p) < id_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(p, id, id_len);
+ p += id_len;
+
+ /* Compute hash */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecjpake_compute_hash(md_type,
+ buf, (size_t) (p - buf), hash));
+
+ /* Turn it into an integer mod n */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(h, hash,
+ mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_type)));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(h, h, &grp->N));
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a ECShnorrZKP (7.4.2.2.2) and verify it (7.4.2.3.3)
+ */
+static int ecjpake_zkp_read(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const int pf,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *G,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *X,
+ const char *id,
+ const unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point V, VV;
+ mbedtls_mpi r, h;
+ size_t r_len;
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&V);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&VV);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&r);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&h);
+
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * ECPoint V;
+ * opaque r<1..2^8-1>;
+ * } ECSchnorrZKP;
+ */
+ if (end < *p) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(grp, &V, p, (size_t) (end - *p)));
+
+ if (end < *p || (size_t) (end - *p) < 1) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ r_len = *(*p)++;
+
+ if (end < *p || (size_t) (end - *p) < r_len || r_len == 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&r, *p, r_len));
+ *p += r_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Verification
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_hash(md_type, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_muladd((mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp,
+ &VV, &h, X, &r, G));
+
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp(&VV, &V) != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&V);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&VV);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&r);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&h);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate ZKP (7.4.2.3.2) and write it as ECSchnorrZKP (7.4.2.2.2)
+ */
+static int ecjpake_zkp_write(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const int pf,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *G,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *x,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *X,
+ const char *id,
+ unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point V;
+ mbedtls_mpi v;
+ mbedtls_mpi h; /* later recycled to hold r */
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (end < *p) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&V);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&v);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&h);
+
+ /* Compute signature */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base((mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp,
+ G, &v, &V, f_rng, p_rng));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_hash(md_type, grp, pf, G, &V, X, id, &h));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&h, &h, x)); /* x*h */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&h, &v, &h)); /* v - x*h */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&h, &h, &grp->N)); /* r */
+
+ /* Write it out */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(grp, &V,
+ pf, &len, *p, (size_t) (end - *p)));
+ *p += len;
+
+ len = mbedtls_mpi_size(&h); /* actually r */
+ if (end < *p || (size_t) (end - *p) < 1 + len || len > 255) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ *(*p)++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(len);
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&h, *p, len)); /* r */
+ *p += len;
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&V);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&v);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&h);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a ECJPAKEKeyKP (7.4.2.2.1) and check proof
+ * Output: verified public key X
+ */
+static int ecjpake_kkp_read(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const int pf,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *G,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *X,
+ const char *id,
+ const unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (end < *p) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * ECPoint X;
+ * ECSchnorrZKP zkp;
+ * } ECJPAKEKeyKP;
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(grp, X, p, (size_t) (end - *p)));
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(X)) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_read(md_type, grp, pf, G, X, id, p, end));
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate an ECJPAKEKeyKP
+ * Output: the serialized structure, plus private/public key pair
+ */
+static int ecjpake_kkp_write(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const int pf,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *G,
+ mbedtls_mpi *x,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *X,
+ const char *id,
+ unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (end < *p) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate key (7.4.2.3.1) and write it out */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base((mbedtls_ecp_group *) grp, G, x, X,
+ f_rng, p_rng));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(grp, X,
+ pf, &len, *p, (size_t) (end - *p)));
+ *p += len;
+
+ /* Generate and write proof */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_write(md_type, grp, pf, G, x, X, id,
+ p, end, f_rng, p_rng));
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList (7.4.2.3) and check proofs
+ * Outputs: verified peer public keys Xa, Xb
+ */
+static int ecjpake_kkpp_read(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const int pf,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *G,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *Xa,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *Xb,
+ const char *id,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const unsigned char *p = buf;
+ const unsigned char *end = buf + len;
+
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp_pair_list[2];
+ * } ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList;
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(md_type, grp, pf, G, Xa, id, &p, end));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(md_type, grp, pf, G, Xb, id, &p, end));
+
+ if (p != end) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate a ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList
+ * Outputs: the serialized structure, plus two private/public key pairs
+ */
+static int ecjpake_kkpp_write(const mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const int pf,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *G,
+ mbedtls_mpi *xm1,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *Xa,
+ mbedtls_mpi *xm2,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *Xb,
+ const char *id,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len,
+ size_t *olen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ const unsigned char *end = buf + len;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_write(md_type, grp, pf, G, xm1, Xa, id,
+ &p, end, f_rng, p_rng));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_write(md_type, grp, pf, G, xm2, Xb, id,
+ &p, end, f_rng, p_rng));
+
+ *olen = (size_t) (p - buf);
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read and process the first round message
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ return ecjpake_kkpp_read(ctx->md_type, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format,
+ &ctx->grp.G,
+ &ctx->Xp1, &ctx->Xp2, ID_PEER,
+ buf, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate and write the first round message
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ return ecjpake_kkpp_write(ctx->md_type, &ctx->grp, ctx->point_format,
+ &ctx->grp.G,
+ &ctx->xm1, &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->Xm2,
+ ID_MINE, buf, len, olen, f_rng, p_rng);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute the sum of three points R = A + B + C
+ */
+static int ecjpake_ecp_add3(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *A,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *B,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *C)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi one;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&one);
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&one, 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_muladd(grp, R, &one, A, &one, B));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_muladd(grp, R, &one, R, &one, C));
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&one);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read and process second round message (C: 7.4.2.5, S: 7.4.2.6)
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const unsigned char *p = buf;
+ const unsigned char *end = buf + len;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point G; /* C: GB, S: GA */
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&G);
+
+ /*
+ * Server: GA = X3 + X4 + X1 (7.4.2.6.1)
+ * Client: GB = X1 + X2 + X3 (7.4.2.5.1)
+ * Unified: G = Xm1 + Xm2 + Xp1
+ * We need that before parsing in order to check Xp as we read it
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_ecp_add3(&ctx->grp, &G,
+ &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->Xm2, &ctx->Xp1));
+
+ /*
+ * struct {
+ * ECParameters curve_params; // only client reading server msg
+ * ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp;
+ * } Client/ServerECJPAKEParams;
+ */
+ if (ctx->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group(&grp, &p, len));
+ if (grp.id != ctx->grp.id) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_kkp_read(ctx->md_type, &ctx->grp,
+ ctx->point_format,
+ &G, &ctx->Xp, ID_PEER, &p, end));
+
+ if (p != end) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&G);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute R = +/- X * S mod N, taking care not to leak S
+ */
+static int ecjpake_mul_secret(mbedtls_mpi *R, int sign,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *S,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *N,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi b; /* Blinding value, then s + N * blinding */
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&b);
+
+ /* b = s + rnd-128-bit * N */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(&b, 16, f_rng, p_rng));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&b, &b, N));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&b, &b, S));
+
+ /* R = sign * X * b mod N */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(R, X, &b));
+ R->s *= sign;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(R, R, N));
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&b);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate and write the second round message (S: 7.4.2.5, C: 7.4.2.6)
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point G; /* C: GA, S: GB */
+ mbedtls_ecp_point Xm; /* C: Xc, S: Xs */
+ mbedtls_mpi xm; /* C: xc, S: xs */
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ const unsigned char *end = buf + len;
+ size_t ec_len;
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&G);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Xm);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&xm);
+
+ /*
+ * First generate private/public key pair (S: 7.4.2.5.1, C: 7.4.2.6.1)
+ *
+ * Client: GA = X1 + X3 + X4 | xs = x2 * s | Xc = xc * GA
+ * Server: GB = X3 + X1 + X2 | xs = x4 * s | Xs = xs * GB
+ * Unified: G = Xm1 + Xp1 + Xp2 | xm = xm2 * s | Xm = xm * G
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_ecp_add3(&ctx->grp, &G,
+ &ctx->Xp1, &ctx->Xp2, &ctx->Xm1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_mul_secret(&xm, 1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->s,
+ &ctx->grp.N, f_rng, p_rng));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &Xm, &xm, &G, f_rng, p_rng));
+
+ /*
+ * Now write things out
+ *
+ * struct {
+ * ECParameters curve_params; // only server writing its message
+ * ECJPAKEKeyKP ecjpake_key_kp;
+ * } Client/ServerECJPAKEParams;
+ */
+ if (ctx->role == MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER) {
+ if (end < p) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group(&ctx->grp, &ec_len,
+ p, (size_t) (end - p)));
+ p += ec_len;
+ }
+
+ if (end < p) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(&ctx->grp, &Xm,
+ ctx->point_format, &ec_len, p, (size_t) (end - p)));
+ p += ec_len;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_zkp_write(ctx->md_type, &ctx->grp,
+ ctx->point_format,
+ &G, &xm, &Xm, ID_MINE,
+ &p, end, f_rng, p_rng));
+
+ *olen = (size_t) (p - buf);
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&G);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&Xm);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&xm);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Derive PMS (7.4.2.7 / 7.4.2.8)
+ */
+static int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_k(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *K,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi m_xm2_s, one;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&m_xm2_s);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&one);
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&one, 1));
+
+ /*
+ * Client: K = ( Xs - X4 * x2 * s ) * x2
+ * Server: K = ( Xc - X2 * x4 * s ) * x4
+ * Unified: K = ( Xp - Xp2 * xm2 * s ) * xm2
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_mul_secret(&m_xm2_s, -1, &ctx->xm2, &ctx->s,
+ &ctx->grp.N, f_rng, p_rng));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_muladd(&ctx->grp, K,
+ &one, &ctx->Xp,
+ &m_xm2_s, &ctx->Xp2));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, K, &ctx->xm2, K,
+ f_rng, p_rng));
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&m_xm2_s);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&one);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point K;
+ unsigned char kx[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
+ size_t x_bytes;
+
+ *olen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(ctx->md_type);
+ if (len < *olen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&K);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_k(ctx, &K, f_rng, p_rng);
+ if (ret) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* PMS = SHA-256( K.X ) */
+ x_bytes = (ctx->grp.pbits + 7) / 8;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&K.X, kx, x_bytes));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecjpake_compute_hash(ctx->md_type,
+ kx, x_bytes, buf));
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&K);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len, size_t *olen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point K;
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&K);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_k(ctx, &K, f_rng, p_rng);
+ if (ret) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ctx->grp, &K, ctx->point_format,
+ olen, buf, len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&K);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#undef ID_MINE
+#undef ID_PEER
+
+#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ (void) verbose;
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
+
+static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_password[] = {
+ 0x74, 0x68, 0x72, 0x65, 0x61, 0x64, 0x6a, 0x70, 0x61, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x74,
+ 0x65, 0x73, 0x74
+};
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT)
+
+static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x1[] = {
+ 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c,
+ 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18,
+ 0x19, 0x1a, 0x1b, 0x1c, 0x1d, 0x1e, 0x1f, 0x21
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x2[] = {
+ 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c,
+ 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78,
+ 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x81
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x3[] = {
+ 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c,
+ 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78,
+ 0x79, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0x7c, 0x7d, 0x7e, 0x7f, 0x81
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_x4[] = {
+ 0xc1, 0xc2, 0xc3, 0xc4, 0xc5, 0xc6, 0xc7, 0xc8, 0xc9, 0xca, 0xcb, 0xcc,
+ 0xcd, 0xce, 0xcf, 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xd2, 0xd3, 0xd4, 0xd5, 0xd6, 0xd7, 0xd8,
+ 0xd9, 0xda, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xde, 0xdf, 0xe1
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_cli_one[] = {
+ 0x41, 0x04, 0xac, 0xcf, 0x01, 0x06, 0xef, 0x85, 0x8f, 0xa2, 0xd9, 0x19,
+ 0x33, 0x13, 0x46, 0x80, 0x5a, 0x78, 0xb5, 0x8b, 0xba, 0xd0, 0xb8, 0x44,
+ 0xe5, 0xc7, 0x89, 0x28, 0x79, 0x14, 0x61, 0x87, 0xdd, 0x26, 0x66, 0xad,
+ 0xa7, 0x81, 0xbb, 0x7f, 0x11, 0x13, 0x72, 0x25, 0x1a, 0x89, 0x10, 0x62,
+ 0x1f, 0x63, 0x4d, 0xf1, 0x28, 0xac, 0x48, 0xe3, 0x81, 0xfd, 0x6e, 0xf9,
+ 0x06, 0x07, 0x31, 0xf6, 0x94, 0xa4, 0x41, 0x04, 0x1d, 0xd0, 0xbd, 0x5d,
+ 0x45, 0x66, 0xc9, 0xbe, 0xd9, 0xce, 0x7d, 0xe7, 0x01, 0xb5, 0xe8, 0x2e,
+ 0x08, 0xe8, 0x4b, 0x73, 0x04, 0x66, 0x01, 0x8a, 0xb9, 0x03, 0xc7, 0x9e,
+ 0xb9, 0x82, 0x17, 0x22, 0x36, 0xc0, 0xc1, 0x72, 0x8a, 0xe4, 0xbf, 0x73,
+ 0x61, 0x0d, 0x34, 0xde, 0x44, 0x24, 0x6e, 0xf3, 0xd9, 0xc0, 0x5a, 0x22,
+ 0x36, 0xfb, 0x66, 0xa6, 0x58, 0x3d, 0x74, 0x49, 0x30, 0x8b, 0xab, 0xce,
+ 0x20, 0x72, 0xfe, 0x16, 0x66, 0x29, 0x92, 0xe9, 0x23, 0x5c, 0x25, 0x00,
+ 0x2f, 0x11, 0xb1, 0x50, 0x87, 0xb8, 0x27, 0x38, 0xe0, 0x3c, 0x94, 0x5b,
+ 0xf7, 0xa2, 0x99, 0x5d, 0xda, 0x1e, 0x98, 0x34, 0x58, 0x41, 0x04, 0x7e,
+ 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa4, 0x48, 0x70, 0x37, 0xa9, 0xe0, 0xdb, 0xd7, 0x92, 0x62,
+ 0xb2, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x77, 0x99, 0x30, 0xfc, 0x18, 0x40, 0x9a, 0xc5,
+ 0x36, 0x1c, 0x5f, 0xe6, 0x69, 0xd7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x47, 0x79, 0x0a, 0xeb,
+ 0x4c, 0xe7, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x75, 0xab, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x7f, 0xd1, 0xc3, 0x35,
+ 0x93, 0x9a, 0xa8, 0x63, 0xba, 0x37, 0xec, 0x91, 0xb7, 0xe3, 0x2b, 0xb0,
+ 0x13, 0xbb, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x04, 0xa4, 0x95, 0x58, 0xd3, 0x2e, 0xd1, 0xeb,
+ 0xfc, 0x18, 0x16, 0xaf, 0x4f, 0xf0, 0x9b, 0x55, 0xfc, 0xb4, 0xca, 0x47,
+ 0xb2, 0xa0, 0x2d, 0x1e, 0x7c, 0xaf, 0x11, 0x79, 0xea, 0x3f, 0xe1, 0x39,
+ 0x5b, 0x22, 0xb8, 0x61, 0x96, 0x40, 0x16, 0xfa, 0xba, 0xf7, 0x2c, 0x97,
+ 0x56, 0x95, 0xd9, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0xf0, 0xe5, 0x19, 0x7f, 0xe9, 0xf0, 0x40,
+ 0x63, 0x4e, 0xd5, 0x97, 0x64, 0x93, 0x77, 0x87, 0xbe, 0x20, 0xbc, 0x4d,
+ 0xee, 0xbb, 0xf9, 0xb8, 0xd6, 0x0a, 0x33, 0x5f, 0x04, 0x6c, 0xa3, 0xaa,
+ 0x94, 0x1e, 0x45, 0x86, 0x4c, 0x7c, 0xad, 0xef, 0x9c, 0xf7, 0x5b, 0x3d,
+ 0x8b, 0x01, 0x0e, 0x44, 0x3e, 0xf0
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_srv_one[] = {
+ 0x41, 0x04, 0x7e, 0xa6, 0xe3, 0xa4, 0x48, 0x70, 0x37, 0xa9, 0xe0, 0xdb,
+ 0xd7, 0x92, 0x62, 0xb2, 0xcc, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x77, 0x99, 0x30, 0xfc, 0x18,
+ 0x40, 0x9a, 0xc5, 0x36, 0x1c, 0x5f, 0xe6, 0x69, 0xd7, 0x02, 0xe1, 0x47,
+ 0x79, 0x0a, 0xeb, 0x4c, 0xe7, 0xfd, 0x65, 0x75, 0xab, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x7f,
+ 0xd1, 0xc3, 0x35, 0x93, 0x9a, 0xa8, 0x63, 0xba, 0x37, 0xec, 0x91, 0xb7,
+ 0xe3, 0x2b, 0xb0, 0x13, 0xbb, 0x2b, 0x41, 0x04, 0x09, 0xf8, 0x5b, 0x3d,
+ 0x20, 0xeb, 0xd7, 0x88, 0x5c, 0xe4, 0x64, 0xc0, 0x8d, 0x05, 0x6d, 0x64,
+ 0x28, 0xfe, 0x4d, 0xd9, 0x28, 0x7a, 0xa3, 0x65, 0xf1, 0x31, 0xf4, 0x36,
+ 0x0f, 0xf3, 0x86, 0xd8, 0x46, 0x89, 0x8b, 0xc4, 0xb4, 0x15, 0x83, 0xc2,
+ 0xa5, 0x19, 0x7f, 0x65, 0xd7, 0x87, 0x42, 0x74, 0x6c, 0x12, 0xa5, 0xec,
+ 0x0a, 0x4f, 0xfe, 0x2f, 0x27, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x0a, 0x1d, 0x8f, 0xb5, 0x16,
+ 0x20, 0x93, 0x4d, 0x74, 0xeb, 0x43, 0xe5, 0x4d, 0xf4, 0x24, 0xfd, 0x96,
+ 0x30, 0x6c, 0x01, 0x17, 0xbf, 0x13, 0x1a, 0xfa, 0xbf, 0x90, 0xa9, 0xd3,
+ 0x3d, 0x11, 0x98, 0xd9, 0x05, 0x19, 0x37, 0x35, 0x14, 0x41, 0x04, 0x19,
+ 0x0a, 0x07, 0x70, 0x0f, 0xfa, 0x4b, 0xe6, 0xae, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xee, 0x0f,
+ 0x06, 0xae, 0xb5, 0x44, 0xcd, 0x5a, 0xdd, 0xaa, 0xbe, 0xdf, 0x70, 0xf8,
+ 0x62, 0x33, 0x21, 0x33, 0x2c, 0x54, 0xf3, 0x55, 0xf0, 0xfb, 0xfe, 0xc7,
+ 0x83, 0xed, 0x35, 0x9e, 0x5d, 0x0b, 0xf7, 0x37, 0x7a, 0x0f, 0xc4, 0xea,
+ 0x7a, 0xce, 0x47, 0x3c, 0x9c, 0x11, 0x2b, 0x41, 0xcc, 0xd4, 0x1a, 0xc5,
+ 0x6a, 0x56, 0x12, 0x41, 0x04, 0x36, 0x0a, 0x1c, 0xea, 0x33, 0xfc, 0xe6,
+ 0x41, 0x15, 0x64, 0x58, 0xe0, 0xa4, 0xea, 0xc2, 0x19, 0xe9, 0x68, 0x31,
+ 0xe6, 0xae, 0xbc, 0x88, 0xb3, 0xf3, 0x75, 0x2f, 0x93, 0xa0, 0x28, 0x1d,
+ 0x1b, 0xf1, 0xfb, 0x10, 0x60, 0x51, 0xdb, 0x96, 0x94, 0xa8, 0xd6, 0xe8,
+ 0x62, 0xa5, 0xef, 0x13, 0x24, 0xa3, 0xd9, 0xe2, 0x78, 0x94, 0xf1, 0xee,
+ 0x4f, 0x7c, 0x59, 0x19, 0x99, 0x65, 0xa8, 0xdd, 0x4a, 0x20, 0x91, 0x84,
+ 0x7d, 0x2d, 0x22, 0xdf, 0x3e, 0xe5, 0x5f, 0xaa, 0x2a, 0x3f, 0xb3, 0x3f,
+ 0xd2, 0xd1, 0xe0, 0x55, 0xa0, 0x7a, 0x7c, 0x61, 0xec, 0xfb, 0x8d, 0x80,
+ 0xec, 0x00, 0xc2, 0xc9, 0xeb, 0x12
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_srv_two[] = {
+ 0x03, 0x00, 0x17, 0x41, 0x04, 0x0f, 0xb2, 0x2b, 0x1d, 0x5d, 0x11, 0x23,
+ 0xe0, 0xef, 0x9f, 0xeb, 0x9d, 0x8a, 0x2e, 0x59, 0x0a, 0x1f, 0x4d, 0x7c,
+ 0xed, 0x2c, 0x2b, 0x06, 0x58, 0x6e, 0x8f, 0x2a, 0x16, 0xd4, 0xeb, 0x2f,
+ 0xda, 0x43, 0x28, 0xa2, 0x0b, 0x07, 0xd8, 0xfd, 0x66, 0x76, 0x54, 0xca,
+ 0x18, 0xc5, 0x4e, 0x32, 0xa3, 0x33, 0xa0, 0x84, 0x54, 0x51, 0xe9, 0x26,
+ 0xee, 0x88, 0x04, 0xfd, 0x7a, 0xf0, 0xaa, 0xa7, 0xa6, 0x41, 0x04, 0x55,
+ 0x16, 0xea, 0x3e, 0x54, 0xa0, 0xd5, 0xd8, 0xb2, 0xce, 0x78, 0x6b, 0x38,
+ 0xd3, 0x83, 0x37, 0x00, 0x29, 0xa5, 0xdb, 0xe4, 0x45, 0x9c, 0x9d, 0xd6,
+ 0x01, 0xb4, 0x08, 0xa2, 0x4a, 0xe6, 0x46, 0x5c, 0x8a, 0xc9, 0x05, 0xb9,
+ 0xeb, 0x03, 0xb5, 0xd3, 0x69, 0x1c, 0x13, 0x9e, 0xf8, 0x3f, 0x1c, 0xd4,
+ 0x20, 0x0f, 0x6c, 0x9c, 0xd4, 0xec, 0x39, 0x22, 0x18, 0xa5, 0x9e, 0xd2,
+ 0x43, 0xd3, 0xc8, 0x20, 0xff, 0x72, 0x4a, 0x9a, 0x70, 0xb8, 0x8c, 0xb8,
+ 0x6f, 0x20, 0xb4, 0x34, 0xc6, 0x86, 0x5a, 0xa1, 0xcd, 0x79, 0x06, 0xdd,
+ 0x7c, 0x9b, 0xce, 0x35, 0x25, 0xf5, 0x08, 0x27, 0x6f, 0x26, 0x83, 0x6c
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_cli_two[] = {
+ 0x41, 0x04, 0x69, 0xd5, 0x4e, 0xe8, 0x5e, 0x90, 0xce, 0x3f, 0x12, 0x46,
+ 0x74, 0x2d, 0xe5, 0x07, 0xe9, 0x39, 0xe8, 0x1d, 0x1d, 0xc1, 0xc5, 0xcb,
+ 0x98, 0x8b, 0x58, 0xc3, 0x10, 0xc9, 0xfd, 0xd9, 0x52, 0x4d, 0x93, 0x72,
+ 0x0b, 0x45, 0x54, 0x1c, 0x83, 0xee, 0x88, 0x41, 0x19, 0x1d, 0xa7, 0xce,
+ 0xd8, 0x6e, 0x33, 0x12, 0xd4, 0x36, 0x23, 0xc1, 0xd6, 0x3e, 0x74, 0x98,
+ 0x9a, 0xba, 0x4a, 0xff, 0xd1, 0xee, 0x41, 0x04, 0x07, 0x7e, 0x8c, 0x31,
+ 0xe2, 0x0e, 0x6b, 0xed, 0xb7, 0x60, 0xc1, 0x35, 0x93, 0xe6, 0x9f, 0x15,
+ 0xbe, 0x85, 0xc2, 0x7d, 0x68, 0xcd, 0x09, 0xcc, 0xb8, 0xc4, 0x18, 0x36,
+ 0x08, 0x91, 0x7c, 0x5c, 0x3d, 0x40, 0x9f, 0xac, 0x39, 0xfe, 0xfe, 0xe8,
+ 0x2f, 0x72, 0x92, 0xd3, 0x6f, 0x0d, 0x23, 0xe0, 0x55, 0x91, 0x3f, 0x45,
+ 0xa5, 0x2b, 0x85, 0xdd, 0x8a, 0x20, 0x52, 0xe9, 0xe1, 0x29, 0xbb, 0x4d,
+ 0x20, 0x0f, 0x01, 0x1f, 0x19, 0x48, 0x35, 0x35, 0xa6, 0xe8, 0x9a, 0x58,
+ 0x0c, 0x9b, 0x00, 0x03, 0xba, 0xf2, 0x14, 0x62, 0xec, 0xe9, 0x1a, 0x82,
+ 0xcc, 0x38, 0xdb, 0xdc, 0xae, 0x60, 0xd9, 0xc5, 0x4c
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_shared_key[] = {
+ 0x04, 0x01, 0xab, 0xe9, 0xf2, 0xc7, 0x3a, 0x99, 0x14, 0xcb, 0x1f, 0x80,
+ 0xfb, 0x9d, 0xdb, 0x7e, 0x00, 0x12, 0xa8, 0x9c, 0x2f, 0x39, 0x27, 0x79,
+ 0xf9, 0x64, 0x40, 0x14, 0x75, 0xea, 0xc1, 0x31, 0x28, 0x43, 0x8f, 0xe1,
+ 0x12, 0x41, 0xd6, 0xc1, 0xe5, 0x5f, 0x7b, 0x80, 0x88, 0x94, 0xc9, 0xc0,
+ 0x27, 0xa3, 0x34, 0x41, 0xf5, 0xcb, 0xa1, 0xfe, 0x6c, 0xc7, 0xe6, 0x12,
+ 0x17, 0xc3, 0xde, 0x27, 0xb4,
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ecjpake_test_pms[] = {
+ 0xf3, 0xd4, 0x7f, 0x59, 0x98, 0x44, 0xdb, 0x92, 0xa5, 0x69, 0xbb, 0xe7,
+ 0x98, 0x1e, 0x39, 0xd9, 0x31, 0xfd, 0x74, 0x3b, 0xf2, 0x2e, 0x98, 0xf9,
+ 0xb4, 0x38, 0xf7, 0x19, 0xd3, 0xc4, 0xf3, 0x51
+};
+
+/*
+ * PRNG for test - !!!INSECURE NEVER USE IN PRODUCTION!!!
+ *
+ * This is the linear congruential generator from numerical recipes,
+ * except we only use the low byte as the output. See
+ * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_congruential_generator#Parameters_in_common_use
+ */
+static int self_test_rng(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len)
+{
+ static uint32_t state = 42;
+
+ (void) ctx;
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ state = state * 1664525u + 1013904223u;
+ out[i] = (unsigned char) state;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Load my private keys and generate the corresponding public keys */
+static int ecjpake_test_load(mbedtls_ecjpake_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *xm1, size_t len1,
+ const unsigned char *xm2, size_t len2)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->xm1, xm1, len1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx->xm2, xm2, len2));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm1, &ctx->xm1,
+ &ctx->grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Xm2, &ctx->xm2,
+ &ctx->grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL));
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */
+
+/* For tests we don't need a secure RNG;
+ * use the LGC from Numerical Recipes for simplicity */
+static int ecjpake_lgc(void *p, unsigned char *out, size_t len)
+{
+ static uint32_t x = 42;
+ (void) p;
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ size_t use_len = len > 4 ? 4 : len;
+ x = 1664525 * x + 1013904223;
+ memcpy(out, &x, use_len);
+ out += use_len;
+ len -= use_len;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define TEST_ASSERT(x) \
+ do { \
+ if (x) \
+ ret = 0; \
+ else \
+ { \
+ ret = 1; \
+ goto cleanup; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Checkup routine
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecjpake_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_context cli;
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_context srv;
+ unsigned char buf[512], pms[32];
+ size_t len, pmslen;
+
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_init(&cli);
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_init(&srv);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ECJPAKE test #0 (setup): ");
+ }
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(&cli, MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT,
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1,
+ ecjpake_test_password,
+ sizeof(ecjpake_test_password)) == 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_setup(&srv, MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_SERVER,
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1,
+ ecjpake_test_password,
+ sizeof(ecjpake_test_password)) == 0);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ECJPAKE test #1 (random handshake): ");
+ }
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&cli,
+ buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&srv, buf, len) == 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one(&srv,
+ buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&cli, buf, len) == 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(&srv,
+ buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&cli, buf, len) == 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&cli,
+ pms, sizeof(pms), &pmslen, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two(&cli,
+ buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&srv, buf, len) == 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&srv,
+ buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(len == pmslen);
+ TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, pms, len) == 0);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT)
+ /* 'reference handshake' tests can only be run against implementations
+ * for which we have 100% control over how the random ephemeral keys
+ * are generated. This is only the case for the internal Mbed TLS
+ * implementation, so these tests are skipped in case the internal
+ * implementation is swapped out for an alternative one. */
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ECJPAKE test #2 (reference handshake): ");
+ }
+
+ /* Simulate generation of round one */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_test_load(&cli,
+ ecjpake_test_x1, sizeof(ecjpake_test_x1),
+ ecjpake_test_x2, sizeof(ecjpake_test_x2)));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecjpake_test_load(&srv,
+ ecjpake_test_x3, sizeof(ecjpake_test_x3),
+ ecjpake_test_x4, sizeof(ecjpake_test_x4)));
+
+ /* Read round one */
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&srv,
+ ecjpake_test_cli_one,
+ sizeof(ecjpake_test_cli_one)) == 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one(&cli,
+ ecjpake_test_srv_one,
+ sizeof(ecjpake_test_srv_one)) == 0);
+
+ /* Skip generation of round two, read round two */
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&cli,
+ ecjpake_test_srv_two,
+ sizeof(ecjpake_test_srv_two)) == 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two(&srv,
+ ecjpake_test_cli_two,
+ sizeof(ecjpake_test_cli_two)) == 0);
+
+ /* Server derives PMS */
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&srv,
+ buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(len == sizeof(ecjpake_test_pms));
+ TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, ecjpake_test_pms, len) == 0);
+
+ /* Server derives K as unsigned binary data */
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(&srv,
+ buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(len == sizeof(ecjpake_test_shared_key));
+ TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, ecjpake_test_shared_key, len) == 0);
+
+ memset(buf, 0, len); /* Avoid interferences with next step */
+
+ /* Client derives PMS */
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret(&cli,
+ buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(len == sizeof(ecjpake_test_pms));
+ TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, ecjpake_test_pms, len) == 0);
+
+ /* Client derives K as unsigned binary data */
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecjpake_write_shared_key(&cli,
+ buf, sizeof(buf), &len, ecjpake_lgc, NULL) == 0);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(len == sizeof(ecjpake_test_shared_key));
+ TEST_ASSERT(memcmp(buf, ecjpake_test_shared_key, len) == 0);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+#endif /* ! MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ALT */
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_free(&cli);
+ mbedtls_ecjpake_free(&srv);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#undef TEST_ASSERT
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecp.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fdd00a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3703 @@
+/*
+ * Elliptic curves over GF(p): generic functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/*
+ * References:
+ *
+ * SEC1 https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf
+ * GECC = Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography - Hankerson, Menezes, Vanstone
+ * FIPS 186-3 http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips186-3/fips_186-3.pdf
+ * RFC 4492 for the related TLS structures and constants
+ * - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4492
+ * RFC 7748 for the Curve448 and Curve25519 curve definitions
+ * - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7748
+ *
+ * [Curve25519] https://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf
+ *
+ * [2] CORON, Jean-S'ebastien. Resistance against differential power analysis
+ * for elliptic curve cryptosystems. In : Cryptographic Hardware and
+ * Embedded Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999. p. 292-302.
+ * <http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/3-540-48059-5_25>
+ *
+ * [3] HEDABOU, Mustapha, PINEL, Pierre, et B'EN'ETEAU, Lucien. A comb method to
+ * render ECC resistant against Side Channel Attacks. IACR Cryptology
+ * ePrint Archive, 2004, vol. 2004, p. 342.
+ * <http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/342.pdf>
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+/**
+ * \brief Function level alternative implementation.
+ *
+ * The MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT macro enables alternative implementations to
+ * replace certain functions in this module. The alternative implementations are
+ * typically hardware accelerators and need to activate the hardware before the
+ * computation starts and deactivate it after it finishes. The
+ * mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() and mbedtls_internal_ecp_free() functions serve
+ * this purpose.
+ *
+ * To preserve the correct functionality the following conditions must hold:
+ *
+ * - The alternative implementation must be activated by
+ * mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() before any of the replaceable functions is
+ * called.
+ * - mbedtls_internal_ecp_free() must \b only be called when the alternative
+ * implementation is activated.
+ * - mbedtls_internal_ecp_init() must \b not be called when the alternative
+ * implementation is activated.
+ * - Public functions must not return while the alternative implementation is
+ * activated.
+ * - Replaceable functions are guarded by \c MBEDTLS_ECP_XXX_ALT macros and
+ * before calling them an \code if( mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable( grp ) )
+ * \endcode ensures that the alternative implementation supports the current
+ * group.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
+
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include "bn_mul.h"
+#include "ecp_invasive.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT)
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include "ecp_internal_alt.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/*
+ * Counts of point addition and doubling, and field multiplications.
+ * Used to test resistance of point multiplication to simple timing attacks.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+static unsigned long add_count, dbl_count;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+static unsigned long mul_count;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+/*
+ * Maximum number of "basic operations" to be done in a row.
+ *
+ * Default value 0 means that ECC operations will not yield.
+ * Note that regardless of the value of ecp_max_ops, always at
+ * least one step is performed before yielding.
+ *
+ * Setting ecp_max_ops=1 can be suitable for testing purposes
+ * as it will interrupt computation at all possible points.
+ */
+static unsigned ecp_max_ops = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Set ecp_max_ops
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops(unsigned max_ops)
+{
+ ecp_max_ops = max_ops;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if restart is enabled
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled(void)
+{
+ return ecp_max_ops != 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restart sub-context for ecp_mul_comb()
+ */
+struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul {
+ mbedtls_ecp_point R; /* current intermediate result */
+ size_t i; /* current index in various loops, 0 outside */
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *T; /* table for precomputed points */
+ unsigned char T_size; /* number of points in table T */
+ enum { /* what were we doing last time we returned? */
+ ecp_rsm_init = 0, /* nothing so far, dummy initial state */
+ ecp_rsm_pre_dbl, /* precompute 2^n multiples */
+ ecp_rsm_pre_norm_dbl, /* normalize precomputed 2^n multiples */
+ ecp_rsm_pre_add, /* precompute remaining points by adding */
+ ecp_rsm_pre_norm_add, /* normalize all precomputed points */
+ ecp_rsm_comb_core, /* ecp_mul_comb_core() */
+ ecp_rsm_final_norm, /* do the final normalization */
+ } state;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Init restart_mul sub-context
+ */
+static void ecp_restart_rsm_init(mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->R);
+ ctx->i = 0;
+ ctx->T = NULL;
+ ctx->T_size = 0;
+ ctx->state = ecp_rsm_init;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free the components of a restart_mul sub-context
+ */
+static void ecp_restart_rsm_free(mbedtls_ecp_restart_mul_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ unsigned char i;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->R);
+
+ if (ctx->T != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->T_size; i++) {
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(ctx->T + i);
+ }
+ mbedtls_free(ctx->T);
+ }
+
+ ecp_restart_rsm_init(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restart context for ecp_muladd()
+ */
+struct mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd {
+ mbedtls_ecp_point mP; /* mP value */
+ mbedtls_ecp_point R; /* R intermediate result */
+ enum { /* what should we do next? */
+ ecp_rsma_mul1 = 0, /* first multiplication */
+ ecp_rsma_mul2, /* second multiplication */
+ ecp_rsma_add, /* addition */
+ ecp_rsma_norm, /* normalization */
+ } state;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Init restart_muladd sub-context
+ */
+static void ecp_restart_ma_init(mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->mP);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&ctx->R);
+ ctx->state = ecp_rsma_mul1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free the components of a restart_muladd sub-context
+ */
+static void ecp_restart_ma_free(mbedtls_ecp_restart_muladd_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->mP);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&ctx->R);
+
+ ecp_restart_ma_init(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize a restart context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_restart_init(mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->ops_done = 0;
+ ctx->depth = 0;
+ ctx->rsm = NULL;
+ ctx->ma = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free the components of a restart context
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_restart_free(mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ecp_restart_rsm_free(ctx->rsm);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx->rsm);
+
+ ecp_restart_ma_free(ctx->ma);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx->ma);
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_init(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if we can do the next step
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_check_budget(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx,
+ unsigned ops)
+{
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && ecp_max_ops != 0) {
+ /* scale depending on curve size: the chosen reference is 256-bit,
+ * and multiplication is quadratic. Round to the closest integer. */
+ if (grp->pbits >= 512) {
+ ops *= 4;
+ } else if (grp->pbits >= 384) {
+ ops *= 2;
+ }
+
+ /* Avoid infinite loops: always allow first step.
+ * Because of that, however, it's not generally true
+ * that ops_done <= ecp_max_ops, so the check
+ * ops_done > ecp_max_ops below is mandatory. */
+ if ((rs_ctx->ops_done != 0) &&
+ (rs_ctx->ops_done > ecp_max_ops ||
+ ops > ecp_max_ops - rs_ctx->ops_done)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS;
+ }
+
+ /* update running count */
+ rs_ctx->ops_done += ops;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Call this when entering a function that needs its own sub-context */
+#define ECP_RS_ENTER(SUB) do { \
+ /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ \
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->depth++ == 0) \
+ rs_ctx->ops_done = 0; \
+ \
+ /* set up our own sub-context if needed */ \
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && \
+ rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB == NULL) \
+ { \
+ rs_ctx->SUB = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(*rs_ctx->SUB)); \
+ if (rs_ctx->SUB == NULL) \
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED; \
+ \
+ ecp_restart_## SUB ##_init(rs_ctx->SUB); \
+ } \
+} while (0)
+
+/* Call this when leaving a function that needs its own sub-context */
+#define ECP_RS_LEAVE(SUB) do { \
+ /* clear our sub-context when not in progress (done or error) */ \
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB != NULL && \
+ ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) \
+ { \
+ ecp_restart_## SUB ##_free(rs_ctx->SUB); \
+ mbedtls_free(rs_ctx->SUB); \
+ rs_ctx->SUB = NULL; \
+ } \
+ \
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL) \
+ rs_ctx->depth--; \
+} while (0)
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+#define ECP_RS_ENTER(sub) (void) rs_ctx;
+#define ECP_RS_LEAVE(sub) (void) rs_ctx;
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+static void mpi_init_many(mbedtls_mpi *arr, size_t size)
+{
+ while (size--) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(arr++);
+ }
+}
+
+static void mpi_free_many(mbedtls_mpi *arr, size_t size)
+{
+ while (size--) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(arr++);
+ }
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
+/*
+ * List of supported curves:
+ * - internal ID
+ * - TLS NamedCurve ID (RFC 4492 sec. 5.1.1, RFC 7071 sec. 2, RFC 8446 sec. 4.2.7)
+ * - size in bits
+ * - readable name
+ *
+ * Curves are listed in order: largest curves first, and for a given size,
+ * fastest curves first.
+ *
+ * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c and ssl_tls.c when adding a new curve!
+ */
+static const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info ecp_supported_curves[] =
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+ { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1, 25, 521, "secp521r1" },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED)
+ { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1, 28, 512, "brainpoolP512r1" },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+ { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1, 24, 384, "secp384r1" },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED)
+ { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1, 27, 384, "brainpoolP384r1" },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
+ { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, 23, 256, "secp256r1" },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+ { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1, 22, 256, "secp256k1" },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED)
+ { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1, 26, 256, "brainpoolP256r1" },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
+ { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1, 21, 224, "secp224r1" },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
+ { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1, 20, 224, "secp224k1" },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
+ { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1, 19, 192, "secp192r1" },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
+ { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1, 18, 192, "secp192k1" },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+ { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519, 29, 256, "x25519" },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+ { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448, 30, 448, "x448" },
+#endif
+ { MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, 0, 0, NULL },
+};
+
+#define ECP_NB_CURVES sizeof(ecp_supported_curves) / \
+ sizeof(ecp_supported_curves[0])
+
+static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_supported_grp_id[ECP_NB_CURVES];
+
+/*
+ * List of supported curves and associated info
+ */
+const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_list(void)
+{
+ return ecp_supported_curves;
+}
+
+/*
+ * List of supported curves, group ID only
+ */
+const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list(void)
+{
+ static int init_done = 0;
+
+ if (!init_done) {
+ size_t i = 0;
+ const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
+
+ for (curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list();
+ curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
+ curve_info++) {
+ ecp_supported_grp_id[i++] = curve_info->grp_id;
+ }
+ ecp_supported_grp_id[i] = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
+
+ init_done = 1;
+ }
+
+ return ecp_supported_grp_id;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the curve info for the internal identifier
+ */
+const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id)
+{
+ const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
+
+ for (curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list();
+ curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
+ curve_info++) {
+ if (curve_info->grp_id == grp_id) {
+ return curve_info;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the curve info from the TLS identifier
+ */
+const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id)
+{
+ const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
+
+ for (curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list();
+ curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
+ curve_info++) {
+ if (curve_info->tls_id == tls_id) {
+ return curve_info;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the curve info from the name
+ */
+const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_name(const char *name)
+{
+ const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
+
+ if (name == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_list();
+ curve_info->grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
+ curve_info++) {
+ if (strcmp(curve_info->name, name) == 0) {
+ return curve_info;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the type of a curve
+ */
+mbedtls_ecp_curve_type mbedtls_ecp_get_type(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp)
+{
+ if (grp->G.X.p == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_NONE;
+ }
+
+ if (grp->G.Y.p == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY;
+ } else {
+ return MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize (the components of) a point
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_point_init(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&pt->X);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&pt->Y);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&pt->Z);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize (the components of) a group
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_group_init(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp)
+{
+ grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&grp->P);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&grp->A);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&grp->B);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&grp->G);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&grp->N);
+ grp->pbits = 0;
+ grp->nbits = 0;
+ grp->h = 0;
+ grp->modp = NULL;
+ grp->t_pre = NULL;
+ grp->t_post = NULL;
+ grp->t_data = NULL;
+ grp->T = NULL;
+ grp->T_size = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize (the components of) a key pair
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key)
+{
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&key->grp);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&key->d);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&key->Q);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unallocate (the components of) a point
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_point_free(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt)
+{
+ if (pt == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&(pt->X));
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&(pt->Y));
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&(pt->Z));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that the comb table (grp->T) is static initialized.
+ */
+static int ecp_group_is_static_comb_table(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp)
+{
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+ return grp->T != NULL && grp->T_size == 0;
+#else
+ (void) grp;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unallocate (the components of) a group
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_group_free(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (grp == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (grp->h != 1) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->A);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->B);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&grp->G);
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT)
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->N);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->P);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (!ecp_group_is_static_comb_table(grp) && grp->T != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < grp->T_size; i++) {
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&grp->T[i]);
+ }
+ mbedtls_free(grp->T);
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(grp, sizeof(mbedtls_ecp_group));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unallocate (the components of) a key pair
+ */
+void mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key)
+{
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&key->grp);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&key->d);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&key->Q);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the contents of a point
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_copy(mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&P->X, &Q->X));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&P->Y, &Q->Y));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&P->Z, &Q->Z));
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy the contents of a group object
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(mbedtls_ecp_group *dst, const mbedtls_ecp_group *src)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ecp_group_load(dst, src->id);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set point to zero
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_set_zero(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->X, 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->Y, 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->Z, 0));
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tell if a point is zero
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_is_zero(mbedtls_ecp_point *pt)
+{
+ return mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&pt->Z, 0) == 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two points lazily
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp(const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q)
+{
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&P->X, &Q->X) == 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&P->Y, &Q->Y) == 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&P->Z, &Q->Z) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Import a non-zero point from ASCII strings
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_string(mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int radix,
+ const char *x, const char *y)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&P->X, radix, x));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(&P->Y, radix, y));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&P->Z, 1));
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Export a point into unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.3 and RFC7748)
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ int format, size_t *olen,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ size_t plen;
+ if (format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED &&
+ format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ plen = mbedtls_mpi_size(&grp->P);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+ (void) format; /* Montgomery curves always use the same point format */
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) {
+ *olen = plen;
+ if (buflen < *olen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(&P->X, buf, plen));
+ }
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) {
+ /*
+ * Common case: P == 0
+ */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&P->Z, 0) == 0) {
+ if (buflen < 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ buf[0] = 0x00;
+ *olen = 1;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED) {
+ *olen = 2 * plen + 1;
+
+ if (buflen < *olen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ buf[0] = 0x04;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&P->X, buf + 1, plen));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&P->Y, buf + 1 + plen, plen));
+ } else if (format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) {
+ *olen = plen + 1;
+
+ if (buflen < *olen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ buf[0] = 0x02 + mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&P->Y, 0);
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&P->X, buf + 1, plen));
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+static int mbedtls_ecp_sw_derive_y(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ mbedtls_mpi *Y,
+ int parity_bit);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Import a point from unsigned binary data (SEC1 2.3.4 and RFC7748)
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *pt,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t ilen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ size_t plen;
+ if (ilen < 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ plen = mbedtls_mpi_size(&grp->P);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) {
+ if (plen != ilen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le(&pt->X, buf, plen));
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&pt->Y);
+
+ if (grp->id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) {
+ /* Set most significant bit to 0 as prescribed in RFC7748 §5 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&pt->X, plen * 8 - 1, 0));
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->Z, 1));
+ }
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) {
+ if (buf[0] == 0x00) {
+ if (ilen == 1) {
+ return mbedtls_ecp_set_zero(pt);
+ } else {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ilen < 1 + plen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&pt->X, buf + 1, plen));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&pt->Z, 1));
+
+ if (buf[0] == 0x04) {
+ /* format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED */
+ if (ilen != 1 + plen * 2) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ return mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&pt->Y, buf + 1 + plen, plen);
+ } else if (buf[0] == 0x02 || buf[0] == 0x03) {
+ /* format == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED */
+ if (ilen != 1 + plen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ return mbedtls_ecp_sw_derive_y(grp, &pt->X, &pt->Y,
+ (buf[0] & 1));
+ } else {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Import a point from a TLS ECPoint record (RFC 4492)
+ * struct {
+ * opaque point <1..2^8-1>;
+ * } ECPoint;
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_point(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *pt,
+ const unsigned char **buf, size_t buf_len)
+{
+ unsigned char data_len;
+ const unsigned char *buf_start;
+ /*
+ * We must have at least two bytes (1 for length, at least one for data)
+ */
+ if (buf_len < 2) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ data_len = *(*buf)++;
+ if (data_len < 1 || data_len > buf_len - 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Save buffer start for read_binary and update buf
+ */
+ buf_start = *buf;
+ *buf += data_len;
+
+ return mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(grp, pt, buf_start, data_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Export a point as a TLS ECPoint record (RFC 4492)
+ * struct {
+ * opaque point <1..2^8-1>;
+ * } ECPoint;
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt,
+ int format, size_t *olen,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t blen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ if (format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED &&
+ format != MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * buffer length must be at least one, for our length byte
+ */
+ if (blen < 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(grp, pt, format,
+ olen, buf + 1, blen - 1)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * write length to the first byte and update total length
+ */
+ buf[0] = (unsigned char) *olen;
+ ++*olen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set a group from an ECParameters record (RFC 4492)
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const unsigned char **buf, size_t len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(&grp_id, buf, len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_ecp_group_load(grp, grp_id);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a group id from an ECParameters record (RFC 4492) and convert it to
+ * mbedtls_ecp_group_id.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp,
+ const unsigned char **buf, size_t len)
+{
+ uint16_t tls_id;
+ const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
+ /*
+ * We expect at least three bytes (see below)
+ */
+ if (len < 3) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled
+ */
+ if (*(*buf)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value
+ */
+ tls_id = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE(*buf, 0);
+ *buf += 2;
+
+ if ((curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id(tls_id)) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ *grp = curve_info->grp_id;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the ECParameters record corresponding to a group (RFC 4492)
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, size_t *olen,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t blen)
+{
+ const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
+ if ((curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(grp->id)) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We are going to write 3 bytes (see below)
+ */
+ *olen = 3;
+ if (blen < *olen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * First byte is curve_type, always named_curve
+ */
+ *buf++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE;
+
+ /*
+ * Next two bytes are the namedcurve value
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(curve_info->tls_id, buf, 0);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wrapper around fast quasi-modp functions, with fall-back to mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi.
+ * See the documentation of struct mbedtls_ecp_group.
+ *
+ * This function is in the critial loop for mbedtls_ecp_mul, so pay attention to perf.
+ */
+static int ecp_modp(mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (grp->modp == NULL) {
+ return mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(N, N, &grp->P);
+ }
+
+ /* N->s < 0 is a much faster test, which fails only if N is 0 */
+ if ((N->s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 0) != 0) ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(N) > 2 * grp->pbits) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(grp->modp(N));
+
+ /* N->s < 0 is a much faster test, which fails only if N is 0 */
+ while (N->s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 0) != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(N, N, &grp->P));
+ }
+
+ while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(N, &grp->P) >= 0) {
+ /* we known P, N and the result are positive */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(N, N, &grp->P));
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fast mod-p functions expect their argument to be in the 0..p^2 range.
+ *
+ * In order to guarantee that, we need to ensure that operands of
+ * mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi are in the 0..p range. So, after each operation we will
+ * bring the result back to this range.
+ *
+ * The following macros are shortcuts for doing that.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, general case, to use after mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+#define INC_MUL_COUNT mul_count++;
+#else
+#define INC_MUL_COUNT
+#endif
+
+#define MOD_MUL(N) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_modp(&(N), grp)); \
+ INC_MUL_COUNT \
+ } while (0)
+
+static inline int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *B)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(X, A, B));
+ MOD_MUL(*X);
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi
+ * N->s < 0 is a very fast test, which fails only if N is 0
+ */
+#define MOD_SUB(N) \
+ do { \
+ while ((N)->s < 0 && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int((N), 0) != 0) \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi((N), (N), &grp->P)); \
+ } while (0)
+
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED
+static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *B)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(X, A, B));
+ MOD_SUB(X);
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reduce a mbedtls_mpi mod p in-place, to use after mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi and mbedtls_mpi_mul_int.
+ * We known P, N and the result are positive, so sub_abs is correct, and
+ * a bit faster.
+ */
+#define MOD_ADD(N) \
+ while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi((N), &grp->P) >= 0) \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs((N), (N), &grp->P))
+
+static inline int mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *B)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(X, A, B));
+ MOD_ADD(X);
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED
+static inline int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint c)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(X, A, c));
+ MOD_ADD(X);
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED
+static inline int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *A,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint c)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(X, A, c));
+ MOD_SUB(X);
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#define MPI_ECP_SUB_INT(X, A, c) \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int_mod(grp, X, A, c))
+
+MBEDTLS_MAYBE_UNUSED
+static inline int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ size_t count)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(X, count));
+ MOD_ADD(X);
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Macro wrappers around ECP modular arithmetic
+ *
+ * Currently, these wrappers are defined via the bignum module.
+ */
+
+#define MPI_ECP_ADD(X, A, B) \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mod(grp, X, A, B))
+
+#define MPI_ECP_SUB(X, A, B) \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mod(grp, X, A, B))
+
+#define MPI_ECP_MUL(X, A, B) \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, X, A, B))
+
+#define MPI_ECP_SQR(X, A) \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mod(grp, X, A, A))
+
+#define MPI_ECP_MUL_INT(X, A, c) \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_int_mod(grp, X, A, c))
+
+#define MPI_ECP_INV(dst, src) \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod((dst), (src), &grp->P))
+
+#define MPI_ECP_MOV(X, A) \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(X, A))
+
+#define MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(X, count) \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l_mod(grp, X, count))
+
+#define MPI_ECP_LSET(X, c) \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(X, c))
+
+#define MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(X, c) \
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, c)
+
+#define MPI_ECP_CMP(X, Y) \
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(X, Y)
+
+/* Needs f_rng, p_rng to be defined. */
+#define MPI_ECP_RAND(X) \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_random((X), 2, &grp->P, f_rng, p_rng))
+
+/* Conditional negation
+ * Needs grp and a temporary MPI tmp to be defined. */
+#define MPI_ECP_COND_NEG(X, cond) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ unsigned char nonzero = mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int((X), 0) != 0; \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&tmp, &grp->P, (X))); \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign((X), &tmp, \
+ nonzero & cond)); \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define MPI_ECP_NEG(X) MPI_ECP_COND_NEG((X), 1)
+
+#define MPI_ECP_VALID(X) \
+ ((X)->p != NULL)
+
+#define MPI_ECP_COND_ASSIGN(X, Y, cond) \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign((X), (Y), (cond)))
+
+#define MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(X, Y, cond) \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap((X), (Y), (cond)))
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+
+/*
+ * Computes the right-hand side of the Short Weierstrass equation
+ * RHS = X^3 + A X + B
+ */
+static int ecp_sw_rhs(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *rhs,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *X)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Compute X^3 + A X + B as X (X^2 + A) + B */
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(rhs, X);
+
+ /* Special case for A = -3 */
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_group_a_is_minus_3(grp)) {
+ MPI_ECP_SUB_INT(rhs, rhs, 3);
+ } else {
+ MPI_ECP_ADD(rhs, rhs, &grp->A);
+ }
+
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(rhs, rhs, X);
+ MPI_ECP_ADD(rhs, rhs, &grp->B);
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Derive Y from X and a parity bit
+ */
+static int mbedtls_ecp_sw_derive_y(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *X,
+ mbedtls_mpi *Y,
+ int parity_bit)
+{
+ /* w = y^2 = x^3 + ax + b
+ * y = sqrt(w) = w^((p+1)/4) mod p (for prime p where p = 3 mod 4)
+ *
+ * Note: this method for extracting square root does not validate that w
+ * was indeed a square so this function will return garbage in Y if X
+ * does not correspond to a point on the curve.
+ */
+
+ /* Check prerequisite p = 3 mod 4 */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&grp->P, 0) != 1 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&grp->P, 1) != 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ int ret;
+ mbedtls_mpi exp;
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&exp);
+
+ /* use Y to store intermediate result, actually w above */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_sw_rhs(grp, Y, X));
+
+ /* w = y^2 */ /* Y contains y^2 intermediate result */
+ /* exp = ((p+1)/4) */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&exp, &grp->P, 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&exp, 2));
+ /* sqrt(w) = w^((p+1)/4) mod p (for prime p where p = 3 mod 4) */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(Y, Y /*y^2*/, &exp, &grp->P, NULL));
+
+ /* check parity bit match or else invert Y */
+ /* This quick inversion implementation is valid because Y != 0 for all
+ * Short Weierstrass curves supported by mbedtls, as each supported curve
+ * has an order that is a large prime, so each supported curve does not
+ * have any point of order 2, and a point with Y == 0 would be of order 2 */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(Y, 0) != parity_bit) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(Y, &grp->P, Y));
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&exp);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * For curves in short Weierstrass form, we do all the internal operations in
+ * Jacobian coordinates.
+ *
+ * For multiplication, we'll use a comb method with countermeasures against
+ * SPA, hence timing attacks.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Normalize jacobian coordinates so that Z == 0 || Z == 1 (GECC 3.2.1)
+ * Cost: 1N := 1I + 3M + 1S
+ */
+static int ecp_normalize_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt)
+{
+ if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&pt->Z, 0) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT)
+ if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) {
+ return mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac(grp, pt);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#else
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi T;
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&T);
+
+ MPI_ECP_INV(&T, &pt->Z); /* T <- 1 / Z */
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Y, &pt->Y, &T); /* Y' <- Y*T = Y / Z */
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(&T, &T); /* T <- T^2 = 1 / Z^2 */
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->X, &pt->X, &T); /* X <- X * T = X / Z^2 */
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Y, &pt->Y, &T); /* Y'' <- Y' * T = Y / Z^3 */
+
+ MPI_ECP_LSET(&pt->Z, 1);
+
+cleanup:
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&T);
+
+ return ret;
+#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT) */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Normalize jacobian coordinates of an array of (pointers to) points,
+ * using Montgomery's trick to perform only one inversion mod P.
+ * (See for example Cohen's "A Course in Computational Algebraic Number
+ * Theory", Algorithm 10.3.4.)
+ *
+ * Warning: fails (returning an error) if one of the points is zero!
+ * This should never happen, see choice of w in ecp_mul_comb().
+ *
+ * Cost: 1N(t) := 1I + (6t - 3)M + 1S
+ */
+static int ecp_normalize_jac_many(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *T[], size_t T_size)
+{
+ if (T_size < 2) {
+ return ecp_normalize_jac(grp, *T);
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT)
+ if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) {
+ return mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac_many(grp, T, T_size);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#else
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t i;
+ mbedtls_mpi *c, t;
+
+ if ((c = mbedtls_calloc(T_size, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi))) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&t);
+
+ mpi_init_many(c, T_size);
+ /*
+ * c[i] = Z_0 * ... * Z_i, i = 0,..,n := T_size-1
+ */
+ MPI_ECP_MOV(&c[0], &T[0]->Z);
+ for (i = 1; i < T_size; i++) {
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&c[i], &c[i-1], &T[i]->Z);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * c[n] = 1 / (Z_0 * ... * Z_n) mod P
+ */
+ MPI_ECP_INV(&c[T_size-1], &c[T_size-1]);
+
+ for (i = T_size - 1;; i--) {
+ /* At the start of iteration i (note that i decrements), we have
+ * - c[j] = Z_0 * .... * Z_j for j < i,
+ * - c[j] = 1 / (Z_0 * .... * Z_j) for j == i,
+ *
+ * This is maintained via
+ * - c[i-1] <- c[i] * Z_i
+ *
+ * We also derive 1/Z_i = c[i] * c[i-1] for i>0 and use that
+ * to do the actual normalization. For i==0, we already have
+ * c[0] = 1 / Z_0.
+ */
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ /* Compute 1/Z_i and establish invariant for the next iteration. */
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&t, &c[i], &c[i-1]);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&c[i-1], &c[i], &T[i]->Z);
+ } else {
+ MPI_ECP_MOV(&t, &c[0]);
+ }
+
+ /* Now t holds 1 / Z_i; normalize as in ecp_normalize_jac() */
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &t);
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(&t, &t);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[i]->X, &T[i]->X, &t);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[i]->Y, &T[i]->Y, &t);
+
+ /*
+ * Post-precessing: reclaim some memory by shrinking coordinates
+ * - not storing Z (always 1)
+ * - shrinking other coordinates, but still keeping the same number of
+ * limbs as P, as otherwise it will too likely be regrown too fast.
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shrink(&T[i]->X, grp->P.n));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shrink(&T[i]->Y, grp->P.n));
+
+ MPI_ECP_LSET(&T[i]->Z, 1);
+
+ if (i == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&t);
+ mpi_free_many(c, T_size);
+ mbedtls_free(c);
+
+ return ret;
+#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT) */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Conditional point inversion: Q -> -Q = (Q.X, -Q.Y, Q.Z) without leak.
+ * "inv" must be 0 (don't invert) or 1 (invert) or the result will be invalid
+ */
+static int ecp_safe_invert_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ unsigned char inv)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi tmp;
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&tmp);
+
+ MPI_ECP_COND_NEG(&Q->Y, inv);
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&tmp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Point doubling R = 2 P, Jacobian coordinates
+ *
+ * Based on http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian.html#doubling-dbl-1998-cmo-2 .
+ *
+ * We follow the variable naming fairly closely. The formula variations that trade a MUL for a SQR
+ * (plus a few ADDs) aren't useful as our bignum implementation doesn't distinguish squaring.
+ *
+ * Standard optimizations are applied when curve parameter A is one of { 0, -3 }.
+ *
+ * Cost: 1D := 3M + 4S (A == 0)
+ * 4M + 4S (A == -3)
+ * 3M + 6S + 1a otherwise
+ */
+static int ecp_double_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ mbedtls_mpi tmp[4])
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+ dbl_count++;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT)
+ if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) {
+ return mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac(grp, R, P);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#else
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ /* Special case for A = -3 */
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_group_a_is_minus_3(grp)) {
+ /* tmp[0] <- M = 3(X + Z^2)(X - Z^2) */
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[1], &P->Z);
+ MPI_ECP_ADD(&tmp[2], &P->X, &tmp[1]);
+ MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[3], &P->X, &tmp[1]);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[2], &tmp[3]);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL_INT(&tmp[0], &tmp[1], 3);
+ } else {
+ /* tmp[0] <- M = 3.X^2 + A.Z^4 */
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[1], &P->X);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL_INT(&tmp[0], &tmp[1], 3);
+
+ /* Optimize away for "koblitz" curves with A = 0 */
+ if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&grp->A, 0) != 0) {
+ /* M += A.Z^4 */
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[1], &P->Z);
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[2], &tmp[1]);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[2], &grp->A);
+ MPI_ECP_ADD(&tmp[0], &tmp[0], &tmp[1]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* tmp[1] <- S = 4.X.Y^2 */
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[2], &P->Y);
+ MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[2], 1);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &P->X, &tmp[2]);
+ MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[1], 1);
+
+ /* tmp[3] <- U = 8.Y^4 */
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[3], &tmp[2]);
+ MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[3], 1);
+
+ /* tmp[2] <- T = M^2 - 2.S */
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[2], &tmp[0]);
+ MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], &tmp[1]);
+ MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], &tmp[1]);
+
+ /* tmp[1] <- S = M(S - T) - U */
+ MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &tmp[2]);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &tmp[0]);
+ MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &tmp[3]);
+
+ /* tmp[3] <- U = 2.Y.Z */
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[3], &P->Y, &P->Z);
+ MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[3], 1);
+
+ /* Store results */
+ MPI_ECP_MOV(&R->X, &tmp[2]);
+ MPI_ECP_MOV(&R->Y, &tmp[1]);
+ MPI_ECP_MOV(&R->Z, &tmp[3]);
+
+cleanup:
+
+ return ret;
+#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT) */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Addition: R = P + Q, mixed affine-Jacobian coordinates (GECC 3.22)
+ *
+ * The coordinates of Q must be normalized (= affine),
+ * but those of P don't need to. R is not normalized.
+ *
+ * P,Q,R may alias, but only at the level of EC points: they must be either
+ * equal as pointers, or disjoint (including the coordinate data buffers).
+ * Fine-grained aliasing at the level of coordinates is not supported.
+ *
+ * Special cases: (1) P or Q is zero, (2) R is zero, (3) P == Q.
+ * None of these cases can happen as intermediate step in ecp_mul_comb():
+ * - at each step, P, Q and R are multiples of the base point, the factor
+ * being less than its order, so none of them is zero;
+ * - Q is an odd multiple of the base point, P an even multiple,
+ * due to the choice of precomputed points in the modified comb method.
+ * So branches for these cases do not leak secret information.
+ *
+ * Cost: 1A := 8M + 3S
+ */
+static int ecp_add_mixed(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ mbedtls_mpi tmp[4])
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+ add_count++;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT)
+ if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) {
+ return mbedtls_internal_ecp_add_mixed(grp, R, P, Q);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#else
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ /* NOTE: Aliasing between input and output is allowed, so one has to make
+ * sure that at the point X,Y,Z are written, {P,Q}->{X,Y,Z} are no
+ * longer read from. */
+ mbedtls_mpi * const X = &R->X;
+ mbedtls_mpi * const Y = &R->Y;
+ mbedtls_mpi * const Z = &R->Z;
+
+ if (!MPI_ECP_VALID(&Q->Z)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Trivial cases: P == 0 or Q == 0 (case 1)
+ */
+ if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&P->Z, 0) == 0) {
+ return mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, Q);
+ }
+
+ if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&Q->Z, 0) == 0) {
+ return mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, P);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure Q coordinates are normalized
+ */
+ if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&Q->Z, 1) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[0], &P->Z);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[0], &P->Z);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[0], &tmp[0], &Q->X);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &Q->Y);
+ MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[0], &tmp[0], &P->X);
+ MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[1], &tmp[1], &P->Y);
+
+ /* Special cases (2) and (3) */
+ if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&tmp[0], 0) == 0) {
+ if (MPI_ECP_CMP_INT(&tmp[1], 0) == 0) {
+ ret = ecp_double_jac(grp, R, P, tmp);
+ goto cleanup;
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_set_zero(R);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* {P,Q}->Z no longer used, so OK to write to Z even if there's aliasing. */
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(Z, &P->Z, &tmp[0]);
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(&tmp[2], &tmp[0]);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[3], &tmp[2], &tmp[0]);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], &P->X);
+
+ MPI_ECP_MOV(&tmp[0], &tmp[2]);
+ MPI_ECP_SHIFT_L(&tmp[0], 1);
+
+ /* {P,Q}->X no longer used, so OK to write to X even if there's aliasing. */
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(X, &tmp[1]);
+ MPI_ECP_SUB(X, X, &tmp[0]);
+ MPI_ECP_SUB(X, X, &tmp[3]);
+ MPI_ECP_SUB(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], X);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[2], &tmp[2], &tmp[1]);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&tmp[3], &tmp[3], &P->Y);
+ /* {P,Q}->Y no longer used, so OK to write to Y even if there's aliasing. */
+ MPI_ECP_SUB(Y, &tmp[2], &tmp[3]);
+
+cleanup:
+
+ return ret;
+#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT) */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Randomize jacobian coordinates:
+ * (X, Y, Z) -> (l^2 X, l^3 Y, l Z) for random l
+ * This is sort of the reverse operation of ecp_normalize_jac().
+ *
+ * This countermeasure was first suggested in [2].
+ */
+static int ecp_randomize_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *pt,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT)
+ if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) {
+ return mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_jac(grp, pt, f_rng, p_rng);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#else
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi l;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&l);
+
+ /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */
+ MPI_ECP_RAND(&l);
+
+ /* Z' = l * Z */
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Z, &pt->Z, &l);
+
+ /* Y' = l * Y */
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Y, &pt->Y, &l);
+
+ /* X' = l^2 * X */
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(&l, &l);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->X, &pt->X, &l);
+
+ /* Y'' = l^2 * Y' = l^3 * Y */
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&pt->Y, &pt->Y, &l);
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&l);
+
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
+ }
+ return ret;
+#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT) */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check and define parameters used by the comb method (see below for details)
+ */
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE < 2 || MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE > 7
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE out of bounds"
+#endif
+
+/* d = ceil( n / w ) */
+#define COMB_MAX_D (MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BITS + 1) / 2
+
+/* number of precomputed points */
+#define COMB_MAX_PRE (1 << (MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE - 1))
+
+/*
+ * Compute the representation of m that will be used with our comb method.
+ *
+ * The basic comb method is described in GECC 3.44 for example. We use a
+ * modified version that provides resistance to SPA by avoiding zero
+ * digits in the representation as in [3]. We modify the method further by
+ * requiring that all K_i be odd, which has the small cost that our
+ * representation uses one more K_i, due to carries, but saves on the size of
+ * the precomputed table.
+ *
+ * Summary of the comb method and its modifications:
+ *
+ * - The goal is to compute m*P for some w*d-bit integer m.
+ *
+ * - The basic comb method splits m into the w-bit integers
+ * x[0] .. x[d-1] where x[i] consists of the bits in m whose
+ * index has residue i modulo d, and computes m * P as
+ * S[x[0]] + 2 * S[x[1]] + .. + 2^(d-1) S[x[d-1]], where
+ * S[i_{w-1} .. i_0] := i_{w-1} 2^{(w-1)d} P + ... + i_1 2^d P + i_0 P.
+ *
+ * - If it happens that, say, x[i+1]=0 (=> S[x[i+1]]=0), one can replace the sum by
+ * .. + 2^{i-1} S[x[i-1]] - 2^i S[x[i]] + 2^{i+1} S[x[i]] + 2^{i+2} S[x[i+2]] ..,
+ * thereby successively converting it into a form where all summands
+ * are nonzero, at the cost of negative summands. This is the basic idea of [3].
+ *
+ * - More generally, even if x[i+1] != 0, we can first transform the sum as
+ * .. - 2^i S[x[i]] + 2^{i+1} ( S[x[i]] + S[x[i+1]] ) + 2^{i+2} S[x[i+2]] ..,
+ * and then replace S[x[i]] + S[x[i+1]] = S[x[i] ^ x[i+1]] + 2 S[x[i] & x[i+1]].
+ * Performing and iterating this procedure for those x[i] that are even
+ * (keeping track of carry), we can transform the original sum into one of the form
+ * S[x'[0]] +- 2 S[x'[1]] +- .. +- 2^{d-1} S[x'[d-1]] + 2^d S[x'[d]]
+ * with all x'[i] odd. It is therefore only necessary to know S at odd indices,
+ * which is why we are only computing half of it in the first place in
+ * ecp_precompute_comb and accessing it with index abs(i) / 2 in ecp_select_comb.
+ *
+ * - For the sake of compactness, only the seven low-order bits of x[i]
+ * are used to represent its absolute value (K_i in the paper), and the msb
+ * of x[i] encodes the sign (s_i in the paper): it is set if and only if
+ * if s_i == -1;
+ *
+ * Calling conventions:
+ * - x is an array of size d + 1
+ * - w is the size, ie number of teeth, of the comb, and must be between
+ * 2 and 7 (in practice, between 2 and MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE)
+ * - m is the MPI, expected to be odd and such that bitlength(m) <= w * d
+ * (the result will be incorrect if these assumptions are not satisfied)
+ */
+static void ecp_comb_recode_core(unsigned char x[], size_t d,
+ unsigned char w, const mbedtls_mpi *m)
+{
+ size_t i, j;
+ unsigned char c, cc, adjust;
+
+ memset(x, 0, d+1);
+
+ /* First get the classical comb values (except for x_d = 0) */
+ for (i = 0; i < d; i++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < w; j++) {
+ x[i] |= mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(m, i + d * j) << j;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Now make sure x_1 .. x_d are odd */
+ c = 0;
+ for (i = 1; i <= d; i++) {
+ /* Add carry and update it */
+ cc = x[i] & c;
+ x[i] = x[i] ^ c;
+ c = cc;
+
+ /* Adjust if needed, avoiding branches */
+ adjust = 1 - (x[i] & 0x01);
+ c |= x[i] & (x[i-1] * adjust);
+ x[i] = x[i] ^ (x[i-1] * adjust);
+ x[i-1] |= adjust << 7;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Precompute points for the adapted comb method
+ *
+ * Assumption: T must be able to hold 2^{w - 1} elements.
+ *
+ * Operation: If i = i_{w-1} ... i_1 is the binary representation of i,
+ * sets T[i] = i_{w-1} 2^{(w-1)d} P + ... + i_1 2^d P + P.
+ *
+ * Cost: d(w-1) D + (2^{w-1} - 1) A + 1 N(w-1) + 1 N(2^{w-1} - 1)
+ *
+ * Note: Even comb values (those where P would be omitted from the
+ * sum defining T[i] above) are not needed in our adaption
+ * the comb method. See ecp_comb_recode_core().
+ *
+ * This function currently works in four steps:
+ * (1) [dbl] Computation of intermediate T[i] for 2-power values of i
+ * (2) [norm_dbl] Normalization of coordinates of these T[i]
+ * (3) [add] Computation of all T[i]
+ * (4) [norm_add] Normalization of all T[i]
+ *
+ * Step 1 can be interrupted but not the others; together with the final
+ * coordinate normalization they are the largest steps done at once, depending
+ * on the window size. Here are operation counts for P-256:
+ *
+ * step (2) (3) (4)
+ * w = 5 142 165 208
+ * w = 4 136 77 160
+ * w = 3 130 33 136
+ * w = 2 124 11 124
+ *
+ * So if ECC operations are blocking for too long even with a low max_ops
+ * value, it's useful to set MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE to a lower value in order
+ * to minimize maximum blocking time.
+ */
+static int ecp_precompute_comb(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point T[], const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ unsigned char w, size_t d,
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char i;
+ size_t j = 0;
+ const unsigned char T_size = 1U << (w - 1);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *cur, *TT[COMB_MAX_PRE - 1] = { NULL };
+
+ mbedtls_mpi tmp[4];
+
+ mpi_init_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) {
+ if (rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_dbl) {
+ goto dbl;
+ }
+ if (rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_norm_dbl) {
+ goto norm_dbl;
+ }
+ if (rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_add) {
+ goto add;
+ }
+ if (rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_norm_add) {
+ goto norm_add;
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ (void) rs_ctx;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) {
+ rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_dbl;
+
+ /* initial state for the loop */
+ rs_ctx->rsm->i = 0;
+ }
+
+dbl:
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Set T[0] = P and
+ * T[2^{l-1}] = 2^{dl} P for l = 1 .. w-1 (this is not the final value)
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(&T[0], P));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm->i != 0) {
+ j = rs_ctx->rsm->i;
+ } else
+#endif
+ j = 0;
+
+ for (; j < d * (w - 1); j++) {
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL);
+
+ i = 1U << (j / d);
+ cur = T + i;
+
+ if (j % d == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(cur, T + (i >> 1)));
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_jac(grp, cur, cur, tmp));
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) {
+ rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_norm_dbl;
+ }
+
+norm_dbl:
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Normalize current elements in T to allow them to be used in
+ * ecp_add_mixed() below, which requires one normalized input.
+ *
+ * As T has holes, use an auxiliary array of pointers to elements in T.
+ *
+ */
+ j = 0;
+ for (i = 1; i < T_size; i <<= 1) {
+ TT[j++] = T + i;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 6 * j - 2);
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_normalize_jac_many(grp, TT, j));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) {
+ rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_add;
+ }
+
+add:
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Compute the remaining ones using the minimal number of additions
+ * Be careful to update T[2^l] only after using it!
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET((T_size - 1) * MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD);
+
+ for (i = 1; i < T_size; i <<= 1) {
+ j = i;
+ while (j--) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, &T[i + j], &T[j], &T[i], tmp));
+ }
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) {
+ rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_pre_norm_add;
+ }
+
+norm_add:
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Normalize final elements in T. Even though there are no holes now, we
+ * still need the auxiliary array for homogeneity with the previous
+ * call. Also, skip T[0] which is already normalised, being a copy of P.
+ */
+ for (j = 0; j + 1 < T_size; j++) {
+ TT[j] = T + j + 1;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 6 * j - 2);
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_normalize_jac_many(grp, TT, j));
+
+ /* Free Z coordinate (=1 after normalization) to save RAM.
+ * This makes T[i] invalid as mbedtls_ecp_points, but this is OK
+ * since from this point onwards, they are only accessed indirectly
+ * via the getter function ecp_select_comb() which does set the
+ * target's Z coordinate to 1. */
+ for (i = 0; i < T_size; i++) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&T[i].Z);
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+
+ mpi_free_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL &&
+ ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
+ if (rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_pre_dbl) {
+ rs_ctx->rsm->i = j;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Select precomputed point: R = sign(i) * T[ abs(i) / 2 ]
+ *
+ * See ecp_comb_recode_core() for background
+ */
+static int ecp_select_comb(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point T[], unsigned char T_size,
+ unsigned char i)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char ii, j;
+
+ /* Ignore the "sign" bit and scale down */
+ ii = (i & 0x7Fu) >> 1;
+
+ /* Read the whole table to thwart cache-based timing attacks */
+ for (j = 0; j < T_size; j++) {
+ MPI_ECP_COND_ASSIGN(&R->X, &T[j].X, j == ii);
+ MPI_ECP_COND_ASSIGN(&R->Y, &T[j].Y, j == ii);
+ }
+
+ /* Safely invert result if i is "negative" */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_safe_invert_jac(grp, R, i >> 7));
+
+ MPI_ECP_LSET(&R->Z, 1);
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Core multiplication algorithm for the (modified) comb method.
+ * This part is actually common with the basic comb method (GECC 3.44)
+ *
+ * Cost: d A + d D + 1 R
+ */
+static int ecp_mul_comb_core(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point T[], unsigned char T_size,
+ const unsigned char x[], size_t d,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point Txi;
+ mbedtls_mpi tmp[4];
+ size_t i;
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Txi);
+ mpi_init_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi));
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ (void) rs_ctx;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL &&
+ rs_ctx->rsm->state != ecp_rsm_comb_core) {
+ rs_ctx->rsm->i = 0;
+ rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_comb_core;
+ }
+
+ /* new 'if' instead of nested for the sake of the 'else' branch */
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm->i != 0) {
+ /* restore current index (R already pointing to rs_ctx->rsm->R) */
+ i = rs_ctx->rsm->i;
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ /* Start with a non-zero point and randomize its coordinates */
+ i = d;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_select_comb(grp, R, T, T_size, x[i]));
+ if (f_rng != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_jac(grp, R, f_rng, p_rng));
+ }
+ }
+
+ while (i != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_DBL + MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD);
+ --i;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_jac(grp, R, R, tmp));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_select_comb(grp, &Txi, T, T_size, x[i]));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, R, R, &Txi, tmp));
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&Txi);
+ mpi_free_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL &&
+ ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
+ rs_ctx->rsm->i = i;
+ /* no need to save R, already pointing to rs_ctx->rsm->R */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Recode the scalar to get constant-time comb multiplication
+ *
+ * As the actual scalar recoding needs an odd scalar as a starting point,
+ * this wrapper ensures that by replacing m by N - m if necessary, and
+ * informs the caller that the result of multiplication will be negated.
+ *
+ * This works because we only support large prime order for Short Weierstrass
+ * curves, so N is always odd hence either m or N - m is.
+ *
+ * See ecp_comb_recode_core() for background.
+ */
+static int ecp_comb_recode_scalar(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *m,
+ unsigned char k[COMB_MAX_D + 1],
+ size_t d,
+ unsigned char w,
+ unsigned char *parity_trick)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi M, mm;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&M);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&mm);
+
+ /* N is always odd (see above), just make extra sure */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&grp->N, 0) != 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* do we need the parity trick? */
+ *parity_trick = (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(m, 0) == 0);
+
+ /* execute parity fix in constant time */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&M, m));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&mm, &grp->N, m));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(&M, &mm, *parity_trick));
+
+ /* actual scalar recoding */
+ ecp_comb_recode_core(k, d, w, &M);
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&mm);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&M);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform comb multiplication (for short Weierstrass curves)
+ * once the auxiliary table has been pre-computed.
+ *
+ * Scalar recoding may use a parity trick that makes us compute -m * P,
+ * if that is the case we'll need to recover m * P at the end.
+ */
+static int ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *m,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *T,
+ unsigned char T_size,
+ unsigned char w,
+ size_t d,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char parity_trick;
+ unsigned char k[COMB_MAX_D + 1];
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *RR = R;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) {
+ RR = &rs_ctx->rsm->R;
+
+ if (rs_ctx->rsm->state == ecp_rsm_final_norm) {
+ goto final_norm;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_comb_recode_scalar(grp, m, k, d, w,
+ &parity_trick));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_mul_comb_core(grp, RR, T, T_size, k, d,
+ f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_safe_invert_jac(grp, RR, parity_trick));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) {
+ rs_ctx->rsm->state = ecp_rsm_final_norm;
+ }
+
+final_norm:
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV);
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Knowledge of the jacobian coordinates may leak the last few bits of the
+ * scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow,
+ * inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value
+ * of its input via side-channels [2].
+ *
+ * [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191
+ * [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055
+ *
+ * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them.
+ */
+ if (f_rng != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_jac(grp, RR, f_rng, p_rng));
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_normalize_jac(grp, RR));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, RR));
+ }
+#endif
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pick window size based on curve size and whether we optimize for base point
+ */
+static unsigned char ecp_pick_window_size(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ unsigned char p_eq_g)
+{
+ unsigned char w;
+
+ /*
+ * Minimize the number of multiplications, that is minimize
+ * 10 * d * w + 18 * 2^(w-1) + 11 * d + 7 * w, with d = ceil( nbits / w )
+ * (see costs of the various parts, with 1S = 1M)
+ */
+ w = grp->nbits >= 384 ? 5 : 4;
+
+ /*
+ * If P == G, pre-compute a bit more, since this may be re-used later.
+ * Just adding one avoids upping the cost of the first mul too much,
+ * and the memory cost too.
+ */
+ if (p_eq_g) {
+ w++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If static comb table may not be used (!p_eq_g) or static comb table does
+ * not exists, make sure w is within bounds.
+ * (The last test is useful only for very small curves in the test suite.)
+ *
+ * The user reduces MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE does not changes the size of
+ * static comb table, because the size of static comb table is fixed when
+ * it is generated.
+ */
+#if (MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE < 6)
+ if ((!p_eq_g || !ecp_group_is_static_comb_table(grp)) && w > MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE) {
+ w = MBEDTLS_ECP_WINDOW_SIZE;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (w >= grp->nbits) {
+ w = 2;
+ }
+
+ return w;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiplication using the comb method - for curves in short Weierstrass form
+ *
+ * This function is mainly responsible for administrative work:
+ * - managing the restart context if enabled
+ * - managing the table of precomputed points (passed between the below two
+ * functions): allocation, computation, ownership transfer, freeing.
+ *
+ * It delegates the actual arithmetic work to:
+ * ecp_precompute_comb() and ecp_mul_comb_with_precomp()
+ *
+ * See comments on ecp_comb_recode_core() regarding the computation strategy.
+ */
+static int ecp_mul_comb(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char w, p_eq_g, i;
+ size_t d;
+ unsigned char T_size = 0, T_ok = 0;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *T = NULL;
+
+ ECP_RS_ENTER(rsm);
+
+ /* Is P the base point ? */
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+ p_eq_g = (MPI_ECP_CMP(&P->Y, &grp->G.Y) == 0 &&
+ MPI_ECP_CMP(&P->X, &grp->G.X) == 0);
+#else
+ p_eq_g = 0;
+#endif
+
+ /* Pick window size and deduce related sizes */
+ w = ecp_pick_window_size(grp, p_eq_g);
+ T_size = 1U << (w - 1);
+ d = (grp->nbits + w - 1) / w;
+
+ /* Pre-computed table: do we have it already for the base point? */
+ if (p_eq_g && grp->T != NULL) {
+ /* second pointer to the same table, will be deleted on exit */
+ T = grp->T;
+ T_ok = 1;
+ } else
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ /* Pre-computed table: do we have one in progress? complete? */
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm->T != NULL) {
+ /* transfer ownership of T from rsm to local function */
+ T = rs_ctx->rsm->T;
+ rs_ctx->rsm->T = NULL;
+ rs_ctx->rsm->T_size = 0;
+
+ /* This effectively jumps to the call to mul_comb_after_precomp() */
+ T_ok = rs_ctx->rsm->state >= ecp_rsm_comb_core;
+ } else
+#endif
+ /* Allocate table if we didn't have any */
+ {
+ T = mbedtls_calloc(T_size, sizeof(mbedtls_ecp_point));
+ if (T == NULL) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < T_size; i++) {
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&T[i]);
+ }
+
+ T_ok = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute table (or finish computing it) if not done already */
+ if (!T_ok) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_precompute_comb(grp, T, P, w, d, rs_ctx));
+
+ if (p_eq_g) {
+ /* almost transfer ownership of T to the group, but keep a copy of
+ * the pointer to use for calling the next function more easily */
+ grp->T = T;
+ grp->T_size = T_size;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Actual comb multiplication using precomputed points */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_mul_comb_after_precomp(grp, R, m,
+ T, T_size, w, d,
+ f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx));
+
+cleanup:
+
+ /* does T belong to the group? */
+ if (T == grp->T) {
+ T = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* does T belong to the restart context? */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS && T != NULL) {
+ /* transfer ownership of T from local function to rsm */
+ rs_ctx->rsm->T_size = T_size;
+ rs_ctx->rsm->T = T;
+ T = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* did T belong to us? then let's destroy it! */
+ if (T != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < T_size; i++) {
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&T[i]);
+ }
+ mbedtls_free(T);
+ }
+
+ /* prevent caller from using invalid value */
+ int should_free_R = (ret != 0);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ /* don't free R while in progress in case R == P */
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
+ should_free_R = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (should_free_R) {
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(R);
+ }
+
+ ECP_RS_LEAVE(rsm);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * For Montgomery curves, we do all the internal arithmetic in projective
+ * coordinates. Import/export of points uses only the x coordinates, which is
+ * internally represented as X / Z.
+ *
+ * For scalar multiplication, we'll use a Montgomery ladder.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Normalize Montgomery x/z coordinates: X = X/Z, Z = 1
+ * Cost: 1M + 1I
+ */
+static int ecp_normalize_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT)
+ if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) {
+ return mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_mxz(grp, P);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#else
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ MPI_ECP_INV(&P->Z, &P->Z);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&P->X, &P->X, &P->Z);
+ MPI_ECP_LSET(&P->Z, 1);
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT) */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Randomize projective x/z coordinates:
+ * (X, Z) -> (l X, l Z) for random l
+ * This is sort of the reverse operation of ecp_normalize_mxz().
+ *
+ * This countermeasure was first suggested in [2].
+ * Cost: 2M
+ */
+static int ecp_randomize_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT)
+ if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) {
+ return mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_mxz(grp, P, f_rng, p_rng);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#else
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi l;
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&l);
+
+ /* Generate l such that 1 < l < p */
+ MPI_ECP_RAND(&l);
+
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&P->X, &P->X, &l);
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&P->Z, &P->Z, &l);
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&l);
+
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
+ }
+ return ret;
+#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT) */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Double-and-add: R = 2P, S = P + Q, with d = X(P - Q),
+ * for Montgomery curves in x/z coordinates.
+ *
+ * http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-code/montgom/xz/ladder/mladd-1987-m.op3
+ * with
+ * d = X1
+ * P = (X2, Z2)
+ * Q = (X3, Z3)
+ * R = (X4, Z4)
+ * S = (X5, Z5)
+ * and eliminating temporary variables tO, ..., t4.
+ *
+ * Cost: 5M + 4S
+ */
+static int ecp_double_add_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *R, mbedtls_ecp_point *S,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *P, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ mbedtls_mpi T[4])
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT)
+ if (mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp)) {
+ return mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_add_mxz(grp, R, S, P, Q, d);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT)
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#else
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ MPI_ECP_ADD(&T[0], &P->X, &P->Z); /* Pp := PX + PZ */
+ MPI_ECP_SUB(&T[1], &P->X, &P->Z); /* Pm := PX - PZ */
+ MPI_ECP_ADD(&T[2], &Q->X, &Q->Z); /* Qp := QX + XZ */
+ MPI_ECP_SUB(&T[3], &Q->X, &Q->Z); /* Qm := QX - QZ */
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[3], &T[3], &T[0]); /* Qm * Pp */
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&T[2], &T[2], &T[1]); /* Qp * Pm */
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(&T[0], &T[0]); /* Pp^2 */
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(&T[1], &T[1]); /* Pm^2 */
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&R->X, &T[0], &T[1]); /* Pp^2 * Pm^2 */
+ MPI_ECP_SUB(&T[0], &T[0], &T[1]); /* Pp^2 - Pm^2 */
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&R->Z, &grp->A, &T[0]); /* A * (Pp^2 - Pm^2) */
+ MPI_ECP_ADD(&R->Z, &T[1], &R->Z); /* [ A * (Pp^2-Pm^2) ] + Pm^2 */
+ MPI_ECP_ADD(&S->X, &T[3], &T[2]); /* Qm*Pp + Qp*Pm */
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(&S->X, &S->X); /* (Qm*Pp + Qp*Pm)^2 */
+ MPI_ECP_SUB(&S->Z, &T[3], &T[2]); /* Qm*Pp - Qp*Pm */
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(&S->Z, &S->Z); /* (Qm*Pp - Qp*Pm)^2 */
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&S->Z, d, &S->Z); /* d * ( Qm*Pp - Qp*Pm )^2 */
+ MPI_ECP_MUL(&R->Z, &T[0], &R->Z); /* [A*(Pp^2-Pm^2)+Pm^2]*(Pp^2-Pm^2) */
+
+cleanup:
+
+ return ret;
+#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NO_FALLBACK) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT) */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiplication with Montgomery ladder in x/z coordinates,
+ * for curves in Montgomery form
+ */
+static int ecp_mul_mxz(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned char b;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point RP;
+ mbedtls_mpi PX;
+ mbedtls_mpi tmp[4];
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&RP); mbedtls_mpi_init(&PX);
+
+ mpi_init_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi));
+
+ if (f_rng == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* Save PX and read from P before writing to R, in case P == R */
+ MPI_ECP_MOV(&PX, &P->X);
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(&RP, P));
+
+ /* Set R to zero in modified x/z coordinates */
+ MPI_ECP_LSET(&R->X, 1);
+ MPI_ECP_LSET(&R->Z, 0);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&R->Y);
+
+ /* RP.X might be slightly larger than P, so reduce it */
+ MOD_ADD(&RP.X);
+
+ /* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_mxz(grp, &RP, f_rng, p_rng));
+
+ /* Loop invariant: R = result so far, RP = R + P */
+ i = grp->nbits + 1; /* one past the (zero-based) required msb for private keys */
+ while (i-- > 0) {
+ b = mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(m, i);
+ /*
+ * if (b) R = 2R + P else R = 2R,
+ * which is:
+ * if (b) double_add( RP, R, RP, R )
+ * else double_add( R, RP, R, RP )
+ * but using safe conditional swaps to avoid leaks
+ */
+ MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(&R->X, &RP.X, b);
+ MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(&R->Z, &RP.Z, b);
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_double_add_mxz(grp, R, &RP, R, &RP, &PX, tmp));
+ MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(&R->X, &RP.X, b);
+ MPI_ECP_COND_SWAP(&R->Z, &RP.Z, b);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Knowledge of the projective coordinates may leak the last few bits of the
+ * scalar [1], and since our MPI implementation isn't constant-flow,
+ * inversion (used for coordinate normalization) may leak the full value
+ * of its input via side-channels [2].
+ *
+ * [1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2003/191
+ * [2] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055
+ *
+ * Avoid the leak by randomizing coordinates before we normalize them.
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_randomize_mxz(grp, R, f_rng, p_rng));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_normalize_mxz(grp, R));
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&RP); mbedtls_mpi_free(&PX);
+
+ mpi_free_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Restartable multiplication R = m * P
+ *
+ * This internal function can be called without an RNG in case where we know
+ * the inputs are not sensitive.
+ */
+static int ecp_mul_restartable_internal(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
+ char is_grp_capable = 0;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ /* reset ops count for this call if top-level */
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->depth++ == 0) {
+ rs_ctx->ops_done = 0;
+ }
+#else
+ (void) rs_ctx;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
+ if ((is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp))) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_internal_ecp_init(grp));
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */
+
+ int restarting = 0;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ restarting = (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->rsm != NULL);
+#endif
+ /* skip argument check when restarting */
+ if (!restarting) {
+ /* check_privkey is free */
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK);
+
+ /* Common sanity checks */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(grp, m));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(grp, P));
+ }
+
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_mul_mxz(grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng));
+ }
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_mul_comb(grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx));
+ }
+#endif
+
+cleanup:
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
+ if (is_grp_capable) {
+ mbedtls_internal_ecp_free(grp);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL) {
+ rs_ctx->depth--;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restartable multiplication R = m * P
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+ if (f_rng == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return ecp_mul_restartable_internal(grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Multiplication R = m * P
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_mul(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable(grp, R, m, P, f_rng, p_rng, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Check that an affine point is valid as a public key,
+ * short weierstrass curves (SEC1 3.2.3.1)
+ */
+static int ecp_check_pubkey_sw(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi YY, RHS;
+
+ /* pt coordinates must be normalized for our checks */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&pt->X, 0) < 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&pt->Y, 0) < 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pt->X, &grp->P) >= 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pt->Y, &grp->P) >= 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&YY); mbedtls_mpi_init(&RHS);
+
+ /*
+ * YY = Y^2
+ * RHS = X^3 + A X + B
+ */
+ MPI_ECP_SQR(&YY, &pt->Y);
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_sw_rhs(grp, &RHS, &pt->X));
+
+ if (MPI_ECP_CMP(&YY, &RHS) != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&YY); mbedtls_mpi_free(&RHS);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * R = m * P with shortcuts for m == 0, m == 1 and m == -1
+ * NOT constant-time - ONLY for short Weierstrass!
+ */
+static int mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *m,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi tmp;
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&tmp);
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(m, 0) == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(grp, P));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_set_zero(R));
+ } else if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(m, 1) == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(grp, P));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, P));
+ } else if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(m, -1) == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(grp, P));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, P));
+ MPI_ECP_NEG(&R->Y);
+ } else {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_mul_restartable_internal(grp, R, m, P,
+ NULL, NULL, rs_ctx));
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&tmp);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restartable linear combination
+ * NOT constant-time
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable(
+ mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point mP;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *pmP = &mP;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *pR = R;
+ mbedtls_mpi tmp[4];
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
+ char is_grp_capable = 0;
+#endif
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) != MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&mP);
+ mpi_init_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi));
+
+ ECP_RS_ENTER(ma);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL) {
+ /* redirect intermediate results to restart context */
+ pmP = &rs_ctx->ma->mP;
+ pR = &rs_ctx->ma->R;
+
+ /* jump to next operation */
+ if (rs_ctx->ma->state == ecp_rsma_mul2) {
+ goto mul2;
+ }
+ if (rs_ctx->ma->state == ecp_rsma_add) {
+ goto add;
+ }
+ if (rs_ctx->ma->state == ecp_rsma_norm) {
+ goto norm;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts(grp, pmP, m, P, rs_ctx));
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL) {
+ rs_ctx->ma->state = ecp_rsma_mul2;
+ }
+
+mul2:
+#endif
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul_shortcuts(grp, pR, n, Q, rs_ctx));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
+ if ((is_grp_capable = mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(grp))) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_internal_ecp_init(grp));
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL) {
+ rs_ctx->ma->state = ecp_rsma_add;
+ }
+
+add:
+#endif
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_ADD);
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_add_mixed(grp, pR, pmP, pR, tmp));
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL) {
+ rs_ctx->ma->state = ecp_rsma_norm;
+ }
+
+norm:
+#endif
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_BUDGET(MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV);
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecp_normalize_jac(grp, pR));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ma != NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_copy(R, pR));
+ }
+#endif
+
+cleanup:
+
+ mpi_free_many(tmp, sizeof(tmp) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
+ if (is_grp_capable) {
+ mbedtls_internal_ecp_free(grp);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&mP);
+
+ ECP_RS_LEAVE(ma);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Linear combination
+ * NOT constant-time
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_muladd(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *m, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *n, const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable(grp, R, m, P, n, Q, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+#define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) }
+#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \
+ ECP_MPI_INIT(x, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint))
+/*
+ * Constants for the two points other than 0, 1, -1 (mod p) in
+ * https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate
+ * See ecp_check_pubkey_x25519().
+ */
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint x25519_bad_point_1[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xe0, 0xeb, 0x7a, 0x7c, 0x3b, 0x41, 0xb8, 0xae),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x56, 0xe3, 0xfa, 0xf1, 0x9f, 0xc4, 0x6a),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xda, 0x09, 0x8d, 0xeb, 0x9c, 0x32, 0xb1, 0xfd),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x62, 0x05, 0x16, 0x5f, 0x49, 0xb8, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint x25519_bad_point_2[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5f, 0x9c, 0x95, 0xbc, 0xa3, 0x50, 0x8c, 0x24),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xb1, 0xd0, 0xb1, 0x55, 0x9c, 0x83, 0xef, 0x5b),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x44, 0x5c, 0xc4, 0x58, 0x1c, 0x8e, 0x86),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xd8, 0x22, 0x4e, 0xdd, 0xd0, 0x9f, 0x11, 0x57),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi ecp_x25519_bad_point_1 = ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(
+ x25519_bad_point_1);
+static const mbedtls_mpi ecp_x25519_bad_point_2 = ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(
+ x25519_bad_point_2);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Check that the input point is not one of the low-order points.
+ * This is recommended by the "May the Fourth" paper:
+ * https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/806.pdf
+ * Those points are never sent by an honest peer.
+ */
+static int ecp_check_bad_points_mx(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *P,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id)
+{
+ int ret;
+ mbedtls_mpi XmP;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&XmP);
+
+ /* Reduce X mod P so that we only need to check values less than P.
+ * We know X < 2^256 so we can proceed by subtraction. */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&XmP, X));
+ while (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&XmP, P) >= 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&XmP, &XmP, P));
+ }
+
+ /* Check against the known bad values that are less than P. For Curve448
+ * these are 0, 1 and -1. For Curve25519 we check the values less than P
+ * from the following list: https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html#validate */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&XmP, 1) <= 0) { /* takes care of 0 and 1 */
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+ if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) {
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&XmP, &ecp_x25519_bad_point_1) == 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&XmP, &ecp_x25519_bad_point_2) == 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ (void) grp_id;
+#endif
+
+ /* Final check: check if XmP + 1 is P (final because it changes XmP!) */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&XmP, &XmP, 1));
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&XmP, P) == 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&XmP);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check validity of a public key for Montgomery curves with x-only schemes
+ */
+static int ecp_check_pubkey_mx(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt)
+{
+ /* [Curve25519 p. 5] Just check X is the correct number of bytes */
+ /* Allow any public value, if it's too big then we'll just reduce it mod p
+ * (RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 3). */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_size(&pt->X) > (grp->nbits + 7) / 8) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
+ }
+
+ /* Implicit in all standards (as they don't consider negative numbers):
+ * X must be non-negative. This is normally ensured by the way it's
+ * encoded for transmission, but let's be extra sure. */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&pt->X, 0) < 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
+ }
+
+ return ecp_check_bad_points_mx(&pt->X, &grp->P, grp->id);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Check that a point is valid as a public key
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *pt)
+{
+ /* Must use affine coordinates */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&pt->Z, 1) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) {
+ return ecp_check_pubkey_mx(grp, pt);
+ }
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) {
+ return ecp_check_pubkey_sw(grp, pt);
+ }
+#endif
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that an mbedtls_mpi is valid as a private key
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *d)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) {
+ /* see RFC 7748 sec. 5 para. 5 */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(d, 0) != 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(d, 1) != 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(d) != grp->nbits + 1) { /* mbedtls_mpi_bitlen is one-based! */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
+ }
+
+ /* see [Curve25519] page 5 */
+ if (grp->nbits == 254 && mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(d, 2) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) {
+ /* see SEC1 3.2 */
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(d, 1) < 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(d, &grp->N) >= 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
+
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx(size_t high_bit,
+ mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ size_t n_random_bytes = high_bit / 8 + 1;
+
+ /* [Curve25519] page 5 */
+ /* Generate a (high_bit+1)-bit random number by generating just enough
+ * random bytes, then shifting out extra bits from the top (necessary
+ * when (high_bit+1) is not a multiple of 8). */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(d, n_random_bytes,
+ f_rng, p_rng));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(d, 8 * n_random_bytes - high_bit - 1));
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(d, high_bit, 1));
+
+ /* Make sure the last two bits are unset for Curve448, three bits for
+ Curve25519 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(d, 0, 0));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(d, 1, 0));
+ if (high_bit == 254) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(d, 2, 0));
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+static int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_sw(
+ const mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = mbedtls_mpi_random(d, 1, N, f_rng, p_rng);
+ switch (ret) {
+ case MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
+ default:
+ return ret;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Generate a private key
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) {
+ return mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx(grp->nbits, d, f_rng, p_rng);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) {
+ return mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_sw(&grp->N, d, f_rng, p_rng);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
+
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+/*
+ * Generate a keypair with configurable base point
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *G,
+ mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey(grp, d, f_rng, p_rng));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(grp, Q, d, G, f_rng, p_rng));
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate key pair, wrapper for conventional base point
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair_base(grp, &grp->G, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate a keypair, prettier wrapper
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&key->grp, grp_id)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(&key->grp, &key->d, &key->Q, f_rng, p_rng);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
+int mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id,
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
+ /* Group not set yet */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&key->grp, grp_id)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ } else if (key->grp.id != grp_id) {
+ /* Group mismatch */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ return mbedtls_ecp_copy(&key->Q, Q);
+}
+
+
+#define ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE 32
+#define ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE 56
+/*
+ * Read a private key.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&key->grp, grp_id)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) {
+ /*
+ * Mask the key as mandated by RFC7748 for Curve25519 and Curve448.
+ */
+ if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) {
+ if (buflen != ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le(&key->d, buf, buflen));
+
+ /* Set the three least significant bits to 0 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, 0, 0));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, 1, 0));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, 2, 0));
+
+ /* Set the most significant bit to 0 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+ mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d,
+ ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 1, 0)
+ );
+
+ /* Set the second most significant bit to 1 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+ mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d,
+ ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 2, 1)
+ );
+ } else if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448) {
+ if (buflen != ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le(&key->d, buf, buflen));
+
+ /* Set the two least significant bits to 0 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, 0, 0));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d, 1, 0));
+
+ /* Set the most significant bit to 1 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+ mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&key->d,
+ ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE * 8 - 1, 1)
+ );
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&key->d, buf, buflen));
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(&key->grp, &key->d));
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&key->d);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a private key.
+ */
+#if !defined MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED
+int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) {
+ if (key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) {
+ if (buflen < ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ } else if (key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448) {
+ if (buflen < ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(&key->d, buf, buflen));
+ }
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&key->d, buf, buflen));
+ }
+
+#endif
+cleanup:
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+int mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
+ size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ size_t len = (key->grp.nbits + 7) / 8;
+ if (len > buflen) {
+ /* For robustness, ensure *olen <= buflen even on error. */
+ *olen = 0;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ *olen = len;
+
+ /* Private key not set */
+ if (key->d.n == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY) {
+ return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary_le(&key->d, buf, len);
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+ if (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&key->grp) == MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS) {
+ return mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&key->d, buf, len);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* Private key set but no recognized curve type? This shouldn't happen. */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a public key.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
+ int format, size_t *olen,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&key->grp, &key->Q,
+ format, olen, buf, buflen);
+}
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+/*
+ * Check a public-private key pair
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(
+ const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point Q;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
+ if (pub->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE ||
+ pub->grp.id != prv->grp.id ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->Q.X, &prv->Q.X) ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->Q.Y, &prv->Q.Y) ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&pub->Q.Z, &prv->Q.Z)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Q);
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp);
+
+ /* mbedtls_ecp_mul() needs a non-const group... */
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(&grp, &prv->grp);
+
+ /* Also checks d is valid */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&grp, &Q, &prv->d, &prv->grp.G, f_rng, p_rng));
+
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&Q.X, &prv->Q.X) ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&Q.Y, &prv->Q.Y) ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&Q.Z, &prv->Q.Z)) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&Q);
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ecp_mul(&key->grp, &key->Q, &key->d, &key->grp.G,
+ f_rng, p_rng);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
+mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(
+ const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key)
+{
+ return key->grp.id;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Export generic key-pair parameters.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_export(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (grp != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(grp, &key->grp)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (d != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(d, &key->d)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (Q != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy(Q, &key->Q)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+/*
+ * PRNG for test - !!!INSECURE NEVER USE IN PRODUCTION!!!
+ *
+ * This is the linear congruential generator from numerical recipes,
+ * except we only use the low byte as the output. See
+ * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_congruential_generator#Parameters_in_common_use
+ */
+static int self_test_rng(void *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t len)
+{
+ static uint32_t state = 42;
+
+ (void) ctx;
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ state = state * 1664525u + 1013904223u;
+ out[i] = (unsigned char) state;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Adjust the exponent to be a valid private point for the specified curve.
+ * This is sometimes necessary because we use a single set of exponents
+ * for all curves but the validity of values depends on the curve. */
+static int self_test_adjust_exponent(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_mpi *m)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ switch (grp->id) {
+ /* If Curve25519 is available, then that's what we use for the
+ * Montgomery test, so we don't need the adjustment code. */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:
+ /* Move highest bit from 254 to N-1. Setting bit N-1 is
+ * necessary to enforce the highest-bit-set constraint. */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(m, 254, 0));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(m, grp->nbits, 1));
+ /* Copy second-highest bit from 253 to N-2. This is not
+ * necessary but improves the test variety a bit. */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(
+ mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(m, grp->nbits - 1,
+ mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(m, 253)));
+ break;
+#endif
+#endif /* ! defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) */
+ default:
+ /* Non-Montgomery curves and Curve25519 need no adjustment. */
+ (void) grp;
+ (void) m;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Calculate R = m.P for each m in exponents. Check that the number of
+ * basic operations doesn't depend on the value of m. */
+static int self_test_point(int verbose,
+ mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ mbedtls_mpi *m,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ const char *const *exponents,
+ size_t n_exponents)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t i = 0;
+ unsigned long add_c_prev, dbl_c_prev, mul_c_prev;
+ add_count = 0;
+ dbl_count = 0;
+ mul_count = 0;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(m, 16, exponents[0]));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(self_test_adjust_exponent(grp, m));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(grp, R, m, P, self_test_rng, NULL));
+
+ for (i = 1; i < n_exponents; i++) {
+ add_c_prev = add_count;
+ dbl_c_prev = dbl_count;
+ mul_c_prev = mul_count;
+ add_count = 0;
+ dbl_count = 0;
+ mul_count = 0;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_string(m, 16, exponents[i]));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(self_test_adjust_exponent(grp, m));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(grp, R, m, P, self_test_rng, NULL));
+
+ if (add_count != add_c_prev ||
+ dbl_count != dbl_c_prev ||
+ mul_count != mul_c_prev) {
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed (%u)\n", (unsigned int) i);
+ } else {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
+/*
+ * Checkup routine
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
+ mbedtls_ecp_point R, P;
+ mbedtls_mpi m;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+ /* Exponents especially adapted for secp192k1, which has the lowest
+ * order n of all supported curves (secp192r1 is in a slightly larger
+ * field but the order of its base point is slightly smaller). */
+ const char *sw_exponents[] =
+ {
+ "000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001", /* one */
+ "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE26F2FC170F69466A74DEFD8C", /* n - 1 */
+ "5EA6F389A38B8BC81E767753B15AA5569E1782E30ABE7D25", /* random */
+ "400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000", /* one and zeros */
+ "7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", /* all ones */
+ "555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555", /* 101010... */
+ };
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+ const char *m_exponents[] =
+ {
+ /* Valid private values for Curve25519. In a build with Curve448
+ * but not Curve25519, they will be adjusted in
+ * self_test_adjust_exponent(). */
+ "4000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+ "5C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C30",
+ "5715ECCE24583F7A7023C24164390586842E816D7280A49EF6DF4EAE6B280BF8",
+ "41A2B017516F6D254E1F002BCCBADD54BE30F8CEC737A0E912B4963B6BA74460",
+ "5555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555555550",
+ "7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF8",
+ };
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&R);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&P);
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&m);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+ /* Use secp192r1 if available, or any available curve */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1));
+#else
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()->grp_id));
+#endif
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ECP SW test #1 (constant op_count, base point G): ");
+ }
+ /* Do a dummy multiplication first to trigger precomputation */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&m, 2));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_mul(&grp, &P, &m, &grp.G, self_test_rng, NULL));
+ ret = self_test_point(verbose,
+ &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G,
+ sw_exponents,
+ sizeof(sw_exponents) / sizeof(sw_exponents[0]));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ECP SW test #2 (constant op_count, other point): ");
+ }
+ /* We computed P = 2G last time, use it */
+ ret = self_test_point(verbose,
+ &grp, &R, &m, &P,
+ sw_exponents,
+ sizeof(sw_exponents) / sizeof(sw_exponents[0]));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&R);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ECP Montgomery test (constant op_count): ");
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519));
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448));
+#else
+#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED is defined, but no curve is supported for self-test"
+#endif
+ ret = self_test_point(verbose,
+ &grp, &R, &m, &grp.G,
+ m_exponents,
+ sizeof(m_exponents) / sizeof(m_exponents[0]));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
+
+cleanup:
+
+ if (ret < 0 && verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("Unexpected error, return code = %08X\n", (unsigned int) ret);
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&R);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&P);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&m);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+ (void) verbose;
+ return 0;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3cd33f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5460 @@
+/*
+ * Elliptic curves over GF(p): curve-specific data and functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
+
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include "bn_mul.h"
+#include "bignum_core.h"
+#include "ecp_invasive.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT)
+
+#define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) }
+
+#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \
+ ECP_MPI_INIT(x, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint))
+
+#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(x, y) { \
+ ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(NULL, 0) }
+#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(x, y) { \
+ ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(mpi_one, 1) }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+/* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */
+#define ECP_LOAD_GROUP
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_one[] = { 1 };
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Note: the constants are in little-endian order
+ * to be directly usable in MPIs
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Domain parameters for secp192r1
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xB9, 0x46, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0xB8, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x30, 0x24, 0x72, 0xAB, 0xE9, 0xA7, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x80, 0x9C, 0xE5, 0x19, 0x05, 0x21, 0x64),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x28, 0xD2, 0xB4, 0xB1, 0xC9, 0x6B, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xF8, 0xDE, 0x99, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x9E, 0xE3, 0x60, 0x59, 0xD1, 0xC4, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBD, 0x22, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xB6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x2A, 0xCF, 0x33, 0xF0, 0xBE, 0xD1, 0xED),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x71, 0x4B, 0xA8, 0xED, 0x7E, 0xC9, 0x1A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x2A, 0xF6, 0xDF, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x35, 0xF7, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0x1E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x67, 0xC2, 0x1D, 0x32, 0x8F, 0x10, 0xFB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x2D, 0x17, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xD8, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x45, 0x10, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x3E, 0x52, 0x3E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xF1, 0x04, 0x5D, 0xEE, 0xD4, 0x56, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x27, 0x61, 0xAA, 0x81, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x37, 0xD7, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x14),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x35, 0x52, 0xC6, 0x31, 0xB7, 0x27, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xD4, 0x15, 0x98, 0x0F, 0xE7, 0xF3, 0x6A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x31, 0x70, 0x35, 0x09, 0xA0, 0x2B, 0xC2),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x75, 0xA7, 0x4C, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5B, 0xE4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x17, 0x48, 0x8D, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x86, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xCF, 0xFE, 0x6B, 0xB0, 0xA5, 0x06, 0xAB),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0x6D, 0x7B, 0x47, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xFC, 0x51, 0x12, 0x62, 0x66, 0x0B, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x40, 0x93, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x58, 0xD7),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x0B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xFB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x36, 0x9D, 0xA3, 0xD7, 0x3B, 0xAD, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x3B, 0x05, 0x9A, 0xA8, 0xAA, 0x69, 0xB2),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xD9, 0xD1, 0x4D, 0x4A, 0x6E, 0x96, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x66, 0x32, 0x39, 0xC6, 0x57, 0x7D, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xA0, 0x36, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x00, 0x62),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xEF, 0x59, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xD9, 0x8F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xB0, 0xE9, 0x41, 0xA4, 0x87, 0x76, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xD4, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0xFA, 0x16, 0x56, 0xDC),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x62, 0xD2, 0xB1, 0x34, 0xB2, 0xF1, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xED, 0x55, 0xC5, 0x47, 0xB5, 0x07, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xF6, 0x2F, 0x94, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x54, 0x2F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xA6, 0xD4, 0x8C, 0xA9, 0xCE, 0x4D, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x4B, 0x46, 0xCC, 0xB2, 0x55, 0xC8, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xAE, 0x31, 0xED, 0x89, 0x65, 0x59, 0x55),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x0A, 0xD1, 0x1A, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0xEA, 0x43),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xFC, 0x0C, 0x1A, 0xFB, 0xA0, 0xC8, 0x70),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xFD, 0x53, 0x6F, 0x6D, 0xBF, 0xBA, 0xAF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xB0, 0x7D, 0x83, 0x96, 0xE3, 0xCB, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x6E, 0x55, 0x2C, 0x20, 0x53, 0x2F, 0x46),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x66, 0x00, 0x17, 0x08, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0x31),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x12, 0x97, 0x3A, 0xC7, 0x57, 0x45, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x25, 0x99, 0x00, 0xF6, 0x97, 0xB4, 0x64),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x74, 0xE6, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xCC),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xF4, 0x76, 0xD5, 0x5F, 0x2A, 0xFD, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x80, 0x7E, 0x3E, 0xE5, 0xE8, 0xD6, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xAD, 0x1E, 0x70, 0x79, 0x3E, 0x3D, 0x83),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x15, 0xBB, 0xB3, 0x42, 0x6A, 0xA1, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x58, 0xCB, 0x43, 0x25, 0x00, 0x14, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x4E, 0x93, 0x11, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x54, 0x98),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x52, 0xA2, 0xB4, 0x57, 0x32, 0xB9, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x43, 0xA1, 0xB1, 0xFB, 0x01, 0xE1, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x11, 0xB8, 0xC2, 0x03, 0xE5),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x2B, 0x71, 0x26, 0x4E, 0x7C, 0xC5, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xF5, 0xD3, 0xA8, 0xE4, 0x95, 0x48, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xAE, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9F, 0x6A, 0x22, 0xAD),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xCC, 0xA3, 0x4D, 0xA0, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xF8, 0x5E, 0xA6, 0x58, 0x7D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x8A, 0x3D, 0x17, 0xFF, 0x0F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xCD, 0xA8, 0xDD, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x5C, 0xEA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xFE, 0x17, 0xE2, 0xCF, 0xEA, 0x63, 0xDE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x51, 0xC9, 0x16, 0xDE, 0xB4, 0xB2, 0xDD),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBE, 0x12, 0xD7, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x50, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x87, 0xC5, 0x8A, 0x76, 0x57, 0x07, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x1F, 0xC6, 0x1B, 0x66, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0x8A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xA4, 0x85, 0x13, 0x8F, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x19),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x0D, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0x1B, 0xD1, 0xD6, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x7A, 0xD0, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x66),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xFE, 0xA5, 0x9C, 0x34, 0x30, 0x49, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x26, 0x06, 0xE3, 0x01, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x2B, 0x66, 0xFC, 0x95, 0x5F, 0x35, 0xF7),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xCF, 0x54, 0x63, 0x99, 0x57, 0x05, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x6F, 0x00, 0x5F, 0x65, 0x08, 0x47, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x6D, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xBC, 0x45),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x0A, 0x35, 0x9E, 0x33, 0x9C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x17, 0x0C, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x7A, 0x49, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x44, 0x06, 0x8F, 0x0B, 0x70, 0x2F, 0x71),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x4B, 0xCB, 0xF9, 0x8E, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x3F, 0xCE, 0x17, 0xD2, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x0D, 0xD2, 0x6C, 0x82, 0x37, 0xE5, 0xFC),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x3C, 0xF4, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x8A, 0x95, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x96, 0xF1, 0x0A, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x74, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xA1, 0xAA, 0xBA, 0x86, 0x77, 0x4F, 0xA2),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x7F, 0xEF, 0x60, 0x50, 0x80, 0xD7, 0xD4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x2F, 0xBE, 0x91, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x48),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xAE, 0x85, 0x98, 0xFE, 0x05, 0x7F, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBE, 0xFD, 0x11, 0x31, 0x3D, 0x14, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x75, 0xE8, 0x30, 0x01, 0xCB, 0x9B, 0x1C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192r1_T[16] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192r1_T_0_X, secp192r1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_1_X, secp192r1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_2_X, secp192r1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_3_X, secp192r1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_4_X, secp192r1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_5_X, secp192r1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_6_X, secp192r1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_7_X, secp192r1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_8_X, secp192r1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_9_X, secp192r1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_10_X, secp192r1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_11_X, secp192r1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_12_X, secp192r1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_13_X, secp192r1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_14_X, secp192r1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_15_X, secp192r1_T_15_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define secp192r1_T NULL
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Domain parameters for secp224r1
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xFF, 0x55, 0x23, 0x43, 0x39, 0x0B, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xD8, 0xBF, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0xB0, 0x44, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0x32, 0x41, 0xF5, 0xAB, 0xB3, 0x04, 0x0C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x85, 0x0A, 0x05, 0xB4),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x2A, 0x5C, 0x5C, 0x45, 0x29, 0xDD, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xF0, 0xB8, 0xE0, 0xA2, 0x16, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xF9, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0xD3, 0xFA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xFD, 0x99, 0x26, 0x19, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x0E, 0x4C, 0x48, 0x7C, 0xA2, 0x17, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x57, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x16, 0x5C, 0x8F, 0xAA, 0xED, 0x0F, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xC5, 0x43, 0x34, 0x93, 0x05, 0x2A, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCA, 0xC6, 0x14, 0xC2, 0x25),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x43, 0x6C, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x5A, 0x98, 0x1E, 0xC8, 0xA5, 0x42, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x49, 0x56, 0x78, 0xF8, 0xEF, 0xED, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0xBB, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x4C, 0x54, 0x5F, 0xD1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x0C, 0x33, 0xCC, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x79, 0xCB, 0x2E, 0x08, 0xFF, 0xD8, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x1F, 0xD4, 0xD7, 0x57, 0xE9, 0x39, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xD6, 0x3B, 0x0A, 0x1C, 0x87, 0xB7, 0x6A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x30, 0xD8, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x79, 0x74, 0x9A, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x67, 0xC1, 0x91, 0xE7, 0x64),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xDF, 0x38, 0x82, 0x19, 0x2C, 0x4C, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x2E, 0x39, 0xC5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x36, 0x78, 0x4E, 0xAE, 0x5B, 0x02, 0x76),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0xF8, 0xF4, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x35, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0x2C, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xA5, 0x1F, 0xAE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x1C, 0x4B, 0xDF, 0x5B, 0xF2, 0x51, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0x0E, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x24, 0x09, 0x62, 0xAF, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xE1, 0x80, 0x55, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x82, 0xFE, 0xAD, 0xC3, 0xE5, 0xCF, 0xD8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xA2, 0x62, 0x17, 0x76, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0xFA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xB8, 0xE5, 0xAC, 0xB7, 0x66, 0x38, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xFD, 0x86, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xD3, 0x0C, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x66, 0xB0, 0xF1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x8D, 0x90, 0x10, 0xB7, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x47, 0x9B, 0xE6, 0x55, 0x8A, 0xE4, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x78, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x97, 0xED, 0xDE, 0xFF, 0xB3, 0xDF, 0x48),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xB9, 0x83, 0xB7, 0xEB, 0xBE, 0x40, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xD3, 0xD3, 0xCD, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x79, 0x3D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x83, 0x1B, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x54, 0xD3, 0x31, 0x56, 0xFC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x36, 0xE5, 0xE0, 0x89, 0x96, 0x8E, 0x71),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xEF, 0x0A, 0xED, 0xD0, 0x11, 0x4A, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x00, 0x57, 0x27, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xCA, 0x3D, 0xF7, 0x64, 0x9B, 0x6E, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xE3, 0x70, 0x6B, 0x41, 0xD7, 0xED, 0x8F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x44, 0x44, 0x80, 0xCE, 0x13, 0x37, 0x92),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x73, 0x80, 0x79, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x4D, 0x70, 0x7D, 0x31, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x35, 0x88, 0x47, 0xC4, 0x24, 0x78, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xF0, 0xCD, 0x91, 0x81, 0xB3, 0xDE, 0xB6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xCE, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x9C, 0x2D, 0xE8, 0xD2, 0x00, 0x8F, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x5E, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0x6E, 0x58, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x81, 0x21, 0xCE, 0x43, 0xF4, 0x24, 0x3D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0xBC, 0xF0, 0xF4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x10, 0xC2, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x8F, 0x8A, 0xCF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x67, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x38, 0x2B, 0x35, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0xA9, 0xFA, 0x77, 0x5C, 0xBD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x33, 0x19, 0x2B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x3E, 0x96, 0x22, 0x53, 0xE1, 0xE9, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x13, 0xBC, 0xA1, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x01, 0x1A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x00, 0xC9, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x73, 0xA5, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0xC1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x95, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x32, 0x30, 0x2B, 0xD0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x42, 0x09, 0x05, 0x61, 0x2A, 0x7E, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x84, 0xA2, 0x05, 0x88, 0x64, 0x65, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x2D, 0x90, 0xB3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xE7, 0x2E, 0x85, 0x55, 0x80, 0x7C, 0x79),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xC1, 0xAC, 0x78, 0xB4, 0xAF, 0xFB, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xC3, 0x28, 0x8E, 0x79, 0x18, 0x1F, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x5F, 0xA8, 0x6C, 0x46, 0x83, 0x43, 0xFA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xA9, 0x93, 0x11, 0xB6, 0x07, 0x57, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x03, 0x89, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x8C, 0x62, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x2C, 0x13, 0x59, 0xCC, 0xFA, 0x84, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xB9, 0x48, 0xBC, 0x57, 0xC7, 0xB3, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0x2E, 0x3A, 0x28, 0x25),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x0A, 0x43, 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x25, 0xAB, 0xC1, 0xEE, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xDB, 0x45, 0x1D, 0x4A, 0x80, 0x75, 0x35),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x2D, 0x9A, 0x05, 0xF4, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x10, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x95, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x15, 0x86, 0xC3, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xDC, 0x27, 0xD1, 0x56, 0xA1, 0x14, 0x0D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x0B, 0xD6, 0x77, 0x4E, 0x44, 0xA2, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x42, 0x71, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x86, 0xB2, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0x2F, 0x7B, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xEF, 0xCB, 0xDB, 0xBC, 0x9E, 0x3B, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x03, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x5B, 0xF5, 0x8D, 0x46),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x95, 0x79, 0xD6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x32, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x9B, 0x4F, 0x07, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x3E, 0xFB, 0x06, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0x40, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x1F, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x61, 0xFD, 0x8B, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x8B, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x34, 0xB3, 0xB4, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0xB0, 0x5E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x58, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x77, 0xBB, 0x13, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x34, 0xCC, 0x89, 0x21, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x33, 0xDD, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x81, 0xEF, 0xA4, 0xF2, 0x10, 0x0B, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xF7, 0x6E, 0x72, 0x4A, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x23, 0x0A, 0x53, 0x03, 0x16, 0x62, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x76, 0xFD, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x14, 0xA1, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x07),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xD7, 0xB0, 0x6C, 0xA0, 0xDE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xC0, 0xB0, 0xC6, 0x63, 0x24, 0xCD, 0x4E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x38, 0x2C, 0xB1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xCD, 0x7D, 0x20, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x97, 0x9F, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x45, 0xF7, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x99, 0xF3, 0xD2, 0x20, 0x02, 0xEB, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x18, 0x5B, 0x7B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x91, 0x60, 0xEA, 0xFD, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xD3, 0xB5, 0xD6, 0x90, 0x17, 0x0E, 0x1A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xF4, 0x28, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x58, 0xDC, 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x20, 0x01, 0xFB, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x7F, 0x06, 0xDA, 0x11, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0xA6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x41, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x33, 0x79),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xFF, 0x27, 0xCA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224r1_T[16] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224r1_T_0_X, secp224r1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_1_X, secp224r1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_2_X, secp224r1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_3_X, secp224r1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_4_X, secp224r1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_5_X, secp224r1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_6_X, secp224r1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_7_X, secp224r1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_8_X, secp224r1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_9_X, secp224r1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_10_X, secp224r1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_11_X, secp224r1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_12_X, secp224r1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_13_X, secp224r1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_14_X, secp224r1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_15_X, secp224r1_T_15_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define secp224r1_T NULL
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Domain parameters for secp256r1
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x60, 0xD2, 0x27, 0x3E, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xB0, 0x53, 0xCC, 0xB0, 0x06, 0x1D, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x86, 0x98, 0x76, 0x55, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x93, 0x3A, 0xAA, 0xD8, 0x35, 0xC6, 0x5A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x25, 0x63, 0xFC, 0xC2, 0xCA, 0xB9, 0xF3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x9E, 0x17, 0xA7, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE6, 0xBC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xC8, 0xBA, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x4B, 0xD2, 0xF7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xC6, 0x23, 0x3A, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x3A, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x23, 0xCC, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x29, 0x87, 0x0F, 0xFA, 0x3C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x69, 0xF2, 0x40, 0x0B, 0xA3, 0x98, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xA8, 0x48, 0x02, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0x12, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xAF, 0x09, 0x83, 0x80, 0xAA, 0x58, 0xA7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x12, 0xBE, 0x70, 0x94, 0x76, 0xE3, 0xE4),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x7D, 0xEF, 0x86, 0xFF, 0xE3, 0x37, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x86, 0x8B, 0x08, 0x27, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x54, 0x4C, 0x25, 0x4F, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xFD, 0xF0, 0x6D, 0x37, 0x03, 0x69, 0xD6),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xD5, 0xDA, 0xAD, 0x92, 0x49, 0xF0, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x73, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xAF, 0xA7, 0xD1, 0xF3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x41, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x78, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0xE2, 0x20),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x6A, 0x5D, 0x52, 0x35, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0x96, 0xF4, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x20, 0x49, 0x54, 0xEA, 0xB3, 0x82, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0xDB, 0xEA, 0x02, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x1C, 0x62),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x9E, 0x4C, 0xDC, 0x39, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0x57, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x5D, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x7F, 0x2D, 0x52, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0x4F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x64, 0xFA, 0xB4, 0xFE, 0xA4, 0xC4, 0xD7),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x37, 0xB9, 0xC0, 0xAA, 0x59, 0xC6, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x58, 0xD9, 0xED, 0x58, 0x99, 0x65, 0xF7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x7D, 0x26, 0x8C, 0x4A, 0xF9, 0x05, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x73, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xD0, 0x55, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x0A, 0xF5, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x81, 0x2D, 0x20, 0xEB, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xC1, 0x28, 0x52, 0xAB, 0xE3, 0xD1, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x34, 0x79, 0x45, 0x57, 0xA5, 0x12, 0x03),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xCF, 0xB8, 0x7E, 0xF7, 0x92, 0x96, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x01, 0x8C, 0x0D, 0x23, 0xF2, 0xE3, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x2E, 0xE3, 0x84, 0x52, 0x7A, 0x34, 0x76),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xA1, 0xB0, 0x15, 0x90, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x3C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x98, 0xE7, 0xFA, 0xA5, 0x7D, 0x8B, 0x53),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x35, 0xD2, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x1B, 0x9F, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x69, 0x08, 0x9A, 0x72, 0xF0, 0xA9, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0xD3),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xF6, 0xE8, 0xF8, 0x87, 0xF7, 0xFC, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xBE, 0x7F, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x2B, 0xD7, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x32, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x6D, 0x42, 0xFD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x9A, 0xE3, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xBB, 0x84, 0xED),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x95, 0x29, 0x73, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3E, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x30, 0x54, 0x35, 0x8E, 0x0A, 0xDD, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0x97, 0x61, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x0C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x33, 0x3C, 0x58, 0x55, 0x34, 0x23, 0xA3),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x5D, 0x16, 0x5F, 0x7B, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x8A, 0xC1, 0x51, 0xCC, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x0D, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x53, 0x23, 0x1D, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x66, 0x52, 0x84, 0xE1, 0x95),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x9B, 0x83, 0x0A, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xFF, 0x42, 0x41, 0x6E, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0xA0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xA1, 0x4F, 0x1F, 0x89, 0x82, 0xAA, 0x3E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xB8, 0x0F, 0x6B, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0xD6, 0x68),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0xB3, 0xBB, 0x51, 0x69, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x4F, 0x0F, 0x8D, 0xBD, 0x26, 0x0F, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xCB, 0xEC, 0x6B, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x3D, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x5D, 0x1E, 0x10, 0xD5, 0x44, 0xE2, 0x54),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x9E, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0x6E, 0x4C, 0xAD, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x58, 0xC0, 0xFB, 0x34, 0x43),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x9C, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x07, 0x41, 0xBD, 0x19),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x6E, 0x10, 0xEC, 0x0E, 0xEC, 0xBB, 0xD6),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xCF, 0xEF, 0x3F, 0x83, 0x1A, 0x88, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x29, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0xE0, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x46, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCD, 0x7E, 0xB3, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x21, 0xD0, 0xD4, 0xA3, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEE),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0xCA, 0xA8, 0xB3, 0xBF, 0x29, 0x99, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xF2, 0x05, 0xC1, 0xCF, 0x5D, 0x91, 0x48),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x01, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x82, 0xDF, 0x5F, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x06, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xE3, 0x38, 0xA4, 0xC4),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xD2, 0x3A, 0xE8, 0x03, 0xC5, 0x6D, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x35, 0xD0, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x1E, 0xD2, 0xCB, 0xAC, 0x88, 0x27, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xE0, 0x31, 0xDD, 0x99, 0x86),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x32, 0x96, 0x41, 0x58, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x5A, 0x2A, 0xB8, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x78, 0x2C, 0xC7, 0x08, 0x99, 0x19, 0x24),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xE9, 0x84, 0x54, 0xE6, 0x16),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x38, 0x30, 0xDB, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x0A, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x5C, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0xD5, 0x46, 0x0B, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x0B, 0x60, 0x4B, 0x37, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x24, 0xF3, 0x3D, 0x79, 0x7F, 0x6C, 0x18),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7F, 0xE5, 0x1C, 0x4F, 0x60, 0x24, 0xF7, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x89, 0x49, 0x92),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xA7, 0x2E, 0x8D, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0x39, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x89, 0xB5, 0x9A, 0xB8, 0x8D, 0x42, 0x9C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0x45, 0xE6, 0x4B, 0x3F, 0x4F, 0x1E, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x59, 0x22, 0xCC, 0x72, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x93, 0x1A, 0x27, 0x1E, 0x34, 0xC5, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x58, 0x5C, 0x15, 0x2E, 0xC6),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x7F, 0xBA, 0x58, 0x5A, 0x84, 0x6F, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xA6, 0x36, 0x7E, 0xDC, 0xF7, 0xE1, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x4D, 0xAA, 0xEE, 0x57, 0x76, 0x3A, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x7E, 0x26, 0x18, 0x22, 0x23, 0x9F, 0xFF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x4C, 0x64, 0xC7, 0x55, 0x02, 0x3F, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x02, 0x90, 0xBB, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0x30, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x6F, 0x64, 0xF4, 0x16, 0x69, 0x48, 0xA4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x44, 0x9C, 0x95, 0x0C, 0x7D, 0x67, 0x5E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x91, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0xD0, 0xD7, 0xE7, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xF9, 0x48, 0x62, 0x6F, 0xA8, 0x93, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x3A, 0x99, 0x02, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0x3D, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xD3, 0x00, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x0C, 0x9F, 0x44),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xB2, 0xAA, 0xFD, 0x88, 0x15, 0xDF, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0x35, 0x27, 0x31, 0x44, 0xCD, 0xC0, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xA5, 0x71, 0x94, 0x84, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xCB, 0xD0, 0x93, 0xE9, 0x88, 0xDA, 0xE4),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xC6, 0x39, 0x16, 0x5D, 0xA3, 0x1E, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x07, 0x37, 0x26, 0x36, 0x2A, 0xFE, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xBC, 0xF3, 0xD0, 0xDE, 0x50, 0xFC, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x2E, 0x06, 0x10, 0x15, 0x4D, 0xFA, 0xF7),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x65, 0x69, 0x5B, 0x66, 0xA2, 0x75, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x16, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB0, 0x30, 0x25, 0x1A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xFB, 0x86, 0x42, 0x80, 0xC1, 0xC4, 0x76),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x1D, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x01, 0x5F, 0x82),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x37, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x1F, 0xA1, 0xF0, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x10, 0x5B, 0xCE, 0xC4, 0x9B, 0x6F, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x11, 0x11, 0x24, 0x4F, 0x4C, 0x79, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x3A, 0x72, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x72, 0x58, 0x43),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256r1_T[16] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256r1_T_0_X, secp256r1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_1_X, secp256r1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_2_X, secp256r1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_3_X, secp256r1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_4_X, secp256r1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_5_X, secp256r1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_6_X, secp256r1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_7_X, secp256r1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_8_X, secp256r1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_9_X, secp256r1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_10_X, secp256r1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_11_X, secp256r1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_12_X, secp256r1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_13_X, secp256r1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_14_X, secp256r1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_15_X, secp256r1_T_15_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define secp256r1_T NULL
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Domain parameters for secp384r1
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x2A, 0xEC, 0xD3, 0xED, 0xC8, 0x85, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x8A, 0x8D, 0x39, 0x56, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x87, 0x13, 0x50, 0x8F, 0x08, 0x14, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x41, 0x81, 0xFE, 0x6E, 0x9C, 0x1D, 0x18),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x2D, 0xF8, 0xE3, 0x6B, 0x05, 0x8E, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0xE2, 0xA7, 0x2F, 0x31, 0xB3),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x29, 0xC5, 0xCC, 0x6A, 0x19, 0xEC, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xA7, 0xB0, 0x48, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x2D, 0x37, 0xF4, 0x81, 0x4D, 0x63, 0xC7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x92, 0x00, 0x2C, 0x78, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x37),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xB7, 0x06, 0xF7, 0xB6, 0xBC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xBC, 0x2C, 0xCF, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x53, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x75, 0x7B, 0xA3, 0xAB, 0xC3, 0x2C, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x9D, 0x78, 0x41, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x84, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x56, 0xE8, 0x52, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0xA8, 0xBD),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xF2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0xB6, 0x89, 0x1B, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x0F, 0xCE, 0x1C, 0x7C, 0xF6, 0x50, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xEB, 0x90, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0xC7, 0xD4, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x49, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x01, 0x99, 0x60, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x80, 0x9B, 0x9B, 0x6A, 0xB0, 0x07, 0xD9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xA2, 0xEE, 0x59, 0xBE, 0x95, 0xBC, 0x23),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x9D, 0x56, 0xAE, 0x59, 0xFB, 0x1F, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xAC, 0x91, 0x80, 0x87, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x08, 0xA7, 0x08, 0x94, 0x32, 0xFC, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x29, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF4, 0xE5, 0x6E, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x21, 0xB9, 0x50, 0x24, 0xF8, 0x9C, 0xC7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x04, 0x01, 0xC2, 0xFB, 0x77, 0x3E, 0xDE),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x38, 0xEE, 0xE3, 0xC7, 0x9D, 0xEC, 0xA6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x43, 0xFA, 0x92, 0x5E, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xCA, 0x43, 0xF8, 0x3B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xE7, 0xEB, 0x17, 0x45, 0x86, 0xC2, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x69, 0x57, 0x32, 0xE0, 0x9C, 0xD1, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x10, 0xB8, 0x4D, 0xB8, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xE3),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0xB2, 0x79, 0x39, 0x27, 0x16),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x71, 0xE4, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xBD, 0x19, 0x40, 0xFA, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xF8, 0x1E, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x50, 0x8D, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x18, 0x7C, 0x41, 0xFA, 0x7C, 0x1B, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x59, 0x24, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xB7, 0xD3, 0xAD),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x63, 0x54, 0x45, 0x6F, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xB2, 0x19, 0xA3, 0x86, 0x1D, 0x42, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x02, 0x87, 0x18, 0x92, 0x52, 0x1A, 0x71),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x37, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x74, 0x61, 0xBA, 0x18, 0xAF, 0x40, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x52, 0x0F, 0x07, 0xB0, 0x6F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x39, 0x13, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x15, 0x99, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x00, 0xCB, 0xC6, 0xB1, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xFA, 0x60, 0xB8, 0x24, 0xE4, 0x7D, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x75, 0xB3, 0x70, 0xB2, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCD, 0x33, 0x62, 0x7A, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x30, 0xDC, 0x0F, 0x9F, 0xBB, 0xB8, 0xAA),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xD5, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x81, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x16),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xAA, 0x2F, 0xD6, 0xF2, 0x73, 0xDF, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x7B, 0x74, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0x5B, 0x95, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x04, 0xEB, 0x15, 0xC8, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x50, 0x20, 0x28, 0xD1, 0x01, 0xAF, 0xF0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x4F, 0x31, 0x81, 0x2F, 0x94, 0x48),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x63, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x37, 0x63, 0xDE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x46, 0xAD, 0xCE, 0x7B, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x47, 0x2D, 0x66, 0xA7, 0xE9, 0x33, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xF9, 0x93, 0x94, 0xA8, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x4F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x4A, 0xAC, 0x51, 0x08, 0x72, 0x2F, 0x1A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0xAD, 0xA0, 0xF9, 0x81, 0xE1, 0x78, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x9A, 0x63, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x31, 0x7B, 0x7A, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0x7D, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x96, 0x12, 0x4B, 0x19, 0x09, 0xE0, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x8A, 0x57, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x7E, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x9D, 0x69, 0xDC, 0xB3, 0xDA, 0xD8, 0x08),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x49, 0x03, 0x03, 0x33, 0x6F, 0x28, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xDB, 0xA7, 0x05, 0x8C, 0xF3, 0x4D, 0xFB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x92, 0xB1, 0xA8, 0xEC, 0x0D, 0x64, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0x4B, 0x88, 0x1B, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x9C, 0x51, 0x69, 0xCE, 0x71, 0x73, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x5A, 0x14, 0x23, 0x1A, 0x46, 0x63, 0x5F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x44, 0x18, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x49, 0xDD, 0x64, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x92),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x32, 0x7C, 0x09, 0xD0, 0x3F, 0xD6, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE0, 0x4F, 0x65, 0x0C, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x3E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xFA, 0xFB, 0x4A, 0xB4, 0x79, 0x5A, 0x8C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x5D, 0x1B, 0x2B, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0x9A, 0x74),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xAC, 0x56, 0xF7, 0x5F, 0x51, 0x68, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xE0, 0x1D, 0xBC, 0x13, 0x4E, 0xAC, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xF5, 0xC5, 0xE6, 0xD2, 0x88, 0xBA, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x23, 0x58, 0x67, 0xFA, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x80, 0x4B, 0xD8, 0xC4, 0xDF, 0x15, 0xE4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x0E, 0x58, 0xE6, 0x2C, 0x59, 0xC2, 0x03),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x26, 0x27, 0x99, 0x16, 0x2B, 0x22, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xF3, 0x8F, 0xC3, 0x2A, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x2E, 0x83, 0x3D, 0xFE, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x57, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0xC1, 0x49, 0x38, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x42, 0x8B, 0x33, 0x89, 0x1F, 0xEA, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x1D, 0x13, 0xD7, 0x50, 0xBB, 0x3E, 0xEB),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x9A, 0x52, 0xD2, 0x54, 0x7C, 0x97, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x33, 0x6E, 0xED, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x50, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x35, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x40, 0x15, 0x83, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x2B, 0xA4, 0xAB, 0x03, 0x91, 0xEA, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x47, 0x39, 0xEF, 0x05, 0x59, 0xD0, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x24, 0x0D, 0x76, 0x11, 0x53, 0x08, 0xAF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x2F, 0xDD, 0xBD, 0x50, 0x48, 0xB1, 0xE5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x1C, 0x84, 0x55, 0x78, 0x14, 0xEB, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x5E, 0x3E, 0xA6, 0xAF, 0xF6, 0xC7, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x11, 0xE2, 0x65, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x95, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x83, 0xD8, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0x22, 0x06, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x7F, 0x25, 0x2A, 0xAA, 0x28, 0x46, 0x97),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xDB, 0x15, 0x56, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xC0, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xDB, 0x0E, 0x08, 0xC9, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x62, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x7C, 0x13, 0xD5, 0x07),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x21, 0xA0, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x38, 0x81, 0x21, 0x23, 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xBB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x51, 0x05, 0xD0, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA9, 0x71),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xC3, 0x27, 0xBF, 0xC6, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x65, 0x45, 0xDF, 0xB9, 0x46, 0x17, 0x46),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x38, 0x3F, 0xB2, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0xCA, 0x1C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xD7, 0x48, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x99, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x05, 0x99),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE6, 0x5E, 0x82, 0x6D, 0xE5, 0x7E, 0xD5),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x61, 0xFA, 0x7D, 0x01, 0xDB, 0xB6, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xC6, 0x58, 0x39, 0xF4, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x5A, 0x7A, 0x80, 0x08, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0xD8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x3F, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0x68, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xF5, 0xD5, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xD8, 0x8A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xAD, 0x92, 0xC5, 0x57, 0x6C, 0xDA, 0x91),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x67, 0x17, 0xC0, 0x40, 0x78, 0x8C, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xAA, 0xDA, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xDB, 0x42, 0x3E, 0x72, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xF9, 0x41, 0x17, 0x43, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xDD, 0xCC, 0x43, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x05, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x4B, 0xCF, 0x48, 0x8F, 0x41, 0x90, 0xE5),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x0C, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0x22, 0x04, 0xBC, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x63, 0x79, 0x2F, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x8A, 0xDE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x67, 0x3F, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x14, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x33, 0xF4, 0x6B, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x44, 0x71, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x88, 0x3F, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x2B, 0x85, 0x05, 0xC5, 0x44, 0x53, 0x15),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD1, 0x1C, 0x73, 0xE3, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x33, 0xA1, 0xD3, 0x69, 0x1C, 0x9D, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x5A, 0xBA, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0x1B, 0x94, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x74, 0x90, 0x5C, 0x57, 0xB0, 0x3A, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x2F, 0x93, 0x20, 0x24, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x78, 0x9D, 0x71, 0x67, 0x5D, 0x49, 0x98),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xC8, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0x8F, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x7F, 0x79, 0x6C, 0x5F, 0xB7, 0xBC, 0xB1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xE1, 0x83, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xBB, 0xEE, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x41, 0x71, 0xB9, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0xEE, 0xBB, 0x1D, 0x89, 0x50, 0x88, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x1C, 0x55, 0x74, 0xEB, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x3F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x38, 0x92, 0x06, 0x19, 0xD0, 0xB3, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x99, 0x26, 0xA3, 0x5F, 0xE2, 0xC1, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xC3, 0xB6, 0x26, 0x24, 0x8F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xB7, 0x64, 0x4B, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x4E, 0x95, 0xAD, 0x07, 0xFE, 0xB6, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x15, 0xE7, 0x2D, 0x19, 0xA9, 0x08, 0x10),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0x0A, 0x3F, 0x6B, 0xFF, 0xFA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xE4, 0x74, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x1D, 0x71),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xB0, 0x71, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x96, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0xB8, 0x19, 0x90, 0x80, 0xB5, 0xEE, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x21, 0x20, 0xA6, 0x17, 0x48, 0x03, 0x6F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x1D, 0xBB, 0x6D, 0x94, 0x20, 0x34, 0xF1),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x82, 0x67, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x4E, 0xBE, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xDA, 0x77, 0xF8, 0x23, 0x55, 0x2B, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x02, 0xDE, 0x25, 0x35, 0x2D, 0x74, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x0C, 0xB8, 0x0B, 0x39, 0xBA, 0xAD, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x4D, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0xE4, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xB0),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x68, 0xCE, 0xC2, 0x55, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x20, 0x93, 0x32, 0x90, 0xD6, 0xAE, 0x47),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x78, 0xAB, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xEB, 0x73, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x97, 0xC3, 0x83, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xF1, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x25, 0x25, 0x66, 0x08, 0x26, 0xFA, 0x4B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xFB, 0x44, 0x5D, 0x82, 0xEC, 0x3B, 0xAC),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x90, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x04, 0x99, 0xD0, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0xF2, 0x22, 0xA0, 0xEB, 0xFD, 0x45, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA4, 0x81, 0x32, 0xFC, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x4F, 0xF0, 0x10, 0xB3, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x74, 0x13, 0x14, 0x9E, 0x90, 0xD7, 0xE6),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x4F, 0xA8, 0xD1, 0x06, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0x68, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x53, 0x75, 0xED, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0xC2, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x87, 0x6B, 0x9F, 0x05, 0xE2, 0x22, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x1A, 0xA8, 0xB7, 0x03, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xD0, 0x69, 0x88, 0xA8, 0x39, 0x9E, 0x3A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xEF, 0x68, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x08, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x06, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x0D, 0xB7, 0x34, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xF4, 0xDD, 0x1A, 0xA0, 0x4A, 0xE4, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x63, 0x4F, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xBB, 0xD6, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xEE, 0x8D, 0xDF, 0x3F, 0x73, 0xB7, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x06, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xD9, 0x53),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xF5, 0x13, 0xDF, 0x13, 0x19, 0x97, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xF9, 0xB3, 0x33, 0x66, 0x82, 0x21, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xFC, 0x39, 0x16, 0x23, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x48, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x64, 0x95, 0x1C, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xAC, 0x15, 0x57, 0xD9, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x5F, 0xB8, 0x3D, 0x48, 0x91, 0x24, 0xCC),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xF2, 0xC8, 0x54, 0xD1, 0x32, 0xBD, 0xC4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x3B, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF4, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xC3, 0xBB, 0x6C, 0x66, 0xAC, 0x25, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x25, 0x10, 0xB2, 0xE1, 0x41, 0xDE, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xE8, 0x30, 0xB8, 0x37, 0xBC, 0x2A, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x57, 0x01, 0x4A, 0x1E, 0x78, 0x9F, 0x85),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x19, 0xCD, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x51, 0x4F, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x4B, 0x3D, 0x24, 0xA4, 0x16, 0x59, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xEB, 0xD3, 0x59, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x7C, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xB9, 0xB4, 0xA5, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0x29, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x16, 0x05, 0x75, 0x02, 0xB3, 0x06, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x7C, 0x9F, 0x79, 0x91, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0x23),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x98, 0x7C, 0x84, 0xE1, 0xFF, 0x30, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xE2, 0xC2, 0x5F, 0x55, 0x40, 0xBD, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x65, 0x87, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x30, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x15, 0xD1, 0x24, 0x48),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x99, 0xD9, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0xB1, 0xAF, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x80, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0x74, 0xB9, 0xF3),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xE6, 0x0F, 0x37, 0xC1, 0x10, 0x99, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xAD, 0x9D, 0x5D, 0x80, 0x01, 0xA6, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x20, 0x38, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x60, 0xCB, 0xCE, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0xA7, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xCF, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xBF, 0xE5, 0x74, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xDD, 0x59, 0x02, 0x5D, 0xC6),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC9, 0xF8, 0xF5, 0xB6, 0x13, 0x4D, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x93, 0xB3, 0xA2, 0x79, 0xDC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xF6, 0xCF, 0xF7, 0xE6, 0x29, 0x9C, 0xCC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x50, 0x65, 0x80, 0xBC, 0x59, 0x0A, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xF0, 0x24, 0x35, 0xA2, 0x46, 0xF0, 0x0C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x26, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x61, 0x56, 0x62, 0x67),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x37, 0x54),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xF7, 0xCE, 0x35, 0xFC, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x34, 0x96, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x76, 0x9D, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x3B, 0x0F, 0xEA, 0xA8, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x3F, 0x5D, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0xD4, 0x9E, 0xFB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x2E, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0x6E, 0xAB, 0xAF, 0xDC),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xB2, 0x7B, 0x0C, 0x9A, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x51, 0x90, 0x92, 0x79, 0x32, 0x19, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x89, 0xF9, 0xD0, 0xCF, 0x2C, 0xA5, 0x8F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x50, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x50, 0x41, 0x9D, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x7D, 0x2B, 0x9E, 0x9D, 0x95, 0xA8, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x87, 0x88, 0x97, 0x5F, 0xAA),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2, 0xAD, 0xD9, 0xC9, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x83, 0x07, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x26, 0xC7, 0x13, 0x35, 0x0D, 0xB0, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x60, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0x4B, 0x93, 0x18, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0x31, 0x4C, 0xE4, 0x61, 0xAE),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x4D, 0x1E, 0x51, 0x59, 0x6E, 0x91, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x54, 0x4D, 0x51, 0xED, 0x36, 0xCC, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xA8, 0x56, 0xC7, 0x78, 0x27, 0x33, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB7, 0x95, 0xC9, 0x8B, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0xBC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xE9, 0x13, 0x96, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0xF9, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x46, 0xB0, 0x5E, 0xC3, 0x94, 0x03, 0x05),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x5B, 0x29, 0x30, 0x41, 0x1A, 0x9E, 0xB6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xCA, 0x83, 0x31, 0x5B, 0xA7, 0xCB, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x41, 0x50, 0x44, 0x4D, 0x64, 0x31, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x84, 0xC2, 0x5D, 0x97, 0xA5, 0x3C, 0x18),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x0F, 0xA5, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x47, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x58, 0x02, 0x2D, 0x40, 0xB1, 0x0B, 0xBA),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x33, 0x8C, 0x67, 0xCE, 0x23, 0x43, 0x99),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x53, 0x47, 0x72, 0x44, 0x1F, 0x5B, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xC1, 0xD9, 0xA4, 0x50, 0x88, 0x63, 0x18),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xF2, 0x75, 0x69, 0x73, 0x00, 0xC4, 0x31),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x90, 0x1D, 0xDF, 0x1A, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xB1, 0x89, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x70, 0x62, 0xEF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x8A, 0x55, 0x50, 0x7B, 0xEF, 0x8A, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x1B, 0x23, 0x48, 0x23, 0x63, 0x91, 0xB6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x04, 0x54, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x9B, 0xC7, 0x9A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x38, 0xC3, 0x84, 0xFB, 0xFF, 0x9F, 0x49),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x2A, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x68, 0x8A, 0x5C, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x93, 0x53, 0x85, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xAF, 0x63),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x88, 0x95, 0x4C, 0x0B, 0xD0, 0x06, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xAF, 0x8D, 0x49, 0xA2, 0xC8, 0xB4, 0xE0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x76, 0x53, 0x09, 0x88, 0x43, 0x87, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xA4, 0x77, 0x3F, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xB4, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x9E, 0x86, 0x64, 0xCC, 0x91, 0xC1, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x17, 0x56, 0xCB, 0xC3, 0x7D, 0x5B, 0xB1),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x74, 0x9F, 0xB5, 0x91, 0x21, 0xB1, 0x1C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xED, 0xE1, 0x11, 0xEF, 0x45, 0xAF, 0xC1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x31, 0xBE, 0xB2, 0xBC, 0x72, 0x65, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x4B, 0x8C, 0x77, 0xCE, 0x1E, 0x42, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xC9, 0xAA, 0xB9, 0xD9, 0x86, 0x99, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x23, 0x80, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x35, 0x0B, 0x6D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xD8, 0xA2, 0x0A, 0x39, 0x32, 0x1D, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xF1, 0x12, 0x9A, 0x4A, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xF1, 0x7C, 0xAA, 0x70, 0x8E, 0xBC, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x01, 0x47, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0x8B, 0xA5, 0xC8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x08, 0x21, 0xF4, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0xF5, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x76, 0xA5, 0x95, 0xC4, 0x0F, 0x88, 0x1D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x42, 0x2A, 0x52, 0xCD, 0x75, 0x51, 0x49),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x36, 0xE5, 0x04, 0x2B, 0x44, 0xC6, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xEE, 0x16, 0x13, 0x07, 0x83, 0xB5, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x59, 0xC6, 0xA2, 0x19, 0x05, 0xD3, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x8B, 0xA8, 0x16, 0x09, 0xB7, 0xEA, 0xD6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xEE, 0x14, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0xEF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x7C, 0xCA, 0x71, 0x3E, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x31, 0x0E, 0x3F, 0xE5, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x3E, 0x95, 0x37, 0x58, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x1F, 0x02, 0x03, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xEE, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x5B, 0x1A, 0xFC, 0x38, 0xCD, 0xE8, 0x24),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x57, 0x42, 0x85, 0xC6, 0x21, 0x68, 0x71),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xA2, 0x4A, 0x66, 0xB1, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x9D, 0x5E, 0x99, 0xB2, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x03, 0x40, 0xCA, 0xB2, 0xB3, 0x30, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x78, 0x48, 0x27, 0x34, 0x1E, 0xE2, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x72, 0x5B, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0x6D, 0xE3, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAB, 0x46, 0xCB, 0xEA, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0x0B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x08, 0xAD, 0x4E, 0x51, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5C, 0x7D, 0x4C, 0xD6, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x76, 0x26, 0xE0, 0x8B, 0x10, 0xD9, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xA7, 0x23, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x42, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xE5, 0xA4, 0xEC, 0x77, 0x21, 0x34, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x14, 0x65, 0xEA, 0x4A, 0x85, 0xC3, 0x2F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xD8, 0x40, 0x27, 0x73, 0x15, 0x7E, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xBB, 0x53, 0x7E, 0x0F, 0x40, 0xC8, 0xD4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x37, 0x19, 0x73, 0xEF, 0x5A, 0x5E, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x73, 0x2B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xAC, 0x97, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xB2, 0xC3, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0xE7, 0xD2, 0x21),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x08, 0xD6, 0xDD, 0xAC, 0x21, 0xD6, 0x3E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x26, 0xBE, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x38, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x6C, 0x31, 0xA7, 0x49, 0x50, 0x3A, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x99, 0xC6, 0xF5, 0xD2, 0xC2, 0x30, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0x8B, 0x97, 0xE9, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0D, 0xFC, 0x15, 0x54, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x83, 0x1C, 0xA4, 0xCD, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0xF2),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x48, 0xE4, 0xAA, 0x69, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x7A, 0x27, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x96, 0x1A, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0xE7, 0x30, 0xA5, 0xCF, 0x13, 0x46, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xD8, 0xAF, 0x74, 0x23, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x3D, 0x44, 0x14, 0x1B, 0x97, 0x83, 0xF0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x47, 0xD7, 0x5F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x38, 0xF7),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x73, 0x64, 0x36, 0xFD, 0x7B, 0xC1, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x5D, 0x32, 0xD2, 0x47, 0x94, 0x89, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xE9, 0x30, 0xAC, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x65, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x1B, 0xF7, 0x61, 0x49, 0x53),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xFF, 0x32, 0x43, 0x80, 0xDA, 0xA6, 0xB1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x01, 0x95, 0x35, 0xCE, 0x21),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x06, 0x46, 0x0D, 0x51, 0xE2, 0xD8, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x57, 0x1D, 0x6F, 0x79, 0xA0, 0xCD, 0xA6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0xFB, 0x36, 0xCA, 0xAD, 0xF5, 0x9E, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x7A, 0x1D, 0x9E, 0x1D, 0x95, 0x48, 0xDC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x26, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x15, 0x2C, 0xC2, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x42, 0x72, 0xAA, 0x11, 0xDC, 0xC9, 0xB6),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x6C, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x62, 0x3C, 0xAB, 0xD4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x6A, 0x44, 0xD8, 0x60, 0xC0, 0xA8, 0x80),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x76, 0x58, 0x12, 0x57, 0x3C, 0x89, 0x46),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x4F, 0x83, 0xCE, 0xCB, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x84, 0x04, 0xB0, 0xAD, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xA4, 0xC3, 0x41, 0x44, 0x4E, 0x65, 0x3E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x16, 0xA9, 0x1C, 0xE7, 0x65, 0x20, 0xC1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x53, 0x32, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xA6, 0xBD, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xF0, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x26, 0x6F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xE3, 0x54, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xD3, 0x17, 0xBC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xAE, 0xED, 0xFB, 0xCD, 0xE7, 0x1E, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x16, 0x1C, 0x34, 0x40, 0x00, 0x1F, 0xB6),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x32, 0x00, 0xC2, 0xD4, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0x09),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xE0, 0x99, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0x4A, 0x16, 0x44),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x73, 0x18, 0x1B, 0xD4, 0x94, 0x29, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xA4, 0x2D, 0xB1, 0x9D, 0x74, 0x32, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xF4, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x37, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xFF, 0xDA, 0xE2, 0x35, 0xA3, 0xB6, 0x42),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x49, 0x99, 0x65, 0xC5, 0xED, 0x16, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x42, 0x9A, 0xF3, 0xA7, 0x4E, 0x6F, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x0A, 0x7E, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x07, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x7A, 0x31, 0x69, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x15, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xE0, 0x72, 0xA4, 0x3F, 0xB9, 0xF8, 0x0C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x75, 0x32, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0x37, 0x12),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xC0, 0x0D, 0xCF, 0x25, 0x41, 0xA4, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xFC, 0xB2, 0x48, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x83, 0x4B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xBE, 0x0B, 0x58, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x9A, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xF3, 0x81, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x74, 0x4F, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x43, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x16, 0x8B, 0xA3, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x18, 0x81, 0x7B, 0x8D, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x77),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xC4, 0x3F, 0x2C, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0x99, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0xAD, 0x5A, 0x56, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x48, 0xC8, 0xE8, 0xBA, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xA1, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x5A, 0xCD, 0x99, 0x9C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x95, 0xAD, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x6B, 0xD1, 0x34, 0x99, 0x53, 0x63, 0x0B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x5D, 0x2B, 0xAB, 0x01, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x85, 0xD0, 0xD5, 0x49, 0x83, 0x4D, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xC6, 0x91, 0x30, 0x3B, 0x00, 0xAF, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xAE, 0x61, 0x07, 0xE1, 0xB6, 0xE2, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x43, 0x41, 0xFE, 0x9B, 0xB6, 0xF0, 0xA5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x97, 0xAE, 0xAD, 0x89, 0x88, 0x9E, 0x41),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp384r1_T[32] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp384r1_T_0_X, secp384r1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_1_X, secp384r1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_2_X, secp384r1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_3_X, secp384r1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_4_X, secp384r1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_5_X, secp384r1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_6_X, secp384r1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_7_X, secp384r1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_8_X, secp384r1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_9_X, secp384r1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_10_X, secp384r1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_11_X, secp384r1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_12_X, secp384r1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_13_X, secp384r1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_14_X, secp384r1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_15_X, secp384r1_T_15_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_16_X, secp384r1_T_16_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_17_X, secp384r1_T_17_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_18_X, secp384r1_T_18_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_19_X, secp384r1_T_19_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_20_X, secp384r1_T_20_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_21_X, secp384r1_T_21_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_22_X, secp384r1_T_22_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_23_X, secp384r1_T_23_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_24_X, secp384r1_T_24_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_25_X, secp384r1_T_25_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_26_X, secp384r1_T_26_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_27_X, secp384r1_T_27_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_28_X, secp384r1_T_28_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_29_X, secp384r1_T_29_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_30_X, secp384r1_T_30_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_31_X, secp384r1_T_31_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define secp384r1_T NULL
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Domain parameters for secp521r1
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xFF, 0x01),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x3F, 0x50, 0x6B, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0x45, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x34, 0x2C, 0x3D, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x73, 0x35),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xBF, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0xBD, 0xC0, 0x52, 0x16),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x93, 0x7E, 0xEC, 0x51, 0x39, 0x19, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x09, 0xF1, 0x8E, 0x91, 0x89, 0xB4, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x15, 0xB3, 0x99, 0x5B, 0x72, 0xDA, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x40, 0x85, 0xB6, 0xA0, 0x21, 0x9A, 0x92),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x9A, 0x1C, 0x8E, 0x61, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x51, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xC6, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x18, 0x01),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x64, 0x38, 0x91, 0x1E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xBB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x47, 0x9C, 0x89, 0xB8, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0xA5, 0x09, 0xF7, 0x48, 0x01, 0xCC, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x96, 0x2F, 0xBF, 0x83, 0x87, 0x86, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xFF, 0x01),
+};
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xB1, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x27, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x4B, 0x44, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x5C, 0x5F, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x85, 0x28, 0x78, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x34, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x57, 0x0F, 0x73, 0x78, 0x7A, 0xE3, 0x53),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD8, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xDA, 0x04, 0xAD, 0xAB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x8A, 0x09, 0xF3, 0x58, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x29),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x03, 0xCB, 0x50, 0x1A, 0x7F, 0x56, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xA6, 0x78, 0x38, 0x85, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xD5, 0xD2, 0x22, 0xC4, 0x00, 0x3B, 0xBA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x93, 0x0E, 0x7B, 0x85, 0x51, 0xC3, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x54, 0x49, 0x02, 0x81, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x3A, 0x92, 0xE7, 0x72, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x5F, 0x28, 0x9E, 0x91, 0x27, 0x88, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x28, 0x31, 0xB3, 0x84, 0xCA, 0x12, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xF9, 0xAC, 0x22, 0x10, 0x0A, 0x64, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xC6, 0x33, 0x1F, 0x69, 0x19, 0x18, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x48, 0xB8, 0xC7, 0x37, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x36),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xCC, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xEE, 0x03, 0xC2, 0xBA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x29, 0xC2, 0xE4, 0x6E, 0x24, 0x20, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0x7B, 0xF9, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x7B, 0x3C, 0xE1, 0x19, 0xA1, 0x23, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x53, 0xC0, 0x07, 0x13, 0xA9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFE, 0x36, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x5E, 0x59, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x55, 0x89, 0x84, 0xBC, 0xEF, 0xA2, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x1A, 0x08, 0x67, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x22, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x26, 0xDF, 0x81, 0x3C, 0x5F, 0x1C, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x4D, 0xD0, 0x0A, 0x48, 0x06, 0xF4, 0x48),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x18, 0x39, 0xF7, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x77, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x8F, 0x44, 0x13, 0xCB, 0x78, 0x11, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xE2, 0x49, 0xEA, 0x43, 0x79, 0x08, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xD1, 0xD8, 0x73, 0x2C, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0xF4, 0x46, 0xAB, 0x20, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x0B, 0xB9, 0x71, 0x1A, 0x27, 0xB7, 0xA7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xA2, 0x2C, 0xD1, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0xBD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xA3, 0x10, 0x1F, 0x90, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xFB, 0x20, 0xF4, 0xC0, 0x70, 0xC0, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xA7, 0x99, 0xF0, 0xA5, 0xD3, 0x09, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0xE8, 0x14, 0x39, 0xBE, 0xCB, 0x60, 0xAF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xD6, 0x14, 0xA9, 0xC9, 0x20, 0xC3, 0xEA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA8, 0x5B, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x96, 0xBC, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x04, 0x45, 0xBE, 0xCE, 0x75, 0x95, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x49, 0x35, 0x09, 0x8D, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x36, 0xF2, 0xA6, 0x2D, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xFC, 0x3D, 0xA8, 0xFB, 0x3C, 0xD2, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x09, 0x18, 0x42, 0xF0, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xC1, 0xCE, 0x9E, 0x6A, 0x49, 0x60, 0x12),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xB1, 0x00, 0xF7, 0xA1, 0x7A, 0x31, 0xB4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xC3, 0x86, 0xCD, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x47, 0x8D, 0xAA, 0xA6, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x97, 0xF0, 0xBC, 0x2D, 0xDC, 0x9D, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x86, 0xB0, 0x74, 0xB2, 0xF4, 0xF6, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x43, 0x5C, 0xB1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xC3, 0xE2, 0x6E, 0x25, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x5E, 0x08, 0xB3, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x5F, 0xD1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xB7, 0xD1, 0xF4, 0xDC, 0x19, 0xE9, 0xC8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xE4, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x3E, 0xED, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x67, 0x92, 0x84, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x03, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x95, 0xEF, 0x8F, 0xB2, 0x82, 0x6B, 0x1C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFA, 0xB9, 0x55, 0x23, 0xFE, 0x09, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x79, 0x85, 0x4B, 0x0E, 0xD4, 0x35, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x27, 0x45, 0x81, 0xE0, 0x88, 0x52, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x63, 0xA2, 0x4B, 0xBC, 0x5D, 0xB1, 0x92),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x8C, 0x83, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0xD3, 0x42, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x03, 0x3A, 0x31, 0xBA, 0xE9, 0x3A, 0xD1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x10, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0x00, 0xFE, 0x32, 0xA7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0xDA, 0xF8, 0x6F, 0x4D, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x79, 0x7D, 0x09, 0xE5, 0xD3, 0x03, 0x21),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xC3, 0xBE, 0xDF, 0x07, 0x65, 0x49, 0xCC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x57, 0x33, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x4F, 0x04, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xFE, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x85, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xBA, 0xAA, 0x06, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x83, 0x01, 0xA9, 0xF6, 0x51, 0xE7, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xA6, 0x15, 0x8E, 0xAB, 0x1F, 0x10, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x08, 0x27, 0x1A, 0xA1, 0x21, 0xAD, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x09, 0x90, 0x6E, 0x50, 0x90, 0x9A, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0xF5, 0xA2, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x7D, 0xE3, 0xDC, 0x21, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xBF, 0x07, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x51, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x5C, 0x34, 0x02, 0x62, 0x9B, 0x08, 0x12),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0x6A, 0xEC, 0x75, 0xF6, 0x46),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x3C, 0x60, 0xB1, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x37, 0x84, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0xF2, 0x9A, 0x7D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x9A, 0x9A, 0x15, 0x36, 0xE0, 0x2B, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x38, 0x9C, 0x50, 0x3D, 0x1E, 0x37, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x79, 0xF0, 0x92, 0xF2, 0x8B, 0x18, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x1E, 0x80, 0x82, 0x4B, 0xD7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x6B, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xF9, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0x4A, 0x82, 0xCF, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x8C, 0xC8, 0x9B, 0x72, 0x9E, 0xF7, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xCE, 0xE9, 0x77, 0x0A, 0x19, 0x59, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xA1, 0x41, 0x6A, 0x72, 0x4B, 0xB4, 0xDC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x35, 0x43, 0xE2, 0x8C, 0xBE, 0x0D, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xEB, 0xAD, 0xF3, 0xA9, 0xA6, 0x68, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x2F, 0xE2, 0x48, 0x0C, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x1E, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xD2, 0xC1, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x64, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0xF6, 0xF6, 0x6E, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x3D, 0x30, 0x78, 0x10, 0x18, 0x41, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x1D, 0x1C, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x83, 0xD1, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x03, 0x0B, 0xF5, 0x2F, 0x6C, 0x04, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x3E, 0xD5, 0xFC, 0x31, 0x5B, 0x3A, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x82, 0x2F, 0xFB, 0xFE, 0xF8, 0x76, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x26, 0xDA, 0x9C, 0x36, 0xF5, 0x93, 0xD1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xE7, 0x6E, 0xD2, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x09, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x03, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x48, 0x24, 0xA2, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x79, 0x0C, 0x8E, 0x6B, 0x95, 0xF3, 0xC4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x87, 0x03, 0x39, 0xCF, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xF0, 0xF7, 0xC1, 0x07, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xE8, 0x02, 0x89, 0x65, 0xC4, 0x72, 0x36),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x88, 0xEA, 0x96, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x5D, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x75, 0x60, 0xA8, 0xBD, 0x74, 0xDF, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xE5, 0x71, 0x50, 0x67, 0xD0, 0xD2, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xFC, 0xE5, 0xC7, 0x77, 0xB0, 0x7F, 0x8C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x86, 0x69, 0xCD, 0x0D, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x17, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x0E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xA8, 0x76, 0xAC, 0x80, 0xA9, 0x72, 0xE0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x78, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x4D, 0xAF, 0xF9, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x97, 0x8E, 0x74, 0xC4, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD8, 0xF6, 0xF3, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0x52, 0xE5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x57, 0xF4, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0x43, 0xED, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x46, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x18),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x18, 0xE8, 0x58, 0xB9, 0x76, 0x2C, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x54, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xC7, 0xBC, 0x31, 0x37),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xF8, 0x89, 0xEE, 0x70, 0xB5, 0xB0, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x22, 0x26, 0x9A, 0x53, 0xB9, 0x38, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xA7, 0x19, 0x8C, 0x74, 0x7E, 0x88, 0x46),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xDA, 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDA, 0xA5, 0xBE, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x5C, 0xF7, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x72, 0xFB, 0x09),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xE2, 0x23, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xB7, 0xE0, 0x91),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x36, 0xBC, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x72),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xBB, 0xA1, 0xF7, 0x0B, 0x9E, 0xBF, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x28, 0xE1, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xFC, 0xFC, 0xD6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xFE, 0x19, 0x0A, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0x69, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xCD, 0x12, 0xF5, 0xBE, 0xD3, 0x04, 0xF1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xA8, 0x0D, 0x81, 0x59, 0xC4, 0x79, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xF3, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x65, 0xC3, 0x31, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xB5, 0x4F, 0x4D, 0x91, 0xD4, 0xE2, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x09, 0x41, 0x79, 0x1D, 0x4D, 0x0D, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x31, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xA0, 0xF2, 0x6E, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x5B, 0x4D, 0x4F, 0xAF, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x99, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x68, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x29),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x04, 0xE1, 0xB5, 0x9D, 0x00, 0xBC, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x95, 0x92, 0x8D, 0x72, 0xD3, 0x37, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x4B, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xE8, 0xA4, 0x26, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x45, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0xCB, 0x9F, 0xBA, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x7E, 0x1B, 0x64, 0xF4, 0xE8, 0xA5, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x20, 0xA9, 0xCA, 0xF3, 0x89, 0xE5, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xED, 0xFC, 0xAB, 0xD9, 0x0A, 0xB9, 0x07),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x6F, 0x46, 0x7C, 0xCD, 0x78, 0xFF, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xAB, 0x71, 0x5A, 0x94, 0xAB, 0x20, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x2E, 0xEE, 0x87, 0x57, 0x1F, 0xAD, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x4C, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x7E, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x07),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x86, 0xBA, 0x53, 0x37, 0xCF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x26, 0xB2, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x91, 0xE3, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xC9, 0x54, 0x84, 0x08, 0x3D, 0x0B, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA8, 0x77, 0x2F, 0x64, 0x45, 0x99, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x96, 0x16, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0x96, 0x28, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x2B, 0x8D, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x4F, 0x55, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xE6, 0x48, 0xBD, 0x99, 0x3D, 0x12, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x84, 0x59, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xB6, 0x66, 0x12),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x78, 0x41, 0x92, 0xDF, 0xF4, 0x3F, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x86, 0x6F, 0x4F, 0xBF, 0x67, 0xDF, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x2B, 0x1E, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xB9, 0x6A, 0x89, 0xD8, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0xA7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x9A, 0x32, 0x23, 0xA0, 0x02, 0x91, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x7F, 0x6A, 0x15, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x8B, 0xBB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x57, 0x82, 0x58, 0xA9, 0x56, 0xB5, 0xFB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x50, 0x92, 0x60, 0xCC, 0x81, 0x24, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x3D, 0xAD, 0xDA, 0xD9, 0x51, 0x3E, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xFE, 0x8F, 0xB0, 0x0B, 0xDE, 0x2E, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xD2, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0xAC, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xE8, 0x72, 0x0B, 0xAC, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x5B, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0xE3, 0x3C, 0x7C, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x04, 0xA7, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x93, 0xC0, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x32, 0xC5, 0xF0, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x42, 0x07, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0xF1, 0x72, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9C, 0x88, 0xD2, 0x62, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x89, 0x58, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xCC, 0x4C, 0x97, 0x30, 0x66, 0x34, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0xC9, 0x5E, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x4D, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x9B, 0x9C, 0xAC, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xE4, 0x4B, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xDA, 0xE8, 0x61, 0x9F, 0xC8, 0x49, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x85, 0xF6, 0x8D, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xC5, 0xCD, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xC6, 0x0E, 0x4F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x22, 0x9F, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x56, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x57, 0x32, 0xEC, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x9A, 0xC6, 0x4C, 0x09, 0xC4, 0x52, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x1E, 0x6F, 0xF4, 0x7D, 0x27, 0xDD, 0xAF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x11, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x79, 0x83, 0xAD, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x4E, 0x92, 0x1F, 0x19, 0x7D, 0x65, 0xDC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xFF, 0x78, 0x15, 0x45, 0x63, 0x32, 0xE4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x91, 0xD0, 0x78, 0x58, 0xDA, 0x50, 0x47),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0xDE, 0x40, 0xF6, 0x41, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0xE1, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0x35, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xD4, 0xBA, 0x7B, 0xCC, 0x1B, 0x3A, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x74, 0x47, 0x14, 0xC3, 0x4D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xF0, 0x8B, 0x06, 0x15, 0x8E, 0x0E, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0xD2, 0xEB, 0x97, 0x50, 0x7D, 0x31, 0xFC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x93, 0x4C, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x79, 0x44, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xA2, 0xA0, 0x0B, 0xC8, 0x3A, 0x8A, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x50, 0x92, 0x9E, 0x24, 0x1F, 0xCB, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x16, 0xC9, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0x5A, 0xAF, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xE4, 0xA8, 0x50, 0xF6, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x57, 0x97, 0x42, 0x78, 0x92, 0x49, 0x0D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xEB, 0x62, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0x32, 0xCF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x0C, 0x36, 0x6E, 0x8F, 0xE8, 0xE8, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xD3, 0x7C, 0xC7, 0x8D, 0x3F, 0x5C, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x73, 0x10, 0x79, 0xB8, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xF9, 0xEF, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x5C, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xF3, 0xF4, 0x49, 0x5B, 0x73, 0xAA, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xF2, 0xEA, 0x0F, 0x00, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xAB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xB8, 0x66, 0xED, 0xC4, 0x2B, 0x4C, 0x35),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x2F, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x37, 0xD2, 0x7F, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xA7, 0x81, 0x38, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x37, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x3B, 0x6C, 0x9F, 0x5B, 0xD9, 0x8B, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x08, 0xD8, 0xD2, 0x7E, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x71, 0xE6, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xB0, 0xE7, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x81, 0x23, 0xEC, 0x2D, 0x42, 0x45, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x5B, 0x44, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x03, 0x67, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x27, 0xAE, 0x80, 0x5A, 0x33, 0xBE, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xB6, 0x64, 0x1A, 0xDF, 0xD3, 0x85, 0x91),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x8C, 0x22, 0xBA, 0xD0, 0xBD, 0xCC, 0xA0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x3C, 0x01, 0x3A, 0xFF, 0x9D, 0xC7, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xC7, 0x64, 0xB4, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x9F, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x34, 0x0A, 0x41, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xF2, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xD4, 0xE4, 0xF0, 0x97, 0x45, 0x6D, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x6D, 0xFE, 0xA0, 0xC4, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x40, 0xBB, 0x65, 0xD4, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xA8, 0x87, 0x35, 0x20, 0x3A, 0x89, 0x44),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFD, 0x4F, 0xAB, 0x2D, 0xD1, 0xD0, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xE8, 0x00, 0xFC, 0x69, 0x52, 0xF8, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x9A, 0x99, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x9C, 0x3F, 0xD9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x08, 0x98, 0xD9, 0xCA, 0x73, 0xD5, 0xA9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xD7, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x04, 0xB0, 0x54, 0x09, 0xF4, 0x72, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xEE, 0x28, 0xCC, 0xE8, 0x50, 0x78, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x91, 0x03, 0x76, 0xDB, 0x68, 0x24, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xE0, 0x56, 0xB2, 0x5D, 0x12, 0xD3, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x42, 0x59, 0x8B, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xB5, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xCC, 0xE5, 0x31, 0x53, 0x7A, 0x46, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x8D, 0x59, 0xB5, 0x1B, 0x0F, 0xF4, 0xAF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x2F, 0xD1, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0x04, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0xBA, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x7E, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x08, 0x51, 0x56, 0xA6, 0x76, 0x67, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x17, 0x63, 0xFE, 0x56, 0xD0, 0xD9, 0x71),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xF6, 0xC3, 0x14, 0x47, 0xC5, 0xA7, 0x31),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x4C, 0x80, 0xF6, 0xA2, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xB3, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x2F, 0xE1, 0x3E, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x6B, 0x7B, 0x90, 0xDF, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x82, 0xEF, 0x62, 0xA1, 0x4C, 0x53, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x99, 0x76, 0x01, 0xBA, 0x8D, 0x0F, 0x54),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xF4, 0x58, 0x73, 0x56, 0xFE, 0xDD, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xCE, 0xF9, 0xE8, 0xA1, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x5F, 0xDC, 0x6A, 0x3D, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xF4, 0x51, 0xB8, 0xB8, 0xC1, 0xD7, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x7D, 0x58, 0xD1, 0xD4, 0x1B, 0x4D, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x95, 0xDF, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x47, 0x3C, 0xC3, 0xB2, 0x01, 0x53, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x17, 0x43, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xBA, 0x0F, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x41, 0x54, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x39, 0x26, 0x70, 0x53, 0x32, 0x18, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x46, 0x07, 0x97, 0x3A, 0x57, 0xE0, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x92, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xDF, 0x25, 0x80, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x6F, 0x9A, 0x03, 0x05, 0x4B, 0xD1, 0x47),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x01, 0x72, 0x30, 0x90, 0x17, 0x51, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xFB, 0x41, 0x65, 0x5C, 0xB4, 0x2D, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xCD, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xCC, 0xBB, 0x07),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xCE, 0x08, 0x0A, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xA2, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA8, 0x21, 0x7F, 0x7A, 0x5B, 0x9B, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x44, 0x0A, 0x7F, 0x85, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xDE, 0x7C, 0x19, 0x5C, 0x65, 0x26, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x29, 0x4A, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x00, 0x40, 0x87, 0xEB, 0xA9, 0x58, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x51, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x56, 0x35, 0x51, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xAC, 0x08, 0x94, 0x71, 0xDA, 0xEC, 0x99),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x4D, 0xC5, 0x7B, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x8D, 0x5E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x05, 0xF1, 0x3E, 0x9E, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x8F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0x62, 0x94, 0xAD, 0x49, 0xFC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0x8F, 0xFD, 0x33, 0x44, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7F, 0x42, 0xBE, 0xF7, 0x0D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x29, 0x39, 0x13, 0x08, 0x8D, 0x91, 0x47),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x79, 0xF9, 0x2F, 0xA9, 0x0A, 0xCF, 0xD6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x87, 0x7A, 0xA3, 0x19, 0xAB, 0x55, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x0B, 0x01, 0xC5, 0x56, 0x19, 0x9D, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xDE, 0x82, 0x3B, 0xEA, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0x8C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x6B, 0xC7, 0xF3, 0x0F, 0x82, 0x87, 0x6C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x2E, 0x23, 0xF2, 0x39, 0x9D, 0x49, 0x70),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0xDE, 0xAF, 0x7A, 0xEE, 0xB0, 0xDA, 0x70),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x4E, 0x2A, 0x50, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0xC0, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x63, 0xD8, 0x89, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x4E, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x85, 0xCF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x95, 0x5C, 0x96, 0x5D, 0xAA, 0x59, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xDB, 0xD2, 0x68, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x94, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x02, 0xBF, 0x77, 0x9F, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xDC, 0xC0, 0xCF, 0x81, 0x1E, 0xC4, 0x6C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xCC, 0x37, 0x86, 0xDC, 0xE2, 0x64, 0x72),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x59, 0x20, 0x9D, 0x98, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x0C, 0x9D, 0xF8, 0x20, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xBA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xA0, 0xF4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0x9C, 0x9E, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x25, 0xA2, 0xB0, 0x54, 0xCD, 0x2E, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD9, 0x42, 0xB0, 0x80, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xFE, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x40, 0xFF, 0x27, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x9D, 0xA6, 0x88, 0x3A, 0x8B, 0x6F, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x39, 0xEE, 0x1F, 0x3F, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xD7, 0x9E, 0xFF, 0xD2, 0x35, 0x67, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x4F, 0x15, 0x5D, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0x53, 0x86),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xF7, 0x24, 0x98, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0x11, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x2E, 0x25, 0xE1, 0x94, 0xC5, 0xA3, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x82, 0x6E, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x43, 0x25, 0xB0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x65, 0xB4, 0x49, 0x73, 0x18, 0x35, 0x54),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x5B, 0xBC, 0x62, 0x86, 0x4C, 0xC1, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xF2, 0x95, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x59, 0x62, 0xB0, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0xB4, 0xD8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x55, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x69, 0xBA, 0x63, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0x69, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x34, 0x7D, 0x68, 0x64),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x06, 0xCA, 0x55, 0x44, 0x36, 0x2B, 0xBA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xD4, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x69, 0xA4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x44, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x40, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x4F, 0xFA, 0x75, 0xE3, 0xFB, 0x97, 0x0E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x1C, 0x48, 0xB0, 0x26, 0xD0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x7B, 0x32, 0xFA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0x84, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x21, 0x03, 0x1D, 0x0D, 0x22, 0x55, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xF9, 0x42, 0x03, 0x9C, 0xC2, 0xCB, 0xBA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xA1, 0x96, 0xD9, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x6F, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x40, 0x57, 0xEB, 0x40, 0x2D, 0xC0, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x4F, 0x2F, 0x23, 0xA8, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x29, 0x85, 0x21, 0xA5, 0x50, 0x62, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x7D, 0x92, 0xCF, 0x87, 0x0C, 0x22, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x0E, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x96, 0x37, 0x2C, 0x88, 0x35, 0x30, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xB4, 0x69, 0xFF, 0xEB, 0xC6, 0x94, 0x08),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x55, 0x60, 0xAD, 0xAA, 0x58, 0x14, 0x88),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xFF, 0xF2, 0xB2, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0xD9, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xAE, 0x54, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x31, 0xF3, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x92, 0x83, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x42, 0x83, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xD2, 0xC8, 0xB7, 0x76, 0x45, 0x7F, 0x7D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x11, 0xA4, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x01, 0xBC, 0xC8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x27, 0x73, 0x8D, 0x02, 0x91, 0x27, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x62, 0xF6, 0xDD, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x5B, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xCA, 0xA2, 0x44, 0x2C, 0xF0, 0x28, 0xD8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xF1, 0x7A, 0xA2, 0x42, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x83, 0x3E, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0xF7, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xED, 0x78, 0xCB, 0x76, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x01, 0x1E, 0x43, 0x27, 0x47, 0x6E, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x4F, 0x54, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x44),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x35, 0x40, 0x69, 0x7F, 0x74, 0x9D, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x06, 0x6F, 0x67, 0x68, 0x2B, 0x4D, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x65, 0x41, 0xFC, 0x7C, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x79, 0x37, 0xAF, 0xFD, 0xD2, 0xDA, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xA8, 0x69, 0x56, 0x62, 0xA4, 0xE4, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x71, 0x73, 0x21, 0x8A, 0x17, 0x81, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x55, 0x8F, 0x7B, 0xB8, 0xAF, 0xF7, 0x86),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xD1, 0xBD, 0xBE, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0x60, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xA6, 0x57, 0x8C, 0xAE, 0x5C, 0x19, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x43, 0xE4, 0xD9, 0xD8, 0x7B, 0xE7, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xB9, 0xE4, 0x85, 0x7C, 0x2E, 0xFC, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x2A, 0x6D, 0x56, 0xBE, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x0C, 0x25, 0x9B, 0xAE, 0x86, 0x37, 0x43),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x22, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0x99, 0x66, 0xB7, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xF7, 0x90, 0xF0, 0x1B, 0x09, 0x27, 0xF7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x64, 0x49, 0x31),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xA0, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xA9, 0x07, 0x54, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xFF, 0xE2, 0x00, 0x07, 0x21, 0x88, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x53, 0x05, 0x6C, 0x42, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xF7, 0x39, 0x5C, 0x82, 0x36, 0xE8, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x83, 0xA8, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x43, 0x07, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xAF, 0x2B, 0x79, 0xED, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x20, 0x91, 0x7A, 0xC4, 0x07, 0xEF, 0x6C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x10, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x0E, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x81, 0x87, 0x41, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x55, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x53, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xB6, 0xEB, 0x6C, 0xCC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x77, 0x73, 0x9D, 0xFC, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x40, 0xE3, 0x6D, 0x1C, 0x16, 0x71, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xF4, 0x1B, 0xFF, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0xA5, 0xD7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x0E, 0x0B, 0x11, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x93, 0xAF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xC5, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x24, 0x19, 0xF2, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xB3, 0xAF, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x4F, 0x5E, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x18, 0x8E, 0x33, 0x68, 0x6C, 0xE8, 0xE0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x8B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x19, 0x7F, 0x90, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x68, 0xE2, 0x7D, 0xD4, 0xD0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xC1, 0x67, 0xB3, 0x72, 0xCB, 0xBF, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x1D, 0x14, 0x58, 0x0A, 0x80),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x7A, 0x65, 0x98, 0xB3, 0x07, 0x4B, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x87, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA2, 0x01, 0x08),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xC9, 0xC8, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x87, 0xA5, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xA0, 0xAB, 0x24, 0x1E, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xBC, 0x02, 0x35, 0x70, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x59, 0xA0, 0x50, 0x04, 0x80, 0x52, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x56, 0x6E, 0x42, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x91, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0xA5, 0xDE, 0x14, 0x24, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xCB, 0x74, 0x28, 0xE6, 0xA7, 0xE7, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x73, 0xA8, 0x8F, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0x63, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x1B, 0x77, 0xC7, 0xC1, 0x38, 0xF9, 0xDC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x3C, 0xCF, 0xA8, 0x7A, 0xD7, 0xF3, 0xC4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x5F, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xAD, 0xE9, 0x1A, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x5E, 0xD5, 0x81, 0x95, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x88, 0x75, 0x29, 0x1F, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xD0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA9, 0x5A, 0x4D, 0x63, 0x95, 0xF9, 0x4E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xCD, 0x04, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x91, 0xDE, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xD4, 0xFD, 0x25, 0x11, 0x99, 0x6E, 0xEA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x83, 0x01, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x4E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x3A, 0xDC, 0x74, 0xC2, 0xD7, 0xCF, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xBD, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x07, 0x03, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xBE, 0xE9, 0x2E, 0x58, 0x84, 0x66, 0xFC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x20, 0x78, 0x37, 0x79, 0x0B, 0xA6, 0x64),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xF2, 0xAC, 0x65, 0xC8, 0xC9, 0x2F, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x93, 0xE5, 0x0D, 0x0C, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xAD, 0x5C, 0x19, 0x12, 0x61, 0x0E, 0x25),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x4F, 0x0B, 0x1F, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2E, 0x30, 0x61, 0xDB, 0x08, 0x68, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x78, 0xAF, 0xB3, 0x08, 0xC1, 0x69, 0xE5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x5F, 0x5D, 0xC1, 0x57, 0x6F, 0xD8, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0xD3, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xE5, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x7B, 0x47, 0xE8, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x62, 0xC8, 0x7E, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x2B, 0xA5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x84, 0xFD, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6F, 0x12, 0x6E, 0x4D, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x08, 0xA1, 0x82, 0x9C, 0x62, 0x74, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x58, 0x22, 0x05, 0x1D, 0x15, 0x35, 0x79),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5C, 0x05, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x6B, 0x2F, 0x79, 0x09, 0x73, 0x67, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA0, 0x80, 0xD8, 0xE8, 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x48, 0x7B, 0xD9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x53, 0xA9, 0xED, 0x61, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x49, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9B, 0x4E, 0x89, 0x35),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x12, 0xEB, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xCB, 0xC1, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xDC, 0x95, 0x16, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x70, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x33, 0xB1, 0xD6, 0x78, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x36),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xCE, 0x88, 0xC3, 0xFD, 0x7A, 0x6B, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x1E, 0x50, 0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB1, 0x25, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xE7, 0xD7, 0xD5, 0xBD, 0x7A, 0x12, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xAA, 0xA2, 0x80, 0x5D, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0xC8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x39, 0x79, 0x64, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3C, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xC7, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xAC, 0xAB, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x83, 0xF0, 0x3D, 0xBC, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x92, 0x4A, 0x38, 0x42, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x0B, 0x4F, 0xEE, 0x9E, 0x92, 0xA5, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xDD, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x6B, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xFC, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x8A, 0xE5, 0x4C, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x06, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x7E, 0xF8, 0x12),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xC8, 0x01, 0x51, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x52, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x89, 0x66, 0x2B, 0x1F, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x0F, 0x95, 0x07, 0x2B, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xBB, 0x91, 0x1F, 0xA3, 0x72),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x6E, 0x54, 0x28, 0x7B, 0x9C, 0x79, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x45, 0xFF, 0xA6, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x83, 0x71),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xDE, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x37, 0x82, 0xCB, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x94, 0x3F, 0x26, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x97, 0x28, 0x20, 0xCD, 0xC1, 0xF3, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x7D, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0x8C, 0xF0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xD1, 0x42, 0xE6, 0x39, 0x33, 0x6D, 0xBB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xC0, 0xFC, 0xD2, 0x14, 0x5D, 0x3E, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x4A, 0x3E, 0x40, 0x16, 0x93, 0x15, 0xCF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x24, 0xC1, 0x27, 0x27, 0xE5, 0x4B, 0xD8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x50, 0xD8, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0x46, 0x22, 0xBB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x0E, 0x60, 0xA1, 0xB3, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x86),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xB1, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x47, 0x5A, 0x6F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0xAC, 0x11, 0x35, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0xF4, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x97, 0xFA, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x39, 0x13, 0xD8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x7B, 0x34, 0x12, 0x75, 0x8E, 0x9B, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x9E, 0xCD, 0x29, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0x8D, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xAC, 0xE9, 0x25, 0x27, 0xBB, 0x78, 0x47),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x7A, 0xA8, 0xD3, 0xE3, 0x66, 0xE5, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x76, 0x81, 0x50, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x71, 0x08, 0xB8, 0x52, 0x7C, 0xAF, 0xDC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x59, 0x24, 0xDD, 0xFB, 0x2F, 0xD0, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xCD, 0x56, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x91, 0xE6, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x64, 0x20, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xE4, 0xEF, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x97, 0xF6, 0x22, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF4, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xA5, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x6C, 0xAE, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x55, 0x55, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x67, 0x84, 0x47, 0x7C, 0x83, 0x5C, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x10, 0x4D, 0xDD, 0x30, 0x60, 0xB0, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xA7, 0x36, 0x76, 0x24, 0x32, 0x9F, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x42, 0x81, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x2E, 0x13, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x94, 0x91, 0xFF, 0x99, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x83, 0xA1, 0x76, 0xAF, 0x37, 0x5C, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xA8, 0x04, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xA9, 0x79, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xFB, 0x83, 0x28, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0xB0, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x02, 0x46, 0x7F, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xED, 0x48, 0xC2, 0x96, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x1C, 0x7E, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x2E, 0x18, 0x71, 0x2D, 0x7B, 0xD7, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x46, 0x9D, 0xDE, 0xAA, 0x78, 0x8E, 0xB1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xD7, 0x69, 0x2E, 0xE1, 0xD9, 0x48, 0xDE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xFF, 0x9E, 0x09, 0x22, 0x22, 0xE6, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x14, 0x28, 0x13, 0x1B, 0x62, 0x12, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x7F, 0x67, 0x03, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF3, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xC3, 0x0F, 0xFB, 0x25, 0x48, 0x3E, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x98, 0x36, 0xB3, 0xD3, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x81, 0x54, 0x22, 0xA4, 0xCC, 0xC1, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xBA, 0xFC, 0xA9, 0xDF, 0x68, 0x86, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x92, 0x0E, 0xC3, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xE8, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp521r1_T[32] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp521r1_T_0_X, secp521r1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_1_X, secp521r1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_2_X, secp521r1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_3_X, secp521r1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_4_X, secp521r1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_5_X, secp521r1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_6_X, secp521r1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_7_X, secp521r1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_8_X, secp521r1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_9_X, secp521r1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_10_X, secp521r1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_11_X, secp521r1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_12_X, secp521r1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_13_X, secp521r1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_14_X, secp521r1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_15_X, secp521r1_T_15_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_16_X, secp521r1_T_16_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_17_X, secp521r1_T_17_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_18_X, secp521r1_T_18_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_19_X, secp521r1_T_19_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_20_X, secp521r1_T_20_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_21_X, secp521r1_T_21_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_22_X, secp521r1_T_22_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_23_X, secp521r1_T_23_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_24_X, secp521r1_T_24_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_25_X, secp521r1_T_25_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_26_X, secp521r1_T_26_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_27_X, secp521r1_T_27_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_28_X, secp521r1_T_28_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_29_X, secp521r1_T_29_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_30_X, secp521r1_T_30_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_31_X, secp521r1_T_31_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define secp521r1_T NULL
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_a[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x03, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFD, 0xDE, 0x74, 0x6A, 0x46, 0x69, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xFC, 0xF2, 0x26, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x77, 0x3D, 0x0D, 0x85, 0x48, 0xA8, 0xA9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x1D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x01, 0x54),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x86, 0xF6, 0xAF, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x88, 0x2E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x90, 0xB6, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x36, 0x4C, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x11, 0x14, 0xA6, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0x15, 0xD9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0xB0, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0xBA, 0xD7),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xC1, 0x9C, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x19, 0xAC, 0x5A, 0xC9, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x86, 0x89, 0x27, 0x8D, 0x28),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xE0, 0x6F, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xD3, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0x87, 0xC9, 0x9D, 0xC0, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x11, 0x7E, 0xD6, 0xF7, 0x33, 0xFC, 0xE4),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x37, 0x3E, 0xC0, 0x7F, 0x62, 0xE7, 0x54),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x3B, 0x69, 0x9D, 0x44, 0xBC, 0x82, 0x99),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x84, 0xB3, 0x5F, 0x2B, 0xA5, 0x9E, 0x2C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x4C, 0x04, 0xB4, 0xF4, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xAD, 0x4B, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0xEB, 0xC4, 0x4E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xB1, 0xC5, 0x59, 0xE3, 0xD5, 0x16, 0x2A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x2A, 0xCC, 0xAC, 0xD0, 0xEE, 0x50, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x83, 0xE0, 0x5B, 0x14, 0x44, 0x52, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x15, 0x2D, 0x78, 0xF6, 0x51, 0x32, 0xCF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x36, 0x9B, 0xDD, 0xF8, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xB1, 0x6A, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2B, 0xB1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x87, 0x7A, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x8F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x45, 0xE5, 0x81, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x37, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x29, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x64, 0x23, 0x6B, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x1D, 0x41, 0xE1, 0x9B, 0x61, 0x7B, 0xD9),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x59, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x6E, 0x4A, 0x48, 0x84, 0x90, 0xAC, 0xC7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xB8, 0xF5, 0xF3, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0xA1, 0x1D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x32, 0x81, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x5A, 0x4E, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xA8, 0x90, 0xBE, 0x0F, 0xEC, 0xC0, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x30, 0xD7, 0x08, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x3A, 0xA5),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x76, 0xB3, 0x64, 0x74, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x75, 0xD4, 0xDB, 0x98, 0xD7, 0x39, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xEB, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xD4, 0x0B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xBE, 0xF9, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xBA, 0xF3, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x85, 0x59, 0xF3, 0x60, 0x41, 0x02, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x1C, 0x4A, 0xA4, 0xC7, 0xED, 0x66, 0xBC),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x46, 0x52, 0x18, 0x87, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x75, 0xAC, 0x4D, 0x75, 0x91),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x2F, 0xAC, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x93, 0x5E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x4D, 0xC9, 0x18, 0xE9, 0x00, 0xEB, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x69, 0x72, 0x07, 0x5A, 0x59, 0xA8, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x65, 0x83, 0x20, 0x10, 0xF9, 0x69, 0x82),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x9F, 0xBF, 0x46, 0x0C, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xCF, 0xF0, 0xDC, 0xDF, 0x2D, 0xE6, 0xE5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xF0, 0x72, 0x3A, 0x7A, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x22),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xAA, 0x57, 0x13, 0x37, 0xA7, 0x2C, 0xD4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xAC, 0xA2, 0x23, 0xF9, 0x84, 0x60, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xEB, 0x51, 0x70, 0x64, 0x78, 0xCA, 0x05),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xCC, 0x30, 0x62, 0x93, 0x46, 0x13, 0xE9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x26, 0xCC, 0x6C, 0x3D, 0x5C, 0xDA, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xAA, 0xB8, 0x03, 0xA4, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x96),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x9D, 0xE6, 0xCC, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xC3, 0x8A, 0xAE, 0x6F, 0x40, 0x05, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x8F, 0x4A, 0x4D, 0x35, 0xD3, 0x50, 0x9D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0x03, 0xB4, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x40, 0xD2, 0x9F, 0xCA, 0xD0, 0x53, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x84, 0x00, 0x6F, 0xC8, 0xAD, 0xED, 0x8D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xD3, 0x57, 0xD7, 0xC3, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xD7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xBA, 0x47, 0x1D, 0x3D, 0xEF, 0x98, 0x6C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xC0, 0x6C, 0x7F, 0x12, 0xEE, 0x9F, 0x67),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x02, 0xDA, 0x79, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x27, 0xC4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x79, 0xC7, 0x71, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xE5, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x37, 0x06, 0xBA, 0xB5, 0xD5, 0x18, 0x4C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6C, 0xF2, 0x63, 0x27, 0x6A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xBC, 0x71, 0xDF, 0x75, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x4D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x70, 0x9B, 0xDC, 0xE7, 0x18, 0x71, 0xFF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x5B, 0x9F, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xE0, 0xBB, 0xFC, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x9C, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x03, 0x68, 0x83, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x4C, 0xDD),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x49, 0x23, 0xA8, 0xCB, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x75, 0xB6, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xFD, 0x30, 0x01, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0xF9, 0xE8),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0x29, 0x42, 0xC9, 0xC7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xD7, 0xA0, 0xE6, 0x6B, 0x86, 0x61, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0xE9, 0xD3, 0x37, 0xD8, 0xE7, 0x35, 0xA9),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC8, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xCB, 0xB1, 0xB5, 0x4D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xD7, 0x46, 0x7D, 0xAF, 0xE2, 0xDC, 0xBB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x46, 0xE7, 0xD8, 0x76, 0x31, 0x90, 0x76),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xD3, 0xF4, 0x74, 0xE1, 0x67, 0xD8, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xC8, 0xAF, 0x5F, 0xF4, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x4E, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x43, 0xB3, 0x16, 0x35),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAE, 0xD1, 0xDD, 0x31, 0x14, 0xD3, 0xF0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x14, 0x06, 0x13, 0x12, 0x1C, 0x81, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xF9, 0x0C, 0x91, 0xF7, 0x67, 0x59, 0x63),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x91, 0xE2, 0xF4, 0x9D, 0xEB, 0x88, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x82, 0x30, 0x9C, 0xAE, 0x18, 0x4D, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x79, 0xCF, 0x17, 0xA5, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192k1_T[16] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192k1_T_0_X, secp192k1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_1_X, secp192k1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_2_X, secp192k1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_3_X, secp192k1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_4_X, secp192k1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_5_X, secp192k1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_6_X, secp192k1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_7_X, secp192k1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_8_X, secp192k1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_9_X, secp192k1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_10_X, secp192k1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_11_X, secp192k1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_12_X, secp192k1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_13_X, secp192k1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_14_X, secp192k1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_15_X, secp192k1_T_15_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define secp192k1_T NULL
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE5, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_a[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x05, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xB1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x61, 0xEC, 0xD2, 0xE8, 0xDC, 0x01, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x6C, 0x22, 0x22, 0x40, 0x89, 0xAE, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x92, 0xE1, 0x87, 0x56, 0x35, 0xAF, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xAF, 0x08, 0x35, 0x27, 0xEA, 0x04, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x53, 0xFD, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xD0, 0x9F, 0x8D, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x54, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xDB, 0x0F, 0x61, 0x54, 0x26, 0xD1, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x21, 0xF7, 0x1B, 0xB5, 0x1D, 0xF6, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x05, 0xDA, 0x8F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x26, 0x73, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0x29, 0x62, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x95, 0x17, 0x8B, 0xC3, 0x9B, 0xAC, 0xCC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xDB, 0x77, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0x13, 0x04, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0xFC, 0x22, 0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x65, 0xF1, 0x5A, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x79, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x01, 0x37, 0xAC, 0x9A, 0x5B, 0x51, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x75, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x4A, 0xAD, 0xFE, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x82, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x5E, 0xF0, 0x40, 0xC3, 0xA6, 0xE2, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x9A, 0x6F, 0xCF, 0x11, 0x26, 0x66, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x73, 0xA8, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x12, 0x36, 0x37),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xB3, 0x0A, 0x58, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x79, 0x00, 0x55, 0x04, 0x34, 0x90, 0x1A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x54, 0x1C, 0xC2, 0x45, 0x0C, 0x1B, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x19, 0xAB, 0xA8, 0xFC, 0x73, 0xDC, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0xFB, 0x93, 0xCE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x75, 0xD0, 0x66, 0x95, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xEA, 0x29, 0x16, 0x6A, 0x38, 0xDF, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA2, 0x36, 0x2F, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0x5E, 0xF7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x89, 0x59, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0x77, 0x9D, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x93, 0x43, 0x47, 0xC6, 0x5C, 0xF9, 0xFD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x00, 0x79, 0x42, 0x64, 0xB8, 0x25, 0x3E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x54, 0xB4, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x0C, 0x42, 0x90, 0x83, 0x0B, 0x31, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x2E, 0xAE, 0xC8, 0xC7, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x70),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xBC, 0xAD, 0x41, 0xE7, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x97, 0x52, 0x83, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x13, 0x7A, 0xBD, 0xAE, 0x94, 0x60, 0xFD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x9B, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x6E, 0x68, 0xB2, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x49, 0xBE, 0x51, 0xFE, 0x66, 0x15, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x37, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x9B, 0xEE, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x1B, 0xBD, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0xA9, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x25, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x13, 0xB1, 0x38, 0xFB, 0x9D, 0x78, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xE7, 0x1B, 0xFA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xB3, 0xB7, 0x44, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x00, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x82, 0x44, 0x3E, 0x18, 0x1A, 0x58, 0x6A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xE4, 0xEE, 0xC1, 0xBF, 0x44),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x32, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x9A, 0x42, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x26, 0x54, 0x21),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x85, 0x74, 0xA0, 0x79, 0xA8, 0xEE, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x36, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x28, 0x4D, 0x55, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x27, 0x82, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0xFC, 0x73, 0x77, 0xAF, 0x5C, 0xAC, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xED, 0xE5, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x43),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x1C, 0xF1, 0x80, 0x73, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE2, 0xDE, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x3E, 0x6B, 0xFE, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x28, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xB2, 0x14, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x11, 0x7D, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC4, 0xD6, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x57, 0x4D, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x55, 0x1B, 0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xF7, 0x17, 0xBC, 0x45, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xAB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xB0, 0xEF, 0x61, 0xE3, 0x20, 0x7C, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x85, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xC2, 0x9B, 0x5E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x2E, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x3E, 0x4B, 0xD3, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x2B, 0x9D, 0xD5, 0x27, 0xFA, 0xCA, 0xE0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0xB3, 0x6A, 0xE0, 0x79, 0x14, 0x28, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0xF5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x44, 0x56, 0xCD, 0xFC, 0x9F, 0x09, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x8C, 0x59, 0xA4, 0x64, 0x2A, 0x3A, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x86, 0x4E, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x8B, 0x11, 0x38, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x17, 0x16, 0x12, 0x17, 0xDC, 0x00, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x76, 0x24, 0x6C, 0x97, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x71, 0xE3, 0xB0, 0xBB, 0x4E, 0x50, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0x48, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x5F, 0x28, 0xF6, 0x01, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x95, 0xFE, 0xD0, 0xAD, 0x15, 0xD4, 0xD9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0xFD, 0x80, 0xF7, 0x9F, 0x64),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xBC, 0x1B, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xE6, 0xDF, 0x14, 0x29, 0xF4, 0xD4, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x12, 0xDD, 0xEC, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x59, 0xE5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x92, 0x3E, 0x35, 0x08, 0xE9, 0xCF, 0x0E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x35, 0x29, 0x97, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xDB, 0xD6, 0x6A, 0xC5, 0x43, 0xA4, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x33, 0x50, 0x61, 0x70, 0xA1, 0xE9, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x15, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x8C, 0xFA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0xA1, 0x9A, 0x9D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0x4A, 0xCD, 0x9B, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x4D, 0x5A, 0xB8, 0xE2, 0x6D, 0xA6, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x3F, 0xB6, 0x17, 0xE3, 0x2C, 0x6F, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xA4, 0x59, 0x51, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x6E, 0xEB, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xC9, 0x1F, 0xB7, 0x4D, 0x98, 0xC7, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x20, 0x95, 0xBB, 0x20, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xF2, 0x73, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xEF, 0xFB, 0x30, 0xFA, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xB0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x4C, 0x24, 0xB4, 0x5B, 0xC9, 0x4C, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xDD, 0x5E, 0x84, 0x95, 0x4D, 0x26, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xFA, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0x7A, 0xDC, 0xA7, 0x53, 0xA9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x9F, 0x81, 0x84, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0xFE, 0x31),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x89, 0x1B, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x89, 0x71, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xE9, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xAD, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xE0, 0x23, 0x02, 0x86, 0x0F, 0x77, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x93, 0x6D, 0xE9, 0xF9, 0x3C, 0xBE, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xE7, 0x24, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x3C, 0x5B, 0x4B, 0x1B, 0x25, 0x37, 0xD6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xE8, 0x38, 0x1B, 0xA1, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x19, 0xFD, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x01, 0x6B, 0x44),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x69, 0x37, 0x4F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xE2, 0xBF, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x95, 0x9C, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x7B, 0xFC, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x25, 0x5E, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x55, 0x09, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x6A, 0xC9, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xCC, 0x3B, 0xD9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x08, 0x65, 0x5E, 0xCB, 0xAB, 0x48, 0xC8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x79, 0x8B, 0xC0, 0x11, 0xC0, 0x69, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xE8, 0x8C, 0x4C, 0xC5, 0x28, 0xE4, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x1F, 0x34, 0x5C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224k1_T[16] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224k1_T_0_X, secp224k1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_1_X, secp224k1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_2_X, secp224k1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_3_X, secp224k1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_4_X, secp224k1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_5_X, secp224k1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_6_X, secp224k1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_7_X, secp224k1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_8_X, secp224k1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_9_X, secp224k1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_10_X, secp224k1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_11_X, secp224k1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_12_X, secp224k1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_13_X, secp224k1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_14_X, secp224k1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_15_X, secp224k1_T_15_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define secp224k1_T NULL
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xFC, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_a[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x07, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x41, 0x36, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xAF, 0xE6, 0xDC, 0xAE, 0xBA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xEE, 0xD7, 0x1E, 0x67, 0x86, 0x32, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x73, 0xB1, 0xA9, 0xD5, 0xCC, 0x27, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x01, 0x71, 0xFE, 0x92, 0x73),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x28, 0x63, 0x6D, 0x72, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xC0),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE1, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x3E, 0x2C, 0x75, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xB7, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0x3C, 0xDF, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x5D, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x5E, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xC3, 0x05, 0xD6, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x24, 0xFC),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xCF, 0x7B, 0xDC, 0xCD, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xE5, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x47, 0x91),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x46, 0xA8, 0x61, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xE4, 0x55, 0xD5, 0xC2, 0xBF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x59, 0x24, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x45, 0x12, 0xDE, 0xBA, 0x4F, 0xEF, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x08, 0xBF, 0xC1, 0x66, 0xAA, 0x0A, 0xBC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xFE, 0x30, 0x55, 0x31, 0x86, 0xA7, 0xB4),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xBF, 0x18, 0x81, 0x67, 0x27, 0x42, 0xBD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x05, 0x83, 0xA4, 0xDD, 0x57, 0xD3, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x63, 0xAB, 0xE4, 0x90, 0x70, 0xD0, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x5D, 0xFD, 0xA0, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x1C, 0x54),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x80, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x09, 0xBC, 0x57, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x9F, 0x6E, 0x88, 0x54, 0x6E, 0x51, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x5F, 0x85, 0xFB, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x4A, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x19, 0xF5, 0x55, 0xC9, 0x07, 0xD8, 0xCE),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xB4, 0xC3, 0xD9, 0x5C, 0xA0, 0xD4, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x30, 0xAF, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x66, 0x7B, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xBF, 0xF0, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0x71, 0xA4, 0x9E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x88, 0x28, 0xF1, 0xBE, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xF3, 0x1A, 0x0E, 0xB9, 0x01, 0x66, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xA7, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x05, 0xD0, 0xAA, 0x53),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x39, 0x1E, 0x47, 0xE5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0xC0),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xB9, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0x33, 0x8A, 0x7D, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x93, 0xA5, 0x53, 0x55, 0x16, 0xB4, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x5F, 0xEA, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x52, 0x71, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xF0, 0x24, 0xB8, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0xA0, 0x9B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x00, 0x27, 0xB2, 0xDF, 0x73, 0xA2, 0xE0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x2E, 0x4D, 0x7C, 0xDE, 0x7A, 0x23, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x65, 0x60, 0xC7, 0x97, 0x1E, 0xA4, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x13, 0x5B, 0x77, 0x59, 0xCB, 0x36, 0xE1),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0x9E, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x2A, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x5F, 0x64, 0x9F, 0x1A, 0x19, 0xE6, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x7B, 0x39, 0xD2, 0xDB, 0x85, 0x84, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xC7, 0x0D, 0x58, 0x6E, 0x3F, 0x52, 0x15),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x68, 0x19, 0x0B, 0x68, 0xC9, 0x1E, 0xFB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x4E, 0x21, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x55, 0xCC, 0x25),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xF9, 0x25, 0x45, 0x54, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xB3, 0xF7, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA4, 0x04, 0x05),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x1E, 0x88, 0xC4, 0xAA, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xAC, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x71, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xA2, 0xF1, 0x15, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x6C, 0x86),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x5B, 0x05, 0xBC, 0xB7, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x72),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x80, 0xF8, 0x5C, 0x20, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x48, 0x2E, 0x68, 0x82, 0x7F, 0xEB, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x3B, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x32, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x6E, 0xA6, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x62, 0x78, 0x22),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x4D, 0x3E, 0x86, 0x58, 0xC3, 0xEB, 0xBA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x89, 0x33, 0x18, 0x21, 0x1D, 0x9B, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x9D, 0xFF, 0xC3, 0x79, 0xC1, 0x88, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xD4, 0x48, 0x53, 0xE8, 0xAD, 0x21, 0x16),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x7B, 0xDE, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x17, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xF3, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xC8, 0x8A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xAE, 0x4C, 0xB0, 0x16, 0xA4, 0x93, 0x86),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x8B, 0x6B, 0xDC, 0xD7, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0x7E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0xD2, 0x59, 0x05, 0xA2, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x56, 0x09, 0x32, 0xF1, 0xE8, 0xE3, 0x72),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xCA, 0xE5, 0x2E, 0xF0, 0xFB, 0x18, 0x19),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x85, 0xA9, 0x23, 0x15, 0x31, 0x1F, 0x0E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xE5, 0xB1, 0x86, 0xB9, 0x6E, 0x8D, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x77, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0x3F, 0x89, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x25, 0xB0, 0xC7, 0x41, 0x54),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x11, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0x11, 0x62, 0xD4, 0x2D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x7D, 0x34, 0xB3, 0x20, 0x7F, 0x37, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xD4, 0x45, 0xE8, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0xC5, 0xEA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x32, 0x3B, 0x25, 0x7E, 0x79, 0xAF, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xE4, 0x54, 0x71, 0xBE, 0x35, 0x4E, 0xD0),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x94, 0xDD, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC2, 0xDD, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x49, 0xE9, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0x08, 0x49, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xB6, 0x03, 0x88, 0x6F, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xD3, 0x1C, 0xF3, 0xA5, 0xEB, 0x79, 0x01),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xF9, 0x43, 0x88, 0x89, 0x0D, 0x06, 0xEA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x2D, 0xF5, 0x98, 0x32, 0xF6, 0xB1, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x73, 0x8F, 0x2B, 0x50, 0x27, 0x0A, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xE3, 0xBD, 0x16, 0x05, 0xC8, 0x93, 0x12),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xE3, 0x3D, 0xDE, 0x5F, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xA3, 0x9C, 0x22, 0x3C, 0x33, 0x36, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x69, 0x45, 0x78, 0x14, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xF8, 0xD4, 0xBF, 0xB8, 0xC0, 0xA1, 0x25),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x88, 0xE1, 0x91, 0x03, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x11, 0xA1, 0xEF, 0x14, 0x0D, 0xC4, 0x7D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xD4, 0x0D, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x33, 0x5C, 0x19),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x45, 0x2A, 0x1A, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x04, 0x9B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xB5, 0xA7, 0x80, 0xE9, 0x93, 0x97, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xB9, 0x7C, 0xA0, 0xC9, 0x57, 0x26, 0x43),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0xEF, 0x56, 0xDA, 0x66, 0xF6, 0x1B, 0x9A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x89, 0x6B, 0x91, 0xE0, 0xA9, 0x65, 0x2B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x98, 0x96, 0x9B, 0x06, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x19, 0x37, 0x94, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xBE, 0x6B, 0x1A, 0x05, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xCD, 0x5D, 0x35, 0xB4, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x64),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xEF, 0x96, 0xDB, 0xF2, 0x61, 0x63, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x04, 0x88, 0xC9, 0x9F, 0x1B, 0x94, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x30, 0x79, 0x7E, 0x24, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xB8, 0x90, 0xB7, 0x94, 0x25, 0xBB, 0x0F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x79, 0xEA, 0xAD, 0xC0, 0x6D, 0x18, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xA4, 0x58, 0x2A, 0x8D, 0x95, 0xB3, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x12, 0x0D, 0x79, 0xE2, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x6F, 0xBE, 0x97, 0x4D, 0xA4, 0x20, 0x07),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x31, 0x71, 0xC6, 0xA6, 0x91, 0xEB, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x9B, 0xA8, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0x77, 0xE1, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x06, 0xD3, 0x3D, 0x94, 0x30, 0xEF, 0x8C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xDF, 0xCA, 0xFA, 0xF5, 0x28, 0xF8, 0xC9),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xE1, 0x32, 0xFD, 0x3E, 0x81, 0xF8, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xF2, 0x4B, 0x1D, 0x19, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xCC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xB1, 0x8A, 0x22, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x6B, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x21, 0xEF, 0x30, 0xEC, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x89),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x84, 0x4A, 0x46, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x3C, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x18, 0x3A, 0xF4, 0xCC, 0xF5, 0xB2, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xF4, 0xBD, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x89, 0x7F, 0x8A, 0xB1, 0x52, 0x3A, 0xAB),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256k1_T[16] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256k1_T_0_X, secp256k1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_1_X, secp256k1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_2_X, secp256k1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_3_X, secp256k1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_4_X, secp256k1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_5_X, secp256k1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_6_X, secp256k1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_7_X, secp256k1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_8_X, secp256k1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_9_X, secp256k1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_10_X, secp256k1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_11_X, secp256k1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_12_X, secp256k1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_13_X, secp256k1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_14_X, secp256k1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_15_X, secp256k1_T_15_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define secp256k1_T NULL
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Domain parameters for brainpoolP256r1 (RFC 5639 3.4)
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x53, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0x1D, 0x48, 0x13, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x20, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x23, 0xF6, 0x3B, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_a[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3, 0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26, 0xC1, 0x55, 0x80, 0xFB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xFF, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x30, 0x75, 0xF6, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x30, 0x2C, 0xFC, 0x75, 0x09, 0x5A, 0x7D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x07, 0x8C, 0xFF, 0x18, 0xDC, 0xCC, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE1, 0xF7, 0x5C, 0x29, 0x16, 0x84, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xBB, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9, 0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x56, 0x48, 0x97, 0x82, 0x0E, 0x1E, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xA6, 0x61, 0xB5, 0xA3, 0x7A, 0x39, 0x8C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9),
+};
+
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xA2, 0xED, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xE3, 0xA5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0xC9, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x3F, 0x93, 0x7A, 0xD1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x12, 0x53, 0x61, 0x3E, 0x76, 0x08, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x8C, 0x74, 0xF4, 0x08, 0xC3, 0x76, 0x80),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xDD, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xED, 0xEE, 0xC4, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xD9, 0xBE, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x20, 0x12, 0xCA, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0xAB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x72, 0x71, 0x90, 0x7A, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x23),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x51, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0xBC, 0xB0, 0xB6, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x58, 0xD7, 0x0A, 0x84, 0x05, 0xA3, 0x9C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x8E, 0x95, 0x61, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0xDF, 0x36),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x92, 0x12, 0x0F, 0x5E, 0x87, 0x70, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x3A, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0xC4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xF7, 0x45, 0xD3, 0x06, 0xB6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x28, 0x65, 0xE1, 0xC5, 0x6C, 0x57, 0x18),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x01, 0x81, 0x9E, 0x38, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xA5, 0x91, 0x2B, 0xDF, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xEE, 0xB6, 0x25, 0xD6, 0x98, 0xDE, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xA1, 0x55, 0x63, 0x39, 0xEB, 0xB5, 0x47),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xD6, 0xB8, 0xE3, 0x13, 0xED, 0x7F, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xE8, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xB8, 0xCD, 0x19, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x82, 0x83, 0x7A, 0x7B, 0x46, 0x56, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x60, 0x46, 0x15, 0x5A, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x30),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x61, 0x50, 0xC6, 0xFF, 0x10, 0x7D, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x51, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0x7D, 0x78, 0x26, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0x15, 0x9A, 0xF7, 0x01, 0xC1, 0xBB, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x0F, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xBD, 0x4A, 0x9E, 0x87),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xF8, 0xD1, 0x77, 0xD2, 0x49, 0xB3, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x86, 0xFB, 0x9E, 0x1F, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x47),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xCD, 0x86, 0x61, 0x2F, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xF6, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x37, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0x28),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x77, 0xAA, 0x97, 0x9C, 0x0B, 0x04, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xA6, 0x60, 0x81, 0xCE, 0x25, 0x13, 0x3E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x00, 0xF3, 0xBB, 0x82, 0x99, 0x95, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x5A, 0xCE, 0x90, 0x71, 0x38, 0x2F, 0x10),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x1A, 0xC0, 0x84, 0x27, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x37, 0x52, 0x16, 0x13, 0x0E, 0xCE, 0x92),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xBF, 0x5A, 0xDB, 0xDB, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xB7, 0x5E, 0xF9, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x5C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xAB, 0x5C, 0x8D, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC5, 0xF8, 0xF7, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x0B, 0x4D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x4C, 0xA7, 0x45, 0x20, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x5D, 0xEF, 0xDE, 0xEE, 0x39, 0x44, 0x19),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x2F, 0x6D, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x58, 0x60, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xC9, 0x62, 0xCB, 0x38, 0x3C, 0x55, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xA5, 0x09, 0x10, 0x88, 0xDB, 0xE3, 0xBD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x4B, 0x5D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x1D, 0xB4, 0x10, 0x76, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0x09),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x70, 0x5A, 0x07, 0xF5, 0x1A, 0x74, 0xC7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xE9, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xC0, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x6D, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0x9B, 0xE9, 0x6D, 0x0E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x00, 0x32, 0x41, 0x57, 0x84, 0x89, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xC7, 0x14, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0xFF, 0xF3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x67, 0x9E, 0xFB, 0xB6, 0xB8, 0x96, 0xF3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x4A, 0xE3, 0x97, 0x4B, 0x58, 0xDE, 0x30),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x1E, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x7F, 0xD5, 0xD4, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x08, 0x7A, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x89, 0xC7, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xF9, 0x11, 0x1B, 0xF5, 0x3C, 0x6D, 0x8C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x50, 0xE5, 0x69, 0x1D, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x0C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x2F, 0xF8, 0x3F, 0xEC, 0x55, 0x99, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x90, 0x43, 0x81, 0x31, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x18, 0x44, 0x50, 0x5D, 0x76, 0xCB, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xC5, 0x5B, 0x9A, 0x03, 0xE6, 0x17, 0x39),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x89, 0xFC, 0x55, 0x94, 0x91, 0x6A, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x46, 0x35, 0xF2, 0x3A, 0x42, 0x08, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xD2, 0x76, 0x49, 0x42, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xEA, 0xA0, 0x52, 0xF1, 0x6A, 0x30, 0x57),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xB2, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x8A, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x94, 0xB5, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x09),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xC3, 0xD7, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x49, 0x1C, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x23, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x5C, 0x53),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x65, 0x5C, 0x85, 0x94, 0xD7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x37, 0xC7, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0xAE, 0x6C, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xD8, 0x11, 0x54, 0x98, 0x44, 0xE3, 0xF1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x4D, 0xA6, 0x4B, 0x28, 0xF2, 0x57, 0x9E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xD0, 0xEB, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x30, 0xD3, 0x6A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0xA7, 0x73, 0x6E, 0xB6, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x47, 0xF6, 0xED, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x71, 0x4D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xB5, 0x49, 0x61, 0x5E, 0x45, 0xF6, 0x4A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x0E, 0xB3, 0x84, 0x3A, 0x63, 0x72, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x53, 0x5C, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0x2E, 0xAB, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x0F, 0x8F, 0x87, 0x50, 0x28, 0xB4, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x98, 0x4A, 0x98, 0x31, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x51),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xC9, 0xE2, 0xFD, 0x5D, 0x1F, 0xE8, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x90, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xBA, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x5A, 0xB3, 0x4E, 0xFB, 0xE0, 0x57, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x0B, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x9D, 0x8E, 0x02),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x41, 0x8F, 0x31, 0xFA, 0x5A, 0xF6, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xE9, 0xE3, 0xF6, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x4E, 0xCD, 0xA2, 0x22, 0x14, 0xD4, 0x12),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xED, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0F, 0x53, 0x10, 0x17),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x06, 0x24, 0x2C, 0x4E, 0xD1, 0x1E, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0x9F, 0xAB, 0xF0, 0x37, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x5E, 0x12, 0xCE, 0x83, 0x1B, 0x2A, 0x18),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x65, 0xCF, 0xE8, 0x5C, 0xA5, 0xA2, 0x70),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x86, 0x76, 0x3A, 0x94, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xC1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xDA, 0xC9, 0xA6, 0x29, 0x93, 0x15, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x61, 0x6A, 0x7D, 0xC7, 0xA9, 0xF3, 0x76),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x03, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x15, 0xCE, 0x50, 0x72),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xD0, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x4F, 0x24),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x4B, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x71, 0x58, 0x7E, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x93, 0x95, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x8F, 0xC7, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0x7A, 0x86, 0x54),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xAF, 0x68, 0x3A, 0x23, 0xC1, 0x2E, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x50, 0x11, 0x67, 0x39, 0xB9, 0xAF, 0x48),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x86, 0xAA, 0x1E, 0x88, 0x21, 0x29, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x28, 0xA4, 0x9D, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x9A, 0x10),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBA, 0x04, 0x67, 0xB7, 0x01, 0x40, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xA3, 0xCA, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x97, 0xA8, 0xB6, 0x3C, 0xEE, 0x90, 0x3D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xED, 0xC4, 0xF7, 0xC3, 0x95, 0xEC, 0x85),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x84, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xD5, 0x64, 0xBB, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x9B, 0xE2, 0x28, 0x50, 0xC2, 0x72, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xF2, 0x74, 0xD1, 0x26, 0xBF, 0x32, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0x72, 0xDB, 0x6D, 0x30, 0x98),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x50, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x48, 0xC1, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x28, 0xBB, 0x11, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x22, 0x6C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0x5C, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x44, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xE8, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xBB, 0xC1, 0x81, 0x7F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP256r1_T[16] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define brainpoolP256r1_T NULL
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Domain parameters for brainpoolP384r1 (RFC 5639 3.6)
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xEC, 0x07, 0x31, 0x13, 0x00, 0x47, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x1A, 0x1D, 0x90, 0x29, 0xA7, 0xD3, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x11, 0xB7, 0x7F, 0x19, 0xDA, 0xB1, 0x12),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_a[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xD4, 0x3A, 0x50, 0x4A, 0x81, 0xA5, 0x8A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xF9, 0x91, 0xBA, 0xEF, 0x65, 0x91, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x4F, 0x8E, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xAF, 0x05, 0xCE, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x72, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x15, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0xC6, 0x82, 0xC3, 0x7B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x96, 0x86, 0xB7, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0xC9, 0xDB, 0x95, 0x02, 0x39, 0xB4, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x62, 0xEB, 0x3E, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x88, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xD2, 0xDC, 0x07, 0xE1, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x44, 0xF0, 0x16, 0x54, 0xB5, 0x39, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x65, 0x04, 0xE9, 0x02, 0x32, 0x88, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xC3, 0x7F, 0x6B, 0xAF, 0xB6, 0x3A, 0xCF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x25, 0x04, 0xAC, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x16, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C),
+};
+
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0xD8, 0x8A, 0x54, 0x41, 0xD6, 0x6B, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x3B, 0xF1, 0x22, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x4B, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x33, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x52, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0x52, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x6E, 0x17, 0x9B, 0xD5, 0x2A, 0x4A, 0x31),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xDA, 0x6B, 0xE5, 0x03, 0x07, 0x1D, 0x2E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0x98, 0xE3, 0xA4, 0xF6, 0x19),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x7D, 0xFE, 0x51, 0x40, 0x3B, 0x47, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x88, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xE2, 0x8F, 0xCB, 0xA4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xE2, 0x88, 0x2D, 0x4E, 0x50, 0xEB, 0x9A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x54, 0x94, 0x5E, 0xF4, 0x7F, 0x3A, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x07, 0x1C, 0xE1, 0xBD, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x63),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x92, 0x28, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x04, 0xB1, 0x4D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x82, 0x44, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0D, 0x55, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xE3, 0xFF, 0x89, 0x46, 0xDE, 0x4E, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x67, 0x1A, 0x81, 0xEE, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x54, 0xE2, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0xDA, 0x2C, 0xD0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x9A, 0x90, 0xAA, 0x6E, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x5F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x40, 0xAC, 0xED, 0x7D, 0x37, 0x87, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xF8, 0xB1, 0x80, 0x4C, 0x8C, 0x04, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x98, 0x2C, 0xAD, 0x30, 0x69, 0x35, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x2E, 0x00, 0x2F, 0x44, 0x8C, 0xF0, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x58, 0x07, 0xD7, 0xCD, 0x60, 0xA1, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xFB, 0x7B, 0x03, 0x05, 0x5E, 0x79, 0x73),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x17, 0xCE, 0x38, 0x4B, 0x5E, 0x5B, 0xC8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x0E, 0x0A, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x7C, 0x62, 0x08),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xF0, 0x98, 0x71, 0x7F, 0x17, 0x26, 0xD7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xD3, 0xFA, 0x3C, 0xF0, 0x70, 0x07, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x47, 0x5C, 0x09, 0x43, 0xB7, 0x65, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xFA, 0xF3, 0xEC, 0x22),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x78, 0x22, 0x2B, 0x58, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x30, 0xCE, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0xB0, 0x4F, 0x83),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x95, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x23, 0xC2, 0x65, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xCF, 0x03, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x80, 0x44, 0xBB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xD5, 0xED, 0xEA, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x5B, 0x16, 0x10, 0x25, 0xAC, 0x2A, 0x17),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0x8C, 0x6B, 0xE9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xBB, 0x1C, 0xD3, 0x5A, 0xEE, 0xD9, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x5D, 0x30, 0x5E, 0xF7, 0xB2, 0x41, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xCE, 0x0F, 0x1A, 0xC6, 0x41, 0x64, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x18, 0xE1, 0xE3, 0x82, 0x15, 0x66, 0x4B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xE2, 0x24, 0x04, 0x72, 0x39, 0xA0, 0x7C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x51, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x88, 0x62, 0xE1, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xD2, 0x65, 0x14, 0xE9, 0x4C, 0x82, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xE1, 0xAC, 0x87, 0xAE, 0x31, 0x1A, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x4F, 0x96, 0x1E, 0x85, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x86, 0xBB, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x08, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x53, 0x03, 0x09, 0x80, 0x91, 0xEF, 0x68),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xD7, 0xAF, 0x6F, 0x69, 0x7B, 0x88, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x30, 0xA2, 0x47, 0xB5, 0xC1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xD2, 0xC0, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x3C, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x8C, 0xB3, 0x4C, 0xBA, 0x8B, 0x6D, 0xCF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0xC7, 0xA1, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x4F, 0xF1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x4A, 0x97, 0xC8, 0x03, 0x6F, 0x01, 0x82),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x18, 0x12, 0xA9, 0x39, 0xD5, 0x22, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xA7, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x78, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xB3, 0xD0, 0x7F, 0xDF, 0xD0, 0x30, 0xDE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x25, 0x73, 0x96, 0xEC, 0xA8, 0x1D, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xD1, 0x65, 0x66, 0xDC, 0xD9, 0xCF, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x37, 0xAD, 0xE2, 0xBE, 0x2D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x79, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x07, 0x66, 0xB1, 0xBD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x53, 0x62, 0x65, 0x92, 0x09, 0x4C, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xAF, 0xC3, 0x03, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x2D, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xCA, 0x41, 0xD9, 0xA2, 0x69, 0x9B, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xB2, 0xA6, 0x8D, 0xE1, 0xAA, 0x61, 0x76),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xBA, 0x4D, 0x12, 0xB6, 0xBE, 0xF3, 0x7E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xD9, 0x92, 0x22, 0x07, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xA1, 0x7C, 0x91, 0xDB, 0x32, 0xF7, 0xE5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x49, 0x4B, 0x6D, 0xFB, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xFB, 0x4E, 0x4C, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x81, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0x00, 0xB7, 0xD9, 0xCC, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x36, 0x8B, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x30),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x1F, 0x60, 0x03, 0xBB, 0xD7, 0x60, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xDD, 0x71, 0x95, 0xE9, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0x5F, 0x68, 0x81, 0xC5, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0x98, 0x42, 0x28, 0xA5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x29, 0x8E, 0x11, 0x49, 0xB4, 0xD7, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x3E, 0xD2, 0x30, 0xA1, 0xBA, 0xCA, 0x03),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x37, 0x64, 0x44, 0x2F, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x42, 0xBC, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x1A, 0x5F, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x04, 0xAB, 0x04, 0xE0, 0x24, 0xAD, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x45, 0x17, 0x67, 0x1F, 0x3E, 0x53, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x0F, 0xB3, 0x1B, 0x57, 0x54, 0xC2, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xD3, 0xF8, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x9B, 0xFA, 0x30),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x90, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x49, 0x38, 0x4E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xCF, 0xC6, 0xDD, 0xF0, 0xFF, 0x8C, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x69, 0x9D, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x33, 0xE9, 0xB4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x19, 0x82, 0x3D, 0xAC, 0x1C, 0x40, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC7, 0x02, 0x46, 0x14, 0x77, 0x00, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x05, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x3A, 0x66, 0x5C, 0x39),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xE6, 0x17, 0xDE, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xC6, 0x42, 0x5E, 0xE7, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xD0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x21, 0x68, 0x5A, 0x26, 0xFB, 0xD7, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x00, 0x5C, 0xBA, 0x8A, 0x34, 0xEC, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x9C, 0x3C, 0xAF, 0x53, 0xE8, 0x65, 0x35),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xEF, 0x28, 0xDC, 0x67, 0x05, 0xC8, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x78, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x49, 0xA0, 0xBC, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x3E, 0x2D, 0xA0, 0xCF, 0xD4, 0x7A, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x93, 0xFE, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x6E, 0x99, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xAD, 0x04, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xAF, 0x5E, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x7A, 0xED, 0xA6, 0x9E, 0x18, 0x09, 0x31),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x05, 0x94, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xB8, 0x85, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xB7, 0x37, 0xC2, 0x50, 0x75, 0x15, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0xB2, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x3E, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x81, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x73, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xF1, 0xD1, 0x61, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x8F, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xDB, 0x4A, 0xFF, 0x14, 0xA7, 0x48, 0x0B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x73, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xCC, 0xF1, 0x57, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xED, 0x73, 0x27, 0x70, 0x82, 0xB6, 0x5E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xBA, 0xAC, 0x3A, 0xCF, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0xA6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xD6, 0xB1, 0x8F, 0x0E, 0x08, 0x2C, 0x5E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x2F, 0x0E, 0xA1, 0xF3, 0x07),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xF5, 0x7C, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x0A, 0xF6, 0x28),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xEE, 0x17, 0x47, 0x34, 0x15, 0xA3, 0xAF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xBE, 0x88, 0x48, 0xE7, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xDE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xAD, 0xDC, 0x65, 0x61, 0x37, 0x0F, 0xC1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x67, 0xAD, 0xA2, 0x3A, 0x1C, 0x91, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x07, 0x0C, 0x3A, 0x41, 0x6E, 0x13, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0xBD, 0x7E, 0xED, 0xAA, 0x14, 0xDD, 0x61),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xDC, 0x20, 0x01, 0x72, 0x11, 0x48, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x62, 0x3D, 0xF0, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xC2, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x52, 0xA3, 0x4A, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x46, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xF8, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xC7, 0x8F, 0xA9, 0x26, 0x42, 0x32, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xA6, 0xA0, 0x8D, 0x4B, 0x9A, 0x19, 0x03),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xAB, 0x6D, 0x1E, 0xFB, 0xEE, 0x60, 0x0C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x56, 0x3C, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0x10, 0x79, 0x1C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xBC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0x71, 0xEF, 0x02, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x36, 0xC4, 0xD0, 0x88, 0x9B, 0x32, 0xFC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xD4, 0x5D, 0x17, 0x39, 0xE6, 0x22, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x26, 0x01, 0xCE, 0xBE, 0x4A, 0x9C, 0x27),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x6D, 0x11, 0xCA, 0x6C, 0x5A, 0x93, 0x0C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x96, 0x26, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0xE4, 0x30, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xC1, 0x4C, 0xC6, 0x30, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xB3, 0xE8, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xEB, 0x63, 0x6C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x1D, 0xCA, 0xFC, 0x50, 0x36, 0x4B, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x0E, 0x23, 0x5B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x31),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x88, 0xB6, 0xD7, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x23, 0xB6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x66, 0xE2, 0xBB, 0x29, 0xA6, 0x4F, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x68, 0x6E, 0xA0, 0x14, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x73, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0xAB, 0x5B, 0xF6, 0x0D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x00, 0x95, 0xE9, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x0D, 0x4F, 0x81, 0xD0, 0xF2, 0x3F, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x1D, 0xCD, 0x78, 0x39, 0xC4, 0x6B, 0xD9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x45, 0xC7, 0xB8, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x5D, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x8C, 0x6E, 0xA3, 0x24, 0xB2, 0xDB, 0x4B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x2D, 0xD9, 0xF1, 0xC7, 0x9B, 0x8A, 0xAF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0xB9, 0x40, 0x37, 0x91, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0x23, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0x2F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x9D, 0x5A, 0x20, 0x10, 0xA9, 0x84, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x30, 0x89, 0x20, 0x13, 0xE9, 0xB2, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x6E, 0x52, 0xEB, 0x03, 0x18, 0x1F, 0xA6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x9E, 0x1C, 0x35, 0x87, 0x92, 0x69, 0xC7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0xC9, 0x88, 0xAF, 0xC6, 0x6C, 0x83, 0x72),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xD5, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x34, 0x99, 0xB6, 0x6F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0xAD, 0x45, 0x9B, 0x4B, 0x41, 0x4D, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x5D, 0xAB, 0x7F, 0x35, 0x34, 0xE9, 0x29),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0xBE, 0x78, 0x34, 0x44, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xDE, 0xE3, 0xC4, 0xEE, 0x0B, 0xF9, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x86, 0x16, 0x48, 0x32, 0xB8, 0x74, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xEE, 0x7C, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0x81, 0xE3, 0x55),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x6A, 0xFA, 0x84, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0xD5, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8A, 0xD5, 0x1B, 0x2E, 0x1A, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0C, 0x61, 0xE2, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0xE6, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x62, 0xC1, 0x87, 0x53, 0x1B, 0x92, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x90, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x6A, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x2E, 0xB5, 0x3B, 0x44, 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x78),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x5D, 0x02, 0x58, 0xB5, 0xBE, 0x45, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xEF, 0x8E, 0x90, 0x4D, 0x2A, 0x32, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x99, 0x75, 0x5C, 0x0A, 0x33, 0x8F, 0x36),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x6C, 0x95, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xE4, 0x4C, 0x91, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x25, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x29, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x34, 0x81),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x15, 0xE5, 0x13, 0x7E, 0x64, 0x8B, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xBC, 0x0D, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x37, 0x9E, 0xFA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x82, 0x20, 0xF7, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x77, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x29, 0xA2, 0xDB, 0x7A, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xA5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xC6, 0x50, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xBD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x9F, 0xD5, 0xE8, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x30),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x03, 0x55, 0x10, 0xDB, 0xA6, 0x8B, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x78, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x43, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x35, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x47, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x95, 0x2F, 0xEA, 0xBC, 0xB4, 0x18, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x48, 0xAE, 0x89, 0xF5, 0x65, 0x3D, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0x20, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x50, 0x63),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xE6, 0x5C, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0x7D, 0xDF, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x07, 0x3E, 0xCE, 0x9F, 0x18, 0xB6, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0xF8, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xFA, 0x42, 0x1D, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x6C, 0x1D, 0x03, 0xC9, 0x0E, 0x2B, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x18, 0x52, 0xA5, 0xB4, 0x63, 0xE1, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0xD9, 0xC4, 0xFD, 0x16, 0x60, 0x54),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x7D, 0xDE, 0xDF, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xB0, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x4E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x85, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xF0, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x9B, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xC2, 0x39, 0x5D, 0xF3, 0x2C, 0xD9, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x1C, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x2F, 0x54, 0x87, 0x80),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x72, 0xC7, 0xB5, 0x50, 0xA3, 0x84, 0x77),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xD1, 0xAF, 0xA9, 0xB4, 0x8B, 0x5D, 0xFA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xF6, 0x52, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x5E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x52, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x05, 0x42, 0x77, 0x83),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x08, 0x90, 0x72, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x15, 0xF8, 0xF1, 0x16, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x87, 0xAC, 0x8F, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x83, 0x81),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xE1, 0xE6, 0x2D, 0x0E, 0x11, 0xA1, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x32, 0xE6, 0xE3, 0x83, 0xD1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x56, 0xE5, 0xCD, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x67, 0x6F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xED, 0xC9, 0x65, 0x6D, 0x87, 0xE1, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x8E, 0xFD, 0x9A, 0x53, 0x0E, 0xFA, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0x23, 0x84, 0xFA, 0x01),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xFE, 0x49, 0x81, 0xD1, 0x3E, 0xF4, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x72, 0xE0, 0xEF, 0x0D, 0xB8, 0x3E, 0x6F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCE, 0x60, 0x72, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xCC, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x07, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x3A, 0x35, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x1F, 0xCA, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xEA, 0x88, 0x55, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x05, 0x7F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x6D, 0xF1, 0x97, 0xA6, 0x69, 0x39, 0x24),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x41, 0x99, 0xFF, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x2F, 0x95, 0x80, 0x12, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xBF, 0x51, 0xAA, 0xAE, 0x2D, 0xDA, 0xCF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x1C, 0xB3, 0x52, 0x36, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x86),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xC1, 0x1F, 0x3A, 0xD3, 0x3E, 0x5C, 0x1A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x2B, 0xC8, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0x98, 0x41, 0x66, 0xB0, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x1D, 0xC0, 0x42, 0xCD, 0xF8, 0xC3, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x41, 0x91, 0x7D, 0xCC, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xAE, 0x76, 0xED, 0x56, 0x18, 0xC5, 0xAB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x6A, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x7F, 0x65, 0x10, 0x1F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xEC, 0x3C, 0x05, 0x05, 0xCA, 0xF6, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0xCD, 0x02, 0x51, 0x12, 0x16, 0x3C, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x43, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x59, 0x90, 0x41, 0xDB, 0xE4, 0xF5, 0x91),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x0E, 0x18, 0x2A, 0x5A, 0x83, 0x7C, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x37, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xF1, 0x2F, 0x63, 0x79),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xC0, 0xFA, 0x6F, 0x1F, 0x67, 0xCF, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x34, 0x45, 0xBB, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x67, 0x1D, 0x64, 0x8F, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x39, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0xAD, 0x8A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x93, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0x28, 0xFA, 0x39, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xF9, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x26, 0x7A, 0x88, 0x89),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xD5, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x11, 0xDE, 0xEB, 0x4E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x46, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x74, 0x34, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xBD, 0xD3, 0xF5, 0x14, 0xEE, 0xFE, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x4C, 0xA3, 0x71, 0x43, 0x65, 0xF8, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x6C, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x90, 0x25, 0xD8, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x34, 0x84, 0x96, 0xA1, 0x43, 0x03, 0x4D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x3B, 0x3B, 0x2F, 0xCA, 0x59, 0xF2, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x48, 0x24, 0x74, 0xD8, 0x72, 0x90, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x42, 0x74, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x52, 0x19, 0x3D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x9E, 0x41, 0x63, 0x68, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x6B, 0x38, 0x52, 0xA8, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x30, 0x25, 0x93, 0xA1, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x68),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x2F, 0x4B, 0x64, 0x79, 0x50, 0xFF, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x36, 0xED, 0x57, 0x39, 0x3B, 0xE7, 0xF3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x85, 0xEA, 0x35, 0xD6, 0xC0, 0xA0, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x89, 0x3A, 0xCC, 0x22, 0x1C, 0x46, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x7A, 0xB0, 0xA1, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x62, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xB8, 0x8A, 0x6C, 0x18, 0x85, 0x0D, 0x88),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xB6, 0x50, 0xE9, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0xE8, 0x07),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x5B, 0x5C, 0xD1, 0x4B, 0x11, 0x9A, 0xD8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x25, 0x56, 0x74, 0x51, 0x9C, 0xEC, 0x9C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x7F, 0xB6, 0x8A, 0xCB, 0x3A, 0x10, 0x6A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x33, 0x07, 0x01, 0xE9, 0x49, 0x59, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xA5, 0x2E, 0xF2, 0xBA, 0x32, 0x63, 0x44),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x06, 0x0B, 0xA5, 0x44, 0x27, 0x7F, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x74, 0xAC, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x4F, 0x13, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xB1, 0xBF, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA5, 0x1C, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x64, 0x68, 0x7B, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x77, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x39, 0xF9, 0x4E, 0x84, 0x9C, 0xF6, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xCF, 0x6D, 0xE2, 0xA1, 0x2D, 0xF9, 0x2B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xC4, 0x90, 0x57, 0x31, 0x01, 0x05, 0x5E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x1E, 0xBB, 0xBF, 0x98, 0xA4, 0x7C, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xE3, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0xCD, 0x39, 0x9A, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x34, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x89, 0x98, 0xB5, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0x20, 0x3D, 0x3A, 0x04, 0x8F, 0x5A, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x49, 0x09, 0x9C, 0x0F, 0x59),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x66, 0xD2, 0x38, 0x2A, 0x62, 0x81, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xC8, 0x20, 0x5E, 0x28, 0xA3, 0x81, 0xA7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x31, 0xA4, 0xF1, 0xEA, 0x7D, 0x87, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x2C, 0x99, 0x09, 0x6F, 0x63, 0xEB, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x76, 0xDA, 0x1A, 0x06, 0xBE, 0xDE, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x09, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x39, 0x30, 0x2D, 0x42),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x9B, 0xC1, 0x5A, 0x17, 0xC3, 0x8C, 0x31),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x8D, 0x94, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xAB, 0x60, 0xD4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFD, 0x1E, 0x0F, 0x43, 0xAE, 0x9D, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0xF2, 0xF3, 0x20, 0x1B, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x5B, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x90, 0x3B, 0xE3, 0x71),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x78, 0x72, 0xBD, 0x65, 0x09, 0x0B, 0x01),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x37, 0x2A, 0x6C, 0x16, 0x4F, 0x64, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xCE, 0xA3, 0x90, 0xB4, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xF7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x38, 0x55, 0x63, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x6E, 0x18),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xB4, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x22, 0x45, 0x89, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x7C, 0x8C, 0xA6, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x06, 0x42, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0xE3, 0xC6, 0x12),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0x5D, 0x47, 0x31, 0x7C, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x85, 0xEE, 0x46, 0x7E, 0x13, 0x04, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x3C, 0x8B, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x74, 0xF5, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x88, 0x8E, 0x07, 0x29, 0x08, 0x03, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x9B, 0x89, 0xEB, 0x08, 0xE8, 0x43, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x07, 0x67, 0xFD, 0xD9, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x18),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xEB, 0x21, 0x8D, 0x98, 0x43, 0x74, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xCC, 0x14, 0xD8, 0x08, 0xBB, 0xA6, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x98, 0xF2, 0x6A, 0x18, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x38, 0x91, 0xA0, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x04, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xAF, 0xE8, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0x13, 0x70, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x93, 0x87, 0x98, 0x4A, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x12),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x2E, 0x69, 0x9C, 0xA2, 0x2D, 0x03, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xFE, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x2A, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xB1, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0x41, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xD8, 0x9A, 0x21, 0xF3, 0xFE, 0xCB, 0xF1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x78, 0x04, 0x60, 0xB7, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1E, 0x66, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x51, 0xBD, 0x8B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x16, 0x36, 0xEF, 0x61, 0x2D, 0xEE, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x5F, 0x88, 0xA0, 0x13, 0x12, 0xF7, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0x4A, 0x4A, 0x07, 0x01, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x06, 0x4F, 0xD7, 0xBC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x8B, 0x4D, 0x48, 0xE0, 0x98, 0xFB, 0x6A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0xBA, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x0D, 0x52, 0xAC, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xD0, 0xE0, 0x36, 0xE6, 0x07, 0x3A, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x80, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x49, 0x22, 0x4B, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xC7, 0xAB, 0x1C, 0x89, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x2A, 0xFC, 0xB3, 0x6D, 0x45, 0x96, 0x49),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xE4, 0xDB, 0x52, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xB4, 0x19),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xCC, 0xC8, 0x7F, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x87, 0x47),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x21, 0x3C, 0x69, 0x7D, 0x38, 0x57, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x4C, 0x18, 0x3C, 0x53, 0xA5, 0x48, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xC3, 0x64, 0x45, 0xDB, 0xC4, 0x6D, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xCC, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0x17, 0xB8, 0x34, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x69, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x28, 0x4A, 0x3D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xE8, 0x9E, 0x39, 0xEA, 0x8D, 0x38, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x9C, 0xBB, 0xCD, 0x80, 0x1A, 0xEE, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA0, 0x45, 0xBF, 0xD9, 0x22, 0x11, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x7C, 0x5C, 0xD9, 0xC0, 0x9F, 0x69, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x8A, 0xA6, 0x79, 0x4E, 0x35, 0xB9, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x8B, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0xA1, 0xB8, 0x28, 0x10),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x2F, 0xEF, 0xBB, 0xA9, 0x72, 0x7F, 0xEA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x34, 0xB7, 0x12, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0xC3, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0x42, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x71, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x01, 0x59, 0xA7, 0x56, 0x03, 0x91, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x91, 0x99, 0x33, 0x30, 0x3E, 0xEF, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xC9, 0x5A, 0x9A, 0x54, 0x66, 0xF1, 0x70),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x2C, 0xB7, 0x6E, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x35, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x0D, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x2D, 0x99, 0x63, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x31, 0xAF, 0x2D, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xC0, 0xDF, 0x80, 0x54, 0xC4, 0xAC, 0xF3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x6B, 0xA0, 0x84, 0x96, 0xF7, 0x31, 0xC8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0xE2, 0x7C, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x45, 0x75, 0x6A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xEE, 0x58, 0x31, 0xE8, 0x68, 0xD6, 0x76),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x2E, 0x48, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x9F, 0xD4, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xA9, 0x5C, 0xE7, 0x64, 0x43, 0x5D, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x58, 0x9F, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x68, 0xFF, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x88, 0x2D, 0xBA, 0x12, 0xBF, 0x8D, 0x7D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xDF, 0x6F, 0xB3, 0x75, 0xA4, 0x55, 0x73),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x17, 0x92, 0x39, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x37, 0x6F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x43, 0x71, 0xA7, 0xCA, 0x17, 0x1B, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xB9, 0xB0, 0x78, 0xEF, 0xA0, 0xDA, 0x83),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x84, 0xF2, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x65, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x45, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x6A, 0x8C, 0x2B, 0x77, 0x96, 0x36, 0x22),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x7A, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x97, 0x63, 0x02, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x03, 0x8F, 0xB9, 0xEE, 0x64),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0xEE, 0x8B, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDB, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x7B, 0x81, 0xC9, 0x70, 0x8D, 0x62, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xDA, 0x46, 0xF8, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0xBE, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x9C, 0x7A, 0x97, 0x62, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0x0F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x03, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0x46, 0x27, 0x9E, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x08, 0x1C, 0xD5, 0x25, 0xAF, 0xE9, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x7C, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x9A, 0x7A, 0x99, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x4E, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xCE, 0x85, 0x5F, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x57, 0x69, 0x90, 0x76, 0xF3, 0x53, 0x3F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP384r1_T[32] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define brainpoolP384r1_T NULL
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Domain parameters for brainpoolP512r1 (RFC 5639 3.7)
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x58, 0x56, 0x60, 0xAA, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x81, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x80, 0xA3, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xA1, 0xCD, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x68, 0xC6, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0x7D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_a[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77, 0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B, 0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D, 0x8D, 0xDD, 0xCB, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x4C, 0x23, 0xAC, 0x45, 0x71, 0x32, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x8B, 0x31, 0xA3, 0x30, 0x78),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0xF7, 0x16, 0x80, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x09, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xE5, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xB7, 0x50, 0x40, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x3E, 0x08, 0xDC, 0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7, 0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F, 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A, 0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D, 0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8, 0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x00, 0xA9, 0x9C, 0x82, 0x96, 0x87, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xDA, 0x5D, 0x08, 0x81, 0xD3, 0xB1, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x10, 0xAC, 0x7F, 0x19, 0x61, 0x86, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x26, 0xA9, 0x4C, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA),
+};
+
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x9D, 0x88, 0x43),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x96, 0xA7, 0x56, 0xD1, 0x37),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xF5, 0x0E, 0xA6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x40, 0xEF, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0xD6, 0x32, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xED, 0x56, 0x14, 0x57, 0x1A, 0x8D, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xED, 0x4D, 0x3A, 0xFA, 0x71, 0x75, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xC5, 0x76, 0x1C, 0x14, 0xBE, 0xB5, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x5A, 0xCB, 0xE7, 0x36, 0x1D, 0x52, 0x1C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x8D, 0x7A, 0xEB, 0xA3, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0xB0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xA3, 0x41, 0xF8, 0xAC, 0x9E, 0xAB, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xE3, 0x65, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0xFE, 0x09, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x3F, 0xC5, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x5D, 0x63, 0x28, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xD3, 0x91),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x95, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x82, 0xD4, 0x77, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xBB, 0x92, 0x32, 0x00, 0xF4, 0x66, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x58, 0x31, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x22),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x36, 0xA9, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA5, 0x2D, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x44, 0xAB, 0xCE, 0x71, 0xFF, 0x0C, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x24, 0x58, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x21, 0x32, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0xA6, 0x28, 0xF8, 0x7A, 0x97, 0xAE, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xE7, 0x08, 0xFA, 0x47, 0xC9, 0x55, 0x09),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xAC, 0x2E, 0x84, 0xA4, 0xF5, 0x52, 0xC4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x58, 0x05, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0x71, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x92, 0xC1, 0x92, 0xEC, 0x6B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x48, 0x2D, 0x79, 0x5E, 0x58, 0xE5, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x85, 0x26, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x6E, 0xD4, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x68, 0x26, 0x87, 0x38, 0xA2, 0xD2, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x17, 0x60, 0xCE, 0x75, 0xF8, 0xA5, 0x6F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x51, 0xDB, 0xA9, 0xAE, 0x87, 0xF1, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x49, 0x92, 0x3B, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF5, 0xB0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0xD5, 0x52, 0x52, 0x8C, 0xCE, 0xFD, 0xFA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x18, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xF6, 0xAE, 0x08, 0x41),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x2B, 0xD8, 0x54, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x57, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x9E, 0x03, 0x03, 0x3C, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x29, 0x00, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x33, 0x99, 0x0E, 0x00, 0x5D, 0xFE, 0x4B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2D, 0xF2, 0x59, 0x32, 0xCF, 0x03, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xC9, 0x72, 0xAE, 0x0C, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x5A, 0x27, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xBE, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0x1E, 0x88),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x83, 0xC2, 0x46, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xDC, 0xCE, 0x15, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x46),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xDB, 0x5E, 0x94, 0x31, 0x0B, 0xB2, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xB9, 0xE3, 0xE3, 0x11, 0x71, 0x41, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xE3, 0x01, 0xB7, 0x7D, 0xBC, 0x65, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x07, 0x65, 0x87, 0xA7, 0xE8, 0x48, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x48, 0x8F, 0xD4, 0x30, 0x8E, 0xB4, 0x6C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xE0, 0x73, 0xBE, 0x1E, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x36),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x0E, 0x5E, 0x87, 0xC5, 0xAB, 0x0E, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xF9, 0x5F, 0x80, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0xF1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x15, 0x21, 0x54, 0x92, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x6A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x8A, 0x47, 0x74, 0xDC, 0x42, 0xB1, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xF7, 0x30, 0xFD, 0xC1, 0x9B, 0x0C, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x6C, 0xCC, 0xDF, 0xC5, 0xE3, 0xA9, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x67, 0x59, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x51, 0x54, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x37, 0xFB, 0x6E, 0xB0, 0x78, 0x63, 0x8E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xEF, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xF1, 0x46, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xFF, 0x10, 0xE4, 0xE2, 0xE9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x2E, 0x22, 0x89, 0xE5, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x0C, 0x29, 0xA8, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0xCA, 0x87, 0x2A, 0x6F, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xDC, 0x9B, 0x9F, 0x65, 0xD4, 0xAD, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xC3, 0x08, 0x0F, 0xCF, 0x67, 0xE9, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x5C, 0xD7, 0xFF, 0x41, 0x9C, 0xCB, 0x26),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x25, 0x05, 0x12, 0xAD, 0x73, 0x63, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x99, 0x07, 0x86, 0x57, 0xE7, 0x94, 0xB1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xBF, 0x18, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x6A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x09, 0xF2, 0x2F, 0x0C, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x3A, 0x04, 0xEA, 0x89, 0x6C, 0x91, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x21, 0x04, 0xE3, 0xB9, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x71, 0x4B, 0x7B, 0xC2, 0x89, 0xCD, 0xA2),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xB9, 0xA8, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x41, 0x6C, 0xBB, 0x5A, 0xCA, 0x1F, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xD7, 0xE2, 0x6C, 0x6B, 0xA7, 0x48, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x19, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0xC1, 0x7E, 0x4F, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xF7, 0x19, 0x3C, 0x06, 0x74, 0x2C, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x23, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x09, 0xB0, 0x80, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x74, 0x34, 0x08, 0x44, 0x7E, 0xA3, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xCC, 0x8D, 0x12, 0x6E, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0x0B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x71, 0x02, 0x93, 0xC2, 0xA4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x89, 0x40, 0xE2, 0x1F, 0xE7, 0x5E, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x8E, 0xAE, 0x89, 0x01, 0xD4, 0x0C, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x70, 0x24, 0xF2, 0xE4, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0xC7, 0x1D, 0xD6, 0x4A, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x4F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x1D, 0x7E, 0x4A, 0x2C, 0xCA, 0xEC, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x06, 0x7F, 0xA8, 0x99, 0xE4, 0xD3, 0x4E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x1D, 0x5A, 0xDF, 0x5E, 0x58, 0x36, 0x49),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xB9, 0x32, 0x69, 0x1F, 0x72, 0x2A, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x73, 0xE2, 0x03, 0x39, 0x35, 0xAA, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x5E, 0x5D, 0x48, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x30, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x7F, 0x60, 0x19, 0xAF, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xFC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xD9, 0x19, 0xE4, 0x1B, 0x56, 0x15, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xD7, 0x33, 0x59, 0x1F, 0x43, 0x59, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0xCA, 0xA4, 0x7F, 0x63, 0xD4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x40, 0xC0, 0xF6, 0x19, 0x89, 0x43, 0x20),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x92, 0xEA, 0x07, 0x65, 0x79, 0x86, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x75, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x0A, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x9E, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x1F, 0x0C, 0xF9, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x8C, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x21, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x4D, 0xD8, 0x18, 0xC4, 0xF6, 0x36, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xC9, 0xAC, 0x5C, 0xFA, 0x69, 0xA4, 0xA0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x8C, 0x94, 0x1C, 0x7B, 0x71, 0x36, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xBD, 0x46, 0xCE, 0xB7, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x5E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD6, 0x96, 0x4B, 0xA6, 0x47, 0xEB, 0xE5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0xF1, 0x5F, 0x15, 0xDE, 0x99, 0x6F, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0x04, 0xB8, 0xE6, 0xC0, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xD3, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x00, 0xE4, 0x05, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xF3, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x1A, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x73),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x32, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x33, 0x09, 0xB6, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xEF, 0xFC, 0x61, 0x10, 0x42, 0x31, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF1, 0xF4, 0x33, 0xCF, 0x28, 0x90, 0x9C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x88, 0x87, 0x7B, 0xEB, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xB8, 0xDA, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0x3D, 0xA6, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xF0, 0x62, 0x82, 0x53, 0x32, 0x55, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x4A, 0x19, 0x11, 0x9C, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xB3, 0x27, 0xE9, 0x75, 0x90, 0x05, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x1C, 0x90, 0x48, 0x77, 0x01, 0x85, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xD6, 0x9B, 0x84, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xC5, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x7A, 0xCB, 0xB3, 0x11, 0x46, 0xD7, 0x99),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x23, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x75, 0xA1, 0x95, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x34, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x03, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x80, 0x9D, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x44, 0xE1, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x5D, 0xBD, 0xA8, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x25, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x99, 0x1F, 0x53, 0xF1, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x7C, 0xE5, 0xC5, 0x51, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0xB0, 0x1A, 0x9C, 0x16, 0xB0, 0x32, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xE3, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x7B, 0x33),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xDD, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xAB, 0x01, 0xD3, 0x87, 0x74, 0x25, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xA3, 0xE3, 0x76, 0x43, 0x87, 0x12, 0xBD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x66, 0xEB, 0x98, 0x54),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x78, 0xC8, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x75, 0xCA, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x19, 0xE7, 0x07, 0x36, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xC9, 0xA8, 0x5F, 0x91, 0xBF, 0x47, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x96, 0x58, 0x96, 0x18, 0xB6, 0xFA, 0x01),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x2D, 0xA9, 0x9B, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x0C, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x0B, 0x2D, 0x56, 0x4A, 0xD3, 0x93, 0x8A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x15, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x12, 0x86, 0x0E, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xC1, 0xCB, 0xE4, 0xC3, 0xD7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x53, 0x10, 0xCA, 0xA3, 0xAC, 0x83, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x01, 0x22, 0x96, 0x10, 0xAD, 0x69, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x46, 0x4E, 0xD8, 0xEA, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xF3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x2F, 0x7F, 0x62, 0x62, 0x80, 0xD0, 0x14),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x63, 0x09, 0xBD, 0x6A, 0x83),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xD4, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x05, 0xB7, 0xF7, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x4D, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x4A, 0x15, 0x27, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x15, 0xAA, 0x37, 0x27, 0x34, 0x18, 0x24),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x20, 0x2C, 0x84, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xBA, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x09, 0xD6, 0x04, 0xA2, 0x60, 0x84, 0x72),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x04, 0x94, 0x08, 0xD4, 0xED, 0x47, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x35, 0x42),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x80, 0xD6, 0xF1, 0x30, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x14, 0xA6, 0x85, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xD8, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x49, 0x2A, 0x1E, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x2D, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x87, 0x56, 0x91, 0x03, 0x77, 0x4D, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x52, 0xD4, 0xAA, 0xF7, 0xFA, 0xB0, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x5D, 0x11, 0x39, 0xB1, 0xE7, 0x76, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x13, 0xBC, 0x37, 0x5D, 0x74, 0xCD, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x48, 0x14, 0x23, 0x30, 0xF8, 0x46, 0x37),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x27, 0xB0, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0x74, 0xB4, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0x64, 0x36, 0x92),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x2B, 0x78, 0x40, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x7B, 0xA9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x68, 0x3A, 0xB6, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0xDB, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x33, 0xD7, 0x34, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x45, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xCE, 0xA8, 0xC9, 0x01, 0xFB, 0x0E, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xF9, 0x51, 0x4C, 0x12, 0x9F, 0x60, 0xE4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x85, 0xBD, 0x30, 0x37, 0x84, 0x39, 0x44),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x33, 0xAF, 0x2E, 0xB8, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x0C, 0x09, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x24, 0x89, 0x81, 0x12, 0xFF, 0xBB, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x37, 0x1A, 0x66, 0xEE, 0xED, 0xB6, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xBD, 0x04, 0x20, 0x5D, 0xFB, 0xBF, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xF8, 0x34, 0xA3, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDE, 0x92),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x18, 0x73, 0xF1, 0x32, 0x25, 0x58, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xC1, 0x14, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x40, 0x0F, 0x12),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0x9D, 0x9C, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x56, 0x19),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xBA, 0x87, 0xF9, 0x15, 0x0C, 0x66, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x1F, 0xC1, 0x28, 0xB0, 0x47, 0x0D, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xCA, 0x27, 0xEE, 0x4B, 0x23, 0x2B, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0xB5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0x17, 0x5D, 0xC3, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x02, 0x08, 0xEE, 0x20, 0x9D, 0xEA, 0x64),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x14, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xFA, 0xF8, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0xDC, 0x14, 0x8C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xBD, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x18, 0x98, 0xDC, 0xB0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x63, 0x02, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x5B, 0x5A, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xB1, 0xD7, 0x4B, 0x15, 0x39, 0x61, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x32, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0x70, 0x1B, 0xCE, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x83, 0x52, 0x9B, 0x6D, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x55, 0x56, 0x19, 0x34, 0xA4, 0xEA, 0xFC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xA9, 0x55, 0x80, 0xE3, 0x15, 0x36, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x1D, 0x17, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x16),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0xD6, 0xF0, 0xCC, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x53, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x5A, 0xDC, 0x46, 0xBD, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x2F, 0x11, 0x60, 0x15, 0x51, 0x4A, 0xEA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xE3, 0x93, 0x38, 0xD5, 0x83, 0xAA, 0x0D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xA6, 0xCC, 0xB1, 0xFD, 0xBB, 0x1A, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x54, 0xC8, 0x54, 0x6F, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x4A, 0xDA, 0x28, 0x92, 0x97, 0x9D, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x4B, 0xDB, 0xC7, 0x52, 0xC5, 0x66, 0x34),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x7E, 0x92, 0x53, 0x30, 0x93, 0xFD, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x16, 0x6A, 0xB1, 0x91, 0x0A, 0xB4, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x9D, 0x40, 0x3F, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x01, 0x46),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x0E, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x4C, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x8D, 0x29, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x23, 0x21, 0x11, 0xAB, 0x77, 0x81, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xAF, 0x11, 0xFA, 0xBA, 0x40, 0x63, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x6F, 0x8D, 0x80, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xF5, 0x44),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0x08, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x2B, 0x30, 0x02, 0x45, 0x71, 0x08, 0x49),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x3A, 0xCA, 0x50, 0xF6, 0xC2, 0x19, 0x8C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0x73, 0x95, 0x1D, 0x49),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x60, 0x59, 0x48, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0xD6, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xB9, 0x6C, 0x89, 0xAB, 0x99, 0xA8, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x4E, 0x06, 0x19, 0xEC, 0x99),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x95, 0x04, 0xCF, 0xD5, 0x94, 0xB3, 0x02),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x35, 0x93, 0x7C, 0xB3, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x45, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x81, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xE8, 0x24, 0xDF, 0xEC, 0x2F, 0x7D, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0x6A, 0x9B, 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x4F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xE3, 0x27, 0x82, 0xDE, 0xDD, 0xCA, 0x4B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x57, 0x56, 0x46, 0x05, 0x06, 0x01, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x35, 0xA7, 0x47, 0xE2, 0x6B, 0x2C, 0x4F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xEC, 0x1F, 0x11, 0x75, 0x2B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xC1, 0xE9, 0x0E, 0xE9, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xCF, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0xE8, 0xED, 0x0A, 0x49),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x73, 0xCA, 0x0C, 0x46, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xE4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x44, 0x63, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x43, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xF8, 0xC1, 0x8C, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x4B, 0xF0, 0x69, 0x25, 0xBD, 0x71, 0x1A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x82, 0xE7, 0xC1, 0xC1, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x5A, 0x6E, 0x5E, 0x97, 0x6A, 0x35, 0x8D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x18, 0x6C, 0x7E, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x57, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0xD0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x08, 0xAE, 0x46, 0x34, 0xEA, 0x7A, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1C, 0x56, 0xA9, 0x18, 0x37, 0xD4, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x63, 0xE9, 0x0A, 0xB6, 0x38, 0x3C, 0xC1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x4F, 0xA4, 0x6E, 0x85, 0x31, 0x23, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0xAD, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB1, 0x4B, 0x1C, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x56, 0x4A, 0x38, 0xB3, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0x2C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xC7, 0x19, 0xDE, 0x21, 0xED, 0x89, 0xD0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0xEB, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x0E, 0x13, 0x1E, 0x86, 0x57, 0xC3, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x4B, 0x30, 0x46, 0x52, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xD5, 0x44, 0x31, 0x96, 0x3B, 0x26, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x68, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x78, 0x39, 0xE8, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x78, 0xB7, 0xDD, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xB6, 0x3D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x3C, 0xB3, 0x26, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x8C, 0xA5),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x24, 0xE5, 0x73, 0xEE, 0x9A, 0x02, 0xA9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x6A, 0x65, 0x60, 0xF3, 0x62, 0xE3, 0xE9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x07, 0x84, 0xE6, 0x3B, 0x46, 0x65, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0xB0, 0xE1, 0x04, 0x82, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x13, 0xBF, 0x3D, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xA2, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x26, 0x76, 0x74, 0xAB, 0x0B, 0x29, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x03, 0x34, 0x7C, 0x38, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x72, 0xF9, 0x3B, 0x3C, 0xA4, 0xBC, 0x7C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xCE, 0x18, 0x80, 0xB8, 0x24, 0x45, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x09, 0x03, 0xB8, 0x06, 0x64, 0xF7, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x26, 0xB1, 0x10, 0x6D, 0x71, 0x12, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x12, 0xC6, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x6A, 0xC3, 0x80),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xD3, 0x0A, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x6B, 0x04, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x87, 0x5B, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x3C, 0xC0, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0xF5, 0xF9, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x89, 0xBB, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x69, 0x72, 0x8B, 0xAE, 0x32, 0x13, 0x11),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x16, 0x07, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0xCF, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x50, 0x21, 0xE9, 0xDE, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0x83, 0x30, 0x0B, 0x65, 0x0E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xBA, 0x6C, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x0D, 0x7B, 0x9E, 0x08, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x91, 0xB2, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xCE, 0x67, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x93, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xD7, 0x1F, 0x2F, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x7F, 0x9D, 0x40, 0xF8, 0x78, 0x7A, 0x54),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x22, 0x95, 0xE8, 0xEF, 0x31, 0x57, 0x35),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x88, 0x53, 0xFE, 0xAF, 0x7C, 0x47, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xCE, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xE8, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0xC4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x16, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x6E, 0x8A, 0x73, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x07, 0x97, 0x21, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x5F, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0x81, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xE7, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x8F, 0x75, 0x09, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x53, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x4F, 0x70, 0x97, 0xC7, 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x3F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x3C, 0x6A, 0xB4, 0x10, 0xA9, 0xC8, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xC5, 0xD6, 0x69, 0x16, 0xB8, 0xAC, 0x25),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xEB, 0x48, 0x54, 0x5D, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x48, 0x9B, 0xD7, 0x72, 0x69, 0xA4, 0x8A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x0D, 0x36, 0x9A, 0x66, 0x0B, 0xEC, 0x24),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xC6, 0xD4, 0xB6, 0x60, 0xE5, 0xC3, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x29, 0x42, 0xE0, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x7C, 0x3E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x10, 0xBA, 0x55, 0xBC, 0x3B, 0x38, 0x5D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x66, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x73, 0x03, 0x1B, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xA4, 0x66, 0x12, 0x96, 0x7B, 0x02, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xB5, 0xDE, 0x6D, 0x98, 0xD1, 0xD5, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xF5, 0x44, 0xB8, 0x8E, 0xF6, 0x8C, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x15, 0x2B, 0x72, 0xBC, 0x49, 0xE5, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x44, 0xD7, 0xDF, 0x8F, 0xEB, 0x8D, 0x80),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x64, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xE4, 0x70, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x14, 0xBB, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xB9, 0x65, 0x5D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x8E, 0x88, 0xF5, 0xF1, 0xC1, 0x89, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x30, 0x53, 0xE6, 0xFB, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xB4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xE4, 0xFF, 0xBA, 0x31, 0x79, 0xAB, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x09, 0xF7, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xAE, 0xC2, 0x44, 0xDC, 0x17, 0x78, 0x47),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xD4, 0x17, 0x43, 0x19, 0x74, 0x9E, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x64, 0x3B, 0x73, 0xA2, 0x99, 0x27, 0x76),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x74, 0x36, 0x5F, 0xD3, 0x14, 0xB1, 0x31),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x07, 0xAB, 0xFD, 0x9B, 0x03, 0xC5, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xBE, 0xB0, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x0C, 0x73, 0x73),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xE7, 0x7B, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x34, 0xFD, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x25, 0x3D, 0xC7, 0x36, 0x83, 0x53, 0xDC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x7C, 0xCF, 0x63, 0x55, 0x12, 0x11, 0xB0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x34, 0x4D, 0x27, 0x92, 0xAC, 0x18, 0x16),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x42, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x2E, 0xFF, 0x13, 0x16),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x65, 0x57, 0x0D, 0xBC, 0x0A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x7B, 0x6E, 0xC6, 0x2A, 0x21, 0x74, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xA7, 0x53, 0x4D, 0x29, 0x36, 0xEF, 0xE5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xD6, 0x41, 0xC7, 0x99, 0xAD, 0x50, 0x53),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xAC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0x86, 0xF1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xBB, 0xE6, 0x25, 0x28, 0xAA, 0xEB, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x04, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0x08, 0x8A, 0xCC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x2B, 0x5B, 0xE2, 0x8D, 0x76, 0xEA, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x33, 0xD2, 0x21, 0x4D, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x8E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x06, 0x8B, 0x2B, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0xB1, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xF5, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x03, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x12),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x55, 0xB6, 0x1A, 0x9F, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x54, 0x32, 0xBE, 0x06, 0x43, 0xB5, 0xFD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x20, 0x89, 0xBE, 0xD4, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x26, 0x95, 0x10, 0xCE, 0xB4, 0x88, 0x79),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xA6, 0x27, 0xAC, 0x32, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0xC7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0x9C, 0x7B, 0xBE, 0xA1, 0x63),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xCD, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xDF, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x7D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xA7, 0x11, 0x06, 0xCC, 0x0E, 0x31, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0xE4, 0xF4, 0xAD, 0x7B, 0x5F, 0xF1, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x54, 0xBE, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x03, 0x47, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x53, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xB0, 0x8A, 0x68, 0xA6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x16, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x5B, 0x0E, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x32, 0xE3, 0x43, 0x64, 0x75, 0xFB, 0xFB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x18, 0x55, 0x8A, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x54),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x97, 0x15, 0x1E, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x9C, 0xA5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xAD, 0x13, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x96, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0x5E, 0xDA, 0xD5, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x81, 0xE9, 0x65, 0x66, 0x76, 0x47, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x35, 0x87, 0x06, 0x73, 0xCF, 0x34, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x81, 0x15, 0x42, 0xA2, 0x79, 0x5B, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xA2, 0x7D, 0x09, 0x14, 0x64, 0xC6, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0xED, 0xF1, 0xD6, 0xE9, 0x24),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xD5, 0xBB, 0x25, 0xA3, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x88),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xF2, 0x68, 0x67, 0x39, 0x8F, 0x73, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x76, 0x28, 0x89, 0xAD, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x90, 0xCC, 0x57, 0x58, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xD7, 0x43, 0xD2, 0xCE, 0x5E, 0xA0, 0x08),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0xA4, 0x9E, 0x96, 0x26, 0x86),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x61, 0x1D, 0xF3, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x60, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xED, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x60, 0x20),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x30, 0x17, 0x8A, 0x91, 0x88, 0x0A, 0xA4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x7D, 0x18, 0xA4, 0xAC, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x65, 0x39, 0x9A, 0xDC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x16, 0x4B, 0x68, 0xBA, 0x59, 0x13, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFD, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x56, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0x5E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xE6, 0xF7, 0xB4, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x7C, 0x03, 0x00, 0x26, 0x9F, 0xD8, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x1D, 0x6E, 0x00, 0xB9, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x93),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x63, 0xDA, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0x47, 0xF0, 0xAE, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x4C, 0xF7, 0x50, 0x0C, 0x48, 0x06, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x2B, 0x32, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x7E, 0x61, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x02, 0x27, 0xFE, 0x75, 0x86, 0xDF, 0x24),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x22, 0x32, 0x1B, 0xFE, 0x24),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x27, 0xF7, 0x78, 0x6F, 0xD7, 0xFD, 0xE4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x78, 0xCC, 0xEA, 0xC0, 0x50, 0x24, 0x44),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x2B, 0x4F, 0x7F, 0x58, 0xE6, 0xC2, 0x70),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x43, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x3C, 0x80, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x6D, 0x4B, 0x12, 0x00, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0xA6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x15, 0xBD, 0xD0, 0x9B, 0xCA, 0xAA, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xCE, 0x9C, 0xE3, 0x8B, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x53),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xDA, 0x4B, 0x03, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x43, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAF, 0x00, 0x2B, 0x32, 0xF0, 0x22, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xD9, 0x99, 0x99, 0xBE, 0x43, 0x99, 0x3E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x71, 0x41, 0xF4, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xDD, 0x36),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x4C, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x1F, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x43, 0x48, 0x76, 0x8A, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x1A, 0x55, 0xA8, 0xA3, 0xD4, 0x57, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xA6, 0x84, 0x39, 0xC9, 0x13, 0xBB, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xFA, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDE, 0x83, 0xDD, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xC9, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x91, 0x68, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x9F, 0x85, 0x6D, 0xF7, 0x54, 0x36, 0x82),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0xA3, 0xE5, 0xD4, 0x46, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x3E, 0xDC, 0x84, 0x7C, 0x7B, 0x24, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xED, 0x7F, 0x86, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x57, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x06, 0xFE, 0x52, 0x12, 0x79, 0x69, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xD1, 0x44, 0x5F, 0x21, 0x3A, 0xC3, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xD9, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0x75, 0xAB, 0x17, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x81, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xBE, 0x8E, 0xA5, 0xAA, 0xBC, 0x1E, 0x3E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xC7, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xB1, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xCE, 0x40, 0xD1, 0xFB, 0xDF, 0x94, 0xF7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xB8, 0x5E, 0xBF, 0x45, 0xA8, 0x2D, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x1B, 0xA9, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x79),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0xA2, 0xD3, 0x74, 0xA1, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0x78, 0xDB, 0xAE, 0x3A, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x32, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x68, 0x6A, 0x43, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xBC, 0x39, 0x36, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0xBB, 0x11),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x07, 0xA2, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0x4D, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x1D, 0x67, 0xE6, 0xF1, 0x46, 0xEB, 0x71),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x41, 0x23, 0x95, 0xE7, 0xE0, 0x10, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x68, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x5F, 0xB6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xB9, 0x2B, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0x4F, 0xD8, 0x1A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x09, 0xF5, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xF6, 0x91, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x15, 0x42, 0x6B, 0x6D, 0xB5, 0xF3, 0xB6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x56, 0x9D, 0xC5, 0xFF, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x9B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x38, 0xE6, 0x23, 0x63, 0x48, 0x3C, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x68, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x3B, 0xE9, 0x3B, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x08, 0x54, 0x49, 0xD1, 0x46, 0x45, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x70, 0x52, 0x6E, 0x79, 0xC4, 0x5E, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xDF, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x32, 0x81, 0xDA, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x5B, 0xB5, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x12, 0x8D, 0xC3, 0x36, 0x36, 0xB2, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x2F, 0x22, 0x38, 0x5B, 0x18, 0x4C, 0x35),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x11, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0x56, 0x18, 0x61, 0x66, 0x12),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xFB, 0x72, 0x08, 0x84, 0x38, 0x51, 0xB0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x86, 0xA8, 0xB9, 0x31, 0x99, 0x29, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xFB, 0xC3, 0x42, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0x6F, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x09, 0xBE, 0x75, 0xB0, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x7D, 0xFF, 0xF4, 0x99, 0xFC, 0x13, 0xAB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x1B, 0x84, 0x81, 0x42, 0x22, 0xC6, 0x3D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xE0, 0x37, 0xA4, 0xA0, 0x2F, 0x38, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x40, 0x2F, 0x39, 0x3C, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x3B, 0x8A, 0x51, 0xAE, 0x40, 0x49, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x20, 0x9F, 0xDD, 0xA9, 0xD0, 0x77, 0xC7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x1D, 0x64, 0xDA, 0xA0, 0x53, 0xC7, 0x7D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x7B, 0x66, 0x55, 0x94, 0xD1, 0x51, 0x44),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xA9, 0xB5, 0x5B, 0x38, 0x35, 0x40, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x79, 0x43, 0x61),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x47, 0x45, 0x69, 0x80, 0x72, 0x72, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x11, 0x99, 0x59, 0xDB, 0x48, 0x80, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x6E, 0x3D, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x15, 0xF4, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xBB, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x35, 0x8D, 0x28, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x1A, 0x3B, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0xD3, 0xAA, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x1C, 0x1A, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xD9, 0x7B, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x69, 0xAC, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x31, 0x14, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x8A, 0xE6, 0xDE, 0x58, 0xB9, 0xC4, 0x7A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x83, 0x52, 0xFE, 0xF9, 0x7B, 0xE9, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xA2, 0x55, 0x46, 0x15, 0x49, 0xC1, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xBC, 0x5C, 0x91, 0xBD, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xFD, 0xB1, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0x74, 0xEE, 0x53),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0x8B, 0x17, 0x73, 0x1B, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x67, 0x06, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x0F, 0x80, 0x24, 0xE2, 0x27, 0x5F, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x1C, 0xCE, 0xD0, 0x67, 0xCA, 0xD4, 0x0B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0x33, 0x66, 0xF9, 0x05, 0xD6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xE5, 0x6B, 0x79, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x42, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x14, 0x52, 0xE3, 0x53, 0xB4, 0x50, 0xD4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x84, 0x6C, 0xCF, 0xDA, 0xB2, 0x20, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xD6, 0x1A, 0xE5, 0xE2, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x61, 0xFE, 0xBB, 0x21, 0x82, 0xD1, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0xF0, 0x9C, 0x8B, 0x1A, 0x42, 0x30, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xD6, 0x49, 0x81, 0x92, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x90),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x91, 0x93, 0x6A, 0xA6, 0x22, 0xE9, 0xD6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xDC, 0xC3, 0x69, 0x11, 0x95, 0x7D, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xA3, 0x9D, 0x87, 0x5E, 0x64, 0x41, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x87, 0x5A, 0x15, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x8D, 0x50, 0xCC, 0xCF, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x65, 0xCD, 0x31, 0x30, 0xF1, 0x68, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x5C, 0x66, 0x67, 0x92, 0x30, 0x57, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x9B, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x20, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x0D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xC0, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xDE, 0x62, 0xAB, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x1C, 0x0F, 0x16, 0x93, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x1F, 0x16, 0x50, 0x56, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x06, 0xBC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xFE, 0x21, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x55, 0xE1, 0xFD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xA8, 0xD0, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB5, 0xB2, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xE7, 0x4B, 0xF3, 0x11, 0x0C, 0xC9, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x3A, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xFA, 0x18),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x77, 0xEE, 0x81, 0x5E, 0x96, 0xEA, 0x4B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0xF4, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0xB2, 0x43),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xD4, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x63, 0x47, 0x25, 0x8A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x3D, 0xFF, 0xA4, 0x02, 0xC3, 0x95, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x10, 0x78, 0xD1, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xBE, 0x0E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xF9, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0xFC, 0xBC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xC4, 0x01, 0xD6, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x78, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x13, 0xA4, 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x6F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xB0, 0xC9, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0xA2, 0x1E, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x22, 0x9B, 0xEA, 0xE8, 0xBB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x46, 0xDF, 0x43, 0xB9, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x32, 0xF1, 0x4E, 0x95, 0x41, 0xAE, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x93, 0x26, 0xFC, 0xD3, 0x90, 0xDC, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x05, 0x45, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x82, 0x63, 0x4E, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x08),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x69, 0x52, 0x49, 0xE9, 0xED, 0x57, 0x34),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x64, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xEA, 0x25),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xE9, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xE7, 0xF9, 0xA9, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x0C, 0xC1, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x07, 0xB6, 0xB1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x68, 0xFA, 0x35, 0xE4, 0x9E, 0xAE, 0xD9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x2D, 0x1A, 0x13, 0x8E, 0x02, 0xE2, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x38, 0x28, 0x86, 0x46, 0x7B, 0x3A, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x4C, 0x64, 0x59, 0x0A, 0xF9, 0x02, 0xC4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x4F, 0x23, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xD5, 0xEF, 0x42),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP512r1_T[32] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define brainpoolP512r1_T NULL
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP)
+/*
+ * Create an MPI from embedded constants
+ * (assumes len is an exact multiple of sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint))
+ */
+static inline void ecp_mpi_load(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t len)
+{
+ X->s = 1;
+ X->n = (unsigned short) (len / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
+ X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) p;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set an MPI to static value 1
+ */
+static inline void ecp_mpi_set1(mbedtls_mpi *X)
+{
+ X->s = 1;
+ X->n = 1;
+ X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mpi_one; /* X->p will not be modified so the cast is safe */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make group available from embedded constants
+ */
+static int ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t plen,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *a, size_t alen,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *b, size_t blen,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gx, size_t gxlen,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gy, size_t gylen,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *n, size_t nlen,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *T)
+{
+ ecp_mpi_load(&grp->P, p, plen);
+ if (a != NULL) {
+ ecp_mpi_load(&grp->A, a, alen);
+ }
+ ecp_mpi_load(&grp->B, b, blen);
+ ecp_mpi_load(&grp->N, n, nlen);
+
+ ecp_mpi_load(&grp->G.X, gx, gxlen);
+ ecp_mpi_load(&grp->G.Y, gy, gylen);
+ ecp_mpi_set1(&grp->G.Z);
+
+ grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P);
+ grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->N);
+
+ grp->h = 1;
+
+ grp->T = (mbedtls_ecp_point *) T;
+ /*
+ * Set T_size to 0 to prevent T free by mbedtls_ecp_group_free.
+ */
+ grp->T_size = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM)
+/* Forward declarations */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p192(mbedtls_mpi *);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p224(mbedtls_mpi *);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p256(mbedtls_mpi *);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p384(mbedtls_mpi *);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p521(mbedtls_mpi *);
+#endif
+
+#define NIST_MODP(P) grp->modp = ecp_mod_ ## P;
+#else
+#define NIST_MODP(P)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */
+
+/* Additional forward declarations */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p255(mbedtls_mpi *);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p448(mbedtls_mpi *);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP)
+#define LOAD_GROUP_A(G) ecp_group_load(grp, \
+ G ## _p, sizeof(G ## _p), \
+ G ## _a, sizeof(G ## _a), \
+ G ## _b, sizeof(G ## _b), \
+ G ## _gx, sizeof(G ## _gx), \
+ G ## _gy, sizeof(G ## _gy), \
+ G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n), \
+ G ## _T \
+ )
+
+#define LOAD_GROUP(G) ecp_group_load(grp, \
+ G ## _p, sizeof(G ## _p), \
+ NULL, 0, \
+ G ## _b, sizeof(G ## _b), \
+ G ## _gx, sizeof(G ## _gx), \
+ G ## _gy, sizeof(G ## _gy), \
+ G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n), \
+ G ## _T \
+ )
+#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve25519() */
+static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve25519_a24 = 0x01DB42;
+static const unsigned char curve25519_part_of_n[] = {
+ 0x14, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0xDE, 0xA2, 0xF7, 0x9C, 0xD6,
+ 0x58, 0x12, 0x63, 0x1A, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0xD3, 0xED,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Specialized function for creating the Curve25519 group
+ */
+static int ecp_use_curve25519(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->A, curve25519_a24));
+
+ /* P = 2^255 - 19 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->P, 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&grp->P, 255));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&grp->P, &grp->P, 19));
+ grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P);
+
+ /* N = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&grp->N,
+ curve25519_part_of_n, sizeof(curve25519_part_of_n)));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&grp->N, 252, 1));
+
+ /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates.
+ * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.X, 9));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.Z, 1));
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->G.Y);
+
+ /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */
+ grp->nbits = 254;
+
+cleanup:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve448() */
+static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve448_a24 = 0x98AA;
+static const unsigned char curve448_part_of_n[] = {
+ 0x83, 0x35, 0xDC, 0x16, 0x3B, 0xB1, 0x24,
+ 0xB6, 0x51, 0x29, 0xC9, 0x6F, 0xDE, 0x93,
+ 0x3D, 0x8D, 0x72, 0x3A, 0x70, 0xAA, 0xDC,
+ 0x87, 0x3D, 0x6D, 0x54, 0xA7, 0xBB, 0x0D,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Specialized function for creating the Curve448 group
+ */
+static int ecp_use_curve448(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi Ns;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_init(&Ns);
+
+ /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->A, curve448_a24));
+
+ /* P = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->P, 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&grp->P, 224));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&grp->P, &grp->P, 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&grp->P, 224));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(&grp->P, &grp->P, 1));
+ grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P);
+
+ /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates.
+ * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.X, 5));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.Z, 1));
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->G.Y);
+
+ /* N = 2^446 - 13818066809895115352007386748515426880336692474882178609894547503885 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(&grp->N, 446, 1));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&Ns,
+ curve448_part_of_n, sizeof(curve448_part_of_n)));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi(&grp->N, &grp->N, &Ns));
+
+ /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */
+ grp->nbits = 447;
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&Ns);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Set a group using well-known domain parameters
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id)
+{
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp);
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_init(grp);
+
+ grp->id = id;
+
+ switch (id) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:
+ NIST_MODP(p192);
+ return LOAD_GROUP(secp192r1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:
+ NIST_MODP(p224);
+ return LOAD_GROUP(secp224r1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:
+ NIST_MODP(p256);
+ return LOAD_GROUP(secp256r1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:
+ NIST_MODP(p384);
+ return LOAD_GROUP(secp384r1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:
+ NIST_MODP(p521);
+ return LOAD_GROUP(secp521r1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1:
+ grp->modp = ecp_mod_p192k1;
+ return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp192k1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1:
+ grp->modp = ecp_mod_p224k1;
+ return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp224k1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:
+ grp->modp = ecp_mod_p256k1;
+ return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp256k1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:
+ return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP256r1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1:
+ return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP384r1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:
+ return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP512r1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:
+ grp->modp = ecp_mod_p255;
+ return ecp_use_curve25519(grp);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:
+ grp->modp = ecp_mod_p448;
+ return ecp_use_curve448(grp);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */
+
+ default:
+ grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM)
+/*
+ * Fast reduction modulo the primes used by the NIST curves.
+ *
+ * These functions are critical for speed, but not needed for correct
+ * operations. So, we make the choice to heavily rely on the internals of our
+ * bignum library, which creates a tight coupling between these functions and
+ * our MPI implementation. However, the coupling between the ECP module and
+ * MPI remains loose, since these functions can be deactivated at will.
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Compared to the way things are presented in FIPS 186-3 D.2,
+ * we proceed in columns, from right (least significant chunk) to left,
+ * adding chunks to N in place, and keeping a carry for the next chunk.
+ * This avoids moving things around in memory, and uselessly adding zeros,
+ * compared to the more straightforward, line-oriented approach.
+ *
+ * For this prime we need to handle data in chunks of 64 bits.
+ * Since this is always a multiple of our basic mbedtls_mpi_uint, we can
+ * use a mbedtls_mpi_uint * to designate such a chunk, and small loops to handle it.
+ */
+
+/* Add 64-bit chunks (dst += src) and update carry */
+static inline void add64(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry)
+{
+ unsigned char i;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); i++, dst++, src++) {
+ *dst += c; c = (*dst < c);
+ *dst += *src; c += (*dst < *src);
+ }
+ *carry += c;
+}
+
+/* Add carry to a 64-bit chunk and update carry */
+static inline void carry64(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry)
+{
+ unsigned char i;
+ for (i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); i++, dst++) {
+ *dst += *carry;
+ *carry = (*dst < *carry);
+ }
+}
+
+#define WIDTH 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)
+#define A(i) N->p + (i) * WIDTH
+#define ADD(i) add64(p, A(i), &c)
+#define NEXT p += WIDTH; carry64(p, &c)
+#define LAST p += WIDTH; *p = c; while (++p < end) *p = 0
+
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.1)
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p192(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, *end;
+
+ /* Make sure we have enough blocks so that A(5) is legal */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, 6 * WIDTH));
+
+ p = N->p;
+ end = p + N->n;
+
+ ADD(3); ADD(5); NEXT; // A0 += A3 + A5
+ ADD(3); ADD(4); ADD(5); NEXT; // A1 += A3 + A4 + A5
+ ADD(4); ADD(5); LAST; // A2 += A4 + A5
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#undef WIDTH
+#undef A
+#undef ADD
+#undef NEXT
+#undef LAST
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * The reader is advised to first understand ecp_mod_p192() since the same
+ * general structure is used here, but with additional complications:
+ * (1) chunks of 32 bits, and (2) subtractions.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * For these primes, we need to handle data in chunks of 32 bits.
+ * This makes it more complicated if we use 64 bits limbs in MPI,
+ * which prevents us from using a uniform access method as for p192.
+ *
+ * So, we define a mini abstraction layer to access 32 bit chunks,
+ * load them in 'cur' for work, and store them back from 'cur' when done.
+ *
+ * While at it, also define the size of N in terms of 32-bit chunks.
+ */
+#define LOAD32 cur = A(i);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) /* 32 bit */
+
+#define MAX32 N->n
+#define A(j) N->p[j]
+#define STORE32 N->p[i] = cur;
+
+#else /* 64-bit */
+
+#define MAX32 N->n * 2
+#define A(j) (j) % 2 ? (uint32_t) (N->p[(j)/2] >> 32) : \
+ (uint32_t) (N->p[(j)/2])
+#define STORE32 \
+ if (i % 2) { \
+ N->p[i/2] &= 0x00000000FFFFFFFF; \
+ N->p[i/2] |= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur) << 32; \
+ } else { \
+ N->p[i/2] &= 0xFFFFFFFF00000000; \
+ N->p[i/2] |= (mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur; \
+ }
+
+#endif /* sizeof( mbedtls_mpi_uint ) */
+
+/*
+ * Helpers for addition and subtraction of chunks, with signed carry.
+ */
+static inline void add32(uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry)
+{
+ *dst += src;
+ *carry += (*dst < src);
+}
+
+static inline void sub32(uint32_t *dst, uint32_t src, signed char *carry)
+{
+ *carry -= (*dst < src);
+ *dst -= src;
+}
+
+#define ADD(j) add32(&cur, A(j), &c);
+#define SUB(j) sub32(&cur, A(j), &c);
+
+/*
+ * Helpers for the main 'loop'
+ */
+#define INIT(b) \
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; \
+ signed char c = 0, cc; \
+ uint32_t cur; \
+ size_t i = 0, bits = (b); \
+ /* N is the size of the product of two b-bit numbers, plus one */ \
+ /* limb for fix_negative */ \
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, (b) * 2 / biL + 1)); \
+ LOAD32;
+
+#define NEXT \
+ STORE32; i++; LOAD32; \
+ cc = c; c = 0; \
+ if (cc < 0) \
+ sub32(&cur, -cc, &c); \
+ else \
+ add32(&cur, cc, &c); \
+
+#define LAST \
+ STORE32; i++; \
+ cur = c > 0 ? c : 0; STORE32; \
+ cur = 0; while (++i < MAX32) { STORE32; } \
+ if (c < 0) mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative(N, c, bits);
+
+/*
+ * If the result is negative, we get it in the form
+ * c * 2^bits + N, with c negative and N positive shorter than 'bits'
+ */
+static void mbedtls_ecp_fix_negative(mbedtls_mpi *N, signed char c, size_t bits)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Set N := 2^bits - 1 - N. We know that 0 <= N < 2^bits, so
+ * set the absolute value to 0xfff...fff - N. There is no carry
+ * since we're subtracting from all-bits-one. */
+ for (i = 0; i <= bits / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); i++) {
+ N->p[i] = ~(mbedtls_mpi_uint) 0 - N->p[i];
+ }
+ /* Add 1, taking care of the carry. */
+ i = 0;
+ do {
+ ++N->p[i];
+ } while (N->p[i++] == 0 && i <= bits / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
+ /* Invert the sign.
+ * Now N = N0 - 2^bits where N0 is the initial value of N. */
+ N->s = -1;
+
+ /* Add |c| * 2^bits to the absolute value. Since c and N are
+ * negative, this adds c * 2^bits. */
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint msw = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) -c;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64)
+ if (bits == 224) {
+ msw <<= 32;
+ }
+#endif
+ N->p[bits / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)] += msw;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.2)
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p224(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ INIT(224);
+
+ SUB(7); SUB(11); NEXT; // A0 += -A7 - A11
+ SUB(8); SUB(12); NEXT; // A1 += -A8 - A12
+ SUB(9); SUB(13); NEXT; // A2 += -A9 - A13
+ SUB(10); ADD(7); ADD(11); NEXT; // A3 += -A10 + A7 + A11
+ SUB(11); ADD(8); ADD(12); NEXT; // A4 += -A11 + A8 + A12
+ SUB(12); ADD(9); ADD(13); NEXT; // A5 += -A12 + A9 + A13
+ SUB(13); ADD(10); LAST; // A6 += -A13 + A10
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.3)
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p256(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ INIT(256);
+
+ ADD(8); ADD(9);
+ SUB(11); SUB(12); SUB(13); SUB(14); NEXT; // A0
+
+ ADD(9); ADD(10);
+ SUB(12); SUB(13); SUB(14); SUB(15); NEXT; // A1
+
+ ADD(10); ADD(11);
+ SUB(13); SUB(14); SUB(15); NEXT; // A2
+
+ ADD(11); ADD(11); ADD(12); ADD(12); ADD(13);
+ SUB(15); SUB(8); SUB(9); NEXT; // A3
+
+ ADD(12); ADD(12); ADD(13); ADD(13); ADD(14);
+ SUB(9); SUB(10); NEXT; // A4
+
+ ADD(13); ADD(13); ADD(14); ADD(14); ADD(15);
+ SUB(10); SUB(11); NEXT; // A5
+
+ ADD(14); ADD(14); ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(14); ADD(13);
+ SUB(8); SUB(9); NEXT; // A6
+
+ ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(8);
+ SUB(10); SUB(11); SUB(12); SUB(13); LAST; // A7
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p384 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.4)
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p384(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ INIT(384);
+
+ ADD(12); ADD(21); ADD(20);
+ SUB(23); NEXT; // A0
+
+ ADD(13); ADD(22); ADD(23);
+ SUB(12); SUB(20); NEXT; // A2
+
+ ADD(14); ADD(23);
+ SUB(13); SUB(21); NEXT; // A2
+
+ ADD(15); ADD(12); ADD(20); ADD(21);
+ SUB(14); SUB(22); SUB(23); NEXT; // A3
+
+ ADD(21); ADD(21); ADD(16); ADD(13); ADD(12); ADD(20); ADD(22);
+ SUB(15); SUB(23); SUB(23); NEXT; // A4
+
+ ADD(22); ADD(22); ADD(17); ADD(14); ADD(13); ADD(21); ADD(23);
+ SUB(16); NEXT; // A5
+
+ ADD(23); ADD(23); ADD(18); ADD(15); ADD(14); ADD(22);
+ SUB(17); NEXT; // A6
+
+ ADD(19); ADD(16); ADD(15); ADD(23);
+ SUB(18); NEXT; // A7
+
+ ADD(20); ADD(17); ADD(16);
+ SUB(19); NEXT; // A8
+
+ ADD(21); ADD(18); ADD(17);
+ SUB(20); NEXT; // A9
+
+ ADD(22); ADD(19); ADD(18);
+ SUB(21); NEXT; // A10
+
+ ADD(23); ADD(20); ADD(19);
+ SUB(22); LAST; // A11
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
+
+#undef A
+#undef LOAD32
+#undef STORE32
+#undef MAX32
+#undef INIT
+#undef NEXT
+#undef LAST
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Here we have an actual Mersenne prime, so things are more straightforward.
+ * However, chunks are aligned on a 'weird' boundary (521 bits).
+ */
+
+/* Size of p521 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */
+#define P521_WIDTH (521 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1)
+
+/* Bits to keep in the most significant mbedtls_mpi_uint */
+#define P521_MASK 0x01FF
+
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5)
+ * Write N as A1 + 2^521 A0, return A0 + A1
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p521(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t i;
+ mbedtls_mpi M;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P521_WIDTH + 1];
+ /* Worst case for the size of M is when mbedtls_mpi_uint is 16 bits:
+ * we need to hold bits 513 to 1056, which is 34 limbs, that is
+ * P521_WIDTH + 1. Otherwise P521_WIDTH is enough. */
+
+ if (N->n < P521_WIDTH) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* M = A1 */
+ M.s = 1;
+ M.n = N->n - (P521_WIDTH - 1);
+ if (M.n > P521_WIDTH + 1) {
+ M.n = P521_WIDTH + 1;
+ }
+ M.p = Mp;
+ memcpy(Mp, N->p + P521_WIDTH - 1, M.n * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&M, 521 % (8 * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint))));
+
+ /* N = A0 */
+ N->p[P521_WIDTH - 1] &= P521_MASK;
+ for (i = P521_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++) {
+ N->p[i] = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* N = A0 + A1 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(N, N, &M));
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#undef P521_WIDTH
+#undef P521_MASK
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+
+/* Size of p255 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */
+#define P255_WIDTH (255 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1)
+
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p255 = 2^255 - 19
+ * Write N as A0 + 2^256 A1, return A0 + 38 * A1
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p255(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P255_WIDTH];
+
+ /* Helper references for top part of N */
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint * const NT_p = N->p + P255_WIDTH;
+ const size_t NT_n = N->n - P255_WIDTH;
+ if (N->n <= P255_WIDTH) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (NT_n > P255_WIDTH) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* Split N as N + 2^256 M */
+ memcpy(Mp, NT_p, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * NT_n);
+ memset(NT_p, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * NT_n);
+
+ /* N = A0 + 38 * A1 */
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(N->p, P255_WIDTH + 1,
+ Mp, NT_n,
+ 38);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+
+/* Size of p448 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */
+#define P448_WIDTH (448 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint))
+
+/* Number of limbs fully occupied by 2^224 (max), and limbs used by it (min) */
+#define DIV_ROUND_UP(X, Y) (((X) + (Y) -1) / (Y))
+#define P224_SIZE (224 / 8)
+#define P224_WIDTH_MIN (P224_SIZE / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint))
+#define P224_WIDTH_MAX DIV_ROUND_UP(P224_SIZE, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint))
+#define P224_UNUSED_BITS ((P224_WIDTH_MAX * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * 8) - 224)
+
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p448 = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1
+ * Write N as A0 + 2^448 A1 and A1 as B0 + 2^224 B1, and return
+ * A0 + A1 + B1 + (B0 + B1) * 2^224. This is different to the reference
+ * implementation of Curve448, which uses its own special 56-bit limbs rather
+ * than a generic bignum library. We could squeeze some extra speed out on
+ * 32-bit machines by splitting N up into 32-bit limbs and doing the
+ * arithmetic using the limbs directly as we do for the NIST primes above,
+ * but for 64-bit targets it should use half the number of operations if we do
+ * the reduction with 224-bit limbs, since mpi_add_mpi will then use 64-bit adds.
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p448(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t i;
+ mbedtls_mpi M, Q;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P448_WIDTH + 1], Qp[P448_WIDTH];
+
+ if (N->n <= P448_WIDTH) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* M = A1 */
+ M.s = 1;
+ M.n = N->n - (P448_WIDTH);
+ if (M.n > P448_WIDTH) {
+ /* Shouldn't be called with N larger than 2^896! */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ M.p = Mp;
+ memset(Mp, 0, sizeof(Mp));
+ memcpy(Mp, N->p + P448_WIDTH, M.n * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
+
+ /* N = A0 */
+ for (i = P448_WIDTH; i < N->n; i++) {
+ N->p[i] = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* N += A1 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(N, N, &M));
+
+ /* Q = B1, N += B1 */
+ Q = M;
+ Q.p = Qp;
+ memcpy(Qp, Mp, sizeof(Qp));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&Q, 224));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(N, N, &Q));
+
+ /* M = (B0 + B1) * 2^224, N += M */
+ if (sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) > 4) {
+ Mp[P224_WIDTH_MIN] &= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint)-1) >> (P224_UNUSED_BITS);
+ }
+ for (i = P224_WIDTH_MAX; i < M.n; ++i) {
+ Mp[i] = 0;
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&M, &M, &Q));
+ M.n = P448_WIDTH + 1; /* Make room for shifted carry bit from the addition */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(&M, 224));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(N, N, &M));
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo P = 2^s - R,
+ * with R about 33 bits, used by the Koblitz curves.
+ *
+ * Write N as A0 + 2^224 A1, return A0 + R * A1.
+ * Actually do two passes, since R is big.
+ */
+#define P_KOBLITZ_MAX (256 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) // Max limbs in P
+#define P_KOBLITZ_R (8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) // Limbs in R
+static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p_limbs,
+ size_t adjust, size_t shift, mbedtls_mpi_uint mask)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t i;
+ mbedtls_mpi M, R;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint Mp[P_KOBLITZ_MAX + P_KOBLITZ_R + 1];
+
+ if (N->n < p_limbs) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Init R */
+ R.s = 1;
+ R.p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) Rp; /* R.p will not be modified so the cast is safe */
+ R.n = P_KOBLITZ_R;
+
+ /* Common setup for M */
+ M.s = 1;
+ M.p = Mp;
+
+ /* M = A1 */
+ M.n = (unsigned short) (N->n - (p_limbs - adjust));
+ if (M.n > p_limbs + adjust) {
+ M.n = (unsigned short) (p_limbs + adjust);
+ }
+ memset(Mp, 0, sizeof(Mp));
+ memcpy(Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
+ if (shift != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&M, shift));
+ }
+ M.n += R.n; /* Make room for multiplication by R */
+
+ /* N = A0 */
+ if (mask != 0) {
+ N->p[p_limbs - 1] &= mask;
+ }
+ for (i = p_limbs; i < N->n; i++) {
+ N->p[i] = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* N = A0 + R * A1 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&M, &M, &R));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(N, N, &M));
+
+ /* Second pass */
+
+ /* M = A1 */
+ M.n = (unsigned short) (N->n - (p_limbs - adjust));
+ if (M.n > p_limbs + adjust) {
+ M.n = (unsigned short) (p_limbs + adjust);
+ }
+ memset(Mp, 0, sizeof(Mp));
+ memcpy(Mp, N->p + p_limbs - adjust, M.n * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
+ if (shift != 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(&M, shift));
+ }
+ M.n += R.n; /* Make room for multiplication by R */
+
+ /* N = A0 */
+ if (mask != 0) {
+ N->p[p_limbs - 1] &= mask;
+ }
+ for (i = p_limbs; i < N->n; i++) {
+ N->p[i] = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* N = A0 + R * A1 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&M, &M, &R));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(N, N, &M));
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) ||
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) ||
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192k1 = 2^192 - R,
+ * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x01000011C9
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00)
+ };
+
+ return ecp_mod_koblitz(N, Rp, 192 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), 0, 0,
+ 0);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224k1 = 2^224 - R,
+ * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^11 + 2^9 + 2^7 + 2^4 + 2 + 1 = 0x0100001A93
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00)
+ };
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64)
+ return ecp_mod_koblitz(N, Rp, 4, 1, 32, 0xFFFFFFFF);
+#else
+ return ecp_mod_koblitz(N, Rp, 224 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), 0, 0,
+ 0);
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256k1 = 2^256 - R,
+ * with R = 2^32 + 2^9 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^4 + 1 = 0x01000003D1
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00)
+ };
+ return ecp_mod_koblitz(N, Rp, 256 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint), 0, 0,
+ 0);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+mbedtls_ecp_variant mbedtls_ecp_get_variant(void)
+{
+ return MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_STRUCT;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves_new.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves_new.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..035b23a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecp_curves_new.c
@@ -0,0 +1,6036 @@
+/*
+ * Elliptic curves over GF(p): curve-specific data and functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
+
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+
+#include "bn_mul.h"
+#include "bignum_core.h"
+#include "ecp_invasive.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT)
+
+#define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) }
+
+#define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \
+ ECP_MPI_INIT(x, sizeof(x) / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint))
+
+#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(x, y) { \
+ ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(NULL, 0) }
+#define ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(x, y) { \
+ ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x), ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(y), ECP_MPI_INIT(mpi_one, 1) }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+/* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */
+#define ECP_LOAD_GROUP
+static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_one[] = { 1 };
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Note: the constants are in little-endian order
+ * to be directly usable in MPIs
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Domain parameters for secp192r1
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xB9, 0x46, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0xB8, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x30, 0x24, 0x72, 0xAB, 0xE9, 0xA7, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x80, 0x9C, 0xE5, 0x19, 0x05, 0x21, 0x64),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x28, 0xD2, 0xB4, 0xB1, 0xC9, 0x6B, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xF8, 0xDE, 0x99, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x10, 0xFF, 0x82, 0xFD, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x88, 0xA1, 0x43, 0xEB, 0x20, 0xBF, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x90, 0x30, 0xB0, 0x0E, 0xA8, 0x8D, 0x18),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x48, 0x79, 0x1E, 0xA1, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x73),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x6B, 0xED, 0x11, 0x10, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xDA, 0xC8, 0xFF, 0x95, 0x2B, 0x19, 0x07),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x9E, 0xE3, 0x60, 0x59, 0xD1, 0xC4, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBD, 0x22, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xB6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x2A, 0xCF, 0x33, 0xF0, 0xBE, 0xD1, 0xED),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x71, 0x4B, 0xA8, 0xED, 0x7E, 0xC9, 0x1A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x2A, 0xF6, 0xDF, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x35, 0xF7, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0xDE, 0x1E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x67, 0xC2, 0x1D, 0x32, 0x8F, 0x10, 0xFB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x2D, 0x17, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xD8, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x45, 0x10, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x3E, 0x52, 0x3E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xF1, 0x04, 0x5D, 0xEE, 0xD4, 0x56, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x27, 0x61, 0xAA, 0x81, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x37, 0xD7, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x14),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x35, 0x52, 0xC6, 0x31, 0xB7, 0x27, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xD4, 0x15, 0x98, 0x0F, 0xE7, 0xF3, 0x6A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x31, 0x70, 0x35, 0x09, 0xA0, 0x2B, 0xC2),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x75, 0xA7, 0x4C, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5B, 0xE4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x17, 0x48, 0x8D, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x86, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xCF, 0xFE, 0x6B, 0xB0, 0xA5, 0x06, 0xAB),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0x6D, 0x7B, 0x47, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xFC, 0x51, 0x12, 0x62, 0x66, 0x0B, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x40, 0x93, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x5A, 0x58, 0xD7),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0xDC, 0x0B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xFB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x36, 0x9D, 0xA3, 0xD7, 0x3B, 0xAD, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x3B, 0x05, 0x9A, 0xA8, 0xAA, 0x69, 0xB2),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xD9, 0xD1, 0x4D, 0x4A, 0x6E, 0x96, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x66, 0x32, 0x39, 0xC6, 0x57, 0x7D, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xA0, 0x36, 0xC2, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x00, 0x62),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xEF, 0x59, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xD9, 0x8F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xB0, 0xE9, 0x41, 0xA4, 0x87, 0x76, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xD4, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0xFA, 0x16, 0x56, 0xDC),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x62, 0xD2, 0xB1, 0x34, 0xB2, 0xF1, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xED, 0x55, 0xC5, 0x47, 0xB5, 0x07, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xF6, 0x2F, 0x94, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x54, 0x2F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xA6, 0xD4, 0x8C, 0xA9, 0xCE, 0x4D, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x4B, 0x46, 0xCC, 0xB2, 0x55, 0xC8, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xAE, 0x31, 0xED, 0x89, 0x65, 0x59, 0x55),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x0A, 0xD1, 0x1A, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0xEA, 0x43),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xFC, 0x0C, 0x1A, 0xFB, 0xA0, 0xC8, 0x70),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xFD, 0x53, 0x6F, 0x6D, 0xBF, 0xBA, 0xAF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xB0, 0x7D, 0x83, 0x96, 0xE3, 0xCB, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x6E, 0x55, 0x2C, 0x20, 0x53, 0x2F, 0x46),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x66, 0x00, 0x17, 0x08, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0x31),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x12, 0x97, 0x3A, 0xC7, 0x57, 0x45, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x25, 0x99, 0x00, 0xF6, 0x97, 0xB4, 0x64),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x74, 0xE6, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xCC),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xF4, 0x76, 0xD5, 0x5F, 0x2A, 0xFD, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x80, 0x7E, 0x3E, 0xE5, 0xE8, 0xD6, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xAD, 0x1E, 0x70, 0x79, 0x3E, 0x3D, 0x83),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x15, 0xBB, 0xB3, 0x42, 0x6A, 0xA1, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x58, 0xCB, 0x43, 0x25, 0x00, 0x14, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x4E, 0x93, 0x11, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x54, 0x98),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x52, 0xA2, 0xB4, 0x57, 0x32, 0xB9, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x43, 0xA1, 0xB1, 0xFB, 0x01, 0xE1, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xFB, 0x5A, 0x11, 0xB8, 0xC2, 0x03, 0xE5),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x2B, 0x71, 0x26, 0x4E, 0x7C, 0xC5, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xF5, 0xD3, 0xA8, 0xE4, 0x95, 0x48, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xAE, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9F, 0x6A, 0x22, 0xAD),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xCC, 0xA3, 0x4D, 0xA0, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xF8, 0x5E, 0xA6, 0x58, 0x7D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x8A, 0x3D, 0x17, 0xFF, 0x0F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xCD, 0xA8, 0xDD, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x5C, 0xEA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xFE, 0x17, 0xE2, 0xCF, 0xEA, 0x63, 0xDE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x51, 0xC9, 0x16, 0xDE, 0xB4, 0xB2, 0xDD),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBE, 0x12, 0xD7, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x50, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x87, 0xC5, 0x8A, 0x76, 0x57, 0x07, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x1F, 0xC6, 0x1B, 0x66, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0x8A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xA4, 0x85, 0x13, 0x8F, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x19),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x0D, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0x1B, 0xD1, 0xD6, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x7A, 0xD0, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x66),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xFE, 0xA5, 0x9C, 0x34, 0x30, 0x49, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x26, 0x06, 0xE3, 0x01, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x2B, 0x66, 0xFC, 0x95, 0x5F, 0x35, 0xF7),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xCF, 0x54, 0x63, 0x99, 0x57, 0x05, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x6F, 0x00, 0x5F, 0x65, 0x08, 0x47, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x2A, 0x90, 0x6D, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xBC, 0x45),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x0A, 0x35, 0x9E, 0x33, 0x9C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x17, 0x0C, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x7A, 0x49, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x44, 0x06, 0x8F, 0x0B, 0x70, 0x2F, 0x71),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x4B, 0xCB, 0xF9, 0x8E, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x3F, 0xCE, 0x17, 0xD2, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x0D, 0xD2, 0x6C, 0x82, 0x37, 0xE5, 0xFC),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x3C, 0xF4, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x8A, 0x95, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x96, 0xF1, 0x0A, 0x34, 0x2F, 0x74, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xA1, 0xAA, 0xBA, 0x86, 0x77, 0x4F, 0xA2),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x7F, 0xEF, 0x60, 0x50, 0x80, 0xD7, 0xD4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x2F, 0xBE, 0x91, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0x38, 0x48),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192r1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xAE, 0x85, 0x98, 0xFE, 0x05, 0x7F, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBE, 0xFD, 0x11, 0x31, 0x3D, 0x14, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x75, 0xE8, 0x30, 0x01, 0xCB, 0x9B, 0x1C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192r1_T[16] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192r1_T_0_X, secp192r1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_1_X, secp192r1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_2_X, secp192r1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_3_X, secp192r1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_4_X, secp192r1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_5_X, secp192r1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_6_X, secp192r1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_7_X, secp192r1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_8_X, secp192r1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_9_X, secp192r1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_10_X, secp192r1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_11_X, secp192r1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_12_X, secp192r1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_13_X, secp192r1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_14_X, secp192r1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192r1_T_15_X, secp192r1_T_15_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define secp192r1_T NULL
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Domain parameters for secp224r1
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xFF, 0x55, 0x23, 0x43, 0x39, 0x0B, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xD8, 0xBF, 0xD7, 0xB7, 0xB0, 0x44, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0x32, 0x41, 0xF5, 0xAB, 0xB3, 0x04, 0x0C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x85, 0x0A, 0x05, 0xB4),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x2A, 0x5C, 0x5C, 0x45, 0x29, 0xDD, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xF0, 0xB8, 0xE0, 0xA2, 0x16, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x1D, 0x5C, 0x11, 0xD6, 0x80, 0x32, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x11, 0xC2, 0x56, 0xD3, 0xC1, 0x03, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x90, 0x13, 0x32, 0x7F, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0xB7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x85, 0x99, 0x81, 0xD5, 0x44),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x47, 0x07, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0x75, 0x43, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xDF, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xFB, 0x23, 0xF7, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x63, 0x37, 0xBD, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xF9, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0xD3, 0xFA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xFD, 0x99, 0x26, 0x19, 0xFE, 0x13, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x0E, 0x4C, 0x48, 0x7C, 0xA2, 0x17, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x57, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x16, 0x5C, 0x8F, 0xAA, 0xED, 0x0F, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xC5, 0x43, 0x34, 0x93, 0x05, 0x2A, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCA, 0xC6, 0x14, 0xC2, 0x25),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x43, 0x6C, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x5A, 0x98, 0x1E, 0xC8, 0xA5, 0x42, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x49, 0x56, 0x78, 0xF8, 0xEF, 0xED, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0xBB, 0x64, 0xB6, 0x4C, 0x54, 0x5F, 0xD1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x0C, 0x33, 0xCC, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x79, 0xCB, 0x2E, 0x08, 0xFF, 0xD8, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x1F, 0xD4, 0xD7, 0x57, 0xE9, 0x39, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xD6, 0x3B, 0x0A, 0x1C, 0x87, 0xB7, 0x6A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x30, 0xD8, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x79, 0x74, 0x9A, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x67, 0xC1, 0x91, 0xE7, 0x64),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xDF, 0x38, 0x82, 0x19, 0x2C, 0x4C, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x2E, 0x39, 0xC5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x36, 0x78, 0x4E, 0xAE, 0x5B, 0x02, 0x76),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0xF8, 0xF4, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x35, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0x2C, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xA5, 0x1F, 0xAE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x1C, 0x4B, 0xDF, 0x5B, 0xF2, 0x51, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0x0E, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x24, 0x09, 0x62, 0xAF, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xE1, 0x80, 0x55, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x82, 0xFE, 0xAD, 0xC3, 0xE5, 0xCF, 0xD8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xA2, 0x62, 0x17, 0x76, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0xFA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xB8, 0xE5, 0xAC, 0xB7, 0x66, 0x38, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xFD, 0x86, 0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xD3, 0x0C, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x66, 0xB0, 0xF1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x8D, 0x90, 0x10, 0xB7, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x47, 0x9B, 0xE6, 0x55, 0x8A, 0xE4, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x78, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x97, 0xED, 0xDE, 0xFF, 0xB3, 0xDF, 0x48),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xB9, 0x83, 0xB7, 0xEB, 0xBE, 0x40, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xD3, 0xD3, 0xCD, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x79, 0x3D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x83, 0x1B, 0xF0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x54, 0xD3, 0x31, 0x56, 0xFC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x36, 0xE5, 0xE0, 0x89, 0x96, 0x8E, 0x71),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xEF, 0x0A, 0xED, 0xD0, 0x11, 0x4A, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x00, 0x57, 0x27, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xCA, 0x3D, 0xF7, 0x64, 0x9B, 0x6E, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xE3, 0x70, 0x6B, 0x41, 0xD7, 0xED, 0x8F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x44, 0x44, 0x80, 0xCE, 0x13, 0x37, 0x92),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x73, 0x80, 0x79, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x4D, 0x70, 0x7D, 0x31, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x35, 0x88, 0x47, 0xC4, 0x24, 0x78, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xF0, 0xCD, 0x91, 0x81, 0xB3, 0xDE, 0xB6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xCE, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x9C, 0x2D, 0xE8, 0xD2, 0x00, 0x8F, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x5E, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0x6E, 0x58, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x81, 0x21, 0xCE, 0x43, 0xF4, 0x24, 0x3D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0xBC, 0xF0, 0xF4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x10, 0xC2, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x8F, 0x8A, 0xCF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x67, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x38, 0x2B, 0x35, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0xA9, 0xFA, 0x77, 0x5C, 0xBD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x33, 0x19, 0x2B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x3E, 0x96, 0x22, 0x53, 0xE1, 0xE9, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x13, 0xBC, 0xA1, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x01, 0x1A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x00, 0xC9, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x73, 0xA5, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0xC1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x95, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x32, 0x30, 0x2B, 0xD0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x42, 0x09, 0x05, 0x61, 0x2A, 0x7E, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x84, 0xA2, 0x05, 0x88, 0x64, 0x65, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x2D, 0x90, 0xB3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xE7, 0x2E, 0x85, 0x55, 0x80, 0x7C, 0x79),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xC1, 0xAC, 0x78, 0xB4, 0xAF, 0xFB, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xC3, 0x28, 0x8E, 0x79, 0x18, 0x1F, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x5F, 0xA8, 0x6C, 0x46, 0x83, 0x43, 0xFA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xA9, 0x93, 0x11, 0xB6, 0x07, 0x57, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x03, 0x89, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x8C, 0x62, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x2C, 0x13, 0x59, 0xCC, 0xFA, 0x84, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xB9, 0x48, 0xBC, 0x57, 0xC7, 0xB3, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0x2E, 0x3A, 0x28, 0x25),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x0A, 0x43, 0xB8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x25, 0xAB, 0xC1, 0xEE, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xDB, 0x45, 0x1D, 0x4A, 0x80, 0x75, 0x35),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x2D, 0x9A, 0x05, 0xF4, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x10, 0xF0, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x95, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x15, 0x86, 0xC3, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xDC, 0x27, 0xD1, 0x56, 0xA1, 0x14, 0x0D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x0B, 0xD6, 0x77, 0x4E, 0x44, 0xA2, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x42, 0x71, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x86, 0xB2, 0xB0, 0xC8, 0x2F, 0x7B, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xEF, 0xCB, 0xDB, 0xBC, 0x9E, 0x3B, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x03, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x5B, 0xF5, 0x8D, 0x46),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x95, 0x79, 0xD6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x32, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x9B, 0x4F, 0x07, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x3E, 0xFB, 0x06, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0x40, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x1F, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x61, 0xFD, 0x8B, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x8B, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x34, 0xB3, 0xB4, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0xB0, 0x5E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x58, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x77, 0xBB, 0x13, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0x34, 0xCC, 0x89, 0x21, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x33, 0xDD, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x81, 0xEF, 0xA4, 0xF2, 0x10, 0x0B, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xF7, 0x6E, 0x72, 0x4A, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x23, 0x0A, 0x53, 0x03, 0x16, 0x62, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x76, 0xFD, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x14, 0xA1, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x18, 0xBE, 0x07),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xD7, 0xB0, 0x6C, 0xA0, 0xDE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xC0, 0xB0, 0xC6, 0x63, 0x24, 0xCD, 0x4E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x38, 0x2C, 0xB1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xCD, 0x7D, 0x20, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xAC, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x97, 0x9F, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x45, 0xF7, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x99, 0xF3, 0xD2, 0x20, 0x02, 0xEB, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x18, 0x5B, 0x7B, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x91, 0x60, 0xEA, 0xFD, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xD3, 0xB5, 0xD6, 0x90, 0x17, 0x0E, 0x1A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xF4, 0x28, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x58, 0xDC, 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224r1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x20, 0x01, 0xFB, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x7F, 0x06, 0xDA, 0x11, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0xA6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x41, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x33, 0x79),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xFF, 0x27, 0xCA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224r1_T[16] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224r1_T_0_X, secp224r1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_1_X, secp224r1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_2_X, secp224r1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_3_X, secp224r1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_4_X, secp224r1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_5_X, secp224r1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_6_X, secp224r1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_7_X, secp224r1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_8_X, secp224r1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_9_X, secp224r1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_10_X, secp224r1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_11_X, secp224r1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_12_X, secp224r1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_13_X, secp224r1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_14_X, secp224r1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224r1_T_15_X, secp224r1_T_15_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define secp224r1_T NULL
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Domain parameters for secp256r1
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x60, 0xD2, 0x27, 0x3E, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xB0, 0x53, 0xCC, 0xB0, 0x06, 0x1D, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x86, 0x98, 0x76, 0x55, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x93, 0x3A, 0xAA, 0xD8, 0x35, 0xC6, 0x5A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x25, 0x63, 0xFC, 0xC2, 0xCA, 0xB9, 0xF3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x9E, 0x17, 0xA7, 0xAD, 0xFA, 0xE6, 0xBC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC2, 0x98, 0xD8, 0x45, 0x39, 0xA1, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x33, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x81, 0x7D, 0x03, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x40, 0xA4, 0x63, 0xE5, 0xE6, 0xBC, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x42, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0xF2, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x6B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x51, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x68, 0x40, 0xB6, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x5E, 0x31, 0x6B, 0x57, 0x33, 0xCE, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x4A, 0xEB, 0xE7, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x7F, 0x1A, 0xFE, 0xE2, 0x42, 0xE3, 0x4F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xC8, 0xBA, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x4B, 0xD2, 0xF7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xC6, 0x23, 0x3A, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x3A, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x23, 0xCC, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x29, 0x87, 0x0F, 0xFA, 0x3C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x69, 0xF2, 0x40, 0x0B, 0xA3, 0x98, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xA8, 0x48, 0x02, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0x12, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xAF, 0x09, 0x83, 0x80, 0xAA, 0x58, 0xA7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x12, 0xBE, 0x70, 0x94, 0x76, 0xE3, 0xE4),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x7D, 0xEF, 0x86, 0xFF, 0xE3, 0x37, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x86, 0x8B, 0x08, 0x27, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x54, 0x4C, 0x25, 0x4F, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xFD, 0xF0, 0x6D, 0x37, 0x03, 0x69, 0xD6),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xD5, 0xDA, 0xAD, 0x92, 0x49, 0xF0, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x73, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xAF, 0xA7, 0xD1, 0xF3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x41, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x78, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0xE2, 0x20),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x6A, 0x5D, 0x52, 0x35, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0x96, 0xF4, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x20, 0x49, 0x54, 0xEA, 0xB3, 0x82, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0xDB, 0xEA, 0x02, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x1C, 0x62),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x9E, 0x4C, 0xDC, 0x39, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0x57, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x5D, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x7F, 0x2D, 0x52, 0x6F, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0x4F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x64, 0xFA, 0xB4, 0xFE, 0xA4, 0xC4, 0xD7),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x37, 0xB9, 0xC0, 0xAA, 0x59, 0xC6, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x58, 0xD9, 0xED, 0x58, 0x99, 0x65, 0xF7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x7D, 0x26, 0x8C, 0x4A, 0xF9, 0x05, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x73, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xDC, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xD0, 0x55, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x0A, 0xF5, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x81, 0x2D, 0x20, 0xEB, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xC1, 0x28, 0x52, 0xAB, 0xE3, 0xD1, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x34, 0x79, 0x45, 0x57, 0xA5, 0x12, 0x03),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xCF, 0xB8, 0x7E, 0xF7, 0x92, 0x96, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x01, 0x8C, 0x0D, 0x23, 0xF2, 0xE3, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x2E, 0xE3, 0x84, 0x52, 0x7A, 0x34, 0x76),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xA1, 0xB0, 0x15, 0x90, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x3C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x98, 0xE7, 0xFA, 0xA5, 0x7D, 0x8B, 0x53),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x35, 0xD2, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x1B, 0x9F, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x69, 0x08, 0x9A, 0x72, 0xF0, 0xA9, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0xFE, 0x0E, 0x14, 0xDA, 0x7C, 0x0E, 0xD3),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xF6, 0xE8, 0xF8, 0x87, 0xF7, 0xFC, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xBE, 0x7F, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x2B, 0xD7, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x32, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x6D, 0x42, 0xFD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x9A, 0xE3, 0x5F, 0x42, 0xBB, 0x84, 0xED),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x95, 0x29, 0x73, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3E, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x30, 0x54, 0x35, 0x8E, 0x0A, 0xDD, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0x97, 0x61, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x0C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x33, 0x3C, 0x58, 0x55, 0x34, 0x23, 0xA3),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x5D, 0x16, 0x5F, 0x7B, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x8A, 0xC1, 0x51, 0xCC, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x0D, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x53, 0x23, 0x1D, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x66, 0x52, 0x84, 0xE1, 0x95),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x9B, 0x83, 0x0A, 0x81, 0x4F, 0xAD, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xFF, 0x42, 0x41, 0x6E, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0xA0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xA1, 0x4F, 0x1F, 0x89, 0x82, 0xAA, 0x3E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xB8, 0x0F, 0x6B, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0xD6, 0x68),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0xB3, 0xBB, 0x51, 0x69, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x4F, 0x0F, 0x8D, 0xBD, 0x26, 0x0F, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xCB, 0xEC, 0x6B, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x3D, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x5D, 0x1E, 0x10, 0xD5, 0x44, 0xE2, 0x54),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x9E, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0x6E, 0x4C, 0xAD, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x58, 0xC0, 0xFB, 0x34, 0x43),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x9C, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x07, 0x41, 0xBD, 0x19),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x6E, 0x10, 0xEC, 0x0E, 0xEC, 0xBB, 0xD6),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xCF, 0xEF, 0x3F, 0x83, 0x1A, 0x88, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x29, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0xE0, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x46, 0x1E, 0x77, 0xCD, 0x7E, 0xB3, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x21, 0xD0, 0xD4, 0xA3, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEE),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0xCA, 0xA8, 0xB3, 0xBF, 0x29, 0x99, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xF2, 0x05, 0xC1, 0xCF, 0x5D, 0x91, 0x48),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x01, 0x49, 0xDB, 0x82, 0xDF, 0x5F, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x06, 0x90, 0xAD, 0xE3, 0x38, 0xA4, 0xC4),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xD2, 0x3A, 0xE8, 0x03, 0xC5, 0x6D, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x35, 0xD0, 0xAE, 0x1D, 0x7A, 0x9F, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x1E, 0xD2, 0xCB, 0xAC, 0x88, 0x27, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xE0, 0x31, 0xDD, 0x99, 0x86),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x32, 0x96, 0x41, 0x58, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x5A, 0x2A, 0xB8, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB2, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x78, 0x2C, 0xC7, 0x08, 0x99, 0x19, 0x24),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xE9, 0x84, 0x54, 0xE6, 0x16),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x38, 0x30, 0xDB, 0x70, 0x2C, 0x0A, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x5C, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0xD5, 0x46, 0x0B, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x0B, 0x60, 0x4B, 0x37, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x24, 0xF3, 0x3D, 0x79, 0x7F, 0x6C, 0x18),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7F, 0xE5, 0x1C, 0x4F, 0x60, 0x24, 0xF7, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xD8, 0xE2, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x89, 0x49, 0x92),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xA7, 0x2E, 0x8D, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0x39, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x89, 0xB5, 0x9A, 0xB8, 0x8D, 0x42, 0x9C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0x45, 0xE6, 0x4B, 0x3F, 0x4F, 0x1E, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x59, 0x22, 0xCC, 0x72, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x93, 0x1A, 0x27, 0x1E, 0x34, 0xC5, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x58, 0x5C, 0x15, 0x2E, 0xC6),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x7F, 0xBA, 0x58, 0x5A, 0x84, 0x6F, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xA6, 0x36, 0x7E, 0xDC, 0xF7, 0xE1, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x4D, 0xAA, 0xEE, 0x57, 0x76, 0x3A, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x7E, 0x26, 0x18, 0x22, 0x23, 0x9F, 0xFF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x4C, 0x64, 0xC7, 0x55, 0x02, 0x3F, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x02, 0x90, 0xBB, 0xC3, 0xEC, 0x30, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x6F, 0x64, 0xF4, 0x16, 0x69, 0x48, 0xA4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x44, 0x9C, 0x95, 0x0C, 0x7D, 0x67, 0x5E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x91, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0xD0, 0xD7, 0xE7, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xF9, 0x48, 0x62, 0x6F, 0xA8, 0x93, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x3A, 0x99, 0x02, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0x3D, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xD3, 0x00, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x0C, 0x9F, 0x44),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xB2, 0xAA, 0xFD, 0x88, 0x15, 0xDF, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0x35, 0x27, 0x31, 0x44, 0xCD, 0xC0, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xA5, 0x71, 0x94, 0x84, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xCB, 0xD0, 0x93, 0xE9, 0x88, 0xDA, 0xE4),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xC6, 0x39, 0x16, 0x5D, 0xA3, 0x1E, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x07, 0x37, 0x26, 0x36, 0x2A, 0xFE, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xBC, 0xF3, 0xD0, 0xDE, 0x50, 0xFC, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x2E, 0x06, 0x10, 0x15, 0x4D, 0xFA, 0xF7),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x65, 0x69, 0x5B, 0x66, 0xA2, 0x75, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x16, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB0, 0x30, 0x25, 0x1A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xFB, 0x86, 0x42, 0x80, 0xC1, 0xC4, 0x76),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x1D, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x01, 0x5F, 0x82),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256r1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x37, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x1F, 0xA1, 0xF0, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x10, 0x5B, 0xCE, 0xC4, 0x9B, 0x6F, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x11, 0x11, 0x24, 0x4F, 0x4C, 0x79, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x3A, 0x72, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x72, 0x58, 0x43),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256r1_T[16] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256r1_T_0_X, secp256r1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_1_X, secp256r1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_2_X, secp256r1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_3_X, secp256r1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_4_X, secp256r1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_5_X, secp256r1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_6_X, secp256r1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_7_X, secp256r1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_8_X, secp256r1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_9_X, secp256r1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_10_X, secp256r1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_11_X, secp256r1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_12_X, secp256r1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_13_X, secp256r1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_14_X, secp256r1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256r1_T_15_X, secp256r1_T_15_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define secp256r1_T NULL
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Domain parameters for secp384r1
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x2A, 0xEC, 0xD3, 0xED, 0xC8, 0x85, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x8A, 0x8D, 0x39, 0x56, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x87, 0x13, 0x50, 0x8F, 0x08, 0x14, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x41, 0x81, 0xFE, 0x6E, 0x9C, 0x1D, 0x18),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x2D, 0xF8, 0xE3, 0x6B, 0x05, 0x8E, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0xE2, 0xA7, 0x2F, 0x31, 0xB3),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x29, 0xC5, 0xCC, 0x6A, 0x19, 0xEC, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xA7, 0xB0, 0x48, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0x1A, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x2D, 0x37, 0xF4, 0x81, 0x4D, 0x63, 0xC7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0x76, 0x72, 0x38, 0x5E, 0x54, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x29, 0x55, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0xF2, 0x02, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x82, 0xE0, 0x41, 0xF7, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9B, 0xA7, 0x8B, 0x62, 0x3B, 0x1D, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xAD, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xB1, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x05, 0x8B, 0xBE, 0x22, 0xCA, 0x87, 0xAA),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0E, 0xEA, 0x90, 0x7C, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x81, 0x7E, 0x1D, 0xCE, 0xB1, 0x60, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x31, 0xDA, 0xE9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x14, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x1D, 0xF4, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xDC, 0x92, 0x92, 0xBF, 0x98, 0x9E, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x2C, 0x26, 0x96, 0x4A, 0xDE, 0x17, 0x36),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x92, 0x00, 0x2C, 0x78, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x37),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xB7, 0x06, 0xF7, 0xB6, 0xBC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xBC, 0x2C, 0xCF, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x53, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x75, 0x7B, 0xA3, 0xAB, 0xC3, 0x2C, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x9D, 0x78, 0x41, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x84, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x56, 0xE8, 0x52, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0xA8, 0xBD),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xF2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0xB6, 0x89, 0x1B, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x0F, 0xCE, 0x1C, 0x7C, 0xF6, 0x50, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xEB, 0x90, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0xC7, 0xD4, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x49, 0x2D, 0x8A, 0x01, 0x99, 0x60, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x80, 0x9B, 0x9B, 0x6A, 0xB0, 0x07, 0xD9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xA2, 0xEE, 0x59, 0xBE, 0x95, 0xBC, 0x23),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x9D, 0x56, 0xAE, 0x59, 0xFB, 0x1F, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xAC, 0x91, 0x80, 0x87, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x08, 0xA7, 0x08, 0x94, 0x32, 0xFC, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x29, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF4, 0xE5, 0x6E, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x21, 0xB9, 0x50, 0x24, 0xF8, 0x9C, 0xC7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x04, 0x01, 0xC2, 0xFB, 0x77, 0x3E, 0xDE),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x38, 0xEE, 0xE3, 0xC7, 0x9D, 0xEC, 0xA6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x43, 0xFA, 0x92, 0x5E, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xCA, 0x43, 0xF8, 0x3B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xE7, 0xEB, 0x17, 0x45, 0x86, 0xC2, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x69, 0x57, 0x32, 0xE0, 0x9C, 0xD1, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x10, 0xB8, 0x4D, 0xB8, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xE3),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0xDC, 0x9A, 0xB2, 0x79, 0x39, 0x27, 0x16),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x71, 0xE4, 0x3B, 0x4D, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xBD, 0x19, 0x40, 0xFA, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xF8, 0x1E, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x50, 0x8D, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x18, 0x7C, 0x41, 0xFA, 0x7C, 0x1B, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x59, 0x24, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xB7, 0xD3, 0xAD),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x63, 0x54, 0x45, 0x6F, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xB2, 0x19, 0xA3, 0x86, 0x1D, 0x42, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x02, 0x87, 0x18, 0x92, 0x52, 0x1A, 0x71),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x37, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x74, 0x61, 0xBA, 0x18, 0xAF, 0x40, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x7D, 0x3C, 0x52, 0x0F, 0x07, 0xB0, 0x6F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x39, 0x13, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x15, 0x99, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x00, 0xCB, 0xC6, 0xB1, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xFA, 0x60, 0xB8, 0x24, 0xE4, 0x7D, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x75, 0xB3, 0x70, 0xB2, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xE3, 0x6C, 0xCD, 0x33, 0x62, 0x7A, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x30, 0xDC, 0x0F, 0x9F, 0xBB, 0xB8, 0xAA),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xD5, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x81, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0x16),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xAA, 0x2F, 0xD6, 0xF2, 0x73, 0xDF, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x7B, 0x74, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0x5B, 0x95, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x04, 0xEB, 0x15, 0xC8, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x50, 0x20, 0x28, 0xD1, 0x01, 0xAF, 0xF0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x4F, 0x31, 0x81, 0x2F, 0x94, 0x48),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x63, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x37, 0x63, 0xDE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x46, 0xAD, 0xCE, 0x7B, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x47, 0x2D, 0x66, 0xA7, 0xE9, 0x33, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xF9, 0x93, 0x94, 0xA8, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x4F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x4A, 0xAC, 0x51, 0x08, 0x72, 0x2F, 0x1A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0xAD, 0xA0, 0xF9, 0x81, 0xE1, 0x78, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x9A, 0x63, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x31, 0x7B, 0x7A, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0x7D, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x96, 0x12, 0x4B, 0x19, 0x09, 0xE0, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x8A, 0x57, 0xEE, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x7E, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x9D, 0x69, 0xDC, 0xB3, 0xDA, 0xD8, 0x08),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x49, 0x03, 0x03, 0x33, 0x6F, 0x28, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xDB, 0xA7, 0x05, 0x8C, 0xF3, 0x4D, 0xFB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x92, 0xB1, 0xA8, 0xEC, 0x0D, 0x64, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0x4B, 0x88, 0x1B, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x9C, 0x51, 0x69, 0xCE, 0x71, 0x73, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x5A, 0x14, 0x23, 0x1A, 0x46, 0x63, 0x5F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x4C, 0x70, 0x44, 0x18, 0xCD, 0xEF, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x49, 0xDD, 0x64, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x92),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x32, 0x7C, 0x09, 0xD0, 0x3F, 0xD6, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE0, 0x4F, 0x65, 0x0C, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x3E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xFA, 0xFB, 0x4A, 0xB4, 0x79, 0x5A, 0x8C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x5D, 0x1B, 0x2B, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0x9A, 0x74),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xAC, 0x56, 0xF7, 0x5F, 0x51, 0x68, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xE0, 0x1D, 0xBC, 0x13, 0x4E, 0xAC, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xF5, 0xC5, 0xE6, 0xD2, 0x88, 0xBA, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x23, 0x58, 0x67, 0xFA, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x80, 0x4B, 0xD8, 0xC4, 0xDF, 0x15, 0xE4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x0E, 0x58, 0xE6, 0x2C, 0x59, 0xC2, 0x03),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x26, 0x27, 0x99, 0x16, 0x2B, 0x22, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xF3, 0x8F, 0xC3, 0x2A, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x2E, 0x83, 0x3D, 0xFE, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x57, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0xC1, 0x49, 0x38, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x42, 0x8B, 0x33, 0x89, 0x1F, 0xEA, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x1D, 0x13, 0xD7, 0x50, 0xBB, 0x3E, 0xEB),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x9A, 0x52, 0xD2, 0x54, 0x7C, 0x97, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x33, 0x6E, 0xED, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x50, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x35, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x40, 0x15, 0x83, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x2B, 0xA4, 0xAB, 0x03, 0x91, 0xEA, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x47, 0x39, 0xEF, 0x05, 0x59, 0xD0, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x24, 0x0D, 0x76, 0x11, 0x53, 0x08, 0xAF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x2F, 0xDD, 0xBD, 0x50, 0x48, 0xB1, 0xE5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x1C, 0x84, 0x55, 0x78, 0x14, 0xEB, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x5E, 0x3E, 0xA6, 0xAF, 0xF6, 0xC7, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x11, 0xE2, 0x65, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x95, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x83, 0xD8, 0xE6, 0x4D, 0x22, 0x06, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x7F, 0x25, 0x2A, 0xAA, 0x28, 0x46, 0x97),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xDB, 0x15, 0x56, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xC0, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xDB, 0x0E, 0x08, 0xC9, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x62, 0xD0, 0x1A, 0x7C, 0x13, 0xD5, 0x07),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xE0, 0x32, 0x21, 0xA0, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x38, 0x81, 0x21, 0x23, 0x0E, 0xD2, 0xBB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x51, 0x05, 0xD0, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA9, 0x71),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xC3, 0x27, 0xBF, 0xC6, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x65, 0x45, 0xDF, 0xB9, 0x46, 0x17, 0x46),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x38, 0x3F, 0xB2, 0xB1, 0x5D, 0xCA, 0x1C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xD7, 0x48, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xF1, 0xD7, 0x99, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x05, 0x99),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE6, 0x5E, 0x82, 0x6D, 0xE5, 0x7E, 0xD5),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x61, 0xFA, 0x7D, 0x01, 0xDB, 0xB6, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xC6, 0x58, 0x39, 0xF4, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x5A, 0x7A, 0x80, 0x08, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0xD8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x3F, 0x3C, 0xA5, 0x68, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xF5, 0xD5, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xD8, 0x8A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xAD, 0x92, 0xC5, 0x57, 0x6C, 0xDA, 0x91),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x67, 0x17, 0xC0, 0x40, 0x78, 0x8C, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xAA, 0xDA, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xDB, 0x42, 0x3E, 0x72, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xF9, 0x41, 0x17, 0x43, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xDD, 0xCC, 0x43, 0x7E, 0x16, 0x05, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x4B, 0xCF, 0x48, 0x8F, 0x41, 0x90, 0xE5),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x0C, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0x22, 0x04, 0xBC, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x63, 0x79, 0x2F, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x8A, 0xDE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x67, 0x3F, 0x02, 0xB8, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x14, 0x64, 0xA0, 0x33, 0xF4, 0x6B, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x44, 0x71, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x88, 0x3F, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x2B, 0x85, 0x05, 0xC5, 0x44, 0x53, 0x15),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x2B, 0xFE, 0xD1, 0x1C, 0x73, 0xE3, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x33, 0xA1, 0xD3, 0x69, 0x1C, 0x9D, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x5A, 0xBA, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0x1B, 0x94, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x74, 0x90, 0x5C, 0x57, 0xB0, 0x3A, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x2F, 0x93, 0x20, 0x24, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x78, 0x9D, 0x71, 0x67, 0x5D, 0x49, 0x98),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xC8, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0x8F, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x7F, 0x79, 0x6C, 0x5F, 0xB7, 0xBC, 0xB1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xE1, 0x83, 0x3C, 0x12, 0xBB, 0xEE, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x41, 0x71, 0xB9, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0xEE, 0xBB, 0x1D, 0x89, 0x50, 0x88, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x1C, 0x55, 0x74, 0xEB, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x3F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x38, 0x92, 0x06, 0x19, 0xD0, 0xB3, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x99, 0x26, 0xA3, 0x5F, 0xE2, 0xC1, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xC3, 0xB6, 0x26, 0x24, 0x8F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xAD, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xB7, 0x64, 0x4B, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x4E, 0x95, 0xAD, 0x07, 0xFE, 0xB6, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x15, 0xE7, 0x2D, 0x19, 0xA9, 0x08, 0x10),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0x0A, 0x3F, 0x6B, 0xFF, 0xFA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xE4, 0x74, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x1D, 0x71),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xB0, 0x71, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x96, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0xB8, 0x19, 0x90, 0x80, 0xB5, 0xEE, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x21, 0x20, 0xA6, 0x17, 0x48, 0x03, 0x6F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x1D, 0xBB, 0x6D, 0x94, 0x20, 0x34, 0xF1),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x82, 0x67, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x4E, 0xBE, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xDA, 0x77, 0xF8, 0x23, 0x55, 0x2B, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x02, 0xDE, 0x25, 0x35, 0x2D, 0x74, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x0C, 0xB8, 0x0B, 0x39, 0xBA, 0xAD, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x0E, 0x28, 0x4D, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0xE4, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xB0),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x68, 0xCE, 0xC2, 0x55, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x20, 0x93, 0x32, 0x90, 0xD6, 0xAE, 0x47),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x78, 0xAB, 0x43, 0x9E, 0xEB, 0x73, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x97, 0xC3, 0x83, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xF1, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x25, 0x25, 0x66, 0x08, 0x26, 0xFA, 0x4B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xFB, 0x44, 0x5D, 0x82, 0xEC, 0x3B, 0xAC),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x90, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x04, 0x99, 0xD0, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0xF2, 0x22, 0xA0, 0xEB, 0xFD, 0x45, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA4, 0x81, 0x32, 0xFC, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x4F, 0xF0, 0x10, 0xB3, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x74, 0x13, 0x14, 0x9E, 0x90, 0xD7, 0xE6),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x4F, 0xA8, 0xD1, 0x06, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0x68, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x53, 0x75, 0xED, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0xC2, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x87, 0x6B, 0x9F, 0x05, 0xE2, 0x22, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x1A, 0xA8, 0xB7, 0x03, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xD0, 0x69, 0x88, 0xA8, 0x39, 0x9E, 0x3A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xEF, 0x68, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x08, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x06, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x0D, 0xB7, 0x34, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xF4, 0xDD, 0x1A, 0xA0, 0x4A, 0xE4, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x63, 0x4F, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xBB, 0xD6, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xEE, 0x8D, 0xDF, 0x3F, 0x73, 0xB7, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x06, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xD9, 0x53),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xF5, 0x13, 0xDF, 0x13, 0x19, 0x97, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xF9, 0xB3, 0x33, 0x66, 0x82, 0x21, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xFC, 0x39, 0x16, 0x23, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x48, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x64, 0x95, 0x1C, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xAC, 0x15, 0x57, 0xD9, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x5F, 0xB8, 0x3D, 0x48, 0x91, 0x24, 0xCC),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_16_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xF2, 0xC8, 0x54, 0xD1, 0x32, 0xBD, 0xC4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x3B, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF4, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xC3, 0xBB, 0x6C, 0x66, 0xAC, 0x25, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x25, 0x10, 0xB2, 0xE1, 0x41, 0xDE, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xE8, 0x30, 0xB8, 0x37, 0xBC, 0x2A, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x57, 0x01, 0x4A, 0x1E, 0x78, 0x9F, 0x85),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x19, 0xCD, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x51, 0x4F, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x4B, 0x3D, 0x24, 0xA4, 0x16, 0x59, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xEB, 0xD3, 0x59, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x7C, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xB9, 0xB4, 0xA5, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0x29, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x16, 0x05, 0x75, 0x02, 0xB3, 0x06, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x7C, 0x9F, 0x79, 0x91, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0x23),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_17_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x98, 0x7C, 0x84, 0xE1, 0xFF, 0x30, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xE2, 0xC2, 0x5F, 0x55, 0x40, 0xBD, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x65, 0x87, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x30, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x15, 0xD1, 0x24, 0x48),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x99, 0xD9, 0xB6, 0xAE, 0xB1, 0xAF, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x80, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0x74, 0xB9, 0xF3),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xE6, 0x0F, 0x37, 0xC1, 0x10, 0x99, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xAD, 0x9D, 0x5D, 0x80, 0x01, 0xA6, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x0F, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x9D, 0x20, 0x38, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x60, 0xCB, 0xCE, 0x5A, 0xA0, 0xA7, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xCF, 0x14, 0xDF, 0xBF, 0xE5, 0x74, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xDD, 0x59, 0x02, 0x5D, 0xC6),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_18_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC9, 0xF8, 0xF5, 0xB6, 0x13, 0x4D, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x93, 0xB3, 0xA2, 0x79, 0xDC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xF6, 0xCF, 0xF7, 0xE6, 0x29, 0x9C, 0xCC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x50, 0x65, 0x80, 0xBC, 0x59, 0x0A, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xF0, 0x24, 0x35, 0xA2, 0x46, 0xF0, 0x0C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x26, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x61, 0x56, 0x62, 0x67),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xBB, 0xC2, 0x24, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x37, 0x54),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xF7, 0xCE, 0x35, 0xFC, 0x77, 0xF3, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x34, 0x96, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x76, 0x9D, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x3B, 0x0F, 0xEA, 0xA8, 0x12, 0x0B, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x3F, 0x5D, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0xD4, 0x9E, 0xFB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x2E, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0x6E, 0xAB, 0xAF, 0xDC),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_19_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xB2, 0x7B, 0x0C, 0x9A, 0x83, 0x8E, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x51, 0x90, 0x92, 0x79, 0x32, 0x19, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x89, 0xF9, 0xD0, 0xCF, 0x2C, 0xA5, 0x8F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x50, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x50, 0x41, 0x9D, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x7D, 0x2B, 0x9E, 0x9D, 0x95, 0xA8, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x87, 0x88, 0x97, 0x5F, 0xAA),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x59, 0xB4, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xB2, 0xAD, 0xD9, 0xC9, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA3, 0x13, 0x83, 0x07, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x26, 0xC7, 0x13, 0x35, 0x0D, 0xB0, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x60, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0x4B, 0x93, 0x18, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x2D, 0x1C, 0x31, 0x4C, 0xE4, 0x61, 0xAE),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_20_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x4D, 0x1E, 0x51, 0x59, 0x6E, 0x91, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x54, 0x4D, 0x51, 0xED, 0x36, 0xCC, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xA8, 0x56, 0xC7, 0x78, 0x27, 0x33, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB7, 0x95, 0xC9, 0x8B, 0xC8, 0x6A, 0xBC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xE9, 0x13, 0x96, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0xF9, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x46, 0xB0, 0x5E, 0xC3, 0x94, 0x03, 0x05),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x5B, 0x29, 0x30, 0x41, 0x1A, 0x9E, 0xB6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xCA, 0x83, 0x31, 0x5B, 0xA7, 0xCB, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x41, 0x50, 0x44, 0x4D, 0x64, 0x31, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x84, 0xC2, 0x5D, 0x97, 0xA5, 0x3C, 0x18),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x0F, 0xA5, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x47, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x58, 0x02, 0x2D, 0x40, 0xB1, 0x0B, 0xBA),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_21_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x33, 0x8C, 0x67, 0xCE, 0x23, 0x43, 0x99),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x53, 0x47, 0x72, 0x44, 0x1F, 0x5B, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xC1, 0xD9, 0xA4, 0x50, 0x88, 0x63, 0x18),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xF2, 0x75, 0x69, 0x73, 0x00, 0xC4, 0x31),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x90, 0x1D, 0xDF, 0x1A, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xB1, 0x89, 0x48, 0xA8, 0x70, 0x62, 0xEF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x8A, 0x55, 0x50, 0x7B, 0xEF, 0x8A, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x1B, 0x23, 0x48, 0x23, 0x63, 0x91, 0xB6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x04, 0x54, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x9B, 0xC7, 0x9A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x38, 0xC3, 0x84, 0xFB, 0xFF, 0x9F, 0x49),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x2A, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x68, 0x8A, 0x5C, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x93, 0x53, 0x85, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xAF, 0x63),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_22_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x88, 0x95, 0x4C, 0x0B, 0xD0, 0x06, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xAF, 0x8D, 0x49, 0xA2, 0xC8, 0xB4, 0xE0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x76, 0x53, 0x09, 0x88, 0x43, 0x87, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xA4, 0x77, 0x3F, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xB4, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x9E, 0x86, 0x64, 0xCC, 0x91, 0xC1, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x17, 0x56, 0xCB, 0xC3, 0x7D, 0x5B, 0xB1),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x74, 0x9F, 0xB5, 0x91, 0x21, 0xB1, 0x1C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xED, 0xE1, 0x11, 0xEF, 0x45, 0xAF, 0xC1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x31, 0xBE, 0xB2, 0xBC, 0x72, 0x65, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x4B, 0x8C, 0x77, 0xCE, 0x1E, 0x42, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xC9, 0xAA, 0xB9, 0xD9, 0x86, 0x99, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x23, 0x80, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x35, 0x0B, 0x6D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_23_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xD8, 0xA2, 0x0A, 0x39, 0x32, 0x1D, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0xC8, 0x86, 0xF1, 0x12, 0x9A, 0x4A, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xF1, 0x7C, 0xAA, 0x70, 0x8E, 0xBC, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x01, 0x47, 0x8F, 0xDD, 0x8B, 0xA5, 0xC8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x08, 0x21, 0xF4, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0xF5, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x76, 0xA5, 0x95, 0xC4, 0x0F, 0x88, 0x1D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x42, 0x2A, 0x52, 0xCD, 0x75, 0x51, 0x49),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x36, 0xE5, 0x04, 0x2B, 0x44, 0xC6, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xEE, 0x16, 0x13, 0x07, 0x83, 0xB5, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x59, 0xC6, 0xA2, 0x19, 0x05, 0xD3, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x8B, 0xA8, 0x16, 0x09, 0xB7, 0xEA, 0xD6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xEE, 0x14, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0xEF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_24_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x7C, 0xCA, 0x71, 0x3E, 0x6E, 0x66, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x31, 0x0E, 0x3F, 0xE5, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x3E, 0x95, 0x37, 0x58, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x1F, 0x02, 0x03, 0xF3, 0xEF, 0xEE, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x5B, 0x1A, 0xFC, 0x38, 0xCD, 0xE8, 0x24),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x57, 0x42, 0x85, 0xC6, 0x21, 0x68, 0x71),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xA2, 0x4A, 0x66, 0xB1, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x9D, 0x5E, 0x99, 0xB2, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x03, 0x40, 0xCA, 0xB2, 0xB3, 0x30, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x78, 0x48, 0x27, 0x34, 0x1E, 0xE2, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x72, 0x5B, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0x6D, 0xE3, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAB, 0x46, 0xCB, 0xEA, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0x0B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_25_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x08, 0xAD, 0x4E, 0x51, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5C, 0x7D, 0x4C, 0xD6, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x76, 0x26, 0xE0, 0x8B, 0x10, 0xD9, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xA7, 0x23, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x42, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xE5, 0xA4, 0xEC, 0x77, 0x21, 0x34, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x14, 0x65, 0xEA, 0x4A, 0x85, 0xC3, 0x2F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xD8, 0x40, 0x27, 0x73, 0x15, 0x7E, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xBB, 0x53, 0x7E, 0x0F, 0x40, 0xC8, 0xD4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x37, 0x19, 0x73, 0xEF, 0x5A, 0x5E, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x73, 0x2B, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xAC, 0x97, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xB2, 0xC3, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0xE7, 0xD2, 0x21),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x08, 0xD6, 0xDD, 0xAC, 0x21, 0xD6, 0x3E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_26_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x26, 0xBE, 0x6D, 0x6D, 0xF2, 0x38, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x6C, 0x31, 0xA7, 0x49, 0x50, 0x3A, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x99, 0xC6, 0xF5, 0xD2, 0xC2, 0x30, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x8B, 0x8B, 0x97, 0xE9, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0D, 0xFC, 0x15, 0x54, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x83, 0x1C, 0xA4, 0xCD, 0x6B, 0x9D, 0xF2),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x48, 0xE4, 0xAA, 0x69, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x7A, 0x27, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x96, 0x1A, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0xE7, 0x30, 0xA5, 0xCF, 0x13, 0x46, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xD8, 0xAF, 0x74, 0x23, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x3D, 0x44, 0x14, 0x1B, 0x97, 0x83, 0xF0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x47, 0xD7, 0x5F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x38, 0xF7),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_27_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x73, 0x64, 0x36, 0xFD, 0x7B, 0xC1, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x5D, 0x32, 0xD2, 0x47, 0x94, 0x89, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xE9, 0x30, 0xAC, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x65, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x1B, 0xF7, 0x61, 0x49, 0x53),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xFF, 0x32, 0x43, 0x80, 0xDA, 0xA6, 0xB1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x01, 0x95, 0x35, 0xCE, 0x21),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x06, 0x46, 0x0D, 0x51, 0xE2, 0xD8, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x57, 0x1D, 0x6F, 0x79, 0xA0, 0xCD, 0xA6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0xFB, 0x36, 0xCA, 0xAD, 0xF5, 0x9E, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x7A, 0x1D, 0x9E, 0x1D, 0x95, 0x48, 0xDC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x26, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x15, 0x2C, 0xC2, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x42, 0x72, 0xAA, 0x11, 0xDC, 0xC9, 0xB6),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_28_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x6C, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x62, 0x3C, 0xAB, 0xD4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x6A, 0x44, 0xD8, 0x60, 0xC0, 0xA8, 0x80),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x76, 0x58, 0x12, 0x57, 0x3C, 0x89, 0x46),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x4F, 0x83, 0xCE, 0xCB, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x84, 0x04, 0xB0, 0xAD, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xA4, 0xC3, 0x41, 0x44, 0x4E, 0x65, 0x3E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x16, 0xA9, 0x1C, 0xE7, 0x65, 0x20, 0xC1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x53, 0x32, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xA6, 0xBD, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xF0, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x31, 0xCC, 0x26, 0x6F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xE3, 0x54, 0x1C, 0x34, 0xD3, 0x17, 0xBC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xAE, 0xED, 0xFB, 0xCD, 0xE7, 0x1E, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x16, 0x1C, 0x34, 0x40, 0x00, 0x1F, 0xB6),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_29_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x32, 0x00, 0xC2, 0xD4, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0x09),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xE0, 0x99, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0x4A, 0x16, 0x44),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x73, 0x18, 0x1B, 0xD4, 0x94, 0x29, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xA4, 0x2D, 0xB1, 0x9D, 0x74, 0x32, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0xF4, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x37, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xFF, 0xDA, 0xE2, 0x35, 0xA3, 0xB6, 0x42),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x49, 0x99, 0x65, 0xC5, 0xED, 0x16, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x42, 0x9A, 0xF3, 0xA7, 0x4E, 0x6F, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x0A, 0x7E, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x07, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x7A, 0x31, 0x69, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x15, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xE0, 0x72, 0xA4, 0x3F, 0xB9, 0xF8, 0x0C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x75, 0x32, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0x37, 0x12),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_30_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xC0, 0x0D, 0xCF, 0x25, 0x41, 0xA4, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xFC, 0xB2, 0x48, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x83, 0x4B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xBE, 0x0B, 0x58, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x9A, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xF3, 0x81, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x74, 0x4F, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x43, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x16, 0x8B, 0xA3, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x18, 0x81, 0x7B, 0x8D, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x77),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xC4, 0x3F, 0x2C, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0x99, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0xAD, 0x5A, 0x56, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x00, 0xA4, 0x48, 0xC8, 0xE8, 0xBA, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xA1, 0xB5, 0x13, 0x5A, 0xCD, 0x99, 0x9C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x95, 0xAD, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x6B, 0xD1, 0x34, 0x99, 0x53, 0x63, 0x0B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp384r1_T_31_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x5D, 0x2B, 0xAB, 0x01, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x85, 0xD0, 0xD5, 0x49, 0x83, 0x4D, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xC6, 0x91, 0x30, 0x3B, 0x00, 0xAF, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xAE, 0x61, 0x07, 0xE1, 0xB6, 0xE2, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x43, 0x41, 0xFE, 0x9B, 0xB6, 0xF0, 0xA5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x97, 0xAE, 0xAD, 0x89, 0x88, 0x9E, 0x41),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp384r1_T[32] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp384r1_T_0_X, secp384r1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_1_X, secp384r1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_2_X, secp384r1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_3_X, secp384r1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_4_X, secp384r1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_5_X, secp384r1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_6_X, secp384r1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_7_X, secp384r1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_8_X, secp384r1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_9_X, secp384r1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_10_X, secp384r1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_11_X, secp384r1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_12_X, secp384r1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_13_X, secp384r1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_14_X, secp384r1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_15_X, secp384r1_T_15_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_16_X, secp384r1_T_16_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_17_X, secp384r1_T_17_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_18_X, secp384r1_T_18_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_19_X, secp384r1_T_19_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_20_X, secp384r1_T_20_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_21_X, secp384r1_T_21_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_22_X, secp384r1_T_22_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_23_X, secp384r1_T_23_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_24_X, secp384r1_T_24_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_25_X, secp384r1_T_25_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_26_X, secp384r1_T_26_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_27_X, secp384r1_T_27_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_28_X, secp384r1_T_28_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_29_X, secp384r1_T_29_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_30_X, secp384r1_T_30_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp384r1_T_31_X, secp384r1_T_31_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define secp384r1_T NULL
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Domain parameters for secp521r1
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xFF, 0x01),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x3F, 0x50, 0x6B, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0x45, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x34, 0x2C, 0x3D, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x73, 0x35),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xBF, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0xBD, 0xC0, 0x52, 0x16),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x93, 0x7E, 0xEC, 0x51, 0x39, 0x19, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x09, 0xF1, 0x8E, 0x91, 0x89, 0xB4, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x15, 0xB3, 0x99, 0x5B, 0x72, 0xDA, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x40, 0x85, 0xB6, 0xA0, 0x21, 0x9A, 0x92),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x9A, 0x1C, 0x8E, 0x61, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x51, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xC6, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x18, 0x01),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x64, 0x38, 0x91, 0x1E, 0xB7, 0x6F, 0xBB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x47, 0x9C, 0x89, 0xB8, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0xA5, 0x09, 0xF7, 0x48, 0x01, 0xCC, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x96, 0x2F, 0xBF, 0x83, 0x87, 0x86, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0xFF, 0x01),
+};
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0xC2, 0x31, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xB3, 0x48, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0xA8, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x27, 0xC1, 0x1D, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x59, 0xE7, 0xEF, 0x77, 0x5E, 0x4B, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x3D, 0x4D, 0x6B, 0x60, 0xAF, 0x28, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xB5, 0x3F, 0x05, 0x39, 0x81, 0x64, 0x9C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xB4, 0x95, 0x23, 0x66, 0xCB, 0x3E, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x04, 0xB7, 0x06, 0x8E, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x66, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x94, 0xBE, 0x88),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC2, 0x72, 0xA2, 0x86, 0x70, 0x3C, 0x35),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x01, 0xB9, 0x50, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x26, 0xF4, 0x5E, 0x99, 0x72, 0xEE, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0x3E, 0x27, 0x17, 0xBD, 0xAF, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x44, 0x9B, 0x57, 0x49, 0x44, 0xF5, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x2C, 0xB4, 0x5F, 0x8A, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xC0, 0x3B, 0x9A, 0x78, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xB1, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x27, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x4B, 0x44, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x5C, 0x5F, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x85, 0x28, 0x78, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x34, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x57, 0x0F, 0x73, 0x78, 0x7A, 0xE3, 0x53),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD8, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xDA, 0x04, 0xAD, 0xAB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x8A, 0x09, 0xF3, 0x58, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x29),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x03, 0xCB, 0x50, 0x1A, 0x7F, 0x56, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xA6, 0x78, 0x38, 0x85, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xD5, 0xD2, 0x22, 0xC4, 0x00, 0x3B, 0xBA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x93, 0x0E, 0x7B, 0x85, 0x51, 0xC3, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x54, 0x49, 0x02, 0x81, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x3A, 0x92, 0xE7, 0x72, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x5F, 0x28, 0x9E, 0x91, 0x27, 0x88, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x28, 0x31, 0xB3, 0x84, 0xCA, 0x12, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xF9, 0xAC, 0x22, 0x10, 0x0A, 0x64, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xC6, 0x33, 0x1F, 0x69, 0x19, 0x18, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x48, 0xB8, 0xC7, 0x37, 0x5A, 0x00, 0x36),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xCC, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xEE, 0x03, 0xC2, 0xBA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x29, 0xC2, 0xE4, 0x6E, 0x24, 0x20, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0x7B, 0xF9, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x7B, 0x3C, 0xE1, 0x19, 0xA1, 0x23, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE3, 0xC2, 0x53, 0xC0, 0x07, 0x13, 0xA9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFE, 0x36, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x5E, 0x59, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x55, 0x89, 0x84, 0xBC, 0xEF, 0xA2, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x1A, 0x08, 0x67, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x22, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x26, 0xDF, 0x81, 0x3C, 0x5F, 0x1C, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x4D, 0xD0, 0x0A, 0x48, 0x06, 0xF4, 0x48),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x18, 0x39, 0xF7, 0xD1, 0x20, 0x77, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x8F, 0x44, 0x13, 0xCB, 0x78, 0x11, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xE2, 0x49, 0xEA, 0x43, 0x79, 0x08, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xD1, 0xD8, 0x73, 0x2C, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0xF4, 0x46, 0xAB, 0x20, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x0B, 0xB9, 0x71, 0x1A, 0x27, 0xB7, 0xA7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xA2, 0x2C, 0xD1, 0xDA, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0xBD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xA3, 0x10, 0x1F, 0x90, 0xF2, 0xA5, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xFB, 0x20, 0xF4, 0xC0, 0x70, 0xC0, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xA7, 0x99, 0xF0, 0xA5, 0xD3, 0x09, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0xE8, 0x14, 0x39, 0xBE, 0xCB, 0x60, 0xAF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xD6, 0x14, 0xA9, 0xC9, 0x20, 0xC3, 0xEA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA8, 0x5B, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x96, 0xBC, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x04, 0x45, 0xBE, 0xCE, 0x75, 0x95, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x49, 0x35, 0x09, 0x8D, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x36, 0xF2, 0xA6, 0x2D, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xFC, 0x3D, 0xA8, 0xFB, 0x3C, 0xD2, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x4D, 0x71, 0x09, 0x18, 0x42, 0xF0, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xC1, 0xCE, 0x9E, 0x6A, 0x49, 0x60, 0x12),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xB1, 0x00, 0xF7, 0xA1, 0x7A, 0x31, 0xB4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xC3, 0x86, 0xCD, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x17, 0x86),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xAB, 0x8B, 0x47, 0x8D, 0xAA, 0xA6, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x97, 0xF0, 0xBC, 0x2D, 0xDC, 0x9D, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x86, 0xB0, 0x74, 0xB2, 0xF4, 0xF6, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBD, 0xAC, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x43, 0x5C, 0xB1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xC3, 0xE2, 0x6E, 0x25, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x5E, 0x08, 0xB3, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x5F, 0xD1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xB7, 0xD1, 0xF4, 0xDC, 0x19, 0xE9, 0xC8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xE4, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x36, 0x3E, 0xED, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x67, 0x92, 0x84, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x03, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x95, 0xEF, 0x8F, 0xB2, 0x82, 0x6B, 0x1C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFA, 0xB9, 0x55, 0x23, 0xFE, 0x09, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x79, 0x85, 0x4B, 0x0E, 0xD4, 0x35, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x27, 0x45, 0x81, 0xE0, 0x88, 0x52, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x63, 0xA2, 0x4B, 0xBC, 0x5D, 0xB1, 0x92),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x8C, 0x83, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0xD3, 0x42, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x03, 0x3A, 0x31, 0xBA, 0xE9, 0x3A, 0xD1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x10, 0xCD, 0x2D, 0x00, 0xFE, 0x32, 0xA7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0xDA, 0xF8, 0x6F, 0x4D, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x79, 0x7D, 0x09, 0xE5, 0xD3, 0x03, 0x21),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xC3, 0xBE, 0xDF, 0x07, 0x65, 0x49, 0xCC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x57, 0x33, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x4F, 0x04, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xFE, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0x85, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xBA, 0xAA, 0x06, 0xC4, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x83, 0x01, 0xA9, 0xF6, 0x51, 0xE7, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xA6, 0x15, 0x8E, 0xAB, 0x1F, 0x10, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x08, 0x27, 0x1A, 0xA1, 0x21, 0xAD, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x09, 0x90, 0x6E, 0x50, 0x90, 0x9A, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0xD7, 0xA1, 0xF5, 0xA2, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x7D, 0xE3, 0xDC, 0x21, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xBF, 0x07, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDF, 0x51, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x5C, 0x34, 0x02, 0x62, 0x9B, 0x08, 0x12),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0x6A, 0xEC, 0x75, 0xF6, 0x46),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x3C, 0x60, 0xB1, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x37, 0x84, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0xF2, 0x9A, 0x7D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x9A, 0x9A, 0x15, 0x36, 0xE0, 0x2B, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x38, 0x9C, 0x50, 0x3D, 0x1E, 0x37, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x79, 0xF0, 0x92, 0xF2, 0x8B, 0x18, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x1E, 0x80, 0x82, 0x4B, 0xD7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x6B, 0x8A, 0x77, 0x41, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xF9, 0xD4, 0xB8, 0x4A, 0x82, 0xCF, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x8C, 0xC8, 0x9B, 0x72, 0x9E, 0xF7, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xCE, 0xE9, 0x77, 0x0A, 0x19, 0x59, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xA1, 0x41, 0x6A, 0x72, 0x4B, 0xB4, 0xDC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x35, 0x43, 0xE2, 0x8C, 0xBE, 0x0D, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xEB, 0xAD, 0xF3, 0xA9, 0xA6, 0x68, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x2F, 0xE2, 0x48, 0x0C, 0xDB, 0x1F, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x1E, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xD2, 0xC1, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x64, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0xF6, 0xF6, 0x6E, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x3D, 0x30, 0x78, 0x10, 0x18, 0x41, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x1D, 0x1C, 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x83, 0xD1, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x03, 0x0B, 0xF5, 0x2F, 0x6C, 0x04, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x3E, 0xD5, 0xFC, 0x31, 0x5B, 0x3A, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x82, 0x2F, 0xFB, 0xFE, 0xF8, 0x76, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x26, 0xDA, 0x9C, 0x36, 0xF5, 0x93, 0xD1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xE7, 0x6E, 0xD2, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x09, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x03, 0xF9, 0x58, 0x48, 0x24, 0xA2, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x79, 0x0C, 0x8E, 0x6B, 0x95, 0xF3, 0xC4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x87, 0x03, 0x39, 0xCF, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xF0, 0xF7, 0xC1, 0x07, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xE8, 0x02, 0x89, 0x65, 0xC4, 0x72, 0x36),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x88, 0xEA, 0x96, 0x67, 0x0B, 0x5D, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x75, 0x60, 0xA8, 0xBD, 0x74, 0xDF, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xE5, 0x71, 0x50, 0x67, 0xD0, 0xD2, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xFC, 0xE5, 0xC7, 0x77, 0xB0, 0x7F, 0x8C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x86, 0x69, 0xCD, 0x0D, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x17, 0xBC, 0xBB, 0x59, 0x85, 0x7D, 0x0E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xA8, 0x76, 0xAC, 0x80, 0xA9, 0x72, 0xE0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x78, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x4D, 0xAF, 0xF9, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x97, 0x8E, 0x74, 0xC4, 0x4B, 0xB2, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD8, 0xF6, 0xF3, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0x52, 0xE5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x57, 0xF4, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0x43, 0xED, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x46, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x18),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x18, 0xE8, 0x58, 0xB9, 0x76, 0x2C, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x54, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0xC7, 0xBC, 0x31, 0x37),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xF8, 0x89, 0xEE, 0x70, 0xB5, 0xB0, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x22, 0x26, 0x9A, 0x53, 0xB9, 0x38, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xA7, 0x19, 0x8C, 0x74, 0x7E, 0x88, 0x46),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xDA, 0x0A, 0xE8, 0xDA, 0xA5, 0xBE, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x5C, 0xF7, 0xB1, 0x0C, 0x72, 0xFB, 0x09),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0xE2, 0x23, 0xE7, 0x46, 0xB7, 0xE0, 0x91),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x36, 0xBC, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x72),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xBB, 0xA1, 0xF7, 0x0B, 0x9E, 0xBF, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x28, 0xE1, 0xA2, 0x8F, 0xFC, 0xFC, 0xD6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xFE, 0x19, 0x0A, 0xE5, 0xE7, 0x69, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xCD, 0x12, 0xF5, 0xBE, 0xD3, 0x04, 0xF1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xA8, 0x0D, 0x81, 0x59, 0xC4, 0x79, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xF3, 0x4B, 0x92, 0x65, 0xC3, 0x31, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xB5, 0x4F, 0x4D, 0x91, 0xD4, 0xE2, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x09, 0x41, 0x79, 0x1D, 0x4D, 0x0D, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x31, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xA0, 0xF2, 0x6E, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x5B, 0x4D, 0x4F, 0xAF, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x99, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x68, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x29),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x04, 0xE1, 0xB5, 0x9D, 0x00, 0xBC, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x95, 0x92, 0x8D, 0x72, 0xD3, 0x37, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x4B, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xE8, 0xA4, 0x26, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x45, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0xCB, 0x9F, 0xBA, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x7E, 0x1B, 0x64, 0xF4, 0xE8, 0xA5, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x20, 0xA9, 0xCA, 0xF3, 0x89, 0xE5, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xED, 0xFC, 0xAB, 0xD9, 0x0A, 0xB9, 0x07),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x6F, 0x46, 0x7C, 0xCD, 0x78, 0xFF, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xAB, 0x71, 0x5A, 0x94, 0xAB, 0x20, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x2E, 0xEE, 0x87, 0x57, 0x1F, 0xAD, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x4C, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x7E, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x07),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x86, 0xBA, 0x53, 0x37, 0xCF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x26, 0xB2, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x91, 0xE3, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xC9, 0x54, 0x84, 0x08, 0x3D, 0x0B, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xA8, 0x77, 0x2F, 0x64, 0x45, 0x99, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x96, 0x16, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0x96, 0x28, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x2B, 0x8D, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x4F, 0x55, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xE6, 0x48, 0xBD, 0x99, 0x3D, 0x12, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x84, 0x59, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xB6, 0x66, 0x12),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x78, 0x41, 0x92, 0xDF, 0xF4, 0x3F, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x86, 0x6F, 0x4F, 0xBF, 0x67, 0xDF, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x2B, 0x1E, 0x5F, 0x00, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xB9, 0x6A, 0x89, 0xD8, 0xC0, 0xD7, 0xA7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x9A, 0x32, 0x23, 0xA0, 0x02, 0x91, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x7F, 0x6A, 0x15, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x8B, 0xBB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x57, 0x82, 0x58, 0xA9, 0x56, 0xB5, 0xFB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x50, 0x92, 0x60, 0xCC, 0x81, 0x24, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x3D, 0xAD, 0xDA, 0xD9, 0x51, 0x3E, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xFE, 0x8F, 0xB0, 0x0B, 0xDE, 0x2E, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xD2, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0xAC, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xE8, 0x72, 0x0B, 0xAC, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x5B, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0xE3, 0x3C, 0x7C, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x04, 0xA7, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x93, 0xC0, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x8E, 0x32, 0xC5, 0xF0, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x42, 0x07, 0xC1, 0xF2, 0xF1, 0x72, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x37, 0x54, 0x9C, 0x88, 0xD2, 0x62, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x19, 0x8A, 0x89, 0x58, 0xA2, 0x0F, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xCC, 0x4C, 0x97, 0x30, 0x66, 0x34, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x1F, 0xDB, 0xC9, 0x5E, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x4D, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x9B, 0x9C, 0xAC, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xE4, 0x4B, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0x1A, 0xD2, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xDA, 0xE8, 0x61, 0x9F, 0xC8, 0x49, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x85, 0xF6, 0x8D, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xC5, 0xCD, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xC6, 0x0E, 0x4F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x1D, 0x55, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x22, 0x9F, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x56, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x57, 0x32, 0xEC, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x9A, 0xC6, 0x4C, 0x09, 0xC4, 0x52, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x1E, 0x6F, 0xF4, 0x7D, 0x27, 0xDD, 0xAF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x11, 0x16, 0xEC, 0x79, 0x83, 0xAD, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x4E, 0x92, 0x1F, 0x19, 0x7D, 0x65, 0xDC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xFF, 0x78, 0x15, 0x45, 0x63, 0x32, 0xE4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x91, 0xD0, 0x78, 0x58, 0xDA, 0x50, 0x47),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0xDE, 0x40, 0xF6, 0x41, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x8D, 0xE0, 0xE1, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0x35, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xD4, 0xBA, 0x7B, 0xCC, 0x1B, 0x3A, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x74, 0x47, 0x14, 0xC3, 0x4D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xF0, 0x8B, 0x06, 0x15, 0x8E, 0x0E, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0xD2, 0xEB, 0x97, 0x50, 0x7D, 0x31, 0xFC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x93, 0x4C, 0xDB, 0x97, 0x79, 0x44, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xA2, 0xA0, 0x0B, 0xC8, 0x3A, 0x8A, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x50, 0x92, 0x9E, 0x24, 0x1F, 0xCB, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x16, 0xC9, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0x5A, 0xAF, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xE4, 0xA8, 0x50, 0xF6, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x57, 0x97, 0x42, 0x78, 0x92, 0x49, 0x0D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xEB, 0x62, 0x24, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0x32, 0xCF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x0C, 0x36, 0x6E, 0x8F, 0xE8, 0xE8, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xD3, 0x7C, 0xC7, 0x8D, 0x3F, 0x5C, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x64, 0x6A, 0x73, 0x10, 0x79, 0xB8, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xF9, 0xEF, 0xA5, 0x20, 0x4A, 0x5C, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xF3, 0xF4, 0x49, 0x5B, 0x73, 0xAA, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xF2, 0xEA, 0x0F, 0x00, 0xAD, 0x53, 0xAB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xB8, 0x66, 0xED, 0xC4, 0x2B, 0x4C, 0x35),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x2F, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x37, 0xD2, 0x7F, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xA7, 0x81, 0x38, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x37, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x3B, 0x6C, 0x9F, 0x5B, 0xD9, 0x8B, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x14, 0xD9, 0x08, 0xD8, 0xD2, 0x7E, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x71, 0xE6, 0x3D, 0xD1, 0xB0, 0xE7, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x81, 0x23, 0xEC, 0x2D, 0x42, 0x45, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x5B, 0x44, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x03, 0x67, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x27, 0xAE, 0x80, 0x5A, 0x33, 0xBE, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xB6, 0x64, 0x1A, 0xDF, 0xD3, 0x85, 0x91),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x8C, 0x22, 0xBA, 0xD0, 0xBD, 0xCC, 0xA0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x3C, 0x01, 0x3A, 0xFF, 0x9D, 0xC7, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xC7, 0x64, 0xB4, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x9F, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x34, 0x0A, 0x41, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xF2, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xD4, 0xE4, 0xF0, 0x97, 0x45, 0x6D, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x1F, 0x4D, 0x6D, 0xFE, 0xA0, 0xC4, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x28, 0x5C, 0x40, 0xBB, 0x65, 0xD4, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xA8, 0x87, 0x35, 0x20, 0x3A, 0x89, 0x44),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFD, 0x4F, 0xAB, 0x2D, 0xD1, 0xD0, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xE8, 0x00, 0xFC, 0x69, 0x52, 0xF8, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x9A, 0x99, 0xE1, 0xDC, 0x9C, 0x3F, 0xD9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x08, 0x98, 0xD9, 0xCA, 0x73, 0xD5, 0xA9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xD7, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x04, 0xB0, 0x54, 0x09, 0xF4, 0x72, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xEE, 0x28, 0xCC, 0xE8, 0x50, 0x78, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x91, 0x03, 0x76, 0xDB, 0x68, 0x24, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xE0, 0x56, 0xB2, 0x5D, 0x12, 0xD3, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x42, 0x59, 0x8B, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xB5, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xCC, 0xE5, 0x31, 0x53, 0x7A, 0x46, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x8D, 0x59, 0xB5, 0x1B, 0x0F, 0xF4, 0xAF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x2F, 0xD1, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0x04, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0xBA, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x7E, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x08, 0x51, 0x56, 0xA6, 0x76, 0x67, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x17, 0x63, 0xFE, 0x56, 0xD0, 0xD9, 0x71),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xF6, 0xC3, 0x14, 0x47, 0xC5, 0xA7, 0x31),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x4C, 0x80, 0xF6, 0xA2, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xB3, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x2F, 0xE1, 0x3E, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_16_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x6B, 0x7B, 0x90, 0xDF, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x82, 0xEF, 0x62, 0xA1, 0x4C, 0x53, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x99, 0x76, 0x01, 0xBA, 0x8D, 0x0F, 0x54),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xF4, 0x58, 0x73, 0x56, 0xFE, 0xDD, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xCE, 0xF9, 0xE8, 0xA1, 0x34, 0xC3, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x5F, 0xDC, 0x6A, 0x3D, 0xD8, 0x7F, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xF4, 0x51, 0xB8, 0xB8, 0xC1, 0xD7, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x7D, 0x58, 0xD1, 0xD4, 0x1B, 0x4D, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x95, 0xDF, 0x00, 0xD8, 0x21, 0xDE, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x47, 0x3C, 0xC3, 0xB2, 0x01, 0x53, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x17, 0x43, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xBA, 0x0F, 0x4F, 0xDC, 0x41, 0x54, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x39, 0x26, 0x70, 0x53, 0x32, 0x18, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x46, 0x07, 0x97, 0x3A, 0x57, 0xE0, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x92, 0x4F, 0xCE, 0xDF, 0x25, 0x80, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x6F, 0x9A, 0x03, 0x05, 0x4B, 0xD1, 0x47),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_17_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x01, 0x72, 0x30, 0x90, 0x17, 0x51, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xFB, 0x41, 0x65, 0x5C, 0xB4, 0x2D, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xCD, 0xCD, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xCC, 0xBB, 0x07),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xCE, 0x08, 0x0A, 0x63, 0xE9, 0xA2, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xA8, 0x21, 0x7F, 0x7A, 0x5B, 0x9B, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x6B, 0x89, 0x44, 0x0A, 0x7F, 0x85, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0xDE, 0x7C, 0x19, 0x5C, 0x65, 0x26, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0xAC, 0x62, 0x29, 0x4A, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x00, 0x40, 0x87, 0xEB, 0xA9, 0x58, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x51, 0x0B, 0xFF, 0x56, 0x35, 0x51, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xAC, 0x08, 0x94, 0x71, 0xDA, 0xEC, 0x99),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x4D, 0xC5, 0x7B, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x8D, 0x5E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x05, 0xF1, 0x3E, 0x9E, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x8F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0x62, 0x94, 0xAD, 0x49, 0xFC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0x8F, 0xFD, 0x33, 0x44, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7F, 0x42, 0xBE, 0xF7, 0x0D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_18_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x29, 0x39, 0x13, 0x08, 0x8D, 0x91, 0x47),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x79, 0xF9, 0x2F, 0xA9, 0x0A, 0xCF, 0xD6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x87, 0x7A, 0xA3, 0x19, 0xAB, 0x55, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x0B, 0x01, 0xC5, 0x56, 0x19, 0x9D, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xDE, 0x82, 0x3B, 0xEA, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0x8C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x6B, 0xC7, 0xF3, 0x0F, 0x82, 0x87, 0x6C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x2E, 0x23, 0xF2, 0x39, 0x9D, 0x49, 0x70),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0xDE, 0xAF, 0x7A, 0xEE, 0xB0, 0xDA, 0x70),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x4E, 0x2A, 0x50, 0xFD, 0x8E, 0xC0, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x0F, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x63, 0xD8, 0x89, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x4E, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x85, 0xCF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x95, 0x5C, 0x96, 0x5D, 0xAA, 0x59, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xDB, 0xD2, 0x68, 0x8E, 0x5A, 0x94, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x02, 0xBF, 0x77, 0x9F, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xDC, 0xC0, 0xCF, 0x81, 0x1E, 0xC4, 0x6C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xCC, 0x37, 0x86, 0xDC, 0xE2, 0x64, 0x72),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_19_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x59, 0x20, 0x9D, 0x98, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x0C, 0x9D, 0xF8, 0x20, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xBA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xA0, 0xF4, 0xE7, 0x3E, 0x9C, 0x9E, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x25, 0xA2, 0xB0, 0x54, 0xCD, 0x2E, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD9, 0x42, 0xB0, 0x80, 0xB0, 0xA3, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xFE, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x40, 0xFF, 0x27, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x9D, 0xA6, 0x88, 0x3A, 0x8B, 0x6F, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x39, 0xEE, 0x1F, 0x3F, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xD7, 0x9E, 0xFF, 0xD2, 0x35, 0x67, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x4F, 0x15, 0x5D, 0xE3, 0xE8, 0x53, 0x86),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xF7, 0x24, 0x98, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0x11, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x2E, 0x25, 0xE1, 0x94, 0xC5, 0xA3, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x82, 0x6E, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0x43, 0x25, 0xB0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x65, 0xB4, 0x49, 0x73, 0x18, 0x35, 0x54),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0x5B, 0xBC, 0x62, 0x86, 0x4C, 0xC1, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xF2, 0x95, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xA2, 0x35, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_20_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x59, 0x62, 0xB0, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0xB4, 0xD8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x55, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x69, 0xBA, 0x63, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0x69, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x34, 0x7D, 0x68, 0x64),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x06, 0xCA, 0x55, 0x44, 0x36, 0x2B, 0xBA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xD4, 0xC4, 0x3D, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x69, 0xA4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x44, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x31, 0xE6, 0x40, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x4F, 0xFA, 0x75, 0xE3, 0xFB, 0x97, 0x0E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x1C, 0x48, 0xB0, 0x26, 0xD0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x7B, 0x32, 0xFA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0x84, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x21, 0x03, 0x1D, 0x0D, 0x22, 0x55, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xF9, 0x42, 0x03, 0x9C, 0xC2, 0xCB, 0xBA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xA1, 0x96, 0xD9, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x6F, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x40, 0x57, 0xEB, 0x40, 0x2D, 0xC0, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x4F, 0x2F, 0x23, 0xA8, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x29, 0x85, 0x21, 0xA5, 0x50, 0x62, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x7D, 0x92, 0xCF, 0x87, 0x0C, 0x22, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_21_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x0E, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x96, 0x37, 0x2C, 0x88, 0x35, 0x30, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xB4, 0x69, 0xFF, 0xEB, 0xC6, 0x94, 0x08),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x55, 0x60, 0xAD, 0xAA, 0x58, 0x14, 0x88),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xFF, 0xF2, 0xB2, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0xD9, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xAE, 0x54, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x31, 0xF3, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x92, 0x83, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x42, 0x83, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xD2, 0xC8, 0xB7, 0x76, 0x45, 0x7F, 0x7D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x11, 0xA4, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x01, 0xBC, 0xC8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x27, 0x73, 0x8D, 0x02, 0x91, 0x27, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x62, 0xF6, 0xDD, 0x6B, 0xFA, 0x5B, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xCA, 0xA2, 0x44, 0x2C, 0xF0, 0x28, 0xD8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xF1, 0x7A, 0xA2, 0x42, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x83, 0x3E, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x9C, 0xF7, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xED, 0x78, 0xCB, 0x76, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x01, 0x1E, 0x43, 0x27, 0x47, 0x6E, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_22_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x4F, 0x54, 0xB9, 0x3E, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x44),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x35, 0x40, 0x69, 0x7F, 0x74, 0x9D, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x06, 0x6F, 0x67, 0x68, 0x2B, 0x4D, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x65, 0x41, 0xFC, 0x7C, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x79, 0x37, 0xAF, 0xFD, 0xD2, 0xDA, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xA8, 0x69, 0x56, 0x62, 0xA4, 0xE4, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x71, 0x73, 0x21, 0x8A, 0x17, 0x81, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x55, 0x8F, 0x7B, 0xB8, 0xAF, 0xF7, 0x86),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xD1, 0xBD, 0xBE, 0x8C, 0xBC, 0x60, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xA6, 0x57, 0x8C, 0xAE, 0x5C, 0x19, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x43, 0xE4, 0xD9, 0xD8, 0x7B, 0xE7, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xB9, 0xE4, 0x85, 0x7C, 0x2E, 0xFC, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x2E, 0x01, 0x2A, 0x6D, 0x56, 0xBE, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x0C, 0x25, 0x9B, 0xAE, 0x86, 0x37, 0x43),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x22, 0xB3, 0xCB, 0x99, 0x66, 0xB7, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xF7, 0x90, 0xF0, 0x1B, 0x09, 0x27, 0xF7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_23_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x16, 0x08, 0xEF, 0x39, 0x64, 0x49, 0x31),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xA0, 0xE3, 0x97, 0xA9, 0x07, 0x54, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xFF, 0xE2, 0x00, 0x07, 0x21, 0x88, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xFD, 0x59, 0x53, 0x05, 0x6C, 0x42, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xF7, 0x39, 0x5C, 0x82, 0x36, 0xE8, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x83, 0xA8, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x43, 0x07, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xAF, 0x2B, 0x79, 0xED, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x20, 0x91, 0x7A, 0xC4, 0x07, 0xEF, 0x6C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x10, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x0C, 0x94, 0x0E, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x81, 0x87, 0x41, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x55, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x53, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xB6, 0xEB, 0x6C, 0xCC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x77, 0x73, 0x9D, 0xFC, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x40, 0xE3, 0x6D, 0x1C, 0x16, 0x71, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xF4, 0x1B, 0xFF, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0xA5, 0xD7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x0E, 0x0B, 0x11, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x93, 0xAF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xC5, 0x64, 0x6F, 0x24, 0x19, 0xF2, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_24_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xB3, 0xAF, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x4F, 0x5E, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x77, 0xCA, 0xF2, 0x6D, 0xC5, 0xF6, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x18, 0x8E, 0x33, 0x68, 0x6C, 0xE8, 0xE0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x8B, 0x80, 0x90, 0x19, 0x7F, 0x90, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x68, 0xE2, 0x7D, 0xD4, 0xD0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xC1, 0x67, 0xB3, 0x72, 0xCB, 0xBF, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x1D, 0x14, 0x58, 0x0A, 0x80),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x7A, 0x65, 0x98, 0xB3, 0x07, 0x4B, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x87, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA2, 0x01, 0x08),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xC9, 0xC8, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x87, 0xA5, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x3E, 0x91, 0xA0, 0xAB, 0x24, 0x1E, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xBC, 0x02, 0x35, 0x70, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x59, 0xA0, 0x50, 0x04, 0x80, 0x52, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x56, 0x6E, 0x42, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x91, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xA2, 0xCB, 0xA5, 0xDE, 0x14, 0x24, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xCB, 0x74, 0x28, 0xE6, 0xA7, 0xE7, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_25_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x73, 0xA8, 0x8F, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0x63, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x1B, 0x77, 0xC7, 0xC1, 0x38, 0xF9, 0xDC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x3C, 0xCF, 0xA8, 0x7A, 0xD7, 0xF3, 0xC4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x5F, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xAD, 0xE9, 0x1A, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x5E, 0xD5, 0x81, 0x95, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x88, 0x75, 0x29, 0x1F, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xD0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA9, 0x5A, 0x4D, 0x63, 0x95, 0xF9, 0x4E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xCD, 0x04, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x91, 0xDE, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xD4, 0xFD, 0x25, 0x11, 0x99, 0x6E, 0xEA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x83, 0x01, 0x3D, 0xFB, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x4E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x3A, 0xDC, 0x74, 0xC2, 0xD7, 0xCF, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0xBD, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x07, 0x03, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xBE, 0xE9, 0x2E, 0x58, 0x84, 0x66, 0xFC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x20, 0x78, 0x37, 0x79, 0x0B, 0xA6, 0x64),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xF2, 0xAC, 0x65, 0xC8, 0xC9, 0x2F, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x93, 0xE5, 0x0D, 0x0C, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_26_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xAD, 0x5C, 0x19, 0x12, 0x61, 0x0E, 0x25),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x4F, 0x0B, 0x1F, 0x49, 0x7E, 0xCD, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2E, 0x30, 0x61, 0xDB, 0x08, 0x68, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x78, 0xAF, 0xB3, 0x08, 0xC1, 0x69, 0xE5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x5F, 0x5D, 0xC1, 0x57, 0x6F, 0xD8, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0xD3, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xE5, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x70, 0x7B, 0x47, 0xE8, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x62, 0xC8, 0x7E, 0x9D, 0x11, 0x2B, 0xA5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x84, 0xFD, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xBB, 0xA4, 0x6F, 0x12, 0x6E, 0x4D, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x08, 0xA1, 0x82, 0x9C, 0x62, 0x74, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x58, 0x22, 0x05, 0x1D, 0x15, 0x35, 0x79),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x88, 0xCF, 0x5C, 0x05, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x6B, 0x2F, 0x79, 0x09, 0x73, 0x67, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA0, 0x80, 0xD8, 0xE8, 0xEC, 0xFB, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xE7, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x48, 0x7B, 0xD9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_27_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x53, 0xA9, 0xED, 0x61, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x49, 0xD9, 0x5D, 0x9B, 0x4E, 0x89, 0x35),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x12, 0xEB, 0x9A, 0xC9, 0xCB, 0xC1, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xDC, 0x95, 0x16, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x70, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x33, 0xB1, 0xD6, 0x78, 0xB9, 0xE2, 0x36),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xCE, 0x88, 0xC3, 0xFD, 0x7A, 0x6B, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x1E, 0x50, 0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB1, 0x25, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xE7, 0xD7, 0xD5, 0xBD, 0x7A, 0x12, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xAA, 0xA2, 0x80, 0x5D, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0xC8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x39, 0x79, 0x64, 0xA1, 0x67, 0x3C, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xC7, 0x49, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xAC, 0xAB, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x54, 0x3E, 0x83, 0xF0, 0x3D, 0xBC, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x92, 0x4A, 0x38, 0x42, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x0B, 0x4F, 0xEE, 0x9E, 0x92, 0xA5, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0xDD, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF2, 0xF0, 0x6B, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xFC, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x8A, 0xE5, 0x4C, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_28_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x06, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x7E, 0xF8, 0x12),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xC8, 0x01, 0x51, 0xEA, 0xF6, 0x52, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x89, 0x66, 0x2B, 0x1F, 0x9B, 0x2A, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x0F, 0x95, 0x07, 0x2B, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0xC3, 0xB4, 0xBB, 0x91, 0x1F, 0xA3, 0x72),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x6E, 0x54, 0x28, 0x7B, 0x9C, 0x79, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x45, 0xFF, 0xA6, 0xDA, 0xA2, 0x83, 0x71),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xDE, 0x8F, 0x17, 0x37, 0x82, 0xCB, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x94, 0x3F, 0x26, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x97, 0x28, 0x20, 0xCD, 0xC1, 0xF3, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xC9, 0xB5, 0x60, 0x9B, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x7D, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0x8C, 0xF0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xD1, 0x42, 0xE6, 0x39, 0x33, 0x6D, 0xBB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xC0, 0xFC, 0xD2, 0x14, 0x5D, 0x3E, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x4A, 0x3E, 0x40, 0x16, 0x93, 0x15, 0xCF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x24, 0xC1, 0x27, 0x27, 0xE5, 0x4B, 0xD8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_29_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x50, 0xD8, 0xBC, 0xC1, 0x46, 0x22, 0xBB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x0E, 0x60, 0xA1, 0xB3, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x86),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xB1, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x47, 0x5A, 0x6F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0xAC, 0x11, 0x35, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0xF4, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x97, 0xFA, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x39, 0x13, 0xD8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x7B, 0x34, 0x12, 0x75, 0x8E, 0x9B, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x9E, 0xCD, 0x29, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0x8D, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xAC, 0xE9, 0x25, 0x27, 0xBB, 0x78, 0x47),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x7A, 0xA8, 0xD3, 0xE3, 0x66, 0xE5, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x76, 0x81, 0x50, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x71, 0x08, 0xB8, 0x52, 0x7C, 0xAF, 0xDC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x59, 0x24, 0xDD, 0xFB, 0x2F, 0xD0, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xCD, 0x56, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x91, 0xE6, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x64, 0x20, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xE4, 0xEF, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0x8C, 0x97, 0xF6, 0x22, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xF4, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xA5, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_30_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x6C, 0xAE, 0x83, 0xB1, 0x55, 0x55, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x67, 0x84, 0x47, 0x7C, 0x83, 0x5C, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x10, 0x4D, 0xDD, 0x30, 0x60, 0xB0, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xA7, 0x36, 0x76, 0x24, 0x32, 0x9F, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x42, 0x81, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x2E, 0x13, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x94, 0x91, 0xFF, 0x99, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x83, 0xA1, 0x76, 0xAF, 0x37, 0x5C, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xA8, 0x04, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xA9, 0x79, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x8C, 0xC2, 0x34, 0xFB, 0x83, 0x28, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x9E, 0x0E, 0xB0, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x02, 0x46, 0x7F, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xED, 0x48, 0xC2, 0x96, 0x4D, 0x56, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xB5, 0xC5, 0xD1, 0xE6, 0x1C, 0x7E, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x2E, 0x18, 0x71, 0x2D, 0x7B, 0xD7, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x46, 0x9D, 0xDE, 0xAA, 0x78, 0x8E, 0xB1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xD7, 0x69, 0x2E, 0xE1, 0xD9, 0x48, 0xDE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp521r1_T_31_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xFF, 0x9E, 0x09, 0x22, 0x22, 0xE6, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x14, 0x28, 0x13, 0x1B, 0x62, 0x12, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x7F, 0x67, 0x03, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF3, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xC3, 0x0F, 0xFB, 0x25, 0x48, 0x3E, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x98, 0x36, 0xB3, 0xD3, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x81, 0x54, 0x22, 0xA4, 0xCC, 0xC1, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xBA, 0xFC, 0xA9, 0xDF, 0x68, 0x86, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x92, 0x0E, 0xC3, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xE8, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp521r1_T[32] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp521r1_T_0_X, secp521r1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_1_X, secp521r1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_2_X, secp521r1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_3_X, secp521r1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_4_X, secp521r1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_5_X, secp521r1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_6_X, secp521r1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_7_X, secp521r1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_8_X, secp521r1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_9_X, secp521r1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_10_X, secp521r1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_11_X, secp521r1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_12_X, secp521r1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_13_X, secp521r1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_14_X, secp521r1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_15_X, secp521r1_T_15_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_16_X, secp521r1_T_16_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_17_X, secp521r1_T_17_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_18_X, secp521r1_T_18_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_19_X, secp521r1_T_19_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_20_X, secp521r1_T_20_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_21_X, secp521r1_T_21_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_22_X, secp521r1_T_22_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_23_X, secp521r1_T_23_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_24_X, secp521r1_T_24_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_25_X, secp521r1_T_25_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_26_X, secp521r1_T_26_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_27_X, secp521r1_T_27_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_28_X, secp521r1_T_28_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_29_X, secp521r1_T_29_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_30_X, secp521r1_T_30_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp521r1_T_31_X, secp521r1_T_31_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define secp521r1_T NULL
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_a[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x03, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFD, 0xDE, 0x74, 0x6A, 0x46, 0x69, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xFC, 0xF2, 0x26, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0xE0, 0xEA, 0xB1, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF4, 0xB7, 0x80, 0x02, 0x7D, 0xB0, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xC0, 0x0E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xDB),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x2F, 0x5E, 0xD9, 0x88, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x86, 0xBE, 0x15, 0xD0, 0x63, 0x41, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x28, 0x56, 0x9C, 0x6D, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x9B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x77, 0x3D, 0x0D, 0x85, 0x48, 0xA8, 0xA9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x07, 0xDF, 0x1D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x01, 0x54),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x86, 0xF6, 0xAF, 0x19, 0x2A, 0x88, 0x2E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x90, 0xB6, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x36, 0x4C, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x11, 0x14, 0xA6, 0xCB, 0xBA, 0x15, 0xD9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0xB0, 0xF2, 0xD4, 0xC9, 0xDA, 0xBA, 0xD7),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0xC1, 0x9C, 0xE6, 0xBB, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x19, 0xAC, 0x5A, 0xC9, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xF6, 0x76, 0x86, 0x89, 0x27, 0x8D, 0x28),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xE0, 0x6F, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xD3, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0x87, 0xC9, 0x9D, 0xC0, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x11, 0x7E, 0xD6, 0xF7, 0x33, 0xFC, 0xE4),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x37, 0x3E, 0xC0, 0x7F, 0x62, 0xE7, 0x54),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x3B, 0x69, 0x9D, 0x44, 0xBC, 0x82, 0x99),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x84, 0xB3, 0x5F, 0x2B, 0xA5, 0x9E, 0x2C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x4C, 0x04, 0xB4, 0xF4, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xAD, 0x4B, 0xD5, 0x9A, 0xEB, 0xC4, 0x4E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xB1, 0xC5, 0x59, 0xE3, 0xD5, 0x16, 0x2A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x2A, 0xCC, 0xAC, 0xD0, 0xEE, 0x50, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x83, 0xE0, 0x5B, 0x14, 0x44, 0x52, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x15, 0x2D, 0x78, 0xF6, 0x51, 0x32, 0xCF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x36, 0x9B, 0xDD, 0xF8, 0xDD, 0xEF, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xB1, 0x6A, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2B, 0xB1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x87, 0x7A, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x5B, 0xDF, 0x8F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x45, 0xE5, 0x81, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x37, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x29, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x64, 0x23, 0x6B, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x1D, 0x41, 0xE1, 0x9B, 0x61, 0x7B, 0xD9),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x59, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x6E, 0x4A, 0x48, 0x84, 0x90, 0xAC, 0xC7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xB8, 0xF5, 0xF3, 0xDE, 0xA0, 0xA1, 0x1D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x32, 0x81, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x5A, 0x4E, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xA8, 0x90, 0xBE, 0x0F, 0xEC, 0xC0, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x30, 0xD7, 0x08, 0xAE, 0xC4, 0x3A, 0xA5),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x76, 0xB3, 0x64, 0x74, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x75, 0xD4, 0xDB, 0x98, 0xD7, 0x39, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xEB, 0x8A, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xD4, 0x0B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xBE, 0xF9, 0xC7, 0xC7, 0xBA, 0xF3, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x85, 0x59, 0xF3, 0x60, 0x41, 0x02, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x1C, 0x4A, 0xA4, 0xC7, 0xED, 0x66, 0xBC),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x46, 0x52, 0x18, 0x87, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x75, 0xAC, 0x4D, 0x75, 0x91),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0x2F, 0xAC, 0xFC, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x93, 0x5E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x4D, 0xC9, 0x18, 0xE9, 0x00, 0xEB, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x69, 0x72, 0x07, 0x5A, 0x59, 0xA8, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x65, 0x83, 0x20, 0x10, 0xF9, 0x69, 0x82),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x9F, 0xBF, 0x46, 0x0C, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xCF, 0xF0, 0xDC, 0xDF, 0x2D, 0xE6, 0xE5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xF0, 0x72, 0x3A, 0x7A, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x22),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xAA, 0x57, 0x13, 0x37, 0xA7, 0x2C, 0xD4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xAC, 0xA2, 0x23, 0xF9, 0x84, 0x60, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xEB, 0x51, 0x70, 0x64, 0x78, 0xCA, 0x05),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xCC, 0x30, 0x62, 0x93, 0x46, 0x13, 0xE9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x26, 0xCC, 0x6C, 0x3D, 0x5C, 0xDA, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xAA, 0xB8, 0x03, 0xA4, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x96),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x9D, 0xE6, 0xCC, 0x4E, 0x2E, 0xC2, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xC3, 0x8A, 0xAE, 0x6F, 0x40, 0x05, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x8F, 0x4A, 0x4D, 0x35, 0xD3, 0x50, 0x9D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xFD, 0x98, 0xAB, 0xC7, 0x03, 0xB4, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x40, 0xD2, 0x9F, 0xCA, 0xD0, 0x53, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x84, 0x00, 0x6F, 0xC8, 0xAD, 0xED, 0x8D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xD3, 0x57, 0xD7, 0xC3, 0x07, 0xBD, 0xD7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xBA, 0x47, 0x1D, 0x3D, 0xEF, 0x98, 0x6C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xC0, 0x6C, 0x7F, 0x12, 0xEE, 0x9F, 0x67),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x02, 0xDA, 0x79, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x27, 0xC4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x79, 0xC7, 0x71, 0x84, 0xCB, 0xE5, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x37, 0x06, 0xBA, 0xB5, 0xD5, 0x18, 0x4C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6C, 0xF2, 0x63, 0x27, 0x6A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0xBC, 0x71, 0xDF, 0x75, 0xF8, 0x98, 0x4D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x70, 0x9B, 0xDC, 0xE7, 0x18, 0x71, 0xFF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x5B, 0x9F, 0x00, 0x5A, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xE0, 0xBB, 0xFC, 0x5E, 0x78, 0x9C, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x03, 0x68, 0x83, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x4C, 0xDD),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x49, 0x23, 0xA8, 0xCB, 0x3B, 0x1A, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x46, 0xCF, 0x75, 0xB6, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0xFD, 0x30, 0x01, 0xB6, 0xEF, 0xF9, 0xE8),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0x29, 0x42, 0xC9, 0xC7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xD7, 0xA0, 0xE6, 0x6B, 0x86, 0x61, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0xE9, 0xD3, 0x37, 0xD8, 0xE7, 0x35, 0xA9),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC8, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xCB, 0xB1, 0xB5, 0x4D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xD7, 0x46, 0x7D, 0xAF, 0xE2, 0xDC, 0xBB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x46, 0xE7, 0xD8, 0x76, 0x31, 0x90, 0x76),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xD3, 0xF4, 0x74, 0xE1, 0x67, 0xD8, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x70, 0x3C, 0xC8, 0xAF, 0x5F, 0xF4, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x4E, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x43, 0xB3, 0x16, 0x35),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAE, 0xD1, 0xDD, 0x31, 0x14, 0xD3, 0xF0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x14, 0x06, 0x13, 0x12, 0x1C, 0x81, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xF9, 0x0C, 0x91, 0xF7, 0x67, 0x59, 0x63),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp192k1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x91, 0xE2, 0xF4, 0x9D, 0xEB, 0x88, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x82, 0x30, 0x9C, 0xAE, 0x18, 0x4D, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x79, 0xCF, 0x17, 0xA5, 0x1E, 0xE8, 0xC8),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp192k1_T[16] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp192k1_T_0_X, secp192k1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_1_X, secp192k1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_2_X, secp192k1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_3_X, secp192k1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_4_X, secp192k1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_5_X, secp192k1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_6_X, secp192k1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_7_X, secp192k1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_8_X, secp192k1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_9_X, secp192k1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_10_X, secp192k1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_11_X, secp192k1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_12_X, secp192k1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_13_X, secp192k1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_14_X, secp192k1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp192k1_T_15_X, secp192k1_T_15_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define secp192k1_T NULL
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xE5, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_a[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x05, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_4(0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xB1, 0x9F, 0x76, 0x71, 0xA9, 0xF0, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x61, 0xEC, 0xD2, 0xE8, 0xDC, 0x01, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xA4, 0xB7, 0xB6, 0x0E, 0x65, 0x7E, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x75, 0x70, 0xE4, 0xE9, 0x67, 0xA4, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x28, 0xFC, 0x30, 0xDF, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x4D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x5B, 0x45, 0xA1, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x61, 0x6D, 0x55, 0xDB, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xBD, 0xB0, 0xC0, 0xF7, 0x19, 0xE3, 0xF7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x82, 0x42, 0x34, 0xBA, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x9F, 0x08, 0x7E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x6C, 0x22, 0x22, 0x40, 0x89, 0xAE, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x92, 0xE1, 0x87, 0x56, 0x35, 0xAF, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xAF, 0x08, 0x35, 0x27, 0xEA, 0x04, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x53, 0xFD, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0xD0, 0x9F, 0x8D, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x54, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xDB, 0x0F, 0x61, 0x54, 0x26, 0xD1, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x21, 0xF7, 0x1B, 0xB5, 0x1D, 0xF6, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x05, 0xDA, 0x8F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x26, 0x73, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0x29, 0x62, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x95, 0x17, 0x8B, 0xC3, 0x9B, 0xAC, 0xCC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0xDB, 0x77, 0xDF, 0xDD, 0x13, 0x04, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0xFC, 0x22, 0x93, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x65, 0xF1, 0x5A, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x79, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x01, 0x37, 0xAC, 0x9A, 0x5B, 0x51, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x75, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x4A, 0xAD, 0xFE, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x82, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x5E, 0xF0, 0x40, 0xC3, 0xA6, 0xE2, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x9A, 0x6F, 0xCF, 0x11, 0x26, 0x66, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0x73, 0xA8, 0xCF, 0x2B, 0x12, 0x36, 0x37),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xB3, 0x0A, 0x58, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x79, 0x00, 0x55, 0x04, 0x34, 0x90, 0x1A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x54, 0x1C, 0xC2, 0x45, 0x0C, 0x1B, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x19, 0xAB, 0xA8, 0xFC, 0x73, 0xDC, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0xFB, 0x93, 0xCE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x75, 0xD0, 0x66, 0x95, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xEA, 0x29, 0x16, 0x6A, 0x38, 0xDF, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xA2, 0x36, 0x2F, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0x5E, 0xF7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x89, 0x59, 0x49, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0x77, 0x9D, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x93, 0x43, 0x47, 0xC6, 0x5C, 0xF9, 0xFD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x00, 0x79, 0x42, 0x64, 0xB8, 0x25, 0x3E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x54, 0xB4, 0x33, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x0C, 0x42, 0x90, 0x83, 0x0B, 0x31, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x2E, 0xAE, 0xC8, 0xC7, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x70),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xBC, 0xAD, 0x41, 0xE7, 0x32, 0x3A, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x97, 0x52, 0x83, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x13, 0x7A, 0xBD, 0xAE, 0x94, 0x60, 0xFD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x9B, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x6E, 0x68, 0xB2, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x49, 0xBE, 0x51, 0xFE, 0x66, 0x15, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x37, 0xE4, 0xFE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x9B, 0xEE, 0x64, 0xC9, 0x1B, 0xBD, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0xA9, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x25, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0x13, 0xB1, 0x38, 0xFB, 0x9D, 0x78, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xE7, 0x1B, 0xFA, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xB3, 0xB7, 0x44, 0x92, 0x6B, 0x00, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x82, 0x44, 0x3E, 0x18, 0x1A, 0x58, 0x6A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0xF8, 0xC0, 0xE4, 0xEE, 0xC1, 0xBF, 0x44),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x32, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x9A, 0x42, 0x62, 0x8B, 0x26, 0x54, 0x21),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x85, 0x74, 0xA0, 0x79, 0xA8, 0xEE, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x36, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x28, 0x4D, 0x55, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x27, 0x82, 0x29, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0xFC, 0x73, 0x77, 0xAF, 0x5C, 0xAC, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xED, 0xE5, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x43),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x1C, 0xF1, 0x80, 0x73, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xE2, 0xDE, 0x3C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x3E, 0x6B, 0xFE, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x28, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xB2, 0x14, 0x9D, 0x18, 0x11, 0x7D, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xC4, 0xD6, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x57, 0x4D, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x55, 0x1B, 0xDE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xF7, 0x17, 0xBC, 0x45, 0xAB, 0x16, 0xAB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xB0, 0xEF, 0x61, 0xE3, 0x20, 0x7C, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x85, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0x4D, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xC2, 0x9B, 0x5E, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x2E, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x3E, 0x4B, 0xD3, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x2B, 0x9D, 0xD5, 0x27, 0xFA, 0xCA, 0xE0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0xB3, 0x6A, 0xE0, 0x79, 0x14, 0x28, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x1E, 0xDC, 0xF5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x44, 0x56, 0xCD, 0xFC, 0x9F, 0x09, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x8C, 0x59, 0xA4, 0x64, 0x2A, 0x3A, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xA0, 0xB5, 0x86, 0x4E, 0x69, 0xDA, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x8B, 0x11, 0x38, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x17, 0x16, 0x12, 0x17, 0xDC, 0x00, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0x76, 0x24, 0x6C, 0x97, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x71, 0xE3, 0xB0, 0xBB, 0x4E, 0x50, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0x48, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x5F, 0x28, 0xF6, 0x01, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x95, 0xFE, 0xD0, 0xAD, 0x15, 0xD4, 0xD9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0xFD, 0x80, 0xF7, 0x9F, 0x64),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xBC, 0x1B, 0xDF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xE6, 0xDF, 0x14, 0x29, 0xF4, 0xD4, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x12, 0xDD, 0xEC, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x59, 0xE5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x92, 0x3E, 0x35, 0x08, 0xE9, 0xCF, 0x0E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0x35, 0x29, 0x97, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xDB, 0xD6, 0x6A, 0xC5, 0x43, 0xA4, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x33, 0x50, 0x61, 0x70, 0xA1, 0xE9, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x15, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x01, 0x0C, 0x8C, 0xFA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0xA1, 0x9A, 0x9D, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xC6, 0xF7, 0xE2, 0x4A, 0xCD, 0x9B, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x4D, 0x5A, 0xB8, 0xE2, 0x6D, 0xA6, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x3F, 0xB6, 0x17, 0xE3, 0x2C, 0x6F, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xA4, 0x59, 0x51, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0x49, 0xCD, 0x6E, 0xEB, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xC9, 0x1F, 0xB7, 0x4D, 0x98, 0xC7, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4C, 0xFD, 0x98, 0x20, 0x95, 0xBB, 0x20, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xF2, 0x73, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xEF, 0xFB, 0x30, 0xFA, 0x12, 0x1A, 0xB0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x4C, 0x24, 0xB4, 0x5B, 0xC9, 0x4C, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xDD, 0x5E, 0x84, 0x95, 0x4D, 0x26, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xFA, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0xA3, 0x2E, 0x7A, 0xDC, 0xA7, 0x53, 0xA9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x9F, 0x81, 0x84, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0xFE, 0x31),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x89, 0x1B, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x89, 0x71, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xB2, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xE9, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xA6, 0x3C, 0xAD, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xE0, 0x23, 0x02, 0x86, 0x0F, 0x77, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x93, 0x6D, 0xE9, 0xF9, 0x3C, 0xBE, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0xE7, 0x24, 0x92, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x3C, 0x5B, 0x4B, 0x1B, 0x25, 0x37, 0xD6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xE8, 0x38, 0x1B, 0xA1, 0x5A, 0x2E, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x19, 0xFD, 0xF4, 0x78, 0x01, 0x6B, 0x44),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0x69, 0x37, 0x4F, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xE2, 0xBF, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x95, 0x9C, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x7B, 0xFC, 0xD5, 0xD3, 0x25, 0x5E, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x55, 0x09, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x6A, 0xC9, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xCC, 0x3B, 0xD9, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp224k1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x08, 0x65, 0x5E, 0xCB, 0xAB, 0x48, 0xC8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x79, 0x8B, 0xC0, 0x11, 0xC0, 0x69, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xE8, 0x8C, 0x4C, 0xC5, 0x28, 0xE4, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x1F, 0x34, 0x5C, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp224k1_T[16] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp224k1_T_0_X, secp224k1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_1_X, secp224k1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_2_X, secp224k1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_3_X, secp224k1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_4_X, secp224k1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_5_X, secp224k1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_6_X, secp224k1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_7_X, secp224k1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_8_X, secp224k1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_9_X, secp224k1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_10_X, secp224k1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_11_X, secp224k1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_12_X, secp224k1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_13_X, secp224k1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_14_X, secp224k1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp224k1_T_15_X, secp224k1_T_15_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define secp224k1_T NULL
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xFC, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_a[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x00, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_2(0x07, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x41, 0x36, 0xD0, 0x8C, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xAF, 0xE6, 0xDC, 0xAE, 0xBA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF),
+};
+
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x17, 0xF8, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x81, 0xF2, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x2D, 0xDB, 0xFC, 0x9B, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x0B, 0x87, 0xCE, 0x95, 0x62, 0xA0, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xBB, 0xDC, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x66, 0xBE, 0x79),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0xD4, 0x10, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0xD0, 0x47, 0x9C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x54, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x17, 0xFD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x08, 0x11, 0x0E, 0xFC, 0xFB, 0xA4, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC4, 0xA3, 0x26, 0x77, 0xDA, 0x3A, 0x48),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xEE, 0xD7, 0x1E, 0x67, 0x86, 0x32, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x73, 0xB1, 0xA9, 0xD5, 0xCC, 0x27, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x01, 0x71, 0xFE, 0x92, 0x73),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x28, 0x63, 0x6D, 0x72, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xC0),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE1, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x3E, 0x2C, 0x75, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xB7, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0x3C, 0xDF, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x5D, 0x0E, 0xE8, 0x5E, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0xC3, 0x05, 0xD6, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x24, 0xFC),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0xCF, 0x7B, 0xDC, 0xCD, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0xDA, 0xB9, 0xE5, 0x64, 0xA7, 0x47, 0x91),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0x46, 0xA8, 0x61, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xEB, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xC1, 0xFF, 0xE4, 0x55, 0xD5, 0xC2, 0xBF),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xBE, 0xB9, 0x59, 0x24, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x45, 0x12, 0xDE, 0xBA, 0x4F, 0xEF, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x08, 0xBF, 0xC1, 0x66, 0xAA, 0x0A, 0xBC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xFE, 0x30, 0x55, 0x31, 0x86, 0xA7, 0xB4),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xBF, 0x18, 0x81, 0x67, 0x27, 0x42, 0xBD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x05, 0x83, 0xA4, 0xDD, 0x57, 0xD3, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x63, 0xAB, 0xE4, 0x90, 0x70, 0xD0, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x5D, 0xFD, 0xA0, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x1C, 0x54),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x80, 0xE4, 0xF6, 0x09, 0xBC, 0x57, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x9F, 0x6E, 0x88, 0x54, 0x6E, 0x51, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x5F, 0x85, 0xFB, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x4A, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x19, 0xF5, 0x55, 0xC9, 0x07, 0xD8, 0xCE),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xB4, 0xC3, 0xD9, 0x5C, 0xA0, 0xD4, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x30, 0xAF, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x66, 0x7B, 0xC3, 0x39, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE0, 0xBF, 0xF0, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0x71, 0xA4, 0x9E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0x88, 0x28, 0xF1, 0xBE, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xF3, 0x1A, 0x0E, 0xB9, 0x01, 0x66, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xA7, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x05, 0xD0, 0xAA, 0x53),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x39, 0x1E, 0x47, 0xE5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0xC0),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xB9, 0xFC, 0xE0, 0x33, 0x8A, 0x7D, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x93, 0xA5, 0x53, 0x55, 0x16, 0xB4, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x5F, 0xEA, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x52, 0x71, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xF0, 0x24, 0xB8, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0xA0, 0x9B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x00, 0x27, 0xB2, 0xDF, 0x73, 0xA2, 0xE0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x2E, 0x4D, 0x7C, 0xDE, 0x7A, 0x23, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x65, 0x60, 0xC7, 0x97, 0x1E, 0xA4, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x13, 0x5B, 0x77, 0x59, 0xCB, 0x36, 0xE1),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xBC, 0x9F, 0x9E, 0x2D, 0x53, 0x2A, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x5F, 0x64, 0x9F, 0x1A, 0x19, 0xE6, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x7B, 0x39, 0xD2, 0xDB, 0x85, 0x84, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xC7, 0x0D, 0x58, 0x6E, 0x3F, 0x52, 0x15),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x68, 0x19, 0x0B, 0x68, 0xC9, 0x1E, 0xFB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x4E, 0x21, 0x49, 0x3D, 0x55, 0xCC, 0x25),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xF9, 0x25, 0x45, 0x54, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xB3, 0xF7, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA4, 0x04, 0x05),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x1E, 0x88, 0xC4, 0xAA, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xAC, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x71, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xA2, 0xF1, 0x15, 0xA6, 0x5F, 0x6C, 0x86),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x5B, 0x05, 0xBC, 0xB7, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x72),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x80, 0xF8, 0x5C, 0x20, 0x2A, 0xE1, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x48, 0x2E, 0x68, 0x82, 0x7F, 0xEB, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x3B, 0x25, 0xDB, 0x32, 0x4D, 0x88, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0x6E, 0xA6, 0xB6, 0x6D, 0x62, 0x78, 0x22),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x4D, 0x3E, 0x86, 0x58, 0xC3, 0xEB, 0xBA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x89, 0x33, 0x18, 0x21, 0x1D, 0x9B, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x9D, 0xFF, 0xC3, 0x79, 0xC1, 0x88, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0xD4, 0x48, 0x53, 0xE8, 0xAD, 0x21, 0x16),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x7B, 0xDE, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0x39, 0x17, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xF3, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xC8, 0x8A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0xAE, 0x4C, 0xB0, 0x16, 0xA4, 0x93, 0x86),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x8B, 0x6B, 0xDC, 0xD7, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0x7E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0xD2, 0x59, 0x05, 0xA2, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x56, 0x09, 0x32, 0xF1, 0xE8, 0xE3, 0x72),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0xCA, 0xE5, 0x2E, 0xF0, 0xFB, 0x18, 0x19),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x85, 0xA9, 0x23, 0x15, 0x31, 0x1F, 0x0E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xE5, 0xB1, 0x86, 0xB9, 0x6E, 0x8D, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x77, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0xA3, 0x3F, 0x89, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x6A, 0xDC, 0x25, 0xB0, 0xC7, 0x41, 0x54),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x11, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0x11, 0x62, 0xD4, 0x2D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x7D, 0x34, 0xB3, 0x20, 0x7F, 0x37, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xD4, 0x45, 0xE8, 0xC2, 0xE9, 0xC5, 0xEA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x32, 0x3B, 0x25, 0x7E, 0x79, 0xAF, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xE4, 0x54, 0x71, 0xBE, 0x35, 0x4E, 0xD0),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x94, 0xDD, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0xC2, 0xDD, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x49, 0xE9, 0x1C, 0x2F, 0x08, 0x49, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xB6, 0x03, 0x88, 0x6F, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x67),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xD3, 0x1C, 0xF3, 0xA5, 0xEB, 0x79, 0x01),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xF9, 0x43, 0x88, 0x89, 0x0D, 0x06, 0xEA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x2D, 0xF5, 0x98, 0x32, 0xF6, 0xB1, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x73, 0x8F, 0x2B, 0x50, 0x27, 0x0A, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xE3, 0xBD, 0x16, 0x05, 0xC8, 0x93, 0x12),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xE3, 0x3D, 0xDE, 0x5F, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xA3, 0x9C, 0x22, 0x3C, 0x33, 0x36, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x69, 0x45, 0x78, 0x14, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xF8, 0xD4, 0xBF, 0xB8, 0xC0, 0xA1, 0x25),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x88, 0xE1, 0x91, 0x03, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x11, 0xA1, 0xEF, 0x14, 0x0D, 0xC4, 0x7D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0xD4, 0x0D, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x33, 0x5C, 0x19),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x45, 0x2A, 0x1A, 0xE6, 0x57, 0x04, 0x9B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xB5, 0xA7, 0x80, 0xE9, 0x93, 0x97, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0xB9, 0x7C, 0xA0, 0xC9, 0x57, 0x26, 0x43),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0xEF, 0x56, 0xDA, 0x66, 0xF6, 0x1B, 0x9A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x89, 0x6B, 0x91, 0xE0, 0xA9, 0x65, 0x2B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x98, 0x96, 0x9B, 0x06, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xFA, 0xC1, 0x5F, 0x19, 0x37, 0x94, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xBE, 0x6B, 0x1A, 0x05, 0xE4, 0xBF, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xCD, 0x5D, 0x35, 0xB4, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x64),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xEF, 0x96, 0xDB, 0xF2, 0x61, 0x63, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x04, 0x88, 0xC9, 0x9F, 0x1B, 0x94, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x30, 0x79, 0x7E, 0x24, 0xE7, 0x5F, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xB8, 0x90, 0xB7, 0x94, 0x25, 0xBB, 0x0F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x79, 0xEA, 0xAD, 0xC0, 0x6D, 0x18, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xA4, 0x58, 0x2A, 0x8D, 0x95, 0xB3, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC4, 0xC2, 0x12, 0x0D, 0x79, 0xE2, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x6F, 0xBE, 0x97, 0x4D, 0xA4, 0x20, 0x07),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x31, 0x71, 0xC6, 0xA6, 0x91, 0xEB, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x9B, 0xA8, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0x77, 0xE1, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0x06, 0xD3, 0x3D, 0x94, 0x30, 0xEF, 0x8C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xDF, 0xCA, 0xFA, 0xF5, 0x28, 0xF8, 0xC9),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0xE1, 0x32, 0xFD, 0x3E, 0x81, 0xF8, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0xF2, 0x4B, 0x1D, 0x19, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xCC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xB1, 0x8A, 0x22, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x6B, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0x21, 0xEF, 0x30, 0xEC, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x89),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint secp256k1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x84, 0x4A, 0x46, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x3C, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x18, 0x3A, 0xF4, 0xCC, 0xF5, 0xB2, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0x8F, 0xCD, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xF4, 0xBD, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x89, 0x7F, 0x8A, 0xB1, 0x52, 0x3A, 0xAB),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point secp256k1_T[16] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(secp256k1_T_0_X, secp256k1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_1_X, secp256k1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_2_X, secp256k1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_3_X, secp256k1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_4_X, secp256k1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_5_X, secp256k1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_6_X, secp256k1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_7_X, secp256k1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_8_X, secp256k1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_9_X, secp256k1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_10_X, secp256k1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_11_X, secp256k1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_12_X, secp256k1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_13_X, secp256k1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_14_X, secp256k1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(secp256k1_T_15_X, secp256k1_T_15_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define secp256k1_T NULL
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Domain parameters for brainpoolP256r1 (RFC 5639 3.4)
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x53, 0x6E, 0x1F, 0x1D, 0x48, 0x13, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x20, 0x26, 0xD5, 0x23, 0xF6, 0x3B, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_a[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3, 0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26, 0xC1, 0x55, 0x80, 0xFB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xFF, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x30, 0x75, 0xF6, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x30, 0x2C, 0xFC, 0x75, 0x09, 0x5A, 0x7D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x07, 0x8C, 0xFF, 0x18, 0xDC, 0xCC, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE1, 0xF7, 0x5C, 0x29, 0x16, 0x84, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0xBB, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x30, 0xF3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xE9, 0x6C, 0x5C, 0xDC, 0x26),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x56, 0x48, 0x97, 0x82, 0x0E, 0x1E, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xA6, 0x61, 0xB5, 0xA3, 0x7A, 0x39, 0x8C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x8D, 0x83, 0x9D, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x66, 0x3E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA9, 0xEE, 0xA1, 0xDB, 0x57, 0xFB, 0xA9),
+};
+
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0x32, 0xCE, 0x9A, 0xBD, 0x53, 0x44, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x23, 0xBD, 0xE3, 0xE1, 0x27, 0xDE, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xB7, 0x81, 0xFC, 0x2F, 0x48, 0x4B, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x57, 0x7E, 0xCB, 0xB9, 0xAE, 0xD2, 0x8B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x69, 0x04, 0x2F, 0xC7, 0x54, 0x1D, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x8E, 0xED, 0x2D, 0x13, 0x45, 0x77, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x1D, 0x61, 0x14, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xF8, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xC4, 0xDA, 0xC3, 0x35, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0x54),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xA2, 0xED, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0xE3, 0xA5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0xC9, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x3F, 0x93, 0x7A, 0xD1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x12, 0x53, 0x61, 0x3E, 0x76, 0x08, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0x8C, 0x74, 0xF4, 0x08, 0xC3, 0x76, 0x80),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0xDD, 0x09, 0xA6, 0xED, 0xEE, 0xC4, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xD9, 0xBE, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x20, 0x12, 0xCA, 0x0A, 0x38, 0x24, 0xAB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x72, 0x71, 0x90, 0x7A, 0x2E, 0xB7, 0x23),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x66, 0xA1, 0x93, 0x10, 0x2A, 0x51, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0xBC, 0xB0, 0xB6, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x58, 0xD7, 0x0A, 0x84, 0x05, 0xA3, 0x9C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x8E, 0x95, 0x61, 0xD3, 0x0B, 0xDF, 0x36),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x92, 0x12, 0x0F, 0x5E, 0x87, 0x70, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xEB, 0x3A, 0xFB, 0xCF, 0xC4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xF7, 0x45, 0xD3, 0x06, 0xB6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x28, 0x65, 0xE1, 0xC5, 0x6C, 0x57, 0x18),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x01, 0x81, 0x9E, 0x38, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xA5, 0x91, 0x2B, 0xDF, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xEE, 0xB6, 0x25, 0xD6, 0x98, 0xDE, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0xA1, 0x55, 0x63, 0x39, 0xEB, 0xB5, 0x47),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xD6, 0xB8, 0xE3, 0x13, 0xED, 0x7F, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xE8, 0xAE, 0x36, 0xB8, 0xCD, 0x19, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x82, 0x83, 0x7A, 0x7B, 0x46, 0x56, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x60, 0x46, 0x15, 0x5A, 0xAC, 0x99, 0x30),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x61, 0x50, 0xC6, 0xFF, 0x10, 0x7D, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x51, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0x7D, 0x78, 0x26, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0x15, 0x9A, 0xF7, 0x01, 0xC1, 0xBB, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x0F, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xBD, 0x4A, 0x9E, 0x87),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xF8, 0xD1, 0x77, 0xD2, 0x49, 0xB3, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x86, 0xFB, 0x9E, 0x1F, 0x5A, 0x60, 0x47),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xC4, 0x8D, 0xCD, 0x86, 0x61, 0x2F, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xF6, 0xB9, 0xAC, 0x37, 0x9D, 0xE9, 0x28),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x77, 0xAA, 0x97, 0x9C, 0x0B, 0x04, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0xA6, 0x60, 0x81, 0xCE, 0x25, 0x13, 0x3E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x00, 0xF3, 0xBB, 0x82, 0x99, 0x95, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x5A, 0xCE, 0x90, 0x71, 0x38, 0x2F, 0x10),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x1A, 0xC0, 0x84, 0x27, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x37, 0x52, 0x16, 0x13, 0x0E, 0xCE, 0x92),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xBF, 0x5A, 0xDB, 0xDB, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0xB7, 0x5E, 0xF9, 0x86, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x5C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xAB, 0x5C, 0x8D, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x2D, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0xC5, 0xF8, 0xF7, 0x1D, 0x96, 0x0B, 0x4D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x4C, 0xA7, 0x45, 0x20, 0x6A, 0x1E, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x5D, 0xEF, 0xDE, 0xEE, 0x39, 0x44, 0x19),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x2F, 0x6D, 0x52, 0xC9, 0x58, 0x60, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xC9, 0x62, 0xCB, 0x38, 0x3C, 0x55, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xA5, 0x09, 0x10, 0x88, 0xDB, 0xE3, 0xBD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0xCE, 0x06, 0x0B, 0x4B, 0x5D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x1D, 0xB4, 0x10, 0x76, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0x09),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x70, 0x5A, 0x07, 0xF5, 0x1A, 0x74, 0xC7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xE9, 0x94, 0xA8, 0xC0, 0xD5, 0x4A, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x6D, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0x9B, 0xE9, 0x6D, 0x0E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x00, 0x32, 0x41, 0x57, 0x84, 0x89, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xC7, 0x14, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0xFF, 0xF3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x67, 0x9E, 0xFB, 0xB6, 0xB8, 0x96, 0xF3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0x4A, 0xE3, 0x97, 0x4B, 0x58, 0xDE, 0x30),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0x1E, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x7F, 0xD5, 0xD4, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x08, 0x7A, 0xF1, 0xBD, 0x89, 0xC7, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0xF9, 0x11, 0x1B, 0xF5, 0x3C, 0x6D, 0x8C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x50, 0xE5, 0x69, 0x1D, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x0C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x2F, 0xF8, 0x3F, 0xEC, 0x55, 0x99, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x90, 0x43, 0x81, 0x31, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x18, 0x44, 0x50, 0x5D, 0x76, 0xCB, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xC5, 0x5B, 0x9A, 0x03, 0xE6, 0x17, 0x39),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x89, 0xFC, 0x55, 0x94, 0x91, 0x6A, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x46, 0x35, 0xF2, 0x3A, 0x42, 0x08, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0xD2, 0x76, 0x49, 0x42, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xEA, 0xA0, 0x52, 0xF1, 0x6A, 0x30, 0x57),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0xB2, 0x57, 0xA3, 0x8A, 0x4D, 0x1B, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0xA3, 0x99, 0x94, 0xB5, 0x3D, 0x64, 0x09),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xC3, 0xD7, 0x53, 0xF6, 0x49, 0x1C, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x23, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xFB, 0x7A, 0x5C, 0x53),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xB8, 0x15, 0x65, 0x5C, 0x85, 0x94, 0xD7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x37, 0xC7, 0xF8, 0x7E, 0xAE, 0x6C, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xD8, 0x11, 0x54, 0x98, 0x44, 0xE3, 0xF1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x4D, 0xA6, 0x4B, 0x28, 0xF2, 0x57, 0x9E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xD0, 0xEB, 0x1E, 0xAA, 0x30, 0xD3, 0x6A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0xA7, 0x73, 0x6E, 0xB6, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x47, 0xF6, 0xED, 0x37, 0xEF, 0x71, 0x4D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xB5, 0x49, 0x61, 0x5E, 0x45, 0xF6, 0x4A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x0E, 0xB3, 0x84, 0x3A, 0x63, 0x72, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x53, 0x5C, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0x2E, 0xAB, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x0F, 0x8F, 0x87, 0x50, 0x28, 0xB4, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x98, 0x4A, 0x98, 0x31, 0x86, 0xCA, 0x51),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xC9, 0xE2, 0xFD, 0x5D, 0x1F, 0xE8, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x90, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xBA, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x5A, 0xB3, 0x4E, 0xFB, 0xE0, 0x57, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x0B, 0x90, 0xA6, 0xFD, 0x9D, 0x8E, 0x02),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x41, 0x8F, 0x31, 0xFA, 0x5A, 0xF6, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xE9, 0xE3, 0xF6, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0xE7, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0x4E, 0xCD, 0xA2, 0x22, 0x14, 0xD4, 0x12),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xED, 0x21, 0xB7, 0x0F, 0x53, 0x10, 0x17),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x06, 0x24, 0x2C, 0x4E, 0xD1, 0x1E, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0x9F, 0xAB, 0xF0, 0x37, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x03, 0x5E, 0x12, 0xCE, 0x83, 0x1B, 0x2A, 0x18),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x65, 0xCF, 0xE8, 0x5C, 0xA5, 0xA2, 0x70),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x86, 0x76, 0x3A, 0x94, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0xC1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xDA, 0xC9, 0xA6, 0x29, 0x93, 0x15, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x61, 0x6A, 0x7D, 0xC7, 0xA9, 0xF3, 0x76),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x03, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x15, 0xCE, 0x50, 0x72),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xD0, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x91, 0xC4, 0x4F, 0x24),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x4B, 0x7E, 0xD7, 0x71, 0x58, 0x7E, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x45, 0xAF, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x93, 0x95, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x8F, 0xC7, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0x7A, 0x86, 0x54),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0xAF, 0x68, 0x3A, 0x23, 0xC1, 0x2E, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x50, 0x11, 0x67, 0x39, 0xB9, 0xAF, 0x48),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x86, 0xAA, 0x1E, 0x88, 0x21, 0x29, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x28, 0xA4, 0x9D, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x9A, 0x10),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xBA, 0x04, 0x67, 0xB7, 0x01, 0x40, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xA3, 0xCA, 0xA6, 0x37, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x97, 0xA8, 0xB6, 0x3C, 0xEE, 0x90, 0x3D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xED, 0xC4, 0xF7, 0xC3, 0x95, 0xEC, 0x85),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x84, 0xBD, 0xEB, 0xD5, 0x64, 0xBB, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x9B, 0xE2, 0x28, 0x50, 0xC2, 0x72, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0xF2, 0x74, 0xD1, 0x26, 0xBF, 0x32, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xCB, 0xAF, 0x72, 0xDB, 0x6D, 0x30, 0x98),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x50, 0x85, 0xF4, 0x2B, 0x48, 0xC1, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x28, 0xBB, 0x11, 0xBA, 0x5B, 0x22, 0x6C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0x5C, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x44, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xE8, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xBB, 0xC1, 0x81, 0x7F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP256r1_T[16] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP256r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP256r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP256r1_T_15_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define brainpoolP256r1_T NULL
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Domain parameters for brainpoolP384r1 (RFC 5639 3.6)
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xEC, 0x07, 0x31, 0x13, 0x00, 0x47, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x1A, 0x1D, 0x90, 0x29, 0xA7, 0xD3, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x11, 0xB7, 0x7F, 0x19, 0xDA, 0xB1, 0x12),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_a[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0xD4, 0x3A, 0x50, 0x4A, 0x81, 0xA5, 0x8A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xF9, 0x91, 0xBA, 0xEF, 0x65, 0x91, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x27, 0xB2, 0x4F, 0x8E, 0xA2, 0xBE, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xAF, 0x05, 0xCE, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x72, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x15, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0xC6, 0x82, 0xC3, 0x7B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x4C, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x96, 0x86, 0xB7, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0xC9, 0xDB, 0x95, 0x02, 0x39, 0xB4, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x62, 0xEB, 0x3E, 0xA5, 0x0E, 0x88, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA6, 0xD2, 0xDC, 0x07, 0xE1, 0x7D, 0xB7, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x44, 0xF0, 0x16, 0x54, 0xB5, 0x39, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x28, 0xCE, 0x22, 0xDD, 0xC7, 0xA8, 0x04),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x65, 0x04, 0xE9, 0x02, 0x32, 0x88, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xC3, 0x7F, 0x6B, 0xAF, 0xB6, 0x3A, 0xCF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x25, 0x04, 0xAC, 0x6C, 0x6E, 0x16, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x56, 0x54, 0xED, 0x09, 0x71, 0x2F, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x41, 0xE6, 0x50, 0x7E, 0x6F, 0x5D, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x6D, 0x38, 0xA3, 0x82, 0x1E, 0xB9, 0x8C),
+};
+
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x47, 0xE2, 0xB2, 0x87, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x46, 0xD6, 0x36, 0x34, 0xE0, 0x26, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x10, 0xBD, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x7E, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0x47, 0x88),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x3F, 0xC1, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x3A, 0xA6, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x68, 0xF0, 0x64, 0x1C, 0x1D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x53, 0x3C, 0x26, 0x41, 0x03, 0x82, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x91, 0x77, 0x21, 0x46, 0x46, 0x0E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x29, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x4F, 0x05, 0x9C, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x58, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0x29, 0x0B, 0xB7, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0xD5, 0xCF, 0x95, 0x8E, 0xEB, 0xB1, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xC2, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x75, 0x1D, 0xBE, 0x8A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0xD8, 0x8A, 0x54, 0x41, 0xD6, 0x6B, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x3B, 0xF1, 0x22, 0xFD, 0x2D, 0x4B, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x55, 0xE3, 0x33, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x52, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x3F, 0x30, 0x26, 0xCA, 0x7F, 0x52, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD3, 0x6E, 0x17, 0x9B, 0xD5, 0x2A, 0x4A, 0x31),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xDA, 0x6B, 0xE5, 0x03, 0x07, 0x1D, 0x2E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0x98, 0xE3, 0xA4, 0xF6, 0x19),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x7D, 0xFE, 0x51, 0x40, 0x3B, 0x47, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x88, 0xEC, 0xC4, 0xE2, 0x8F, 0xCB, 0xA4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xE2, 0x88, 0x2D, 0x4E, 0x50, 0xEB, 0x9A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x54, 0x94, 0x5E, 0xF4, 0x7F, 0x3A, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x07, 0x1C, 0xE1, 0xBD, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x63),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x92, 0x28, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x04, 0xB1, 0x4D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x82, 0x44, 0x43, 0x76, 0x0D, 0x55, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xE3, 0xFF, 0x89, 0x46, 0xDE, 0x4E, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0x22, 0xBB, 0x67, 0x1A, 0x81, 0xEE, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x54, 0xE2, 0x7A, 0xAE, 0xDA, 0x2C, 0xD0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x9A, 0x90, 0xAA, 0x6E, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x5F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x40, 0xAC, 0xED, 0x7D, 0x37, 0x87, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0xF8, 0xB1, 0x80, 0x4C, 0x8C, 0x04, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x98, 0x2C, 0xAD, 0x30, 0x69, 0x35, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x2E, 0x00, 0x2F, 0x44, 0x8C, 0xF0, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x58, 0x07, 0xD7, 0xCD, 0x60, 0xA1, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0xFB, 0x7B, 0x03, 0x05, 0x5E, 0x79, 0x73),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x17, 0xCE, 0x38, 0x4B, 0x5E, 0x5B, 0xC8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x0E, 0x0A, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x7C, 0x62, 0x08),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xF0, 0x98, 0x71, 0x7F, 0x17, 0x26, 0xD7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0xD3, 0xFA, 0x3C, 0xF0, 0x70, 0x07, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x47, 0x5C, 0x09, 0x43, 0xB7, 0x65, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xFA, 0xF3, 0xEC, 0x22),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x78, 0x22, 0x2B, 0x58, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x30, 0xCE, 0x6A, 0xB3, 0xB0, 0x4F, 0x83),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0x95, 0x20, 0xA9, 0x23, 0xC2, 0x65, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0xCF, 0x03, 0x5B, 0x8A, 0x80, 0x44, 0xBB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xF8, 0x91, 0xF7, 0xD5, 0xED, 0xEA, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x5B, 0x16, 0x10, 0x25, 0xAC, 0x2A, 0x17),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xEC, 0xDC, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0x8C, 0x6B, 0xE9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xBB, 0x1C, 0xD3, 0x5A, 0xEE, 0xD9, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x5D, 0x30, 0x5E, 0xF7, 0xB2, 0x41, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xCE, 0x0F, 0x1A, 0xC6, 0x41, 0x64, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x18, 0xE1, 0xE3, 0x82, 0x15, 0x66, 0x4B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0xE2, 0x24, 0x04, 0x72, 0x39, 0xA0, 0x7C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x51, 0xA2, 0x58, 0x88, 0x62, 0xE1, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xD2, 0x65, 0x14, 0xE9, 0x4C, 0x82, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xE1, 0xAC, 0x87, 0xAE, 0x31, 0x1A, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0x4F, 0x96, 0x1E, 0x85, 0x7A, 0xC3, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x86, 0xBB, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0x9D, 0x08, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x53, 0x03, 0x09, 0x80, 0x91, 0xEF, 0x68),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0xD7, 0xAF, 0x6F, 0x69, 0x7B, 0x88, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x13, 0xE4, 0x30, 0xA2, 0x47, 0xB5, 0xC1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xD2, 0xC0, 0xDD, 0x8A, 0x1C, 0x3C, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x8C, 0xB3, 0x4C, 0xBA, 0x8B, 0x6D, 0xCF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0xC7, 0xA1, 0xA8, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x4F, 0xF1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x4A, 0x97, 0xC8, 0x03, 0x6F, 0x01, 0x82),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x18, 0x12, 0xA9, 0x39, 0xD5, 0x22, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0xA7, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x9D, 0x8D, 0x78, 0x38),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xB3, 0xD0, 0x7F, 0xDF, 0xD0, 0x30, 0xDE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x25, 0x73, 0x96, 0xEC, 0xA8, 0x1D, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xD1, 0x65, 0x66, 0xDC, 0xD9, 0xCF, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xED, 0x7B, 0x37, 0xAD, 0xE2, 0xBE, 0x2D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x79, 0x42, 0x6A, 0x07, 0x66, 0xB1, 0xBD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x53, 0x62, 0x65, 0x92, 0x09, 0x4C, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xAF, 0xC3, 0x03, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x2D, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xCA, 0x41, 0xD9, 0xA2, 0x69, 0x9B, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0xB2, 0xA6, 0x8D, 0xE1, 0xAA, 0x61, 0x76),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xBA, 0x4D, 0x12, 0xB6, 0xBE, 0xF3, 0x7E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xD9, 0x92, 0x22, 0x07, 0xCE, 0xC9, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xA1, 0x7C, 0x91, 0xDB, 0x32, 0xF7, 0xE5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x49, 0x4B, 0x6D, 0xFB, 0xD9, 0x70, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xFB, 0x4E, 0x4C, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x81, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xB3, 0xE1, 0x00, 0xB7, 0xD9, 0xCC, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x36, 0x8B, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xFD, 0x30),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x1F, 0x60, 0x03, 0xBB, 0xD7, 0x60, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x3C, 0x62, 0xDD, 0x71, 0x95, 0xE9, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0x5F, 0x68, 0x81, 0xC5, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xAF, 0xB5, 0xB9, 0x98, 0x42, 0x28, 0xA5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x29, 0x8E, 0x11, 0x49, 0xB4, 0xD7, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x3E, 0xD2, 0x30, 0xA1, 0xBA, 0xCA, 0x03),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x37, 0x64, 0x44, 0x2F, 0x03, 0xE5, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x42, 0xBC, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0x1A, 0x5F, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0x04, 0xAB, 0x04, 0xE0, 0x24, 0xAD, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x45, 0x17, 0x67, 0x1F, 0x3E, 0x53, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x0F, 0xB3, 0x1B, 0x57, 0x54, 0xC2, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xD3, 0xF8, 0xC4, 0x1B, 0x9B, 0xFA, 0x30),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x90, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0xCA, 0x49, 0x38, 0x4E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xCF, 0xC6, 0xDD, 0xF0, 0xFF, 0x8C, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x69, 0x9D, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x33, 0xE9, 0xB4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x19, 0x82, 0x3D, 0xAC, 0x1C, 0x40, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0xC7, 0x02, 0x46, 0x14, 0x77, 0x00, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x05, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x3A, 0x66, 0x5C, 0x39),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xE6, 0x17, 0xDE, 0xB2, 0xA1, 0xE5, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xD8, 0xF5, 0xD4, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xC6, 0x42, 0x5E, 0xE7, 0x18, 0xBA, 0xD0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x21, 0x68, 0x5A, 0x26, 0xFB, 0xD7, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x00, 0x5C, 0xBA, 0x8A, 0x34, 0xEC, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0x9C, 0x3C, 0xAF, 0x53, 0xE8, 0x65, 0x35),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xEF, 0x28, 0xDC, 0x67, 0x05, 0xC8, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x78, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x49, 0xA0, 0xBC, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x3E, 0x2D, 0xA0, 0xCF, 0xD4, 0x7A, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x93, 0xFE, 0x60, 0xB3, 0x6E, 0x99, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x62, 0xAD, 0x04, 0xE7, 0x49, 0xAF, 0x5E, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x7A, 0xED, 0xA6, 0x9E, 0x18, 0x09, 0x31),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x05, 0x94, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xB8, 0x85, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xB7, 0x37, 0xC2, 0x50, 0x75, 0x15, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0xC6, 0x0F, 0xB2, 0xA9, 0x91, 0x3E, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x81, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x73, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xF1, 0xD1, 0x61, 0x7C, 0x76, 0x8F, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0xDB, 0x4A, 0xFF, 0x14, 0xA7, 0x48, 0x0B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x73, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xCC, 0xF1, 0x57, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0xED, 0x73, 0x27, 0x70, 0x82, 0xB6, 0x5E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xBA, 0xAC, 0x3A, 0xCF, 0xF4, 0xEA, 0xA6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xD6, 0xB1, 0x8F, 0x0E, 0x08, 0x2C, 0x5E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x2F, 0x0E, 0xA1, 0xF3, 0x07),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0xF5, 0x7C, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x0A, 0xF6, 0x28),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0xEE, 0x17, 0x47, 0x34, 0x15, 0xA3, 0xAF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xBE, 0x88, 0x48, 0xE7, 0xA2, 0xBB, 0xDE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xAD, 0xDC, 0x65, 0x61, 0x37, 0x0F, 0xC1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x67, 0xAD, 0xA2, 0x3A, 0x1C, 0x91, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x07, 0x0C, 0x3A, 0x41, 0x6E, 0x13, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0xBD, 0x7E, 0xED, 0xAA, 0x14, 0xDD, 0x61),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC3, 0xDC, 0x20, 0x01, 0x72, 0x11, 0x48, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xC4, 0x7B, 0xF8, 0x62, 0x3D, 0xF0, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xC2, 0x3D, 0x2E, 0x52, 0xA3, 0x4A, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xE2, 0x53, 0x46, 0x5E, 0x21, 0xF8, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xC7, 0x8F, 0xA9, 0x26, 0x42, 0x32, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xA6, 0xA0, 0x8D, 0x4B, 0x9A, 0x19, 0x03),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xAB, 0x6D, 0x1E, 0xFB, 0xEE, 0x60, 0x0C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x56, 0x3C, 0xC5, 0x5D, 0x10, 0x79, 0x1C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0xBC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0x71, 0xEF, 0x02, 0xF9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x36, 0xC4, 0xD0, 0x88, 0x9B, 0x32, 0xFC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xD4, 0x5D, 0x17, 0x39, 0xE6, 0x22, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7B, 0x26, 0x01, 0xCE, 0xBE, 0x4A, 0x9C, 0x27),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x6D, 0x11, 0xCA, 0x6C, 0x5A, 0x93, 0x0C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x96, 0x26, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0xE4, 0x30, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xC1, 0x4C, 0xC6, 0x30, 0x1F, 0x5C, 0x04),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x59, 0xB3, 0xE8, 0xFC, 0x35, 0xEB, 0x63, 0x6C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x1D, 0xCA, 0xFC, 0x50, 0x36, 0x4B, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x0E, 0x23, 0x5B, 0xAF, 0xEB, 0x2D, 0x31),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0x88, 0xB6, 0xD7, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x23, 0xB6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x66, 0xE2, 0xBB, 0x29, 0xA6, 0x4F, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x68, 0x6E, 0xA0, 0x14, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x73, 0xD4, 0xE8, 0xAB, 0x5B, 0xF6, 0x0D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xE0, 0x3C, 0x24, 0x00, 0x95, 0xE9, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x0D, 0x4F, 0x81, 0xD0, 0xF2, 0x3F, 0x00),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0x1D, 0xCD, 0x78, 0x39, 0xC4, 0x6B, 0xD9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x45, 0xC7, 0xB8, 0x2F, 0xAA, 0x5D, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0x8C, 0x6E, 0xA3, 0x24, 0xB2, 0xDB, 0x4B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x2D, 0xD9, 0xF1, 0xC7, 0x9B, 0x8A, 0xAF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0xB9, 0x40, 0x37, 0x91, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x2C, 0xB5, 0x23, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xAF, 0x2F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0x9D, 0x5A, 0x20, 0x10, 0xA9, 0x84, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x30, 0x89, 0x20, 0x13, 0xE9, 0xB2, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x6E, 0x52, 0xEB, 0x03, 0x18, 0x1F, 0xA6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x9E, 0x1C, 0x35, 0x87, 0x92, 0x69, 0xC7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0xC9, 0x88, 0xAF, 0xC6, 0x6C, 0x83, 0x72),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0xD5, 0x7A, 0x54, 0x34, 0x99, 0xB6, 0x6F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0xAD, 0x45, 0x9B, 0x4B, 0x41, 0x4D, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0x5D, 0xAB, 0x7F, 0x35, 0x34, 0xE9, 0x29),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0xBE, 0x78, 0x34, 0x44, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xDE, 0xE3, 0xC4, 0xEE, 0x0B, 0xF9, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x86, 0x16, 0x48, 0x32, 0xB8, 0x74, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0xEE, 0x7C, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0x81, 0xE3, 0x55),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x6A, 0xFA, 0x84, 0xDA, 0xB8, 0xD5, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x9F, 0x8A, 0xD5, 0x1B, 0x2E, 0x1A, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x0C, 0x61, 0xE2, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0xE6, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x62, 0xC1, 0x87, 0x53, 0x1B, 0x92, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x90, 0x00, 0xD1, 0x6A, 0x0C, 0x0E, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x2E, 0xB5, 0x3B, 0x44, 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x78),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x5D, 0x02, 0x58, 0xB5, 0xBE, 0x45, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xEF, 0x8E, 0x90, 0x4D, 0x2A, 0x32, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0x99, 0x75, 0x5C, 0x0A, 0x33, 0x8F, 0x36),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x6C, 0x95, 0xD4, 0x1F, 0xF3, 0xEB, 0xDA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0xE4, 0x4C, 0x91, 0x20, 0xF3, 0x25, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x95, 0xEB, 0x29, 0x6F, 0x20, 0x34, 0x81),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x15, 0xE5, 0x13, 0x7E, 0x64, 0x8B, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xBC, 0x0D, 0x18, 0x7E, 0x37, 0x9E, 0xFA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x82, 0x20, 0xF7, 0x2D, 0x7A, 0x77, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x29, 0xA2, 0xDB, 0x7A, 0xE6, 0x6F, 0xA5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xC6, 0x50, 0x5C, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xBD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x9F, 0xD5, 0xE8, 0xC5, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x30),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x03, 0x55, 0x10, 0xDB, 0xA6, 0x8B, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x17, 0xAE, 0x78, 0xC9, 0x1D, 0x43, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x35, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x47, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x95, 0x2F, 0xEA, 0xBC, 0xB4, 0x18, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x48, 0xAE, 0x89, 0xF5, 0x65, 0x3D, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0x20, 0xD1, 0x75, 0x50, 0x63),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0xE6, 0x5C, 0x2C, 0xE0, 0x7D, 0xDF, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x07, 0x3E, 0xCE, 0x9F, 0x18, 0xB6, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0xF8, 0xF0, 0xD5, 0xFA, 0x42, 0x1D, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x6C, 0x1D, 0x03, 0xC9, 0x0E, 0x2B, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x18, 0x52, 0xA5, 0xB4, 0x63, 0xE1, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x0A, 0xD9, 0xC4, 0xFD, 0x16, 0x60, 0x54),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x7D, 0xDE, 0xDF, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xB0, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x4E, 0x8C, 0x94, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0x85, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4F, 0xF0, 0xEA, 0xB5, 0x9B, 0x70, 0xEF, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x56, 0xC2, 0x39, 0x5D, 0xF3, 0x2C, 0xD9, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0x1C, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x2F, 0x54, 0x87, 0x80),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB0, 0x72, 0xC7, 0xB5, 0x50, 0xA3, 0x84, 0x77),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xD1, 0xAF, 0xA9, 0xB4, 0x8B, 0x5D, 0xFA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xF6, 0x52, 0x8A, 0xC3, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x5E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x52, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x05, 0x42, 0x77, 0x83),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x08, 0x90, 0x72, 0x86, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x15, 0xF8, 0xF1, 0x16, 0x67, 0xC6, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x87, 0xAC, 0x8F, 0x71, 0xEC, 0x83, 0x81),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0xE1, 0xE6, 0x2D, 0x0E, 0x11, 0xA1, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0xE2, 0xA8, 0x32, 0xE6, 0xE3, 0x83, 0xD1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x56, 0xE5, 0xCD, 0xB7, 0x2B, 0x67, 0x6F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xED, 0xC9, 0x65, 0x6D, 0x87, 0xE1, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x8E, 0xFD, 0x9A, 0x53, 0x0E, 0xFA, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0x23, 0x84, 0xFA, 0x01),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xFE, 0x49, 0x81, 0xD1, 0x3E, 0xF4, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x72, 0xE0, 0xEF, 0x0D, 0xB8, 0x3E, 0x6F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0xCE, 0x60, 0x72, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xCC, 0xD8, 0x03, 0x07, 0x6E, 0x5A, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x3A, 0x35, 0x50, 0x4E, 0x1F, 0xCA, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0xEA, 0x88, 0x55, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x05, 0x7F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x6D, 0xF1, 0x97, 0xA6, 0x69, 0x39, 0x24),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0x41, 0x99, 0xFF, 0x3B, 0xA1, 0x26, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x2F, 0x95, 0x80, 0x12, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xBF, 0x51, 0xAA, 0xAE, 0x2D, 0xDA, 0xCF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x1C, 0xB3, 0x52, 0x36, 0x49, 0xD4, 0x86),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xC1, 0x1F, 0x3A, 0xD3, 0x3E, 0x5C, 0x1A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x51, 0xF7, 0x2B, 0xC8, 0xA9, 0xA7, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0x98, 0x41, 0x66, 0xB0, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x1D, 0xC0, 0x42, 0xCD, 0xF8, 0xC3, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x41, 0x91, 0x7D, 0xCC, 0x8B, 0xCC, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xAE, 0x76, 0xED, 0x56, 0x18, 0xC5, 0xAB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x6A, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x7F, 0x65, 0x10, 0x1F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xEC, 0x3C, 0x05, 0x05, 0xCA, 0xF6, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x48, 0xCD, 0x02, 0x51, 0x12, 0x16, 0x3C, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0xEB, 0xB3, 0x43, 0x7B, 0xDD, 0xB2, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x59, 0x90, 0x41, 0xDB, 0xE4, 0xF5, 0x91),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x0E, 0x18, 0x2A, 0x5A, 0x83, 0x7C, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x37, 0xA1, 0x0D, 0xF1, 0x2F, 0x63, 0x79),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xC0, 0xFA, 0x6F, 0x1F, 0x67, 0xCF, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x34, 0x45, 0xBB, 0xF4, 0xF9, 0x9B, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x67, 0x1D, 0x64, 0x8F, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x39, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0xAD, 0x8A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x93, 0xFF, 0xF3, 0x28, 0xFA, 0x39, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xF9, 0xC3, 0x85, 0x26, 0x7A, 0x88, 0x89),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xD5, 0x79, 0xD8, 0x11, 0xDE, 0xEB, 0x4E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x46, 0xA4, 0x6A, 0xDA, 0x74, 0x34, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0xBD, 0xD3, 0xF5, 0x14, 0xEE, 0xFE, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x4C, 0xA3, 0x71, 0x43, 0x65, 0xF8, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x6C, 0x35, 0xFA, 0x90, 0x25, 0xD8, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x34, 0x84, 0x96, 0xA1, 0x43, 0x03, 0x4D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x3B, 0x3B, 0x2F, 0xCA, 0x59, 0xF2, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCD, 0x48, 0x24, 0x74, 0xD8, 0x72, 0x90, 0xA3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x42, 0x74, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x52, 0x19, 0x3D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x40, 0x9E, 0x41, 0x63, 0x68, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x6B, 0x38, 0x52, 0xA8, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x30, 0x25, 0x93, 0xA1, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x68),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x2F, 0x4B, 0x64, 0x79, 0x50, 0xFF, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0x36, 0xED, 0x57, 0x39, 0x3B, 0xE7, 0xF3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x85, 0xEA, 0x35, 0xD6, 0xC0, 0xA0, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x89, 0x3A, 0xCC, 0x22, 0x1C, 0x46, 0x02),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x7A, 0xB0, 0xA1, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x62, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xB8, 0x8A, 0x6C, 0x18, 0x85, 0x0D, 0x88),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xB6, 0x50, 0xE9, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0xE8, 0x07),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x5B, 0x5C, 0xD1, 0x4B, 0x11, 0x9A, 0xD8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x25, 0x56, 0x74, 0x51, 0x9C, 0xEC, 0x9C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x7F, 0xB6, 0x8A, 0xCB, 0x3A, 0x10, 0x6A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x60, 0x33, 0x07, 0x01, 0xE9, 0x49, 0x59, 0xE6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xA5, 0x2E, 0xF2, 0xBA, 0x32, 0x63, 0x44),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x06, 0x0B, 0xA5, 0x44, 0x27, 0x7F, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x74, 0xAC, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x4F, 0x13, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0xB1, 0xBF, 0x97, 0x49, 0xA5, 0x1C, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x64, 0x68, 0x7B, 0x0F, 0xCC, 0x77, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x39, 0xF9, 0x4E, 0x84, 0x9C, 0xF6, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xCF, 0x6D, 0xE2, 0xA1, 0x2D, 0xF9, 0x2B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0xC4, 0x90, 0x57, 0x31, 0x01, 0x05, 0x5E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x1E, 0xBB, 0xBF, 0x98, 0xA4, 0x7C, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xE3, 0xA0, 0xB2, 0xCD, 0x39, 0x9A, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x34, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x89, 0x98, 0xB5, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0x20, 0x3D, 0x3A, 0x04, 0x8F, 0x5A, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x26, 0xB6, 0x49, 0x09, 0x9C, 0x0F, 0x59),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x66, 0xD2, 0x38, 0x2A, 0x62, 0x81, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0xC8, 0x20, 0x5E, 0x28, 0xA3, 0x81, 0xA7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x31, 0xA4, 0xF1, 0xEA, 0x7D, 0x87, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8F, 0x2C, 0x99, 0x09, 0x6F, 0x63, 0xEB, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x73, 0x76, 0xDA, 0x1A, 0x06, 0xBE, 0xDE, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x09, 0x2E, 0x75, 0x39, 0x30, 0x2D, 0x42),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x9B, 0xC1, 0x5A, 0x17, 0xC3, 0x8C, 0x31),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x58, 0x8D, 0x94, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xAB, 0x60, 0xD4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xFD, 0x1E, 0x0F, 0x43, 0xAE, 0x9D, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0xF2, 0xF3, 0x20, 0x1B, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0x5B, 0xA4, 0xF4, 0x90, 0x3B, 0xE3, 0x71),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x78, 0x72, 0xBD, 0x65, 0x09, 0x0B, 0x01),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x37, 0x2A, 0x6C, 0x16, 0x4F, 0x64, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0xCE, 0xA3, 0x90, 0xB4, 0x9A, 0xBC, 0xF7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x38, 0x55, 0x63, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x6E, 0x18),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xB4, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x22, 0x45, 0x89, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0x7C, 0x8C, 0xA6, 0x3D, 0xA7, 0x3E, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x06, 0x42, 0xDC, 0xA6, 0xE3, 0xC6, 0x12),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x8C, 0x3D, 0x5D, 0x47, 0x31, 0x7C, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x85, 0xEE, 0x46, 0x7E, 0x13, 0x04, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x3C, 0x8B, 0x43, 0x2E, 0x74, 0xF5, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x88, 0x8E, 0x07, 0x29, 0x08, 0x03, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0x9B, 0x89, 0xEB, 0x08, 0xE8, 0x43, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x07, 0x67, 0xFD, 0xD9, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x18),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0xEB, 0x21, 0x8D, 0x98, 0x43, 0x74, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x88, 0xCC, 0x14, 0xD8, 0x08, 0xBB, 0xA6, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x98, 0xF2, 0x6A, 0x18, 0xC3, 0xDD, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x38, 0x91, 0xA0, 0x03, 0xF2, 0x04, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0xAF, 0xE8, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0x13, 0x70, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x93, 0x87, 0x98, 0x4A, 0xE0, 0x00, 0x12),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x2E, 0x69, 0x9C, 0xA2, 0x2D, 0x03, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xFE, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x2A, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xFD, 0x86, 0xB1, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0x41, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xD8, 0x9A, 0x21, 0xF3, 0xFE, 0xCB, 0xF1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x78, 0x04, 0x60, 0xB7, 0xA9, 0xA2, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1E, 0x66, 0x2A, 0x54, 0x51, 0xBD, 0x8B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x16, 0x36, 0xEF, 0x61, 0x2D, 0xEE, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x5F, 0x88, 0xA0, 0x13, 0x12, 0xF7, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA9, 0xC6, 0xAD, 0x4A, 0x4A, 0x07, 0x01, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB8, 0x74, 0xB1, 0x4F, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xF9, 0x71, 0xA2, 0x06, 0x4F, 0xD7, 0xBC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x8B, 0x4D, 0x48, 0xE0, 0x98, 0xFB, 0x6A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0xBA, 0x10, 0xA3, 0x0D, 0x52, 0xAC, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xD0, 0xE0, 0x36, 0xE6, 0x07, 0x3A, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x80, 0xF0, 0xAA, 0x49, 0x22, 0x4B, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xC7, 0xAB, 0x1C, 0x89, 0xCD, 0x24, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x82, 0x2A, 0xFC, 0xB3, 0x6D, 0x45, 0x96, 0x49),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xE4, 0xDB, 0x52, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xB4, 0x19),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5B, 0xCC, 0xC8, 0x7F, 0xBB, 0x6B, 0x87, 0x47),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x21, 0x3C, 0x69, 0x7D, 0x38, 0x57, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x4C, 0x18, 0x3C, 0x53, 0xA5, 0x48, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xC3, 0x64, 0x45, 0xDB, 0xC4, 0x6D, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xCC, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0x17, 0xB8, 0x34, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x69, 0x71, 0xFA, 0xA0, 0x28, 0x4A, 0x3D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xE8, 0x9E, 0x39, 0xEA, 0x8D, 0x38, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x9C, 0xBB, 0xCD, 0x80, 0x1A, 0xEE, 0xB7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xA0, 0x45, 0xBF, 0xD9, 0x22, 0x11, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x7C, 0x5C, 0xD9, 0xC0, 0x9F, 0x69, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x8A, 0xA6, 0x79, 0x4E, 0x35, 0xB9, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCC, 0x8B, 0x9A, 0x3E, 0xA1, 0xB8, 0x28, 0x10),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x2F, 0xEF, 0xBB, 0xA9, 0x72, 0x7F, 0xEA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x34, 0xB7, 0x12, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0xC3, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x1D, 0xD9, 0x42, 0x77, 0x0C, 0x71, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x01, 0x59, 0xA7, 0x56, 0x03, 0x91, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x91, 0x99, 0x33, 0x30, 0x3E, 0xEF, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xC9, 0x5A, 0x9A, 0x54, 0x66, 0xF1, 0x70),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0x2C, 0xB7, 0x6E, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x35, 0x30),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x0D, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x2D, 0x99, 0x63, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x31, 0xAF, 0x2D, 0xC9, 0xC6, 0xC2, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0xC0, 0xDF, 0x80, 0x54, 0xC4, 0xAC, 0xF3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x6B, 0xA0, 0x84, 0x96, 0xF7, 0x31, 0xC8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0xE2, 0x7C, 0x7A, 0x41, 0x45, 0x75, 0x6A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xEE, 0x58, 0x31, 0xE8, 0x68, 0xD6, 0x76),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x2E, 0x48, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x9F, 0xD4, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xA9, 0x5C, 0xE7, 0x64, 0x43, 0x5D, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9E, 0x58, 0x9F, 0x50, 0xAB, 0x68, 0xFF, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0x88, 0x2D, 0xBA, 0x12, 0xBF, 0x8D, 0x7D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xDF, 0x6F, 0xB3, 0x75, 0xA4, 0x55, 0x73),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x17, 0x92, 0x39, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x37, 0x6F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x43, 0x71, 0xA7, 0xCA, 0x17, 0x1B, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE7, 0xB9, 0xB0, 0x78, 0xEF, 0xA0, 0xDA, 0x83),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x84, 0xF2, 0x0F, 0x85, 0xA2, 0xB6, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x72, 0x65, 0x2E, 0x6E, 0x45, 0xB9, 0x4C, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x6A, 0x8C, 0x2B, 0x77, 0x96, 0x36, 0x22),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x7A, 0x13, 0x4A, 0x97, 0x63, 0x02, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x03, 0x8F, 0xB9, 0xEE, 0x64),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0xEE, 0x8B, 0x89, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDB, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x7B, 0x81, 0xC9, 0x70, 0x8D, 0x62, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0xDA, 0x46, 0xF8, 0xF9, 0x3A, 0xBE, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0x9C, 0x7A, 0x97, 0x62, 0xEB, 0xFA, 0x0F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x03, 0x3D, 0x3C, 0x46, 0x27, 0x9E, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x08, 0x1C, 0xD5, 0x25, 0xAF, 0xE9, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x69, 0xDC, 0x59, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x7C, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x9A, 0x7A, 0x99, 0x21, 0x0C, 0x4E, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xCE, 0x85, 0x5F, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x82, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x83, 0x57, 0x69, 0x90, 0x76, 0xF3, 0x53, 0x3F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP384r1_T[32] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP384r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_15_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_16_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_17_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_18_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_19_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_20_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_21_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_22_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_23_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_24_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_25_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_26_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_27_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_28_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_29_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_30_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP384r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP384r1_T_31_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define brainpoolP384r1_T NULL
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Domain parameters for brainpoolP512r1 (RFC 5639 3.7)
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED)
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0x48, 0x3A, 0x58, 0x56, 0x60, 0xAA, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x85, 0xC6, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x2F, 0xFF, 0x81, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x80, 0xA3, 0xE6, 0x2A, 0xA1, 0xCD, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x68, 0xC6, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0x7D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_a[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77, 0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B, 0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8, 0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA, 0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D, 0x8D, 0xDD, 0xCB, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x4C, 0x23, 0xAC, 0x45, 0x71, 0x32, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x8B, 0x31, 0xA3, 0x30, 0x78),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_b[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0xF7, 0x16, 0x80, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x09, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xE5, 0xBA, 0x5E, 0xB7, 0x50, 0x40, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x3E, 0x08, 0xDC, 0xCA, 0x94, 0xFC, 0x77),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0xAC, 0xC1, 0xE7, 0xB9, 0xC7, 0xF2, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x17, 0x11, 0x7F, 0xB5, 0xC8, 0x9A, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x0A, 0xA1, 0x3A, 0x25, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x5D, 0xED, 0x2D, 0xBC, 0x63, 0x98, 0xEA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0x41, 0x34, 0xA8, 0x10, 0x16, 0xF9, 0x3D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gx[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_gy[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x69, 0x00, 0xA9, 0x9C, 0x82, 0x96, 0x87, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0xDA, 0x5D, 0x08, 0x81, 0xD3, 0xB1, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x47, 0x10, 0xAC, 0x7F, 0x19, 0x61, 0x86, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x26, 0xA9, 0x4C, 0x41, 0x5C, 0x3E, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x08, 0x33, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x9C, 0x63, 0xD6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0x8D, 0x30, 0xCB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xFC, 0xC9, 0x33, 0xAE, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0x3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xC4, 0xE9, 0xDB, 0xB8, 0x9D, 0xDD, 0xAA),
+};
+
+#if MBEDTLS_ECP_FIXED_POINT_OPTIM == 1
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0xF8, 0xB9, 0xBC, 0x09, 0x22, 0x35, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x5E, 0x6A, 0x40, 0x47, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x7C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0x7D, 0xB9, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x68, 0xD1, 0x50),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xD4, 0xD0, 0xE2, 0x78, 0x1F, 0x3B, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x09, 0xD0, 0xF4, 0xEE, 0x62, 0x3B, 0xB4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC1, 0x16, 0xD9, 0xB5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0xED, 0x85),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x6A, 0x4C, 0x9C, 0x2E, 0x32, 0x21, 0x5A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD9, 0x2E, 0xD8, 0xBD, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x81),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x08, 0xD8, 0x3A, 0x0F, 0x1E, 0xCD, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x06, 0x54, 0xF0, 0xA8, 0x2F, 0x2B, 0xCA, 0xD1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0x63, 0x27, 0x8A, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xCA, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x48, 0x5F, 0x4A, 0x49, 0xDE, 0xDC, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0x81, 0x1F, 0x88, 0x5B, 0xC5, 0x00, 0xA0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA5, 0x24, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x22, 0x78, 0xCF, 0xA9, 0xBF, 0xEA, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0x32, 0x63, 0x56, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xDE, 0x7D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xE9, 0x6B, 0x8C, 0x6F, 0x9D, 0x88, 0x43),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x96, 0xA7, 0x56, 0xD1, 0x37),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xAB, 0xFA, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xF5, 0x0E, 0xA6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x40, 0xEF, 0x9E, 0x6D, 0xD6, 0x32, 0x33),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xED, 0x56, 0x14, 0x57, 0x1A, 0x8D, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xED, 0x4D, 0x3A, 0xFA, 0x71, 0x75, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xC5, 0x76, 0x1C, 0x14, 0xBE, 0xB5, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x5A, 0xCB, 0xE7, 0x36, 0x1D, 0x52, 0x1C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x8D, 0x7A, 0xEB, 0xA3, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0xB0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0xA3, 0x41, 0xF8, 0xAC, 0x9E, 0xAB, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x12, 0xE3, 0x65, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0xFE, 0x09, 0x2B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x3F, 0xC5, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0x5D, 0x63, 0x28, 0xA6, 0x89, 0xD3, 0x91),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x95, 0x3F, 0x7A, 0x82, 0xD4, 0x77, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xBB, 0x92, 0x32, 0x00, 0xF4, 0x66, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x58, 0x31, 0xD1, 0x17, 0x9F, 0x2A, 0x22),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x36, 0xA9, 0xCD, 0x80, 0xA5, 0x2D, 0x78),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x91, 0x44, 0xAB, 0xCE, 0x71, 0xFF, 0x0C, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0x24, 0x58, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x21, 0x32, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1B, 0xA6, 0x28, 0xF8, 0x7A, 0x97, 0xAE, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xE7, 0x08, 0xFA, 0x47, 0xC9, 0x55, 0x09),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xAC, 0x2E, 0x84, 0xA4, 0xF5, 0x52, 0xC4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x58, 0x05, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0xC8, 0x71, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x92, 0xB4, 0x92, 0xC1, 0x92, 0xEC, 0x6B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4A, 0x48, 0x2D, 0x79, 0x5E, 0x58, 0xE5, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x85, 0x26, 0xEC, 0xE9, 0x6E, 0xD4, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x68, 0x26, 0x87, 0x38, 0xA2, 0xD2, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0x17, 0x60, 0xCE, 0x75, 0xF8, 0xA5, 0x6F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0x51, 0xDB, 0xA9, 0xAE, 0x87, 0xF1, 0x15),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x49, 0x92, 0x3B, 0x19, 0x96, 0xF5, 0xB0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0xD5, 0x52, 0x52, 0x8C, 0xCE, 0xFD, 0xFA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x18, 0x0A, 0xE6, 0xF6, 0xAE, 0x08, 0x41),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x2B, 0xD8, 0x54, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x57, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x9E, 0x03, 0x03, 0x3C, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x0E, 0x29, 0x29, 0x00, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0x33, 0x99, 0x0E, 0x00, 0x5D, 0xFE, 0x4B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0x2D, 0xF2, 0x59, 0x32, 0xCF, 0x03, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0xC9, 0x72, 0xAE, 0x0C, 0xEF, 0xD1, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x5A, 0x27, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x45, 0xF9, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD4, 0xBE, 0xE5, 0x2C, 0xFF, 0x5B, 0x1E, 0x88),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0xAC, 0xBB, 0xD8, 0x83, 0xC2, 0x46, 0xF6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xDC, 0xCE, 0x15, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0xCF, 0x46),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xDB, 0x5E, 0x94, 0x31, 0x0B, 0xB2, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0xB9, 0xE3, 0xE3, 0x11, 0x71, 0x41, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xE3, 0x01, 0xB7, 0x7D, 0xBC, 0x65, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x07, 0x65, 0x87, 0xA7, 0xE8, 0x48, 0xE3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x48, 0x8F, 0xD4, 0x30, 0x8E, 0xB4, 0x6C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0xE0, 0x73, 0xBE, 0x1E, 0xBF, 0x56, 0x36),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFE, 0x0E, 0x5E, 0x87, 0xC5, 0xAB, 0x0E, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0xF9, 0x5F, 0x80, 0x24, 0x4C, 0x2A, 0xF1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDE, 0x15, 0x21, 0x54, 0x92, 0x84, 0x8D, 0x6A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA8, 0x8A, 0x47, 0x74, 0xDC, 0x42, 0xB1, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0xF7, 0x30, 0xFD, 0xC1, 0x9B, 0x0C, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x6C, 0xCC, 0xDF, 0xC5, 0xE3, 0xA9, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x67, 0x59, 0x10, 0x5C, 0x51, 0x54, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x37, 0xFB, 0x6E, 0xB0, 0x78, 0x63, 0x8E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0xEF, 0xC4, 0x39, 0x20, 0xF1, 0x46, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xFF, 0x10, 0xE4, 0xE2, 0xE9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x5C, 0xF5, 0x2E, 0x22, 0x89, 0xE5, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0x0C, 0x29, 0xA8, 0x62, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x9E, 0x0F, 0xCA, 0x87, 0x2A, 0x6F, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCE, 0xDC, 0x9B, 0x9F, 0x65, 0xD4, 0xAD, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0xC3, 0x08, 0x0F, 0xCF, 0x67, 0xE9, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x5C, 0xD7, 0xFF, 0x41, 0x9C, 0xCB, 0x26),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x25, 0x05, 0x12, 0xAD, 0x73, 0x63, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x99, 0x07, 0x86, 0x57, 0xE7, 0x94, 0xB1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x4B, 0xA5, 0xBF, 0x18, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x6A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0x4C, 0xC4, 0x09, 0xF2, 0x2F, 0x0C, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x3A, 0x04, 0xEA, 0x89, 0x6C, 0x91, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0xE7, 0xA3, 0xEC, 0x24, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xA1, 0x26, 0x21, 0x04, 0xE3, 0xB9, 0x40),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0x71, 0x4B, 0x7B, 0xC2, 0x89, 0xCD, 0xA2),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB7, 0xB9, 0xA8, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x00, 0x3A, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x41, 0x6C, 0xBB, 0x5A, 0xCA, 0x1F, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0xD7, 0xE2, 0x6C, 0x6B, 0xA7, 0x48, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x19, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0xC1, 0x7E, 0x4F, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0xF7, 0x19, 0x3C, 0x06, 0x74, 0x2C, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x23, 0x4F, 0x0C, 0x09, 0xB0, 0x80, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4E, 0x74, 0x34, 0x08, 0x44, 0x7E, 0xA3, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xCC, 0x8D, 0x12, 0x6E, 0xE1, 0x3D, 0x0B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x18, 0xB1, 0x71, 0x02, 0x93, 0xC2, 0xA4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x89, 0x40, 0xE2, 0x1F, 0xE7, 0x5E, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x8E, 0xAE, 0x89, 0x01, 0xD4, 0x0C, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAE, 0xDA, 0x58, 0x70, 0x24, 0xF2, 0xE4, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0xC7, 0x1D, 0xD6, 0x4A, 0x6F, 0x66, 0x4F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x1D, 0x7E, 0x4A, 0x2C, 0xCA, 0xEC, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA1, 0x06, 0x7F, 0xA8, 0x99, 0xE4, 0xD3, 0x4E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x1D, 0x5A, 0xDF, 0x5E, 0x58, 0x36, 0x49),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0xB9, 0x32, 0x69, 0x1F, 0x72, 0x2A, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0x73, 0xE2, 0x03, 0x39, 0x35, 0xAA, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x5E, 0x5D, 0x48, 0xEF, 0xAE, 0x30, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x7F, 0x60, 0x19, 0xAF, 0xEC, 0x9D, 0xFC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCA, 0xD9, 0x19, 0xE4, 0x1B, 0x56, 0x15, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xD7, 0x33, 0x59, 0x1F, 0x43, 0x59, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xCE, 0xEE, 0xCA, 0xA4, 0x7F, 0x63, 0xD4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBD, 0x40, 0xC0, 0xF6, 0x19, 0x89, 0x43, 0x20),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x92, 0xEA, 0x07, 0x65, 0x79, 0x86, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0xB7, 0x13, 0x75, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x0A, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x9E, 0xFA, 0xE1, 0x1F, 0x0C, 0xF9, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x8C, 0xED, 0x5C, 0x21, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0x4D, 0xD8, 0x18, 0xC4, 0xF6, 0x36, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xC9, 0xAC, 0x5C, 0xFA, 0x69, 0xA4, 0xA0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0x8C, 0x94, 0x1C, 0x7B, 0x71, 0x36, 0x58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xBD, 0x46, 0xCE, 0xB7, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x5E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xD6, 0x96, 0x4B, 0xA6, 0x47, 0xEB, 0xE5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0xF1, 0x5F, 0x15, 0xDE, 0x99, 0x6F, 0x66),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0x04, 0xB8, 0xE6, 0xC0, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x49, 0xD3, 0xF0, 0x04, 0x00, 0xE4, 0x05, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xF3, 0x06, 0xA3, 0x1A, 0xFF, 0xEA, 0x73),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x32, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x33, 0x09, 0xB6, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xEF, 0xFC, 0x61, 0x10, 0x42, 0x31, 0x94),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0xF1, 0xF4, 0x33, 0xCF, 0x28, 0x90, 0x9C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0x88, 0x87, 0x7B, 0xEB, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0xB8, 0xDA, 0xFA, 0xDA, 0x3D, 0xA6, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xF0, 0x62, 0x82, 0x53, 0x32, 0x55, 0x03),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xA5, 0x32, 0x4A, 0x19, 0x11, 0x9C, 0x10),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xB3, 0x27, 0xE9, 0x75, 0x90, 0x05, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x1C, 0x90, 0x48, 0x77, 0x01, 0x85, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xD6, 0x9B, 0x84, 0xA8, 0xD7, 0xC5, 0x28),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x7A, 0xCB, 0xB3, 0x11, 0x46, 0xD7, 0x99),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0x23, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x75, 0xA1, 0x95, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4B, 0x66, 0x5D, 0x34, 0x13, 0xA9, 0x03, 0xBE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x80, 0x9D, 0x5F, 0xD2, 0x44, 0xE1, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x5D, 0xBD, 0xA8, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0x25, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x99, 0x1F, 0x53, 0xF1, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x7C, 0xE5, 0xC5, 0x51, 0x0B, 0x4C, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6B, 0xB0, 0x1A, 0x9C, 0x16, 0xB0, 0x32, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xE3, 0xCF, 0xDD, 0x48, 0xB4, 0x7B, 0x33),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0xDD, 0x9E, 0x3C, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x77, 0x65),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0xAB, 0x01, 0xD3, 0x87, 0x74, 0x25, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xA3, 0xE3, 0x76, 0x43, 0x87, 0x12, 0xBD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x54, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0x60, 0x66, 0xEB, 0x98, 0x54),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x78, 0xC8, 0xD7, 0x4E, 0x75, 0xCA, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xDF, 0x71, 0x19, 0xE7, 0x07, 0x36, 0xB5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0xC9, 0xA8, 0x5F, 0x91, 0xBF, 0x47, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x96, 0x58, 0x96, 0x18, 0xB6, 0xFA, 0x01),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x2D, 0xA9, 0x9B, 0x86, 0xDB, 0x0C, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x0B, 0x2D, 0x56, 0x4A, 0xD3, 0x93, 0x8A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x15, 0xE2, 0x65, 0x12, 0x86, 0x0E, 0xB2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x41, 0x4D, 0xC1, 0xCB, 0xE4, 0xC3, 0xD7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x53, 0x10, 0xCA, 0xA3, 0xAC, 0x83, 0x26),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x01, 0x22, 0x96, 0x10, 0xAD, 0x69, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x42, 0x46, 0x4E, 0xD8, 0xEA, 0xD6, 0x9D, 0xF3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x2F, 0x7F, 0x62, 0x62, 0x80, 0xD0, 0x14),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xDA, 0x00, 0x63, 0x09, 0xBD, 0x6A, 0x83),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0F, 0xD4, 0x6E, 0x48, 0x05, 0xB7, 0xF7, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0x4D, 0xD7, 0x00, 0x4A, 0x15, 0x27, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x15, 0xAA, 0x37, 0x27, 0x34, 0x18, 0x24),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x20, 0x2C, 0x84, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xBA, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x09, 0xD6, 0x04, 0xA2, 0x60, 0x84, 0x72),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0x04, 0x94, 0x08, 0xD4, 0xED, 0x47, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xF3, 0xE4, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x5B, 0x35, 0x42),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5F, 0xD8, 0xB6, 0x80, 0xD6, 0xF1, 0x30, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x14, 0xA6, 0x85, 0xEE, 0xA7, 0xD8, 0x61),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x49, 0x2A, 0x1E, 0x7C, 0xE9, 0x2D, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3A, 0x87, 0x56, 0x91, 0x03, 0x77, 0x4D, 0x55),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0x52, 0xD4, 0xAA, 0xF7, 0xFA, 0xB0, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x5D, 0x11, 0x39, 0xB1, 0xE7, 0x76, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x13, 0xBC, 0x37, 0x5D, 0x74, 0xCD, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x48, 0x14, 0x23, 0x30, 0xF8, 0x46, 0x37),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x27, 0xB0, 0xD9, 0xB2, 0x74, 0xB4, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEA, 0xA6, 0xB9, 0x6F, 0x9F, 0x64, 0x36, 0x92),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2E, 0x2B, 0x78, 0x40, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x7B, 0xA9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x68, 0x3A, 0xB6, 0x4A, 0xE2, 0xDB, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1E, 0x33, 0xD7, 0x34, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x45, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xCE, 0xA8, 0xC9, 0x01, 0xFB, 0x0E, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xF9, 0x51, 0x4C, 0x12, 0x9F, 0x60, 0xE4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0x85, 0xBD, 0x30, 0x37, 0x84, 0x39, 0x44),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x26, 0x33, 0xAF, 0x2E, 0xB8, 0x2E, 0xCC, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x59, 0x4E, 0x0C, 0x09, 0x4A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0x24, 0x89, 0x81, 0x12, 0xFF, 0xBB, 0x6E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x71, 0x37, 0x1A, 0x66, 0xEE, 0xED, 0xB6, 0x9B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0xBD, 0x04, 0x20, 0x5D, 0xFB, 0xBF, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0xF8, 0x34, 0xA3, 0xFF, 0x45, 0xDE, 0x92),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x18, 0x73, 0xF1, 0x32, 0x25, 0x58, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0xC1, 0x14, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x40, 0x0F, 0x12),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x07, 0x9D, 0x9C, 0x00, 0xF7, 0x56, 0x19),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0xBA, 0x87, 0xF9, 0x15, 0x0C, 0x66, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0x1F, 0xC1, 0x28, 0xB0, 0x47, 0x0D, 0xF5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0xCA, 0x27, 0xEE, 0x4B, 0x23, 0x2B, 0x89),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7E, 0xB5, 0x68, 0xC8, 0x17, 0x5D, 0xC3, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0x02, 0x08, 0xEE, 0x20, 0x9D, 0xEA, 0x64),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x14, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xA0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0xFA, 0xF8, 0xA7, 0xC6, 0xDC, 0x14, 0x8C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x76, 0xBD, 0x0A, 0x1A, 0x18, 0x98, 0xDC, 0xB0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x63, 0x63, 0x02, 0xB7, 0xD5, 0x5B, 0x5A, 0xC6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0xB1, 0xD7, 0x4B, 0x15, 0x39, 0x61, 0x5D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0x32, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0x70, 0x1B, 0xCE, 0x51),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x64, 0xD8, 0x18, 0x83, 0x52, 0x9B, 0x6D, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x55, 0x56, 0x19, 0x34, 0xA4, 0xEA, 0xFC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0xA9, 0x55, 0x80, 0xE3, 0x15, 0x36, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0x06, 0xC8, 0x1D, 0x17, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x16),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0xD6, 0xF0, 0xCC, 0xF3, 0x63, 0x53, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x5A, 0xDC, 0x46, 0xBD, 0x0D, 0xAD, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0x2F, 0x11, 0x60, 0x15, 0x51, 0x4A, 0xEA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xE3, 0x93, 0x38, 0xD5, 0x83, 0xAA, 0x0D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x90, 0xA6, 0xCC, 0xB1, 0xFD, 0xBB, 0x1A, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3B, 0x54, 0xC8, 0x54, 0x6F, 0x79, 0x1A, 0x59),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x4A, 0xDA, 0x28, 0x92, 0x97, 0x9D, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD6, 0x4B, 0xDB, 0xC7, 0x52, 0xC5, 0x66, 0x34),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x7E, 0x92, 0x53, 0x30, 0x93, 0xFD, 0xFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x16, 0x6A, 0xB1, 0x91, 0x0A, 0xB4, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6D, 0x9D, 0x40, 0x3F, 0xE3, 0xF1, 0x01, 0x46),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x0E, 0xD8, 0xED, 0x11, 0x8E, 0x4C, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x86, 0x4A, 0x1B, 0x88, 0xDF, 0x8D, 0x29, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x23, 0x21, 0x11, 0xAB, 0x77, 0x81, 0x62),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0B, 0xAF, 0x11, 0xFA, 0xBA, 0x40, 0x63, 0xE7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x6F, 0x8D, 0x80, 0xDF, 0x67, 0xF5, 0x44),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0x8B, 0xB7, 0x08, 0xF4, 0xD7, 0x2D, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x2B, 0x30, 0x02, 0x45, 0x71, 0x08, 0x49),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x97, 0x3A, 0xCA, 0x50, 0xF6, 0xC2, 0x19, 0x8C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x3E, 0x73, 0x95, 0x1D, 0x49),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x60, 0x59, 0x48, 0xCB, 0xD8, 0xD6, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0xB9, 0x6C, 0x89, 0xAB, 0x99, 0xA8, 0xF8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0xA1, 0x8B, 0x4E, 0x06, 0x19, 0xEC, 0x99),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x95, 0x04, 0xCF, 0xD5, 0x94, 0xB3, 0x02),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x29, 0x35, 0x93, 0x7C, 0xB3, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC4, 0x45, 0x5C, 0x7E, 0xBF, 0x75, 0x81, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xE8, 0x24, 0xDF, 0xEC, 0x2F, 0x7D, 0xB9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF2, 0x8B, 0xD5, 0x6A, 0x9B, 0xA0, 0xE0, 0x4F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0xE3, 0x27, 0x82, 0xDE, 0xDD, 0xCA, 0x4B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x57, 0x56, 0x46, 0x05, 0x06, 0x01, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x74, 0x35, 0xA7, 0x47, 0xE2, 0x6B, 0x2C, 0x4F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x9D, 0x4C, 0xEC, 0x1F, 0x11, 0x75, 0x2B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0xAA, 0x41, 0xC1, 0xE9, 0x0E, 0xE9, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xCF, 0x9C, 0x4B, 0xE8, 0xED, 0x0A, 0x49),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0x73, 0xCA, 0x0C, 0x46, 0x0A, 0x9C, 0xE4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xE1, 0x9E, 0xBC, 0xFE, 0x44, 0x63, 0x6D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x31, 0x43, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xF8, 0xC1, 0x8C, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6A, 0x4B, 0xF0, 0x69, 0x25, 0xBD, 0x71, 0x1A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFD, 0x9A, 0xFE, 0x82, 0xE7, 0xC1, 0xC1, 0xEE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFC, 0x5A, 0x6E, 0x5E, 0x97, 0x6A, 0x35, 0x8D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA2, 0x18, 0x6C, 0x7E, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x57, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x35, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0xD0, 0xFE, 0x78, 0xFB, 0x32),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x08, 0xAE, 0x46, 0x34, 0xEA, 0x7A, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x1C, 0x56, 0xA9, 0x18, 0x37, 0xD4, 0x9E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x28, 0x63, 0xE9, 0x0A, 0xB6, 0x38, 0x3C, 0xC1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3E, 0x4F, 0xA4, 0x6E, 0x85, 0x31, 0x23, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0D, 0xAD, 0xC4, 0xC3, 0xB1, 0x4B, 0x1C, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x56, 0x4A, 0x38, 0xB3, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0x2C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x67, 0xC7, 0x19, 0xDE, 0x21, 0xED, 0x89, 0xD0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2F, 0xBE, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0xEB, 0x9D, 0xA7, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x0E, 0x13, 0x1E, 0x86, 0x57, 0xC3, 0x3B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x4B, 0x30, 0x46, 0x52, 0xC1, 0xEC, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6E, 0xD5, 0x44, 0x31, 0x96, 0x3B, 0x26, 0x27),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x68, 0xA8, 0x67, 0x78, 0x39, 0xE8, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0x78, 0xB7, 0xDD, 0xF2, 0x58, 0xB6, 0x3D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x81, 0x3C, 0xB3, 0x26, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0x8C, 0xA5),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB9, 0x24, 0xE5, 0x73, 0xEE, 0x9A, 0x02, 0xA9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0x6A, 0x65, 0x60, 0xF3, 0x62, 0xE3, 0xE9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFB, 0x07, 0x84, 0xE6, 0x3B, 0x46, 0x65, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0x8F, 0x0C, 0xB0, 0xE1, 0x04, 0x82, 0x9D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEB, 0x13, 0xBF, 0x3D, 0xA0, 0x48, 0xA2, 0x74),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0x26, 0x76, 0x74, 0xAB, 0x0B, 0x29, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x30, 0x6E, 0x5F, 0x03, 0x34, 0x7C, 0x38, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x72, 0xF9, 0x3B, 0x3C, 0xA4, 0xBC, 0x7C),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5C, 0xCE, 0x18, 0x80, 0xB8, 0x24, 0x45, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x09, 0x03, 0xB8, 0x06, 0x64, 0xF7, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF1, 0x26, 0xB1, 0x10, 0x6D, 0x71, 0x12, 0x2E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x12, 0xC6, 0x6E, 0x1E, 0x6A, 0xC3, 0x80),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE5, 0xD3, 0x0A, 0xDE, 0xD8, 0x6B, 0x04, 0x5C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x87, 0x5B, 0xAE, 0xDB, 0x3C, 0xC0, 0xC5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8E, 0xF5, 0xF9, 0xC1, 0x9A, 0x89, 0xBB, 0x7E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0x69, 0x72, 0x8B, 0xAE, 0x32, 0x13, 0x11),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x16, 0x07, 0x50, 0xFA, 0x4C, 0xCF, 0xE8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x50, 0x21, 0xE9, 0xDE, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0x83, 0x30, 0x0B, 0x65, 0x0E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xAC, 0xC9, 0xBA, 0x6C, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x0D, 0x7B, 0x9E, 0x08, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x34, 0x91, 0xB2, 0xDC, 0x90, 0xCE, 0x67, 0xED),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x93, 0x60, 0x0C, 0xD7, 0x1F, 0x2F, 0x17),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x19, 0x7F, 0x9D, 0x40, 0xF8, 0x78, 0x7A, 0x54),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x13, 0x22, 0x95, 0xE8, 0xEF, 0x31, 0x57, 0x35),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x88, 0x53, 0xFE, 0xAF, 0x7C, 0x47, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xCE, 0xCC, 0x79, 0xE8, 0x9F, 0x8C, 0xC4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDB, 0x16, 0xDD, 0x77, 0x6E, 0x8A, 0x73, 0x97),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x07, 0x97, 0x21, 0x3B, 0xF8, 0x5F, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC6, 0xB5, 0xD2, 0x81, 0x84, 0xF0, 0xE7, 0x9F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCB, 0x8F, 0x75, 0x09, 0x6A, 0x0E, 0x53, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x4F, 0x70, 0x97, 0xC7, 0xAC, 0x7D, 0x3F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF9, 0x3C, 0x6A, 0xB4, 0x10, 0xA9, 0xC8, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xC5, 0xD6, 0x69, 0x16, 0xB8, 0xAC, 0x25),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x44, 0xDC, 0xEB, 0x48, 0x54, 0x5D, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6F, 0x48, 0x9B, 0xD7, 0x72, 0x69, 0xA4, 0x8A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x0D, 0x36, 0x9A, 0x66, 0x0B, 0xEC, 0x24),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0xC6, 0xD4, 0xB6, 0x60, 0xE5, 0xC3, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBA, 0x29, 0x42, 0xE0, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0x7C, 0x3E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x10, 0xBA, 0x55, 0xBC, 0x3B, 0x38, 0x5D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x25, 0x66, 0xFA, 0x05, 0x73, 0x03, 0x1B, 0x69),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x11, 0xA4, 0x66, 0x12, 0x96, 0x7B, 0x02, 0x4C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x44, 0xB5, 0xDE, 0x6D, 0x98, 0xD1, 0xD5, 0xA8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE2, 0xF5, 0x44, 0xB8, 0x8E, 0xF6, 0x8C, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x15, 0x2B, 0x72, 0xBC, 0x49, 0xE5, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x6C, 0x44, 0xD7, 0xDF, 0x8F, 0xEB, 0x8D, 0x80),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x64, 0x88, 0xAA, 0xB7, 0xE4, 0x70, 0x1D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9C, 0x14, 0xBB, 0xE9, 0x9B, 0xB9, 0x65, 0x5D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x66, 0x8E, 0x88, 0xF5, 0xF1, 0xC1, 0x89, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x16, 0x30, 0x53, 0xE6, 0xFB, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xB4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0xE4, 0xFF, 0xBA, 0x31, 0x79, 0xAB, 0xC2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x45, 0x09, 0xF7, 0xB7, 0x09, 0x78, 0x4C, 0x90),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xAE, 0xC2, 0x44, 0xDC, 0x17, 0x78, 0x47),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xD4, 0x17, 0x43, 0x19, 0x74, 0x9E, 0x23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x64, 0x3B, 0x73, 0xA2, 0x99, 0x27, 0x76),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x74, 0x36, 0x5F, 0xD3, 0x14, 0xB1, 0x31),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAC, 0x07, 0xAB, 0xFD, 0x9B, 0x03, 0xC5, 0xD5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0xBE, 0xB0, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0x0C, 0x73, 0x73),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xE7, 0x7B, 0x87, 0xD3, 0x34, 0xFD, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9A, 0x25, 0x3D, 0xC7, 0x36, 0x83, 0x53, 0xDC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x7C, 0xCF, 0x63, 0x55, 0x12, 0x11, 0xB0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC0, 0x34, 0x4D, 0x27, 0x92, 0xAC, 0x18, 0x16),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x42, 0x61, 0x9D, 0x2E, 0xFF, 0x13, 0x16),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF4, 0xDE, 0x92, 0x65, 0x57, 0x0D, 0xBC, 0x0A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEF, 0x7B, 0x6E, 0xC6, 0x2A, 0x21, 0x74, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0xA7, 0x53, 0x4D, 0x29, 0x36, 0xEF, 0xE5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE1, 0xD6, 0x41, 0xC7, 0x99, 0xAD, 0x50, 0x53),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x99, 0xAC, 0x41, 0x9F, 0xFB, 0x4C, 0x86, 0xF1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xBB, 0xE6, 0x25, 0x28, 0xAA, 0xEB, 0x1E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x92, 0x04, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xAA, 0x08, 0x8A, 0xCC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x2B, 0x5B, 0xE2, 0x8D, 0x76, 0xEA, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB3, 0x33, 0xD2, 0x21, 0x4D, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x8E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0x06, 0x8B, 0x2B, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0xB1, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFA, 0xF5, 0xA1, 0xC0, 0x03, 0x6A, 0x29, 0x12),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF5, 0xA9, 0xEF, 0x55, 0xB6, 0x1A, 0x9F, 0x6B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9B, 0x54, 0x32, 0xBE, 0x06, 0x43, 0xB5, 0xFD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF7, 0xD6, 0xD9, 0x20, 0x89, 0xBE, 0xD4, 0x1B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0x26, 0x95, 0x10, 0xCE, 0xB4, 0x88, 0x79),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0xA6, 0x27, 0xAC, 0x32, 0xBA, 0xBD, 0xC7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0xA6, 0xAE, 0x9C, 0x7B, 0xBE, 0xA1, 0x63),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8B, 0xCD, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xDF, 0x96, 0xBB, 0x7D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0xA7, 0x11, 0x06, 0xCC, 0x0E, 0x31, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x20, 0xE4, 0xF4, 0xAD, 0x7B, 0x5F, 0xF1, 0xEF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE4, 0x54, 0xBE, 0xF4, 0x8A, 0x03, 0x47, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0x53, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xB0, 0x8A, 0x68, 0xA6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x16, 0xB1, 0x73, 0x6F, 0x5B, 0x0E, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x32, 0xE3, 0x43, 0x64, 0x75, 0xFB, 0xFB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x18, 0x55, 0x8A, 0x4E, 0x6E, 0x35, 0x54),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x80, 0x97, 0x15, 0x1E, 0xCB, 0xF2, 0x9C, 0xA5),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0xD1, 0xBB, 0xF3, 0x70, 0xAD, 0x13, 0xAD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0x96, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0x5E, 0xDA, 0xD5, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x81, 0xE9, 0x65, 0x66, 0x76, 0x47, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x35, 0x87, 0x06, 0x73, 0xCF, 0x34, 0xD2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x81, 0x15, 0x42, 0xA2, 0x79, 0x5B, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x08, 0xA2, 0x7D, 0x09, 0x14, 0x64, 0xC6, 0xAE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0x6D, 0xC4, 0xED, 0xF1, 0xD6, 0xE9, 0x24),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB4, 0xD5, 0xBB, 0x25, 0xA3, 0xDD, 0xA3, 0x88),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xF2, 0x68, 0x67, 0x39, 0x8F, 0x73, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x76, 0x28, 0x89, 0xAD, 0x32, 0xE0, 0xDF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0x90, 0xCC, 0x57, 0x58, 0xAA, 0xC9, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xD7, 0x43, 0xD2, 0xCE, 0x5E, 0xA0, 0x08),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x33, 0xB0, 0xB8, 0xA4, 0x9E, 0x96, 0x26, 0x86),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x94, 0x61, 0x1D, 0xF3, 0x65, 0x5E, 0x60, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC7, 0x1E, 0x65, 0xED, 0xCF, 0x07, 0x60, 0x20),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x30, 0x17, 0x8A, 0x91, 0x88, 0x0A, 0xA4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x05, 0x7D, 0x18, 0xA4, 0xAC, 0x59, 0xFC, 0x5F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x25, 0x65, 0x39, 0x9A, 0xDC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x15, 0x16, 0x4B, 0x68, 0xBA, 0x59, 0x13, 0x2F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8D, 0xFD, 0xD3, 0xC5, 0x56, 0xC9, 0x8C, 0x5E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBC, 0xC6, 0x9F, 0xF4, 0xE6, 0xF7, 0xB4, 0x01),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2D, 0x7C, 0x03, 0x00, 0x26, 0x9F, 0xD8, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x1D, 0x6E, 0x00, 0xB9, 0x00, 0x6E, 0x93),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x63, 0xDA, 0x03, 0x2B, 0xD5, 0x0B, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x46, 0xFC, 0xE2, 0xC8, 0x47, 0xF0, 0xAE, 0xF2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x51, 0x4C, 0xF7, 0x50, 0x0C, 0x48, 0x06, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDF, 0x2B, 0x32, 0x98, 0x0E, 0x7E, 0x61, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x02, 0x27, 0xFE, 0x75, 0x86, 0xDF, 0x24),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2B, 0x30, 0xB1, 0x22, 0x32, 0x1B, 0xFE, 0x24),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC2, 0x27, 0xF7, 0x78, 0x6F, 0xD7, 0xFD, 0xE4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA0, 0x78, 0xCC, 0xEA, 0xC0, 0x50, 0x24, 0x44),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x2B, 0x4F, 0x7F, 0x58, 0xE6, 0xC2, 0x70),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x43, 0xD5, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x3C, 0x80, 0xB8),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1A, 0x6D, 0x4B, 0x12, 0x00, 0x7B, 0xE6, 0xA6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x15, 0xBD, 0xD0, 0x9B, 0xCA, 0xAA, 0x81),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xCF, 0xCE, 0x9C, 0xE3, 0x8B, 0x60, 0x7A, 0x53),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0xDA, 0x4B, 0x03, 0xA7, 0x8D, 0x43, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0xAF, 0x00, 0x2B, 0x32, 0xF0, 0x22, 0x68),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDC, 0xD9, 0x99, 0x99, 0xBE, 0x43, 0x99, 0x3E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1F, 0x71, 0x41, 0xF4, 0xB5, 0xFD, 0xDD, 0x36),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9D, 0xE2, 0x20, 0x4C, 0xD1, 0x2E, 0x1F, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x96, 0x43, 0x48, 0x76, 0x8A, 0x49, 0xAC, 0x87),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0C, 0x1A, 0x55, 0xA8, 0xA3, 0xD4, 0x57, 0x75),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0xA6, 0x84, 0x39, 0xC9, 0x13, 0xBB, 0x60),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD9, 0xFA, 0xA9, 0x70, 0xDE, 0x83, 0xDD, 0xC9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEC, 0xC9, 0xD9, 0x3E, 0x44, 0x91, 0x68, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB6, 0x9F, 0x85, 0x6D, 0xF7, 0x54, 0x36, 0x82),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x68, 0x6B, 0xA6, 0xA3, 0xE5, 0xD4, 0x46, 0xDB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x3E, 0xDC, 0x84, 0x7C, 0x7B, 0x24, 0x34),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x14, 0xED, 0x7F, 0x86, 0x07, 0x6C, 0x57, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x95, 0x06, 0xFE, 0x52, 0x12, 0x79, 0x69, 0x56),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x84, 0xD1, 0x44, 0x5F, 0x21, 0x3A, 0xC3, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5E, 0xD9, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0x75, 0xAB, 0x17, 0xAC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xFF, 0x81, 0x94, 0xB6, 0x80, 0x6B, 0x6F, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xBE, 0x8E, 0xA5, 0xAA, 0xBC, 0x1E, 0x3E),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x89, 0xC7, 0x85, 0xA6, 0x59, 0x9B, 0xB1, 0x52),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xCE, 0x40, 0xD1, 0xFB, 0xDF, 0x94, 0xF7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x18, 0xB8, 0x5E, 0xBF, 0x45, 0xA8, 0x2D, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x98, 0x9C, 0x06, 0x1B, 0xA9, 0x57, 0xB9, 0x79),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x53, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0xA2, 0xD3, 0x74, 0xA1, 0x3C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAA, 0x5F, 0x34, 0x78, 0xDB, 0xAE, 0x3A, 0x14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7D, 0x32, 0x84, 0x3E, 0x68, 0x6A, 0x43, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0xBC, 0x39, 0x36, 0xA4, 0xC5, 0xBB, 0x11),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8C, 0x07, 0xA2, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0x4D, 0x0F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0x1D, 0x67, 0xE6, 0xF1, 0x46, 0xEB, 0x71),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD7, 0x41, 0x23, 0x95, 0xE7, 0xE0, 0x10, 0xDD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x69, 0xFE, 0x68, 0x8C, 0xC6, 0x5F, 0xB6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE3, 0xB9, 0x2B, 0x3D, 0xD2, 0x4F, 0xD8, 0x1A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA3, 0x09, 0xF5, 0x5F, 0xCF, 0xF6, 0x91, 0x57),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x65, 0x15, 0x42, 0x6B, 0x6D, 0xB5, 0xF3, 0xB6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBF, 0x56, 0x9D, 0xC5, 0xFF, 0xCA, 0x13, 0x9B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x4D, 0x38, 0xE6, 0x23, 0x63, 0x48, 0x3C, 0xCA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD2, 0x68, 0x3C, 0xD1, 0x3B, 0xE9, 0x3B, 0x82),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB5, 0x08, 0x54, 0x49, 0xD1, 0x46, 0x45, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x70, 0x52, 0x6E, 0x79, 0xC4, 0x5E, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0xDF, 0xE8, 0x5A, 0x32, 0x81, 0xDA, 0xD3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3C, 0x2D, 0x94, 0x5B, 0xB5, 0x35, 0x9F, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2A, 0x12, 0x8D, 0xC3, 0x36, 0x36, 0xB2, 0x2A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x39, 0x2F, 0x22, 0x38, 0x5B, 0x18, 0x4C, 0x35),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0xC1, 0x22, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x11, 0x05),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB2, 0xAE, 0xA4, 0x56, 0x18, 0x61, 0x66, 0x12),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x79, 0xFB, 0x72, 0x08, 0x84, 0x38, 0x51, 0xB0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDA, 0x86, 0xA8, 0xB9, 0x31, 0x99, 0x29, 0xC3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x8A, 0xFB, 0xC3, 0x42, 0xB3, 0xC7, 0x6F, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD8, 0xF8, 0xE1, 0x09, 0xBE, 0x75, 0xB0, 0x22),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5A, 0x7D, 0xFF, 0xF4, 0x99, 0xFC, 0x13, 0xAB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE6, 0x1B, 0x84, 0x81, 0x42, 0x22, 0xC6, 0x3D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x21, 0xE0, 0x37, 0xA4, 0xA0, 0x2F, 0x38, 0x7F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x3D, 0xB7, 0x40, 0x2F, 0x39, 0x3C, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7A, 0x3B, 0x8A, 0x51, 0xAE, 0x40, 0x49, 0x7A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x36, 0x20, 0x9F, 0xDD, 0xA9, 0xD0, 0x77, 0xC7),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x78, 0x1D, 0x64, 0xDA, 0xA0, 0x53, 0xC7, 0x7D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x37, 0x7B, 0x66, 0x55, 0x94, 0xD1, 0x51, 0x44),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0E, 0xA9, 0xB5, 0x5B, 0x38, 0x35, 0x40, 0xC0),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC8, 0xC9, 0x0F, 0xF0, 0x73, 0x79, 0x43, 0x61),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x47, 0x45, 0x69, 0x80, 0x72, 0x72, 0x42),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x11, 0x99, 0x59, 0xDB, 0x48, 0x80, 0x39),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x75, 0x6E, 0x3D, 0xFC, 0x37, 0x15, 0xF4, 0xBF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x17, 0xBB, 0x5B, 0xA6, 0x35, 0x8D, 0x28, 0x20),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0x1A, 0x3B, 0x2C, 0x8F, 0xD3, 0xAA, 0x2D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x55, 0x1C, 0x1A, 0xF8, 0x02, 0xD9, 0x7B, 0x41),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAF, 0x69, 0xAC, 0xF8, 0x54, 0x31, 0x14, 0xA1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x8A, 0xE6, 0xDE, 0x58, 0xB9, 0xC4, 0x7A),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x57, 0x83, 0x52, 0xFE, 0xF9, 0x7B, 0xE9, 0x1F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0xA2, 0x55, 0x46, 0x15, 0x49, 0xC1, 0x3A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xBC, 0x5C, 0x91, 0xBD, 0xB9, 0x9C, 0xF4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBB, 0xFD, 0xB1, 0x4E, 0x5F, 0x74, 0xEE, 0x53),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xB1, 0x8B, 0xD8, 0x8B, 0x17, 0x73, 0x1B, 0x96),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x22, 0x92, 0xD7, 0x67, 0x06, 0xAD, 0x25, 0xCD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x01, 0x0F, 0x80, 0x24, 0xE2, 0x27, 0x5F, 0x8B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x61, 0x1C, 0xCE, 0xD0, 0x67, 0xCA, 0xD4, 0x0B),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x87, 0xF1, 0xDD, 0x33, 0x66, 0xF9, 0x05, 0xD6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1D, 0xE5, 0x6B, 0x79, 0xBD, 0x48, 0x42, 0xAA),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x14, 0x52, 0xE3, 0x53, 0xB4, 0x50, 0xD4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x32, 0x84, 0x6C, 0xCF, 0xDA, 0xB2, 0x20, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0xD6, 0x1A, 0xE5, 0xE2, 0x29, 0x70, 0xCE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x61, 0xFE, 0xBB, 0x21, 0x82, 0xD1, 0xFE),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x2C, 0xF0, 0x9C, 0x8B, 0x1A, 0x42, 0x30, 0x06),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0xD6, 0x49, 0x81, 0x92, 0xF1, 0xD0, 0x90),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x91, 0x93, 0x6A, 0xA6, 0x22, 0xE9, 0xD6),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x09, 0xDC, 0xC3, 0x69, 0x11, 0x95, 0x7D, 0xEC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x1C, 0xA3, 0x9D, 0x87, 0x5E, 0x64, 0x41, 0xA2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xBE, 0x87, 0x5A, 0x15, 0xBD, 0x6E, 0x3C, 0x8D),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD0, 0x8D, 0x50, 0xCC, 0xCF, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0x0B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x38, 0x65, 0xCD, 0x31, 0x30, 0xF1, 0x68, 0x13),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x10, 0x5C, 0x66, 0x67, 0x92, 0x30, 0x57, 0x95),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x23, 0x9B, 0x01, 0x3D, 0x20, 0x8B, 0xD1, 0x0D),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAB, 0xC0, 0xE6, 0x4F, 0xDE, 0x62, 0xAB, 0xB3),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA4, 0x48, 0xB3, 0x1C, 0x0F, 0x16, 0x93, 0x45),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x77, 0x63, 0xBD, 0x1F, 0x16, 0x50, 0x56, 0x98),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x5D, 0x06, 0xBC, 0xE9, 0x27, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x7B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF8, 0xFE, 0x21, 0xC5, 0x39, 0x55, 0xE1, 0xFD),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF6, 0xA8, 0xD0, 0x96, 0x0E, 0xB5, 0xB2, 0x84),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3D, 0xE7, 0x4B, 0xF3, 0x11, 0x0C, 0xC9, 0x5B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x43, 0x3A, 0xC4, 0x87, 0x71, 0xEE, 0xFA, 0x18),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA7, 0x77, 0xEE, 0x81, 0x5E, 0x96, 0xEA, 0x4B),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xEE, 0xDF, 0xA9, 0xF4, 0x4F, 0x7C, 0xB2, 0x43),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x9F, 0xD4, 0xDF, 0x35, 0x63, 0x47, 0x25, 0x8A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xA5, 0x3D, 0xFF, 0xA4, 0x02, 0xC3, 0x95, 0x11),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD5, 0x10, 0x78, 0xD1, 0x2B, 0xB7, 0xBE, 0x0E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x0A, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xF9, 0xE0, 0xD8, 0xFC, 0xBC),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF3, 0xC4, 0x01, 0xD6, 0xB4, 0xE7, 0x78, 0xE2),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x02, 0x6C, 0xB9, 0x13, 0xA4, 0xE8, 0x6D, 0x6F),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE8, 0xB0, 0xC9, 0xCD, 0xBF, 0xA2, 0x1E, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xDD, 0x4F, 0x86, 0x22, 0x9B, 0xEA, 0xE8, 0xBB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x50, 0x46, 0xDF, 0x43, 0xB9, 0x82, 0x2D, 0x0A),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x07, 0x32, 0xF1, 0x4E, 0x95, 0x41, 0xAE, 0x8E),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x52, 0x93, 0x26, 0xFC, 0xD3, 0x90, 0xDC, 0xEB),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x04, 0x05, 0x45, 0xCA, 0xF9, 0x5A, 0x89, 0x93),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC5, 0x82, 0x63, 0x4E, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x3A, 0x08),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x7C, 0x69, 0x52, 0x49, 0xE9, 0xED, 0x57, 0x34),
+};
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x70, 0x64, 0xE9, 0xAC, 0x4C, 0x4A, 0xEA, 0x25),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xE9, 0xE9, 0x0B, 0x99, 0xE7, 0xF9, 0xA9, 0x2C),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x24, 0x0C, 0xC1, 0xF4, 0x8D, 0x07, 0xB6, 0xB1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xAD, 0x68, 0xFA, 0x35, 0xE4, 0x9E, 0xAE, 0xD9),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xF0, 0x2D, 0x1A, 0x13, 0x8E, 0x02, 0xE2, 0x63),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x27, 0x38, 0x28, 0x86, 0x46, 0x7B, 0x3A, 0xE1),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x3F, 0x4C, 0x64, 0x59, 0x0A, 0xF9, 0x02, 0xC4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x41, 0x4F, 0x23, 0xA2, 0xC3, 0xD5, 0xEF, 0x42),
+};
+static const mbedtls_ecp_point brainpoolP512r1_T[32] = {
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z1(brainpoolP512r1_T_0_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_0_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_1_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_1_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_2_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_2_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_3_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_3_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_4_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_4_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_5_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_5_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_6_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_6_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_7_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_7_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_8_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_8_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_9_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_9_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_10_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_10_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_11_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_11_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_12_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_12_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_13_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_13_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_14_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_14_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_15_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_15_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_16_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_16_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_17_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_17_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_18_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_18_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_19_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_19_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_20_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_20_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_21_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_21_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_22_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_22_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_23_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_23_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_24_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_24_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_25_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_25_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_26_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_26_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_27_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_27_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_28_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_28_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_29_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_29_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_30_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_30_Y),
+ ECP_POINT_INIT_XY_Z0(brainpoolP512r1_T_31_X, brainpoolP512r1_T_31_Y),
+};
+#else
+#define brainpoolP512r1_T NULL
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */
+
+
+#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Create an MPI from embedded constants
+ * (assumes len is an exact multiple of sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) and
+ * len < 1048576)
+ */
+static inline void ecp_mpi_load(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t len)
+{
+ X->s = 1;
+ X->n = (unsigned short) (len / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
+ X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) p;
+}
+#endif
+
+#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP)
+/*
+ * Set an MPI to static value 1
+ */
+static inline void ecp_mpi_set1(mbedtls_mpi *X)
+{
+ X->s = 1;
+ X->n = 1;
+ X->p = mpi_one;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make group available from embedded constants
+ */
+static int ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, size_t plen,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *a, size_t alen,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *b, size_t blen,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gx, size_t gxlen,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *gy, size_t gylen,
+ const mbedtls_mpi_uint *n, size_t nlen,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *T)
+{
+ ecp_mpi_load(&grp->P, p, plen);
+ if (a != NULL) {
+ ecp_mpi_load(&grp->A, a, alen);
+ }
+ ecp_mpi_load(&grp->B, b, blen);
+ ecp_mpi_load(&grp->N, n, nlen);
+
+ ecp_mpi_load(&grp->G.X, gx, gxlen);
+ ecp_mpi_load(&grp->G.Y, gy, gylen);
+ ecp_mpi_set1(&grp->G.Z);
+
+ grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P);
+ grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->N);
+
+ grp->h = 1;
+
+ grp->T = (mbedtls_ecp_point *) T;
+ /*
+ * Set T_size to 0 to prevent T free by mbedtls_ecp_group_free.
+ */
+ grp->T_size = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM)
+/* Forward declarations */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p192(mbedtls_mpi *);
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *Np, size_t Nn);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p224(mbedtls_mpi *);
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p256(mbedtls_mpi *);
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p384(mbedtls_mpi *);
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p521(mbedtls_mpi *);
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *N_p, size_t N_n);
+#endif
+
+#define NIST_MODP(P) grp->modp = ecp_mod_ ## P;
+#else
+#define NIST_MODP(P)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */
+
+/* Additional forward declarations */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p255(mbedtls_mpi *);
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p448(mbedtls_mpi *);
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *, size_t);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *);
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *);
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *);
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(ECP_LOAD_GROUP)
+#define LOAD_GROUP_A(G) ecp_group_load(grp, \
+ G ## _p, sizeof(G ## _p), \
+ G ## _a, sizeof(G ## _a), \
+ G ## _b, sizeof(G ## _b), \
+ G ## _gx, sizeof(G ## _gx), \
+ G ## _gy, sizeof(G ## _gy), \
+ G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n), \
+ G ## _T \
+ )
+
+#define LOAD_GROUP(G) ecp_group_load(grp, \
+ G ## _p, sizeof(G ## _p), \
+ NULL, 0, \
+ G ## _b, sizeof(G ## _b), \
+ G ## _gx, sizeof(G ## _gx), \
+ G ## _gy, sizeof(G ## _gy), \
+ G ## _n, sizeof(G ## _n), \
+ G ## _T \
+ )
+#endif /* ECP_LOAD_GROUP */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve25519() */
+static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve25519_a24 = 0x01DB42;
+
+/* P = 2^255 - 19 */
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint curve25519_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xED, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0X7F)
+};
+
+/* N = 2^252 + 27742317777372353535851937790883648493 */
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint curve25519_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XED, 0XD3, 0XF5, 0X5C, 0X1A, 0X63, 0X12, 0X58),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XD6, 0X9C, 0XF7, 0XA2, 0XDE, 0XF9, 0XDE, 0X14),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10)
+};
+
+/*
+ * Specialized function for creating the Curve25519 group
+ */
+static int ecp_use_curve25519(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->A, curve25519_a24));
+
+ ecp_mpi_load(&grp->P, curve25519_p, sizeof(curve25519_p));
+
+ grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P);
+
+ ecp_mpi_load(&grp->N, curve25519_n, sizeof(curve25519_n));
+
+ /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates.
+ * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.X, 9));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.Z, 1));
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->G.Y);
+
+ /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */
+ grp->nbits = 254;
+
+cleanup:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+/* Constants used by ecp_use_curve448() */
+static const mbedtls_mpi_sint curve448_a24 = 0x98AA;
+
+/* P = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1 */
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint curve448_p[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFE, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00)
+};
+
+/* N = 2^446 - 13818066809895115352007386748515426880336692474882178609894547503885 */
+static const mbedtls_mpi_uint curve448_n[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XF3, 0X44, 0X58, 0XAB, 0X92, 0XC2, 0X78, 0X23),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X55, 0X8F, 0XC5, 0X8D, 0X72, 0XC2, 0X6C, 0X21),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X90, 0X36, 0XD6, 0XAE, 0X49, 0XDB, 0X4E, 0XC4),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XE9, 0X23, 0XCA, 0X7C, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0XFF, 0X3F),
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00, 0X00)
+};
+
+/*
+ * Specialized function for creating the Curve448 group
+ */
+static int ecp_use_curve448(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ /* Actually ( A + 2 ) / 4 */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->A, curve448_a24));
+
+ ecp_mpi_load(&grp->P, curve448_p, sizeof(curve448_p));
+ grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P);
+
+ /* Y intentionally not set, since we use x/z coordinates.
+ * This is used as a marker to identify Montgomery curves! */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.X, 5));
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.Z, 1));
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp->G.Y);
+
+ ecp_mpi_load(&grp->N, curve448_n, sizeof(curve448_n));
+
+ /* Actually, the required msb for private keys */
+ grp->nbits = 447;
+
+cleanup:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */
+
+/*
+ * Set a group using well-known domain parameters
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id)
+{
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp);
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_init(grp);
+
+ grp->id = id;
+
+ switch (id) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:
+ NIST_MODP(p192);
+ return LOAD_GROUP(secp192r1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:
+ NIST_MODP(p224);
+ return LOAD_GROUP(secp224r1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:
+ NIST_MODP(p256);
+ return LOAD_GROUP(secp256r1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:
+ NIST_MODP(p384);
+ return LOAD_GROUP(secp384r1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:
+ NIST_MODP(p521);
+ return LOAD_GROUP(secp521r1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1:
+ grp->modp = ecp_mod_p192k1;
+ return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp192k1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1:
+ grp->modp = ecp_mod_p224k1;
+ return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp224k1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:
+ grp->modp = ecp_mod_p256k1;
+ return LOAD_GROUP_A(secp256k1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:
+ return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP256r1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1:
+ return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP384r1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:
+ return LOAD_GROUP_A(brainpoolP512r1);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:
+ grp->modp = ecp_mod_p255;
+ return ecp_use_curve25519(grp);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:
+ grp->modp = ecp_mod_p448;
+ return ecp_use_curve448(grp);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */
+
+ default:
+ grp->id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM)
+/*
+ * Fast reduction modulo the primes used by the NIST curves.
+ *
+ * These functions are critical for speed, but not needed for correct
+ * operations. So, we make the choice to heavily rely on the internals of our
+ * bignum library, which creates a tight coupling between these functions and
+ * our MPI implementation. However, the coupling between the ECP module and
+ * MPI remains loose, since these functions can be deactivated at will.
+ */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Compared to the way things are presented in FIPS 186-3 D.2,
+ * we proceed in columns, from right (least significant chunk) to left,
+ * adding chunks to N in place, and keeping a carry for the next chunk.
+ * This avoids moving things around in memory, and uselessly adding zeros,
+ * compared to the more straightforward, line-oriented approach.
+ *
+ * For this prime we need to handle data in chunks of 64 bits.
+ * Since this is always a multiple of our basic mbedtls_mpi_uint, we can
+ * use a mbedtls_mpi_uint * to designate such a chunk, and small loops to handle it.
+ */
+
+/* Add 64-bit chunks (dst += src) and update carry */
+static inline void add64(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *src, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry)
+{
+ unsigned char i;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); i++, dst++, src++) {
+ *dst += c; c = (*dst < c);
+ *dst += *src; c += (*dst < *src);
+ }
+ *carry += c;
+}
+
+/* Add carry to a 64-bit chunk and update carry */
+static inline void carry64(mbedtls_mpi_uint *dst, mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry)
+{
+ unsigned char i;
+ for (i = 0; i < 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint); i++, dst++) {
+ *dst += *carry;
+ *carry = (*dst < *carry);
+ }
+}
+
+#define WIDTH 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)
+#define A(i) Np + (i) * WIDTH
+#define ADD(i) add64(p, A(i), &c)
+#define NEXT p += WIDTH; carry64(p, &c)
+#define LAST p += WIDTH; do *p = 0; while (++p < end)
+#define RESET last_carry[0] = c; c = 0; p = Np
+#define ADD_LAST add64(p, last_carry, &c)
+
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.1)
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p192(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(192) * 2;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width));
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(N->p, expected_width);
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *Np, size_t Nn)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint c = 0, last_carry[WIDTH] = { 0 };
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *p, *end;
+
+ if (Nn != BITS_TO_LIMBS(192) * 2) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ p = Np;
+ end = p + Nn;
+
+ ADD(3); ADD(5); NEXT; // A0 += A3 + A5
+ ADD(3); ADD(4); ADD(5); NEXT; // A1 += A3 + A4 + A5
+ ADD(4); ADD(5); // A2 += A4 + A5
+
+ RESET;
+
+ /* Use the reduction for the carry as well:
+ * 2^192 * last_carry = 2^64 * last_carry + last_carry mod P192
+ * It can generate a carry. */
+ ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 += last_carry
+ ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A1 += last_carry
+ // A2 += carry
+
+ RESET;
+
+ /* Use the reduction for the carry as well:
+ * 2^192 * last_carry = 2^64 * last_carry + last_carry mod P192
+ */
+ ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0 += last_carry
+ ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A1 += last_carry
+ // A2 += carry
+
+ LAST;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#undef WIDTH
+#undef A
+#undef ADD
+#undef NEXT
+#undef LAST
+#undef RESET
+#undef ADD_LAST
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+
+/*
+ * The reader is advised to first understand ecp_mod_p192() since the same
+ * general structure is used here, but with additional complications:
+ * (1) chunks of 32 bits, and (2) subtractions.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * For these primes, we need to handle data in chunks of 32 bits.
+ * This makes it more complicated if we use 64 bits limbs in MPI,
+ * which prevents us from using a uniform access method as for p192.
+ *
+ * So, we define a mini abstraction layer to access 32 bit chunks,
+ * load them in 'cur' for work, and store them back from 'cur' when done.
+ *
+ * While at it, also define the size of N in terms of 32-bit chunks.
+ */
+#define LOAD32 cur = A(i);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT32) /* 32 bit */
+
+#define MAX32 X_limbs
+#define A(j) X[j]
+#define STORE32 X[i] = (mbedtls_mpi_uint) cur;
+#define STORE0 X[i] = 0;
+
+#else /* 64 bit */
+
+#define MAX32 X_limbs * 2
+#define A(j) \
+ (j) % 2 ? \
+ (uint32_t) (X[(j) / 2] >> 32) : \
+ (uint32_t) (X[(j) / 2])
+#define STORE32 \
+ if (i % 2) { \
+ X[i/2] &= 0x00000000FFFFFFFF; \
+ X[i/2] |= (uint64_t) (cur) << 32; \
+ } else { \
+ X[i/2] &= 0xFFFFFFFF00000000; \
+ X[i/2] |= (uint32_t) cur; \
+ }
+
+#define STORE0 \
+ if (i % 2) { \
+ X[i/2] &= 0x00000000FFFFFFFF; \
+ } else { \
+ X[i/2] &= 0xFFFFFFFF00000000; \
+ }
+
+#endif
+
+static inline int8_t extract_carry(int64_t cur)
+{
+ return (int8_t) (cur >> 32);
+}
+
+#define ADD(j) cur += A(j)
+#define SUB(j) cur -= A(j)
+
+#define ADD_CARRY(cc) cur += (cc)
+#define SUB_CARRY(cc) cur -= (cc)
+
+#define ADD_LAST ADD_CARRY(last_c)
+#define SUB_LAST SUB_CARRY(last_c)
+
+/*
+ * Helpers for the main 'loop'
+ */
+#define INIT(b) \
+ int8_t c = 0, last_c; \
+ int64_t cur; \
+ size_t i = 0; \
+ LOAD32;
+
+#define NEXT \
+ c = extract_carry(cur); \
+ STORE32; i++; LOAD32; \
+ ADD_CARRY(c);
+
+#define RESET \
+ c = extract_carry(cur); \
+ last_c = c; \
+ STORE32; i = 0; LOAD32; \
+ c = 0; \
+
+#define LAST \
+ c = extract_carry(cur); \
+ STORE32; i++; \
+ if (c != 0) \
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; \
+ while (i < MAX32) { STORE0; i++; }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
+
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.2)
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p224(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(224) * 2;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width));
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw(N->p, expected_width);
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs)
+{
+ if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(224) * 2) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ INIT(224);
+
+ SUB(7); SUB(11); NEXT; // A0 += -A7 - A11
+ SUB(8); SUB(12); NEXT; // A1 += -A8 - A12
+ SUB(9); SUB(13); NEXT; // A2 += -A9 - A13
+ SUB(10); ADD(7); ADD(11); NEXT; // A3 += -A10 + A7 + A11
+ SUB(11); ADD(8); ADD(12); NEXT; // A4 += -A11 + A8 + A12
+ SUB(12); ADD(9); ADD(13); NEXT; // A5 += -A12 + A9 + A13
+ SUB(13); ADD(10); // A6 += -A13 + A10
+
+ RESET;
+
+ /* Use 2^224 = P + 2^96 - 1 to modulo reduce the final carry */
+ SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A0 -= last_c
+ ; NEXT; // A1
+ ; NEXT; // A2
+ ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A3 += last_c
+ ; NEXT; // A4
+ ; NEXT; // A5
+ // A6
+
+ /* The carry reduction cannot generate a carry
+ * (see commit 73e8553 for details)*/
+
+ LAST;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
+
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.3)
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p256(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(256) * 2;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width));
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw(N->p, expected_width);
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs)
+{
+ if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(256) * 2) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ INIT(256);
+
+ ADD(8); ADD(9);
+ SUB(11); SUB(12); SUB(13); SUB(14); NEXT; // A0
+
+ ADD(9); ADD(10);
+ SUB(12); SUB(13); SUB(14); SUB(15); NEXT; // A1
+
+ ADD(10); ADD(11);
+ SUB(13); SUB(14); SUB(15); NEXT; // A2
+
+ ADD(11); ADD(11); ADD(12); ADD(12); ADD(13);
+ SUB(15); SUB(8); SUB(9); NEXT; // A3
+
+ ADD(12); ADD(12); ADD(13); ADD(13); ADD(14);
+ SUB(9); SUB(10); NEXT; // A4
+
+ ADD(13); ADD(13); ADD(14); ADD(14); ADD(15);
+ SUB(10); SUB(11); NEXT; // A5
+
+ ADD(14); ADD(14); ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(14); ADD(13);
+ SUB(8); SUB(9); NEXT; // A6
+
+ ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(15); ADD(8);
+ SUB(10); SUB(11); SUB(12); SUB(13); // A7
+
+ RESET;
+
+ /* Use 2^224 * (2^32 - 1) + 2^192 + 2^96 - 1
+ * to modulo reduce the final carry. */
+ ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0
+ ; NEXT; // A1
+ ; NEXT; // A2
+ SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A3
+ ; NEXT; // A4
+ ; NEXT; // A5
+ SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A6
+ ADD_LAST; // A7
+
+ RESET;
+
+ /* Use 2^224 * (2^32 - 1) + 2^192 + 2^96 - 1
+ * to modulo reduce the carry generated by the previous reduction. */
+ ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0
+ ; NEXT; // A1
+ ; NEXT; // A2
+ SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A3
+ ; NEXT; // A4
+ ; NEXT; // A5
+ SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A6
+ ADD_LAST; // A7
+
+ LAST;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p384 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.4)
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p384(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(384) * 2;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width));
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw(N->p, expected_width);
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs)
+{
+ if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(384) * 2) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ INIT(384);
+
+ ADD(12); ADD(21); ADD(20);
+ SUB(23); NEXT; // A0
+
+ ADD(13); ADD(22); ADD(23);
+ SUB(12); SUB(20); NEXT; // A1
+
+ ADD(14); ADD(23);
+ SUB(13); SUB(21); NEXT; // A2
+
+ ADD(15); ADD(12); ADD(20); ADD(21);
+ SUB(14); SUB(22); SUB(23); NEXT; // A3
+
+ ADD(21); ADD(21); ADD(16); ADD(13); ADD(12); ADD(20); ADD(22);
+ SUB(15); SUB(23); SUB(23); NEXT; // A4
+
+ ADD(22); ADD(22); ADD(17); ADD(14); ADD(13); ADD(21); ADD(23);
+ SUB(16); NEXT; // A5
+
+ ADD(23); ADD(23); ADD(18); ADD(15); ADD(14); ADD(22);
+ SUB(17); NEXT; // A6
+
+ ADD(19); ADD(16); ADD(15); ADD(23);
+ SUB(18); NEXT; // A7
+
+ ADD(20); ADD(17); ADD(16);
+ SUB(19); NEXT; // A8
+
+ ADD(21); ADD(18); ADD(17);
+ SUB(20); NEXT; // A9
+
+ ADD(22); ADD(19); ADD(18);
+ SUB(21); NEXT; // A10
+
+ ADD(23); ADD(20); ADD(19);
+ SUB(22); // A11
+
+ RESET;
+
+ /* Use 2^384 = P + 2^128 + 2^96 - 2^32 + 1 to modulo reduce the final carry */
+ ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0
+ SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A1
+ ; NEXT; // A2
+ ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A3
+ ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A4
+ ; NEXT; // A5
+ ; NEXT; // A6
+ ; NEXT; // A7
+ ; NEXT; // A8
+ ; NEXT; // A9
+ ; NEXT; // A10
+ // A11
+
+ RESET;
+
+ ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A0
+ SUB_LAST; NEXT; // A1
+ ; NEXT; // A2
+ ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A3
+ ADD_LAST; NEXT; // A4
+ ; NEXT; // A5
+ ; NEXT; // A6
+ ; NEXT; // A7
+ ; NEXT; // A8
+ ; NEXT; // A9
+ ; NEXT; // A10
+ // A11
+
+ LAST;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
+
+#undef LOAD32
+#undef MAX32
+#undef A
+#undef STORE32
+#undef STORE0
+#undef ADD
+#undef SUB
+#undef ADD_CARRY
+#undef SUB_CARRY
+#undef ADD_LAST
+#undef SUB_LAST
+#undef INIT
+#undef NEXT
+#undef RESET
+#undef LAST
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED ||
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+/* Size of p521 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */
+#define P521_WIDTH (521 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1)
+
+/* Bits to keep in the most significant mbedtls_mpi_uint */
+#define P521_MASK 0x01FF
+
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 = 2^521 - 1 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5)
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p521(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(521) * 2;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width));
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(N->p, expected_width);
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint carry = 0;
+
+ if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(521) * 2) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* Step 1: Reduction to P521_WIDTH limbs */
+ /* Helper references for bottom part of X */
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *X0 = X;
+ size_t X0_limbs = P521_WIDTH;
+ /* Helper references for top part of X */
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *X1 = X + X0_limbs;
+ size_t X1_limbs = X_limbs - X0_limbs;
+ /* Split X as X0 + 2^P521_WIDTH X1 and compute X0 + 2^(biL - 9) X1.
+ * (We are using that 2^P521_WIDTH = 2^(512 + biL) and that
+ * 2^(512 + biL) X1 = 2^(biL - 9) X1 mod P521.)
+ * The high order limb of the result will be held in carry and the rest
+ * in X0 (that is the result will be represented as
+ * 2^P521_WIDTH carry + X0).
+ *
+ * Also, note that the resulting carry is either 0 or 1:
+ * X0 < 2^P521_WIDTH = 2^(512 + biL) and X1 < 2^(P521_WIDTH-biL) = 2^512
+ * therefore
+ * X0 + 2^(biL - 9) X1 < 2^(512 + biL) + 2^(512 + biL - 9)
+ * which in turn is less than 2 * 2^(512 + biL).
+ */
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint shift = ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1u) << (biL - 9);
+ carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(X0, X0_limbs, X1, X1_limbs, shift);
+ /* Set X to X0 (by clearing the top part). */
+ memset(X1, 0, X1_limbs * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint));
+
+ /* Step 2: Reduction modulo P521
+ *
+ * At this point X is reduced to P521_WIDTH limbs. What remains is to add
+ * the carry (that is 2^P521_WIDTH carry) and to reduce mod P521. */
+
+ /* 2^P521_WIDTH carry = 2^(512 + biL) carry = 2^(biL - 9) carry mod P521.
+ * Also, recall that carry is either 0 or 1. */
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint addend = carry << (biL - 9);
+ /* Keep the top 9 bits and reduce the rest, using 2^521 = 1 mod P521. */
+ addend += (X[P521_WIDTH - 1] >> 9);
+ X[P521_WIDTH - 1] &= P521_MASK;
+
+ /* Reuse the top part of X (already zeroed) as a helper array for
+ * carrying out the addition. */
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *addend_arr = X + P521_WIDTH;
+ addend_arr[0] = addend;
+ (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, addend_arr, P521_WIDTH);
+ /* Both addends were less than P521 therefore X < 2 * P521. (This also means
+ * that the result fit in P521_WIDTH limbs and there won't be any carry.) */
+
+ /* Clear the reused part of X. */
+ addend_arr[0] = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#undef P521_WIDTH
+#undef P521_MASK
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+
+/* Size of p255 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */
+#define P255_WIDTH (255 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) + 1)
+
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p255 = 2^255 - 19
+ * Write N as A0 + 2^256 A1, return A0 + 38 * A1
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p255(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(255) * 2;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width));
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw(N->p, expected_width);
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_Limbs)
+{
+
+ if (X_Limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(255) * 2) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *carry = mbedtls_calloc(P255_WIDTH, ciL);
+ if (carry == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Step 1: Reduction to P255_WIDTH limbs */
+ if (X_Limbs > P255_WIDTH) {
+ /* Helper references for top part of X */
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint * const A1 = X + P255_WIDTH;
+ const size_t A1_limbs = X_Limbs - P255_WIDTH;
+
+ /* X = A0 + 38 * A1, capture carry out */
+ *carry = mbedtls_mpi_core_mla(X, P255_WIDTH, A1, A1_limbs, 38);
+ /* Clear top part */
+ memset(A1, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * A1_limbs);
+ }
+
+ /* Step 2: Reduce to <2p
+ * Split as A0 + 2^255*c, with c a scalar, and compute A0 + 19*c */
+ *carry <<= 1;
+ *carry += (X[P255_WIDTH - 1] >> (biL - 1));
+ *carry *= 19;
+
+ /* Clear top bit */
+ X[P255_WIDTH - 1] <<= 1; X[P255_WIDTH - 1] >>= 1;
+ /* Since the top bit for X has been cleared 0 + 0 + Carry
+ * will not overflow.
+ *
+ * Furthermore for 2p = 2^256-38. When a carry propagation on the highest
+ * limb occurs, X > 2^255 and all the remaining bits on the limb are zero.
+ * - If X < 2^255 ==> X < 2p
+ * - If X > 2^255 ==> X < 2^256 - 2^255 < 2p */
+ (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, carry, P255_WIDTH);
+
+ mbedtls_free(carry);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+
+/* Size of p448 in terms of mbedtls_mpi_uint */
+#define P448_WIDTH (448 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint))
+
+/* Number of limbs fully occupied by 2^224 (max), and limbs used by it (min) */
+#define DIV_ROUND_UP(X, Y) (((X) + (Y) -1) / (Y))
+#define P224_SIZE (224 / 8)
+#define P224_WIDTH_MIN (P224_SIZE / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint))
+#define P224_WIDTH_MAX DIV_ROUND_UP(P224_SIZE, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint))
+#define P224_UNUSED_BITS ((P224_WIDTH_MAX * sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint) * 8) - 224)
+
+static int ecp_mod_p448(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(448) * 2;
+
+ /* This is required as some tests and use cases do not pass in a Bignum of
+ * the correct size, and expect the growth to be done automatically, which
+ * will no longer happen. */
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width));
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw(N->p, N->n);
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p448 = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1
+ * Write X as A0 + 2^448 A1 and A1 as B0 + 2^224 B1, and return A0 + A1 + B1 +
+ * (B0 + B1) * 2^224. This is different to the reference implementation of
+ * Curve448, which uses its own special 56-bit limbs rather than a generic
+ * bignum library. We could squeeze some extra speed out on 32-bit machines by
+ * splitting N up into 32-bit limbs and doing the arithmetic using the limbs
+ * directly as we do for the NIST primes above, but for 64-bit targets it should
+ * use half the number of operations if we do the reduction with 224-bit limbs,
+ * since mpi_core_add will then use 64-bit adds.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs)
+{
+ size_t round;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(448) * 2) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ size_t M_limbs = X_limbs - (P448_WIDTH);
+
+ if (M_limbs > P448_WIDTH) {
+ /* Shouldn't be called with X larger than 2^896! */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* Both M and Q require an extra limb to catch carries. */
+ M_limbs++;
+
+ const size_t Q_limbs = M_limbs;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *M = NULL;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *Q = NULL;
+
+ M = mbedtls_calloc(M_limbs, ciL);
+
+ if (M == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ Q = mbedtls_calloc(Q_limbs, ciL);
+
+ if (Q == NULL) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* M = A1 */
+ memset(M, 0, (M_limbs * ciL));
+ /* Do not copy into the overflow limb, as this would read past the end of
+ * X. */
+ memcpy(M, X + P448_WIDTH, ((M_limbs - 1) * ciL));
+
+ /* X = A0 */
+ memset(X + P448_WIDTH, 0, ((M_limbs - 1) * ciL));
+
+ /* X = X + M = A0 + A1 */
+ /* Carry here fits in oversize X. Oversize M means it will get
+ * added in, not returned as carry. */
+ (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, M, M_limbs);
+
+ /* Q = B1 = M >> 224 */
+ memcpy(Q, (char *) M + P224_SIZE, P224_SIZE);
+ memset((char *) Q + P224_SIZE, 0, P224_SIZE);
+
+ /* X = X + Q = (A0 + A1) + B1
+ * Oversize Q catches potential carry here when X is already max 448 bits.
+ */
+ (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, Q, Q_limbs);
+
+ /* M = B0 */
+#ifdef MBEDTLS_HAVE_INT64
+ M[P224_WIDTH_MIN] &= ((mbedtls_mpi_uint)-1) >> (P224_UNUSED_BITS);
+ #endif
+ memset(M + P224_WIDTH_MAX, 0, ((M_limbs - P224_WIDTH_MAX) * ciL));
+
+ /* M = M + Q = B0 + B1 */
+ (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(M, M, Q, Q_limbs);
+
+ /* M = (B0 + B1) * 2^224 */
+ /* Shifted carry bit from the addition fits in oversize M. */
+ memmove((char *) M + P224_SIZE, M, P224_SIZE + ciL);
+ memset(M, 0, P224_SIZE);
+
+ /* X = X + M = (A0 + A1 + B1) + (B0 + B1) * 2^224 */
+ (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, M, M_limbs);
+
+ /* In the second and third rounds A1 and B0 have at most 1 non-zero limb and
+ * B1=0.
+ * Using this we need to calculate:
+ * A0 + A1 + B1 + (B0 + B1) * 2^224 = A0 + A1 + B0 * 2^224. */
+ for (round = 0; round < 2; ++round) {
+
+ /* M = A1 */
+ memset(M, 0, (M_limbs * ciL));
+ memcpy(M, X + P448_WIDTH, ((M_limbs - 1) * ciL));
+
+ /* X = A0 */
+ memset(X + P448_WIDTH, 0, ((M_limbs - 1) * ciL));
+
+ /* M = A1 + B0 * 2^224
+ * We know that only one limb of A1 will be non-zero and that it will be
+ * limb 0. We also know that B0 is the bottom 224 bits of A1 (which is
+ * then shifted up 224 bits), so, given M is currently A1 this turns
+ * into:
+ * M = M + (M << 224)
+ * As the single non-zero limb in B0 will be A1 limb 0 shifted up by 224
+ * bits, we can just move that into the right place, shifted up
+ * accordingly.*/
+ M[P224_WIDTH_MIN] = M[0] << (224 & (biL - 1));
+
+ /* X = A0 + (A1 + B0 * 2^224) */
+ (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, M, M_limbs);
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_free(M);
+ mbedtls_free(Q);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo P = 2^s - R,
+ * with R about 33 bits, used by the Koblitz curves.
+ *
+ * Write X as A0 + 2^224 A1, return A0 + R * A1.
+ */
+#define P_KOBLITZ_R (8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) // Limbs in R
+
+static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
+ size_t X_limbs,
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *R,
+ size_t bits)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Determine if A1 is aligned to limb bitsize. If not then the used limbs
+ * of P, A0 and A1 must be set accordingly and there is a middle limb
+ * which is shared by A0 and A1 and need to handle accordingly.
+ */
+ size_t shift = bits % biL;
+ size_t adjust = (shift + biL - 1) / biL;
+ size_t P_limbs = bits / biL + adjust;
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *A1 = mbedtls_calloc(P_limbs, ciL);
+ if (A1 == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Create a buffer to store the value of `R * A1` */
+ size_t R_limbs = P_KOBLITZ_R;
+ size_t M_limbs = P_limbs + R_limbs;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *M = mbedtls_calloc(M_limbs, ciL);
+ if (M == NULL) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint mask = 0;
+ if (adjust != 0) {
+ mask = ((mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << shift) - 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Two passes are needed to reduce the value of `A0 + R * A1` and then
+ * we need an additional one to reduce the possible overflow during
+ * the addition.
+ */
+ for (size_t pass = 0; pass < 3; pass++) {
+ /* Copy A1 */
+ memcpy(A1, X + P_limbs - adjust, P_limbs * ciL);
+
+ /* Shift A1 to be aligned */
+ if (shift != 0) {
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(A1, P_limbs, shift);
+ }
+
+ /* Zeroize the A1 part of the shared limb */
+ if (mask != 0) {
+ X[P_limbs - 1] &= mask;
+ }
+
+ /* X = A0
+ * Zeroize the A1 part of X to keep only the A0 part.
+ */
+ for (size_t i = P_limbs; i < X_limbs; i++) {
+ X[i] = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* X = A0 + R * A1 */
+ mbedtls_mpi_core_mul(M, A1, P_limbs, R, R_limbs);
+ (void) mbedtls_mpi_core_add(X, X, M, P_limbs + R_limbs);
+
+ /* Carry can not be generated since R is a 33-bit value and stored in
+ * 64 bits. The result value of the multiplication is at most
+ * P length + 33 bits in length and the result value of the addition
+ * is at most P length + 34 bits in length. So the result of the
+ * addition always fits in P length + 64 bits.
+ */
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_free(M);
+ mbedtls_free(A1);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) ||
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) ||
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
+
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192k1 = 2^192 - R,
+ * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x01000011C9
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(192) * 2;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width));
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw(N->p, expected_width);
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs)
+{
+ static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00)
+ };
+
+ if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(192) * 2) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return ecp_mod_koblitz(X, X_limbs, Rp, 192);
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
+
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224k1 = 2^224 - R,
+ * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^11 + 2^9 + 2^7 + 2^4 + 2 + 1 = 0x0100001A93
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(224) * 2;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width));
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw(N->p, expected_width);
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs)
+{
+ static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00)
+ };
+
+ if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(224) * 2) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return ecp_mod_koblitz(X, X_limbs, Rp, 224);
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+
+/*
+ * Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256k1 = 2^256 - R,
+ * with R = 2^32 + 2^9 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^4 + 1 = 0x01000003D1
+ */
+static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *N)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t expected_width = BITS_TO_LIMBS(256) * 2;
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(N, expected_width));
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw(N->p, expected_width);
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs)
+{
+ static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = {
+ MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00)
+ };
+
+ if (X_limbs != BITS_TO_LIMBS(256) * 2) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return ecp_mod_koblitz(X, X_limbs, Rp, 256);
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group_id id,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type ctype)
+{
+ mbedtls_mpi_modp_fn modp = NULL;
+ mbedtls_mpi_uint *p = NULL;
+ size_t p_limbs;
+
+ if (!(ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE || \
+ ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ switch (id) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:
+ if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM)
+ modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw;
+#endif
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192r1_p;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192r1_p));
+ } else {
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192r1_n;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192r1_n));
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:
+ if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM)
+ modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw;
+#endif
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224r1_p;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224r1_p));
+ } else {
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224r1_n;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224r1_n));
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:
+ if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM)
+ modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw;
+#endif
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256r1_p;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256r1_p));
+ } else {
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256r1_n;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256r1_n));
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:
+ if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM)
+ modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw;
+#endif
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp384r1_p;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp384r1_p));
+ } else {
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp384r1_n;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp384r1_n));
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:
+ if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM)
+ modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw;
+#endif
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp521r1_p;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp521r1_p));
+ } else {
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp521r1_n;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp521r1_n));
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:
+ if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP256r1_p;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP256r1_p));
+ } else {
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP256r1_n;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP256r1_n));
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1:
+ if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP384r1_p;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP384r1_p));
+ } else {
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP384r1_n;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP384r1_n));
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:
+ if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP512r1_p;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP512r1_p));
+ } else {
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) brainpoolP512r1_n;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(brainpoolP512r1_n));
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:
+ if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+ modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw;
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve25519_p;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve25519_p));
+ } else {
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve25519_n;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve25519_n));
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1:
+ if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+ modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw;
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192k1_p;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192k1_p));
+ } else {
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp192k1_n;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp192k1_n));
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1:
+ if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+ modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw;
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224k1_p;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224k1_p));
+ } else {
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp224k1_n;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp224k1_n));
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:
+ if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+ modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw;
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256k1_p;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256k1_p));
+ } else {
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) secp256k1_n;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(secp256k1_n));
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:
+ if (ctype == (mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type) MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE) {
+ modp = &mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw;
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve448_p;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve448_p));
+ } else {
+ p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) curve448_n;
+ p_limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(sizeof(curve448_n));
+ }
+ break;
+#endif
+
+ default:
+ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (modp != NULL) {
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_mod_optred_modulus_setup(N, p, p_limbs, modp)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_setup(N, p, p_limbs)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+mbedtls_ecp_variant mbedtls_ecp_get_variant(void)
+{
+ return MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_UINT;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_WITH_MPI_UINT */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecp_internal_alt.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecp_internal_alt.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..668edc7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecp_internal_alt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+/**
+ * \file ecp_internal_alt.h
+ *
+ * \brief Function declarations for alternative implementation of elliptic curve
+ * point arithmetic.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/*
+ * References:
+ *
+ * [1] BERNSTEIN, Daniel J. Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records.
+ * <http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf>
+ *
+ * [2] CORON, Jean-S'ebastien. Resistance against differential power analysis
+ * for elliptic curve cryptosystems. In : Cryptographic Hardware and
+ * Embedded Systems. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1999. p. 292-302.
+ * <http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/3-540-48059-5_25>
+ *
+ * [3] HEDABOU, Mustapha, PINEL, Pierre, et B'EN'ETEAU, Lucien. A comb method to
+ * render ECC resistant against Side Channel Attacks. IACR Cryptology
+ * ePrint Archive, 2004, vol. 2004, p. 342.
+ * <http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/342.pdf>
+ *
+ * [4] Certicom Research. SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters.
+ * <http://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf>
+ *
+ * [5] HANKERSON, Darrel, MENEZES, Alfred J., VANSTONE, Scott. Guide to Elliptic
+ * Curve Cryptography.
+ *
+ * [6] Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS 186-4.
+ * <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>
+ *
+ * [7] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
+ * Security (TLS), RFC 4492.
+ * <https://tools.ietf.org/search/rfc4492>
+ *
+ * [8] <http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-jacobian.html>
+ *
+ * [9] COHEN, Henri. A Course in Computational Algebraic Number Theory.
+ * Springer Science & Business Media, 1 Aug 2000
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT)
+
+/**
+ * \brief Indicate if the Elliptic Curve Point module extension can
+ * handle the group.
+ *
+ * \param grp The pointer to the elliptic curve group that will be the
+ * basis of the cryptographic computations.
+ *
+ * \return Non-zero if successful.
+ */
+unsigned char mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialise the Elliptic Curve Point module extension.
+ *
+ * If mbedtls_internal_ecp_grp_capable returns true for a
+ * group, this function has to be able to initialise the
+ * module for it.
+ *
+ * This module can be a driver to a crypto hardware
+ * accelerator, for which this could be an initialise function.
+ *
+ * \param grp The pointer to the group the module needs to be
+ * initialised for.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful.
+ */
+int mbedtls_internal_ecp_init(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Frees and deallocates the Elliptic Curve Point module
+ * extension.
+ *
+ * \param grp The pointer to the group the module was initialised for.
+ */
+void mbedtls_internal_ecp_free(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_JAC_ALT)
+/**
+ * \brief Randomize jacobian coordinates:
+ * (X, Y, Z) -> (l^2 X, l^3 Y, l Z) for random l.
+ *
+ * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve.
+ *
+ * \param pt The point on the curve to be randomised, given with Jacobian
+ * coordinates.
+ *
+ * \param f_rng A function pointer to the random number generator.
+ *
+ * \param p_rng A pointer to the random number generator state.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful.
+ */
+int mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *pt, int (*f_rng)(void *,
+ unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ADD_MIXED_ALT)
+/**
+ * \brief Addition: R = P + Q, mixed affine-Jacobian coordinates.
+ *
+ * The coordinates of Q must be normalized (= affine),
+ * but those of P don't need to. R is not normalized.
+ *
+ * This function is used only as a subrutine of
+ * ecp_mul_comb().
+ *
+ * Special cases: (1) P or Q is zero, (2) R is zero,
+ * (3) P == Q.
+ * None of these cases can happen as intermediate step in
+ * ecp_mul_comb():
+ * - at each step, P, Q and R are multiples of the base
+ * point, the factor being less than its order, so none of
+ * them is zero;
+ * - Q is an odd multiple of the base point, P an even
+ * multiple, due to the choice of precomputed points in the
+ * modified comb method.
+ * So branches for these cases do not leak secret information.
+ *
+ * We accept Q->Z being unset (saving memory in tables) as
+ * meaning 1.
+ *
+ * Cost in field operations if done by [5] 3.22:
+ * 1A := 8M + 3S
+ *
+ * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve.
+ *
+ * \param R Pointer to a point structure to hold the result.
+ *
+ * \param P Pointer to the first summand, given with Jacobian
+ * coordinates
+ *
+ * \param Q Pointer to the second summand, given with affine
+ * coordinates.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful.
+ */
+int mbedtls_internal_ecp_add_mixed(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Point doubling R = 2 P, Jacobian coordinates.
+ *
+ * Cost: 1D := 3M + 4S (A == 0)
+ * 4M + 4S (A == -3)
+ * 3M + 6S + 1a otherwise
+ * when the implementation is based on the "dbl-1998-cmo-2"
+ * doubling formulas in [8] and standard optimizations are
+ * applied when curve parameter A is one of { 0, -3 }.
+ *
+ * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve.
+ *
+ * \param R Pointer to a point structure to hold the result.
+ *
+ * \param P Pointer to the point that has to be doubled, given with
+ * Jacobian coordinates.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_JAC_ALT)
+int mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *R, const mbedtls_ecp_point *P);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Normalize jacobian coordinates of an array of (pointers to)
+ * points.
+ *
+ * Using Montgomery's trick to perform only one inversion mod P
+ * the cost is:
+ * 1N(t) := 1I + (6t - 3)M + 1S
+ * (See for example Algorithm 10.3.4. in [9])
+ *
+ * This function is used only as a subrutine of
+ * ecp_mul_comb().
+ *
+ * Warning: fails (returning an error) if one of the points is
+ * zero!
+ * This should never happen, see choice of w in ecp_mul_comb().
+ *
+ * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve.
+ *
+ * \param T Array of pointers to the points to normalise.
+ *
+ * \param t_len Number of elements in the array.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful,
+ * an error if one of the points is zero.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_MANY_ALT)
+int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac_many(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *T[], size_t t_len);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Normalize jacobian coordinates so that Z == 0 || Z == 1.
+ *
+ * Cost in field operations if done by [5] 3.2.1:
+ * 1N := 1I + 3M + 1S
+ *
+ * \param grp Pointer to the group representing the curve.
+ *
+ * \param pt pointer to the point to be normalised. This is an
+ * input/output parameter.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_JAC_ALT)
+int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_jac(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *pt);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DOUBLE_ADD_MXZ_ALT)
+int mbedtls_internal_ecp_double_add_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *S,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *P,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
+ const mbedtls_mpi *d);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Randomize projective x/z coordinates:
+ * (X, Z) -> (l X, l Z) for random l
+ *
+ * \param grp pointer to the group representing the curve
+ *
+ * \param P the point on the curve to be randomised given with
+ * projective coordinates. This is an input/output parameter.
+ *
+ * \param f_rng a function pointer to the random number generator
+ *
+ * \param p_rng a pointer to the random number generator state
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RANDOMIZE_MXZ_ALT)
+int mbedtls_internal_ecp_randomize_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *P, int (*f_rng)(void *,
+ unsigned char *,
+ size_t),
+ void *p_rng);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Normalize Montgomery x/z coordinates: X = X/Z, Z = 1.
+ *
+ * \param grp pointer to the group representing the curve
+ *
+ * \param P pointer to the point to be normalised. This is an
+ * input/output parameter.
+ *
+ * \return 0 if successful
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NORMALIZE_MXZ_ALT)
+int mbedtls_internal_ecp_normalize_mxz(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_point *P);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INTERNAL_ALT */
+
+#endif /* ecp_internal_alt.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff9f9ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/ecp_invasive.h
@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+/**
+ * \file ecp_invasive.h
+ *
+ * \brief ECP module: interfaces for invasive testing only.
+ *
+ * The interfaces in this file are intended for testing purposes only.
+ * They SHOULD NOT be made available in library integrations except when
+ * building the library for testing.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H
+#define MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#include "bignum_mod.h"
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+
+/*
+ * Curve modulus types
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_NONE = 0,
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_COORDINATE,
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_MOD_SCALAR
+} mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type;
+
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_NONE = 0,
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_STRUCT,
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_VARIANT_WITH_MPI_UINT
+} mbedtls_ecp_variant;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT)
+
+/** Queries the ecp variant.
+ *
+ * \return The id of the ecp variant.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+mbedtls_ecp_variant mbedtls_ecp_get_variant(void);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED)
+/** Generate a private key on a Montgomery curve (Curve25519 or Curve448).
+ *
+ * This function implements key generation for the set of secret keys
+ * specified in [Curve25519] p. 5 and in [Curve448]. The resulting value
+ * has the lower bits masked but is not necessarily canonical.
+ *
+ * \note - [Curve25519] http://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curve25519-20060209.pdf
+ * - [RFC7748] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748
+ *
+ * \p high_bit The position of the high-order bit of the key to generate.
+ * This is the bit-size of the key minus 1:
+ * 254 for Curve25519 or 447 for Curve448.
+ * \param d The randomly generated key. This is a number of size
+ * exactly \p high_bit + 1 bits, with the least significant bits
+ * masked as specified in [Curve25519] and in [RFC7748] §5.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_xxx or MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey_mx(size_t high_bit,
+ mbedtls_mpi *d,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_MONTGOMERY_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED)
+
+/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.1)
+ *
+ * This operation expects a 384 bit MPI and the result of the reduction
+ * is a 192 bit MPI.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] Np The address of the MPI to be converted.
+ * Must have twice as many limbs as the modulus.
+ * Upon return this holds the reduced value. The bitlength
+ * of the reduced value is the same as that of the modulus
+ * (192 bits).
+ * \param[in] Nn The length of \p Np in limbs.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *Np, size_t Nn);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED)
+
+/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.2)
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted.
+ * Must have exact limb size that stores a 448-bit MPI
+ * (double the bitlength of the modulus).
+ * Upon return holds the reduced value which is
+ * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus).
+ * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as
+ * that of the modulus (224 bits).
+ * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X_limbs is not the
+ * limb size that sores a 448-bit MPI.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED)
+
+/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.3)
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted.
+ * Must have exact limb size that stores a 512-bit MPI
+ * (double the bitlength of the modulus).
+ * Upon return holds the reduced value which is
+ * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus).
+ * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as
+ * that of the modulus (256 bits).
+ * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X_limbs is not the
+ * limb size that sores a 512-bit MPI.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED)
+
+/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p521 = 2^521 - 1 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.5)
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted.
+ * Must have twice as many limbs as the modulus
+ * (the modulus is 521 bits long). Upon return this
+ * holds the reduced value. The reduced value is
+ * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus).
+ * and its the bitlength is one plus the bitlength
+ * of the modulus.
+ * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X_limbs does not have
+ * twice as many limbs as the modulus.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p521_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED)
+
+/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p384 (FIPS 186-3 D.2.4)
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted.
+ * Must have exact limb size that stores a 768-bit MPI
+ * (double the bitlength of the modulus).
+ * Upon return holds the reduced value which is
+ * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus).
+ * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as
+ * that of the modulus (384 bits).
+ * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p N in limbs.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p N_n does not have
+ * twice as many limbs as the modulus.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p384_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED)
+
+/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p192k1 = 2^192 - R,
+ * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^3 + 1 = 0x01000011C9
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted.
+ * Must have exact limb size that stores a 384-bit MPI
+ * (double the bitlength of the modulus).
+ * Upon return holds the reduced value which is
+ * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus).
+ * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as
+ * that of the modulus (192 bits).
+ * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have
+ * twice as many limbs as the modulus.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p192k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED)
+
+/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p224k1 = 2^224 - R,
+ * with R = 2^32 + 2^12 + 2^11 + 2^9 + 2^7 + 2^4 + 2 + 1 = 0x0100001A93
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted.
+ * Must have exact limb size that stores a 448-bit MPI
+ * (double the bitlength of the modulus).
+ * Upon return holds the reduced value which is
+ * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus).
+ * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as
+ * that of the modulus (224 bits).
+ * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have
+ * twice as many limbs as the modulus.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p224k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED)
+
+/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p256k1 = 2^256 - R,
+ * with R = 2^32 + 2^9 + 2^8 + 2^7 + 2^6 + 2^4 + 1 = 0x01000003D1
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted.
+ * Must have exact limb size that stores a 512-bit MPI
+ * (double the bitlength of the modulus).
+ * Upon return holds the reduced value which is
+ * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus).
+ * The bitlength of the reduced value is the same as
+ * that of the modulus (256 bits).
+ * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have
+ * twice as many limbs as the modulus.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p256k1_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED)
+
+/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p255 = 2^255 - 19
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted.
+ * Must have exact limb size that stores a 510-bit MPI
+ * (double the bitlength of the modulus).
+ * Upon return holds the reduced value which is
+ * in range `0 <= X < 2 * N` (where N is the modulus).
+ * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have
+ * twice as many limbs as the modulus.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p255_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED)
+
+/** Fast quasi-reduction modulo p448 = 2^448 - 2^224 - 1
+ * Write X as A0 + 2^448 A1 and A1 as B0 + 2^224 B1, and return A0 + A1 + B1 +
+ * (B0 + B1) * 2^224.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] X The address of the MPI to be converted.
+ * Must have exact limb size that stores a 896-bit MPI
+ * (double the bitlength of the modulus). Upon return
+ * holds the reduced value which is in range `0 <= X <
+ * N` (where N is the modulus). The bitlength of the
+ * reduced value is the same as that of the modulus
+ * (448 bits).
+ * \param[in] X_limbs The length of \p X in limbs.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on Success.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p X does not have
+ * twice as many limbs as the modulus.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation
+ * failed.
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_mod_p448_raw(mbedtls_mpi_uint *X, size_t X_limbs);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED */
+
+/** Initialise a modulus with hard-coded const curve data.
+ *
+ * \note The caller is responsible for the \p N modulus' memory.
+ * mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus_free(&N) should be invoked at the
+ * end of its lifecycle.
+ *
+ * \param[in,out] N The address of the modulus structure to populate.
+ * Must be initialized.
+ * \param[in] id The mbedtls_ecp_group_id for which to initialise the modulus.
+ * \param[in] ctype The mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type identifier for a coordinate modulus (P)
+ * or a scalar modulus (N).
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 if successful.
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the given MPIs do not
+ * have the correct number of limbs.
+ *
+ */
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE
+int mbedtls_ecp_modulus_setup(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group_id id,
+ const mbedtls_ecp_modulus_type ctype);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_INVASIVE_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/entropy.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/entropy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7dcf067
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/entropy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,680 @@
+/*
+ * Entropy accumulator implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
+#include "entropy_poll.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+#include <stdio.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#define ENTROPY_MAX_LOOP 256 /**< Maximum amount to loop before error */
+
+void mbedtls_entropy_init(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->source_count = 0;
+ memset(ctx->source, 0, sizeof(ctx->source));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex);
+#endif
+
+ ctx->accumulator_started = 0;
+ mbedtls_md_init(&ctx->accumulator);
+
+ /* Reminder: Update ENTROPY_HAVE_STRONG in the test files
+ * when adding more strong entropy sources here. */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES)
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY)
+ mbedtls_entropy_add_source(ctx, mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll, NULL,
+ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM,
+ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT)
+ mbedtls_entropy_add_source(ctx, mbedtls_hardware_poll, NULL,
+ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE,
+ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED)
+ mbedtls_entropy_add_source(ctx, mbedtls_nv_seed_poll, NULL,
+ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG);
+ ctx->initial_entropy_run = 0;
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_NO_DEFAULT_ENTROPY_SOURCES */
+}
+
+void mbedtls_entropy_free(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* If the context was already free, don't call free() again.
+ * This is important for mutexes which don't allow double-free. */
+ if (ctx->accumulator_started == -1) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex);
+#endif
+ mbedtls_md_free(&ctx->accumulator);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED)
+ ctx->initial_entropy_run = 0;
+#endif
+ ctx->source_count = 0;
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->source, sizeof(ctx->source));
+ ctx->accumulator_started = -1;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_entropy_add_source(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_entropy_f_source_ptr f_source, void *p_source,
+ size_t threshold, int strong)
+{
+ int idx, ret = 0;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ idx = ctx->source_count;
+ if (idx >= MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ctx->source[idx].f_source = f_source;
+ ctx->source[idx].p_source = p_source;
+ ctx->source[idx].threshold = threshold;
+ ctx->source[idx].strong = strong;
+
+ ctx->source_count++;
+
+exit:
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Entropy accumulator update
+ */
+static int entropy_update(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, unsigned char source_id,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned char header[2];
+ unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ size_t use_len = len;
+ const unsigned char *p = data;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (use_len > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD),
+ data, len, tmp)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ p = tmp;
+ use_len = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ header[0] = source_id;
+ header[1] = use_len & 0xFF;
+
+ /*
+ * Start the accumulator if this has not already happened. Note that
+ * it is sufficient to start the accumulator here only because all calls to
+ * gather entropy eventually execute this code.
+ */
+ if (ctx->accumulator_started == 0) {
+ ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx->accumulator,
+ mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD), 0);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&ctx->accumulator);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ ctx->accumulator_started = 1;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ctx->accumulator, header, 2)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ctx->accumulator, p, use_len);
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_entropy_update_manual(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ ret = entropy_update(ctx, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_MANUAL, data, len);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Run through the different sources to add entropy to our accumulator
+ */
+static int entropy_gather_internal(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED;
+ int i;
+ int have_one_strong = 0;
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER];
+ size_t olen;
+
+ if (ctx->source_count == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Run through our entropy sources
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->source_count; i++) {
+ if (ctx->source[i].strong == MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG) {
+ have_one_strong = 1;
+ }
+
+ olen = 0;
+ if ((ret = ctx->source[i].f_source(ctx->source[i].p_source,
+ buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_GATHER, &olen)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Add if we actually gathered something
+ */
+ if (olen > 0) {
+ if ((ret = entropy_update(ctx, (unsigned char) i,
+ buf, olen)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ ctx->source[i].size += olen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (have_one_strong == 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Thread-safe wrapper for entropy_gather_internal()
+ */
+int mbedtls_entropy_gather(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ ret = entropy_gather_internal(ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_entropy_func(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len)
+{
+ int ret, count = 0, i, thresholds_reached;
+ size_t strong_size;
+ mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx = (mbedtls_entropy_context *) data;
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ if (len > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED)
+ /* Update the NV entropy seed before generating any entropy for outside
+ * use.
+ */
+ if (ctx->initial_entropy_run == 0) {
+ ctx->initial_entropy_run = 1;
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_nv_seed(ctx)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Always gather extra entropy before a call
+ */
+ do {
+ if (count++ > ENTROPY_MAX_LOOP) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = entropy_gather_internal(ctx)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ thresholds_reached = 1;
+ strong_size = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->source_count; i++) {
+ if (ctx->source[i].size < ctx->source[i].threshold) {
+ thresholds_reached = 0;
+ }
+ if (ctx->source[i].strong == MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_STRONG) {
+ strong_size += ctx->source[i].size;
+ }
+ }
+ } while (!thresholds_reached || strong_size < MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ memset(buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * Note that at this stage it is assumed that the accumulator was started
+ * in a previous call to entropy_update(). If this is not guaranteed, the
+ * code below will fail.
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&ctx->accumulator, buf)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reset accumulator and counters and recycle existing entropy
+ */
+ mbedtls_md_free(&ctx->accumulator);
+ mbedtls_md_init(&ctx->accumulator);
+ ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx->accumulator,
+ mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD), 0);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&ctx->accumulator);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ctx->accumulator, buf,
+ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Perform second hashing on entropy
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MD),
+ buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, buf)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->source_count; i++) {
+ ctx->source[i].size = 0;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(output, buf, len);
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED)
+int mbedtls_entropy_update_nv_seed(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ /* Read new seed and write it to NV */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_func(ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_nv_seed_write(buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) < 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Manually update the remaining stream with a separator value to diverge */
+ memset(buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_manual(ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+int mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_func(ctx, buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE)) != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if ((f = fopen(path, "wb")) == NULL) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */
+ mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL);
+
+ if (fwrite(buf, 1, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE, f) != MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ if (f != NULL) {
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_entropy_update_seed_file(mbedtls_entropy_context *ctx, const char *path)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ FILE *f;
+ size_t n;
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE];
+
+ if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */
+ mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL);
+
+ fseek(f, 0, SEEK_END);
+ n = (size_t) ftell(f);
+ fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET);
+
+ if (n > MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE) {
+ n = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ if (fread(buf, 1, n, f) != n) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_manual(ctx, buf, n);
+ }
+
+ fclose(f);
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_entropy_write_seed_file(ctx, path);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/*
+ * Dummy source function
+ */
+static int entropy_dummy_source(void *data, unsigned char *output,
+ size_t len, size_t *olen)
+{
+ ((void) data);
+
+ memset(output, 0x2a, len);
+ *olen = len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT)
+
+static int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_gather(unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t entropy_len = 0;
+ size_t olen = 0;
+ size_t attempts = buf_len;
+
+ while (attempts > 0 && entropy_len < buf_len) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_hardware_poll(NULL, buf + entropy_len,
+ buf_len - entropy_len, &olen)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ entropy_len += olen;
+ attempts--;
+ }
+
+ if (entropy_len < buf_len) {
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+static int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_check_bits(const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buf_len)
+{
+ unsigned char set = 0xFF;
+ unsigned char unset = 0x00;
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < buf_len; i++) {
+ set &= buf[i];
+ unset |= buf[i];
+ }
+
+ return set == 0xFF || unset == 0x00;
+}
+
+/*
+ * A test to ensure that the entropy sources are functioning correctly
+ * and there is no obvious failure. The test performs the following checks:
+ * - The entropy source is not providing only 0s (all bits unset) or 1s (all
+ * bits set).
+ * - The entropy source is not providing values in a pattern. Because the
+ * hardware could be providing data in an arbitrary length, this check polls
+ * the hardware entropy source twice and compares the result to ensure they
+ * are not equal.
+ * - The error code returned by the entropy source is not an error.
+ */
+int mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned char buf0[2 * sizeof(unsigned long long int)];
+ unsigned char buf1[2 * sizeof(unsigned long long int)];
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ENTROPY_BIAS test: ");
+ }
+
+ memset(buf0, 0x00, sizeof(buf0));
+ memset(buf1, 0x00, sizeof(buf1));
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_gather(buf0, sizeof(buf0))) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_gather(buf1, sizeof(buf1))) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure that the returned values are not all 0 or 1 */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_check_bits(buf0, sizeof(buf0))) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test_check_bits(buf1, sizeof(buf1))) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure that the entropy source is not returning values in a
+ * pattern */
+ ret = memcmp(buf0, buf1, sizeof(buf0)) == 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ } else {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ return ret != 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT */
+
+/*
+ * The actual entropy quality is hard to test, but we can at least
+ * test that the functions don't cause errors and write the correct
+ * amount of data to buffers.
+ */
+int mbedtls_entropy_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ int ret = 1;
+ mbedtls_entropy_context ctx;
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 };
+ unsigned char acc[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE] = { 0 };
+ size_t i, j;
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" ENTROPY test: ");
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_entropy_init(&ctx);
+
+ /* First do a gather to make sure we have default sources */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_gather(&ctx)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_entropy_add_source(&ctx, entropy_dummy_source, NULL, 16,
+ MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SOURCE_WEAK);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_update_manual(&ctx, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * To test that mbedtls_entropy_func writes correct number of bytes:
+ * - use the whole buffer and rely on ASan to detect overruns
+ * - collect entropy 8 times and OR the result in an accumulator:
+ * any byte should then be 0 with probably 2^(-64), so requiring
+ * each of the 32 or 64 bytes to be non-zero has a false failure rate
+ * of at most 2^(-58) which is acceptable.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_func(&ctx, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(buf); j++) {
+ acc[j] |= buf[j];
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(buf); j++) {
+ if (acc[j] == 0) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT)
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_source_self_test(0)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+#endif
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_entropy_free(&ctx);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ } else {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ return ret != 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..611768c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+/*
+ * Platform-specific and custom entropy polling functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__midipix__)
+/* Ensure that syscall() is available even when compiling with -std=c99 */
+#if !defined(_GNU_SOURCE)
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
+#include "entropy_poll.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C)
+#include "mbedtls/timing.h"
+#endif
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY)
+
+#if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \
+ !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \
+ !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) && !defined(__MVS__)
+#error \
+ "Platform entropy sources only work on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY in mbedtls_config.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
+
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <bcrypt.h>
+#include <intsafe.h>
+
+int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len,
+ size_t *olen)
+{
+ ((void) data);
+ *olen = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * BCryptGenRandom takes ULONG for size, which is smaller than size_t on
+ * 64-bit Windows platforms. Extract entropy in chunks of len (dependent
+ * on ULONG_MAX) size.
+ */
+ while (len != 0) {
+ unsigned long ulong_bytes =
+ (len > ULONG_MAX) ? ULONG_MAX : (unsigned long) len;
+
+ if (!BCRYPT_SUCCESS(BCryptGenRandom(NULL, output, ulong_bytes,
+ BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG))) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ *olen += ulong_bytes;
+ len -= ulong_bytes;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#else /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
+
+/*
+ * Test for Linux getrandom() support.
+ * Since there is no wrapper in the libc yet, use the generic syscall wrapper
+ * available in GNU libc and compatible libc's (eg uClibc).
+ */
+#if ((defined(__linux__) && defined(__GLIBC__)) || defined(__midipix__))
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#if defined(SYS_getrandom)
+#define HAVE_GETRANDOM
+#include <errno.h>
+
+static int getrandom_wrapper(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ /* MemSan cannot understand that the syscall writes to the buffer */
+#if defined(__has_feature)
+#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer)
+ memset(buf, 0, buflen);
+#endif
+#endif
+ return (int) syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, flags);
+}
+#endif /* SYS_getrandom */
+#endif /* __linux__ || __midipix__ */
+
+#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__)
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) || \
+ (defined(__DragonFly__) && __DragonFly_version >= 500700)
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/random.h>
+#define HAVE_GETRANDOM
+static int getrandom_wrapper(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags)
+{
+ return (int) getrandom(buf, buflen, flags);
+}
+#endif /* (__FreeBSD__ && __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000) ||
+ (__DragonFly__ && __DragonFly_version >= 500700) */
+#endif /* __FreeBSD__ || __DragonFly__ */
+
+/*
+ * Some BSD systems provide KERN_ARND.
+ * This is equivalent to reading from /dev/urandom, only it doesn't require an
+ * open file descriptor, and provides up to 256 bytes per call (basically the
+ * same as getentropy(), but with a longer history).
+ *
+ * Documentation: https://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?sysctl+7
+ */
+#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && !defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM)
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/sysctl.h>
+#if defined(KERN_ARND)
+#define HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND
+
+static int sysctl_arnd_wrapper(unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ int name[2];
+ size_t len;
+
+ name[0] = CTL_KERN;
+ name[1] = KERN_ARND;
+
+ while (buflen > 0) {
+ len = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen;
+ if (sysctl(name, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ buflen -= len;
+ buf += len;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* KERN_ARND */
+#endif /* __FreeBSD__ || __NetBSD__ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen)
+{
+ FILE *file;
+ size_t read_len;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ ((void) data);
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETRANDOM)
+ ret = getrandom_wrapper(output, len, 0);
+ if (ret >= 0) {
+ *olen = (size_t) ret;
+ return 0;
+ } else if (errno != ENOSYS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED;
+ }
+ /* Fall through if the system call isn't known. */
+#else
+ ((void) ret);
+#endif /* HAVE_GETRANDOM */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND)
+ ((void) file);
+ ((void) read_len);
+ if (sysctl_arnd_wrapper(output, len) == -1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED;
+ }
+ *olen = len;
+ return 0;
+#else
+
+ *olen = 0;
+
+ file = fopen("/dev/urandom", "rb");
+ if (file == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */
+ mbedtls_setbuf(file, NULL);
+
+ read_len = fread(output, 1, len, file);
+ if (read_len != len) {
+ fclose(file);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ fclose(file);
+ *olen = len;
+
+ return 0;
+#endif /* HAVE_SYSCTL_ARND */
+}
+#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED)
+int mbedtls_nv_seed_poll(void *data,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen)
+{
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ size_t use_len = MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ ((void) data);
+
+ memset(buf, 0, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+ if (mbedtls_nv_seed_read(buf, MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE) < 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (len < use_len) {
+ use_len = len;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(output, buf, use_len);
+ *olen = use_len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b4aec0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.h
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/**
+ * \file entropy_poll.h
+ *
+ * \brief Platform-specific and custom entropy polling functions
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_POLL_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Default thresholds for built-in sources, in bytes
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM 32 /**< Minimum for platform source */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE)
+#define MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_HARDWARE 32 /**< Minimum for the hardware source */
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY)
+/**
+ * \brief Platform-specific entropy poll callback
+ */
+int mbedtls_platform_entropy_poll(void *data,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT)
+/**
+ * \brief Entropy poll callback for a hardware source
+ *
+ * \warning This is not provided by Mbed TLS!
+ * See \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_HARDWARE_ALT in mbedtls_config.h.
+ *
+ * \note This must accept NULL as its first argument.
+ */
+int mbedtls_hardware_poll(void *data,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED)
+/**
+ * \brief Entropy poll callback for a non-volatile seed file
+ *
+ * \note This must accept NULL as its first argument.
+ */
+int mbedtls_nv_seed_poll(void *data,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t len, size_t *olen);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* entropy_poll.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/error.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/error.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..297eccd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/error.c
@@ -0,0 +1,878 @@
+/*
+ * Error message information
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+#include "mbedtls/aria.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C)
+#include "mbedtls/base64.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+#include "mbedtls/camellia.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ccm.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C)
+#include "mbedtls/chacha20.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+#include "mbedtls/chachapoly.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+#include "mbedtls/des.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/dhm.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C)
+#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C)
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+#include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C)
+#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
+#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C)
+#include "mbedtls/lms.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C)
+#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C)
+#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C)
+#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
+#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C)
+#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C)
+#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C)
+#include "mbedtls/pkcs7.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C)
+#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+#include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C)
+#include "mbedtls/sha3.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+#include "mbedtls/sha512.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C)
+#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
+#endif
+
+
+const char *mbedtls_high_level_strerr(int error_code)
+{
+ int high_level_error_code;
+
+ if (error_code < 0) {
+ error_code = -error_code;
+ }
+
+ /* Extract the high-level part from the error code. */
+ high_level_error_code = error_code & 0xFF80;
+
+ switch (high_level_error_code) {
+ /* Begin Auto-Generated Code. */
+ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
+ return( "CIPHER - The selected feature is not available" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "CIPHER - Bad input parameters" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_ALLOC_FAILED):
+ return( "CIPHER - Failed to allocate memory" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING):
+ return( "CIPHER - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FULL_BLOCK_EXPECTED):
+ return( "CIPHER - Decryption of block requires a full block" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED):
+ return( "CIPHER - Authentication failed (for AEAD modes)" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_CONTEXT):
+ return( "CIPHER - The context is invalid. For example, because it was freed" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "DHM - Bad input parameters" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PARAMS_FAILED):
+ return( "DHM - Reading of the DHM parameters failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PARAMS_FAILED):
+ return( "DHM - Making of the DHM parameters failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_READ_PUBLIC_FAILED):
+ return( "DHM - Reading of the public values failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_MAKE_PUBLIC_FAILED):
+ return( "DHM - Making of the public value failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_CALC_SECRET_FAILED):
+ return( "DHM - Calculation of the DHM secret failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_INVALID_FORMAT):
+ return( "DHM - The ASN.1 data is not formatted correctly" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_ALLOC_FAILED):
+ return( "DHM - Allocation of memory failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_FILE_IO_ERROR):
+ return( "DHM - Read or write of file failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DHM_SET_GROUP_FAILED):
+ return( "DHM - Setting the modulus and generator failed" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "ECP - Bad input parameters to function" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL):
+ return( "ECP - The buffer is too small to write to" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
+ return( "ECP - The requested feature is not available, for example, the requested curve is not supported" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_VERIFY_FAILED):
+ return( "ECP - The signature is not valid" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED):
+ return( "ECP - Memory allocation failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED):
+ return( "ECP - Generation of random value, such as ephemeral key, failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY):
+ return( "ECP - Invalid private or public key" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH):
+ return( "ECP - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS):
+ return( "ECP - Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
+ return( "MD - The selected feature is not available" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "MD - Bad input parameters to function" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED):
+ return( "MD - Failed to allocate memory" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR):
+ return( "MD - Opening or reading of file failed" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT):
+ return( "PEM - No PEM header or footer found" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA):
+ return( "PEM - PEM string is not as expected" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED):
+ return( "PEM - Failed to allocate memory" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV):
+ return( "PEM - RSA IV is not in hex-format" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG):
+ return( "PEM - Unsupported key encryption algorithm" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED):
+ return( "PEM - Private key password can't be empty" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH):
+ return( "PEM - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
+ return( "PEM - Unavailable feature, e.g. hashing/encryption combination" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "PEM - Bad input parameters to function" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED):
+ return( "PK - Memory allocation failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH):
+ return( "PK - Type mismatch, eg attempt to encrypt with an ECDSA key" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "PK - Bad input parameters to function" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FILE_IO_ERROR):
+ return( "PK - Read/write of file failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION):
+ return( "PK - Unsupported key version" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT):
+ return( "PK - Invalid key tag or value" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG):
+ return( "PK - Key algorithm is unsupported (only RSA and EC are supported)" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_REQUIRED):
+ return( "PK - Private key password can't be empty" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH):
+ return( "PK - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY):
+ return( "PK - The pubkey tag or value is invalid (only RSA and EC are supported)" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG):
+ return( "PK - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE):
+ return( "PK - Elliptic curve is unsupported (only NIST curves are supported)" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
+ return( "PK - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA disabled for RSA key" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH):
+ return( "PK - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL):
+ return( "PK - The output buffer is too small" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "PKCS12 - Bad input parameters to function" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
+ return( "PKCS12 - Feature not available, e.g. unsupported encryption scheme" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT):
+ return( "PKCS12 - PBE ASN.1 data not as expected" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH):
+ return( "PKCS12 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "PKCS5 - Bad input parameters to function" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT):
+ return( "PKCS5 - Unexpected ASN.1 data" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
+ return( "PKCS5 - Requested encryption or digest alg not available" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH):
+ return( "PKCS5 - Given private key password does not allow for correct decryption" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT):
+ return( "PKCS7 - The format is invalid, e.g. different type expected" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
+ return( "PKCS7 - Unavailable feature, e.g. anything other than signed data" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION):
+ return( "PKCS7 - The PKCS #7 version element is invalid or cannot be parsed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO):
+ return( "PKCS7 - The PKCS #7 content info is invalid or cannot be parsed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG):
+ return( "PKCS7 - The algorithm tag or value is invalid or cannot be parsed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT):
+ return( "PKCS7 - The certificate tag or value is invalid or cannot be parsed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNATURE):
+ return( "PKCS7 - Error parsing the signature" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO):
+ return( "PKCS7 - Error parsing the signer's info" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "PKCS7 - Input invalid" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED):
+ return( "PKCS7 - Allocation of memory failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL):
+ return( "PKCS7 - Verification Failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_CERT_DATE_INVALID):
+ return( "PKCS7 - The PKCS #7 date issued/expired dates are invalid" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "RSA - Bad input parameters to function" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING):
+ return( "RSA - Input data contains invalid padding and is rejected" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED):
+ return( "RSA - Something failed during generation of a key" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED):
+ return( "RSA - Key failed to pass the validity check of the library" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED):
+ return( "RSA - The public key operation failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED):
+ return( "RSA - The private key operation failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED):
+ return( "RSA - The PKCS#1 verification failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE):
+ return( "RSA - The output buffer for decryption is not large enough" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED):
+ return( "RSA - The random generator failed to generate non-zeros" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS):
+ return( "SSL - A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
+ return( "SSL - The requested feature is not available" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "SSL - Bad input parameters to function" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC):
+ return( "SSL - Verification of the message MAC failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD):
+ return( "SSL - An invalid SSL record was received" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF):
+ return( "SSL - The connection indicated an EOF" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR):
+ return( "SSL - A message could not be parsed due to a syntactic error" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG):
+ return( "SSL - No RNG was provided to the SSL module" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE):
+ return( "SSL - No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION):
+ return( "SSL - Client received an extended server hello containing an unsupported extension" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL):
+ return( "SSL - No ALPN protocols supported that the client advertises" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED):
+ return( "SSL - The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED):
+ return( "SSL - No CA Chain is set, but required to operate" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE):
+ return( "SSL - An unexpected message was received from our peer" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE):
+ return( "SSL - A fatal alert message was received from our peer" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME):
+ return( "SSL - No server could be identified matching the client's SNI" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY):
+ return( "SSL - The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE):
+ return( "SSL - Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET):
+ return( "SSL - A TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket message has been received" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA):
+ return( "SSL - Not possible to read early data" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA):
+ return( "SSL - * Early data has been received as part of an on-going handshake. This error code can be returned only on server side if and only if early data has been enabled by means of the mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() API. This error code can then be returned by mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() if early data has been received as part of the handshake sequence they triggered. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA):
+ return( "SSL - Not possible to write early data" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND):
+ return( "SSL - Cache entry not found" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED):
+ return( "SSL - Memory allocation failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED):
+ return( "SSL - Hardware acceleration function returned with error" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH):
+ return( "SSL - Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION):
+ return( "SSL - Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE):
+ return( "SSL - The handshake negotiation failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED):
+ return( "SSL - Session ticket has expired" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH):
+ return( "SSL - Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key)" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY):
+ return( "SSL - Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity)" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR):
+ return( "SSL - Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module)" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING):
+ return( "SSL - A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged)" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO):
+ return( "SSL - Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED):
+ return( "SSL - DTLS client must retry for hello verification" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL):
+ return( "SSL - A buffer is too small to receive or write a message" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ):
+ return( "SSL - No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE):
+ return( "SSL - Connection requires a write call" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT):
+ return( "SSL - The operation timed out" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT):
+ return( "SSL - The client initiated a reconnect from the same port" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD):
+ return( "SSL - Record header looks valid but is not expected" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL):
+ return( "SSL - The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER):
+ return( "SSL - A field in a message was incorrect or inconsistent with other fields" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING):
+ return( "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS):
+ return( "SSL - The asynchronous operation is not completed yet" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE):
+ return( "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID):
+ return( "SSL - An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was received" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH):
+ return( "SSL - An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configuration" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG):
+ return( "SSL - Invalid value in SSL config" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME):
+ return( "SSL - Attempt to verify a certificate without an expected hostname. This is usually insecure. In TLS clients, when a client authenticates a server through its certificate, the client normally checks three things: - the certificate chain must be valid; - the chain must start from a trusted CA; - the certificate must cover the server name that is expected by the client. Omitting any of these checks is generally insecure, and can allow a malicious server to impersonate a legitimate server. The third check may be safely skipped in some unusual scenarios, such as networks where eavesdropping is a risk but not active attacks, or a private PKI where the client equally trusts all servers that are accredited by the root CA. You should call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() with the expected server name before starting a TLS handshake on a client (unless the client is set up to only use PSK-based authentication, which does not rely on the host name). If you have determined that server name verification is not required for security in your scenario, call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() with \\p NULL as the server name. This error is raised if all of the following conditions are met: - A TLS client is configured with the authentication mode #MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED (default). - Certificate authentication is enabled. - The client does not call mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(). - The configuration option #MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_ALLOW_WEAK_CERTIFICATE_VERIFICATION_WITHOUT_HOSTNAME is not enabled" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE):
+ return( "X509 - Unavailable feature, e.g. RSA hashing/encryption combination" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID):
+ return( "X509 - Requested OID is unknown" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_FORMAT):
+ return( "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR format is invalid, e.g. different type expected" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_VERSION):
+ return( "X509 - The CRT/CRL/CSR version element is invalid" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SERIAL):
+ return( "X509 - The serial tag or value is invalid" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_ALG):
+ return( "X509 - The algorithm tag or value is invalid" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_NAME):
+ return( "X509 - The name tag or value is invalid" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_DATE):
+ return( "X509 - The date tag or value is invalid" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_SIGNATURE):
+ return( "X509 - The signature tag or value invalid" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS):
+ return( "X509 - The extension tag or value is invalid" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_VERSION):
+ return( "X509 - CRT/CRL/CSR has an unsupported version number" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_SIG_ALG):
+ return( "X509 - Signature algorithm (oid) is unsupported" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_SIG_MISMATCH):
+ return( "X509 - Signature algorithms do not match. (see \\c ::mbedtls_x509_crt sig_oid)" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED):
+ return( "X509 - Certificate verification failed, e.g. CRL, CA or signature check failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_UNKNOWN_FORMAT):
+ return( "X509 - Format not recognized as DER or PEM" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "X509 - Input invalid" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED):
+ return( "X509 - Allocation of memory failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FILE_IO_ERROR):
+ return( "X509 - Read/write of file failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL):
+ return( "X509 - Destination buffer is too small" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR):
+ return( "X509 - A fatal error occurred, eg the chain is too long or the vrfy callback failed" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */
+ /* End Auto-Generated Code. */
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *mbedtls_low_level_strerr(int error_code)
+{
+ int low_level_error_code;
+
+ if (error_code < 0) {
+ error_code = -error_code;
+ }
+
+ /* Extract the low-level part from the error code. */
+ low_level_error_code = error_code & ~0xFF80;
+
+ switch (low_level_error_code) {
+ /* Begin Auto-Generated Code. */
+ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH):
+ return( "AES - Invalid key length" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH):
+ return( "AES - Invalid data input length" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "AES - Invalid input data" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARIA_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "ARIA - Bad input data" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH):
+ return( "ARIA - Invalid data input length" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ARIA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA):
+ return( "ASN1 - Out of data when parsing an ASN1 data structure" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG):
+ return( "ASN1 - ASN1 tag was of an unexpected value" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH):
+ return( "ASN1 - Error when trying to determine the length or invalid length" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH):
+ return( "ASN1 - Actual length differs from expected length" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA):
+ return( "ASN1 - Data is invalid" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED):
+ return( "ASN1 - Memory allocation failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL):
+ return( "ASN1 - Buffer too small when writing ASN.1 data structure" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BASE64_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL):
+ return( "BASE64 - Output buffer too small" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER):
+ return( "BASE64 - Invalid character in input" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BASE64_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_FILE_IO_ERROR):
+ return( "BIGNUM - An error occurred while reading from or writing to a file" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "BIGNUM - Bad input parameters to function" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_INVALID_CHARACTER):
+ return( "BIGNUM - There is an invalid character in the digit string" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL):
+ return( "BIGNUM - The buffer is too small to write to" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE):
+ return( "BIGNUM - The input arguments are negative or result in illegal output" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO):
+ return( "BIGNUM - The input argument for division is zero, which is not allowed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE):
+ return( "BIGNUM - The input arguments are not acceptable" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED):
+ return( "BIGNUM - Memory allocation failed" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "CAMELLIA - Bad input data" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CAMELLIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH):
+ return( "CAMELLIA - Invalid data input length" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CAMELLIA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_BAD_INPUT):
+ return( "CCM - Bad input parameters to the function" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CCM_AUTH_FAILED):
+ return( "CCM - Authenticated decryption failed" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CCM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHA20_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "CHACHA20 - Invalid input parameter(s)" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHA20_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_BAD_STATE):
+ return( "CHACHAPOLY - The requested operation is not permitted in the current state" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CHACHAPOLY_AUTH_FAILED):
+ return( "CHACHAPOLY - Authenticated decryption failed: data was not authentic" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CHACHAPOLY_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED):
+ return( "CTR_DRBG - The entropy source failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG):
+ return( "CTR_DRBG - The requested random buffer length is too big" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG):
+ return( "CTR_DRBG - The input (entropy + additional data) is too large" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR):
+ return( "CTR_DRBG - Read or write error in file" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_DES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH):
+ return( "DES - The data input has an invalid length" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED):
+ return( "ENTROPY - Critical entropy source failure" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_MAX_SOURCES):
+ return( "ENTROPY - No more sources can be added" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_SOURCES_DEFINED):
+ return( "ENTROPY - No sources have been added to poll" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_NO_STRONG_SOURCE):
+ return( "ENTROPY - No strong sources have been added to poll" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ENTROPY_FILE_IO_ERROR):
+ return( "ENTROPY - Read/write error in file" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR):
+ return( "ERROR - Generic error" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED):
+ return( "ERROR - This is a bug in the library" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED):
+ return( "PLATFORM - Hardware accelerator failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED):
+ return( "PLATFORM - The requested feature is not supported by the platform" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED):
+ return( "GCM - Authenticated decryption failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT):
+ return( "GCM - Bad input parameters to function" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL):
+ return( "GCM - An output buffer is too small" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "HKDF - Bad input parameters to function" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG):
+ return( "HMAC_DRBG - Too many random requested in single call" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG):
+ return( "HMAC_DRBG - Input too large (Entropy + additional)" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR):
+ return( "HMAC_DRBG - Read/write error in file" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED):
+ return( "HMAC_DRBG - The entropy source failed" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "LMS - Bad data has been input to an LMS function" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_OUT_OF_PRIVATE_KEYS):
+ return( "LMS - Specified LMS key has utilised all of its private keys" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED):
+ return( "LMS - LMS signature verification failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED):
+ return( "LMS - LMS failed to allocate space for a private key" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL):
+ return( "LMS - Input/output buffer is too small to contain requited data" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_LMS_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED):
+ return( "NET - Failed to open a socket" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED):
+ return( "NET - The connection to the given server / port failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED):
+ return( "NET - Binding of the socket failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED):
+ return( "NET - Could not listen on the socket" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED):
+ return( "NET - Could not accept the incoming connection" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED):
+ return( "NET - Reading information from the socket failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED):
+ return( "NET - Sending information through the socket failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET):
+ return( "NET - Connection was reset by peer" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST):
+ return( "NET - Failed to get an IP address for the given hostname" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL):
+ return( "NET - Buffer is too small to hold the data" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT):
+ return( "NET - The context is invalid, eg because it was free()ed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED):
+ return( "NET - Polling the net context failed" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "NET - Input invalid" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND):
+ return( "OID - OID is not found" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL):
+ return( "OID - output buffer is too small" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "POLY1305 - Invalid input parameter(s)" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA1_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "SHA1 - SHA-1 input data was malformed" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA256_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "SHA256 - SHA-256 input data was malformed" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA256_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA3_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "SHA3 - SHA-3 input data was malformed" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA3_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA512_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "SHA512 - SHA-512 input data was malformed" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA512_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA):
+ return( "THREADING - Bad input parameters to function" );
+ case -(MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR):
+ return( "THREADING - Locking / unlocking / free failed with error code" );
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
+ /* End Auto-Generated Code. */
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_strerror(int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ int use_ret;
+ const char *high_level_error_description = NULL;
+ const char *low_level_error_description = NULL;
+
+ if (buflen == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ memset(buf, 0x00, buflen);
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ret = -ret;
+ }
+
+ if (ret & 0xFF80) {
+ use_ret = ret & 0xFF80;
+
+ // Translate high level error code.
+ high_level_error_description = mbedtls_high_level_strerr(ret);
+
+ if (high_level_error_description == NULL) {
+ mbedtls_snprintf(buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", (unsigned int) use_ret);
+ } else {
+ mbedtls_snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s", high_level_error_description);
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C)
+ // Early return in case of a fatal error - do not try to translate low
+ // level code.
+ if (use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE)) {
+ return;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
+ }
+
+ use_ret = ret & ~0xFF80;
+
+ if (use_ret == 0) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // If high level code is present, make a concatenation between both
+ // error strings.
+ //
+ len = strlen(buf);
+
+ if (len > 0) {
+ if (buflen - len < 5) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len, " : ");
+
+ buf += len + 3;
+ buflen -= len + 3;
+ }
+
+ // Translate low level error code.
+ low_level_error_description = mbedtls_low_level_strerr(ret);
+
+ if (low_level_error_description == NULL) {
+ mbedtls_snprintf(buf, buflen, "UNKNOWN ERROR CODE (%04X)", (unsigned int) use_ret);
+ } else {
+ mbedtls_snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s", low_level_error_description);
+ }
+}
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */
+
+/*
+ * Provide a dummy implementation when MBEDTLS_ERROR_C is not defined
+ */
+void mbedtls_strerror(int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen)
+{
+ ((void) ret);
+
+ if (buflen > 0) {
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ERROR_C || MBEDTLS_ERROR_STRERROR_DUMMY */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/gcm.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/gcm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5dfac23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/gcm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1330 @@
+/*
+ * NIST SP800-38D compliant GCM implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/*
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
+ *
+ * See also:
+ * [MGV] http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/BCM/documents/proposedmodes/gcm/gcm-revised-spec.pdf
+ *
+ * We use the algorithm described as Shoup's method with 4-bit tables in
+ * [MGV] 4.1, pp. 12-13, to enhance speed without using too much memory.
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/gcm.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+#include "block_cipher_internal.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_C)
+#include "aesni.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C)
+#include "aesce.h"
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT)
+
+/* Used to select the acceleration mechanism */
+#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_SMALLTABLE 0
+#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_LARGETABLE 1
+#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESNI 2
+#define MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESCE 3
+
+/*
+ * Initialize a context
+ */
+void mbedtls_gcm_init(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_gcm_context));
+}
+
+static inline void gcm_set_acceleration(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE)
+ ctx->acceleration = MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_LARGETABLE;
+#else
+ ctx->acceleration = MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_SMALLTABLE;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
+ /* With CLMUL support, we need only h, not the rest of the table */
+ if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL)) {
+ ctx->acceleration = MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESNI;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE)
+ if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) {
+ ctx->acceleration = MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESCE;
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline void gcm_gen_table_rightshift(uint64_t dst[2], const uint64_t src[2])
+{
+ uint8_t *u8Dst = (uint8_t *) dst;
+ uint8_t *u8Src = (uint8_t *) src;
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(&src[1], 0) >> 1, &dst[1], 0);
+ u8Dst[8] |= (u8Src[7] & 0x01) << 7;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(MBEDTLS_GET_UINT64_BE(&src[0], 0) >> 1, &dst[0], 0);
+ u8Dst[0] ^= (u8Src[15] & 0x01) ? 0xE1 : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Precompute small multiples of H, that is set
+ * HH[i] || HL[i] = H times i,
+ * where i is seen as a field element as in [MGV], ie high-order bits
+ * correspond to low powers of P. The result is stored in the same way, that
+ * is the high-order bit of HH corresponds to P^0 and the low-order bit of HL
+ * corresponds to P^127.
+ */
+static int gcm_gen_table(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx)
+{
+ int ret, i, j;
+ uint64_t u64h[2] = { 0 };
+ uint8_t *h = (uint8_t *) u64h;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, h, h);
+#else
+ size_t olen = 0;
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, h, 16, h, &olen);
+#endif
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ gcm_set_acceleration(ctx);
+
+ /* MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2 = 1000 corresponds to 1 in GF(2^128) */
+ ctx->H[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2][0] = u64h[0];
+ ctx->H[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2][1] = u64h[1];
+
+ switch (ctx->acceleration) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
+ case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESNI:
+ return 0;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE)
+ case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESCE:
+ return 0;
+#endif
+
+ default:
+ /* 0 corresponds to 0 in GF(2^128) */
+ ctx->H[0][0] = 0;
+ ctx->H[0][1] = 0;
+
+ for (i = MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/4; i > 0; i >>= 1) {
+ gcm_gen_table_rightshift(ctx->H[i], ctx->H[i*2]);
+ }
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE)
+ /* pack elements of H as 64-bits ints, big-endian */
+ for (i = MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2; i > 0; i >>= 1) {
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ctx->H[i][0], &ctx->H[i][0], 0);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(ctx->H[i][1], &ctx->H[i][1], 0);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ for (i = 2; i < MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE; i <<= 1) {
+ for (j = 1; j < i; j++) {
+ mbedtls_xor_no_simd((unsigned char *) ctx->H[i+j],
+ (unsigned char *) ctx->H[i],
+ (unsigned char *) ctx->H[j],
+ 16);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_gcm_setkey(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (keybits != 128 && keybits != 192 && keybits != 256) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setup(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, cipher)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_setkey(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, key, keybits)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#else
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
+
+ cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher, keybits,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB);
+ if (cipher_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(cipher_info) != 16) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&ctx->cipher_ctx, key, keybits,
+ MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if ((ret = gcm_gen_table(ctx)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE)
+static const uint16_t last8[256] = {
+ 0x0000, 0xc201, 0x8403, 0x4602, 0x0807, 0xca06, 0x8c04, 0x4e05,
+ 0x100e, 0xd20f, 0x940d, 0x560c, 0x1809, 0xda08, 0x9c0a, 0x5e0b,
+ 0x201c, 0xe21d, 0xa41f, 0x661e, 0x281b, 0xea1a, 0xac18, 0x6e19,
+ 0x3012, 0xf213, 0xb411, 0x7610, 0x3815, 0xfa14, 0xbc16, 0x7e17,
+ 0x4038, 0x8239, 0xc43b, 0x063a, 0x483f, 0x8a3e, 0xcc3c, 0x0e3d,
+ 0x5036, 0x9237, 0xd435, 0x1634, 0x5831, 0x9a30, 0xdc32, 0x1e33,
+ 0x6024, 0xa225, 0xe427, 0x2626, 0x6823, 0xaa22, 0xec20, 0x2e21,
+ 0x702a, 0xb22b, 0xf429, 0x3628, 0x782d, 0xba2c, 0xfc2e, 0x3e2f,
+ 0x8070, 0x4271, 0x0473, 0xc672, 0x8877, 0x4a76, 0x0c74, 0xce75,
+ 0x907e, 0x527f, 0x147d, 0xd67c, 0x9879, 0x5a78, 0x1c7a, 0xde7b,
+ 0xa06c, 0x626d, 0x246f, 0xe66e, 0xa86b, 0x6a6a, 0x2c68, 0xee69,
+ 0xb062, 0x7263, 0x3461, 0xf660, 0xb865, 0x7a64, 0x3c66, 0xfe67,
+ 0xc048, 0x0249, 0x444b, 0x864a, 0xc84f, 0x0a4e, 0x4c4c, 0x8e4d,
+ 0xd046, 0x1247, 0x5445, 0x9644, 0xd841, 0x1a40, 0x5c42, 0x9e43,
+ 0xe054, 0x2255, 0x6457, 0xa656, 0xe853, 0x2a52, 0x6c50, 0xae51,
+ 0xf05a, 0x325b, 0x7459, 0xb658, 0xf85d, 0x3a5c, 0x7c5e, 0xbe5f,
+ 0x00e1, 0xc2e0, 0x84e2, 0x46e3, 0x08e6, 0xcae7, 0x8ce5, 0x4ee4,
+ 0x10ef, 0xd2ee, 0x94ec, 0x56ed, 0x18e8, 0xdae9, 0x9ceb, 0x5eea,
+ 0x20fd, 0xe2fc, 0xa4fe, 0x66ff, 0x28fa, 0xeafb, 0xacf9, 0x6ef8,
+ 0x30f3, 0xf2f2, 0xb4f0, 0x76f1, 0x38f4, 0xfaf5, 0xbcf7, 0x7ef6,
+ 0x40d9, 0x82d8, 0xc4da, 0x06db, 0x48de, 0x8adf, 0xccdd, 0x0edc,
+ 0x50d7, 0x92d6, 0xd4d4, 0x16d5, 0x58d0, 0x9ad1, 0xdcd3, 0x1ed2,
+ 0x60c5, 0xa2c4, 0xe4c6, 0x26c7, 0x68c2, 0xaac3, 0xecc1, 0x2ec0,
+ 0x70cb, 0xb2ca, 0xf4c8, 0x36c9, 0x78cc, 0xbacd, 0xfccf, 0x3ece,
+ 0x8091, 0x4290, 0x0492, 0xc693, 0x8896, 0x4a97, 0x0c95, 0xce94,
+ 0x909f, 0x529e, 0x149c, 0xd69d, 0x9898, 0x5a99, 0x1c9b, 0xde9a,
+ 0xa08d, 0x628c, 0x248e, 0xe68f, 0xa88a, 0x6a8b, 0x2c89, 0xee88,
+ 0xb083, 0x7282, 0x3480, 0xf681, 0xb884, 0x7a85, 0x3c87, 0xfe86,
+ 0xc0a9, 0x02a8, 0x44aa, 0x86ab, 0xc8ae, 0x0aaf, 0x4cad, 0x8eac,
+ 0xd0a7, 0x12a6, 0x54a4, 0x96a5, 0xd8a0, 0x1aa1, 0x5ca3, 0x9ea2,
+ 0xe0b5, 0x22b4, 0x64b6, 0xa6b7, 0xe8b2, 0x2ab3, 0x6cb1, 0xaeb0,
+ 0xf0bb, 0x32ba, 0x74b8, 0xb6b9, 0xf8bc, 0x3abd, 0x7cbf, 0xbebe
+};
+
+static void gcm_mult_largetable(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *x, uint64_t H[256][2])
+{
+ int i;
+ uint64_t u64z[2];
+ uint16_t *u16z = (uint16_t *) u64z;
+ uint8_t *u8z = (uint8_t *) u64z;
+ uint8_t rem;
+
+ u64z[0] = 0;
+ u64z[1] = 0;
+
+ if (MBEDTLS_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) {
+ for (i = 15; i > 0; i--) {
+ mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[x[i]], 16);
+ rem = u8z[15];
+
+ u64z[1] >>= 8;
+ u8z[8] = u8z[7];
+ u64z[0] >>= 8;
+
+ u16z[0] ^= MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_LE(&last8[rem], 0);
+ }
+ } else {
+ for (i = 15; i > 0; i--) {
+ mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[x[i]], 16);
+ rem = u8z[15];
+
+ u64z[1] <<= 8;
+ u8z[8] = u8z[7];
+ u64z[0] <<= 8;
+
+ u16z[0] ^= last8[rem];
+ }
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_xor_no_simd(output, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[x[0]], 16);
+}
+#else
+/*
+ * Shoup's method for multiplication use this table with
+ * last4[x] = x times P^128
+ * where x and last4[x] are seen as elements of GF(2^128) as in [MGV]
+ */
+static const uint16_t last4[16] =
+{
+ 0x0000, 0x1c20, 0x3840, 0x2460,
+ 0x7080, 0x6ca0, 0x48c0, 0x54e0,
+ 0xe100, 0xfd20, 0xd940, 0xc560,
+ 0x9180, 0x8da0, 0xa9c0, 0xb5e0
+};
+
+static void gcm_mult_smalltable(uint8_t *output, const uint8_t *x, uint64_t H[16][2])
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ unsigned char lo, hi, rem;
+ uint64_t u64z[2];
+ const uint64_t *pu64z = NULL;
+ uint8_t *u8z = (uint8_t *) u64z;
+
+ lo = x[15] & 0xf;
+ hi = (x[15] >> 4) & 0xf;
+
+ pu64z = H[lo];
+
+ rem = (unsigned char) pu64z[1] & 0xf;
+ u64z[1] = (pu64z[0] << 60) | (pu64z[1] >> 4);
+ u64z[0] = (pu64z[0] >> 4);
+ u64z[0] ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48;
+ mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[hi], 16);
+
+ for (i = 14; i >= 0; i--) {
+ lo = x[i] & 0xf;
+ hi = (x[i] >> 4) & 0xf;
+
+ rem = (unsigned char) u64z[1] & 0xf;
+ u64z[1] = (u64z[0] << 60) | (u64z[1] >> 4);
+ u64z[0] = (u64z[0] >> 4);
+ u64z[0] ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48;
+ mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[lo], 16);
+
+ rem = (unsigned char) u64z[1] & 0xf;
+ u64z[1] = (u64z[0] << 60) | (u64z[1] >> 4);
+ u64z[0] = (u64z[0] >> 4);
+ u64z[0] ^= (uint64_t) last4[rem] << 48;
+ mbedtls_xor_no_simd(u8z, u8z, (uint8_t *) H[hi], 16);
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(u64z[0], output, 0);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(u64z[1], output, 8);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Sets output to x times H using the precomputed tables.
+ * x and output are seen as elements of GF(2^128) as in [MGV].
+ */
+static void gcm_mult(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const unsigned char x[16],
+ unsigned char output[16])
+{
+ switch (ctx->acceleration) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
+ case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESNI:
+ mbedtls_aesni_gcm_mult(output, x, (uint8_t *) ctx->H[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2]);
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE)
+ case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_AESCE:
+ mbedtls_aesce_gcm_mult(output, x, (uint8_t *) ctx->H[MBEDTLS_GCM_HTABLE_SIZE/2]);
+ break;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_LARGE_TABLE)
+ case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_LARGETABLE:
+ gcm_mult_largetable(output, x, ctx->H);
+ break;
+#else
+ case MBEDTLS_GCM_ACC_SMALLTABLE:
+ gcm_mult_smalltable(output, x, ctx->H);
+ break;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ return;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_gcm_starts(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char work_buf[16];
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ size_t use_len;
+ uint64_t iv_bits;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ size_t olen = 0;
+#endif
+
+ /* IV is limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */
+ /* IV is not allowed to be zero length */
+ if (iv_len == 0 || (uint64_t) iv_len >> 61 != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ memset(ctx->y, 0x00, sizeof(ctx->y));
+ memset(ctx->buf, 0x00, sizeof(ctx->buf));
+
+ ctx->mode = mode;
+ ctx->len = 0;
+ ctx->add_len = 0;
+
+ if (iv_len == 12) {
+ memcpy(ctx->y, iv, iv_len);
+ ctx->y[15] = 1;
+ } else {
+ memset(work_buf, 0x00, 16);
+ iv_bits = (uint64_t) iv_len * 8;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(iv_bits, work_buf, 8);
+
+ p = iv;
+ while (iv_len > 0) {
+ use_len = (iv_len < 16) ? iv_len : 16;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 70110)
+#pragma GCC diagnostic push
+#pragma GCC diagnostic warning "-Wstringop-overflow=0"
+#endif
+
+ mbedtls_xor(ctx->y, ctx->y, p, use_len);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 70110)
+#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
+#endif
+
+ gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y);
+
+ iv_len -= use_len;
+ p += use_len;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_xor(ctx->y, ctx->y, work_buf, 16);
+
+ gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->y, ctx->y);
+ }
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ctx->base_ectr);
+#else
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ctx->base_ectr, &olen);
+#endif
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mbedtls_gcm_context::buf contains the partial state of the computation of
+ * the authentication tag.
+ * mbedtls_gcm_context::add_len and mbedtls_gcm_context::len indicate
+ * different stages of the computation:
+ * * len == 0 && add_len == 0: initial state
+ * * len == 0 && add_len % 16 != 0: the first `add_len % 16` bytes have
+ * a partial block of AD that has been
+ * xored in but not yet multiplied in.
+ * * len == 0 && add_len % 16 == 0: the authentication tag is correct if
+ * the data ends now.
+ * * len % 16 != 0: the first `len % 16` bytes have
+ * a partial block of ciphertext that has
+ * been xored in but not yet multiplied in.
+ * * len > 0 && len % 16 == 0: the authentication tag is correct if
+ * the data ends now.
+ */
+int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *add, size_t add_len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ size_t use_len, offset;
+ uint64_t new_add_len;
+
+ /* AD is limited to 2^64 bits, ie 2^61 bytes
+ * Also check for possible overflow */
+#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL
+ if (add_len > 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+#endif
+ new_add_len = ctx->add_len + (uint64_t) add_len;
+ if (new_add_len < ctx->add_len || new_add_len >> 61 != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ offset = ctx->add_len % 16;
+ p = add;
+
+ if (offset != 0) {
+ use_len = 16 - offset;
+ if (use_len > add_len) {
+ use_len = add_len;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf + offset, ctx->buf + offset, p, use_len);
+
+ if (offset + use_len == 16) {
+ gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf);
+ }
+
+ ctx->add_len += use_len;
+ add_len -= use_len;
+ p += use_len;
+ }
+
+ ctx->add_len += add_len;
+
+ while (add_len >= 16) {
+ mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf, ctx->buf, p, 16);
+
+ gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf);
+
+ add_len -= 16;
+ p += 16;
+ }
+
+ if (add_len > 0) {
+ mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf, ctx->buf, p, add_len);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Increment the counter. */
+static void gcm_incr(unsigned char y[16])
+{
+ uint32_t x = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(y, 12);
+ x++;
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(x, y, 12);
+}
+
+/* Calculate and apply the encryption mask. Process use_len bytes of data,
+ * starting at position offset in the mask block. */
+static int gcm_mask(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char ectr[16],
+ size_t offset, size_t use_len,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ ret = mbedtls_block_cipher_encrypt(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx, ctx->y, ectr);
+#else
+ size_t olen = 0;
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx, ctx->y, 16, ectr, &olen);
+#endif
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ectr, 16);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT) {
+ mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf + offset, ctx->buf + offset, input, use_len);
+ }
+ mbedtls_xor(output, ectr + offset, input, use_len);
+ if (ctx->mode == MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT) {
+ mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf + offset, ctx->buf + offset, output, use_len);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_gcm_update(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t input_length,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_length)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const unsigned char *p = input;
+ unsigned char *out_p = output;
+ size_t offset;
+ unsigned char ectr[16] = { 0 };
+
+ if (output_size < input_length) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ *output_length = input_length;
+
+ /* Exit early if input_length==0 so that we don't do any pointer arithmetic
+ * on a potentially null pointer.
+ * Returning early also means that the last partial block of AD remains
+ * untouched for mbedtls_gcm_finish */
+ if (input_length == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (output > input && (size_t) (output - input) < input_length) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ /* Total length is restricted to 2^39 - 256 bits, ie 2^36 - 2^5 bytes
+ * Also check for possible overflow */
+ if (ctx->len + input_length < ctx->len ||
+ (uint64_t) ctx->len + input_length > 0xFFFFFFFE0ull) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->len == 0 && ctx->add_len % 16 != 0) {
+ gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf);
+ }
+
+ offset = ctx->len % 16;
+ if (offset != 0) {
+ size_t use_len = 16 - offset;
+ if (use_len > input_length) {
+ use_len = input_length;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = gcm_mask(ctx, ectr, offset, use_len, p, out_p)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (offset + use_len == 16) {
+ gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf);
+ }
+
+ ctx->len += use_len;
+ input_length -= use_len;
+ p += use_len;
+ out_p += use_len;
+ }
+
+ ctx->len += input_length;
+
+ while (input_length >= 16) {
+ gcm_incr(ctx->y);
+ if ((ret = gcm_mask(ctx, ectr, 0, 16, p, out_p)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf);
+
+ input_length -= 16;
+ p += 16;
+ out_p += 16;
+ }
+
+ if (input_length > 0) {
+ gcm_incr(ctx->y);
+ if ((ret = gcm_mask(ctx, ectr, 0, input_length, p, out_p)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ectr, sizeof(ectr));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_gcm_finish(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_length,
+ unsigned char *tag, size_t tag_len)
+{
+ unsigned char work_buf[16];
+ uint64_t orig_len;
+ uint64_t orig_add_len;
+
+ /* We never pass any output in finish(). The output parameter exists only
+ * for the sake of alternative implementations. */
+ (void) output;
+ (void) output_size;
+ *output_length = 0;
+
+ /* Total length is restricted to 2^39 - 256 bits, ie 2^36 - 2^5 bytes
+ * and AD length is restricted to 2^64 bits, ie 2^61 bytes so neither of
+ * the two multiplications would overflow. */
+ orig_len = ctx->len * 8;
+ orig_add_len = ctx->add_len * 8;
+
+ if (ctx->len == 0 && ctx->add_len % 16 != 0) {
+ gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf);
+ }
+
+ if (tag_len > 16 || tag_len < 4) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->len % 16 != 0) {
+ gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(tag, ctx->base_ectr, tag_len);
+
+ if (orig_len || orig_add_len) {
+ memset(work_buf, 0x00, 16);
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE((orig_add_len >> 32), work_buf, 0);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE((orig_add_len), work_buf, 4);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE((orig_len >> 32), work_buf, 8);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE((orig_len), work_buf, 12);
+
+ mbedtls_xor(ctx->buf, ctx->buf, work_buf, 16);
+
+ gcm_mult(ctx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf);
+
+ mbedtls_xor(tag, tag, ctx->buf, tag_len);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *iv,
+ size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *add,
+ size_t add_len,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output,
+ size_t tag_len,
+ unsigned char *tag)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t olen;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts(ctx, mode, iv, iv_len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(ctx, add, add_len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(ctx, input, length,
+ output, length, &olen)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(ctx, NULL, 0, &olen, tag, tag_len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_gcm_auth_decrypt(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx,
+ size_t length,
+ const unsigned char *iv,
+ size_t iv_len,
+ const unsigned char *add,
+ size_t add_len,
+ const unsigned char *tag,
+ size_t tag_len,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char check_tag[16];
+ int diff;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT, length,
+ iv, iv_len, add, add_len,
+ input, output, tag_len, check_tag)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Check tag in "constant-time" */
+ diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(tag, check_tag, tag_len);
+
+ if (diff != 0) {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(output, length);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_AUTH_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_gcm_free(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_C)
+ mbedtls_block_cipher_free(&ctx->block_cipher_ctx);
+#else
+ mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
+#endif
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_gcm_context));
+}
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES)
+/*
+ * AES-GCM test vectors from:
+ *
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/mac/gcmtestvectors.zip
+ */
+#define MAX_TESTS 6
+
+static const int key_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] =
+{ 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 };
+
+static const unsigned char key_test_data[][32] =
+{
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
+ { 0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c,
+ 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08,
+ 0xfe, 0xff, 0xe9, 0x92, 0x86, 0x65, 0x73, 0x1c,
+ 0x6d, 0x6a, 0x8f, 0x94, 0x67, 0x30, 0x83, 0x08 },
+};
+
+static const size_t iv_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] =
+{ 12, 12, 12, 12, 8, 60 };
+
+static const int iv_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] =
+{ 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 2 };
+
+static const unsigned char iv_test_data[][64] =
+{
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
+ { 0xca, 0xfe, 0xba, 0xbe, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xdb, 0xad,
+ 0xde, 0xca, 0xf8, 0x88 },
+ { 0x93, 0x13, 0x22, 0x5d, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5,
+ 0x55, 0x90, 0x9c, 0x5a, 0xff, 0x52, 0x69, 0xaa,
+ 0x6a, 0x7a, 0x95, 0x38, 0x53, 0x4f, 0x7d, 0xa1,
+ 0xe4, 0xc3, 0x03, 0xd2, 0xa3, 0x18, 0xa7, 0x28,
+ 0xc3, 0xc0, 0xc9, 0x51, 0x56, 0x80, 0x95, 0x39,
+ 0xfc, 0xf0, 0xe2, 0x42, 0x9a, 0x6b, 0x52, 0x54,
+ 0x16, 0xae, 0xdb, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0xde, 0x6a, 0x57,
+ 0xa6, 0x37, 0xb3, 0x9b },
+};
+
+static const size_t add_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] =
+{ 0, 0, 0, 20, 20, 20 };
+
+static const int add_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] =
+{ 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 };
+
+static const unsigned char additional_test_data[][64] =
+{
+ { 0x00 },
+ { 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef,
+ 0xfe, 0xed, 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef,
+ 0xab, 0xad, 0xda, 0xd2 },
+};
+
+static const size_t pt_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] =
+{ 0, 16, 64, 60, 60, 60 };
+
+static const int pt_index_test_data[MAX_TESTS] =
+{ 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 };
+
+static const unsigned char pt_test_data[][64] =
+{
+ { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 },
+ { 0xd9, 0x31, 0x32, 0x25, 0xf8, 0x84, 0x06, 0xe5,
+ 0xa5, 0x59, 0x09, 0xc5, 0xaf, 0xf5, 0x26, 0x9a,
+ 0x86, 0xa7, 0xa9, 0x53, 0x15, 0x34, 0xf7, 0xda,
+ 0x2e, 0x4c, 0x30, 0x3d, 0x8a, 0x31, 0x8a, 0x72,
+ 0x1c, 0x3c, 0x0c, 0x95, 0x95, 0x68, 0x09, 0x53,
+ 0x2f, 0xcf, 0x0e, 0x24, 0x49, 0xa6, 0xb5, 0x25,
+ 0xb1, 0x6a, 0xed, 0xf5, 0xaa, 0x0d, 0xe6, 0x57,
+ 0xba, 0x63, 0x7b, 0x39, 0x1a, 0xaf, 0xd2, 0x55 },
+};
+
+static const unsigned char ct_test_data[][64] =
+{
+ { 0x00 },
+ { 0x03, 0x88, 0xda, 0xce, 0x60, 0xb6, 0xa3, 0x92,
+ 0xf3, 0x28, 0xc2, 0xb9, 0x71, 0xb2, 0xfe, 0x78 },
+ { 0x42, 0x83, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x21, 0x77, 0x74, 0x24,
+ 0x4b, 0x72, 0x21, 0xb7, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0x9c,
+ 0xe3, 0xaa, 0x21, 0x2f, 0x2c, 0x02, 0xa4, 0xe0,
+ 0x35, 0xc1, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x29, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x2e,
+ 0x21, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xb2, 0x54, 0x66, 0x93, 0x1c,
+ 0x7d, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0x5a, 0xac, 0x84, 0xaa, 0x05,
+ 0x1b, 0xa3, 0x0b, 0x39, 0x6a, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x97,
+ 0x3d, 0x58, 0xe0, 0x91, 0x47, 0x3f, 0x59, 0x85 },
+ { 0x42, 0x83, 0x1e, 0xc2, 0x21, 0x77, 0x74, 0x24,
+ 0x4b, 0x72, 0x21, 0xb7, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xd4, 0x9c,
+ 0xe3, 0xaa, 0x21, 0x2f, 0x2c, 0x02, 0xa4, 0xe0,
+ 0x35, 0xc1, 0x7e, 0x23, 0x29, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x2e,
+ 0x21, 0xd5, 0x14, 0xb2, 0x54, 0x66, 0x93, 0x1c,
+ 0x7d, 0x8f, 0x6a, 0x5a, 0xac, 0x84, 0xaa, 0x05,
+ 0x1b, 0xa3, 0x0b, 0x39, 0x6a, 0x0a, 0xac, 0x97,
+ 0x3d, 0x58, 0xe0, 0x91 },
+ { 0x61, 0x35, 0x3b, 0x4c, 0x28, 0x06, 0x93, 0x4a,
+ 0x77, 0x7f, 0xf5, 0x1f, 0xa2, 0x2a, 0x47, 0x55,
+ 0x69, 0x9b, 0x2a, 0x71, 0x4f, 0xcd, 0xc6, 0xf8,
+ 0x37, 0x66, 0xe5, 0xf9, 0x7b, 0x6c, 0x74, 0x23,
+ 0x73, 0x80, 0x69, 0x00, 0xe4, 0x9f, 0x24, 0xb2,
+ 0x2b, 0x09, 0x75, 0x44, 0xd4, 0x89, 0x6b, 0x42,
+ 0x49, 0x89, 0xb5, 0xe1, 0xeb, 0xac, 0x0f, 0x07,
+ 0xc2, 0x3f, 0x45, 0x98 },
+ { 0x8c, 0xe2, 0x49, 0x98, 0x62, 0x56, 0x15, 0xb6,
+ 0x03, 0xa0, 0x33, 0xac, 0xa1, 0x3f, 0xb8, 0x94,
+ 0xbe, 0x91, 0x12, 0xa5, 0xc3, 0xa2, 0x11, 0xa8,
+ 0xba, 0x26, 0x2a, 0x3c, 0xca, 0x7e, 0x2c, 0xa7,
+ 0x01, 0xe4, 0xa9, 0xa4, 0xfb, 0xa4, 0x3c, 0x90,
+ 0xcc, 0xdc, 0xb2, 0x81, 0xd4, 0x8c, 0x7c, 0x6f,
+ 0xd6, 0x28, 0x75, 0xd2, 0xac, 0xa4, 0x17, 0x03,
+ 0x4c, 0x34, 0xae, 0xe5 },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { 0x00 },
+ { 0x98, 0xe7, 0x24, 0x7c, 0x07, 0xf0, 0xfe, 0x41,
+ 0x1c, 0x26, 0x7e, 0x43, 0x84, 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x00 },
+ { 0x39, 0x80, 0xca, 0x0b, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xe8, 0x41,
+ 0xeb, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xc4, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x57,
+ 0x85, 0x9e, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xa6, 0xef, 0xd9, 0x84,
+ 0x62, 0x85, 0x93, 0xb4, 0x0c, 0xa1, 0xe1, 0x9c,
+ 0x7d, 0x77, 0x3d, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x44, 0xc5, 0x25,
+ 0xac, 0x61, 0x9d, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0x47,
+ 0x18, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x24, 0xd9,
+ 0xcc, 0xda, 0x27, 0x10, 0xac, 0xad, 0xe2, 0x56 },
+ { 0x39, 0x80, 0xca, 0x0b, 0x3c, 0x00, 0xe8, 0x41,
+ 0xeb, 0x06, 0xfa, 0xc4, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x27, 0x57,
+ 0x85, 0x9e, 0x1c, 0xea, 0xa6, 0xef, 0xd9, 0x84,
+ 0x62, 0x85, 0x93, 0xb4, 0x0c, 0xa1, 0xe1, 0x9c,
+ 0x7d, 0x77, 0x3d, 0x00, 0xc1, 0x44, 0xc5, 0x25,
+ 0xac, 0x61, 0x9d, 0x18, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0x3f, 0x47,
+ 0x18, 0xe2, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x2f, 0xe3, 0x24, 0xd9,
+ 0xcc, 0xda, 0x27, 0x10 },
+ { 0x0f, 0x10, 0xf5, 0x99, 0xae, 0x14, 0xa1, 0x54,
+ 0xed, 0x24, 0xb3, 0x6e, 0x25, 0x32, 0x4d, 0xb8,
+ 0xc5, 0x66, 0x63, 0x2e, 0xf2, 0xbb, 0xb3, 0x4f,
+ 0x83, 0x47, 0x28, 0x0f, 0xc4, 0x50, 0x70, 0x57,
+ 0xfd, 0xdc, 0x29, 0xdf, 0x9a, 0x47, 0x1f, 0x75,
+ 0xc6, 0x65, 0x41, 0xd4, 0xd4, 0xda, 0xd1, 0xc9,
+ 0xe9, 0x3a, 0x19, 0xa5, 0x8e, 0x8b, 0x47, 0x3f,
+ 0xa0, 0xf0, 0x62, 0xf7 },
+ { 0xd2, 0x7e, 0x88, 0x68, 0x1c, 0xe3, 0x24, 0x3c,
+ 0x48, 0x30, 0x16, 0x5a, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0xf9, 0xff,
+ 0x1d, 0xe9, 0xa1, 0xd8, 0xe6, 0xb4, 0x47, 0xef,
+ 0x6e, 0xf7, 0xb7, 0x98, 0x28, 0x66, 0x6e, 0x45,
+ 0x81, 0xe7, 0x90, 0x12, 0xaf, 0x34, 0xdd, 0xd9,
+ 0xe2, 0xf0, 0x37, 0x58, 0x9b, 0x29, 0x2d, 0xb3,
+ 0xe6, 0x7c, 0x03, 0x67, 0x45, 0xfa, 0x22, 0xe7,
+ 0xe9, 0xb7, 0x37, 0x3b },
+ { 0x00 },
+ { 0xce, 0xa7, 0x40, 0x3d, 0x4d, 0x60, 0x6b, 0x6e,
+ 0x07, 0x4e, 0xc5, 0xd3, 0xba, 0xf3, 0x9d, 0x18 },
+ { 0x52, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x99, 0x56, 0x7d, 0x07,
+ 0xf4, 0x7f, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7d,
+ 0x64, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0xc9,
+ 0x75, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x55, 0xd1, 0xaa,
+ 0x8c, 0xb0, 0x8e, 0x48, 0x59, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0x3d,
+ 0xa7, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x10, 0x56, 0x82, 0x88, 0x38,
+ 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1e, 0x63, 0x93, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0a,
+ 0xbc, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0x62, 0x89, 0x80, 0x15, 0xad },
+ { 0x52, 0x2d, 0xc1, 0xf0, 0x99, 0x56, 0x7d, 0x07,
+ 0xf4, 0x7f, 0x37, 0xa3, 0x2a, 0x84, 0x42, 0x7d,
+ 0x64, 0x3a, 0x8c, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0xc9,
+ 0x75, 0x98, 0xa2, 0xbd, 0x25, 0x55, 0xd1, 0xaa,
+ 0x8c, 0xb0, 0x8e, 0x48, 0x59, 0x0d, 0xbb, 0x3d,
+ 0xa7, 0xb0, 0x8b, 0x10, 0x56, 0x82, 0x88, 0x38,
+ 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1e, 0x63, 0x93, 0xba, 0x7a, 0x0a,
+ 0xbc, 0xc9, 0xf6, 0x62 },
+ { 0xc3, 0x76, 0x2d, 0xf1, 0xca, 0x78, 0x7d, 0x32,
+ 0xae, 0x47, 0xc1, 0x3b, 0xf1, 0x98, 0x44, 0xcb,
+ 0xaf, 0x1a, 0xe1, 0x4d, 0x0b, 0x97, 0x6a, 0xfa,
+ 0xc5, 0x2f, 0xf7, 0xd7, 0x9b, 0xba, 0x9d, 0xe0,
+ 0xfe, 0xb5, 0x82, 0xd3, 0x39, 0x34, 0xa4, 0xf0,
+ 0x95, 0x4c, 0xc2, 0x36, 0x3b, 0xc7, 0x3f, 0x78,
+ 0x62, 0xac, 0x43, 0x0e, 0x64, 0xab, 0xe4, 0x99,
+ 0xf4, 0x7c, 0x9b, 0x1f },
+ { 0x5a, 0x8d, 0xef, 0x2f, 0x0c, 0x9e, 0x53, 0xf1,
+ 0xf7, 0x5d, 0x78, 0x53, 0x65, 0x9e, 0x2a, 0x20,
+ 0xee, 0xb2, 0xb2, 0x2a, 0xaf, 0xde, 0x64, 0x19,
+ 0xa0, 0x58, 0xab, 0x4f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x6b, 0xf4,
+ 0x0f, 0xc0, 0xc3, 0xb7, 0x80, 0xf2, 0x44, 0x45,
+ 0x2d, 0xa3, 0xeb, 0xf1, 0xc5, 0xd8, 0x2c, 0xde,
+ 0xa2, 0x41, 0x89, 0x97, 0x20, 0x0e, 0xf8, 0x2e,
+ 0x44, 0xae, 0x7e, 0x3f },
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */
+};
+
+static const unsigned char tag_test_data[][16] =
+{
+ { 0x58, 0xe2, 0xfc, 0xce, 0xfa, 0x7e, 0x30, 0x61,
+ 0x36, 0x7f, 0x1d, 0x57, 0xa4, 0xe7, 0x45, 0x5a },
+ { 0xab, 0x6e, 0x47, 0xd4, 0x2c, 0xec, 0x13, 0xbd,
+ 0xf5, 0x3a, 0x67, 0xb2, 0x12, 0x57, 0xbd, 0xdf },
+ { 0x4d, 0x5c, 0x2a, 0xf3, 0x27, 0xcd, 0x64, 0xa6,
+ 0x2c, 0xf3, 0x5a, 0xbd, 0x2b, 0xa6, 0xfa, 0xb4 },
+ { 0x5b, 0xc9, 0x4f, 0xbc, 0x32, 0x21, 0xa5, 0xdb,
+ 0x94, 0xfa, 0xe9, 0x5a, 0xe7, 0x12, 0x1a, 0x47 },
+ { 0x36, 0x12, 0xd2, 0xe7, 0x9e, 0x3b, 0x07, 0x85,
+ 0x56, 0x1b, 0xe1, 0x4a, 0xac, 0xa2, 0xfc, 0xcb },
+ { 0x61, 0x9c, 0xc5, 0xae, 0xff, 0xfe, 0x0b, 0xfa,
+ 0x46, 0x2a, 0xf4, 0x3c, 0x16, 0x99, 0xd0, 0x50 },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { 0xcd, 0x33, 0xb2, 0x8a, 0xc7, 0x73, 0xf7, 0x4b,
+ 0xa0, 0x0e, 0xd1, 0xf3, 0x12, 0x57, 0x24, 0x35 },
+ { 0x2f, 0xf5, 0x8d, 0x80, 0x03, 0x39, 0x27, 0xab,
+ 0x8e, 0xf4, 0xd4, 0x58, 0x75, 0x14, 0xf0, 0xfb },
+ { 0x99, 0x24, 0xa7, 0xc8, 0x58, 0x73, 0x36, 0xbf,
+ 0xb1, 0x18, 0x02, 0x4d, 0xb8, 0x67, 0x4a, 0x14 },
+ { 0x25, 0x19, 0x49, 0x8e, 0x80, 0xf1, 0x47, 0x8f,
+ 0x37, 0xba, 0x55, 0xbd, 0x6d, 0x27, 0x61, 0x8c },
+ { 0x65, 0xdc, 0xc5, 0x7f, 0xcf, 0x62, 0x3a, 0x24,
+ 0x09, 0x4f, 0xcc, 0xa4, 0x0d, 0x35, 0x33, 0xf8 },
+ { 0xdc, 0xf5, 0x66, 0xff, 0x29, 0x1c, 0x25, 0xbb,
+ 0xb8, 0x56, 0x8f, 0xc3, 0xd3, 0x76, 0xa6, 0xd9 },
+ { 0x53, 0x0f, 0x8a, 0xfb, 0xc7, 0x45, 0x36, 0xb9,
+ 0xa9, 0x63, 0xb4, 0xf1, 0xc4, 0xcb, 0x73, 0x8b },
+ { 0xd0, 0xd1, 0xc8, 0xa7, 0x99, 0x99, 0x6b, 0xf0,
+ 0x26, 0x5b, 0x98, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0x8a, 0xb9, 0x19 },
+ { 0xb0, 0x94, 0xda, 0xc5, 0xd9, 0x34, 0x71, 0xbd,
+ 0xec, 0x1a, 0x50, 0x22, 0x70, 0xe3, 0xcc, 0x6c },
+ { 0x76, 0xfc, 0x6e, 0xce, 0x0f, 0x4e, 0x17, 0x68,
+ 0xcd, 0xdf, 0x88, 0x53, 0xbb, 0x2d, 0x55, 0x1b },
+ { 0x3a, 0x33, 0x7d, 0xbf, 0x46, 0xa7, 0x92, 0xc4,
+ 0x5e, 0x45, 0x49, 0x13, 0xfe, 0x2e, 0xa8, 0xf2 },
+ { 0xa4, 0x4a, 0x82, 0x66, 0xee, 0x1c, 0x8e, 0xb0,
+ 0xc8, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0xcf, 0x5a, 0xe9, 0xf1, 0x9a },
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH */
+};
+
+int mbedtls_gcm_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ mbedtls_gcm_context ctx;
+ unsigned char buf[64];
+ unsigned char tag_buf[16];
+ int i, j, ret;
+ mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES;
+ size_t olen;
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT)
+ mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: alternative implementation.\n");
+#else /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESNI_HAVE_CODE)
+ if (mbedtls_aesni_has_support(MBEDTLS_AESNI_CLMUL)) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: using AESNI.\n");
+ } else
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAVE_CODE)
+ if (MBEDTLS_AESCE_HAS_SUPPORT()) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: using AESCE.\n");
+ } else
+#endif
+
+ mbedtls_printf(" GCM note: built-in implementation.\n");
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT */
+ }
+
+ static const int loop_limit =
+ (sizeof(ct_test_data) / sizeof(*ct_test_data)) / MAX_TESTS;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < loop_limit; j++) {
+ int key_len = 128 + 64 * j;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_TESTS; i++) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES-GCM-%3d #%d (%s): ",
+ key_len, i, "enc");
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&ctx, cipher,
+ key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]],
+ key_len);
+ /*
+ * AES-192 is an optional feature that may be unavailable when
+ * there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when
+ * MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined.
+ */
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && key_len == 192) {
+ mbedtls_printf("skipped\n");
+ break;
+ } else if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT,
+ pt_len_test_data[i],
+ iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]],
+ iv_len_test_data[i],
+ additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]],
+ add_len_test_data[i],
+ pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]],
+ buf, 16, tag_buf);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT)
+ /* Allow alternative implementations to only support 12-byte nonces. */
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED &&
+ iv_len_test_data[i] != 12) {
+ mbedtls_printf("skipped\n");
+ break;
+ }
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_ALT) */
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(buf, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i],
+ pt_len_test_data[i]) != 0 ||
+ memcmp(tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16) != 0) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES-GCM-%3d #%d (%s): ",
+ key_len, i, "dec");
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&ctx, cipher,
+ key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]],
+ key_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_crypt_and_tag(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT,
+ pt_len_test_data[i],
+ iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]],
+ iv_len_test_data[i],
+ additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]],
+ add_len_test_data[i],
+ ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], buf, 16, tag_buf);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(buf, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]],
+ pt_len_test_data[i]) != 0 ||
+ memcmp(tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16) != 0) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES-GCM-%3d #%d split (%s): ",
+ key_len, i, "enc");
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&ctx, cipher,
+ key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]],
+ key_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT,
+ iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]],
+ iv_len_test_data[i]);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx,
+ additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]],
+ add_len_test_data[i]);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (pt_len_test_data[i] > 32) {
+ size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32;
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx,
+ pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]],
+ 32,
+ buf, sizeof(buf), &olen);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if (olen != 32) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx,
+ pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]] + 32,
+ rest_len,
+ buf + 32, sizeof(buf) - 32, &olen);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if (olen != rest_len) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx,
+ pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]],
+ pt_len_test_data[i],
+ buf, sizeof(buf), &olen);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if (olen != pt_len_test_data[i]) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, NULL, 0, &olen, tag_buf, 16);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(buf, ct_test_data[j * 6 + i],
+ pt_len_test_data[i]) != 0 ||
+ memcmp(tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16) != 0) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" AES-GCM-%3d #%d split (%s): ",
+ key_len, i, "dec");
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_setkey(&ctx, cipher,
+ key_test_data[key_index_test_data[i]],
+ key_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_starts(&ctx, MBEDTLS_GCM_DECRYPT,
+ iv_test_data[iv_index_test_data[i]],
+ iv_len_test_data[i]);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx,
+ additional_test_data[add_index_test_data[i]],
+ add_len_test_data[i]);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (pt_len_test_data[i] > 32) {
+ size_t rest_len = pt_len_test_data[i] - 32;
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx,
+ ct_test_data[j * 6 + i], 32,
+ buf, sizeof(buf), &olen);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if (olen != 32) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx,
+ ct_test_data[j * 6 + i] + 32,
+ rest_len,
+ buf + 32, sizeof(buf) - 32, &olen);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if (olen != rest_len) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx,
+ ct_test_data[j * 6 + i],
+ pt_len_test_data[i],
+ buf, sizeof(buf), &olen);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if (olen != pt_len_test_data[i]) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_gcm_finish(&ctx, NULL, 0, &olen, tag_buf, 16);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(buf, pt_test_data[pt_index_test_data[i]],
+ pt_len_test_data[i]) != 0 ||
+ memcmp(tag_buf, tag_test_data[j * 6 + i], 16) != 0) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+ mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_GCM_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..631ac24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/hkdf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+/*
+ * HKDF implementation -- RFC 5869
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HKDF_C)
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "mbedtls/hkdf.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+int mbedtls_hkdf(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *salt,
+ size_t salt_len, const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
+ const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
+ unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char prk[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+
+ ret = mbedtls_hkdf_extract(md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk);
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ ret = mbedtls_hkdf_expand(md, prk, mbedtls_md_get_size(md),
+ info, info_len, okm, okm_len);
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(prk, sizeof(prk));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_hkdf_extract(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md,
+ const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
+ const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
+ unsigned char *prk)
+{
+ unsigned char null_salt[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE] = { '\0' };
+
+ if (salt == NULL) {
+ size_t hash_len;
+
+ if (salt_len != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md);
+
+ if (hash_len == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ salt = null_salt;
+ salt_len = hash_len;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_md_hmac(md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_hkdf_expand(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md, const unsigned char *prk,
+ size_t prk_len, const unsigned char *info,
+ size_t info_len, unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
+{
+ size_t hash_len;
+ size_t where = 0;
+ size_t n;
+ size_t t_len = 0;
+ size_t i;
+ int ret = 0;
+ mbedtls_md_context_t ctx;
+ unsigned char t[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+
+ if (okm == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(md);
+
+ if (prk_len < hash_len || hash_len == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (info == NULL) {
+ info = (const unsigned char *) "";
+ info_len = 0;
+ }
+
+ n = okm_len / hash_len;
+
+ if (okm_len % hash_len != 0) {
+ n++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Per RFC 5869 Section 2.3, okm_len must not exceed
+ * 255 times the hash length
+ */
+ if (n > 255) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_HKDF_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_md_init(&ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx, md, 1)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ memset(t, 0, hash_len);
+
+ /*
+ * Compute T = T(1) | T(2) | T(3) | ... | T(N)
+ * Where T(N) is defined in RFC 5869 Section 2.3
+ */
+ for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
+ size_t num_to_copy;
+ unsigned char c = i & 0xff;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&ctx, prk, prk_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx, t, t_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx, info, info_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* The constant concatenated to the end of each T(n) is a single octet.
+ * */
+ ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx, &c, 1);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&ctx, t);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ num_to_copy = i != n ? hash_len : okm_len - where;
+ memcpy(okm + where, t, num_to_copy);
+ where += hash_len;
+ t_len = hash_len;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_md_free(&ctx);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(t, sizeof(t));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HKDF_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..90174d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/hmac_drbg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,633 @@
+/*
+ * HMAC_DRBG implementation (NIST SP 800-90)
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The NIST SP 800-90A DRBGs are described in the following publication.
+ * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf
+ * References below are based on rev. 1 (January 2012).
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+#include <stdio.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+/*
+ * HMAC_DRBG context initialization
+ */
+void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context));
+
+ ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * HMAC_DRBG update, using optional additional data (10.1.2.2)
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *additional,
+ size_t add_len)
+{
+ size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_ctx.md_info);
+ unsigned char rounds = (additional != NULL && add_len != 0) ? 2 : 1;
+ unsigned char sep[1];
+ unsigned char K[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+
+ for (sep[0] = 0; sep[0] < rounds; sep[0]++) {
+ /* Step 1 or 4 */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&ctx->md_ctx)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx->md_ctx,
+ ctx->V, md_len)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx->md_ctx,
+ sep, 1)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if (rounds == 2) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx->md_ctx,
+ additional, add_len)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&ctx->md_ctx, K)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Step 2 or 5 */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&ctx->md_ctx, K, md_len)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx->md_ctx,
+ ctx->V, md_len)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(K, sizeof(K));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation (for use with deterministic ECDSA)
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Set initial working state.
+ * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the
+ * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value.
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V,
+ mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info))) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ memset(ctx->V, 0x01, mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info));
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, data, data_len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Internal function used both for seeding and reseeding the DRBG.
+ * Comments starting with arabic numbers refer to section 10.1.2.4
+ * of SP800-90A, while roman numbers refer to section 9.2.
+ */
+static int hmac_drbg_reseed_core(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *additional, size_t len,
+ int use_nonce)
+{
+ unsigned char seed[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT];
+ size_t seedlen = 0;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ {
+ size_t total_entropy_len;
+
+ if (use_nonce == 0) {
+ total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len;
+ } else {
+ total_entropy_len = ctx->entropy_len * 3 / 2;
+ }
+
+ /* III. Check input length */
+ if (len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ||
+ total_entropy_len + len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG;
+ }
+ }
+
+ memset(seed, 0, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT);
+
+ /* IV. Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy for the seed */
+ if ((ret = ctx->f_entropy(ctx->p_entropy,
+ seed, ctx->entropy_len)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED;
+ }
+ seedlen += ctx->entropy_len;
+
+ /* For initial seeding, allow adding of nonce generated
+ * from the entropy source. See Sect 8.6.7 in SP800-90A. */
+ if (use_nonce) {
+ /* Note: We don't merge the two calls to f_entropy() in order
+ * to avoid requesting too much entropy from f_entropy()
+ * at once. Specifically, if the underlying digest is not
+ * SHA-1, 3 / 2 * entropy_len is at least 36 Bytes, which
+ * is larger than the maximum of 32 Bytes that our own
+ * entropy source implementation can emit in a single
+ * call in configurations disabling SHA-512. */
+ if ((ret = ctx->f_entropy(ctx->p_entropy,
+ seed + seedlen,
+ ctx->entropy_len / 2)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ seedlen += ctx->entropy_len / 2;
+ }
+
+
+ /* 1. Concatenate entropy and additional data if any */
+ if (additional != NULL && len != 0) {
+ memcpy(seed + seedlen, additional, len);
+ seedlen += len;
+ }
+
+ /* 2. Update state */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, seed, seedlen)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* 3. Reset reseed_counter */
+ ctx->reseed_counter = 1;
+
+exit:
+ /* 4. Done */
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(seed, seedlen);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * HMAC_DRBG reseeding: 10.1.2.4 + 9.2
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *additional, size_t len)
+{
+ return hmac_drbg_reseed_core(ctx, additional, len, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * HMAC_DRBG initialisation (10.1.2.3 + 9.1)
+ *
+ * The nonce is not passed as a separate parameter but extracted
+ * from the entropy source as suggested in 8.6.7.
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info,
+ int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_entropy,
+ const unsigned char *custom,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t md_size;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx->md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* The mutex is initialized iff the md context is set up. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ mbedtls_mutex_init(&ctx->mutex);
+#endif
+
+ md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info);
+
+ /*
+ * Set initial working state.
+ * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the
+ * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value.
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_size)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ memset(ctx->V, 0x01, md_size);
+
+ ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy;
+ ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy;
+
+ if (ctx->entropy_len == 0) {
+ /*
+ * See SP800-57 5.6.1 (p. 65-66) for the security strength provided by
+ * each hash function, then according to SP800-90A rev1 10.1 table 2,
+ * min_entropy_len (in bits) is security_strength.
+ *
+ * (This also matches the sizes used in the NIST test vectors.)
+ */
+ ctx->entropy_len = md_size <= 20 ? 16 : /* 160-bits hash -> 128 bits */
+ md_size <= 28 ? 24 : /* 224-bits hash -> 192 bits */
+ 32; /* better (256+) -> 256 bits */
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = hmac_drbg_reseed_core(ctx, custom, len,
+ 1 /* add nonce */)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set prediction resistance
+ */
+void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx,
+ int resistance)
+{
+ ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set entropy length grabbed for seeding
+ */
+void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len)
+{
+ ctx->entropy_len = len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set reseed interval
+ */
+void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, int interval)
+{
+ ctx->reseed_interval = interval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * HMAC_DRBG random function with optional additional data:
+ * 10.1.2.5 (arabic) + 9.3 (Roman)
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t out_len,
+ const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng;
+ size_t md_len = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_ctx.md_info);
+ size_t left = out_len;
+ unsigned char *out = output;
+
+ /* II. Check request length */
+ if (out_len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG;
+ }
+
+ /* III. Check input length */
+ if (add_len > MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG;
+ }
+
+ /* 1. (aka VII and IX) Check reseed counter and PR */
+ if (ctx->f_entropy != NULL && /* For no-reseeding instances */
+ (ctx->prediction_resistance == MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON ||
+ ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval)) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, add_len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ add_len = 0; /* VII.4 */
+ }
+
+ /* 2. Use additional data if any */
+ if (additional != NULL && add_len != 0) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx,
+ additional, add_len)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* 3, 4, 5. Generate bytes */
+ while (left != 0) {
+ size_t use_len = left > md_len ? md_len : left;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(&ctx->md_ctx)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx->md_ctx,
+ ctx->V, md_len)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(out, ctx->V, use_len);
+ out += use_len;
+ left -= use_len;
+ }
+
+ /* 6. Update */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx,
+ additional, add_len)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* 7. Update reseed counter */
+ ctx->reseed_counter++;
+
+exit:
+ /* 8. Done */
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * HMAC_DRBG random function
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random_with_add(ctx, output, out_len, NULL, 0);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function resets HMAC_DRBG context to the state immediately
+ * after initial call of mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init().
+ */
+void mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ /* The mutex is initialized iff the md context is set up. */
+ if (ctx->md_ctx.md_info != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_mutex_free(&ctx->mutex);
+ }
+#endif
+ mbedtls_md_free(&ctx->md_ctx);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context));
+ ctx->reseed_interval = MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ FILE *f;
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT];
+
+ if ((f = fopen(path, "wb")) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */
+ mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(ctx, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (fwrite(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f) != sizeof(buf)) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ fclose(f);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update_seed_file(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ size_t n;
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT];
+ unsigned char c;
+
+ if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */
+ mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL);
+
+ n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f);
+ if (fread(&c, 1, 1, f) != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if (n == 0 || ferror(f)) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ f = NULL;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_hmac_drbg_update(ctx, buf, n);
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (f != NULL) {
+ fclose(f);
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return mbedtls_hmac_drbg_write_seed_file(ctx, path);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
+/* Dummy checkup routine */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ (void) verbose;
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
+
+#define OUTPUT_LEN 80
+
+/* From a NIST PR=true test vector */
+static const unsigned char entropy_pr[] = {
+ 0xa0, 0xc9, 0xab, 0x58, 0xf1, 0xe2, 0xe5, 0xa4, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xbd, 0x4f,
+ 0xf7, 0x3e, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xef, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x02, 0x8c, 0xf8, 0x11,
+ 0x48, 0xa5, 0x84, 0xfe, 0x69, 0xab, 0x5a, 0xee, 0x42, 0xaa, 0x4d, 0x42,
+ 0x17, 0x60, 0x99, 0xd4, 0x5e, 0x13, 0x97, 0xdc, 0x40, 0x4d, 0x86, 0xa3,
+ 0x7b, 0xf5, 0x59, 0x54, 0x75, 0x69, 0x51, 0xe4
+};
+static const unsigned char result_pr[OUTPUT_LEN] = {
+ 0x9a, 0x00, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0xd5, 0x9b, 0xfe, 0x31, 0xec, 0xb1, 0x39,
+ 0x9b, 0x60, 0x81, 0x48, 0xd1, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x25, 0x0d, 0x3c, 0x1e, 0x94,
+ 0x10, 0x10, 0x98, 0x12, 0x93, 0x25, 0xca, 0xb8, 0xfc, 0xcc, 0x2d, 0x54,
+ 0x73, 0x19, 0x70, 0xc0, 0x10, 0x7a, 0xa4, 0x89, 0x25, 0x19, 0x95, 0x5e,
+ 0x4b, 0xc6, 0x00, 0x1d, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x6a, 0x2b, 0xf8, 0xa3, 0x01, 0xab,
+ 0x46, 0x05, 0x5c, 0x09, 0xa6, 0x71, 0x88, 0xf1, 0xa7, 0x40, 0xee, 0xf3,
+ 0xe1, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x9b, 0x44, 0xaf, 0x03, 0x44
+};
+
+/* From a NIST PR=false test vector */
+static const unsigned char entropy_nopr[] = {
+ 0x79, 0x34, 0x9b, 0xbf, 0x7c, 0xdd, 0xa5, 0x79, 0x95, 0x57, 0x86, 0x66,
+ 0x21, 0xc9, 0x13, 0x83, 0x11, 0x46, 0x73, 0x3a, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0x35, 0xc8,
+ 0xc7, 0x21, 0x5b, 0x5b, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x9b, 0x33, 0x8c, 0x74, 0xe3,
+ 0xe9, 0x9d, 0xfe, 0xdf
+};
+static const unsigned char result_nopr[OUTPUT_LEN] = {
+ 0xc6, 0xa1, 0x6a, 0xb8, 0xd4, 0x20, 0x70, 0x6f, 0x0f, 0x34, 0xab, 0x7f,
+ 0xec, 0x5a, 0xdc, 0xa9, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x3e, 0x15, 0x9c, 0xa6,
+ 0xac, 0x43, 0xc6, 0xf8, 0xa2, 0xbe, 0x22, 0x83, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0x0a,
+ 0xff, 0xb1, 0x0d, 0x71, 0x94, 0xf1, 0xc1, 0xa5, 0xcf, 0x73, 0x22, 0xec,
+ 0x1a, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x4e, 0xd4, 0xbf, 0x12, 0x27, 0x46, 0xe0, 0x87, 0xfd,
+ 0xb5, 0xb3, 0xe9, 0x1b, 0x34, 0x93, 0xd5, 0xbb, 0x98, 0xfa, 0xed, 0x49,
+ 0xe8, 0x5f, 0x13, 0x0f, 0xc8, 0xa4, 0x59, 0xb7
+};
+
+/* "Entropy" from buffer */
+static size_t test_offset;
+static int hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy(void *data,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p = data;
+ memcpy(buf, p + test_offset, len);
+ test_offset += len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define CHK(c) if ((c) != 0) \
+ { \
+ if (verbose != 0) \
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); \
+ return 1; \
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Checkup routine for HMAC_DRBG with SHA-1
+ */
+int mbedtls_hmac_drbg_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context ctx;
+ unsigned char buf[OUTPUT_LEN];
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1);
+
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(&ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * PR = True
+ */
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" HMAC_DRBG (PR = True) : ");
+ }
+
+ test_offset = 0;
+ CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(&ctx, md_info,
+ hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_pr,
+ NULL, 0));
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance(&ctx, MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON);
+ CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN));
+ CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN));
+ CHK(memcmp(buf, result_pr, OUTPUT_LEN));
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&ctx);
+
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&ctx);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * PR = False
+ */
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" HMAC_DRBG (PR = False) : ");
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init(&ctx);
+
+ test_offset = 0;
+ CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed(&ctx, md_info,
+ hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_nopr,
+ NULL, 0));
+ CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_reseed(&ctx, NULL, 0));
+ CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN));
+ CHK(mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random(&ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN));
+ CHK(memcmp(buf, result_nopr, OUTPUT_LEN));
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&ctx);
+
+ mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free(&ctx);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/lmots.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/lmots.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..404aa80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/lmots.c
@@ -0,0 +1,789 @@
+/*
+ * The LM-OTS one-time public-key signature scheme
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation
+ * of the LM-OTS algorithm:
+ *
+ * [1] IETF RFC8554
+ * D. McGrew, M. Curcio, S.Fluhrer
+ * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8554
+ *
+ * [2] NIST Special Publication 800-208
+ * David A. Cooper et. al.
+ * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-208.pdf
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C)
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "lmots.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/lms.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "psa_util_internal.h"
+
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+
+/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many
+ * arguments in each translating place. */
+static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status)
+{
+ return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_lms_errors,
+ ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_lms_errors),
+ psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls);
+}
+#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status)
+
+#define PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET (0)
+#define PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN)
+#define PUBLIC_KEY_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN)
+#define PUBLIC_KEY_KEY_HASH_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN)
+
+/* We only support parameter sets that use 8-bit digits, as it does not require
+ * translation logic between digits and bytes */
+#define W_WINTERNITZ_PARAMETER (8u)
+#define CHECKSUM_LEN (2)
+#define I_DIGIT_IDX_LEN (2)
+#define J_HASH_IDX_LEN (1)
+#define D_CONST_LEN (2)
+
+#define DIGIT_MAX_VALUE ((1u << W_WINTERNITZ_PARAMETER) - 1u)
+
+#define D_CONST_LEN (2)
+static const unsigned char D_PUBLIC_CONSTANT_BYTES[D_CONST_LEN] = { 0x80, 0x80 };
+static const unsigned char D_MESSAGE_CONSTANT_BYTES[D_CONST_LEN] = { 0x81, 0x81 };
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+int (*mbedtls_lmots_sign_private_key_invalidated_hook)(unsigned char *) = NULL;
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) */
+
+/* Calculate the checksum digits that are appended to the end of the LMOTS digit
+ * string. See NIST SP800-208 section 3.1 or RFC8554 Algorithm 2 for details of
+ * the checksum algorithm.
+ *
+ * params The LMOTS parameter set, I and q values which
+ * describe the key being used.
+ *
+ * digest The digit string to create the digest from. As
+ * this does not contain a checksum, it is the same
+ * size as a hash output.
+ */
+static unsigned short lmots_checksum_calculate(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params,
+ const unsigned char *digest)
+{
+ size_t idx;
+ unsigned sum = 0;
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type); idx++) {
+ sum += DIGIT_MAX_VALUE - digest[idx];
+ }
+
+ return sum;
+}
+
+/* Create the string of digest digits (in the base determined by the Winternitz
+ * parameter with the checksum appended to the end (Q || cksm(Q)). See NIST
+ * SP800-208 section 3.1 or RFC8554 Algorithm 3 step 5 (also used in Algorithm
+ * 4b step 3) for details.
+ *
+ * params The LMOTS parameter set, I and q values which
+ * describe the key being used.
+ *
+ * msg The message that will be hashed to create the
+ * digest.
+ *
+ * msg_size The size of the message.
+ *
+ * C_random_value The random value that will be combined with the
+ * message digest. This is always the same size as a
+ * hash output for whichever hash algorithm is
+ * determined by the parameter set.
+ *
+ * output An output containing the digit string (+
+ * checksum) of length P digits (in the case of
+ * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8, this means it is of
+ * size P bytes).
+ */
+static int create_digit_array_with_checksum(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params,
+ const unsigned char *msg,
+ size_t msg_len,
+ const unsigned char *C_random_value,
+ unsigned char *out)
+{
+ psa_hash_operation_t op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t output_hash_len;
+ unsigned short checksum;
+
+ status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->I_key_identifier,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->q_leaf_identifier,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, D_MESSAGE_CONSTANT_BYTES, D_CONST_LEN);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, C_random_value,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(params->type));
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, msg, msg_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_finish(&op, out,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type),
+ &output_hash_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ checksum = lmots_checksum_calculate(params, out);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(checksum, out, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type));
+
+exit:
+ psa_hash_abort(&op);
+
+ return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+}
+
+/* Hash each element of the string of digits (+ checksum), producing a hash
+ * output for each element. This is used in several places (by varying the
+ * hash_idx_min/max_values) in order to calculate a public key from a private
+ * key (RFC8554 Algorithm 1 step 4), in order to sign a message (RFC8554
+ * Algorithm 3 step 5), and to calculate a public key candidate from a
+ * signature and message (RFC8554 Algorithm 4b step 3).
+ *
+ * params The LMOTS parameter set, I and q values which
+ * describe the key being used.
+ *
+ * x_digit_array The array of digits (of size P, 34 in the case of
+ * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8).
+ *
+ * hash_idx_min_values An array of the starting values of the j iterator
+ * for each of the members of the digit array. If
+ * this value in NULL, then all iterators will start
+ * at 0.
+ *
+ * hash_idx_max_values An array of the upper bound values of the j
+ * iterator for each of the members of the digit
+ * array. If this value in NULL, then iterator is
+ * bounded to be less than 2^w - 1 (255 in the case
+ * of MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8)
+ *
+ * output An array containing a hash output for each member
+ * of the digit string P. In the case of
+ * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8, this is of size 32 *
+ * 34.
+ */
+static int hash_digit_array(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params,
+ const unsigned char *x_digit_array,
+ const unsigned char *hash_idx_min_values,
+ const unsigned char *hash_idx_max_values,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ unsigned int i_digit_idx;
+ unsigned char i_digit_idx_bytes[I_DIGIT_IDX_LEN];
+ unsigned int j_hash_idx;
+ unsigned char j_hash_idx_bytes[J_HASH_IDX_LEN];
+ unsigned int j_hash_idx_min;
+ unsigned int j_hash_idx_max;
+ psa_hash_operation_t op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t output_hash_len;
+ unsigned char tmp_hash[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX];
+
+ for (i_digit_idx = 0;
+ i_digit_idx < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(params->type);
+ i_digit_idx++) {
+
+ memcpy(tmp_hash,
+ &x_digit_array[i_digit_idx * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)],
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type));
+
+ j_hash_idx_min = hash_idx_min_values != NULL ?
+ hash_idx_min_values[i_digit_idx] : 0;
+ j_hash_idx_max = hash_idx_max_values != NULL ?
+ hash_idx_max_values[i_digit_idx] : DIGIT_MAX_VALUE;
+
+ for (j_hash_idx = j_hash_idx_min;
+ j_hash_idx < j_hash_idx_max;
+ j_hash_idx++) {
+ status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op,
+ params->I_key_identifier,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op,
+ params->q_leaf_identifier,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(i_digit_idx, i_digit_idx_bytes, 0);
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, i_digit_idx_bytes, I_DIGIT_IDX_LEN);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ j_hash_idx_bytes[0] = (uint8_t) j_hash_idx;
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, j_hash_idx_bytes, J_HASH_IDX_LEN);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, tmp_hash,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type));
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_finish(&op, tmp_hash, sizeof(tmp_hash),
+ &output_hash_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ psa_hash_abort(&op);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&output[i_digit_idx * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)],
+ tmp_hash, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type));
+ }
+
+exit:
+ psa_hash_abort(&op);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_hash, sizeof(tmp_hash));
+
+ return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+}
+
+/* Combine the hashes of the digit array into a public key. This is used in
+ * in order to calculate a public key from a private key (RFC8554 Algorithm 1
+ * step 4), and to calculate a public key candidate from a signature and message
+ * (RFC8554 Algorithm 4b step 3).
+ *
+ * params The LMOTS parameter set, I and q values which describe
+ * the key being used.
+ * y_hashed_digits The array of hashes, one hash for each digit of the
+ * symbol array (which is of size P, 34 in the case of
+ * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8)
+ *
+ * pub_key The output public key (or candidate public key in
+ * case this is being run as part of signature
+ * verification), in the form of a hash output.
+ */
+static int public_key_from_hashed_digit_array(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params,
+ const unsigned char *y_hashed_digits,
+ unsigned char *pub_key)
+{
+ psa_hash_operation_t op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t output_hash_len;
+
+ status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op,
+ params->I_key_identifier,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->q_leaf_identifier,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, D_PUBLIC_CONSTANT_BYTES, D_CONST_LEN);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, y_hashed_digits,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(params->type) *
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type));
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_finish(&op, pub_key,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type),
+ &output_hash_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+
+exit:
+ psa_hash_abort(&op);
+ }
+
+ return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+int mbedtls_lms_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status)
+{
+ switch (status) {
+ case PSA_SUCCESS:
+ return 0;
+ case PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
+ case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+ case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
+
+void mbedtls_lmots_public_init(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+void mbedtls_lmots_public_free(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+int mbedtls_lmots_import_public_key(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+ if (key_len < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ uint32_t type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET);
+ if (type != (uint32_t) MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ ctx->params.type = (mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t) type;
+
+ if (key_len != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(ctx->params.I_key_identifier,
+ key + PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN);
+
+ memcpy(ctx->params.q_leaf_identifier,
+ key + PUBLIC_KEY_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN);
+
+ memcpy(ctx->public_key,
+ key + PUBLIC_KEY_KEY_HASH_OFFSET,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type));
+
+ ctx->have_public_key = 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_lmots_export_public_key(const mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t key_size,
+ size_t *key_len)
+{
+ if (key_size < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ctx->have_public_key) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.type, key, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET);
+
+ memcpy(key + PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET,
+ ctx->params.I_key_identifier,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN);
+
+ memcpy(key + PUBLIC_KEY_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET,
+ ctx->params.q_leaf_identifier,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN);
+
+ memcpy(key + PUBLIC_KEY_KEY_HASH_OFFSET, ctx->public_key,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type));
+
+ if (key_len != NULL) {
+ *key_len = MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key_candidate(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params,
+ const unsigned char *msg,
+ size_t msg_size,
+ const unsigned char *sig,
+ size_t sig_size,
+ unsigned char *out,
+ size_t out_size,
+ size_t *out_len)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp_digit_array[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX];
+ unsigned char y_hashed_digits[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX][MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX];
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (msg == NULL && msg_size != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (sig_size != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(params->type) ||
+ out_size < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ret = create_digit_array_with_checksum(params, msg, msg_size,
+ sig + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_C_RANDOM_OFFSET,
+ tmp_digit_array);
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = hash_digit_array(params,
+ sig + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_SIGNATURE_OFFSET(params->type),
+ tmp_digit_array, NULL, (unsigned char *) y_hashed_digits);
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = public_key_from_hashed_digit_array(params,
+ (unsigned char *) y_hashed_digits,
+ out);
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (out_len != NULL) {
+ *out_len = MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->type);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_lmots_verify(const mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size)
+{
+ unsigned char Kc_public_key_candidate[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX];
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (msg == NULL && msg_size != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (!ctx->have_public_key) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->params.type != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (sig_size < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(sig, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET) != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key_candidate(&ctx->params,
+ msg, msg_size, sig, sig_size,
+ Kc_public_key_candidate,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type),
+ NULL);
+ if (ret) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(&Kc_public_key_candidate, ctx->public_key,
+ sizeof(ctx->public_key))) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE)
+
+void mbedtls_lmots_private_init(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+void mbedtls_lmots_private_free(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx,
+ sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+int mbedtls_lmots_generate_private_key(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx,
+ mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t type,
+ const unsigned char I_key_identifier[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN],
+ uint32_t q_leaf_identifier,
+ const unsigned char *seed,
+ size_t seed_size)
+{
+ psa_hash_operation_t op = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t output_hash_len;
+ unsigned int i_digit_idx;
+ unsigned char i_digit_idx_bytes[2];
+ unsigned char const_bytes[1] = { 0xFF };
+
+ if (ctx->have_private_key) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (type != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ctx->params.type = type;
+
+ memcpy(ctx->params.I_key_identifier,
+ I_key_identifier,
+ sizeof(ctx->params.I_key_identifier));
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(q_leaf_identifier, ctx->params.q_leaf_identifier, 0);
+
+ for (i_digit_idx = 0;
+ i_digit_idx < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(ctx->params.type);
+ i_digit_idx++) {
+ status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op,
+ ctx->params.I_key_identifier,
+ sizeof(ctx->params.I_key_identifier));
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op,
+ ctx->params.q_leaf_identifier,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(i_digit_idx, i_digit_idx_bytes, 0);
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, i_digit_idx_bytes, I_DIGIT_IDX_LEN);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, const_bytes, sizeof(const_bytes));
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, seed, seed_size);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_finish(&op,
+ ctx->private_key[i_digit_idx],
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type),
+ &output_hash_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ psa_hash_abort(&op);
+ }
+
+ ctx->have_private_key = 1;
+
+exit:
+ psa_hash_abort(&op);
+
+ return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_lmots_private_t *priv_ctx)
+{
+ unsigned char y_hashed_digits[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX][MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX];
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ /* Check that a private key is loaded */
+ if (!priv_ctx->have_private_key) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ret = hash_digit_array(&priv_ctx->params,
+ (unsigned char *) priv_ctx->private_key, NULL,
+ NULL, (unsigned char *) y_hashed_digits);
+ if (ret) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = public_key_from_hashed_digit_array(&priv_ctx->params,
+ (unsigned char *) y_hashed_digits,
+ ctx->public_key);
+ if (ret) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&ctx->params, &priv_ctx->params,
+ sizeof(ctx->params));
+
+ ctx->have_public_key = 1;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(y_hashed_digits, sizeof(y_hashed_digits));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_lmots_sign(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len)
+{
+ unsigned char tmp_digit_array[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX];
+ /* Create a temporary buffer to prepare the signature in. This allows us to
+ * finish creating a signature (ensuring the process doesn't fail), and then
+ * erase the private key **before** writing any data into the sig parameter
+ * buffer. If data were directly written into the sig buffer, it might leak
+ * a partial signature on failure, which effectively compromises the private
+ * key.
+ */
+ unsigned char tmp_sig[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT_MAX][MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX];
+ unsigned char tmp_c_random[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX];
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (msg == NULL && msg_size != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (sig_size < MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that a private key is loaded */
+ if (!ctx->have_private_key) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ret = f_rng(p_rng, tmp_c_random,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type));
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = create_digit_array_with_checksum(&ctx->params,
+ msg, msg_size,
+ tmp_c_random,
+ tmp_digit_array);
+ if (ret) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = hash_digit_array(&ctx->params, (unsigned char *) ctx->private_key,
+ NULL, tmp_digit_array, (unsigned char *) tmp_sig);
+ if (ret) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.type, sig, MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET);
+
+ /* Test hook to check if sig is being written to before we invalidate the
+ * private key.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+ if (mbedtls_lmots_sign_private_key_invalidated_hook != NULL) {
+ ret = (*mbedtls_lmots_sign_private_key_invalidated_hook)(sig);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) */
+
+ /* We've got a valid signature now, so it's time to make sure the private
+ * key can't be reused.
+ */
+ ctx->have_private_key = 0;
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx->private_key,
+ sizeof(ctx->private_key));
+
+ memcpy(sig + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_C_RANDOM_OFFSET, tmp_c_random,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(ctx->params.type));
+
+ memcpy(sig + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_SIGNATURE_OFFSET(ctx->params.type), tmp_sig,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_P_SIG_DIGIT_COUNT(ctx->params.type)
+ * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(ctx->params.type));
+
+ if (sig_len != NULL) {
+ *sig_len = MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type);
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_digit_array, sizeof(tmp_digit_array));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp_sig, sizeof(tmp_sig));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/lmots.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/lmots.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf92d32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/lmots.h
@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+/**
+ * \file lmots.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file provides an API for the LM-OTS post-quantum-safe one-time
+ * public-key signature scheme as defined in RFC8554 and NIST.SP.200-208.
+ * This implementation currently only supports a single parameter set
+ * MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8 in order to reduce complexity.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_LMOTS_H
+#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/lms.h"
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+
+#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(type) (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(type))
+
+#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET (0)
+#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_C_RANDOM_OFFSET (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN)
+#define MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_SIGNATURE_OFFSET(type) (MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_C_RANDOM_OFFSET + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_C_RANDOM_VALUE_LEN(type))
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+extern int (*mbedtls_lmots_sign_private_key_invalidated_hook)(unsigned char *);
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+/**
+ * \brief This function converts a \ref psa_status_t to a
+ * low-level LMS error code.
+ *
+ * \param status The psa_status_t to convert
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding LMS error code.
+ */
+int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_lms_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes a public LMOTS context
+ *
+ * \param ctx The uninitialized LMOTS context that will then be
+ * initialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_lmots_public_init(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function uninitializes a public LMOTS context
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context that will then be
+ * uninitialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_lmots_public_free(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function imports an LMOTS public key into a
+ * LMOTS context.
+ *
+ * \note Before this function is called, the context must
+ * have been initialized.
+ *
+ * \note See IETF RFC8554 for details of the encoding of
+ * this public key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context store the key in.
+ * \param key The buffer from which the key will be read.
+ * #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN bytes will be read
+ * from this.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A non-zero error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_lmots_import_public_key(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t key_size);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function exports an LMOTS public key from a
+ * LMOTS context that already contains a public key.
+ *
+ * \note Before this function is called, the context must
+ * have been initialized and the context must contain
+ * a public key.
+ *
+ * \note See IETF RFC8554 for details of the encoding of
+ * this public key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context that contains the
+ * public key.
+ * \param key The buffer into which the key will be output. Must
+ * be at least #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN in size.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A non-zero error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_lmots_export_public_key(const mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t key_size,
+ size_t *key_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function creates a candidate public key from
+ * an LMOTS signature. This can then be compared to
+ * the real public key to determine the validity of
+ * the signature.
+ *
+ * \note This function is exposed publicly to be used in LMS
+ * signature verification, it is expected that
+ * mbedtls_lmots_verify will be used for LMOTS
+ * signature verification.
+ *
+ * \param params The LMOTS parameter set, q and I values as an
+ * mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t struct.
+ * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read.
+ * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read.
+ * \param sig The buffer from which the signature will be read.
+ * #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN bytes will be read from
+ * this.
+ * \param out The buffer where the candidate public key will be
+ * stored. Must be at least #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN
+ * bytes in size.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A non-zero error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key_candidate(const mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t *params,
+ const unsigned char *msg,
+ size_t msg_size,
+ const unsigned char *sig,
+ size_t sig_size,
+ unsigned char *out,
+ size_t out_size,
+ size_t *out_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function verifies a LMOTS signature, using a
+ * LMOTS context that contains a public key.
+ *
+ * \warning This function is **not intended for use in
+ * production**, due to as-yet unsolved problems with
+ * handling stateful keys. The API for this function
+ * may change considerably in future versions.
+ *
+ * \note Before this function is called, the context must
+ * have been initialized and must contain a public key
+ * (either by import or calculation from a private
+ * key).
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context from which the public
+ * key will be read.
+ * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read.
+ * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read.
+ * \param sig The buf from which the signature will be read.
+ * #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN bytes will be read from
+ * this.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on successful verification.
+ * \return A non-zero error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_lmots_verify(const mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *msg,
+ size_t msg_size, const unsigned char *sig,
+ size_t sig_size);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE)
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function initializes a private LMOTS context
+ *
+ * \param ctx The uninitialized LMOTS context that will then be
+ * initialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_lmots_private_init(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function uninitializes a private LMOTS context
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context that will then be
+ * uninitialized.
+ */
+void mbedtls_lmots_private_free(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function calculates an LMOTS private key, and
+ * stores in into an LMOTS context.
+ *
+ * \warning This function is **not intended for use in
+ * production**, due to as-yet unsolved problems with
+ * handling stateful keys. The API for this function
+ * may change considerably in future versions.
+ *
+ * \note The seed must have at least 256 bits of entropy.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context to generate the key
+ * into.
+ * \param I_key_identifier The key identifier of the key, as a 16-byte string.
+ * \param q_leaf_identifier The leaf identifier of key. If this LMOTS key is
+ * not being used as part of an LMS key, this should
+ * be set to 0.
+ * \param seed The seed used to deterministically generate the
+ * key.
+ * \param seed_size The length of the seed.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A non-zero error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_lmots_generate_private_key(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx,
+ mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t type,
+ const unsigned char I_key_identifier[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN],
+ uint32_t q_leaf_identifier,
+ const unsigned char *seed,
+ size_t seed_size);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function generates an LMOTS public key from a
+ * LMOTS context that already contains a private key.
+ *
+ * \note Before this function is called, the context must
+ * have been initialized and the context must contain
+ * a private key.
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context to generate the key
+ * from and store it into.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A non-zero error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key(mbedtls_lmots_public_t *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_lmots_private_t *priv_ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief This function creates a LMOTS signature, using a
+ * LMOTS context that contains a private key.
+ *
+ * \note Before this function is called, the context must
+ * have been initialized and must contain a private
+ * key.
+ *
+ * \note LMOTS private keys can only be used once, otherwise
+ * attackers may be able to create forged signatures.
+ * If the signing operation is successful, the private
+ * key in the context will be erased, and no further
+ * signing will be possible until another private key
+ * is loaded
+ *
+ * \param ctx The initialized LMOTS context from which the
+ * private key will be read.
+ * \param f_rng The RNG function to be used for signature
+ * generation.
+ * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to f_rng
+ * \param msg The buffer from which the message will be read.
+ * \param msg_size The size of the message that will be read.
+ * \param sig The buf into which the signature will be stored.
+ * Must be at least #MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN in size.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A non-zero error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_lmots_sign(mbedtls_lmots_private_t *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng, const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len);
+
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_LMOTS_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/lms.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/lms.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..41d34bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/lms.c
@@ -0,0 +1,778 @@
+/*
+ * The LMS stateful-hash public-key signature scheme
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation
+ * of the LMS algorithm:
+ *
+ * [1] IETF RFC8554
+ * D. McGrew, M. Curcio, S.Fluhrer
+ * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8554
+ *
+ * [2] NIST Special Publication 800-208
+ * David A. Cooper et. al.
+ * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-208.pdf
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C)
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "lmots.h"
+
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#include "psa_util_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/lms.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+/* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many
+ * arguments in each translating place. */
+static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status)
+{
+ return psa_status_to_mbedtls(status, psa_to_lms_errors,
+ ARRAY_LENGTH(psa_to_lms_errors),
+ psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls);
+}
+#define PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) local_err_translation(status)
+
+#define SIG_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET (0)
+#define SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET (SIG_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_Q_LEAF_ID_LEN)
+#define SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(otstype) (SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(otstype))
+#define SIG_PATH_OFFSET(otstype) (SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(otstype) + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN)
+
+#define PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET (0)
+#define PUBLIC_KEY_OTSTYPE_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN)
+#define PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_OTSTYPE_OFFSET + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN)
+#define PUBLIC_KEY_ROOT_NODE_OFFSET (PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET + \
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN)
+
+
+/* Currently only support H=10 */
+#define H_TREE_HEIGHT_MAX 10
+#define MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(type) ((size_t) 1 << (MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type) + 1u))
+#define MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(type) ((size_t) 1 << MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type))
+#define MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(type) ((unsigned int) \
+ (1u << MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type)))
+
+#define D_CONST_LEN (2)
+static const unsigned char D_LEAF_CONSTANT_BYTES[D_CONST_LEN] = { 0x82, 0x82 };
+static const unsigned char D_INTR_CONSTANT_BYTES[D_CONST_LEN] = { 0x83, 0x83 };
+
+
+/* Calculate the value of a leaf node of the Merkle tree (which is a hash of a
+ * public key and some other parameters like the leaf index). This function
+ * implements RFC8554 section 5.3, in the case where r >= 2^h.
+ *
+ * params The LMS parameter set, the underlying LMOTS
+ * parameter set, and I value which describe the key
+ * being used.
+ *
+ * pub_key The public key of the private whose index
+ * corresponds to the index of this leaf node. This
+ * is a hash output.
+ *
+ * r_node_idx The index of this node in the Merkle tree. Note
+ * that the root node of the Merkle tree is
+ * 1-indexed.
+ *
+ * out The output node value, which is a hash output.
+ */
+static int create_merkle_leaf_value(const mbedtls_lms_parameters_t *params,
+ unsigned char *pub_key,
+ unsigned int r_node_idx,
+ unsigned char *out)
+{
+ psa_hash_operation_t op;
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t output_hash_len;
+ unsigned char r_node_idx_bytes[4];
+
+ /* Always zeroize the output buffer because it may contain data from the previous invocation */
+ memset(out, 0, MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(params->type));
+
+ op = psa_hash_operation_init();
+ status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->I_key_identifier,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(r_node_idx, r_node_idx_bytes, 0);
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, r_node_idx_bytes, 4);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, D_LEAF_CONSTANT_BYTES, D_CONST_LEN);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, pub_key,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN(params->otstype));
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_finish(&op, out, MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(params->type),
+ &output_hash_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ psa_hash_abort(&op);
+
+ return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+}
+
+/* Calculate the value of an internal node of the Merkle tree (which is a hash
+ * of a public key and some other parameters like the node index). This function
+ * implements RFC8554 section 5.3, in the case where r < 2^h.
+ *
+ * params The LMS parameter set, the underlying LMOTS
+ * parameter set, and I value which describe the key
+ * being used.
+ *
+ * left_node The value of the child of this node which is on
+ * the left-hand side. As with all nodes on the
+ * Merkle tree, this is a hash output.
+ *
+ * right_node The value of the child of this node which is on
+ * the right-hand side. As with all nodes on the
+ * Merkle tree, this is a hash output.
+ *
+ * r_node_idx The index of this node in the Merkle tree. Note
+ * that the root node of the Merkle tree is
+ * 1-indexed.
+ *
+ * out The output node value, which is a hash output.
+ */
+static int create_merkle_internal_value(const mbedtls_lms_parameters_t *params,
+ const unsigned char *left_node,
+ const unsigned char *right_node,
+ unsigned int r_node_idx,
+ unsigned char *out)
+{
+ psa_hash_operation_t op;
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t output_hash_len;
+ unsigned char r_node_idx_bytes[4];
+
+ op = psa_hash_operation_init();
+ status = psa_hash_setup(&op, PSA_ALG_SHA_256);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, params->I_key_identifier,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(r_node_idx, r_node_idx_bytes, 0);
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, r_node_idx_bytes, 4);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, D_INTR_CONSTANT_BYTES, D_CONST_LEN);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, left_node,
+ MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(params->type));
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_update(&op, right_node,
+ MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(params->type));
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_hash_finish(&op, out, MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(params->type),
+ &output_hash_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ psa_hash_abort(&op);
+
+ return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+}
+
+void mbedtls_lms_public_init(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+void mbedtls_lms_public_free(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+int mbedtls_lms_import_public_key(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t key_size)
+{
+ if (key_size < 4) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ uint32_t type = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET);
+ if (type != (uint32_t) MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ ctx->params.type = (mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t) type;
+
+ if (key_size != MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ uint32_t otstype = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(key, PUBLIC_KEY_OTSTYPE_OFFSET);
+ if (otstype != (uint32_t) MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ ctx->params.otstype = (mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t) otstype;
+
+ memcpy(ctx->params.I_key_identifier,
+ key + PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN);
+ memcpy(ctx->T_1_pub_key, key + PUBLIC_KEY_ROOT_NODE_OFFSET,
+ MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type));
+
+ ctx->have_public_key = 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_lms_export_public_key(const mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx,
+ unsigned char *key,
+ size_t key_size, size_t *key_len)
+{
+ if (key_size < MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ctx->have_public_key) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.type, key, PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE_OFFSET);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.otstype, key, PUBLIC_KEY_OTSTYPE_OFFSET);
+ memcpy(key + PUBLIC_KEY_I_KEY_ID_OFFSET,
+ ctx->params.I_key_identifier,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN);
+ memcpy(key +PUBLIC_KEY_ROOT_NODE_OFFSET,
+ ctx->T_1_pub_key,
+ MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type));
+
+ if (key_len != NULL) {
+ *key_len = MBEDTLS_LMS_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN(ctx->params.type);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_lms_verify(const mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *msg, size_t msg_size,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size)
+{
+ unsigned int q_leaf_identifier;
+ unsigned char Kc_candidate_ots_pub_key[MBEDTLS_LMOTS_N_HASH_LEN_MAX];
+ unsigned char Tc_candidate_root_node[MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES_MAX];
+ unsigned int height;
+ unsigned int curr_node_id;
+ unsigned int parent_node_id;
+ const unsigned char *left_node;
+ const unsigned char *right_node;
+ mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t ots_params;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (!ctx->have_public_key) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->params.type
+ != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->params.otstype
+ != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (sig_size != MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, ctx->params.otstype)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (sig_size < SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_TYPE_LEN) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(sig, SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET + MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_TYPE_OFFSET)
+ != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (sig_size < SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype) + MBEDTLS_LMS_TYPE_LEN) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(sig, SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype))
+ != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
+
+
+ q_leaf_identifier = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(sig, SIG_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET);
+
+ if (q_leaf_identifier >= MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(ots_params.I_key_identifier,
+ ctx->params.I_key_identifier,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(q_leaf_identifier, ots_params.q_leaf_identifier, 0);
+ ots_params.type = ctx->params.otstype;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key_candidate(&ots_params,
+ msg,
+ msg_size,
+ sig + SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.otstype),
+ Kc_candidate_ots_pub_key,
+ sizeof(Kc_candidate_ots_pub_key),
+ NULL);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ ret = create_merkle_leaf_value(
+ &ctx->params,
+ Kc_candidate_ots_pub_key,
+ MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) + q_leaf_identifier,
+ Tc_candidate_root_node);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ curr_node_id = MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) +
+ q_leaf_identifier;
+
+ for (height = 0; height < MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(ctx->params.type);
+ height++) {
+ parent_node_id = curr_node_id / 2;
+
+ /* Left/right node ordering matters for the hash */
+ if (curr_node_id & 1) {
+ left_node = sig + SIG_PATH_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype) +
+ height * MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type);
+ right_node = Tc_candidate_root_node;
+ } else {
+ left_node = Tc_candidate_root_node;
+ right_node = sig + SIG_PATH_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype) +
+ height * MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type);
+ }
+
+ ret = create_merkle_internal_value(&ctx->params, left_node, right_node,
+ parent_node_id, Tc_candidate_root_node);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
+ curr_node_id /= 2;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(Tc_candidate_root_node, ctx->T_1_pub_key,
+ MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type))) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE)
+
+/* Calculate a full Merkle tree based on a private key. This function
+ * implements RFC8554 section 5.3, and is used to generate a public key (as the
+ * public key is the root node of the Merkle tree).
+ *
+ * ctx The LMS private context, containing a parameter
+ * set and private key material consisting of both
+ * public and private OTS.
+ *
+ * tree The output tree, which is 2^(H + 1) hash outputs.
+ * In the case of H=10 we have 2048 tree nodes (of
+ * which 1024 of them are leaf nodes). Note that
+ * because the Merkle tree root is 1-indexed, the 0
+ * index tree node is never used.
+ */
+static int calculate_merkle_tree(const mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx,
+ unsigned char *tree)
+{
+ unsigned int priv_key_idx;
+ unsigned int r_node_idx;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ /* First create the leaf nodes, in ascending order */
+ for (priv_key_idx = 0;
+ priv_key_idx < MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type);
+ priv_key_idx++) {
+ r_node_idx = MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) + priv_key_idx;
+
+ ret = create_merkle_leaf_value(&ctx->params,
+ ctx->ots_public_keys[priv_key_idx].public_key,
+ r_node_idx,
+ &tree[r_node_idx * MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(
+ ctx->params.type)]);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Then the internal nodes, in reverse order so that we can guarantee the
+ * parent has been created */
+ for (r_node_idx = MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) - 1;
+ r_node_idx > 0;
+ r_node_idx--) {
+ ret = create_merkle_internal_value(&ctx->params,
+ &tree[(r_node_idx * 2) *
+ MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)],
+ &tree[(r_node_idx * 2 + 1) *
+ MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)],
+ r_node_idx,
+ &tree[r_node_idx *
+ MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type)]);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Calculate a path from a leaf node of the Merkle tree to the root of the tree,
+ * and return the full path. This function implements RFC8554 section 5.4.1, as
+ * the Merkle path is the main component of an LMS signature.
+ *
+ * ctx The LMS private context, containing a parameter
+ * set and private key material consisting of both
+ * public and private OTS.
+ *
+ * leaf_node_id Which leaf node to calculate the path from.
+ *
+ * path The output path, which is H hash outputs.
+ */
+static int get_merkle_path(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx,
+ unsigned int leaf_node_id,
+ unsigned char *path)
+{
+ const size_t node_bytes = MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(ctx->params.type);
+ unsigned int curr_node_id = leaf_node_id;
+ unsigned int adjacent_node_id;
+ unsigned char *tree = NULL;
+ unsigned int height;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ tree = mbedtls_calloc((size_t) MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type),
+ node_bytes);
+ if (tree == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ ret = calculate_merkle_tree(ctx, tree);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ for (height = 0; height < MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(ctx->params.type);
+ height++) {
+ adjacent_node_id = curr_node_id ^ 1;
+
+ memcpy(&path[height * node_bytes],
+ &tree[adjacent_node_id * node_bytes], node_bytes);
+
+ curr_node_id >>= 1;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(tree, node_bytes *
+ (size_t) MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_lms_private_init(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+void mbedtls_lms_private_free(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ unsigned int idx;
+
+ if (ctx->have_private_key) {
+ if (ctx->ots_private_keys != NULL) {
+ for (idx = 0; idx < MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); idx++) {
+ mbedtls_lmots_private_free(&ctx->ots_private_keys[idx]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->ots_public_keys != NULL) {
+ for (idx = 0; idx < MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); idx++) {
+ mbedtls_lmots_public_free(&ctx->ots_public_keys[idx]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_free(ctx->ots_private_keys);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx->ots_public_keys);
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+
+int mbedtls_lms_generate_private_key(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx,
+ mbedtls_lms_algorithm_type_t type,
+ mbedtls_lmots_algorithm_type_t otstype,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng, const unsigned char *seed,
+ size_t seed_size)
+{
+ unsigned int idx = 0;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (type != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (otstype != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->have_private_key) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ctx->params.type = type;
+ ctx->params.otstype = otstype;
+ ctx->have_private_key = 1;
+
+ ret = f_rng(p_rng,
+ ctx->params.I_key_identifier,
+ MBEDTLS_LMOTS_I_KEY_ID_LEN);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Requires a cast to size_t to avoid an implicit cast warning on certain
+ * platforms (particularly Windows) */
+ ctx->ots_private_keys = mbedtls_calloc((size_t) MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type),
+ sizeof(*ctx->ots_private_keys));
+ if (ctx->ots_private_keys == NULL) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Requires a cast to size_t to avoid an implicit cast warning on certain
+ * platforms (particularly Windows) */
+ ctx->ots_public_keys = mbedtls_calloc((size_t) MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type),
+ sizeof(*ctx->ots_public_keys));
+ if (ctx->ots_public_keys == NULL) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); idx++) {
+ mbedtls_lmots_private_init(&ctx->ots_private_keys[idx]);
+ mbedtls_lmots_public_init(&ctx->ots_public_keys[idx]);
+ }
+
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type); idx++) {
+ ret = mbedtls_lmots_generate_private_key(&ctx->ots_private_keys[idx],
+ otstype,
+ ctx->params.I_key_identifier,
+ idx, seed, seed_size);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_lmots_calculate_public_key(&ctx->ots_public_keys[idx],
+ &ctx->ots_private_keys[idx]);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ctx->q_next_usable_key = 0;
+
+exit:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_lms_private_free(ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_lms_calculate_public_key(mbedtls_lms_public_t *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_lms_private_t *priv_ctx)
+{
+ const size_t node_bytes = MBEDTLS_LMS_M_NODE_BYTES(priv_ctx->params.type);
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char *tree = NULL;
+
+ if (!priv_ctx->have_private_key) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (priv_ctx->params.type
+ != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (priv_ctx->params.otstype
+ != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ tree = mbedtls_calloc((size_t) MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(priv_ctx->params.type),
+ node_bytes);
+ if (tree == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&ctx->params, &priv_ctx->params,
+ sizeof(mbedtls_lmots_parameters_t));
+
+ ret = calculate_merkle_tree(priv_ctx, tree);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* Root node is always at position 1, due to 1-based indexing */
+ memcpy(ctx->T_1_pub_key, &tree[node_bytes], node_bytes);
+
+ ctx->have_public_key = 1;
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(tree, node_bytes *
+ (size_t) MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(priv_ctx->params.type));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+int mbedtls_lms_sign(mbedtls_lms_private_t *ctx,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng, const unsigned char *msg,
+ unsigned int msg_size, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size,
+ size_t *sig_len)
+{
+ uint32_t q_leaf_identifier;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (!ctx->have_private_key) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (sig_size < MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, ctx->params.otstype)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->params.type != MBEDTLS_LMS_SHA256_M32_H10) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->params.otstype
+ != MBEDTLS_LMOTS_SHA256_N32_W8) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->q_next_usable_key >= MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_OUT_OF_PRIVATE_KEYS;
+ }
+
+
+ q_leaf_identifier = ctx->q_next_usable_key;
+ /* This new value must _always_ be written back to the disk before the
+ * signature is returned.
+ */
+ ctx->q_next_usable_key += 1;
+
+ if (MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, ctx->params.otstype)
+ < SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_LMS_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_lmots_sign(&ctx->ots_private_keys[q_leaf_identifier],
+ f_rng,
+ p_rng,
+ msg,
+ msg_size,
+ sig + SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET,
+ MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type,
+ ctx->params.otstype) - SIG_OTS_SIG_OFFSET,
+ NULL);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(ctx->params.type, sig, SIG_TYPE_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype));
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(q_leaf_identifier, sig, SIG_Q_LEAF_ID_OFFSET);
+
+ ret = get_merkle_path(ctx,
+ MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(ctx->params.type) + q_leaf_identifier,
+ sig + SIG_PATH_OFFSET(ctx->params.otstype));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (sig_len != NULL) {
+ *sig_len = MBEDTLS_LMS_SIG_LEN(ctx->params.type, ctx->params.otstype);
+ }
+
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_PRIVATE) */
+#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/md.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/md.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c95846a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/md.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1108 @@
+/**
+ * \file md.c
+ *
+ * \brief Generic message digest wrapper for Mbed TLS
+ *
+ * \author Adriaan de Jong <dejong@fox-it.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+/*
+ * Availability of functions in this module is controlled by two
+ * feature macros:
+ * - MBEDTLS_MD_C enables the whole module;
+ * - MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT enables only functions for hashing and accessing
+ * most hash metadata (everything except string names); is it
+ * automatically set whenever MBEDTLS_MD_C is defined.
+ *
+ * In this file, functions from MD_LIGHT are at the top, MD_C at the end.
+ *
+ * In the future we may want to change the contract of some functions
+ * (behaviour with NULL arguments) depending on whether MD_C is defined or
+ * only MD_LIGHT. Also, the exact scope of MD_LIGHT might vary.
+ *
+ * For these reasons, we're keeping MD_LIGHT internal for now.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT)
+
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+#include "md_wrap.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/md5.h"
+#include "mbedtls/ripemd160.h"
+#include "mbedtls/sha1.h"
+#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
+#include "mbedtls/sha512.h"
+#include "mbedtls/sha3.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
+#include <psa/crypto.h>
+#include "md_psa.h"
+#include "psa_util_internal.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA)
+#include "psa_crypto_core.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+#include <stdio.h>
+#endif
+
+/* See comment above MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE in md.h */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE < PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE
+#error "Internal error: MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE < PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+#define MD_INFO(type, out_size, block_size) type, out_size, block_size,
+#else
+#define MD_INFO(type, out_size, block_size) type, out_size,
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5)
+static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_md5_info = {
+ MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, 16, 64)
+};
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160)
+static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_ripemd160_info = {
+ MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, 20, 64)
+};
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
+static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha1_info = {
+ MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 20, 64)
+};
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224)
+static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha224_info = {
+ MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, 28, 64)
+};
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)
+static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha256_info = {
+ MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, 32, 64)
+};
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
+static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha384_info = {
+ MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, 48, 128)
+};
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512)
+static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha512_info = {
+ MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, 64, 128)
+};
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224)
+static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha3_224_info = {
+ MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224, 28, 144)
+};
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256)
+static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha3_256_info = {
+ MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256, 32, 136)
+};
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384)
+static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha3_384_info = {
+ MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384, 48, 104)
+};
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512)
+static const mbedtls_md_info_t mbedtls_sha3_512_info = {
+ MD_INFO(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512, 64, 72)
+};
+#endif
+
+const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type)
+{
+ switch (md_type) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
+ return &mbedtls_md5_info;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:
+ return &mbedtls_ripemd160_info;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
+ return &mbedtls_sha1_info;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
+ return &mbedtls_sha224_info;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
+ return &mbedtls_sha256_info;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
+ return &mbedtls_sha384_info;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
+ return &mbedtls_sha512_info;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224:
+ return &mbedtls_sha3_224_info;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256:
+ return &mbedtls_sha3_256_info;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384:
+ return &mbedtls_sha3_384_info;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512:
+ return &mbedtls_sha3_512_info;
+#endif
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA)
+static psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_of_md(const mbedtls_md_info_t *info)
+{
+ switch (info->type) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5_VIA_PSA)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
+ return PSA_ALG_MD5;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160_VIA_PSA)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:
+ return PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1_VIA_PSA)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
+ return PSA_ALG_SHA_1;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224_VIA_PSA)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
+ return PSA_ALG_SHA_224;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256_VIA_PSA)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
+ return PSA_ALG_SHA_256;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384_VIA_PSA)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
+ return PSA_ALG_SHA_384;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512_VIA_PSA)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
+ return PSA_ALG_SHA_512;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224_VIA_PSA)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224:
+ return PSA_ALG_SHA3_224;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256_VIA_PSA)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256:
+ return PSA_ALG_SHA3_256;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384_VIA_PSA)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384:
+ return PSA_ALG_SHA3_384;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512_VIA_PSA)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512:
+ return PSA_ALG_SHA3_512;
+#endif
+ default:
+ return PSA_ALG_NONE;
+ }
+}
+
+static int md_can_use_psa(const mbedtls_md_info_t *info)
+{
+ psa_algorithm_t alg = psa_alg_of_md(info);
+ if (alg == PSA_ALG_NONE) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return psa_can_do_hash(alg);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA */
+
+void mbedtls_md_init(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ /* Note: this sets engine (if present) to MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_LEGACY */
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_md_context_t));
+}
+
+void mbedtls_md_free(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->md_ctx != NULL) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA)
+ if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) {
+ psa_hash_abort(ctx->md_ctx);
+ } else
+#endif
+ switch (ctx->md_info->type) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
+ mbedtls_md5_free(ctx->md_ctx);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:
+ mbedtls_ripemd160_free(ctx->md_ctx);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
+ mbedtls_sha1_free(ctx->md_ctx);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
+ mbedtls_sha256_free(ctx->md_ctx);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
+ mbedtls_sha256_free(ctx->md_ctx);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
+ mbedtls_sha512_free(ctx->md_ctx);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
+ mbedtls_sha512_free(ctx->md_ctx);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224:
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256:
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384:
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512:
+ mbedtls_sha3_free(ctx->md_ctx);
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ /* Shouldn't happen */
+ break;
+ }
+ mbedtls_free(ctx->md_ctx);
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+ if (ctx->hmac_ctx != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ctx->hmac_ctx,
+ 2 * ctx->md_info->block_size);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_md_context_t));
+}
+
+int mbedtls_md_clone(mbedtls_md_context_t *dst,
+ const mbedtls_md_context_t *src)
+{
+ if (dst == NULL || dst->md_info == NULL ||
+ src == NULL || src->md_info == NULL ||
+ dst->md_info != src->md_info) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA)
+ if (src->engine != dst->engine) {
+ /* This can happen with src set to legacy because PSA wasn't ready
+ * yet, and dst to PSA because it became ready in the meantime.
+ * We currently don't support that case (we'd need to re-allocate
+ * md_ctx to the size of the appropriate MD context). */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ if (src->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) {
+ psa_status_t status = psa_hash_clone(src->md_ctx, dst->md_ctx);
+ return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ switch (src->md_info->type) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
+ mbedtls_md5_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:
+ mbedtls_ripemd160_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
+ mbedtls_sha1_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
+ mbedtls_sha256_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
+ mbedtls_sha256_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
+ mbedtls_sha512_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
+ mbedtls_sha512_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224:
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256:
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384:
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512:
+ mbedtls_sha3_clone(dst->md_ctx, src->md_ctx);
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define ALLOC(type) \
+ do { \
+ ctx->md_ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_##type##_context)); \
+ if (ctx->md_ctx == NULL) \
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED; \
+ mbedtls_##type##_init(ctx->md_ctx); \
+ } \
+ while (0)
+
+int mbedtls_md_setup(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, int hmac)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (md_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ctx->md_info = md_info;
+ ctx->md_ctx = NULL;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+ ctx->hmac_ctx = NULL;
+#else
+ if (hmac != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA)
+ if (md_can_use_psa(ctx->md_info)) {
+ ctx->md_ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(psa_hash_operation_t));
+ if (ctx->md_ctx == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+ ctx->engine = MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA;
+ } else
+#endif
+ switch (md_info->type) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
+ ALLOC(md5);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:
+ ALLOC(ripemd160);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
+ ALLOC(sha1);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
+ ALLOC(sha256);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
+ ALLOC(sha256);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
+ ALLOC(sha512);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
+ ALLOC(sha512);
+ break;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224:
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256:
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384:
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512:
+ ALLOC(sha3);
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+ if (hmac != 0) {
+ ctx->hmac_ctx = mbedtls_calloc(2, md_info->block_size);
+ if (ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL) {
+ mbedtls_md_free(ctx);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#undef ALLOC
+
+int mbedtls_md_starts(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA)
+ if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) {
+ psa_algorithm_t alg = psa_alg_of_md(ctx->md_info);
+ psa_hash_abort(ctx->md_ctx);
+ psa_status_t status = psa_hash_setup(ctx->md_ctx, alg);
+ return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ switch (ctx->md_info->type) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
+ return mbedtls_md5_starts(ctx->md_ctx);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:
+ return mbedtls_ripemd160_starts(ctx->md_ctx);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
+ return mbedtls_sha1_starts(ctx->md_ctx);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
+ return mbedtls_sha256_starts(ctx->md_ctx, 1);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
+ return mbedtls_sha256_starts(ctx->md_ctx, 0);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
+ return mbedtls_sha512_starts(ctx->md_ctx, 1);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
+ return mbedtls_sha512_starts(ctx->md_ctx, 0);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224:
+ return mbedtls_sha3_starts(ctx->md_ctx, MBEDTLS_SHA3_224);
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256:
+ return mbedtls_sha3_starts(ctx->md_ctx, MBEDTLS_SHA3_256);
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384:
+ return mbedtls_sha3_starts(ctx->md_ctx, MBEDTLS_SHA3_384);
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512:
+ return mbedtls_sha3_starts(ctx->md_ctx, MBEDTLS_SHA3_512);
+#endif
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+}
+
+int mbedtls_md_update(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA)
+ if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) {
+ psa_status_t status = psa_hash_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen);
+ return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ switch (ctx->md_info->type) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
+ return mbedtls_md5_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:
+ return mbedtls_ripemd160_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
+ return mbedtls_sha1_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
+ return mbedtls_sha256_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
+ return mbedtls_sha256_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
+ return mbedtls_sha512_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
+ return mbedtls_sha512_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224:
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256:
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384:
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512:
+ return mbedtls_sha3_update(ctx->md_ctx, input, ilen);
+#endif
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+}
+
+int mbedtls_md_finish(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA)
+ if (ctx->engine == MBEDTLS_MD_ENGINE_PSA) {
+ size_t size = ctx->md_info->size;
+ psa_status_t status = psa_hash_finish(ctx->md_ctx,
+ output, size, &size);
+ return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ switch (ctx->md_info->type) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
+ return mbedtls_md5_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:
+ return mbedtls_ripemd160_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
+ return mbedtls_sha1_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
+ return mbedtls_sha256_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
+ return mbedtls_sha256_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
+ return mbedtls_sha512_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
+ return mbedtls_sha512_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224:
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256:
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384:
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512:
+ return mbedtls_sha3_finish(ctx->md_ctx, output, ctx->md_info->size);
+#endif
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+}
+
+int mbedtls_md(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ if (md_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_SOME_PSA)
+ if (md_can_use_psa(md_info)) {
+ size_t size = md_info->size;
+ psa_status_t status = psa_hash_compute(psa_alg_of_md(md_info),
+ input, ilen,
+ output, size, &size);
+ return mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(status);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ switch (md_info->type) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:
+ return mbedtls_md5(input, ilen, output);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:
+ return mbedtls_ripemd160(input, ilen, output);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:
+ return mbedtls_sha1(input, ilen, output);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:
+ return mbedtls_sha256(input, ilen, output, 1);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:
+ return mbedtls_sha256(input, ilen, output, 0);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:
+ return mbedtls_sha512(input, ilen, output, 1);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:
+ return mbedtls_sha512(input, ilen, output, 0);
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA3_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224:
+ return mbedtls_sha3(MBEDTLS_SHA3_224, input, ilen, output, md_info->size);
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256:
+ return mbedtls_sha3(MBEDTLS_SHA3_256, input, ilen, output, md_info->size);
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384:
+ return mbedtls_sha3(MBEDTLS_SHA3_384, input, ilen, output, md_info->size);
+ case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512:
+ return mbedtls_sha3(MBEDTLS_SHA3_512, input, ilen, output, md_info->size);
+#endif
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+}
+
+unsigned char mbedtls_md_get_size(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info)
+{
+ if (md_info == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return md_info->size;
+}
+
+mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_get_type(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info)
+{
+ if (md_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
+ }
+
+ return md_info->type;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
+int mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status)
+{
+ return PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, psa_to_md_errors,
+ psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */
+
+
+/************************************************************************
+ * Functions above this separator are part of MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT, *
+ * functions below are only available when MBEDTLS_MD_C is set. *
+ ************************************************************************/
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+
+/*
+ * Reminder: update profiles in x509_crt.c when adding a new hash!
+ */
+static const int supported_digests[] = {
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512)
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512,
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224)
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224,
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1,
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160)
+ MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160,
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5)
+ MBEDTLS_MD_MD5,
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224)
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224,
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256)
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256,
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384)
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384,
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512)
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512,
+#endif
+
+ MBEDTLS_MD_NONE
+};
+
+const int *mbedtls_md_list(void)
+{
+ return supported_digests;
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+ const char *md_name;
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_type;
+} md_name_entry;
+
+static const md_name_entry md_names[] = {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5)
+ { "MD5", MBEDTLS_MD_MD5 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160)
+ { "RIPEMD160", MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
+ { "SHA1", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 },
+ { "SHA", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 }, // compatibility fallback
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224)
+ { "SHA224", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)
+ { "SHA256", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
+ { "SHA384", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512)
+ { "SHA512", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224)
+ { "SHA3-224", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256)
+ { "SHA3-256", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384)
+ { "SHA3-384", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384 },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512)
+ { "SHA3-512", MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512 },
+#endif
+ { NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE },
+};
+
+const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_string(const char *md_name)
+{
+ if (NULL == md_name) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ const md_name_entry *entry = md_names;
+ while (entry->md_name != NULL &&
+ strcmp(entry->md_name, md_name) != 0) {
+ ++entry;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_md_info_from_type(entry->md_type);
+}
+
+const char *mbedtls_md_get_name(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info)
+{
+ if (md_info == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ const md_name_entry *entry = md_names;
+ while (entry->md_type != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE &&
+ entry->md_type != md_info->type) {
+ ++entry;
+ }
+
+ return entry->md_name;
+}
+
+const mbedtls_md_info_t *mbedtls_md_info_from_ctx(
+ const mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(md_info);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+int mbedtls_md_file(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info, const char *path, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ FILE *f;
+ size_t n;
+ mbedtls_md_context_t ctx;
+ unsigned char buf[1024];
+
+ if (md_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if ((f = fopen(path, "rb")) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure no stdio buffering of secrets, as such buffers cannot be wiped. */
+ mbedtls_setbuf(f, NULL);
+
+ mbedtls_md_init(&ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&ctx)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ while ((n = fread(buf, 1, sizeof(buf), f)) > 0) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&ctx, buf, n)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ferror(f) != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_FILE_IO_ERROR;
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&ctx, output);
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ fclose(f);
+ mbedtls_md_free(&ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_FS_IO */
+
+int mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char sum[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *ipad, *opad;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (keylen > (size_t) ctx->md_info->block_size) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(ctx)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(ctx, key, keylen)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, sum)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ keylen = ctx->md_info->size;
+ key = sum;
+ }
+
+ ipad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx;
+ opad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx + ctx->md_info->block_size;
+
+ memset(ipad, 0x36, ctx->md_info->block_size);
+ memset(opad, 0x5C, ctx->md_info->block_size);
+
+ mbedtls_xor(ipad, ipad, key, keylen);
+ mbedtls_xor(opad, opad, key, keylen);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(ctx)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(ctx, ipad,
+ ctx->md_info->block_size)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(sum, sizeof(sum));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_md_hmac_update(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_md_update(ctx, input, ilen);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *opad;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ opad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx + ctx->md_info->block_size;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, tmp)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(ctx)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(ctx, opad,
+ ctx->md_info->block_size)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(ctx, tmp,
+ ctx->md_info->size)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return mbedtls_md_finish(ctx, output);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char *ipad;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->md_info == NULL || ctx->hmac_ctx == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ipad = (unsigned char *) ctx->hmac_ctx;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(ctx)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return mbedtls_md_update(ctx, ipad, ctx->md_info->block_size);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_md_hmac(const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ mbedtls_md_context_t ctx;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (md_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_MD_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_md_init(&ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(&ctx, key, keylen)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_md_free(&ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/md5.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/md5.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e4a87a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/md5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,426 @@
+/*
+ * RFC 1321 compliant MD5 implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+/*
+ * The MD5 algorithm was designed by Ron Rivest in 1991.
+ *
+ * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/md5.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT)
+
+void mbedtls_md5_init(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_md5_context));
+}
+
+void mbedtls_md5_free(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_md5_context));
+}
+
+void mbedtls_md5_clone(mbedtls_md5_context *dst,
+ const mbedtls_md5_context *src)
+{
+ *dst = *src;
+}
+
+/*
+ * MD5 context setup
+ */
+int mbedtls_md5_starts(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->total[0] = 0;
+ ctx->total[1] = 0;
+
+ ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301;
+ ctx->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89;
+ ctx->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE;
+ ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT)
+int mbedtls_internal_md5_process(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char data[64])
+{
+ struct {
+ uint32_t X[16], A, B, C, D;
+ } local;
+
+ local.X[0] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 0);
+ local.X[1] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 4);
+ local.X[2] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 8);
+ local.X[3] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 12);
+ local.X[4] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 16);
+ local.X[5] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 20);
+ local.X[6] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 24);
+ local.X[7] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 28);
+ local.X[8] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 32);
+ local.X[9] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 36);
+ local.X[10] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 40);
+ local.X[11] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 44);
+ local.X[12] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 48);
+ local.X[13] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 52);
+ local.X[14] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 56);
+ local.X[15] = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(data, 60);
+
+#define S(x, n) \
+ (((x) << (n)) | (((x) & 0xFFFFFFFF) >> (32 - (n))))
+
+#define P(a, b, c, d, k, s, t) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ (a) += F((b), (c), (d)) + local.X[(k)] + (t); \
+ (a) = S((a), (s)) + (b); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ local.A = ctx->state[0];
+ local.B = ctx->state[1];
+ local.C = ctx->state[2];
+ local.D = ctx->state[3];
+
+#define F(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z))))
+
+ P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 0, 7, 0xD76AA478);
+ P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 1, 12, 0xE8C7B756);
+ P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 2, 17, 0x242070DB);
+ P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 3, 22, 0xC1BDCEEE);
+ P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 4, 7, 0xF57C0FAF);
+ P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 5, 12, 0x4787C62A);
+ P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 6, 17, 0xA8304613);
+ P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 7, 22, 0xFD469501);
+ P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 8, 7, 0x698098D8);
+ P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 9, 12, 0x8B44F7AF);
+ P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 10, 17, 0xFFFF5BB1);
+ P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 11, 22, 0x895CD7BE);
+ P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 12, 7, 0x6B901122);
+ P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 13, 12, 0xFD987193);
+ P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 14, 17, 0xA679438E);
+ P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 15, 22, 0x49B40821);
+
+#undef F
+
+#define F(x, y, z) ((y) ^ ((z) & ((x) ^ (y))))
+
+ P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 1, 5, 0xF61E2562);
+ P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 6, 9, 0xC040B340);
+ P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 11, 14, 0x265E5A51);
+ P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 0, 20, 0xE9B6C7AA);
+ P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 5, 0xD62F105D);
+ P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 10, 9, 0x02441453);
+ P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 15, 14, 0xD8A1E681);
+ P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 4, 20, 0xE7D3FBC8);
+ P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 5, 0x21E1CDE6);
+ P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 14, 9, 0xC33707D6);
+ P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 3, 14, 0xF4D50D87);
+ P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 8, 20, 0x455A14ED);
+ P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 13, 5, 0xA9E3E905);
+ P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 2, 9, 0xFCEFA3F8);
+ P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 7, 14, 0x676F02D9);
+ P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 12, 20, 0x8D2A4C8A);
+
+#undef F
+
+#define F(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
+
+ P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 5, 4, 0xFFFA3942);
+ P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 8, 11, 0x8771F681);
+ P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 11, 16, 0x6D9D6122);
+ P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 14, 23, 0xFDE5380C);
+ P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 1, 4, 0xA4BEEA44);
+ P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 4, 11, 0x4BDECFA9);
+ P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 7, 16, 0xF6BB4B60);
+ P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 10, 23, 0xBEBFBC70);
+ P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 13, 4, 0x289B7EC6);
+ P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 0, 11, 0xEAA127FA);
+ P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 3, 16, 0xD4EF3085);
+ P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 6, 23, 0x04881D05);
+ P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 9, 4, 0xD9D4D039);
+ P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 12, 11, 0xE6DB99E5);
+ P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 15, 16, 0x1FA27CF8);
+ P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 2, 23, 0xC4AC5665);
+
+#undef F
+
+#define F(x, y, z) ((y) ^ ((x) | ~(z)))
+
+ P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 0, 6, 0xF4292244);
+ P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 7, 10, 0x432AFF97);
+ P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 14, 15, 0xAB9423A7);
+ P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 5, 21, 0xFC93A039);
+ P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 12, 6, 0x655B59C3);
+ P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 3, 10, 0x8F0CCC92);
+ P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 10, 15, 0xFFEFF47D);
+ P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 1, 21, 0x85845DD1);
+ P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 8, 6, 0x6FA87E4F);
+ P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 15, 10, 0xFE2CE6E0);
+ P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 6, 15, 0xA3014314);
+ P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 13, 21, 0x4E0811A1);
+ P(local.A, local.B, local.C, local.D, 4, 6, 0xF7537E82);
+ P(local.D, local.A, local.B, local.C, 11, 10, 0xBD3AF235);
+ P(local.C, local.D, local.A, local.B, 2, 15, 0x2AD7D2BB);
+ P(local.B, local.C, local.D, local.A, 9, 21, 0xEB86D391);
+
+#undef F
+
+ ctx->state[0] += local.A;
+ ctx->state[1] += local.B;
+ ctx->state[2] += local.C;
+ ctx->state[3] += local.D;
+
+ /* Zeroise variables to clear sensitive data from memory. */
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&local, sizeof(local));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD5_PROCESS_ALT */
+
+/*
+ * MD5 process buffer
+ */
+int mbedtls_md5_update(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t fill;
+ uint32_t left;
+
+ if (ilen == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ left = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F;
+ fill = 64 - left;
+
+ ctx->total[0] += (uint32_t) ilen;
+ ctx->total[0] &= 0xFFFFFFFF;
+
+ if (ctx->total[0] < (uint32_t) ilen) {
+ ctx->total[1]++;
+ }
+
+ if (left && ilen >= fill) {
+ memcpy((void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, fill);
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ input += fill;
+ ilen -= fill;
+ left = 0;
+ }
+
+ while (ilen >= 64) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process(ctx, input)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ input += 64;
+ ilen -= 64;
+ }
+
+ if (ilen > 0) {
+ memcpy((void *) (ctx->buffer + left), input, ilen);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * MD5 final digest
+ */
+int mbedtls_md5_finish(mbedtls_md5_context *ctx,
+ unsigned char output[16])
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ uint32_t used;
+ uint32_t high, low;
+
+ /*
+ * Add padding: 0x80 then 0x00 until 8 bytes remain for the length
+ */
+ used = ctx->total[0] & 0x3F;
+
+ ctx->buffer[used++] = 0x80;
+
+ if (used <= 56) {
+ /* Enough room for padding + length in current block */
+ memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 56 - used);
+ } else {
+ /* We'll need an extra block */
+ memset(ctx->buffer + used, 0, 64 - used);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ memset(ctx->buffer, 0, 56);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Add message length
+ */
+ high = (ctx->total[0] >> 29)
+ | (ctx->total[1] << 3);
+ low = (ctx->total[0] << 3);
+
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(low, ctx->buffer, 56);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(high, ctx->buffer, 60);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_internal_md5_process(ctx, ctx->buffer)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Output final state
+ */
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[0], output, 0);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[1], output, 4);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[2], output, 8);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_LE(ctx->state[3], output, 12);
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_md5_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_MD5_ALT */
+
+/*
+ * output = MD5( input buffer )
+ */
+int mbedtls_md5(const unsigned char *input,
+ size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char output[16])
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_md5_context ctx;
+
+ mbedtls_md5_init(&ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_starts(&ctx)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_update(&ctx, input, ilen)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md5_finish(&ctx, output)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_md5_free(&ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+/*
+ * RFC 1321 test vectors
+ */
+static const unsigned char md5_test_buf[7][81] =
+{
+ { "" },
+ { "a" },
+ { "abc" },
+ { "message digest" },
+ { "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" },
+ { "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" },
+ { "12345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890" }
+};
+
+static const size_t md5_test_buflen[7] =
+{
+ 0, 1, 3, 14, 26, 62, 80
+};
+
+static const unsigned char md5_test_sum[7][16] =
+{
+ { 0xD4, 0x1D, 0x8C, 0xD9, 0x8F, 0x00, 0xB2, 0x04,
+ 0xE9, 0x80, 0x09, 0x98, 0xEC, 0xF8, 0x42, 0x7E },
+ { 0x0C, 0xC1, 0x75, 0xB9, 0xC0, 0xF1, 0xB6, 0xA8,
+ 0x31, 0xC3, 0x99, 0xE2, 0x69, 0x77, 0x26, 0x61 },
+ { 0x90, 0x01, 0x50, 0x98, 0x3C, 0xD2, 0x4F, 0xB0,
+ 0xD6, 0x96, 0x3F, 0x7D, 0x28, 0xE1, 0x7F, 0x72 },
+ { 0xF9, 0x6B, 0x69, 0x7D, 0x7C, 0xB7, 0x93, 0x8D,
+ 0x52, 0x5A, 0x2F, 0x31, 0xAA, 0xF1, 0x61, 0xD0 },
+ { 0xC3, 0xFC, 0xD3, 0xD7, 0x61, 0x92, 0xE4, 0x00,
+ 0x7D, 0xFB, 0x49, 0x6C, 0xCA, 0x67, 0xE1, 0x3B },
+ { 0xD1, 0x74, 0xAB, 0x98, 0xD2, 0x77, 0xD9, 0xF5,
+ 0xA5, 0x61, 0x1C, 0x2C, 0x9F, 0x41, 0x9D, 0x9F },
+ { 0x57, 0xED, 0xF4, 0xA2, 0x2B, 0xE3, 0xC9, 0x55,
+ 0xAC, 0x49, 0xDA, 0x2E, 0x21, 0x07, 0xB6, 0x7A }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Checkup routine
+ */
+int mbedtls_md5_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ int i, ret = 0;
+ unsigned char md5sum[16];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" MD5 test #%d: ", i + 1);
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_md5(md5_test_buf[i], md5_test_buflen[i], md5sum);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(md5sum, md5_test_sum[i], 16) != 0) {
+ ret = 1;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+fail:
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD5_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/md_psa.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/md_psa.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..028ba24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/md_psa.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/**
+ * Translation between MD and PSA identifiers (algorithms, errors).
+ *
+ * Note: this internal module will go away when everything becomes based on
+ * PSA Crypto; it is a helper for the transition period.
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_PSA_H
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_PSA_H
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+
+/** Convert PSA status to MD error code.
+ *
+ * \param status PSA status.
+ *
+ * \return The corresponding MD error code,
+ */
+int mbedtls_md_error_from_psa(psa_status_t status);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_PSA_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/md_wrap.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/md_wrap.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dad1235
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/md_wrap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/**
+ * \file md_wrap.h
+ *
+ * \brief Message digest wrappers.
+ *
+ * \warning This in an internal header. Do not include directly.
+ *
+ * \author Adriaan de Jong <dejong@fox-it.com>
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H
+#define MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Message digest information.
+ * Allows message digest functions to be called in a generic way.
+ */
+struct mbedtls_md_info_t {
+ /** Digest identifier */
+ mbedtls_md_type_t type;
+
+ /** Output length of the digest function in bytes */
+ unsigned char size;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
+ /** Block length of the digest function in bytes */
+ unsigned char block_size;
+#endif
+};
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_WRAP_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79b0a8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/memory_buffer_alloc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,745 @@
+/*
+ * Buffer-based memory allocator
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C)
+#include "mbedtls/memory_buffer_alloc.h"
+
+/* No need for the header guard as MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C
+ is dependent upon MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE)
+#include <execinfo.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
+#endif
+
+#define MAGIC1 0xFF00AA55
+#define MAGIC2 0xEE119966
+#define MAX_BT 20
+
+typedef struct _memory_header memory_header;
+struct _memory_header {
+ size_t magic1;
+ size_t size;
+ size_t alloc;
+ memory_header *prev;
+ memory_header *next;
+ memory_header *prev_free;
+ memory_header *next_free;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE)
+ char **trace;
+ size_t trace_count;
+#endif
+ size_t magic2;
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ size_t len;
+ memory_header *first;
+ memory_header *first_free;
+ int verify;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ size_t alloc_count;
+ size_t free_count;
+ size_t total_used;
+ size_t maximum_used;
+ size_t header_count;
+ size_t maximum_header_count;
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mutex;
+#endif
+}
+buffer_alloc_ctx;
+
+static buffer_alloc_ctx heap;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+static void debug_header(memory_header *hdr)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE)
+ size_t i;
+#endif
+
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "HDR: PTR(%10zu), PREV(%10zu), NEXT(%10zu), "
+ "ALLOC(%zu), SIZE(%10zu)\n",
+ (size_t) hdr, (size_t) hdr->prev, (size_t) hdr->next,
+ hdr->alloc, hdr->size);
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, " FPREV(%10zu), FNEXT(%10zu)\n",
+ (size_t) hdr->prev_free, (size_t) hdr->next_free);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE)
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "TRACE: \n");
+ for (i = 0; i < hdr->trace_count; i++) {
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", hdr->trace[i]);
+ }
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#endif
+}
+
+static void debug_chain(void)
+{
+ memory_header *cur = heap.first;
+
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "\nBlock list\n");
+ while (cur != NULL) {
+ debug_header(cur);
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "Free list\n");
+ cur = heap.first_free;
+
+ while (cur != NULL) {
+ debug_header(cur);
+ cur = cur->next_free;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */
+
+static int verify_header(memory_header *hdr)
+{
+ if (hdr->magic1 != MAGIC1) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: MAGIC1 mismatch\n");
+#endif
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (hdr->magic2 != MAGIC2) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: MAGIC2 mismatch\n");
+#endif
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (hdr->alloc > 1) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: alloc has illegal value\n");
+#endif
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (hdr->prev != NULL && hdr->prev == hdr->next) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: prev == next\n");
+#endif
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (hdr->prev_free != NULL && hdr->prev_free == hdr->next_free) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: prev_free == next_free\n");
+#endif
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int verify_chain(void)
+{
+ memory_header *prv = heap.first, *cur;
+
+ if (prv == NULL || verify_header(prv) != 0) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: verification of first header "
+ "failed\n");
+#endif
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (heap.first->prev != NULL) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: verification failed: "
+ "first->prev != NULL\n");
+#endif
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ cur = heap.first->next;
+
+ while (cur != NULL) {
+ if (verify_header(cur) != 0) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: verification of header "
+ "failed\n");
+#endif
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (cur->prev != prv) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: verification failed: "
+ "cur->prev != prv\n");
+#endif
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ prv = cur;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void *buffer_alloc_calloc(size_t n, size_t size)
+{
+ memory_header *new, *cur = heap.first_free;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ void *ret;
+ size_t original_len, len;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE)
+ void *trace_buffer[MAX_BT];
+ size_t trace_cnt;
+#endif
+
+ if (heap.buf == NULL || heap.first == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ original_len = len = n * size;
+
+ if (n == 0 || size == 0 || len / n != size) {
+ return NULL;
+ } else if (len > (size_t) -MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (len % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE) {
+ len -= len % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE;
+ len += MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE;
+ }
+
+ // Find block that fits
+ //
+ while (cur != NULL) {
+ if (cur->size >= len) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ cur = cur->next_free;
+ }
+
+ if (cur == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (cur->alloc != 0) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: block in free_list but allocated "
+ "data\n");
+#endif
+ mbedtls_exit(1);
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ heap.alloc_count++;
+#endif
+
+ // Found location, split block if > memory_header + 4 room left
+ //
+ if (cur->size - len < sizeof(memory_header) +
+ MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE) {
+ cur->alloc = 1;
+
+ // Remove from free_list
+ //
+ if (cur->prev_free != NULL) {
+ cur->prev_free->next_free = cur->next_free;
+ } else {
+ heap.first_free = cur->next_free;
+ }
+
+ if (cur->next_free != NULL) {
+ cur->next_free->prev_free = cur->prev_free;
+ }
+
+ cur->prev_free = NULL;
+ cur->next_free = NULL;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ heap.total_used += cur->size;
+ if (heap.total_used > heap.maximum_used) {
+ heap.maximum_used = heap.total_used;
+ }
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE)
+ trace_cnt = backtrace(trace_buffer, MAX_BT);
+ cur->trace = backtrace_symbols(trace_buffer, trace_cnt);
+ cur->trace_count = trace_cnt;
+#endif
+
+ if ((heap.verify & MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC) && verify_chain() != 0) {
+ mbedtls_exit(1);
+ }
+
+ ret = (unsigned char *) cur + sizeof(memory_header);
+ memset(ret, 0, original_len);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ p = ((unsigned char *) cur) + sizeof(memory_header) + len;
+ new = (memory_header *) p;
+
+ new->size = cur->size - len - sizeof(memory_header);
+ new->alloc = 0;
+ new->prev = cur;
+ new->next = cur->next;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE)
+ new->trace = NULL;
+ new->trace_count = 0;
+#endif
+ new->magic1 = MAGIC1;
+ new->magic2 = MAGIC2;
+
+ if (new->next != NULL) {
+ new->next->prev = new;
+ }
+
+ // Replace cur with new in free_list
+ //
+ new->prev_free = cur->prev_free;
+ new->next_free = cur->next_free;
+ if (new->prev_free != NULL) {
+ new->prev_free->next_free = new;
+ } else {
+ heap.first_free = new;
+ }
+
+ if (new->next_free != NULL) {
+ new->next_free->prev_free = new;
+ }
+
+ cur->alloc = 1;
+ cur->size = len;
+ cur->next = new;
+ cur->prev_free = NULL;
+ cur->next_free = NULL;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ heap.header_count++;
+ if (heap.header_count > heap.maximum_header_count) {
+ heap.maximum_header_count = heap.header_count;
+ }
+ heap.total_used += cur->size;
+ if (heap.total_used > heap.maximum_used) {
+ heap.maximum_used = heap.total_used;
+ }
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE)
+ trace_cnt = backtrace(trace_buffer, MAX_BT);
+ cur->trace = backtrace_symbols(trace_buffer, trace_cnt);
+ cur->trace_count = trace_cnt;
+#endif
+
+ if ((heap.verify & MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_ALLOC) && verify_chain() != 0) {
+ mbedtls_exit(1);
+ }
+
+ ret = (unsigned char *) cur + sizeof(memory_header);
+ memset(ret, 0, original_len);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void buffer_alloc_free(void *ptr)
+{
+ memory_header *hdr, *old = NULL;
+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) ptr;
+
+ if (ptr == NULL || heap.buf == NULL || heap.first == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (p < heap.buf || p >= heap.buf + heap.len) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: mbedtls_free() outside of managed "
+ "space\n");
+#endif
+ mbedtls_exit(1);
+ }
+
+ p -= sizeof(memory_header);
+ hdr = (memory_header *) p;
+
+ if (verify_header(hdr) != 0) {
+ mbedtls_exit(1);
+ }
+
+ if (hdr->alloc != 1) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: mbedtls_free() on unallocated "
+ "data\n");
+#endif
+ mbedtls_exit(1);
+ }
+
+ hdr->alloc = 0;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ heap.free_count++;
+ heap.total_used -= hdr->size;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BACKTRACE)
+ free(hdr->trace);
+ hdr->trace = NULL;
+ hdr->trace_count = 0;
+#endif
+
+ // Regroup with block before
+ //
+ if (hdr->prev != NULL && hdr->prev->alloc == 0) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ heap.header_count--;
+#endif
+ hdr->prev->size += sizeof(memory_header) + hdr->size;
+ hdr->prev->next = hdr->next;
+ old = hdr;
+ hdr = hdr->prev;
+
+ if (hdr->next != NULL) {
+ hdr->next->prev = hdr;
+ }
+
+ memset(old, 0, sizeof(memory_header));
+ }
+
+ // Regroup with block after
+ //
+ if (hdr->next != NULL && hdr->next->alloc == 0) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ heap.header_count--;
+#endif
+ hdr->size += sizeof(memory_header) + hdr->next->size;
+ old = hdr->next;
+ hdr->next = hdr->next->next;
+
+ if (hdr->prev_free != NULL || hdr->next_free != NULL) {
+ if (hdr->prev_free != NULL) {
+ hdr->prev_free->next_free = hdr->next_free;
+ } else {
+ heap.first_free = hdr->next_free;
+ }
+
+ if (hdr->next_free != NULL) {
+ hdr->next_free->prev_free = hdr->prev_free;
+ }
+ }
+
+ hdr->prev_free = old->prev_free;
+ hdr->next_free = old->next_free;
+
+ if (hdr->prev_free != NULL) {
+ hdr->prev_free->next_free = hdr;
+ } else {
+ heap.first_free = hdr;
+ }
+
+ if (hdr->next_free != NULL) {
+ hdr->next_free->prev_free = hdr;
+ }
+
+ if (hdr->next != NULL) {
+ hdr->next->prev = hdr;
+ }
+
+ memset(old, 0, sizeof(memory_header));
+ }
+
+ // Prepend to free_list if we have not merged
+ // (Does not have to stay in same order as prev / next list)
+ //
+ if (old == NULL) {
+ hdr->next_free = heap.first_free;
+ if (heap.first_free != NULL) {
+ heap.first_free->prev_free = hdr;
+ }
+ heap.first_free = hdr;
+ }
+
+ if ((heap.verify & MBEDTLS_MEMORY_VERIFY_FREE) && verify_chain() != 0) {
+ mbedtls_exit(1);
+ }
+}
+
+void mbedtls_memory_buffer_set_verify(int verify)
+{
+ heap.verify = verify;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_verify(void)
+{
+ return verify_chain();
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_status(void)
+{
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr,
+ "Current use: %zu blocks / %zu bytes, max: %zu blocks / "
+ "%zu bytes (total %zu bytes), alloc / free: %zu / %zu\n",
+ heap.header_count, heap.total_used,
+ heap.maximum_header_count, heap.maximum_used,
+ heap.maximum_header_count * sizeof(memory_header)
+ + heap.maximum_used,
+ heap.alloc_count, heap.free_count);
+
+ if (heap.first->next == NULL) {
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "All memory de-allocated in stack buffer\n");
+ } else {
+ mbedtls_fprintf(stderr, "Memory currently allocated:\n");
+ debug_chain();
+ }
+}
+
+void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_count_get(size_t *alloc_count, size_t *free_count)
+{
+ *alloc_count = heap.alloc_count;
+ *free_count = heap.free_count;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_get(size_t *max_used, size_t *max_blocks)
+{
+ *max_used = heap.maximum_used;
+ *max_blocks = heap.maximum_header_count;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_max_reset(void)
+{
+ heap.maximum_used = 0;
+ heap.maximum_header_count = 0;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_cur_get(size_t *cur_used, size_t *cur_blocks)
+{
+ *cur_used = heap.total_used;
+ *cur_blocks = heap.header_count;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+static void *buffer_alloc_calloc_mutexed(size_t n, size_t size)
+{
+ void *buf;
+ if (mbedtls_mutex_lock(&heap.mutex) != 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ buf = buffer_alloc_calloc(n, size);
+ if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&heap.mutex)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return buf;
+}
+
+static void buffer_alloc_free_mutexed(void *ptr)
+{
+ /* We have no good option here, but corrupting the heap seems
+ * worse than losing memory. */
+ if (mbedtls_mutex_lock(&heap.mutex)) {
+ return;
+ }
+ buffer_alloc_free(ptr);
+ (void) mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&heap.mutex);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
+
+void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init(unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ memset(&heap, 0, sizeof(buffer_alloc_ctx));
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ mbedtls_mutex_init(&heap.mutex);
+ mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free(buffer_alloc_calloc_mutexed,
+ buffer_alloc_free_mutexed);
+#else
+ mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free(buffer_alloc_calloc, buffer_alloc_free);
+#endif
+
+ if (len < sizeof(memory_header) + MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE) {
+ return;
+ } else if ((size_t) buf % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE) {
+ /* Adjust len first since buf is used in the computation */
+ len -= MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE
+ - (size_t) buf % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE;
+ buf += MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE
+ - (size_t) buf % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE;
+ }
+
+ memset(buf, 0, len);
+
+ heap.buf = buf;
+ heap.len = len;
+
+ heap.first = (memory_header *) buf;
+ heap.first->size = len - sizeof(memory_header);
+ heap.first->magic1 = MAGIC1;
+ heap.first->magic2 = MAGIC2;
+ heap.first_free = heap.first;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free(void)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
+ mbedtls_mutex_free(&heap.mutex);
+#endif
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&heap, sizeof(buffer_alloc_ctx));
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+static int check_pointer(void *p)
+{
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((size_t) p % MBEDTLS_MEMORY_ALIGN_MULTIPLE != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_all_free(void)
+{
+ if (
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG)
+ heap.total_used != 0 ||
+#endif
+ heap.first != heap.first_free ||
+ (void *) heap.first != (void *) heap.buf) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define TEST_ASSERT(condition) \
+ if (!(condition)) \
+ { \
+ if (verbose != 0) \
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n"); \
+ \
+ ret = 1; \
+ goto cleanup; \
+ }
+
+int mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ unsigned char buf[1024];
+ unsigned char *p, *q, *r, *end;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" MBA test #1 (basic alloc-free cycle): ");
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ p = mbedtls_calloc(1, 1);
+ q = mbedtls_calloc(1, 128);
+ r = mbedtls_calloc(1, 16);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(check_pointer(p) == 0 &&
+ check_pointer(q) == 0 &&
+ check_pointer(r) == 0);
+
+ mbedtls_free(r);
+ mbedtls_free(q);
+ mbedtls_free(p);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(check_all_free() == 0);
+
+ /* Memorize end to compare with the next test */
+ end = heap.buf + heap.len;
+
+ mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free();
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" MBA test #2 (buf not aligned): ");
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init(buf + 1, sizeof(buf) - 1);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(heap.buf + heap.len == end);
+
+ p = mbedtls_calloc(1, 1);
+ q = mbedtls_calloc(1, 128);
+ r = mbedtls_calloc(1, 16);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(check_pointer(p) == 0 &&
+ check_pointer(q) == 0 &&
+ check_pointer(r) == 0);
+
+ mbedtls_free(r);
+ mbedtls_free(q);
+ mbedtls_free(p);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(check_all_free() == 0);
+
+ mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free();
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" MBA test #3 (full): ");
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init(buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ p = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(buf) - sizeof(memory_header));
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(check_pointer(p) == 0);
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_calloc(1, 1) == NULL);
+
+ mbedtls_free(p);
+
+ p = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(buf) - 2 * sizeof(memory_header) - 16);
+ q = mbedtls_calloc(1, 16);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(check_pointer(p) == 0 && check_pointer(q) == 0);
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_calloc(1, 1) == NULL);
+
+ mbedtls_free(q);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_calloc(1, 17) == NULL);
+
+ mbedtls_free(p);
+
+ TEST_ASSERT(check_all_free() == 0);
+
+ mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free();
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_free();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f9fe099
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \file mps_common.h
+ *
+ * \brief Common functions and macros used by MPS
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H
+
+#include "mps_error.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: MPS Configuration
+ *
+ * \{
+ */
+
+/*! This flag controls whether the MPS-internal components
+ * (reader, writer, Layer 1-3) perform validation of the
+ * expected abstract state at the entry of API calls.
+ *
+ * Context: All MPS API functions impose assumptions/preconditions on the
+ * context on which they operate. For example, every structure has a notion of
+ * state integrity which is established by `xxx_init()` and preserved by any
+ * calls to the MPS API which satisfy their preconditions and either succeed,
+ * or fail with an error code which is explicitly documented to not corrupt
+ * structure integrity (such as WANT_READ and WANT_WRITE);
+ * apart from `xxx_init()` any function assumes state integrity as a
+ * precondition (but usually more). If any of the preconditions is violated,
+ * the function's behavior is entirely undefined.
+ * In addition to state integrity, all MPS structures have a more refined
+ * notion of abstract state that the API operates on. For example, all layers
+ * have a notion of 'abstract read state' which indicates if incoming data has
+ * been passed to the user, e.g. through mps_l2_read_start() for Layer 2
+ * or mps_l3_read() in Layer 3. After such a call, it doesn't make sense to
+ * call these reading functions again until the incoming data has been
+ * explicitly 'consumed', e.g. through mps_l2_read_consume() for Layer 2 or
+ * mps_l3_read_consume() on Layer 3. However, even if it doesn't make sense,
+ * it's a design choice whether the API should fail gracefully on such
+ * non-sensical calls or not, and that's what this option is about:
+ *
+ * This option determines whether the expected abstract state
+ * is part of the API preconditions or not: If the option is set,
+ * then the abstract state is not part of the precondition and is
+ * thus required to be validated by the implementation. If an unexpected
+ * abstract state is encountered, the implementation must fail gracefully
+ * with error #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED.
+ * Conversely, if this option is not set, then the expected abstract state
+ * is included in the preconditions of the respective API calls, and
+ * an implementation's behaviour is undefined if the abstract state is
+ * not as expected.
+ *
+ * For example: Enabling this makes mps_l2_read_done() fail if
+ * no incoming record is currently open; disabling this would
+ * lead to undefined behavior in this case.
+ *
+ * Comment this to remove state validation.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION
+
+/*! This flag enables/disables assertions on the internal state of MPS.
+ *
+ * Assertions are sanity checks that should never trigger when MPS
+ * is used within the bounds of its API and preconditions.
+ *
+ * Enabling this increases security by limiting the scope of
+ * potential bugs, but comes at the cost of increased code size.
+ *
+ * Note: So far, there is no guiding principle as to what
+ * expected conditions merit an assertion, and which don't.
+ *
+ * Comment this to disable assertions.
+ */
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS
+
+/*! This flag controls whether tracing for MPS should be enabled. */
+//#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW(cond, string) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ if (!(cond)) \
+ { \
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, string); \
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED); \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW(cond, string) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ (cond); \
+ } while (0)
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATION */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ASSERT_RAW(cond, string) \
+ do \
+ { \
+ if (!(cond)) \
+ { \
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR, string); \
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_INTERNAL_ERROR); \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ASSERT_RAW(cond, string) do {} while (0)
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_ASSERTIONS */
+
+
+/* \} name SECTION: MPS Configuration */
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: Common types
+ *
+ * Various common types used throughout MPS.
+ * \{
+ */
+
+/** \brief The type of buffer sizes and offsets used in MPS structures.
+ *
+ * This is an unsigned integer type that should be large enough to
+ * hold the length of any buffer or message processed by MPS.
+ *
+ * The reason to pick a value as small as possible here is
+ * to reduce the size of MPS structures.
+ *
+ * \warning Care has to be taken when using a narrower type
+ * than ::mbedtls_mps_size_t here because of
+ * potential truncation during conversion.
+ *
+ * \warning Handshake messages in TLS may be up to 2^24 ~ 16Mb in size.
+ * If mbedtls_mps_[opt_]stored_size_t is smaller than that, the
+ * maximum handshake message is restricted accordingly.
+ *
+ * For now, we use the default type of size_t throughout, and the use of
+ * smaller types or different types for ::mbedtls_mps_size_t and
+ * ::mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t is not yet supported.
+ *
+ */
+typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t;
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX (SIZE_MAX)
+
+/** \brief The type of buffer sizes and offsets used in the MPS API
+ * and implementation.
+ *
+ * This must be at least as wide as ::mbedtls_stored_size_t but
+ * may be chosen to be strictly larger if more suitable for the
+ * target architecture.
+ *
+ * For example, in a test build for ARM Thumb, using uint_fast16_t
+ * instead of uint16_t reduced the code size from 1060 Byte to 962 Byte,
+ * so almost 10%.
+ */
+typedef size_t mbedtls_mps_size_t;
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX (SIZE_MAX)
+
+#if MBEDTLS_MPS_STORED_SIZE_MAX > MBEDTLS_MPS_SIZE_MAX
+#error "Misconfiguration of mbedtls_mps_size_t and mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t."
+#endif
+
+/* \} SECTION: Common types */
+
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_error.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_error.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..016a84c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_error.h
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \file mps_error.h
+ *
+ * \brief Error codes used by MPS
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H
+
+
+/* TODO: The error code allocation needs to be revisited:
+ *
+ * - Should we make (some of) the MPS Reader error codes public?
+ * If so, we need to adjust MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR() to hit
+ * a gap in the Mbed TLS public error space.
+ * If not, we have to make sure we don't forward those errors
+ * at the level of the public API -- no risk at the moment as
+ * long as MPS is an experimental component not accessible from
+ * public API.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: MPS general error codes
+ *
+ * \{
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE (0)
+#endif
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR(code) \
+ (-(MBEDTLS_MPS_ERR_BASE | (code)))
+
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_OPERATION_UNEXPECTED MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR(0x1)
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_INTERNAL_ERROR MBEDTLS_MPS_MAKE_ERROR(0x2)
+
+/* \} name SECTION: MPS general error codes */
+
+/**
+ * \name SECTION: MPS Reader error codes
+ *
+ * \{
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE (1 << 8)
+#endif
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(code) \
+ (-(MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_ERR_BASE | (code)))
+
+/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because
+ * the user hasn't yet read and committed all of it. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_DATA_LEFT MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(0x1)
+
+/*! An invalid argument was passed to the reader. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INVALID_ARG MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(0x2)
+
+/*! An attempt to move a reader to consuming mode through mbedtls_mps_reader_feed()
+ * after pausing failed because the provided data is not sufficient to serve the
+ * read requests that led to the pausing. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(0x3)
+
+/*! A get request failed because not enough data is available in the reader. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(0x4)
+
+/*!< A get request after pausing and reactivating the reader failed because
+ * the request is not in line with the request made prior to pausing. The user
+ * must not change it's 'strategy' after pausing and reactivating a reader. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INCONSISTENT_REQUESTS MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(0x5)
+
+/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because the reader
+ * has no accumulator it can use to backup the data that hasn't been processed. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_ACCUMULATOR MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(0x6)
+
+/*! An attempt to reclaim the data buffer from a reader failed because the
+ * accumulator passed to the reader is not large enough to hold both the
+ * data that hasn't been processed and the excess of the last read-request. */
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_ACCUMULATOR_TOO_SMALL MBEDTLS_MPS_READER_MAKE_ERROR(0x7)
+
+/* \} name SECTION: MPS Reader error codes */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ERROR_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27d0c04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.c
@@ -0,0 +1,538 @@
+/*
+ * Message Processing Stack, Reader implementation
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+
+#include "mps_reader.h"
+#include "mps_common.h"
+#include "mps_trace.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE)
+static int mbedtls_mps_trace_id = MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE */
+
+/*
+ * GENERAL NOTE ON CODING STYLE
+ *
+ * The following code intentionally separates memory loads
+ * and stores from other operations (arithmetic or branches).
+ * This leads to the introduction of many local variables
+ * and significantly increases the C-code line count, but
+ * should not increase the size of generated assembly.
+ *
+ * The reason for this is twofold:
+ * (1) It will ease verification efforts using the VST
+ * (Verified Software Toolchain)
+ * whose program logic cannot directly reason
+ * about instructions containing a load or store in
+ * addition to other operations (e.g. *p = *q or
+ * tmp = *p + 42).
+ * (2) Operating on local variables and writing the results
+ * back to the target contexts on success only
+ * allows to maintain structure invariants even
+ * on failure - this in turn has two benefits:
+ * (2.a) If for some reason an error code is not caught
+ * and operation continues, functions are nonetheless
+ * called with sane contexts, reducing the risk
+ * of dangerous behavior.
+ * (2.b) Randomized testing is easier if structures
+ * remain intact even in the face of failing
+ * and/or non-sensical calls.
+ * Moreover, it might even reduce code-size because
+ * the compiler need not write back temporary results
+ * to memory in case of failure.
+ *
+ */
+
+static inline int mps_reader_is_accumulating(
+ mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd)
+{
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_remaining;
+ if (rd->acc == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ acc_remaining = rd->acc_share.acc_remaining;
+ return acc_remaining > 0;
+}
+
+static inline int mps_reader_is_producing(
+ mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd)
+{
+ unsigned char *frag = rd->frag;
+ return frag == NULL;
+}
+
+static inline int mps_reader_is_consuming(
+ mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd)
+{
+ return !mps_reader_is_producing(rd);
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_mps_size_t mps_reader_get_fragment_offset(
+ mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd)
+{
+ unsigned char *acc = rd->acc;
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_offset;
+
+ if (acc == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ frag_offset = rd->acc_share.frag_offset;
+ return frag_offset;
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_mps_size_t mps_reader_serving_from_accumulator(
+ mbedtls_mps_reader const *rd)
+{
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_offset, end;
+
+ frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset(rd);
+ end = rd->end;
+
+ return end < frag_offset;
+}
+
+static inline void mps_reader_zero(mbedtls_mps_reader *rd)
+{
+ /* A plain memset() would likely be more efficient,
+ * but the current way of zeroing makes it harder
+ * to overlook fields which should not be zero-initialized.
+ * It's also more suitable for FV efforts since it
+ * doesn't require reasoning about structs being
+ * interpreted as unstructured binary blobs. */
+ static mbedtls_mps_reader const zero =
+ { .frag = NULL,
+ .frag_len = 0,
+ .commit = 0,
+ .end = 0,
+ .pending = 0,
+ .acc = NULL,
+ .acc_len = 0,
+ .acc_available = 0,
+ .acc_share = { .acc_remaining = 0 } };
+ *rd = zero;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mps_reader_init(mbedtls_mps_reader *rd,
+ unsigned char *acc,
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len)
+{
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT("mbedtls_mps_reader_init");
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ "* Accumulator size: %u bytes", (unsigned) acc_len);
+ mps_reader_zero(rd);
+ rd->acc = acc;
+ rd->acc_len = acc_len;
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(0);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mps_reader_free(mbedtls_mps_reader *rd)
+{
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT("mbedtls_mps_reader_free");
+ mps_reader_zero(rd);
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(0);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(mbedtls_mps_reader *rd,
+ unsigned char *new_frag,
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t new_frag_len)
+{
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t copy_to_acc;
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT("mbedtls_mps_reader_feed");
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ "* Fragment length: %u bytes", (unsigned) new_frag_len);
+
+ if (new_frag == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INVALID_ARG);
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW(mps_reader_is_producing(
+ rd),
+ "mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() requires reader to be in producing mode");
+
+ if (mps_reader_is_accumulating(rd)) {
+ unsigned char *acc = rd->acc;
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_remaining = rd->acc_share.acc_remaining;
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_available = rd->acc_available;
+
+ /* Skip over parts of the accumulator that have already been filled. */
+ acc += acc_available;
+
+ copy_to_acc = acc_remaining;
+ if (copy_to_acc > new_frag_len) {
+ copy_to_acc = new_frag_len;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy new contents to accumulator. */
+ memcpy(acc, new_frag, copy_to_acc);
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ "Copy new data of size %u of %u into accumulator at offset %u",
+ (unsigned) copy_to_acc, (unsigned) new_frag_len,
+ (unsigned) acc_available);
+
+ /* Check if, with the new fragment, we have enough data. */
+ acc_remaining -= copy_to_acc;
+ if (acc_remaining > 0) {
+ /* We need to accumulate more data. Stay in producing mode. */
+ acc_available += copy_to_acc;
+ rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = acc_remaining;
+ rd->acc_available = acc_available;
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE);
+ }
+
+ /* We have filled the accumulator: Move to consuming mode. */
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ "Enough data available to serve user request");
+
+ /* Remember overlap of accumulator and fragment. */
+ rd->acc_share.frag_offset = acc_available;
+ acc_available += copy_to_acc;
+ rd->acc_available = acc_available;
+ } else { /* Not accumulating */
+ rd->acc_share.frag_offset = 0;
+ }
+
+ rd->frag = new_frag;
+ rd->frag_len = new_frag_len;
+ rd->commit = 0;
+ rd->end = 0;
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(0);
+}
+
+
+int mbedtls_mps_reader_get(mbedtls_mps_reader *rd,
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t desired,
+ unsigned char **buffer,
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t *buflen)
+{
+ unsigned char *frag;
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_len, frag_offset, end, frag_fetched, frag_remaining;
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT("mbedtls_mps_reader_get");
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ "* Bytes requested: %u", (unsigned) desired);
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW(mps_reader_is_consuming(
+ rd),
+ "mbedtls_mps_reader_get() requires reader to be in consuming mode");
+
+ end = rd->end;
+ frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset(rd);
+
+ /* Check if we're still serving from the accumulator. */
+ if (mps_reader_serving_from_accumulator(rd)) {
+ /* Illustration of supported and unsupported cases:
+ *
+ * - Allowed #1
+ *
+ * +-----------------------------------+
+ * | frag |
+ * +-----------------------------------+
+ *
+ * end end+desired
+ * | |
+ * +-----v-------v-------------+
+ * | acc |
+ * +---------------------------+
+ * | |
+ * frag_offset acc_available
+ *
+ * - Allowed #2
+ *
+ * +-----------------------------------+
+ * | frag |
+ * +-----------------------------------+
+ *
+ * end end+desired
+ * | |
+ * +----------v----------------v
+ * | acc |
+ * +---------------------------+
+ * | |
+ * frag_offset acc_available
+ *
+ * - Not allowed #1 (could be served, but we don't actually use it):
+ *
+ * +-----------------------------------+
+ * | frag |
+ * +-----------------------------------+
+ *
+ * end end+desired
+ * | |
+ * +------v-------------v------+
+ * | acc |
+ * +---------------------------+
+ * | |
+ * frag_offset acc_available
+ *
+ *
+ * - Not allowed #2 (can't be served with a contiguous buffer):
+ *
+ * +-----------------------------------+
+ * | frag |
+ * +-----------------------------------+
+ *
+ * end end + desired
+ * | |
+ * +------v--------------------+ v
+ * | acc |
+ * +---------------------------+
+ * | |
+ * frag_offset acc_available
+ *
+ * In case of Allowed #2 we're switching to serve from
+ * `frag` starting from the next call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get().
+ */
+
+ unsigned char *acc;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ "Serve the request from the accumulator");
+ if (frag_offset - end < desired) {
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_available;
+ acc_available = rd->acc_available;
+ if (acc_available - end != desired) {
+ /* It might be possible to serve some of these situations by
+ * making additional space in the accumulator, removing those
+ * parts that have already been committed.
+ * On the other hand, this brings additional complexity and
+ * enlarges the code size, while there doesn't seem to be a use
+ * case where we don't attempt exactly the same `get` calls when
+ * resuming on a reader than what we tried before pausing it.
+ * If we believe we adhere to this restricted usage throughout
+ * the library, this check is a good opportunity to
+ * validate this. */
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_INCONSISTENT_REQUESTS);
+ }
+ }
+
+ acc = rd->acc;
+ acc += end;
+
+ *buffer = acc;
+ if (buflen != NULL) {
+ *buflen = desired;
+ }
+
+ end += desired;
+ rd->end = end;
+ rd->pending = 0;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(0);
+ }
+
+ /* Attempt to serve the request from the current fragment */
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ "Serve the request from the current fragment.");
+
+ frag_len = rd->frag_len;
+ frag_fetched = end - frag_offset; /* The amount of data from the current
+ * fragment that has already been passed
+ * to the user. */
+ frag_remaining = frag_len - frag_fetched; /* Remaining data in fragment */
+
+ /* Check if we can serve the read request from the fragment. */
+ if (frag_remaining < desired) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ "There's not enough data in the current fragment "
+ "to serve the request.");
+ /* There's not enough data in the current fragment,
+ * so either just RETURN what we have or fail. */
+ if (buflen == NULL) {
+ if (frag_remaining > 0) {
+ rd->pending = desired - frag_remaining;
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ "Remember to collect %u bytes before re-opening",
+ (unsigned) rd->pending);
+ }
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA);
+ }
+
+ desired = frag_remaining;
+ }
+
+ /* There's enough data in the current fragment to serve the
+ * (potentially modified) read request. */
+
+ frag = rd->frag;
+ frag += frag_fetched;
+
+ *buffer = frag;
+ if (buflen != NULL) {
+ *buflen = desired;
+ }
+
+ end += desired;
+ rd->end = end;
+ rd->pending = 0;
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(0);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mps_reader_commit(mbedtls_mps_reader *rd)
+{
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t end;
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT("mbedtls_mps_reader_commit");
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW(mps_reader_is_consuming(
+ rd),
+ "mbedtls_mps_reader_commit() requires reader to be in consuming mode");
+
+ end = rd->end;
+ rd->commit = end;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(0);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(mbedtls_mps_reader *rd,
+ int *paused)
+{
+ unsigned char *frag, *acc;
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t pending, commit;
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len, frag_offset, frag_len;
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT("mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim");
+
+ if (paused != NULL) {
+ *paused = 0;
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_STATE_VALIDATE_RAW(mps_reader_is_consuming(
+ rd),
+ "mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() requires reader to be in consuming mode");
+
+ frag = rd->frag;
+ acc = rd->acc;
+ pending = rd->pending;
+ commit = rd->commit;
+ frag_len = rd->frag_len;
+
+ frag_offset = mps_reader_get_fragment_offset(rd);
+
+ if (pending == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ "No unsatisfied read-request has been logged.");
+
+ /* Check if there's data left to be consumed. */
+ if (commit < frag_offset || commit - frag_offset < frag_len) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ "There is data left to be consumed.");
+ rd->end = commit;
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_DATA_LEFT);
+ }
+
+ rd->acc_available = 0;
+ rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = 0;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ "Fragment has been fully processed and committed.");
+ } else {
+ int overflow;
+
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_backup_offset;
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_backup_len;
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_backup_offset;
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t frag_backup_len;
+
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t backup_len;
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len_needed;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ "There has been an unsatisfied read with %u bytes overhead.",
+ (unsigned) pending);
+
+ if (acc == NULL) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ "No accumulator present");
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_ACCUMULATOR);
+ }
+ acc_len = rd->acc_len;
+
+ /* Check if the upper layer has already fetched
+ * and committed the contents of the accumulator. */
+ if (commit < frag_offset) {
+ /* No, accumulator is still being processed. */
+ frag_backup_offset = 0;
+ frag_backup_len = frag_len;
+ acc_backup_offset = commit;
+ acc_backup_len = frag_offset - commit;
+ } else {
+ /* Yes, the accumulator is already processed. */
+ frag_backup_offset = commit - frag_offset;
+ frag_backup_len = frag_len - frag_backup_offset;
+ acc_backup_offset = 0;
+ acc_backup_len = 0;
+ }
+
+ backup_len = acc_backup_len + frag_backup_len;
+ acc_len_needed = backup_len + pending;
+
+ overflow = 0;
+ overflow |= (backup_len < acc_backup_len);
+ overflow |= (acc_len_needed < backup_len);
+
+ if (overflow || acc_len < acc_len_needed) {
+ /* Except for the different return code, we behave as if
+ * there hadn't been a call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get()
+ * since the last commit. */
+ rd->end = commit;
+ rd->pending = 0;
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR,
+ "The accumulator is too small to handle the backup.");
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR,
+ "* Size: %u", (unsigned) acc_len);
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR,
+ "* Needed: %u (%u + %u)",
+ (unsigned) acc_len_needed,
+ (unsigned) backup_len, (unsigned) pending);
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_ACCUMULATOR_TOO_SMALL);
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ "Fragment backup: %u", (unsigned) frag_backup_len);
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ "Accumulator backup: %u", (unsigned) acc_backup_len);
+
+ /* Move uncommitted parts from the accumulator to the front
+ * of the accumulator. */
+ memmove(acc, acc + acc_backup_offset, acc_backup_len);
+
+ /* Copy uncommitted parts of the current fragment to the
+ * accumulator. */
+ memcpy(acc + acc_backup_len,
+ frag + frag_backup_offset, frag_backup_len);
+
+ rd->acc_available = backup_len;
+ rd->acc_share.acc_remaining = pending;
+
+ if (paused != NULL) {
+ *paused = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rd->frag = NULL;
+ rd->frag_len = 0;
+
+ rd->commit = 0;
+ rd->end = 0;
+ rd->pending = 0;
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ "Final state: aa %u, al %u, ar %u",
+ (unsigned) rd->acc_available, (unsigned) rd->acc_len,
+ (unsigned) rd->acc_share.acc_remaining);
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(0);
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3193a5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_reader.h
@@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \file mps_reader.h
+ *
+ * \brief This file defines reader objects, which together with their
+ * sibling writer objects form the basis for the communication
+ * between the various layers of the Mbed TLS messaging stack,
+ * as well as the communication between the messaging stack and
+ * the (D)TLS handshake protocol implementation.
+ *
+ * Readers provide a means of transferring incoming data from
+ * a 'producer' providing it in chunks of arbitrary size, to
+ * a 'consumer' which fetches and processes it in chunks of
+ * again arbitrary, and potentially different, size.
+ *
+ * Readers can thus be seen as datagram-to-stream converters,
+ * and they abstract away the following two tasks from the user:
+ * 1. The pointer arithmetic of stepping through a producer-
+ * provided chunk in smaller chunks.
+ * 2. The merging of incoming data chunks in case the
+ * consumer requests data in larger chunks than what the
+ * producer provides.
+ *
+ * The basic abstract flow of operation is the following:
+ * - Initially, the reader is in 'producing mode'.
+ * - The producer hands an incoming data buffer to the reader,
+ * moving it from 'producing' to 'consuming' mode.
+ * - The consumer subsequently fetches and processes the buffer
+ * content. Once that's done -- or partially done and a consumer's
+ * request can't be fulfilled -- the producer revokes the reader's
+ * access to the incoming data buffer, putting the reader back to
+ * producing mode.
+ * - The producer subsequently gathers more incoming data and hands
+ * it to the reader until it switches back to consuming mode
+ * if enough data is available for the last consumer request to
+ * be satisfiable.
+ * - Repeat the above.
+ *
+ * The abstract states of the reader from the producer's and
+ * consumer's perspective are as follows:
+ *
+ * - From the perspective of the consumer, the state of the
+ * reader consists of the following:
+ * - A byte stream representing (concatenation of) the data
+ * received through calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(),
+ * - A marker within that byte stream indicating which data
+ * can be considered processed, and hence need not be retained,
+ * when the reader is passed back to the producer via
+ * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim().
+ * The marker is set via mbedtls_mps_reader_commit()
+ * which places it at the end of the current byte stream.
+ * The consumer need not be aware of the distinction between consumer
+ * and producer mode, because it only interfaces with the reader
+ * when the latter is in consuming mode.
+ *
+ * - From the perspective of the producer, the reader's state is one of:
+ * - Attached: The reader is in consuming mode.
+ * - Unset: No incoming data buffer is currently managed by the reader,
+ * and all previously handed incoming data buffers have been
+ * fully processed. More data needs to be fed into the reader
+ * via mbedtls_mps_reader_feed().
+ *
+ * - Accumulating: No incoming data buffer is currently managed by the
+ * reader, but some data from the previous incoming data
+ * buffer hasn't been processed yet and is internally
+ * held back.
+ * The Attached state belongs to consuming mode, while the Unset and
+ * Accumulating states belong to producing mode.
+ *
+ * Transitioning from the Unset or Accumulating state to Attached is
+ * done via successful calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(), while
+ * transitioning from Attached to either Unset or Accumulating (depending
+ * on what has been processed) is done via mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim().
+ *
+ * The following diagram depicts the producer-state progression:
+ *
+ * +------------------+ reclaim
+ * | Unset +<-------------------------------------+ get
+ * +--------|---------+ | +------+
+ * | | | |
+ * | | | |
+ * | feed +---------+---+--+ |
+ * +--------------------------------------> <---+
+ * | Attached |
+ * +--------------------------------------> <---+
+ * | feed, enough data available +---------+---+--+ |
+ * | to serve previous consumer request | | |
+ * | | | |
+ * +--------+---------+ | +------+
+ * +----> Accumulating |<-------------------------------------+ commit
+ * | +---+--------------+ reclaim, previous read request
+ * | | couldn't be fulfilled
+ * | |
+ * +--------+
+ * feed, need more data to serve
+ * previous consumer request
+ * |
+ * |
+ * producing mode | consuming mode
+ * |
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_READER_H
+#define MBEDTLS_READER_H
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "mps_common.h"
+#include "mps_error.h"
+
+struct mbedtls_mps_reader;
+typedef struct mbedtls_mps_reader mbedtls_mps_reader;
+
+/*
+ * Structure definitions
+ */
+
+struct mbedtls_mps_reader {
+ unsigned char *frag; /*!< The fragment of incoming data managed by
+ * the reader; it is provided to the reader
+ * through mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(). The reader
+ * does not own the fragment and does not
+ * perform any allocation operations on it,
+ * but does have read and write access to it.
+ *
+ * The reader is in consuming mode if
+ * and only if \c frag is not \c NULL. */
+ mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t frag_len;
+ /*!< The length of the current fragment.
+ * Must be 0 if \c frag == \c NULL. */
+ mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t commit;
+ /*!< The offset of the last commit, relative
+ * to the first byte in the fragment, if
+ * no accumulator is present. If an accumulator
+ * is present, it is viewed as a prefix to the
+ * current fragment, and this variable contains
+ * an offset from the beginning of the accumulator.
+ *
+ * This is only used when the reader is in
+ * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL;
+ * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */
+ mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t end;
+ /*!< The offset of the end of the last chunk
+ * passed to the user through a call to
+ * mbedtls_mps_reader_get(), relative to the first
+ * byte in the fragment, if no accumulator is
+ * present. If an accumulator is present, it is
+ * viewed as a prefix to the current fragment, and
+ * this variable contains an offset from the
+ * beginning of the accumulator.
+ *
+ * This is only used when the reader is in
+ * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL;
+ * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */
+ mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t pending;
+ /*!< The amount of incoming data missing on the
+ * last call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get().
+ * In particular, it is \c 0 if the last call
+ * was successful.
+ * If a reader is reclaimed after an
+ * unsuccessful call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get(),
+ * this variable is used to have the reader
+ * remember how much data should be accumulated
+ * so that the call to mbedtls_mps_reader_get()
+ * succeeds next time.
+ * This is only used when the reader is in
+ * consuming mode, i.e. \c frag != \c NULL;
+ * otherwise, its value is \c 0. */
+
+ /* The accumulator is only needed if we need to be able to pause
+ * the reader. A few bytes could be saved by moving this to a
+ * separate struct and using a pointer here. */
+
+ unsigned char *acc; /*!< The accumulator is used to gather incoming
+ * data if a read-request via mbedtls_mps_reader_get()
+ * cannot be served from the current fragment. */
+ mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_len;
+ /*!< The total size of the accumulator. */
+ mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_available;
+ /*!< The number of bytes currently gathered in
+ * the accumulator. This is both used in
+ * producing and in consuming mode:
+ * While producing, it is increased until
+ * it reaches the value of \c acc_remaining below.
+ * While consuming, it is used to judge if a
+ * get request can be served from the
+ * accumulator or not.
+ * Must not be larger than \c acc_len. */
+ union {
+ mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t acc_remaining;
+ /*!< This indicates the amount of data still
+ * to be gathered in the accumulator. It is
+ * only used in producing mode.
+ * Must be at most acc_len - acc_available. */
+ mbedtls_mps_stored_size_t frag_offset;
+ /*!< If an accumulator is present and in use, this
+ * field indicates the offset of the current
+ * fragment from the beginning of the
+ * accumulator. If no accumulator is present
+ * or the accumulator is not in use, this is \c 0.
+ * It is only used in consuming mode.
+ * Must not be larger than \c acc_available. */
+ } acc_share;
+};
+
+/*
+ * API organization:
+ * A reader object is usually prepared and maintained
+ * by some lower layer and passed for usage to an upper
+ * layer, and the API naturally splits according to which
+ * layer is supposed to use the respective functions.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Maintenance API (Lower layer)
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a reader object
+ *
+ * \param reader The reader to be initialized.
+ * \param acc The buffer to be used as a temporary accumulator
+ * in case get requests through mbedtls_mps_reader_get()
+ * exceed the buffer provided by mbedtls_mps_reader_feed().
+ * This buffer is owned by the caller and exclusive use
+ * for reading and writing is given to the reader for the
+ * duration of the reader's lifetime. It is thus the caller's
+ * responsibility to maintain (and not touch) the buffer for
+ * the lifetime of the reader, and to properly zeroize and
+ * free the memory after the reader has been destroyed.
+ * \param acc_len The size in Bytes of \p acc.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mps_reader_init(mbedtls_mps_reader *reader,
+ unsigned char *acc,
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t acc_len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Free a reader object
+ *
+ * \param reader The reader to be freed.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mps_reader_free(mbedtls_mps_reader *reader);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Pass chunk of data for the reader to manage.
+ *
+ * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must be
+ * in producing mode.
+ * \param buf The buffer to be managed by the reader.
+ * \param buflen The size in Bytes of \p buffer.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, the reader will be
+ * moved to consuming mode and obtains read access
+ * of \p buf until mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim()
+ * is called. It is the responsibility of the caller
+ * to ensure that the \p buf persists and is not changed
+ * between successful calls to mbedtls_mps_reader_feed()
+ * and mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim().
+ * \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_NEED_MORE if more input data is
+ * required to fulfill a previous request to mbedtls_mps_reader_get().
+ * In this case, the reader remains in producing mode and
+ * takes no ownership of the provided buffer (an internal copy
+ * is made instead).
+ * \return Another negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on
+ * different kinds of failures.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mps_reader_feed(mbedtls_mps_reader *reader,
+ unsigned char *buf,
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t buflen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Reclaim reader's access to the current input buffer.
+ *
+ * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must be
+ * in consuming mode.
+ * \param paused If not \c NULL, the integer at address \p paused will be
+ * modified to indicate whether the reader has been paused
+ * (value \c 1) or not (value \c 0). Pausing happens if there
+ * is uncommitted data and a previous request to
+ * mbedtls_mps_reader_get() has exceeded the bounds of the
+ * input buffer.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim(mbedtls_mps_reader *reader,
+ int *paused);
+
+/*
+ * Usage API (Upper layer)
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Request data from the reader.
+ *
+ * \param reader The reader context to use. The reader must
+ * be in consuming mode.
+ * \param desired The desired amount of data to be read, in Bytes.
+ * \param buffer The address to store the buffer pointer in.
+ * This must not be \c NULL.
+ * \param buflen The address to store the actual buffer
+ * length in, or \c NULL.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success. In this case, \c *buf holds the
+ * address of a buffer of size \c *buflen
+ * (if \c buflen != \c NULL) or \c desired
+ * (if \c buflen == \c NULL). The user has read access
+ * to the buffer and guarantee of stability of the data
+ * until the next call to mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim().
+ * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPS_READER_OUT_OF_DATA if there is not enough
+ * data available to serve the get request. In this case, the
+ * reader remains intact and in consuming mode, and the consumer
+ * should retry the call after a successful cycle of
+ * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() and mbedtls_mps_reader_feed().
+ * If, after such a cycle, the consumer requests a different
+ * amount of data, the result is implementation-defined;
+ * progress is guaranteed only if the same amount of data
+ * is requested after a mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() and
+ * mbedtls_mps_reader_feed() cycle.
+ * \return Another negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error
+ * code for different kinds of failure.
+ *
+ * \note Passing \c NULL as \p buflen is a convenient way to
+ * indicate that fragmentation is not tolerated.
+ * It's functionally equivalent to passing a valid
+ * address as buflen and checking \c *buflen == \c desired
+ * afterwards.
+ */
+int mbedtls_mps_reader_get(mbedtls_mps_reader *reader,
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t desired,
+ unsigned char **buffer,
+ mbedtls_mps_size_t *buflen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Mark data obtained from mbedtls_mps_reader_get() as processed.
+ *
+ * This call indicates that all data received from prior calls to
+ * mbedtls_mps_reader_get() has been or will have been
+ * processed when mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called,
+ * and thus need not be backed up.
+ *
+ * This function has no user observable effect until
+ * mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called. In particular,
+ * buffers received from mbedtls_mps_reader_get() remain
+ * valid until mbedtls_mps_reader_reclaim() is called.
+ *
+ * \param reader The reader context to use.
+ *
+ * \return \c 0 on success.
+ * \return A negative \c MBEDTLS_ERR_READER_XXX error code on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mbedtls_mps_reader_commit(mbedtls_mps_reader *reader);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_READER_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..69f6e5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.c
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+/*
+ * Message Processing Stack, Trace module
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
+
+#include "mps_common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE)
+
+#include "mps_trace.h"
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+static int trace_depth = 0;
+
+#define color_default "\x1B[0m"
+#define color_red "\x1B[1;31m"
+#define color_green "\x1B[1;32m"
+#define color_yellow "\x1B[1;33m"
+#define color_blue "\x1B[1;34m"
+#define color_magenta "\x1B[1;35m"
+#define color_cyan "\x1B[1;36m"
+#define color_white "\x1B[1;37m"
+
+static char const *colors[] =
+{
+ color_default,
+ color_green,
+ color_yellow,
+ color_magenta,
+ color_cyan,
+ color_blue,
+ color_white
+};
+
+#define MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE 100
+
+void mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg(int id, int line, const char *format, ...)
+{
+ int ret;
+ char str[MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE];
+ va_list argp;
+ va_start(argp, format);
+ ret = mbedtls_vsnprintf(str, MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE, format, argp);
+ va_end(argp);
+
+ if (ret >= 0 && ret < MPS_TRACE_BUF_SIZE) {
+ str[ret] = '\0';
+ mbedtls_printf("[%d|L%d]: %s\n", id, line, str);
+ }
+}
+
+int mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth()
+{
+ return trace_depth;
+}
+void mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth()
+{
+ trace_depth--;
+}
+void mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth()
+{
+ trace_depth++;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mps_trace_color(int id)
+{
+ if (id > (int) (sizeof(colors) / sizeof(*colors))) {
+ return;
+ }
+ printf("%s", colors[id]);
+}
+
+void mbedtls_mps_trace_indent(int level, mbedtls_mps_trace_type ty)
+{
+ if (level > 0) {
+ while (--level) {
+ printf("| ");
+ }
+
+ printf("| ");
+ }
+
+ switch (ty) {
+ case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT:
+ mbedtls_printf("@ ");
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL:
+ mbedtls_printf("+--> ");
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR:
+ mbedtls_printf("E ");
+ break;
+
+ case MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN:
+ mbedtls_printf("< ");
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b456b2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/mps_trace.h
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \file mps_trace.h
+ *
+ * \brief Tracing module for MPS
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "mps_common.h"
+#include "mps_trace.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_ENABLE_TRACE)
+
+/*
+ * Adapt this to enable/disable tracing output
+ * from the various layers of the MPS.
+ */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_1
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_2
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_3
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_4
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_READER
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_WRITER
+
+/*
+ * To use the existing trace module, only change
+ * MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_XXX above, but don't modify the
+ * rest of this file.
+ */
+
+typedef enum {
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_COMMENT,
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL,
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_ERROR,
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN
+} mbedtls_mps_trace_type;
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_1 1
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_2 2
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_3 3
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_4 4
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_WRITER 5
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER 6
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_1)
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_1)
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 0
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_2)
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_2)
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 0
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_3)
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_3)
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 0
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_LAYER_4)
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_LAYER_4)
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 0
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_READER)
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_READER)
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER 0
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_ENABLE_WRITER)
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER (1u << MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_BIT_WRITER)
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER 0
+#endif
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK (MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_1 | \
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_2 | \
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_3 | \
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_LAYER_4 | \
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_READER | \
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK_WRITER)
+
+/* We have to avoid globals because E-ACSL chokes on them...
+ * Wrap everything in stub functions. */
+int mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth(void);
+void mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth(void);
+void mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth(void);
+
+void mbedtls_mps_trace_color(int id);
+void mbedtls_mps_trace_indent(int level, mbedtls_mps_trace_type ty);
+
+void mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg(int id, int line, const char *format, ...);
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(type, ...) \
+ do { \
+ if (!(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & (1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id))) \
+ break; \
+ mbedtls_mps_trace_indent(mbedtls_mps_trace_get_depth(), type); \
+ mbedtls_mps_trace_color(mbedtls_mps_trace_id); \
+ mbedtls_mps_trace_print_msg(mbedtls_mps_trace_id, __LINE__, __VA_ARGS__); \
+ mbedtls_mps_trace_color(0); \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT(...) \
+ do { \
+ if (!(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & (1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id))) \
+ break; \
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_CALL, __VA_ARGS__); \
+ mbedtls_mps_trace_inc_depth(); \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END(val) \
+ do { \
+ if (!(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_MASK & (1u << mbedtls_mps_trace_id))) \
+ break; \
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_TYPE_RETURN, "%d (-%#04x)", \
+ (int) (val), -((unsigned) (val))); \
+ mbedtls_mps_trace_dec_depth(); \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(val) \
+ do { \
+ /* Breaks tail recursion. */ \
+ int ret__ = val; \
+ MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END(ret__); \
+ return ret__; \
+ } while (0)
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE(type, ...) do { } while (0)
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_INIT(...) do { } while (0)
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_END do { } while (0)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_RETURN(val) return val;
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MPS_MBEDTLS_MPS_TRACE_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1419c78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/net_sockets.c
@@ -0,0 +1,696 @@
+/*
+ * TCP/IP or UDP/IP networking functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+/* Enable definition of getaddrinfo() even when compiling with -std=c99. Must
+ * be set before mbedtls_config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h indirectly.
+ * Harmless on other platforms. */
+#ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE
+#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L
+#endif
+#ifndef _XOPEN_SOURCE
+#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 600 /* sockaddr_storage */
+#endif
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C)
+
+#if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \
+ !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \
+ !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__)
+#error "This module only works on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NET_C in mbedtls_config.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \
+ !defined(EFI32)
+
+#define IS_EINTR(ret) ((ret) == WSAEINTR)
+
+#include <ws2tcpip.h>
+
+#include <winsock2.h>
+#include <windows.h>
+#if (_WIN32_WINNT < 0x0501)
+#include <wspiapi.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#if defined(_WIN32_WCE)
+#pragma comment( lib, "ws2.lib" )
+#else
+#pragma comment( lib, "ws2_32.lib" )
+#endif
+#endif /* _MSC_VER */
+
+#define read(fd, buf, len) recv(fd, (char *) (buf), (int) (len), 0)
+#define write(fd, buf, len) send(fd, (char *) (buf), (int) (len), 0)
+#define close(fd) closesocket(fd)
+
+static int wsa_init_done = 0;
+
+#else /* ( _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE ) && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#define IS_EINTR(ret) ((ret) == EINTR)
+#define SOCKET int
+
+#endif /* ( _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE ) && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
+
+/* Some MS functions want int and MSVC warns if we pass size_t,
+ * but the standard functions use socklen_t, so cast only for MSVC */
+#if defined(_MSC_VER)
+#define MSVC_INT_CAST (int)
+#else
+#define MSVC_INT_CAST
+#endif
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+#include <time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/*
+ * Prepare for using the sockets interface
+ */
+static int net_prepare(void)
+{
+#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \
+ !defined(EFI32)
+ WSADATA wsaData;
+
+ if (wsa_init_done == 0) {
+ if (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2, 0), &wsaData) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ wsa_init_done = 1;
+ }
+#else
+#if !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+#endif
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 0 if the file descriptor is valid, an error otherwise.
+ * If for_select != 0, check whether the file descriptor is within the range
+ * allowed for fd_set used for the FD_xxx macros and the select() function.
+ */
+static int check_fd(int fd, int for_select)
+{
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_INVALID_CONTEXT;
+ }
+
+#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \
+ !defined(EFI32)
+ (void) for_select;
+#else
+ /* A limitation of select() is that it only works with file descriptors
+ * that are strictly less than FD_SETSIZE. This is a limitation of the
+ * fd_set type. Error out early, because attempting to call FD_SET on a
+ * large file descriptor is a buffer overflow on typical platforms. */
+ if (for_select && fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize a context
+ */
+void mbedtls_net_init(mbedtls_net_context *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->fd = -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initiate a TCP connection with host:port and the given protocol
+ */
+int mbedtls_net_connect(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *host,
+ const char *port, int proto)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *addr_list, *cur;
+
+ if ((ret = net_prepare()) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Do name resolution with both IPv6 and IPv4 */
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+ hints.ai_socktype = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM;
+ hints.ai_protocol = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP;
+
+ if (getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &addr_list) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST;
+ }
+
+ /* Try the sockaddrs until a connection succeeds */
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST;
+ for (cur = addr_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->ai_next) {
+ ctx->fd = (int) socket(cur->ai_family, cur->ai_socktype,
+ cur->ai_protocol);
+ if (ctx->fd < 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (connect(ctx->fd, cur->ai_addr, MSVC_INT_CAST cur->ai_addrlen) == 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_net_close(ctx);
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONNECT_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ freeaddrinfo(addr_list);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a listening socket on bind_ip:port
+ */
+int mbedtls_net_bind(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, const char *bind_ip, const char *port, int proto)
+{
+ int n, ret;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *addr_list, *cur;
+
+ if ((ret = net_prepare()) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Bind to IPv6 and/or IPv4, but only in the desired protocol */
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+ hints.ai_socktype = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM;
+ hints.ai_protocol = proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_UDP ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP;
+ if (bind_ip == NULL) {
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+ }
+
+ if (getaddrinfo(bind_ip, port, &hints, &addr_list) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST;
+ }
+
+ /* Try the sockaddrs until a binding succeeds */
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_UNKNOWN_HOST;
+ for (cur = addr_list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->ai_next) {
+ ctx->fd = (int) socket(cur->ai_family, cur->ai_socktype,
+ cur->ai_protocol);
+ if (ctx->fd < 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ n = 1;
+ if (setsockopt(ctx->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
+ (const char *) &n, sizeof(n)) != 0) {
+ mbedtls_net_close(ctx);
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (bind(ctx->fd, cur->ai_addr, MSVC_INT_CAST cur->ai_addrlen) != 0) {
+ mbedtls_net_close(ctx);
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Listen only makes sense for TCP */
+ if (proto == MBEDTLS_NET_PROTO_TCP) {
+ if (listen(ctx->fd, MBEDTLS_NET_LISTEN_BACKLOG) != 0) {
+ mbedtls_net_close(ctx);
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_LISTEN_FAILED;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Bind was successful */
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ freeaddrinfo(addr_list);
+
+ return ret;
+
+}
+
+#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \
+ !defined(EFI32)
+/*
+ * Check if the requested operation would be blocking on a non-blocking socket
+ * and thus 'failed' with a negative return value.
+ */
+static int net_would_block(const mbedtls_net_context *ctx)
+{
+ ((void) ctx);
+ return WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK;
+}
+#else
+/*
+ * Check if the requested operation would be blocking on a non-blocking socket
+ * and thus 'failed' with a negative return value.
+ *
+ * Note: on a blocking socket this function always returns 0!
+ */
+static int net_would_block(const mbedtls_net_context *ctx)
+{
+ int err = errno;
+
+ /*
+ * Never return 'WOULD BLOCK' on a blocking socket
+ */
+ if ((fcntl(ctx->fd, F_GETFL) & O_NONBLOCK) != O_NONBLOCK) {
+ errno = err;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (errno = err) {
+#if defined EAGAIN
+ case EAGAIN:
+#endif
+#if defined EWOULDBLOCK && EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN
+ case EWOULDBLOCK:
+#endif
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* ( _WIN32 || _WIN32_WCE ) && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
+
+/*
+ * Accept a connection from a remote client
+ */
+int mbedtls_net_accept(mbedtls_net_context *bind_ctx,
+ mbedtls_net_context *client_ctx,
+ void *client_ip, size_t buf_size, size_t *cip_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ int type;
+
+ struct sockaddr_storage client_addr;
+
+#if defined(__socklen_t_defined) || defined(_SOCKLEN_T) || \
+ defined(_SOCKLEN_T_DECLARED) || defined(__DEFINED_socklen_t) || \
+ defined(socklen_t) || (defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200112L)
+ socklen_t n = (socklen_t) sizeof(client_addr);
+ socklen_t type_len = (socklen_t) sizeof(type);
+#else
+ int n = (int) sizeof(client_addr);
+ int type_len = (int) sizeof(type);
+#endif
+
+ /* Is this a TCP or UDP socket? */
+ if (getsockopt(bind_ctx->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TYPE,
+ (void *) &type, &type_len) != 0 ||
+ (type != SOCK_STREAM && type != SOCK_DGRAM)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (type == SOCK_STREAM) {
+ /* TCP: actual accept() */
+ ret = client_ctx->fd = (int) accept(bind_ctx->fd,
+ (struct sockaddr *) &client_addr, &n);
+ } else {
+ /* UDP: wait for a message, but keep it in the queue */
+ char buf[1] = { 0 };
+
+ ret = (int) recvfrom(bind_ctx->fd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_PEEK,
+ (struct sockaddr *) &client_addr, &n);
+
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+ if (ret == SOCKET_ERROR &&
+ WSAGetLastError() == WSAEMSGSIZE) {
+ /* We know buf is too small, thanks, just peeking here */
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ if (net_would_block(bind_ctx) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ;
+ }
+
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* UDP: hijack the listening socket to communicate with the client,
+ * then bind a new socket to accept new connections */
+ if (type != SOCK_STREAM) {
+ struct sockaddr_storage local_addr;
+ int one = 1;
+
+ if (connect(bind_ctx->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &client_addr, n) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_ACCEPT_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ client_ctx->fd = bind_ctx->fd;
+ bind_ctx->fd = -1; /* In case we exit early */
+
+ n = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+ if (getsockname(client_ctx->fd,
+ (struct sockaddr *) &local_addr, &n) != 0 ||
+ (bind_ctx->fd = (int) socket(local_addr.ss_family,
+ SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP)) < 0 ||
+ setsockopt(bind_ctx->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
+ (const char *) &one, sizeof(one)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SOCKET_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (bind(bind_ctx->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &local_addr, n) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BIND_FAILED;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (client_ip != NULL) {
+ if (client_addr.ss_family == AF_INET) {
+ struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *) &client_addr;
+ *cip_len = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
+
+ if (buf_size < *cip_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(client_ip, &addr4->sin_addr.s_addr, *cip_len);
+ } else {
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) &client_addr;
+ *cip_len = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
+
+ if (buf_size < *cip_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(client_ip, &addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, *cip_len);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the socket blocking or non-blocking
+ */
+int mbedtls_net_set_block(mbedtls_net_context *ctx)
+{
+#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \
+ !defined(EFI32)
+ u_long n = 0;
+ return ioctlsocket(ctx->fd, FIONBIO, &n);
+#else
+ return fcntl(ctx->fd, F_SETFL, fcntl(ctx->fd, F_GETFL) & ~O_NONBLOCK);
+#endif
+}
+
+int mbedtls_net_set_nonblock(mbedtls_net_context *ctx)
+{
+#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \
+ !defined(EFI32)
+ u_long n = 1;
+ return ioctlsocket(ctx->fd, FIONBIO, &n);
+#else
+ return fcntl(ctx->fd, F_SETFL, fcntl(ctx->fd, F_GETFL) | O_NONBLOCK);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if data is available on the socket
+ */
+
+int mbedtls_net_poll(mbedtls_net_context *ctx, uint32_t rw, uint32_t timeout)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ struct timeval tv;
+
+ fd_set read_fds;
+ fd_set write_fds;
+
+ int fd = ctx->fd;
+
+ ret = check_fd(fd, 1);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#if defined(__has_feature)
+#if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer)
+ /* Ensure that memory sanitizers consider read_fds and write_fds as
+ * initialized even on platforms such as Glibc/x86_64 where FD_ZERO
+ * is implemented in assembly. */
+ memset(&read_fds, 0, sizeof(read_fds));
+ memset(&write_fds, 0, sizeof(write_fds));
+#endif
+#endif
+
+ FD_ZERO(&read_fds);
+ if (rw & MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ) {
+ rw &= ~MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ;
+ FD_SET((SOCKET) fd, &read_fds);
+ }
+
+ FD_ZERO(&write_fds);
+ if (rw & MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE) {
+ rw &= ~MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE;
+ FD_SET((SOCKET) fd, &write_fds);
+ }
+
+ if (rw != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ tv.tv_sec = timeout / 1000;
+ tv.tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000;
+
+ do {
+ ret = select(fd + 1, &read_fds, &write_fds, NULL,
+ timeout == (uint32_t) -1 ? NULL : &tv);
+ } while (IS_EINTR(ret));
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_POLL_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ if (FD_ISSET(fd, &read_fds)) {
+ ret |= MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_READ;
+ }
+ if (FD_ISSET(fd, &write_fds)) {
+ ret |= MBEDTLS_NET_POLL_WRITE;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Portable usleep helper
+ */
+void mbedtls_net_usleep(unsigned long usec)
+{
+#if defined(_WIN32)
+ Sleep((usec + 999) / 1000);
+#else
+ struct timeval tv;
+ tv.tv_sec = usec / 1000000;
+#if (defined(__unix__) || defined(__unix) || \
+ (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__))) && !defined(__DJGPP__)
+ tv.tv_usec = (suseconds_t) usec % 1000000;
+#else
+ tv.tv_usec = usec % 1000000;
+#endif
+ select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &tv);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read at most 'len' characters
+ */
+int mbedtls_net_recv(void *ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd;
+
+ ret = check_fd(fd, 0);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = (int) read(fd, buf, len);
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ if (net_would_block(ctx) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ;
+ }
+
+#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \
+ !defined(EFI32)
+ if (WSAGetLastError() == WSAECONNRESET) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET;
+ }
+#else
+ if (errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET;
+ }
+
+ if (errno == EINTR) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read at most 'len' characters, blocking for at most 'timeout' ms
+ */
+int mbedtls_net_recv_timeout(void *ctx, unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len, uint32_t timeout)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ struct timeval tv;
+ fd_set read_fds;
+ int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd;
+
+ ret = check_fd(fd, 1);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ FD_ZERO(&read_fds);
+ FD_SET((SOCKET) fd, &read_fds);
+
+ tv.tv_sec = timeout / 1000;
+ tv.tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000;
+
+ ret = select(fd + 1, &read_fds, NULL, NULL, timeout == 0 ? NULL : &tv);
+
+ /* Zero fds ready means we timed out */
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT;
+ }
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \
+ !defined(EFI32)
+ if (WSAGetLastError() == WSAEINTR) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ;
+ }
+#else
+ if (errno == EINTR) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_RECV_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* This call will not block */
+ return mbedtls_net_recv(ctx, buf, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write at most 'len' characters
+ */
+int mbedtls_net_send(void *ctx, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ int fd = ((mbedtls_net_context *) ctx)->fd;
+
+ ret = check_fd(fd, 0);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = (int) write(fd, buf, len);
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ if (net_would_block(ctx) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE;
+ }
+
+#if (defined(_WIN32) || defined(_WIN32_WCE)) && !defined(EFIX64) && \
+ !defined(EFI32)
+ if (WSAGetLastError() == WSAECONNRESET) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET;
+ }
+#else
+ if (errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_CONN_RESET;
+ }
+
+ if (errno == EINTR) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_NET_SEND_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Close the connection
+ */
+void mbedtls_net_close(mbedtls_net_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx->fd == -1) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ close(ctx->fd);
+
+ ctx->fd = -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Gracefully close the connection
+ */
+void mbedtls_net_free(mbedtls_net_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->fd == -1) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ shutdown(ctx->fd, 2);
+ close(ctx->fd);
+
+ ctx->fd = -1;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_NET_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8faafe4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/nist_kw.c
@@ -0,0 +1,729 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of NIST SP 800-38F key wrapping, supporting KW and KWP modes
+ * only
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+/*
+ * Definition of Key Wrapping:
+ * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-38F.pdf
+ * RFC 3394 "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm"
+ * RFC 5649 "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm"
+ *
+ * Note: RFC 3394 defines different methodology for intermediate operations for
+ * the wrapping and unwrapping operation than the definition in NIST SP 800-38F.
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/nist_kw.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
+#include "constant_time_internal.h"
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT)
+
+#define KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH 8
+#define MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT 3
+
+/*! The 64-bit default integrity check value (ICV) for KW mode. */
+static const unsigned char NIST_KW_ICV1[] = { 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6, 0xA6 };
+/*! The 32-bit default integrity check value (ICV) for KWP mode. */
+static const unsigned char NIST_KW_ICV2[] = { 0xA6, 0x59, 0x59, 0xA6 };
+
+/*
+ * Initialize context
+ */
+void mbedtls_nist_kw_init(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_nist_kw_context));
+}
+
+int mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_cipher_id_t cipher,
+ const unsigned char *key,
+ unsigned int keybits,
+ const int is_wrap)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
+
+ cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_values(cipher,
+ keybits,
+ MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB);
+ if (cipher_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_cipher_info_get_block_size(cipher_info) != 16) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * SP 800-38F currently defines AES cipher as the only block cipher allowed:
+ * "For KW and KWP, the underlying block cipher shall be approved, and the
+ * block size shall be 128 bits. Currently, the AES block cipher, with key
+ * lengths of 128, 192, or 256 bits, is the only block cipher that fits
+ * this profile."
+ * Currently we don't support other 128 bit block ciphers for key wrapping,
+ * such as Camellia and Aria.
+ */
+ if (cipher != MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&ctx->cipher_ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&ctx->cipher_ctx, key, keybits,
+ is_wrap ? MBEDTLS_ENCRYPT :
+ MBEDTLS_DECRYPT)
+ ) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free context
+ */
+void mbedtls_nist_kw_free(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_cipher_free(&ctx->cipher_ctx);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_nist_kw_context));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper function for Xoring the uint64_t "t" with the encrypted A.
+ * Defined in NIST SP 800-38F section 6.1
+ */
+static void calc_a_xor_t(unsigned char A[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH], uint64_t t)
+{
+ size_t i = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(t); i++) {
+ A[i] ^= (t >> ((sizeof(t) - 1 - i) * 8)) & 0xff;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * KW-AE as defined in SP 800-38F section 6.2
+ * KWP-AE as defined in SP 800-38F section 6.3
+ */
+int mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *out_len, size_t out_size)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t semiblocks = 0;
+ size_t s;
+ size_t olen, padlen = 0;
+ uint64_t t = 0;
+ unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2];
+ unsigned char inbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2];
+
+ *out_len = 0;
+ /*
+ * Generate the String to work on
+ */
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW) {
+ if (out_size < in_len + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * According to SP 800-38F Table 1, the plaintext length for KW
+ * must be between 2 to 2^54-1 semiblocks inclusive.
+ */
+ if (in_len < 16 ||
+#if SIZE_MAX > 0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFF8
+ in_len > 0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFF8 ||
+#endif
+ in_len % KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(output, NIST_KW_ICV1, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH);
+ memmove(output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, input, in_len);
+ } else {
+ if (in_len % 8 != 0) {
+ padlen = (8 - (in_len % 8));
+ }
+
+ if (out_size < in_len + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + padlen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * According to SP 800-38F Table 1, the plaintext length for KWP
+ * must be between 1 and 2^32-1 octets inclusive.
+ */
+ if (in_len < 1
+#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFF
+ || in_len > 0xFFFFFFFF
+#endif
+ ) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(output, NIST_KW_ICV2, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2);
+ MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE((in_len & 0xffffffff), output,
+ KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2);
+
+ memcpy(output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, input, in_len);
+ memset(output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH + in_len, 0, padlen);
+ }
+ semiblocks = ((in_len + padlen) / KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH) + 1;
+
+ s = 6 * (semiblocks - 1);
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP
+ && in_len <= KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH) {
+ memcpy(inbuff, output, 16);
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ inbuff, 16, output, &olen);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ } else {
+ unsigned char *R2 = output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH;
+ unsigned char *A = output;
+
+ /*
+ * Do the wrapping function W, as defined in RFC 3394 section 2.2.1
+ */
+ if (semiblocks < MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate intermediate values */
+ for (t = 1; t <= s; t++) {
+ memcpy(inbuff, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH);
+ memcpy(inbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, R2, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ inbuff, 16, outbuff, &olen);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(A, outbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH);
+ calc_a_xor_t(A, t);
+
+ memcpy(R2, outbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH);
+ R2 += KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH;
+ if (R2 >= output + (semiblocks * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH)) {
+ R2 = output + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ *out_len = semiblocks * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH;
+
+cleanup:
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ memset(output, 0, semiblocks * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH);
+ }
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(inbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(outbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * W-1 function as defined in RFC 3394 section 2.2.2
+ * This function assumes the following:
+ * 1. Output buffer is at least of size ( semiblocks - 1 ) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH.
+ * 2. The input buffer is of size semiblocks * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH.
+ * 3. Minimal number of semiblocks is 3.
+ * 4. A is a buffer to hold the first semiblock of the input buffer.
+ */
+static int unwrap(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t semiblocks,
+ unsigned char A[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH],
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *out_len)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ const size_t s = 6 * (semiblocks - 1);
+ size_t olen;
+ uint64_t t = 0;
+ unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2];
+ unsigned char inbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2];
+ unsigned char *R = NULL;
+ *out_len = 0;
+
+ if (semiblocks < MIN_SEMIBLOCKS_COUNT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(A, input, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH);
+ memmove(output, input + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, (semiblocks - 1) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH);
+ R = output + (semiblocks - 2) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH;
+
+ /* Calculate intermediate values */
+ for (t = s; t >= 1; t--) {
+ calc_a_xor_t(A, t);
+
+ memcpy(inbuff, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH);
+ memcpy(inbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, R, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ inbuff, 16, outbuff, &olen);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(A, outbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+ /* Set R as LSB64 of outbuff */
+ memcpy(R, outbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+ if (R == output) {
+ R = output + (semiblocks - 2) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH;
+ } else {
+ R -= KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *out_len = (semiblocks - 1) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH;
+
+cleanup:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ memset(output, 0, (semiblocks - 1) * KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH);
+ }
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(inbuff, sizeof(inbuff));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(outbuff, sizeof(outbuff));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * KW-AD as defined in SP 800-38F section 6.2
+ * KWP-AD as defined in SP 800-38F section 6.3
+ */
+int mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(mbedtls_nist_kw_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_nist_kw_mode_t mode,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t in_len,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *out_len, size_t out_size)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ size_t olen;
+ unsigned char A[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH];
+ int diff;
+
+ *out_len = 0;
+ if (out_size < in_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW) {
+ /*
+ * According to SP 800-38F Table 1, the ciphertext length for KW
+ * must be between 3 to 2^54 semiblocks inclusive.
+ */
+ if (in_len < 24 ||
+#if SIZE_MAX > 0x200000000000000
+ in_len > 0x200000000000000 ||
+#endif
+ in_len % KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ret = unwrap(ctx, input, in_len / KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH,
+ A, output, out_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Check ICV in "constant-time" */
+ diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(NIST_KW_ICV1, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+ if (diff != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ } else if (mode == MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP) {
+ size_t padlen = 0;
+ uint32_t Plen;
+ /*
+ * According to SP 800-38F Table 1, the ciphertext length for KWP
+ * must be between 2 to 2^29 semiblocks inclusive.
+ */
+ if (in_len < KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2 ||
+#if SIZE_MAX > 0x100000000
+ in_len > 0x100000000 ||
+#endif
+ in_len % KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (in_len == KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2) {
+ unsigned char outbuff[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 2];
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_update(&ctx->cipher_ctx,
+ input, 16, outbuff, &olen);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(A, outbuff, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH);
+ memcpy(output, outbuff + KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(outbuff, sizeof(outbuff));
+ *out_len = KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH;
+ } else {
+ /* in_len >= KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH * 3 */
+ ret = unwrap(ctx, input, in_len / KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH,
+ A, output, out_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check ICV in "constant-time" */
+ diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp(NIST_KW_ICV2, A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2);
+
+ if (diff != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ Plen = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(A, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH / 2);
+
+ /*
+ * Plen is the length of the plaintext, when the input is valid.
+ * If Plen is larger than the plaintext and padding, padlen will be
+ * larger than 8, because of the type wrap around.
+ */
+ padlen = in_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - Plen;
+ ret = mbedtls_ct_error_if(mbedtls_ct_uint_gt(padlen, 7),
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED, ret);
+ padlen &= 7;
+
+ /* Check padding in "constant-time" */
+ const uint8_t zero[KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH] = { 0 };
+ diff = mbedtls_ct_memcmp_partial(
+ &output[*out_len - KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH], zero,
+ KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH, KW_SEMIBLOCK_LENGTH - padlen, 0);
+
+ if (diff != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_AUTH_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ memset(output + Plen, 0, padlen);
+ *out_len = Plen;
+ } else {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ memset(output, 0, *out_len);
+ *out_len = 0;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&diff, sizeof(diff));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(A, sizeof(A));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_ALT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+
+/*
+ * Test vectors taken from NIST
+ * https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/CAVP-TESTING-BLOCK-CIPHER-MODES#KW
+ */
+static const unsigned int key_len[] = {
+ 16,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ 24,
+ 32
+#endif
+};
+
+static const unsigned char kw_key[][32] = {
+ { 0x75, 0x75, 0xda, 0x3a, 0x93, 0x60, 0x7c, 0xc2,
+ 0xbf, 0xd8, 0xce, 0xc7, 0xaa, 0xdf, 0xd9, 0xa6 },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { 0x2d, 0x85, 0x26, 0x08, 0x1d, 0x02, 0xfb, 0x5b,
+ 0x85, 0xf6, 0x9a, 0xc2, 0x86, 0xec, 0xd5, 0x7d,
+ 0x40, 0xdf, 0x5d, 0xf3, 0x49, 0x47, 0x44, 0xd3 },
+ { 0x11, 0x2a, 0xd4, 0x1b, 0x48, 0x56, 0xc7, 0x25,
+ 0x4a, 0x98, 0x48, 0xd3, 0x0f, 0xdd, 0x78, 0x33,
+ 0x5b, 0x03, 0x9a, 0x48, 0xa8, 0x96, 0x2c, 0x4d,
+ 0x1c, 0xb7, 0x8e, 0xab, 0xd5, 0xda, 0xd7, 0x88 }
+#endif
+};
+
+static const unsigned char kw_msg[][40] = {
+ { 0x42, 0x13, 0x6d, 0x3c, 0x38, 0x4a, 0x3e, 0xea,
+ 0xc9, 0x5a, 0x06, 0x6f, 0xd2, 0x8f, 0xed, 0x3f },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { 0x95, 0xc1, 0x1b, 0xf5, 0x35, 0x3a, 0xfe, 0xdb,
+ 0x98, 0xfd, 0xd6, 0xc8, 0xca, 0x6f, 0xdb, 0x6d,
+ 0xa5, 0x4b, 0x74, 0xb4, 0x99, 0x0f, 0xdc, 0x45,
+ 0xc0, 0x9d, 0x15, 0x8f, 0x51, 0xce, 0x62, 0x9d,
+ 0xe2, 0xaf, 0x26, 0xe3, 0x25, 0x0e, 0x6b, 0x4c },
+ { 0x1b, 0x20, 0xbf, 0x19, 0x90, 0xb0, 0x65, 0xd7,
+ 0x98, 0xe1, 0xb3, 0x22, 0x64, 0xad, 0x50, 0xa8,
+ 0x74, 0x74, 0x92, 0xba, 0x09, 0xa0, 0x4d, 0xd1 }
+#endif
+};
+
+static const size_t kw_msg_len[] = {
+ 16,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ 40,
+ 24
+#endif
+};
+static const size_t kw_out_len[] = {
+ 24,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ 48,
+ 32
+#endif
+};
+static const unsigned char kw_res[][48] = {
+ { 0x03, 0x1f, 0x6b, 0xd7, 0xe6, 0x1e, 0x64, 0x3d,
+ 0xf6, 0x85, 0x94, 0x81, 0x6f, 0x64, 0xca, 0xa3,
+ 0xf5, 0x6f, 0xab, 0xea, 0x25, 0x48, 0xf5, 0xfb },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { 0x44, 0x3c, 0x6f, 0x15, 0x09, 0x83, 0x71, 0x91,
+ 0x3e, 0x5c, 0x81, 0x4c, 0xa1, 0xa0, 0x42, 0xec,
+ 0x68, 0x2f, 0x7b, 0x13, 0x6d, 0x24, 0x3a, 0x4d,
+ 0x6c, 0x42, 0x6f, 0xc6, 0x97, 0x15, 0x63, 0xe8,
+ 0xa1, 0x4a, 0x55, 0x8e, 0x09, 0x64, 0x16, 0x19,
+ 0xbf, 0x03, 0xfc, 0xaf, 0x90, 0xb1, 0xfc, 0x2d },
+ { 0xba, 0x8a, 0x25, 0x9a, 0x47, 0x1b, 0x78, 0x7d,
+ 0xd5, 0xd5, 0x40, 0xec, 0x25, 0xd4, 0x3d, 0x87,
+ 0x20, 0x0f, 0xda, 0xdc, 0x6d, 0x1f, 0x05, 0xd9,
+ 0x16, 0x58, 0x4f, 0xa9, 0xf6, 0xcb, 0xf5, 0x12 }
+#endif
+};
+
+static const unsigned char kwp_key[][32] = {
+ { 0x78, 0x65, 0xe2, 0x0f, 0x3c, 0x21, 0x65, 0x9a,
+ 0xb4, 0x69, 0x0b, 0x62, 0x9c, 0xdf, 0x3c, 0xc4 },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { 0xf5, 0xf8, 0x96, 0xa3, 0xbd, 0x2f, 0x4a, 0x98,
+ 0x23, 0xef, 0x16, 0x2b, 0x00, 0xb8, 0x05, 0xd7,
+ 0xde, 0x1e, 0xa4, 0x66, 0x26, 0x96, 0xa2, 0x58 },
+ { 0x95, 0xda, 0x27, 0x00, 0xca, 0x6f, 0xd9, 0xa5,
+ 0x25, 0x54, 0xee, 0x2a, 0x8d, 0xf1, 0x38, 0x6f,
+ 0x5b, 0x94, 0xa1, 0xa6, 0x0e, 0xd8, 0xa4, 0xae,
+ 0xf6, 0x0a, 0x8d, 0x61, 0xab, 0x5f, 0x22, 0x5a }
+#endif
+};
+
+static const unsigned char kwp_msg[][31] = {
+ { 0xbd, 0x68, 0x43, 0xd4, 0x20, 0x37, 0x8d, 0xc8,
+ 0x96 },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { 0x6c, 0xcd, 0xd5, 0x85, 0x18, 0x40, 0x97, 0xeb,
+ 0xd5, 0xc3, 0xaf, 0x3e, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x2c, 0x19,
+ 0x14, 0x7b, 0x4d, 0x99, 0x5f, 0x96, 0x43, 0x66,
+ 0x91, 0x56, 0x75, 0x8c, 0x13, 0x16, 0x8f },
+ { 0xd1 }
+#endif
+};
+static const size_t kwp_msg_len[] = {
+ 9,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ 31,
+ 1
+#endif
+};
+
+static const unsigned char kwp_res[][48] = {
+ { 0x41, 0xec, 0xa9, 0x56, 0xd4, 0xaa, 0x04, 0x7e,
+ 0xb5, 0xcf, 0x4e, 0xfe, 0x65, 0x96, 0x61, 0xe7,
+ 0x4d, 0xb6, 0xf8, 0xc5, 0x64, 0xe2, 0x35, 0x00 },
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ { 0x4e, 0x9b, 0xc2, 0xbc, 0xbc, 0x6c, 0x1e, 0x13,
+ 0xd3, 0x35, 0xbc, 0xc0, 0xf7, 0x73, 0x6a, 0x88,
+ 0xfa, 0x87, 0x53, 0x66, 0x15, 0xbb, 0x8e, 0x63,
+ 0x8b, 0xcc, 0x81, 0x66, 0x84, 0x68, 0x17, 0x90,
+ 0x67, 0xcf, 0xa9, 0x8a, 0x9d, 0x0e, 0x33, 0x26 },
+ { 0x06, 0xba, 0x7a, 0xe6, 0xf3, 0x24, 0x8c, 0xfd,
+ 0xcf, 0x26, 0x75, 0x07, 0xfa, 0x00, 0x1b, 0xc4 }
+#endif
+};
+static const size_t kwp_out_len[] = {
+ 24,
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH)
+ 40,
+ 16
+#endif
+};
+
+int mbedtls_nist_kw_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ mbedtls_nist_kw_context ctx;
+ unsigned char out[48];
+ size_t olen;
+ int i;
+ int ret = 0;
+ mbedtls_nist_kw_init(&ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * KW mode
+ */
+ {
+ static const int num_tests = sizeof(kw_key) / sizeof(*kw_key);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_tests; i++) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" KW-AES-%u ", (unsigned int) key_len[i] * 8);
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES,
+ kw_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 1);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" KW: setup failed ");
+ }
+
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW, kw_msg[i],
+ kw_msg_len[i], out, &olen, sizeof(out));
+ if (ret != 0 || kw_out_len[i] != olen ||
+ memcmp(out, kw_res[i], kw_out_len[i]) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed. ");
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES,
+ kw_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 0))
+ != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" KW: setup failed ");
+ }
+
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KW,
+ out, olen, out, &olen, sizeof(out));
+
+ if (ret != 0 || olen != kw_msg_len[i] ||
+ memcmp(out, kw_msg[i], kw_msg_len[i]) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * KWP mode
+ */
+ {
+ static const int num_tests = sizeof(kwp_key) / sizeof(*kwp_key);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_tests; i++) {
+ olen = sizeof(out);
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" KWP-AES-%u ", (unsigned int) key_len[i] * 8);
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES, kwp_key[i],
+ key_len[i] * 8, 1);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" KWP: setup failed ");
+ }
+
+ goto end;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_wrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, kwp_msg[i],
+ kwp_msg_len[i], out, &olen, sizeof(out));
+
+ if (ret != 0 || kwp_out_len[i] != olen ||
+ memcmp(out, kwp_res[i], kwp_out_len[i]) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed. ");
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_setkey(&ctx, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES,
+ kwp_key[i], key_len[i] * 8, 0))
+ != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" KWP: setup failed ");
+ }
+
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_nist_kw_unwrap(&ctx, MBEDTLS_KW_MODE_KWP, out,
+ olen, out, &olen, sizeof(out));
+
+ if (ret != 0 || olen != kwp_msg_len[i] ||
+ memcmp(out, kwp_msg[i], kwp_msg_len[i]) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed. ");
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+end:
+ mbedtls_nist_kw_free(&ctx);
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST && MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/oid.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/oid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d6b1eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/oid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1166 @@
+/**
+ * \file oid.c
+ *
+ * \brief Object Identifier (OID) database
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_OID_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
+#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+/*
+ * Macro to automatically add the size of #define'd OIDs
+ */
+#define ADD_LEN(s) s, MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(s)
+
+/*
+ * Macro to generate mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t
+ */
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
+#define OID_DESCRIPTOR(s, name, description) { ADD_LEN(s), name, description }
+#define NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR { NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }
+#else
+#define OID_DESCRIPTOR(s, name, description) { ADD_LEN(s) }
+#define NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR { NULL, 0 }
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Macro to generate an internal function for oid_XXX_from_asn1() (used by
+ * the other functions)
+ */
+#define FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(TYPE_T, NAME, LIST) \
+ static const TYPE_T *oid_ ## NAME ## _from_asn1( \
+ const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid) \
+ { \
+ const TYPE_T *p = (LIST); \
+ const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *cur = \
+ (const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *) p; \
+ if (p == NULL || oid == NULL) return NULL; \
+ while (cur->asn1 != NULL) { \
+ if (cur->asn1_len == oid->len && \
+ memcmp(cur->asn1, oid->p, oid->len) == 0) { \
+ return p; \
+ } \
+ p++; \
+ cur = (const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t *) p; \
+ } \
+ return NULL; \
+ }
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
+/*
+ * Macro to generate a function for retrieving a single attribute from the
+ * descriptor of an mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper.
+ */
+#define FN_OID_GET_DESCRIPTOR_ATTR1(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, TYPE_NAME, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1) \
+ int FN_NAME(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1) \
+ { \
+ const TYPE_T *data = oid_ ## TYPE_NAME ## _from_asn1(oid); \
+ if (data == NULL) return MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND; \
+ *ATTR1 = data->descriptor.ATTR1; \
+ return 0; \
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
+
+/*
+ * Macro to generate a function for retrieving a single attribute from an
+ * mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper.
+ */
+#define FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, TYPE_NAME, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1) \
+ int FN_NAME(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1) \
+ { \
+ const TYPE_T *data = oid_ ## TYPE_NAME ## _from_asn1(oid); \
+ if (data == NULL) return MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND; \
+ *ATTR1 = data->ATTR1; \
+ return 0; \
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Macro to generate a function for retrieving two attributes from an
+ * mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper.
+ */
+#define FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, TYPE_NAME, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1, \
+ ATTR2_TYPE, ATTR2) \
+ int FN_NAME(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid, ATTR1_TYPE * ATTR1, \
+ ATTR2_TYPE * ATTR2) \
+ { \
+ const TYPE_T *data = oid_ ## TYPE_NAME ## _from_asn1(oid); \
+ if (data == NULL) return MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND; \
+ *(ATTR1) = data->ATTR1; \
+ *(ATTR2) = data->ATTR2; \
+ return 0; \
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Macro to generate a function for retrieving the OID based on a single
+ * attribute from a mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper.
+ */
+#define FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, LIST, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1) \
+ int FN_NAME(ATTR1_TYPE ATTR1, const char **oid, size_t *olen) \
+ { \
+ const TYPE_T *cur = (LIST); \
+ while (cur->descriptor.asn1 != NULL) { \
+ if (cur->ATTR1 == (ATTR1)) { \
+ *oid = cur->descriptor.asn1; \
+ *olen = cur->descriptor.asn1_len; \
+ return 0; \
+ } \
+ cur++; \
+ } \
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND; \
+ }
+
+/*
+ * Macro to generate a function for retrieving the OID based on two
+ * attributes from a mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t wrapper.
+ */
+#define FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR2(FN_NAME, TYPE_T, LIST, ATTR1_TYPE, ATTR1, \
+ ATTR2_TYPE, ATTR2) \
+ int FN_NAME(ATTR1_TYPE ATTR1, ATTR2_TYPE ATTR2, const char **oid, \
+ size_t *olen) \
+ { \
+ const TYPE_T *cur = (LIST); \
+ while (cur->descriptor.asn1 != NULL) { \
+ if (cur->ATTR1 == (ATTR1) && cur->ATTR2 == (ATTR2)) { \
+ *oid = cur->descriptor.asn1; \
+ *olen = cur->descriptor.asn1_len; \
+ return 0; \
+ } \
+ cur++; \
+ } \
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND; \
+ }
+
+/*
+ * For X520 attribute types
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor;
+ const char *short_name;
+} oid_x520_attr_t;
+
+static const oid_x520_attr_t oid_x520_attr_type[] =
+{
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, "id-at-commonName", "Common Name"),
+ "CN",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, "id-at-countryName", "Country"),
+ "C",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, "id-at-locality", "Locality"),
+ "L",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, "id-at-state", "State"),
+ "ST",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION, "id-at-organizationName",
+ "Organization"),
+ "O",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, "id-at-organizationalUnitName", "Org Unit"),
+ "OU",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL,
+ "emailAddress",
+ "E-mail address"),
+ "emailAddress",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER,
+ "id-at-serialNumber",
+ "Serial number"),
+ "serialNumber",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS,
+ "id-at-postalAddress",
+ "Postal address"),
+ "postalAddress",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE, "id-at-postalCode", "Postal code"),
+ "postalCode",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, "id-at-surName", "Surname"),
+ "SN",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, "id-at-givenName", "Given name"),
+ "GN",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS, "id-at-initials", "Initials"),
+ "initials",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER,
+ "id-at-generationQualifier",
+ "Generation qualifier"),
+ "generationQualifier",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE, "id-at-title", "Title"),
+ "title",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER,
+ "id-at-dnQualifier",
+ "Distinguished Name qualifier"),
+ "dnQualifier",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM, "id-at-pseudonym", "Pseudonym"),
+ "pseudonym",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_UID, "id-uid", "User Id"),
+ "uid",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT,
+ "id-domainComponent",
+ "Domain component"),
+ "DC",
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AT_UNIQUE_IDENTIFIER,
+ "id-at-uniqueIdentifier",
+ "Unique Identifier"),
+ "uniqueIdentifier",
+ },
+ {
+ NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR,
+ NULL,
+ }
+};
+
+FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_x520_attr_t, x520_attr, oid_x520_attr_type)
+FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_attr_short_name,
+ oid_x520_attr_t,
+ x520_attr,
+ const char *,
+ short_name)
+
+/*
+ * For X509 extensions
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor;
+ int ext_type;
+} oid_x509_ext_t;
+
+static const oid_x509_ext_t oid_x509_ext[] =
+{
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
+ "id-ce-basicConstraints",
+ "Basic Constraints"),
+ MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS,
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_KEY_USAGE, "id-ce-keyUsage", "Key Usage"),
+ MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_KEY_USAGE,
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE,
+ "id-ce-extKeyUsage",
+ "Extended Key Usage"),
+ MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE,
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+ "id-ce-subjectAltName",
+ "Subject Alt Name"),
+ MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME,
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_NS_CERT_TYPE,
+ "id-netscape-certtype",
+ "Netscape Certificate Type"),
+ MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_NS_CERT_TYPE,
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES,
+ "id-ce-certificatePolicies",
+ "Certificate Policies"),
+ MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_CERTIFICATE_POLICIES,
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
+ "id-ce-subjectKeyIdentifier",
+ "Subject Key Identifier"),
+ MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
+ "id-ce-authorityKeyIdentifier",
+ "Authority Key Identifier"),
+ MBEDTLS_OID_X509_EXT_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
+ },
+ {
+ NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR,
+ 0,
+ },
+};
+
+FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_x509_ext_t, x509_ext, oid_x509_ext)
+FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_x509_ext_type, oid_x509_ext_t, x509_ext, int, ext_type)
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
+static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_ext_key_usage[] =
+{
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_SERVER_AUTH,
+ "id-kp-serverAuth",
+ "TLS Web Server Authentication"),
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_CLIENT_AUTH,
+ "id-kp-clientAuth",
+ "TLS Web Client Authentication"),
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_CODE_SIGNING, "id-kp-codeSigning", "Code Signing"),
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EMAIL_PROTECTION, "id-kp-emailProtection", "E-mail Protection"),
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_TIME_STAMPING, "id-kp-timeStamping", "Time Stamping"),
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_OCSP_SIGNING, "id-kp-OCSPSigning", "OCSP Signing"),
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_WISUN_FAN,
+ "id-kp-wisun-fan-device",
+ "Wi-SUN Alliance Field Area Network (FAN)"),
+ NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR,
+};
+
+FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, ext_key_usage, oid_ext_key_usage)
+FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_extended_key_usage,
+ mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t,
+ ext_key_usage,
+ const char *,
+ description)
+
+static const mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t oid_certificate_policies[] =
+{
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ANY_POLICY, "anyPolicy", "Any Policy"),
+ NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR,
+};
+
+FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t, certificate_policies, oid_certificate_policies)
+FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_certificate_policies,
+ mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t,
+ certificate_policies,
+ const char *,
+ description)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO */
+
+/*
+ * For SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor;
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg;
+} oid_sig_alg_t;
+
+static const oid_sig_alg_t oid_sig_alg[] =
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_MD5, "md5WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with MD5"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA1, "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA224, "sha224WithRSAEncryption",
+ "RSA with SHA-224"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA256, "sha256WithRSAEncryption",
+ "RSA with SHA-256"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA384, "sha384WithRSAEncryption",
+ "RSA with SHA-384"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_SHA512, "sha512WithRSAEncryption",
+ "RSA with SHA-512"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_SHA_OBS, "sha-1WithRSAEncryption", "RSA with SHA1"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA1, "ecdsa-with-SHA1", "ECDSA with SHA1"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA224, "ecdsa-with-SHA224", "ECDSA with SHA224"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
+ },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA256, "ecdsa-with-SHA256", "ECDSA with SHA256"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA384, "ecdsa-with-SHA384", "ECDSA with SHA384"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_ECDSA_SHA512, "ecdsa-with-SHA512", "ECDSA with SHA512"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_RSASSA_PSS, "RSASSA-PSS", "RSASSA-PSS"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+ {
+ NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR,
+ MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_PK_NONE,
+ },
+};
+
+FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_sig_alg_t, sig_alg, oid_sig_alg)
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO)
+FN_OID_GET_DESCRIPTOR_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg_desc,
+ oid_sig_alg_t,
+ sig_alg,
+ const char *,
+ description)
+#endif
+
+FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_sig_alg,
+ oid_sig_alg_t,
+ sig_alg,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t,
+ md_alg,
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t,
+ pk_alg)
+FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_sig_alg,
+ oid_sig_alg_t,
+ oid_sig_alg,
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t,
+ pk_alg,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t,
+ md_alg)
+
+/*
+ * For PublicKeyInfo (PKCS1, RFC 5480)
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor;
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg;
+} oid_pk_alg_t;
+
+static const oid_pk_alg_t oid_pk_alg[] =
+{
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS1_RSA, "rsaEncryption", "RSA"),
+ MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_UNRESTRICTED, "id-ecPublicKey", "Generic EC key"),
+ MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY,
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_ALG_ECDH, "id-ecDH", "EC key for ECDH"),
+ MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH,
+ },
+ {
+ NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR,
+ MBEDTLS_PK_NONE,
+ },
+};
+
+FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_pk_alg_t, pk_alg, oid_pk_alg)
+FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg, oid_pk_alg_t, pk_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t, pk_alg)
+FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_pk_alg,
+ oid_pk_alg_t,
+ oid_pk_alg,
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t,
+ pk_alg)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+/*
+ * For elliptic curves that use namedCurve inside ECParams (RFC 5480)
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
+} oid_ecp_grp_t;
+
+static const oid_ecp_grp_t oid_ecp_grp[] =
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192R1, "secp192r1", "secp192r1"),
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224R1, "secp224r1", "secp224r1"),
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224R1 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256R1, "secp256r1", "secp256r1"),
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP384R1, "secp384r1", "secp384r1"),
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP521R1, "secp521r1", "secp521r1"),
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP192K1, "secp192k1", "secp192k1"),
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192K1 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP224K1, "secp224k1", "secp224k1"),
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_SECP256K1, "secp256k1", "secp256k1"),
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP256R1, "brainpoolP256r1", "brainpool256r1"),
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP256R1 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP384R1, "brainpoolP384r1", "brainpool384r1"),
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP384R1 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_EC_GRP_BP512R1, "brainpoolP512r1", "brainpool512r1"),
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_BP512R1 */
+ {
+ NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR,
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE,
+ },
+};
+
+FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_ecp_grp_t, grp_id, oid_ecp_grp)
+FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp, oid_ecp_grp_t, grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_group_id, grp_id)
+FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp,
+ oid_ecp_grp_t,
+ oid_ecp_grp,
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id,
+ grp_id)
+
+/*
+ * For Elliptic Curve algorithms that are directly
+ * encoded in the AlgorithmIdentifier (RFC 8410)
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
+} oid_ecp_grp_algid_t;
+
+static const oid_ecp_grp_algid_t oid_ecp_grp_algid[] =
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_X25519, "X25519", "X25519"),
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_X448, "X448", "X448"),
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448 */
+ {
+ NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR,
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE,
+ },
+};
+
+FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_ecp_grp_algid_t, grp_id_algid, oid_ecp_grp_algid)
+FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp_algid,
+ oid_ecp_grp_algid_t,
+ grp_id_algid,
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id,
+ grp_id)
+FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_ec_grp_algid,
+ oid_ecp_grp_algid_t,
+ oid_ecp_grp_algid,
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id,
+ grp_id)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+/*
+ * For PKCS#5 PBES2 encryption algorithm
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor;
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg;
+} oid_cipher_alg_t;
+
+static const oid_cipher_alg_t oid_cipher_alg[] =
+{
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC, "desCBC", "DES-CBC"),
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC,
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC, "des-ede3-cbc", "DES-EDE3-CBC"),
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC,
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AES_128_CBC, "aes128-cbc", "AES128-CBC"),
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC,
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AES_192_CBC, "aes192-cbc", "AES192-CBC"),
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC,
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AES_256_CBC, "aes256-cbc", "AES256-CBC"),
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC,
+ },
+ {
+ NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR,
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE,
+ },
+};
+
+FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_cipher_alg_t, cipher_alg, oid_cipher_alg)
+FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg,
+ oid_cipher_alg_t,
+ cipher_alg,
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t,
+ cipher_alg)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
+
+/*
+ * For digestAlgorithm
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor;
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+} oid_md_alg_t;
+
+static const oid_md_alg_t oid_md_alg[] =
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_MD5, "id-md5", "MD5"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_MD5,
+ },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA1, "id-sha1", "SHA-1"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1,
+ },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA224, "id-sha224", "SHA-224"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224,
+ },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA256, "id-sha256", "SHA-256"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
+ },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA384, "id-sha384", "SHA-384"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,
+ },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA512, "id-sha512", "SHA-512"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512,
+ },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_RIPEMD160, "id-ripemd160", "RIPEMD-160"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160,
+ },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_224, "id-sha3-224", "SHA-3-224"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224,
+ },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_256, "id-sha3-256", "SHA-3-256"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256,
+ },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_384, "id-sha3-384", "SHA-3-384"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384,
+ },
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DIGEST_ALG_SHA3_512, "id-sha3-512", "SHA-3-512"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512,
+ },
+#endif
+ {
+ NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR,
+ MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
+ },
+};
+
+FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_md_alg_t, md_alg, oid_md_alg)
+FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg, oid_md_alg_t, md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_alg)
+FN_OID_GET_OID_BY_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md,
+ oid_md_alg_t,
+ oid_md_alg,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t,
+ md_alg)
+
+/*
+ * For HMAC digestAlgorithm
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor;
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_hmac;
+} oid_md_hmac_t;
+
+static const oid_md_hmac_t oid_md_hmac[] =
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA1, "hmacSHA1", "HMAC-SHA-1"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA224, "hmacSHA224", "HMAC-SHA-224"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA256, "hmacSHA256", "HMAC-SHA-256"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA384, "hmacSHA384", "HMAC-SHA-384"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA512, "hmacSHA512", "HMAC-SHA-512"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_224, "hmacSHA3-224", "HMAC-SHA3-224"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_256, "hmacSHA3-256", "HMAC-SHA3-256"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_384, "hmacSHA3-384", "HMAC-SHA3-384"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_SHA3_512, "hmacSHA3-512", "HMAC-SHA3-512"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512 */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160)
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_RIPEMD160, "hmacRIPEMD160", "HMAC-RIPEMD160"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160,
+ },
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160 */
+ {
+ NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR,
+ MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
+ },
+};
+
+FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_md_hmac_t, md_hmac, oid_md_hmac)
+FN_OID_GET_ATTR1(mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac, oid_md_hmac_t, md_hmac, mbedtls_md_type_t, md_hmac)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+/*
+ * For PKCS#12 PBEs
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_oid_descriptor_t descriptor;
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg;
+} oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t;
+
+static const oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg[] =
+{
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC,
+ "pbeWithSHAAnd3-KeyTripleDES-CBC",
+ "PBE with SHA1 and 3-Key 3DES"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC,
+ },
+ {
+ OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS12_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC,
+ "pbeWithSHAAnd2-KeyTripleDES-CBC",
+ "PBE with SHA1 and 2-Key 3DES"),
+ MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE_CBC,
+ },
+ {
+ NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR,
+ MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE,
+ },
+};
+
+FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t, pkcs12_pbe_alg, oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg)
+FN_OID_GET_ATTR2(mbedtls_oid_get_pkcs12_pbe_alg,
+ oid_pkcs12_pbe_alg_t,
+ pkcs12_pbe_alg,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t,
+ md_alg,
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t,
+ cipher_alg)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
+
+/* Return the x.y.z.... style numeric string for the given OID */
+int mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(char *buf, size_t size,
+ const mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ char *p = buf;
+ size_t n = size;
+ unsigned int value = 0;
+
+ if (size > INT_MAX) {
+ /* Avoid overflow computing return value */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ if (oid->len <= 0) {
+ /* OID must not be empty */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < oid->len; i++) {
+ /* Prevent overflow in value. */
+ if (value > (UINT_MAX >> 7)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+ if ((value == 0) && ((oid->p[i]) == 0x80)) {
+ /* Overlong encoding is not allowed */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ value <<= 7;
+ value |= oid->p[i] & 0x7F;
+
+ if (!(oid->p[i] & 0x80)) {
+ /* Last byte */
+ if (n == size) {
+ int component1;
+ unsigned int component2;
+ /* First subidentifier contains first two OID components */
+ if (value >= 80) {
+ component1 = '2';
+ component2 = value - 80;
+ } else if (value >= 40) {
+ component1 = '1';
+ component2 = value - 40;
+ } else {
+ component1 = '0';
+ component2 = value;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, "%c.%u", component1, component2);
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_snprintf(p, n, ".%u", value);
+ }
+ if (ret < 2 || (size_t) ret >= n) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ n -= (size_t) ret;
+ p += ret;
+ value = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (value != 0) {
+ /* Unterminated subidentifier */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return (int) (size - n);
+}
+
+static int oid_parse_number(unsigned int *num, const char **p, const char *bound)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
+
+ *num = 0;
+
+ while (*p < bound && **p >= '0' && **p <= '9') {
+ ret = 0;
+ if (*num > (UINT_MAX / 10)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+ *num *= 10;
+ *num += **p - '0';
+ (*p)++;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static size_t oid_subidentifier_num_bytes(unsigned int value)
+{
+ size_t num_bytes = 0;
+
+ do {
+ value >>= 7;
+ num_bytes++;
+ } while (value != 0);
+
+ return num_bytes;
+}
+
+static int oid_subidentifier_encode_into(unsigned char **p,
+ unsigned char *bound,
+ unsigned int value)
+{
+ size_t num_bytes = oid_subidentifier_num_bytes(value);
+
+ if ((size_t) (bound - *p) < num_bytes) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ (*p)[num_bytes - 1] = (unsigned char) (value & 0x7f);
+ value >>= 7;
+
+ for (size_t i = 2; i <= num_bytes; i++) {
+ (*p)[num_bytes - i] = 0x80 | (unsigned char) (value & 0x7f);
+ value >>= 7;
+ }
+ *p += num_bytes;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Return the OID for the given x.y.z.... style numeric string */
+int mbedtls_oid_from_numeric_string(mbedtls_asn1_buf *oid,
+ const char *oid_str, size_t size)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
+ const char *str_ptr = oid_str;
+ const char *str_bound = oid_str + size;
+ unsigned int val = 0;
+ unsigned int component1, component2;
+ size_t encoded_len;
+ unsigned char *resized_mem;
+
+ /* Count the number of dots to get a worst-case allocation size. */
+ size_t num_dots = 0;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+ if (oid_str[i] == '.') {
+ num_dots++;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Allocate maximum possible required memory:
+ * There are (num_dots + 1) integer components, but the first 2 share the
+ * same subidentifier, so we only need num_dots subidentifiers maximum. */
+ if (num_dots == 0 || (num_dots > MBEDTLS_OID_MAX_COMPONENTS - 1)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+ /* Each byte can store 7 bits, calculate number of bytes for a
+ * subidentifier:
+ *
+ * bytes = ceil(subidentifer_size * 8 / 7)
+ */
+ size_t bytes_per_subidentifier = (((sizeof(unsigned int) * 8) - 1) / 7)
+ + 1;
+ size_t max_possible_bytes = num_dots * bytes_per_subidentifier;
+ oid->p = mbedtls_calloc(max_possible_bytes, 1);
+ if (oid->p == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+ unsigned char *out_ptr = oid->p;
+ unsigned char *out_bound = oid->p + max_possible_bytes;
+
+ ret = oid_parse_number(&component1, &str_ptr, str_bound);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (component1 > 2) {
+ /* First component can't be > 2 */
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (str_ptr >= str_bound || *str_ptr != '.') {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ str_ptr++;
+
+ ret = oid_parse_number(&component2, &str_ptr, str_bound);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if ((component1 < 2) && (component2 > 39)) {
+ /* Root nodes 0 and 1 may have up to 40 children, numbered 0-39 */
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (str_ptr < str_bound) {
+ if (*str_ptr == '.') {
+ str_ptr++;
+ } else {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (component2 > (UINT_MAX - (component1 * 40))) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ ret = oid_subidentifier_encode_into(&out_ptr, out_bound,
+ (component1 * 40) + component2);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ while (str_ptr < str_bound) {
+ ret = oid_parse_number(&val, &str_ptr, str_bound);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (str_ptr < str_bound) {
+ if (*str_ptr == '.') {
+ str_ptr++;
+ } else {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = oid_subidentifier_encode_into(&out_ptr, out_bound, val);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ encoded_len = (size_t) (out_ptr - oid->p);
+ resized_mem = mbedtls_calloc(encoded_len, 1);
+ if (resized_mem == NULL) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ memcpy(resized_mem, oid->p, encoded_len);
+ mbedtls_free(oid->p);
+ oid->p = resized_mem;
+ oid->len = encoded_len;
+
+ oid->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
+
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ mbedtls_free(oid->p);
+ oid->p = NULL;
+ oid->len = 0;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_OID_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/padlock.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/padlock.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f00691
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/padlock.c
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+/*
+ * VIA PadLock support functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+/*
+ * This implementation is based on the VIA PadLock Programming Guide:
+ *
+ * http://www.via.com.tw/en/downloads/whitepapers/initiatives/padlock/
+ * programming_guide.pdf
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C)
+
+#include "padlock.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE)
+
+/*
+ * PadLock detection routine
+ */
+int mbedtls_padlock_has_support(int feature)
+{
+ static int flags = -1;
+ int ebx = 0, edx = 0;
+
+ if (flags == -1) {
+ asm ("movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t"
+ "movl $0xC0000000, %%eax \n\t"
+ "cpuid \n\t"
+ "cmpl $0xC0000001, %%eax \n\t"
+ "movl $0, %%edx \n\t"
+ "jb 1f \n\t"
+ "movl $0xC0000001, %%eax \n\t"
+ "cpuid \n\t"
+ "1: \n\t"
+ "movl %%edx, %1 \n\t"
+ "movl %2, %%ebx \n\t"
+ : "=m" (ebx), "=m" (edx)
+ : "m" (ebx)
+ : "eax", "ecx", "edx");
+
+ flags = edx;
+ }
+
+ return flags & feature;
+}
+
+/*
+ * PadLock AES-ECB block en(de)cryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16])
+{
+ int ebx = 0;
+ uint32_t *rk;
+ uint32_t *blk;
+ uint32_t *ctrl;
+ unsigned char buf[256];
+
+ rk = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset;
+
+ if (((long) rk & 15) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED;
+ }
+
+ blk = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16(buf);
+ memcpy(blk, input, 16);
+
+ ctrl = blk + 4;
+ *ctrl = 0x80 | ctx->nr | ((ctx->nr + (mode^1) - 10) << 9);
+
+ asm ("pushfl \n\t"
+ "popfl \n\t"
+ "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t"
+ "movl $1, %%ecx \n\t"
+ "movl %2, %%edx \n\t"
+ "movl %3, %%ebx \n\t"
+ "movl %4, %%esi \n\t"
+ "movl %4, %%edi \n\t"
+ ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xc8 \n\t"
+ "movl %1, %%ebx \n\t"
+ : "=m" (ebx)
+ : "m" (ebx), "m" (ctrl), "m" (rk), "m" (blk)
+ : "memory", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi");
+
+ memcpy(output, blk, 16);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC)
+/*
+ * PadLock AES-CBC buffer en(de)cryption
+ */
+int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ unsigned char iv[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int ebx = 0;
+ size_t count;
+ uint32_t *rk;
+ uint32_t *iw;
+ uint32_t *ctrl;
+ unsigned char buf[256];
+
+ rk = ctx->buf + ctx->rk_offset;
+
+ if (((long) input & 15) != 0 ||
+ ((long) output & 15) != 0 ||
+ ((long) rk & 15) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED;
+ }
+
+ iw = MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16(buf);
+ memcpy(iw, iv, 16);
+
+ ctrl = iw + 4;
+ *ctrl = 0x80 | ctx->nr | ((ctx->nr + (mode ^ 1) - 10) << 9);
+
+ count = (length + 15) >> 4;
+
+ asm ("pushfl \n\t"
+ "popfl \n\t"
+ "movl %%ebx, %0 \n\t"
+ "movl %2, %%ecx \n\t"
+ "movl %3, %%edx \n\t"
+ "movl %4, %%ebx \n\t"
+ "movl %5, %%esi \n\t"
+ "movl %6, %%edi \n\t"
+ "movl %7, %%eax \n\t"
+ ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xd0 \n\t"
+ "movl %1, %%ebx \n\t"
+ : "=m" (ebx)
+ : "m" (ebx), "m" (count), "m" (ctrl),
+ "m" (rk), "m" (input), "m" (output), "m" (iw)
+ : "memory", "eax", "ecx", "edx", "esi", "edi");
+
+ memcpy(iv, iw, 16);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/padlock.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/padlock.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..92d72af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/padlock.h
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+/**
+ * \file padlock.h
+ *
+ * \brief VIA PadLock ACE for HW encryption/decryption supported by some
+ * processors
+ *
+ * \warning These functions are only for internal use by other library
+ * functions; you must not call them directly.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H
+#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
+
+#define MBEDTLS_ERR_PADLOCK_DATA_MISALIGNED -0x0030 /**< Input data should be aligned. */
+
+#if defined(__has_feature)
+#if __has_feature(address_sanitizer)
+#define MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASAN
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * - `padlock` is implements with GNUC assembly for x86 target.
+ * - Some versions of ASan result in errors about not enough registers.
+ */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C) && \
+ defined(__GNUC__) && defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X86) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASM) && \
+ !defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_ASAN)
+
+#define MBEDTLS_VIA_PADLOCK_HAVE_CODE
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_RNG 0x000C
+#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ACE 0x00C0
+#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PHE 0x0C00
+#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_PMM 0x3000
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_ALIGN16(x) (uint32_t *) (16 + ((int32_t) (x) & ~15))
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal PadLock detection routine
+ *
+ * \note This function is only for internal use by other library
+ * functions; you must not call it directly.
+ *
+ * \param feature The feature to detect
+ *
+ * \return non-zero if CPU has support for the feature, 0 otherwise
+ */
+int mbedtls_padlock_has_support(int feature);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal PadLock AES-ECB block en(de)cryption
+ *
+ * \note This function is only for internal use by other library
+ * functions; you must not call it directly.
+ *
+ * \param ctx AES context
+ * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT
+ * \param input 16-byte input block
+ * \param output 16-byte output block
+ *
+ * \return 0 if success, 1 if operation failed
+ */
+int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptecb(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ const unsigned char input[16],
+ unsigned char output[16]);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Internal PadLock AES-CBC buffer en(de)cryption
+ *
+ * \note This function is only for internal use by other library
+ * functions; you must not call it directly.
+ *
+ * \param ctx AES context
+ * \param mode MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT or MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT
+ * \param length length of the input data
+ * \param iv initialization vector (updated after use)
+ * \param input buffer holding the input data
+ * \param output buffer holding the output data
+ *
+ * \return 0 if success, 1 if operation failed
+ */
+int mbedtls_padlock_xcryptcbc(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx,
+ int mode,
+ size_t length,
+ unsigned char iv[16],
+ const unsigned char *input,
+ unsigned char *output);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* HAVE_X86 */
+
+#endif /* padlock.h */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/pem.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pem.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..119fd59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pem.c
@@ -0,0 +1,554 @@
+/*
+ * Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) decoding
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
+#include "mbedtls/base64.h"
+#include "mbedtls/des.h"
+#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
+#include "mbedtls/md.h"
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) && \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) && \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C))
+#define PEM_RFC1421
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5 &&
+ MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC &&
+ ( MBEDTLS_AES_C || MBEDTLS_DES_C ) */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
+void mbedtls_pem_init(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_pem_context));
+}
+
+#if defined(PEM_RFC1421)
+/*
+ * Read a 16-byte hex string and convert it to binary
+ */
+static int pem_get_iv(const unsigned char *s, unsigned char *iv,
+ size_t iv_len)
+{
+ size_t i, j, k;
+
+ memset(iv, 0, iv_len);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < iv_len * 2; i++, s++) {
+ if (*s >= '0' && *s <= '9') {
+ j = *s - '0';
+ } else
+ if (*s >= 'A' && *s <= 'F') {
+ j = *s - '7';
+ } else
+ if (*s >= 'a' && *s <= 'f') {
+ j = *s - 'W';
+ } else {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV;
+ }
+
+ k = ((i & 1) != 0) ? j : j << 4;
+
+ iv[i >> 1] = (unsigned char) (iv[i >> 1] | k);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int pem_pbkdf1(unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ unsigned char *iv,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen)
+{
+ mbedtls_md_context_t md5_ctx;
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md5_info;
+ unsigned char md5sum[16];
+ size_t use_len;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ mbedtls_md_init(&md5_ctx);
+
+ /* Prepare the context. (setup() errors gracefully on NULL info.) */
+ md5_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5);
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md5_ctx, md5_info, 0)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * key[ 0..15] = MD5(pwd || IV)
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md5_ctx)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, iv, 8)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md5_ctx, md5sum)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (keylen <= 16) {
+ memcpy(key, md5sum, keylen);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(key, md5sum, 16);
+
+ /*
+ * key[16..23] = MD5(key[ 0..15] || pwd || IV])
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md5_ctx)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, md5sum, 16)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md5_ctx, iv, 8)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md5_ctx, md5sum)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ use_len = 16;
+ if (keylen < 32) {
+ use_len = keylen - 16;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(key + 16, md5sum, use_len);
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_md_free(&md5_ctx);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(md5sum, 16);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+/*
+ * Decrypt with DES-CBC, using PBKDF1 for key derivation
+ */
+static int pem_des_decrypt(unsigned char des_iv[8],
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen)
+{
+ mbedtls_des_context des_ctx;
+ unsigned char des_key[8];
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ mbedtls_des_init(&des_ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = pem_pbkdf1(des_key, 8, des_iv, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_des_setkey_dec(&des_ctx, des_key)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_des_crypt_cbc(&des_ctx, MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT, buflen,
+ des_iv, buf, buf);
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_des_free(&des_ctx);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(des_key, 8);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decrypt with 3DES-CBC, using PBKDF1 for key derivation
+ */
+static int pem_des3_decrypt(unsigned char des3_iv[8],
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen)
+{
+ mbedtls_des3_context des3_ctx;
+ unsigned char des3_key[24];
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ mbedtls_des3_init(&des3_ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = pem_pbkdf1(des3_key, 24, des3_iv, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_des3_set3key_dec(&des3_ctx, des3_key)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_des3_crypt_cbc(&des3_ctx, MBEDTLS_DES_DECRYPT, buflen,
+ des3_iv, buf, buf);
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_des3_free(&des3_ctx);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(des3_key, 24);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+/*
+ * Decrypt with AES-XXX-CBC, using PBKDF1 for key derivation
+ */
+static int pem_aes_decrypt(unsigned char aes_iv[16], unsigned int keylen,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen)
+{
+ mbedtls_aes_context aes_ctx;
+ unsigned char aes_key[32];
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ mbedtls_aes_init(&aes_ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = pem_pbkdf1(aes_key, keylen, aes_iv, pwd, pwdlen)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_setkey_dec(&aes_ctx, aes_key, keylen * 8)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_cbc(&aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_DECRYPT, buflen,
+ aes_iv, buf, buf);
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_aes_free(&aes_ctx);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(aes_key, keylen);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+static int pem_check_pkcs_padding(unsigned char *input, size_t input_len, size_t *data_len)
+{
+ /* input_len > 0 is not guaranteed by mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(). */
+ if (input_len < 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+ size_t pad_len = input[input_len - 1];
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (pad_len > input_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ *data_len = input_len - pad_len;
+
+ for (i = *data_len; i < input_len; i++) {
+ if (input[i] != pad_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C || MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+#endif /* PEM_RFC1421 */
+
+int mbedtls_pem_read_buffer(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx, const char *header, const char *footer,
+ const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *pwd,
+ size_t pwdlen, size_t *use_len)
+{
+ int ret, enc;
+ size_t len;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+ const unsigned char *s1, *s2, *end;
+#if defined(PEM_RFC1421)
+ unsigned char pem_iv[16];
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE;
+#else
+ ((void) pwd);
+ ((void) pwdlen);
+#endif /* PEM_RFC1421 */
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ s1 = (unsigned char *) strstr((const char *) data, header);
+
+ if (s1 == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT;
+ }
+
+ s2 = (unsigned char *) strstr((const char *) data, footer);
+
+ if (s2 == NULL || s2 <= s1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT;
+ }
+
+ s1 += strlen(header);
+ if (*s1 == ' ') {
+ s1++;
+ }
+ if (*s1 == '\r') {
+ s1++;
+ }
+ if (*s1 == '\n') {
+ s1++;
+ } else {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_NO_HEADER_FOOTER_PRESENT;
+ }
+
+ end = s2;
+ end += strlen(footer);
+ if (*end == ' ') {
+ end++;
+ }
+ if (*end == '\r') {
+ end++;
+ }
+ if (*end == '\n') {
+ end++;
+ }
+ *use_len = (size_t) (end - data);
+
+ enc = 0;
+
+ if (s2 - s1 >= 22 && memcmp(s1, "Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED", 22) == 0) {
+#if defined(PEM_RFC1421)
+ enc++;
+
+ s1 += 22;
+ if (*s1 == '\r') {
+ s1++;
+ }
+ if (*s1 == '\n') {
+ s1++;
+ } else {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+ if (s2 - s1 >= 23 && memcmp(s1, "DEK-Info: DES-EDE3-CBC,", 23) == 0) {
+ enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC;
+
+ s1 += 23;
+ if (s2 - s1 < 16 || pem_get_iv(s1, pem_iv, 8) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV;
+ }
+
+ s1 += 16;
+ } else if (s2 - s1 >= 18 && memcmp(s1, "DEK-Info: DES-CBC,", 18) == 0) {
+ enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC;
+
+ s1 += 18;
+ if (s2 - s1 < 16 || pem_get_iv(s1, pem_iv, 8) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV;
+ }
+
+ s1 += 16;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+ if (s2 - s1 >= 14 && memcmp(s1, "DEK-Info: AES-", 14) == 0) {
+ if (s2 - s1 < 22) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG;
+ } else if (memcmp(s1, "DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,", 22) == 0) {
+ enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC;
+ } else if (memcmp(s1, "DEK-Info: AES-192-CBC,", 22) == 0) {
+ enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC;
+ } else if (memcmp(s1, "DEK-Info: AES-256-CBC,", 22) == 0) {
+ enc_alg = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC;
+ } else {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG;
+ }
+
+ s1 += 22;
+ if (s2 - s1 < 32 || pem_get_iv(s1, pem_iv, 16) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_ENC_IV;
+ }
+
+ s1 += 32;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+ if (enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_UNKNOWN_ENC_ALG;
+ }
+
+ if (*s1 == '\r') {
+ s1++;
+ }
+ if (*s1 == '\n') {
+ s1++;
+ } else {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+#else
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#endif /* PEM_RFC1421 */
+ }
+
+ if (s1 >= s2) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_base64_decode(NULL, 0, &len, s1, (size_t) (s2 - s1));
+
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_INVALID_CHARACTER) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if ((buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_base64_decode(buf, len, &len, s1, (size_t) (s2 - s1))) != 0) {
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_INVALID_DATA, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (enc != 0) {
+#if defined(PEM_RFC1421)
+ if (pwd == NULL) {
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_PASSWORD_REQUIRED;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+ if (enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC) {
+ ret = pem_des3_decrypt(pem_iv, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen);
+ } else if (enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_CBC) {
+ ret = pem_des_decrypt(pem_iv, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_DES_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
+ if (enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC) {
+ ret = pem_aes_decrypt(pem_iv, 16, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen);
+ } else if (enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC) {
+ ret = pem_aes_decrypt(pem_iv, 24, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen);
+ } else if (enc_alg == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC) {
+ ret = pem_aes_decrypt(pem_iv, 32, buf, len, pwd, pwdlen);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_AES_C */
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Check PKCS padding and update data length based on padding info.
+ * This can be used to detect invalid padding data and password
+ * mismatches. */
+ size_t unpadded_len;
+ ret = pem_check_pkcs_padding(buf, len, &unpadded_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ len = unpadded_len;
+#else
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(buf, len);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#endif /* PEM_RFC1421 */
+ }
+
+ ctx->buf = buf;
+ ctx->buflen = len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void mbedtls_pem_free(mbedtls_pem_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->buf != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ctx->buf, ctx->buflen);
+ }
+ mbedtls_free(ctx->info);
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_pem_context));
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C)
+int mbedtls_pem_write_buffer(const char *header, const char *footer,
+ const unsigned char *der_data, size_t der_len,
+ unsigned char *buf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char *encode_buf = NULL, *c, *p = buf;
+ size_t len = 0, use_len, add_len = 0;
+
+ mbedtls_base64_encode(NULL, 0, &use_len, der_data, der_len);
+ add_len = strlen(header) + strlen(footer) + (((use_len > 2) ? (use_len - 2) : 0) / 64) + 1;
+
+ if (use_len + add_len > buf_len) {
+ *olen = use_len + add_len;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_BASE64_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ if (use_len != 0 &&
+ ((encode_buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, use_len)) == NULL)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_base64_encode(encode_buf, use_len, &use_len, der_data,
+ der_len)) != 0) {
+ mbedtls_free(encode_buf);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(p, header, strlen(header));
+ p += strlen(header);
+ c = encode_buf;
+
+ while (use_len) {
+ len = (use_len > 64) ? 64 : use_len;
+ memcpy(p, c, len);
+ use_len -= len;
+ p += len;
+ c += len;
+ *p++ = '\n';
+ }
+
+ memcpy(p, footer, strlen(footer));
+ p += strlen(footer);
+
+ *p++ = '\0';
+ *olen = (size_t) (p - buf);
+
+ /* Clean any remaining data previously written to the buffer */
+ memset(buf + *olen, 0, buf_len - *olen);
+
+ mbedtls_free(encode_buf);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/pk.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pk.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..51f0c24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1503 @@
+/*
+ * Public Key abstraction layer
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
+#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
+#include "pk_wrap.h"
+#include "pkwrite.h"
+#include "pk_internal.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
+#include "rsa_internal.h"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
+#include "psa_util_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/*
+ * Initialise a mbedtls_pk_context
+ */
+void mbedtls_pk_init(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->pk_info = NULL;
+ ctx->pk_ctx = NULL;
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ ctx->priv_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ memset(ctx->pub_raw, 0, sizeof(ctx->pub_raw));
+ ctx->pub_raw_len = 0;
+ ctx->ec_family = 0;
+ ctx->ec_bits = 0;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free (the components of) a mbedtls_pk_context
+ */
+void mbedtls_pk_free(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx->pk_info != NULL) && (ctx->pk_info->ctx_free_func != NULL)) {
+ ctx->pk_info->ctx_free_func(ctx->pk_ctx);
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ /* The ownership of the priv_id key for opaque keys is external of the PK
+ * module. It's the user responsibility to clear it after use. */
+ if ((ctx->pk_info != NULL) && (ctx->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE)) {
+ psa_destroy_key(ctx->priv_id);
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_pk_context));
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+/*
+ * Initialize a restart context
+ */
+void mbedtls_pk_restart_init(mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->pk_info = NULL;
+ ctx->rs_ctx = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free the components of a restart context
+ */
+void mbedtls_pk_restart_free(mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ||
+ ctx->pk_info->rs_free_func == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ctx->pk_info->rs_free_func(ctx->rs_ctx);
+
+ ctx->pk_info = NULL;
+ ctx->rs_ctx = NULL;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+/*
+ * Get pk_info structure from type
+ */
+const mbedtls_pk_info_t *mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type)
+{
+ switch (pk_type) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:
+ return &mbedtls_rsa_info;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:
+ return &mbedtls_eckey_info;
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:
+ return &mbedtls_eckeydh_info;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
+ return &mbedtls_ecdsa_info;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME */
+ /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT omitted on purpose */
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise context
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_setup(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info)
+{
+ if (info == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if ((info->ctx_alloc_func != NULL) &&
+ ((ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func()) == NULL)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ ctx->pk_info = info;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+/*
+ * Initialise a PSA-wrapping context
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key)
+{
+ const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info = NULL;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_key_type_t type;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes(key, &attributes)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+ if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type)) {
+ info = &mbedtls_ecdsa_opaque_info;
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+ if (type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) {
+ info = &mbedtls_rsa_opaque_info;
+ } else {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ ctx->pk_info = info;
+ ctx->priv_id = key;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
+/*
+ * Initialize an RSA-alt context
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, void *key,
+ mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func decrypt_func,
+ mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func sign_func,
+ mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func key_len_func)
+{
+ mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt;
+ const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info = &mbedtls_rsa_alt_info;
+
+ if (ctx->pk_info != NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx->pk_ctx = info->ctx_alloc_func()) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ ctx->pk_info = info;
+
+ rsa_alt = (mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *) ctx->pk_ctx;
+
+ rsa_alt->key = key;
+ rsa_alt->decrypt_func = decrypt_func;
+ rsa_alt->sign_func = sign_func;
+ rsa_alt->key_len_func = key_len_func;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */
+
+/*
+ * Tell if a PK can do the operations of the given type
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_can_do(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_type_t type)
+{
+ /* A context with null pk_info is not set up yet and can't do anything.
+ * For backward compatibility, also accept NULL instead of a context
+ * pointer. */
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ctx->pk_info->can_do(type);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+/*
+ * Tell if a PK can do the operations of the given PSA algorithm
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ psa_key_usage_t usage)
+{
+ psa_key_usage_t key_usage;
+
+ /* A context with null pk_info is not set up yet and can't do anything.
+ * For backward compatibility, also accept NULL instead of a context
+ * pointer. */
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Filter out non allowed algorithms */
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) == 0 &&
+ PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) == 0 &&
+ PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) == 0 &&
+ alg != PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT &&
+ PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Filter out non allowed usage flags */
+ if (usage == 0 ||
+ (usage & ~(PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH |
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT |
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE)) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Wildcard hash is not allowed */
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) &&
+ PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(ctx) != MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) {
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t type;
+
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg)) {
+ type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY;
+ } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) ||
+ alg == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) {
+ type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA;
+ } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)) {
+ type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->pk_info->can_do(type) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:
+ key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE;
+ break;
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS:
+ key_usage = PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH |
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE |
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Should never happen */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return (key_usage & usage) == usage;
+ }
+
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ status = psa_get_key_attributes(ctx->priv_id, &attributes);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ psa_algorithm_t key_alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes);
+ /* Key's enrollment is available only when an Mbed TLS implementation of PSA
+ * Crypto is being used, i.e. when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined.
+ * Even though we don't officially support using other implementations of PSA
+ * Crypto with TLS and X.509 (yet), we try to keep vendor's customizations
+ * separated. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+ psa_algorithm_t key_alg2 = psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm(&attributes);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
+ key_usage = psa_get_key_usage_flags(&attributes);
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
+
+ if ((key_usage & usage) != usage) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Common case: the key alg [or alg2] only allows alg.
+ * This will match PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT & PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH
+ * directly.
+ * This would also match ECDSA/RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN/RSA_PSS with
+ * a fixed hash on key_alg [or key_alg2].
+ */
+ if (alg == key_alg) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+ if (alg == key_alg2) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
+
+ /*
+ * If key_alg [or key_alg2] is a hash-and-sign with a wildcard for the hash,
+ * and alg is the same hash-and-sign family with any hash,
+ * then alg is compliant with this key alg
+ */
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)) {
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(key_alg) &&
+ PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(key_alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH &&
+ (alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == (key_alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(key_alg2) &&
+ PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(key_alg2) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH &&
+ (alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == (key_alg2 & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+static psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm_for_rsa(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa,
+ int want_crypt)
+{
+ if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
+ if (want_crypt) {
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa);
+ return PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type));
+ } else {
+ return PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH);
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (want_crypt) {
+ return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT;
+ } else {
+ return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH);
+ }
+ }
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
+int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ psa_key_usage_t usage,
+ psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
+{
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk);
+
+ psa_key_usage_t more_usage = usage;
+ if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE) {
+ more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE;
+ } else if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) {
+ more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH;
+ } else if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT) {
+ more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT;
+ }
+ more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY;
+
+ int want_private = !(usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE ||
+ usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH ||
+ usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT);
+
+ switch (pk_type) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:
+ {
+ int want_crypt = 0; /* 0: sign/verify; 1: encrypt/decrypt */
+ switch (usage) {
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:
+ /* Nothing to do. */
+ break;
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:
+ want_crypt = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ /* Detect the presence of a private key in a way that works both
+ * in CRT and non-CRT configurations. */
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk);
+ int has_private = (mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(rsa) == 0);
+ if (want_private && !has_private) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ psa_set_key_type(attributes, (want_private ?
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR :
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY));
+ psa_set_key_bits(attributes, mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(pk));
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes,
+ psa_algorithm_for_rsa(rsa, want_crypt));
+ break;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
+ {
+ int sign_ok = (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH);
+ int derive_ok = (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ psa_ecc_family_t family = pk->ec_family;
+ size_t bits = pk->ec_bits;
+ int has_private = 0;
+ if (pk->priv_id != MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT) {
+ has_private = 1;
+ }
+#else
+ const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk);
+ int has_private = (ec->d.n != 0);
+ size_t bits = 0;
+ psa_ecc_family_t family =
+ mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id, &bits);
+#endif
+ psa_algorithm_t alg = 0;
+ switch (usage) {
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:
+ if (!sign_ok) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+ alg = PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH);
+#else
+ alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH);
+#endif
+ break;
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:
+ alg = PSA_ALG_ECDH;
+ if (!derive_ok) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ if (want_private && !has_private) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ psa_set_key_type(attributes, (want_private ?
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(family) :
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(family)));
+ psa_set_key_bits(attributes, bits);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, alg);
+ break;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE:
+ {
+ psa_key_attributes_t old_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &old_attributes);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ psa_key_type_t old_type = psa_get_key_type(&old_attributes);
+ switch (usage) {
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:
+ if (!(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(old_type) ||
+ old_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ break;
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:
+ if (old_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ break;
+ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:
+ if (!(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(old_type))) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ psa_key_type_t new_type = old_type;
+ /* Opaque keys are always key pairs, so we don't need a check
+ * on the input if the required usage is private. We just need
+ * to adjust the type correctly if the required usage is public. */
+ if (!want_private) {
+ new_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(new_type);
+ }
+ more_usage = psa_get_key_usage_flags(&old_attributes);
+ if ((usage & more_usage) == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ psa_set_key_type(attributes, new_type);
+ psa_set_key_bits(attributes, psa_get_key_bits(&old_attributes));
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, psa_get_key_algorithm(&old_attributes));
+ break;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(attributes, more_usage);
+ /* Key's enrollment is available only when an Mbed TLS implementation of PSA
+ * Crypto is being used, i.e. when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is defined.
+ * Even though we don't officially support using other implementations of PSA
+ * Crypto with TLS and X.509 (yet), we try to keep vendor's customizations
+ * separated. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
+ psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm(attributes, PSA_ALG_NONE);
+#endif
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) || defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+static psa_status_t export_import_into_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t old_key_id,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *new_key_id)
+{
+ unsigned char key_buffer[PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE];
+ size_t key_length = 0;
+ psa_status_t status = psa_export_key(old_key_id,
+ key_buffer, sizeof(key_buffer),
+ &key_length);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return status;
+ }
+ status = psa_import_key(attributes, key_buffer, key_length, new_key_id);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_buffer, key_length);
+ return status;
+}
+
+static int copy_into_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t old_key_id,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *new_key_id)
+{
+ /* Normally, we prefer copying: it's more efficient and works even
+ * for non-exportable keys. */
+ psa_status_t status = psa_copy_key(old_key_id, attributes, new_key_id);
+ if (status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED /*missing COPY usage*/ ||
+ status == PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT /*incompatible policy*/) {
+ /* There are edge cases where copying won't work, but export+import
+ * might:
+ * - If the old key does not allow PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY.
+ * - If the old key's usage does not allow what attributes wants.
+ * Because the key was intended for use in the pk module, and may
+ * have had a policy chosen solely for what pk needs rather than
+ * based on a detailed understanding of PSA policies, we are a bit
+ * more liberal than psa_copy_key() here.
+ */
+ /* Here we need to check that the types match, otherwise we risk
+ * importing nonsensical data. */
+ psa_key_attributes_t old_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ status = psa_get_key_attributes(old_key_id, &old_attributes);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ psa_key_type_t old_type = psa_get_key_type(&old_attributes);
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&old_attributes);
+ if (old_type != psa_get_key_type(attributes)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ status = export_import_into_psa(old_key_id, attributes, new_key_id);
+ }
+ return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA || MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+static int import_pair_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_id)
+{
+ switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk)) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:
+ {
+ if (psa_get_key_type(attributes) != PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ unsigned char key_buffer[
+ PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS)];
+ unsigned char *const key_end = key_buffer + sizeof(key_buffer);
+ unsigned char *key_data = key_end;
+ int ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk),
+ key_buffer, &key_data);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ size_t key_length = key_end - key_data;
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(psa_import_key(attributes,
+ key_data, key_length,
+ key_id));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_data, key_length);
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
+ {
+ /* We need to check the curve family, otherwise the import could
+ * succeed with nonsensical data.
+ * We don't check the bit-size: it's optional in attributes,
+ * and if it's specified, psa_import_key() will know from the key
+ * data length and will check that the bit-size matches. */
+ psa_key_type_t to_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ psa_ecc_family_t from_family = pk->ec_family;
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk);
+ size_t from_bits = 0;
+ psa_ecc_family_t from_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id,
+ &from_bits);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ if (to_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(from_family)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(pk->priv_id)) {
+ /* We have a public key and want a key pair. */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ return copy_into_psa(pk->priv_id, attributes, key_id);
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ if (ec->d.n == 0) {
+ /* Private key not set. Assume the input is a public key only.
+ * (The other possibility is that it's an incomplete object
+ * where the group is set but neither the public key nor
+ * the private key. This is not possible through ecp.h
+ * functions, so we don't bother reporting a more suitable
+ * error in that case.) */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ unsigned char key_buffer[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)];
+ size_t key_length = 0;
+ int ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_key_ext(ec, &key_length,
+ key_buffer, sizeof(key_buffer));
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(psa_import_key(attributes,
+ key_buffer, key_length,
+ key_id));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key_buffer, key_length);
+ return ret;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE:
+ return copy_into_psa(pk->priv_id, attributes, key_id);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+}
+
+static int import_public_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_id)
+{
+ psa_key_type_t psa_type = psa_get_key_type(attributes);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || \
+ (defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)) || \
+ defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ unsigned char key_buffer[PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE];
+#endif
+ unsigned char *key_data = NULL;
+ size_t key_length = 0;
+
+ switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk)) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:
+ {
+ if (psa_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ unsigned char *const key_end = key_buffer + sizeof(key_buffer);
+ key_data = key_end;
+ int ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk),
+ key_buffer, &key_data);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ key_length = (size_t) ret;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif /*MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
+ {
+ /* We need to check the curve family, otherwise the import could
+ * succeed with nonsensical data.
+ * We don't check the bit-size: it's optional in attributes,
+ * and if it's specified, psa_import_key() will know from the key
+ * data length and will check that the bit-size matches. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ if (psa_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(pk->ec_family)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ key_data = (unsigned char *) pk->pub_raw;
+ key_length = pk->pub_raw_len;
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk);
+ size_t from_bits = 0;
+ psa_ecc_family_t from_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id,
+ &from_bits);
+ if (psa_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(from_family)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ int ret = mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(
+ ec, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ &key_length, key_buffer, sizeof(key_buffer));
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ key_data = key_buffer;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ break;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE:
+ {
+ psa_key_attributes_t old_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status =
+ psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &old_attributes);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ psa_key_type_t old_type = psa_get_key_type(&old_attributes);
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&old_attributes);
+ if (psa_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(old_type)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ status = psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id,
+ key_buffer, sizeof(key_buffer),
+ &key_length);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+ key_data = key_buffer;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+ default:
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(psa_import_key(attributes,
+ key_data, key_length,
+ key_id));
+}
+
+int mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_id)
+{
+ /* Set the output immediately so that it won't contain garbage even
+ * if we error out before calling psa_import_key(). */
+ *key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
+ if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */
+
+ int want_public = PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(psa_get_key_type(attributes));
+ if (want_public) {
+ return import_public_into_psa(pk, attributes, key_id);
+ } else {
+ return import_pair_into_psa(pk, attributes, key_id);
+ }
+}
+
+static int copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ int public_only)
+{
+ psa_status_t status;
+ psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_key_type_t key_type;
+ size_t key_bits;
+ /* Use a buffer size large enough to contain either a key pair or public key. */
+ unsigned char exp_key[PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_OR_PUBLIC_MAX_SIZE];
+ size_t exp_key_len;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+
+ if (pk == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_get_key_attributes(key_id, &key_attr);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (public_only) {
+ status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, exp_key, sizeof(exp_key), &exp_key_len);
+ } else {
+ status = psa_export_key(key_id, exp_key, sizeof(exp_key), &exp_key_len);
+ }
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ key_type = psa_get_key_type(&key_attr);
+ if (public_only) {
+ key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(key_type);
+ }
+ key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attr);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ if ((key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) ||
+ (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)) {
+
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (key_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) {
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), exp_key, exp_key_len);
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), exp_key, exp_key_len);
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ psa_algorithm_t alg_type = psa_get_key_algorithm(&key_attr);
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
+ if (PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg_type) != PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) {
+ md_type = mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(alg_type);
+ }
+
+ if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg_type) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg_type)) {
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_type);
+ } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg_type) ||
+ alg_type == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) {
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, md_type);
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+ if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type) ||
+ PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(key_type)) {
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(key_type), key_bits);
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(pk, grp_id);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(key_type)) {
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(pk, exp_key, exp_key_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(pk, exp_key, exp_key_len,
+ mbedtls_psa_get_random,
+ MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE);
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(pk, exp_key, exp_key_len);
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+ {
+ (void) key_bits;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(exp_key, sizeof(exp_key));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
+{
+ return copy_from_psa(key_id, pk, 0);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_pk_copy_public_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
+{
+ return copy_from_psa(key_id, pk, 1);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */
+
+/*
+ * Helper for mbedtls_pk_sign and mbedtls_pk_verify
+ */
+static inline int pk_hashlen_helper(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, size_t *hash_len)
+{
+ if (*hash_len != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *hash_len = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_alg);
+
+ if (*hash_len == 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+/*
+ * Helper to set up a restart context if needed
+ */
+static int pk_restart_setup(mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx,
+ const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info)
+{
+ /* Don't do anything if already set up or invalid */
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Should never happen when we're called */
+ if (info->rs_alloc_func == NULL || info->rs_free_func == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx->rs_ctx = info->rs_alloc_func()) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ ctx->pk_info = info;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+/*
+ * Verify a signature (restartable)
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
+ mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+ if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hash_len != 0) && hash == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->pk_info == NULL ||
+ pk_hashlen_helper(md_alg, &hash_len) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ /* optimization: use non-restartable version if restart disabled */
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL &&
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() &&
+ ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func != NULL) {
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if ((ret = pk_restart_setup(rs_ctx, ctx->pk_info)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func(ctx,
+ md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, rs_ctx->rs_ctx);
+
+ if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
+ mbedtls_pk_restart_free(rs_ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+ (void) rs_ctx;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+ if (ctx->pk_info->verify_func == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ return ctx->pk_info->verify_func(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify a signature
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_verify(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ return mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_len, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify a signature with options
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hash_len != 0) && hash == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(ctx, type)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ if (type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) {
+ /* General case: no options */
+ if (options != NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_pk_verify(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len);
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure the PK context is of the right type otherwise mbedtls_pk_rsa()
+ * below would return a NULL pointer. */
+ if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(ctx) != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *pss_opts;
+
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
+ if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (options == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ pss_opts = (const mbedtls_pk_rsassa_pss_options *) options;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if (pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id == md_alg) {
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES];
+ unsigned char *p;
+ int key_len;
+ size_t signature_length;
+ psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT;
+ psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT;
+
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg);
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(psa_md_alg);
+ p = buf + sizeof(buf);
+ key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), buf, &p);
+
+ if (key_len < 0) {
+ return key_len;
+ }
+
+ psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY);
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_alg);
+
+ status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
+ buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len,
+ &key_id);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ psa_destroy_key(key_id);
+ return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+
+ /* This function requires returning MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH
+ * on a valid signature with trailing data in a buffer, but
+ * mbedtls_psa_rsa_verify_hash requires the sig_len to be exact,
+ * so for this reason the passed sig_len is overwritten. Smaller
+ * signature lengths should not be accepted for verification. */
+ signature_length = sig_len > mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx) ?
+ mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx) : sig_len;
+ status = psa_verify_hash(key_id, psa_sig_alg, hash,
+ hash_len, sig, signature_length);
+ destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(key_id);
+
+ if (status == PSA_SUCCESS && sig_len > mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ status = destruction_status;
+ }
+
+ return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ {
+ if (sig_len < mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx),
+ md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash,
+ pss_opts->mgf1_hash_id,
+ pss_opts->expected_salt_len,
+ sig);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (sig_len > mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+#else
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make a signature (restartable)
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
+ mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx)
+{
+ if ((md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE || hash_len != 0) && hash == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->pk_info == NULL || pk_hashlen_helper(md_alg, &hash_len) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ /* optimization: use non-restartable version if restart disabled */
+ if (rs_ctx != NULL &&
+ mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() &&
+ ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func != NULL) {
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if ((ret = pk_restart_setup(rs_ctx, ctx->pk_info)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func(ctx, md_alg,
+ hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_size, sig_len,
+ f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx->rs_ctx);
+
+ if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) {
+ mbedtls_pk_restart_free(rs_ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+ (void) rs_ctx;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+ if (ctx->pk_info->sign_func == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ return ctx->pk_info->sign_func(ctx, md_alg,
+ hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_size, sig_len,
+ f_rng, p_rng);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make a signature
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_sign(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ return mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_size, sig_len,
+ f_rng, p_rng, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make a signature given a signature type.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_sign_ext(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (!mbedtls_pk_can_do(ctx, pk_type)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ if (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS) {
+ return mbedtls_pk_sign(ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_size, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng);
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ const psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg);
+ if (psa_md_alg == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(ctx) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) {
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ /* PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS() behaves the same as PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT() when
+ * performing a signature, but they are encoded differently. Instead of
+ * extracting the proper one from the wrapped key policy, just try both. */
+ status = psa_sign_hash(ctx->priv_id, PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(psa_md_alg),
+ hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_size, sig_len);
+ if (status == PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED) {
+ status = psa_sign_hash(ctx->priv_id, PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(psa_md_alg),
+ hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_size, sig_len);
+ }
+ return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(psa_md_alg),
+ ctx->pk_ctx, hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_size, sig_len);
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+ if (sig_size < mbedtls_pk_get_len(ctx)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ if (pk_hashlen_helper(md_alg, &hash_len) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *const rsa_ctx = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx);
+
+ const int ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign_no_mode_check(rsa_ctx, f_rng, p_rng, md_alg,
+ (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ *sig_len = rsa_ctx->len;
+ }
+ return ret;
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#else
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decrypt message
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_decrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->pk_info->decrypt_func == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ return ctx->pk_info->decrypt_func(ctx, input, ilen,
+ output, olen, osize, f_rng, p_rng);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encrypt message
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_encrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->pk_info->encrypt_func == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ return ctx->pk_info->encrypt_func(ctx, input, ilen,
+ output, olen, osize, f_rng, p_rng);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check public-private key pair
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_check_pair(const mbedtls_pk_context *pub,
+ const mbedtls_pk_context *prv,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ if (pub->pk_info == NULL ||
+ prv->pk_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (f_rng == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (prv->pk_info->check_pair_func == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ if (prv->pk_info->type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT) {
+ if (pub->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if ((prv->pk_info->type != MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) &&
+ (pub->pk_info != prv->pk_info)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return prv->pk_info->check_pair_func((mbedtls_pk_context *) pub,
+ (mbedtls_pk_context *) prv,
+ f_rng, p_rng);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get key size in bits
+ */
+size_t mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx)
+{
+ /* For backward compatibility, accept NULL or a context that
+ * isn't set up yet, and return a fake value that should be safe. */
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ctx->pk_info->get_bitlen((mbedtls_pk_context *) ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Export debug information
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_debug(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items)
+{
+ if (ctx->pk_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->pk_info->debug_func == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ ctx->pk_info->debug_func((mbedtls_pk_context *) ctx, items);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Access the PK type name
+ */
+const char *mbedtls_pk_get_name(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL) {
+ return "invalid PK";
+ }
+
+ return ctx->pk_info->name;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Access the PK type
+ */
+mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_pk_get_type(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
+ }
+
+ return ctx->pk_info->type;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/pk_ecc.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pk_ecc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86218ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pk_ecc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,255 @@
+/*
+ * ECC setters for PK.
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#include "pk_internal.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+
+int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ size_t ec_bits;
+ psa_ecc_family_t ec_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(grp_id, &ec_bits);
+
+ /* group may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match */
+ if ((pk->ec_family != 0 && pk->ec_family != ec_family) ||
+ (pk->ec_bits != 0 && pk->ec_bits != ec_bits)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+
+ /* set group */
+ pk->ec_family = ec_family;
+ pk->ec_bits = ec_bits;
+
+ return 0;
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk);
+
+ /* grp may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match */
+ if (mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE &&
+ mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id != grp_id) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+
+ /* set group */
+ return mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&(ecp->grp), grp_id);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+}
+
+int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, unsigned char *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_key_usage_t flags;
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(pk->ec_family));
+ if (pk->ec_family == PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY) {
+ /* Do not set algorithm here because Montgomery keys cannot do ECDSA and
+ * the PK module cannot do ECDH. When the key will be used in TLS for
+ * ECDH, it will be exported and then re-imported with proper flags
+ * and algorithm. */
+ flags = PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT;
+ } else {
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes,
+ MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH));
+ flags = PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE |
+ PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT;
+ }
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, flags);
+
+ status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &pk->priv_id);
+ return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status);
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk);
+ int ret = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(eck->grp.id, eck, key, key_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+ return 0;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+}
+
+int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const unsigned char *prv, size_t prv_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+
+ (void) f_rng;
+ (void) p_rng;
+ (void) prv;
+ (void) prv_len;
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ status = psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, pk->pub_raw, sizeof(pk->pub_raw),
+ &pk->pub_raw_len);
+ return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status);
+
+#elif defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /* && !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+
+ (void) f_rng;
+ (void) p_rng;
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx;
+ size_t curve_bits;
+ psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(eck->grp.id, &curve_bits);
+
+ /* Import private key into PSA, from serialized input */
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve));
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT);
+ status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, prv, prv_len, &key_id);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status);
+ }
+
+ /* Export public key from PSA */
+ unsigned char pub[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH];
+ size_t pub_len;
+ status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, pub, sizeof(pub), &pub_len);
+ psa_status_t destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(key_id);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status);
+ } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(destruction_status);
+ }
+
+ /* Load serialized public key into ecp_keypair structure */
+ return mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&eck->grp, &eck->Q, pub, pub_len);
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+ (void) prv;
+ (void) prv_len;
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eck = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx;
+ return mbedtls_ecp_mul(&eck->grp, &eck->Q, &eck->d, &eck->grp.G, f_rng, p_rng);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+/*
+ * Set the public key: fallback using ECP_LIGHT in the USE_PSA_EC_DATA case.
+ *
+ * Normally, when MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is enabled, we only use PSA
+ * functions to handle keys. However, currently psa_import_key() does not
+ * support compressed points. In case that support was explicitly requested,
+ * this fallback uses ECP functions to get the job done. This is the reason
+ * why MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED auto-enables MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT.
+ *
+ * [in/out] pk: in: must have the group set, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group().
+ * out: will have the public key set.
+ * [in] pub, pub_len: the public key as an ECPoint,
+ * in any format supported by ECP.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0 on success;
+ * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the format is potentially valid
+ * but not supported;
+ * - another error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int pk_ecc_set_pubkey_psa_ecp_fallback(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const unsigned char *pub,
+ size_t pub_len)
+{
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED)
+ (void) pk;
+ (void) pub;
+ (void) pub_len;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED */
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair ecp_key;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_group_id;
+ int ret;
+
+ ecp_group_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits);
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ecp_key);
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&(ecp_key.grp), ecp_group_id);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&(ecp_key.grp), &ecp_key.Q,
+ pub, pub_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&(ecp_key.grp), &ecp_key.Q,
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ &pk->pub_raw_len, pk->pub_raw,
+ sizeof(pk->pub_raw));
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&ecp_key);
+ return ret;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_COMPRESSED */
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+
+int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *pub, size_t pub_len)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+
+ /* Load the key */
+ if (!PSA_ECC_FAMILY_IS_WEIERSTRASS(pk->ec_family) || *pub == 0x04) {
+ /* Format directly supported by PSA:
+ * - non-Weierstrass curves that only have one format;
+ * - uncompressed format for Weierstrass curves. */
+ if (pub_len > sizeof(pk->pub_raw)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ memcpy(pk->pub_raw, pub, pub_len);
+ pk->pub_raw_len = pub_len;
+ } else {
+ /* Other format, try the fallback */
+ int ret = pk_ecc_set_pubkey_psa_ecp_fallback(pk, pub, pub_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Validate the key by trying to import it */
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_key_attributes_t key_attrs = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attrs, 0);
+ psa_set_key_type(&key_attrs, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(pk->ec_family));
+ psa_set_key_bits(&key_attrs, pk->ec_bits);
+
+ if ((psa_import_key(&key_attrs, pk->pub_raw, pk->pub_raw_len,
+ &key_id) != PSA_SUCCESS) ||
+ (psa_destroy_key(key_id) != PSA_SUCCESS)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+
+ int ret;
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec_key = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx;
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&ec_key->grp, &ec_key->Q, pub, pub_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(&ec_key->grp, &ec_key->Q);
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/pk_internal.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pk_internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e86a3a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pk_internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+/**
+ * \file pk_internal.h
+ *
+ * \brief Public Key abstraction layer: internal (i.e. library only) functions
+ * and definitions.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_INTERNAL_H
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT)
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+
+#include "psa_util_internal.h"
+#define PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status)
+#define PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, \
+ psa_to_pk_rsa_errors, \
+ psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls)
+#define PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status) PSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR_LIST(status, \
+ psa_to_pk_ecdsa_errors, \
+ psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls)
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */
+
+/* Headers/footers for PEM files */
+#define PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----"
+#define PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----"
+#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
+#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
+#define PEM_BEGIN_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA "-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----"
+#define PEM_END_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA "-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----"
+#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----"
+#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_EC "-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----"
+#define PEM_BEGIN_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----"
+#define PEM_END_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----"
+#define PEM_BEGIN_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----"
+#define PEM_END_ENCRYPTED_PRIVATE_KEY_PKCS8 "-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+/**
+ * Public function mbedtls_pk_ec() can be used to get direct access to the
+ * wrapped ecp_keypair structure pointed to the pk_ctx. However this is not
+ * ideal because it bypasses the PK module on the control of its internal
+ * structure (pk_context) fields.
+ * For backward compatibility we keep mbedtls_pk_ec() when ECP_C is defined, but
+ * we provide 2 very similar functions when only ECP_LIGHT is enabled and not
+ * ECP_C.
+ * These variants embed the "ro" or "rw" keywords in their name to make the
+ * usage of the returned pointer explicit. Of course the returned value is
+ * const or non-const accordingly.
+ */
+static inline const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(const mbedtls_pk_context pk)
+{
+ switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk)) {
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
+ return (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx);
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline mbedtls_ecp_keypair *mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(const mbedtls_pk_context pk)
+{
+ switch (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk)) {
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:
+ case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:
+ return (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) (pk).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(pk_ctx);
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS && !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+static inline mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
+{
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id id;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+ if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) {
+ psa_key_attributes_t opaque_attrs = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_key_type_t opaque_key_type;
+ psa_ecc_family_t curve;
+
+ if (psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &opaque_attrs) != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
+ }
+ opaque_key_type = psa_get_key_type(&opaque_attrs);
+ curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(opaque_key_type);
+ id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, psa_get_key_bits(&opaque_attrs));
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&opaque_attrs);
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+ {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits);
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ id = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ }
+
+ return id;
+}
+
+/* Helper for Montgomery curves */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE448)
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519 || MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 */
+
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(id) \
+ ((id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519) || (id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448))
+
+static inline int mbedtls_pk_is_rfc8410(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
+{
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id id = mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(pk);
+
+ return MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(id);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the group used by this key.
+ *
+ * [in/out] pk: in: must have been pk_setup() to an ECC type
+ * out: will have group (curve) information set
+ * [in] grp_in: a supported group ID (not NONE)
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id);
+
+/*
+ * Set the private key material
+ *
+ * [in/out] pk: in: must have the group set already, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group().
+ * out: will have the private key set.
+ * [in] key, key_len: the raw private key (no ASN.1 wrapping).
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, unsigned char *key, size_t key_len);
+
+/*
+ * Set the public key.
+ *
+ * [in/out] pk: in: must have its group set, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group().
+ * out: will have the public key set.
+ * [in] pub, pub_len: the raw public key (an ECPoint).
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0 on success;
+ * - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the format is potentially valid
+ * but not supported;
+ * - another error code otherwise.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *pub, size_t pub_len);
+
+/*
+ * Derive a public key from its private counterpart.
+ * Computationally intensive, only use when public key is not available.
+ *
+ * [in/out] pk: in: must have the private key set, see mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key().
+ * out: will have the public key set.
+ * [in] prv, prv_len: the raw private key (see note below).
+ * [in] f_rng, p_rng: RNG function and context.
+ *
+ * Note: the private key information is always available from pk,
+ * however for convenience the serialized version is also passed,
+ * as it's available at each calling site, and useful in some configs
+ * (as otherwise we would have to re-serialize it from the pk context).
+ *
+ * There are three implementations of this function:
+ * 1. MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA,
+ * 2. MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO but not MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA,
+ * 3. not MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO.
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const unsigned char *prv, size_t prv_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+
+/* Helper for (deterministic) ECDSA */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA
+#else
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET PSA_ALG_ECDSA
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
+MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der(
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+int mbedtls_pk_load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19196b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1584 @@
+/*
+ * Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
+#include "pk_wrap.h"
+#include "pk_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
+
+/* Even if RSA not activated, for the sake of RSA-alt */
+#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
+#include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#include "psa_util_internal.h"
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+#include "pkwrite.h"
+#include "rsa_internal.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME)
+#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h"
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#endif
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+static int rsa_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type)
+{
+ return type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ||
+ type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS;
+}
+
+static size_t rsa_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
+{
+ const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx;
+ return mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(rsa);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+static int rsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status;
+ int key_len;
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES];
+ unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf);
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_md;
+ size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa);
+
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
+ if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
+ psa_alg_md = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg));
+ } else {
+ psa_alg_md = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg));
+ }
+
+ if (sig_len < rsa_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa, buf, &p);
+ if (key_len <= 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_alg_md);
+ psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY);
+
+ status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
+ buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len,
+ &key_id);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_verify_hash(key_id, psa_alg_md, hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ status = psa_destroy_key(key_id);
+ if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+static int rsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx;
+ size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa);
+
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
+ if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (sig_len < rsa_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(rsa, md_alg,
+ (unsigned int) hash_len,
+ hash, sig)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* The buffer contains a valid signature followed by extra data.
+ * We have a special error code for that so that so that callers can
+ * use mbedtls_pk_verify() to check "Does the buffer start with a
+ * valid signature?" and not just "Does the buffer contain a valid
+ * signature?". */
+ if (sig_len > rsa_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+int mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_algorithm_t alg,
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa_ctx,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size,
+ size_t *sig_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status;
+ int key_len;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES);
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+ p = buf + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES;
+
+ *sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa_ctx);
+ if (sig_size < *sig_len) {
+ mbedtls_free(buf);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(rsa_ctx, buf, &p);
+ if (key_len <= 0) {
+ mbedtls_free(buf);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg);
+ psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR);
+
+ status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
+ buf + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES - key_len, key_len,
+ &key_id);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ status = psa_sign_hash(key_id, alg, hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_size, sig_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_free(buf);
+ status = psa_destroy_key(key_id);
+ if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+static int rsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ ((void) f_rng);
+ ((void) p_rng);
+
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg;
+ psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg);
+ if (psa_md_alg == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_alg;
+ if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk)) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
+ psa_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(psa_md_alg);
+ } else {
+ psa_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(psa_md_alg);
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_alg, pk->pk_ctx, hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_size, sig_len);
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+static int rsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx;
+
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
+ if (md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE && UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ *sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa);
+ if (sig_size < *sig_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(rsa, f_rng, p_rng,
+ md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len,
+ hash, sig);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+static int rsa_decrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg, decrypt_alg;
+ psa_status_t status;
+ int key_len;
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES];
+ unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf);
+
+ ((void) f_rng);
+ ((void) p_rng);
+
+ if (ilen != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(rsa, buf, &p);
+ if (key_len <= 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR);
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT);
+ if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
+ psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa));
+ decrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(psa_md_alg);
+ } else {
+ decrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT;
+ }
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, decrypt_alg);
+
+ status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
+ buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len,
+ &key_id);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_asymmetric_decrypt(key_id, decrypt_alg,
+ input, ilen,
+ NULL, 0,
+ output, osize, olen);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ status = psa_destroy_key(key_id);
+ if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+static int rsa_decrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx;
+
+ if (ilen != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(rsa, f_rng, p_rng,
+ olen, input, output, osize);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+static int rsa_encrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_md_alg, psa_encrypt_alg;
+ psa_status_t status;
+ int key_len;
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES];
+ unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf);
+
+ ((void) f_rng);
+ ((void) p_rng);
+
+ if (mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa) > osize) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE;
+ }
+
+ key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa, buf, &p);
+ if (key_len <= 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT);
+ if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) {
+ psa_md_alg = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type((mbedtls_md_type_t) mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa));
+ psa_encrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(psa_md_alg);
+ } else {
+ psa_encrypt_alg = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT;
+ }
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_encrypt_alg);
+ psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY);
+
+ status = psa_import_key(&attributes,
+ buf + sizeof(buf) - key_len, key_len,
+ &key_id);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_asymmetric_encrypt(key_id, psa_encrypt_alg,
+ input, ilen,
+ NULL, 0,
+ output, osize, olen);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ status = psa_destroy_key(key_id);
+ if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+static int rsa_encrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx;
+ *olen = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa);
+
+ if (*olen > osize) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(rsa, f_rng, p_rng,
+ ilen, input, output);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+static int rsa_check_pair_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ (void) f_rng;
+ (void) p_rng;
+ return mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv((const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pub->pk_ctx,
+ (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) prv->pk_ctx);
+}
+
+static void *rsa_alloc_wrap(void)
+{
+ void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context));
+
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_rsa_init((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void rsa_free_wrap(void *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_rsa_free((mbedtls_rsa_context *) ctx);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static void rsa_debug(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT)
+ /* Not supported */
+ (void) pk;
+ (void) items;
+#else
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx;
+
+ items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI;
+ items->name = "rsa.N";
+ items->value = &(rsa->N);
+
+ items++;
+
+ items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_MPI;
+ items->name = "rsa.E";
+ items->value = &(rsa->E);
+#endif
+}
+
+const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info = {
+ .type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA,
+ .name = "RSA",
+ .get_bitlen = rsa_get_bitlen,
+ .can_do = rsa_can_do,
+ .verify_func = rsa_verify_wrap,
+ .sign_func = rsa_sign_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ .verify_rs_func = NULL,
+ .sign_rs_func = NULL,
+ .rs_alloc_func = NULL,
+ .rs_free_func = NULL,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+ .decrypt_func = rsa_decrypt_wrap,
+ .encrypt_func = rsa_encrypt_wrap,
+ .check_pair_func = rsa_check_pair_wrap,
+ .ctx_alloc_func = rsa_alloc_wrap,
+ .ctx_free_func = rsa_free_wrap,
+ .debug_func = rsa_debug,
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+/*
+ * Generic EC key
+ */
+static int eckey_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type)
+{
+ return type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ||
+ type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH ||
+ type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
+}
+
+static size_t eckey_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ return pk->ec_bits;
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx;
+ return ecp->grp.pbits;
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+/* Common helper for ECDSA verify using PSA functions. */
+static int ecdsa_verify_psa(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
+ psa_ecc_family_t curve, size_t curve_bits,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY;
+ size_t signature_len = PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(curve_bits);
+ size_t converted_sig_len;
+ unsigned char extracted_sig[PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *p;
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ if (curve == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve));
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_md);
+
+ status = psa_import_key(&attributes, key, key_len, &key_id);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (signature_len > sizeof(extracted_sig)) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ p = (unsigned char *) sig;
+ ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(curve_bits, p, sig_len, extracted_sig,
+ sizeof(extracted_sig), &converted_sig_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (converted_sig_len != signature_len) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_verify_hash(key_id, psa_sig_md, hash, hash_len,
+ extracted_sig, signature_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+ status = psa_destroy_key(key_id);
+ if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_opaque_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ (void) md_alg;
+ unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN];
+ size_t key_len;
+ psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_ecc_family_t curve;
+ size_t curve_bits;
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &key_attr);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+ curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(psa_get_key_type(&key_attr));
+ curve_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attr);
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr);
+
+ status = psa_export_public_key(pk->priv_id, key, sizeof(key), &key_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+
+ return ecdsa_verify_psa(key, key_len, curve, curve_bits,
+ hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ (void) md_alg;
+ psa_ecc_family_t curve = pk->ec_family;
+ size_t curve_bits = pk->ec_bits;
+
+ return ecdsa_verify_psa(pk->pub_raw, pk->pub_raw_len, curve, curve_bits,
+ hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len);
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ (void) md_alg;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx = pk->pk_ctx;
+ unsigned char key[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH];
+ size_t key_len;
+ size_t curve_bits;
+ psa_ecc_family_t curve = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&ctx->grp, &ctx->Q,
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ &key_len, key, sizeof(key));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return ecdsa_verify_psa(key, key_len, curve, curve_bits,
+ hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ ((void) md_alg);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx,
+ hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len);
+
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+/* Common helper for ECDSA sign using PSA functions.
+ * Instead of extracting key's properties in order to check which kind of ECDSA
+ * signature it supports, we try both deterministic and non-deterministic.
+ */
+static int ecdsa_sign_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ psa_status_t status;
+ psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ size_t key_bits = 0;
+
+ status = psa_get_key_attributes(key_id, &key_attr);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+ key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attr);
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr);
+
+ status = psa_sign_hash(key_id,
+ PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)),
+ hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len);
+ if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ goto done;
+ } else if (status != PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED) {
+ return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+
+ status = psa_sign_hash(key_id,
+ PSA_ALG_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)),
+ hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+
+done:
+ ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(key_bits, sig, *sig_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_opaque_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size,
+ size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ ((void) f_rng);
+ ((void) p_rng);
+
+ return ecdsa_sign_psa(pk->priv_id, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size,
+ sig_len);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+/* When PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is defined opaque and non-opaque keys end up
+ * using the same function. */
+#define ecdsa_sign_wrap ecdsa_opaque_sign_wrap
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_status_t status;
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ctx = pk->pk_ctx;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_KEY_PAIR_LENGTH];
+ size_t curve_bits;
+ psa_ecc_family_t curve =
+ mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ctx->grp.id, &curve_bits);
+ size_t key_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits);
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_hash = mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg);
+ psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = MBEDTLS_PK_PSA_ALG_ECDSA_MAYBE_DET(psa_hash);
+ ((void) f_rng);
+ ((void) p_rng);
+
+ if (curve == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (key_len > sizeof(buf)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&ctx->d, buf, key_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ psa_set_key_type(&attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve));
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH);
+ psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, psa_sig_md);
+
+ status = psa_import_key(&attributes, buf, key_len, &key_id);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = ecdsa_sign_psa(key_id, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len);
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ status = psa_destroy_key(key_id);
+ if (ret == 0 && status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+static int ecdsa_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature((mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx,
+ md_alg, hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_size, sig_len,
+ f_rng, p_rng);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+/* Forward declarations */
+static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
+ void *rs_ctx);
+
+static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
+ void *rs_ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Restart context for ECDSA operations with ECKEY context
+ *
+ * We need to store an actual ECDSA context, as we need to pass the same to
+ * the underlying ecdsa function, so we can't create it on the fly every time.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx ecdsa_rs;
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa_ctx;
+} eckey_restart_ctx;
+
+static void *eckey_rs_alloc(void)
+{
+ eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx;
+
+ void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(eckey_restart_ctx));
+
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ rs_ctx = ctx;
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(&rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs);
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void eckey_rs_free(void *ctx)
+{
+ eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ rs_ctx = ctx;
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(&rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs);
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx);
+
+ mbedtls_free(ctx);
+}
+
+static int eckey_verify_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
+ void *rs_ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx;
+
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (rs == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */
+ if (rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, pk->pk_ctx));
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(pk,
+ md_alg, hash, hash_len,
+ sig, sig_len, &rs->ecdsa_rs));
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int eckey_sign_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
+ void *rs_ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx;
+
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (rs == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */
+ if (rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0) {
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair(&rs->ecdsa_ctx, pk->pk_ctx));
+ }
+
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(pk, md_alg,
+ hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len,
+ f_rng, p_rng, &rs->ecdsa_rs));
+
+cleanup:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+static int eckey_check_pair_psa(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv)
+{
+ psa_status_t status;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ uint8_t prv_key_buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH];
+ size_t prv_key_len;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = prv->priv_id;
+
+ status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, prv_key_buf, sizeof(prv_key_buf),
+ &prv_key_len);
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(prv_key_buf, pub->pub_raw, pub->pub_raw_len) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+static int eckey_check_pair_psa(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv)
+{
+ psa_status_t status;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ uint8_t prv_key_buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH];
+ size_t prv_key_len;
+ psa_status_t destruction_status;
+ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
+ psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ uint8_t pub_key_buf[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH];
+ size_t pub_key_len;
+ size_t curve_bits;
+ const psa_ecc_family_t curve =
+ mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*prv)->grp.id, &curve_bits);
+ const size_t curve_bytes = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(curve_bits);
+
+ if (curve == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ psa_set_key_type(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve));
+ psa_set_key_usage_flags(&key_attr, PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*prv)->d,
+ prv_key_buf, curve_bytes);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(prv_key_buf, sizeof(prv_key_buf));
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_import_key(&key_attr, prv_key_buf, curve_bytes, &key_id);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(prv_key_buf, sizeof(prv_key_buf));
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ // From now on prv_key_buf is used to store the public key of prv.
+ status = psa_export_public_key(key_id, prv_key_buf, sizeof(prv_key_buf),
+ &prv_key_len);
+ ret = PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ destruction_status = psa_destroy_key(key_id);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ } else if (destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(destruction_status);
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pub)->grp,
+ &mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pub)->Q,
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ &pub_key_len, pub_key_buf,
+ sizeof(pub_key_buf));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(prv_key_buf, pub_key_buf, curve_bytes) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+
+static int eckey_check_pair_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ (void) f_rng;
+ (void) p_rng;
+ return eckey_check_pair_psa(pub, prv);
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+static int eckey_check_pair_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv((const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pub->pk_ctx,
+ (const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) prv->pk_ctx,
+ f_rng, p_rng);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+/* When PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is defined opaque and non-opaque keys end up
+ * using the same function. */
+#define ecdsa_opaque_check_pair_wrap eckey_check_pair_wrap
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+static int ecdsa_opaque_check_pair_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pub,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *prv,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ psa_status_t status;
+ uint8_t exp_pub_key[MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN];
+ size_t exp_pub_key_len = 0;
+ uint8_t pub_key[MBEDTLS_PK_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_RAW_LEN];
+ size_t pub_key_len = 0;
+ int ret;
+ (void) f_rng;
+ (void) p_rng;
+
+ status = psa_export_public_key(prv->priv_id, exp_pub_key, sizeof(exp_pub_key),
+ &exp_pub_key_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = psa_pk_status_to_mbedtls(status);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&(mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pub)->grp),
+ &(mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pub)->Q),
+ MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ &pub_key_len, pub_key, sizeof(pub_key));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if ((exp_pub_key_len != pub_key_len) ||
+ memcmp(exp_pub_key, pub_key, exp_pub_key_len)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+static void *eckey_alloc_wrap(void)
+{
+ void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecp_keypair));
+
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void eckey_free_wrap(void *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free((mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) ctx);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+
+static void eckey_debug(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_PSA_EC;
+ items->name = "eckey.Q";
+ items->value = pk;
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = (mbedtls_ecp_keypair *) pk->pk_ctx;
+ items->type = MBEDTLS_PK_DEBUG_ECP;
+ items->name = "eckey.Q";
+ items->value = &(ecp->Q);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+}
+
+const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info = {
+ .type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY,
+ .name = "EC",
+ .get_bitlen = eckey_get_bitlen,
+ .can_do = eckey_can_do,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY)
+ .verify_func = ecdsa_verify_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */
+ .verify_func = NULL,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN)
+ .sign_func = ecdsa_sign_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */
+ .sign_func = NULL,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ .verify_rs_func = eckey_verify_rs_wrap,
+ .sign_rs_func = eckey_sign_rs_wrap,
+ .rs_alloc_func = eckey_rs_alloc,
+ .rs_free_func = eckey_rs_free,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+ .decrypt_func = NULL,
+ .encrypt_func = NULL,
+ .check_pair_func = eckey_check_pair_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ .ctx_alloc_func = NULL,
+ .ctx_free_func = NULL,
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ .ctx_alloc_func = eckey_alloc_wrap,
+ .ctx_free_func = eckey_free_wrap,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ .debug_func = eckey_debug,
+};
+
+/*
+ * EC key restricted to ECDH
+ */
+static int eckeydh_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type)
+{
+ return type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ||
+ type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH;
+}
+
+const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info = {
+ .type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH,
+ .name = "EC_DH",
+ .get_bitlen = eckey_get_bitlen, /* Same underlying key structure */
+ .can_do = eckeydh_can_do,
+ .verify_func = NULL,
+ .sign_func = NULL,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ .verify_rs_func = NULL,
+ .sign_rs_func = NULL,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+ .decrypt_func = NULL,
+ .encrypt_func = NULL,
+ .check_pair_func = eckey_check_pair_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ .ctx_alloc_func = NULL,
+ .ctx_free_func = NULL,
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ .ctx_alloc_func = eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */
+ .ctx_free_func = eckey_free_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ .debug_func = eckey_debug, /* Same underlying key structure */
+};
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME)
+static int ecdsa_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type)
+{
+ return type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
+ void *rs_ctx)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ ((void) md_alg);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable(
+ (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx,
+ hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len,
+ (mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx);
+
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
+ void *rs_ctx)
+{
+ return mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(
+ (mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx,
+ md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng,
+ (mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx);
+
+}
+
+static void *ecdsa_rs_alloc(void)
+{
+ void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx));
+
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init(ctx);
+ }
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void ecdsa_rs_free(void *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free(ctx);
+ mbedtls_free(ctx);
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info = {
+ .type = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
+ .name = "ECDSA",
+ .get_bitlen = eckey_get_bitlen, /* Compatible key structures */
+ .can_do = ecdsa_can_do,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY)
+ .verify_func = ecdsa_verify_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */
+ .verify_func = NULL,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN)
+ .sign_func = ecdsa_sign_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */
+ .sign_func = NULL,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ .verify_rs_func = ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap,
+ .sign_rs_func = ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap,
+ .rs_alloc_func = ecdsa_rs_alloc,
+ .rs_free_func = ecdsa_rs_free,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+ .decrypt_func = NULL,
+ .encrypt_func = NULL,
+ .check_pair_func = eckey_check_pair_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA)
+ .ctx_alloc_func = NULL,
+ .ctx_free_func = NULL,
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ .ctx_alloc_func = eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */
+ .ctx_free_func = eckey_free_wrap, /* Compatible key structures */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */
+ .debug_func = eckey_debug, /* Compatible key structures */
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME */
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
+/*
+ * Support for alternative RSA-private implementations
+ */
+
+static int rsa_alt_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type)
+{
+ return type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA;
+}
+
+static size_t rsa_alt_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
+{
+ const mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = pk->pk_ctx;
+
+ return 8 * rsa_alt->key_len_func(rsa_alt->key);
+}
+
+static int rsa_alt_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = pk->pk_ctx;
+
+#if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX
+ if (UINT_MAX < hash_len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ *sig_len = rsa_alt->key_len_func(rsa_alt->key);
+ if (*sig_len > MBEDTLS_PK_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ if (*sig_len > sig_size) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ return rsa_alt->sign_func(rsa_alt->key, f_rng, p_rng,
+ md_alg, (unsigned int) hash_len, hash, sig);
+}
+
+static int rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ mbedtls_rsa_alt_context *rsa_alt = pk->pk_ctx;
+
+ ((void) f_rng);
+ ((void) p_rng);
+
+ if (ilen != rsa_alt->key_len_func(rsa_alt->key)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ return rsa_alt->decrypt_func(rsa_alt->key,
+ olen, input, output, osize);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+static int rsa_alt_check_pair(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng)
+{
+ unsigned char sig[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char hash[32];
+ size_t sig_len = 0;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (rsa_alt_get_bitlen(prv) != rsa_get_bitlen(pub)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ memset(hash, 0x2a, sizeof(hash));
+
+ if ((ret = rsa_alt_sign_wrap(prv, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
+ hash, sizeof(hash),
+ sig, sizeof(sig), &sig_len,
+ f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa_verify_wrap(pub, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE,
+ hash, sizeof(hash), sig, sig_len) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
+static void *rsa_alt_alloc_wrap(void)
+{
+ void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_alt_context));
+
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_alt_context));
+ }
+
+ return ctx;
+}
+
+static void rsa_alt_free_wrap(void *ctx)
+{
+ mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(ctx, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_alt_context));
+}
+
+const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info = {
+ .type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT,
+ .name = "RSA-alt",
+ .get_bitlen = rsa_alt_get_bitlen,
+ .can_do = rsa_alt_can_do,
+ .verify_func = NULL,
+ .sign_func = rsa_alt_sign_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ .verify_rs_func = NULL,
+ .sign_rs_func = NULL,
+ .rs_alloc_func = NULL,
+ .rs_free_func = NULL,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+ .decrypt_func = rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap,
+ .encrypt_func = NULL,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ .check_pair_func = rsa_alt_check_pair,
+#else
+ .check_pair_func = NULL,
+#endif
+ .ctx_alloc_func = rsa_alt_alloc_wrap,
+ .ctx_free_func = rsa_alt_free_wrap,
+ .debug_func = NULL,
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+static size_t opaque_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
+{
+ size_t bits;
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+
+ if (PSA_SUCCESS != psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &attributes)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ bits = psa_get_key_bits(&attributes);
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
+ return bits;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+static int ecdsa_opaque_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type)
+{
+ return type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ||
+ type == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA;
+}
+
+const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_opaque_info = {
+ .type = MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE,
+ .name = "Opaque",
+ .get_bitlen = opaque_get_bitlen,
+ .can_do = ecdsa_opaque_can_do,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY)
+ .verify_func = ecdsa_opaque_verify_wrap,
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */
+ .verify_func = NULL,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN)
+ .sign_func = ecdsa_opaque_sign_wrap,
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */
+ .sign_func = NULL,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ .verify_rs_func = NULL,
+ .sign_rs_func = NULL,
+ .rs_alloc_func = NULL,
+ .rs_free_func = NULL,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+ .decrypt_func = NULL,
+ .encrypt_func = NULL,
+ .check_pair_func = ecdsa_opaque_check_pair_wrap,
+ .ctx_alloc_func = NULL,
+ .ctx_free_func = NULL,
+ .debug_func = NULL,
+};
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+
+static int rsa_opaque_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type)
+{
+ return type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ||
+ type == MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS;
+}
+
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
+static int rsa_opaque_decrypt(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg;
+ psa_key_type_t type;
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ /* PSA has its own RNG */
+ (void) f_rng;
+ (void) p_rng;
+
+ status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &attributes);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+
+ type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
+ alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes);
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
+
+ if (!PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_asymmetric_decrypt(pk->priv_id, alg, input, ilen, NULL, 0, output, osize, olen);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
+
+static int rsa_opaque_sign_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+ psa_algorithm_t alg;
+ psa_key_type_t type;
+ psa_status_t status;
+
+ /* PSA has its own RNG */
+ (void) f_rng;
+ (void) p_rng;
+
+ status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &attributes);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+
+ type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes);
+ alg = psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes);
+ psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
+
+ if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) {
+ alg = (alg & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg);
+ } else {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ status = psa_sign_hash(pk->priv_id, alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len);
+ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
+ if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)) {
+ return PSA_PK_RSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ } else {
+ return PSA_PK_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+#else /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+ ((void) pk);
+ ((void) md_alg);
+ ((void) hash);
+ ((void) hash_len);
+ ((void) sig);
+ ((void) sig_size);
+ ((void) sig_len);
+ ((void) f_rng);
+ ((void) p_rng);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+#endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+}
+
+const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_opaque_info = {
+ .type = MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE,
+ .name = "Opaque",
+ .get_bitlen = opaque_get_bitlen,
+ .can_do = rsa_opaque_can_do,
+ .verify_func = NULL,
+ .sign_func = rsa_opaque_sign_wrap,
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ .verify_rs_func = NULL,
+ .sign_rs_func = NULL,
+ .rs_alloc_func = NULL,
+ .rs_free_func = NULL,
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)
+ .decrypt_func = rsa_opaque_decrypt,
+#else /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
+ .decrypt_func = NULL,
+#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */
+ .encrypt_func = NULL,
+ .check_pair_func = NULL,
+ .ctx_alloc_func = NULL,
+ .ctx_free_func = NULL,
+ .debug_func = NULL,
+};
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.h b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..be096da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pk_wrap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+/**
+ * \file pk_wrap.h
+ *
+ * \brief Public Key abstraction layer: wrapper functions
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H
+#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#endif
+
+struct mbedtls_pk_info_t {
+ /** Public key type */
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t type;
+
+ /** Type name */
+ const char *name;
+
+ /** Get key size in bits */
+ size_t (*get_bitlen)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk);
+
+ /** Tell if the context implements this type (e.g. ECKEY can do ECDSA) */
+ int (*can_do)(mbedtls_pk_type_t type);
+
+ /** Verify signature */
+ int (*verify_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len);
+
+ /** Make signature */
+ int (*sign_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ /** Verify signature (restartable) */
+ int (*verify_rs_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
+ void *rs_ctx);
+
+ /** Make signature (restartable) */
+ int (*sign_rs_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size, size_t *sig_len,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng, void *rs_ctx);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+ /** Decrypt message */
+ int (*decrypt_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng);
+
+ /** Encrypt message */
+ int (*encrypt_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const unsigned char *input, size_t ilen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t *olen, size_t osize,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng);
+
+ /** Check public-private key pair */
+ int (*check_pair_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pub, mbedtls_pk_context *prv,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
+ void *p_rng);
+
+ /** Allocate a new context */
+ void * (*ctx_alloc_func)(void);
+
+ /** Free the given context */
+ void (*ctx_free_func)(void *ctx);
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
+ /** Allocate the restart context */
+ void *(*rs_alloc_func)(void);
+
+ /** Free the restart context */
+ void (*rs_free_func)(void *rs_ctx);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
+
+ /** Interface with the debug module */
+ void (*debug_func)(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_pk_debug_item *items);
+
+};
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
+/* Container for RSA-alt */
+typedef struct {
+ void *key;
+ mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_decrypt_func decrypt_func;
+ mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_sign_func sign_func;
+ mbedtls_pk_rsa_alt_key_len_func key_len_func;
+} mbedtls_rsa_alt_context;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info;
+extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME)
+extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT)
+extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_opaque_info;
+extern const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_opaque_info;
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+int mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_md,
+ mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa_ctx,
+ const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
+ unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_size,
+ size_t *sig_len);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRAP_H */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3467b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pkcs12.c
@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
+/*
+ * PKCS#12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+/*
+ * The PKCS #12 Personal Information Exchange Syntax Standard v1.1
+ *
+ * http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/pkcs/files/h11301-wp-pkcs-12v1-1-personal-information-exchange-syntax.pdf
+ * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/pkcs-12v1-1.asn
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h"
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_DES_C)
+#include "mbedtls/des.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "psa_util_internal.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+
+static int pkcs12_parse_pbe_params(mbedtls_asn1_buf *params,
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char **p = ¶ms->p;
+ const unsigned char *end = params->p + params->len;
+
+ /*
+ * pkcs-12PbeParams ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * salt OCTET STRING,
+ * iterations INTEGER
+ * }
+ *
+ */
+ if (params->tag != (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG);
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &salt->len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ salt->p = *p;
+ *p += salt->len;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, iterations)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (*p != end) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PBE_INVALID_FORMAT,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN 128
+
+static int pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
+{
+ int ret, iterations = 0;
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf salt;
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned char unipwd[PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN * 2 + 2];
+
+ if (pwdlen > PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ memset(&salt, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf));
+ memset(&unipwd, 0, sizeof(unipwd));
+
+ if ((ret = pkcs12_parse_pbe_params(pbe_params, &salt,
+ &iterations)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < pwdlen; i++) {
+ unipwd[i * 2 + 1] = pwd[i];
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(key, keylen, unipwd, pwdlen * 2 + 2,
+ salt.p, salt.len, md_type,
+ MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_KEY, iterations)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (iv == NULL || ivlen == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(iv, ivlen, unipwd, pwdlen * 2 + 2,
+ salt.p, salt.len, md_type,
+ MBEDTLS_PKCS12_DERIVE_IV, iterations)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#undef PKCS12_MAX_PWDLEN
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t len,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_len);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t len,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ size_t output_len = 0;
+
+ /* We assume caller of the function is providing a big enough output buffer
+ * so we pass output_size as SIZE_MAX to pass checks, However, no guarantees
+ * for the output size actually being correct.
+ */
+ return mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(pbe_params, mode, cipher_type, md_type,
+ pwd, pwdlen, data, len, output, SIZE_MAX,
+ &output_len);
+}
+#endif
+
+int mbedtls_pkcs12_pbe_ext(mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_type, mbedtls_md_type_t md_type,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t len,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_len)
+{
+ int ret, keylen = 0;
+ unsigned char key[32];
+ unsigned char iv[16];
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
+ mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx;
+ size_t iv_len = 0;
+ size_t finish_olen = 0;
+ unsigned int padlen = 0;
+
+ if (pwd == NULL && pwdlen != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_type);
+ if (cipher_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ keylen = (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info) / 8;
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT) {
+ if (output_size < len) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_ENCRYPT) {
+ padlen = cipher_info->block_size - (len % cipher_info->block_size);
+ if (output_size < (len + padlen)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ iv_len = mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(cipher_info);
+ if ((ret = pkcs12_pbe_derive_key_iv(pbe_params, md_type, pwd, pwdlen,
+ key, keylen,
+ iv, iv_len)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_cipher_init(&cipher_ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&cipher_ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen,
+ (mbedtls_operation_t) mode)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING)
+ {
+ /* PKCS12 uses CBC with PKCS7 padding */
+ mbedtls_cipher_padding_t padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+ /* For historical reasons, when decrypting, this function works when
+ * decrypting even when support for PKCS7 padding is disabled. In this
+ * case, it ignores the padding, and so will never report a
+ * password mismatch.
+ */
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS12_PBE_DECRYPT) {
+ padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE;
+ }
+#endif
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&cipher_ctx, padding)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */
+
+ ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&cipher_ctx, iv, iv_len, data, len, output, &finish_olen);
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_INVALID_PADDING) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_PASSWORD_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ *output_len += finish_olen;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(key, sizeof(key));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(iv, sizeof(iv));
+ mbedtls_cipher_free(&cipher_ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
+
+static void pkcs12_fill_buffer(unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
+ const unsigned char *filler, size_t fill_len)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = data;
+ size_t use_len;
+
+ if (filler != NULL && fill_len != 0) {
+ while (data_len > 0) {
+ use_len = (data_len > fill_len) ? fill_len : data_len;
+ memcpy(p, filler, use_len);
+ p += use_len;
+ data_len -= use_len;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* If either of the above are not true then clearly there is nothing
+ * that this function can do. The function should *not* be called
+ * under either of those circumstances, as you could end up with an
+ * incorrect output but for safety's sake, leaving the check in as
+ * otherwise we could end up with memory corruption.*/
+ }
+}
+
+
+static int calculate_hashes(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, int iterations,
+ unsigned char *diversifier, unsigned char *salt_block,
+ unsigned char *pwd_block, unsigned char *hash_output, int use_salt,
+ int use_password, size_t hlen, size_t v)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ size_t i;
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
+ mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
+ md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_type);
+ if (md_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 0)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ // Calculate hash( diversifier || salt_block || pwd_block )
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_starts(&md_ctx)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, diversifier, v)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (use_salt != 0) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, salt_block, v)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (use_password != 0) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_update(&md_ctx, pwd_block, v)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_finish(&md_ctx, hash_output)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ // Perform remaining ( iterations - 1 ) recursive hash calculations
+ for (i = 1; i < (size_t) iterations; i++) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, hash_output, hlen, hash_output))
+ != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+int mbedtls_pkcs12_derivation(unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_type, int id, int iterations)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned int j;
+
+ unsigned char diversifier[128];
+ unsigned char salt_block[128], pwd_block[128], hash_block[128] = { 0 };
+ unsigned char hash_output[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char c;
+ int use_password = 0;
+ int use_salt = 0;
+
+ size_t hlen, use_len, v, i;
+
+ // This version only allows max of 64 bytes of password or salt
+ if (datalen > 128 || pwdlen > 64 || saltlen > 64) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (pwd == NULL && pwdlen != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ if (salt == NULL && saltlen != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS12_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ use_password = (pwd && pwdlen != 0);
+ use_salt = (salt && saltlen != 0);
+
+ hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size_from_type(md_type);
+
+ if (hlen <= 32) {
+ v = 64;
+ } else {
+ v = 128;
+ }
+
+ memset(diversifier, (unsigned char) id, v);
+
+ if (use_salt != 0) {
+ pkcs12_fill_buffer(salt_block, v, salt, saltlen);
+ }
+
+ if (use_password != 0) {
+ pkcs12_fill_buffer(pwd_block, v, pwd, pwdlen);
+ }
+
+ p = data;
+ while (datalen > 0) {
+ if (calculate_hashes(md_type, iterations, diversifier, salt_block,
+ pwd_block, hash_output, use_salt, use_password, hlen,
+ v) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ use_len = (datalen > hlen) ? hlen : datalen;
+ memcpy(p, hash_output, use_len);
+ datalen -= use_len;
+ p += use_len;
+
+ if (datalen == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ // Concatenating copies of hash_output into hash_block (B)
+ pkcs12_fill_buffer(hash_block, v, hash_output, hlen);
+
+ // B += 1
+ for (i = v; i > 0; i--) {
+ if (++hash_block[i - 1] != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (use_salt != 0) {
+ // salt_block += B
+ c = 0;
+ for (i = v; i > 0; i--) {
+ j = salt_block[i - 1] + hash_block[i - 1] + c;
+ c = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(j);
+ salt_block[i - 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(j);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (use_password != 0) {
+ // pwd_block += B
+ c = 0;
+ for (i = v; i > 0; i--) {
+ j = pwd_block[i - 1] + hash_block[i - 1] + c;
+ c = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(j);
+ pwd_block[i - 1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(j);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(salt_block, sizeof(salt_block));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(pwd_block, sizeof(pwd_block));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hash_block, sizeof(hash_block));
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(hash_output, sizeof(hash_output));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6c5305
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pkcs5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,500 @@
+/**
+ * \file pkcs5.c
+ *
+ * \brief PKCS#5 functions
+ *
+ * \author Mathias Olsson <mathias@kompetensum.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+/*
+ * PKCS#5 includes PBKDF2 and more
+ *
+ * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2898 (Specification)
+ * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6070 (Test vectors)
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C)
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+#include "mbedtls/cipher.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
+#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+
+#include "psa_util_internal.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C)
+static int pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params,
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf *salt, int *iterations,
+ int *keylen, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_type)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf prf_alg_oid;
+ unsigned char *p = params->p;
+ const unsigned char *end = params->p + params->len;
+
+ if (params->tag != (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG);
+ }
+ /*
+ * PBKDF2-params ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * salt OCTET STRING,
+ * iterationCount INTEGER,
+ * keyLength INTEGER OPTIONAL
+ * prf AlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT algid-hmacWithSHA1
+ * }
+ *
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &salt->len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ salt->p = p;
+ p += salt->len;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, iterations)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (p == end) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, keylen)) != 0) {
+ if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (p == end) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(&p, end, &prf_alg_oid)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_oid_get_md_hmac(&prf_alg_oid, md_type) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ if (p != end) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_len);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+ unsigned char *output)
+{
+ size_t output_len = 0;
+
+ /* We assume caller of the function is providing a big enough output buffer
+ * so we pass output_size as SIZE_MAX to pass checks, However, no guarantees
+ * for the output size actually being correct.
+ */
+ return mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(pbe_params, mode, pwd, pwdlen, data,
+ datalen, output, SIZE_MAX, &output_len);
+}
+#endif
+
+int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2_ext(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *pbe_params, int mode,
+ const unsigned char *pwd, size_t pwdlen,
+ const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
+ unsigned char *output, size_t output_size,
+ size_t *output_len)
+{
+ int ret, iterations = 0, keylen = 0;
+ unsigned char *p, *end;
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf kdf_alg_oid, enc_scheme_oid, kdf_alg_params, enc_scheme_params;
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf salt;
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
+ unsigned char key[32], iv[32];
+ const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher_info;
+ mbedtls_cipher_type_t cipher_alg;
+ mbedtls_cipher_context_t cipher_ctx;
+ unsigned int padlen = 0;
+
+ p = pbe_params->p;
+ end = p + pbe_params->len;
+
+ /*
+ * PBES2-params ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * keyDerivationFunc AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-KDFs}},
+ * encryptionScheme AlgorithmIdentifier {{PBES2-Encs}}
+ * }
+ */
+ if (pbe_params->tag != (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG);
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&p, end, &kdf_alg_oid,
+ &kdf_alg_params)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ // Only PBKDF2 supported at the moment
+ //
+ if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS5_PBKDF2, &kdf_alg_oid) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params(&kdf_alg_params,
+ &salt, &iterations, &keylen,
+ &md_type)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(&p, end, &enc_scheme_oid,
+ &enc_scheme_params)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_oid_get_cipher_alg(&enc_scheme_oid, &cipher_alg) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ cipher_info = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type(cipher_alg);
+ if (cipher_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The value of keylen from pkcs5_parse_pbkdf2_params() is ignored
+ * since it is optional and we don't know if it was set or not
+ */
+ keylen = (int) mbedtls_cipher_info_get_key_bitlen(cipher_info) / 8;
+
+ if (enc_scheme_params.tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING ||
+ enc_scheme_params.len != mbedtls_cipher_info_get_iv_size(cipher_info)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS5_DECRYPT) {
+ if (output_size < datalen) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_PKCS5_ENCRYPT) {
+ padlen = cipher_info->block_size - (datalen % cipher_info->block_size);
+ if (output_size < (datalen + padlen)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_cipher_init(&cipher_ctx);
+
+ memcpy(iv, enc_scheme_params.p, enc_scheme_params.len);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(md_type, pwd, pwdlen, salt.p,
+ salt.len, iterations, keylen,
+ key)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setup(&cipher_ctx, cipher_info)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_setkey(&cipher_ctx, key, 8 * keylen,
+ (mbedtls_operation_t) mode)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING)
+ {
+ /* PKCS5 uses CBC with PKCS7 padding (which is the same as
+ * "PKCS5 padding" except that it's typically only called PKCS5
+ * with 64-bit-block ciphers).
+ */
+ mbedtls_cipher_padding_t padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_PKCS7;
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7)
+ /* For historical reasons, when decrypting, this function works when
+ * decrypting even when support for PKCS7 padding is disabled. In this
+ * case, it ignores the padding, and so will never report a
+ * password mismatch.
+ */
+ if (mode == MBEDTLS_DECRYPT) {
+ padding = MBEDTLS_PADDING_NONE;
+ }
+#endif
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_set_padding_mode(&cipher_ctx, padding)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_WITH_PADDING */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_cipher_crypt(&cipher_ctx, iv, enc_scheme_params.len,
+ data, datalen, output, output_len)) != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_PASSWORD_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+exit:
+ mbedtls_cipher_free(&cipher_ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C */
+
+static int pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *password,
+ size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen,
+ unsigned int iteration_count,
+ uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned char md1[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char work[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
+ unsigned char md_size = mbedtls_md_get_size(ctx->md_info);
+ size_t use_len;
+ unsigned char *out_p = output;
+ unsigned char counter[4];
+
+ memset(counter, 0, 4);
+ counter[3] = 1;
+
+#if UINT_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFF
+ if (iteration_count > 0xFFFFFFFF) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_starts(ctx, password, plen)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ while (key_length) {
+ // U1 ends up in work
+ //
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(ctx, salt, slen)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(ctx, counter, 4)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(ctx, work)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(ctx)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(md1, work, md_size);
+
+ for (i = 1; i < iteration_count; i++) {
+ // U2 ends up in md1
+ //
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_update(ctx, md1, md_size)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_finish(ctx, md1)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_hmac_reset(ctx)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ // U1 xor U2
+ //
+ mbedtls_xor(work, work, md1, md_size);
+ }
+
+ use_len = (key_length < md_size) ? key_length : md_size;
+ memcpy(out_p, work, use_len);
+
+ key_length -= (uint32_t) use_len;
+ out_p += use_len;
+
+ for (i = 4; i > 0; i--) {
+ if (++counter[i - 1] != 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ /* Zeroise buffers to clear sensitive data from memory. */
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(work, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE);
+ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(md1, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
+int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(mbedtls_md_context_t *ctx,
+ const unsigned char *password,
+ size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen,
+ unsigned int iteration_count,
+ uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ return pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(ctx, password, plen, salt, slen, iteration_count,
+ key_length, output);
+}
+#endif
+
+int mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
+ const unsigned char *password,
+ size_t plen, const unsigned char *salt, size_t slen,
+ unsigned int iteration_count,
+ uint32_t key_length, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx;
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = NULL;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
+ if (md_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_md_init(&md_ctx);
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_md_setup(&md_ctx, md_info, 1)) != 0) {
+ goto exit;
+ }
+ ret = pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac(&md_ctx, password, plen, salt, slen,
+ iteration_count, key_length, output);
+exit:
+ mbedtls_md_free(&md_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST)
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
+int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" PBKDF2 (SHA1): skipped\n\n");
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
+
+#define MAX_TESTS 6
+
+static const size_t plen_test_data[MAX_TESTS] =
+{ 8, 8, 8, 24, 9 };
+
+static const unsigned char password_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] =
+{
+ "password",
+ "password",
+ "password",
+ "passwordPASSWORDpassword",
+ "pass\0word",
+};
+
+static const size_t slen_test_data[MAX_TESTS] =
+{ 4, 4, 4, 36, 5 };
+
+static const unsigned char salt_test_data[MAX_TESTS][40] =
+{
+ "salt",
+ "salt",
+ "salt",
+ "saltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsaltSALTsalt",
+ "sa\0lt",
+};
+
+static const uint32_t it_cnt_test_data[MAX_TESTS] =
+{ 1, 2, 4096, 4096, 4096 };
+
+static const uint32_t key_len_test_data[MAX_TESTS] =
+{ 20, 20, 20, 25, 16 };
+
+static const unsigned char result_key_test_data[MAX_TESTS][32] =
+{
+ { 0x0c, 0x60, 0xc8, 0x0f, 0x96, 0x1f, 0x0e, 0x71,
+ 0xf3, 0xa9, 0xb5, 0x24, 0xaf, 0x60, 0x12, 0x06,
+ 0x2f, 0xe0, 0x37, 0xa6 },
+ { 0xea, 0x6c, 0x01, 0x4d, 0xc7, 0x2d, 0x6f, 0x8c,
+ 0xcd, 0x1e, 0xd9, 0x2a, 0xce, 0x1d, 0x41, 0xf0,
+ 0xd8, 0xde, 0x89, 0x57 },
+ { 0x4b, 0x00, 0x79, 0x01, 0xb7, 0x65, 0x48, 0x9a,
+ 0xbe, 0xad, 0x49, 0xd9, 0x26, 0xf7, 0x21, 0xd0,
+ 0x65, 0xa4, 0x29, 0xc1 },
+ { 0x3d, 0x2e, 0xec, 0x4f, 0xe4, 0x1c, 0x84, 0x9b,
+ 0x80, 0xc8, 0xd8, 0x36, 0x62, 0xc0, 0xe4, 0x4a,
+ 0x8b, 0x29, 0x1a, 0x96, 0x4c, 0xf2, 0xf0, 0x70,
+ 0x38 },
+ { 0x56, 0xfa, 0x6a, 0xa7, 0x55, 0x48, 0x09, 0x9d,
+ 0xcc, 0x37, 0xd7, 0xf0, 0x34, 0x25, 0xe0, 0xc3 },
+};
+
+int mbedtls_pkcs5_self_test(int verbose)
+{
+ int ret, i;
+ unsigned char key[64];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_TESTS; i++) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf(" PBKDF2 (SHA1) #%d: ", i);
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_pkcs5_pbkdf2_hmac_ext(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, password_test_data[i],
+ plen_test_data[i], salt_test_data[i],
+ slen_test_data[i], it_cnt_test_data[i],
+ key_len_test_data[i], key);
+ if (ret != 0 ||
+ memcmp(result_key_test_data[i], key, key_len_test_data[i]) != 0) {
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("failed\n");
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("passed\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (verbose != 0) {
+ mbedtls_printf("\n");
+ }
+
+exit:
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1 */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C */
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/pkcs7.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pkcs7.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3aac662
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pkcs7.c
@@ -0,0 +1,773 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+#include "common.h"
+
+#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C)
+#include "mbedtls/pkcs7.h"
+#include "x509_internal.h"
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
+#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h"
+#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
+#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
+#include <time.h>
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Initializes the mbedtls_pkcs7 structure.
+ */
+void mbedtls_pkcs7_init(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7)
+{
+ memset(pkcs7, 0, sizeof(*pkcs7));
+}
+
+static int pkcs7_get_next_content_len(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
+ size_t *len)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+ | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret);
+ } else if ((size_t) (end - *p) != *len) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * version Version
+ * Version ::= INTEGER
+ **/
+static int pkcs7_get_version(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end, int *ver)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(p, end, ver);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION, ret);
+ }
+
+ /* If version != 1, return invalid version */
+ if (*ver != MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SUPPORTED_VERSION) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_VERSION;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * contentType ContentType,
+ * content
+ * [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL }
+ **/
+static int pkcs7_get_content_info_type(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
+ unsigned char **seq_end,
+ mbedtls_pkcs7_buf *pkcs7)
+{
+ size_t len = 0;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char *start = *p;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+ | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ *p = start;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret);
+ }
+ *seq_end = *p + len;
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, *seq_end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ *p = start;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret);
+ }
+
+ pkcs7->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID;
+ pkcs7->len = len;
+ pkcs7->p = *p;
+ *p += len;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
+ *
+ * This is from x509.h
+ **/
+static int pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_x509_buf *alg)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(p, end, alg)) != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG, ret);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers :: SET of DigestAlgorithmIdentifier
+ **/
+static int pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm_set(unsigned char **p,
+ unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_x509_buf *alg)
+{
+ size_t len = 0;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+ | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG, ret);
+ }
+
+ end = *p + len;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg_null(p, end, alg);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG, ret);
+ }
+
+ /** For now, it assumes there is only one digest algorithm specified **/
+ if (*p != end) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * certificates :: SET OF ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate,
+ * ExtendedCertificateOrCertificate ::= CHOICE {
+ * certificate Certificate -- x509,
+ * extendedCertificate[0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificate }
+ * Return number of certificates added to the signed data,
+ * 0 or higher is valid.
+ * Return negative error code for failure.
+ **/
+static int pkcs7_get_certificates(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_x509_crt *certs)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len1 = 0;
+ size_t len2 = 0;
+ unsigned char *end_set, *end_cert, *start;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len1, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+ | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+ start = *p;
+ end_set = *p + len1;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_set, &len2, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+ | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT, ret);
+ }
+
+ end_cert = *p + len2;
+
+ /*
+ * This is to verify that there is only one signer certificate. It seems it is
+ * not easy to differentiate between the chain vs different signer's certificate.
+ * So, we support only the root certificate and the single signer.
+ * The behaviour would be improved with addition of multiple signer support.
+ */
+ if (end_cert != end_set) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der(certs, start, len1)) < 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT;
+ }
+
+ *p = end_cert;
+
+ /*
+ * Since in this version we strictly support single certificate, and reaching
+ * here implies we have parsed successfully, we return 1.
+ */
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * EncryptedDigest ::= OCTET STRING
+ **/
+static int pkcs7_get_signature(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_pkcs7_buf *signature)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ signature->tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING;
+ signature->len = len;
+ signature->p = *p;
+
+ *p = *p + len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void pkcs7_free_signer_info(mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer)
+{
+ mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur;
+ mbedtls_x509_name *name_prv;
+
+ if (signer == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ name_cur = signer->issuer.next;
+ while (name_cur != NULL) {
+ name_prv = name_cur;
+ name_cur = name_cur->next;
+ mbedtls_free(name_prv);
+ }
+ signer->issuer.next = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version Version;
+ * issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
+ * digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
+ * authenticatedAttributes
+ * [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL,
+ * digestEncryptionAlgorithm DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
+ * encryptedDigest EncryptedDigest,
+ * unauthenticatedAttributes
+ * [1] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL,
+ * Returns 0 if the signerInfo is valid.
+ * Return negative error code for failure.
+ * Structure must not contain vales for authenticatedAttributes
+ * and unauthenticatedAttributes.
+ **/
+static int pkcs7_get_signer_info(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer,
+ mbedtls_x509_buf *alg)
+{
+ unsigned char *end_signer, *end_issuer_and_sn;
+ int asn1_ret = 0, ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ asn1_ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+ | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+ if (asn1_ret != 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ end_signer = *p + len;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_get_version(p, end_signer, &signer->version);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ asn1_ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_signer, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+ if (asn1_ret != 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ end_issuer_and_sn = *p + len;
+ /* Parsing IssuerAndSerialNumber */
+ signer->issuer_raw.p = *p;
+
+ asn1_ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end_issuer_and_sn, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+ if (asn1_ret != 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_get_name(p, *p + len, &signer->issuer);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ signer->issuer_raw.len = (size_t) (*p - signer->issuer_raw.p);
+
+ ret = mbedtls_x509_get_serial(p, end_issuer_and_sn, &signer->serial);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* ensure no extra or missing bytes */
+ if (*p != end_issuer_and_sn) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm(p, end_signer, &signer->alg_identifier);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the digest algorithm used matches the one provided earlier */
+ if (signer->alg_identifier.tag != alg->tag ||
+ signer->alg_identifier.len != alg->len ||
+ memcmp(signer->alg_identifier.p, alg->p, alg->len) != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Assume authenticatedAttributes is nonexistent */
+ ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm(p, end_signer, &signer->sig_alg_identifier);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = pkcs7_get_signature(p, end_signer, &signer->sig);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Do not permit any unauthenticated attributes */
+ if (*p != end_signer) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO;
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (asn1_ret != 0 || ret != 0) {
+ pkcs7_free_signer_info(signer);
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO,
+ asn1_ret);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * SignerInfos ::= SET of SignerInfo
+ * Return number of signers added to the signed data,
+ * 0 or higher is valid.
+ * Return negative error code for failure.
+ **/
+static int pkcs7_get_signers_info_set(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signers_set,
+ mbedtls_x509_buf *digest_alg)
+{
+ unsigned char *end_set;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ int count = 0;
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+ | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_SIGNER_INFO, ret);
+ }
+
+ /* Detect zero signers */
+ if (len == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ end_set = *p + len;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_get_signer_info(p, end_set, signers_set, digest_alg);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ count++;
+
+ mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *prev = signers_set;
+ while (*p != end_set) {
+ mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer =
+ mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info));
+ if (!signer) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = pkcs7_get_signer_info(p, end_set, signer, digest_alg);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_free(signer);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ prev->next = signer;
+ prev = signer;
+ count++;
+ }
+
+ return count;
+
+cleanup:
+ pkcs7_free_signer_info(signers_set);
+ mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer = signers_set->next;
+ while (signer != NULL) {
+ prev = signer;
+ signer = signer->next;
+ pkcs7_free_signer_info(prev);
+ mbedtls_free(prev);
+ }
+ signers_set->next = NULL;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version Version,
+ * digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
+ * contentInfo ContentInfo,
+ * certificates
+ * [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates
+ * OPTIONAL,
+ * crls
+ * [0] IMPLICIT CertificateRevocationLists OPTIONAL,
+ * signerInfos SignerInfos }
+ */
+static int pkcs7_get_signed_data(unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen,
+ mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data *signed_data)
+{
+ unsigned char *p = buf;
+ unsigned char *end = buf + buflen;
+ unsigned char *end_content_info = NULL;
+ size_t len = 0;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+ | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (p + len != end) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+
+ /* Get version of signed data */
+ ret = pkcs7_get_version(&p, end, &signed_data->version);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Get digest algorithm */
+ ret = pkcs7_get_digest_algorithm_set(&p, end,
+ &signed_data->digest_alg_identifiers);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&signed_data->digest_alg_identifiers, &md_alg);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_ALG;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_pkcs7_buf content_type;
+ memset(&content_type, 0, sizeof(content_type));
+ ret = pkcs7_get_content_info_type(&p, end, &end_content_info, &content_type);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA, &content_type)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO;
+ }
+
+ if (p != end_content_info) {
+ /* Determine if valid content is present */
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p,
+ end_content_info,
+ &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret);
+ }
+ p += len;
+ if (p != end_content_info) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CONTENT_INFO, ret);
+ }
+ /* Valid content is present - this is not supported */
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ /* Look for certificates, there may or may not be any */
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_init(&signed_data->certs);
+ ret = pkcs7_get_certificates(&p, end, &signed_data->certs);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ signed_data->no_of_certs = ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Currently CRLs are not supported. If CRL exist, the parsing will fail
+ * at next step of getting signers info and return error as invalid
+ * signer info.
+ */
+
+ signed_data->no_of_crls = 0;
+
+ /* Get signers info */
+ ret = pkcs7_get_signers_info_set(&p,
+ end,
+ &signed_data->signers,
+ &signed_data->digest_alg_identifiers);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ signed_data->no_of_signers = ret;
+
+ /* Don't permit trailing data */
+ if (p != end) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_pkcs7_parse_der(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7, const unsigned char *buf,
+ const size_t buflen)
+{
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *end;
+ size_t len = 0;
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (pkcs7 == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+
+ /* make an internal copy of the buffer for parsing */
+ pkcs7->raw.p = p = mbedtls_calloc(1, buflen);
+ if (pkcs7->raw.p == NULL) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(p, buf, buflen);
+ pkcs7->raw.len = buflen;
+ end = p + buflen;
+
+ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+ | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((size_t) (end - p) != len) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_FORMAT,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
+ if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ p = pkcs7->raw.p;
+ len = buflen;
+ goto try_data;
+ }
+
+ if (MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA, p, len)) {
+ /* OID is not MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA, which is the only supported feature */
+ if (!MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DATA, p, len)
+ || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA, p, len)
+ || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA, p, len)
+ || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_AND_ENVELOPED_DATA, p, len)
+ || !MBEDTLS_OID_CMP_RAW(MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA, p, len)) {
+ /* OID is valid according to the spec, but unsupported */
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ } else {
+ /* OID is invalid according to the spec */
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ p += len;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_get_next_content_len(&p, end, &len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* ensure no extra/missing data */
+ if (p + len != end) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+try_data:
+ ret = pkcs7_get_signed_data(p, len, &pkcs7->signed_data);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = MBEDTLS_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA;
+
+out:
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ mbedtls_pkcs7_free(pkcs7);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t datalen,
+ const int is_data_hash)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char *hash;
+ mbedtls_pk_context pk_cxt = cert->pk;
+ const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
+ mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg;
+ mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer;
+
+ if (pkcs7->signed_data.no_of_signers == 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_INVALID_CERT;
+ }
+
+ if (mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(&cert->valid_to) ||
+ mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(&cert->valid_from)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_CERT_DATE_INVALID;
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_oid_get_md_alg(&pkcs7->signed_data.digest_alg_identifiers, &md_alg);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type(md_alg);
+ if (md_info == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ hash = mbedtls_calloc(mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info), 1);
+ if (hash == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_ALLOC_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /* BEGIN must free hash before jumping out */
+ if (is_data_hash) {
+ if (datalen != mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info)) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(hash, data, datalen);
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = mbedtls_md(md_info, data, datalen, hash);
+ }
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_free(hash);
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /* assume failure */
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_VERIFY_FAIL;
+
+ /*
+ * Potential TODOs
+ * Currently we iterate over all signers and return success if any of them
+ * verify.
+ *
+ * However, we could make this better by checking against the certificate's
+ * identification and SignerIdentifier fields first. That would also allow
+ * us to distinguish between 'no signature for key' and 'signature for key
+ * failed to validate'.
+ */
+ for (signer = &pkcs7->signed_data.signers; signer; signer = signer->next) {
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_verify(&pk_cxt, md_alg, hash,
+ mbedtls_md_get_size(md_info),
+ signer->sig.p, signer->sig.len);
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_free(hash);
+ /* END must free hash before jumping out */
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_data_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
+ const unsigned char *data,
+ size_t datalen)
+{
+ if (data == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ return mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify(pkcs7, cert, data, datalen, 0);
+}
+
+int mbedtls_pkcs7_signed_hash_verify(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7,
+ const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
+ const unsigned char *hash,
+ size_t hashlen)
+{
+ if (hash == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS7_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
+ }
+ return mbedtls_pkcs7_data_or_hash_verify(pkcs7, cert, hash, hashlen, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unallocate all pkcs7 data
+ */
+void mbedtls_pkcs7_free(mbedtls_pkcs7 *pkcs7)
+{
+ mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer_cur;
+ mbedtls_pkcs7_signer_info *signer_prev;
+
+ if (pkcs7 == NULL || pkcs7->raw.p == NULL) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbedtls_free(pkcs7->raw.p);
+
+ mbedtls_x509_crt_free(&pkcs7->signed_data.certs);
+ mbedtls_x509_crl_free(&pkcs7->signed_data.crl);
+
+ signer_cur = pkcs7->signed_data.signers.next;
+ pkcs7_free_signer_info(&pkcs7->signed_data.signers);
+ while (signer_cur != NULL) {
+ signer_prev = signer_cur;
+ signer_cur = signer_prev->next;
+ pkcs7_free_signer_info(signer_prev);
+ mbedtls_free(signer_prev);
+ }
+
+ pkcs7->raw.p = NULL;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/third_party/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f6ee13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/third_party/mbedtls/library/pkparse.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1392 @@
+/*
+ * Public Key layer for parsing key files and structures
+ *
+ * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C)
+
+#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
+#include "mbedtls/asn1.h"
+#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
+#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
+#include "mbedtls/error.h"
+#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
+#include "pk_internal.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
+#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
+#include "psa/crypto.h"
+#endif
+
+/* Key types */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+#include "mbedtls/rsa.h"
+#include "rsa_internal.h"
+#endif
+
+/* Extended formats */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
+#include "mbedtls/pem.h"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C)
+#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h"
+#endif
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS12_C)
+#include "mbedtls/pkcs12.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+
+/***********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Low-level ECC parsing: optional support for SpecifiedECDomain
+ *
+ * There are two functions here that are used by the rest of the code:
+ * - pk_ecc_tag_is_speficied_ec_domain()
+ * - pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified()
+ *
+ * All the other functions are internal to this section.
+ *
+ * The two "public" functions have a dummy variant provided
+ * in configs without MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED. This acts as an
+ * abstraction layer for this macro, which should not appear outside
+ * this section.
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED)
+/* See the "real" version for documentation */
+static int pk_ecc_tag_is_specified_ec_domain(int tag)
+{
+ (void) tag;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* See the "real" version for documentation */
+static int pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params,
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id)
+{
+ (void) params;
+ (void) grp_id;
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+}
+#else /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */
+/*
+ * Tell if the passed tag might be the start of SpecifiedECDomain
+ * (that is, a sequence).
+ */
+static int pk_ecc_tag_is_specified_ec_domain(int tag)
+{
+ return tag == (MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a SpecifiedECDomain (SEC 1 C.2) and (mostly) fill the group with it.
+ * WARNING: the resulting group should only be used with
+ * pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified(), since its base point may not be set correctly
+ * if it was encoded compressed.
+ *
+ * SpecifiedECDomain ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version SpecifiedECDomainVersion(ecdpVer1 | ecdpVer2 | ecdpVer3, ...),
+ * fieldID FieldID {{FieldTypes}},
+ * curve Curve,
+ * base ECPoint,
+ * order INTEGER,
+ * cofactor INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * hash HashAlgorithm OPTIONAL,
+ * ...
+ * }
+ *
+ * We only support prime-field as field type, and ignore hash and cofactor.
+ */
+static int pk_group_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ unsigned char *p = params->p;
+ const unsigned char *const end = params->p + params->len;
+ const unsigned char *end_field, *end_curve;
+ size_t len;
+ int ver;
+
+ /* SpecifiedECDomainVersion ::= INTEGER { 1, 2, 3 } */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &ver)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (ver < 1 || ver > 3) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * FieldID { FIELD-ID:IOSet } ::= SEQUENCE { -- Finite field
+ * fieldType FIELD-ID.&id({IOSet}),
+ * parameters FIELD-ID.&Type({IOSet}{@fieldType})
+ * }
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ end_field = p + len;
+
+ /*
+ * FIELD-ID ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
+ * FieldTypes FIELD-ID ::= {
+ * { Prime-p IDENTIFIED BY prime-field } |
+ * { Characteristic-two IDENTIFIED BY characteristic-two-field }
+ * }
+ * prime-field OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-fieldType 1 }
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end_field, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (len != MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD) ||
+ memcmp(p, MBEDTLS_OID_ANSI_X9_62_PRIME_FIELD, len) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ p += len;
+
+ /* Prime-p ::= INTEGER -- Field of size p. */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end_field, &grp->P)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ grp->pbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->P);
+
+ if (p != end_field) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Curve ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * a FieldElement,
+ * b FieldElement,
+ * seed BIT STRING OPTIONAL
+ * -- Shall be present if used in SpecifiedECDomain
+ * -- with version equal to ecdpVer2 or ecdpVer3
+ * }
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ end_curve = p + len;
+
+ /*
+ * FieldElement ::= OCTET STRING
+ * containing an integer in the case of a prime field
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&grp->A, p, len)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ p += len;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&grp->B, p, len)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ p += len;
+
+ /* Ignore seed BIT STRING OPTIONAL */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end_curve, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING)) == 0) {
+ p += len;
+ }
+
+ if (p != end_curve) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * ECPoint ::= OCTET STRING
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(grp, &grp->G,
+ (const unsigned char *) p, len)) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * If we can't read the point because it's compressed, cheat by
+ * reading only the X coordinate and the parity bit of Y.
+ */
+ if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ||
+ (p[0] != 0x02 && p[0] != 0x03) ||
+ len != mbedtls_mpi_size(&grp->P) + 1 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&grp->G.X, p + 1, len - 1) != 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.Y, p[0] - 2) != 0 ||
+ mbedtls_mpi_lset(&grp->G.Z, 1) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ p += len;
+
+ /*
+ * order INTEGER
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(&p, end, &grp->N)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ grp->nbits = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&grp->N);
+
+ /*
+ * Allow optional elements by purposefully not enforcing p == end here.
+ */
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find the group id associated with an (almost filled) group as generated by
+ * pk_group_from_specified(), or return an error if unknown.
+ */
+static int pk_group_id_from_group(const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group ref;
+ const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *id;
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&ref);
+
+ for (id = mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list(); *id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; id++) {
+ /* Load the group associated to that id */
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&ref);
+ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ref, *id));
+
+ /* Compare to the group we were given, starting with easy tests */
+ if (grp->pbits == ref.pbits && grp->nbits == ref.nbits &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&grp->P, &ref.P) == 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&grp->A, &ref.A) == 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&grp->B, &ref.B) == 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&grp->N, &ref.N) == 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&grp->G.X, &ref.G.X) == 0 &&
+ mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&grp->G.Z, &ref.G.Z) == 0 &&
+ /* For Y we may only know the parity bit, so compare only that */
+ mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&grp->G.Y, 0) == mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(&ref.G.Y, 0)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&ref);
+
+ *grp_id = *id;
+
+ if (ret == 0 && *id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a SpecifiedECDomain (SEC 1 C.2) and find the associated group ID
+ */
+static int pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params,
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group grp;
+
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp);
+
+ if ((ret = pk_group_from_specified(params, &grp)) != 0) {
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ret = pk_group_id_from_group(&grp, grp_id);
+
+cleanup:
+ /* The API respecting lifecycle for mbedtls_ecp_group struct is
+ * _init(), _load() and _free(). In pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified() the
+ * temporary grp breaks that flow and it's members are populated
+ * by pk_group_id_from_group(). As such mbedtls_ecp_group_free()
+ * which is assuming a group populated by _setup() may not clean-up
+ * properly -> Manually free it's members.
+ */
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp.N);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp.P);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp.A);
+ mbedtls_mpi_free(&grp.B);
+ mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&grp.G);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_EC_EXTENDED */
+
+/***********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Unsorted (yet!) from this point on until the next section header
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+/* Minimally parse an ECParameters buffer to and mbedtls_asn1_buf
+ *
+ * ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
+ * namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ * specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- = SEQUENCE { ... }
+ * -- implicitCurve NULL
+ * }
+ */
+static int pk_get_ecparams(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf *params)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+
+ if (end - *p < 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA);
+ }
+
+ /* Acceptable tags: OID for namedCurve, or specifiedECDomain */
+ params->tag = **p;
+ if (params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID &&
+ !pk_ecc_tag_is_specified_ec_domain(params->tag)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG);
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, ¶ms->len, params->tag)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ params->p = *p;
+ *p += params->len;
+
+ if (*p != end) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use EC parameters to initialise an EC group
+ *
+ * ECParameters ::= CHOICE {
+ * namedCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ * specifiedCurve SpecifiedECDomain -- = SEQUENCE { ... }
+ * -- implicitCurve NULL
+ */
+static int pk_use_ecparams(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
+
+ if (params->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID) {
+ if (mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp(params, &grp_id) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_NAMED_CURVE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = pk_ecc_group_id_from_specified(params, &grp_id);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(pk, grp_id);
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES)
+
+/*
+ * Load an RFC8410 EC key, which doesn't have any parameters
+ */
+static int pk_use_ecparams_rfc8410(const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params,
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
+{
+ if (params->tag != 0 || params->len != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+
+ return mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_group(pk, grp_id);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse an RFC 8410 encoded private EC key
+ *
+ * CurvePrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING
+ */
+static int pk_parse_key_rfc8410_der(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, const unsigned char *end,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&key, (key + keylen), &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (key + len != end) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Load the private key
+ */
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(pk, key, len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der() only supports version 1 PKCS8 keys,
+ * which never contain a public key. As such, derive the public key
+ * unconditionally. */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(pk, key, len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES */
+
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+
+/* Get a PK algorithm identifier
+ *
+ * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ * parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL }
+ */
+static int pk_get_pk_alg(unsigned char **p,
+ const unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, mbedtls_asn1_buf *params,
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id *ec_grp_id)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_oid;
+
+ memset(params, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_asn1_buf));
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_alg(p, end, &alg_oid, params)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG, ret);
+ }
+
+ ret = mbedtls_oid_get_pk_alg(&alg_oid, pk_alg);
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+ if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_NOT_FOUND) {
+ ret = mbedtls_oid_get_ec_grp_algid(&alg_oid, ec_grp_id);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ *pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY;
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ (void) ec_grp_id;
+#endif
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * No parameters with RSA (only for EC)
+ */
+ if (*pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA &&
+ ((params->tag != MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL && params->tag != 0) ||
+ params->len != 0)) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_ALG;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
+ * subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }
+ */
+int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end,
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ size_t len;
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf alg_params;
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
+ const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ end = *p + len;
+
+ if ((ret = pk_get_pk_alg(p, end, &pk_alg, &alg_params, &ec_grp_id)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(p, end, &len)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (*p + len != end) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+
+ if ((pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(pk_alg)) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) {
+ ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), *p, (size_t) (end - *p));
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ /* On success all the input has been consumed by the parsing function. */
+ *p += end - *p;
+ } else if ((ret <= MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA) &&
+ (ret >= MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL)) {
+ /* In case of ASN1 error codes add MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY. */
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret);
+ } else {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+ if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES)
+ if (MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(ec_grp_id)) {
+ ret = pk_use_ecparams_rfc8410(&alg_params, ec_grp_id, pk);
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ ret = pk_use_ecparams(&alg_params, pk);
+ }
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(pk, *p, (size_t) (end - *p));
+ *p += end - *p;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG;
+
+ if (ret == 0 && *p != end) {
+ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ mbedtls_pk_free(pk);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+/*
+ * Parse a SEC1 encoded private EC key
+ */
+static int pk_parse_key_sec1_der(mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
+ int version, pubkey_done;
+ size_t len, d_len;
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf params = { 0, 0, NULL };
+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key;
+ unsigned char *d;
+ unsigned char *end = p + keylen;
+ unsigned char *end2;
+
+ /*
+ * RFC 5915, or SEC1 Appendix C.4
+ *
+ * ECPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version INTEGER { ecPrivkeyVer1(1) } (ecPrivkeyVer1),
+ * privateKey OCTET STRING,
+ * parameters [0] ECParameters {{ NamedCurve }} OPTIONAL,
+ * publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL
+ * }
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ end = p + len;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (version != 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ /* Keep a reference to the position fo the private key. It will be used
+ * later in this function. */
+ d = p;
+ d_len = len;
+
+ p += len;
+
+ pubkey_done = 0;
+ if (p != end) {
+ /*
+ * Is 'parameters' present?
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+ 0)) == 0) {
+ if ((ret = pk_get_ecparams(&p, p + len, ¶ms)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = pk_use_ecparams(¶ms, pk)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Load the private key
+ */
+ ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_key(pk, d, d_len);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (p != end) {
+ /*
+ * Is 'publickey' present? If not, or if we can't read it (eg because it
+ * is compressed), create it from the private key.
+ */
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
+ 1)) == 0) {
+ end2 = p + len;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring_null(&p, end2, &len)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (p + len != end2) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey(pk, p, (size_t) (end2 - p))) == 0) {
+ pubkey_done = 1;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The only acceptable failure mode of mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey() above
+ * is if the point format is not recognized.
+ */
+ if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!pubkey_done) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_ecc_set_pubkey_from_prv(pk, d, d_len, f_rng, p_rng)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */
+
+/***********************************************************************
+ *
+ * PKCS#8 parsing functions
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Parse an unencrypted PKCS#8 encoded private key
+ *
+ * Notes:
+ *
+ * - This function does not own the key buffer. It is the
+ * responsibility of the caller to take care of zeroizing
+ * and freeing it after use.
+ *
+ * - The function is responsible for freeing the provided
+ * PK context on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der(
+ mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng)
+{
+ int ret, version;
+ size_t len;
+ mbedtls_asn1_buf params;
+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key;
+ unsigned char *end = p + keylen;
+ mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
+ mbedtls_ecp_group_id ec_grp_id = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
+ const mbedtls_pk_info_t *pk_info;
+
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+ (void) f_rng;
+ (void) p_rng;
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * This function parses the PrivateKeyInfo object (PKCS#8 v1.2 = RFC 5208)
+ *
+ * PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * version Version,
+ * privateKeyAlgorithm PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier,
+ * privateKey PrivateKey,
+ * attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL }
+ *
+ * Version ::= INTEGER
+ * PrivateKeyAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier
+ * PrivateKey ::= OCTET STRING
+ *
+ * The PrivateKey OCTET STRING is a SEC1 ECPrivateKey
+ */
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len,
+ MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ end = p + len;
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (version != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION, ret);
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = pk_get_pk_alg(&p, end, &pk_alg, ¶ms, &ec_grp_id)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) != 0) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (len < 1) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT,
+ MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA);
+ }
+
+ if ((pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(pk_alg)) == NULL) {
+ return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_UNKNOWN_PK_ALG;
+ }
+
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info)) != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
+ if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) {
+ if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), p, len)) != 0) {
+ mbedtls_pk_free(pk);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS)
+ if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY || pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH) {
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_RFC8410_CURVES)
+ if (MBEDTLS_PK_IS_RFC8410_GROUP_ID(ec_grp_id)) {
+ if ((ret =
+ pk_use_ecparams_rfc8410(¶ms, ec_grp_id, pk)) != 0 ||
+ (ret =
+ pk_parse_key_rfc8410_der(pk, p, len, end, f_rng,
+ p_rng)) != 0) {
+ mbedtls_pk_free(pk);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ if ((ret = pk_use_ecparams(¶