No functional change here.
- CoreRunningMode enum and variable wasn't used anymore.
- Code was moved to the frontend
- CustomCPUFactory wasn't used anymore
- All special signal handling and various features were moved to
TestHarnessRunner
- We also don't want to support actual custom CPU cores.
- TestHarnessRunner just runs as a host runner if compiled on an
x86-64 device if vixl sim isn't enabled now.
- Removes the Core config option entirely.
- Moves VDSOPointers struct to the frontend
- Every use of this lives in the Linux frontend instead now
Seccomp is a relatively complex feature that was added to Linux back in
2005, and was further extended in 2013 to support BPF based protections.
Once seccomp is enabled, you can no longer disable seccomp but
additional protections can be placed on top of existing seccomp filters.
Additionally seccomp filters are inherited in child processes, which
ensures the process tree can't escape from the secure computing
environment through child processes.
The basis of this feature is a shim that lives between userspace and the
kernel at the syscall entrypoint.
In "strict" mode, seccomp only allows read, write, exit, exit_group, and {rt_,}sigreturn to function.
When in "filter" mode, a BPF filter is run on syscall entrypoint and
returns state about if the syscall should be allowed or not. Multiple
filters can be installed in this mode, all of which get executed. The
result that is the most restricted is the action that occurs at the end.
There are some significant limitations in filter mode that must be
adhered to which makes executing this code inside of kernel space a
non-issue and effectively limits how much cpu time is spent in the filters.
Although these filters are free to do basically anything with the
provided data, just can't do any loops.
FEX needs to implement seccomp because there are multiple applications
using the feature, the primary one being Chromium which some games embed
without disabling the sandbox. WINE also uses seccomp for capturing
games that do raw Windows system calls. Apparently Red Dead Redemption
is one of the games that requires this.
While FEX implements seccomp, it is not yet all encompassing, which is
one of the reasons why it isn't enabled by default and requires a config
option.
**seccomp_unotify is not implemented**
This is a relatively new feature for seccomp which lets the seccomp
filter signal an FD for multiple things. Luckily Chromium and WINE don't
use this. This will be tricky to implement under FEX since it
requires ioctl trapping and some other behaviour
**ptrace isn't supported**
One feature of seccomp is that it can raise ptrace events. Since FEX
doesn't support ptrace at all, this isn't handled. Again Chromium and
WINE don't use this.
**kill-thread not quite correct**
This isn't directly related to seccomp but more about how we do thread
shutdown in FEX. This will require some more changes around thread state
tracking before fully supporting this. Chromium and WINE don't use this.
kill-process also falls under this
Features that are supported:
- Strict mode and seccomp-bpf mode supported
- All BFP instructions that seccomp-bpf understands
- Inheriting seccomp through execve
- This means we serialize and deserialize the calling thread's
seccomp filters
- An execve that escapes FEX will also escape seccomp. Not much we
can do about it
- TSync - Allowing post-mortem seccomp insertion which allows threads to
synchronize seccomp filters after the fact
Features that are not supported:
- Different arch qualifiers depending on syscall entrypoint
- Just like our syscall handler, we are hardcoded to the arch that the
application starts with
- user_notif
- ptrace
- Runtime code cache invalidation when seccomp is installed
- Currently we must ensure all syscalls go through the frontend
syscall handler
- Runtime invalidation of code cache with inline syscalls will get
fixed in the future.
This currently isn't enabled by default because of the minor feature
problems that haven't been resolved. Currently the Linux Kernel's test
application works for the features that FEX supports, and WINE's usage
can be handled by FEX. Chromium's sandbox doesn't yet work with this PR,
but it only fails due to features unrelated to seccomp.
Having this open for merging now so we can work to resolve the remaining
issues without this bitrotting.
For atomics that cross the 16-byte or 64-byte granularity, we need to
lock a mutex to ensure strict emulation of split-locks.
I took another look at these when I found out that Zen3 actually
implements split-locks. Not sure which architecture actually added
support for from them, but I wanted to ensure we have the ability to
handle this.
One thing that we can't handle in user-space is cross-process
split-locks through shared memory. This requires a kernel SIGBUS handler
to ensure a crashing/SIGKILL'd process doesn't lock all FEX processes in
the system.
This fixes a little split-lock abusing test that I have locally. It's a
bit flakey so it isn't viable to run in CI. Considering it is explicitly
testing a race problem.
After two months of testing I finally have enough confidence that these
default options getting changed is safe enough that most games won't
notice the difference. But the performance differences can be wild.
Might want to come back and reenable this on platforms that support
hardware TSO and LRCPC3 (for the vector feature), but we can care once
those platforms come up to speed.
A feature of FEX's JIT is that when an unaligned atomic load/store
operation occurs, the instructions will be backpatched in to a barrier
plus a non-atomic memory instruction. This is the half-barrier technique
that still ensures correct visibility of loadstores in an unaligned
context.
The problem with this approach is that the dmb instructions are HEAVY,
because they effectively stop the world until all memory operations in
flight are visible. But it is a necessary evil since unaligned atomics
aren't a thing on ARM processors. FEAT_LSE only gives you unaligned
atomics inside of a 16-byte granularity, which doesn't match x86
behaviour of cacheline size (effectively always 64B).
This adds a new TSO option to disable the half-barrier on unaligned
atomic and instead only convert it to a regular loadstore instruction,
ommiting the half-barrier. This gives more insight in to how well a
CPU's LRCPC implementation is by not stalling on DMB instructions when
possible.
Originally implemented as a test to see if this makes Sonic Adventure 2
run full speed with TSO enabled (but all available TSO options disabled)
on NVIDIA Orin. Unfortunately this basically makes the code no longer
stall on dmb instructions and instead just showing how bad the LRCPC
implementation is, since the stalls show up on `ldapur` instructions
instead.
Tested Sonic Adventure 2 on X13s and it ran at 60FPS there without the
hack anyway.
This environment variable had an incorrect priority on the configuration
system. The expectation was higher priority than most other layers.
Now the only layer that has higher priority is the environment
variables.
This is used for instcountci to ensure instruction counts don't change
when a compiler supports this feature or not. Always runtime disable
when running in instcountci.
CMake option from #3394 can still be useful so leaving that in place.
We only used this so that our Xavier CI system which were running old
kernels could run unit tests. We have now removed the Xaviers from CI
and this is no longer necessary.
Stop pretending that we support kernels older than 5.0 and allowing this
fallback.
The 32-bit allocator is still used for the MAP_32BIT mmap flag, so the
load bearing code can't be fully removed. Just remove the config and the
frontend things using it.
This is an option that has been long overdue for removal. It's original
intention was primarily to lie to the guest application about the number
of cores in the system. This allowed us to say that the system was only
single threaded which worked around some threading bugs that we had
early on.
This is no longer the case and now it is a confusing remnant of the past
that people think they need to set. Incorrectly assuming that "0" by
default means that FEX is doing some sort of disabling of threading and
forcing all emulation down one CPU core. This is not the case and has
never been the case, so removing the option makes that idea go away.
This allows us to use reciprocal instructions which matches precision of
what x86 expects rather than converting everything to float divides.
Currently no hardware supports this, and even the upcoming X4/A720/A520
won't support it, but it was trivial to implement so wire it up.
Enables in InstCountCI so Pi users can run InstCountCI can run the tests
without breaking on crypto operations.
When crypto is enabled or disabled just wholesale change AES, CRC32, and
PMULL 128-bit in one step. We don't really care about partial support
here.
This would have caused core to try and initialize a custom core on
Arm64, which causes a std::function assert because it doesn't support
that.
Users would likely get hit by this immediately since we deleted the
interpreter and shifted all the core numbers.
It is scarcely used today, and like the x86 jit, it is a significant
maintainence burden complicating work on FEXCore and arm64 optimization. Remove
it, bringing us down to 2 backends.
1 down, 1 to go.
Some interpreter scaffolding remains for x87 fallbacks. That is not a problem
here.
Signed-off-by: Alyssa Rosenzweig <alyssa@rosenzweig.io>
Now that PF calculation is deferred, the cost of calculating PF correctly should
be tolerable. Remove the speed hack to skip PF. It's fundamentally broken, and
there are enough broken things in FEX as it is that we don't need to maintain
this one ;-)
Signed-off-by: Alyssa Rosenzweig <alyssa@rosenzweig.io>
It is not an external component, and it makes paths needlessly long.
Ryan seemed amenable to this when we discussed on IRC earlier.
Signed-off-by: Alyssa Rosenzweig <alyssa@rosenzweig.io>
Ryan Houdek