This environment variable had an incorrect priority on the configuration
system. The expectation was higher priority than most other layers.
Now the only layer that has higher priority is the environment
variables.
FEXCore includes was including an FHU header which would result in
compilation failure for external projects trying to link to libFEXCore.
Moves it over to fix this, it was the only FHU usage in FEXCore/include
NFC
This is no longer necessary to be part of the public API. Moves the
header internally.
Needed to pass through `IsAddressInCodeBuffer` from CPUBackend through
the Context object, but otherwise no functional change.
Same situation as the last stack leak memory fix, this is fairly tricky
since it is dealing with stack pivoting. Fixes the memory leak around
pthread stack allocations, making memory usage lower for applications
that constantly spin-up and destroy threads (Like Steam).
We need to let glibc allocate a minimum sized stack (128KB and we can't
control it) to work around a race condition with DTV/TLS regions. This
means we need to do a stack pivot once the thread starts executing.
We also need to be careful because the `PThread` object is deleted
inside of the execution thread, which was resulting in a use-after-free
bug.
There are definitely some more memory leaks that I'm still fighting, and I have
noticed in my abusive thread creation program that we might want to
change some jemalloc options to more aggressively cut down on residency.
This is just one out of many.
I remember seeing some application last year where they closed a FEX
owned FD but now I don't remember what it was. This can really mess us
up so add some debug tracking so we can try and find it again.
Might be something specifically around flatpack, appimage, or chrome's
sandbox. I have some ideas about how to work around these problems if
they crop up but need to find the problem applications again.
This may be useful for tracking TSO faulting when it manages to fetch
stale data. While most TSO crashes are due to nullptr dereferences, this
can still check for the corruption case.
This was a funny joke that this was here, but it is fundamentally
incompatible with what we're doing. All those users are running proot
anyway because of how broken running under termux directly is.
Just remove this from here.
The NVIF ioctl isn't publicly described in the nouveau headers and it is
required for anything to work with Nouveau.
Pass the ioctl command through without modification and hope that this
ioctl is architecture agnostic.
Reimagining of #3355 without any json generators or new concepts.
Fixes some mislabeling of system calls. Some getting inlined when they
shouldn't be, a lot not getting inlined when they can be.
This really cleans up the syscall implementation, all syscalls that can
be passthrough implementations require a very small two line
declaration.
Additionally cleans up a bit of implementation cruft where some
passthrough syscalls were using the glibc syscall handler, and some were
using the glibc implementation. We have had multiple issues in the past
where the glibc implementation does something subtly different than the
raw syscall and breaks things. Now all passthrough handlers do a system
call directly, removing at least one indirection and some ambiguity.
This makes it significantly easier to add new passthrough syscalls as
well. Only need to do a version check and add the three lines per
syscall. Which there are new syscalls incoming that we will want to add.
Tangible improvements:
- Syscalls are lower overhead than ever.
- When I'm adding more syscalls I have less chance of mucking it up.
FEXCore doesn't need track the TLS state of the SignalDelegator, this is
a frontend concept.
Removes the tracking from the backend and keeps it in the frontend.
Previously: Would keep one clone thread's stack active for teardown
delaying.
With aggressive cloning and teardown, this was unsafe.
Only reap the stack when told it is safe to do so.
The creation mutex could have been held if the parent thread was in the
middle of creating a thread when forking. This would result in a
deadlock once the fork child attempted to create another thread.
Forcefully dropping the lock in the fork child works around this
deadlock. This comes at the expense of potentially leaving resources
guarded by the thread creation mutex in an invalid state. Crashes caused
by this are easier to reason about than a delayed deadlock, though.
Moves the CTX LockBeforeFork in to the Syscallhandler's LockBeforeFork.
This lets the syscall handler just call its own LockBeforeFork and
UnlockAfterFork functions rather than two on each call site.
Also moves the CTX->UnlockAfterFork in to the SyscallHandler's to be
consistent with the LockBeforeFork half.
No functional change.
When code invalidation is happening we currently have the issue that a
thread can acquire the code invalidation mutex in the middle of
invalidation. This is due to us acquiring and releasing the mutex
between each thread's code invalidation.
We need to hold the mutex for the entire duration for all thread's code
invalidation.
This fixes a rare hang on proton startup and resolves a consistent hang
on Proton application shutdown.
This now puts us on par with FEX-2312.1 with hanging.
This does not fix a relatively rare hang on fork (which also existed with FEX-2312.1).
This also does not fix the issue that the intersection of our mutexes
between frontend and backend are very convoluted. In part of the work
that is going to fix the rare fork mutex hang will change more of this.
ARM64, x86 (64-bit), and x86 (32-bit) each have different alignment
requirements, so this change ensures that consistent data layout is
used for packing and unpacking.
If the thread object is added to the tracking vector immediately then
there ends up being a race condition before the thread manages to fill
out the thread-specific data that only occurs at the start of the new
thread.
This manifests in a crash when a thread is allocating memory while
another thread is getting constructed. Easy fix is to defer the tracking
until the thread has setup its state.
We are required in our syscall emulation to handle cases where pointers
are invalid. This means we need to pessimistically assume a memcpy will
fault when reading application memory.
This implements a signal handler based approach to catching the SIGSEGV
on memcpy and returning an EFAULT if it faults.
Paulo Matos